confederate activities pr014 canaea r a thesis in …
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CONFEDERATE ACTIVITIES PR014 CANAEA r
A STUDY IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
by
MARTHA LUAN CARTER BRUNSON, B.S.
A THESIS
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Technological College in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
MA.STER OF ARTS
Approved
Ac ;^ep t^
Augus t , 1958
20^
Co p 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 2
*I. CONFEDERATE ACTIVITIES ALONG THE CANADIAN FRONTIER* ?
II. THE NORTHWEST CONSPIRACY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR A
NEGOTIATED PEACE 21
III.CONFEDERATE ACTIVITIES ON LAKE ERIE k3
IV. THE CONFEDERATE RAID INTO VERJ IONT 56
V. CONFEDERATE REFUGEES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
OF 1861 7k
VI. LAST EFFORTS OP THE CONFEDERATES IN CANADA 89
AFTERWORD 110
INTRODUCTION
One of the more remote facets of the Civil War had to
do with a series of activities conducted by Confederates
operating from Canada. Since many Confederates and Con
federate sympathizers found it expedient to escape the
bounds of the Union and were not able, for one reason or
another, to make their way southward, there was a rather
large colony of Southern refugees in Canada. Some were
escaped prisoners of war who had crossed into Canada from
Northern war camps, many of which were located near the
Canadian border* Others were Southerners who deemed Canada
a refuge of safety for themselves and their families*
Several were businessmen -^o found it advantageous to con
duct business from a neutral country* Whatever their reason
for being in Canada, the more loyal members of the con
tingent were willing to participate directly or indirectly
in any activity that might help the Southern cause* Even
though there were early plots originating in Canada to help:
the Confederacy, these attempts for the most part were
instigated by unauthorized individuals* Rumors ran raiT5)ent
that Confederate troops were being mustered in Canada and
attacks were being planned upon the Union lake cities* The
efficient Union detective system kept a constant check on
the validity of such rumors and most often proved them to
be false• Nonetheless, the unrest caused by these rumors.
as well as the fact that there were so many Confederates and
Confederate sympathizers in Canada, was enough to warrant
grave concern*
Because the bulk of the Confederate activities con
ducted from Canada took place during the time official
commissioners sent by tbs Confederate government operated
there, it was considered valid to limit the scope of the
thesis primarily to that period* For the purpose of setting
the scene, however, a brief summary was made of unauthorized
attempts to frustrate the Union from the north before their
arrival* In order to present a more nearly complete picture
of the operation and its participants, reference was made to
the subsequent lives of the men who were most active in
Canada* The main part of the thesis, however, was built
around the major activities planned and carried out by the
commissioners and their coherts in Canada.
A search for materials dealing with the Confederate
activities from Canada, revealed that no one person who had
done research had presented a summation of the complete
operation from Canada* Most of the research done on the
subject had to do with tne complete details of only one
segmsnt of the operation* In several instances there were
sideline references to other parts of the operation insofar
as they dealt with the primary issue* This type of material
was considered Invaluable in attempting to develop a
complete picture of the total operation. Two such sources
were the memoirs of two of the participants in the Canadian
enterprise, John B. Castleman and John W* Headley. Micro
film from the Canadian archives which presented records from
the office of the secretary to the Governor General from
l86Ij. to 1870 revealed valuable Information on the subject*
Much of this information had already been incorporated into
an unpublished manuscript prepared by Dr* Oscar A. Kinchen
which pertained to the St. Albans' raid, one of the major
episodes in the Canadian enterprise. This microfilm and
other inaccessible materials used by Dr. Kinchen in pre
paring his manuscript made his research an invaluable
source for the thesis* James D* Horan's biography of Thomas
Henry Hines, one of tne most active Confederates in Canada,
presented materials concerning Hines* part in the Canadian
operation and, incidentally, presented a brief picture of
some of the other enterprises originating from Canada* His
book contained evidence of documentation from valuable and
inaccessible sources as far as this study was concerned*
He had use of the Baker-Turner Papers and other papers
housed in the National Archives which heretofore had been
unavailable to researchers and of Hines' own papers, some
of which had been discovered in the Margaret I. King
Library at the University of Kentucky and others which were
In the possession of Hines' granddaughter, Mrs. John J* V/inn
of Mt. Sterling, Kentucky* In his book dealing with
Canadian-American foreign policy, James Morton Callahan
discussed pertinent material which proved helpful in the
preparation of the thesis* Also, reference was made to his
history pertaining to Southern diplomacy during the War* A
few articles which appeared in historical quarterlies and
summaries of papers delivered at historical meetings were
referred to, although they were usually of a highly special
ized nature or biased to such an extent that the information
in them had to be carefully weighed* Although the previous
research efforts mentioned here were of imnEnse value in
preparing the study, the primary source was the Official
Records of the Union ana Confederate Armies> a compilation
of available documents that had passed through the hands of
either of the two governments during the War as far as they
had been gathered by the National Archives in 1901* Un
fortunately some of the documents had not been acquired by
that time or were considered too defamatory to persons still
living then to be incorporated into records that would be
available to the public* Thus, it was necessary to make use
of the other sources to fill the gaps* Even so, some
questions pertaining to the Confederate operations from
Canada could not be answered since papers that might have
answered them had been misplaced or destroyed*
The purpose of this thesis is to examine carefully
all accessible materials pertaining to the Confederate
activities in Canada and from them to present a narrative of
the events which took place there* As a result of this
presentation* it is hoped tliat it can be adequately discern
ed how much the operation affected the outcome of the War
and how greatly it influenced the relationship between the
various governments concerned*
CHAPTER I
CONFEDERATE ACTIVITIiiJS ALONG THE CANADIAN BORDER
Although the primary battlefield of the Civil War
was not located along the border between Canada and the
United States, activities which took place there during the
War caused concern among the officials and other citizens
of tne Union, the Confederacy, and the Canadian provincial
government as well as Britain itself. At the opening of the
War a large number of Canadians joined the Union army, which
seemed to indicate that the Csinadians were in sympathy with
the Union cause* This sympathy seemed to wane somewhat as
the War continued, and prior to the spring of l86I|., when
the president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, sent
official Confederate commissioners to Canada to conduct
certain operations frctn that area, the growth of tensions
betv/een the governments of the United States and Canada was
quite evident*
In the early months of tne War, rumors, which were
vehemently denied, that the United States was interested in
annexing Canada by means of war if necessary, coupled with
succeeding actions on the part of both the Canadians and
James Morten Callahan, Araerican Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations (New York, 1937)> PP« 270-2?^* Hereafter cited as Callahan, American Foreign Policy* Unless otherwise documented the first part of this account is based primarily on the above work*
8
and the Americans, caused considerable tension oeoween the
two governments. In May of l86l, the Union Secretary of
State, William H. Seward, strenuously objected to the
Canadian officials because the Confederates had purchased
a vessel, the Peerless, at Toronto and were talcing it from
Lake Ontario to the ocean to use as a privateer. When Lord
Lyons, the British minister in V/ashington, did not take
action because of uncertainties in the case, Seward made it
clear that the American government would not tolerate the
fitting out of vessels for delivery to the American in
surgents and threatened seizure and detention of the vessel*
When this threat did not bring action frcm the Canadians,
Seward promptly gave conditional instructions for seizure
and detention* Later in the same month. May 13* American
relations with Canada were affected by the British de
claration of neutrality which recognized the Confederates
as belligerents and seemed to deny American sovereignty over
the Confederate states. Then before the close of the year,
both the American and British governments were apprehensive
about the possible enlargement of armaments on the border*
To a British inquiry of whether the Americans had a naval
force in excess of the stipulations of an agreement of I8I7,
Seward replied that the Michip;anj the only American naval
vessel on the Lakes, which was used for recruiting and
artillery practice, was not in his opinion excessive* In
October, apparently influenced by information that the
British were sending troops for defense of Canada, Seward
sent to the governors of the border states a circular in
which he stated that there was a need for defenses on the
Lakes, a statement which caused Canadian newspapers to re
port that such border fortifications would be a menace to
Canada*
Prom 1862 until the spring of lQGl\. the primary tension
between Canada and the Union was caused by the British
policy concerning Confederate use of British ports and Con
federate purchase of British ships. The Confederates were
allovjed to negotiate for British vessels even though tbs
British, no doubt, knew that they would be used against the
Union. As the V/ar had taken a turn favoring the Union in
July of 1863, Seward again spoke strongly against British-
Canadian policies. V/ith another hint of possible war
between England and the Union, the English government de
cided to detain all Confederate ironclads, but it refused
to assume any responsibility for the damages committed by
the cruisers which it had previously allowed to depart*
Another strain was placed upon Canadian-American
relations in November of I863 when plans of offensive trans-
border operations by Confederates assembled in Canada vrere
revealed* According to a November 11 commumication sent by
Edwin M. Stanton, Union Secretary of War, to governors of
border states, mayors of border tovms, and Union military
officials who were present in the danger areas. Lord Lyons
10
had officially notified the American government that from
telegraphic information received from Canadian Governor-
General Monck there was "reason to believe that a plot" was
"on foot by persons hostile to the United States, who" had
"found asylum in Canada, to invade the United States and de
stroy the city of Buffalo:." Furthermore, they proposed "to
take possession of some of the steamboats on Lake Erie, to
surprise Johnson's Island and set free the prisoners of war
confined there, and to proceed with them to attack Buffalo."
Lyons assured the Union government that the Canadian govern
ment would employ all the means possible to suppress the
plot* Reports made by Union detectives sent into Canada
immediately after Lord Monck's warning was received in
dicated that such plans had definitely been under foot but
that the plans had been frustrated by the effective warn
ing of the Canadian government and that further plans had
been temporarily postponed.^ Even though the people of the
border states were assured that the planned invasion had been
allayed, they, no doubt, continued to feel insecure.
Again in December the American government
%red C. Ainsworth and J.W* Kirkley (eds*). War of the Rebellior, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Vol. Ill (Washington, 1901), pp. 1013-1015• Hereafter cited as Official Records with series and volume numbe r *
^Ibid., pp. 1099-1100*
11
found grounds for complaint when fourteen men, operating
from a Canadian port and claLining that they acted under
orders from the Confederate government at Richmond, seized
the American steamer Chesapeake* After the American naval
commander of the U.S.S. Ella and Annie recaptured the
vessel in the harbor of Sambro, Nova Scotia, and delivered
it to the British authorities at Halifax, the Washington
authorities demanded the delivery of the fourteen men for
trial in the United States. The Confederate government at
first assumed responsibility for the actions 6f the men and
sent to defend them James P. Holcombe, liio was reputed as
being the best lawyer on international affairs in the
Confederacy* He discovered, however, upon his arrival in
March of l86i}. that the case was already decided, the vessel
had been returned to its rightful oi ners, and the men had
been released by writ of habeas corpus by the court at
New Brunswick, although a warrant was secured for their
re-arrest. Holcombe in his report to the Confederate
Secretary of State, Judah P. Benjamin, stated his belief
that most of the men who took part in the enterprise
assumed that it was invested with the sanction of law and
that they were mainly impelled by a "generous sympathy"
with the Confederate cause. He went ahead to point out,
however, that only one of the men involved had even a
remote claim to citizenship in the Confederacy and that
12
the rest were British subjects.^ Benjamin, in reporting
back to Holcombe, made it clear that originally the facts
had been misrepresented to Confederate officials and that,
because of Holcombe's investigation of the matter* the
truth had been uncovered* The truth, according to his
communication, was the following:
First. That the expedition wa.s devised, planned, and organized in a British colony by Vernon G* Locke, a British subject, who, under the feigned name of Parker, had been placed in command of the privateer Retribution by the officer who was named as her coimander at tiie tine of the issue of the letter of marque. Second* That Locke assumed to issue commissions in the Confederate service to British subjects on British soil, without the slightest pretext of authority for so doing, and without being himself in the public service of this Government* Third. There is great reason to doubt whether either Braine, who was in command of the expedition, or Parr, his subordinate, is a Confederate citizen, and tne weight of the evidence is rather in favor of the presumption that neither is a citizen and that the former had never been in our military service. Fourth. That Braine, the commander of the expedition, after getting possession of the vessel and proceeding to the British colonies, instead of confining himself to his professed object of obtaining fuel for navigating her to a Confederate port, sold portions of the cargo at different points on the coast, thus
Dudley W. Know (ed*). Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol* 2 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1927), PP. 551-552* Hereafter referred to as-Official Records of the Navies with series and volume number*
13
divest ing himself of the character of an officer engaged in legi t imate warfare»
Benjamin added tha t the Confederate government would at any
time uphold the r ight of any Confederate c i t i zen and every
foreigner en l i s t ed in the Confederate service to "wage
warfare openly, or by stratagem, upon the vessels of our
enemies on the high seas . . . ."' Since Holcombe's i n -
ves t iga t ion revealed t ha t th i s was not the case, tha t i n
stead neu t ra l subjects within neu t ra l j u r i sd ic t ion had
organized the h o s t i l i t i e s , the Confederate government d i s -5
claimed t he i r demands* Pro-Union authors, Nicolay and
Hay, indicated the i r bel ief that the only reason Holcombe
was sent to Canada was that the Confederates saw an
opportunity for prof i t in the Confederate cause. They also
observed that when Holcombe discovered that the men had
been **guilty of s tea l ing and peddling the cargo" and tha t
*the so-cal led Confederate off icers involved were most
disreputable,"" he "'concluded to make no demand upon Br i t i sh
au tho r i t i e s for the r e s t i t u t i o n of the s tolen ship,"' which
as far as they were concerned had been captured by a "gang
of murderers and thieves," ' not "high-minded and honorable
gentlemen" as the Confederate government o r ig ina l ly hoped*
^Official Records of the Navies, Series I , Vol* 2 , pp. 55U-^55T
John Go Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, Vol* VIII (New York, 1886), pp. 15-16.
Ik
Confederate interference originating from Canadian
shores upon Union shipping, as the United States chose to
view the Chesapeake affair, led Seward to make strong
complaints to the Canadian government. He also pointed to
other causes for complaint:*
The recent shipment of one thousand rifles from New York to Halifax in violation of military regulations, the recently discovered plans of Confederate 'pirates' at Halifax to capture other American steamers between New York and Halifax, the plans of 'neutral passengers' to carry forbidden and treasonable mails to the insurgents and the plsins of 'neutral merchants' to carry war supplies.
Seward further observed that these proceedings could in
volve Canada and the United States in a war along the
border which would have dire results and that American
vigilance was necessary to prevent information and war 7
material from reaching the insurgents through Canada*'
In March of 1861 ., the Canadian government considered
Increasing her defensive force on the Lakes in order to pre
vent "certain vessels" from attacking American trading vessels*
There was to be sa temporary transfer of five vessels to the
area, but upon further consideration, the plan was
abandoned because it might be misconstrued by the United
States as a menace* Meanwhile, Seward himself was some
what embarrassed, when statements he had made in his in-
'Callahan, American Foreip;n Policy, pp. 276-277.
15
structions in I863 to Charles Francis Adams, Union
Ambassador to England, concerning the British failure to
observe strict neutrality were published and then in
corporated into one of President Lincoln's messages. The
British immediately took offense, but Seward assured them
that no menace had been intended*
In April, l86Ij., the American government began the
construction of several sidescrew revenue cutters for ser
vice on Lake Erie* Seward quickly assured Lord Lyons that
the cutters formed no part of the American naval force and
were intended exclusively for prevention of smuggling. In
conjunction with the building of the cutters, however,
there was a move in Congress to terminate certain treaties?
with Canada* Although some proposals of termination were
voted on in Congress, none passed* When Lord Lyons in
quired about the situation, he was assured that the
American government had no intention to abrogate any of
these treaties*
It was into this strained atmosphere that Jefferson
Davis sent to Canada on April 27, l861j.. Confederate
Commissioners, Jacob Thompson and Clement C* Clay, Jr*
Their activities for the next several months added to the
tense situation as will be revealed in the succeeding
chapters*
Jacob Thompson of Oxford, Mississippi, who had served
as Secretary of the Interior in the cabinet of President
16
Buchanan prior to the outbreak of the War, had become, like
so many of his fellow Southerners, actively involved in the
Confederate cause* During the early years of the War he
had served on the staff of General Forrest* Then on April
7, 1861|., Jefferson Davis summoned him to Richmond* "If
your engagements" he wrote* "will; permit you to accept ser
vice abroad for the next six months, please come here o
immediately*" Shortly thereafter, plans for the Canadian
operation were consumated and similar letters were prepared
from President Davis for Thompson and Clement C* Clay, Jr.,
who was to accompany Thompson to Canada* The communication
read as follows?
Richmond, Va., April 27, l861|.
Sirr
Confiding special trust in your zeal, discretion and patriotism, I hereby direct you to proceed at once to Canada, there to carry out such instructions as you have received from me verbally in such a manner as shall seem most likely to conduce to the furtherance of the interests of the Confederate Q States of America which have been intrusted to you*
The man chosen to accompany Thompson, Clement C..
Clay, Jr*, of Alabama, had distinguished himself as a merriber
of both houses of the United States Congress. He also
o
Off ic i a l Records, Se r i e s IV, Vol* I I I , p* 2>2Z^
^Ib id* , p* 322»
10
17
represented his state in the Confederate Congress at
Richmond. A third man, W.W. Cleary, accompanied the two
commissioners to Canada as secretary to the commission*
James P. Holcombe, who had been sent to Canada earlier to
serve as attorney for the fourteen men involved in the
Chesapeake affair and had then been directed to remain in
Canada in order to locate Confederate soldiers who had
escaped from Northern prisoner of war camps and provide
means for them to return to the South to resume active
service for the Confederacy, became the third commissioner*
On May 6, l861j., Thompson, Clay, and Cleary left
Wilmington, North Carolina, on the Thistle, a fast blockade
runner. Even though a Union gunboat was in hot pursuit,
tte Thistle reached the Bermudas and from there the
connissioners sailed for Halifax on the British mail steam
er Alpha, which brought them to their destination on May
19. Because of illness. Clay remained in Halifax and later
made his headquarters at St. Catherines on the Canadian
side of the Niagara River. Thompson, accompanied by Cleary,
proceeded to Montreal, where he deposited approximately
three quarters of a million dollars in the Bank of Ontario,
but later he found that headquarters at the Queen's Hotel
in Toronto would be more convenient for his operation*
10 Official Records, Series IV, Vol. Ill, pp* 583-58i4-»
Oscar A. Kinchen, "The St. Albans Raiders," (unpublished manuscript, 1958*), pp* 2-3. Hereafter cited as Kinchen, "St. Albans Raiders."
