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2004

by

Crowood PressLlu

ry, Marlborough

SN82HR

Kev Darling 2004

rightsreserved. No parr of thispublicationmay

reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any

electronicor

mechanical

including

orany

information storage

retrievalsystem, without permission inwriting

the

publishers.

Publication

Data

cataloguerecordfor thisbook is available from

British Library.

1861266545

previouspage: Air France Concorde

ot BravoapproachesParis to land. Since its

ent the aircrafthas gone toGermany to join

Tu-144 at Sinsheim.

Colleaion

Goudy

text),

headings).

and designed

hy

N Publishing

Woodlands, Hungerford, Berkshire.

and bound in

Great

Britain byCPI Group,

knowledgements

Concorde is oneo f

those

aircraft

that

sparked myinterest in

aviation the others

being

a black

Hawker

Sea

Hawk

and

a red

and

whiteGlosterjavelin.

A t ri p

to

the

mock-up

at

Filton would further increase my interestin

Concorde

especially as

the

first produc

tion

examples werebeing

constructed

in

the

same building; my

one

regret

is that

I mis

laid

the

leaflets I received

at

the

time.

This

desire

to

knowmore

about

the

aircraft was

reinforced

by

seeing

the

prototype, its followers

and

i ts chase planes flying

over

the

Cotswolds

either

departingor

arriving

at

Fairford.

Concorde

and

Iwould miss

each other

overthe next

few years before

our becomingreaquainted at

Royal

InternationalAir

Tat

toos,

where

I wouldbe al lowed aboard

the

flagship

of

British Airways.

As

the

story

of Concorde

involved

the

efforts

of

many, so did

the

effort required

to

put

this book

together and

therefore I must

thank

my co-conspirators for

their

inputs.

The

first as

ever is Peter

Russell

Smith

whoas always al lowed me

to

rampage

through

his

photograph collection

for those

interesting

shots. My good friend

Dennis

jenkins

provided

the

usual

encouragement

plus

help

in securing images from the

NASA

col

lection.

john

Battersby,

Curator

of

the

Bristol Aircraft

Collection

assisted

with many

photographs, while

Capt Peter

Duffey provided

much

useful information.

The

staff at

the

Fleet

A irA rm

Museum

and the

Public RecordOffice,Kew were, asever,

their

smil

ing,helpful selves,

as

alsowere

their counterparts

at BAESystems

and the

Heritage Cen-

tres.

The

PR

departments

at

Air

France

and

Brit ish Airways were more

than

helpful,

although

I

never

did

get

my

complimentary

ticket Others who rose

to the occas ion

included Lee Howard, Phil l ipe

juret

Bernard Charles, Nick

Challoner

plus justin

Cederholm

in

New

York

and jose

M Palacios from Portugal , who

came

up with

the

impounded photographsand the

Pepsi photographs, respectively. Alsohigh

on

the

men-

tion

list are

Adrian

Falconer for

the in depth

Concorde

walk-around

taken

at

the

Con-

corde

Facility, Filton,

and

last

bu t never

least,

Henry Matthews

for those snippets

of

information concerning

test pilots.

To all , my sincerest

thanks and

it goes

without

saying

that

any goofs are

mine and

mine

alone.

ev arling

South Wales, 2003

ontents

Acknowledgements

4

1

THE

SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN

7

2

DESIGN

AND

DEVELOPMENT

3

SKIN AND BONES

47

4

FLYING THE FASTEST AIRLINER

73

5 TRIALS

AND

TRIBULATIONS 95

6

THE AMERICAN

SST

115

7

SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144

127

8

DEATH AND DISASTER

145

9

SST INTO

THE

FUTURE

65

Appendix I

Concorde Data

183

Appendix

Concorde Incidents

184

Append

ix

III

Concorde and Tu-144 Fleet Details

187

Bibliography

190

Index

9



CHAPTERONE

The upersonic ivilian

TheMe 163 w s one of

two

designs by Messerschmittthatfeaturedswept wings

theother beingthe e 262 jet.Thisearlier rocket powered aircrafthad wings of

moderatesweep; even so it gave aremarkableperformance albeit with atendency

to crash. BBA Colecton

will no

longergraceour skies

with

anyregularity isthat of Concorde. Here theill fated

F WTSC

s awayfrom thecamera.Whether anyaerobaticswere everperformed using a Concordehas never been

led. However exceptfor upsetting thepassengers there is

no

reason why suchgyrationscould nothave

attempted. BBA Colecton

Prehistory

The

1960swere described bypoliticians at

the time s giving

bi rth t o

the

white

heat

of

technology .

O u t o f

thisperiod

cam et he

nuclearpower

station

the

six-lanemotor

way

a nd t he

m ost successful supersoni c

transport

aircraft

t o d at e t he BAC/

Aerospatiale

Concorde. Of the

three

the

nuclear

power

station

has becom e a poli t

ical

embarrassment and

a

potential

disas

ter

the

s ix -l an e m ot or wa y h as b ec o me a

carm agnet and

perpetually clogged while

Concorde

is still awaiting

the

verdict

of

historyto confirm

whether

it was

an

expen

sive white elephant

o r o n e o f t h e

most sig

nificant advances

in

aviation technology

since 1945.

The

stories

of

t he developm ent

o f t h e

supersonic

t r an s po r t a n d C o nc o r de

are

completely

intertwinedand

would

encom

pass

both

Britain

and

France with signifi

cant

contributions

from

the

USA

a n d t h e

USSR.

It has

to

be

conceded

that war

ha

t h e h a bi t

of

pushing

the

bounds

of tech

nology

both

further

and

faster

not

only

those

then

in

development but

those

that

existed only at

the

theoretical level. In

the

closing years of

t heSecond

World

Wart he

piston-engined

fighter was

at

the zenith of

aircraft

development

not only asa

combat

machine

but

i n p ur e a e ro n au t ic a l t er ms

and

included

the

R oll s-R oyce Merli n

powered

North American

P-51 Mustang

the Griffon-powered Spitfires

the

radial

engined

w 190/Ta 152 series of

German

fighters

a n d t h e H a w ke r

Tempest.

However waiting in t he win gs w er e

emergent technologies

that

were beingdri

ven

by

t he i ndust rial m i ght and t echnical

muscle

of

B ri ta in a nd A me ri ca f or

the

Allies while opposing them were

the

inno

vative organizations in Nazi

Germany

sup

port i ng t he A xis forces. The

Third

Reich

had begun

to

providesupportto

the

Heinkel

aircraftcompanyand intotal

contravention

of the

terms

oft he

Treaty

of

Versailles.

Not

onlywereaircraftbeingdeveloped

that

were

capable

of

being converted for

combat

pur

poses but more importantly in 1937

the

same

company

had begun w ork

on the jet

engine.

A f te r m u ch d e ve l op m en t

work

and not a few set backs a w orkabl e engine

an axial flow powerplant made its maiden

flight

in

the

speciallydesigned

Heinkel

He

1 78 in 1 93 9.

The

success

of this

flight

would lead

t o t h e

further

development of

the

axial flow jet

engine

albeitby Junkers

s

the

main

contractor

instead of

Heinkel.

With

t his new

powerplant

looking promis

ing airframe

construction

wa s p la ce d i n

the

hands of

Messerschm it t w ho w oul d

create

the

M e 2 62 p o we re d b y J u nk er s

Jumo

engines

a nd t he

M e 16 3 K om et

powered by

rocket

motors.

A l t hough t he

l at ter pow erpl ant is

not

r el ev an t t o t he

developm ent of

jet-powered aircraft

both

featured

o n e i m po r ta n t i n no v at i on :

the

swept

wing.

The

use

of swept

w ings had

become

an i m port ant requirem ent

for

the

furtherance

ofh

igh-speed ight

since their

use

on an

ai rcraft del ayed the

onset

of

compressibility

which

in

turn

delayed

7

the onset of generat ed drag

and p

unpredictability

i nfl i ght . A

furt her

vat ion developed

by

Messerschm

the

nose-wheel undercarriage

whi

been

found necessary

to

replace

the

nal

tail-wheel

arrangement

now

wanting

at

both

take-off and

la

E ve n H ei nk el h ad e xp er ie nc ed

probl em s w i th i ts H e

l78

trials airc

this

case the

company

e x ten d ed th

wheel assembly

to

compensate.

Across

t h e C h an n e l

such i nnov

were viewed

by

the

establishmentwi

picion if

not

downrighthostilityand

In

the

field

of

powerplant

develo

Frank

Whittle

later

and

deservedly

Frank was pursuing

thedevelopmen

j et engine

s well s his career of b

j unior R A F

officer

at

Cranwell. Bein

to

t ak e a s ab ba ti ca l a nd

the

creat

PowerJets Ltd allowed

Whittle

topu

ward work

o n t he

centrifugal jet eng

contrast

to

the

m ore compl icated



THE

SUPERSONIC CIVILI N

T HE SUPERSO NIC CIVILI N

erWhittle, builtto Specification E 28/39 was constructedpurely to prove

Whittlecentrifugal jet engine was viable.Fewreal aerodynamicrefinements

orated. Rea

WingsPhotographs

deleted. Further power was t o h av e

obtained

by

fitting a specially ducted f

increase airflow through

the jet

sy

After Ministry approval , a

contrac

issued which authorized

the

release

of

to build a single prototype. All this v

effor t came to naught in February

when the entire project was cancelled

reasons frequently quoted

for

this dec

include the poten ti al ser ious r isk t o

The

first

jet-powered aircraft to enter

RAF

servicewas theMeteor.This is

DG202lG

apreproductionversionbuilt byGlosterAircraft.

The

engines thatpoweredthis series

ofaircraftwere centrifugal intype, ablindalleysincetheaxial flow engine

was

seen

as

a betterprospect. BBA

Colecton

supersonic speed range,

but

none satisfied

the

need for pos it ive cont ro l behav iour

across

the

proposed speed envelope.

This

notwithstanding, Miles began construc

tion

of

a woodenmock-up

with

shortspan,

st raight wings. Engine

development

was

by

the

Whittle company, utilizing

the

W2/700

engine with

an

afterburner which

was later developed i n to t he Rolls-Royce

Den-vent,

although the

afterburner was

Contrasting with theforegoingphotographis the GlosterWhittle justafter reassembly

atCranwell. Soon afterwards,the aircraftmade itsfirst flight.and

was

painted and

acquiredsecondaryfins

on

thetailplanesto improvelongitudinalstability. BBA Colecton

The Military

Imperative

G iv en t he h um an d es ir e t o s tr iv e f or

improvement, the technical deficiencies

would eventually be overcome.

The

Royal

Aircraft Establ ishment

at

Farnborough

hecame

home

t o a ser ies

of

wind tunnels

that were more than capable of providing

the airflowneededto testscalemodels and

full-size sections, while the major engine

manufacturers, mainly Rolls-Royce and

Armstrong

Whitworth

made strenuous

efforts to improve

the

reliability

of

the

jet

engine, thereby increasing i ts mean t ime

between fai lures rate to an economically

sustainable level.To give these effortssub

stance, experimental specification E.24/43

was issued by

the

Ministry

of

Supply.

This

called for

an

aircraft capable

of

achieving

I OOOmph although

no

inclination to

wards

either

civil

or

military status was

implied.

The

manufacturereventuallycho

sen to develop this futurist ic ai rcraft was

Mil es Aircraf t, a surpr is ing choice , per

haps, given

that their

previous experience

was geared to

the

building of lightaircraft

more orientated towards l ight sport , tour

i ng and t ra in ing. In l at er years i t was pos

tulated that there was greatscepticism that

such

an

a ircraf t cou ld be bui lt , l et a l one

flownsafely, therefore to grant thecontract

t o a company wit h

no

experience in this

kind of design would lead to failure, where

as w it h ano th er , b ig ge r c ompany

the

chances

of

immediatesuccesswere greater.

To the

consternation of

many, Miles Air

craft presented the M.52 d es ig n t o the

Ministry

of

Supply in 1942 for considera

t io n. L ooki ng much lik e a bul le t w it h

wings, the aircraft featured a flush-fi tted

cockpit that was not only jettisonable,

but

was fully pressurized while still

attached

to

the ai tframe. Thisideawould gain further

prominence

when

General

Dynamics

designed

the

F-l11 f ight er bomber wit h a

similar module.

Within

the presentation

given to

the

Ministry were ideas for sever

al wing planforms, since this was the pri

mary area that was giving the greatest

headache.

All

were

either

capable of per

forming adequately in the subsonic

or

the

the

type

of

powerplant needed, and the

centrifugal engine was

n ot t he

answer.

Although

thistype

ofengine

wasfairlysim

p le and robus t, i t was recognized that fur

ther development

would be fairly limited;

thus

the

temperamental axial flow engine

was seen as

the

best

bet

for

the

future.

1944.

In

contrast

to

the German

aircraft,

the Meteor

st il l revealed i ts earlier piston

antecedents

and

camecomplete with

fair

ly

straight

wings

that

carried

w it h t hem

the problems of

extra

drag and associated

speed limitations. Although both fighters

would enter service

with

their own a ir

force,

n o h ea d to h ea d combat

ever

ensued, much to

the chagrin of

those who

rel ish such thi ngs. What subsequently

emerged, however, was that the axial flow

jet

engine

ha d a

short

service l ife, being

l im ite d t o s om e 7 flying h ou rs be fo re

requiring

an

overhaul,whereas the farsim

pler centri fugal powerplant pushing

the

Meteor

c ou ld s tay in

the

airframe far

longerbefore needing removal.

W ith the final defeat of Germany, the

All ies descended upon i ts manufacturers

a nd t es t e st ab li shment s t o r emove

the

spoils

of

war: teams from

theUSA

Britain,

Franceand the

USSR

departed

with

infor

mation

on the axial flow jet

engineand

the

principles of sweptwings, plus the associat

e d s ki ll of wing-fuselage blending.

In

Britain under

the

aeg is of, among

other

bodies, the Brabazon

Committee

the the

ory

of

transonicand supersonic flight were

not

onlyunderstood

but

were beingactive

ly pursued.

The

majorproblem facing

both

the designers and the aircraft manufactur

ers was thatofthe hardware to test the the

ori es and the powerplants to propel the

designs. Before any

attempt

was made t o

developany high-speedtransport, the deci

sionhad already

been

reached

concerning

operators. To further prove the

concept

the

Gloster

Aircraft

Company

was con

t racted to

construct

an airframe to specifi

cation E .28/ 39 t o hou se a

development

engine.

What

eme rg ed t o make its f ir st

flight

a t R AF

Cranwel l was a l ow-wing

monoplane

aircraft

with

a tricycle under

carriage, unl ike i ts German

counterpart

with

its tail-wheel undercarriage and mid

fuselage-mounted wings. After a series of

ground taxi runs, this flying test bed made

itsmaiden

fl

ight

on 5

May 1941.

The

suc

cess

ofthe

E.28/39during its testflight led

to the

G l ost er Meteor

f ight er whi ch

entered servicewith 616

Squadron

inJuly

jet

f ighteravailableatthe war s end was the

Me

262 Notonly did

it

combine

swept

anda carefullyblendedstructure, it alsoused axial flow turbojets.althoughthe MTBF mean time

n failure)

was

limitedto approximatelyseven hours. Rea

WingsPhotographs

the progress of

the

centrifugal

was speeded up by its simplicity.

Power Jet s and

Whittle

would

ce some interestingproblems,

be tt e rknown ones wasa

bench

thethrot t le

failed to

control

output; eventually the engine

down

by

the simple expedient of

the

fuel supply, which prevented

to

the

machine,which was

ing on the

attached

gauges. In the

of time, as with all such projects,

on and careful redesign

meant

that

engine could be test run with

much

trepidation on the part ofthe

8

9



Miles M.52

the cancelation

of

the M.52. the govern

a new

programme

that involved no

to testpiots and a limited purpose.

TheRoya

Establshmentwasresponsiblefor the devel

nt of a suitable rocket

motor. and in charge

of

desgn

was

Barnes Wallis on detachment

Vickers

Armstrongs. The

drones

were

J{oth scale

of the

M.52 and designated

the Vickers A.l.

flight control system was a two-axis automatc

. while

external control and data transmission

va

radio

telemetering equipment; the

first

test

h tookplace on

30 May

1947.

A Mosquito light

r took

off

fromSt Eva

airfield

in

Cornwal with

A.l

drone

complete with i ts B ft

12.4m)

wings

in

its

bely. It

was intended

t o launcht he

ne f rom a h e ig h t o f 3 0 .0 0 0ft 9 .1 0 0ml b efo re

westwards

overthe Atlantic. This

wasnot to

as the Mosquito

entered

astorm

cloud

at20.000ft

the pilot lostcontrol durng

t heensung

tur

ce. It would take a 14,000ft 14.300m) drop

for

pilot

to

recover

control. by wh ich tme thedrone

torn

off

and

had disappeared into

the

Brs

Channe. A further test flight was undertaken

on

off Lands End

usng drone A.2.

Ths was

by two otherflights on 9

June

and 9 Octo

drone A.3. This latter run was suc

and

a speed of

Mach

1.5

wasobtained;how

instea d o fd iving in to th e sea asplanned. t he

ne ignored

radio

commands

and w as l as t

on

radar

heading

into the Atlantic. Durng

perod

the NOTAMS INotices to Air Mariners)

indicatethat

an area some 4

mies 122.5km)

the

Bishop

Rock lghthouse off the S ci y

Isles

off limits. A l p i o ts w er e w a rn ed o f

the

possi

thatpi otless drones would be operatng with

radius

of

11.5

mies 11B.5km

from

the lghthouse

that

there was

a

danger

of drones fa ln g from

12.200ml and diving into

the

sea.

The

final

terof thisstory

cameto an

end when

eventhese

et trialswere suspended, t he reasonbeing t he

co st for little apparent return. although once

1

was

achieved thelead

in

thisfield

was

hand

over

to

the

Amerca ns. Al d esign d ata we re se n t

Aircraft

i n t h e U S A

for

further

development,

result ofwhich wasthat

in

1947the sound barri

broken by t he Be XS-l.

whichwas

simiar in

t o t he Miles

M.52.

As

well

as airframe

data

transferred to Amerca,

t he Ros-Royce

Der

engine

would

later

appear

as t heGenera Eec

Type 1 powerplant.

flying

the machine and

the

possibili

Miles Aircraft with its

production

t ie s f ir ml y r o ot ed

at

the light

on end

of

the

m arket w ould be

to

sust ain a reasonabl e rate of pro

should

the

M.52 provesuccessful.

y

although

the

pilot

safety aspect

a bl y h ad a b ea r in g

on

the

cancella

is

more likely

that

the

limited pro

capability available allied

t o an

ri shed B rit ain w ere cl oser

t o t he

THE SUPERSONIC

IVILI N

point.

Al though the

ful l size M. 52 w oul d

be

terminated, the

general specification

was worked

on

by Vickers Aircraft who

w ou ld b ui ld a s er ie s of rocket-powered

scale models for

development

in

the

fields

of

supersonic flight

and

air-launched mis

siles.

The

launch

vehiclefor

the

trial mod

els w oul dbe a m odi fied

de

Havilland Mos

qui t o b ombe r a nd t he

r oc ke ts w ou ld b e

successfully flown

at

speeds up

to Mach

1.4

unguided.

By the

time

Vickers

had

begun

their

unguided

rocket

test programme

thoughts

on

aerofoi l desi gn had progressed beyond

the

earlier idea

of

short stubby wings

and

were

concentrating

o n t h e

swept wing in

all

of

itsvarietiesfrom

gentle

t osevere. A s

the

information

recovered from

Germany

had

been

s h ar e d t o s o me d eg r ee

between

the m ajor ai rfram e m anufact urers al l

w oul d begi n t o i nvest igate

the

integrating

of

such advancesi n

current

and

future pro

jects.

Oneof the

first

to

d o s o w as d e H a v

illand

who

took a modified Vampire fuse

lage pod

and

used i t

t ocrea te t he

D H 1 08

Swallow a tailless swept-wing

machine.

The

first protot ype w oul d

undertake

its

maiden

flight

on

15 May 1948 with Geof

frey

de Havi lland

a t t he

controls before

being transferred to

RAE

Farnborough for

in-depth

i nvest igat ive t est flying. A sec

ond

D H 108 al so based

o n t he

Vampire

w ou ld b e r ol le d out some

months

later.

Unlike

its predecessor this version of

the

Swallow was

intended

to

breach

the

sound

barrierfrom

the

outset.

To

ensure

that

this

version

stood

a great er

chance

of

success

the

airframe

had

undergone considerable

modification

and

refinement.

The

wing

leading-edge sweep

had

b ee n s et at 45

degrees

and t h e

fl ight

controls

h a d b e en

changed

from

the

earlier mechanically

assisted type

to

being fully powered.

The

w ings al so featured l eadi ng-edge sl ot s

to

assist with stability while changesapplied

t o t he

fuselage included

the

fitting of a

more

pointed

nosesection.

After

aseries

of

proving flights

the

S wa ll ow w ou ld b e

pushed

to

its limits successfully

setting

a

world speed record

of

6]

6mph 992km/h

on

23

August

1946 with

John

Derry

a t t h e

controls.

This jubilation

w ould soon t urn

to

tragedy

on

27

September

when the air

frame being piloted byGeoffrey

de

Havil

land the son of

t he company

founder

w oul d break up w hil e i t w as bei ng used

to

investigate

the

behaviour of

aircraft in

the

Mach

0.9

to

1 r eg io n. E ve n

though

the

secondSwallowhad

been

lost in tragic cir

cumstances a third

machine

was built

and

70

this would successfully breach

t heMach

1

barrier

on

9

September

1948

although

i t wo uld r eq uir e a d iv e f rom 4 0 00 0f t

12,200m to achieve

this. Piloted by

John

Derry later

to

l ose his l ife in

the

DH ] 10

crash at Farnborough the

entire

exercise

consumed

10,OOOft

3,OOOm

of

altitude

before success was achieved.

Once

the

DH

108 seri es

had

m an ag ed t o b re ac h

the

Mach

1 barrier

thei r contribut ion

to

the

development

of high-speed flight would be

complete

s in ce t he y we re

inherently

unstable.

T hu s t he

t wo survi vors w oul d

eventually

be scrapped as

no

further use

could befound for

them.

Al though the de Havi l l and

Swallow

had

paved

the

w ay for supersoni c fl ight

t h e b at on

w ou ld b e p as se d

on to

two

machines

being

developed

for m i li t ary

purposes. One w as bei ng designed for the

bomber

role while

the other

was

intend

ed

to operate

asa fighter;

both

would

have

a

significant

bearing

on t h e

development

of Concorde. The bomber

would emerge

as the A vr o T yp e 6 98 V ul ca n

and

the

fighter would

become known

as the Eng

lish Electric Lightning

both

would enter

servi ce w i th

the

RAF and

the

annals

of

British

aviation

history. From

the

Avro

Vulcan

development

programme

the

designers

of the

futurewould

gain the

nec

essary

informat ion on

the

behav iour of

t h e d el t a

wing

at

various

heigh ts and

speeds.

Some data

would

come

from

the

several versi ons

of

the

Vulcan

a nd t he

wing planforms

they

employed;

but

most

was

generated

by a

unique

series

of

devel

opment and

trials

machines that

weredes

i gn at ed T yp e 7 07 .

The

first of these

machines

w oul dbe l ost i na fatal crash

due

to

a

malfunction

o f t h e airbrake circuit.

Although

this

accident

was at first seenas

a

setback,

i t di dgi ve

the

Avrodesign team

a

chance to

review

the

kind

of

airframe

r e qu ir e d f or t hi s r e se ar c h

and

thus

the

subsequent

Type707s were

moreorientat

ed towardshigh-speed flight

even though

there

weredifferencesin

performanceand

behaviour. Whi le t he Avro

machines

were

intended to support the Vulcan

pro

gramme,

m ost w oul d befl own by

the RAE

for research purposes.

Both Avro and the

RAE

would quickly

come t o

the

conclu

sion

that

the pure

delta

wingwas

unstable

in flight

and

therefore two

separate

routes

w ere pursued

to

remedy

this

deficiency.

The

first required

t hat the

bomber s wing

be

cranked and drooped

forward

of

the

front spar while

the

flight

controls

would

require

that their

power

operating

unitsbe

The DH

108

Swallow

was

based

on

the Vampire

fighterbomberfuselageand was intendedto prove

that sweptwings wereviable.Thisaircraft is

TG283/G,

the

first

proof of concept vehicle. Thenext

airframe wasfurther modified andexceededthe

speed ofsound. BBA

Colecton

BELOW: The

Lightning s contribution to the Concorde

projectincluded proving thatsupersonicspeeds

could

be

reached

by

usingreheated or augmented

engines. BBA Colecton

THE SUPERSONIC IVILI N

slaved

to

pitch

and

yawdampers.

The

fit

ting

of both of

these

enhancements

would

immediately improve

the

bomber s stabili

ty,

even t hough

i t w ou ld a lw ay s r e ta in a

tendency to

t ra ve rs e a m il d a r c i n a l ev el

pl aneof

flight.

O n t he o th er

hand,

the

Lightning,

al though having

separate wings

and

tail

planes describeda deltashape inplanform.

This however was

not the

Lightning s main

77

claim to f am e a s f ar as

Concorde

i

cerned,

since the fighter

cont r ibu

the

development

of

theengine

powe

essary to drive an ai lframe

at

speeds

Mach

2.

The

rstbeneficiaries

of

thesetech

ical advances would be

the

military b

civilian market also sawsome benefit

all them.The planning

of

civilian tran

had begun

in

1943 two years before



THE

SUPERSONIC

CIVILIAN

THE SUPERSONIC CIVILIAN

of

M or ie n M or ga n l at er

Sir

Mor

the

deputy uirector

o f t he

RAE.

W

months

of

its formation thissteeringg

deli vereu i ts first report, w hich concl

that

a supersoni cai rl i ner w i th fi ft een

sengers

anu

crew aboaru for comm e

flights between London

anuNew

York

entirely feasible.

Farnborough

anu the RAE

wind tu

woulu be where

much ofthe

originald

w ork w oulu be

concentrateu.

Formal

posals

into

research anu

development

formally

s et o ut a t

a m ee ti ng h el d

a

Ministry

of

Supply

on

I

October

1956

sent

at

thisgathering

at

Shell-Mex

Hou

London

and

chaired

by

Sir Cyril Mus

of t he

Ministry were representatives

o

major manufacturers,

the

Ministry

of

T

port

anu

Civil Aviation plus uelegates

the

t wo m aj or airl ines, B ri ti sh E uro

Airways BEA)

anu

the

British Ove

Airways

Company (BOAC).

The

res

thismeeting was

the

creation

ofthe

S

s on ic T ra ns po rt A ir cr af t

Comm

(STAC),

w hich w oulu also be chai r

Morgan.Joininghim

as

part

ofSTAC

be personnel uraw n from A vro, A rms

~ = r ~ = ~

---_::-......._------_.

<--F;:-----------.

-

...

- . -

--------------

Q.Q

o -0

-

-

.. - - - -

-

- -- - - - - - - --- -

-

- - -- - - - -

-

-

-

- --_ -

--------

----_.-

- ----------------- ---------

theywerealso investigating

the

application

of

auvancedflightaerodynamic

and

engine

developments

to

match.Someof

the

result

ingaircraft were rightly described

as

weird

and

wonderful,

but

t he y d id g iv e s om e

insightsinto

the

behaviour

of

aircraft

at

dif

fering heights, speeds

and

angles

of

attack.

In Britain

the

firstapproach towardsa high

speeu, uelt a, j et-powered ai rl i ner resul ted

in

the

A vro T ype 720

Atlantic,

developed

from

the

V ulcan, w hil e a further

advance

baseu around

the

s up er so n ic T yp e 7 30

wasalso

onthe

drawing board. In its initial

guise

the

latter was originally a supersonic

bomber

constructed

of

stainless steel

and

powered

by eight

engines, while

the

former

married

the

Vulcan s delta wings

to

a m or e

conventional

fusel age, al bei t sti ll m i nus a

tailplane.

Although nei ther

design would

progress farbeyond

the

confines

ofthe

wind

tunnel , their

very existence would

prompt

RAE

Farnborough t o begi n

to

devel op a

supersonictransport

(SST).

To

controland

steer

the

research in

the

correct direction

anu

to reduce

the

potential financial waste,

the

Morgan

Committee

w as form ed

on

25 February 1954,

under the chairmanship

o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

--0..-

. -¥::.-

1111 It 1 t , •.

- \.

=:: :: :L

= - - - - - . - - .• -

~ : ~ _

its own,

the nn

l A ir w ou ld h a ve t o

rely

on

ai rcraft purchased from overseas.

M an y w ou ld c om e f ro m d e H av il la n d i n

Britain

and

w ere powered

by

its

Nene

engine.Havingenteredthe jet

age,

French

manufacturers then

began

to

work

on

sev

eral designs

a t t he behes t of government ,

a

maj or f in an ci al i nv es to r a t t he

time.

Numerouspathsof

development

werepur

s ue d, s om e l ed

to

a d ea d

end

while

the

remainder would

culminate

in

the

Dassault

series

of

delta-winged fighters

and

bombers.

While

Dassaultwere leading

the

develop

m en t o f

m i li t ary ai rfram es t owards

the

supersonicera,

the

company

mostinvolved

with developing

ai rcraft for

the civil ian

airline market

was

Sud Aviat ion. Under

pinning the

efforts

of both

these organiza

tions was

theengine

manufacturers

SNEC

MA.

From

the

efforts

of

Sud A viat ion

emerged

theCaravel

Ie

airliner,

which

bore

a m arked resem blance

to t he Come t

in

many

respects,

even down t o

the

similar

flight

deckand

pilots panels.

While

Britain

and

France were actively

developing military

and

civilian jet-pow

ered aircraft for

their

air forces

and

airline

Althoughnota majorplayerinthe British SST programme English Electric

stil l putforward some proposals as thisdiagram shows. BBAColecton

The

French Join In

LEFT TheAvro

Type

707C was originally developedto

support theVulcan programme; however itsdelta

wing gave pointerstowards the developmentofthe

Concordewing. BBA Colecton

ABOVE The contributionsof theVulcan includedthe

use ofelevonsforroll

and

pitchcontrol and of

mixingboxes and feel unitsto assist in controlling

the aircraft. BBAColecton

Although

British aircraftmanufacturers had

gained a certain advantage from

the

secrets

removed fromGermany,

the

Frenchhad

not

b ee n p ri vy t o s o m an y

of

them. However,

engi neers i n France gained m ore physi cal

embodiments

of

t hem to

w ork from; t hus

access

t o j e t

engines was

obtained

from air

fields around

the

country,

as

were examples

of

swept-wing aircraft.

These

benefits were

passed on to

the

French aircraft manufac

turers forfurther

development

work. Before

the

Frenchindustry coulddeliverdesigns

of

w oul d be

subject to

a seri es

of

accidents

that

would

eventually

l ea d t o i ts

ground

ing

and eventua l

withdrawal.

Although

the Comet

M k. 4 wa s a f ar

better

aircraft,

the

loss

ofdevelopment

l ead t o

the

Boeing

and

D ougl as ai rcraft

companies meant

that

sales were limited.

The

next

genera

tion

of

airlinerto

be

built

was exemplified

by

the

Vickers

VC

10.

Although

a speedy

and elegant

aircraft,

the VC

10 would

not

achieve great

sales i n

comparison to

its

American

rivals

and

w ou ld i n r ea li ty b e

the

final

airliner

created

i n B rit ain unti l

the appearanceof Concorde.

in

the

immediate post-war period

aircraft

that

could beused

sh routes to generate income were

ed m il it ary t ransports such as

the

the

D ougl as D C-3 and D C

hiatusgave

the

aircraft industrytime

creatinga new

generation

airliners. However, some

oftheir

efforts, such

as the

Brabazon, would

beyond

the

initial prototype.

The

wered aircraftto emerge from

the

Committee s

deliberations would

de Havil land

Comet. The

first pro

version

of

this

landmark

aircraft

7

7





were

the

extra requirements brought

o

supersonicflight,which, itwasnoted, w

increase theamounto f testflying neede

clear the design for commercial usage. I

also proposed thatthe testrequirements

schedulesshouldbedevelopedalongsid

aircraftdeSign stage in order to cater for

possible failures in the early stages

of

flight-test period. Itwasalso noted

that

an approach would reduce

the

numbe

test flyinghours required.

The STAC was

one

of the f ir st to

that such a n a ir li ne r n ee de d t o h av

support

equipment

designed and te

together with the airframe. Also requ

development were air-traffic control

vices, ground handling, navigation,

take-off

and landing

aids. Away from

scientific

and technical

fields

the com

tee

began

to

speculate

about

the

pote

sales of such

an

SST. In 1959

the com

tee

suggested,

that

by 1970,

potential

cou ld be be tween 150and 500 airfra

What d id con fu se i t to some extent

the mathematicsconcerning the opera

costs o f a n SST even under cruising

ditions, although these were

not

unu

during the introductory period of a

airliner.

The only

answer STAC c

provide was thatthe careful

integratio

all

the

efforts by the workinggroupsw

result in lower costs eventually, which

turn, would lead to a par i ty

of

opera

costs with

competing

subsonicaircraf

an attempt to p rov ide some so rt of in

opera ting and f ir st purcha se cos t s

committee turned to

that

stalwart form

of

the

British aircraft industry:

the po

sterling perpound weight value, whichg

a return of

one-third greater

for

an

SS

comparison with i ts sub son ic

equiva

The

committee

was

convinced

tha

British industry was advanced enoug

design and build an economically v

SST for sale around the world and th

reasonable stabcould be made with reg

to the costs of operating such an aircra

wasrecognized

by

the

STAC

tha t thed

opment,

design

and

manufacture

of

a Br

SST

would have

to

be

of the

highest o

sinceitsgreatestrival,

theUSA,

hadgre

resources in all areas

of

manufacture

marketingand wouldbe quick toseizeu

any perceived deficiencies.

With t he decision made to use con

tional alloys for constructing the ailfr

the committee turned itsattention tod

mining the aerodynamics required

f

supersonic transport. Ideas on the

dra

board

at

several manufacturers were stu

the

extra coolingneeded for enginesoper

ating at high speeds. With

the

technology

available at the time it wasdeduced

that

the

chosen engine would experience its opti

mum efficiency a t Mach 2 to 2.5, although

it was recognized tha t k ine t ic heat ing and

low-speed hand l ing migh t compromise

this . Allied to th is was the more pressing

concern

of

the

noise

o n t he

ground that

would be generated by a powerplant engi

n ee red for thi s k ind

of

performance; thus

investigations would be needed into howto

reduce this without compromising petfor

mance, otherwise the whole projectwould

be put in jeopardy. Considerationwasgiven

to the use of special engines, specific throt

t le-handling techniques a nd t he use of

engine-silencing devices.

First consideration

wasgiven

t o t h e

use

of

a turbofan bypass

engine which

would

operate

effic iently up to

Mach

1.2

and

with

which

the

ground

noise

component

wo ul d be r ed uc ed . B ut for operations

above this speed t he e ng in e a n d t h e noz

zles would require modification, otherwise

the noise problem would recur. Fortunate

ly

a solution appeared to be a t hand in the

form

of

a m ix in g duct which provided

noise

a t te n ua ti o n a nd t he e je ct ed

air

which

wou ld a ls o s up pl y a sma ll

extra

thrust. The design of these mixing duets

was viewed as critical, otherwise

there

could be weight

or

drag penalties . To com

ba t th is i t was recognized that great skill

would be needed in the design and in te

g ra ti on o f b ot h t he e ng in es a nd the air

frame. It wasalso recognized that thecom

plete propulsivesystem needed to befitted

in such a way that

the engines

perfor

mance

was not compromised.

Having

dealt

with

the

type

o f e ng in e a nd

noise

suppres sion requi red for

t he eme rg en t

SST, attention was tu rned to

the

types of

intake needed to feed

the

powerplants. Up

to a speed ofMach 1 2 fixed intakes were

deemed acceptable; however, beyond that

point i t was realized that variable geome

t ry in tak es wou ld be requi r ed s ince they

offered

d ist inc t advantages over the con

trol of

the incoming

air mass

when com

pared with fixed intakes.

Beyond the basic technical requirements

each relevant working group also provided

the committee with information concern

ing the airworthiness and operational

aspects of SST operations. By t hi s t im e i t

was recognized tha t the increased complex

ity

of

modern airliners required extensive

flight testing

to ensure

the

long-term air

worthiness of the aircraft.

Added

t o t hi s

The

STAC

Report

would effectively abrogate any industrial

leadgainedfrom

the

researchthus far

None

of

th is report was based on the fanciful, as

the reasons given for a recommendation to

proceed noted. Thus the efficiency o f t h e

turbojet engine and i ts b ehav iou r in h igh

speed flight were alreadyascertained, as was

the ability of the aircraft manufacturers to

huild

the

airframe from

conventional

mate

rialsso longas

the

maximumexpectedspeed

did

not

straytoofarabove Mach 2 A further

point concerned

the

design

of

the ailframe

itself, where much work had already been

completed,taking asits basis the idealsuper

sonic delta and modifying it for low-speed

operation. This conclusion had been the

result of a two-pronged approach: the first

based upon the puredeltashape and the sec

ond

looking

a t t he

creation

of

a wing

that

featured a shock-free aerofoil, to which was

added subsonic leading and trailing edges,

all

of

which formed

an

aerodynamic com

promise aimed

at

producing a wingcapable

of petforming adequately throughout the

r eq ui red s peed r ange. A s b ot h wings

appeared to offer the solution to different

parts

of

the speed range, it was decided that

the final product would bea judiciousblend

of

both.

The STAC report also highlighted other

development areas that were either under

active considerationor givingrise for con

cern. These included the dispersion

of

heat

created

by

kinetic energy, a l though no

revisions

t o t he m et ho d

of

construction

wou ld b e n ee de d. B ey on d

t he h ea ti ng

problemand how it would affect the struc

ture, another

of

the working groups had

also raised concerns

about

possible prob

lems with control-surface flutter, structur

al oscillations, vibration effects on the

structure and the behaviour of the air

frame under the effects

of

aero-elasticity.

These points, the committee concluded,

would require

extensive

research

in to the

required

strengthand

stiffnessof

candidate

materials, plus the

performance

of sub

structures

andcomplete

assemblies

under

a

full range

of

heat ing and loading effects

throughout

the

intended speed envelope.

Unlike the airframe

that

carries it, the

powerplants were identified as needing lit

t le in the way ofextra research. However,

the working groups and the

STAC

conced

ed that

the

British industry lacked

the

required

in-depth

knowledge to

cater

for

these efforts the Ministry of Supply would

issue contracts to individual organizations

for research.To push the research effortfor

ward was a technical

subcommittee

backed

up by seven specialist working groups;

the

subcommittee

met

for

the

first time

o n 3 0

November

1956where

the

RAE briefed

the

technical staff from

the

participating com

panies on th e problems to be concentrated

upon. The working groups would concen

tra te upon project and assessment studies,

operations, cruising aerodynamics, low

speed aerodynamic s, s truc tu re s, power

plants

and engine

installation.

Once

the

workhad started, further inter

ested bodieswere invitedto send represen

tatives to join the subcommittee and thus

people from theAir Registration Board, the

Aircraft Research Association a nd t he

National Physical Laboratory plus some

from the College of Aeronautics at Cran

fie ld would soon add their expertise. After

two years

of

meetings, trials and intensive

investigations

and the

writing of some 400

research papers,a final report was ready for

delivery to

the Control ler

Aircraft, Air

hiefMarshal Sir Claude Pelly, at

the

Min

istry

of

Supply on 9 March 1959. Toget th is

far the main committee had met seven

times, the technical subcommittee at least

twelve times and the working groups innu

merable times, while the RAE staged meet

ings

at

Farnborough at vita l points during

the

process.

This document

confirmed

the

fe<lsibility

ofthe

SST

concept and

provided

strongpointerstowards itsdesign and devel

opment. The report would emphasize

one

recommendationmost strongly: the require

ment for two separate aircraft designs. The

first would concentrate upon a long-range

design which would need to travel further

and faster and theo therspecification would

centre around an airframecateringfor medi

um ranges.

