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Confucius Institutes and China’s softpower: practices and paradoxesJoe Tin-yau Loa & Suyan Pana

a Department of Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Institute ofEducation, Tai Po, Hong KongPublished online: 30 May 2014.

To cite this article: Joe Tin-yau Lo & Suyan Pan (2014): Confucius Institutes and China’s soft power:practices and paradoxes, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, DOI:10.1080/03057925.2014.916185

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Confucius Institutes and China’s soft power: practices andparadoxes

Joe Tin-yau Lo* and Suyan Pan

Department of Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Institute of Education, Tai Po,Hong Kong

Since China’s implementation of the Confucius Institute (CI) project in2004, most academic works have been written on its objectives, nature,features, development, problems and challenges, especially in terms ofsoft power projection. Though some of them could unravel the tensionsand paradoxes in the CI project, there is a paucity of in-depth and focusedanalysis on the related issues with a more systematic framework. UtilisingTellis et al.’s tripartite taxonomy approach to power – resources, strategiesand outcomes – and integrating it with Nye’s tripartite approach toexercising power – coercion, inducement and attraction – this paper aimsto fill this research gap. The findings can shed light on the tensions andparadoxes in China’s development of soft power by providing a moresystematic and integrated framework for analysing the dilemmas andpredicaments in the exercise of its power strategies in the global age.

Keywords: Confucius Institutes; comprehensive national power; culturaldiplomacy; soft power; hard power

Introduction

The growing economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) hasmoved the country from the periphery of world politics to the centre andattracted global interest in its culture and language (Zhao and Huang 2010).Capitalising on this economic and cultural attractiveness, the PRC has, sincethe early 2000s, used the Confucius Institute (CI) project to build harmoni-ous foreign relationships, enhance socio-cultural understanding, globaliseChinese culture and promote collaboration with foreign countries(Kurlantzik 2007; PRC Ministry of Education 2012). In fact, China’s leaders(e.g. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) expressed concerns about the role cultureplays in enhancing the nation’s ability to compete in the international arenaand the need to promote external harmony for national development in theirrespective reports to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002and 2007 (Jiang 2002; Hu 2007). It is no wonder that the CI project, as a

*Corresponding author. Email: joelo@ied.edu.hk

© 2014 British Association for International and Comparative Education

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soft power component of China’s cultural diplomacy, has been gainingmomentum. Between November 2004 and August 2011, China set up 353CIs (mostly in tertiary institutions) and 473 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) inprimary and secondary educational institutions in 104 countries and regions(Chinese Language Council International 2011). By the end of 2013, therewere 440 CIs and 646 CCs in 120 countries (regions) (Hanban 2013c).

The exponential growth of CIs has generated heated discussion regardingtheir purposes, hidden agenda, problems, challenges and/or potential. Anumber of scholars (Ding and Saunders 2006; Guo 2008; Hoare-Vance2009; Paradise 2009; Starr 2009; Yu 2010; Hartig 2012; Ren 2012; Pan2013) have examined the purposes, nature, features, structure, operation,controversies and challenges of the CI project through the lenses of softpower theory and/or cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is a paucity offocused and in-depth study of the tensions and paradoxes in the CI projectwith a more systematic framework. This paper aims to fill such a researchgap and provide a more systematic framework by integrating Nye’s (1990)tripartite taxonomy – coercion, inducement and attraction – and Telliset al.’s (2000) tripartite taxonomy – resources, strategies and outcomes – foranalysing the dilemmas and predicaments of the CI project in the exerciseof soft power in the globalised age.

Conceptual and theoretical resources

Before analysing the tensions and paradoxes in the practices of China’s softpower (cultural diplomacy) as embodied in the CI project, it is necessary toclarify the approaches and concepts to be used in this study. Basically, thispaper adopts the method of literature review that analyses the primaryresources provided by various stakeholders (e.g. official papers, governmentpolicy pronouncements, constitutions and by-laws of CIs, annual reports,symposium materials, surveys/opinion polls) and the secondary resources onthe empirical data, interpretations and evaluations related to CIs/CCs (e.g.case studies, media commentaries, refereed books/book chapters, journalarticles, etc.). This paper also uses both within-study and between-study lit-erature reviews to develop and integrate conceptual/theoretical frameworksthat could inform the study, to analyse and interpret the data/informationgathered from various textual sources, to identify connections and contradic-tions or other relations in the literature under review for the purpose ofuncovering the complexities and controversies, and to synthesise the currentknowledge for the study of CIs in the context of China’s soft-power (cul-tural) diplomacy (Smallbone and Quinton 2011; Onwuegbuzie, Leech, andCollins 2012). This qualitative research method, which seeks to understandcultural influences, paradigms, controversies and contradictions through thearticulation of diverse discourses and multiple data resources, is a usefulapproach to explore and explain the complex linkages among portrayals of

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society that give meaning to particular terms, ideas and activities out oftheir historico-cultural circumstance (Hall 1985; Slack 1996; Denzin andLincoln 2011).

