concurrent weapons development and productionconcurrent development and production of weapons...

CONGf^SS OF THE UNITED STATESCONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE AUGUST 1988

Concurrent WeaponsDevelopment and Production

BO STUDY

CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

AND PRODUCTION

The Congress of the United StatesCongressional Budget Office

PREFACE

Overlaps in the development and production of major weapons systems, called"concurrency," have been a topic of sustained debate in the weapons acquisitioncommunity and the Congress. Many ascribe the problems experienced by the B-1Bbomber to concurrency in its development and production. Some have also con-cluded that the failure of the Army's Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun system toperform successfully was the result, in part at least, of excessive concurrency.Others feel that, although concurrency involves risks, it can achieve significantsavings and minimize the time required for acquisition. In reviewing Department ofDefense budget requests, the Congress must consider the potential advantages andrisks of using concurrency in acquiring major weapons systems.

This study, performed at the request of the House Committee on Armed Ser-vices, analyzes the effectiveness of concurrency in selected major weapons programsduring the 1970s. The study also traces the recent history of the use of concurrencyand outlines relevant legislation, policies, and regulations. Finally, it evaluates thepotential benefits and costs of improving Congressional review of concurrent pro-grams. In keeping with the mandate of the Congressional Budget Office to provideobjective analysis, the study does not recommend any particular course of action.

G. Wayne Glass of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study withthe extensive assistance of William Kostak and under the general supervision ofRobert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr. The author acknowledges the helpfulassistance provided by Philip Webre and R. William Thomas of the CongressionalBudget Office and Dr. Gerald R. McNichols of Management Consulting andResearch, Inc. (The assistance of external participants implies no responsibility forthe final product, which rests solely with CBO.) Francis S. Pierce edited the report,and Rebecca Kees and Kathryn Quattrone prepared it for publication.

James L. BlumActing Director

August 1988

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CONTENTS

I

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

vii

1

Some Examples of Concurrency 2Advantages of Concurrency 4Possible Disadvantages

of Concurrency 5

H THE EFFECTS OF CONCURRENCY 7

Analysis of Recent Programs 7History of Concurrency 19Current Legislation and Regulations 24

III SHOULD THE CONGRESSTAKE ACTION? 27

Getting Information onConcurrent Programs 27

Noncurrent Benchmarks 29Ensuring Adequate Operational

Testing 30Ensuring Adequate Risk Analysis 31

APPENDIXES

A Current Legislation, Policies, andRegulations Affecting Concurrency 37

B Risk Analysis Policies andTheir Implementation 43

GLOSSARY 47

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vi CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

TABLES

S-1. Concurrency, Cost Growth, and ScheduleChange for 14 Major Programs x

1. Concurrency, Cost Growth, and ScheduleChange for 14 Major Programs 15

2. Planned Concurrency Levels ofSelected Major Weapons Programs 28

3. Major Risk Factors in ConcurrentWeapons Systems Acquisition 33

FIGURES

1. Simplified Diagram of Concurrencyin a Weapons Program 2

2. Operational Schematic of Concurrency 12

3. Concurrency and Unit Cost Growth 16

4. Concurrency and Schedule Slippage 18

BOX

1. Initial Acquisition Milestones and Phases 11

SUMMARY

Some analyses of weapons programs in the Department of Defense(DoD) have suggested that the practice of allowing development andproduction to overlap—that is, to proceed concurrently—is a principalcontributor to program problems. These views have been reinforcedby difficulties with recent major weapons projects that featuredconcurrency, including the B-1B aircraft and the Division Air Defense(DIVAD) gun system. Other analyses, however, have argued that con-currency is a useful, if not essential, means to meet urgent defenserequirements by accelerating the weapons acquisition process.

Concurrency is fairly common in weapons acquisition programs.Out of a sample of 31 major programs surveyed in this study, 13 couldbe classified as highly concurrent.

To assist the Congress in reconciling the conflicting claims aboutconcurrency, the study reviews the success of selected weapons pro-grams that featured concurrency, and summarizes the history of itsuse by DoD. The study also proposes several actions the Congresscould take to improve its oversight of weapons systems in which devel-opment and production are proceeding concurrently.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CONCURRENCY

Concurrency can provide important advantages over the sequentialdevelopment and production of a weapons system. Perhaps most im-portant, it can shorten the time required to field a weapons system,perhaps enabling U.S. forces to meet a new enemy threat sooner or toestablish a technological advantage important to national security.Accelerating the acquisition process can also reduce the risk that theuseful lives of some weapons will be shortened by obsolescence.

Concurrency can also achieve cost savings and management effi-ciencies. Reducing the time required to develop and produce a weaponcan mean lower overhead costs. In addition, the tighter schedule of a

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viii CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

concurrent program may mean more continuity and stability in thelabor force, improving management efficiency. For example, close col-laboration between design and production personnel can facilitateadjustments or improvements in a weapons system.

Concurrency can also prevent program changes that mightcompromise cost and schedule objectives. For example, to meet tighterschedules, an accelerated program must avoid design changes thatwould add substantially to costs. Also, by compressing developmentand production, a concurrent program can reduce the number ofmanagement reviews and minimize opportunities for budget adjust-ments.

On the other hand, there are significant risks in the concurrentdevelopment and production of weapons systems. As was the casewith the B-1B aircraft and the DIVAD gun, after production has be-gun problems may be uncovered that require major redesign and pro-duction changes, significantly increasing costs and delaying deploy-ment. Weapons already deployed may need to be modified, furtheradding to costs. Finally, the program's performance and scheduleobjectives may not be met, placing in jeopardy one of the key goals ofconcurrency.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CONCURRENCY

To what extent has concurrency succeeded or failed? Lack of informa-tion makes it difficult to separate the effects of concurrency from themany other factors that influence the success or failure of weaponsprograms. Nevertheless, it is possible to correlate concurrency withtwo measures often associated with the success or failure of weaponsprograms: cost growth and schedule delays.

This study examined concurrency, cost growth, and schedule datafor 14 major weapons systems that were developed during the 1970sand have been subsequently produced and deployed. The systemsinclude a variety of types of weapons from each of the military ser-vices, and all of them have been reviewed by the Defense Systems

SUMMARY

Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).l The analysis showed that nostrong relationship exists between concurrency and schedule delay(see Summary Table). A statistical regression analysis found thatonly a couple of percentage points of the variation in schedule delaysare explained by concurrency. A modestly stronger relationship existsbetween concurrency and cost growth: approximately 14 percent ofthe variance in cost growth is explained by concurrency.

Despite these ambivalent statistical findings for the 14 programsas a group, it is clear that some highly concurrent programs have ex-perienced significant cost growth. For example, unit cost for thePatriot missile, a highly concurrent program, is 256 percent of whatwas originally planned. The Copperhead artillery shell, another high-ly concurrent program, did not achieve its initial operational capa-bility (IOC) until 41 months after the date in the original plan—aperiod equal to about 84 percent of the time originally planned fromthe beginning of full-scale development to IOC.

HISTORY OF CONCURRENCY

Concurrent development and production of weapons systems has beenemphasized during wartime or periods of national emergency, when aconsensus readily supported the acceleration of high-priority weaponssystems. Examples include the depth charges developed for useagainst German submarines in World War I, the atom bomb developedduring World War II, the missile programs initiated during the"Sputnik" era of the late 1950s, and the "smart" weapons used inVietnam. Until the 1960s, however, concurrency was seldom used inacquiring weapons during peacetime.

Department of Defense policies governing concurrency have fluc-tuated since then. In the 1960s, under Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara, DoD encouraged the use of concurrency through the"Total Package Procurement" approach to buying weapons. But prob-

The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council is a senior-level advisory board to the Secretaryof Defense that recommends actions concerning the acquisition of major weapons systems. TheDSARC was recently restructured and is now called the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

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x CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

SUMMARY TABLE. CONCURRENCY, COST GROWTH, ANDSCHEDULE CHANGE FOR 14 MAJORPROGRAMS

Concurrency(Percentage ofIOT&E testing

to complete afterproduction) a/

Cost Growth(Current;baselineunit cost

in percent) b/

Schedule Change(Change in IOCas percentage ofprogram length) c/

Group I(High concurrency)

Harpoon Missile 100 228 69Patriot Missile 83 256 24CH-47 Helicopter 67 141 22Copperhead Shell 67 527 84

Average 79.3 288.0 49.0

Group II(Medium concurrency)

Bradley Fighting Vehicle 55 389 120I2R Maverick Missile 50 249 100UH-60 Helicopter 50 232 1Ml Tank 39 176 6Phalanx Gun System 33 118 126

Average 45.4 232.8 70.6

Group III(Low concurrency)

Hellfire Missile 32 172 47Stinger Missile 25 300 69SH-60 LAMPS Helicopter 19 174 0CH-53 Helicopter 0 133 139F/A-18 Aircraft 0 185 38

Average 15.2 192.8 58.6

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense program data and budgetand schedule information.

NOTE: Concurrency was defined as the percentage of initial operational testing and evaluation(IOT&E) planned for completion after initial production was authorized. Zero concurrencymeans that all testing was to be completed before production began, while a concurrency valueof 100 percent means that all testing was to take place after the beginning of production. Thestudy defined high concurrency as 66 percent or above, medium concurrency as 33 percent to 66percent and low concurrency as below 33 percent.

a. IOT&E = Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation.

b. Calculated using current dollars.

c. IOC = Initial Operational Capability.