The

shorter-range aircraft was

intended to h av e a r an ge

of

1,300 miles

2,100km and a top speed

of

Mach 1 3 and

the

longer-range machine was estimated to

havea range

of

3,000 miles 4,800km and

a topspeed

of

Mach 2

This

was seen as

the

maximumfeasiblespeed possible using con

ventional construction methods and mate

rials. This proviso meant t ha t t he use of

exotic materia ls in airframe construction

was not required to combat the highertem

peratures generated above

Mach 2;

i t a lso

meant t ha t

manufacturing and develop

ment

costscouldbe keptwithin reasonable

levels. TheSTAC reportalsostated that, if

the design work were

not

progressed from

this point, then the British aircraft industry

18 3IN5

i

i

scientists from t he RAE t ha t a n aircraft

could bebuilt that was capableof travelling

between

800 and 1 ,2 00mph

1,300

and

I,900km/h ; however, thiswas

the

easy part

as itwasquickly realized

that

researchneed

ed t o b e concentrated more

on

some areas

inwhich Brita inwasweakest. Tospeed this

up, the partic ipating companies agreed to

co-operate with RAE as neither group had

the resources to proceed alone.These com

binedresourceswould bring togetherall the

workshops, wind tunnels,

computing

sys

tems as well as

the technical

facilities, pro

ject

offices

and

drawingoffices. To fund all

.100

so I TNOMINAL

.000 sa FT ACTUAL

SPECTR TlO

25 ACTUAL

MAi CSA

22. sa n

AUW 3SO OODLBS

107FT,INS

ENTRY

DOOR

22FtIINS

HP 9 design.plannedas a large transatlantictransport.had eight

acentral block. BBA

Colecton

1121 T81N9

Bristol,de Havilland, Handley

Bros and VickersAircraft.Join

airframe manufacturers were dele

from the powerplant constructors:

Siddeley, Bristol Aero Engines,

lland Engine division and Rolls

Fur th er i nd us tr y p ar ti ci pa ti on

beadded

at

a late r

date when

Fairey

g li sh Ele ct ri c were a lso inv ited to

to

the

programme in

November

The first consultative meeting of

wouldbe held on 5 November 1956

Giles Court, London. This initial

confirmed the findings of the

74

75



THE

SUPERSONIC

CIVILIAN

THE SUPERSONIC

CIVILIAN

t ha t t he h ea t

generated by kinetic en

would be kept under control but still a

for the use

of

conventional alloys and s

in itsconstruction. The committee also

ommended that investigations be unde

en in developing the design to reach M

3, although a combined programme in

cert

with

the

military was seen as

the

course in order to reduce

developmen

production

costs. The third

and

fina l

posed SST design was a smaller versio

the first proposal, although thi s h ad a

senger capacity

of

100 passengers and a

gle-stage range

of

1,300 miles (Z,IOO

This last aircraft wasseen as ideal for ro

acrossEurope and domestic routesacros

USA. The report from the STAC, ba

by

the Ministry of Transport and Civ

Aviation, was alsoexceptionally optim

regarding sales since

at

least

ZOO

were

jected as being sold by 1970.

Another

in which

there

was greatoptimism was

of

development costs , those indicate

STAC

being that no more

than

£95 mi

would beneeded for the building of six

totypes and the required type certifica

The three designs proposedwere gen

innature, itwould beup to individual

m

ufacturcrs

to develop their

own propo

Those

companies

tha tpu t

forwarddefi

proposals included Avro, English Ele

and Handley Page, who based their des

around

the

delta-wing shape; but i t w

crea t ing an a irl ine r

that was

virtually

a

pure f ly ing wing, thi s b eing based

on

an

earlierproposal put forward by Avro for the

Type 698 Vulcanbomber. Ina similarman

ner to Roy Chadwick

at

Avro,

the

Morgan

Committee would eventually discard this

ideaas impractical since the flight control

technology

did

no t then

exist to

make

this

ideaworkable. Alsomil

itating

against

such

a design were

the potential

structural diffi

culties

broughtto the

fore by tryingto inte

grate a sufficiently large passenger com

partment

and flight deck in to

the

layout,

whi le p roblems with h igh d rag, skin f ri c

t io n a nd all the pena l tie s o f excess heat

would haveneeded to besolved.

Eventuallyall thesedesignconfigurations

and

investigations would be compressed

i nt o o ne

concise report

t ha t t he S TA

wou ld p resen t to

the

Ministry in March

1956.

Contained

within it were details and

diagrams

that

covered

three

different

con

figurations

that

were deemed worthy

of

fur

ther investigation and development. The

one proposal that wasstrongly recommend

ed was a super sonic t r an spor t d es igned to

convey 150 passengers over a single-stage

length

of3,000

miles (4,800km), this made

the

aircraft capable

of

flying

the Atlantic

non-stop. The proposed cruising speed was

Mach 1.8 , which was entire ly feasible and

would givea crossingtime

of

approximately

3hr. Travelling at thesespeeds would ensure

to judge their possible use; however,all were

rejected as being ineffic ient. Even though

applying brute-force engine power would

have had the desired effect the operating

cos ts wou ld have been unacceptable .

Analysis of all the available data would

eventually reveal that a slenderdelta-wing

planform

1V0uid

be

the

ideal

shape

for an

SST flying

at

a high sustained speed

and

sweptwingswereviewedas

the

bestforsub

sonic handling. To blend

the

best

of

both

some unusual designs were proposed. From

the

drawing boards

of

Armstrong

Whit

worth came an airframebasedaround anM

shaped wing and Handley Page developed

an airliner that was based around a slew

winglayout, a totally impracticable

concept

that

remained

on the

drawing board.

With

the

unusual

andthe

impracticable

outofthe

way

the

design teamsreturned to

the

delta

wing layout, although their first task would

be to

overcome the handling

problems

inherent in it . The primary concern

that

needed tobe tackled was the tendency for a

del t a wing to t rans fe r i ts centre of lift aft

wardsas the speed increased; to compensate

for thi s i t was p roposed tha t any a irc raf t

designed

for

this

role

must include

fuel

transfer tanks that

would

enab le thecen

t re o f

gravity

a nd h enc e t he c en t re o f

lift

t o b e altered

to compensate.

On e avenue

that wa s f ol lowe d f or a

while before it was abandoned was

tha to f

lO in

3 000

son

111FT

4,n

nOSOFT

310

SQ

FT

AlRCRAFTOATA

WINOSP '

WINOAREA

LENGTH

HEIGHT.NOMINAL

TAllPLA '

ARE A

,NIRUDDERAREA

-

.

.

~

GROUNDLINEWITH FUSELAGE DATUM I iOR1Z0NTAL

1FT

116FT

UINS

UINS

20lNS

5FT10lNS

•

FT

IINS

CABIN DATA

FUSELAGELENGTH

PRESSURISEDLENGTH

TRIPLESEATWlFTH

DOUBLE

SEATWIDTH

MINIMUM

GANGWAY

MINIMUMHEADROOM

NORMALHEADROOM

T O L T S ~

rr

GALLEY

PITCH

Armstrong

Whitworth

produced its

SST

design thecompany

were

tryingto

inethe benefitsfrom bothfore andaft sweptwings Notethe arearuling

to thefuselage hencethe cokebottle effect BBA

Coecton

Whenthe Bristol

Type198

appeare

ideasthatwould underpin Concord

hadstartedto emerge

One

ofthese

the

wing

shape although Concorde

a lowwing mounting not

as

shown

here BBA Coecton

:<d 4 1l4

L

g

u

:_:::.e;:::

. .•. . . :.

; ; u

e € - 3 ~ 1

0 : -- -. -- -- -. . ....

B f . ~ ~ ~ ~ . I

c:

~ .

CABIN SECTION A-A

CABIN ENTRANCE

- - - - - -. . : ~ : : : ~ t

150

SF A

r

- -

- -

A.SSF2NGF2b -

- . - '1

CA EJ N

_ ,

- - -_ . . J r - - - . . t -

I

UF L

__

./

.

II

JI

LANDING CONFIGURATION

BELOW:

ThisHandleyPage slew-wing design

was

known

as

theSycamore In this layoutthepassengerstravelled

inthe wingwhile thepod housedthe crew Theidea

was

abandoned BBA Coecton

BRISTOLTYPE198

GENERALARRANGEMENT

16

17



THE

SUPERSONIC

CIVILI N

THE

SUPERSONIC CIVILI N

the

air. Known as kinetic heating,

t

frame experiences

t he h ea t

genera

skin Friction, this beingproJlortional

square

ofthe

aircraft'svelocity. The sh

an aircraft governs the dispersal o f t h

generated; however, some

of

this is e

allyoffset by radiation coolingand in

conduction. But a fter a p er iod in

flig

dispersion pattern for the heat range

d own t o a n a ve ra ge

o f 9 0 °C

overa

t h ou g h t h e

tip

o f t he

nose is sub je

maximum

of 12r.

To

combat the

v

heat

rangesgenerated by speed and al

the

surfaceskin

o f t h e

aircraft expen

contracts;

the

passengers in their air-

tioned cabin would noticenone

of

thi

the conditioning remains constant.

heat differentia ls cause thermal s

within the structure that need com

tionin the design process to reduce the

es of potential fatigue failure.

Because

an

SST design would be

ed in

t he q ua nt i ty o f

fue l i t could

owing to its weight

and

size, it was

do

the

designers

to

ensure that

the

ai

exhibited

the

greatest aerodynami

ciency possible, powered by a n e

w it h t h e best cruise effiCiency whe

lowesr possible specific fuel consum

was m at ch ed t o t h e best possible

output. Another factor

that

guide

design was

t h e r eq ui re me nt t o k ee

basic

weight

as low as possible,

oth

the

total

w eightof the

aircraFtwould

beyonda

prohibitive

level, especiall

per

c e n t o f t h e

fuel

is consumed

in

th

sonic part

o f t h e

flight.

T o c r ea te an SST

that

compliedw

theserequirementswas a complex bu

especially as above Mach 1 the airc

sub jec t to a phenomenon known a

drag. This is t h e h i dd e n p en al t y t h a

trols the size of an aircraft's fuselage.

subsonic regime,

expansion

in

the

section

o f t h e

fuselage brings little in

in wave d rag; but above

the

limit

soundbarrier

the

opposite applies

an

a

slender

fuselage

is

the only option

able for high-speed flight. In contra

design

of

a supersonic wing is fraugh

contrasting complications. In theo

best wingfor sUJlersonic flight is one a

der aspossible, yetthis brings itsown

ties in t h a t t h er e is an increase in in

drag caused by

t h e g e ne r at i on o f

l

counteract

this requires

t h a t t h e

wing

should be modified to achieve

the

g

lift:drag ratio as possible.

Having

tw

the

wingfor

the

bestperformance at

sonic s pe ed s i t w ou ld r eq ui re f

known sonic

boom,

the

most

conspicuous

aspect

of

compressibility.

At

subsonic

speeds

the

air

c a n a c t

as a non-compress

ible fluid, but

at

supersonic speeds

changes

occur in

the

shape

o f t h e

wave in front

of

t he o bj ec t travelling at speed.

Under

Mach 1 the wavesbegin t o b u nc h t o ge t h

er, but

at

the point

of

transition to Mach 1

the w avefront becomes a completely flat

shock

wall. As

the

speed increases

above

Mach

1

t h e c o ne

begins

to

form

and

will

r e ma i n i n

place

unti

I

t h e o b je c t

reduces

speed.

G etting

an aircraftup

to

supersonic

speed requires

t h a t t h e

lift:drag ratio beas

efficient as possible; therefore

t ha t o f

a

subsonicairliner has a ra tio

of

16:1 which

reduces sharply as Mach I is approached.

However, an SST with itsslender, pointed

fuselage a nd d el ta wings has a l if t:drag

ratio

of

8:1, which gradually decreases

above Mach

2 before

evening out.

W h e n t h e

scientists

and

engineers

turned

their

attention

to the type o f engi ne

required to give sustained

supersonic

per

formance i t w as

apparenr rhat

o n ly t wo

typeswould be available to poweran SST:

the

turbojet,which literally turns fuel

into

propulsive energy and becomes more effi

cient

as speed increases, or

the

emergent

turbofan, which is firmly anchored in the

subsonic regime and becomes less efficient

as

Mach I approaches.

As

the

proposed SST was

intended to

fly

at between

50,000

and

60,000ft,

there

were

other

f ac to rs t o t ak e

into

consideration

besides those

that

normally affect subsonic

aircraft.

Changes

in temperature, pressure

and wind direction and the gas dynamics

of

the

air, which behaves like a compressible

fluid at this height and speed, all affect

an

SST's performance. Against thesevariables

the technical teams found t h a t t h er e was

one bonus: t h e b e ha vi o ur o f t h e preferred

turbojet engine,

which becomes more effi

cient

as

altitude

increases. Behaviour inside

the

cabin was also taken

into consideration

since there were

other

variables

to

be taken

intoaccount,

such aschangesin

cabin

pres

surization

at

different altitudes and temper

atures, and, surprisingly enough, variations

in external temperature that could affect

the behaviour

of

the air-conditioning sys

tem. Fortunately , wind varia tions

at

such

height and speed normally fail to affect an

SST,

although therehave been some

prob

lems with high

altitudejet

streams kicking

the autopilotout of

lock.

A s w i th all such aircraft

rhat

travel

at

supersonicspeeds, an

SST is

subjectto

the

temperature built UJl by its Jlassage through

By

t h e t i m e t h e t e n d er

for proposals was

ready for sending

to

manufacturers

the

French aviation industry had been reduced

t o j us t three major p laye rs , the se being

Nord Avi(ltion, S ud A viation and Avions

Marcel Dassault. All would begin theirown

design approaches in 1958-59,although by

1960 there would be only one design being

pursued assiduously. This wou ld bea com

bined effort

between Sud Aviation and

Avions Marcel Dassault

who

would fuse

their

similar efforts

together into one

pro

posal. The

other

manufacturer,

Nord

Avia

tion, would eventually decide to withdraw

from this particular

development

process.

A lthough the resultant French submission

was

not

as advanced as

t ha t o f B AC

there

was enoughof a resemblance to suggest

that

a joint A nglo-French approach might be

the course to follow. It was at this pointthat

the politicians from both countries would

begin

t h ei r i n vo l ve m en t which

would

resultin a merger

of

ideas

that

would

even

tually lead

to Concorde.

The Technological Challenge

Having assessed

the

potential and

the

pol

itics

of

designing a supersonic transport,

a t t en t i on n o w t u r n ed t o t h e m a th e ma t ic s

nd physics associated with

such

a design.

simplify

t h e b e ha v io u r o f s u pe r so ni c

flight it

can

be regarded a s varying with

the

square

r oo t o f t he

air

temperature,

which

i n i ts

turn

decreases with

height,

Ithough relationship is limited to

the

lower atmosphere,

the

tropopause, and

the

region above that,

the

troposphere. Above

hat is the stratosphere in w hich tempera

ture a n d t h us speed are constant. To add

'igures to thisstatement, the lnternation

I

S tandard A tmosphere

was

defined

thus:

t s ea lev el

the

speed

ofsound is approxi

mately

760mph 1,200km/h).

For

the

cor

responding 50,000

to

60,000ft

15,200

18,300m)

band

where

an

SST flies,

to

be

botheconomicand

speedy has

an

ISA rat

ing around

t he 6 60 mp h

1 ,060kmjh)

mark. The scale indicating the speed

of

~ o u was devised by Ernst Mach, an A us

Lrian scientist who investigated the behav

iour

of

objects passing t h ro u gh t h e air.

Research o n t he effects o f s o ni c booms

~ v e n t a l l y revealed

that

a h igh -sp eed

object

passing

through air

produces a dis-

inctive bow wave

which

forms a

cone; the

ooom comes from

t he s ho ck c on e

inter

~ e c t i n g with

the

g ro un d a nd t hu s

the

hange in air pressure causes the well-

o

Thiscutaway

view

ofthe

Sud

Aviation Super

Caravelle and the BAC Type 221 reveals the

convergence ofthinking byboth companies.

In theory, i t w a s thena shortstepto Concorde.

In reality,

i t w a s

amoretortuousprocess.

SSA Colecton

explore

it

a n d r e a ct t o t h e c o mp l ai n ts

gen

erated, although

i t was quickly

conceded

that

a c ce l er a ti o n t o

supersonic speeds

should be delayed until

the

aircraft was

o v er t h e

sea.

In France

the

government and

the

air

craft manufacturers i t sponsored were also

investigating the possibilities of a super

sonicairlinerduring 1957. Behind

the

sud

den

flurry

of interest

i n i t was

t he m ai n

Frenchairline,

Air

France. Initial approach

e shad

been

made by

the company

w it h a

specification

that

r equ ir ed a mid-range

capable

SST for use

within

Europe. As a

result

the

specificationwas extremely mod

est,requiring,as itdid, a range of some 1,900

miles 3,OOOkm) with a passenger loading of

betw een sixty

and

seventy. The reason

givenby Air Franceforsuch a modestspec

ification was

t h at t h e

airline wanted a fol

low-on from

the

extremely successful sub

sonic Caravelle

which

was in widespread

usc.

The

negative side

of

this

approach

was

t h at A i r

France wanted a supersonicairlin

er

that

could be operated

at

subsonic cost

ing, an unrealisticproposal from

the

outset

as events would subsequently prove.

o

SUD AVIATION

SUPER C R VELLE

SUDAVIATION

SUPER C R VELLE

BACTYPE223

o

BAC

TYPE 23

0 0

\:

SUD AVIATION

SUPER C R VELLE

84cm). By t h e e n d o f 1961 there was con

cern

about theeconomicsof scalelinked to

the

size ofthe aircraft, the usc

of

six engines

a n d t h e c om p le xi t y o f t h e intakes needed

to supply mass airflow t o t h e e n gi n e c o m

pressors. A further look a t t he design

by

BAC

would see

the emergence ofthe

Type

223 powered by four

Olympus

592/3

engines coupl ed t o a gross weight

of

260,0001b

l 1 8 , 20 0 kg ) a n d

capacity for

110 passengers. Retained from

the

original

specification was

the

capability to fly

the

London-New

York route as a singlestage.

The reduction in s iz e of

the

BAC SST

meant

that

the Type 223 des ign was the

preferred o pt i on ; t h us t h e larger Type 198

was eventuallyabandoned.

W h i le t h e M i n

istries

and manufacturers

werewrestlingwith

the

technology required

to create

a

supersonic transportthe

STAC

raised

concernsabout the creationof

son ic

booms and,more importantly, their effects

on

people below

the

flight path.

Although

no serious in-depth research concerning

the

public's view o n t h es e wascarried out,

the committee deduced that the bestway

to understand publictolerance

wouldbe

to

the

Bristol Aircraft

C o mp a ny a n d

its

p e 198 , f ir st r ev ea led in

October

1958,

would

capturethe attention ofS T A

the

two Ministries . In itsfirst iteration

Type 198was seen as

an

eight-engined,

der delta-winged aircraft, th is being a

ogee-shaped wing with

ds. Further development of the pro

sal wou ld see t he n um be r o f engines

to six a nd t he d el et io n o f t he

To assistBristol Aircraft, the Min

of Supplywould award the company a

in

order that comparative

studies

undertaken on

different structures.

ne would look

a t t he

structure

o f a n

air

e capable

ofMach

1

and

built

of

light

and

another

would consider the lay

an aircraft built withsteel and titani

r u se in Mach 3 operations. As would

eexpected, the latter wasquickly ruled out

tooexpensiveto manufacture and

perate, p lus t he p en al ty o f a n e xt en de d

evelopment period.

As

a fol low up

t o t h e

impressive Bristol

design,

the

Ministry

of

Supply would issue

a

joiMcontract

to

both

Bristol

and

Avro to

develop

an

SST jointly

that

would com

bine

the

ideasevolved through

the

former's

Type 198 and

the

latter'sType 735. What

would emergeat

the

e n d o f t h is processwas

a completely redesigned aircraft. Deleted

was the earlier mid-mounted wing, which

wasreplaced

by

a low-mounted, delta wing

above w hich

was a long,

slender

fuselage.

Power

came

from six Rolls-Royce

Olympus

engines

in

clutchesof three

in

twO

nacelles

under

the

wings. Regarded asan

optimum

design,

the

Ministry issued

another

con

tract

in

October

1 96 0 t o allow

both

com

panies to

continue

further development.

However, this was a period ofgovernment

sponsored consolidationw ithin the British

indllsny ami so Avro would eventually be

I h

\' 1

Ilf t hl s ec on d p ar t o f t h e SST

IC8

I

w r o c c ~ liS thIS wmpany was taken

Into the

Il1Iwkt r

Sidddl'Y Am.raft

Group,

\lui

BriM,,1

Aircrn t

I1wrgcd

WII

h English

nl l HI l ill V kkcrll til orlll

till Brit

ish

A,rlr l t t ~ o r p l l r a t i l l n (HAC). Althllllgh

Avro was thus cf(elllvcly l x d ll d l d, t h e

b l ue p ri n t t h at eme rged f rom

B t

III

August 1961 was largelybased o n t h e Typ\.

198issued in

O ctober the

previous year.

As

before,

the powerplants

were proposed as

the

Rolls-Royce

Olympus

rated

at

26,700lb

e ac h, t he se d ri vi ng

an

airframe

that

weighed in

at

385,0001b 175,000kg) with

proposed range

of

3,260 miles 5,200km).

m

..

d·1\

innwas set

at

136 passengers

t bcinl pitched

at

33in

18

19



THE

SUPERSONI

IVILI N

cost viabil it y, w hil e Sud A viat io

cont i nue t o

persi st w i th

the

vis

shorter-range design.

Given

t h

obvi ousl y di sparate views, i t w as

prising

that many of

these meetin

in arguments

as both

parties

cont

assert

their

own requirements.

Since

this

situation

coulcl

allowed

to cont inue,

the politicia

exert

pressure

on both

groups of m

turers

t o c ome t o

a consensus.

Th

result i n a full -bl own

project

rev

in Paris

on

17

January 1962, wher

fram e m anufact urers decided t o

the development

of

both

design

with as

much commonal i ty

as

Fortunately,

the

bl ueprint s prese

both

groups w ere si mi l ar i n

outli

being powered by

Olympus

593

the

m ajor di fference w as

t he qu

f ue l i n

each

version

a nd t he n u

tanks required

to

house i t. It w as

ognized

that there might

be diffe

the radio

and

navigational requ

for

each

version; however,

the

fundamental

systems were

the

s

both

versi ons. A s w el l

as

using

standard materials for

constructio

intended that both

versions would

a h ig h

proportion

of

common

p

components.

To furtherincrease

c

ality,

the product ion

tools

and

jigs were identical.

Given

that

t

t ure for

both

versions was

the

sam

decided

to

f ol lo w a s im il ar

R

gramme,

which

w oul d encom pa

strength,

aero elasticity

and

fat

calculations.

The

initial design d

countersigned

b y D r W il li am

St

L uci en Servanty, revealed a

com

out

dimensionally,

the

onl y di

bei ng i nfuel capaci t ies w hich w er

and

17,400gal, respectively 57,

79,000Itr) and

maximum

take-of

c a lc u la t ed a s 2 0 9, 4 00

and

25

respectively 95,000

and

115,00

each

version.

At

this

point the

SS

was

shown

with

both

a fixed

and

a

geometry nose,

although the max

angle

ofattack

was

13

degrees,whi

on t h eSud

Aviationtrade

s t and when the

company

di spl ayed a scal e m odel of

their

own

Super Caravel

Ie SST.

Since t he

simi

larities

between the Sud Avi a t ion

model

and

the

proposed B ri stol T ype 223 desi gn

w ere fai rl y obvi ous,

an

official

meeting

between

representativesfrom both

compa

nies w as quickly

convened

i n Pari s

on

8

June.

By

t hi s t im e B ri st ol

Aircraft

had

been absorbed by

BAC

as

part

of a

shake

up

of

the

British industry, while

the French

representatives were still

part of Sud

Avi

ation.

A reci procal

meet ing between

the

twogroupswould take place

at

Weybridge,

once home

of Vickers Aircraft,

on

10 July,

where

the

first serious discussions

con

cerning the adoption

of a

common

design

and t he

pooling of resources w ere under

taken.

While

the

airframe manufacturers

were

taking

their

first,

tentative

steps

towards

col laborat ion, the engine

manu

facturers werealsoengaged in

negotiations

concerningthe development

of a

common

engine and supplementary

items. The two

selected primary

contractors

were origin

all y B ristol E ngi nes

at

Fi lt on, l ater

to

become

part

of

Rolls-Royce,

and

the

French

conglomerate SNECMA

Societe

Nationale d etude et

de

Construction

de

Moteurs

d Aviation), who

signed a prelim

inary

declaration

of

co-operation

in

Nov

ember

1961.

With

the

m anufact urers seemi ngl y

coming

t o a consensus, i t w as t i me for

the

politicians to finalize

their

aspects

of

the

project.

Presentat

this

meeting

in Paris

on

7 D ecem ber1961 w ere Peter

Thorneycroft

and

R obert B uran.

The

outcome

was a

joint formal request

t obo t h

groups ofman

ufacturers

to co-operate

fully in

the

design

and

development

of an

Anglo-French

u pe r so ni c t r an s po r t, i ts s ys te ms

and

engines.

Although the

politicians

and the

official entourages were

presenting

a unit

ed front

t o t he

world,

the

airframe

manu

facturers were still at odds

over t he exac t

n at ur e o f t h e

airliner required.

BAC

was

st il l pushi ng for

an

aircraftcapable

of

fly

ing

the Atlantic

i n a si ngl e st age,

on t he

grounds

of manufacturing and

operating-

esign n evelop lent

H PTER

TWO

ohn u and

Marianne

Become Engaged

With

all

the

technical, scientific,

theoreti

cal

and operat ional

meetings, discussions

nd papers compl eted, i t w as t i me for

the

politicians

to

enter

the

a r en a. I t h a d b e en

realized early

on that the

design, develop

mentand product ionof

a supersonic trans

port using only

the

resources available to

n a lm os t

destitute

Britain would

put

a

reat st rai n

on

the

economy, t herefore

tlpproaches were made

by

representatives

the

British

government

to

their counter

part s i n France,

Germany

and

t he USA .

he se wer e g iv en a mi xe d r ec ep ti on ;

r ma ny d ec li ne d a ny o ff er

to

become

involved for

the

reason that t hey coul dsee

no

use for such

an

aircraft

under

their

cur

rent

ci vi l ian avi at i on requi rem ent s;

the

.)lher

nati on t o

decline

the invi tat ion

was

he

USA

w hi ch h a d

intimated

plans

to

undertake development

of

thei rown

SST

based upon

the

experience gainedfrom

the

unique X B -70 V al kyri e,

Mach

3 , six-

ngined bomber.

The

only

country

to

Iccept

the

invitation

was France sincethey

100

w ere st il l i m poveri shed after

the

war

, lnd had al ready begun t o i nvesti gat e t heir

ow n versi on of

an

S ST , a

Sud

Aviation

d es ig n p ow er ed by four R oll s-R oyce

R8l67-1 engi nes. T o t his end Pet er

Thor

I eycroft

(Minister

of

A vi a ti on ) m ad e

lprroaches

to his Fr enc h

counterpart

R obert B uron Mi nist er

of

Publ i c Works

tntl T ra ns po rt ) i n A pr il 1 96 0. A s t he se

I

Ilks had

come to

an amicable conclusion

II

was proposed

that

a

meeting

b e h el d

hCLween desi gn t eam s from

the

favoured

1\IILish

and

French

manufacturers.

The

1\l ll lsh t eam from B ristol A i rcraft w as l ed

I y Dr

Archibald

Russell; his

counterpart

10m

S ud A vi a ti on wa s P ie rr e S at re . A s

hese initial discussions proved that

there

\ S

common

ground, i t w as proposed that

h er e s ho ul d be f ur th er o ne s,

although

llh

the

manufacturers would

continue

to

kvcloptheir

own

design in

the

meantime.

During

the

Paris

AirShow of

1961 a fur

her

spur towards

collaboration

appeared

difficultdue

to the changingcentreof

pres

sure that would occur as

the

aircraft trav

elled across

the

A t lanti c; yet i f such a

sys-

t em c ou ld b e d ev is ed i t w ou ld a ll ow f or a

reduction

o f t he

size

of

the

power units,

although

the SST

would need

the

already

envi saged powered fl ight controls and

an

artificial feel system.

Itseemsstrange

to

relate that, at

the

out

set

of t he

STAC

investigation,

the

aerody

namics workinggroup were unsure

whether

a feel system ofany ki nd w ould be needed.

This at t i tude

quickly changed

when t he

experience

of

t ho se a lr ea dy e ng ag ed i n

developingMach 2 fighters and a particular

delt a-w ing bomber w ere brought i n. H ow

ever, i t w as reali zed,

that

si nce t his w as a

civilian application,

not

only w ould a feel

systembe needed,

but

duplicationfor safety

reasons would be essential.

Thusan

exten

sive programme

of

development, including

the

useof specially designedtestbeds, would

be required. Further systems

development

covering

an

automatic blind-landing capa

bility

was

also seen

as

a necessity, although

whether

thiswould be

by

directvision, tele

vision or some form

of

periscope had

not

b e en d et er mi ne d . A ll t he se i nn ov a ti on s

were warmly welcomed by

the

participating

airlines, although they would express some

reservat ions concerning t hei r appl i cat ion

sinceany deterioration in controllability in

m an ua l m od e wa s s ee n

as

unacceptable.

As

the

British

SST

d es ig n w as s e t

to

incorporate many

radi cal changes,

the

commit tee concluded

that initial R D

contracts

could

be

ready for i ssue i nJanu-

a ry 1 96 0, w it h a

complet ion date

some

time

i n 1 96 2.

The

target

date

for ai rli ne

entry

was

put at 1971-72. This date

was

s e t f or

the

l ong-range ai rcraft w hil e

the

shorter-ranged

machine

was

set

forservice

entry

some

three

years earlier.

Costs

were

a

thorny point

in

the

STAC

report

as accu

rate figures wereimpossible

to

predict;

but

they did presentsome figures

which

would

entail

the expending of

£51 m i ll i on,

to

include

the

prototype

and the

develop

ment programme up

to Cert ificateof

Air

worthiness

standard, which

would

entail

the

use

of

up

to

five

production

machines.

These

figures covered only

t h e Mach

1.2

part

of

the

programmebecause

the

devel

opment of t he Mach

1.8aircraft would lift

the

final cost

to

approxim atel y £91 m il

lion. This

then

was

the

British Supersonic

Transport

i n all i ts paper glory; m uch

had

already

been

l earned, m ore w oul d need

to

be learnedbefore

the

aircraft

known

as

the

oncorde became

a reality

natureof t he

ai rcraft i nvol ved, i t w as rea

soned

that

i ts engi nes w oul dhave a hi gher

specific thrust

andj e t

velocityduring take

off,

h en ce a n

i ncreased noise

quotient

would be inevitable. Allied to this was

the

shape

ofthe

SST swing,which

is

very inef

ficient

at

low speeds

and

therefore more

power ~ ~ o u l beneeded

to

climbclear

ofthe

runway. To compensate for these potential

noise problems,

the commit tee

concluded

that

an

i nc re as ed a ng le o f c li mb a nd a

shortened

period

of

full power application

would be sufficient to negate any problems.

Having

achieved flight,

the

STAC

recom

mended

t ha t t he

engines be

throttled

back

within

the

designed safety margins

as

soon

as

possible

to maintain

a l ow noise output.

As

the

engines intendedfor

the

SST would

be fi tt ed w i th

thrust

augmenters,

complete

with variable nozzles,

the

reduced t hrust

output

would be compensated for

by

the

air

m ass flow remai ni ng consi stent, and t hus

jet

velocity

and

noise w ould be reduced.

Engines

and

their

number

for drivi ng a

Mach 2 ai rl i ner w eighing i n at 350,000 t o

500,0001b l59,000-227,000kg) would also

exercise

the col lect ive

m in d s o f

STAC.

Should smaller, low-thrust powerplants be

developed

to

satisfy

the

SST

requirement?

Or

would a newdesign

of

engine be better?

As

the

expected power requirement was

in

the

150, 000 t o 200,0001b t hrust range, a

numbe r o f

engines,

between e i gh t

ancl

t we lv e, wa s p ro po se d, e ac h w it h a t h ru s t

rating

of

20,000lbor more.

On the

subj ect ofsoni c boom

the

com

mittee

reiterated

that the

publ ic w ould be

the

final arbit er of

what

was acceptable;

however,asa startingpoint, theywouldrec

ommend

that s up er so ni c f li gh t b e k e pt

above 35, 000ft

(l0,700m)

as

t hi s was

deemed acceptable. Itwouldalsobe recom

mended

that,

in

the

case

of

transatlantic

departures, supersonic speed be restrained

until

the

ai rcraft w as over

the

sea; con

versely,supersonicspeedswouldbe prohib

it ed o ve r l an d. A s p ar t

o f t he

proposed

development

ofthe

SST

in

the

future itwas

suggested

that

a form

of

automat ic engine

c o nt ro l b e d ev el op ed ; t hi s wa s s ee n

as

a

good selling

point

to prospective airlines.

As well as a form

of

automatic controlfor

the

engines,

the

commi

ttee

aIso discussed

the

possibility

ofan

automatic,aerodynam

ic, balancingsystem. Butthis idea would be

placed

on

hold

as

its

development

was seen

as a long-winded process, especially

as the

requirementfor

the

manual reversion of

the

flyingcontrols was built into

the

specifica

tion.

This

l att erneed w ould be m ade m ore

changes t o perform effi cientl y under l ow

speed

handling

conditions.

Once

all

of

t hese fact ors had been t aken

into consideration

the

designers were able

to

set tl e down

to the

task

of

creating

the

Anglo-French Concorde.

The

STAC

would,however,

have

further

input

into

the

design process as it was proposed

that,

instead ofusingsize, range, take-off/landing

performanceto define

the

aircraft,they sug

gested

that to

relate size to payload instead

of

al l-up w eight m i ght m ake

the concept

moresaleableto potential customers. Even

so,

the

design was never going t o exceed a

maximum capacity

of

200 passengers since

the

available data suggested

that

a l arger

airframe would be

uneconomic to

operate.

Carefulconsiderationwould also have tobe

given

t o t he

manufacture

of

eachpart oft he

airfram eas any m arkeddi screpancy i n t his

area w ould i ncrease operat ing costs, espe

c ia ll y i n a il fr am es b ei ng o p er a te d o v er

longer distances

and

at

speeds bet ween

Mach

1.2

and

1.8.

This

proviso w as also

aimed

a t t he

engine manufacturers since

fai lure t o control all aspects of

the

design

could

p ut t he

a ir li ne s a ga in st a ny S ST .

These

possi bl e defi cienci es w ere greatl y

lessened if

the

required rangewerereduced,

and

thus

the

committee

concluded

t ha t t he

proposed

SST

shoul d be bui lt

in

twO ver

sions:

the

shorter-ranged vehicle would be

regarded

as the

l eadi n t o

the

longer-ranged,

d ef in it iv e a ir cr af t. I n t hi s m an ne r , i t wa s

concluded, any defects in desi gn and per

formance could be rectified in

the machine

built later.

Although thecommit tee

had, i n

concert

with

the

relevant workinggroups, discussed

the

behaviour of

the

jetengines

on

previous

occasions, they were still particularly con

cerneclabout

the

nuisance noisegenerated

by t hi s t yp e

of

powerplant and,

of

course,

the

potentiallydestructivebehaviourof

the

s on ic b oo m. In d ea lin g wit h

the

first

requirement,

the commit tee

were reaching

for

the

i mpossible i n requiri ng

t ha t t he

accept abl e generat ed noise shoul d be kept

t o t h e

same l evel as, or j ust below that

of

c o nt em po r ar y p is to n- e ng in ed a ir li ne rs

because jet

engine

noise

is

more pervasive.

Thus

a l i mi t of 103dB

was

seen

as the

high

est acceptable. A fter st art ing

and

taxiing,

t henex t

part

of t he

sequencewas

the

take

off. Yet agai n noise w as

the

prime factor;

here the commit tee

asked that

the

engine

manufacturers take into consideration

the

design

of

powerplant,

the

velocity

o f t h e

exhaust, totalengine

output

and

the

climb

performance

o f t he

aircraft.

G iv en t he

20

27



Airframe Management Committee

n

Andre Puget

Chairman/Managing Director

alternates

with:

Sir George Edwards Vice Chairman/Deputy Managing Director

ierre Satre Technca Director

O r E Russe Deputy Technical

Director

Jr. Harper Directorof Producton Fnance Contracts

Lou s Giusta Deputy

Directorof Producton.

etc.

A H C Greenwood Sa es Director

WJ. Jakimiuk Saes Director

GE.

Knight Director

C Val eres Director

EngineManagement Committee

Sir

Arnold

Ha

Chairman/ManagingDirector alternates with:

H.A. Desbrueres Vice Chairman/DeputyManaging Director

DrE.J.

Warlow Davies

Technical

Director

M. Garnier

Deputy Technca Director

R

Abel

Directorof Producton

w Saxon

Deputy

Directorof Producton

J.

Bloch Sa es Director

W.H. Rees Sa es Director

r e su lt i n the f ix ed n os e b ei ng d ro pp e d.

Agreement

had been reached, however, on

the

materials

to

be us ed i n

construction.

Most

ofthe

structurewas

to

be bui lt using

aluminium

alloy

to

B R 58 B rit i sh Stan

dard)

or

i ts French

equivalent A-U2GN,

while the

remainder

w ou ld us e h ig h

t ensi le st eel si n hi gh-st ress areas

and

tita

ni um i nareas

of

high temperature.

DESIGN N EVELOPMENT

A f u rt he r

meeting

held on January

1 96 2 b e tw ee n

the

t wo m anufacturi ng

groups led

by

D r R ussel l and D r

Strang

of

BAC and

Pierre

Satre

and L uci enServan

ty

of Sud

Aviation resulted in a declaration

of intent

which

allowed for the

continued

development and

refinement of

both

de

signs so

that

a final deci sion

concerning

the

configurationand

the

details regarding

22

the

workshares, supposedly equally, could

b e h a mm er e d o u t.

The

declaration read:

Ir is feasiblero

have

a

common

hasicaircrafr in

rwo versions

one ofwhich

would

comrly

wirh

r h e n e e d s

exrressed

by

rhe

French

governmenr

and

approved by

Sud

Aviarion

and Ai r

France

for

medium

range

operarions

while

rhe

mher

would

comply

wirh rhe requiremenrs requesred

hy

rhe

B r ir i sh M i n is t r y

o f A vi ar io n a nd

aprroved

by

BAC

forusc

on

rhe

London-New

York transatlantic

route.

On 26Marcha further

meeting

w as held i n

London between

Thorneycroft and

Buron

at

w hich i t w asagreed that the preliminary

designs wereclose

enough to ac t

as

a basis

for

an

Anglo-French

SST

with

the

whole

being carried

o ut o n

a

50-50

basis.

After

t hese negot i ati ons the f ir st m aj o r m il e

stone

in

the Concorde

programm e w as

passed. This was the announcelTlent

of the

Anglo-French

Supersonic AircraftAgree

ment

w hich w as presented t o

the

world s

press

on

25 O ctober. This historic docu

ment wascounter signed by representatives

of

the two

governments

in

London on

29

November. Encapsulated

within

i t w er e

point s coveri ng

the

equal shari ng

of

all

development

and desi gn costs, i ncl uding

the

pursuit

of potential

sales

on

a w orld

wide basis. However,

nine

days earl i er i t

had been t ouch

and

go

at

a

Cabinet

meet

i ng held

to

decide

the

future

of the entire

project. Present

at

this

meeting

were the

Prim e Mi ni ster, H arol d MacMi l lan,

and

his son-i n-l aw , Juli an A m ery

(who

had

replaced

Thorneycroft

as the

Minister

of

A viat ion) and m embers

of

the

Treasury.

An

i ntense di scussi on revol vi ng around

development

costs and potential sales were

finally resolved

and

would allow

Concorde

to continue.

It w ould also affi rm

the

com

mitment to

progress

both

versions in paral

lel. Also

within

this

document

werefuller

t echni cal proposal s for the S ST , w hi c h

i ncl uded a passengercabi n capabl e

of

car

rying 100

at

a maximum speed

of

Mach

2.2.

TOP: Witha backdrop of aerodynamictest shapes

isthis unpowered drop testmodelof Concorde

preserved atthe Fleet ir Arm Museum Yeovilton.

BBA Colecton

LEFT Beforethe Fairey FD.2 was rebuilt as the

BAC

221

thisdrop model

was

manufactured

totest itsbehaviourin fl ight.

BBA

Colecton

Joint Oversight

Overseeing

the whole

project

w as a

stand

ing committee drawn from

both

countries.

This

w oul d i ncl ude a

chairman/managing

di rector, a vi ce

chairman/deputy

manag

i ng di rector, a French t echni cal di rect or, a

ritish deputy

technical

director, a British

director

of production, finance

a nd con

t ract s, w ho w oul d

have

a F r en ch d e pu ty

director, a British

and

a French salesdi rec-

or

and

a

director

representing

Sud

Avia

t ion and one

from

BAC doing

the same

j ob . T o i ns ti l a d eg re e of fairness the two

p p os ts

alternated

between the British

nd

the

F re nc h m em be rs , w ho w ou ld

hange

post s every t wo years.

Working

in

ncert

with the oversight

committee

was

civil servant

contingent from

eachcoun

ry whosepurposewas

to

supervise the pro

t

and

liaise

between the technical and

inance

directors. The role

ofthe

oversight

mmittee

w as t o k e e p both

governments

Informed of progress

a nd t o

make propos

lisfor

economy and

efficiency, arrange for

Joint airworthiness

and operational

regu

lations

and

g iv e a pp ro pr ia te a dv ic e if

Icquired

to

the

manufacturing

groups.

Fven

w it h t his

agreement

i n p la ce

there

w oul d st il l be some frict ion

between

the

manufacturers

that

would

end

only

when

a

dcsi gn w as chosen.