18
John B* Castleman, a Confederate who spent some time
in Canada and worked closely with the commissioners, made
some rather candid observations about their personalities*
Of Thompson he observed, "Jacob Thompson was a successful
man of business, a politician of unusual ability. . .was
always a gentleman, but was not a diplomat." Thompson, he
added, was "somewhat disqualified for the duties of
commissioner by being unable to realize that many men were
not as honorable as he*" Of Clay he wroter
Mr* Clay was a man of culture and of some political experience* It would have been difficult for President Davis to have found one prominent in political life who was more unfitted to perform the duties exacted* He was not a practical man, he lacked judgment and he was in ill health, was peevish, irritable and suspicious — he distrusted his colleague, Mr. Thompson, and he relied on those who were often unworthy* From the very outset he was out of harmony with Commissioner Thompscnp with his residence at St. Catherines, removed from Mr* Thompson's semi-official residence at Toronto, and demanded and was paid then the sum of $93,000^00 from which he should make such expenditures as might accord with his undisputed judgment*
Castleman indicated that in his opinion the mission would
have been infinitely more efficient if Thompson alone, even
with his own weaknesses, had represented the Confederate
4- 12 government*
The duties of the commission were never completely
spelled out in writing, but apparently the main object was
12john B* Castleinan, Active Service (Louisville, 1917), pp. 133-13l|-»
19
making contacts with men in the North who were interested in
bringing about peace at any cost* Such an object was in
dicated by Jefferson Davis when he later wrotes
The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it seemed that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election of that year was the continuance or cessation of the war* A commission of three persons, eminent in position and intelligence, was accordingly appointed to visit Canada with a view to negotiation with such persons in the North as could be realied upon to aid the attainment of peace*13
A close scrutiny of activities of the commissioners
and those with whom they worked revealed that the verbal
instructions given by President Davis were quite elastic*
They involved schemes whereby the Copperheads, or Peace
Democrats, would be backed in every effort to win the
Democratic presidential nomination and ultimately the
election, thus leaving the way open to peace* Even though
this seemed to be the initial purpose of the commission,
several other schemes were put into operation through the
commission* It would be well, however, to turn attention
first to the initial contacts of the commission with that
group of Peace Democrats organized under the name of ' Sons
^3jefferson I avis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government (Richmond, Idbl), pp* 516-517.
^The term Copperhead is variously interpreted, but for this study refers to radical Peace Democrats who were anxious to attain peace at any cost*.
20
of Liberty" and their joint activities prior to, during, and
immediately after the Democratic Convention held in Chicago
in August of l86i|. and to other efforts to bring about peace*
CHAPTER II
THE NORTHWEST CONSPIRACY AND THE
MOVEMENT FOR A NEGOTIATED
PEACE
After Jacob Thompson had established his headquarters
in Toronto, he began immediately to ascertain how strong
the peace movements were in the North* The first contacted
were leading New York Copperheads who assured him that their
number in the Northeast was not at that time ready to par
ticipate actively in a peace movement. It seemed that too
many Eastern manufacturers were becoming wealthy as a result
of the War.
Thompson concluded that little could be expected
from the Northeast. Nonetheless* he developed one more
scheins to be carried out there before turning to the Norths
west* Actually a plan had been suggested before he left the
Confederacy, whereby it would be possible to thwart the
Union gold market* People of the North were urged to convert
their paper money into gold and thus withdraw it from the
market* To further this movement, John Porterfield, a
Nashville banker, was "furnished with $100,000 and in
structed to proceed to New York to carry out a financial
policy, of his own conception, which consisted in the pur-
^Official Records, Series I, Vol. XLIII, Part II, p. 930. This fact was disclosed in a report of activities in Canada from Thompson to Benjamin on December 3> I86J4.*
2X
chase of gold and export ing the same, s e l l i n g i t for s t e r l i n g
b i l l s of exchange, and then again convert ing h i s exchange
i n t o g o l d . " P o r t e r f i e l d succeeded in ge t t i ng $2,000,000 i n
gold shipped from the country by spending only $10,000
before he r e tu rned to Canada. He re tu rned sooner than he
might have because h i s former p a r t n e r , a Mr* Lyons, who had
no a c t u a l connect ion with h i s ope ra t ion , had been a r re s t ed
on the ground t h a t he was expor t ing gold* P o r t e r f i e l d r e
turned $75,000 of the money en t rus t ed to him, keeping
$15*000 to continue h i s scheme, should he have the
oppor tuni ty* Of the opera t ion Thompson sa id , " I must confess
t h a t the f i r s t shipment had a marked ef fec t on t he market .
I am i n c l i n e d to t he opinion t h a t h i s / P o r t e r f i e l d ' ^
theory w i l l work g r e a t damage and d i s t r u s t to Federal
f i n a n c e s , i f v igorous ly followed up* . . . " No r epo r t of
fu r the r ac t i on along t h i s l i ne was repor ted , however*
By June of l861| contac t had been made and a meeting
arranged a t Winsor in Canada West, between Thompson and
Clement L* Vallandigham, Orand Commander of the Sons of 3
L i b e r t y , an a l l e g e d l y powerful organizat icn in the North-
2 Official Records, Series I, Vol* XLIII, Part II, pp*
932-933* Taken from Thompson's report to Benjamin* 3 The Sons of Liberty, a radical secret associaticn
consisting primarily of those with Copperhead sentiments was called by various names at different times during its history. Originally it was known in certain localities as the Mutual Protection Society, the Circle of Honor, or the Circle or Knights of the Mighty Host and in a wider sense
23
west which was sympathetic to plans for peace at any cost —
even the secession of the Northwestern States. It was at
this and subsequent meetings that plans for what has often
been called the "Northwest Conspiracy" were developed*
The conspiracy consisted of a flexible plan which
was variously interpreted by its participants* Generally
speaking there was to be an uprising in the Northwestern
States, primarily Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, which as a
minimum goal would lead to peace, an overthrow of the
Lincoln administration, and restoration of the Union to its
former state* As a maximum goal it would lead to secession
from the Unign even to the point, in its more radical stages,
oaf revolution in conjunction with the Southern States*
Since tt© Peace Democrats were strong in the above mentioned
states as well as in such fringe states as Kentucky,
Missouri, and Iowa, the War was unpopular* From the
as the Knights of the Golden Circle* Because of partial exposure of secrets in I863, Sterling Price had instituted the Corps de Belgique in Missouri as a successor of the Knights* Also there had been instituted in the N^rth, by such prominent persons as Vallandigham, a secret order known as the Order of American Knights (O.A.K.). Upon the institution of the principal organization. Price modified the Corps de Belgique which became the Southern section of the O.A.K* Since the secrets of the O.A.K. became generally known to the Union officials, further modifications were made in its secrets and its name was finally changed to the Order of the Sons of Liberty* Even so, the term Order of American Knights was still used in some areas* This above information was taken fran a report compiled on October 8, l86Ij., for the Secretary of War Stanton by Judge-Advocate-General Holt as it is recorded in the Official Records, Series II, Vol. VII, pp* 931-932*
2k
beginning of the War, the offer of Je f fe rson Davis and h i s
Congress for f ree nav iga t ion of the Miss i s s ipp i River to
i t s mouth for t he Northwestern t r a d e r and farmer was an
appeal ing lu re toward the Southern cause*^ As a r e s u l t of
what might be c l a s s i f i e d as a r i f t between the Northwestern
a g r i c u l t u r a l element and the Nor theas tern manufacturing
element, to many people the l o g i c a l a l l i a n c e was one between
the West and the South. Too, L inco ln ' s consc r ip t ion
p o l i c i e s were qu i t e unpopular among many in the Westj thus
the c a l l i n g of new d r a f t s was often received co ld ly ,
e s p e c i a l l y by members of the Sons of L i b e r t y .
J u s t as the s o - c a l l e d conspiracy could be va r ious ly
i n t e r p r e t e d by ind iv idua l s concerned, so could meiribership
in the Sons of L i b e r t y , if test imony of l eaders and other
members of the movement a r r e s t e d l a t e r in tbs War could be
be l i eved a t a l l * A summation of the p r i n c i p l e s , purposes ,
and opera t ions of the Sons of L iber ty as se t fo r th in a
r e p o r t compiled by Judge-Advocate-General Holt and h i s
s t a f f f o r Edwin M; Stanton, Union Secre ta ry of War, and
submitted in October of 1861 . shed some l i g h t upon the
movement* This r e p o r t was compiled from var ied sources ,
prominent among which were testimony of meiribers who had been
a r r e s t e d and chose to t e s t i f y to save t h e i r own necks and
^James Morton Cal lahan, Diplomatic His tory of the Southern Confederacy (BaltimoreT 1901), p* 66* Hereaf ter c i t e d as Cal lahan, Diplomatic History*
25
Union detect ives who had purposely joined the organization
in order to gather information pertaining to i t s secrets and
inner-workings* If one could believe the testimony
completely, i t would seem that many people joined the Order
and took the various degrees without rea l iz ing to what
extent the more r ad i ca l members would go to achieve i t s
goals* I t seemed tha t only a few were fully aware of those
goals* The following, according to the report , were tiie
wr i t ten pr inc ip les of the Orderr
A declarat ion f i r s t , of the absolute r ight of s lavery; second, of State sovereignty and the r igh t of secession; t h i rd , of the r ight of armed res is tance to const i tu ted authori ty on the par t of the disaffected and the disloyal , whenever the i r ambition may prompt them to revolution* . . .
The report also included a statement regarding the make-up
and general purpose of the Order which, according to the
testimony of one of i t s turncoat leaders , was as follows:
" I t i s exclusively made up of dis loyal persons, of a l l
Democrats "who are desirous of securing the independence of
the Confederate Sta tes with a view of res tor ing the Union as
i t was." The report continued with a l i s t of specif ic
a c t i v i t i e s already performed or contemplated by the Orderr
1* Aiding soldiers to desert and harboring and protec t ing d e s e r t e r s .
2* Discouraging enlistments and re s i s t ing the draft* 3* Circulat ion of d i s loya l and treasonable pub l i
cat ions* k* Communicating with and giving in te l l igence to the
26
enemy. 5 . Aiding the enemy, by r e c r u i t i n g for them, or
a s s i s t i n g them to r e c r u i t , wi th in our l i n e . . . . 6* Furn i sh ing the r e b e l s with arms, ammunition, e t c . 7 . Co-operat ing with the enemy in r a i d s and i n
vasions * 8* Des t ruc t i on of Government p r o p e r t y . 9* Des t ruc t ion of p r i v a t e proper ty and persecut ion
of l o y a l men* 10 . Assas s ina t i on and murder* 11* Establ ishment of a Northwestern Confederacy*
According to the testimony " the new confederacy" was a l ready
organized and had a "p rov i s iona l government, o f f i c e r s ,
depar tments , bureaus , e t c* i n s e c r e t operat ion*" As the
Confederate l eade r s in Canada worked with the Sons of
L ibe r ty , however, i t became more and more evident to some
of them, e s p e c i a l l y Hines and h i s l i e u t e n a n t s who were i n
charge of the m i l i t a r y schemes, tha t the Order looked b e t t e r
on paper and i n the minds of the more avid l eade r s t h a n i t
did i n a c t u a l opera t ion*
At the i n i t i a l meeting between Thompson and
Vallandigham in June , the l a t t e r ta lked conf ident ly of the
s t r e n g t h of the Sons of L i b e r t y . He gave the fol lowing
f i gu re s as t h e i r es t imated ac t ive p o t e n t i a l in the more
powerful s t a t e s involved in the movementr 85,000 in
I l l i n o i s , 50,000 in Indiana , and 1^0,000 in Ohio* He a l so
r epo r t ed an e f f i c i e n t o rganiza t ion in Kentucky and
Missouri as we l l as a c t i v e sympathizers in New York and some
^ O f f i c i a l RecordSo Ser ies I I , Vole VI I , pp . 9l|3-95l»
2?
6 of the other Eastern states* He indicated that Thompson's
offer of financial aid would be welcome, although he declined
to accept it himself* Instead he introduced and fully en
dorsed James A. Barrett of St. Louis as the "Grand Lecturer"
of the Order and suggested that financial transactions be
carried on through him* Barrett also agreed to contact
officials of the Order and arrange a meeting with Thompson
in the near future* Among those present at the meeting at
at* Catherines were several prominent Copperhead leadersr
Charles Walsh, political boss of Cook County, Illinoisj?
Amos Green, commanding Copperhead in Illinois? H.H. Dodd of
Indiana? T.C. Massie of Ohio? and Justice J* Bullitt of
Kentucky. This meeting and later ones proved to be
enthusiatic, and both sides seemed ready to pursue plans that
would lead to a Northwestern Confederacy vriiich would in turn
form a close alliance with the South* Durii^ the meetings
Walsh informed Thompson that he had two organized regiments
partially armed in Chicago for which he was offered
monetary aid and arms by the commissioner* Aid was also
given to the others attending the meetings. Cleary, the
secretary of the commission, was sent to New York to
negotiate for arms through the assistance of Fernando Wood
and other Northeastern leaders who for ample monetary con
sideration were willing to render aid* The war supplies were
Castleman, Active Service, p* ll|.5.
28
shipped directly to Canada in boxes labeled "Prayer Books" 7
or "School Books."
As the plans for the conspiracy materialized, it
became apparent that if the Sons of Liberty were to seize the
state governments in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, a military
force was necessary* While a supposed flurry of troops and
arm gathering was taking place among the members of the
Order, Thomas H. Hines, a commissioned captain in the Con
federate army, was busy at work. Hines, under orders from
Confederate officials at Richmond had arrived in Canada on o
Apr i l 20 , and was handl ing m i l i t a r y operat ions there* As
was t r u e of so many of the Confederates ac t ive i n the
Canadian o p e r a t i o n s , Hines had been a prominent meirber of
General Morgan's r a i d e r s who had played havoc with the
Federa l s along the Union and Confederate l i n e s , bu t who were
captured in Ju ly of I863 and confined in pr i son camps in the
North* Several of Morgan's r a i d e r s , among them Hines,
escaped from the Northern p r i sons and found a sanctuary i n
Canada* Hines , who had p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t ingu i shed himself
by saving Morgan from capture during one of the r a i d s in to
Ohio, was recognized as a capable m i l i t a r y leader* Thus,
'James D* Horan, Confederate Agent (New York, 19^k)f pp* 91-91+.
Q
John W. Headley, Confederate Operations in Canada and New York (New York, I906), pp* 217-220. Hereafter cited as Headley, Confederate Operations* The following pertaining to Hines is based on Headley's account unless otherwise stated*
29
under orders from Richmond, he had met with Northern Copper
head leaders by passing into the North through Southern
lines, even before plans had been formulated to operate from
Canada* In this manner he familiarized himself with early
operations of the radical movement as it evolved into the
Sons of Liberty* Because of his contacts he was a logical
choice to be sent to Canada on a secret mission -- a mission
which involved co-operating with Holcombe in contacting Con
federate prisoners of war, who had escaped from Northern
camps, to ascertain whether they might be persuaded to re
turn to active service in the Confederacy* Upon the arrival
of Thompson and in order to consolidate the operation, he
received word from Confederate Secretary of War Seddon that
he should help the commissioners mature their plans of
operation* He immediately set to work recruiting a trusted
group of Confederate refugees who would form the nucleus of
a military force who would co-operate with the military
forces of the Sons of Liberty* On July 9, Thonpson wrote
Benjamin from Windsor: "We have sixty escaped prisoners
who are ready for any enterprise*"
While Hines was busy gathering troops, a series of
peace meetings were being held in the Northwest. The first
meeting, which, according to Thompson, was highly successful,
was held in Peoria, Illinois* Others were later held at
Q
Callahan, Diplomatic History, p.226*
30
Springfield and Chicago* These meetings were financed by the
commissioners and were designed as popular rallies that were
to prepare the people for a peace movement*
The insurrection was first planned for the fourth of
July only to be postponed at the request of the Copperhead
leaders until the eighteenth, and then the twentieth of
July* Each time there was a postponement the leaders
pleaded their unreadiness for action* Finally Hines,
Thompson, and Clay met with Vallandigham and insisted that
the date of the uprising should be August 29, the day the
Democratic Convention was to meet in Chicago* There would
be a large crowd in the city then, and Confederate agents
and Sons of Liberty could carry out their plans without being
detected*
The initial plan for the day of the convention was
simple, but far-fetched© Hines and his men in co-operation
with members of the Sons of Liberty would release the Con
federate prisoners from Camp Douglas and Rock Island,
Illinois, from Camp Morton in Indiana, and from Camp Chase in
Ohio* The liberated prisoners would in turn form a massive
military force which would be joined to those of the Sons of
Liberty* ImirBdiately after the release of prisoners at Camp
Douglas, Chicago was to be captured and the convention
controlled by sympathizers who would nominate a peace
10 Official Records, Series I, Vol* XLIII, Part II, p*935.
31
candidate for the presidency* The b a t t l e f i e l d of the War
would be sh i f t ed t o the Northwest? t l ^ Southern s t a t e s
would be l e f t independent? and the War would be brought to
an end since no Northern army could withstand the force of
the contemplated one hundred thousand men of arms* Such a
p lan would depend upon p in -po in t p r ec i s ion and the utmost i n . . 11
co-opera t ion*
As soon as the seventy Confederates ^ o had been
read ied in Canada for the i n su r r ec t i on of August 29 should
a r r i v e i n Chicago, t h e i r l e ade r , Hines, and John B.
Castleman, who had jo ined him as co-commander of the move
ment, were to meet with the l eaders of the Sons of Liberty*
Colonel S t . Leger Grenfel , former Chief of Staff of Morgan's
r a i d e r s , was a l so sunong the group. I t soon became apparent
t ha t the t roops tha t were to have been organized by the Order
had not m a t e r i a l i z e d and, t h u s , could not be depended upon*
Too, the i n i t i a l zeal fo r the up r i s i ng seemed t o have subs id
ed, a development which had been a n t i c i p a t e d by some of the
Confederates because of the seve ra l postponment s* The fac t
t ha t the Union o f f i c i a l s had sent reinforcements to Chicago
and Camp Douglas as a r e s u l t of rumors they had received
regarding a poss ib le i n s u r r e c t i o n was a su f f i c i en t cause for
t i m i d i t y on the p a r t of the consp i r a to r s* Also, many of the
l lCas t leman, Active Se rv i ce , p* 160. From an account p resen ted in the A t l a n t i c Monthly for Ju ly , 1865.