With regard to conceptual and theoretical resources, Nye (1990) defined‘power’ as the ability to influence the behaviour of others in order to getthe outcomes one wants. He argued that there are three ways to exercisepower: (1) to coerce through threats, (2) to induce behavioural change withpayments or (3) to attract and co-opt. The first two, coercion and induce-ment through payment, are forms of hard power; soft power is the ability toobtain preferred outcomes through attraction. According to Nye (2009), themajor elements of a country’s soft power include its culture, values and pol-icies. However, he also pointed out that the passive use of military and eco-nomic resources can sometimes be used to attract, just as their active usecan be a means to coerce, implying that different resources can also contrib-ute to soft power. At the same time, Nye (2009) also coined the concept of‘smart power’, arguing that hard and soft power can be combined and exer-cised judicially with ‘contextual intelligence’ (161–162).

To examine the abstract conception of power, Tellis et al. (2000) used atripartite taxonomy of ‘resources’, ‘strategies’ and ‘outcomes’. Power asresource(s), ‘essentially describes the sum total of the capabilities availableto any entity for influencing others’. Strategies are ‘attempts to capture theprocesses, relationships and situations through which entities intend toinfluence one another’. Outcomes focus on ‘consequences to test whetherthe targeted entities respond in the manner intended by the initiator’ (14–15,italics in original). This tripartite taxonomy, together with Nye’s (1999) tri-partite approach to power, forms the conceptual framework for analysingthe tensions and paradoxes of the CI project.

The above-mentioned theories and concepts mostly focus on issuesrelated to the USA’s power strategies in the context of new global chal-lenges to its hegemony. Yet the power concepts in general, and Nye’s theo-ries of hard and soft power in particular, also found resonances in Chineseacademic and official circles at the turn of the century (Ding 2008). Forinstance, Wang Huning, one of the political advisors to former ChinesePresident Jiang Zemin, argued in a 1993 article that there had been aninternational shift from power based on wealth and violence to a knowl-edge-based power structure, and enjoined that China should strengthen itsculture so as to attract other countries (Guo 2004). Accordingly, under thepresidency of Jiang Zemin, cultural development was made a part, togetherwith economic and political developments, of the ‘three-in-one’ model(sanweiyiti) for strengthening socialism with Chinese characteristics (Zhang2010). Zheng Bijian, a party theorist who coined the concept of China’s‘peaceful rise’ in 2003, advocated the promotion of Chinese culture abroadas a means of overcoming hostility towards communism and negativeimages of the nation and its people. The ‘peaceful rise’ theory (later

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changed into ‘peaceful development’ in order to further soften the nation’sinternational profile) involves using soft power to promote China’s interna-tional image, alleviate the fear of the ‘China threat’ and establish a favour-able environment for China’s sustainable development (Hoare-Vance 2009).In 2007, in a Chinese Communist Central Committee report to the 17thParty Congress, former President Hu Jintao stated that China needed toemphasise culture as a part of its soft power, though he did not specify whatform this soft power should take or how it would enhance China’s influenceover other nations (Hu 2007).

Although the power theories mentioned above can provide conceptuallenses for the study of China’s soft power as embodied in the CI project,the national context should also be considered. Firstly, China’s soft power isnot confined to the cultural dimension. Economic, diplomatic and politicalmeans have also been taken to strengthen soft power in China’s nationaldevelopment (Kurlantzick 2007; Cho and Jeong 2008). Secondly, hardpower and soft power are combined and integrated in Chinese diplomacy,but not in the sense of ‘smart power’, as put forth by Nye (2009). Hence,these elements may compete or even conflict with each other, as the formersuggests harmony while the latter suggests confrontation. Thirdly, since theJiang Zemin era, China’s leaders have sought to resurrect Confucianism asa means of promoting domestic peace and order as well as external har-mony, securing sustainable national development and alleviating increasinginternational fear of the ‘China threat’ (Cho and Jeong 2008). However,there is no clear articulation at the government or state level of how Confu-cian values are to be integrated with socialist ethics to form a systematic,coherent ideology that is appealing and attractive to Chinese and foreignpeoples, aside from vague references to public virtue, civilised behaviour,professional ethics, humanistic norms and collectivistic mentality found inofficial propaganda (e.g. Xinhuanet 2007). These specific China factors arealso taken into consideration in analysing the tensions and paradoxes inher-ent in the CI project that embodies soft power as a kind of cultural diplo-macy for the development of the nation in an increasingly globalised world.

Resources

According to Etzioni (1968, 357–361), there are three distinct types ofpower resources – utilitarian, coercive and normative. Utilitarian resourcesare material rewards that resemble inducement (including economic posses-sions, technical and administrative capabilities, manpower, etc.); coerciveresources are material objects capable of doing violence to bodies or psy-ches, or assets used to impose the wielder’s preferences on others; norma-tive resources are malleable symbols that work through persuasion anddraw on ideas, values and sentiments. These categories tally, more or less,with the strategies of inducement, coercion and attraction/persuasion set

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forth by Nye (1990). Regarding the CI project, it mostly utilises utilitarianand normative resources in its exercise of soft power strategies, thoughthese resources could also be used in a coercive manner by Chineseauthorities.