Oneo f t he

first deci

\ Ions m ade by the new organi zat ion w as

he

name

of the aircraft,

Concorde.

Even

this was not

without

controversy as BAC

had decided

not

to

spell

the

name

w it h a

rminal

e

while

the government

had

lcadfastly

promoted

it; the manufacturers

r ~ l l y g av e i n

during

D ecem ber 1967 as

I \Llch o f t he e xt an t paperwork reveals.

Ihis

minor

bureaucrat i c spat aside,

the

Itlanagement

of the

projectitselfwas

under

\less

d ue t o

the size

of the

several

man

IltCmentorganizations

that

hadevol ved i n

IIPoort.

DESIGN

N EVELOPMENT

As

both countries

had

created

a t ea m

of

consi derable size, the

decision-making

process w as bei ng sl ow ed

down

consider

ably

and

t hi s i n t u r n h a d

begunto

pushup

the

development

costs,

which had

origi

nally stood

at

£95 m i ll i on

but

had begun

to creep

inexorably towards

the £

billion

mark.

What

saved the

situation

were the

belief,

dedication and management

skills

of

Sir

George

Edwards,

t he BAC

chair

m an. H i sopposi te number,

the

chairman

of

the Airframe Committee,

Andre

Puget,

w oul d also

exert

maximum inf1uence on

hi s si de of the Channel

to

hold the pro

gramme

together. A further

spanner

in the

works

came

in 1 96 4

when

a L ab ou r g ov

ernment

assumed power.

Oneof

itsearliest

acts w as

to

tr y t o

cancel

all

outstanding

aviation contracts

in both the civil

and

the

m i li t ary field. A

memorandum to

the

Prime

Min

is te r, d at ed f or 2 4 J un e, c as t

doubt on the

project s viability as costs

at

that date

h a d a lr ea dy r e ac he d £ 2 75 m il

lion,

enough to

buil d t w o

Channel tun

nels.

The

paper also st ated that

to ge t

the

aircraft

into

servi ce w i th

BOAC a t an

early

date

could

have

far-reaching effects

on the o n ly B ri ti sh s u bs o ni c a ir l in e r

al ready i n

production,

t he VC-I0 .

The

proposed coursewas

to

drop Concorde

and

proceed w it h

t he Channel tunnel

while

passing

theSST baton to the USA,

which

hadexpressed a w ish

to continue to

devel

op

i ts supersoni c

transport

at a more

leisurely pace.

The apparent

pay-off was

that the VC-10

would

have

an

easier pas

sage

into the American

market. The

next

paragraph

then

turned the previous state

menton its

head

as the French part ofthe

agreement came in to

play. Although not

blatantly stating

t hat the

cost

of

pulling

out

wa s b e in g u se d a s a l ev e r t o k ee p

the

United K i ngdom i nvol ved,

the

govern

ment decided

that

a poli cy

o fn o

enthusi

asm was

the

answer, so

that

a get-outclause

Anglo French Concorde Management Committees

23

c ou ld b e

created

for

an

easy esc

allowing Britain

to

spend

no

mo

further

£30 to £50

million. Fortu

history,

there

was a no break clau

November

1962

agreement

whic

h e av y f i na nc ia l p en a lt ie s s ho ul

s id e d e ci de t o b a ck o ut .

Having

this brickwall, the

government

w

to

continue the project,

althoug

everything

i n i ts p ow er

to

cause

delays as possibleand cancelled

o

jects instead.

Changes had

alsooccurred in

th

process as

both

of the airframe m

t urers w ere now w orki ng

on

a si

j ec t, f or 1 00 p as se ng er s

at

a

m

speed

of Mach

2.2.

This

airfr

retained the medium-stage capa

2,400 miles

(J,840km)

for

Air

F

well as the l onger range capab

fen ed

by BOAC. This

gave maxi

up w eights

of nO,5001b

100,2

the m ed iu m v er si on w hi le

the

ranged ai rcraft w oul d

have

a

m

of 262,5001b

(l19,300kg).

Other

applicable

to the

shorter-rang

included airbrakes

to

reduce

the

run

and

a

ventral

a ir s ta ir t o a ll

more f1exible usage

pattern on

sm

fields with fewer facilities.

For

the

following twoyearsdeve

on both versions

of

the

Anglo-Fre

would continue, although, as expe

without rancour.

The

main stick

remained as before: t he B ri ti sh t

hated

the

idea

of the

extras require

duce

the

medium-range

Super

C

sincethey regardedit aseconomic

able, while

the

French disliked th

range ai rcraft bei ng pushed by

B

t hey could see

no

need for

the

ex

capability. Eventually

BAC and

S

tion

came to an agreemen t as

sense

and

a realizationofthe

econ

scaleprevailed

and

the British ve



-

-.--

DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN

ND DEVELOPMENT

•

\

RIGHT

To

explorethe behaviourofthe deltawing at

low

speeds

HandleyPage

was

contracted to buildthe strange looking

HP 115

researchaircraft C P

Russel Smith

C ol ec ton

BELOW One ofthe firstexperimentaltai l lessaircraftbuil t to testthe delta

wingwas the BoultonPaul BP lll seen hereat Cranfield Ithad a

pure delta wingwith elevonsat thetrai l ing edge The seemingly

overlargefin

was

requiredfor betterstabil ity along thelongitudinal

axis C P

Russel Smith

C ol ec ton

BonOM: Seen touching downat Farnboroughis theHandley Page

HP 115

Since

it

wasrequiredonlyfor low speedhandlingtr ialsthe

undercarriageunits were fixed

B B A C ol ec ton

AnotherConcordefeaturethat

was trialled

on

the BAC 221 was

theextended undercarriagethat

the

airliner

wouldneedto allow

for intake clearance

B B A C ol ec ton

ABOVE Undertakinga

slow

f1ypast

forthe camerais the BAC 221

rebuiltfrom aFaireyFO 2 Notonly

werethe wingsmodified t o a n

ogee planform but adroopnose

was

incorporated andshown in

action B B A C ol ec ton

The Bristol Type

188

was constructed mainly ofstainless steel forresearch into

high speedfl ight Theaircraftwas nota successsince

i twas

expensive to build

andoperate due to i tshigh fuelconsumption

B B A C ol ec ton

Beforethe appearance ofthe Fairey

FO 2

researchaircraft thecompany built the

delta winged FO formuch the samepurpose However

VX350 was

notthe success

envisagedsince

it

sufferedfromexcessive drag and instability

B B A C ol ec ton

adopted

for

continued development.

The

end

of

this

uncertainty meant that the

decision was made

to

virtually redesign

the

whole

aircraft in 1964.

The

mostobvious

alteration

was

an extension to the

fuselage

by

14ft 4.3m ,which wouldgrow

by anoth

e r6 .5 f t 2m during the

following twelve

months.

This

changeto

the

fuselageallowed

the number

of

passengers

to

be increased to

14 A further reworkingaffected the wings

whose gross area was increased

by

15 per

cent, the

final result

was

an

increasein gross

weight

to

367,0001b 166,800kg . Todrive

thisbigger

Concorde

Rolls-Royce offered

an

improved

version

o f t he O lympus

593

which

g av e a f in al

max imum thr us t o f

40,000lb l78kN

per

engine.

It was

at

this

point

in

the development

process

that

research a irc ra ft began to

make

their

presencefelt.

One

of the

most

expensive to build

and opera te

was

the

Bristol Type 188

which

was

constructed

mainly from stainlesssteel

and

powered

by

a pai r

of

Rolls-Royce

Cyron

engines.

The

main

purpose

of

this aircraft was

to

probe

the

behaviour

of

an

airframe flying

at

speeds exceeding

Mach

2

In t hi s

part o f

the

flight

envelopethe

main area

of

study

was

the

effect

of

sustained

kinetic

heating

onan aircraft.

The

first

of

theseunique air

frames, XF923, made i ts maiden fl ight

on

14

April

1961, beingfollowed bya second

Type 188, XF926,

on

29 April 1963. To

study

the behaviour

of

the

wing during

various phases

of

igh

was decided

to

allow BristolAircraft to rebuild

the

Fairey

FD

2

Originallythis delta-winged testair

craft

had been

used solely in research

on

this wing planform before being diverted

to

this

new task.

The

rebuilding

of

the

air

frame

meant tha t

a completely new wing

was fitted,

of

a s le nd er o ge e shape . T o

ensure longitudinal stability

the

fuselage

was

lengthened,

the

new airframe being

24

25



DESIGN N EVELOPMENT DESIGN N EVELOPMENT

The

Nord Griffon II was

one

of the firstdelta-wingaircraftbuilt in France.

Used

entirely for experimentalpurposes

it

would make itsclaim for fame when Andre

Turcat passed Mach2 piloting

it

in

1959.

BBA Colecton

The SNCASE later Sud Aviation SE 212 Durandal was another French delta-wing

trialsaircraftthat wouldexert

some

influence

on

the Concorde programme.

BBA

Colecton

The Gerfaut II wasyet another delta-winged aircraft in which Andre Turcatset

another record

in

1957. Although

the

original conceptbehind

the

aircraftwas

to

act

as afighter prototype.

it

remained

as

atrials aircraftuntil the

end of

itslife.

BBA

Colecton

The SNCASE 9000 Tridentwas amixedpowerplant aircraftfeaturing ajet engine

in

the fuselage

and

rocket engines mounted

on

the wingtips. Turcatused

it

to push the

French questfor speed even further.

BBA

Colecton

Aviation, assumed responsibility For the

aircraft hydraulics, flying-control power

units,

automaticpilotand

stabilization sys

tems.

Some o f t h e avionics including the

radio

and

aerials

and navigation

systems

inc lud ing the p i to t s tat ic system) were

also be handled by French companies, as

were power

generation and

air-condition

ing

control,

plus

the complete

design

and

computation of the air-conditioning

sys

tem. The critical area of engine nacelle

design was given to Brita in; th is included

the

aerodynamic design and testing

of the

speciFication

and

performance

of the

nacelles,

which

also

included the in take

assemblies

and

ramps plus

the

nozzles.

Overall responsibility For the remaining

erodynamic workwas undercontrol ofthe

French; calculation

of

aero elasticity

and

strength

in a

three-dimensional

aerody

namic

loading Framework would

determine

t he behaviour o f t he

aircraFt

at

critical

peed points and was the responsibility of

the British, whilegeneral airframe calcula

tionswere

undertaken

by

the

French.

Cen

tre

of

gravity

and

weight

estimation

were

the responsibility of each country s own

esign teamand calcula tion of thecentre

of

:avity

For

each aircraft version was the

responsibility

of the

French manuFacturers,

who were also charged with providing

the

manufacturer s

empty

weight figures,

and

a

combined team would calculate the forward

weight and centre

of

gravity estimates plus

the

projected operator s empty weight . All

hese Figures covered in-flight ranges

For

both

versions.

To ensure continuity, each manuFactur

er would normally design and build each

sub-assembly

and

install

t he r el ev an t

wiring

and

subsystems

in to each

where

pplicable.

Any

modifications were dis

ussed under the aegis of thejoint commit

e, who assisted in gaining approval and

nsured

tha t the

work-share process would

tay in balance

at

40 per

cent For

Britain

dnd

60 For

France.

The

responsibility for

lhe powerplant

was

under the guidance of

Bristol Engines whoseareas of responsibil

ityincluded

the

basicengine.

This

baseline

item included

the

compressor, com buster

system,

turbine,

primary Fuel-control sys

tem, nozzle-area

control

system

a nd t he

majority of engine-mounted accessories

and drives suchas

the

combined drive unit.

NECMA

gained responsibility for

the

heat

Fuel-controlsystem,

the reheat

unit,

he convergent-divergent

nozzle

and

a

jet

ipe equipped with a noise suppresser and

thrust-reverser control system. To speed

air conditioning, de-icing, engine instru

mentation

andcontrol systems. Alsowith

in the British remit were

thedevelopment

of t he rmal a nd sound

insulation plus

calculationson thethermalcharacteristics

of the cabin. The French, led by Sud

Estimates of Design Costs

Mach 1.2 Aircraft E million Mach 1.8 Aircraft E million

Existng New

Existng New

engines

engines e ngines

engines

prototype

development

Airframe development and 17

17 22

22

flight costs

Engne development and supply 6

24

20

26

of

engine

costs

Tota

23

41 42

48

further

development to costs ofA

4development aircraft

12 12

15

15

10 OOOhr flight

tests 16

16 21 21

20 OOOhr flight tests

24 25 32

32

C A B

lO OOOhr

51 69

78

84

20 OOOhr

59

78 89 95

Planned Concorde

Costs

E million

Year

irframe

Engnes

Tota

1962

84 3.6

12

1963 8.7

8

16.7

1964

11.6 6.9

18.5

1965

264

11.6

38

1966

22.1

5.8 27.9

1967

145

3.3

17.8

1968

6.9

0.7

17.6

1969

-3.3 0

-3.3

Totals 95.3

39.9 145.2

BAC

also took

on

much

o f t h e

responsi

bi

I ity for

the

strategy

concern ing the

essential systems.

Included in t h is r emi t

were

the electrical, Fuel in collaboration

with Rolls-Royce), oxygen provision For

both passengers and crew, Fire protection,

redesignated as

the

Typ e 2 21 . I t w ou ld

make

its

maiden

flight

on

1May 1964. In

its

new

guise

theBAC

221 wasused

to

pro

videvaluable

dataon high-speed handling

on

behalF of the Concorde programme. To

cater For the

low-speed

handling

data

requirements,

the Hand ley

Page

HP115

wasspecially

constructed.This too

sported

a

delta

wing,

although with

a

straight

lead

ingedge, and made its maiden flight on 17

August 1961. For

the next

Four years

the

HP

115 made numerous , oc ca s ional ly

unstable, f ligh ts in

support of the

pro

gramme

beFore

retirement to the

Fleet

Air

Arm

Museum at Yeovilton.

The French

SST

development teamwere

also drawing

on the

test resultsgained From

a

number of

unique testailframes.To inves

tigate purehigh-speed flight

the Sud-Ouest

9050 Trident II research aircraFt had been

constructed, its propulsion beingdelivered

by apair

of

wingtip-mounted rocketengines.

Delta-wing research had been carried

out

with

the

Sud-Est SE212 Durandal

a nd t he

Nord

1502 Griffon,

which

would eventual

ly lead to the Mirage series of Fighters and

the Mirage IV s tr ateg ic bombe r. As the

French industry had

the

greater experience

indelta-wingflight, it

came

as

no

surprise to

Find that

Sud

Aviation

would assume

the

design and construction lead For the Front

section of th is major component plus the

e1evons.

In the

event, Sud Aviation eventu

allygained

the

greatershare 60 per

cent of

the

airframe design

and construction

work.

In contrast, the British beneFitted From

an

increase in the workshare in enginedevel

opment

as Rolls-Royce were chosen as

the

primary

contractor

to develop

the

Olympus

593 for

Concorde.

Responsibility for

the

design, development and manuFacture of

the r e levant majo r components was

assumed by

the

relevant division

of the

Four

primary contractors,

and

a ll wou ld in turn

be overseen by

the joint-manned

oversight

committee. In Brita inmost of the ailframe

work was concentrated at the old Vickers

plant

at

Weybridge,where the rear Fuselage,

fin and rudder sections were designed and

manuFactured. The Forward fuselage became

the

responsibility

of the BAC,

ex-Bristol

AircraFt, p lan t a t Filton, while the centre

fuselagesection wasmanuFactured in France,

even though i t was des igned

at

Filton.

Beyond

the Four

primary manuFacturerswas

Marshalls

of

Cambridge, now Marshalls

Aerospace, whose responsibility was the

unique droop nose. The design and manu

Facture

of

these assemblies were concentrat

ed

at

their bases in

Hum and Cambridge.

26

27



DESIGN

ND DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN

ND DEVELOPMENT

ALLOY

system

and

confi rm structural in

and

ensure

that each

team was made

of

changes

when

they occurred.

Rolls-Royce covered

the

respons

for developing

the

bas ic Olympu

engine; however, beyond this

SNE

had

the

oversight

of

developing

the

e

thrust

augmenter

assembl ies and

intetfaces and

B A C at

Filton were ch

with

the

design of

the

complete engi

assemblies, plus

the

intakes and asso

ramps.

In

France there were four Sud

t ion factories assigned to ai lframe

and construct ion and in Bourges D

took

o n t h e

responsibilityfor the ma

ture

of the outer

wing panels.

Other

facturers

in

Europe were also involv

creatingassemblies forConcorde;thu

pano Suiza,

once

famous for i ts

ca

received

the contract

for

the

manuf

o f t he

main undercarriage legs whi

nose undercarriage leg was designe

manufactured

by

Messier. Other, s

concerns

in

France also gained lu

contracts

for the

manufacture

of

BRITISH

AIRCRAFT

C OR PO RA TI ON A ER OS PA TI AL E

Electrics Hydraulics

Oxygen Flying

Conlrols

Fuel Navigation

Engine

instrumentation

Radio

Enginecontrols

Air conditioning supply

Fire

Airconditioningdistribution

De icing

Production was split as close to 50 50 as possible thereby reducing duplicatio

countr ieshad aproduction line

with

components movedbetween each

as

re

The items shownhereare thesectionsdestined forfatiguetesting.

BBA

C

while hisdeputy

was

Dr

Strangand

a third

appointee

was Etienne Escola

as

the

assis

tant

director

of

engineering.

Their

remit

was to make maximum usage of eachcom

pany s

management

structure by which

means i t

was

hoped anyproblemscould be

resolved quickly.To providesupport for

the

engineering

direct ora te R .S . Brown was

appointed

as the

production

manager, his

deputy beingAlfredAsse ot and

an

assistant

was also

appointed

George

Gedge

from

Britain.

Their

responsibilities weredefined

thus: Asselot would takecharge

of

produc

tion

issues inFrance

and

wasempowered

to

accept engineering

requirements

on behalf

of SudA via tionand G edge

would fulfil a

similar rolein Britain. Each

of

these mem

bers

of

the productioncommittee

wasably

supported

by

representatives

from

both

BAC and Sud A via tion. To ensure that

there

was

no

discrepancy

between the

British

and

the

French

organization it was

arranged for all

the

drawings

and

docu

m en ts t o

be dupli ca ted

b et we en t he

manufacturers, this would

act

as a fail-safe

COMPONENT

DESIGN I MANUFACTURE

07 irIntakes

BAC BAC - PresIon

08

Engine Bay

BAC BAC -

FilIon

09

roop

Nose

BAC BAC -

Hum

10

ose Fuselage BAC

BAC -

Weybridge

11

Forward usel ge BAC

BAC -

Weybridge

12 Intermediate Fuselage

BAC A·S Marignane

24

Rear Fuselage BAC

BAC -

Weybridge

26 Fin

BAC

BAC -

Weybridge

27 R ud der

BAC BAC - Weybridge

13 Forward Wing Aerospatiale

A-S - Bouguenais

14

Centre W ing Aerospatiale

A·S Marignane

15 entre Wing Aerospatiale

S Bouguenais

16

Centre

Wing Aeros patiale

A ·S - Toulouse

18

Centre Wing Aerospatiale

A -S -

Toulouse

20

Centre

Wing Aerospatiale

A·S

- SI

Naza;re

21 Outer Wing Aerospatiale

A -S -

Bourges

23

Elevans Aerospatiale

A ·S ouguenais

51

Main

landing

Gear

Hispano Messier

51 Nose Landing Gear

Hispano Messier

06

TRA Nozzles

SNECMA

Engines

Rolls·Royce

119711 LId.

he process up,

optimal

use was made

of

all

vailable test facilities, including

the ov-

rnment owned

l aborat or ies in

both

untries.

At the beginning

of

the

initial

manufacture process

SNECMA

manufac

ured

and

tested

certain

parts

o f t he

test

ngines. As

the

process

continued

the

workshare

meant

that

Rolls-Royce (Bris

I

carried

o ut 6 6

per cent o f the deve

pment

work whi le

SNECMA

would

rry

out

the

remainder.

Production

was

ivided

at 60

per

cent

for

the

British

com-

any

and40

for

the

French.

PRODUCTIONM NUF CTURE RE KDOWN M JOR ITEMS SYSTEMS RESPONSI ILITIES

I I

__

_

i

Ina similar

manner

to

the

oversight com

mittee, the manufacturers also formed a

mmittee

to

ov rs the

day-to-day engi

neering requirements.

Heading

thisorgani

zation was Lucien

Servanty

who

had

been

esignated as director

of

engineering

by

. ierre

Satre

from the oversight

committee

The Manufacturers

et

Together

c ~ : · :

1

FRENCH

Photographed alongsidethe

French prototypeConcorde

F WTSS

isthe secondDassault

Mirage

IV

Both would benefit

fromearl ierdevelopment

programmes.

BBAColecton

BELOW: This diagrambreaksdown

theproduction allotmentsforthe

manufacturing partners. Although

production aircraft were

reputedlybuilt inj igs with little

variation investigations after the

Pariscrash showed thateach

airframewas virtually handbuilt.

thereforeall differ.Sections

2 2 1

and

2 1

areextrafuselage

sectionsfor pressure testing.

BBA

Colecton

Concorde wasmainly

constructed fromaluminium as

thisdiagramreveals.Othercon-

structionmaterials used included

steel titanium and resin formed

fairings.

BBAColecton

r ~ R I T I S

Ii :

RESIN BONDED

GLASS FIBRE

rr

STEEL

ROLLED ALUMINIUM

o

ALLOY

28

29



DESIGN AND

DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN

AND DEVELOPMENT

simulation was

not

carried

out

w ith

instead an especially modified Can

bomber, WV787 f le w in f r on t of the

c a n, d is ch a rg ing its icy c a rg o f ro m a

rig

mounted under the

rear fuselage.

To reinforce the fact that Concor

regarded as a p r es tig iou s p r oje ct in

Britain and Fr an ce , a n e x te n siv e f a

testing programme was instituted fro

o u ts e t. To th is e n d a c o mp le te n os e a n

w ar d f us elag e s e ction , s o me 7 0f t 2 1

le ng th, w as d e liv er e d f or te sting . An

.

C> >

Addit ional equipment mounted

in t hi s

spaceincluded an independent fuel system

which would feed the test engine only. The

r e as o n f or th is w as

that

an accurate, com-

plete record

of

fuel consumption was need

e d t o

evaluatethe

performance

of t he

pow

erplant under a ll a s pe c ts o f t he flight

envelope.

Another

modification to XA903

was the complete delet ion

o f t h e

bomb

aimer s blister

under the

nose.

Mounted

in

its p la ce was a w at er spr ay rig which

allowed rainstorms to b e s imu la te d . I c in g

~ n g i n e plusits augmenter assembly, it was

returned to the Sa cla y te stin g f a cility in

rance. Here during A pr i l 1 96 7 i t u nd er

went further high altitudesimulation trials

whichcovered allaspects

of

engine behav-

iour. As

the

ground testingwas proceeding

a ir ly s m o o th ly, itw a s tim e f or a ir bo r n e tr i

als to begin. The aircraft chosen f or th e se

was

that

Farnborough stalwart

the

Vulcan

XA903. This

veteran w as Fine d w ith a

half nacelle complete with powerplant

and a u xiliar y s ys tem s in the bomb-bay.

RIGHT Heavilymodified Canberra WV787

was

used

by

the

RAE

and the A AEEfor i c ingtr ia ls .Ther igat

therear ofthe fuselage was used tospraywater at

the prototypes; depending on thealti tude,spray

came outeither as water orice.

BBAColecton

ABOVE Havingcompleted the in itial fl ighttr ials for

theOlympusengine, Vulcantest bedXA9 3 was

modi f iedto carrya waterspray r ig inplaceof the

bomb aimer s blister

on

thenoseto simulatefoul

weather.

BBA

Colecton

been id e ntif ie d f or c los e r in v es tiga tion .

These

included

the

electrics which were

undergoing

rapid

modification

at least

thirty changes b e ing p r op o se d in J a nu a r y

1966. The i nt ak es w er e d el ay ed u nt il

May-June [967instead

of

February, these

having

been modified by altering the

intake honeycomb

s t ru ct u re w h ic h r e

quiredfurther testing. The changes t o t he

intake l ip s a lso r e s ulte d in al terat ions to

t he engi ne

nacelle assemblies, which in

turn a ls o r eq ui r ed f re sh t e st i ng . E ve n i f

the airframe had been almost r e ad y a f ur

ther hol d up involving t he o n bo ar d

escape

hatch

m echan i sm and i ts b la st

s h ield h a d

not

been c lea r ed . A s imila r s it

uation a lso a r os e concerning the p i l o t ~

personal safety equipment which urgent-

ly needed test ing

and

clearing for flying.

Yet another problem regarding

the

crew

related t o t hei r

seats

which

werefound

to

be

uncom for tab le and needed

a d ra s ti c

redesign,

not

only for the prototype trials

but alsofor

the

production aircraft.

Running

in parallelwith

the

airframe was

deve lopment of t he p ow er pl an tj t hu s i n

November 1 96 5 a bench test e n gin e, a n

Olympus 593B Big)engine,began testrun

ning

at

Filton. By

June [966

a

development

O ly mp u s 5 93 p o we r pla nt, complete with

variablegeometry exhaustassembly, under

t oo k i ts f ir st bench test runs at Melun

V illa ro c he in Fr an ce .

With

the successful

completion o f t h e initial ground runs, the

w ho le a ss em bl y w as t ra ns fe rr ed t o the

NationalGas Turbine Establishment at Pye

s toc k in En gla nd w h er e it w as s u bje cte d

to

extensivetestingin the high-altitude testing

f ac il it y. A ft e r e xt en si ve t es ti ng of the

AvroVulcan

B l

XA9 3 neverentered service

with

the

RAF

being used for trials

throughout its working life. Thisfront-on view showsthe bomber with a Concorde

partnacellecomplete

with

Olympus engine underthe bomb-bay.

BBA

Colecton

the construct ion

jigs,

the remainderof the

airframe sections weredelivered on sched-

u le, s o

that

by March 1966 the first proto

ty pe w as complete enough to a llo w static

and

thermal

testing

to

be undertaken. [n

April final construction and

fitting

o ut o f

prototype Concorde 0 0 I b eg a n at Toulouse,

a nd a t Filton

the

final assembly

of Con-

corde prototype 002began inAugust. Even

though the

SST

had progressed farbeyond

a p a pe r e x er c is e certain a r ea s h a d a lre a dy

Photographed at a n SBAC Farnboroughshow,this Concorde model defined the end of

theresearch programme andthe startofthe manufacturingprogramme.

BBAColecton

c o ntr o ls , n a vig a tio n s ys tem components

hydraulic valves and jacks, communica-

tions components and parts of t he air-con

ditioning system. In Britain the remainder

of t he

system items were manufactured by

s u ch c o m pa n ies a s N o r ma la ir

Garrett and

Dunlop. All assemblies and sub-assemblies

were then

fed

into a production line, one

p e r c o un try ; h ow e ve r , s u ch w as the plan

ning

a lr ea dy i n p la ce

t hat t here

was

no

duplication of production in eithercountry.

G i ven t he

w ay i n w hich each aircraft

industry

approached certain

aspects

of

design,

development and manufacture

it

is

hardly surprising thar there were incompat

ibilities between the parts of the organiza

tion.

O neof

the majordifferenceswas in the

system

of measurements

since France used

the metric system and Britain used imperial

measurements. After a s e rie s

of

meetings

conversion tables were eventuallydrawn up

that

s a tis fie d b o th p a rties , a n d, h a vin g s e t

tledthis difference, construction ofthe first

prototypescould begin. First metal for

the

Anglo French SST prototypes was

cut

in

A pr il 1 96 5 i n

both

Britain and France.

With

manufacture well

under

way,

the

cons t ruc ti on of t he major sub-assemblies

proceeded rapidly, which allowed

the

first

sectionto bedeliveredto

CEAT

inToulouse

in

October. After the

first

combined

wing/

centre fuselage section had been p lac e d in

30

37



ESIGN

N EVELOPMENT

ESIGN N EVELOPMENT

Trubshaw

as

chief testpilot, John Coc

co-pilot) and Brian Wa tt s f ligh t

neer). Also on board acting in the r

observers were M.R. Addeley, J.e. A

and

PA.

Holding. As with the French

totype flight,

the

British prototype w

round ), madeits maiden flight,although in

this instance it was not without incident

as

the No.4 engine initially failed to l ight up

correctly. After an enginerestart the aircraft

finally left the runway at Filton at 14:24

localtime. The crewforthis flight was Brian

This

unusual angle

of

Concorde

F-WTSS

reveals clearly

the

subtle curvesthat define

the

ogee

wing. The

box-like

objects on the outer wing arecovers forthe

outboard

PFCUs. BBA Collection

The FrenchConcorde prototype F-WTSS, departing Le

Bourget

on atest flight.

CP

Russell Smith Collection

Andre

Turcat

Famed for being the

Sud Aviation

test

pilot for the

first Concorde flight, Andre Turcatwas born

in

Mar

seilles on

23

October 1921.

the

son of a

noted vehi

cle

manufacturer.

He

undertook the latter part

ofhis

education

at

the Ecole Polytechnique from where he

graduated in

1942.

Three

years latertheyoung

Turcat

enlisted in the

post-warFrench

Air

Force, earning his

navigators wing

by

June 1947

and

hispilots wings

the

following

month.

His

t ime with the

Armee

de

Aire was

spent flying Douglas DC-3

Dakota aircraft

as part

of

the Touraineand Anjou operations groups.

Much of his flying was undertaken

in

Indochina dur

ing

thewar there. In December

1950

Turcat

was

sec

onded

to

the

FlightTest

Centre,

this

being followed

by

his

assuming command

of

the Test Navigator

School. Turcat

finished his t ime with theFrench

Air

Force

in

late 1953,

then joined

theaircraftmanufac

turer SFECMAS later

to

be absorbed by Nord Avia

tion.

With

both

companies

he

was the Assistant

Director

of Flight

Testing, being

promoted to Chief

Test

Pilot

not

long

afterwards. Oneof

his

first duties

was

to

test fly the

NORD

1402Gerfaut Ion 15 Janu

ary1954, in which he became the first European

pilot

to exceed the

sound

barrier

in

level

flight on 3

August.

This aircraft

would later

be modified

to the

Gerfaut 1

andbe flown

by

Turcat

supersonically in

level

flight

on

11 February

1955.

Following

on f rom the

Gerfaut,

he

test-piloted

the

Griffon Ion 16

February 1957

from

Melun-Villaroche.

This version of theGriffon wassuperseded

by

the

Mk.lI

which Turcat piloted

supersonically

using

the

built-in

ramjet o n 1 7 M ay . Afurther test

flight

of the Griffon

Mk1I on 27

October

1958was made

at

Mach 205,

with

a combination

of the

jet

engine andramjet. Andre

Tur

cat

set a

world

closed circuit

record

on

25 February

1959

for a maximum speed of l,020mph l,640km/hj

This was followed

by

a ceremony

on

11

December

when

he was awarded

the International

Harmon

Tro

phy by Vice-President Nixon for service to aviation.

In 1962 TurcatjoinedSud

Aviation

where he

took

part

in

the developmentflying of an autopilotsystem,

using

a

Learjet

and a

Caravelle

as testbeds. O n 2 7

September 1962

Turcat,

in

company with co-pilot

Max Fischl, made

an

automatic landing using the

Caravelle

testbed;

this

was followed by three

further

landings in

zero

visibility on 5

March 1963.

On

1September 1964

he

wasnamed as

Sud

Avia

tions Flight Test Director,

beingheavily

involved from

this t ime

onwards

with

the development of

Con

corde,also

known

asthe ransporte uper onique

TSSI. Turcat

was in

command when thefirst proto

type

Concorde

001

made itsmaiden flight

on

2

March

1969 in

the

presence

of

over

400

from the media,

Invited

VIPs and an audience

ofmillions.

He wasalso

n command on

30 June 1973

when an especially

quipped Concorde outfitted

for astronomical pur

poses carried seven scientists, following

an

eclipse

thesun for

74min

overMauritania.

Turcat

retired

in March

1976, although his involve

mentwith Concorde

was

notcompletely

over since

in

1987 he was instrumental in a successful attempt to

preservethe first

Concorde 001

prototype from the

rap heap.

cancel it very difficult. In

the

end howev-

er,

thegovernment

acquiesced.

On I I December 1967 the first French

built Concorde prototype 001, F-WTSS

was shown to an audience of

the

press, dig

nitaries

and

staff from

the

manufacturers

just before

the

start

of

its flight trials. The

British-built prototype, Concorde 002 G

BSST, appeared in publicduring September

1968, although it had already undertaken

extensive taxi tria ls at Filton before then.

Once

both prototypes had made

their

bow

they began intensive tria ls involving the

engines, brakes and flight controls. To gain

the most from these, both Concordes were

taxied up and down the runways at their

own ailfields, thus Filton and

ToulOLlSe

reverberated t o t he Olympus engines while

the flight test crews proved the validity of

the aircraft systems. Both machines would

pass these trials successfully, which would

allow

the

French prototypeto beclearedfor

its maiden flight

at the end of

February

1969. Proudly wearing the registration F

WTSS the French initials for supersonic

transport, Concorde 00 I taxied out to the

end

of

the Toulouse runway

on

the after

noon

of

2 March. The crewfor this historic

flight was Andre Turcat as chief test pilot,

the o th er s b eing Jacques Guigna rd co

pilo t), Henri Perrier flight engineer) and

Michael Retif flight testengineer).Taking

their

positionsalongside

the

prototypewere

an especially modified Gloster Meteor

NEll from CEV-Bretigny for use as an

observation aircraft and a Morane Saulnier

Par is , which was to be u sed as the photo

graphic chase plane to record for posterity

and

evaluation

the

stages

of the

flight.

Once

cleared for take-off, the throttles were

advanced to full normal power before being

pushed through the gate toallow the thrust

augmenters to kick in to full reheat power.

After all

the

gauges had been checked and

cleared the brakes were released and the

Concorde began to rol l down the runway.

At 15:38 local time the nose-wheel left the

ground and Concorde 001climbed smooth

ly

into

the

sky. Forthis firstflight

the

under

carriage was left in the down and locked

position. ven with thi s r es tr ic tion thi s

maiden flight, a ll 29min of it, proceeded

smoothly before the aircraft turned and

l in ed up for a pel f ec t l anding .

On

touch

down the

tailbrake parachute was deployed

to s low i tdown and reduce the loading on

the brakes.

iv weeks later, on 9 April, the British

prototype Concorde 002, with

the

registra

tion

G-BSST t o

some

the

r ight way

To f i t thi s extension in, much of t he extra

length was accommodated forward o f t h e

wing, while

the

remainder was gained by

moving

the

aft pressurebulkheadfurther

to

the rear. These changes would allow the

passenger compartment t o c ar ry 1 28 .

Other changes allowed for the inclusion

of

an

extra passengerdoor closeto the leading

edge

o f t he

wing and

t he cabin

windows

werereducedin size

sl

ightly tocomply with

American Federal Aviation Authority reg

ulations. The first appearance

of

this

updated Concorde was at Filton

on

17

December 1971 when

the

British-built

Concorde

02 was rolled

out t o

public view

I t was during 1971 t ha t t he first Royal

approaches were made by t he Comman

dant

ofthe Royal Flighton behalf

of

Prince

Phillip, who had expressed

an

in terest in

f ly ing in

one of the

prototypes.

This

request was

viewed

with some

trepidation

by the government who were about t o

undertake a review

of

the project that year

and were worried

that

a good in te rview

from

the

Prince might make any

at temptto

With a protective cover over the

pitot

head, and neither engines

nor

PFCUs fitted,

Concorde 2

is

rolledout

at

Filton. J A

Todd

Collection

viaLee Howard

part Concorde airframewas alsoconstructed

at Filton during late 1966, although itspur

pose was morecosmetic in nature. Itconsist

ed of a cabin and flightdeck mock-up which

became available for inspectionfrom Febru

ary 1967. It would soonhave positiveresults

as sixteen airlines would express an interest

in the purchase of up to sixty-sevenaircraft.

Behold, th e

Prototypes

The prototype Concordes 001 and

2

were regardedfrom

the

outset as trials and

evaluation airframes only

and

thus further

changes

were

undertaken

a s new

and

dif

ferent requirements c ame t o t he fore. In

May 1966 a revised fuselage was unveiled

for

the

preproduction Concorde airframes.

I n t hi s v er si on

the

fuselage had

been

extended

by a f ur th er 8 .5 ft 2 .6m) and

other modifications included a redesigned

one-piece visor and a fuselage step which

replaced the earlier two-piece assembly

and periscope to give improved visibility.

32

33



--JJr ~ : - - = :

_

DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN ND Di VELOPMENT

l

trials. Design calculations extensive com-

puter analyses

wind-tunnel

testing

and

sim-

ulatorflying would provide the data needed

to create Concorde.

At

least

the

pilots were

spared

the

ordeal

of

learningto steer

the

air-

craft y using a strange modified road vehi-

cle

that

had been employed during

the

de

Havilland

Comet

programme.

The

final

stage

of

these trials was

the comprehensive

series of flight tests that would eventually

clear

the

aircraftforgeneral usage. Eventhis

stage was subject to

the

usual round

of

inter-

national wrangling. However after many

meetings an in-depth flight test schedule

w s hammered

out

which was acceptable

to

both BAC

a nd S ud

Aviation

and

their respective aviation authorities. This

a

RGHT Concorde

G-BSST generates

the

usual

pollution

as

itliftsoff

from

RAF Fairford.

To

allow

for improved airflow and cooling the intake

auxiliary

doors

are fully extended. B B A C ol ec ton

BELOW: An

excitedgathering

o fp re ss,g u e sts

and

officials watch

as Concorde

prototype G-BSST

lands

at Fairford

at

the completion of its maiden

flight B B A C Ol ec ton

Brian Trubshaw

Bornon29 January 1924.ErnestBran

Trubshawwas

educated

atWinchesterbeforejoining the RAF in1942.

Hs

pilot training

was

undertaken

in

the

USA where

he trained on Boeing Stearman biplanes. After con

version training. Trubshaw

joined

BomberCommand

in

1944 where he flew

Stirlngs

and Lancasters.

After

a

tour

with the

Command.he transfered to

Transport

Command.His f y i ng s ki s

were

rated as

excepton

al.

which

led

to

h s b ei ng

transferred

t o t he K n gs

Flght in 1946.

After that,Trubshaw began teaching

at

the

Empre

Fyng Schoo

and

the RAF F y n g

Colege from

1949

to1950. He was almost

sent

to

Malaya asone of

only

two RAF piots who also

had

helcopter experence.

However,

this

movewas canceled

and

he was given

permissionto leave the RAF to become

a

testpilot for

Vlckers-Armstrongs,where he remained for 30

years,

becoming chieftest

pilot in

1960

and Director of Test

Fyng f rom 1966. Trubshawworked on the develop

m ent of

the

Valant V-bomber. the Vanguard civilian

transport. the VC 1

and the BAC-111, al

of

which he

test-flew. His

coolness in savng Britain s prototype

VC-l0 from disaster

o n a n eary

testflight w on h m

t he Derry

and

Richards Memorial

Medal

for out

standing test fying contributing

to

t headvance of

aviation in 1965:

structural faiure

had been

threat

ened

when an

elevator

secton

broke

loose and the

aircraft shook as

though

the tai

was

shakng

the

dog.

D ue t o

the excessive vibration caused

by

the

elevator

faiure, Trubshaw couldnot readthe

instru

ments, butbroadcastthe aircrafts behaviourback to

base

in

casehe could not return

the aircraft

to Wey

brdge; he

thenmanaged

to

land with

only

half the

elevator

control

functoning. He later descrbed this

manoeuvre as o ne o f

my

trickier moments , Three

years earler Trubshaw had beenawarded thesame

m eda f orhiswork in

the

eary

1950s

on

the Valant

jet bomber.

on which he tested

the delvery system

for Britain s first

nuclear

bomb,the 1O OOOlb 4,500kg)

lueDanube In 1985, on the

eve

of his retrement,

he revealedthat, while

flying aValant

V-bomber, he

had

been

compeledt o drop

a

concret ereplca of t he

weapon

into theThames

estuary to sa ve

the aircraft

from crashing.

Concordewas the aircraft that

would

propel Bran

Trubshaw

into

the

publc

eye when he f irst f lew it in

Apri 1969f rom Fit ont ot he

test

base

at

RAF Fairford.

After the Concorde

development programme he

moved

to

become the divisional director

and

general

manager of t he F i t on w o rk s o f Britsh Aerospace

from1980

to

1986. From 1986to1993 he was

a

mem

b er o f t h e b o ar d o f t he C iv

Aviaton Authority

and

worked a sa n

aviaton

consultant.

He

was awarded

the

OBE in

1964, the

CBE

in 1970

and

the

French

Aeronautcal

Medal in 1976.

On 25

March 2001 Trubshawdied peacefuly in hs

s le ep a t h s h om e n ea r

Tetbury,

Gloucestershire.