32
members of the Order began to realize what dire consequences
might result should they attempt to consummate their plans and
fail. They seemed more and more inclined to take their
chances upon the nomination of a favorable presidential
candidate and the outcome of the coming election to bring
their hopes of peace to fruition. Even though McClellan, a
Union Democrat, who had put forth a "mild war policy," was
subsequently nominated, they still seemed willing to wait fa?
the developments between then and the election*
Hines and Castleman realized that with no troops
from the Sons of Liberty their plans to release the prisoners
in Camp Douglas could not be carried out. They suggested
that five hundred well-armed men be furnished to reinforce the
Confederate band of seventy, instead of the originally
requested five thousand. With this number they proposed to
take Rock Island prison according to the following plan:
Castleman with "five hundred Western men and twenty on-
federate soldiers, would run through on regular train * * .to
Rock Island." Hines with the fifty remaining Confederates,
"would control all the wires and railroads out of Chicago,
preventing any truthful telegraphic news, or any transportation,
and convey to the outside world the breaking up of the National
Democratic Convention by assault of the United States troops,"
while the other contingent would release the prisoners
at Rock Island and take possession of the arsenal at
Springfield. But the leaders of the Order insisted that
33
they could not be "ready for schedule time of the Rock
I s l a n d t r a i n . " I t was a l so no t i ceab le that severa l of the
commanders of the Order who were present a t the f i r s t meet
ing i n Chicago were absent from a second meeting* The only
sugges t ion put f o r t h by those leaders present was t ha t new
p lans might be developed to be c a r r i e d out a t the time of
the November e l e c t i o n . Thus, the upr is ing again met with 12
s e r i o u s compl ica t ions , and had to be postponed*
One cannot , however, leave the scene of the Chicago
convention without wondering what happened to Hines,
Castleman, and t h e i r band of Confederates . On the n i g h t of
August 30, the two l eade r s gathered t h e i r fol lowers and
r epo r t ed tha t "because of lack of co-opera t ion" they had
f a i l e d . They advised t h e i r men not to follow them f u r t h e r
because of the ""imminent danger" and offered them t r a n s -
pora t ion t o the South. According to Castleman twenty-two
remained, twenty-f ive went South, and twenty- three re turned
to Canada* No doubt, both Hines and Castleman f e l t t ha t they
should at tempt to thwart the Union war e f f o r t s even if i t
were on a smal l s c a l e . They ev iden t ly did not want o f f i c i a l
permiss ion fo r whatever miss ions they might attempt for fear
t h a t i t would jeopardize the p o s i t i o n of the commissioners i n
Canadar a t l e a s t Castleman ind i ca t ed t h i s when he s t a t e d
C a s t l e m a n , Active Service^ pp . I51|-l59«
3k
that "Asking 'authority' to act was what Captain Hines and
I agreed not to do. We, and those with us, took life in
hand and did ^ a t we thought to be a duty* We intended mere
ly to have the commissioners understand that a moderate ex
penditure would be made along the lines intimated*"''"
They were soon back in Chicago with directions from
Thompson to ascertain whether James C* Robinson, an Illinois
candidate for Governor, could be depended upon to co-operate
with the Confederate aspirations in the Northwest* Both
Castleman and Hines, after investigation, endorsed Robinson
and seemed to feel that monetary aid to the Illinois
Democratic Committee would be more beneficial than the same
aid to the Sons of Liberty* Thompson, however, could not be
completely swayed from his belief that the Sons of Liberty
would eventually aid the Southern cause* He continued to
support their efforts to revive interest for an uprising that
was now scheduled to take place at the time of the pres
idential election on November 8*
Continuing with their plans to thwart Union war efforts
in the Northwest, Castleman and Hines were in Illinois in
early October* Castleman, with ten of the Confederate
soldiers who elected to remain with the two leaders, went to
Marshall, I linois* From there they intended to go to St*
Louis where they intended to s et fire to the steamboats that
13 Castleman, Active Service^ p* 173 .
35
carried military supplies to the Union army at Vicksburg*
After receiving word from one of their number sent ahead as
a scout, they went to St. Louis where they mapped out their
strategy* Each chose a certain number of vessels to be
burned* They used Greek fire, which Castleman described as
"a combination of chemicals which, viien exposed to the air,
ignited and had, or was designed to have, the advantage of
ignitidn after a minute had elapsed in which time the user
of the liquid could move from the scene*"' He then observed
that if they had used a few boxes of matches, **there would
have been none of the seventy-three steamboats left at the
St. Louis wharf," for the Greek fire proved unrealiable and
in most instances the self-ignition did not occur. Castleman
furthef^ iterated, "We dared not go back to complete the work
and, as previously arranged, we quietly left — taking „lli
passage separately — on the train that afternoon."
Meanwhile, Hines went to Mattoon, Illinois, to look
over the army warehouses that were reportedly "bulging with
sxipplies*" Just how much damage was done was not recorded,
but one of Hines' number, Maugham, pleased with the part he
played in burning the Federal warehouses, bragged too much
in a saloon, was captured, and confessed* As a result,
Hines and his group left Mattoon with the Union troops hot
•^^Castleman, Active Service, pp. 173-17^1.
36
l5
on their trail* He had already sent word to Castleman to
join him at Sullivan, Indiana, where they were to meet with
Indiana Copperhead leaders. Here, fate dealt Castleman a.
blow, for he was arrested when he entered the railroad
station* He was afterwards taken to Terre Haute where he
saw some of his men, as well as Hines, awaiting an
opportunity to rescue him* Knowing that there was a great
number of Federal troops nearby in addition to his guard, he
took a chance by asking an elderly gentleman to deliver a
message to his comrades telling them not to attempt to
rescue him* He chose his messenger well, for the man did
his bidding and his fellow Confederates dispersed* Later
when he found that he was to be confined at Camp Morton,
he lamented the fact that he did not allow the men to
follow him and attempt his rescue which he felt would have
been completed successfully* With Castleman in prison,
Hines returned to Canada without abandoning all hope of
rescuing his canrades and with an aim of continuing his
efforts toward bringing about a successful insurrection in
Chicago at election time *
Although the operations involved in the Northwestern
Conspiracy had the full endorsement and enthusiastic support
-^^Horan, Confederate Agent, pp. 137-138*
Castleman, Active Service, pp* 17l;-175.
37
of Thompson; Clay, greatly influenced by George N. Sanders,
ft self-appointed advisor to the commissioners, viewed more
favorably contacts with influential people in the North who
might possibly help negotiate an acceptable peace directly
between Washington and the commissioners* At least two
attempts toward a negotiated peace were made*
The first attempt took place in early July, l86ij., and
was spearheaded primarily by George N. Sanders* The latter,
a rather adventurous S'outhern sympathizer who had a gift for
smooth talk, had early won the confidence of Clay and
Holcombe and, it seemed, went about arranging whatever
schemes he so desired in his assumed capacity of counsel to
the two commissioners. Confederates who left records re
lating to Canadian operations -- Hines, Castleman, and
Headley especially — expressed a strong distrust and dis
taste for Sanders and often lamented the fact that he had
such a strong influence on the two commissioners* Sanders,
according to Castleman's account, assumed the authority to
invite the famed editor of the New York Daily Tribune,
Horace Greeley, to secure from President Lincoln safe conduct
to Washington for himself and Commissioners Clay and
Holcombe in order that they might discuss acceptable peace
terms* Clay, Holcombe, Greeley, and Sanders were to meet at
17 Niagara to confer upon the proposition* According to
'Castleman, Active Service, p* 136*
38
Clay in his report to Confederate Secretary of State
Benjamin concerning the affair, Sanders made his contacts
with Greeley through a Mr* Jewett, regarded by Clay as "an
active and useful agent for communicating with citizens of
the United States."' Jewett reported to the commissioners
that Greeley would accompany the Confederate delegation to
Washington to talk of peace, but Clay expressed doubts about
the development of anything profitable and was even skeptical 18
of t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of J e w e t t ' s d e a l i n g s w i t h Greeley*
G r e e l e y , i t appea red , viewed J e w e t t ' s c o n t a c t with him,
which b r o u g h t p r o s p e c t s of peace t a l k s , as a p o s s i b l e sa lve
f o r L i n c o l n ' s l a c k of p o p u l a r i t y , a s i t u a t i o n "viiich had
r e s u l t e d because of a s l a c k i n Union v i c t o r i e s and L i n c o l n ' s
c a l l i n g f o r more t r o o p s . When Greeley approached Lincoln
w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n , L inco ln s e n t him to Niagara w i t h a
document p romis ing s a f e - c o n d u c t t o Washington f o r Clay ,
Thompson, Holcombe, and Sanders " i n company wi th Hon. Horace t«19 Greeley* . . . " I t seemed t h a t L inco ln was a t a l l t imes
c a r e f u l t o make i t appea r t h a t Gree l ey , no t h imse l f , was i n
cha rge of the o p e r a t i o n , a p r e c a u t i o n he no doubt took
should t h e p l a n s m i s c a r r y or should he d i s c o v e r , a s he
18 L f f i c i a l R e c o r d s , S e r i e s IV, V o l . I l l , p . 581 .*
C l a y ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s on the m a t t e r were r e c o r d e d i n a comm u n i c a t i o n to Benjamin, August 1 1 , 1861;*
mu 29 Ibidem S e r i e s I I I , Vol* IV, p* 501*
39
suspected, tha t the Confederate agents in Canada had no
au thor i ty to negotiate peace* John Hay, Lincoln's pr ivate
sec re ta ry , arr ived a t Niagara on July 20, with addi t ional
ins t ruc t ions that Greeley del iver to the commissionersr
Executive Mansion, Washington, July 18, l86if*
To Whom It May Concernr Any proposition which embraces the restoration of
peace, the integrity of the Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and be considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met with liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways* Po
Abraham Lincoln
Upon presenting Lincoln's message, Greeley was quick to
discover what Lincoln had suspected all along* According
to Clay in his report to Benjamin, the conmission denied
that it had authority to negotiate for peace and referred
Greeley to the authorities in Richmond* Clay further
emphasized that at no time did the commission intend to
assume authority that it did not have* Both Holcombe and
Clay in their reports concerning the affair observed that in
the long run the whole situation proved an advantage to the
Confederacy and to the Peace Democrats in the coming election,
since it appeared that the administration at Washington was
20 Callahan, Diplomatic History, pp.* 228-229*
k(^
21
unwil l ing t o n e g o t i a t e a f a i r peace* Cer ta in ly the whole
episode proved to be a good propaganda move aga ins t the
Republicans a t a time when the War was not going as t h e y
wi shed*
The second contact involving a possible peace pa r l ey
with the commission took place when Judge Je r ry S. Black
same t o Toronto to v i s i t Commissioner Thompson, who had r e
fused to have anything to do with the Greeley a f f a i r .
According t o Castleman, Black was a close personal and
p o l i t i c a l f r i e n d of the Commissioner and talked qu i te
f r e e l y of the p o s s i b i l i t y of favorable peace terms* He had
come " a t the ins tance of Honorable E.M* Stanton. . . . t o
a s c e r t a i n i f he could nego t i a t e terms of peace wi thout the
condi t ion of independence of the Confederate s t a t e s
government and f i n a l separa t ion*" He to ld Thompson " tha t
Stanton considered the r e - e l e c t i o n of Lincoln doubtful un
l e s s something were done to c r y s t a l l i z e in L inco ln ' s favor
pub l ic opinion which then was divided as the ibisdom of con
t i n u i n g the War, end t h a t i f Mr. Lincoln should be defeated,
the cab ine t o f f i c e r s would be t r e a t e d wi th i n d i g n i t y and
subjected to personal danger ." Thompson s ingly informed
Judge Black t ha t he had no au thor i ty to negot ia te peace and
sen t h i s f r i end back to Washington wi th no encouragement*
Castleman expressed h i s and Hines ' disappointment concerning
^•^Official Records, S e r i e s IV, Vol . I l l , p . 583, 587.
kl
the outcome of the meeting between the two men as followsr
. . . *in failing to take advantage of the opportunity to negotiate an honorable peace along reasonable lines of suggestions intimated by Judge Black as emanating from Mr. Lincoln's secretary of war, and allowing Judge Black to return without definite encouragement to Washington, the Confederate commissioners failed to foresee that within five months President Davis would himself be instituting through Honorable F. P. Blair of Washington, inquiries as to the terms on which an honorable peace might be secured. But when Mr. Davis on the twelfth of the following January wrote to Mr* Blair, the presidential election had been held, Mr* Lincoln's war policy had been endorsed by the people and Mr. Stanton was no longer apprehensive*
As a result of Black's visit, Thompson decided that the
Union's position was at a low ebb and the time was ripe for
contact with foreign governments, namely England and France*
His aim would be to acquire more than recognition of the Con«
federacy as abelligerent power; instead he wanted
recognition as an independent power* For the purpose of
opening negotiations abroad, Holcombe was sent to England to
confer with Mason and Slidell* Before such a plan could be
carried out satisfactorily, however, the War had taken a
turn in favor of the Union, and the Confederate opportunity
22
for b e t t e r ba rga in ing power abroad was los t*
Thus, the two a t t empts involving the commissioners i n
peace a r b i t r a t i o n came to naught , and Thompson concent ra ted
upon Confederate opera t ions in the Northwest, a plan of
22 Castleman, Active Se rv i ce , pp* 1)4.9-150*
I i l l l i iMMHMMI.»' l i l lMiai i I limMifli I
CHAPTER III
CONFEDERATE ACTIVITIES ON LAKE ERIE
Although Thompson was still depending on the develop
ment of an uprising in conjunction with the Sons of Liberty
around election time, he and his nucleus of followers in
Toronto were not idle in the meantime. In addition to the
minor activities of Hines and Castleman in Illinois and
•Missouri during the interim months, another scheme was pro
posed to Thompson and willingly adopted. From the beginning
of Thompson's sojourn in Canada, he had expressed a desire
to capture the United States gunboat Michigan, the only
Union man-of-war on the Lakes. Such a prize would lead to
infinite possibilities for raiding and raaurauding in the
United States port cities. A scheme outlined and developed
by Captain John Y. Beall and Captain Charles H. Cole, Con-
federate officers, was the one that was finally adopted.
Beall, who had been commissioned Acting Master of the Con
federate navy early in the War, had proposed in Richmond a
scheme for the capture of the Mi chip; an as early as 1862, but
at that time the plan did not seem feasible because of
possible antagonism to Canadian authorities. He, along with
other Confederates, especially Bennett G, Burley who was to
later become his chief lieutenant in the scheme to capture the
Michigan, first worked in the Chesapeake Bay area. It was
Icastleman, Active Service, p. I6l.
^3
tt
kk
t h e i r duty to d e t e r Union sh ipp ing ; however, they were
even tua l ly captured by the Union. La te r they were re turned
t o t h e Confederacy by process of p r i sone r exchange* Upon his
a r r i v a l i n Richmond, he aga in approached Confederate o f f i c i a l s
wi th h i s plan to capture the Michigan; again he was put off*
Hearing of the opera t ions i n s t i g a t e d by the commissioners,
e s p e c i a l l y Hines ' e x p l o i t s i n Chicago, he made h i s way
through the Union l i n e s to Canada where he l a i d h i s p lan
before Thompson and hoped to rece ive h i s approval* A few
days before h i s a r r i v a l . Captain Charles H. Cole, who
claimed to hold a commission in the Confederate army and
navy, had offered his s e rv i ces to the Confederate cause in
Canada, Upon accept ing B e a l l ' s p l an , which a lso received
Hines ' endorsement, Thompson assigned Cole to work wi th
Beall*
The two men made t h e i r way to Sandusky, Ohio, to lay
out t h e i r p lan of opera t ion* There they were joined by
Lieutenant Bennett H* Young, a young Confederate who was to
be more remembered for a l a t e r dar ing r a i d he led upon St*
Albans, Vermont. Young brought wi th him approximately
$25,000 from the Confederate commission for f inancing the
e n t e r p r i s e * Cole , B e a l l , and Young made a thorough i n
v e s t i g a t i o n of the Michigan, her schedule , and the a rea
p r o t e c t e d by her* In Co le ' s r e p o r t t o Thoirpson, he remarked
t h a t such po r t c i t i e s as Buffalo , D e t r o i t , and Cleveland,
which housed bulging Union a r s e n a l s , were poorly p ro tec ted*
ki
He added t ha t he had c l o s e l y i n v e s t i g a t e d shipping schedules
and va r ious tugs t h a t might be ava i l ab l e in the area in case
of need* He a l so repor ted tha t there would be l i t t l e
d i f f i c u l t y i n b r ing ing ve s se l s t o bea r against Camp Douglas
on Johnson ' s I s l a n d and tha t he had s o l i c i t e d and received
assurances of a id from the "Order of the Star" a t Sandusky.
He sa id t ha t he had made the acquaintance of Captain Ca r t e r ,
the commander of the Michigan, of whom he observed, "He i s
an unpol ished man, whose pr ide seems tobe touched for the
reason t h a t , having been an old United States naval o f f i c e r ,
he i s no t allowed now a more extensive f i e ld of operat ion* „2
I do no t th ink t h a t he can be bought . Prom t h i s r epo r t
and ensuing ac t ions Cole and B e a l l ' s plan of ac t ion might
be formulated a s fo l lows : the capture of the Michigan, to
remove i t as a poss ib le menace, a r e l e a s e of the p r i soners
of war on Johnson 's Is land in Sandusky Bay and poss ib ly in
o ther carps as w e l l , the conso l ida t ion of a force made up
p r ima r i l y of the r e l e a s e d p r i sone r s who were to march upon
the a r s e n a l s of Cleveland, thence to Wheeling and ac ross 3
the Southern line where reinforcements were sorely needed* No doubt desiring foimal authority before undertaking
neadley. Confederate Operations, pp* 232-233* •5
•^Kinchen, "St* Albans Raiders," p. 5# The last step is based upon information recorded in the general introductory statement.
ke
his plan. Cole dispatched the following communication to
Thompson from Sanduskyr
Hon* Jacob Thompsons
Sirr I have the honor to ask to be placed in secret detached service, in undertaking the capture of the gunboat Michigan at Johnson's Island. Combination can be made without infringing the neutrality laws of Canada. I send this by special messenger* An immediate answer requested*
CHARLES H. COLE, Captain, C. S* A*
To this, Thompson repliedr
Captain Charles H. Cole, Captain C* S. A* and Lieutenant C. S. Navy.
Sirr By the authority in me vested, specially trusting in your knowledge and skill, you are assigned to the secret detached service for the purpose mentioned in your letter* To aid you in this undertaking, John Y. Beall, master in the Confederate States Navy, has been directed to report to you for duty. In all you may do in the premises, you will carefully abstain from violating any laws or regulations of Canada or British authorities in relation to neutrality. The combination necessary to effect your purposes must be made by Confederate soldiers, with such assistance as you may draw from the enemy's country*
Your obedient servant, Jacob Thoupson^
With formal permission in his possession. Cole pro
ceeded wilh his part of the plan* Claiming to be a
^Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 233. Both of the communicated records quoted above were taken from Headley.
kl
Philadelphia banker he located himself at West House in San
dusky. He cultivated his acquaintance with Captain Carter
and solicited the friendship of the other officers of the crew
by entertaining them at "lavish but discreet" dinners gar
nished with the choicest of wines. Cole was often a welcome
guest on the Michigan and soon became friendly with the
engineer of the vessel with whom he made safe arrangements,
which certainly included monetary terms, to stall the ship
at a given time. After establishing solid relationships
aboard the ship. Cole found it quite easy to visit freely on
Johnson's Island where he could converse with the Confederate
officers who were prisoners of war there. These men were told
of the proposed capture of the Mchigan and agreed to incite
a revolt in the prison upon a set signal of gunfire from the
Michigan which would signify that the vessel was in Confed
erate hands. On the evening of September 19, the final stage
of Cole's scheme was set. He invited the officers of the
Michigan to be his guests for a special champagne dinner on
their own gunboat. Little did the Union officers suspect at
this point that their wine was to be drugged with a sleeping
potion. With this accomplished. Cole planned to wait for
Beall to arrive on a captured.vessel. Beall, by then, not
only would have received a dispatched message from Cole but
also would have seen an all clear signal that was to be sent
up from the gunboat as he approached.-^
^Headley, Confederate Operations, pp. 23i|.-235«
k8
Before Cole could keep h i s engagement aboard the
Michigan, he was a r r e s t e d in his ho te l room and confined to
await t r i a l . After Cole ' s a r r e s t a message was sent to
Clay and Thompson who immediately communicated on h i s behalf
wi th Colonel H i l l , commandait of the Union p r i son post on
Johnson ' s Is land* They p r o t e s t e d h is being charged as a
publ ic spy and i n s i s t e d tha t he should be regarded as a 6
r ecap tu red p r i sone r of war and t r e a t e d as such* Their
con ten t ion was ev iden t l y e f f e c t i v e , for Cole was eventua l ly
recognized as a recap tured pr isoner of war* He was conf in
ed t o no r the rn pr i sons u n t i l a f t e r the War, as a record of 7
his discharge was recorded on February 10, l866*
As was so often true of schemes planned by the
Confederate commission, the plot miscarried because of
information passed on to Union officials by someone who was
in the confidence of Thompson and the other commissioners
in Canada* This traitor to the Southern cause was later dis
covered to be Godfrey J* Hyams, of Arkansas, who because of
his position of trust was acquainted with many of the inner-
workings of the commission and was present at many of the 8
planning sessions*
^ O f f i c i a l Records, Se r i es I I , Vol . VII , p* 86I1. - -l e t t e r from Clay and Thompson to Colonel H i l l , September 22, l86[j..