To facilitate the expansion of the CI project, China has offered materialand human resources, which are basically utilitarian, to local partners in var-ious countries/regions. Confucius Institutes are operated in one of threemodes: they may be wholly operated by the CI headquarters in Beijing (i.e.,the Office of Chinese Language Council International, called Hanban inChinese), joint ventures with local (university) partners or locally run offi-ces licensed by the CI headquarters in Beijing. Most CIs are operated asjoint ventures, as they are less expensive to set up and maintain when localpartners take responsibility for physical and operational matters. Moreimportantly, this mode can help China more quickly meet its goal of rapidexpansion of CIs to enhance its global branding (Starr 2009). Based on thedata and information from various sources, the initial agreement betweenHanban and the foreign host institutions may vary from three to five years.Hanban usually provides a start-up fund of US$100,000, followed by anannual subsidy to a foreign partner (Ren 2010; Hartig 2012; Shambaugh2013). However, according to Shambaugh (2013, 246), some foreign part-ners receive US$100,000 to US$250,000 or more per annum, and some ofthem receive subsidies from Hanban even though the latter seeks to provideonly three years of seed funding, with the foreign partners absorbing 100%of operating costs thereafter.

In spite of the substantial subventions from Hanban, there have beenconcerns about the sustainability and financial viability of CIs after the ini-tial period of agreement, when these non-profit-making organisations areexpected to become self-supporting by charging course fees (Shepherd2007; Barr 2011; Confucius Institute Headquarters 2011). It must also benoted, however, that out of financial concerns, some of these institutionshave been accused of succumbing to pressure from Chinese authorities andavoiding activities relating to the Falun Gong or the Dalai Lama for fear oflosing CI classes, fee-paying Chinese students, scholarships, exchanges andconferences (Hoare-Vance 2009; Barr 2011; Hartig 2012). Thus, utilitarianresources can still be seen as coercive if the foreign partners do not trustChina’s intentions; herein lies the source of tension in the operation of CIs.

In addition to monetary subsidies, Hanban also supplies textual andhuman resources to facilitate CIs’ operations and development, althoughthere is an inherent tension or dilemma between the quality and quantitythereof (Wang 2007; Zhao and Huang 2010). According to Hanban’s 2012Annual Report (Xu et al. 2012), there were over 655,000 registered studentsin the CIs/CCs in 108 countries/regions by the end of the year. Up to34,000 Chinese language classes have been set up and about 16,000 culturalactivities have been organised, with up to 9.48 million participants. At that

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time, there were about 20,000 full-time and part-time faculty and staff mem-bers, 30% of whom were despatched by Hanban (Xu et al. 2012). Theshortage of experienced teachers is still a major problem in meeting theneeds of the increasing number of foreign participants. In order to meet thedemand for trained teachers, Chinese volunteers have been sent abroad afterreceiving only limited amounts of training, thus causing quality assuranceconcerns (Siow 2011; Ren 2012).

Utilitarian resources in the textual domain fare no better, as Hanbanreportedly cannot strike a balance between quantity and quality in CI expan-sion and programme implementation. For example, teaching materials inRussia were found to be unhelpful, as they had been translated, sometimespoorly and inaccurately, from English. In the UK, teaching materials weredescribed as ‘awkward and inapplicable’, while there was a shortage of text-books in Spanish-speaking countries (Siow 2011, 2). More recently, Hanbanhas begun to encourage locally based teaching resource development initia-tives, but it remains difficult to maintain quality across institutions or toestablish benchmark standards across operators/providers. It is, admittedly,very difficult to cater to the needs of a wide variety of local contexts/cul-tures while maintaining high quality control standards; however, negativereports or news about CIs’ textual and human resources may confoundChina’s image engineering efforts through soft power build-up. Thus, thereis a mismatch, if not an outright conflict, between resources (means) andintended outcomes (end).

The CI project is also relatively frail in terms of normative/ideationalresources (e.g. political values, philosophy and/or moral appeals) (Wang2008; Paradise 2009; Zhao 2009). Basically, the project is intended to pro-mote traditional Chinese culture and contemporary Chinese language in theglobal context, largely by appealing to foreigners’ interest in, or favourableimpressions of, the culture and language offered in CI programmes, and haslittle or nothing to offer in terms of normative/ideational resources. Paradox-ically, although the CCP remains in power, it has moved away from itssocialist origins and has developed no attractive ideational/normativeresource to fill that void and appeal to the world. Moreover, it is still unableto articulate a coherent, logical ideological system apart from a hybrid ofMarxism-Leninism, traditional values and selected contemporary interna-tional values that its leaders use to justify the current developmental modeland structure (Hoare-Vance 2009), yet there is no attempt to resolve theconflicts and contradictions that exist in this hybrid of heterogeneouselements.

In fact, China has become relatively more strategy-oriented rather thanideology-oriented, as the CCP has been keen to find a legitimate place forthe party-led state in the nation and the world. This is probably why the CIproject has little or no ideational resource to offer apart from a ‘charmoffensive’ that uses economic/material means to strengthen China’s soft

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power (Kurlantzick 2007). This lop-sided dependence on utilitarian andcoercive resources, without any substantive or attractive normative or idea-tional resources, tends to discount CIs’ effectiveness in China’s soft powerprojection (Wang 2008; Paradise 2009; Zhao 2009). Certainly, the resourcesthemselves are not the only sources of tensions and paradoxes; the strategiesthrough which these resources are utilised also play a major role.