Commentng

uponthe Concordecrash,

he

would

say,

Ihavenever heard

somuch bloody

rubbish

in my

life,

Concorde

is

the safestai rcraft I

have

flown.

Let

that

be hs epitaph.

001 the British Concorde would use a tail

brake parachute to slow

the

aircraft down.

Even

though both

prototype flight tests

were the more reportable eventsfor the avi-

ation press they were

the

culmination

of

many mon th s o f

actual

and

theoretical

also make its maiden flight with its under-

carriage down

and

locked.

Only oneo ther

minor

problem would plague this flight: a

malfunction on both radioaltimeters on the

approach a l though the landing was com-

pleted

without

fur th er inc id en t. As with

Touchdown for

the

British

Concorde

prototype

at

Fairford after its

maiden

flight

The subtle blending of the wing a n d th e prominenttai l bumper is clearly shown. BBA

C ol ec ton

The internal

face

of

the

forward

e scap e h a tch in th e

prototype

Concorde.

Attached

to

the

door is a rope ladder to assist in

escape

in

an emergency.

B B A C ol ec ton

34

35



DESIGN N EVELOPMENT

DESIGN N EVELOPMENT

. . . . .

i

On thegroundat Fairford arethreeprototypeand preproductionConcordeairframes: on thelef t i s 1 on ther ight i s

2

inthe centre isConcorde 1 BBAC

The primaryescortfor Concorde atthe startandthe endof itsfl ights was this Canberra. on detachmentfrom the FarnboroughAero Flight. BBA Colecton

Withits nose partlylowered and thevisor fully retracted. theBritishConcorde prototype landsat Fairford. Prominent on thefin arethefair ingsfor therudder

PFCUs

BBA

Colecton

BELOW:

One

ofthe safetyprecautions fitted to

Concorde G·BSST

was

atail chute to assistin

braking.By thetimethe productionaircraftwere

builtthisfeaturehad been deleted.

BBA

Colecton

The final agreement

on

the flight-test

s ch edule was comple ted in Janua ry 1969

and covered some 1,935hr for develop

ment

flying, 795 wereallocated forcertifi

cation

flying

and

a further 1 ,500wereallo

cated for rou te proving amI

endurance

flying. T o c ov er t he se 4 2 30 flight test

hours i t w as established

that

seven air

craft

were

n ee de d t o c om pl et e t he

pro

gramme in a reasonable time. To cover

this workload would require the use of

both

prototypes

t he t wo preproduct i on

aircraft and t hree of the early production

aircraft. The plan was

that

supersonic

f ligh t wou ld be

achieved

y mid 1969,

with t he M ac h 2 point being slated for

p as si ng in e ar ly 1 97 0. If al l proceeded

LEIT Thisdramatic nose-on shotof Concordereveals

thelocationofthe nose chinesand thecomplex

shapeof thewing.At theextremenose end i sapi tot

head with afull range ofsensorsfitted. BBAColecton

Flight Tests

schedulewasdividedinto threedistinct sec

tions, although there were overlaps.

The

first would cover flight development and

wasfollowed y certification andendurance

flying.

The

first phasewasessentiallyaimed

at developing the aircraft s complete flight

envelope to ensure that Concorde would

perform s predicted.

Any

problems identi

fied during this sequence of flights would

have to be rectified y modification before

the

wholeregime was undergone

once

more

during the certification process.

36

37



DESIGN

ND DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN NI

DEVELOPMENT

been borne

out

by further flight

Another

modification

that

was intr

i nt o t he flight control system was

shaker

that

becameoperativeshould

craFtstart toapproach

the

sta

II

Th is

a

had been seen as a necessary requi

since Concorde h ad a h ig h s in k ra te

waspossiblefor

the

crewto overreact

rect this behaviour which in tUIll

Unliketheproduction Concordefleet,the pilot s panel on prototypeG-BSSTwas

comparativelybaresince thenumberof engine gaugeswas keptto aminimum.

The view is dominated

by

themovingmapdisplay.

BBA Colecton

TheprototypeConcorde was

well

equipped

with

communicationsequipment, as the

contentsof thisrack reveal.Somewere purelyfor contactuse, otherequipmentwas

usedfor telemetrypurposes.

BBA Colecton

smoother

throughoutthe entire speedrange

while its behaviourafter a simulatedengine

failure was also better than expected. Curing

the

flutter

of

the e1evons was seen

as

para-

mount

and thereforethe gear ratio initially

set at I 1 in pitch was altered to 0:2for the

preproduction machines and again to

0 7:1

for production build aircraft since 0:2 was

seen as rather conservative aresult that had

For such a hi-tech aircraft,someof theescape

measures lookdecidedlyprimitive as thisrope

ladder

by

theescapehatchshows.

BBA Colecton

Although the

British

government

was

indulging

in itsusual

interference the

exe-

cution

o f t he

flight test schedule carried

on

apace

even though

Sud

Aviation

had

been

absorbed by Aerosparialc

alongwith

Nord and SEREB in January 1970 In

France

the

flight test schedule was

under

the jurisdiction o f t he

test

pilot Andre

Turcat and in Britain Brian Trubshaw ful-

filled

the

same role. Communication

between the two a nd t he ir staffs would

ensure

that

there was

no duplication of

effort and so the Frenchteam concentrated

on

developing the flight envelope and the

British focused

on the

performance

ofCon-

corde but e ven so there were areas where

there were inevitableoverlaps.

Not

long after

the Concorde

flight test

programmehad begun a few problems were

identified.

lllese

concerned the variable

geometry intakes a ndthe slightflutter

of

the

control surfaces. Many

of

thesesurfaced dur-

ing the initial flights of prototype 01

F-

WTSS; this aircraft a nd t he British proto-

typestarted to give cause

For

concern since

they were to different buildstandards

than

the Following preproduction and production

aircraft. A lthough the in takes and control

sLilfaces were troublesome there had been

good news since the dragcoefficient ofCon-

corde had been overestimated and thus the

aircraft was able

to

t ra ve l f as te r w it h a

reduced kinetic heat signature. Handling

was a ls o b et te r

than

predicted being

now no

one is

preciselysure why this came

about especially as assurances

had

been

given concerning noise and pollution out-

puts although

the

aircraFt industrywas seen

as

the

prime suspect.

These

enForced delays

would mean that Concorde would not

enter

revenue earning service until

1976

three

years later

than planned.

and

environmental

issues came to

the

Fore

Th e

Former were due to

the

British govern-

ment

which had becomeopenly hostile to

the Concorde programme while the latter

was d ue to an American environmentalis t

and

his supporters

who

began a vociFerous

campaign to

stopConcorde

flights

in to the

USA

a nd t o N ew York in particular. Even

ABOVE: Attached to atug andsurrounded by escorting vehicles, British Concorde prototype

G-BSSTistowed outfor anothertestfl ight. Because

it

had been standingfor atime,the

fl ightcontrolhydraulicpressureshaddissipated allowing thesurfaces to droop.

BBA

Colecton

without incident ai rl ine services

were

scheduledto being by

the

end

of

1973 The

reality would see supersonic speed being

achieved

by

Concorde 00

l

on

I

October

1969 md Mach 2 achieved by the same air-

craFt

on

4

November 1970

UnFortunately

the

most vital area

t ha t o f

airline sales

would

h av e t o endure

delays as political

RIGHT

On

board Concorde

002

are Brian Trubshaw

chiefBritishtestpi lot) on theright andAndreTur

cat on theleft. NotetheCanberrachase aircraft in

the background.

J A Todd Colecton va Lee Howard

ABOVE:

To allow

forexternalairframe checksofthe

prototypeConcorde a periscope was fi tted. Note the

cable looms aroundthis installation.

BBA Colecton

38

39



DESIGN N

EVELOPMENT

40

OPPOSITE PAGE

TOPLEfT

The co pilotposition inthe prototype

Concorde wasa testposition unlikethat inhis

commercialcounterpart. In this view thesteering

handle dominatestheside panel. BBA

Colecton

TOPRIGHr

The

view

outof thevisor

on

the prototype

Concorde was limited as this photographshows.

The commercial aircrafthad much improved vision.

BBAColecton

BOTTOM LEfT

Duringthefl ight tr ialsa small passenger

cabinareawas createdat therear ofthe fuselage.

Itwas used both to

trial

types ofseatand fitment

and to transport

VIP

guests. BBA

Colecton

BOTTOMRIGHr As testarticlesthe Concorde

prototypeswere moreconcerned with recording

performancedata than theprovision ofpassenger

facilities hencethe flight data recordersystem

occupiedmuch ofthe cabinspace. BBAColecton

induce stall.

The

stickshakerwouldcome

in to p la y ifa n a ng le

of attack of

17 degrees

were reached while at the 20 degree point

the s tic k s h ak e r wou ld inc rea se its o u tp u t.

Since

thiswasquiteviolentit was impossible

for the crew to ignoreand therefore the only

way to re du c e

the output

required

the

crew

to ta ke a c tio n. To a s s is t the

c re w in fu rth er

ha ndling C onc or de an auto-stabilization

package was developed

that

was also inte

grated i n to t h e autopilot system.

With the e le von

fluttertrials

under

way

i t w as

time

to

integrate the behaviour of

the

intakes an d t he flighl-test schedule

under

several flight

conditions. Running

them side by sidewas seen asessential

si

nce

incorrect

interaction

between

the

airframe

a nd t he

nacelles

could

g ive ris e

to

safety

and economic iss ue s. To in du c e flutte r in

the e le vons thr e e

types

of

inducer werefit

ted: the firstwas an electrically driven stick

e x citer while la ter a mechanical system

w as i ns ta ll ed . A f in al

exciter

u se d with

oncorde was

the

interestingly named

bonkers .

These

w er e s ma ll e xp lo si ve

charges

that

could be set offin sequence to

in du c e a

sudden deflection o f t h e control

surface; in this flight-test

pr ogra m me the y

w er e u se d d ur in g t he t ra ns on ic flight

re gime . All

the

activity ge ne ra te d dur ing

th e se flig hts was re co rde d

on e lec tr om a g-

netic tape for lateranalysis

o n t h e

ground.

During September 1970

a

further

series

of

te s t flig hts b e ga n . T hese concent rated

n

the

effects

o f t he

s o ni c b o om s h oc k -

wave

o n p e op l e a n d

buildings

and

required

fifty flights to be undertaken.

These

were

flown

along

a

route that

later

got the

nick-

DESIGN N EVELOPMENT

name

of

Boom Alley . Using

Concorde

002 ea c h s or tie de par te d

Fairford before

turning cast; after this the aircraft turned

north

accelerating all

the

t i me u n ti l

the

required speedwas

reached. At t he north-

ern

tip

of

Scotl andC oncorde t hen turned

southwards

to

pass

down the

west coast

of

4

ABOVE Concorde prototype G BS

seenhere with everythingretra

including the visor. The numero

differently coloured patches

underneaththe aircraft are

clearly visible. BBAColecton

LEfT located

i nthis rack are ma

theblack boxes containing

navigational equipment. In the

productionairframesall these w

replaced bythree INSsystems.

BBA

Colecton

Britain

at

supersonic speed.

Once

a

of

Fairford speed wasreduced

and th

craft turned towards the a irfield for

i ng . I n a ll these flights revealed

t h

general over-pressure levels were far

than

ha d be e n e xpe cte d a lthough

complaints about

noisewere receive



DESIGN NDDEVELOPMENT DESIGN ND DEVELOPMENT

With anti-FOD air intake guards in place. Concorde

002

hasits wheels and

tyres inspected. Thelegfair ing isfixed tothe legandthus moves

with

it.

This view alsoshowsthe torque links between themain casting andthebogi

J.A. Todd Colecton via Lee Howard

AMP A S S E M ~ B

£ ± S - ~ t = = = F '

I : f ~ ~ - - - - _ Lo o

I PRIMARYNOZZLEIFFUSERHOCKPATTERN

Diagramshowingthe

two

primaryoperating modesof theOlympusengine as fi ttedto

Concorde.Theupper i l lustratestheaircraft inlow-speedfl ight,

while

the lower isthe

configuration forsupersoniccruise.

bothcasesthe rampscontrol theentryof air to

the engines.

BBA

Colecton

; : ~ I ~ : ~ = o

. i> ,

J

l

B OU ND AR Y L AY ER B L EE D A UX IL IA RY D O OR Y COOLINGDOOR

One

ofthe extra escape routesin theprototype Concordewas this

hatch atthe rearofthe cabin. Thisfeature

would

havebeen incorporated

inproduction machines asan air-stair,had the French medium-range

design gone ahead.

BBAColecton

as part

of

t hehot and high trialssequence.

A successful completion

of

this segment

would lead to a

demonstration

t ou r t o

South America

in September. In

contrast

with the fortunes of 001 prototype 002

departed from Fairford in]une 1972for an

extensive sales tourof

the

Middle and Far

Eas t p lu s a s id e t r ip to Aus tra li a .

Support

services were provided by

the

Royal

Air

Force since they had the only aircraftlarge

enough tocover the logistics requirement.

On both demonstrat ion tours presenta-

tions were made to

the

interested parties

from

the

a ir line s wh o were t rea ted to

speeds ofMach 2 on a regular basis.

Althoughboth Concorde prototypeshad

contributed extensively t o t he initial stages

of

the SST development programme they

were

not

representative

of t he

preproduc-

t ion norproduction

aircraft. In

the

light

of

th is it was decided to retire both aircraft

from operational test flying.

The

f ir st to

shutdown its engines for the last time was

Brian Trubshawphotographed outsideone of

the prototypeConcordes.

BBAColecton

U p t o

this

point

in

the

flight test pro-

gramme nei therofthe prototypeshad man-

aged to break through the Mach 2 barrier.

The first

attempt

t odo so was undertaken

on 4

November

1970

when

Trubshaw

aboard

Concorde

002 pushed

the throttles

asfar forward

as

theywould go. Even

as

the

SST accelerated the speed run had to be

aborted as a fire warninglight cameon for

No.2 engine, al though th is was b e t rac ed

to a hot a ir gas l eak. I n

contrast, the

French prototype airborne

on

a s imi lar

mission would

manageto

pass

throughthe

barrier with Turcat as pilot. The British

team finally claimedsuccesswith their air-

craft

on

2November.

By January 1971

t he Concorde

pro-

gramme had achieved 100supersonic test

flights although not without a few i nc i-

dents. On 27 January

Concorde

0 01 was

airborne undertaking deliberate power-

plant

surge testing in

the Mach

2 region

of

the

fl

ightenvelope. Duringa recycle ofthe

reheat/augmentersystem theengineover-

speed switch

on

No.3 engine malfunc-

tioned causing

the

Olympus to overspeed

and

surge.

Since

this was

oneof

a pair

the

next -door engine No.4 also began to

surge. Such were the forces inducedby this

reaction

that

the front rampdrive coupling

failed this being followed by theramp tear-

ingfree with partsentering the enginecom-

pressor faces and causingdamage to both.

Once the situation regarding the starboard

engines hadbeen stabilized Concorde was

turned

towards Fairford where a gentle

landing was carried out. Inspection

of t he

r i gh t -hand engine

group

and n ac el le

revealed that No. 3 eng in e h ad suffered

extensive damage, al though the strength

of t heengineand the design

ofthe

nacelle

assembly explosion blankets had ensured

that

the

aircraft itself

had

suffered only

minor damage.

As the aircraftwas needed to cont inue

the test programme the engines and ramp

control sys te ms were q uick ly rep la ce d

while repairs were carried

out

to

the

air-

frame

and

nacelle; thiswould allow001

to

undertake its first intercontinental flight

to Dak ar in West Africa a t t heend

of

May

BonOM: Photographed on the flight deckof the

prototypeConcorde areBrianTrubshaw left

and

Roy

Radford right .

BBAColecton

-

\\

-

42 43



DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

DESIGN

AND DEVELOPMENT

The crew seats inthe

developmentConcord

were

partofthe airfra

unlikethosein theTu

whichwere ejectable

Notethemic-tel ando

connectorsclearlyvi

on

the engineer s sea

Helo

Coelho

BELOW: Theaborted BA

TSR.2 providedone im

elementto theConco

programme:the rehea

Olympus engine.

BBA Colecton

w as r ate d w ith a s lig htly h igh e r th r

put. When

Concorde underwent

frame redesigna similar exercisewas

taken

by

Bristol Engines which r

in the appearance

of

the Olympu

dimensionally slightlylargerall roun

in cr e a se in s iz e le d

to an ex traga in

t hr us t o u tp ut w hi ch w as in cr e a

32,0001b

142kN , and th rus t

aug

tion

ourput

with l im ir e d r eh e<

increased

to

35,0001b

156kN .

d es ign c o ntr a cts w er e g r an ted in 1

called for the provision

of

engines

pressure stage.

This

wouldallow

the

pressure

r at io t o r emain a t

12:

I but increase the

mass air flow

into

the engine. Other mod-

ifications were made to

the powerplant

cooling

layout,

which

were

needed

to

compensate for the increased operating

temperature. A II these modifications result

e d in

theappearance oftheOlympus

593 D

which was intended

as

the development

standardengine.

Only

two

of

these power

plants were constructed for ground testing,

the

f irs tw o u ld h a ve a

thrustoutput

rated

at

28,1001b

l25kN

while the second engine

a L-anberra bombertestbedduring 1952. In

i ts o r ig ina l f or m

the

e ng i ne w as r at ed a t

11,0001b 49kN d ry t hr us t, a lt ho ug h a

series of steps saw the final unreheated ver

sion, the Mk.30101 ECU fitted in the Vul

can B 2 bomber,

r un ni ng a t a n o ut pu t o f

20,0001b 89kN . I t w as the development

potential of thisrobustengine for usc in the

TSR2

strike aircraft

that

led to its s e le c tio n

forConcorde.

TheTSR2

engine, rheOlym

pus Mk.22R was rated at 30,61 Olb 136kN

dry thrust and 33,0001b

l47kN

reheated.

Although

thisoutstandingaircraft was

can-

celled through alleged extensive cost over

runs and governmental decision, the princi

ple

o f t he

r e he a te d O lym p us e n gin e h a d

been successfully established. Given this

success, it was no surprise thatthe company

c ho se t hi s e ng in e f or Concorde. Bristol,

l at er R ol ls -R oy ce , i ni ti al ly c on s tr uc t ed

someOlympus 22R and 301 powerplants

for

u se in f ull-s ca le development tes ts , th es e

beingfollowed by

the

Olympus 593engines.

Once the 5 93 h a d u n d e rta k en its

full

devel

opment programme, both companies were

required to supply engines, jet pipes, con-

v er ge nt - di ve rg en t n oz zl es p lu s a ll

the

requiredspares and tools.

At the beginning

of

the Concorde pro

gramme the powerplantproject leader, Bris

tolEngines, were joined by

the

French man

ufacturer SNECMA.

This

company was

given

the

responsibility for

the

design and

development of the

thrust

augmentation

or

reheat system a nd t he variable nozzle sys

tem.

WhileSNECMA

were

concentrating

o n t h e

extras, Bristol Engineswere concen-

trating

on

redesigning

the

Olympus engines

to withstand higheroperatingtemperatures

and an increased

thrust

output. The major

changewas

to

the compressorstage, wherea

stage was removed from theh igh pressure

f an w h i le another was added to

the

low

not

completely removed the thrustdragdis

crepancy.

Curing

thisproblemrequired

that

the

w ing tip b e r e de sig ne d, w h ic h , in tu rn ,

improved the behaviour ofthe wing. While

the

structuralchangeswerebeing made, the

opportunity to upgrade

the

enginemanage

ment system was t ak en a nd t he nacelles

werefurther strengthened to protectthe air

f r am e f ro m d a ma g e s h o uld th er e b e a p ow

erplant

failure.

These

modifications were

in co r po r ate d in to the production Con-

cordes from the o ut se t, w hi ch w ou ld , i n

turn,allowforan extension

ofthe

type sper

formance limitations.

The

primary change

was a n i nc re as e in the permissible take

o ff w ei gh t f rom 4 00 ,0 00 t o 4 08 ,00 01 b

182,000-185,500kg) andthe availablefuel

was increased by 3,3001b l,500kg . Pelfor

mance w ou ld a ls o b e im pr o ve d as the sub

sonic cruise figure was increased from 0.93

to 0 .95 , w h ic h r e du c ed to ta l

fuel

consump

tion by 1 3 percent.

While BAC

were

concentrating on the

developmentand constructionof the Con-

corde ailframe, theirengine partners, Rolls

Royce, were applying themselves to bring

ing

the

Olympus

engine

up

to

speed.

Originally developed

by

Bristol Engines at

Filton, the O lym p us m a de its f ir st f lig h t in

PRODUCTION

367,000 LBS

159,625 LBS

28,000

LBS

193

190,000 LBS

132 34 PITCH

PRODUCTION

PROTOTYPE

184 6

174,000 LBS

118 34 PITCH

326,000 LBS

136,625 LBS

23,000

LBS

PROTOTYPE

Enter

the

Preproduction

Models

After the retirement ofboth prototypes the

g r ea ter p a rt

o f t he

types trials work was

shouldered by

the

preproduction

Concordes

01 and 02. Their first taskwasto investigate

a r e po r te d th r us t d r ag d isc r ep a nc y w h ic h

had

been

noted

on the

prototypes and had

recurred

on

both preproduction machines.

Careful redesign

by

both the ailframe and

engine manufacturers eventually resolved

this deficiency.

The

f ir st a irf r am e to

have

t he se c ha ng es a pp l ie d w as Concorde 02

which madeits maiden flight on 10January

1973, piloted by Brian Trubshaw and crew.

The m ai n c ha ng es t o the aitframe were

applied to the wing, where thecamberand

the leadingedgedroopwerealtered, andthe

fuselage was lengthened by 11ft

JAm

by

the fitting of an extended tail-cone. Rolls

Royce and

SNECMA

h a d a ls o m a de s o me

changes

to the

Olympus reheat/thrust aug

mentation system, mainly concentrated on

the secondary nozzle. At the end ofthe first

sequence

of

test flightsfurther modifications

were necessary since

the

behaviour

o f t h e

wingsflexingin flight needed to be recalcu

lated because the earlier improvementshad

•••••••••••••••••••• l

T.O.wEIGHT

A.P.S.WEIGHT

VOLUMETRIC

PAYLOAD

LENGTH

FUEL

SEATING

0.

a II a I

Cl

I I II a I II II I

I

a 0

II

II 0 C

C

O D

l

D

D a

I

G D

l

D II 0 a a a

I

I I I I 0 0

O

C.,

DATA

COMPARISON: PROTOTYPEAND PRODUCTION

AIRCRAFT

hisdiagram il lustratessomeofthe

changesbetweenthe prototype and

heproduction versionsof Concorde.

here would be onlyonefinal change

othe productionmachine,

an

extendedtail-cone. BBA

Colecton

p r oto typ e 0 0 1, which was fl ow n f rom

oulouse to

the

M us ee d e l A i r a t Le Bour

et

by

Turcat

on

19 October 1973. During

its shor t but significant career, the

Con-

c o rd e h a d f low n ju st in e xc es s

of

8 1 2 h r in

97 testflights.

Within

thissequence

254hr

h a d b e e n spent at Mach I or over.

The

sec

ond a irc r af t, p r oto typ e 0 0 2, w as r e tir ed to

the Fleet

Air Arm

Museum

at

Yeovilton,

w he re i t is displayed alongside t he BAC

221, WG744. Throughout i ts c ar ee r 0 02

h a d a c hie v ed 8 3 6 te st f lig ht h ou r s, d u rin g

which 438 sorties wereflown

of

which 173

were spent in the supersonicregime. During

its short career Concorde 002 suffered only

one

real scare in trials flying.

This

occurred

i n A ug us t 1 97 4 when a f a ult d e ve lop e d

with the left main undercarriage supports

w h ich h a d b e c o me detached from the main

structure. Fortunatelyfor

both

crew

and

air

craft, the undercarriage emergency blow

downsystem worked asadvertised and thus

the

crewwere able

to

executea safe

but

dif

ficult landing. Post-flight investigation of

the mounting failure would lead to modifi

c at i on s b ei ng m ad e t o

the

undercarriage

mountings

o n b ot h

prototypes

and

they

were incorporated from the outset in the

preproduction and production machines.

44

45



_ ~ _

------

DESIGN

AND DEVELOPMENT

programme would mean

that

a n y g r

weight was

kept

in ratiowith availab

load and engine power.

Testing th e Airframe

Fro m a s tru c tu r al

po in t o f

view

the

corde airframe is fairly conventiona

chosen material was

an

alum

a lloy , r ef er r ed to in its 1 96 7

patent

a

tion as Hiduminium RR58. This pa

a llo y h a d the a bi li t y t o compens

overageing

and

a llo y c r e e p, b o th

of

drives costsup, which gave

the

design team

something

else

to

c o pe w ith. Be yo nd

the

complexity o f t he proposed systems the

d es ig ne rs w er e a ls o f ac ed w i th

another

problem

of

supersonic flight:

the

low pay

lo ad in r e la tion to the overall weight ofthe

aircraft. In

the

case

ofCon

corde only 6 p er

cent

would beavailablefor

any

kind

of

pay

lo ad ,a s ta rk contrast to the proportion in a

suhsonic, wide-body aircraft which hovers

around the

2 0 p e r

cent

point.

This meanl

thal

any g ro wt h i n the weight

of

the

airframe would ea t in to

the

available pay

load. However, careful

management ofthe

kin and on s

CHAPTER THREE

Comingcloseto completionand

on

its undercarriage.Concorde preproduction airframe

2was

photographedat Filton.Notethe numerousaccesspanels inthe upperwing; these provedusefulwhen it

was necessaryto modifythe productionairframesafterthe Paris crash. J A Todd Colecton v a Lee Howard

oncorde, f ro m a technical point

of

view,

w as a s u b tle b le n d

of cutting-edge technol

ogy and tried and tested technology. Asthe

aircraft progressed through

the

develop

ment

process,

the

British-

and the

French

built machines were close to identical; only

in the passengercabin and additions to the

on-board

systems would

there

be

any

rec

ognizable, cosmetic differences.The design

engineers werefaced with many new chal

lenges,

no t the

least

of

which was

creating

an advanced supersonic transport

that

was

complex in

the

extreme. The problem,

of

course, with complexity

is

that i t i n t ur n

f ir st p r oto lyp e in J a n u ar y 1 96 6, w ith f lig ht

c l ea r an ce t es ts b ei ng c om pl et e d i n J un e.

Typetesting

ofthe

engine was to ta k e 1 5 0h r

and b e c o mp lete d b y J u n e 1 96 7 and flight

certification trials were scheduled forcom

pletion by December 1969. The costs

of

engine devdopment w er e b as ed

on

the

requirement for

the

d es ign a n d d e ve lop

ment

p h as e w h ic h in clu de d

the

Olympus

22R and 30I engines, twentyOlympus 593

e n gin es f or te sting and flight trials usage,

plus thirty-six Olympus 593enginesintend

e d t o b e r et ro fi tt ed t o t he prototypes, the

preproduction aircraft andthe first two pro

duction

standard machines. The cost esti

matesalso included spares, overhauls, esti

mated

at

e ve ry 4 ,0 00 f li gh t h ou rs , and

tooling to produce

the

Olympus 593 series.

However,in agesture of parsimony, the esti

m ate s d id n o r in clu de a n y f u nd ing f or

the

building of much-needed test facilities.

To ensure that the Olympus engine was

s af e f or o p er a tio n s u n de r a ll f lig ht c o nd i

tions, it was extensively tested. The aircraft

chosento act as the airborne testbed was the

heavily modified Vulcan B.I, XA903. The

firstflight ofthe Concorde Olympus engine

was undertaken

on

9 September 1966, with

c lea r an c e f o r Ma c h 1 .6 b e in g obtained in a

preproduction Concorde i n 1 96 8. When

the first Concorde p ro to ty pe f lew i t w as

powered by s er ie s D as h

3B

powerplants

rated at 34,3701b

l53kN

each. Whenthe

preproduction Concorde began test flying,

the

p ow er p la nt f it te d wa s

the

Dash 4

e n gin e, w h ic h h a d a r a te d th r us t

output of

35,0801b 156kN). When the production

a irc r af t b e ga n to a p pe a r e a c h w as p ow e re d

by

the Olympus 593 Mk.610-14-28, each

being rated at 31,3501b

l40kN ,

plus the

availability

of

reheat which lifted

the

final

output to 38,0501b l69kN . Giventhat the

small Concorde fleet spent much of itstime

f ly in g a t s u pe r so n ic s pe e ds it

is

estimated

that the toral of such hours flown comfort

ablyexceeds the supersonicexperience of all

the

world s air forces.

BonoM: This artist s impression showsConcordein

BOAC

l ivery.a finish

it would

never

wear

sinceBA

was theoperatorwhen it finally went into service.

BBA

Colecton

In

common

with

mostaircraft. Concorde had a

generalarrangement diagramissued that displayed

its main dimensions. In thiscaseboth imperialand

metric measurements wereused.i l lustrating a

then currentdifference between Britain and

France. BBA Colecton

1 ft 10ins/3.3Zm

OJ{: ,

~

36ft Zins

11.0m

59ft8i ns /

18.Zm

0

611t6ins

18.7m

4 ft Oins/1Z.Zm

9ft

5ins/Z.87m

: : u

83ft1 ins

0 :

Z5.6m

PROBE

1It

9ins/O.5m

NOSEDATUM

46

47



SKIN ND

BONES

48

OPPOSITE

P GE

TOP Filton was busy with theproductionrun

The more complete airframe

clearlyshows

the two section rudder filted to Concorde

J A

Todd

Colecton via

Lee Howard

BonOM

Concordes underconstruction are

pictured inthe Brabazon Hangerat Filton;

these were productionversions;in the

backgroundis theConcorde mock up

BBA Colecton

m ay c au s e w e a ke n ing a t t he a tomi c level

and possiblefailure

of t he

structure. Exten

sivetesting of this alloy showed that RR58

had high resistance to stresscreep, thermal

cycles and fatigue loading, from both nor

mal flying and thermal loading. The cost

of

d e v elo pin g th is a llo y f or u se in Concorde

e v en tu ally c o st about £ 2 m il l io n, a far

cheaperopt ion than the£200 million that

was estimated fora

titanium

structure.

The

in-depth

trials

on t h e

alloy revealed

that

it

should have a t he rm a l l if et im e of some

20,000hr. Fatigue loading tests wereessen

tia l in p r ov ing

the

structural strength and

safety

ofConcorde and

therefore majorsec

tions of it were subjected to extensive fail

safe tests. The loading applied to each sec

tio n p u sh e d each a ss em bl y t o i ts l im it s,

even as far as causing cracks and determin

in g h o w much residual strength remained.

The undercarriage also underwent rigorous

testing

that

i nc lu de d s t at i c, d ro p and

fatigue tests. The

culminat ion of

a ll th es e

sub-assembly fatiguetrials was the testing of

two complete a irf r am es f or c e rtif ic a tio n

purposes. The full-scale static loading test

wascarried

out a t t he Cent re

d EssaisAer o

nautiquede Toulouse CEAT on the third

ailframe, while the full-scale fatigue trial

was undertaken

at

RAE Farnborough on

the

sixthone. The aitframe

at

Toulouse was

a s se mb led b e tw e e n Ma y 1 9 68 and March

1969 and c o ve r ed a tw o -p a r ts ta tic te s t p ro

gramme, the f ir st c o ve r ed the nominal

take-off weight

of

385,0001b 175,000kg)

while the second stanza increased the all-up

weight to 400,000lb 182,000kg). It should

be noted

that

the a itfr a me u se d in th e se tri

a ls w as

the

third preproduction airframe,

but all the tests were applicable to a p ro

duction machine. Fuselage-pressurization

differential trials placed the cabin structure

under twice

the

n or ma l e xp ec t ed l oa d,

these being followed by c o ld s o ak tr ia ls to

simulate the m o st s e ve r e condi ti ons of

flight. Duringthese trials the aircraft would

s im ula te tak e- o ff , la nd ing , s tea d y under

p ow er c li mb o ut s

and

low s u pe r so n ic

SKIN ND BONES

speeds, all

of

which placed their own stress

loads

on

parts

of

the airframe. Possibly

one

o f t he

m o st p o ten tially d e str uc tive tr ia ls

was the limitload; thiswas the greatest pos

sible load ever experienced by an airframe

in its lif e

andConcorde

n e ed e d to p as s th is

without the

airframe showing any signs

of

deformation. Having survivedthis test,cer

tain parts

of

the aircraft were subjected to a

test deemed

the

ultimate load trial.

Under

these

condi ti ons t he

s tr es s f ac to r w as

in cr e as e d to 1 5 times the previous limit

load. This was the o n ly tr ia l w h er e d e fo r

mation and cracks were allowed, although

total failure

ofthe

airframe was

not

allowed.

Once t he bending, stretching and cold

trials had been completed, the test airframe

was subjected to tests

of

itsbehaviourunder

hot

conditions.To createthese,

the

airframe

w as b la nk e te d by heat f ro m in fr a -r e d

heaters, while the structure was put under

v ar iou s s tre ss loa ds by means

of

60-ton

hydraulicjacks. As before,

the

full range

of

a f lig ht w as s imu late d

as

closely as possible

from take-off to landing and included the

behaviour o f t he structure as the aircraft

sloweddown. During allthese tests any fail

u re s w er e r ep ai re d i n the sub-assemblies

beforebeing applied t o t he main trials spec

imen.

Once

the aitframe modifications had

beenproved,they were applied

t o t he

draw

ings destined for the production machines.

The trial period atCEAT inToulouse lasted

from August 1969 to June 1973, afterwhich

time

Concorde

was certifiedfor flight.

At

RAE Fa rn b or o ug h th ey w er e f ac ed

with creating a sequence of tests to simulate

the fatigue stresses generated by everyday

flight.

Once

t es t s pe ci m en f ou r h ad b ee n

assembled, a series of t ri al s w as b eg un t o

establish the temperature profiles that

would be experienced by Concorde during

flight. It was soon discovered

t hat t he

tem

perature range woulddip soonaftertake-off,

th is b e in g f ollow ed by a rise t o a st ea dy

plateau.

Once

Concorde dropped outof t he

intended cruise speed, the skin temperature

w ou ld d es ce nd b el ow z er o b ef or e r is in g

again. Internally, the airframe structure

would followa similar pattern,although the

t e mp er at ur e c ha ng es w er e s mo ot he r. T o

simulate this at a f as ter r a te than the actual

a irb o rn e f lee t w ou ld e x pe r ie n ce , Fa rn bo r

ough subjected the testspecimen to temper

atures outside

the

expected range.

When

each

of

th e se s imu late d f lig hts w as u nd e r

taken the cruise phase was shortened while

the climb and the landing phase weresub

je c t to in cr e as e d heating and cooling, as

appropriate.

Given

these radical extremes,

49

each simulated flight was classified

supersonic flights.

The

te st s p ec ime

housed in a specially constructed rig

RAE facility at Ball Hill, homeof the

tures Department, that totally encom

the airframe.

This

monstrouscreation

not

o nl y pu t

the

t es t a il fr am e

m e ch a nic al s tr es s, b u t w as a ls o c a pa

fullysimulati ngall the possible tempe

that

Concorde might experience.

Although Concorde

was a

tec

marvel, the Fa r nb o ro u gh te st r ig w as

great technological achievement , no

as hardware, but in developing softw

control the

whole ensemble. The r

large enough to cope with the Con

airframe, which weighed 80 t on

tonnes plus a simulated f ue l l o

4 0 t on s

41 tO nn e s) , le a vin g on

wingtips and the tip of the tai

e xp os ed . A s t h es e portions w er e s

s e c tio n it w as

thought that

th e y w e

t h in t o

besignificantlyaffected by th

fatigue. The remainder of the aircra

surrounded by heat ing ducts and su

ed by numerous h y dr a ulic ja ck s u s

load simulation. To

crea t e t he

re

temperature ranges two plant house

constructed, these fed t he ir o ut pu

the

ducting. Heating the a ir w as ma

via

heatexchangersthat

drew

their

from superheated, pressurized water

tained

at

180°C. The same matrice

u se d to p r ov ide

the

initial cooling

the

process,

although

in t hi s in

chilled water was used. To drive the

perature down belowzero liquid am

was

the

preferred medium. The f u

simulated by a

simulant

oil, which w

f er re d f or s a fe ty r e as o ns to the real

The r e as o n f or th is simulation was

the

real

Concorde the

f ue l lo ad w as

ed as a

heat

s i nk , t h er e fo r e t o l ea v

component ou t would have pro

inaccurate f at ig ue d at a . T o contro

mass

of

machinery bespoke software

e d t o b e developed for

the compute

plex. This computer s ys te m w as

responsible for managing and mon

the

test conditions, p lus r e c or d in

analysing

t he da ta

generated durin

t es t r un . These t housands of indi

inputs covered temperature, stress,

and deflection.

The British trials began

at

Farnbo

in A u gu s t 1 97 3

and covered t hehe

mechanical fatigue tests. During th

years

of

operation

the

rig and ai

simulated

approximately

17,500 f

a ltho u gh e a ch w ou ld b e o n ly s o m e 2



: ; ; ~

SKINAND BONES

SKINAND

BONES

The

torture machinedesigned

to

simulate hours offlying

on

astatic testairframe.

As well as

theusual selection ofhydraulic jacks

to

simulate loading inflight

therig used high-pressure air formore accurate simulation.

The

rigwas also

capable ofsimulatingextremes oftemperature.

BBA

Colecton

i

;II

<>

duration but

even

s o a t ot al

of

44 000hr

were accumulated. A hiatus

of

nearly a year

followed while

the

rig

underwent

a

much

neededoverhaul a n d t h e airframe was thor-

oughly inspected. It was during this inspec

tion

that

cracks were discovered in

the

lowerbooms

of

the wingspars and therefore

a programme

of

inspections and modifica

tions was

put into

place

t o m o n i to r t h e

sit

uation continually forthose aircraftalready

in service. A lthough the cracking in the

spars g v some slight cause for concern

the

rig had

come

close to

proving

in

the

6

years

of

its operation

that

the required

designed fatigue life

of

45 000hr covering

24,000 flights was more

than

achievable.

Assafety was alwaysa major consideration

in the

SST

programme,it had be e ninte nd-

ed to run

both

testrigsto double

the

expect

ed life

ofthe servi e machines at

a factor

of

3: l This last figure ha d be e nc hos e n as the

ide al to over any possible varia tions in

Concorde s

usage. However,

the

utilization

of

the operational Concorde fleet was, in

reality, much lower

than

expected; in early

1981

the

fleet leaderhad made

only

2,200

flights.

S i nc e r u nn i ng t h e

fatigue rigs was

expensive, it was proposed

that

both be

shut down

y 1984.

The

decision was final

y approved in 1981, the accrued savings

annually being estimated at £63 million.

From 1981 until

the

end testingwas

con-

centratedon

thosesections

o f t h e

aitframe

that

were considered to h a ve b e en under

tested during

the

original regimen. Even

these tria ls

eventually ended in

1983

at

w hich point some 21,000 flight cycles had

been petformed, representing nearly 6 700

real flights

that

included significantsuper

sonic time. O n ce t h e RAE part o f t h e pro

grammeended the responsibilityfor testing

and

support for in-service Concordes

evolve

in Apr i l 1984

to

British Airways

and A ir France.

The

pressurizedfuselage, originallycircu

lar

but c ha nge d

t o a n

ov l

section for

the

production machines, consisted

of

fabricat

ed, machined alloyframes pitched

at

a dis

tance of

21.5in 54.6cm , these being held

in

position y extruded alloy stringers

and

load-bearing longerons, all of which were

c lad in

an

stressed alloy skin, much

of

it

chemically machined.

At

each

end of the

pressure cabin was a pressure bulkhead out-

side

of

which were

the

unpressuriz

and

tail-cone assemblies.

Altho

seemed to be one complete assem

fuselage was actually manufactured

distinct sections, these consisting

nose and the forward, the intermedi

c e ntre a nd the rear group. Inset in

sections was a single row

of

windo

ran

dow n e a ch

side

o f t h e

passenge

Each window assembly was mult

and compriseda load-bearingpanel

to

a

thennal

insulation panel. In tu

window was m ounted into a frame

ually machined from an aluminium

To allow for fuselage expansion an

traction,

the

window, in its frame,

rigidly fixed to the aitframe butcoul

inresponse to

the

thermal loadsplac

the

structure.

Not only

didthisdeal w

thermal loading, it a lso reduced th

bility

of

structural failure due to l

stress-overloading

o f t h e

fuselage. A

idea on a grander scale was applied

cabin floor which floated on load

and would allow

the

fuselage

to act

a

arate

entity

in periods

when

therma

eswere placed o n t h e fuselage.