'Headley, Confederate Operat ions , p* 2I4.O* o Horan, Confederate Agent, p . l57«
k9
Meanwhile B e a l l , not aware of the f a c t t ha t Cole ' s
p lans had m i s c a r r i e d , proceeded according to schedule . In
company with Bennett G. Burley, the Scotchman who had been
h i s a ide during the e a r l i e r opera t ions on Chesapeake Bay,
and e igh teen o the r Confederates , Beal l entered i n t o h is p a r t
of the opera t ion* Burley took passage aboard the Philo
Parsons , a steamer which p l i e d i t s course r e g u l a r l y between
D e t r o i t and Sandusky, and made arrangements with Ashley, the
owner of the v e s s e l , to s t o p the next morning a t Sandwich, a
small i s l a n d on the Canadian s ide of the l ake , so tha t four
of h i s f r i ends might take passage to Sandusky. After t h i s
was accomplished, the other men qui te inconspicuously board
ed the v e s s e l a t Amherstburg with only a trunk as luggage.
About k P»Di. the steamer reached Ke l l ey ' s I s l a n d . After the
v e s s e l embarked from the i s l a n d . Captain Beal l exclaimed
t h a t he was taking "possess ion of the boat in the name of the
Confederate S t a t e s and t h a t any man who r e s i s t e d would do so
a t h i s own p e r i l * " The crew and passengers , with navy s i x e s ,
taken from the old t runk the Confederates had brought on
board , f l a sh ing in t h e i r f a c e s , surrendered immediately*
Heavy f r e i g h t was thrown overboard so that the deck would be
c l ea red for a c t i o n a t Johnson 's Is land* Beal l was headed
fo r Middle Bass I s l a n d , where he planned to r e f u e l a f t e r
being assured by tbs engineer and the mate tha t there was not
enough fue l to run for any l eng th of t i L e . The i s l and was
ten mi les from the Ohio shore and the same d is tance from
"^BOCrX^^^"^'^*^ — ^ ' ^ " - - «
50
Johnson's Island. While they were taking on the wood, the
Island Queen, on its regular daily run between the Bass
Islands and Sandusky, approached and was seized in the name
of the Confederacy. In a slight skirmish which ensued,
several shots were fired before the crew and passengers
surrendered* The engineer was wounded in the neck -- the
Union account of the incident indicated without the slightest
provocation. This account also pointed out that "several
other persons were knocked down and a large number were 9
struck with the butt end of pistols and with hatchets*"
The passengers and crew of both vessels were put ashore at
Middle Bass Island along with their luggage. One of the
passengers had eighty thousand dollars on his person, but
was not deprived of it* The Confederates assured the
passengers that "they wanted nothing from them, but that the
boats and their money we2?e a prize of war on the Lake and ,,10
would be appropriated accordingly* The Philo Parsons,
after taking on the fuel, towed the Island Queen out into
the Lake where she was scuttled and sent adrift* The
official Union report indicated that fortunately the vessel
drifted on a shoal before filling and was afterward rescued
and restored to working order*
Beall had expected to receive a message at Middle
Bass Island from Captain Cole and now found himself pro-
^Official Records, Series I, Vol. XLIII, Part II, p* 227.
l^Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 250.
51
ceeding without any advice whatsoever* No doubt, he was
looking eagerly for the set signal from the Michigan as he
reached the mouth of Sandusky Bay. Even though no signal
came, he sailed slowly and cautiously toward the Michigan,
whose bulk could be seen in the moonlight* The Confederate
crew, with the exception of Burley and one other, suddenly
approached Beall with mutinous intent* They declared that
they did not wish to go into battle without any of the
promises of Captain Cole fulfilled. The ship halted for a
parley and ultimately the seventeen mutineers signed the
following documentr
ON BOARD THE PHILO PARSONS, September 20, l86I|.*
We, the undersigned, crew of the aforesaid, take pleasure in expressing our admiration of gentlemanly bearing, skill, and courage of Captain John Y* Beall as a commanding officer and a gentleman, but believing and being well convinced that the enemy is already apprised of our approach, and is so well prepared that we cannot by possibility make it a success, and having already captured two boats, we respectfully decline to prosecute any further* -"-
Faced with downright mutiny, Beall had no choice but to
turn his captive vessel around and make his way back up
Lake Erie* Having removed everything of value from the
steamer, Beall scuttled the Philo Parsons at Sandwich,
^^Headley, Confederate Operations, pp * 250-251.
52
on the Canadian s ide , and the Confederate crew dispersed*
All of the men evaded a r r e s t except Burley, who was de
tained by Canadian o f f i c i a l s for an ext radi t ion t r i a l at the
demand of the United S t a t e s . He was held for some time a t
Toronto, with Federal o f f i c i a l s watching closely the pro
ceedings of the Canadian cour t . I t was not u n t i l February
of 1865 that the Canadian courts decided his case* They
ruled in favor of ex t r ad i t i on . Before he was sent to the
United S t a t e s , however, the decision was reversed as a
r e s u l t of Mason's plea to the Br i t i sh government. Burley, 12
much to the chagrin of the Union, was se t free in Canada*
Certainly Canadian-American re l a t ions were s t rained -^ \
because of the explo i t s of Beall and Cole on Lake Erie* I t
was d i f f i c u l t for the Canadians to take action one way or
the other* They showed every v i s ib le sign of co-operating
with the United S t a t e s , but they moved slowly and cautiously
because i t became qui te evident that there was much s e n t i
ment for the Confederate cause* Too, i t was d i f f i cu l t to
determine jus t how much, if any, the Confederates had evad
ed the n e u t r a l i t y laws, since they staunchly took a stand
tha t the plans for the capture of the Michigan had been
developed and carr ied out on American so i l and that no
Canadian was in any way involved* They explained away the
fac t tha t Confederates boarded the Philo Parsons from the
^^Headley, Confederate Operations, pp* 321-323.
53
Canadian por t s of Sandwich and Amherstburg, by showing that
they were not regular stops and that the vessel merely slow
ed down in order tha t the passengers might come aboard* Too,
they asked, why could not an American vessel be attacked by
Confederates whom England recognized as be l l ige ren t s? After
a l l , the Michig;an was carrying fourteen guns, th i r teen more
than s t ipu la t ed by t rea ty between the United States and
Great Br i t a in and she was being allowed by England to guard
Confederate prisoners* Were these not overt acts more t o be
condemned than the Confederate in tent ions? On the other
hand the Union of f i c ia l s quite strongly demanded the a r r e s t
of the gu i l ty pa r t i e s since there had been in the i r estima
t ion a breach of the Ashburton Treaty* They pointed out that
the plans for the expedition had been formulated in Canada,
tha t one of the vessels had even been scut t led frcxn a
B r i t i s h dock, that two of the pa r t i e s involved had been
a r res ted and taken before two Br i t i sh magistrates a t
Sandwich and were discharged without a formal examination*
Even though the Canadian a u t h o r i t i e s , who were believed to
be act ing in good fa i th upon d i rec t ion from Quebec, had
promptly res tored the steamer and the plundered property and
had expressed an earnest desire t o secure the gu i l ty pa r t i e s
and punish them, the whole episode l e f t a heated atmosphere
by a l l p a r t i e s concerned© The border c i t i e s of the United
Sta tes were again a ler ted to expect danger from the lake
region and f e l t a great amount of insecur i ty , as well they
^k
might, for Thompson already had instructed that a vessel, to
"fee manned by a crew under the command of Beall, be bought and
secretly equipped on the Lakes for the purpose of operating
another military expedition on Lake Erie*
For the contemplated expedition, the steamer Georgiana,
was purchased and elaborate plans were formulated* According
to an account given by Headley, who had been directed by
Thompson to join Beall's expedition, the plans were as
followsr Beall, after picking up his crew at different
points, would begin operations at the east end of Lake Erie*
He would, if possible, shell and capture Buffalo, or make
the authorities ransom the city* He would then capture
several other good steamers at Buffalo, destroying all of
them that he did not take at the wharf* Then the formed
fleet would capture the towns along the shore to Cleveland*
At each place a few additional Confederates would come aboard
in order to help man the boats* In the meantime the fleet
would have been split, shortly after leaving Buffalo, and
Beall would head west to Toledo, unless he had received
word by this time that the Michigan had left Johnson's
Island in order to restore order near Buffalo. If such were
the case he would head directly to Johnson's Island, release
the prisonsrs of war, and return to the eastern end of the
Lake where he would join in an attempt to capture the
Michigan. If the operation were successful, the Confederates
would control the Lake. It was believed that within a week
55
sifter striking Buffalo, there would be a force of 300 to 1.00
Confederates on the Lake*
The plans were never carried out* In the first place,
the Union officials were fully aware of the purchase of the
Georgiana, which was reported to them on October 30, by R.
J. Kimball, United States Consular Agent in Canada*-^^ After
they detained the vessel and searched her thoroughly, they
watched her so closely that she could never be equipped
according to plan* Besides that, the United States alerted
for possible attack all points on the Lake as well as all
tugs in the area* With such close surveillence imposed, the
last elaborate enterprise which would have involved an
attempt to capture the Michigan and gain control of the
Lakes and their Federal ports was abandoned, and the
Georgiana was sold without delay* Another series of enter
prises planned by the commission had ended in fiasco. Two
of the key figures. Cole and Burley, were lost to the cause*
Still the commission pressed on with other schemes*
^^Official Records. Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p* 551.
CHAPTER IV
THE COTFEDERATE RAID INTO VERMONT
While t h e Union o f f i c i a l s were s t i l l ana lyz ing the
e f f e c t s and t h e p o s s i b l e consequences of the a t t empted
s e i z u r e of t h e Michigan on September 19 and the proposed
c a p t u r e of J o h n s o n ' s I s l a n d t o r e l e a s e the p r i s o n e r s of war,
a n o t h e r p l o t was under way "v^ich was t o r e c e i v e more
n o t o r i e t y t h a n any o t h e r o v e r t a c t of t h e Confedera te
r e f u g e e s i n Canada. At l e a s t one man c l o s e l y connected wi th
t h e commiss ioners , George N. S a n d e r s , had c o n s t a n t l y p-ressed
f o r p r o j e c t e d r a i d s i n t o the Nor thern s t a t e s i n o rde r t o
p l u n d e r as r e t a l i a t i o n f o r s i m i l a r a c t s t a k i n g p l ace i n the
Sou th . Thompson, as w e l l as H ines , Headley, and Cast leman,
c o n s i s t e n t l y o b j e c t e d t o such schemes. Thompson observed
t h a t such a c t s , a l t hough perhaps v a l u a b l e , would prove
" e m b a r r a s s i n g " t o t h e Confedera tes i n Canada, e s p e c i a l l y i f
t h e y shou ld be deemed as a b r each of Canadian n e u t r a l i t y and
cou ld be t r a c e d to the commiss ioners , who would t hen s t a n d a
chance of b e i n g a r r e s t e d , t r i e d , and e x t r a d i t e d t o t h e
Uni ted S t a t e s * N o n e t h e l e s s , when Benne t t H* Young, a n o t h e r
member of General Morgan 's b r i g a d e , who had made good h i s
escape from a Nor the rn p r i s o n e r of war camp, sought out Clay
and proposed a p l a n f o r r e t a l i a t o r y r a i d s a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r ,
he r e c e i v e d encouragement . Sanders l a t e r den ied under oa th
t h a t he knew a n y t h i n g abou t Young's r a i d o r any o the r r a i d
u n t i l a f t e r i t o c c u r r e d ? y e t the v e r y f a c t t h a t Clay had
56
57
heard Sanders' views on the subject and was peevish enough
to disregard admonitions from Thompson would have been some
incentive for him to give endorsement to Young's plan.
Whether or not Sanders was directly involved may
never be known; however, that Clay was involved was certain,
although it was difficult to discern to what extent* Headley
reported in his account of the raid that he had been present
in Thompson's rooms at the Queen's Hotel in Toronto a few
days after* the raid when Clay visited him and took full
credit for sanctioning the raid* Also in an unsigned
letter to Secretary of State Benjamin, which had been
identified as having been written by Clay ten days after the
raid. Clay reviewed his first meeting with Young in Halifax
in May of l86i|., shortly after the Commissioner's arrival to
assume his duties in Canada, and at least indicated his
awareness of and approval of Young's plan* In the com
munication he statedr
After having satisfied me that his heart was with us in our struggle and that he had suffered imprisonment for many months as a soldier of the Confederate army fran which he had escaped, he developed his plan for retaliating some of the injuries and outrages inflicted upon the South.
I thought these feasible and fully warranted by the law of the nations and therefore recommended him and his plans to the Secretary of War* He was sent back /from Richmond/ by the Secretary of War with a commission as Second Lieutenant to execute his plans and purposes, but to report to Hon. /no doubt a reference to
^Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 25^*
58
Jacob Thompsor^ and myself* . . .Finally, disappointed in his original purpose and in all the subsequent enterprises projected, he proposed to return to the Confederate States via Halifax, but passing through the New England States and burning some towns and robbing them of whatever he could convert to the use of the Confederate Government. This I approved as justifiable retaliation. . . *
My instructions to him, oft repeated, were "to destroy whatever was valuable; not to stop to rob, but if, after firing a town, he could seize and caj?ry off money or treasury or bank notes, he might do so, upon condition that they were delivered to the proper authorities of the Confederate states 9
In the Canadian trial which followed the raid. Clay's
connection with the raid was constantly alluded to in terms
which would indicate that he knew of it and approved of it
at least verbally* Sanders even produced a document
supposedly written by Clay which readr "Your suggestion for
a raid on accessible towns in Vermont commencing with St*
Albans is approved* You are authorized and required to act
in conformity with that suggestion." Under close question
ing, however, Sanders admitted that to his knowledge at the
time of the raid no fonnal orders had been written and
signed. One would assume that the above quoted document
was either written later to confirm an oral approval as a
precautionary measure or that the document was forged, a
contention held by one source*-^ Whether or not Clay had
91ij--9l5* 3
^ O f f i c i a l Records . Series I , Vol* XLIII , Par t I I , pp*
Horan, Confederate A^ent. p* 2.k9
59
written a document which approved the raid before it took
place, it seemed quite clear that he had exercised his
authority at least orally and that Young entered into his
scheme feeling assured that he had the approval for his act
and would be regarded as a commissioned Confederate officer
carrying out his orders* Whatever the case may have been,
plans for the raid materialized and were carried out in such
a fashion that both the United States and Canada were
electrified by the results.
As stated in Clay's letter of Novenbo? 1, Young had
participated in other enterprises from Canada only to be
disappointed in their outcome. There were, however, some
values attached to these enterprises which consisted of
participating in Hines' expedition to Chicago during the
Democratic convention, serving as liaison officer between
Cole and Thompson in the Michigan affair, and attempting,
without success, to gather adequate forces to attack Cajnp
Chase in Ohio in order to free prisoners of war* According
to Young's own testimony it was at Chicago that he first
aired his plans and developed them to such an extent that he
interested some of the Confederates enough that they wanted
to join him. In the other two instances he also sought out
trusted men who were willing to participate in the raid*
Thus, the other enterprises, at least provided Young with the
men he needed for the undertaking of raids into the North*^
^Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 258*
60
Young had a definite reason for wishing to do to
Northern villages, at least in some measure, what had been done
to Southern villages* Shortly after the raid he related to
some of his friends what had happened in his home county,
Jassimine, Kentucky, when Union soldiers raided and plundered
at the outbreak of the War* It seemed that the young lady
Young planned to marry was the victim of outrageous insult
by Federal troops and died later as a result of the shock*
With this atrocity fresh on his mind, he immediately enlist
ed in the Confederate army ready to "seek vengeance" upon
the perpetrators of the deed*
After his first conference with Clay, Young traveled
into northern New York and Vermont in order to select the
town that would be raided first* He chose St. Albans,
Vermont, a village of about four thousand people, located
eighteen miles below the Canadian border. He considered the
village the proper size to be sacked by his small band of
approximately twenty Confederates. By early October the
preliminary actions of the raid were well under way*
After his return to Clay's headquarters for a general
kinchen, "St. Albans Raid," p* 9.
The account of the raid itself is primarily based upon Kinchen's account. Chapter II, "The Raid Upon St. Albans," pp. II4.-29. However, specific references are made to official records and other accounts according to footnotes. Too, many of Dr. Kinchen's points are corroborated by such accounts.
61
conference. Young and several of his men reg is te red a t
ho te l s in St* J o ^ s near the border and began studying the
area , no doubt, in order to work out the plans for the
r a id down t o the l a s t d e t a i l . On October 15, Young and two
of his men took rooms at the Tremont Hotel in S t . Albans,
and that same afternoon two other agents checked in a t the
American House. The next day three more arrived at the
American House. Assuming the ro le of members of a Canadian
sportsmen's club, the well-dressed and charming-mannered
young men went about l e i su re ly observing the habi t s of the
c i t i z e n s , locating the banks and possible places where
horses might be acquired for the i r get away, and chatt ing
casual ly with the v i l l age r s — especia l ly the shop-keepers*
Since t h e i r suave appearance and manners afforded them no
suspicion, they ascer tained how well armed the local c i t i zens
were by making attempts to borrow guns for a projected hunt
in the a rea . Young even cal led a t the residence of Governor
Gregory Smith and was granted permission to inspect the
grounds and s t a b l e s . I t was l a t e r learned t ha t a par t of
the plan was to burn the Governor's home in r e t a l i a t i o n for
a similar a t r o c i t y committed by the Federals in Virginia*
This par t of the plan, however, miscarr ied. On October l8
and 19, the r e s t of Young's men a r r ived , a few at a t ime,
and were given l a s t minute ins t ruc t ions*
At three o'clock on the afternoon of the nineteenth
the r a ide r s showed themselves on the s t r e e t s of S t . Albans,
62
according t o Headley, i n Confederate uniforms**^ They
promptly put t h e i r p lans i n t o ope ra t i on . Young and s i x or
seven o the r Confederates p a t r o l l e d the s t r e e t s i n the
v i c i n i t y of the three v i l l a g e banks, a l l of which were
loca ted on the west s ide of Main S t r ee t and n e a r l y opposite
to the v i l l a g e green* The r e s t of the men divided in to
groups of four or f ive each , proceeded to the banks as
Young dec la red to v i l l a g e r s in f ront of the American House
tha t he was a Confederate s o l d i e r who had been sent to take
the town*
Ins ide the Bank of St* Albans, Thomas C o l l i n s , Marcus
Spurr , Squire Teavis , and two o thers pointed t h e i r revolvers
a t the t e l l e r , Cyrus Bishop, who was counting and s o r t i n g
paper money. The nervy t e l l e r dar ted i n t o the d i r e c t o r ' s
room only to be overtaken and forced with the other employees
to c o - o p e r a t e . As the r a i d e r s placed money and s e c u r i t i e s
i n t h e i r haversacks and coat pocke t s , Coll ins answered
Bishop ' s inqu i ry of who they were and what t h e i r purpose was
by sayingr "We are Confederate s o l d i e r s d e t a i l e d from
General B a r l e y ' s army to come nor th and rob and p lunder , the
same as your s o l d i e r s are doing in the Shanandoah Valley and
in o the r p a r t s of the South* We ' l l take your money and if
you r e s i s t , w e ' l l blow your b r a i n s o u t . " When a d e p o s i t o r ,
Samual Breck, came in wi th $390 to pay on a n o t e , h i s money
'Headley, Confederate Opera t ions , p* 259a
63
was seized even though he protested that the men should not
take private property* The reply to this was that Grant,
Sherman, and Sheridan did not respect private property*
Collins, v4io was guarding the prisoners and loudly informing
them of the atrocities that had been committed against
Southerners, administered, as his finale, an oath of
allegiance to the Confederate States in which his victims
were forced to raise their right hands and swear to uphold
the Confederacy, its president, and its cause, and not to
tell anyone of the raid for two hours after their departure.