Strategies

To a large extent, the CI project aims to create, through a soft power strategy,a benign environment for China’s economic development and modernisation(Guo 2008). From the setup of the first CI in South Korea in 2004 up toNovember 2008, the CIs and CCs were opened at a rate of nearly one everyfive days (Ren 2012, 11). By December 2013, there were 440 CIs and 646CCs in 120 countries/regions (Hanban 2013c). When envisioning and pro-moting the cultural attraction of CIs to foreign partners and peoples, Hanbanhas failed to realise that the rapid expansion of overseas institutions that aremonitored and regulated by an authoritarian political system, whose intent isto use those institutions as a state propaganda tool, could raise suspicion andconcern among foreign peoples, especially those academics who worry thatCIs would interfere with academic autonomy and freedom (Wachter 2007;Hartig 2012; Mosher 2012; Pan 2013). There has been criticism centringaround improper interference with teaching and research, political espionage,surveillance and propaganda, though some academics have refuted these(Shepherd 2007; Hoare-Vance 2009; Starr 2009; Nakagawa 2011; Branigan2012; Mattis 2012). Some foreign partner universities certainly have concernsabout the involvement of CIs in credit-bearing undergraduate or post-graduatecourses, not only for resource allocation and quality assurance reasons, butalso out of fear of indoctrination or propaganda (Mosher 2012). As a result,there has been a view that CIs would always have ‘no-go zones’ – embargoedtopics, such as Tibet, Taiwan and Falun Gong (Paradise 2009; UNCUT2012). Also, there are those who warn that the rising number of CIs repre-sents a type of Chinese cultural coercion – cultural invasion as permeatedwith ideology (Ren 2012). Obviously, some of these criticisms might not becompletely justified. First, it is not logical for a public diplomacy programmeto provide a platform for opponents to attack the government that funds it(Sautman 2013). Second, if China only aims to promote its culture and lan-guage through CIs, it can hardly be seen as enforcing ideo-cultural coercionthrough indoctrination. Despite this, the fears and suspicions, howeverungrounded, might be a stumbling block in the development of China’scultural diplomacy.

In addition, the organisational structure and control of the project inevita-bly makes its strategies appear to be quite coercive, at least in terms of rhet-oric. The CI project was launched by Hanban in 2004 for the purpose of

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developing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources, makingHanban services available worldwide, meeting the demands of foreignChinese learners and contributing to global diversity and harmony (PRCMinistry of Education 2012). Hanban itself is under the joint governance of12 different ministries and commissions that are, collectively, responsiblefor education, culture, foreign affairs and strategic planning for long-termnational development under the State Council (Pan 2013). It has overallcontrol of not only the setup and operation of CIs, but also the stipulationof Chinese language education policies, the development of relevant teach-ing materials, the training and dispatch of language teachers and the conductof Chinese language examinations (Ren 2012). Although 15 non-executivemembers (10 foreign representatives and 5 from partner Chinese universi-ties) have been included in the CI Leadership Council since 2007, thisstructure is still directed by Hanban and under the direction and supervisionof the State Council, which is, in turn, led by the CCP (Hoare-Vance 2009).Evidence of the links between the Party and CIs can be found in thespeeches of the Chinese leaders, such as former President Hu Jintao and for-mer Politburo member and propaganda chief Li Changchun, who have takenactive roles in CI ceremonies and set the agenda for their development(Hoare-Vance 2009). Though the CI headquarters is fashioned as a non-profit organisation, it is actually a quasi-governmental body that reflects theviews and policies of the state (Ren 2012). In this way, China’s soft poweris closely connected with political influence and agenda as CIs have beenidentified as part of its objective of national development (comprehensivenational power) and enhancement of cultural power (Hoare-Vance 2009).This political agenda may, in turn, discount the softness of its culturalpower strategies.

Quite often, what seems to be soft cultural diplomacy can be perceivedas coercive, when policies are not carried out in a soft manner. Part of theperceived coerciveness stems from various sections of the CIs’ constitutionand by-laws, which stipulate that foreign partners shall not contravene thelaws and regulations of China; that host institutions must accept both super-vision from and assessment by CI headquarters, and should be willing toaccept its oversight, evaluation and certification; and that Hanban is respon-sible for examining and approving the implementation plans of annual pro-jects as well as for selecting and appointing CIs’ Chinese directors andfaculties (Hanban 2013a). Albeit there are cases in which CIs have operatedsmoothly and without concrete evidence of Hanban intervention, the contro-versies and suspicions arising from the constitution and by-laws might becounterproductive to China’s efforts to promote international harmony andenhance its global brand (Shepherd 2007; Barr 2011).