SUMMARY

lems encountered by the C-5 aircraft and other concurrent programsin the 1960s led to a change of policy. In 1969, DoD adopted a "flybefore buy" approach that emphasized successful testing of prototypesystems before production began. In 1977, however, when studiesshowed that development and production of weapons were takinglonger than ever before, the Defense Science Board-a high-level advi-sory board to the Secretary of Defense-recommended a return to theconcurrent acquisition practices of the past. More recently, the cur-rent has seemed to be moving in the other direction: the President'sBlue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management recommended in1987 that development and testing of prototypes be completed beforeproduction begins.

These ebbs and flows of policy are reflected in today's regulationsand legislation, which do not prohibit concurrency and in some casesencourage it. On the one hand, DoD's basic acquisition regulationsfavor concurrency by emphasizing the need to reduce the time it takesto acquire weapons. On the other hand, the Congress has placed legalconstraints on acquisition policy that seem to limit concurrency. Forexample, the 1987 Defense Authorization Act states that "a majordefense acquisition program may not proceed beyond low-rate initialproduction until IOT&E [Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation]of the program is completed."

IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHTOF CONCURRENT PROGRAMS

Given the ambivalent statistical evidence concerning the effects ofconcurrency on costs and schedules, and the fact that current laws andregulations limit its use, the Congress may wish to take no furtheraction regarding concurrent programs as a group. On the other hand,in view of recent problems with certain programs, the Congress maywish to have more information on high-priority programs that areemploying concurrency.

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xii CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

Measures of Concurrency

DoD does not have a standard definition of concurrency, or providecriteria by which concurrency could be determined. Such a measurewould enable the Congress to identify concurrent programs and wouldencourage DoD to focus management attention on them. It would notbe difficult for DoD to develop a measure of concurrency and report theresults for each major program as part of an existing report such as theCongressional Data Sheets or the Selected Acquisition Reports.

Nonconcurrent Benchmarks

For selected programs, DoD might also be asked to prepare analternative plan that would minimize concurrency. Comparing thetwo plans should clarify the advantages of concurrency during Con-gressional debate. Updated to include the experience acquired as theweapon was developed and tested, this nonconcurrent benchmarkwould also permit future analysts to assess more carefully the advan-tages and disadvantages of concurrency. Since such a nonconcurrentbenchmark would require substantial effort, it should probably berequired only for highly concurrent, high-priority projects.

Operational Testing

The Congress may also wish to address critical elements of theoperational testing plan for concurrent programs in order to ensurethat test plans and funding are adequate. For example, throughhearings or staff analyses, the Congress could determine whethersufficient test assets, testing facilities, targets, and threat simulationshave been planned and budgeted. Adequate testing is important forall weapons programs, but it is particularly important for concurrentprograms in which compressed schedules often allow little time to dealwith problems that are revealed late in the program.

Risk Assessment

The DoD does not routinely conduct and report comprehensive riskassessments for major weapons programs, either for internal manage-

SUMMARY

ment or for the use of the Congress. A program may fail to achieve itsplanned goals for a number of reasons, including cost overruns, sched-ule delays, or poor performance. An assessment of such risk may beparticularly important in programs involving concurrency. The Con-gress might request DoD to provide a comprehensive risk analysis ad-dressing key areas where problems could develop, such as the natureof the enemy threat, the availability of adequate means of testing, thekind of technology involved, and the methods of manufacture.

Preparing risk analyses would mean adding to DoD's reportingworkload. This disadvantage would have to be weighed against thepotential benefit of more informed decision making.

Wlflf

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 1988, the Congress appropriated about $121.3 billion forthe acquisition of weapons and their support systems. Weapons acqui-sition consists of a series of phases beginning with the establishmentof a military need and proceeding to the development of a system con-cept; then to the design, fabrication, and testing of a system; and final-ly, to production and deployment. The basic goal of the weapons ac-quisition process is to produce weapons systems that meet militaryrequirements at the lowest possible cost and in a timely manner. Thisis not easy to achieve, however, because of the expense of high tech-nology and the many uncertainties associated with the acquisitionprocess.

One way of reducing acquisition time and cost is through concur-rent development and production. In simplified terms, weapons pro-grams can be thought of as progressing through a development stage,which includes perfecting ideas and perhaps building a prototype ofthe system, and a production stage that provides operational weaponsfor use in the field. Concurrent programs feature significant overlapof development and production (see Figure I).1 The degree of concur-rency may be measured by the overlap between the testing of wea-pons, which indicates readiness to enter into production, and the pro-duction phase. Chapter n of this study develops a more precise defini-tion and measure of concurrency.

This definition--the overlap between development and production-is consistent with the definitionused by the Defense Science Board in its study of the weapons system acquisition process. SeeDefense Science Board 1977 Summer Study, Report of the Acquisition Cycle Task Force (March1978), p. 47.

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2 CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

SOME EXAMPLES OF CONCURRENCY

Recent experience with highly concurrent programs has caused con-cern in the Congress. The B-1B bomber, intended to close quicklywhat was perceived as a "window" of U.S. strategic vulnerability, wasauthorized to enter production about three years before its develop-mental testing would be completed. Several years after productionbegan, serious problems were discovered with the bomber, particu-

Figure 1.Simplified Diagram of Concurrency in a Weapons Program

High Concurrency

Start Production End

Low Concurrency

Start

D—Development End

Start Production End

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 3

larly with its defensive avionics—a system designed to jam or confuseSoviet radars. It is possible that some of those problems were caused,or at least exacerbated, by concurrency in the program.

Another highly concurrent program was the Army's Division AirDefense (DIVAD) gun, which was designed to destroy enemy heli-copters and fixed-wing aircraft before they could attack U.S. andallied ground forces. Again, production began well before completionof testing. But that testing raised questions about DIVAD's effective-ness, especially at long ranges. After purchasing 146 DIVAD guns,the program was terminated in August 1985. The Army recentlyselected another weapon to meet its air defense needs.

Concurrency is not rare in the acquisition process. Virtually allmajor weapons programs that have begun full-scale development inrecent years have exhibited at least some concurrency. Indeed, of 31major weapons programs surveyed, 13 were found to be highly con-current.2

Concurrency has sometimes worked well. For example, the Per-shing I missile program applied concurrency successfully during the1960s. Despite the fact that production of the missile was approvedover two years before field testing began, the Pershing I met the mostcritical milestone, performance, and deployment goals without signifi-cant cost increases or schedule delays.3 Other major programs, includ-ing the Polaris submarine, the Minuteman missile, and the F-5Eaircraft, have also been cited as successful examples of concurrentprograms.4 In these cases, concurrency has meant that a useful wea-pons system has been deployed more quickly than if a more sequentialapproach to acquisition had been used.

2. An operational definition of concurrency is developed in Chapter II. "Major weapons systems" heremeans systems reviewed by the Defense Acquisition Board, a high-level review group in DoD.

3. See the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on theDepartment of Defense (July 1970), Appendix F, pp. F-5 through F-8.

4. The Defense Science Board, Report of the Acquisition Cycle Task Force (March 1978), pp. 49-50.

..11 n4 CONCURRENT WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION August 1988

ADVANTAGES OF CONCURRENCY

Indeed the key objective of concurrency is to speed up a weapons pro-gram. Speeding delivery can improve military capability in a numberof ways. It can meet an immediate threat as in the case of thePershing n missile program. (Pershing n is a U.S. intermediate-range missile that was placed in Europe in the early 1980s to counterSoviet missiles already in place.) Speed may also be needed to replaceinadequate weapons, as was intended with the DIVAD gun. Finally,concurrency may offer a way of capitalizing on technological advances,such as the new stealth technology designed to help aircraft and otherweapons evade enemy radar.

Speed achieved through concurrency may have other advantagesbesides increasing military capability. Program managers may in-voke it to make up for past delays. Less nobly, concurrency may beused to insure that those managing a program are around to witnessits delivery to operating forces. Contractors may support concurrencyto hasten the moment when the government commits productionmoney to a program. Also, accelerating a weapons system may pro-mote greater program stability by encouraging an early commitmentto designs and by discouraging design changes in order to meet costand schedule goals. It can also minimize opportunities for arbitrarybudgetary adjustments that can disrupt program plans and activitiesand ultimately add to the total cost of a program.

Concurrency may also lead to cost savings through greater effi-ciency. Duplicative tasks can be consolidated or eliminated. Develop-ment testing, for example, can be conducted concurrently with opera-tional testing to save time and money. Also, program staff can be usedmore efficiently: design engineers, for example, might collaboratewith production personnel in creating an efficient production plan. Ifthe same contractor is performing both development and production,shortening the program may reduce the contractor's overhead. Final-ly, a shorter program may avoid some costs associated with inflation,though these would not be savings in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 5

POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF CONCURRENCY

While concurrency may speed up programs, this very fact may lead tocomplications. If problems are discovered during development andtesting that require major design changes, it may be necessary to stopproduction while the changes are incorporated into weapons alreadyproduced. Such disruptions mean delay, and may even result in theprogram taking longer than would have been the case withoutconcurrency. Even if the problems discovered during developmentand testing are minor, solutions to these problems may have to beincorporated into weapons already produced—a process that is oftenexpensive and time consuming.

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CHAPTER II

THE EFFECTS OF CONCURRENCY

Does concurrency meet its objectives of speeding up programs orholding down costs? Concurrent programs have often not met theircost and schedule goals. But would they have performed better withless concurrency? Analysis of recent programs suggests no strongrelationship between concurrency and schedule slippage, and only amoderate relationship between concurrency and cost growth. Never-theless, some highly concurrent programs have experienced major costgrowth and schedule delays. These ambivalent findings are reflectedin the history of the use of concurrency and in current policies.