With reports of gunfire from the street the raiders left
the bank, taking with them a sum of #73>522*.
At the same time the Franklin Bank was entered by
William H* Huntley and three others* After a preliminary
exchange of greenbacks for gold with a customer, an act
performed to engage the cashier, Marcus Beardsley, in
conversation, one of the other raiders in complete silence
stepped forward and pointed his pistol at the cashier*
Another employee named Clark lunged for the door but was
forced back into the vault by one of the alert Confederates. Q
After taking approximately $70,000 in hard cash,^ bank notes .
o Edward A* Bowles, "History of St. Albans Raid," p.
12 of Annual Address to Vermont Historical Society delivered on October 17, I876* The amount taken was quoted there*
^Ibid*, p* Ik.
61
and greenbacks, the raiders forced Beardsley to join Clark
in the vault and made their exit to the street.
One more bank, the First National Bank, was slated
for a Confederate visitation* Caleb Wallace, a nephew of
Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and George McGrorty,
a thirty-seven year old cowhand from Texas, were among the
four men who entered the bank. They approached the cashier,
Albert Sowles, demanding bank notes, greenbacks, government
bonds, and other securities. The only other occupant of the
bank when the men entered was an elderly deaf man of ninety
who made the observation that the young men seemed to him to
be rude in manners. As the raiders made a rush for the door,
with the confiscated $58,000, they ran headlong into Bill
Blaisdell, who, after being tersely told what was going on,
grabbed Wallace and threw him dovn the steps to the ground
and then pounced on him* With several pistols pointed at
his head, Blaisdell elected to give up his fight and join
the other prisoners that had by this tims been gathered by
Young and his men on the village green across the street.
Young, who had busied himself directing the whole
operation, and the others were patrolling the streets during
the looting. They were aware of the fact that just a few
blocks away in the railroad shops several able-bodied men
could be contacted who could easily rout them. Thus the
10 Edward A. Bowles, "History of St* Albans Raid," p* 11*
65
loo te rs ha l ted a l l people who walked along the main s t r ee t
and detained them in the v i l lage green un t i l they were ready
to leave* As the ra iders emerged from the three banks, they
located the horses they had spotted e a r l i e r and made the i r
way down the main s t r ee t*
As the men were r id ing out of the v i l l age , they
attei!?)ted to set f i r e to the town by hurling the f i f ty- four
previously-prepared bo t t l e s of Greek f i r e against the walls
of t h e b u i l d i n g s along Main Street* Minutes l a t e r flames
burs t for th only to f l i cke r out for the most par t shortly
a f te r the ra iders l e f t town* I t was learned l a t e r that
only a woodshed was actual ly burned to the ground*
I t was not long before the v i l l agers who were gather
ing from a l l d i rec t ions with whatever arms they had available
were r a l l i e d under the leadership of Captain George F. Conger,
a young cavalry off icer of nineteen -who had jus t returned
from the front* Gunshots were pouring from several of the
windows even before the band could make i t out of town* The
maurauders, although cautioned to "Keep cool" by Yo\mg,
f i red in to the crowds* Miraculously only one man, El las
Morrison, an out-of-town contrac tor , who i ron ica l ly was a
Southern sympathizer, was f a t a l l y wounded by the r a i d e r ' s
f i r e* More than one r a i d e r , i t was l a t e r found, was wound
ed, one ser ious ly enough tha t he was kept in a Southern
sympathizer 's home near S t . Albans u n t i l he was able to
t r ave l t o Montreal where he l a t e r died* As a par t ing token
66
Young l e f t behind upon the s t r ee t a proclamation, which he
probably planned to read to the gathered c i t i zenry on the
v i l l age green. The document was called by one who examined
i t "a h ighfa lu t in address to the people of Vermont, in the
s ty le of Southern chiva l ry ." Shortly a f te r the ra iders
departed. Conger r a l l i e d forty townspeople into a posse and
a chase ensued.
Conger's posse gained on the Confederates a f te r they
hal ted a t Sheldon where they intended to rob the bank and
f i r e some buildings with Greek f i r e* They found the bank
closed, and b ef ore they could do any damage, they rea l ized
tha t Conger and his men were close behind* Another delay
in t h e i r f l i g h t loomed ahead at a covered bridge where a
farmer was crossing with a load of hay* As soon as they
were able to reach the other side, they stopped the farmer,
placed his wagon crosswise on the br idge, and set f i r e t o i t *
Conger's men experienced a considerable delay as a r e s u l t
of t h i s act , and some of the posse began to f a l t e r* Conger,
however, made a snap decision to follow the ra iders into
Canada and found twenty-two wi l l ing followers* Four miles
across the border , the posse learned that the fugi t ives had
already broken up in to small groups and had scat tered Into
d i f fe ren t d i rect ions* Conger, af ter making an appeal to
Canadian o f f i c i a l s for help , went back to the American side
where he held a n ight parley* At dawn, jus t af ter a de
c i s ion was made by his group to go back into Canada
67
and they were approaching Freligsburg, a messenger approached
with a dispatch from Major General John Dix, commander of the
Department of the East, in which he directed that "in case
the marauders are found on our side of the line, to pursue
them, if necessary, into Canada, and destroy them*"
Although approximately seven of the maurauders, who
were able to make good their escape, evidently had most of
the money. Young learned that several of his men were being
held by Canadian officials and intended to give himself up
and make their cause his, since he carried the official
commission for the raid. Before he was able to make his way
to Canadian headquarters, while he was resting at a farm
house, irate St. Albans citizens caught him unarmed and
seized him, and proceeded toward the United States border*
Luckily for Young, Canadian officials approached as his
attempt to make good an escape was failing. They assured the
Americans that those men already captured were to be sent to
St. Albans the next day and that it would be just as ex
pedient for Young to be housed with them at Freligsburg*
To his relief. Young found upon his arrival at Freligsburg
that no such arrangements had been made©
From this point on, a court hassle, directly or in
directly connected with the raid, was to be carried on among
^•^Official Records. Series I, Vol. XLIII, Part II, pp. l|20-li-23* Letter from Dix to Secretary of War Stanton, Governor Smith, and various Union officials in the area of St* Albans *
68
Canadian, American, and Confederate officials* These court
12
proceedings were to last even until after the War was over*
The issue was essentially one of whether the raiders should
be extraditdd to the United States as robbers and murderers
under the tenth article of the Ashburton Treaty that had
been negotiated between the United States and Canada in
l8i . The key question revolved around the fact that
Britain recognized the Confederates as belligerents and
could, if its courts so decided, rule that the Confederates
were acting as soldiers and commissioned officers of their
government* Of course, the Federal government considered
the Southerners as insurrectionists who had no rights under
international law* The issue was further complicated by the
fact that positive proof must be presented to the Canadian
courts that the Confederates were officially commissioned
to make the raid* With these complicated questions to be
resolved, a series of trials ensued*
The court cases evolved from the local level to the
highest Canadian courts* Judge Coursol, who was authorized
by the Governor-General to examine the prisoners in
compliance with the treaty, removed the case from the local
Justices of peace and proceeded with the case in St* Johns*
When the trial convened on October 22, the defense, through
^^The brief summary which follows the events surrounding the trials is capsuled frcr. Chapters III-XII, pp* 3O-I52 of Kinchen manuscript.
69
the efforts of Sanders, engaged as its chief counsel the
able .John J. C* Abbott, formerly solicitor general for
Canada East and later prime minister of the Dominion of
Canada. Other interests represented with able staffs of
attorneys were the United States, the Canadian government,
the Supreme Court of Vermont, the State of Vermont, and the
looted banks of St. Albans. Taking advantage of the
antagonism already felt in Canada, because of the previous
order for American troops to pursue the raiders into Canada,
rumors were started that General Dix was sending an armed
force into Canada to remove the prisoners from the juris
diction of the province* The desired result of these rumors,
which was ultimately accomplished on October 27, was to get
the hearing moved farther into Canada, to Montreal, away
from the border and in an area sympathetic to the Southern
cause. After a delay of thirty days granted to the Con
federates so that they might acquire from Richmond papers
proving that the raid had been officially authorized by the
Confederate government, the trial resumed and Coursol dis
missed the case on ths grounds that as a local magistrate
he had no jurisdiction in such matters.
The raiders were briefly to taste freedom, and
several of them were to vanish from the scene through various
avenues of escape with much of the money irtiich was released
to the Confederates upon their dismissal* After some delay,
however, the United States Counsel, suspecting collusion.
70
between the Confederates and some of the Canadian o f f i c i a l s ,
was successful in acquiring warrants for the r e a r r e s t of the
fugi t ives* When news of the p r i soner ' s re lease reached the
United S t a t e s , Dix a^ain took steps by issuing an order
on December Ik s imi lar to the one issued in October au thor i
zing the pursu i t into Canada of any other ra iders coming from
Canada in to the United S t a t e s * ^ If the order had been
obeyed, i t possibly would have added great tension to the
ex i s t ing feel ing between Canada and the United S t a t e s , to
such an extent tha t war might have followed* Shortly af ter
a duplicate of Dix's orders reached Washington, by order of
the Pres ident , that par t viiich was considered offensive to ^k Canada was toned down* Considerable tension between the
two governments had already grown as a r e su l t of the order
even TPefore i t could be rescinded. The Canadians, too, r e
cognized the need for saving the feel ings of the United
Sta tes because of the untimely dismissal of the r a i d e r s j
thus , they o f f i c i a l l y reprimanded Coursol and Chief of Police
Lamonthe, both of whom had been closely connected with the
abrupt r e l e a s e , for t h e i r ind i sc ree t actions and co-operated
in the r e - a r r e s t of as many of the fugi t ives as could be
^3off ic ia l Records, Series I , Vol. XLIII, Part I I , p* 789, General Orders No. 97 released December Ikf 18614-*
• ^ I b i d . , pp. 793-300. Part of the order revoked by General Orders No. 100, December 17, 18614..
71
tracked down* The case was placed in the hands of Judge
James Smith, one of the justices of the superior court at
Montreal*
Young and the only four other fugitives to be
apprehended were brought to Judge Smith's Superior Court on
December 27, this time to be charged with a specific case of
robbery of Samuel Breck, the depositor whose personal money
had been taken at the Bank of St* Albans on the day of the
raid* The specific charge of robbery had been brought since
it was assumed that only under such circumstances would
extradition result* Again the Confederate counsel requested
a delay in order to attempt to attain needed documents from
Richmond. It was made clear that all previous attempts to
get through the Federal lines had been thwarted. A thirty
day postponement was granted and several brave attempts to
attain the needed evidence followed. It was not until four
days after the court reconvened on February 10, that mes
sengers successfully completed the trip with the needed
documents. On March 29, Judge Smith presented his final
decision in the case which concurred primarily with the
Southern viewpoint that as a belligerent, the Confederacy
had a right to pursue proper courses of warfare* Although
the chargr was dismissed, the prisoners were again led to
prison to await subsequent charges. On April 5, Judge
Smith discharged the prisoners and ordered that their
personal belongings be restored. He assured his listeners
72
"that no court in Canada could again entertain a demand for
extradition of these Confederate raiders, because the case
l5 had been 'disposed of on the broadest general ground*' "
The raiders' liberation was short lived, for they
were immediately re-arrested by a peace officer from Toronto,
and taken there to stand trial under the indictment of the
Grand Jury of that city* They, as well as the Confederate
commissioners, Thompson and Clay, and their secretary, W*W.
Cleary, were to stand trial for violation of the neutrality
laws of Canada. Thompson and Clay were not to be found*
Young and Cleary were the only ones who were ultimately held
in custody* Later they were released on bond but had to wait
five months before any action was takoi. During this time
the War ended and the interest in the case subsided; even
key witnesses disappeared* All of the other raiders had
already disappeared from the scene. Finally on October 27,
1865, Young and Cleary were released from their bonds and
were free to leave the city. Thus came to an end one of
the most famous court episodes having its genesis in the
Civil War*
The whole episode, the raid and the trials which
followed, led to several trying moments for all of the
governments concerned. The immediate desired effect of the
raid, panic along the frontier, was accomplished by the
• •''Kinchen, "St. Albans Raid," p. ii|.9
73
Confederates* The raiders were not successful, however, in
diverting a large number of troops frcm the main battlefields
of the War* Nor could it be said that they very effectively
retaliated for the many raids which had taken place in the
South* Certainly they were successful in causing tense
relations between the United States and England if that
were one of their goals. All in all, it would be hard to
assess much value to the raid itself;: however, the trials
certainly proved that there was much sympathy among the
Canadians for the gentlemanly Southerners. Too, the raid
added monetarily to the coffers of the Confederacy. The
raid itself served as a stop-gap measure before the elaborate
operations planned by the Commissioners to attempt once more
a successful separation of the Northwest from the Union
during the Presidential election and to do as much other
damage at that time as possible*
CHAPTER V
CONFEDERATE REFUGEES AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTICN
OF 18614.
As the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n of I86I4. drew n e a r , the
commiss ioners and t h o s e c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th t h e i r p l a n s
of o p e r a t i o n i n Canada a g a i n c o n c e n t r a t e d upon a c o - o r d i n a t e d
movement w i t h t h e Sons of L i b e r t y * This time n o t on ly the
Northwest b u t t h e N o r t h e a s t was t o be invo lved i n a cha in of
e v e n t s des igned t o cause a complete c o l l a p s e of t he Union*
This scheme was by f a r the most e l a b o r a t e of a l l t h a t had
been p lanned so f a r by t h e commission* Chicago was t o be
c a p t u r e d and a n o t h e r a t tempt was t o be made t o r e l e a s e the
p r i s o n e r s of war a t Camp Douglas and at Rock I s l a n d . The
c i t i e s of New York, Boston, and C i n c i n n a t i were to be burned*
Cap t a in Thomas B. Hines who p lanned the whole o p e r a t i o n and
p r e s e n t e d I t t o Thompson f o r a p p r o v a l , was aga in t o command
the o p e r a t i o n i n Chicago u s i n g the same men as he had w i t h
him i n Augus t . Colone l G* S t . Leger G r e n f e l , an E n g l i s h
a d v e n t u r e r who had been Genera l Morgan's A d j u t a n t - G e n e r a l ;
Co lone l Vincen t Marmaduke, t h e b r o t h e r of the Confedera te
g e n e r a l ; R icha rd T. Semnes, b r o t h e r of the Confedera te
a d m i r a l ; L i e u t e n a n t J . J* B e t t e r s w o r t h ; and L i e u t e n a n t
George F a s t e n were among those who accompanied Hines t o
C h i c a g o . B r i g a d i e r Genera l C h a r l e s Walsh of the Sons of
L i b e r t y was a g a i n i n charge of t h e c o - o p e r a t i n g t roops of the
7k
mg^g^mm,^,
75
Order in Illinois* In New York, Colonel Robert M* Martin,
with Lieutenant John W* Headley second in command, was to
direct the activities of the Confederates with the assistance
of Fernando Wood; James A. McMasters, editor of the Freeman's
Journal; and a Mr. Horton, all of whom were leaders of the
Copperhead movement in New York. Detachments under Captain
Churchill in Cincinnati and Dr. Luke Blackburn in Boston
were to lead a movement to set fire to those cities*
To prepare the way for the capture of Chicago, rumors
had been circulated by the Sons of Liberty that many days
previous to the election an armed force was to be used by
the Federal government on election day to prevent a
Democratic victory* This served as a good excuse for the
men to carry arms and gather in small groups to organize
the planned insurrection* As had been true of each planned
enterprise, the Federal government was aware of the conplete
Confederate plot* Not only was there an informer, Godfrey
J* Hyams, in the confidence of the commissioners in Canada
who could tell the Union officials of the complete operation,
but also there was a prisoner of war, J. T. Shanks, who
supposedly escaped from Camp Douglas but who actually was
released to join the activities in Chicago for the purpose
of keeping the Federal government informed* Shank's primary
object was to find out where Hines was hiding in the city
Headley, Confederate Operatians^ p* 2614.*
76
and to find out as much as possible about the inner operation*
After Shank's escape was arranged by the commander of Camp
Douglas, Colonel B. J. Sweet, he made his way to the hotel
room of Colonel Marmaduke* After finding that he could not
discover from him Hines' whereabouts, a well-guarded secret,
he said that he would return the next evening to "learn their
plans." Meanwhile the Confederates had been alerted that
Shanks could not be trusted. Hines called a meeting of his
band on the eve of the election at the home of a prominent
Copperhead, Judge Buckner S. Morris* The message informing
him of the meeting was not received by one of the Confederates,
Lieutenant Bettersworth, \tio was out of his room at Richmond
House when a messenger arrived. Shanks, although no one
knows how he found out about it, arrived at the meeting but
not before Hines concealed himself in the next room* After
a cool reception from those present, he excused himself only
to seek out Bettersworth, win his confidence by saying he was
sent to take him to Hines, and succeed in loosening his
tongue with peach brandy* By midnight. Shanks knew the
whole plan, the name and whereabouts of each raider,
especially the carefully guarded infoimation that Hines would
2 be spending the n igh t a t the home of Dr* Edward W* Edwards. After Sweet rece ived Shanks' r e p o r t , he decided to a r r e s t
^Horan, Confederate Agent, pp* 189-190*
77
the Confederates as well as the Copperhead leaders immediately*
Sweet, in explaining his hasty actions, made ttB following
observations in his official report to Brigadier-General
James B* Fry, Provost-Marshal-General, in Washington?
* * . i t was manifest that they had the means of gathering a force considerably larger than the l i t t l e garrison then guarding between 8,000 and 9,000 prisoners of war at Camp Douglas, and that taking advantage of the excitement and the large number of persons who would ordinarily f i l l the streets on election night, they intended to make a night attack on and surprise this camp, release and arm the prisoners of war, cut the telegraph wires, bum the railroad depots, seize the banks and stores containing arms and ammunition, take possession of the city, and commence a campaign for the release of other prisoners of war in the States of Illinois and Indiana, thus organizing an army to effect and give success to the general uprising so long contemplated by the Sons of Liberty*
By deferring action t i l l the night of Monday, the 7th instant, probably all the officers and leaders and many more of the men and arms of the expedition might have been captured, and more home rebels exposed, but such delay would have protracted the necessary movements and attending excitement into the very day of the Presidential election. The great interests involved scarcely justify taking the inevitable risks of postponement*-^
Although most of the would-be insurrectionists were taken
into custody and their ammunition stores confiscated, a few
managed to escape* Even Shanks was taken into custody, an
action, no doubt, perpetrated for his own protection* Among
those who escaped, however, was the biggest prize of a l l .
1078-1079. ^Official Records. Series I, Vol. XLV, Part I, pp.