Hanban also controls the administration of CI funding through a seriesof regulations. For example, it reserves the right to conduct, when it deemsnecessary, inspections and assessments, including audits, appraisals and

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verification, of CIs’ budget implementation and final accounts and theefficiency with which Chinese funds are used; it also reserves the right todemand further explanation from any individual CI of its budget and finalaccounts and may take action against any CI that violates regulations foradministering Chinese CI funds. In the event of a legal dispute between CIheadquarters and an individual CI, the principal bodies of the various part-ners in that operation are to accept the jurisdiction of the Beijing Court(Hanban 2013b). Although there have been no reported cases of legal actionagainst or penalties levied on individual CIs, these regulations are the sticksthat accompany the carrots, and might cause legal disputes between localCIs and the Beijing headquarters (Paradise 2009). From that perspective,what seems to be a utilitarian resource could be used in a coercive mannerto impose China’s preferred course of action on foreign partners, thoughHanban has been careful not to pressure CIs through political and economicstrings thus far (Liu 2010).

Moreover, with massive government support and the increasing demandfor Chinese language education in other parts of the world, the growth ofCIs has surpassed China’s projections (Ren 2010; Yang 2010). While thegovernment has to provide start-up funds and subsidies to meet the demandof local CIs, it has incurred criticism that may tarnish, rather than enhance,China’s brand and image. Such criticism has focused on the appropriatenessof allocating educational funding overseas, out of concern that CI fundingwill come at the expense of domestic educational expenditure, especiallygiven that Hanban aims to open 1000 CIs by 2020 (Hoare-Vance 2009)while China has 10 million children without proper schooling (Starr 2009;Pan 2013). In addition, it is suspected that Hanban’s engagement in com-mercial activities focusing on Chinese language education overseas yieldsenormous profits that might point to potential corruption under Hanban(Ren 2010, 2012; Zheng 2012). This sort of suspicion might have stemmedfrom the fact that the Hanban annual reports have only made known to thepublic the annual expenditure items, but not the incomes from overseasoperations (Xu et al. 2009, 2010, 2012). These negative responses unfoldthe tension and paradox in the strategy of using utilitarian resources in theCI project, which lacks a high degree of transparency and effective commu-nication with various stakeholders, both internal and external.

As mentioned above, the CI project provides material and humanresources in addition to funding, to attract foreign partners. Nevertheless, asit is not easy to recruit qualified local teachers to teach CI courses/pro-grammes, China has to dispatch teachers to CIs and CCs abroad. However,such teachers are in short and unstable supply in China, as experienced uni-versity instructors of Chinese might not be willing to leave their familiesfor one or more years just to work abroad for low salaries (Starr 2009; Barr2011). According to Ren (2012, 7), the monthly salary of US$1500 is quitelow in comparison with the remuneration received by a visiting researcher

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going overseas (roughly US$2000 to US$5000), so university instructorsare less enthusiastic about being sent overseas to teach at CIs. Moreover,these individuals seldom have the necessary accreditation to qualify as fullteachers to teach in overseas institutions, nor do they have the experience inor knowledge of the local culture that would enable them to develop or tai-lor teaching and learning resources and pedagogies effectively to meet theinterests and abilities of local students (Starr 2009; Confucius InstituteHeadquarters 2011; Siow 2011). The problem is not limited to the teachers,however; in some institutes, the materials supplied by Hanban barely meetlocal standards for readability, and hence do not attract many readers(Hartig 2012). Besides, the strategies for utilising textual resources also lacklocal sensitivity, as the domestic Chinese scenes portrayed in the texts arealien to foreign readers, the materials go beyond their language mastery oracquisition abilities and the rote memorisation they require is too boring toarouse readers’ interest (Confucius Institute Headquarters 2011).

China’s eagerness to expand the CI project overseas within a short per-iod of time has forced it to move forward without effective, well-designedstrategies. As such, China has been unable to use its resources effectivelyto build up its soft power. Instead, its strategies have unwittingly beencounterproductive, as they may cause the targets of China’s soft powerinitiatives to lose interest or confidence in collaborating with Chineseauthorities to sustain and develop the CI project. To remedy this situationand relieve cultural tension, more intensive collaboration between Chineseexperts and local scholars and teachers to research and developinter-culturally sensitive, contextually specific and learner-centred resourcesis needed.

The core element of China’s inducement strategy is the teaching, learn-ing and assessing of Chinese language, which is seen as necessary andadvantageous for non-Chinese who seek business and job opportunities inChina (Paradise 2009; Yang 2010; Hartig 2012). The Beijing governmenthas based the standards for spoken Chinese, script and romanisation onPutonghua (Mandarin Chinese), simplified characters and the pinyin system(the official phonetic system for transcribing the Mandarin pronunciations ofChinese characters into the Latin alphabet), respectively. The use ofstandardised PRC-based Chinese through CIs and the Chinese ProficiencyTest (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi) tends to marginalise the more complex Man-darin and traditional characters in use in other Chinese communities (e.g.Taiwan and Hong Kong) (Ding and Saunders 2006; Starr 2009). It is notice-able that Taiwan, once a major destination for people around the world tostudy the Chinese language, has been largely replaced by cities in mainlandChina (e.g. Shanghai and Beijing) (Suzuki 2009). This has been viewed bysome as a coercive strategy designed to secure Beijing-based linguisticsovereignty (Ding 2008).