ANALYSIS OF RECENT PROGRAMS

When the Department of Defense proposes a concurrent program tothe Congress, it does not submit an alternative plan that avoids con-currency. In the absence of such a benchmark for judging the successor failure of a concurrent program, analysts must rely on more generalmeasures. One such measure is the amount of growth in cost aboveplanned levels. Presumably, substantial growth in costs is a sign ofprogram problems, some of which could have been caused or exacer-bated by concurrency. Another measure is the degree of delay in aprogram beyond its planned schedule. Schedule delays may be espe-cially important in assessing the success of concurrency, since one ofits key goals is to speed program completion.

Definitions of Variables

Three major variables used in the analysis are "concurrency," "costgrowth," and "schedule change."

Concurrency. In the sense in which it is used here, concurrency refersto the overlap between the development and production processes of a

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weapons system. 1 There is no agreement, however, on how to measureit. In order to calculate the overlap, it is necessary to measure theproportion of the development program that has been accomplished atthe time production is started. Simple measures based on time anddollars spent may have limitations. For example, calculating concur-rency on the basis of total development time may understate thesignificance of the overlap between development and production ifdevelopment time includes interruptions and delays. Measurementsbased on dollars spent could reflect a similar bias in the case ofextended development programs. Instead, this study assesses concur-rency based on progress achieved in a weapons system testing pro-gram, because testing is closely related to the readiness of the systemfor production.

A weapons testing program consists of two phases: developmenttesting and operational testing. Development testing verifies that adevelopment version of a weapons system has met the technicalperformance specifications and objectives of the system (or subsystemor component) in a controlled testing environment. Operationaltesting, on the other hand, involves the use of a production version ofthe weapons system (or items representative of a production version)to conduct field tests under realistic operational conditions.2 Successin operational testing is supposed to precede production approval.Thus the amount of operational testing that occurs after productionbegins is a reasonable measure of the overlap between developmentand production, and is this study's definition of concurrency.3

Operational testing and evaluation in turn consists of two phases:initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) and follow-ontesting and evaluation (FOT&E). The former uses initial production

1. There are other ways to define "concurrency." In general, they are more restrictive than thedefinition used in this study, but, although useful, do not address the concern of the Congressregarding weapons acquisition strategy. In a more restrictive sense, for example, concurrency canrefer to the simultaneous development of primary and alternative (back-up) technologies orconcepts. In addition, concurrency can refer to the simultaneous development and testing ofseparate subsystems. It can also mean the simultaneous production and integration of subsystemsinto a single weapons system. Alternatively, it may mean scheduling specific tasks to balanceworkload and personnel assignments so as to avoid duplication of effort. Concurrency, as used inthis study, may be either planned or unplanned. Concurrency could be introduced or increased fora program already in development, for example, in response to a change in urgency.

2. Departmentof Defense Directive 5000.3, "Test and Evaluation," March 12,1986, pp. 4-5.

3. See the discussion of current legislation and regulations at the end of this chapter.

CHAPTER H THE EFFECTS OF CONCURRENCY 9

items (or items representative of production) to demonstrate a sys-tem's operational effectiveness and suitability in the field. The latteruses more mature production items to validate achievement of pro-gram objectives.4 FOT&E does not begin until after production hasstarted. Consequently, the IOT&E phase provides a better measure ofthe overlap between development and production.

The limited availability of IOT&E data, however, places a con-straint on the analysis. In theory, the proportion of total IOT&E testscompleted after production begins is the preferred measure of thedevelopment variable in calculating concurrency. But complete dataon the number of IOT&E tests for the programs examined were notavailable. As an alternative, the indicator used in this analysis is thepercentage of all time spent in IOT&E that is to be completed afterproduction is approved. Thus a percentage equaling zero indicatesthat no IOT&E testing is to take place after production is approved, inwhich case, by this study's definition, no concurrency is planned. Apercentage equal to one hundred indicates that all IOT&E testing is totake place after production is approved, meaning that complete con-currency is planned.

Finally, in measuring concurrency, it is also necessary to identifythe point at which production begins. Experts differ on how to definethe start of production. Some consider that the allocation of funds foradvance procurement of materials or long-lead items constitutes theinitial commitment to production. For many programs, however, thisadvance procurement precedes authorization by DoD management tobegin production by a year or more. Moreover, even if the Congressprovides funds for advance procurement, there is no guarantee thatproduction will actually begin. In a subsequent budget review, theCongress could conceivably choose not to fund actual production.

The DoD management decision to begin production seems a moreappropriate measure of its actual beginning. Every weapons systemgoes through a series of phases, from initiation of the program throughcompletion of production. Each major phase is preceded by a mile-stone denoting a decision that must be made by DoD managers. (The

4. Defense Sciences Management College, Systems Engineering Management Guide (October 1986),p. 6-5.

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accompanying box defines the key phases and the numbered mile-stones that precede them.) Under present policy, an initial decision tobegin production at a low rate can occur at Milestone n, the beginningof the full-scale development phase. Alternatively, Milestone HI maybe separated into low-rate (Ilia) and full-rate (nib) production mile-stones. Some consider the full-rate decision to be the actual beginningof production since it constitutes a "full" commitment to a program.On the other hand, few programs are canceled once production hasinitially been approved at a low rate. Thus, since initial productionwas planned to begin at Milestone Ilia for the systems being analyzed,this study uses Milestone Ula as its measure of the start of production.(Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between phases and milestones.)

The formula used for measuring concurrency is:

t2-niaC = x 100

t2-tl

where

ti = beginning of IOT&E,t2 = end of IOT&E, andHla = date of production approval (Milestone Ilia).

Figure 2 shows the definition schematically.

Cost Growth. Defining a valid measure of the growth in cost of a wea-pons system is also problematic. In examining the relationship be-tween concurrency and unit cost growth for a weapons system, it isdesirable to restrict cost growth to increases associated with the basicproduction model and to exclude growth caused by model changes orimprovements. Program cost information contained in the quarterlySelected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to the Congress on major wea-pons systems is satisfactory for this purpose. The SARs contain abaseline cost estimate consistent with initial plans plus current costestimates for each major weapons system. The differences betweenthe current and baseline cost estimates are categorized according tovarious sources of cost growth, including changes in the economy andin production quantities. By eliminating cost growth in these two


BOXINITIAL ACQUISITION MILESTONES AND PHASES

Weapons systems go through a series of phases, from program initiation to completion ofproduction. Each major phase is preceded by a managerial decision called a milestone. Thisbox summarizes the milestones and phases that precede full-rate production.

Milestone 0-Program Initiation/Mission Need Decision

The Defense Resources Board reviews the need for a new major weapons system.

Concept Exploration Phase

Follows Milestone 0. Program office explores alternative approaches to fulfilling mission need.It draws up initial technical specifications and cost and schedule estimates. It also develops testand evaluation plan and identifies critical technical issues.

Milestone I-Concept Demonstration/Validation Decision

Defense Acquisition Board reviews and validates conceptual approach proposed by service tomeet requirement. It establishes planning baseline cost, schedule, and performance thresholdsto be met at Milestone II. It also reviews and validates test and evaluation and logistics andsupport plans and acquisition strategy.

Demonstration and Validation Phase

Follows Milestone I. Program office directs preliminary engineering and design work andanalyzes cost, performance, and schedule trade-off options. Contractor develops prototypes todemonstrate feasibility of system, subsystems, components, and test and support equipment.Principal areas of risk and alternative solutions are identified. Initial designs are reviewed anddevelopment testing conducted.

Milestone Il--Full-Scale Development

Defense Acquisition Board reviews results of the Demonstration and Validation Phase andrecommends that program go ahead when system feasibility has been demonstrated. Asappropriate, low-rate initial production of selected components or end items may be approved toverify production capability and to provide operational test resources. Program cost, schedule,and performance thresholds are updated and serve as development baseline for reports to theCongress. Test and Evaluation Master Plan, acquisition business strategy, and support andlogistics plans are reviewed and updated.

Full-Scale Development Phase

Follows Milestone II. System is fully developed, engineered, and fabricated. Test items arebuilt. Development and operational testing are conducted on the system, subsystems, andcomponents. Engineering and design changes occur, and preparations for transition to pro-duction are made.

Milestone Ill—Production Approval

Defense Acquisition Board reviews results of full-scale development phase and recommendsapproval to enter production phase. (Decision may be delegated to service secretaries if Mile-stone II baseline thresholds have not been breached.) Milestone may be separated into low- rate(Ilia) and full-rate (Illb) production milestones. Operational testing must be certifiedacceptable by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, before entering full-rate pro-duction.

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Figure 2.Operational Schematic of Concurrency

ProgramInitiated

Development D-

Full-ScaleDevelopment

Begins

D

DevelopmentCompleted

Begin IOT&E Complete IOT&E(t2>

Initial Operational Testingand Evaluation (IOT&E)

Production

Begin Low-RateProduction atMilestone Ilia

( I l i a )

Period ofConcurrency

Begin Full-RateProduction atMilestone 1Mb

(Illb)


major categories from current estimates, it is possible to approximatethe level of cost growth above the program baseline associated withonly the basic production model.5

The formula used for measuring the cost growth variable is:

C - Q - EG = x 100

B

5. The resulting indicator is only approximate since it retains all cost growth from engineeringchanges. Some engineering cost growth may have resulted from changes in the basic productionmodel needed to meet program operational goals; such costs are related to concurrency and shouldbe included in the cost growth measure. Other engineering cost growth, however, may haveresulted from engineering improvements authorized subsequent to the beginning of production,and should not be included. The SAR data do not permit a distinction between these two types ofengineering cost growth. Both, therefore, are included in measuring the cost growth variable.


where

C = current cost estimate,Q = cost change due to change in quantity purchased,E = cost change due to change in economic estimates, andB = baseline cost estimate.