VENTILATED

AIRSPACE

C

DETAIL OFVAPOU

SE L

FLOOR

]

R M

LOWER WING

FILLET

fR M

R M

SECTION

A-A

SECTION

B-B

I

F ~ 5 M e

To

~ p ~ w i t h thermal stresses

and

the l ~ I ~

pOSSibIlityof fuel vapourventing the

I

cabinfloor consistedof the

two

types ~ o ~ . J

= : ; : : . ~ : ; : ~ ~ ~ ~ : : : ~ : ~ ~ : ~ , : P b : - - -

~ ~ f t : . ; . o - ; C : ; : ~ - ~ ~

I P ~ ; : u , . : = 1 l f = = I : ~

MAIN FRAME

]

SECTION C- C

The

fuselagewas slightlyoval in

cross-section

and

mainly pressurized

although certain areas such as the

fueltrim-tankbays didnot require

thisservice.

BBAColecton

UNPRESSURISED T NKI

EQUIPMENT

B Y

CENTREAND AFTZONES

UPPERDECK ONLYPRESSURISED

~

SECTION D- D

SYSTEM ROUTING

ZONE

S EC TI ON A - A S EC TI ON B - B

I

SECTION E- E

FORWARDZONE

PRESSURISED

o

SECTION F- F

LOWERWING

SURFACE

50

51



_ : ~

SKIN ND

BONES

SKIN ND

BONES

o

i _

SECTIO

l

SECTIO

B

C

A

MACHINEDWEB

RIB8 BETWEENSPAR POINTS69 72


6

A

The

Wing


Bolted under the fuselagewas the cantilever

wing

which

was

agee

in planform

and

based

on a slender delta

withslight

anhedral and

varied camber

on

the leading edge Struc-

turally

the

wing wasa multi sparassembly

with

many in te rspar r ib s f or structural

strength Internally the

wing

was skinned

with stretched aluminium a l loy pane l s

OPPOSITE: Mounted in itsj ig aConcordeframe is

being preparedfor assembly.Notethe useof

Englishand Frenchon the jig frame.

Bristol ero

Colecton

RIGHT The assemblies atFil tonin thisphotograph

would soon be rol led out as the first prototype.

Bristol eroColecton

BELOW:

Thestructureof theConcorde

wing

was

more complicatedthanthat needed

for

a subsonic aircraft andgavethe aircraft great

strength. BB Colecton

J b W W U ¥ O ¥ O ¥ O ¥ O ~ U ¥ f ¥ U W U ~ o ¥ U R u ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ v ~ v V 4

SEC

C

52



SKIN AND BONES

SKIN AND

BONES

however

the

production aircraft w

with visorswith panels greater in ar

improving the availahle area

of

vi

the

fully-up position

the

nose

an

gave

Concorde

an extremely clean

namic shape. To mainta inboth com

in this position the hydraulic jacks

both i tems simultaneously to

the

positionwhere mechanical lockseng

spread the load and hold them in p

the down position the nose and vis

heldin place through hydraulicpres

counterbalance

springs.

Nacelles, Engines and In

At

first glance the engine nacelle

l oo k as i f they were integral to

frame; they were in fact manufac

separate

assemblies.

Conta ined

each box-like structure was a pair

o

Royce

Olymrus

593engines. Each

was

built

from two sub-assembli

consisting ofthe engine

bays

and th

the air-intake structures. To the rea

engine bays was an extension

that

the

secondary variable nozzles the

mainly constructed

from steel

a

ABOVE:

This

view

ofthenose-conein the fullyraisedpositionshowsthe locationofth

probe whenthis wastaken theairframecompletelylackedall paint work AdrianFa

LEFT Ensconced inthe Filtonnose dock,this Concorde has itsvisor retracted.Notethe

differencebetween thevisor and themain flight-deckwindscreens.This was due

to

thegold film heating elementsembeddedin individual screens. Adrian Falconer

The

Nose

Unique

features

of

the

Concorde

design are

the

retractable visor

and the

drooping nose

develored to give greater visibility during

the landing and take-offphases. The droop

noseconsists

of

a single

structurehingedat

i ts lower edge

and

raised

and

lowered by

hydraulic jacks. The subcontractor for th is

assembly was Marshalls

of

Cambridge,

who

originally began work

o n t he

jigs to

construct

a

circular-shaped structure only

to

find that they had to redo the wholejob

for a mo re oval-shaped nose-cone. Pro

tecting the

main windshie ld assembly was

a

retractable

v isor whose purpo se was to

d iver t k ine t ic heat away from the inner

screens and provide a more aerodynamic

shape to

the

nose. In

the

prototype aircraft

the

visor area

of

visibility was

quite

limited

rrovided mountings

for

the

rudder-powered

flying control units PFCUs and the con

trol sUIfaces themselves. The rudderwas a

two-part lightalloy structure whose prima

ry

structural

member

was a s ingle spa r to

which was attached the strengthening and

shaping ribs all covered by alloy skinning.

manufactured

from single alloy

bi

lIets.

The

wingsparswere continuous across the fuse

lage

the

whole wing being regarded as

one

assembly that

reached

from

one engine

nacelle

to

the other. The

forward wingsec

tionswerebuilt asseparateentitiesattached

to each side

of the

fuselage.

At

the trailing

edge

of

each mainplanewere

three sera

rate

e1evonsections which were primarily

man

ufactured from steel and mounted on the

aitframe with bearings through which were

fitted close-tolerance

mounting

bolts. To

gain access to

the

parts

of the

aitframe for

maintenance purposes Concorde wasliber

ally designed with removable panels. Many

of

these were chemically-manufactured

stresseditems witha series

of

alloy

strength

eners to spread the load and ma in tain the

s ha r e o f

the panel. Externally the whole

airframe was clad in chemically-machined

skins with

cut-outs

for

the

access panels

each being reinforced with alloy landings.

Above the fuselage were the fin and rudder

sections which consisted

of

similar multi

spar assemblies

and,

in

the

case

of the

fin

a ct ed as a t or si on b ox t o gi ve g re at er

strength to

the

whole. Mounted

on

the for

ward face

of the

fin were

the

dorsal fin and

leading edge panels while

the

trailingedge

SHEAR PANEL

S E T I O ~

_ -

LEFT Incontrastto the mainpartof

thewing,theleadingedge was

conventionalin construction, except

forthe thermal expansionjoints

insertedbetween each section.

BBAColecton

DETACHABLEASSEMBLY

BELOW: Incomparison tothe rest

ofthewing structure, the f il letsat

front and rear werelightweightin

constructionsince theirfunction

was purelyaerodynamic.

BBAColecton

RIB

4 I I I I

FUEL TANK

ATIACHMENTOF SPARS30 34 38

ACCESS PANEL

PN JOINTEDSTRUTS

CHEMICALLY

MACHINED

SKIN

PANELS

TYPICALSPARB•B

FILLET./ \

BonOM

MACHINEDTYPICALSECTIONA A ~ \ CABINPRESSURE

_

~ L F ~

L \ \

~ I R S P E

LEADINGEDGE SPAR

MACHINED

LEADING

EOGe

SLIDING

JOINT

DETAIL

LEADINGEOGe SECTIONS

WING JOINT

CAPPINGSTRP

ATIACHMENT SCREWS

ff/ .J

,.

A

HIGHTENSILE

STeELBOLTS

...

/

LOAD INDICATING WASHER

ABOVE: The outerwing panels were bolted

to

the innerwing

by

themethodshownhere. Note theindicator washers

placed underthe locknut,their purposebeing

to

show

anyproblems

with

the mountings. BBAColecton

54

55



SKIN AND

BONES SKIN AND

BONES

SPILLDOOR

RAMPS

SECONDARY

N O Z ~

~ N E Y S

NGINE

AIRINTAKES

/

N

L

REDUCE

SIGNAL

INTAKE

CONTROL

UNIT

BELOW

The

position ofthe intakerampwas dependenton the

speed ofthe aircraft

as

setagainstany external data inputs

althoughthere wasa l imit systemto protecttheenginefrom

incorrect systemcommands. BBA

Colecton

RIGHr. The rearend-on

view

ofsomeof thebusiness partof

Concorde.Theinboard elevon hasits access cover missing

and theengine-bay doors are open for inspection.

Adrian

Falconer

ABOVE The engine nacelleswere divided intolones

as

shown

here. Thisnot onlyhelpedduring maintenance butassisted in

the containment and suppression offire. BBAColecton

SECONDARY NOZZLE

ACELLEREAR FRAME

NACELLEFRAMEATSPAR 72

REARNACELLE OOORS

o

ENGINEMOUNTINGS

THRUSTREVERSECASCADES

UPPERAND LOWER

@ THRUSTREVERSEBUCKETMOUNTING BRACKETS

® CENTRALWING

ATIACHMENT

SPIGOT

flexible jointsand deformable seals located

between the nacelleand

the

underwingskin

to maintainairflow integrity.

The version o f t he Olympus turbojet

installed on C oncorde was a twin sp oo l

enginewhere

the

low and

the

high pressure

compressorsare driven by separate turbines.

ontrolling the engine to give its best per-

formance was the responsibilityof threesep-

arate processes. The first concerned

the

in take ramps

which

were automatically

adjusted to provide the greatest airmass to

the compressor face. In the subsonic part of

the flightenvelope

the

rampsare in

the

fully

open

position

although

as speed increases

the ramps progressively close. The throttle

lever was the second enginecontrol which

exerted greatinfluence

on the

management

ofthe

powerplant. Itstaskwas togovern

the

rate of fuel flow into the combusters. This

inturn limited d e speed also known as N

of

the high pressure turbine driving the

high pressure compressor. The

other

para-

meter sometimes known

as

N governed

the

rotation speed

of

d e low pressure tur-

bineand hence

the

lowpressure compressor

by varying

the

primary convergent diver-

gent nozzle. This in turn matched theN

figure and the flight conditions hence N1

was the primary sensed parameter

that

FORWARO

NACELLEDOORS

UPPERHEAT

SHIElO

this including the in tegral engine bay

dividing wall. At the rear

of

the nacelle

much of

the

structure

was

of

stccl

sheet

for

greater strength.

The

mounting of thiscom-

bined intake nacelle and exhaustassembly

was achieved by using mountingpins with

LONGERON

CENTRE

BAYWALL

TERTIARY AIROOORS·TOP ANaBOTIOM SURFACES

WINGSPAR

FRAME 6

The

engine nacelles were built

as separate assembliesfrom

the rest oftheaircraft

and

housed a pairof Olympus

engineseach.Mounting was

viaflexible locatingpoints

which allowedfor thermal

expansion. BBAColecton

BELOW: The underneath ofthe Olympus

engine appearscomplicated buta careful

examinationwould reveal thelocation ofthe

hydraulic pump theelectrical generator engine

lubrication and theotherservicesneeded

to

keepa

modernjet engine working efficiently. AdrianFalconer

minium. In contrast the intake assemblies

were mainly

of

aluminium construction

although the

leading edgcs were

of

stain-

lesssteel to protcct them from erosion and

heat damage. The n ac e lle b ox i t se lf was

mainly

of

steel honeycomb construction

56

57



-

SKIN N

BONES

SKIN N

BONES

w ould i ndi cate a

potential

bearing

Early in

the development

program

of

the

main identifiedproblemswa

the

driveshafts breaking. As

the

O

was

a high-speedengineoperatingin

speed

environment

sucha failure w

disastrous

as

the

turbine

and

com

sections

would

run

o ut o f

cont

always the

solution

wasfairlysimp

tial

investigationson

a

test bench

revealed that there

wasa tempera

ference between

the

hot

top

of the

and

the

cooler, lower section.

This

ance

in

heat

distribution was the

causc of driveshaft breakage

whi

cured by includinga slow rotation

ity in

the

engine relightsequence.

The

m at e ri al s u se d i n

the

Co

engineswouldalsorequire expensiv

opment work as new

or

modified

needed

to

bet ri edt o

hand le the he

erated.

Unlike

the

st andard ci vi l

whose

intake

temperature

hovers

also subjected

to

similar trials.

Once

these

had been completed an

actual

intake and

engine

were tested undersimulated ground

conditions. To

give

the

sameseries of tests

under

airborne

conditions the

test facility

at theNationalGas

TurbineEstablishment

at

Pyestock was used.

Having

successfully

completedthis testseriesan engineinstalled

in a p a rt n ac e ll e w as t es te d

under

Vulcan

B 1 XA903.

Havingproved

tha t the

Olympus

engine

was

capable of

generating

the power

required,

the whole

assembly was

then

redesigned

to

allowfor ground

maintenance

s in cc i n i ts o ri gi na l f or m

thc powcrplant

needed

to

be removed

to change

a defec

tive

component.

Also incorporated

into

the

Olympus engine

were modifications

that

allowed for

internal

inspections while

it was still installed in

the

aircraft. Anoth-

er

development

was

the application

of

the

magnetic

plugsystem, designed

to collect

minute

particles

of

ferrous metals

which

meant that development

costs were driven

up since

no

compromise

on

safetycould be

al low ed. Furthermore, shoul d

the

safety

m argin dropt o below

the

5 p er

cent

level,

Concorde

would cease

to

bea safe t ransat

lantic

aircraft.

During

the

development

process

both the prototype and the

pre

production machines were subject

to

many

aerodynam

ic,

t ol er a nc e a nd c le ar a nc e

checkswhich would

eventually

leadto

the

Olympus

593 beingseen as

the

m ost t her

modynamicallyefficientengine everdevel

oped i n i ts class.

TogetConcorde tothisstagerequired

the

development of

numerous t est rigs, m any

associated with engine/intake interaction,

which

was of

primary importance. Initially,

wind tunnel

testing at

various speedswas

used

to

determine

the

airpressure

and

veloc

ity flow

patterns. Having determined

the

theoretical layout

of

the

engine/intake

interface in

the

small scale,

the next

stage

was

todevelopa full-scale mock-up

that was

Whena Concorde underwenta majoroverhaul

it

was thoroughlystr ipped inthis purpose-builtaccess dock.

Adrian Falconer

The

Concorde

engine-control system

was designed to operate in a wide variety

of

temperatures, therefore

the

control sUlfaces

were driven by hydraulics while

the

actual

function

ofthe

system

was

computer-driven.

The

bonus with thiskind

of

control

was

that

any

changes required

t o t h e

parameters

of

the flight-control system could be quickly

engineered

i n softw are

and

flight-tested

almost

i m mcdiat el y. In fact ,

thc normal

sequence

w oul d be

to define the

require

ments

rework

the

software

overnight

and

refly the

changes

next day. A si mi l ar

analogue

syst em w as used

to control the

engines,

although at

least

onesequence of

testflights was

undertaken

using

an

exper

imental digital-control system;

however

this was

not accepted

for general use

even

though there

w ere few report ed probl ems

w i th i t. From

the

pilot s

point of

view,

the

engine control

s ys te m wa s h ig hl y a u to

mated

and

t herefore he useda

mode

selec

tor

to

define

engine

behaviour,

and to

give

a degree of flexibility

the engineshad

sep

arate switches.

Selectable

modes included:

take-off,climb,

transonic

acceleration

and

cruise.

This

degree

of

automation meant

that

theoretically,

the

pilotcould place

the

throttle

fully forward, press

the

start

button

and

let

the powerplant

move

through the

completesequenceto ground idle revs,

then

accelerate

to

take-off

poweLIn

reality,mov

ingConcorde requiredan

output

justabove

idle totaxi theaircraft to

the

runway. At this

point

a

retardation to

idle power was need

edt o compl yw i t hnoi se

abatement

regula

tions.

Since

t hese need

to

be followed rig

orously,

the

use

of the engine

modes was

negated; however,

once

airborne the inter

l i nks t o

the

sophisticated

autopilot came

into play.

The

settings

of the

Mach

and

alti

tudelocks

meant that thethrottle

respond

ed

to commands

from

the

autopilot,

as

did

the intake

ramps.

Since

thesesystems were

fully

automated the normal

role for the

flight

engineer

was

that

of

monitoring;

however,should a fault

occur the engineer

had

the

facility

to

assume manual

control.

F ro m t he p oi nt

of

view

of

fli ght and

engine management

Concorde

was a well

rounded product.It was inregard to

the

pay

load where there

was

always some concern

since the aircraft s ability

as

a transatlantic

transport

was

marginal

at

best. To illustrate

thispoint, 1 OOOlb 455kg)

of

payload con

sumed 1per

cent

of

the fuel

load; this

meant

that

shaving

the

structure down

to

its bare

minimum wouldgiveonlya potentialdiver

sion

fuel

load

of

betw een 5 and 10percent .

This

concern t ocreat ea fuel safet y m argi n

ARTIFICIAL

FEEL

engine at

the

time

of

selection.

These

noz

zles

had different operating

modes,

they

were slightly

convergent at

take-off, while

insupersoniccruise mode theyaredescribed

asconvergent-diver gent togive

the

bestrate

of

expansion efficiency, and the final mode

saw

the

thrust reverser buckets fully closed

to provide thrustreversal

on

landing.

YELLOW SYSTEM

4000 PSI

that

t he i nt ak e r am p wa s

at

the

t position toallow

the

correct mass

of

air

enterthe

engine.

Havingmatched

the

enginesand intakes,

systems

came in to

play

when thrust

or

reheat

was selected,since

convergent divergent

nozzle

h ad t o

the

operating parameters

of

the

illustrates Concorde s hydraulic system showing itemsoperated

eachcolour theirpointsof interactionandthe location ofthe ramairturbine RAT .

for

usein an emergency. BBA Colecton

58

59



SKIN AND BONES

SKIN ANDBONES

=

theprocessof being fittedout this engineer s panel showsits complicatedlayout

instrumentsand switchesgrouped accordingto role. Bristol

Aero

Colecton

thatofConeor

de

is

nearly threetimes

andeven t he

so-called

cooling

air

the

turbine

is

proportionallyhotter. Hav

ngdeveloped the required metallurgyit was

specialist lubricantmanufactur

apply their skills;

not

onlydid the oils

greases

need

to

consistently

perform

d er n or ma l o pe ra ti ng temperatures

a lso h ad t o r et ai n t he ir capabilities

viscosityfor t henex t time.

Nacelle d e sig n w as a lso u n us u al in

that

fou r w e re d iffe re nt in la yo u t.

This

was

t o t he

fact that

the

in tak e s w e re to e d

slightly andt ha t in fro n t ofeach intake

the

w ing p rofile w as d iffe re n t.

This

in

turn meant

that

the airflow en try pa th

i n to each i nt ake

was different

and there-

f or e a central intake control s y ste m w as

developed that allowed each intake ramp

to respond to

the

requirements

o f e ac h

engine th u s e n s urin g a smooth flow of bal

anced a irto each powerplant. At the

other

e nd o f t he e ng in e was

the

convergent-

divergent nozzle.

This

toobrought its

own

problems; however careful design would

ensure that

the

intake

engine and

nozzle

would operate efficiently throughout the

whole flight envelope.

60

Doors

To gain access to

Concorde

there weresix

doors

three

p e r s ide

which

allowed

the

crew passengers

and

a irlin e s e rv ice s

to

e nt e r. T wo w er e d es i gn a te d a s p as se ng er

doors and t he other four as service doors.

Other a c ce s s d o ors in

the

lower fuselage

gave

entry

to

the

upper

andt he

lowerbag

gage

and

freight hold

and

allowed ground

maintenance personnel to gain access to

the aircraft s services. The passenger doors

were

of

the p lug ty pe and located on

the

left-hand side

of t he

fuselage

a t t he

front

and themid point

of

thecabinand opened

o ut wa rd s. A s w ou ld be expected both

d o ors c o u ld b e opened from the inside and

the outside although th e y w e re is ola te d

from

inadvertent opening

when airborne.

The four designated

cabin

a cc e ss d o ors

were

operated and control led

i n a s i mi l ar

mannerand a lls ix c o u ld b e u s e d fo r e m er

gencyegressshould

the

need arise.

Flight Deck and Flight Control

Between the fron t p re s su re b u lk h ea d a n d

the

forward intermediate bulkhead was

the

flig ht d e c k w ith accommodation for th ree

c rew a n d

an

observer

al though the

proto

t yp e h ad p ro vi si on f or a n av ig at or . The

three re gu lar c rew for a Concorde were the

captain co-pilot and flight engineer all

p rov ide d w ith in d iv id u al o x yg e n a n d c o m

munications equipment.The crew

and

pas

sengers aboard Concorde u se d o x yg e n for

emergency breathing al though the crew

couldselect theirs when required while in

the passenger cabin it was either controlled

by a detected

change

in

cabin

pressure orby

the

crew s selecting it for deployment. Fac

ing the twopilotswere the main instrument

p a ne ls w h ich contained the usual instru

ments and s w itc he s a n d a c e ntra l sh a re d

p a ne l h e ld

the

engine-monitoring instru

ments. The roof panel located above

the

g la re s h ie ld cont a ined t he autopilot

VOR/ILS frequencyselectorand

the

flight

director autothrottle m o d e s ele cto r. A lso

on thispanel were controlsand switches for

the

external lighting navigation and land

ing de-icing de-misting PFCU inverters

autostabilizers auto trim artificial feel and

e ng i ne s hu t d ow n. B ec au se r oo m i n

the

cockpit was l imited th is o v e rh e a d p a ne l

had

to

be installed in stepped groups with

a final flat panel t o t he rear. Accessible to

allcrew members this panel had the throt-

tle system switches high-pressure control

Photographedbeforeinstal lation isthis centre

console from aproduction Concorde. Prominent

arethethrottle levers wit thegangedreheat

selector

swit

below. Bristol

Aero

Colecton

valves ignition switches flying control

hydraulicsystemchange-overswitchesand

anti-icingcontrols. On

each

sideoutboard

of t he

pilots were consoles

on

w h ich w ere

mounted the controls for the nose-wheel

steering weather radar flight-deck and

c o n tro l-p a n el ligh tin g . Lo ca ted b e tw e en

the p ilo ts s e ats w as a c o ns o le

that

was

home

to

the

throttle levers thrust reversers

and

the

ganged reheat/thrust

augmentation

switches together with the controlsfor the

v is or a n d d roo p n o se a n d th e ir o w n s ta nd

by selectors the normaland the emergency

b rak e le ve r p lu s

the

emergency undercar

riage lowering lever; finally communica

tions navigation a nd I NS programming

panels werealso located there.

The flight engineer w as s e a te d behind

the

first officer/co-pilot and had h is own

select ion of

p a ne ls. Laid

o ut o n

these

which were sectioned i n b lo ck f or m to

del ineate their different functions were

the aircraft systems switches and dials.

The duties

of t he

flight engineer included

management of the

fuel flow

and

balance

system plus the hydraulic system a nd t he

on board electricalsystem which required

monitoring of its output and routing.

When

i t c am e to designing the flight

control system

the

te am w ou ld d raw u p on

the

e x pe rien c e g a in e d fro m

the

Vulcan

b o mb e r w h ere e lev o ns w ere u se d for p itc h

a n d roll c o ntrol. The rudder sections were

conventional in natureand controlled yaw

ingand trimming. All the flight-control sur

faces weredriven by separate PFCUs each

b e in g c o ntro lle d

by

an electrohydraulic

servo-valve. Due t o t he location o f t he

enginenacelle boxes the elevons were split

into twogroups perwing. The twooutboard

groups consisted

of

elevons 1 2 Sand 6

w hi c h w or ke d i n u ni so n as did

the

two

remaining control surfaces 3 and 4 A ll s ix

c on tr ol s ur fa ce s h ad m ec ha ni ca l s to ps

which ensured

that

theycould

not

bedriven

p a st th e ir s e td e fle c tio n ra n g e lim itw ith o ut

causing majordamageto

the

airframe. Also

protecting the aircraft from flight-control

reversal during high-speed flight the outer

e le vo ns w er e l oc ke d i n to the n eu tr al o r

zero deflection position which eliminated

th is p o te n tia lly d isa s tro us p rob lem . The

trimming of Concorde s elevons

was

also

borrowedfrom the Vulcan. All the wingsur

fac es c o uld b e trimm e d to b a la n ce the air

craft; onlypitch controlwas madeavailable

in manual auto-trim and auto-pilot modes

since the delta-wingshapehas a tendencyto

ris e if

not

k e pt u n de r p o sitiv e c o ntrol. To

assist the p ilo ts in fly in g Co n co rd e it w as

f it te d w it h an auto-stabilization

whose primarypurpose was to m a in

natural stability ofthe aircraft in the

a ny t ur b ul en ce a nd t o m ai n ta i n

control should

the

a irc raft te nd to

fro m its s e t flig ht p a th a fte r e n gin e

Feeding the auto-stabilization syste



SKIN N BONES

SKIN N BONES

. - -_

OUTER ELEVON

LOWER RUDDER

The Concorde flight control system

familiar to anyoneassociated

with

d

aircraft since it centredaroundt

elevons.not individualai leronsand e

Bristol

Aero

vert ical speed and aircraft i nci den

warned ifanywereoperatingoutside

erence poi nts. C oncorde

was

na

through three independent inertial

tion

systems lNSs)

that

provided

tion, heading and altitudeinformati

standard practice

was f or

two

of

t

platforms to control

the

aircraft w

third acted

as

overall m oni t or and

s wi tc h i n i f

o ne o f t h e

primary pl

started to malfunction.Linkedinto

platforms were

t he VOR

a nd t h

receiving their inputs via duplicate

signals, w hich i ndi cat ed t hei r di st

the

nearest DMEbeaconand theclo

localizerand glide-slope indicators.

indicatordisplays weredriven

by

com

from t hree di st i nct sources: t he

VO

ILS and t he INS.

Toensure

the

safety

of

Concorde

altitudes was the purpose

of

a p ai r

altimeters, set to operate between z

2,500ft 760m) and capable

of

cross

ing each

other

for errors.

One

of

th

s ys te ms t o be f itt ed t o C on co rd e

ground-proximity warning system,

of

providi ng audi ble and visual w

should

the

ai rcraft descend bel ow

determi ned, safe height

othe r th

approach and l anding. C oncorde

w

equippedwith a nose-mounted, all-

radarwith a limited ground-mapping

POWERED FLIGHT

ONTROL UNITS

MIXING UNIT

became engaged for safetyand back-up rea

sonsduringlanding. If

at

any time

the

pilots

w ere required t o disengage

the

autopilot,

there were disconnect buttons mounted

on

each

flight-control yoke. Further functions

available via

the

auto flight-control system

includeda full range

of

status lights

to

indi

cat et o

the

pilots the state

of

the autopilot

and

the autothrot t le

duri ng crui se m ode.

Extramonitoringfunctionscame to

the

fore

w he n a ut om at ic a pp ro ac h a nd l an di ng

m odes w ere selected.

Waming

functions

w er e a ls o a va il ab le s ho ul d t he a lt it ud e

dialled into

theAFCS

drift too far from

the

selected settings.

The

AFCS

also provided

monitoring functions

of

all

t he o t her

sys-

t ems i nput ti ng data t o t his system; shoul d

t he re b e a ny c ha ng e i n

the

status

of

these

functions, further warning lights were illu

m in at ed , t he se b ei ng s u pp le me nt ed

by

attention-getting warninghorns.

Concorde s navigationsystem was depen

dent

upon

both

i nternal and external data

inputs,

one

being generated intemally

by

the

aircraft while others came from nearby

ground stations. To master

and

process this

d at a, a p ai r

of

air data computers,

one

per

side

of the

d ro op n os e s ec ti on , w er e

e mp lo ye d. E ac h c o mp u te r h ad a b ui lt -i n

servo

monitor

system

that

checked each

channel s parametersfor altitude, airspeed,

M ac h n um be r, o ut si de a ir t em pe ra tu re ,

ONTROL OLUMN

PIT H

I

Y W

ROLL

The control of Concorde

was

handled

by

t he au to

flight-control system,

which

moni to red t he behaviour of

the

aircraft

and

also supplied

the

autopilot and

auto

land functions,

the

latter

being rated

as

Cat.

III capable.

Interl inked to

t hese t wo

syst ems w ere

the autothrot tle,

warning

and

landing system

indicator

displays. In

common

w i th m ost

autothrottle

systems,

this

uni t control led the

behaviour

o f t h e

enginesthroughout the

wholeflight

enve

lope

when

i t w as acti vat ed.

An

available

secondary

function

ensured

that the

engines

w ere protected from over-speed

ing

when

the autopi lot

wa s e ng ag ed i n

m axi m al crui se m ode. Further

protection

for

the throt tle-engine combinat ion

was

provided by

disconnect

sw it ches fi tt ed t o

throttle

l evers 1

and

4

there

being a fi nal

override,

the

manual disconnect

clutches.

When

Concorde

was

flying in autopilot

mode its

input

was via twosignalchannels

that

integratedb oth

the

autopilotand flight

directorsystem feeds. Ina similar

manner

to

most autopilot systems,

that

fitted to

Con

corde operated i n

the

rol l, pi tch and yaw

axes.

When

engaged,

the

autopilotoperated

asequence

of

jackswhich, in turn, impinged

on

mechanical linkages

that

overrode t he

pilots control. In cruise mode, both flight

directors

w ere engaged,

although

only

one autopilot

channel wasengaged,

both

LEtT Seenin c lose up isoneof theelevon

PFCUs

Although it looks complicated it isessential ly a

hydraulic. solenoid controlled jack.

Adrian Falconer

ABOVE This view ofthe Concordefin showsthe

location ofthe rudder PFCU andthe complicated

jobfor finisherswhen theypainted thisarea.

Adrian Falconer

stabilization/air

data

computer.

The

first

visible

indication

gi ven t o

the

pilots that

Concorde might

be

approaching the

stall

was

act ivat ion of the

stick

shaker

system.

If

the

aircraft

cont inued to

rai se i ts nose,

the

arti fici al feel syst em j acks physi cal ly

shook the cont rol

r un s, w hi ch , i n t ur n ,

moved

t he cont rol

yokes.

Should

these

positive inputs still fail

to

alert

the

pilots,

a s ec on d a nt i- st al l s ys te m k ic ke d i n.

Known as

the

super stabilization system,

this

came into

its

own

should

the

angle

of

attack

e xc e ed 1 3. 5 d eg re es , i ts p hy si ca l

manifestation

b e in g t o

input

a posi t ive

down defl ect ion t o t he

e le vo ns . A f in al

stall

warningcomplete

with

warning

lights

and

klaxons

activated

when the

angle

of

attack

exceeded degrees.

d id s pe ed . A s t hi s h ap pe n s,

the

range

of

movement

availableto

the

pilotswas limit

ed

and

thus

the

possibility

of

airframeover

stress was greatly reduced.

Aiding the

flight-control systems was

the

stall

warning

system,

which

received

data

from

t he p it ch channel of t he au to-

much

of

its operating data

was

t heai r data

computer w hich i nterpreted signals from

motion

sensors detecting changes in direc

t i on and

movement

in

the

pi tch, yaw and

roll planes. Artificial feel was provided on

all t hree axes, t heuni t sbei ngbased around

a spri ng

the

tension

of

which increased

as

62

63



SKIN

ND

BONES

SKIN ND BONES

BELOW: This diagram clearly ex

theoperation ofthe fuelsystem

both aircrafttr im andpropulsio

BBA

Colecton

NOMINALTOTAL FUEL95,430 kg

SPECIFICGRAVITY =0.8

100520kg

MAINTRANSFER T NKS

D TRIMTRANSFER T NKS

D

ENGINEFEED

T NKS

ABOVE:

To gain access to the pyramid

componentsthat surroundthe Olympus

engines,thenacellesare provided

with

aplethoraof access panelssuch

as

this

one which has beenremoved to reveal

partof thefuel feedsystem.

Adran

Falconer

)

o n t h e main undercarriage legs

that

ensured

a ut om a ti c d ep l oy m en t o n t ou ch do wn .

I

nadvertentoperationof the

reversers was

prevented

by a

protection control unit;

however, there was the facilityfor the thrust

reversersfitted

t o t h e o u t bo a rd

engines to

be

operated

in flight,

although they

would

on Iy engage w henthe powerplants wereset

in

the

reverse

thrust

idlespeed band.

In

c o nt r as t t o t h e

fuel system employed

by

other

airliners,

that

on

Concor<.le was

u n iq u e in its a p plica tion .

Not

only lid it

supply

the

four engines, its

other

task, just

as

important, was

t ha t o f

balancing

the

air

frame throughout the

full

envelope

of

flight.

The

fuel system in Concorde consiste<.l

of

thirteen

tanks

which

could

contain

a maxi

mum

usable load

of

26,330gal 119,790Itr).

The

tankswerein three distinct groups: one

dealt with engine fuel feed,

another

was

optimized for

the

m a in f ue l tr an s fe r f un c

tion, and the last was concerned with the

fuel trimming in

the

aircraft. Supplying fuel

directto

the

engines was

the

role

ofthe

inte

gral fuel pumps, handled b y a f ue l f lo w con

troller.

The

fuel in

the

trimmingsystem was

used to

maintain the centre of

gravity c.g.)

throughout the

aircraft s full speed range.

To

ensure

that

i ts d ef in ed l im it s w er e not

excee<.led,

the

cockpit c.g. indicatorscould

b e s e t by

the

c r ew to d e fin e

the

trim limits.

Although

each engine in a powerplant

group

had

its

o w n d e di c at e d c o ll e ct o r

tank, there was

the

facilityto cross-feed fuel

t o a n d

from

a n e n gi n e o r group ofengines

should it prove necessary. The filling of

the

collector tanks

was

accomplished

using

tanks

5, 6, 7

and

8

and

a

sequencer that

ensured that the c .g. w as

not

altere<.l too

radically. As its

name

suggests,

the

trim

transfer

system w as u se d

to

move fuel

between tanks w ithin a group t o t h e opti

mum requiredfor take-off, landing, subson

ic

and

supersonic flight.

The main controls

for

the

fuel

system

were

located

o n t he

I ~ n g i n e e r s control panel, the system being

advanced enough

so that an

automatic

transfer

sequence

couldbe

set

up.

The con

trols for

the

trimsystem for

both

pilots were

limited to an overridewhich allowed either

to

carry

o u t a n e m er g en c y

f ue l f o rw a rd

transfer should

the need arise. Although all

the ta nk s in th is g r ou p w er e e q uip pe d w ith

p u mp s to tr an sf e r f ue l to

the

correct loca

tion,

the

rearmost

tank

was fitted with four

pumps for the expresspurpose of emergency

forward transfer. All the tanks installe<.l on

oncorde

w er e f itted w ith a

venting

system

in o r de r to les s en the explosive fumes that

remained after the f ue l w as u se d, w hi le a

lEFT TheOlympusengine installation. with

i tsmanypipesand cables.seemed

complicated. althoughthe diagram

shows i twas entirelylogical and

gave accessto engineersundertaking

repairsor changingthe magneticplugs

used as partof theenginemonitoring and

wear-detection system. Bristol

Aero Colecton

ABOVE:

Groundrunning ofthe engines was

undertakenusingthis speciallyconstructed

testhouse atFil ton. fi tted with noise

suppressors and pollution-prevention

equipment.

Adrian Falconer

engine

cross-feed

v lves could

be

opened,

which allowed

one

engine

to

start

the

remaining

three. In

the

unlikely

e v e nt o f

a n e n gi n e

surge

or

flame-out,

Concorde

h a d a n a u to restart system, backed u p b y a

m a nu a l r e li g ht system.

C on tr ol o f t he

variable

secondary

nozzle was

the

role

of

the nozzle angle scheduling unit

NASU).

At speeds above Mach l.1 these nozzles

were

fu

II y open; however,

shou Id the

speed

drop

belowthis

point, the NASU

starts

to

reduce the size

of

opening, in accordance

with signal inputs generated by

theengine

scheduling

unit.

To

assist

Concorde

in

br a king a f ter la nding, eachengine was fit

ted with thrust reverser buckets

that

could

be linked to compression switches

mounted

9 (' 4::

SLIDINGJOINT

.

LOCATION

O 1

ENGINE Y

SECONDARYHEAT

EXCHANGER

T o g e t Concorde

clear

ofthe

ground

and

p us h i t through the Mach 2 b ar r ie r , the

reheat thrustaugmenters fixed to

the

rear

of

each engine

were used.

Once Concorde

was

safelyairborne, the reheat units were dese

le cte d in the mandatory noise

abatement

zone.

Once over the

sea,

the reheat

gang

s w itc h w as s e le c te d a ga in.

This increased

theenginethrust by burningextra fuel,

the

flow of which was

monitored

by

an

e1ec

n onic control

unit.

When reheat/thrust

augmentation was not e n ga g ed , f ue l f low

was controlled by

the

full authority digital

engine control

unit.

To s t ar t t h e e n gi n es o n t h e ground, an

external, low-pressure start trolley could

b e u s e d f o r

eachengine

individually

o r t h e

FWDENGINE

MOUNTINGS

MAIN HYDRAULICPIPES S

HYDRAULICPRESSURE

IPESTO INTAKES

FORWARD

displayingits results

on

screens in

the

cock

pit. Communicationssystemsfittedto Con

cordeincludeda multi-channel VHF radio,

matched

by an HF system. SELCAL, a n a ir

traffic control

transponder

p lu s a c oc kp it

voice recorder, were also integrated. Con

corde had its own

internal communica

tions

system

consisting of

a

cabin inter

phone/PA system linking the flight deck,

p;:Issenger cabin, galley, ground services

and

passenger servi es together.

More on

the

Engines

E a c h R olls- R oyce Olympus 593

engine

c a me c o m pl e t e w i th

a

r eh ea t o r t hr us t

a ug m en t er u n it a t t h e

rear.

The power

plants were housed i n p ai rs i n box-like

nacelles, eachengine being separated from

its

neighbour

by a

central

firewall which

was stressed to

absorb the

forces

generated

by a dis inte gr atinge ngine . T o

the

front

of

the

nacelle assemblies were

the

variable

geometry

intakes,

which had

hy<.lraulically

< lriven

r am ps t o a ss is t i n controlling the

amountof

air presented to

the

compressor

f ac es , w h ile a n y e x ce s s w as

vented

by air

spill

< loors

To

the

rear

o f t h e

nacelles were

the

v a ria ble a r ea n oz zle structures over

which were

mounted

clam-shell shieldsfor

t he t hr us t

reversers.

A i di n g t h e

perfor

manceand the behaviour

of

the intakes at

high

Mach

numbers were perforations in

the

lower surfaces

o f t he inta ke s w hic h

alsobled any excess

of

air away a nd c r e at

ed a s ta ble boundar y layer.

6

65



SKIN

N

BONES

SKIN

N

BONES

Complete with atug more suitedto

towing

Boeing 7 7s this Concorde

awaits

i tsnextseriesof

functionals. Notethe accessstepsfor ground engineeringstall. Adran Falconer

With an

external

power

cartplugged into providegroundpower thisConcorde isprepared fora post-

maintenanceflight test. Adran Falconer

f ail in f lig h t

and

should there b e a

failure

o n t he

ground,

although

automatic system to engage the

had to be

running at

5 8 p er

cen

The hydraulicsystem

on Concor

ated

at

p re ss ur es b et we en 4 ,0

supplying

the

aircraft s essential services

u nt i l a s af e landing c ou ld b e m ad e. This

part

of the

p o we r s u pp ly s y s tem k ic ke d in

automatically

should

oneof themain

elec

tr ic a l b u sb a rs f ail; a s im ila r r e sp o ns e a lso

happened

should

either

No.1 or 2

engine

supply. The 28V D C o n t he aircraft was

supplied byfour transformer rectifier units

and

b a ck e d u p y a p ai r

of 25A/hr

bat

t er ie s. A f ur t he r p ow er s up pl y b ac k- u p

w as s u pp lie d y an hydraulically-driven

emergency generator

that was

capable of

Since

many

o f t he

systems aboard

Con

corde were electrically

driven

it is

not

sur

prising

that

i t was w el l e qu ip pe d w it h

p ow er g en em t or s, w it h

one

per engine

rated

a t 6 0kVA each.

F or u se

on the

ground, the aircraft had external power

sockets under access panels, which allowed

for

the

plugging in

of an ex te rna l

power

Electrics

and

Hydraulics

Concorde.

These

w er e a im ed

at

cooling

the

aircraft s

equipment

racks

and

initially

took their a ir fl ow v ia t wo extractor fans

from the passenger cabin. The expelling

of

the

air required

the

use

ofthree

fans which

covered the forward electron i c r ac ks ,

instrument panels, weather radar, TRU

and INS

crates.

The

residualair finally left

the aircraft through the forward discharge

valve.

Additional

f an s, tw o p r im a ry and

one

s tan d by , w e re u se d to

extract

air from

the

rear equipment racks, which, in turn,

vented the

air to

the

aft discharge-valve

region. A

non-return

valve allowed for

the

extraction

of

the a ir f ro m the underfloor

area

i nt o t he e xt ra ct or

ducting, which

m o ve d i t

t o t he

forward discharge valv ts.

T o b a c k u p the primarysystem there w as a

forward emergency relief valve to ensure

the extractionof air underabnormal flight

conditions.

Surplus

cabin

a ir w a s a ls o u s ed

to c oo l a mi

ventilate the

main landing

g e ar b ay s a nd t he flying control chassis;

the

f or me r u se d a i r b le d f ro m

the

cabin

u n de r f lo o r a r ea , w h ile

the

flight-control

c h as s is h y dr a ulic s y ste m h a d its own ven

tilation valve, controlled y a barometric

pressureswitch.