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While most of the suspicions and fears mentioned above are notcompletely ungrounded, neither are they well-evidenced (Barr 2011; Siow2011). As Yang (2010) remarked:

By far, there appears to be little factual support for the accusation for impro-per influence over teaching and research of CIs. The CI headquarters inBeijing does not dictate the curricular design of a language or culturalprogram. The teaching materials provided by Beijing have been designed tofacilitate pedagogical needs and are not intended for propaganda purposes.The headquarters cannot control the contents of lecture series or the design ofa festival program. (237–238)

Yet these accusations and suspicions, however ungrounded, could reveal theinherent tension underlying the efforts made by an authoritarian regime touse a state-monitored engine to engage, actively and aggressively, in aglobal cultural undertaking involving soft power diplomacy (Zhao 2009;Mosher 2012; Sahlins 2013).

China’s strategy of attracting foreigners to the CI project through its ownideas and values is weak. Despite the tremendous breadth and depth ofChinese culture available to them, Chinese leaders have limited their focusto the Confucian ideals of harmony, peace, stability and orderliness. Underthe presidency of Hu Jintao, the PRC and CCP were strongly inclined touse the Confucian idea of harmony to counteract the ‘China threat’ theoryexternally and to maintain a harmonious society internally (Hoare-Vance2009). This advocacy for peace, stability and harmony for common devel-opment (co-development) was further emphasised by succeeding PresidentXi Jinping in a speech to the Boao Forum in 2013 (Xi 2013).

This use of Confucianism as an ideational attraction is problematic andhistorically unjustifiable, as the CCP emerged from the 1919 May FourthMovement, in which Chinese intellectuals attacked Confucianism andwarlordism in their pursuit of science and democracy. During the CulturalRevolution (1966–1976), Confucianism was once again subjected to brutalattack by the CCP in its struggle against political opponents/dissidents itdepicted as conservative or reactionary. It was not until after China’s openingup and reform under Deng Xiaoping, in the late 1970s, that Confucianismbegan to rise once more as a means of relieving social tension and counter-balancing the materialism generated by the emerging market-oriented mental-ity. These historical traces show clearly that the ideology or ideationalculture in China is both strategic and goal-oriented (Hoare-Vance 2009;Benavides 2012; Cheung 2012) and reveal how fragile and precarious Con-fucianism, as an ideational attraction, is. In general, CI strategies for attract-ing foreigners are feeble and restrictive, largely limited to courses orprogrammes that promote interest in traditional Chinese culture (e.g. calligra-phy, painting, language, tai-chi and medicine), cultural exchanges (e.g. visits,conferences and film festivals) and/or business, none of which has much to

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do with Confucianism or deepening foreigners’ understanding of contempo-rary China (Starr 2009; Yang 2010; Zhao and Huang 2010). At a popularlevel, how these cultural activities could be diversified to cater to a widerspectrum of interests in different ethno-cultural contexts and how to accom-modate diverse local cultures through social interaction are vital issuesinforming the sustainable development of CI programmes, and must becarefully considered (Confucius Institute Headquarters 2011). At a more aca-demic level, given that some high-level, internationally renowned tertiaryinstitutions (e.g. Harvard, Yale and Stanford in the USA, Oxford andCambridge in the UK, the University of Tokyo and the University of Kyotoin Japan) are reluctant to be involved in the CI project (Starr 2009), it mightbe difficult to collaborate more extensively with foreign academics todevelop courses or conduct research that would enhance the global outreachor branding of Confucianism and foster more positive views about China’ssoft power. It remains to be seen whether Chinese language and culture, evendressed up in Confucian garments, are powerful enough to appeal to foreignaudiences and harmonise China’s international relationships.

Outcomes

Measuring the outcomes and achievements of the CI project is a compli-cated task, as different stakeholders in different contexts might have differ-ent views at different times. Moreover, these views vary depending onChina’s general performance and behaviour in the international and regionalarenas. If outcomes are measured solely in terms of the quantitative leapsreported in Hanban annual reports, the achievements of the CI project arevery remarkable. For example, according to the Hanban 2012 AnnualReport (Xu et al. 2012):

(1) By the end of 2012, 400 CIs and 535 CCs have been established in108 countries and regions in the world;

(2) 11,000 Chinese language teachers and volunteers have been des-patched to 132 countries, an increase of 3000 from the year 2011;

(3) 6229 foreign Chinese language teachers have been trained, anincrease of 41.8% over the previous year;

(4) 780,000 volumes of books have been donated to 1660 institutions in104 countries;

(5) Approximately 70,000 foreign students from over 100 countries wereinvited to China to participate in the ‘Chinese Bridge’ Chinese Profi-ciency Competition for foreign college and secondary students aswell as international students in China;

(6) The number of examinees taking various Chinese tests amounted to3.52 million globally, an increase of 75% over the year 2011; and

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(7) The Confucius Institute Online has achieved in going online in 46languages. The number of users for Confucius Institute Online hasincreased to 596,000 from 124 countries and regions (8–9).