Schedule Change. The third major variable used in this study con-cerns program schedule changes related to concurrency. The most im-portant schedule objective for a major weapons system is the time ofits initial operational capability (IOC). An IOC is typically defined asthe point at which an operating unit is trained and ready to use a newitem of equipment that has been deployed. Thus, for example, the IOCfor a new aircraft is achieved when a squadron begins operations. Anychange in the IOC from its initially planned date is defined in thisstudy as schedule change.6

A measure of schedule change should take into account not onlychange in the time of IOC but also the length of the program. A one-year delay in IOC for a program begun three years earlier is presum-ably more significant than a similar delay for a program begun tenyears before. For purposes of defining schedule change, this study de-fines planned program length as the period from the beginning offull-scale development to the initially planned IOC. Full-scale devel-opment, beginning at Milestone n, is the period during which a pro-totype of the weapons system is developed. Thus, the period betweenfull-scale development and IOC normally includes the major stepsthat are used to define concurrency in this study (IOT&E plus the be-ginning of low-rate production) and seems a reasonable basis for as-sessing schedule change.

6. For some weapons systems, the definition of an IOC may change during the course of developmentfrom its initial criteria established at the program baseline. In such cases, a delay or accelerationmay not accurately express the degree of schedule change associated with a program's concurrency,since the definition of the IOC goal has been altered. Program data contained in the SARs andother program budget documentation do not define lOCs in sufficient detail to determine whetherthe cases selected for this analysis are affected. DoD officials indicate.however, that adjustmentsin IOC definitions are the exception to the rule. This analysis assumes, therefore, that nosignificant change in definition of IOC occurred for the subject programs.

minfnn

JJLLU


The formula for the schedule change variable is:

S = - — x 100IP - Mil

where

Ia = actual IOC,Ip = planned IOC, andMH = date of full-scale development approval.

Results of the Analysis

The analysis examined 14 major weapons systems that enteredfull-scale development during the 1970s and were subsequently pro-duced and deployed.7 The systems selected for analysis included avariety of types from each of the military services. The concurrency,cost, and schedule variables were measured for each system accordingto the criteria and formulas presented in the preceding section. Thedata are displayed in Table 1.

Ideally, an analysis of concurrency would include more than 14programs in order to reveal details such as a preponderance of prob-lems in one type of weapons system. Unfortunately, the historicaldata needed to assess concurrency for other programs that havereached deployment are either incomplete or do not exist, and anexamination of programs currently in development would be pre-mature from the standpoint of assessing the effects of concurrency.

For clarity, the systems in Table 1 are categorized according tothree levels of concurrency. High-concurrency programs are definedas having 66 percent or more of the IOT&E program remaining at thetime initial production is approved (Group I). Programs with a medi-um degree of concurrency (Group II) are those for which 33 percent to

7. These systems represent the total number of major weapons programs reviewed by the DefenseSystems Acquisition Review Council that have been recently deployed, and for which all thenecessary data were available.

CHAPTER II THE EFFECTS OF CONCURRENCY 15

TABLE 1. CONCURRENCY, COST GROWTH, AND SCHEDULECHANGE FOR 14 MAJOR PROGRAMS

Concurrency(Percentage ofIOT&E testing

to complete afterproduction) a/

Cost Growth(Current/baselineunit cost

in percent) b/

Schedule Change(Change in IOCas percentage ofprogram length) c/

Group I(High concurrency)

Harpoon Missile 100 228 69Patriot Missile 83 256 24CH-47 Helicopter 67 141 22Copperhead Shell 67 527 84

Average 79.3 288.0 49.0

Group II(Medium concurrency)

Bradley Fighting Vehicle 55 389 120I2R Maverick Missile 50 249 100UH-60 Helicopter 50 232 1Ml Tank 39 176 6Phalanx Gun System 33 118 126

Average 45.4 232.8 70.6

Group III(Low concurrency)

Hellfire Missile 32 172 47Stinger Missile 25 300 69SH-60 LAMPS Helicopter 19 174 0CH-53 Helicopter 0 133 139F/A-18 Aircraft 0 185 38

Average 15.2 192.8 58.6

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense program data and budgetand schedule information.

NOTE: Concurrency was defined as the percentage of initial operational testing and evaluation(IOT&E) planned for completion after initial production was authorized. Zero concurrencymeans that all testing was to be completed before production began, while a concurrency valueof 100 percent means that all testing was to take place after the beginning of production. Thestudy defined high concurrency as 66 percent or above, medium concurrency as 33 percent to 66percent and low concurrency as below 33 percent.

a. IOT&E = Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation.

b. Calculated using current dollars.

c. IOC = Initial Operational Capability.

11TIT

ill


66 percent of IOT&E remains. Low-concurrency programs (Group III)have less than 33 percent of IOT&E remaining.

The data show a modest relationship between concurrency andcost growth. For example, the most concurrent group of programs ex-perienced a higher average cost growth (288 percent of the initialbaseline estimates) than those in the medium (233 percent) and low(193 percent) concurrency groups.

Figure 3 corroborates this finding, but illustrates that less concur-rent programs may also experience relatively high degrees of costgrowth. Although several highly concurrent programs (Patriot, Har-poon, Copperhead) experienced a high degree of cost growth (currentunit-cost estimates of more than 200 percent of the baseline), so did

Figure 3.Concurrency and Unit Cost Growth

600

500

400

300

200

100

Cost Growth(Current unit cost/baseline unit cost)

Copperhead

Bradley

•

Stinger

• Patriot

Maverick | B• UH-60 Harpoon

SH-60B HellfireF/A-18 U m m

Ml Tank CH.47

CH-53

Phalanx

I I I I I0 20 40 60 80 100

Concurrency

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense program data andbudget and schedule information.


programs in the medium- and low-concurrency groups (Bradley, I2RMaverick, UH-60, Stinger). On the other hand, the CH-47 helicopter,a highly concurrent program, experienced significantly lower costgrowth than most programs in less concurrent groups.

The relationship between concurrency and schedule change ap-pears to be weaker than between concurrency and cost growth. Theprograms in the medium-concurrent Group II, for example, experi-enced a higher average rate of schedule delay than those in the high-concurrent Group I. For the programs in Group n, the average delayapproached 71 percent of the time initially planned between Milestonen and the IOC. The average delay for programs in Group I was less:about 50 percent of the planned period between Milestone II and theIOC. Figure 4 illustrates this point graphically.

Simple regression analyses also corroborate the findings describedabove. Statistical indicators of correlation and determination demon-strate that concurrency is only modestly related to cost growth for theprograms being examined. The correlation coefficient between con-currency and cost growth is only 0.38. This suggests that about 14percent of the variation in cost growth from average levels is ex-plained by concurrency. The correlation between concurrency andschedule delay is 0.12. This means that almost none of the variance inschedule delay from the average for this set of programs is explainedby concurrency.

These findings appear consistent with at least some of the findingsof an earlier study by the Defense Science Board (DSB)-an indepen-dent, high-level advisory group to the Secretary of Defense. In 1977the DSB reviewed 62 acquisition programs that occurred between1940 and 1977. It concluded that no correlation existed between con-currency and the meeting of cost, schedule, and performance goals.Since the DSB study did not present detailed data and definitions, thisstudy has been unable to use the DSB data for comparison. In general,the statistical relationship of concurrency to cost growth and scheduledelay for the programs examined is not compelling. Some highly con-current programs experience major cost growth and schedule delays,however, and this suggests that closer Congressional review of suchprograms might be desirable.

¥1


Figure 4.Concurrency and Schedule Slippage

isnSchedule Change(Delay in initial operational capability as percentage of program length)

140 ,r

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

CH-53

F/A-18

Phalanx

Stinger

Hellfire

Bradley

Maverick

Copperhead

CH-47

SH-60B

-J—

M1 Tank

* UH-60

I * I

20 40 60

Concurrency

80

Harpoon

I I

100

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense program data andbudget and schedule information.


HISTORY OF CONCURRENCY

The use of concurrency has varied since World War I and has been thesubject of continuing debate. During wars or periods of national emer-gency, the need for weapons has put a premium on the accelerateddevelopment and production of weapons. During peacetime, however,the use of concurrency has often been debated. During the pastdecade, some have argued that the Soviet military threat justifies con-current scheduling, while others consider the threat to be less immedi-ate and therefore favor a measured acquisition approach. Some be-lieve in holding weapons acquisition costs to a minimum duringpeacetime, while others are willing to risk higher costs in the pursuitof national security. The following discussion summarizes the histori-cal use of concurrency, and traces the policy debate since the 1960s.

The Use of Concurrency During Wartimeand National Emergency

The development and production of weapons have customarily beenaccelerated in wartime or national emergencies. During World War I,for example, the Navy developed and produced depth charges withinfour months in order to meet the German submarine threat to alliedshipping.8

After the delayed entry of the United States into World War II,urgent military requirements led to widespread use of concurrency.Many examples can be cited. A crash program to develop and produceradars, for instance, was undertaken in November 1940. By the end ofthe war, scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Radi-ation Laboratory had designed, developed, and produced 150 differentradar systems for use on land, ships, and aircraft.9 Research on theproximity fuse—a technological advance enabling destruction ofenemy aircraft without a direct hit—was initiated in 1942, and the fuse

8. Wayne C. Foote, "History of Concurrency: The Controversy of Military Acquisition ProgramSchedule Compression" (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson Air ForceBase, Ohio, 1986), p. 31.

9. Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbows to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1973), p. 209.

nil iiiiirinir

_n


entered production in 1943.10 Numerous aircraft programs were alsoaccelerated; in some cases, such as the P-47, aircraft entered produc-tion within a matter of months after beginning development. H Per-haps the most famous concurrent program during World War n wasthe Manhattan Project, in which the design, development, and produc-tion of the world's first atomic bomb were telescoped into three years.

Soviet progress in space during the 1950s led to the acceleration ofU.S. ballistic missile programs. The Thor intermediate-range missile,for example, entered development in December 1955; it was designed,built, and tested within two years, and was operationally deployed inJune 1959. The Atlas and Titan missiles were also accelerated duringthe 1950s to achieve the earliest possible production and deploymentdates.12

Weapons programs were accelerated to meet military require-ments during the Vietnam War. The history of the Cobra helicopter isa good example. In September 1965, after only six months in devel-opment, a prototype of the AH-1 Huey Cobra helicopter was flighttested in order to meet an urgent requirement for a gunship escort forCH-47 helicopter transports. The Army signed an initial productioncontract six months later, and began deployment of Cobras in the fallof 1967, less than three years after the program had been under-taken.13

Programs designed to interdict enemy logistics and support linesin Southeast Asia were also accelerated. Forward Looking Infra-Red(FLIR) detection, Moving Target Indicators (MTI), and night visiondevices were concurrently developed and produced for use against theHo Chi Minh trail. "Smart" bomb programs were accelerated to pro-vide needed military capability against critical military targets.14

10. Ibid., p. 214.

11. Foote, "History of Concurrency," p. 33.

12. Wernher Von Braun and Frederick Ordway, History of Rocketry and Space Travel (New York:Thomas Crowell Company, 1966), pp. 133-135.

13. Bernard Nolty, Jacob Neufeld, and George Watson, An Illustrated Guide to the Air War OverVietnam (New York: Arco Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 16.

14. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Indochina (Boston: Beacon Press,1972), p. 152.


Concurrency During Peacetime—Debating the Policy

Until recent years, weapons were generally developed and producedsequentially during peacetime. This was particularly true followingWorld War I during a time of demobilization, limited defense budgets,and broad political support for disarmament and international co-operation. No military requirement existed during the postwar periodthat justified accelerating the weapons acquisition process.

During the interwar period, weapons were typically built as proto-types and subjected to extensive testing. The T-4, the only tank toenter serial production before 1935, was developed, tested, and pro-duced sequentially.^ Indeed, even when production of a weapon wasstarted during the interwar era, relatively small quantities weremanufactured. Aircraft such as the Curtiss Goshawk, the Helldiver,and the B-17 were produced in limited quantities.16

Following World War II, weapons acquisition generally returnedto a sequential approach with a few exceptions such as the B-47 air-craft and the missile programs of the 1950s. In some cases, weaponssuch as the Terrier, Sparrow, and Nike missiles were kept in develop-ment in order to incorporate the latest technological advances beforeinitiating production. Other programs were kept in development inorder to avoid the post-production problems being experienced byconcurrent programs such as the B-47. Indeed, the Air Force adopteda policy during the mid-1950s that restricted production for 18 to 24months until testing was completed.17

The introduction of Total Package Procurement (TPP) by Secre-tary of Defense Robert McNamara in the early 1960s represented amajor shift in weapons acquisition policy and practice. Previously, theDepartment of Defense had issued separate contracts for research anddevelopment and production. Under TPP, the DoD awarded a singlefixed-price contract for the entire program. This provided contractors

15. Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, British and American Tanks of World War II (New York: ArcoPublishing Company, 1969), p. 105; and Arthur Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Unionand the United States (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1976), p. 79.

16. Enza Angelucci, ed., Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft 1914-1980 (New York: RandMcNally and Company, 1980), pp. 153-155 and 288.

17. Foote, "History of Concurrency," pp. 41-42.

111!!!! Hi! II! III!

i in i i i mill nil


with an incentive to accelerate a program and to minimize develop-ment costs. In effect, TPP encouraged the use of concurrency.

Experience with programs such as the C-5 cargo aircraft demon-strated the risk of TPP, even for programs with only moderate tech-nological difficulty. The C-5 entered production in 1968, after anabbreviated development phase had been compressed to meet an IOCthat had been advanced from 1972 to 1969.18 In July 1969, six monthsafter the Air Force agreed to purchase a second lot of C-5 aircraft, thewings developed cracks. An expensive wing modification programwas required. 19

Other concurrent programs also experienced significant diffi-culties during the 1960s. The B-70 bomber and the Skybolt missilewere canceled because of excessive costs. The MBT-70 tank, theCheyenne helicopter, and the Condor missile were unable to meet cost,schedule, and performance objectives. The MBT-70 was replaced by aless ambitious program, the XM-803, which in turn, was terminatedin 1972. The Cheyenne helicopter was canceled in favor of the AH-64Apache helicopter program.

Early in 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard re-viewed the acquisition practices of the previous decade and concludedthat "program after program was in trouble from a common fault--production had been started before engineering development wasfinished."20 Packard favored the development and testing of proto-types before beginning production—a "fly before buy" approach to wea-pons acquisition. In 1970, the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Defense Panelsupported Packard by recommending that the DoD adopt "a generalrule against concurrent development and production efforts, with theproduction decision deferred until successful demonstration of devel-opmental prototypes."21

18. Berkeley Rice, The C-5 A Scandal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 41.

19. Ibid., p. 150.

20. Foote, "History of Concurrency," pp. 53-54.

21. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Departmentof Defense (July 1970), p. 8.


The DoD began to implement the "fly before buy" approach duringthe early 1970s. Deputy Secretary Packard established a formalmanagement process under the Defense Systems Acquisition ReviewCouncil (DSARC) to review weapons acquisition and ensure that aweapon did not proceed from one acquisition phase to the next withoutsuccessfully completing the previous phase. Under the DSARC sys-tem, a decision to begin production could not occur until the full-scaleengineering phase had been completed.22

As a result of Packard's new approach, acquisition became moresequential during the 1970s. Flyoffs between prototypes of weapons ortheir components preceded production decisions for major weaponssuch as the A-X attack aircraft, the Lightweight Fighter, the F-15,and the AWACS aircraft. Test program results for major weapons indevelopment during the late 1970s indicate that performanceparameters were more thoroughly tested before beginning productionthan they had been previously.23

As the pendulum swung toward more sequential acquisition, how-ever, the policy process generated another reversal. In 1977, theDefense Science Board (DSB), an independent, high-level advisorygroup to the Secretary of Defense, observed that the acquisition pro-cess was taking too much time and ought to be shortened. The DSBreviewed 62 acquisition programs between 1940 and 1977 anddetermined that no correlation existed between the use of concurrencyand the ability of a program to meet cost, schedule, and performancegoals. Consequently, the DSB recommended that DoD encourage theuse of concurrency.

The recent difficulties with two highly concurrent programs, theB-1B bomber and the DIVAD gun, have again generated concern overthe use of concurrency. In 1985 the President's Commission onDefense Management, under Chairman David Packard, reviewed theacquisition process and recommended a return to more sequential ac-quisition practices. For example, the Commission concluded that themost reliable approach to procuring high-technology weapons systems

22. Although the acquisition milestone system established by Packard has been modified many times,it continues to function. See Box, p. 11.

23. Edmund Dews and others, Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: Department of Defense Experience inthe 1970's (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1979), p. 21.

ill III!! l\ 111


was through developing and testing competitive prototypes beforeawarding a production contract. The Commission further recom-mended that prototype competitions be applied to all major weaponsand critical subsystems.24 It also recommended early operationaltesting in order to ensure that the design was satisfactory before be-ginning production.25

CURRENT LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

The outcome of these ebbs and flows of policy, together with the am-bivalent evidence concerning concurrency, is a set of laws and regula-tions that do not prohibit concurrency, and in some cases encourage it.(Appendix A discusses the laws and regulations in more detail.) In-deed, DoD's basic acquisition regulations favor concurrency byemphasizing the need to reduce the time required to acquire weapons.One regulation explicitly states that the services can reduce weaponsdevelopment or "lead" time through concurrency (DoD Directive5000.1). In addition, a recent change in DoD Regulation 5000.2 per-mits authorization to begin production earlier in the acquisition pro-cess than ever before—at the start of full-scale development.

On the other hand, the Congress has enacted legislation that con-strains concurrency. The 1987 Defense Authorization Act, for exam-ple, states that "a major defense acquisition program may not proceedbeyond low-rate initial production until IOT&E of the program iscompleted." That same law requires that testing of a weapon's abilityto survive enemy attack must be satisfactorily completed before theprogram may begin full-rate production.

Other legislation and policies seem intended to discourage con-currency. The 1987 Defense Authorization Act requires that, absent aCongressional waiver, the DoD must develop and test competitiveprototypes of a major weapon before awarding a production contract.Competitive prototyping, which is also encouraged by several DoD

24. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, A Quest for Excellence: FinalReport to the President (June 1986), p.56.

25. Ibid., p. 50.


instructions, is likely to lead to sequential rather than concurrent pro-grams because time must be allowed to complete a competition be-tween two or more contractors before production begins.

nil nun

CHAPTER III

SHOULD THE CONGRESS TAKE ACTION?