The

hydraulic baylocated

t o t he rear o f t he a irc r af t w as n o rm a lly

ventilated w i th a ir drawn from

the

cabin,

th is b e ing a s sis te d y a fan

drawing

air

f r om o u tsid e the aircraft when

the

cabin

d if fe r en tial p r es s ur e w as low , s u ch s dur

ing

the landing

phase.

When Concorde w as p a rk e d on t he

ground i tc o u ld b e

either

heated

or

cooled,

as needed, y

the

use

ofan externalcondi

tioning unit which plugged in to the main

distribution manifold,

the connection

for

which

w as in

the

lower rearfuselage.

This

input supplied conditioned air d irec t to

b ot h t he

passenger

c ab in a nd t he

flight

deck while the equipment bays, home to

much

of

the avionics, used an indirectsup

ply drawn

through

y

electric

fans.

Further

cooling w as p r ov i de d b y u si ng e xp el l ed

cabin air to cool

the

main undercarriage

bays

and the

hydraulic-system bay.

o nc e t he

main u n de r ca r r ia g e leg s w e re

lowered

s ince the

two

jet

p um ps i n

the

main-gear bays could b e u se d t o s up pl e

mentthe

ram airflow, while

at

higher alti

tudes

and

speeds

the

fuel/air

heat exchang

ers undertookthe same role.

Upstream from each primary

heat

exchanger

air

regulation

wascarried

out

y

u si ng a r am a ir v al ve which modified the

inlet flow upstream

o f t he

c o ld- a ir u n it.

This maintained an ambient temperature

of

100°C when the inlet temperature was

b e lo w 2 5°. The fuel/air

heat

exchangers

provided

further

air

cooling

in supersonic

flight. Should there be overheating in the

primary or secondary

heat

exchangers,

the

downstream duct c lo se st t o t he h ea t

exchanger or in

the duct

downstream

of

the

cold-air

unit, the conditioning

valves

closed and la tched shut . Shou ld there be

over-pressurization in

the

system

down

s t reamof the

b lee d v a lv e ,a s im ila r

action

was made by the bleed valve. The condi

tioning v a lv e w ou ld c lo s e s h o u ld there be

an indicat ion of

high differential pressure

b etwe en t he c ab in a nd t he c o ld- a ir u n it.

Cabin

pressure control was managed by

using

the

discharge valves

and theground

pressure reiief valve which regulated the

outflow

of conditioned

a ir f ro m

the

pres

surized zones.

On-board control

was gov

erned

y

identical systems known

s

SY SI

and S YS 2; t he s e i n

turn

controlled two

discharge valves positioned fore

and

aft

on

each system. Both systems were automatic

in operation and governed y

the cabin

altitude

selector,

throttle

settings

and

weight switches.

There

w as a d eg re e

of

limitedmanual

control

for

each

pressuriza

tion system which allowed the flight engi

n ee r t o

shut

any

o f t he

discharge valves

manually

if required. The settings for

the

cabin differential pressureranged between

10.7 and l1.2psi 0.75-0.78kg/sq cm ,

the

lower

limit

w as g a ine d f ro m

the

amplifier

of the selectedsystem while the upperwas

the

value set y the pressure limiter

on

each

discharge valve.

Cabin altitude

was

set to

11,000ft

3,400m

by

the cabin

alti

tu d e lim ite r

on

each valve although this

increased

to

15,000ft

4,500m when

all

f ou r v al ve s w er e in operation. Should

there

be a requ irement to dump cabin

pressure

there

wasprovisionfor it, restrict

ed to the p r es s ur e r a ng e

of

t he c ab in

altimeter

limiters.

Although

air

conditioning

forcrew

and

passengers is the most apparent aspect

of

a

comfortable aircraft

environment, there

were further cooling enhancements on

Beyond his responsibilities for

the engine

and fuel systems,

the

flight engineer also

controlled

the

air

conditioning

and cabin

pressurizationsystems.

The

former consist

ed

of

four independent groups, e ac h o f

which

w as s up pl i ed f ro m

the

relevant

engine s high-pressure compressor

and

fed

into

the

air conditioning s ys te m vi a a

b lee d v a lv e comprising a

shut-off

valve

and a p re ss ur e -r ed uc in g v al ve . D ow n

stream the airflow ed into fourcross-bleed

valves that allowed cross-feeding

through

out

the system. These w er e f it te d w i th a n

external tapping that allowedfor

the

con

nect ion of ex te rna l coo l ing

tr olley s . To

maintain a s u ita b le temperature through

o ut t he

cabin,

the

air tapped from

the

compressors passed

throughheat exchang

er

m at ri ce s b ef or e b ei ng m ix ed w it h

another, colder air supply delivered y the

cold-air

unit.

Fur ther cool ing of the

air

took p lac e in a s e co n da r y

heat

exchanger

before

the

process finished

a t t he

fuel/air

heat

exchanger.To cool

components

with

in

the

a irf r am e b le ed a ir w as drawn from

s ma ll i n ta k es

mou nt ed o n t he e ng in e

nacelles during low-speed flight, while at

higher speeds there w as a further air bleed

located

with in the

in tak e s th em s elv es . A

further cool ing op tion became available

Air Conditioning and

Pressurization

tank

pressurization system cameinto

orer

a t ion a t h igh a l ti tude , which

assisted

the

pumps in moving fuel and s to pp e d it f ro m

b o ilin g o f f. I n the

even t o fan

emergency,

f ue l c o uld b e

dumped through

a

vent

pipe

a t t he rear o f t he airframe, the required

venting

pressure being supplied y the

pumps

fitted

t o e ac h c ol le ct or

group.

Putting fuel i nt o t he a irc r af t w as done

through a p ai r

o

pressure refuelling cou

pling

points

in

the

wing lowerfairings for

ward

of

t he m ai n undercarriage bays.

These

in turn were

connected

to

the

trim

transfer gallery, the whole

being fuelled

under pressure. To g ive a m e as u re

of

con

trol during

the

refuelling operation,

the

refuel pa ne l all owed for a complete

sequence refuel

of the

whole system or for

p a r tia l r e fu e llin g

of

individual

t an ks t o

give an overall calculated percentage.

Dependingon the

degree

of control

need

ed,

the

refuel

operator

could

either

set

the

refuel panel to carry outthe replenishment

automaticallyo r, f or f ine r control, manual

selection

wasavailable.

66

67



SK IN ND BONES

SKIN ND BONES

BELOW Each main wheel on Concorde

was

fitte

with

oneof these multistatorbrakeunits.

The

t

used toalign allthe tangsbefore thewheel s

refi tting isknown as a spider.

Adran Falconer

Accommodation, Fittings

and Safety

To

the

passengers boardingConco rde,

first impressions might

not

be compl

favourable since

the

fixtures and fit

were

not

palati al, all being designed t

within thecabin;

that

heftypremium on

descent

of

the

undercarriage units th

selves

under

gravity

and

in free-fall.

operation

ofthe

mechanical release for

undercarriage

was

v ia a r el ea se h a nd

the

cockpit.

When

operated,

the

upl

retracted

and

allowed

the

le gs t o d

lthough

gravity was held

to

be

enoug

force

the

legs into

the

locked-down

t ion, shoul d t his fai l

to

occur

pneum

pre ssur e c ou ld be d iv er te d from

hydraulic reservoir to complete

the

ex

sion

ofthe

gearstruts. Aircraft braking

applied hydraulically

t o t he

main wh

each

brake

unit

being a multistatoras

bly To

prevent

brake l ock-up and su

quent

brakefires and damage, there

wa

anti-skid system fitted

which

cycled

brakesto

prevent

this. When

Concorde

on

the

ground, nose-wheel st eering

hydraulically powered,operated throug

el ect ronic controll er l inked t o

the

ru

pedals and

hand

wheels.

In

t heeven t

system failure,

the

b ra ki ng s ys te m

e qu ip pe d w it h a b ra ke a cc um ul at or

had enoughbrakingenergy for

one

land

DR G

STRUT

LEG

ABOVE Concordes maingear

was

fair lycomplicated in operation

althougha bonus

was

that it had

onlyoneoperating doorperbay

to cycleduringretraction and

extension. Bristol Aero Colecton

LEFT

The main gearfi ttedto

Concorde is substantial.This

view

ofthe right-hand assembly

showsthe mainretraction jack

and shorteningassembly.

Adran Falconer

CROSS E M

Should

Concorde

s uf fe r a

total

loss

of

hydraul ic funct ion, t here w as

one

final

option available, this being

an

emergency

release

of t he

undercarriage locks with

the

RETRACTION LINK

RETRACTION J CK

PITCH

D MPER

undercarriage system was supported

by

a

standby circuit

that

operated outside

the

main systems and increased

the

undercar

riageloweringoptions available

tothe

crew.

TELESCOPIC STRUT

4,500psi 280 and 320kg/ sq em ). Syst em s

driven

by

hydraulics included

the

powered

flying cont rol unit s, arti fi ci al feel units,

l an di ng g ea r, w he el b ra ke s, n os e- wh ee l

steering, windscreen visor, nose-conedroop

and raising mechanism,engine intake vari

ableramps and

the

fuel pumpslocatedin

the

aftfuel transfer tank. Services to thesesev

eral sub-syst em s w ere provided by three

independent

systems designated green, yel

low and blue.

The

first two were recognized

as

the

primarysystems, while the third

was

treated

as

t he ai rcraft standby. A l though

each

systemreservoir waspressurized during

maintenance,

an

auxiliary pump was avail

able to recharge

the

reservoirs, which would

eliminate

the

possibility

of

pumpcavitation

that

could becausedduring engine start.

In

theeventof

a main hydraulicsystemfailure,

Concorde

was equipped with a two-bladed

r am a ir t ur bi ne , w hi ch h ad

the

ability to

dr ive two

h yd ra ul ic p um ps . F or us e i n

ground operations, thereweretwo hydraulic

pumps

that

coul d be used t o pressurize all

three hydraulic systems, which allowed for

the

functioning

ofthe

aircraft s systems.

Outside

the

flight-control system PFCUs,

the

aircraft s undercarriage was

of

primary

importance.

This

was

of theconventional

hydraulically-operated type and consisted

of

a t wi n-w heeled nose l eg assembly and a

pair

of

main legs

that

hada bogie

mounting

four w heels and brake unit s each. L ocat ed

in

the

rear fusel age t ail -cone w as a t ai l

wheel

unit

w ho se t as k w as t o

protect the

rearfuselagefromground scrapes.

Thisuni t

hada pair

of

small tail-wheels

that

replaced

the

skid

of

the

earl ier protot ype and pre

product ion C oncordes. E ach m ain under

carriage

unit

retract ed i nboard w hi le

the

nose

unit

retracted forward; as

each unit

began

to

move

tothe

retracted position,

the

greater part

of

each nosedooropened

to

let

the

leg

enter the

bay

while

the

main-gear

doorscycled through

openand

close func

tions as

the

legs moved

into

theirown bays.

When the

undercarri age w as selected

down,

the

reverse

happened

so

that

only

the

legs were exposed

to

the airflow.

While

the

m ai n a nd n os e u ni ts w er e c yc li ng

through

eitherthe

upor

the

downfunction,

the

tail-wheel

unit was

also moving into

the

bay or extendi ng.

Since Concorde

ha d a

powerfulhydraulic system,

the

retractionor

extension

o f t he

undercarriage units hap

pened almost simultaneously.

Whe n t he

undercarriage unit s w ere up

and

locked

into

t he i r b a ys t he y w er e h el d i n p l a ce b y

hydraulic pressure

and mechanical

locks.

As would beexpected,

the

primary hydraulic

STEERING UNIT

J j - - - TELESCOPIC

DRAG STRUT

TORQUELINKS

The tail-skid

as

fi ttedto Concorde

had

two

functions. One w a s t o p r o t e ct t h e r e a r

fuselagefrom damage;theother with the

closing of amicroswitch

was

to alert

the crew tothe possibil i tyof a highAoA.

Bristol

Aero

Colecton

GEAR UPLOCKS

ROCKING

ARM

LEG

OLEOSTRUT_

i

SHOCKABSORBER

SKID

RETRACTION JACK

FULLY EXTENDED

nose gearof Concorderetracted

to enterthe bay Innormal

doors cycled open

on and extension.

Aero Colecton

68

69



SKIN ND

BONES

BOVE Viewed fromtherear the tail wheel bumperin therearfuselage was aneat installation. In the

developmentaircraft

it was no

more thana skid; forthe productionmachineswheelswere added.

dran Falconer

RIGHT

The Concordenosegear:affixedtothe rearupperpart ofthe legis thefixedfair ing andmidwaydown

abovethe torquelinksare thejacksfor thenose wheelsteeringassembly. The frameworkoverthewheels

themselveswas usedfor rain dispersal a nd to protectthe airframe fromforeign object damage.

dran

Falconer

7

L FT With acraneattachedto theslings the

completedforwardfuselage ofF WTSSis almost

ready forshipment to Toulouse.The close spacing

ofthe str ingersunderthe skinis clearlyevident.

Bristol

ero

Colecton

t ic ke t w as f or s pe ed .

The

passenger cabin

w as 1 15 ft 3 5m ) l on g and 8 ft 7 i n 2 . 6m )

wide

at

itsmaximum. The seating arrange

ments were based on four-abreast seating,

s pl it i nt o t wo b an ks s ep ar at ed by a 1 7i n

43cm) aisle. Originallyan arrangement of

108passengers, pitched at 38in 97cm), was

put forward for premium-class passengers

and an e c on o my - cla ss la yo u t c a ter e d f or

128, pitched at 34in 8 6 c m ). A f ina l, a lte r

native

arrangement

was for a higherdensity

layout

that

w ou ld c ar ry 1 44 p as se ng er s

pitched

at

32in 81cm). Eventually, after

m u ch m a r ke t r e se ar c h and consideration,

both Air France and British Airways would

settle on a passenger numberof just100, the

cabinbeingsplit into sections by adividerto

accommodate t he m. I n the forward com

partment the

seating arrangement housed

forty passengers with the remainder in the

rear compartment. To service both cabin

sectionsthere were a pair ofcompact galleys

and similar-sized toilet facilities. To convey

the passengers baggage and any high prior

ity f r eig ht th e re w er e two h old s u n de r the

passenger floor.

Other

equipment

installed in

Concorde

included ant i ice and rain protection and

dispersion systems. Both t he wing leading

edges,

the

leadingedges of

the

intakes and

the

a ir s p illd o o r s a ll benefited from

anti-

ic in g , a s d id

the engine

inlet guide vanes.

Rain dispersion and ant i icing w e re a lso

available for both t he visor and

the

inner

windshield assemblies, although

the

for

mer operated only when

the

visorwasfully

up

and

locked.

Both

wereelectricallyoper

ated as were the anti ice systems installed

in the static vents and galley drain masts.

T o k ee p the windscreens clear, Concorde

u se d a

combinat ion of

windshield wipers,

deflectors and rain repellent,

al though the

last

became

effective

onlyabove

100kt.To

keep the screens clear f r om r a in w as only

one requirement for the crew s visibility,

since

at

low level insects

and

dust became

::mother hazard to d ea l w i th . F or this pur

pose

Concorde

h a d a s c r ee n -w a s h s y ste m

installed which operated in conjunction

with the windscreen wipers.

Although Concorde spent much

of

its

time operating

at

highspeeds, it too had to

comply with

the

regulations regarding

the

carriage of emergency equipment. In flight,

SKIN ND

BONES

BOVE Withthe lower halfof theshipping

containerin position theforwardfuselage of

thefirst prototypeis lowered in.Clearly

visible underneathis thebayfor thenose

gear. Bristol ero Colecton

7

BELOW Insidethe Brabazon hangerat Filtonanot

protectivecasesectionis lowered intoposition.

Before development ofthe SuperGuppyfor

air

s

airframesections travelled

on

specially constru

flatbed trailers. Bristo l eroColecton



SKIN AND BONES

d at Filton beforeenteringthe Brabazonhangarfor maintenance this Concordehad itsway blockedby auniquegateacrosstheperimetertrack

dran Falconer

Given itsimportance sections intransitrequiredspecial to typecontainers

hey were alsobil lboardsfor some subtle advertising r isto l eroColecton

=

c=:=

SOUND/THERMAL INSULA

OXYGEN SYSTEM

FUEL SYSTEM

ENGINE INSTALLATION

ENGINE CONTROLS

FIRE WARNING/EXTINGU

common with the real aircraft the

t or feat ured all the equipm ent fit

Concorde even down t o the elec

drivencrewseats.

Once

the creww

ed i n t hei r si mul at edai rcraft t heyc

through

the

full pre-start sequenc

starting engines. When the Olymp

erplants begantheirstart sequence

i ar rum bl e whi ne and vi brati on b

assertthemselves. Once a simulated

fic cl earance t odepart had beengi

simulator could give a distinct impr

nose-undercarriage bounce as the

w ere t weaked duri ng

the

taxi s

Such was the depth

of

reality that t

lators created t hat t he trainee cre

forgotthey were flying a simulator

L:To

§

lD

I

I

g

:oJ

[ I

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

FLIGHT CONTROLS

NAVIGATION

RADIO

AIR CONDITIONING

ELE TRI L SYSTEM

D BRITISH AIRCRAFTCORPORATION

D SUDAVIATION

<:::::J [ J

I

I

Thisdiagram il lustratesthe division ofwork bythe Anglo Frenchpartnership the air-

frame split eventuallybecame 6l} 40 infavourof France with thepowerplantwork

swinging theotherway Colecton

built up Once the end of course was reached

each crew member underwent a thorough

examination

set j oint ly by

the

manufac

t urers and

the

European

Joint

Airworthi

ness Authority.

All successful candidates

then

w en t t o a

flightsimulator either in Paris or Filton. As

withall flight simulators

each

is a compli

cated machinehoused in

an

air-conditioned

room. Externally they arebox-shapedstruc

t ures m ount ed on a series

of

hydraulic rams

whose purpose is t o si mul at e m ovem ent

a r ou nd a ll t hr ee a xe s. E nt ry t o the flight

deck

w as by

an access l adder w here each

crew m ember was faced w it h Concorde

parked on an a ir po rt r am p a nd v is ib le

through the simulated cockpit windows. In

lying t astest irliner

CH PTER FOUR

Training

the

Crew

To

get

Concorde

into

the ai r w as

quite

a

complicatedprocess. Both the flightand the

cabin crew underwent rigorous training to

prepare them for allemergencies. Training

o ne o f Concorde s three man flight crew

normallytookabout five monthsand all the

applicants were already highly experienced

inall aspectsof commercial jet flying. Before

even entering the cockpit each new mem

berspent at l east si x w eeks i n the training

school classroomswhere much of t he theo

ry ofsupersonic flight was discussed;howev

er only the aspects relevant t o t he aircraft

werepresented since the complexity

of

an

aircraft such as Concorde would take years

to master properly. One theme that pervad

edal l the training lectures was safetywhich

was seen

as

paramount and thuseach exer

cise was studied under normal abnormal

and emergency conditions so

that

compar

isons could be made. Further analyses were

provi ded by

computer which

s h ow ed i n

graphic form

the

actions undertaken by

each crewmember.Supporting the training

programme were extensive audio-visual

aids which in France centred around each

trainee

with his individual

terminal . In

Britain

the

original

training regim e w as

based

around

electronic

working

models

although technology finally caught upand

computer terminals were incorporated later.

The ground-schoolpart ofthe course was

provided by BritishAerospacea nd Aerospa

tiale and

both

pilots underwent thisprocess

f or s ix w ee ks w hi le

the

flight engineer

course lastedseven weeks. Throughout this

period study

of

all Concorde s systems was

undertaken manywere already familiarto

eachcrewmansincethey were variations on

equipment already in use. Where intensive

training was needed was in the handling of

the enginesand theirassociated systemsplus

an

understanding of the fuel system. Once

the

study of t ext sand sli des hadbeen com

pleted the trainees moved

on

t o a fli ght

deck m ock-upw here procedurescoul d be

practised and a familiarity with

the

instru

ments and controls and

their

behaviour

4i l '

system vent pipe thereby preventing any

ignited fuel vapour from blowing back into

the system. Shoul d fire break

out

in the

vicinity of

the

f ue l t an ks t he re w er e f ou r

e xt in gu is he rs ; t he se c ou ld b e o pe ra te d

manually from the flight deck by the crew

a nd s ho ul d t he re be a c ab in e me rg en cy

involvingsmoke or fumes Concorde was fit

ted

with

twooxygensystems. Bothfunction

on lowpressure one

for

the passengercabin

and t he o t her for the flight deck. Should

t he r e b e a n ee d f o r the crew t o m ove about

u nd e r s uc h c ir cu ms ta nc es t h er e w er e

portable oxygen packs availablefor use. To

alert the crew

that

there

was

an emergency

the aircraft was well equipped with visual

and aural warningsactivated at allstations

whenthe aut oarm sw i t ch was operated on

the

flightdeck. With the crew alerted they

could prepare

the

passengers and

the

cabin

forevacuation.

Once

an emergency landing

was made the o rd er c ou ld be g iv en t o

deploy the escapeslides fitted to each cabin

door. Most of thesecould be used as rafts as

well as slides. Other emergency

equipment

on Concorde included smoke masks fire

extinguishers cots for infants and a defib

rillator for heart-attack resuscitation. In the

event of Concorde survi vi ng a di tching

rafts w ere stowed equi pped w i th rati ons

and

other

survivale quipment.

Throughout the

life

ofConcorde

much

of

this

equipment

remained essentially

unchanged except for m odi ficati ons and

upgrading although thischanged radically

after

the

crash inJuIy 2000.

freight holds. Surrounding the engines and

the

nacelles was a dual-sensor system that

warned

of

overheati ng or fire outbreaks.

Before the fire suppressionsystem operated

a s et of secondary fire-damping doors were

activated with

the

purpose of starving

the

fire of oxygen. A further fire-detection sys-

tem

was

installed in the fuel tanks. This

used flame detectors l inked t o a vent i gni

tion suppression system which automati

cally discharged extinguisher into the fuel

ire

is

regarded

as

the m aj or e n em y a nd

therefore Concorde was f it te d w it h b o th

udible and visual warning systems to alert

he

crew.

I n t he

main these systems were

entred around the engine nacel les and

oncent rat ed upon engine overheati ng or

fl agrat i on but t hey also provided t he

eans t o exti ngui sh any fire.

There

were

urt her protecti on and

detection

systems

hose sensors were situated in

the

air-con

i oning duct i ng passenger cabin and

72

73



FLYING Ti l

F ST ST

IRLIN R

FLYING 1111 F ST ST IRLIN R

This view ofthe secondpilot spositionreveals much detail includingthe INSselector

switches.visorcontrolsandthe Machmeterand airframee.g.tr imstr ip indicator.

BristolAeroCol ecton

From anyanglethe flight deckof Concorde was cramped. Withinthis restr icted space

werethe

two

pilotsandthe fl ightengineer. Adran Falconer

Having completed the

simulator conver

sion training, the n e w c r ew m o ve d t o t he

real thing. As before, entrance to

the

flight

d ec k w as u p

the

h igh s e t

of

flight steps

to

compensate

for

the height ofthe

undercar

riage. Entering the flight deck, the crewsaw

the seats for the pilots and the engineer,

rlus

two for supernumerary crew members,

s u ch a s c r e w f lig ht c h ec k er s , a ll f itte d w ith

full oxygenand communications equipment.

Flight-Deck

Layout

Getting

to grips with the

autorilot

real

ly started with

the

thirdsimula tor mission,

where the en ti re

f ligh t w as f low n

surer

sonically, although this

one

h ad an auto

stabilization failure thrown in for go od

measure. As

delta

aircraft

have

a

tendency

to r is e

and

f all in f lig h t,

there is

a p r ed is

position f or p il ot s to overcorrec t this.

Returningthe

controls to neutral will stop

t he mot io n a nd therefore ri

lots

can

try

again. Following on from this fairly gentle

introduction to systems failure, there fol

lo we d a

sequence of

missions

where

more

and more incidents

were added

to

test

the

crew s knowledge. During theeighth sortie

the

instructor w o uld f ail an

e ng in e a t

Mach

2;

having

r e co v er e d f r om th is ,

the

instructor would

then

restore the missing

engine only

to

be followed by a

shutdown

of the

pair

on the opposite

side.

The

final

s tag e w as to p r ac tise

three-engined

land

ings which has stood c r ew s in g o od stead

w h ile f ly ing

the

real thing. From

the

eleventh simulator sortie the

crew

rractise

flying and operatingthe a ir cr a ft f r om d if

ferent scats, thus

the

flight

engineer

gets to

land

Concorde

from

the

co-pilot s

rosi

tion. During this sequence the engineer

alsolands

Concorde

with ju st tw o engines

which is

easier

than

most

due to the

reserve

of rower available

from

the

after

burners. Having played musical chairs, the

crewshould by now

have

been f o r min g a

team and therefore the next

series

of

sim

ulator runs concentratedon bondingthem

together to

0rerate

efficiently under pres

s ur e . Pr a ctic es

covered

in

this

phase

included autothrottle failures, the droop

nose stuck

at

5 d e gr e es which blocks

much

o f t h e

runway),

instrument

failure

and emergency go-rounds

in

the

face

of

changing weather conditions. The last

three

sorties covered noise

abatement

pro

cedures for

opera tingou t o f New

Y or k, a

full daylight sortie and a complete night

flightfrom ramp to ramp.

flight

engineerrractised

fuel trimbalancing,

w h ic h , in tu rn , rrompted the p ilo ts to a dd

t he c ent re

of

gravity e.g.) meter to their

constant scanning of

gauges

on the

rilors

panels. Unlike on most modern subsonic

airliners, the e.g. meter was

oneof

the most

imrortant

instruments

on Concorde

since

itstrim

rosition

governed

the

wholebehav

iour o f t he aircraft. Having grasped the

imrortanceof

this,

the

crew

then

moved on

to

exreriencing the

trimchanges

at Mach

I

and 2, these manoeuvres being followed by

an investigation

o f t he

autorilot. Again,

unlike subsonic airliners,

the autorilot on

Concorde

was used in preference

to

manual

flying. As this system

had seventeen

flight

and thre e

autothrottle

modes, there were

n u me r ou s f lig ht

combinations

available,

many of which automatically functioned

duringan in-flightemergency; for

examrle

should there be a n engine shutdown

on

take-off, the rudder trimmedoutthe change

in d ire c tio n. Although t hi s s ys te m m ay

seem miraculous to some, there were ri10ts

who

left

the

conversion course since

the

importance ofthe autopilot as an extension

of

their skillsescaped them.

PORTE DE

SERVICE

PORTE PASSAGERS

SOUTE DE TRAINAVENT

SOUTE

A BAGAGES

SORTIES DE

SECOURS

TYPE

3

RESERVOIR DE CARBURANT

SO

UT

DE TRAIN PRINCIPAL

CAMPARTIMENT EQUIPMENTS

FOND

DE CABINE ETANCHE

RESERVIOR DE TRANSFERT

POINTE· V NT

P RTIE V NT DE FUSEL GE

P RTIE INTERMEDI RE DE FUSEL GE

P RTIE ENTR LE DE FUSEL GE

P RTIE RRIERE DE FUSEL GE

increasingin

comrlexity

as

the

course

went

on .Many

of

the actions were rereated over

andover again, many for rractice others to

reinforce

the

safety

asrects of

flying

and

handling Concorde in an emergency.

Th e

complete range

of

actions was undertaken

under the

scrutiny

ofan

instructor

who

had

the

dual role

of

also

acting

as

the

air traffic

control centre.

The

instructor was able, via

his

computer

te r min al, to s e lec t

the

flight

rarameters

so

that the

trainees could

have

their simulated flight changed to practise

the

more difficult

ra rts o f

aircraft control

s u ch a s la nd ing . Re ga r de d by a ll c r ew s a s

the hardestpart ofhand

Iing

an

aircraft,

that

practised in

the

simulator

centred around

a

landing under ILS guidance.

Although the

simulated

landing

could

cover

all

the tech

n iq ue s n ee de d, t hi s is o ne r ha se t ha t

r e qu ire d f lying in

the

a c tu a l a irc r af t to

develop

itsfiner pointsprorerly.

The firstsimulatormission was astraight

f or wa rd , s u bs o nic c r uis e w h er e the crew

went

through

the

first, basic, systems usage

and handling

p ha s e. I t w as d u rin g

the

sec

ond mission when simulated supersonic

f lig ht w as u n de r tak e n. D u rin g th is r u n

the

NOSE

FUSEL GE

FORW RD

FUSEL GE B

INTERMEDI TE FUSEL GE C

ENTRE FUSEL GE D

RE R

FUSEL GE E

SERVICE

DOOR

PASSENGER DOOR

NOSEGEAR

BAY

3

BAGGAGE

HOLD

4

TYPE

3

EMERGENCY EXITS

5

FUEL TANK 6

MAIN GEAR BAY 7

EQUIPMENT BAY

8

REAR PRESSURE BULKHEAD

9

FUELTRANSFER TANK

\

A

r

B C

I

D

FR

1

M I

FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M FR M

L

28 41

46

54

Y

i

,I :,

. ~ m d ~ d ~ =.J

b \ \

1 2 3 4 5 6 5 7 6 8 1 9

ncing the

feel

of the s imulato r

the

task

ofthe

computer system which

ated the

hydraulic r a ms . I t succeeded

tricking t he i nn er e ar i nt o believing

i t w as experiencing the sensations of

thus minor

movements

stimulated

feelings

of climbing diving accelerat

tu rn ing and decelerating. The

rams

move

the

simulator in

the

direction

r i lots

selected by using

theircon

yokes,

and thus the crew seemed to

a climb or d ive , w h ile an out

observer w ou ld s ee

the

simulator

move

in small, jerky

movements.

ugh on a day-to-day basis the simu

r normally behaved

itself,

there

w as a

system

integrated intothe control

uit should the motion control

system

violentlyouts ide its normal working

To

cut

power to

the

simulator

it

rerform incorrectly there

was

an

rower cut-off switch on t he

deckwhich whenoperated storred

simulator

in its tr ac k s.

established

themselves

in

the

the t r ainee c rew undertook a

o f n i ne t ee n 4 -h ou r

missions,

thediagrams issuedfor

corde were inEnglish and

h. emphasizing the joint

reof theproject.

Colecton

74

75



FLYING

TilE

FASTESTAIRLINER

FLYINGTHE FASTESTAIRLINER

This view ofthe fl ightdeck encompassespart ofthe fl ightengineer s position

on

a

aircraft

l

seats wereblue and

ir

France seats grey . COlecton

far enough a ftto monitor

the

systems m

agement

panel. The

co-pi l ot or

first

cer sseat could alsotrack rearwardsto

behind t he centre console, which allo

access to

the

crew position. Height aU

ment

for

both

seatswaselectrically

act

ed, although there was a m a n ua l re ve r

fa cility if n e e de d . Other adjustable p

o f t he

f r on t t wo s ea ts i n cl ud ed

the

back and a rm res ts . The flight engin

s e a th a d two p rim a ry d irec tion s : outbo

towards

the

systems

management

pane

forward to a s s ist in

operatingthe

throt

The seat floor-rails for this seat,electri

ly-powered fore and a ft, g a ve ite a s y a c

t o t h e c e nt r e

console. It

too

c o uld b e e

tric a lly a d ju s ted v e rtica lly , with

ma

reversion. In the

event

of a crash, the

h ad t o b e within 2 in S c m)

o f t h e

ri

hand

side

oft he

aircraft s

centrel

inc

ot

wise

the

c ras h lo ck

pin

would

not

di

g ag e. I f

at

any time

better

a cc e ss w

n e e de u to

pansoft he

flightdeck,

the

e

neer s scat could be tracked forward u

the systems management desk. To pre

the

possi

bi

Iity

of

a c las h between

the

tain s

and the

engineer s scat,

an

inter-

strut was positioned o n t he inboaru ra

the

rear

oft he

pilot sseat. Shoul u t he s

approacheach

other, a striker

o n t h e

s

when compressed, operated a limit s w

which electrically disarmed both s

Shoul d t he captai n need to move fur

rearwards

a n d t h e

area wasclear,

an

o

ridepedal, operated o n t h e engineer s s

r es et p ow er t o the p ilo t s s e at. A s im

but

re m ov a b le s trut, c o uld b e fitte u to

captain s seat

to

stop

i t c o llid in g with

occupant

of the

supernumerary s s

Contact

between

the

seats was preven

b y a m icro -s witc h s b e ing tripp e d

o n

pilot s seat, which broke the tracking

c u it o f

the

pilot s seat. The first supe

merary

seat

was

completely

manu

operated a nd m ou nt ed o n sliuing r

The manual adjustments possible inclu

fore anu aft

movement, heightadjustm

anu

partial

rotation. W he n n ot

requ

for usc,

the

s e a tp a n c o uld b e Iifted u p

folded upwards to

the

s e at b ac k, w he

was h e ld in p lac e by

the

safety harness

provide further clearance, t h e s e at c

be disengaged from

the

latchplate, w

allowed full rearward

movement

and

stowage in

the left-hand

rear

corner o

i gh t d ec k. The second supernume

seat was s to we d flat against the left-h

equipment

rack

w he n n ot

i n u sc , b

h el d i n p l a ce by a c la w

arm catch.

Re

ing t hecat ch allowed t h e s e at t o besw

The Crew s Seats

Should

the

crew

continue

to ignore an

MWS

l ig ht , a s in gl e- st r ok e g on g w ou ld

s o un d e v ery LOsee u n til re ctific a tio n h a d

b e en c a rried o u t.

The

primary gongs were

b ac ke d u p by a s ec on da ry g on g s ys te m

wh ich s o un d ed if

t h e M W S

failed; this was

part

of

the aircraft health monitoring sys

tem

and

sounded

at Lsec

intervals. The

MWS am ber

lights, some

o f t h e

red lights

and their associatedprimarygongscouldbe

inhibited via

t he M WS

panel, although

there

was a re ca ll s ys tem

that

reactivated

any

outstanding

fault warnings should

the

relevant system still be inuicating a defect.

Certain

p ri ma ry r ed w a rn i ng l ig ht s w er e

m a rk e d with a

T ;

this indicated

that

they

h ad a push-to-test facility available.

The

three

main c re w s e ats for

the

pilots

and engineer

were

mounted on

rails

and

electrically operated. A f ou rt h s ea t was

also

on

rails and manually operat ed and

was used by

the

first supernumerary crew

m em be r, f r eq ue nt l y a f li gh t

checker or

pilot on a l iv e conversion c ou rs e. A l es s

palatial fifth seat was available and could

b e u se d by a fu rth e r

supernumerary

crew

member. The rail la yo u t o f t he primary

crewseats

m eant t hat

all three crew mem

b ers were p rov id eu with maximum mobil

ity

about t he

fligh t d e ck . In p rac tice ,

this

meant

t h at t h e

captain s seat could travel

were divided into fou r c a te go rie s : Cla ss I,

which covered warnings

of

serious faults

or

an emergency requiring the immediate

at t ent i onof t he

crew and

their

immediate

act ion; a Cl ass 2

warning

i n di c at ed a

les s s e rio us p ro ble m

that

s ti ll n e ed ed t o

be brought t o

t h e a t te n ti o n o f t h e

crew,

although

i m me d ia t e a c ti o n was

not

re qu ire d ;a Clas s 3 indication covered any

abnormality that required monitoring and

needed to be dealt with before

the

situation

b e ca m e a Clas s 2 fa u lt; a Clas s 4 ,

and

final,

warningclassificationcovereu minor, mis

cellaneous indications.Class 1 and 2 warn

ings werepresentedby

both

audio

and

visu

al indicators o n b ot h t he

master

warning

panel and the systems management panel;

audible warnings were broadcast o v er t he

fligh t-d e ck s pe a ke rs, s o me c o uld b e

can

celled while others needed their faults to be

rectified before

cancellation

was possible;

visual warnings were classified by colour:

redindicatedClass

amber

Class2, yellow

las s 3 and g ree n Clas s 4 . The associated

master warning system

MWS)

was orient

ed towards givingwarningsfor Class

Land

2 failures;

not

o n ly d id

the relevant colour

lights c om e o n, b ut a s ing le-s tro k e g o ng

also sounded to emphasize

the

seriousness

oft he

prohlem. Each master

warning

light

on t heMWS m oni t ored a numberof warn

ing sources. The l ig ht itse lfc o u ld b e can

celled by pushing

the relevant

lightswitch,

a lt ho u gh t h e g on g w ou ld c o nt i nu e t o

sound until

the

f au lt w as dealt with.

a rtificia l fee l s witc h es a n d e ng i ne s h ut

down

controls.

The

rearflat

panel

couldbe

reached

by

all three operating crew mem

bers and was h o me t o t h e t h ro t tl e system

switches,

HP

valves, ignition controls, fly-

ing

control

hydraulic switchovers, system

h e at e r c o nt ro l s a n d a n ti -i c in g switches.

To

the

rear

o f t h e

co-pilot were

the

sys

tem

management

panels

operated

by

the

flig h t e n gin ee r. S om e o f these controls

were deemed

of

such importance

that

they

a re a lso a c ce s sib le to

t he captai n,

should

he

reverse hisseat fullyaft.

The

panelsdis

playeu inf or ma tion c ove ring the power

p lan ts, fue l s y ste m, h y dra ulics , e le ctrica l

s y ste ms , a ir

condit i oni ng and

pressuriza

tion,

oxygen, fire

det ect i onand ant i-i cing

s y ste ms . To a id the engineer, a nd t o some

degree

the

p ilots to o,

the

systems, where

appropriate,

w er e d is pl ay ed i n a l og ic al

layout which was et ched and highlighted

in wh ite .

All

the

primary systems were equipped

with a u dib le and visual warnings, which

ABOVE located between the two pilots,this

overheadpanelcontrolsmanyof Concorde s

systems.Thosetothe rearwere accessibleto

the

flight

engineersincethe panel

was

stepped

to presentthe controlsin thebestpossiblemanner.

dran Falconer

seated,

the

p ilo ts fac ed a le ft

and

a

t d as h p an el c o nt ai n in g t h e flight

a nd the c e ntr e dashpanel with

e n gi n e i ns t ru me n ts . A b ov e t h e c e n

ua s h panel

was

the glare shield panel,

h h o us e d the autopilot, autothrottle

or, plus the VORjILS frequency

tors for

each

pilot.

The

right anu

the

p ilot c o ns o le h o us e d the controls for

nose-wheel steering, weather radar and

switches for

t h e p a ne l

lighting. The

r e c o ns o le c o n ta i ne d t h e t h ro tt le s ,

reverser controls, visor a n d u r oo p

standby

controls, parking

and

emer

braking

selectors,

standby landing

communicationsand naviga

control panels.

centrally-mounted

r oo f p an el

the

two p ilo ts,

w hich st ret ched

k to wa rds the f li gh t e ng in e er , h el d a

of steppedsub-panels rounded offby

t p a ne l.

The

former housed

the

master

indicators,

external lighting

warning l igh ts for the dc-icing

dc-misting c o ntro ls , flyin g control

switches, autostabilizer,

auto

trim,

n pilot s panel.showing theplethoraof switches.knobsand dials. Prominent

centre arethegaugesconnected with engine monitoring. ristol

ero

Colecton

76

77



FLYING Ti l

FASTEST

IRLIN R

CAPTAIN S

SEAT

STOWAGEGUIDE

RAIL

- •

RAILEND

STOP

2NDSUPERNUMERARYSEAT

This diagramil lustratesthe seats on Concorde s

flight

deck andtheir operatingtracksand

anti-collision bars. Colecton

down

its legs

to

e n ga g e w ith f loo r la tch e s

a n d t h e b a ck to b e r a is ed i n to t h e vertical.

To reverse the process a lever m ount edon

the

forward legfreed

the

legs from

the

floor

cat ches and allowed the s e at b a c k to fold

for stowage. The safety seat harnesses fit

ted t o t he captain s

the

co-pilot s

the

flight engineer s

a n d t h e

first

supernumer

ary seat w e re p r ov ide d w ith in e rtia r ee ls

while

the

second supernumerary s e at h ad a

fixed harness

m ount ed t o

a single

anchor

age p oi nt on t he floor a nd t hr ee s ea t

anchor points.

Lighting

The flight

deck

and passenger cabins were

well supplied with internal lighting these

b ei ng a mixture

of

fluorescent electrolu

minescent

instrument

integral Spot and

flood. Forgeneral

illumination

purposes a

pair of f lu or e s ce n t la mp s w er e f itte d in the

f o rw ar d r a ck ing a r e a and control l ed by

switchesclose to

t he ci rcui t

breaker panel

a n d t h e c ab i n crew forward control panel.

Tw o s p o tlig h ts w e re mounted as boarding

l igh ts in

the

forward vestibule and a fluo

rescent

l ig ht w as

mounted

in

t he r oo f o f

the flight-deck compartment. Lighting at

each crew station was controlled by the

individual a n d c o ve r ed

both

panel

and

general

illumination.