Although these figures and data could demonstrate how the CI projecthas grown over the years, Hanban has not conducted any systematic andcomprehensive evaluation of the implementation of CIs and CCs, probablybecause it might involve massive amounts of monetary and humanresources. Hence, the effectiveness of the CI project has not been assessedthrough any central or local mechanism, and no relevant information hasbeen publicised in Hanban reports. Given the absence of any evidence-based or evidence-informed research for continuous improvement, it is nowonder that most suggestions for the CI project’s future developmentinclude general directions or principles, but lack concrete plans for theirreification in real contexts. For instance, suggestions for training qualifiedlocal teachers and developing more localised materials have been reiteratedin various documents, including the Hanban 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports(Xu et al. 2009, 2010). On 10 December 2010, Hanban Chairperson, LiuYandong, reported that only nine resource packages in 45 differentlanguages had been produced and that 104 CIs had published 77 localisedChinese language teaching resources (Liu 2010); this report, however, didnot address whether these localised resources could effectively remedy ped-agogical problems or resolve cultural tensions, based on users’ feedback. Inthe same speech, Liu also reiterated the need to establish an assessmentmechanism featuring international co-operation and to manage the CI fundbetter to increase its efficiency and effectiveness; again, there was no con-crete measure or plan for the actual implementation of such an assessmentmechanism. By the end of 2012, the Hanban Annual Report (Xu et al.2012) still could not show how the issues and problems related to qualityenhancement in the operation of the CI project could be resolved and thereare no reliable mechanisms or data by which the outcomes of the inputs(resources) and processes (strategies) can be gauged.

If one of the major purposes of the CI project is to brand China’s globalimage, public opinion polls that have been conducted worldwide can be avalid means of gauging whether the outcomes could help reify this purpose(Gill and Huang 2006; Huang and Ding 2006; Paradise 2009). Paradise(2009, 662–663), for example, analysed data from BBC polls between 2005and 2007 and found that the percentage of respondents holding positiveviews of China’s influence had dropped over the polling period, from 48%to 42%. This trend was confirmed by the results of the Pew Global Atti-tudes Project, which reported the deterioration in China’s global imagebetween 2005 and 2007. As the BBC polls reported a possible correlationbetween soft power and positive views in the cases of Japan, France and

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the European Union, the decline in positive views of China might haveimplications for the effectiveness of its cultural diplomacy (Paradise 2009).

Nevertheless, it must be noted that public opinion polls fluctuate and thatthe factors accounting for the results might vary across the poll periods. Forinstance, a BBC poll, dated 10 May 2012, reported a rise in positive viewsof China over the previous year (from 46% to 50%). Yet another BBC poll,dated 22 May 2013, indicated that positive views of China had droppedeight points, to 42%. In analysing the factors shaping these perceptions, theBBC poll reporter (BBC Poll 2012) remarked:

Of those who said the Chinese influence in the world is positive, a majorityof 51 percent says it is because of China’s economy, products and services.This area is also the top reason, mentioned by 30 percent of respondentsholding unfavourable views, why China is seen to have a negative influence.The way China treats its people (27%), as well as its foreign policy (25%)followed closely among reasons for this disapproval. (10)

This tallies with Pew Research findings that the percentage of Americansholding unfavourable opinions of China rose from 36% in 2011 to 52% in2012 (Wike 2013), mostly due to China’s perceived economic threat to USjob opportunities, trade deficits and government debt. It can therefore beconcluded that economic and economy-related resources and strategies canbe a source of inducement as well as a means of coercion. It is also appar-ent that China’s soft power, as embodied in the CI project, has not contrib-uted much to improving China’s global image, in spite of the remarkablerate of CIs’ global expansion as evidenced by the Hanban 2012 AnnualReport (Xu et al. 2012).

Conclusion

Based on a more integrated conceptual framework combining the tripartitetaxonomies put forth by Nye (1990) and Tellis et al. (2000), the findings ofthis paper suggest that, in its efforts to brand the nation and promote harmo-nious international relationships through the rapid expansion of its cultural(soft power) diplomacy via the CI project, China has emphasised resourceprovision rather than creating appropriate, non-coercive and inter-culturallysensitive strategies to bring about the intended outcomes. It is obvious thatthe means (resources and strategies) tend to baffle the ends (intended out-comes). Without systematic, detailed, comprehensive and long-term plan-ning, the progress of the whole project is like feeling for stones to cross theriver as China has no experience in managing and operating such a venturein multiple countries and regions with diverse cultures, interests and needs.When the national interest is predicated on the size of the CI project or thespeed of its expansion, defects in quality inevitably emerge and tend to tar-nish rather than brand the image of the nation. In this aspect, the CI project

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needs to develop more systematic and rigorous assessment and feedbackmechanisms to address the issues and concerns of its partners and studentsand relieve their fears and tensions.