Given the ambivalent evidence on the effects of concurrency, theCongress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrentprograms as a group. Limits have already been set, both in law and inDoD regulations, to the use of concurrency. The policy pendulum inDoD may be swinging back toward less concurrency if the recentPackard Commission report is an indicator, and the risk factors inspecific programs for which concurrency is proposed could be eval-uated against the benefits of accelerating those programs.

Since some members of the Congress have expressed concernabout concurrency-related problems in specific programs, includingthe B-1B bomber and the DIVAD gun, this chapter discusses severalpossible actions, noting the pros and cons of each.

GETTING INFORMATION ON CONCURRENT PROGRAMS

The documents routinely sent to the Congress do not identify pro-grams that DoD regards as concurrent. Nor is there a definition ofhow DoD measures concurrency or what criteria it uses to identify ahighly concurrent program. The data to make such judgments areavailable, however, and the Congress may wish to ask that a measureof concurrency accompany the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) foreach program. A letter accompanying the first such SAR could defineDoD's measure and indicate its criterion for classifying a program ashighly concurrent or less so.

Such a measure would not only inform the Congress as to whichprograms are concurrent; it might also focus DoD management atten-tion on such programs. In general, DoD managers are in the bestposition to judge whether the benefits that can come from concurrencyare worth its risks. Having such a measure in the SARs would alsoallow the Congress to note when concurrency is being planned or when

HI IHI

ill


programs are becoming more concurrent. A sharp rise in a program'sconcurrency above the level initially planned might suggest a need toreview that program with added care.

A preliminary examination of current and recent programs sug-gests that the list of concurrent programs would include a substantialnumber of major programs (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. PLANNED CONCURRENCY LEVELS OFSELECTED MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

High-Concurrency Programs

Army Helicopter Improvement Program F-15 AircraftHarpoon Missile Patriot MissileNAVSTAR Satellite B-1B AircraftC-17 Aircraft AMRAAM MissileMK-50 Torpedo CH-47 HelicopterT-45 Aircraft Copperhead Artillery Shell

V-22 Aircraft

Medium-Concurrency Programs

Phalanx Gun System UH-60 HelicopterASW SOW (Nuclear) Missile I2R Maverick MissileBradley Fighting Vehicle SRAM II Missile

Ml Tank

Low-Concurrency Programs

AV-8B Aircraft Stinger MissileF/A-18 Aircraft ISA-AMPE CommunicationsHARM Missile SystemCH-53 Helicopter F-16 AircraftSH-60 Helicopter (LAMPS III) ASW SOW (Conventional) MissileHellfire Missile Airborne Self-Protection

Jammer System

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, based on Department of Defense program data.

NOTE: For a definition of concurrency, see Chapter II.

CHAPTER m SHOULD THE CONGRESS TAKE ACTION? 29

A measure of concurrency should at most add modestly to theworkload of DoD managers. If it were analogous to the measure pro-posed in Chapter n of this study, it would require only a few computa-tions for each program.

NONCONCURRENT BENCHMARKS

For programs that reflect substantial concurrency, the Congressmight ask the Department to propose an alternative plan that wouldreduce or eliminate concurrency. This would provide a benchmark forjudging concurrency's effectiveness. If the nonconcurrent benchmark,updated for experience acquired as the weapon was developed andproduced, showed lower costs and the same or lower time to comple-tion, then concurrency would clearly have failed. If the oppositeproved true, then concurrency would be seen to have met its key objec-tives. As noted earlier, without such a benchmark it is very difficult todetermine whether concurrency succeeds, and at what cost.

There is precedent for requiring such a benchmark estimate.When the Congress approved DoD proposals to expand multiyear con-tracting, it required the Department to estimate the costs of the pro-gram in the absence of a multiyear contract. (Multiyear contractingallows DoD to commit itself to buying a weapon for more than one yearand to pay contractors to buy key components in economic quantitiesand stockpile them for later use.) These dual cost estimates haveenabled analysts to estimate the effects of multiyear contracting. 1

Making benchmark estimates could add substantially to DoD'sworkload. To be useful, such estimates would require careful judg-ments by DoD and its contractors concerning schedules and costs.This takes time and is not routinely done at present. If it requiressuch estimates, the Congress may wish to restrict them to selectedprograms.

Congressional Budget Office, Staff Working Paper, "Alternative Strategies for IncreasingMultiyear Procurement" (July 1986).

III:! ill I fill


ENSURING ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL TESTING

Adequate operational testing is important for all weapons programs,whether or not they feature concurrency. The Congress emphasizedthis point in 1983 when it established the office of the Director ofOperational Testing and Evaluation as an independent adviser to theSecretary of Defense and as a rapporteur to the Congress on issuesregarding operational testing.

But operational testing is particularly important for concurrentprograms. By definition, these programs will be producing weapons ata time when operational testing is not yet complete. Testing problemsmust be identified quickly in order to minimize the number of wea-pons that will have to be refitted with modifications. Also, delays inoperational testing can disrupt a concurrent program—which by defi-nition operates under a compressed time schedule—more than a non-concurrent program.

For these reasons, the Congress may wish to ensure adequateoperational testing by examining the testing plans for major programsthat feature substantial concurrency. That could be accomplished byreviewing the testing plan during hearings or, for weapons of par-ticular concern, by asking for staff reports on the plan.

Several guidelines would be needed to assess the adequacy of atesting plan. The plan should:

o Establish clearly the objectives that must be met by a wea-pon for its operational testing to be judged successful. A re-cent GAO study found that, out of 63 reports concerningtesting issued in the period from 1970 to 1986, test objectivesand the criteria and plans for the tests were incomplete in 25cases.2 It is important that test personnel be involved insetting objectives since they must judge the tests' adequacy.

2. General Accounting Office, "Operational Test and Evaluation Can Contribute More toDecisionmaking" (December 1986), p. 14.

CHAPTER III SHOULD THE CONGRESS TAKE ACTION? 31

o Provide enough funds to buy adequate weapons for testing, acontinuing problem according to reports by GAO and theDoD Inspector General.3

o Ensure that all operational tests are made on weapons repre-sentative of those that will actually be produced for use byoperating units, and, particularly during later operationaltests, ensure that actual production versions are used intesting.

o Ensure that targets simulating enemy forces represent thethreat realistically. The DoD Inspector General found thisnot to be the case in some recent tests, such as those of thenew Aegis antimissile system.4 Ranges over which a systemis tested must also be realistic, a problem in recent testing ofthe air-launched cruise missile.5

o Ensure that test facilities are available in a timely manner.In concurrent programs in particular, testing delays canwreak havoc in an already compressed schedule.

As with all actions in the complex arena of defense procurement,efforts to ensure adequate tests entail potential problems. Programcosts could increase if adequate provisions have not been made fortesting during initial program planning. Difficult choices may have tobe made if required testing facilities are not available.

ENSURING ADEQUATE RISK ANALYSIS

Among the most important factors to consider in allocating resourcesfor any weapons system is the risk that the program will not achieveits planned goals. Contributing to this risk are the chances of major

3. General Accounting Office, ibid., and Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Hearings on theManagement of the DoD, 98:1 (June 23,1983), Part 5, p. 21.

4. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Hearings on the Management of the DoD, 98:1 (June 23,1983), Part 5, p. 55.

5. Ibid., p. 19.

wiwunir


cost increases, delays in schedule, or performance that falls belowplanned levels. Any of these could have a serious effect on militarycapability.

DoD regulations encourage, but do not require, an assessment ofrisk. Evidence suggests that risk analysis is not widely used. None ofthe programs reviewed for this study provided a documented compre-hensive risk analysis for the acquisition milestones. A GAO audit in1986 found that only 12 of 48 program managers who were queried in-dicated that a formal, quantitative measure of program risk had beenused in preparing their programs' budgets.6 Even when systematicassessments of risk are performed, they are not made available to theCongress. For example, no such assessments appear in the SelectedAcquisition Reports that are sent to the Congress regarding majorweapons systems. (Appendix B discusses more fully DoD's risk analy-sis policies and their implementation.)

The Congress may wish to require a comprehensive, systematicrisk assessment for selected major programs. Since such assessmentswould involve considerable effort, they could be limited to key pro-grams, perhaps focusing on those that have substantial concurrency.

Identifying Risks

In reviewing any risk assessment, it is necessary to be sure that allmajor sources of potential risk have been considered. Table 3 showssix key sources of risk and the factors to consider in assessing the im-portance of each.

For example, an important source of risk is the potential forchanges in the enemy threat. During the development and productionof a weapons system, which may take 10 years or more, the enemymay acquire new technology; other changes may occur in the scope orcharacteristics of the threat. Any change in the threat may substan-tially affect the program's cost, schedule, and performance. Assessingthis sort of risk is difficult, since it requires examining the historicalexperience of requirements for similar types of weapons, the degree of

General Accounting Office, "Status of the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program's 33Initiatives" (September 1986), p. 17.

CHAPTER III SHOULD THE CONGRESS TAKE ACTION? 33

confidence one can have in threat assessment projections, and the pos-sibilities for alternative technical or policy solutions.