During some flights there was the risk

of

encountering lightningstorms whichcould

overpower

the cockpit

lighting and leave

the c r ew u n sig hte d. To counter this Con

c or de h ad s to rm l i gh t in g i ns ta ll ed - h ig h

intensity fluorescent lighting which oper

ated in combination w ith a r o of - m ou n te d

floodlight both ofw hi ch provided intense

lighting

t o t he

d a s h p a ne ls

and

overcame

any

intenseglare

t hrough t he

windshields.

looking downthe lengthof thepassengercabin of

Concorde revealsthe narrownessof thefuselage.

Although i twas neverfilted

with

thelatest

hi-tech seats dueto weight restrictions such a lack

didnot botherthe passengers as theywere paying

forspeed notexcesses ofcomfort.

dran Falconer

FLYING Ti l

FASTEST

IRLIN R

Toilets on Concorde were justbig enoughfor theirpurpose due to thesizeof the

fuselage. dran Falconer

Giventhe restrictedsizeof theConcordemain cabin

it

ishardlysurprisingthat the

galley is an excellentexample ofintegrated minimalistdesign; even so the menus

wereof thehighestquality. dran Falconer

9

oncorde w as a lso p r ov ide d w ith a w

range of external lighting intended

cover

mosteventualities.

There

were t

anti-collision lights installed at the ti

the tail-cone and wing-root leading ed

all

of

which flashed simultaneously. Li

w e re a lso in sta lle d o n t he

left-

a nd

right-handside oft he frontfuselagefor

purposes. To assist

Concorde

dur ing n

landings there were landing ta xi li

m ou n te d o n t h e left- a nd t he right-h

nose-gear doors. To confirm t h at t h e

was down

and

locked

the

lamps would

illuminate

even

if a lr e a dy s e le c ted to.

c o nt r ol t h e h e a t generated

by

these la

on

the ground each

one

h ad a 400W

ment controlled

by a w e igh t- on - gr o

microswitch. Once airborne the releas

the microswitch allowed a 600W filam

to i l lum ina te . A s th is happened

the

l

rotated

sl

ightly downwards

to

compen

for Concorde s approach attitude. Sup

menting

the

nose-mourned I ig ht s w e

further set

m ount edon t he

leading edg

the m a in u n de r ca r ria ge d o or s . A s w ith

nose-mounted lamps the main-gear li

would

not

i l lum in ate u n til

the

leg

down and locked even if p r es e le c te d

There was an aut omat i c blow-back sy

that

operated should the leg s s till b e d o

at

a speed

of

365kt. The final lamps

o n

a irf r am e in clu d e n a vig a tio n ligh ts :

mounted on the tail-cone and two a t

leading edge

of

each wingtip.

rew

and

passenger

comfort

w as a l

priority not only to justify the cost bu

safety as well. The air-conditioningsys

consisted

of

four

independent

groups

e

o f w hi c h t o ok high-pressure air from

engines ami conditioned i t b y c oo l

heat i ng and

dehumidification. The re

ing a ir w as u se d to pressurize t he rel e

areas and to cool and vent il at eequi pm

racks. On

the

ground

Concorde

c o ul

supplied

with preconditioned

air

thro

anext ernal connect i on in the rear fuse

which wassupplied d i re c t t o t h e distr

tion manifold.

W h en t h e

air

conditio

was

operating

correctly

the

f ou r g r

supplied air to parts

of

the airframe. Gr

1supplied

the

flight deck group2 fed

the

forward

c a bi n a n d t h e r e ma i ni n g

supplied the rear cabin. Temperature c

t ro l w as n or m al l y automatic; thus

g r ou p I selector

cont rol l edt he

ight d

a r ea g r ou p 2

covered the

forward

c

and group4 managed the rearcabin. Se

automatic

control

o f t he

temperatur

each

groupwas possible

through

a

stan

temperaturecontrol for each group.



FLYINGTHE FASTEST AIRLINER

FLYING THE FASTEST AIRLINER

SECONDARYNOZZLE

THRUST REVERSE

PRIMARYNOZZLE

BELOW:

To

maintain

an

even flow

of

air

to the compressor throug

thefl ightenvelope. BAC with R

Royce designeda system of ram

anddoors.

BBA

Colecton

Therewere three hydraulic

systemsfitted to Concorde. The

primarieswerethe blueandthe

greensystem;the

yellowwas

us

in standbymode.There

was

som

interchangeability betweenthem

maintain operation and system

pressure.

BBA

Colecton

engaged while the f li gh t d ir ec to r w

operation

the

modereverted to

pitch

a nd he a ding hold although in land

the autopliot would also engage the

mode.

There

wasa proviso however r

ing the g o -a r ou n d m o de w hic h

return the a ut o pi l ot t o b as ic o pe

ENGINE BAY

VENTILATION DOOR

RAMPS

AUXILIARYDOOR

ARTIFICIAL

- FEEL

INTAKE RAMP, NOZZLEAND DOOR POSITIONS

TAKE-OFFAND LANDING

INTAKE RAMP, NOZZLEAND DOOR POSITIONS

CRUISEAND DESCENT

< = = t ~

AKE-OFF LANDING

were engaged a nd t he a u to p ilo t h a d o n ly

one channel

in full operation although

b o th c o uld b e s e le cte d when land mode

was engaged.

The

selection

of

modes for

both the autopilot and the flight director

was u nd er common s w itc hin g c o ntr ol;

t he re fo re s ho ul d a n a ut op i lo t m od e b e

GREEN

MAIN

YELLOW

STANDBY

BLUE

MAIN

HYDRAULIC SUPPLIES

throttle systemwasrate-limited to5 degrees

of lever movement/sec and by a command

a u tho r ity limiter which required

the

throttle lever to be within

the

to

-36.5

degreesrange. Should the autothrot

t ie b e e n ga g ed o u ts ide

of the

-36.5

point

they w ou ld a ut om at i ca ll y m ov e t o t hi s

p o in t.To g iv e a g r ea ter r a ng e of sensitivity

t o e ac h t hr ot tl e lever s position,

there

were switches

t hat

isolated each le ve r s o

that individual tweaks could b e m ad e.

Other switches

known

as instinctive dis

connect

switches were fitted to the out

board

throttle

levers.

These

would disen

gage the a utothr ottle system while as a

final safetymeasure there were slipclutch

es i n

t h e a u t ot h r ot t l e drive mechanism

whichallowed directmanual override.

C ontrolling C onc or de in f lig ht w as the

purpose

of the

autopilot

and

flight director

there being

twO

separate integrated chan

n els f or e a ch .

The

input signals a n d c o m

putingwere

c om m on to

each autopilot

and

ightdirector;those of

the

autopilot operat

ed the pitch roll and yaw relayjacksin their

autopilot mode duringwhich

the

mechan

ical inputs were locked while the electrical

systemwasenergized. During normal opera

tio n b o th f lig ht d ire c to r s ys tem channels

AFT

OMP RTMENT

FORWARD

OMP RTMENT

FLIGHTOECK

speeds w h en t h e a u t o pi l ot was engaged in

maximum cruisemode. Duringan

automat

iclanding

the

throttle settingwas automat

ically retarded by the autopilot.

The

auto

throttle

s ys te m c om pr is ed t wo s ep ar at e

channels, s e le c te d b y s e pa r ate s w itc he s .

During flight both c ha nne ls were normally

engaged although

channel

1 a ct ed a s

the

primary controller with the other acting as

asynchronized standby. Tosafeguardagainst

malfunction each

channel

was self-moni

toring and wouldswitch out should there be

a s el f- de te ct ed f ai lu re a f ai lu re i n the

air data system or in

the

INSwhich supplied

m a nome tr ic a nd a ttitude data.

The

auto-

:

i

PREcONOA1RFTDISCHARGE

VALVES

FORWARD

DISCHARGE

VALVES

Cabin andflight-de ck pressurization and

conditioning requirementswere drawn

from enginetappings. Passing througha

cooleranda pre-cooler.the finalmixto

thecabin was achievedby adding ram air.

BBA

Colecton

and landing

displays plus

an

interlock fail

ure and monitoring test system.

The

autothrottle sub-system provided

c ontrol ove r

the

engines thrust during

the

approach and cruise phases

of

flight. With

in the autothrottle blackbox was circuitry

that

managed airspeed a n d M ac h control

modes the latter including datum adjust

ment provisions. There wasalso an airspeed

acquire m ode w hic h could capturea select

ed speed in the range

of

130-400kt,

although i t w as s u bje ct to a longitudinal

acceleration limit

of O l The

autothrot

t ie s ys te m a ls o h a d a p r ote ctio n p r ov isio n

b u ilt in that

guarded against

engine

over-

SUPERSONIC

CLASS

ROW 26

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

2

21

22

23

24

25

26

During

their

simulator

t r ai n in g t h e

tyro

pilots a nd e nginee r were intr oduc e dto the

automatic aspects of operating Concorde.

These

were

centred

around

t he aut om at ic

flight control system AFCS) which had

the capability

for

hands-off

flight

during

the

climb cruise

and

let-down phases

of

flight and had the a b ility to fly Concorde

during

a go-around.

Such

was

the

reliabil

ity builtinto

t h e A F C S t h a t

it c ould quite

easily manage a

Ca t

III

landing in the

foulest weather.

Integrated i n to t h e A F C S

were

t he aut ot hrot t l e,

autopilot, warning

The

Systems Take Over

Thisdiagram illustrates

thestandardseatingplan

used by Air France and

British Airways. although

it

could be altered according

to the requirements.

BBAColecton

TOILETIWASHROOM

IT]

80



r

des. If

the

flight director was engaged

the

autopilot,

t h en t h e

alreadyselect

m odes w ould be accepted

by the

flight

ctor. Modes

that

c ou ld b e e ng ag ed

automatic

capture were indicated

by

hts, which illuminated to signal

cessful arming. A subsequent selection

hold woulddisengage

the

primed

e, thusextinguishing

the

prime light.

autopilot

was

authority-limited to plus

m in us 15G and

30

degrees

of

roll,

t ho ug h t hi s i nc re as ed t o 3 5 in a c on

There

wasalsoa ratelimitation

f 0. 10G /sec

at

a r ate

of

5 degrees/sec,

this

is

increased to0.25G/secdur

modeafterglide-slope captureand

go-around mode.

The

autopilot servo

ps were self-monitoring

at

all t im es;

ever, shoul d t here be a need t o di sen

the

autopilot, there was

an

instinctive

s c on n ec t b u tt on o n e a ch c o nt r ol

yoke,

as

a final safety measure

the

mechani

linkage between

the

rel ay j ack and t he

column

contained

a compressible

that

allowed

the

pilot

to

override

the

command

direct.

The

autopilotapproach modes were fully

monitoring; thus when

both channel s

re engaged duri ng l and m ode a st at e

of

ll failure survival was possible should

the

ary No.1

channel

fail. Its switching

would allow

the

fully energized No.2

to

take over automatically. Failure

any peripheral systems would cause

the

todisconnect

ifitwereengagedin

m od e

that

required

the

use

of

data pro

ed by

that

system. However, there were

epti ons; t hus a fail ure

of

the

ILS data

ed during

an

approach would

not

causea

nect, although

the

radio altimeter

ings musthaveexceeded600ft 183m);

s obviated nuisance disconnects. Simul

failure

of

both glide-slope receivers

t we en 2 00 a nd 7 5f t 6 1 a nd 2 3m ) r ad io

tude, or

both

localizer receivers below

also

notdisconnect the

autopi

t , al though an auto-Iandwarning l ight

ld illuminate to warn

the

crew

of

asub

stem fai lure. T o al low for

minor

adjust

of

the

speed hold modes,

the

autopi

datum

adjust

unit

installed.

The

datum

adjust was zeroed

and

inhibit

in

max. cruise mode, while in heading

an

autopilot turn

knob

allowed adjust

t he

heading

at

a fixed roll rate.

The autopilot

provi ded i nformat ion

t he

operational status

and

functional

of

t h e A F CS

in

t he aut om ati c

and l andi ng m ode

and

displayed

s for

both theautopilot

and

the

FLYINGTIlE FASTESTAIRLINER

aut othrot tl e during t he

cruise phase.

This

particular

arrangement

hadt w o

data

chan-

nelswhich operated

a t t h e

sametime; thus

No.1 fed

the

captain s display

andt he N o.2

channel

operated

the

first officer s display;

however,

the

most

important

warnings

were cross-fed

t obot h

displays so

that

both

crewmen

received keyinformation

even

if

one channel

had failed.

Certain

malfunc

tions

that

occurred

within

the

latter stages

o f a n a u to ma t ic

landing would cause

the

auto

l and l i ght

to

i l lum inate, w hich, i n

turn,prompted

the

crew

either

t oi ni t iat ea

manual

take-over

or

allow

an aut om ati c

go-around t o t ake place.

A furt her w arni ng system buil t i nto

the

AFCS/autopilot

was that

which protected

the

altitude setting.

This

was indicated

by

both audible and visual warnings when

the

altitude deviated from

that

selected

o n t he

AFCS

control panel.

Although

thealtitude

alert wasintegrated with

the

autopilot/flight

director tomakeoperationeasier, thesystem

w as, i n fact, compl et ely i solated from

the

AFCS

engagement modes.

The

altitude

alertsystem was inhibited when the under

carriage

was

in the down position.

Backing up

the autothrottle, autopilot,

autostabilization, trim

and the flightdirec-

tor

was

the

interlock

failure

monitor

and

testsystem

whichconstantly

surveyed

the

engagem ent st ate of

these modules

with

their

peripherals

a nd d at a

streams

and

flagged up a fail ure

t o t he

crew.

Should

there

be

an uni ntent i onal di sconnect t he

disengagement

was analysed to

determine

the

cause, displayed

t o t h e

crew

and

held

i n m emoryfor

subsequent

retrieval by

the

groundcrew;

th is function

was still avail

able

even

a ft er p ow er h ad b ee n r em ov ed

from

the

aircraft

a n d t h e n

restored.

The

sLllfaces

controlled

bythis myriad

of

electronics included

the

elevons

on th e

wing trailingedgeswhich provided rolland

pitch control,

while yaw

control

was cov

e re d by

the

use

o f t he

multipart rudder.

Each

of

these

control

sUlfaces

was

driven

by

an i ndependent

powered flying

control

unit PFCU).

The

controlof

these sLllfaces

was

by conventional

y ok e a nd r ud de r,

although

theywereactually linked by three

signal channels:

the

twoelectricalones are

notated

green

and

b lu e a nd

the

third

labelled mechanical. Each

oft he

electrical

channels

had i ts power suppli es deli vered

by their

ow n i nverter, colour-coded

to

m atch t he channel .

Each electrical

chan-

nel generat ed a si gnal via a synchro t rans

m it t er, referred t o

as

a r es ol ve r, t o

the

PFCU s servos. Each

o f t h e

flight control

groups,

the

middle,

outer

and

inner

elevons

and

the

rudders operated t hrough i ts ow n

resolvers; those

handl i ng t he

wing flight

control

providing

the

relevant mixing for

the

pitch

and

roll senses.

The mechanical

channel

coul d also t ransmi t

the

relevant

pilotcontrol inputs

t o t he

PFCU s servos;

thiscircuitbecame

declutched when

either

o f t he

electrical

channels

was engaged.

When

the

mechanical

channel was

engaged

its inputs were delivered to

the

PFCU sser

vos via l inkages and cabl es t hrough a rel ay

jack incorporated into

the

ci rcuit t o com

pensate for linkage inertia. As

the

elevons

were dedicated to

both

pi tch and rol l axes,

the

system required a m echani cal m i xi ng

unit

which was located downstream

of

th

pitch and rollrelayjacks.Builtinto

the

mix

ing

unit

was

the

capabilityto limit

the

range

of m ovem ent of t he i nner

elcvon sections,

which, in turn, minimized

the

aerodynam

ic

interference

of

thesesections

o n t he

fin

and

rudder, thusreducing

the

yaw

moment

in

the

roll sense.

The

maximum range

of

each set

of

elcvons through

the

front and

rear m ixeruni t sw asset

at

15 degrees fully

up and

17

fully d ow n in pur e p it ch ,

although

there was

an

override facility to

fullyup whichwouldgivea deflection

of 17

degrees, should

the

si tuati on w arrant i t.

This,

however, required some application

of

force to move

thecontrol

surfaces. In

the

roll sense

t heout er

a n d t h e

middle

elevon

secti on coul d m ove 20 degrees

each

way

while

t he i nner

sections werelimited

to 14

degrees each

way The

rudder had its limits

set

a t 3 0

degreeseach way The mechanical

stops

at

the

elevon

PFCUs

limited

the

inner

elevons

to 19

degreeseach

way

while

t h e o t he r

s e ct io ns w er e l im it ed t o 2 3. 5

degrees in

either

direction.

The

hydraulic

systems

that

normally supplied pressure to

the

PFCUs, relay jacks

and

artificial feel

unit s w ere

the

green

and

blue circuits,

although

in

t he event of ei t her

a bl ue

or

a

green system fail ure

the

yel low ci rcui t

coul d besw i tched i n,

although

its applica

tion

was limited

to

the

PFCUs

a nd t he

relay jacks only.

Select ion oft he

hydraulic

syst em s w as carri ed

out

using

the

servo

controls panel.

The m on i to r in g o f t h e

flight

control

systemscovered

the

behaviour

oft he

ight

control

inverters,

the

pressure

w i thi n t he

hydraulic systems,

operation

of

the

servo

controlsand

the

operation

oft he

electrical

controlchannels. Shouldthere

bea failure

in

o ne o f

t he control channel s, t he

moni

toring

system would

automatically

switch

over

to

t h e n e xt

available

channel.

Also

monitoring

the

behaviour

o f t h e

aircraft s

flight

controls

was

t he com parator

which

observed

t he i np ut o f e i th er t he p il ot o r

t heaut opil ot andt he

resultant

control

sur

face displacement.

Shoul d t here

b e a d is

agreement between

the

control channel s

the comparator

defined

the

suspectbefore

s wi tc hi ng o ve r t o t he

good

channel,

although

thiswas negatedshould

there

be

a h ig h r at e

o f c o nt ro l i np ut o r t he

flight

control

surface feeds back

inaccurate data

due

to

the

sudden

application ofh

igh aero

dynamic

loads.

Further protect ion

from

over-control was provided by

t he neutral -

ization system

which

engaged in

the

tran

sonic speed regi on

at

high

indicated

air

speeds

and

locked

t h e o u te r

elevons

into

the

neutral position

a t V MC

plus 25kt .

When

i t w as safe for

t he out er el evons

to

be re-engaged

there

w as a t i me-del ayed

transition

before t hey becam e operable,

thus reducing

t he chances of

airframe dis

turbance.

This

protection systemwasavail

able only t hrough

the

blue

a n d t h e

green

electrical

channel , not

in

the

mechanical

channel

selection.

The

relay jackswere twin-ram,electrohy

draulic

actuators

whose ram displacement,

di rect i on and

speed

were

controlled

by a

spool valve. A s

each

spool

valve

was

con-

trolled

by

b o th t h e

blue

and the green

hydraulic

systems,

there

were

indicator

l i ght s for

each

relay

j ac k a n d

its

p a ir o f

hydraulic

systems;

t herefore, should t he

spool valve lock upforany reason,

the

alter

nate,

hydraulic

syst em w oul d

t a ke o v er

operation

oft he

relay jackwhile

the

affect

ed sel ect or valve w as shut, t hus removing

hydraulic power from

the

jammed circuit.

This

fail-safe ensured

that

anyjammedrelay

jack would

not

affect the operation

of

the

fli ght cont rol system. Movi ng

the

actual

control sUlfaces was

the

purpose

of

the

PFCUs.

These

weretwin-ram actuators

that

were also controlled in a similar

manner

to

the

rel ay j acks, via a spool val ve. Shoul d

t here be

an

indication

of

a spool valve jam,

the

defective side

o f t h e

valve would auto

matically switch

out

t o l eave

the

working

side

oft he

systemin operation.

Integrated into

the

ight

control

system

was

the

auto-stabilization system whose

other

purpose was

to

minimize

the

effect

of

turbulence and

reduce

the

resulting flight

path

disturbance following

an engine

shut

down. The autostabilization system

con-

sisted

of

two separate

channels

for

each

control axi s, t hus

maintaining

control of

pitch,yaw

and

roll. Each

channel

for

each

a xi s c ou ld b e s el ec te d

by an

individual


This view alongthe wingtrailing edge

shows

the

location of

thethrust

reverserbuckets

in

the

up

position nlike most

other

aircraft the

augmentor

assemblies areshaped

to

conform

to

theshape ofthe nacelle box

instead

ofbeing round Adran alconer

Whenthe system

hydraulic

pressure is

fullydissipated

theelevonsdroop

against

their limit stops

as shownhere otethe

staticdischarger wicks on

theouterelevon

section and

the

open rearservice

door

Helo oelho

83



l I ,, ,

_

FLYING THE FASTEST

IRLIN R

FLYING THE FASTEST IRLIN R

Communications

Given

that

Concorde

w as a hi ghl y

plex ai rcraft i t should

come

as

no

su

to

find

that

it was fitted

withan exte

range

of

communications equipment

basi c syst em consi st ed

o f VHF a n

radios,

SELCAL, ATC

transponder,

phone

systems

to

the

groundservice

and the

cabin/galley

and

passenger ad

systems. Also

partof the communic

suit e w as

the cockpit

voice recorde

stalled

s

a safety m easure

a nd mat

recoru should

an incident

occur.

The VHF

suitecomprised two ide

radio installations

which

are provid

cover the 118-135 .975MHz

freq

range,

there

being a 25kH z

channel

ing

betweeneach

selectable

channe

H Fsystem w as si mi l ar t o

theVHF

i

ittoo had twoseparate installations

provided single side-band

and

ampl

modula ted operat ion to

give t w

communications

at

2,182kHz

and

2,800kHz-25MHz

band.

The SEL

SELective

CAlling

was us ed in

junction

with

the

aircraft s

VHFan

radios

and permitted

a ground

s tat

FUELTRANSFERFORWARDFOR RAPIDDECELERATION

FUELTRANSFERAFTFOR TRANSONICACCELERATION

FUELTRANSFERFORWARDAS SPEEDREDUCES

twochannels, with No.1 s

the

primary and

No.2

in

synchronized standby mode.

The

super stabilization function became active

when the

angle

of

at tack exceeded 13. 5

degrees; this

in

t ur n g en er at ed a d ow n

e1evondeflection through

the

pitch autosta

bilization

channel,

this being proportional

to

the

angle

of

attack,

the

nose-uppitch rate

and

the

aircraftdecelcration.

The

deflection

of

theelevonswaslimitedto 8 degreesdown

and 0 degreesup-e1evon.

Should the

flight

control

system experi

ence

any form

of control jamming there

was

an

emergency system

that

operated in

both

pitchand

roll axes.

The operation of

the

emergency

fl

ight

control

system was

via

strain

gauge bridges

within the control

yokes

which

measured

the

p i tch and

roll

forces

generated

against

t he j am

by

the

pilot. When a

control jam

was

detected

the command

signals were

inpu t d i rec t to

the

electrical

fl

ight

control

systems. It

shoul d be

noted

that

there

were

no

emer

gency flight

control

funct i ons i n

the

yaw

mode.

When

the

emergency flight

control

s ys te m w as e ng ag ed

the control

forces

experienced

were similar

to those w ith the

artificial system disengaged.

L _L

L 6 ~

Fur th er p ro te c ti on

for

Concorde

throughout varyingangles

ofattack

waspro

vided

by the

high-incidence protection

sys-

tem, comprising

an

i nci dence t ri m m ode, a

st ick shaker and

the

anti-stall system. The

incidencetrimmode was integrated into

the

automatic pitch stability correction system

and operated

at

angles

of attack

above II

degrees. Should

the

n os e r is e a bo ve 1 6. 5

degrees, a stick shaker operated

on

the

cap

tain s control yoke, although the

input

was

felt acrossboth yokessince theywere inter

connected

via mechanical linkages.

The

st ick shaker gained i ts i nput signals from

either channel of the

airdata computer,

s

needed.

Cancellationofthe

stickshaker was

possible

by

pushing

the

c on tr o l y ok e

through

the

trim neutral position. Protect

ing

Concorde

from lOsec after take-off w s

the

anti-stallsystemwhich cameinto play

at

270kt.

When

the

aircraft reached a high

angle

o f a tt ac k t he

anti-stall system aug

m ent ed basic

pitch

st abi li zat ion w it h a

super-stabilization function

that

generateda

posi ti ve w arni ng t o

the

crew duri ng

the

approach

to

very high angles

of attack

via

the

artificial feel unit. As

the

anti-stall

sys-

t em wa s v it al t o p ro te c t C o n co r de , i t h ad

Duringthe

flight

phases the engineermonitored

themovementof fuelbetweentanksto achieve

the levels oftr im shownhere Shouldthe need

arise there was an emergencyforward trim

selectionavailableto thepilots Colecton

This gaugewas o ne o f

themostimportanton

thefl ight deck It

showed thepositions

ofthe

flight

control

surfaces the hydraulic

systembeingused for

operation and thee g for

theaircraftat anygiven

moment

Colecton

pitch

trim selector

on each control

yoke

or

via

the

autotrim

whenthe autopilot

was

engaged.

oncorde w as also provided w it h auto

maticpitch stability correction whichcov

ered four separat e m odes.

The

first w as

M ac h t ri m w hi ch

came in to

play during

transonicflightwhen

the

aircraft s

centreof

pressure moved rearwards, reducing pitch

stabil it y. T o restore t hi s,

the

M a ch t ri m

function automatically signalled

an

up

e1evon

demand

which

w s

related

to

any

Mach

number

betw een 0. 69 and 1.34.

The

s ec on d m od e wa s i nc id en ce t ri m w hi ch

compensated for changes

t o t he c en tr e o f

pressure w hen t heai rcraft al t ered i ts angl e

of

attack.

This

m ode began operat ion at

1 0. 5 d eg re es a nd r ea ch ed i ts m ax im um

point at

19.5.

This

m od e a ls o h ad a s ec

ondary purpose

in

that

itwouldincrease

the

st ick force required t o reach high angl es

of

attack; thus

s the

nose-up angle increased,

the

i nci dence t rim appl ied a nose-dow n

pi tch t rim . A s

the

speed rose, pitch stabili

t y correcti on

w s

introduced, integrated

with

the

Mach trim

channel

and

automat

ically signalled

an

up-e1evon

demand

relat

ed to

an

airspeed

input

betw een 200 and

600kt.

When the

aircraft passes

i nt o t he

supersonicpart

ofthe

flight envelope a fur

ther

speed t rim m ode

came

into play, pro

portional to

the

Mach number.

The

auto

pi tch stabil it y correcti on m odes w ere also

activated

when

autopi lot Mach t rim w as

engaged.Should there bea failure

or

disen

gagement

of

both electric trimsystems,

the

a ut op il ot s ys te m w ou ld a ls o d is en ga ge ,

although thiswasnegated should

Concorde

be below 100ft JOm).

envelope

the

pitch

artificial feel

main

tained

a

constant

loadfactor,wh

i e

the

roll

artificial feel

channel

kept a

constant

rela

tionship

between

the

rate

of

roll

a nd t he

control-wheel

force

during

the

full flight

envelope.

The

yawartificialfeel limits were

governed

by

the ruddcr requirements

matched to

the

aircraft s structural limita

tions.

Should there

b e a f ai lu re i n

either

the

blue

o r t he

green hydraulic system

or

e it he r o f t he

air

data computer channels

there

would be a corresponding loss

of the

artificial feel system

channel. Such

a l oss

would cause

the

system

to

defaul t auto

matically

to

the

back-upsystem. It should

be

noted

that

failure

of the

No.2

Channel

in

standby

m od e h ad n o e ff ec t on

the

behaviour

of

the

arti fici al feel syst em .

Integrated

intothe pitchchannel

artificial

feel was

the

stick wobbler

func t ion of the

a n ti -s t al l s ys te m; t hu s i t wa s a p ri ma ry

requirement

f or t hi s

channel

to

remain

operable

at

all times.

Concorde not

o nl y h ad fuel s ys te m

trimming

available,

the

flight

controls

w er e a ls o f it te d w it h a

conventional

trim

syst em avail abl e for roll , yaw

and p i tch

axes.

The operation

of

the

trim system

cancelled

the

load

of the

artificial feel by

altering

the

feel

datum,

w hi ch , i n t ur n,

altered

the

neutral position

o f t he

flight

controls.

The

t rim syst em fi tt ed

to

the

pitch channel

w as el ect ric i n

nature and

comprised two separate

channels.

During

norma l o pe ra ti on b ot h

engaged, w i th

No.1

channel having

authorityand

No.2

being

maintained

ina synchronizedstand

by

cond i tion. Control o f the

electric trim

system was

either

by

the

pilot using

the

F

f jl l

i tc h, a ll w er e e ng ag ed

during

normal

ation, although Channel

1 was

the

ary while

Channel

2 w as i nsynchro

standby

mode.

The

autostabilization

generated

si gnals i n pi tch, rol l amI

s

a function

ofthe

aircraft s speed

and

number

from

the AOC. These

sig

independently

supplied

through

electrical

channels

d ir ec t t o

the

servos,

although there

was

no

feed

t o t he

p il ot . A s we ll as

the

basic

abilization functions,

the

system

provi ded a roll /yaw

turn co-ordina

function

that

reduced side-slip angles

l ow er speeds i n response t o l argel at eral

demands.

The

autostabilization

N o.1 w as normal ly l i nked t o

the

e el ect ri cal

channel , a l though

this

d switch across

to

the

green

control

in

theeven to f

a failure. A similar

ess alsogoverned

the No.2

autostabi

na si mi l ar

manner to the

other

control

o n Con co rd e, t he

artificial feel

alsooperated

on

two separate

chan

pitch,

r oll a nd y aw a ll b ei ng

con

ed byindividualswitches. During nor

aircraft

operation

allsix feel

channels

re engaged,

although Channel

I for

s

the

primary.

The

mechan

unitthat

controlled

the

range

of

move

availableto

the

pilot

was a spring rod

increased

the

control

stiffness

in

rela

to

the

aircraft s speed.

The Channel

I

s were powered by

the

blue system

anu

theNo.2 Channel

were fed

by

the

en hydraul i c system. Jack syst em pres

es were governed by speedsignals gener

by

the

AOC.

Throughout

the

flight

84

85





IRD T

PRO E

and mechanical springs. The nose a

b ly h a d

three

positions: up

a n d l o ck

degrees deflection and fully d ow n a

degrees. The n o se w as h e ld in the up

tion y two mechanical uplocks, at

degree

point

tw o ja ck s

and their in

l oc ks h el d i t i n p la ce a nd t he fully

r o si t i o n w as ach i ev ed by

the

u

hydraulic pressure,

aerodynamic

load

weight. O p er a ti o n o f t h e nose and

came from the greenhydraulicsystem

alsosuppliedpower to release

the

nos

visor

locks.

S hould the

g r e en s ys tem

c ou ld b e r ep la ce d

y

the yellow sy

although its input w as limite d to lo w

the

nose

and

visor,

the

former req

assistance from the assembly s weigh

aerodynamic forces s in ce t he hyd

p o we r r e le a se d only

the

locks. S

there

b e a to tal h y dr a u lic f a ilu re

the

could

b e r el ea se d by a

mechanical

r

o n t he

flight deck.

This

released the

and

allowed

the

nose

to dror t o t

degree rohlt, a t t he same time this o

tion alsoreleased

the

visor which wa

e r e d in s e q ue n ce ,

WE THER

R D R

PITOT

HE D

Nose Operations

glideslope. When the f irs t f o ur w er e a c ti

v a te d , a r ed f las h in g lig ht w as illuminated

accompanied

y

an

audible

whoop,

whoop pull up .

When

mode five was acti

vated

the

warning was aural onlyand con

sisted

o f t h e

wording glide slope .

Concorde w as a ls o rrovided with a

weather radarsystem comprisingduplicat

ed radardisplays, transceivers

and

a s ing le

radar

antenna,

managed

through

a s ing le

control unit. The r a da r s y ste m p r od u ce d

continuous

information on

the

approach

ing

w eather and

c o uld b e u se d f or

ground

mapping if required. The radar scanner

a ng l e c ou ld b e a dj us te d t o match

t h at o f

the

nose droor angle.

The

droop nose andslidingvisorensured thatthe

flight

crew

had areasonable sight

ofthe ground during take off and landing. Colecton

The

droop

nose assembly was required

on

Concorde

to a llo w g o od v isib ility during

landing

and

take-off. The visor was main

tained

in

the

up position y a

mechanical

uplock, while thedow n position was main

tained in p o s itio n y hydraulic pressure

in c id e nc e . To e n su r e

that

there were no

discrepancies in the data provided, each

of

the

ADC units cross-checked for

any

dis

parity.

The actual navigation was handled by

three

separate

INS

s ys tem s w h os e ta sk s

were to

provide navigation,

heading and

rlltitudeinformation. The No.1 system pro

vided d at a t o

the

le ft d a sh p a ne l and

the

AFCS

N o .J

andN o.2 [N S

did

the

samefor

the right-hand panel andA F C S No.2. The

th ird p latf or m h a d

the

capability to trans

fer

data

to

either

d a sh p a ne l,

although

it

had n o i n pu t t o e i t h e r A F CS . Each o f t h e

INS p latf or m s h a d a p r og r a mm in g m o d u le

in

the centre

c o ns o le w h ic h c o uld b e u se d

to r e trie ve

data

in d igital f or m

and

loa d it

for any desired route. On the ground, the

[NS p latf or m s to ok 1 5 min to a lig n , th is

b e ing in itia ted y a m od e s e le ct o r u ni t.

There

was

o ne M SU

for

each

platform,

th e se b e in g o n t he flight engineer s panel.

O nc e t he

s e le c to r h ad b ee n operated in

navigation

mode

it needed

not

be

operated

again unless there was a failure o f t h e [NS.

Protecting the

AFCS

platforms was a com

parator

able

t o d e te c t w h et h er t h er e

had

been a n [ NS f ailur e; s h ou ld th is happen

t h e r e le va n t A F CS o r [ N S would discon

nect

and d is pl ay a w ar n in g t o

the

crew.

S hould there

b e a f a ilu re

o f t h e

No.l

INS

to the captain h e w as a b le to s w itc h to the

No.2 system to regain data; a similarfacili

ty wasafforded

t o t h e

first officer.

Also aboard Concorde w as a duplicated

radio navigation s ys te m w ho se p ur po se

w as t o give bearings to

t he V OR or t he

A D F beaconor thedistanceto the nearest

A D F b ea c on , localizer and g lid e s lop e

indications. Other systemsavailable to

the

crew included

the

horizontal

situation

in dic ato r , w ith in p uts f r om t he V OR , t he

ILS a nd t he [NS. At low level

Concorde

was

protected

by t wo

independent

radio

altimeters

that yielded

low-altitude

infor

mation in the range 0-2,500ft 0-760m).

This

system was integrated into

the

auto

matic landing

system

a n d t h e

low-altitude

flight system. To

e n su r e t h a t t h er e

was

no

hidden f a ilu re , th is m o s t important of sys

te m s w as monitored

three

times per sec

ond. S upporting the

radio

altimeters

was

t he g ro un d p ro xi mi ty system which

warned

of

any impending c o llis io n w ith

the

terrain.

T h i s h a d

five

warning

modes:

an ex essive rate o f d es c en t , ex essive

ground closure rate, loss

of

altitude below

700ft 214m) a f ter ta ke - of f , c los e ne s s to

t h e g r ou nd

with

the

a irc r a ft in

landing

configuration and a d u ck u n de r

of

the

Each fl ig ht- d ec k a u dio s e lec to r

ranel

provided integration

o f t h e

radio

commu

nications and r a dio n a vig a tio n s ys tem s

and

the

crew s interphone network. The

flight

interphone

system allowed commu

nications

between

the

flight crew

stations

internally and between t h e s t at i on s a n d

the groundcrew handling

connection

m ou nt ed o n t he

n o se la n din g g ea r.

The

flight interphone system could under some

circumstances be connected to the service

interphone

system. The latter was provid

ed to

allow

communication

betweenflight

c r e w s ta tio n s a nd c ab in c r ew s tatio ns .

The system also permittedcommunication

b et w ee n c re w s t at i on s

a n d b et w ee n

all

i nt er na l a nd e xt er na l c om mu ni ca ti on

points.

Another

system available t o b ot h

flight a nd c ab in c re w was

the

public

address system. The P A c o u ld b e

orerated

from

the

flight

d ec k a nd t he t hr ee c ab in

attendant roints

in

the

passenger cabin.

This

a llo w ed a ta pe r e p ro d uc e r

to

be

con

nected and thus routine announcements,

such s safety demonstrations, c ou ld b e

played automatically. Similarly,

announce

ments

which

c am e i nt o

play

w he n t he

emergency oxygen masks weredeployed in

the passenger cabin c o uld b e p lay ed a u to

matically

it

couldalsobe used to broadcast

music .

On e later a d di t io n t o t h e c o mm u ni c a

tions s u ite w as

the cockpit

voi e recorder

C V R ) w hi c h

recorded

any communica

tions from t h e c a pt a in , t h e first officer or

the

flight engineer

on

to ta pe . I n addition,

t h e C V R

recorded

any

verbal

communica

tions generated through the b o om m icr o

phones, regardless

of

any communications

switching,

and

any f ligh t-d e ck n ois es

p ick e d u p y

an

area

microphone.

iven the speed

of

Concorde it is hard

ly

surprising

that

its navigation system was

extremely accurate. The system included

both ground-dependent and independent

position-indicating systems, which dis

played data

t o t he

crew.

This

information

was provided

y

the air data system whose

inputs

came

from

the

ADC

No.1

and

2

computers. These, i n t ur n, g ai ne d their

data

from

thepitot

probes for total pressure

and readings from t h e r e le v an t sensors:

temperature from the temperature probe

sensors, droop n os e a n gle f ro m

the

trans

mitter units, static pressurefrom the static

ports and aircraft weight from the FQI

selector a n d t h e e.g.

channel

selector. Each

o f t h e A D Cs

h ad a

built-in servo monitor

whichchecked for altitude, airspeed, Mach

n u mb e r, te m pe r a tu r e, v e rtica l s p ee d and

chimew hich

repeated

every

5sec

until the

c a ll w as a n sw e r ed . A ls o f itted in duplicate

to

Concorde

was

t he A TC

transponder

system. The s e co n da r y r a da r enabled a

ground controller to identify the aircraft

anddetermine its height.

r

a p a r tic u la r a irc r af t; th is r e m ov e d

need for the pilots to

monitor

the

os continuously. When

SELCAL

was

a f las h in g lig ht indicated to the

t w hich communications

channel

the

a d c as t w as o n ;

there

was a

two-tone

communicationsbetweenthe cabinandthe fl ight deck

crew

this interphone

themaincabin was used.

drian

Falconer

view

ofConcordes nose

was

rarelyvisible to boarding passengers. Observation

alsthat close to thechine underthe

windows

arethesecondary sensorsthat

was drooped. Colecton

86

87




FLYING THE FASTESTAIRLINER

More on the Electrics

All

the equipmenton Concorde

re

a large

amount

of electricalpower;th

provided by four engine-mounted

g ra te d d ri ve g en er at or s IDGs a

hydraulically-driven emergency gen

for essential supplies under failure or

gency condi t ions. External ground

could be connected to

the

power dis

t ion system through a single-pointg

connection. The primary electricals

was a.c. ,wirh d.c. power from transf

rectifier unitsand batteries.

The

a.c. system normally had its g

power supplied from an external gen

during which operation itwas monito

voltage, frequencyand direction of ro

When ground power was applied, a

breaker closed, which directedpower

split system breakers,

the

bus t ie br

BTB rhen to the a.c. main bus-bars.

Concorde started its engines, the o

from

each lOG

was automatically di

to

the

a.c. main bus-bar as soon as

the

imumrequirements for voltageand fre

cy were reached and frequency synchr

tion had been achieved. Frequency c

for each

generator

was provided by

vidual

constant-speed

drive CSD

These

could be di sconnect ed i n

should

the

need arise; however,

the

could be resetonlyon the ground wi

relevant engine stopped. Each gen

was protected

at

all times by a faul td

tion system that trippedshould any lim

exceeded. EachlOG was connected

re la ti ve bus-bar v ia a generator c

breaker. All the generators could be

ated

in paral lel

and

i n any combin

between two and four outputs; i

arrangement the bus-bars themselve

then connected via the relevant BT

split systembreakers SSB . The SSB

nected the left-hand

main

a.c. bus-b

the right-handmain powersystem.No

ly

the a.c. essential bus-bars were po

by

the associated a.c. main bus-bars, h

er in

theevent

of

the

failure

of

a ma

bar, the emergency generator would

automatically and

connect

to

the

essential bus-barthus restoringpower

Should there bea failure

ofthe

p

electrical generators the emergency

generator would kickin.

This

hydrau

powered supply was driven. by the

hydraulic system and couldsupply e

power to maintain power to al l ess

services. This generatorwould start s

there be a total failure of any of

the

nosejacks

L

5

noseuplocks

isoruplock

aerodynamicloads

and gravity

OPPOSITE Thisshowsthe range ofmovement

selectablefor thenose droop mechanism the

methodof lockingthenose inpositionand the

position ofthe visorat eachpoint.