As Gill and Huang (2006) have commented, there is a tension betweenChina’s efforts to pursue a relatively more open and flexible foreign policyor cultural diplomacy and its insistence on monitoring those undertakingsthrough a closed, rigid and authoritarian system. When a party-led andstate-controlled engine operates cultural diplomacy to boost national inter-ests, it tends to use utilitarian soft power resources in a coercive and rigidway, imposing policies, laws and regulations on its foreign partners andpushing its agenda and outcomes through propaganda and control mecha-nisms. To allay fears of intervention by the party-led state and to eliminatesuspicions of propaganda and indoctrination, the CCP should minimise therole played by senior statesmen and bureaucrats in soliciting the active par-ticipation of partners and non-state actors in programme planning, imple-mentation and evaluation (Ding 2008).

The examples of other non-state actors, like the British Council, theGoethe-Institut and Alliance Française on which the CIs are modelled, arerather revelatory to the development of CIs in two aspects. Firstly, the advo-cacy of an institution, which serves as a means of the cultural diplomacy ofthe state, might be trapped in contradiction with the policies of the latter.For instance, the British Council (2014) advocates for human rights, yet theUK’s involvement in rendition, ill-treatment of terror suspects and illegalwars might contradict that message (BBC News 2013; Henningsen 2013).Secondly, the operational modes of the British, French and German culturalinstitutions reveal that stand-alone premises separated from partner universi-ties and dissociated from the party/state propaganda machine might helpreduce suspicion and misunderstanding (Hoare-Vance 2009; Hartig 2012).In fact, if the CI project aims to harmonise foreign relationships rather thanbolster propaganda, indoctrination and cultural hegemony, stringent controlby the party-state might be counterproductive and render its efforts amockery.

The above analysis also shows that China’s CI project relies more on(non-military) coercion and inducement than on attraction, and that it hasused utilitarian resources, which are meant for inducement, in coerciveways. In essence, it has little or no attraction in terms of values or ideolo-gies aside from selected Confucian ethics/values. Even though there is astrong demand for learning Chinese language and culture that might resultin massive exposure to China by learners from CIs, as mentioned before,the teaching of traditional Chinese values, culture and language cannot helpforeigners acquire an in-depth understanding of contemporary China andenable them to view the nation from a more rational, objective and empa-thetic perspective. If foreigners are attracted to learn Chinese language andculture for economic purposes, then any downturn in Chinese economic

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development would inevitably dampen its cultural attractiveness (Gil 2008;Barr 2011). From that perspective, the CI project should revisit and reviseits programmes and see what can be done to rectify foreigners’ misconcep-tions and misunderstandings of contemporary China, instead of relying onselling China’s brand/image through propaganda and material inducements(Yang and Hsiao 2012).

China’s lack of attractiveness in cultural diplomacy also has somethingto do with its deficiency in the national values that appeal to foreign audi-ences. Scholars have pointed out that China’s lack of democracy, social jus-tice, human rights and environmental consciousness, together with itsrampant corruption and political oppression, have undermined the country’ssoft power resources (Pei 2006; Ding 2008). Instead of moving closer tothe global values of democracy and free-market capitalism, China continuesto deviate from them, as its economic development has not been accompa-nied by meaningful liberal democratic reforms to its institutions, which iswhat Ramo (2004) has conceptualised as the ‘Beijing Consensus’.

Moreover, China is trapped in the belief that comprehensive nationalpower is built mainly on military and economic strengths (Cho and Jeong2008; Ghosh 2009). However, if military hard power cannot be used in tan-dem with soft power based on circumstantial expediency and ‘contextualintelligence’ (Nye 2009, 161–162), the former will counteract the attractive-ness of the latter. That is why the CI project can do very little to relieve thefear of the ‘China threat’, particularly its economic and military aspects.China must actually demonstrate its peaceful rise and development by flexi-bly settling territorial disputes with its neighbours and behaving rationallyas a responsible global stakeholder, rather than simply using soft power torelieve fear of the ‘China threat’.

Indeed, fear of the ‘China threat’ is inevitable, because China, as a risingpower, is bound to challenge and upset the interests of the status quo pow-ers (e.g. US hegemony) (Gertz 2000; Wang 2006). This fear cannot berelieved, even if China has moved closer to global norms and values, ashypothesised by Nye (2002). As Barr (2011) has aptly pointed out:

if we examine each of the ‘threatening’ scenarios in context, we find that thecause of the fear is because China desires the same thing, competes for influ-ence in the same international political arena, and beat ‘us’ in the same game.In other words, it is not so much that China is vastly ‘different’ from theWest that causes the emotion; rather, it is because China’s rise creates a criti-cal distance which enables the West to reflect on its own position. (134)

In sum, as China’s comprehensive national power has inherent contradic-tions and tensions, and as its soft power basis is fragile, the resource provi-sions and strategies wielded in the CI project can, at best, serve to arouseforeigners’ interest in Chinese culture and language as economic pathfinders(Ding 2008). In consequence, the soft power resources and strategies used

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in the CI project can hardly bring about broader intended outcomes of deep-ening friendly relationships with other nations, promoting the developmentof multiculturalism and creating a harmonious world (Hoare-Vance 2009).The results of the soft power projection attempted through the CI projectreveal that China’s cultural diplomacy still has a long and tortuous journeyahead, and that the country must resolve the conflicts and (re-)balance com-peting demands between the national and the global, and between past ver-sions of culture and future visions of the nation, in its quest for modernityin an increasingly globalised age.

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