Techniques for Analyzing Risk

Once the main sources of risk have been identified, various analytictechniques can be used to quantify them. Several of these techniquesfocus on the risks of increased costs or delayed schedules. The Pro-gram Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) identifies key deci-

TABLE 3. MAJOR RISK FACTORS IN CONCURRENTWEAPONS SYSTEMS ACQUISITION

Source of RiskFactors to Considerin Assessing Risk

Change in Enemy Threat

Type of Contract

Manner of Funding

Technical Elements

Weapons Testing

Transition to Production

Historical experience with similar systemExperts' confidence in their threat assess-

mentsPossibility of need for new weapon design

Fixed price for highly technical systemsinherently risky

Likely variation from planned funding(because of budgetary constraint orunanticipated inflation)

Level of technology being attemptedFeasibility of implementing system

design concepts

Availability of adequate test assets,including facilities

Feasibility of planned manufacturingprocess

Lead time for materials, special tooling,labor


IHl!i: 11:11 I;


sion points that are critical to program completion. Regression analy-sis can be used to predict costs based on experience with historical sys-tems that have similar characteristics such as weight, speed, andrange.

Other techniques have more general application. Decision analy-sis, for example, identifies important decisions and assigns the proba-bilities of various outcomes. It could be used to assess cost and sched-ule risks as well as the risk of technical problems arising that mightprevent the system from meeting its performance goals. The Delphimethodology used in marketing analysis can also be used to assesssystematically a range of expert opinion bearing on any type of risk.

APPENDIXES

•nun

APPENDIX A

CURRENT LEGISLATION, POLICIES, AND

REGULATIONS AFFECTING CONCURRENCY

Existing laws and federal regulations, including Defense Departmentand service regulations and instructions, permit concurrent develop-ment and production of weapons systems. Recent legislation andchanges in DoD acquisition policies, however, have placed certainconstraints on the acquisition process to reduce the risks associatedwith concurrency. The following discussion summarizes the relevantrecent legislation and outlines current defense acquisition policiesthat could affect the use of concurrency.

LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTWIDE REGULATIONS

In recent years, the Congress has acted to constrain the risks of con-currency by placing increased emphasis on operational testing of wea-pons systems. In 1983, the Congress established an independent officeof Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E) to advise the Secre-tary of Defense on operational testing matters and to report to theCongress concerning operational testing of major weapons systems.Chapter 4 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires that, beforebeginning full-rate production of a major weapons system, the Direc-tor of the office must report to the Congress concerning the adequacyof the system's OT&E. The Director must also assure the Congressthat the items or components that were tested are effective and suit-able for combat.1 Such assurances should minimize the risk of havingto make costly alterations in weapons systems after full-rate produc-tion has begun.

Several provisions in the 1987 Defense Authorization Act are alsointended to reduce the risks of concurrency. Section 909, for example,

Senate Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984,Report No. 98-213,98:1 (1983), pp. 74-76.

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requires that, unless the Congress grants a waiver, the DoD mustdevelop and test competitive prototypes of major weapons systemsunder realistic conditions before awarding a production contract. Thisprovision reflects the Congress's belief that competition between pro-totypes will provide an incentive to contractors to improve systemperformance beyond levels that could be expected in a sole-source con-tracting environment. Such competition, together with the require-ment for realistic testing, should reduce the risk that productionmodels may need expensive retrofits or changes.

Chapter 139 of Title 10, United States Code, specifies that testingof the survivability and lethality of a weapons system must be satis-factorily completed before a program may begin full-rate production.In addition, the legislation states that "a major defense acquisitionprogram may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production untilinitial OT&E of the program is completed."2 The successful comple-tion of survivability, lethality, and initial OT&E before beginningfull-rate production should also reduce the risk that major retrofitswill be needed.

Aside from these legislative constraints affecting concurrency,current governmentwide acquisition regulations neither prohibit theuse of concurrency nor provide detailed guidance concerning its use.The basic federal instruction on major system acquisition policy (OMBCircular A-109), for example, states that limited production of asystem may begin when a system's design concept has been satisfac-torily demonstrated. Full production, the instruction continues, canbegin when the "mission need and program objectives are reaffirmedand when system performance has been satisfactorily tested . . . andevaluated in an environment that assures demonstration in expectedoperational conditions."3 In either case, the meaning of "satisfactory"is not specified. Consequently, considerable latitude exists for pro-gram planners and managers regarding the extent to which concur-rency can or should be used.

2. House Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,ReportNo.99- 1001,99:2<1986),pp.lll-113.

3. Office of Management and Budget, "Major Systems Acquisition - Circular A-109," April 1976, p.10.

APPENDIX A CURRENT LEGISLATION, POLICIES, AND REGULATIONS 39

The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) also fail to providespecific guidance on when to use concurrency. In its discussion of ac-quisition planning, the FAR simply requires that "if concurrency ofdevelopment and production is planned" the agency should "discuss itseffects on cost and schedule risks." Concerning testing, the FAR re-quires a discussion of the "extent of testing to be accomplished beforeproduction release."4

DOD POLICIES AND REGULATIONS

The basic acquisition regulations of the Department of Defenseemphasize the need to reduce the length of the acquisition process.Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, for example, states that "aprimary goal in developing an acquisition strategy is to minimize thetime it takes to satisfy the identified need consistent with commonsense, sound business practices, and the basic management policies ofthis Directive."5 Service regulations also refer specifically to the needfor reducing acquisition time.6 Both DoD and service regulations per-mit the use of concurrency as a means to achieve this goal.

DoD's basic acquisition regulations provide service and programplanners with considerable flexibility in using concurrency. DoDDirective 5000.1, for example, directs the services, "commensuratewith risk," to reduce lead time through concurrency, and to combineacquisition phases and development and operational testing "whenappropriate.'"7 Additional flexibility exists since few prerequisites forproduction are specified. DoD Instruction 5000.2, for example, listsprogram areas to be considered by the Defense Acquisition Board(DAB) before the approval of production, but does not identify specific

4. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subparts 7-1 and 7-2.

5. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs,"September 1,1987, p. 5.

6. Army Regulation 70-1, "System Acquisition Policy and Procedures," November 12, 1986, p. 3; andOPNAV Instruction 5000.42C, "Research, Development and Acquisition Procedures," May 10,1986. p. 4.

7. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, p. 5.

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requirements within these areas.8 The instruction does require, how-ever, that adequate testing and "operational effectiveness and suita-bility" be accomplished before beginning full-rate production. "Ade-quacy," "effectiveness," and "suitability" are not defined, however.9

Although DoD acquisition policy regulations encourage the use ofconcurrency "commensurate with risk," they also contain provisionsthat endorse using a sequential acquisition approach. For instance,they encourage the use of competitive prototyping before beginningproduction and early OT&E.lO

The basic DoD regulation concerning testing and evaluation, DoDDirective 5000.3, endorses reducing acquisition time by combiningdevelopment and operational testing. According to the directive,combined testing "may be used when cost and time benefits aresignificant . . . provided that test objectives are not compromised."! 1Combined testing is characteristic of concurrent programs in that itcan be a primary means to reduce acquisition time and accelerate aproduction decision.

On the other hand, DoD Instruction 5000.3 also contains guidancesupporting sequential acquisition. For example, the directive requiresthat, before a Milestone HI production decision, testing results mustconfirm that all significant design problems have been identified; thatsolutions are available; and that items tested are "effective and suit-able for their intended use."12 The directive also states that, before aproduction decision, operational testing must be completed on a repre-sentative item for production and must "ensure that it meets requiredoperational thresholds."13 An important ambiguity exists, however,since the directive does not distinguish between testing prerequisitesfor an initial, low-rate production decision (Milestone da) and a full-

8. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Program Procedures," September1,1987, p. 4.

9. Department of Defense Directive 5000.3, "Test and Evaluation," March 12,1986, p. 7.

10. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, p. 6.

11. Department of Defense Directive 5000.3,p.8.

12. Ibid., p. 7.

13. Ibid.

APPENDIX A CURRENT LEGISLATION, POLICIES, AND REGULATIONS 41

rate production decision (Milestone ELIb). If the above prerequisitesapply only to a full-rate production decision, they do not constrain theuse of concurrency vis-a-vis an initial production decision.

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APPENDIX B

RISK ANALYSIS POLICIES AND

THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

In general, government and Department of Defense policies support,but do not require, the use of a comprehensive, formal risk analysis ofmajor weapons programs as part of the acquisition and budget pro-cesses. The federal government's basic acquisition policy guidance, forexample, encourages, but does not require, agencies to include "meth-ods for analyzing and evaluating contractor and Government risks" indeveloping acquisition strategies for major systems. 1 The govern-ment's basic acquisition regulations, including the Federal Acquisi-tion Regulations (FAR) and the DoD Supplement to the FAR, do notrequire the use of risk analysis for major procurement programs.

Corresponding acquisition regulations for the DoD also encour-age, but do not require, the use of risk analysis for acquisition mile-stone or annual budget reviews. For example, DoD Directive 5000.1,"Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs," encouragesprogram managers to "consider" conducting studies to assess technol-ogical risk and to develop alternatives for high-risk areas.2 Further,DoD Instruction 5000.2 indicates only that the senior DoD acquisitionreview board, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), may "consider"whether a procurement strategy is appropriate to program cost andrisk assessments.3

The latter instruction, it should be noted, requires that key areasof technological and producibility risk be identified in a System Con-cept Paper for review by the DAB at Milestone I (System ConceptDemonstration and Validation) and that test and evaluation resultsconcerning risk areas be reported in the Decision Coordinating Paper

1. Office of Management and Budget, "Major System Acquisitions Circular A-1.09," April 5,1976, p. 5.

2. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs,"September 1,1987, p. 5.

3. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Program Procedures," September1,1987, p. 5.

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at Milestone n (Full-Scale Development).4 The DoD Instruction5000.2 does not, however, specify that risk analysis be used to fulfillthese requirements.