^•:^.'^-iL:^^i,csf<>-mt^mtttammimmi^ammimiimn ntvn •mMmntitaimim ^^^tj^,,j^^t,Mimmmmttmmmitit^
78
Hine s »
The s t o r y of Hines ' escape was v i v i d l y s e t down by k Castleman. The n igh t of the a r r e s t s Dr. Edwards, who had
been aroused by s teps and voices of troops surrounding h i s
house, q u i e t l y awakened Hines without even d i s tu rb ing
MsETmaduke, who s l e p t in the same room. Hines, th ink ing
qu ick ly , a s c e r t a i n e d i f there was a box spr ing mat t ress in
the house» Learning t h a t Mrs. Edwards, who was i l l , was
s leep ing on one, he and the doctor hollowed out a place for
him to s l i p i n to* Thus, he concealed himself u n t i l a f t e r
the house had been searched and Marmaduke had been taken in to
custody* The next day Hines suggested tha t Edwards c i r c u l a t e
the rumor t ha t h i s wife was worse and not expected to l i v e
in hopes tha t such an ac t would b r i n g seve ra l c a l l e r s to the
house which was heav i ly guarded by Federa l t r o o p s . Ju s t as
Hines had suspected , s eve ra l c a l l e r s came t o inqui re ahoulfc
Mrs. Edwards, and he was able t o s l i p out under the umbrella
of one of the concerned v i s i t o r s * He evaded troops and made
h i s way out of the c i t y by t r a i n to Cinc innat i* Not yet was
the s l i p p e r y Hines out of danger* He went i n to hiding in
C inc inna t i a t the home of Mr. and Mrs* Sam P* Thomas,
" in tense Southerners" and " t r u s t e d f r i ends of Captain Hines*"
A p lan was pe r fec ted whereby he would conceal himself in a
c l o s e t t h a t was b u i l t behind another c l o s e t should troops
^Castleman, Active Se rv i ce , pp . 192-195•
79
approach the house in search of him* One of the dress re
hearsal sessions of concealing himself with split-second
timing became reality when troops approached* They had
been told of Hines' whereabouts, it seems, by the alert
Union spy system, but again the well-concealed Hines was not
discovered* Soon Hines made his way from Ohio through the
enemy lines to Richmond to make a full report on the recent
fiasco in Chicago that he had so hoped would change the
whole complexion of the War*
Colonel Martin, who was in command of the New York
operation. Lieutenant John Headley, his second in command,
and six other carefully selected Confederates among whom
were Captain Robert C* Kennedy of Louisiana, Lieutenants
John T* Ashbrook and James T. Harrington of Kentucky, John
Price of Maryland, and James Chenault of Kentucky, arrived
in New York ten days prior to the election and took rooms at
different hotels under assumed names* Before the band left
Canada, Colonel Thompson had informed Martin that a Confed
erate agent. Captain Longmire of Missouri, had already made
initial preparations for the execution of the plans and that
he had set up contact with James A* McMasters, the proprietor
and editor of the Freeman' s Journal with whom Martin was to
make contact upon arrival in New York. Colonel Martin was
^Headley, Confederate Operations, pp. 261j.-283* The following account is based primarily upon Headley's eyewitness description of the New York procedure*
80
to ld tha t about 20,000 men wer® enl i s ted in New York under
a complete organization and that they were armed and ex
pected to follow Confederate leadership when the time came
to take possession of the city* The Copperhead leaders
suggested as the f i r s t s tep in capturing the c i t y se t t ing
f i r e to several cen t ra l ly located buildings in order to
cause milling crowds in the s t r e e t s and to d ive r t the
Federal troops from the United States Sub-treasury building
and a l l other government propert ies which were to be taken*
Greek f i r e was being prepared for the se t t ing of the f i r e s*
The pr isoners at Fort Lafayette were to be released and
united with the combined Confederate-Copperhead forces*
The plan was to be put in to effect on the afternoon of the
elect ion* McMasters informed Martin and Headley at one of
the planning meetings that an agreement had been cornpleted
with Governor Seymour whereby he would not send s ta te
m i l i t i a to suppress the New York City insurrect ion, but
instead would remain neu t ra l and leave the suppression of
the revolut ion to the au tho r i t i e s a t Washington* He also
reported "that upon the success of the revolution" in the
c i t y , "a convention of delegates from New York, New Jersey,
and the New England States would be held in New York City to
form a Confederacy which would co-operate with the Confed-..6 era te States and Northwestern Confederacy*"
Headley, Confederate Operations, p* 267.
81
Two factors served to dampen the s p i r i t s of the
Copperhead leaders who eventually refused to take part in the
operation completely. F i r s t , Major-General Benjamin F*
Butler with a force of 10,000 soldiers was assigned to the
New York City area a few days before the e lect ion because of
mass p o l i t i c a l demonstrations which might lead to disorders
and also because of information that "disloyal movements"
were to take place on e lec t ion day* Second, when news came
in from Chicago report ing the a r res t s of the Copperhead
and Confederate leaders who were to lead the e lec t ion day
insurrec t ion the re , incentive was deflated even more* In
addi t ion i t became c lea r that tbs plans to burn Boston and
Cincinnati were also f rus t ra ted by informers* The Copper
head leaders refused to act in conjunction with the Con
federates since such a r i s k was now involved.
Martin knew that without Copperhead help i t would be
impossible to capture the c i t y ; nonetheless, he had promised
Thoii?)son tha t even if plans miscarried in the other c i t i e s ,
he would "hear from New York." He waited several days hoping
that a new date would be set for an uprising if Butler
should decide to depart* F ina l ly i t became apparent that
But ler would remain, and the more the Confederates ins i s t ed
upon act ion the weaker McMasters became. I t was at l a s t
decided by the Copperheads to give ^p the idea of revolution*
S t i l l Martin and h i s men did not want to leave without at
82
l e a s t g iv ing the c i t y a scare* They decided to go through
wi th p a r t of the plan which involved s e t t i n g f i r e to b u i l d
ings In Nev York C i t y . In t h a t way, they would a t l e a s t l e t
"the government a t Washington understand tha t burning homes
i n t h e South might f i n d a counterpar t i n the North ." Even
Longmire decided to leave the c i t y should t h i s be at tempted;
however, he gave Martin the address of the man who was making
the Greek f i r e before he l e f t and Headley accomplished the
dangerous miss ion of p icking up the v a l i s e conta ining the
compound. I t had been agreed tha t the f i r e s would be s t a r t e d
in the h o t e l s so t h a t the g r e a t e s t damage would be done in
the downtown area* The hour of 8::00 p . m. on November 25
was chosen, so t h a t "the guests of the ho te l s might a l l
escape , a s " the Confederates "did not want to des t roy 7
l i v e s * " Al toge ther n ine teen ho te l s were f i r e d , s ince some
of the men had checked in to more than one room in the c i t y*
The g r e a t e s t b l a z e , however, was a completely unplanned cne
s t a r t e d by Kennedy in the Barnum's Museum* He t o l d Headley
t h a t a f t e r he had se t f i r e to h i s assigned h o t e l s , "he con
cluded t o go down to Barnum's Museum and s t a y u n t i l something
turned up, but had only been there a few minutes when alarms
began t o r i n g a l l over the c i t y . He decided t o go out , and
coming down the s ta i rway i t happened to be c l e a r a t a turn
and the idea occurred to him tha t there would be fun to
7 'Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 273.
83
start a scare* He broke a bottle of Greek fire . . .on the
edge of a step like he would crack an egg* It blazed up and o
he got out to witness the result*" Although the scare that
the Confederates wanted to create did result and rumors ran
wild that the whole city was to be destroyed, the fires were
easily extinguished and little material damage resulted* Of
this Headley remarked:
So far as we could learn the programme had been carried out, but it appeared that all had made a failure. It seemed to us that there was something wrong with our Greek fire.
All had observed that the fires had been put out in all the places as easily as any ordinary fire. We came to the conclusion that Longmire and his manufacturing chemist had put up a job on us after it was foundgthat we could not be dissuaded frcm our purpose .^
Martin and his men wer® well aware of the dangers sur
rounding them should they remain in the city* The next day
the papers were full of their sensational attempt* Clerks
at the various hotels reported excellent descriptions of the
men, and Federal officials assured the public that the where
abouts of each Confederate was known and that each would sonn
be in custody* Martin and Headley decided to pick up trunks
that they had left at the piano store of Henry W. McDonald,
the brother of one of Thompson's counselors, W. Larry
o
Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 276.
^Ibid*, p. 277.
8i
McDonald, who had offered every possible assistance to the
r e b e l s . Jus t as Martin and Headley approached the s to re ,
they noticed McDonald's daughter in the window signaling
f r an t i ca l ly* They wisely a l te red t h e i r s teps , for i t was
l a t e r learned from an evening newspaper tha t the s tore was
f i l l e d with Federals eagerly awaiting the a r r i v a l of any of
the Rebels. The newspaper also reported that a month before
the Nevj York plans were put into e f fec t , the plot had been
divulged to the au thor i t i es by "a man from Canada, but on
condition that he was t o receive one hundred thousand
dol la rs for h is information." His information was checked
and Martin, Headley, and the others were followed from the
very moment they arrived in the c i t y . Since they spent
t h e i r time in such a l e i su r e ly way, the detectives f ina l ly
abandoned them as a " lo t of well-behaved young men who
seemed to be simply enjoying"themselves* They were never
traced to any of the places where they made contact with the
New York Sons of Liberty except one v i s i t to McMasters and
two v i s i t s to McDonald. Naturally those places were now
under close su rve i l l ance . Headley observed that "while our
bet rayer knew the fac t s he was unable to convince the
au tho r i t i e s* I t appeared that the au thor i t i e s had only given
us up and refused to trade with our betrayer a few days before
we s t a r t e d the f i r e s*" This so-cal led be t rayer , i t was
l a t e r learned, was Godfrey Hyams, who had given the Union
government a complete account of the plans in a l l of the
8?
cities *•*•
An immediate problem was at hand; how were the men to
get out of the city? To the great relief of all of the men,
who met at an earlier designated rendezvous, no one had been
apprehended. It was decided that they would acquire tickets
on a New York Central train and leave at 11 o'clock. Two of
the least known of the party were selected to buy the tickets,
a feat which they successfully accomplished. At nine o'clock
all of the men slipped into the sleeping-car and retired to
their berths. They did not undress and kept a close look
out until the time of departure. As each passenger boarded
that train at tl: normal hour just before departure, the
Confederates observed that each passenger was closely
scrutinized. Luckily for them, the detectives did not enter
the car, although they were ready to escape at the rear of the
car and give the detectives a chase should they be discovered.
The train pulled out on time, and the men successfully crossed
the border into Canada after making another risky change at
Albany* Just a few days after the great fire scare in New
York City, all of the Confederates involved were safely
across the border, and Martin and Headley reported to
Thompson to give him a full account of the operation*
The whole campaign had been a failure* The Northwest
and the Northeast were still intact as a part of the Union*
^^Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 28l*
86
The election had taken place on schedule, and Lincoln had
been re-elected* Many of the Confederates who had been so
active in the operation were either under arrest and awaiting
trial in various parts of the Union or in hiding in Canada
for fear of being hunted down and brought back into the
Union by extradition proceedings and tried for their acts*
Various fates awaited those arrested in Chicago on that
fateful night before the election* Some of the court actions
were not completed until after the operation was abandoned
in Canada; some were not even con5)leted until after the War*
Nonetheless, it might be well to report briefly the results
of the more important trials* Charles Walsh and Buckner S*
Morris, prime movers of the Sons of Liberty in Chicago and
Vincent Marmaduke and R. T* Semnes, Confederates, were tried
in Cincinnati, Ohio, at the headquarters of the Northern
Department. Their sentence, which was recorded in General
Orders, Number 30 of the Official Records on April 21, l865,
were as followsr
Buckner S. Morris, not guilty, acquitted. Charles Walsh, guilty on all charges, to be imprisoned for the term of five years. E.T* Semnes, guilty on all charges, to be imprisoned at hard labor. . .for the term of three years. Vincent Marmaduke, not guilty, acquitted.
On May 26, 1865, R. T. Semnes' sentence was remitted by
order of the President and he was released. Colonel George
St* Leger Grenfel was tried the same time as the others by the
87
same commission* His was the harshest penalty of all, hang
ing* Later, however, July 22, 1865, after his case was re
viewed by President Johnson, he was sent to Dry Tortugas,
Florida, for life imprisonment. Although his case was ap
pealed and even the fact that he might be technically con
sidered an English citizen instead of an American entered
into the proceedings, the sentence was not changed*"''
Headley tells us, however, that "it appears from the records
that Grenfel escaped from Fort Jefferson, Florida, March 7,
1868. What happened to him after that remained a mystery.
As a result of the operations in New York, only two
arrests, neither of which were Confederates, were recorded*
Thompson felt obliged when called upon to furnish monetary
aid in the trials of the two men. Mr. Horton, editor of tfce
Day Book, and Henry W. McDonald, proprietor of the piano
store, both of whom had been active members of the plot as
long as the New York Sons of Liberty were involved were
arrested. Relatives of the two men received not only
financial aid frcm Thompson but sworn testimony that neither
was connected in any way, by knowledge or act, with the
attempt to burn New York. Eventually they were released* -
^^Ofxicial Records. Series II, Vol. Vill, pp. 502-503. General Orders No. 30*
^%eadley. Confederate Operations, pp. 296-300*
^^Ibid*, pp. 281-282*
88
Hines, the prime mover of the whole conspiracy, as has
already been recounted, escaped arrest, and after reporting
to authorities in Richmond, he was sent back to Canada to
assist Thompson in further operations. Thompson, although
obviously discouraged by the failure of the elaborate schemes
thus far attempted, still carried on as his orders required
until such a time as he might be recalled. That time was
drawing near, but there were still opportunities to strike
blows at the Union even in the last discouraging days of his
mission*
CHAPTER VI
LAST EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDER/ITES IN CANADA
On December 3 , 1865, Thompson sen t a d i s p a t c h to Con
f e d e r a t e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Benjamin i n which he gave a f u l l
r e p o r t of t he major a c t i v i t i e s t h a t had been c a r r i e d on from
Canada from t h e time of h i s and C l a y ' s a r r i v a l * He reviewed
b r i e f l y such e v e n t s as hi s c o n t a c t s w i t h the Sons of L i b e r t y ,
which had l e d to t h e s e r i e s of p lanned u p r i s i n g i n t h e Nor th
wes t , a l l of which had ended i n at l e a s t outward f a i l u r e * He
gave an accoun t of the a t t empt to c a p t u r e the Michigan on
Lake E r i e lAiich was supposed t o l ead t o the r e l e a s e of
p r i s o n e r s of war on J o h n s o n ' s I s l a n d and va r ious o t h e r e n t e r
p r i s e s * He ment ioned r e c e i v i n g a f u l l r e p o r t from Mart in
and Headley conce rn ing the a t t e m p t t o burn New York C i ty and
blamed i t s f a i l u r e on t h e i n f e r i o r i t y of Greek f i r e , a p roduc t
which he s u g g e s t e d n o t be used a g a i n . Although the many
a c t i v i t i e s i n i t i a t e d a t the p l a n n i n g conferences i n Canada
had n o t produced t h e a n t i c i p a t e d r e s u l t s , he a s su red the Con
f e d e r a t e government t h a t t h e y had not been complete f a i l u r e s .
Some t r o o p s had been p u l l e d away from t h e Southern borders^
which had perhaps r e l i e v e d the s i t u a t i o n i n the South i n a
sma l l way* Much u n r e s t had been caused i n the North, and many
Union c i t i z e n s were s t i l l p r e s s i n g f o r p e a c e . He was quick
t o p o i n t ou t t h a t i f any one of t h e a c t i v i t i e s shou ld have
succeeded , the War might have come t o an immediate end* He
89
90
lamented the f a c t t ha t so many of the key members of the Sons
of L i b e r t y had been a r r e s t e d as there were s t i l l many in the
North w i l l i n g to work for the Confederate cause should they
be o rgan ized . He sa id t h a t the l eaders of the Order had been
so demoralized by the r e - e l e c t i o n of Lincoln t h a t a complete
r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n was necessary* Such a process was being
a t tempted, the new group c a l l i n g i t s e l f the "Order of the
Star*" Although t h i s group might be of sane as s i s t ance
l a t e r , he s t a t e d tha t they could not be depended upon a t
p resen t add t ha t he suggested urging t hose who wanted to
help in the Confederate cause to cross the l i n e s and e n l i s t
d i r e c t l y i n t o the Confederate r a n k s . He expressed concern
fo r the Confederates who had been a r r e s t ed as a r e s u l t of
the miscar r iage of plans in the vsirious operat ions and were
awai t ing t r i a l a t var ious places i n the United States and
Canada. He said t h a t he was doing what he could for these
men and t hat he be l i eved tha t they would u l t ima te ly be r e -1
leased* Thompson assured Benjamin t h a t he would remain in
Canada u n t i l he was r e c a l l e d bu t made i t c l ea r t h a t i t was
almost impossible to ca r ry out any mission successfu l ly
because the Unicn had such an e f f ec t ive de t ec t ive system
i n Canada and there were too many would-be Confederates
As was pointed out in each of the episodes in some d e t a i l , he was c o r r e c t in the cases of Castleman, who was taken a f t e r the Democratic convention i n Chicago in August; Cole and Burley, who were a r r e s t e d during the attempt to se i ze the Michigafa — Cole, i n the United S t a t e s and Burley
•IIIWII III UMifcliilillMiHiH H I •IMiia .Mi* II^IM iMlrii mli i ^^alMMMniiril m nuMinrhf t-.«..J> w
91
who were willing to turn informer. He said that "the bane
and curse of carrying out anything in this country is the
surveillance under which we act. Detectives, or those ready
to give information, stand at every corner* Two or three 2
cannot interchange ideas without a reporter*"
Thompson was not idle while he was awaiting a reply
from his dispatch to Benjamin. He continued to take
advantage of any opportunity to help the Confederate cause.
It was not long until such an opportunity arose. He re
ceived information from Sandusky, Ohio, that seven Confederate
generals who had been in prison at Johnson's Island were to
be taken by train to Fort Lafayette, New York, on December
l5. Thhmpson immediately contacted Martin and Headley, who
had recently returned from New York City. They were quick
to volunteer for the mission. Three others who had been with
them in New York -- Harrington, Kennedy, and Ashbrook — were
to go with them. To bring the total participants to ten,
Thompson suggested that Captain Beall, who had participated
in the Michigan enterprises in SepteniDer, join the group.
along with three other trusted men. The plan was to stop
in Canada ~ ; and the St. Albans raiders, who were to be involved in several trials in Canada.
^Official Records. Series I, Vol. XLIII, Part II, pp* 930-936*
-^Headley, Confederate Operations, pp. 301-307 • The following is based primarily upon Headley's account as he was a participant*
92
and capture the train while it was en route to the fort, arm
the generals so that they could defend themselves, secure
all the money that was in the express safe, and then escape
into Canada with the generals. Martin and Headley met Beall
for the first time on December llj. in Hamilton, Canada, a
small city on Lake Ontario, and spent the day in BeallVs
hotel room perfecting plans. The train was to be stopped
between Sandusky and Buffalo. The guards were to be taken
by surprise and disarmed. The passenger coaches would be
left on the tracks between stations, and the telegraph wires
would be cut. The generals were to exchange clothing with
passengers of their size* From that point the band from
Canada would take the generals into Buffalo or scatter in
different directions on trains. When the three men met with
the rest of the group in Buffalo on Sunday evening, they
were informed of the plans, and it was decided to depart the
next morning for Dunkirk, New York, in time to meet the
eastbound train from Cleveland on which the generals were
expected to be. Before departure from Buffalo the next
morning, the group read in the newspapers of General Dix's
proclamation, that rash statement which had been the result
of the St. Albans raiders' being released in Canada after
their initial trial. The part that placed them in direct
peril and that was later toned down by Presidential order
stated that Confederate marauders from Canada should be
shot down if possible while committing their crime, but if
l'^^^ •-••- -.-•••--^ —m f tMi i i i i imt II I -1 in imir ir — "-—' ^-.-.^.iMtt^iaiii>i.iM<
93
i t were necessary, they should be chased down even if i t
meant crossing i n to the neutral t e r r i t o r y of Canada. Although
the proclamation afforded the men addit ional danger, i t did
not stop them. All of the men remained in Dunkirk to await
the generals except Martin, who went on to Er i e , Pennsylvania,
where he planned to board the t r a i n that carr ied the Con
federate off icers and ride in with them. Martin returned on
the second t r a i n coming eas t with the news that the generals
had not come through yet* Because of Dix's order, i t was
deemed per i lous for the men to remain in one place long*
Thus, i f the generals did not come through the next morning,
the men planned to hire s leighs and t rave l out from Buffalo
to a l eve l spot by the r a i l road tracks and there ha l t the
next eastbound t r a i n . They would mingle with the passengers
pretending to be concerned about why the t r a in was hal ted,
but a l l the while they would be trying to ascertain i f the
generals were aboard. As they had planned, the sleighs were
h i red , but Beall a l te red the plans s l i gh t ly while awaiting
the t r a i n . He placed an i ron fence r a i l on the track which
he believed would stop the t r a i n should i t not heed the i r
l an te rn s i g n a l . Because of poor timing the men were not
ready to s ignal when the t r a in sped by, and the iron r a i l
did not succeed in stopping the t ra in* The t r a i n did stop,
however, some two hundred yards from the men, no doubt, so
tha t the engineers could see what had been h i t . Because the
episode did not mater ia l ize as had been planned, the
9k
Confederates decided i t would be wise to leave immediately,
take a t r a i n to Suspension Bridge, and walk across t o t t e
Canadian s ide to await a t r a i n tha t would take them back to
h e a d q u a r t e r s . Al l of the men succeeded in c ross ing i n t o
Canada except Bea l l and Anderson. I t was l a t e r l earned t h a t
they had been a r r e s t e d while as leep in the eatimg-room where
Martin and Headley had l e f t them when they crossed the
br idge* The whole e n t e r p r i s e ended in f i a s c o , and the two
key Confederates had been taken pr i soner as a r e s u l t of i t *
The i l l - f a t e d exped i t ion a t Buffalo and Dunkirk
ended the ac t ive opera t ion aga ins t the enemy from Canada,
bu t i t did not end Thompson's planning for more action*.
Although many of the Confederates , anxious to see home again ,
had depar ted or were planning to make an attempt t o pass
through the enemy l i n e s soon, Thompson, Hines, who had been
ordered back to Canada by o f f i c i a l s in Richmond, Headley,
Mart in, and a few o thers were s t i l l a t l i b e r t y in Canada, at
Christmas t ime, l86I|.* Clay had re tu rned to the South i n
mid-December; he had l e f t Sanders to f i g h t h i s court
b a t t l e s p e r t a i n i n g to the St* Albans r a i d . The l a s t scheme
Thompson proposed from planning confereiices in Canada was an
e l a b o r a t e one which would include a l l of the Confederate
f o r c e s . \ccording to Headley he had asked Clay to presen t
h i s plan t o P res iden t Davis when he a r r i v e d in Richmond,
bu t a f t e r not hear ing from him, he sent Martin and Headley
95
south with the f a n t a s t i c scheme*^ E s s e n t i a l l y his p lan was
as fo l lowsr Confederate forces no r th of Sherman and a new
force being organized by Beauregard i n North Carol ina would
be Joined with Lee ' s army to give a combined force of
s^proximately 100,000. These armies would abandon the South
des t roy ing b r i d g e s and r a i l r o a d s as they l e f t , make a
t h r ea t en ing march on Washington and Phi lade lphia u n t i l Grant
was c lo se upon them, gather up a l l the horses i n the country
s ide as they t r a v e l e d , f a l l back, now mounted, and capture
P i t t s b u r g , and f i n a l l y loca te t h e sea t of the government a t
Wheeling* The army would face e a s t and p ro t ec t a l i n e
approximately one hundred miles long from Lake Er ie to the
Ohio R ive r . Thompson concluded t h a t the new Confederate
p o s i t i o n would confound Grant and Sherman because of the
n a t u r a l b a r r i e r s of r i v e r s , l a k e s , and mountains in the area*
Davis could move h i s s e a t of government to t h i s new l o c a t i o n
qu i t e e a s i l y and ca r ry on government proceedings unhindered*
As an adjunct to the primary maneuver, he planned a caval ry
march of ten thousand aga ins t New York* He s t i l l included
in h i s p lan an u p r i s i n g of t h e Sons of L iber ty , who would
a t t a c k Camp Douglas and Camp Chase, an ac t ion which was
a c t u a l l y in5)ossible s ince so many of the leaders had been
a r r e s t e d and the Order was in a s t a t e of complete d i s
organ iza t ion* Next Thompson p red ic t ed what Grant would do
^Headley, Confederate Opera t ions , pp. 382-389.
96
as a r e s u l t of the South ' s sudden s h i f t i n t a c t i c s . He
envis ioned h i s joining h i s forces with Sherman's and coming
up t h e A t l a n t i c Coast* Such a s h i f t of Federa l t roops
would leave the West open t o the Confederate armies, who
under the l eade r sh ip of Taylor , F o r r e s t , and E* Kirby Smith
would march west of the Miss i s s ipp i River, gather f resh
horses and t r o o p s , and then move eastward u n t i l they joined
fo rces with Lee, Johnston, and Beauregard i n the Ohio River
Valley* Such an ac t i on would serve to completely sever the
West from the East* Martin and Headley were t o p resen t
Thon5)Son's scheme t o the newly appointed Confederate
Sec re t a ry of War, Breckinr idge , fo r whom Martin had scouted
a t Sh i loh . I t was f e l t t ha t the sec re ta ry would approve
the plan and take them to see Pres iden t Davis. The wonder
of the whole episode was t h a t the Confederates in Canada
viewed the p lan with such g rea t favor and optimism. The
cause of the South was at a d e f i n i t e low p o i n t ; a l l of the
a c t i v i t i e s from Canada had f a i l e d ; nego t i a t ions with foreign
c o u n t r i e s fo r more than r e cogn i t i on as b e l l i g e r e n t s was at
a s tand s t i l l ; Lincoln had c a r r i e d the day at the p o l l s ;
the re was l i t t l e hope fo r f r e sh t roops nor adequate suppl ies
i n the South; the blockade was t i g h t e r than ever . Yet
Headley i nd i ca t ed t h a t a l l of those who advised Thompson
were in complete accord wi th h i s scheme, which they na ive ly
thought would work, when he observed, "lone of us could
see the p r o p r i e t y of making a l a s t d i t c h s tand in the im-
97
poverished South when the gates to the North and then to the
West stood wide open^"^ Thus, in early February the two men
started across the frozen Detroit River and made their way
to Richmond* How President Davis received the plan or
whether he ever heard of it was not disclosed in any of the
available records* It was recorded, however, that Headley
and Martin did get through the lines and spent some time
along with Davis and his Cabinet dodging the Federal troops
and that both were finally taken into custody only to be re
leased after the War, sometime in 1866*
It was now a daily occurrence to bid farewell to
loyal Confederates who had been active in the Canadian enter
prises but who were anxious to see home* Many left even
though they stood the chance of being followed into the North
by detectives and taken into custody by the Union officials
to be held for trial. Lieutenant Samuel Boyer Davis, when
he journeyed southward in January in a brave attempt to
acquire from Richmond documents that could be used as
evidence in the extradition trial of Burley, was a victim of
just such a happening. Nonetheless, some made it through the
lines as was true of a Reverend Cameron and an unidentified
Kentucky widow who both returned to Canada with documents
-'Headley, Confederate Operations, p. 386.
'^Horan, Confederate Agent, p. 262 and p. 271.
98
needed in the trials taking place there. Among the last to
make an attempt to go through the Union lines were Lieutenant
Ashbrook and Captain Kennedy, who had been active in many of
the Canadian operations, especially the attempt to burn New
York City. Theirs was a dangerous journey since the Union
officials were quite anxious to arrest any of the members of
the band who had tried to destroy a key city* Too, their
descriptions had been vividly recorded in prominent news
papers in the North, and they stood a great risk of being
recognized. Shortly after crossing the line into Michigan,
they caught a train which would take them through the state.
They were just settling in their seats, taken apart because
of crowded conditions, when two Union detectives who had
followed them from Toronto approached Kennedy and took him
into custody. Ashbrook, no doubt realizing that he could
not rescue his friend and that his minutes of freedom were
numbered, jumped from a window of the fast-moving train and
luckily landed in a snow bank uninjured. From there, he made
his way to Cincinnati and thence into Kentucky where he con
tinued to evade arrest* Kennedy was held for trial in the
United States.
The outcome of many of the trials which resulted from
the Canadian activities and which were being conducted
throughout the United States and Canada was discussed in
earlier chapters in conjunction with the episode in which
the Confederates or members of the Sons of Liberty were
^ Mtii*iini futmm m nmimmmmmtmi^tm^mikmtmmmimimaa
99
apprehended* As was observed in most cases, the outcome of
these trials was eventual liberty although many of the court
rangles were prolonged until after the War when an interest
in the cases waned*
Some of the Confederates apprehended, however, did not
fare so well. The fate of those tried in the United States
was certainly worse than that of those who were tried in
Canada. As was mentioned in Chapter VI, Colonel George St*
Leger Grenfel, who was arrested in Chicago in connection with
the crackdown on the participants of the Northwest Conspiracy
on election eve, 1861 ., Kas the first to receive harsh treat
ment. He was first sentenced to be hanged, but later his
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment at Dry Tortugas,
Florida* Lieutenant Davis and Captain Kennedy, who were
arrested in their attempts to pass through the Union lines
into the South, and Captain John Beall, who was taken prison
er after his participation in the attempt to rescue the Con
federate generals, were also sentenced to be hanged as a re-
7
suit of their trials. Anderson, who had been arrested with
Beall, agreed to testify for the Union against Beall and was
later released* Although the three cases were appealed and
7 For a record of the trials of Davis, Beall, and
Kennedy, the Official Records can be consulted* The Davis trial is found in Series II, Vol. VIII, pp. 132-133, 191-192* The Beall trial is found in Series II, Vol. VIII, pp. 279-282. The Kennedy trial is found in Series II, Vol. VIII, pp* l^li^.-I|-l6*
100
and much was done i n t h e i r behalf , only Davis eventua l ly won
h i s freedom. Both Bea l l and Kennedy were hanged, Beal l on
February 2i| , and Kennedy on March 25* Actua l ly , then , of
the immediate group connected wi th the Canadian a c t i v i t i e s ,
only two — Bea l l and Kennedy — were hanged. Many went
i n t o e x i l e , in Canada or abroad. Some made t h e i r way to the
South, where a few were apprehended in the l a s t days of the
War. Such was t r u e in the case of Clay, who spent some
time in pr i son a f t e r the War* Others remained in Union
p r i sons fo r a per iod of time, but were u l t ima t e ly re leased*
The wonder of a l l was tha t Jacob Thompson successfu l ly
l e f t Canada before he was apprehended* Benjamin did not
o f f i c i a l l y r e c a l l iThompsen u n t i l March 2 , 1865. He did n o t ,
however, cons ider i t advantageous to leave immediately
s ince he was doing a l l he could to help in the t r i a l s t h a t
were taking p l a c e , but in e a r l y A p r i l , a warrant was i ssued
for h i s a r r e s t , along with Clay ' s and Clea ry ' s and the
r e c e n t l y r e l e a s e d S t . Albans r a i d e r s , for v i o l a t i o n of the o
n e u t r a l i t y laws of Canada*° Cleary and the r a i d e r s were
taken i n t o cus tody. Clay had been in Richmond f o r some
t i r i e . Thompson, however, was never taken in to custody.
Evident ly he went in to h id ing somewhere in Canada* His f i r s t
a t tempt to leave Canada took place s h o r t l y a f t e r the warrant
was i s s u e d . He bought a schooner, the Canadian Eagle , which
^Kinchen, " S t . Albans R a i d e r s , " p . ll|.9
.„_.^^,_a^i J J, .III , J 'i.-fcMiMMll.i mil III I I »i MiiitaMMMWlMMMiiattr-t"-~''^'-''"^'' "• ""
101
he planned to equip and s a i l t o the Rio Grande with o ther
Confederates who might decide t o accompany him and there 9
j o i n MsLXimillian's dwindling empire* The Canadian o f f i c i a l s were warned of h i s p lan and placed the vesse l under such
10 c lose s u r v e i l l a n c e t h a t he did not dare leave*
One o the r accusa t ion was l eve led at Thompson and
o the r s of h i s commission before he could make h i s departure*
These men were accused of p l o t t i n g to a s sa s s ina t e Lincoln
along wi th John Wilkes Booth* On May 2, 1865, Pres ident
Johnson i ssued a proclamation in i ^ i c h he offered rewards
for the Commissioners Thompson and Clay, George N. Sanders ,
Beverly Tucker, William C* Cleary as wel l as Je f fe rson
Davis for t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the "at rocious murder of
the l a t e P r e s i d e n t . . .and the attempted a s sass ina t ion of
* . . Seward, Secre ta ry of S t a t e . " The blame for i n c i t i n g ,
conce r t i ng , and procur ing the deeds was based upon evidence
which was gathered by the Bureau of Mi l i t a ry J u s t i c e * By
November t h e rewards offered fo r the Commissioners, Tucker,
% o r a n . Confederate A^ent, p . 261 . and Kinchen,"St . Albans R a i d e r s , " p . Ii4.9.
^^The warning was rece ived by the United S t a t e s War Department, Apr i l 28 , l 8 6 5 . See Of f i c i a l Records, Ser ies I , Vol* XLVI, Pa r t I I I , p . 100i|*
^^Ibid** Se r i e s I , Vol* XLIX, Par t I I , p* 566*
102
Sanders, and Cleary were revoked*^^ It was found that all of
the evidence gathered was completely fallacious, that those
who were willing to testify had been bribed, and that
actually no valid proof could be found that connected the
Canadian group of Confederates with the assassination plot*- ^
When Thompson finally left Canada in the late summer
or early fall of l865, he was a man without a country. He
dared not return to the South, for even though the War was
over, there was a reward for his arrest. He sailed to
Europe, as so many of the Confederate officials who were able
to get away did after the War. There he was joined by
Castleman, who had recently been released from Federal
prison, but was not allowed to remain in the United States*
Castleman recorded that the two men enjoyed studying French
in Paris and touring England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland
together. When and how Thompson left Canada was nowhere
recorded. A letter dated September 2, l865, which he re
ceived in Paris from Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin,
now in exile, in London, in which he stated a desire to set
financial matters of the Canadian operation in order, would
make it certain that he arrived in Europe sometime before that
date*
^^Official Records. Series I, Vol. XLIX, Part II, p* 1116, General Orders No. 161 . War Department, Wdjutant General's Office, Washington, November 2I4., 1865.
^Horan, Confederate Agent, p. 267*
^^Castleman, Active Service, pp* 197-200, 201-202o
103
In r e f l e c t i n g upon the Confederate a c t i v i t i e s , which
took place as a r e s u l t of the commissioner's planning in
Canada, a person 's f i r s t inc l ina t ion would be to ca l l them a.
f a i l u r e * Certainly i f one measured the r e su l t s in terms of
successful missions into the United S ta tes , he would be
fool i sh to say the r e su l t s were posit ive* No Northwestern
Confederacy was formed to join forces with the Southern
Confederacy. The Lakss were never dominated by Confederate
f o r ce s . No mass amount of incendiarism l e f t the c i t i e s and
vesse ls of the North in u t t e r ruin* No successful attempts
were made to negotiate a peace with the Union* By no
s t r e t c h of the imagination, then, would one say that the
a c t i v i t i e s , even the S t . Albans r a i d , could equally
r e t a l i a t e for the Northern expeditions into the South nor
did they bring the War to an end*
But were the a c t i v i t i e s a t o t a l fa i lure? Certainly
the constant rumors which resu l ted from the plans of th i s
small band of Confederates served as a thorn in the side of
the Union o f f i c i a l s . As a r e s u l t of the rumors, people
along the Canadian border were in continual upheaval. Thus
they reported upon the s l i g h t e s t provocation, every possible
hint of an invasion from Canada no matter how far-fetched,
and they demanded ac t ion . Although many of the rumors proved
unfounded and most of the actual th rea ts were nipped in the
bud because of the excel lent Union detective system or be
cause of informers in the Confederates' own camp who prized
lOi^
money above cause , severa l man hours had to be spent check
ing out such rumors and t h r e a t s . Several times i t was con
s ide r ed necessary f o r Federal troops to be moved in to the
nerve cen te r of the proposed p lo t s* Each time manpower had
to be taken from the ac tua l b a t t l e f i e l d . Such was the case
when Camp Douglas and Chicago were re inforced during the
Democratic convention and the National e lec t ion* Also a
.arge t roop movement took place i n New York City when
But l e r and a force of 10,000 were s t a t ioned in the New York
area dur ing e l e c t i o n time* F u l l c r e d i t did n o t belong to
the Confederates i n Canada for keeping a peace movement
a l ive i n the North, s ince they co-operated with the Sons of
L ibe r ty and other Peace Democrats who were equal ly anxious
tha t peace be gained at a l l c o s t s , but they were ever a l e r t
to keep a l i v e the peace movement even when the i r Northern
coher t s were waning* Without a doubt the Union o f f i c i a l s
and c i t i z e n s were well aware of t h e a c t i v i t i e s tha t were
being i n s t i g a t e d by Confederates in Canada and they were
anxious tha t the Canadians con t ro l the ac t ions of the
" i n s u r g e n t s . "
Whether or no t , then , the Confederate a c t i v i t i e s in
Canada can be measured in terms of success o r f a i l u r e , they
can be measured i n terms of the e f f ec t they had on Canadian-
American r e l a t i o n s . Even before t h e Confederate commission
a r r i v e d in Canada, the re was cons iderable t ens ion between
the Canad ian-Br i t i sh government and the United S t a t e s
105
government. As was menti6ned in the f i r s t chapter, i t was
p a r t i a l l y because of th i s tension that Jefferson Davis con
sidered i t advantageous t o send Thompson and Clay to Canada
in the spring of l86i^.. As ear ly as May, I86I , the Br i t i sh
had recognized the Confederates as b e l l i g e r e n t s . With such
recogni t ion the Confederacy was in a posi t ion to e s t ab l i sh
at l e a s t semi-off ic ial contacts with neut ra l countries as
long as they did not violate in te rna t iona l neu t r a l i t y laws.
Such a s i t ua t i on was of course d is tas te fu l to the Union
which chose to consider the Southerners as insurgents . As
operations conducted from Canada became organized and
in t ens i f i ed under the leadership of the coranission, na tura l ly
the Union became more and more outspoken about them and about
the fac t that the Canadian government should control them.