The DoD also requires that the DoD Product Engineering ServicesOffice (DPESO) conduct an assessment of production readiness beforea commitment to produce a weapons system, and that DPESO "identi-fy potential problem areas which constitute production, cost, or sched-ule risks." The DoD directive concerning production readiness re-views also states, "Each risk will be expressed in terms of its relativemagnitude and potential consequences."5 The instruction does notprovide specific guidance, however, concerning the methodology usedto determine the magnitude and consequences of producibility risks.

The DoD Instruction 7041.3 concerning economic and programevaluation methods for resource management requires that risk as-sessments be made for major programs, but does not direct that formalrisk analysis methods be used. The directive states that "specialdegrees of risk/uncertainty associated with a particular program/project, may be pointed out quantitatively in an analysis and used forprogram review purposes."6 The directive also requires that programschedules and funding should be structured to accommodate programuncertainties, but does not require that such uncertainties be mea-sured and identified separately.7

Service regulations and guidance also support, but do not require,the use of formal risk analysis to support program and budget reviewsfor major programs. Army Regulation 70-1, for example, states thatdevelopment and procurement programs may be funded, "if appro-priate," using a risk analysis method called Total Risk Assessing Cost

4. Ibid., p. 4-2.

5. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.38, "Production Readiness Reviews," January 24,1979, p.3.

6. Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, "Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation forResource Management," October 19,1972.

7. Ibid.

APPENDIX B RISK ANALYSIS POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 45

Estimate (TRACE).S (The TRACE method uses a risk factor approachto risk analysis.) The Navy requires that programs must "include ef-forts to identify, control, and reduce program risk," but does not speci-fy the use of risk analysis to support program and budget reviews.9

Both through legislation and through management reforms, theCongress and the DoD have initiated a number of measures to reduceprogram risks. Requirements now exist for using performance war-ranties for major weapons systems; for reporting on operationaltesting results before approval for full-rate production; for usingindependent cost estimates; for developing and testing prototypes ofsystems and subsystems; and for using lower-risk, more gradualapproaches to weapons system development (Pre-Planned ProductImprovement). The services are permitted to budget for program risksthrough funding for anticipated program changes (EngineeringChange Orders) or management reserves.^ Little, however, has beenaccomplished in carrying out measures designed to ensure thatprogram risk is identified, measured, and analyzed in a systematicway to support other risk-reducing policies.

Past attempts by the DoD to require risk analysis have achievedonly limited success. In 1981, for example, the DoD undertook amanagement initiative to budget for technological risk as one of 32ways to improve defense acquisition (the "Carlucci Initiatives"). Un-der this initiative, the Deputy Secretary of Defense emphasized theneed for the services to evaluate, quantify, plan, and budget for pro-gram risk. He requested the Navy and Air Force to review the Army'sTRACE program and "either adopt it or propose an alternative "HNone of the other services subsequently adopted the TRACE programas a budgeting requirement. Moreover, the Army currently appliesTRACE only to a limited number of its programs.

8. Department of the Army, Regulation 70-1, "System Acquisition Policy and Procedure," November12,1986, p. 16.

9. OPNAV Instruction 5000.42G, "Research, Development, and Acquisition Procedures," May 10,1986, p. 3.

10. See General Accounting Office, "Defense Budget-Contingency Funds in Three Aircraft Procure-ment Programs," October 1987.

11. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Improving the Acquisition Process," April 30,1981, p.12.

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Despite DoD's policies, initiatives, and regulations supporting theuse of risk analysis, indications (such as the limited application ofTRACE) are that it is used only occasionally, or at least that it is notreported or reviewed at higher levels of management in the DoD.According to a recent GAO audit of DoD's implementation of the"Carlucci Initiatives," only 12 of 48 program managers who werequeried indicated that a formal, quantitative measure of program riskhad been used to derive their program budgets.12 Another GAOreview of DoD's risk assessment efforts observed that, although quali-tative assessments of risk were usually made at acquisition mile-stones, none of the acquisition milestone documentation reviewed for25 major weapons systems contained any quantitative analysis of pro-gram risk.13 Program milestone documentation for the weapons sys-tems examined for concurrency in Chapter n confirmed GAO's find-ings; qualitative assessments were made for some, but no quantitativerisk analysis was cited.

Currently, the Congress is not informed about program risk basedon risk analysis conducted by the Department of Defense. Programand budget documentation provided by the DoD to the Congress, suchas the SARs and the Congressional Data Sheets, do not contain databased on risk analysis. In the past, the DoD has suggested that pro-viding information on program risk to the Congress would result indisapproval for any funds requested to cover risk.14

12. General Accounting Office, "Status of the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program's 33Initiatives" (September 1986), p. 17.

13. General Accounting Office, "Technical Risk Assessment: The Status of Current DoD Efforts"(April 1986), p. 49.

14. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Improving the Acquisition Process," April 30,1981, p.12.

GLOSSARY

Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Army's light armored fighting vehiclethat can be used to transport troops on the battlefield (the InfantryFighting Vehicle—IFV), and also for scouting, reconnaissance, andsecurity missions (the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle-CFV). It is armedwith a 25mm automatic cannon that can be fired on the move, and alsocarries the TOW antitank guided missile system. The Bradley en-tered full-scale development in June 1976, was approved for produc-tion in January 1980, and achieved initial operational capability(IOC) in December 1983.

CH-47 Helicopter. A medium-lift helicopter used by the Army and theMarine Corps to move troops, ammunition, repair parts, petroleum,artillery, and other weapons. A modernization program was initiatedin October 1975 to improve the helicopter's performance capabilities.Initial production of the modernized CH-47 was authorized by theArmy in August 1980, and IOC occurred in February 1984.

CH-53 Helicopter. Used by the Navy and Marine Corps to performheavy lift operations including transporting equipment, supportingconstruction, removing damaged aircraft from carrier decks, andproviding an airborne mine countermeasure capability. The CH-53entered full-scale development in May 1975, was authorized for pro-duction in January 1978, and reached IOC in June 1982.

Copperhead Artillery Projectile. A cannon-launched 155mm laser-guided projectile used by the Army and the Marine Corps againstarmored vehicles or hardened targets. The Copperhead was approvedfor full-scale development in June 1975, was authorized for productionin February 1979, and became operational in December 1982.

F/A-18 Aircraft. The Navy's newest fighter aircraft, designed pri-marily for air-to-air combat. It can also perform light attack, recon-naissance, and training missions. Full-scale development of the

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F/A-18 was authorized in December 1975, production was approved inJune 1981, and IOC was achieved in March 1983.

Harpoon Missile. The Navy's tactical radar-guided missile designedfor use against surface naval targets and launched from aircraft,surface ships, or submarines. Harpoon entered full-scale developmentin June 1973, was approved for production in June 1975, and achievedIOC in July 1977.

Hellfire Missile. A tactical air-to-surface missile used by the Armyand the Marine Corps that is guided by a laser designator andemployed against armored targets. The Hellfire missile enteredfull-scale development in February 1976, was approved for productionin November 1981, and achieved IOC in July 1986.

Imaging Infrared (I2R) Maverick Missile. A tactical air-to-surfacemissile developed by the Air Force to locate and strike ground targetsincluding armored vehicles, fortifications, gun positions, communica-tion centers, and aircraft shelters. The I2R Maverick entered full-scaledevelopment in September 1976, was approved for production inSeptember 1982, and became operational in February 1986.

Ml Tank. The Army's primary main battle tank, armed with a105mm gun and capable of traveling 45 miles per hour. The tank hasa fire control system that permits daytime or nighttime operation, andcan fire at armored or unprotected targets while on the move. The Mlbegan full-scale development in November 1976, was approved forproduction in April 1979, and achieved IOC in January 1981.

Patriot Missile. The Army's land-mobile air defense system, deployedin fire units consisting of a radar set, a control station, a power source,and eight launching stations armed with four missiles each. It iscapable of intercepting high-performance aircraft at all altitudes.Patriot entered full-scale development in February 1972. A decisionwas made to restructure the program in 1974, and approval was givento resume engineering development in 1976. The missile was ap-proved for production in September 1980, and was initially deployedin the United States in June 1983 and in Europe in March 1985.

GLOSSARY 49

Phalanx Gun System. The Mark 15 Phalanx (or Close-in WeaponSystem) is an automatic gun fire-control system used on surface shipsto defend against antiship missiles. The system automaticallysearches for targets, evaluates and tracks the threat, and orders andadjusts firing of a Gatling-type gun. Phalanx was authorized forfull-scale development in December 1972 and for production inSeptember 1977, and its IOC occurred in February 1980.

SH-60B Helicopter. Also called LAMPS m--Light Airborne Multi-purpose System HI. It is deployed on Navy surface ships to detect,identify, track, and interdict enemy surface vessels and submarines.LAMPS in is also used for search and rescue, supply replenishment,medical evacuation, and other fleet support missions. The SH-60Bwas authorized to begin full-scale development in February 1978,initial production was approved in November 1981, and IOC wasachieved in July 1984.

Stinger Missile. A man-portable, infrared-seeking guided missileused by the Army and the Marine Corps against low-altitude, high-speed aircraft. The basic Stinger missile was approved for full-scaledevelopment in May 1972 and for production in November 1977, andwas first deployed in February 1981.

UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter. The Army's multipurpose helicoptercapable of transporting troops, weapons, and supplies. It can also beused for air assault, rescue, and evacuation missions. The BlackHawk was approved for full-scale development in May 1971, auth-orized to begin production in November 1976, and achieved IOC inNovember 1979.

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