With the exposure of each succeeding Confederate scheme
ins t iga ted from Canada Ihe Union protes ts became louder*
There was constant ta lk in the United States Congress of
revoking ex i s t ing Canadian-American t r e a t i e s and of passing
more s t r ingent laws t o safeguard the f r o n t i e r . Even with
such strong Union pressures , i t was often hard for the
Canadian o f f i c i a l s to take action against the Confederates,
since there was such a f ine l ine between the Confederate's
acting within the bounds of n e u t r a l i t y laws and the i r over
stepping the bounds. When the commission f i r s t arr ived in
Canada and even up u n t i l Lincoln was re-e lec ted and the War
shif ted i n favor of the Union cause, the Canadian of f ic ia l s
106
seemed to turn a b l ind eye and deaf ear to Union th rea t s
which seemed at t i ne s strong enough to bring on a war* The
Canadian government even talked back when the Union ins is ted
that i t needed to increase border troops and war-vessels on
the Lakes a f t e r such f ron t i e r scares as the attempts to
capture the Michigan^ and the constant rumors that lake ports
were to be Invaded by troops being gathered in Canada. Al
though the Canadian o f f i c i a l s pract iced extreme caution
when dealing with the S t . Albans' ra iders upon the i r escape
in to Canada from Vermont, they protested vigorously the
Federal t roops ' coming into neut ra l t e r r i t o ry to apprehend
the ra iders* The Canadian o f f i c i a l s co-operated with the
Union o f f i c i a l s by holding the ra iders apprehended for
ex t r ad i t i on hear ings, but they were not wi l l ing for them
to be taken back to the Union without a hearing* Although
Canadian o f f i c i a l s , for the most pa r t , co-operated with the
Union, i t was qui te evident that the majority of Canadian
people, some of the o f f i c i a l s , and most of the Canadian
newspapers were more sympathetic toward the Confederate
cause than toward the Union cause* When the t ide was
turning in favor of the Union and the Peace Democrats were
defeated at the p o l l s , there was an evident sh i f t in Bri t ish-
Canadian pol icy, which became more s tr ingent in i t s dealings
with the Confederates* The B r i t i s h were not wi l l ing to
^^Kinchen, "St . Albans Raiders ," p* kl•
107
involve themselves to such an extent that they would find
themselves at war with the Union as soon as it had finished
with its affairs in the South. On February 13, 1865, Lord
Russell in very strong terms informed the Confederates
representing their government in England that the activities
being conducted from Canada were a violation of British
neutrality and were certain "to involve England in a war
in which she had no intentions to take part*" By accepting
the responsibility for such acts as the seizure of the
Philo Parsons and the attempted capture of the Michigan,
and'the raid into Vermont, and claiming them to be
belligerent operations, he stated that the "so-called Con
federate States showed a gross disregard of her Majesty's
character as a neutral power, and the desire to involve her
Majesty in hostilities with a coterminous power with i^ich
Great Briatin is at peace*" He ended his communication with
the following statement r "I trust you will feel yourselves
authorized to promise that such practices shall cease, and
shall be entirely abandoned for the future*" Although
Benjamin refused to recognize official receipt of the
communication, it was shortly thereafter that Thompson was
recalled from Canada and the operations from that area were
terminated. Although trials continued in Canada after the
War, interest in them subsided and eventually all of the
Callahan, Diplomatic History, p. 238*
108
"be l l i ge ren t s " in custody were re leased . Some of the Con
federates remained i n Canada as permanent r e s iden t s ; some
remained temporarily in the capacity of students as was true
of Hines; some went abroad^ some, i f there was no price on
t h e i r heads, returned to t h e i r homes in the South.*
Even though the Confederate a c t i v i t i e s in Canada
had terminated, i l l - w i l l exis ted in Canada and in the United
States for years to come. In 1866, the Reciprocity Treaty
which had been such a boon to Canada was terminated. From
1866 through the l870's an organization Imown as the Fenian
Brotherhood and composed primarily of I r i s h immigrants,who
had l e f t I re land as a r esu l t of the famine of the l8i |0 's
and had s e t t l e d in the Northern United States along the
f r o n t i e r , used the wartime sympathy of Br i ta in for the
Confederacy and the r a id s from Canada during the War as
one of t h e i r excuses to r a i d the Canadian v i l lages and
countryside along the border . The Fenians bu i l t up a
natura l hatred toward the Br i t i sh and saw in these ra ids
and a proposed plan to subdue a l l of Canada and deliver i t
to the United Sta tes for annexation, a perfect opportunity
for revenge. Although the United States government
eventually subdued the Fenian r a i d e r s , the excuse for thei r
a c t i v i t i e s can be traced to Br i t i sh sympathy for the Con-
federates* Thus another area of f r i c t i on was bu i l t up
17 'Wrong, The Canadians, The Story of a People, pp *
31 .8, 365> 369-370. For an account of the Fenian raids and
109
Considering several angles , then, i t would be hard to
place a def ini te value on Confederate operations in Canada*
With a view of the overa l l war effor t of the Confederacy,
i t was but a small facet of the complete operation* Since
the complete operat ion was not successful, i t might be
log ica l to conclude that the Canadian operation was not
successful . Nonetheless, one must admit that as a resu l t
of the Confederate a c t i v i t i e s from Canada, def ini te effects
were f e l t by the United States and Canada for years to
come.
subsequent American and Canadian act ion see the account in the above book*
AFTERWORD
A b r i e f i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the subsequent l i v e s of Con
f e d e r a t e s who se rved i n Canada d u r i n g the War r e v e a l e d t h a t
most of them e v e n t u a l l y made t h e i r way back t o the Uni ted
S t a t e s , p r i m a r i l y t o t h e South , where t h e y became a c t i v e and
r e p u t a b l e c i t i z e n s . S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e War some of them r e
mained i n Canada o r went abroad u n t i l b a r r i e r s were removed
which p r e v e n t e d them from r e t u r n i n g home* By 1866 most of
t he men, even Cas t leman and Hines , had found i t p o s s i b l e to
r e t u r n home; however . P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n ' s Amnesty Act of
1865 b a r r e d from e n t r y such Confedera tes as t he S t . Albans
R a i d e r s and Thonpson. By the t ime of t h e Amnesty Act of
IB72 most of t he Confede ra t e s who wished t o r e t u r n and who
could be t r a c e d , were back i n the Uni ted States*. The
F o u r t e e n t h Amendment had b a r r e d any of those who had prev ious
l y h e l d n a t i o n a l o r s t a t e o f f i c e s frcm again assuming such
o f f i c e s . Such a s t i p u l a t i o n a f f e c t e d only a few of the men -•
c e r t a i n l y Thompson and Clay - - b u t these men were now ready
t o r e t i r e from a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l l i f e * Most of the Con
f e d e r a t e s who had been in Canada were no t a f f e c t e d by the
•^-Unfortunately on ly b r i e f and incomple te a l l u s i o n s were made t o some of the men, a f a c t o r which made i t imp o s s i b l e t o p r e s e n t a complete account of each man ' s sub sequen t c a r e e r . The f o l l o w i n g s o u r c e s were of g r e a t v a l u e i n p r e p a r i n g t h i s Afterwordr Headley, Confedera te O p e r a t i o n s , p p . I|.60-Ii-62; Horan ,Confedera te Ao;ent, p p . 260-272 , 2b5-292; Kinchen , " S t . Albans R a i d e r s , " p p 7 1 3 1 - 1 6 0 ; Cas t leman, Act ive S e r v i c e , p p . 196-200* " 110
« *^Jtmt'' V- - T ^ ^ — ^ i i i i ' " ——... >
111
s t i p u l a t i o n in t he amendment, for they had been too young
t o hold of f ices of any s o r t before the War* Many of them
were j u s t reaching manhood* They had many years ahead of
them in which they could develop prominance* Some became
lawyers , a c a r ee r which proved to be a gateway in a few
ins t ances t o p o l i t i c a l off ices* Others became prosperous
b u s i n e s s men* P r a c t i c a l l y a l l of the men who could be t raced
seemed t o prosper i n t h e i r chosen occupat ions.
Commissioner Thompson, when he was able to r e t u r n from
e x i l e , s e t t l e d i n Memphis, Tennessee, and l a t e r went back to
h i s home town, Oxford, Miss i ss ipp i* He r e t i r e d from publ ic
l i f e and spent h i s l a s t years in comfort* Although he had
l o s t much of h i s proper ty as a r e s u l t of the War, he s t i l l
was wealthy enough to l i v e a l i f e of l e i s u r e * His fe l low-
c i t i z e n s of h i s home s t a t e , Mi s s i s s i pp i , and of hi s adopted
s t a t e , Tennessee, had the h ighes t esteem for him* He r e
mained one of J e f f e r son Dav is ' s c l o s e s t personal f r iends and
v i s i t e d him o f t e n .
Commissioner Clay, who had re turned t o the South in
mid-December, l861|., had been a r r e s t e d shor t ly a f t e r t h e War,
even though he had bragged to the Canadian group t h a t the
Union o f f i c e r s would not harm a " s i ck old man." I t was
t r u e t h a t during h i s imprisonment he was often i n the
h o s p i t a l . After h i s r e l ea se from F o r t r e s s Monroe, he r e
turned to h i s na t ive H u n t s v i l l e , Alabama, t o die*
The t h i r d commissioner, Holcombe, had l e f t Canada on
112
a mission to England during the late summer of I86I4,.
According to Horan, he never reached England;: instead he 2
made h i s way to Richmond* What happened to him a f t e r he
a r r i v e d there was not recorded in the ava i l ab le sources*
W. W. Cleary, s e c r e t a r y to the Confederate commission
i n Canada, had been one of the few detained i n Toronto on
charges of breaking n e u t r a l i t y laws . After the War when
i n t e r e s t in the Confederate a c t i v i t i e s in Canada subsided,
he was r e l e a s e d from his bond* After the P r e s i d e n t ' s p r o
clamation of genera l amnesty, he s e t t l e d in Covington,
Kentucky, where he became an eminent corpora t ion lawyer*
He died i n l 8 9 7 .
Un t i l l a t e May of I866, Captain Thomas H* Hines
remained in Toronto, where he was joined by his wife,
Nancy. He en tered Toronto Univers i ty to study French and
l i t e r a t u r e and began read ing law a t n igh t with J u s t i c e
B u l l i t t , the prominent Indiana Copperhead who was i n e x i l e
i n Canada. Although he was e l i g i b l e to r e - e n t e r the Union
under the provis ions of Pres iden t Johnson's Amnesty Act of
May 29, 1865, he was warned by "a f r i end" tha t he would be
a r r e s t e d should he at tempt t o r e t u r n to Kentucky a t t h a t
time* As a r e s u l t he did not r e t u r n u n t i l I866* By tha t
time he had completed h i s s tudy of law, and s h o r t l y a f t e r
h i s r e t u r n to Kentucky he passed the s t a t e b a r . In the
2H, oran . Confederate Ap;ent, pp . 110-112*
113
ensuing years Hines became a prominent lawyer* He became
Chief J u s t i c e of Kentucky and in I890-I891 represented the
c a p i t a l in t he C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention. He died in I897,
having achieved p r a i s e as one of the foremost lawyers of
h i s s t a t e .
Hines ' second in command, John B. Castleman, v*io had
been the f i r s t to be a r r e s t e d as a r e s u l t of ths attempt to
form a Northwest Confederacy i n August of I86I4., was paroled
from Federa l p r i son in 1865 wi th the s t i p u l a t i o n t ha t he go
i n t o ex i l e* Since h is h e a l t h was poor for a t ime, he
remained wi th Hines i n Toronto where he s tudied medicine at
the U n i v e r s i t y . As soon as he was well enough to t r a v e l , he
jo ined Thompson in P a r i s , where he continued h i s fetudy of
medicine and wi th Thompson enjoyed a tour of Great Br i t a in*
Upon r e c e i v i n g word in June of I866 tha t i t was poss ib le for
him to come home, he r e tu rned to Kentucky* He gave up h i s
idea of pursuing a medical ca ree r and in t e r rup ted the
w r i t i n g of h i s memoirs t o command the Louisv i l le Legion
during the Spanish-American War. After a tour of duty in
Puerto Rico, where he was commended fo r his bravery , he was
commissioned a b r i g a d i e r - g e n e r a l by President McKinley* He
r e t u r n e d to Kentucky t o serve as an ad ju tan t -genera l of the
s t a t e m i l i t i a , i n which capac i ty he d i s t ingu ished himself in
1900 by prevent ing a storming of a r s e n a l s and s t a t e
b u i l d i n g s a f t e r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Governor Goebel. He
l a t e r became chairman of the L o u i s v i l l e Beard of Parks and
lUl
received praise for his work in developing the municipal
Cherokee Park. Castleman was alwo a member of the firm of
Barbee and Castleman, which represented the Royal Insurance
Company of Liverpool. Too, he left invaluable records of
the operations fran Canada in his memoirs, which were pub
lished in 1917 under the title Active Service. He also
wrote articles pertaining to the Canadian enterprises* The
best known was one published in the Southern Bivouac in I886.
Colonel Robert M. Martin, who had been in charge of the
abortive attempt to burn New York City settled in Evansville,
Indiana,where he became a tobacco wholesaler. In I87I; he
became manager of tobacco inspections for David Dowes
Company of New York City. In I887 he was in Louisville,
where he continued to deal in tobacco. In the winter of
1900 an old lung injury reopened which nearly caused his
immediate death* He went to New York for treatment only to
return to Louisville in M§p?ch, where he saw his faithful
lieutenant, John W. Headley, for the last time. Evidently
he had returned to New York for further treatment shortly
after this meeting, because he died in Brooklyn in April,
1900, and was buried there.
John W. Headley, Martin's most trusted aide, also
engaged in the tobacco business for a time after the War.
He lived in Evansville, Indiana, for sixteen years and then
moved back to his home state of Kentucky \^ere he settled at
Louisville. In I89I he was elected Secretary of State, an
115
of f i ce which he held u n t i l I896* He l a t e r l e f t Kentucky^^j
His l i f e a f t e r t h a t and the date of h i s death were not
known. He l e f t va luab le records of the a c t i v i t i e s of the
Confederates i n Canada i n a book e n t i t l e d Confederate
Operations in Canada and New York, which was published in
1906*
Lieu tenant Bennett H. Young, the leader of the S t .
Albans Raid, along wi th Cleary, remained under bond in
Toronto charged with v i o l a t i o n s of the n e u t r a l i t y laws,
u n t i l a f t e r the War* By the f a l l of 1865 he was r e l eased
from h i s bond but was not e l i g i b l e under Johnson 's amnesty
to r e t u r n to the United S ta t e s* He and h i s new wife, whom
he kad marr ied a t Niagara a f t e r she had journeyed fran
Kentucky, departed fo r the B r i t i s h I s l e s . There he at tended
Queen's Un ive r s i ty a t B e l f a s t , where he s tudied English and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. For h i s accomplishments at Queen's he
rece ived f i r s t honors in the f i e l d of English common law*
In the mid-summer of I866 he received word tha t he was free
to r e t u r n home. He se t up a law p r a c t i c e a t Lou i sv i l l e and
wi th in a few years was recognized as a leading a t t o r n e y ,
T^ose s p e c i a l t y was r a i l r o a d s and r ece ive r sh ips* In I883
he became p res iden t of the Monon Route, a r a i l r o a d tha t ran
between l o u i s v i l l e and Chicago* Later he became pres ident
of the Lou i sv i l l e and Southern Rai l road and of the Kentucky
and Indiana Bridge Company. In I89O and 1691 he was
a de lega te a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l , Convention where
he renewed h i s acquaintance with Hines . In the l a t e
116
nineties he reopened his law offices in Louisville and con
tinued private practice* As an orator he had developed quite
a reputation which led to his being the principal speaker
representing the South at the historic gathering of Union
and Confederate soldiers at Gettysburg in 1913• At about
this time, too, he became the commander of the United
Confederate Veterans. As side interests Young traveled to
different parts of the state in search of prehistoric
relics and wrote several books of historic value. As strange
as it may seem, however, he never wrote an account of his
daring raid into Vermont. Young lived a long and fruitful
life, dying in February, 1919, in his seventy-seventh year.
George N. Sanders, who had taken it upon himself to
advise Clay and Holcombe, was last known to participate in
public affairs in the election of l872 when his name was
once again linked with Horace Greeley, who had bolted his
party and was running for the presidency. As a result of his
participation in the peace conferences of l86I|., Greeley
was being accused of dealing with traitors. It was
especially intimated that Sanders enjoyed his confidence.
Of this Sanders was reported to have said, "The charge
that I have any influence with 14r. Greeley is without
foundation. The meeting with Mr. Clay, Mr. Thompson, my
self and Mr. Greeley was a proper attempt to bring about
a peaceful end to a horrible war." Greeley in reference to
the peace meeting merely commented, "I did nothing then that
117
I am ashamed of now."- At the time of the election there
were veiled hints that Sanders had "powerful connections"
in Washington. Nonetheless, the man kept silent and after
that was not to receive additional public notoriety.
What was known of the subsequent careers of sorre of
the other Confederates who operated from Canada might be
briefly mentioned. Bennett G. Burley, who was nearly extra
dited to the United States as a result of his activities
on the Lakes, made his way back to his native Glasgow,
Scotland, where he became a member of the British
Parliament. He was serving in this capacity during the
late l880's when Young saw him while visiting England.
Lieutenant George B. Eastin, who had served under
Hines in Chicago, settled in Louisville, where during a
part of his life he served as judge of the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky.
Lieutenant James T. Harrington, who had served with
Martin and Headley in New York, was an attorney for the
Southern Pacific Railroad, with his home in Los Angeles.
Lieutenant John T. Ashbrook, viho had luckily escaped
being apprehended by Union detectives when Kennedy was
taken into custody, settled in his native state of Kentucky
where he followed a business career, principally insurance,
and for many years he was adjuster of the Underwriters'
3 -'Horan, Confederate A^ent, p* 289*
118
Association for Kentucky and Tennessee.
Nothing was recorded of the subsequent lives of any
of the St. Albans Raiders except for Swager, who was
supposedly killed in Paris at the time of the German se ige
of that city in I871* In the words of Young, the raiders
had "scattered to the four winds of the earth."
None of the available sources pertaining to the
Canadian enterprise recorded any knowledge of viiat happened
to Captain Charles H. Cole, who had been arrested just
before his plans materialized to seize the Michigan, except
that he was released February 10, I866.
The succeeding lives of auch traitors as Godfrey J.
Hyams, who was close enough to the commission that he could
report fully upon their plans and actions, and J. T. Shanks,
who had been purposely allowed to escape frcxn Camp Douglas
so that he might report the plans of Hines and his men at
Chicago during the November elections, could not be traced
through any available source; however, one might rest assur
ed that they did not dare show themselves too conspicuously
in the South for fear of their lives. Some of the young
men who gave away plans because of a loose tongue, loosened
primarily by alcohol or by money, no doubt, spent some
effort trying to reconcile themselves with their former
superiors. Such was the case with Lieutenant Bettersvo rth,
who had blurted out plans to Shanks that fateful November
night before the election when Federal troops closed in on
119
and arrested many of the Copperhead and Confederate leaders,
for he wrote Hines a letter imploring forgiveness for his
unwitting disclosure of plans because of drinking. Such
men as Marmaduke and Anderson, who turned state's witnesses
and testified against others to save their own necks,
seemed to have disappeared into a life of oblivion as far
as available records were concerned*
ljl*M>*MIM'|l<MJUlMlfcMiiM««MiMl>«*Mi Ml • I 11 taiumtmut*iitMmmmmi^ttmat*mmim imin i imiiiiinn • ! IHT t IHIIMM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bovey, Wilfrid* "Confederate Agents in Canada during the American Civil War," The Canadian Historical Review, II, March, 1921* Pp. k^-W.
S Bowles, Edward A. A History of the St. Albans Raid. St*
Albans, I87O.
Callahan, James Morton. American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations* New York, 1937.
• The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* Baltimore, 1901*
Castleman, John B. Active Service. Louisville, 1917*
Davis, Jefferson. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government J Vol. II. Richjnond, lb 51.
Headley, John William. Confederate Operations in Canada and New York. New York and Washington, 1906.
Horan, James. Confederate Agents A Discovery in History. New York, 1951 1
Kinchen, Oscar A. The St. Albans Raiders^ Daring Adventurers of the Confederate Army. Manuscript prepared for public atIon7T^9FBT"
Nicolay, John G* and Hay, John* Abraham Lincoln, A History^ Vol. Vlir. New York, I892.
United States Government. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the V/ar of the Rebellion, 30 vols* Washington, D.C., 1592-1922.
. War of the Rebellion — Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. Washington, D.C», 1880-1901*
Wrong, George M* The Canadians, The Story of A People* New York, 191+2': ^^—
120