BBA Colecton

SUBSONIC

ND

SUPERSONIC FLIGHT

NOSE

ND

VISOR UP

I

FIN L PPRO H AND L NDING

NOSE DOWN ND VISOR DOWN

T KE

OFF ND INTERMEDIATE PPRO H

NOSE TO 5 DEGREES VISOR DOWN

droop nose greatlybenefited

crew

however undercertain flight

it

couldset up a disturbing

buzz

BBA Colecton

Safely ensconced inthe purpose buil t

dockat Filton thisfrontal

view

of Concorde

hasizesthe almostdart l ikeshapeof the

Adran

Falconer

88

89



FLYINGTHE

FASTEST IRLINER

FLYINGTHE

FASTEST IRLINER

CAPACITIES

RATED: 3 PERSONS

OVERLOAD:40 PERSONS

CAPACITIES

RATED: 36 PERSONS

OVERLOAD: 48 PERSONS

SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALIN

INTERMEDIATESERVICED

SLIDE AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)

REARSERVICEDOOR


FORWARD SERVICE DOOR

Concorde

was

reasonably

well

equipped

safetyand survivalequipment,although

chancesof itsbeingused would be slen

aftera lessthanperfectlanding.

BBA

Co

/

s u pp r es s in g a f ir e in its o w n

or t headj

engine bay. W h e n a n extinguisher w

charged, its contents weredispersed a

the

bay by nozzles

around the

peri

and

its operation c los e d a f ir e v lve

shut off the f lo w t o the air-conditi

primary and secondary heat excha

Further protection for

the

engine ba

provided by f ir e f la ps w ho se ope

sealed off the engine b ay to s ta r v e it o

gen. These normally acted as seconda

doors and engine-bay

vent

d oo rs i

engine firezone.

These

wereoperated

emergency

by

an engine shutdown h

in the c o ck p it. Pr o te c tin g the fuel

·

·

,

·

·

SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)

FORWARDPASSENGERDOOR

CAPACITIES

ATED: 4 PERSONS

OVERLOAD: 53 PERSONS

LL

SLIDE/RAFT PACKSCAN BEDISENGAGEDAT THE

DOOR

SILL

T OS E R V E A S R A F T S A N D F L OTA T ION A I D S

of simple temperature sensing elements

connected in s e rie s to f or m lo op s o n t he

engine-bay doors.

Their

primary purpose

w as t o

det ect hot

gas

or

a ir le ak s. Be yo n d

t heengi ne nacelles there were furthersys

tems, one l oc at e d i n each w ing le ad ing

edge and providing coverage

of

any hot-air

le ak s f ro m

the air-conditioning

system.

H a vin g d e te cte d a f ir e or high overheat

ing, there were four extinguishers available

forsuppressingany conflagration.

There

was

one

e x tin gu ish e r b o ttle in e a ch e n gin e bay

these beingcontrolled from the flight deck

by e lec tric al in itia tio n . Eac h e x tin gu ish e r

h ad t wo f ir in g h ea ds a nd w as c ap ab le

of

NOTE:THE FORWARDLlH SLIDE/RAFT

P K

C A N B E R E MOV ED F R OMI T S L OC A T ION A N D D E PL OY ED

THROUGH EITHER INTERMEDIATEPASSENGERDOOR


REARSERVICEDOOR

SLIDE/RAFT AUTO/MANUALINFLATION)

INTERMEDIATEPASSENGERDOOR

CAPACITIES

RATED: 38 PERSONS

OVERLOAD: 5 PERSONS

the

flight-deck overhead panel or

the

stew

a rd s p a ne l.

These

lights

c am e o n

auto

matically should there b e a f ai lu re o f t h e

d.c. essential bus-bar.

The emergency oxygen systems tted

p r ov id ed f or

both

crew

and

passengers.

The c r e w s y s tem w as o f t h e gaseous pres

sure breathing-on-demand type, the gas

for which w as h e ld in h igh - p re s su r e s tor

age cylinders.

Oxygen

was delivered

at

a

lowerpressure suitablefor human use

vi

a

control regulator which was operable u p t o

a cabin al t it ude

of

32, 000ft 9, 800m).

ove this,

the

crew were supplied with

undiluted

oxygen

at

a p r og r es s iv e ly in

creasing pressure, accordi ng t o

the

cabin

altitude. The p a ss e ng e r s ys tem w as s u p

pi i ed f ro m

three

cylinders vi a s ys te m

control panel. Regulation o f t he g as w as

m ai nt ai ned at 40psi 2.8kg/sq em)

vi

a

distribution panel that

had

an emergency

override to d el i ve r a p re ss ur e

of

90psi

6.3kg/sq em) if required. N o t o n l y could

the passengersystem be used for emergen

cies, there was a medical/therapeutic point

in

the

passenger cabin, this

having

its own

mask. The emergency p r es s ur e w as s u p

plied automatically should cabin al t it ude

exceed 14,000ft 4, J00m ) and resulted in

the

passenger masks beingdeployed with

out manual intervention. The use offixed

point o x yg e n s y ste ms w as augmented

by

the provision

of

s om e por ta ble sets, which

a ll ow ed c r ew m em be rs

to

move freely

about t he cabin.

oncorde w as a lso protected from the

airman s greatest fear: fire in the a ir .A m u l

tiplicity

of

systems were installed

o n C o n

corde, thus

there

weresmoke

detection

sys

te ms in the air generation ducts as w ell a s

in the cabin and the freight holdarea. Both

audible and visual alertswarned the crew

of

any problems. The fire

detection

system in

t he engine bays consisted of a dual-loop

sensor which required

that

both loops must

detect a f ir e b e fo r e giving a w a rn i ng t o

the

crew.

This

ensured

that,

should

there

be a

f ailur e in one loop, no spurious warning

was indicated

and that

a f aile d lo op c o uld

b e s w itc h ed o u t, le ving

t he ot her

to p r o

vide cover

Supplementing the

fire detec

tion system was that covering engine over-

heating, although t hi s w as s pe ci fi c to

certain parts

oft he

engineand

not

general

like

the

fire detectors.

O ut si de t he

general

fire detection system in t he engine nacelle

there was asimilar double-loop system with

similar redundancy t o d e te c t a torching

f lam e. A f u rth e r

overheatdetection

system

w as lo ca ted in the nacelles; this consisted

cabin on the le ft- ha n d s id e. Em er g en cy

transmitter equipment in clu de d tw o r a dio

beaconsto the rear oft he forward cabinand

one

to the rear

of

the aftcabin.Should there

b e a n e ed f or th em , th e re w er e f ir st-a id kits

located

in

the forward, right-hand centre

and rear amenitystowages. As in other air

c r af t, e a ch p as se ng er h a d a life jac ke t u n de r

hisseat and a further sixwerecarriedfor the

use of infants; the c a bin c re w a ls o h a d lif e

jackets.

Other

equipment carried includeda

battery-operated megaphone,a fire axe and

cabincrew portable oxygen sets.

The slides a n d c o mb i ne d slides/rafts

could be used during

the

evacuation

oft he

aircraft; those d e s ig n ate d a s s lid e s/r af ts

c o uld b e detached f or u se a s r af ts , a n d t h e

slides wouldalso float, although they were

not

designed for long-term use. To supple

m ent t he

slides/rafts werea thirty-six-man

raft

complete

with

an emergency

pack; fur

ther emergency p a ck s w e re a v aila ble f or

use with

the

combined slides/rafts. To sig

nal

that

a

Concorde

was down, i t w as f it

ted

w ith tw o r a d io b e a c on s ,

each of which

was self-buoyant, dual-frequency and bat

tery-operated. The e s ca p e r o pe s c o uld b e

used inseveral waysto assist

the

passengers

and

crew

to

e sc ap e f ro m a

di t chi ng or

a

c ra sh l an di ng . D ur in g a n y e m er g en c y

there were e m e rge nc y lighting systems

available

that

c o uld b e a r me d f ro m

either

This

view

along

an ir

France Concorde showsthecurvesengineered intothefuselage

and wings by

the

aircraft s designers. Lookingto therear.oneof theaft access doors isopento allow thecabin t o b e

servicedbeforethe nextgroupof passengersboard. Bernard

Chares

automatically actuated at allstationswhen

ever the flight-deck control switch was set

to

the

on p o sitio n . I f a n e m er g en c y w er e

signalled,

the

crew, both flight and cabin,

had access to emergency equipment. This

included a torch

at

the flight engineer s sta

tions, smokegoggles forall three flightcrew,

p lu s a p o rta b le o x yg e n p a ck s tow e d in

the

miscellaneous equipment rack.

n

case of a

fire there w as a carbon dioxide fire extin

guisher,asbestos gloves and a f ir e a x e .Sim

ilar

equipment

w as s tow e d in

the

miscella

neous equipment r ac k a nd in rac k 215.

Should there b e a n ee d f o r them, ropes and

lifejackets werealso available.

The passenger cabin was equipped with

carbondioxide fire extinguishers at the

for-

ward, c e ntr e a nd r ea r le ft- ha n d d oo r s a n d

th e re w as a w ater /ga s e x tin gu ish e r at the

centre r i gh t- ha nd d oo r. S h ou ld t he re b e a

n ee d f or

Concorde

t o d it ch , t he re we re

ditching lines, one lo ca ted to b o th p o rt and

starboard in the centre amenitystowageand

in the f or wa rd a m en ity s tow a ge w as the

escaperope.Each

oft he

six cabindoorshad

slidepacksinstalledin them,those at t he for

ward passenger a n d c en t re doors also dou

bled as rafts.

Another

raft waspOSitioned at

the

rear

oft he

passenger cabin

on the

right

hand side. Emergency packswere in the for

ward amenitystore:two at the rear of the for

ward cabin and one m o re a t the rear

of

the

ough C oncorde

h as h ad a g en er al l y

p l ar y s af et y r ec or d i n comparison

subsonic a irc r af t, i t h a d ample safety

emergency systems and equipm ent .

u d ed in th is c a te g or y w e re

the

emer

evacuation alert

system,

emergency

equipment, passenger and crewoxy

supplies and escape equipment.

emergency evacuation alert system

aural

and

visual warningsfor

bot ht he

and the c a bin c re w, th is a ls o p e rm it

the c ab i n c re w t o o pe r at e the cabin

system

by

remotecontrol from

the

passenger door position.

The

indica

bleeper and a flashing

the flight compartmentand in e a c h

three vestibules. The warnings were

rearservice doorandthe cabin

windows

were

sizeto comply

with

American

Helo Coelho

on Safety

bus-bars or if N o s I and 2 engines be

in flight.

d .c. p o we r generating s y ste m w as

by f ou r t r an s fo r me r r ec ti f ie r

TRUs). Nos

l a n d 4 w e re p o we r ed

the a.c. essential bus-bars, while the

draw their power from

the

a.c.

bus-bars. The

on-board

battery

con

t e d t o e a ch e s se n tia l d .c. b u s- b ar

vi

essential main is ola te b r ea k er s a lso

power.

90 9



_

_

JL

-- -

,--

-

FLYINGTHE

FASTEST IRLINER

FLYING

THE FASTEST IRLINER

system waspowered

by

a two-bladedram

t ur bi ne w hi ch i n

use

w ou ld d ri ve

hydraulic pumps should

the

main po

plants windmilling speed be insufficie

drive

the

hydraulic and

the

electrical

tems in

theeventof

afour-engine flame

T o suppl y hydraul ic pow er for ground

vicing purposes there were twoelectric

driven pumps

that

would pressurize

bot

mainand

the

standbysystem.

The

green hydrauli c syst em sup

power

to

the

No.1

and

2

engine

air

in

ramp

and

spi

doors, plus

one

ram ea

the

power fl ight control s

a nd t he

jacks. It alsosupplied pressure

t o t h e

ficial feel,

one

No.l1

fuel

tank

p

droop

nose

and

visor, l andi ng gear,

wheel brakes, anti-skid units

a n d t h e

wheel steering jacks.

The

bluesystem

pli ed power

to

Nos 3

and

4 air

in

ramps

and

spill doors,

the alternate

for

the

power flying

controlsand

the

nate

feeds

to

the

relay jacks.

The

blu

tem

also provided

the

secondsupplyt

other

arti fici al feel

c ha nn el a nd

remaining No.ll

tank

pump.

Sta

power w as suppl ied by

the

yellow sy

which

could, i f needed, supply hydr

pressure

to

all four

intake

ramps

and

doors,

the

flight controls,

the droop

and

visor, landing-gear

deployment,

w

brakes

and

anti-skid, emergency

and

ing braking,

w ithout the

anti-skid sy

being operative, and nose-wheel stee

One ofthe

primarysystemsdriven

b

greenand

the

blue hydraulicsystemwa

o

C

G Co

5

56

f FWD

60

58

50 -

52

delivered it

to

the

blue system; pumps

on

N os2 and4 engi nes covered

the

yellow

sys-

t em . D uri ng norm al operati on

the

three

hydraulic systems operated

at

a pressure

of

4,000psi 280kg/sq cm ) and t here

was an

overpressure limiter

that

allowed for a max

imum pressure

of

4,500psi 316kg/sq cm).

T o p r ev en t c av it at io n

of

the

hydraulic

pumps

the

three systems reservoirs were

pressurized and there

was

an auxil iary air

compressor

that

coul d berun t oensure

that

the

reservoirs were pressurized before

the

engines started. The emergency hydraulic

IlIII

COLLECTOR GROUP

c= J

MAIN

T NKS

_ TRIM T RANSFER G ROUP

More on

the

Hydraulics

Hydraulic power was

a t t h e

heart

of

\ on-

corde operati on. It w as provided

by

three

independent

systems; two, blue and green,

acted

as the

primaries andthere

was

a yellow

system desi gnated for st andby purposes.

Each

o f t he

t hr ee was p owe re d by tw o

engi ne-dri ven pum ps per powerpl ant and

em ergencypow er came from a ram air t ur

bine.

The pumpsmounted on engi nesN os 1

and 2deliveredhydraulicpower to

the

green

system and t hose

on

N os 3 a nd 4 e ng in es

BELOW

The achievableMach numberfor Concorde wasdependent on the

c.g. location;thusthe two setsoffiguresare displayedon these cockpit

instruments. BBA

Colecton

Concordes fueltank system

was quitecomplicatedsince

some tanksactedpurelyin thetr im

roleand othersfed theprimaryengine

groups.Cross connection was possible

should

it

be needed. BBA Colecton

the

f li gh t e ng in ee r s f ue l

management

panel

and

at

the

refuel

control

panel dur

ing refuelling.

The

fuel gaugi ng syst em

supplied

datato

thecentral

dash

panel and

t h e m a na g em e nt a nd

refuel panels,

and

al so provi ded

tank

limit

control during

trim transfers

and

refuel s, as w el l as c.g.

data

at

the cockpit

panels,

Mach

limits

to

the

samepanels

and

warnings in

the

cock

pit

should

the

c.g. limits be compromised.

The

load

control

system pumpedfuel from

tanks

N os 9

and to i n to N o s 1 1 ,5 a n d

7

to

provide a rearwardc.g.transfer,

a n d t o

gain

a forw ard t rim , fuel w as t ransferred from

tank

No.ll

to Nos 9, 5

and 7. The

trim

tank contents

were preselected using

the

loadlimitselectors,

there

beingsettings for

tank

Nos

9, 10

and

11.

Any

fuel excess

outside

trimming

requirements was auto

matically transferred

to

N os 5 a n d 7 t an ks .

Since

t hi s wa s a v it al s er vi ce ,

the

trim

t ransfer syst em had

duplicated

electrical

control

circuitry whose No.1

channel

was

the

prim ary and

N o.2 monitored

it

and

w ould sw it ch i n i fN o.1 fai led.

The

c.g. was indicated in

the cockpit

by

three distinct channels. The

primary

one

was

the

main

channel

w hich drew i ts

data

from all

the

fuel tanks

and

used i t

to com

putethe

c.g.

Standbychannel

No.1 gained

its

data

from

the

tanks

o n t he

left-hand

side

o f t h e

aircraft

and channel

A

of

tanks

9,

to and

11. For

computational

purposes,

the

resultant

figure was doubled

and

pre

sented

to

the

crew.

The N o.2channel

took

its

data

from

t h e r i gh t -h a nd t a nk s

plus

channel

B

of

t an ks 9 , 1 0

and

11

and

pre

sented

i ts result s i n a si mi l ar m anner.

The

settingof the

c.g. limitsby

the

crewwas by

the

use

of

,bugs which defined

the

forward

and

aft limits

throughout

the

Mach

range.

These

were set

o n t h e M a c h me t er s

in

the

cockpitand

movedrelativeto

the

aircraft s

speed

and

c.g. range.

The

limits weredis

pl ayed by t wo separate

channels, one

was

contained

in

the

N o. 1 st andby e.g. pack

and

delivered

d at a t o t he

captain s posi

tion

and

the other channel

was

contained

w it hi n t he N o. 2 s ta nd by

e.g.

p ac k a nd

delivered its indications

t o t he

first offi

cer s

and

the

flight engineer s indicators.

S inceC oncorde

was sensitive regarding

i ts e.g., i t had a c.g.

and Mach

limit warn

ing system.

The

first level

of

warningindi

cation

activated as

the

set boundary l i mi t

was reached

and

should

the

set boundary

be breached.

The

warnings were initiated

through

the

standbyNos

1

and

2c.g. packs

andactivated

lights

on

the

master

warning

p a ne l a n d t h e

flight engineer s station.

The

main

transfer group

of

fuel t anks

i nc lu de d N os 5, 6, 7 a nd 8 t an ks , w hi ch

operated

in

sequence to reduce

the

disrup

tionto

the

aircraft sc.g. whilesupplyingfuel

to

the

engine collector tanks. The main

transfersequence

was

manuallyselectedand

used

the

pumps i n

Nos

5 a nd 7 t an ks ;

the

form er fed fuel i nto N o. 1

tank

via

the

left

h an d p um p a n d

N o. 2 t a nk

via

the

right

hand pump, while the latter

fed

fuel

to

No.3

tank

via

the

l eft -hand pump and t o

No.4

tank

via

the

ri ght -hand pum p. A s soon as

N os 5 a nd 7 t an ks h ad e mp ti ed , t he ir r ol e

was

taken

over

by

N os6 and8 t anks. B efore

N os5 and 7 t anks sw it ched out, t hey w ere

replenished by Nos 5A and 7A t anks.

The

t rim t ransfer system

was

u se d t o

redistribute fuel

in

the

t rim t anks andm ai n

transfer tanks so

that

t he c.g. c ou ld be

moved

to

its

optimum

position for take-off,

subsonic and supersonic flight.

Under

nor

mal operation,

the

system was automatical

ly

controlled from

the

engineer s panels;

however, there

was

a forward transferover

ride cont rol avai labl e t o t he pil ot s for

use

underabnormalcircumstanceswhichmight

requirea rapid transferforward

of

fuel.

To reduce

the

possibility

of

fume explo

sions,

the

fuel t anksvented i ntoa ri ng m ain

gallery which

then

fed ascavenge

tank

that

subsequent l y vented t o

the

atmosphere

through

the

rearfuselage.A scavengepump

autom at i cal ly removed any fuel

that

had

entered

the

scavenge tank

and

returned it

for reuse i nN o. 1 t ank.

When

flying

at

high

altitude,

the

aircraft s tanks werepressurized

to

between

1.2

and 1.5psi

0.08-0.llkg/sq

cm)

which prevented

the

fuel from boiling

off.

This

increased differential pressure was

required

to maintain

a

minimum

pressure

as

the

altitude increased.

Should

t he re be a

need for it, there was a fuel-jettison system

installed whichwaspart

ofthe

trim transfer

group;

the

dumping

of

fuel w as t hrough a

vent

pipe

at

the

rear

o f t he

aircraft. To

ensure

that

sufficient fuel remained for

the

engines,

the

system monitored

the amount

b ei ng d um pe d b ef or e s wi tc hi ng o ut . T o

combat the

possibility

of

aerat ion i n t anks

10, 11,6,8,

5 A a nd

7A, whose

contents

remai ned m ainl y st at i c duri ng

the

c1imb

o ut, t he re was a s pec ia l p ump i n

tank

No.

to

the

others used

the

built-in system

pumps.

These

de-aerated

the

f ue l i n

the

t anks, t hus reducing

t he c ha nc e o f

pump

cavitation

o r t ra ns ie nt s i n

tank

pressure.

Fuel

contents

were measured by

the

fuel

quantity

indicators

which

worked

through

capacitor-type gauging

channels. T hese

gave

indicationsof each

tank s

contents

at

the

purpose

o f t h e

fuel

tank vent

igni

suppression system.

This

used a flame

that automatically

triggered adis

ofagent

into

t h e v e n t

pipe

between

d et ec to r a nd t he

fuel t anks.

This

that any

ignition

o f t he v en te d

by any external

sourcecould

not

feed

t he

fuel tanks.

Further protection

provided by smoke

detectors

in

the

air

ducts

and

the

passenger

cabin

freight holds.

the Fuel

e the

design

of

subsonic aircraft,

the

system

o n C o nc o rd e

had

t wo func

the

unusual

one

being

to

provide

ing throughout the

aircraft s speed

The

f uel was h ou se d in

thirteen

t anks i ntegral

w i th t h e

wings

and

and

divided

i n t o t h re e d i st i nc t

engine

feed,

main

transfer

and

trim

Arranging

the

fuel in thesegroups

that

i t w asdel ivered t o

the engines

ow rates, temperaturesand pressures

t

y with

the

engines

operating

para

The

t rim group w as

the

means

of

and

adjusting

Concorde s

cen

of

gravity

throughout

the

flight

enve

and

also

compensated

for

the

differ

centres of

pressure

experiencedduring

sonic acceleration and deceleration.

fuelsystemalsoacted asa

heat

sink

for

heat

generated

by

the

hydraulic

a n d c a bi n c o nd i ti o ni n g a n d t h a t

by kinetic

energy. As

the

fuel

st ored i nseparate t anks, t his reduced

possibility

of

fuelsurges

a n d t h e

devas

effects

of

hydraulicdieseling. A fur

precaution

to

compensate

for

Con

s st eep

climb-out

a ng le was

the

system

which

ensured

that

air

tanks

did

not

become

a hazard.

o f t he

Olympus

engines

h ad i ts

f ue l f ee d f ro m a

dedicated collector

, butthere

was a cross-feedsystem

that

wed any

engine

orgroup

of

engi nes t o

i edfrom any

other

collector

tank.

r t h e

possibility

of

low pressure in

fuel l i nes

there

was

an

accumulator

delivered fuel

untilthe

pumpstook

the

slack. Between

the

low pressure

a nd t h e e n gi n e- d ri v en p um p

was

LP

protection

system

which

allowed

to

bypass

the

air

conditioning and

heat

exchangers in

t h e e v e n t o f

fuel pressure.

When

the

bypasscircuit

disarmed a

constant

flow

of

fuel passed

h t h e h e a t

exchangers.

92

93




indicators this w ou ld b e f ol lo we d b

audio

cancellation

at lBOkt otherwis

pulledundercarriage

circuit

breaker w

set

the

warning system off. Once

parts

o f t h e

checklist had been comp

the

a ir c ra ft w ou ld b e d ep re ss ur iz e

b e lo w 1 0 0 0 0ft

3,000n.). Once this

been

done

b ot h t he c ab in a nd

the

a

altitudeshould be roughly

the

same

w

fuel still

on

board.

While

this was

happen

ing

thecabin

crewwould

have

advised

the

passengers t o p u t o n t h ei r u ni n fl a te d life

jackets an

a c ti o n t h a t

they themselves

would

have

a lr ea dy c ar r ie d o ut .

These

actions completed, the

flig h t c rew wo uld

begin to discharge fuel and pull the circuit

breakers that controlled

the

ground prox

imity w ar n in g a n d l a nd i ng gear warning

High abovethe clouds a BAConcorde G BOAA cruisestowardsthe point

where

the

thrust augmentationcan be selectedto push

it up

toMach

2 BBA Colecton

Handling Emergencies

ri ls nd ribul tions

CHAPTER

FIVE

As well asdispensingmeals and drinks the

cabin c r ew w er e w el l v er se d i n the disci

p line s re la te d to

the

safety

o f t h e

aircraft.

Beforetake-off

the

cabincrew

went

through

t h e c u st o ma r y

safety

r ou ti ne a nd t he n

described what passengers m ig ht n ee d t o

do

in emergencies s uc h a s a crash-landing

or

a

ditching. T hey then

ensured that

the

passenger luggage

bins

we re c los e d

and

that

those marked

C R E W U SE O NL Y

RESERVE A L EQUlPAGE did

n o t c o n

t a in a n y

metallic objects

that could inter

fere

w i th t h e

flu x v a lv e s b y a

magnetic

dis

turbance. Part ofthe briefingalso concerned

smoking areas which wererestricted to the

passenger cabin zones and

the

flight-deck;

smoking was

not

allowed in

the

toilets

and

t h er e w er e h ar d- wi re d s mo ke d et ec t or s

installed to warn

of

infringements.

S h ou l d t h er e

be a need for

an

emer

gency

evacuation

all

the cabin

crewassist

ed. Once the aircraft hadstopped the crew

g u id e d p a ss e ng e rs to wa rds

the

forward

cabin

exits after

which

they we re to shep

herd

their

charges

c le ar o f t h e d ow ne d

m a ch i ne . S h ou l d n e it h er o f t h e

forward

escape slides beavailable

at

least

one

crew

member used

the

e sc ap e r op e i n

the

for

w ar d v es t ib ul e t o l ea ve

the

aircraft

and

a tt em pt t o

realign

any of the door

s lid e s/rafts for e s ca p e u sa ge . S h ou l d t h e

aircraft

have

t o d it ch ,

the

f l ig ht c re w

would

have

already

transmitted

a m a yd a y

w hich included the

disposition

o f t h e

crew

and passengers i n te n ti o ns o n landing

location and a description

of

any danger

ous cargo plus

t h e r e ma i ni n g q u a n ti t y o f

The outward

face

of Concorde

was

the

cabin crew movingabout, efficientlydeal

ing with

the

needs

o f t he ir

passengers.

Although

thissupersonic marvel was slight

ly cramped

in sid e b e ca u se its p u rp os e was

to achieve flight speeds above Mach

1

the

s e rvic e a b o ard it m o re

than

amply justified

the

p rice tag . In c lu d ed in

t h e t i ck e t

price

was a m e al

excellent in

every way.

Even surrounded by groundequipment

Concorde looked a purposeful sleek aircraft;

andits dramaticsweepsand angles are

emphasizedin thisphoto Nick Chalenor

landing gear.

This

consisted

o f t he

two

main gears

the

noseleg

andthe

tail bumper

wheels plus the geardoors. In the

e v en t o f

an emergency there weretwo standby sys

tems:

one

was

the independent

hydraulic

system

a nd t h e o th er

u se d a m e c ha n ica l

release and free-fall under gravity to drop

the undercarriage intothe locked position.

oncorde s braking system compriseddual

hydraulically-powered multi-disc wheel

brake units governed by an anti-skid sys

tem all being mounted on

the

main legs.

S hould there

b e a los s

of

primary hydraulic

p ower em e rge n cy b rak ing c o uld b e s us

tained

by

an accumulator which provided

pressure fora short period. The final under

carriage systemwas

the

nose-wheel steering

w hi ch w as e le ct r ic al l y c on t ro l le d

and

h yd rau lic a lly d rive n th rou g h

the

rudder

pedals a nd t he h an d wheels

on

the flight

deck.

This

then was

t h e c o mp l ex m a ch i ne

that

ourtyrocrew would fly for

either

British

Airways o r A i r France.

lEIT looking more like an insect with everythingout

anddown an ir France Concorde approaches

ParisCharles de Gaulleafter anothertransatlantic

journey BernardChares

BELOW: The endresult highabovethe clouds

BA Concorde G BOAG

flies on

its w y to alanding

at Heathrow

BBA Colecton

94

95



TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

-

- _ ~ - , - . . : . . .

: : : : ~ : : : ~ -

: :.,.,

~ : . _ - _ r : : : _ ~ : : : : :

.

.

.

.- ~ \ . -

. ,

_ ,) lAlR'/' . .

, , , _ C ~

..-

British Airways and Air

France

Test Crews

British Airways

Air

France

aptain

Sen io r Fl g ht Sen io r Fl g ht

aptain

SeniorFl ght

SeniorFlght

Officer

ngineer

Officer

ngineer

AR Meadows CJD Drebar WD Johnston

GJacob Metias Frot

HC

McMullen

BR Olver J Stanbrdege MGies R

Puyperoux

R

Duguet

AJ Massie MBannister

TB Dewis F

Rude

A

Col oc Cuechiaro

JD Eames oWhitton PEggington PDuda

Marchand

Roganbach

JD

Cook

WI

Smith

PJ Phi ps

M

Butel Holbecq Ranty

JC

Hutchinson CD

Green

DA

MacDonald

MCheme Chambr er Pouan

JLChorey

RJ

Tayor

JA

Rodger

MCaiat J

Marcot Diou

NA Britton BHoland

RC

Bricknel La anne Lor sch

ABanc

BO

Walpole

JRWhite

PLng GIe Gaes JC Delorme HPerrer

JW

Burton

PW

Horton

RN Webb Machavoine J Schwartz M Vasseur

J

Bradshaw

MRWithey TJ Quarrey CMarty Y

Pingret

PDuffey

AI Head

SG Foyd Lecerc

VVenchiarrut

KD Leney WD Lowe IF

Smith

PDuda BViale

J Hirst

KWiliiams

M Cooper J Franch

NV

Todd

BR Holand

WJ

Brown JL

Chatelain

BJ Calvert DC Rowland IV Kirby GDefer

DG

Ross

WJ Piper

PJ Newman AQui chini

CMorris B Irven W Dobbs

MA Riey

DG Mitchell

J Groatham

BAC

Test

Crew

BGT Tichener

BJ Calvert AA Brown

Pi ots Fl ght

Observers

JC McNeilley oCobey

SL

Bolton

ngineers

HJ

Linfield B

Harmer

F JE Lidiard

EB

Trubshaw

DFB Ackary

AADrver

JM Renda

AWinstanley

PP Baker

A

Heywood

RG Campbe

o

Brister

ASmith BG Watts

o

Corbyn

PAlan

GWikinson

CAA

J

Lowe

MBannister

the

emergency depressurization

ctorto be engaged.

All theseactions would happen ina very

d and would befollowed by the

briefingdelivered by the cap

This would be followed by the pred

ng checklist which required the seat

signs and no smoking signs to be on

the emergency lighting system

was

t t o a rm . The flight crew would then

in their final checklist which included

the

landing gear, nose and visor being in

the uppositionand the intakeramps at 0

percent, the ramp masters on manual and

the bleedand ditching valves selectedshut.

The

f inal cal l wou ld be to lock the sea ts

and power them down. Completing these

steps would lead to a descent to

OOOft

(305m) where the PA cal l of 'Take up

ditching positions' would be given to be

followed by 'Brace, brace' at 200ft (61m).

Should the PA systembe unavailable, the

96

When Concorde

touches down.tyre contact

generates alarge amount ofsmoke,

as

thisview

of

aBritishAirwaysaircraftshows. Alpha Echo

wears

the

Chatham

Dockyard

flagmotif

on

itsfin

and

rudder.

NickChalenor

s ame si gn al c ou ld be g iv en

by

cabin

signs. As the 50ft (ISm) altitude point

approached, the autothrottlewould bedis

engaged, the throttle sett ing being held

manually. At a signalfrom thecaptain, the

flight engineer would pull allengineshut

down handles . Hav ing survived such a

touchdown, the crew would begin passen

ger evacuation

by the

most convenient

door.

While

the flight crew were carrying

out their tasks and passing on instructions

to the cabincrew, theytoo wouldbe carry

ing out their own actions to prepare for

d it ch ing. Hav ing acknowledged the

instruction to prepare to ditch, thesenior

cab in c rew member ensured that col

leagues were fully aware of their duties,

a ft er which the passenger s were ful ly

briefed

on

the situation and the cabin

lightingwouldbe turned tomaximum.

The

cabincrew

then

secured allloose hand bag

gageand equipment, lockeddown the gal

ley trolleysand equipmentand turned off

the

galley electricalsystems. Since

the

fit

ting of lifejackets could be difficult with

small children, the

cabin crew needed to

do this, after which blankets and pillows

would begiven to passengers, who

by

then

would have been redistributed.

The

reason

for this

was

to placeable-bodiedpassengers

next to the disabled, the physically unsta

ble, children andyoungpeople. Before the

final stage of the descent the cabin crew

would check that the lifejackets fitted cor

rectly, the seats were in the upright posi

t ion, any h igh-heel shoes removed and

TOP:

Pictured soon after its maiden flight is

the

French

Concorde

prototype 01. F-WTSS. complete

with shorttail-cone later extended

to

improve

stability. Alongside is an Armstrong-Whitworth

Meteor ll of

the

CEV acting as a photo/chase

aircraft.

JA Todd Colecton

va

Lee Howard

ABOVE The next Concordeto fly wasthe British

prototype

G-BSST.

Typical

of

theOlympus engine

is

the

dirty exhaust. a problem thatnearlysaw

Concordebanned

from landing in New York.

Unlike

the

production

machines,the prototypes

hadan unusual paint scheme appliedfor

photographic recording

purposes.

BBAColecton

RIGHr. Although

muchof Concorde

waswhite. the

engine

nacelles and wingleading edges

on the

British prototype were paintedblack. The latter

had white photo-calibration

marks imposed

for

data recording purposes. BBA

Colecton



TOP:

Shockconesfromthe thrustaugmentorsfeaturestronglyin this

view

ofthe Britishpreproduction G-AXDN.

A closel ook atthe tail-cone underthe rudder reveals the locationof thebrake-parachute door.

BBA

Coecton

ABOVE: With everythingout and downthe French prototype F WTSS sporting theParis show number

375

comesin to land. BBA Coecton

FOLLOWINGPAGE

Thisdramaticangle emphasizesthe sl

ofthe Concordeairframe.Notethe def

upperrudder segment andpity thepai

applying the irFrance taillogol Bern



BonoM:A furtherchangein thecolourschemeforthe British

irw ys

Concorde fleet

s w themajor colours switch places. Thus thecheat line became red.

with

thespeedbird

incorporated attheleadingedge.thestylizedflag onthe

fin

became more pronouncedly

blue and the titling featured capital lettersfor bothwords. BBAColecton

OPPOSITE P GE

TOP WhenBritish irw ys accepted i tsfirst Concordes theyretainedtheir white overall

finish.over which

w s

applieda blue cheatline.Thefin sported ared-basedplay

on

the

UnionFlag.Thismachine is G-N94AD.registeredfor usein thecombined Braniff/B ritish

irw ys flights. BBAColecton

~ c > . z c : : r E J

Possiblythe mostunflattering aspectof theConcorde

its

first

position. with thevisor retracted;the angle

the dart-like appearanceof the aircraft. Adran Falconer

P GE

Concorde on thegroundat RAF Fairford which w s

as thetestbase.Althoughtheaircraft is thecentre of

ion the surroundingvehicles andground equipmentare

rthy.since theyare bedecked with the full range of

colours.

Adran Falconer



BELOW:

Only one BritishAirways Concordewas allocatedto theSing

Airlines run this being G N94AD buteventhis was half hearted as

Singaporeschemewas appliedto onlyoneside BBAColecton

···l

ABOVE: Caughtjust beforetouch down at Farnborough is thepreproduction

aircraft G AXDN The unusual markings were required for useby cameras

recordingthe behaviourofthe aircraft in f light BBAColecton

ELOW:

Captured on film in ew Zealand thisBritish Airways

Concordeglistens afterrecent rain

Rob

Nei

ir France Concorde

F BTSC

wearsthefirst and short lived originalcolour scheme;a

onewas carried by such aircraftas the Comet BBAColecton



97

This

vi w

of

an Air

France Concorde

shows

the

undercarriage

units

retracting as it leaves Paris.

The glow

ofthe afterburners can

just

be s e e ni n SierraDelta s jet pipes. P hi ppe Noret

either trapped

in thetanks, in thesumps

and

in

galeries. O

capacites

perengine

were

given

quarts 1281tr ,

of

which 11 1 0.5Itr)were usable

quarts [6.2Itr]

beng required

forstarting)

The

maxmumoperatng altitude of 60,OOOft

came

next,

aftermenton was made

of

the con

face range of movements the p io ts m an ua

source for these). The all-important Certificate

worthiness for Export/Certificat

de

Navigabi

Exportaton

carred aboard each Concorde w

toned

in

the nextparagraph,

these

being seri

bered

between 01 and

16. Ths

document had

referencenumber:ConcordeDocumentNo. 408

Issue 2, including

revision

1. Al modifications

out

by

British Airways

and

Air

France

and

app

t heCAAandt he DGAC

were

laid

out

in Air Fra

ument

No. AF-Ol-TSS,

t he indexof

Air

France

ed modifications

and

Civi

Aviaton

Authori

9/30/CDN

10FH, dated

15 December 1978. A

paperwork

needing to

be

carred

on

Concorde

the FAA Standard Airworthiness Certificate,

wh

based

on the

two

documents

issued by

the

Br

the

French

airworthiness

authorities.

Concorde s

certification was

based on FA

a)1

)I ) , which, in

turn, was

based

on

the

Angl

Supersonic Transport TSS Standards, as

defne

tents list No 29,dated

26

March 1976, porton

25

effective from February

1965 which inc

amendments

appropriate

to

a

supersonic

tr

p o rto n s o f

the

US Special Conditons for C

No.25-43-EU-12,dated

21

June1972,

pus FAR

The aircraft

was

approved with respectto opto

tification requirements relatng to ditching,

equipment and

ice

protection

that corresponde

25.801.25.1415 and 25.1419.

The

type certifica

appledfor

on

15 July 1965and approved on 9

1979

TRI LS ND TRI UL TIONS

Type

CertificationAir

Data

Sheet

No.A45EU

Ths t ype

certification

was issued

by

the

Federa Avia

tionAuthority on 9January 1979,

with

copies goingto

British

Aerospace

atWeybridge and

the

Bristol Division

and

t ot he

Societe

Nationale Industrielle

Aerospatiale,

at

37

Boulevard

de

Montmorency

in

Pars.

The first secton

descrbed

Concordeand included

the

fuels and o i s a va i a bl e f or

unlmited usage. These

included ASTM1655-57GradeJETA1 aircraft fuel, this

having the

French specification

AIR

3405 CIssue

4,

and

the

Britsh

equivalent being D.Eng RD2494 Issue 7; the

Canadian specification

was given

as 3-GP-23h. Ony

one

fuel additive

was

specifed as

mandatory: Shel

ASA antistatic additive. Others that could be added

included

anti-icing,

corrosion

inhibitors

or

a

combina

tion

pus

automate

yellow

for

u se in

fuel-system

leak

age detecton.

O

types approved for the Olympus

engines included t heproduct s of

BP

Esso,

Mobil and

Shel. and Esso

were

approved as t heonly

suppler

of

the

ois

required

for

the

integrated drve

generator.

Performance

specifications

concerningengine

limita

tons

were

the

nextdefned

items, theseincludedmax

ima concerning thrust outputsat several altitudes, such

as the maxmumoverspeed

of 110

percent beng

avai

ablefor only2sec.

O

systemparameters were thenset

out,

these

including temperatures and pressures, and

simiar dataforthe fuelsystemwas

lsted

next. The cer

tificate

then

laid

out the

flight

restrictions, these includ

ing

severa

speeds and altitudes, although many

of t he

fgureswere

to be found in the p io ts manual. Further

handlng data

was

also defned;this including

the

c.g.

range,

datum, maxmum

weights,

the minimum

crew

always the piot, the co-pilot andthe

flight

engineer),

t he m axm um

passenger

number andbaggage weight.

The capacites of

the

fuel

tanks

were

given

at

maxi

mum contents

with

aspecific densityof 6.68Ib/USgal.

Also

laid

down in

thistablewere the

usable

andunus

able

fuel

totals, unusable

fuel

being

that which

was

stowed seatbelts secured ties and collars

loosened spectaclesand dentures removed

a ll s ha rp o bj ec ts r em ov ed a nd

t ha t t he

bracingposition w s understood

by

all pas

sengers. The c ab in c re w s f in al a ct i on

would be to tu rn th e lig htsto d im a n d te ll

th e c a pta in that cabin preparation w s

complete; at thispoint theywould take up

theirown ditching positions.

The c ab in c re w we re a ls o t ra in ed f or

crash-landings. There a re two t ypes of

these unpremeditated and premeditated.

The

former

w s

defined

s

one

that

takes

placewithout warning such

s

duringland

ingor take-off and the latter is defined s

g iv in g a mp le tim e to p re pa re for e v ac ua

tion. Duringeitherof these themostimpor

tant

factor is t im e a n d thu s th e c a b in a n d

t h e f li gh t c re w a re d ri ll ed so

that

their

actions almost border

on

the automatic.

ny landing that could involve fire or the

breaking of the aircraft s structure required

that

the cabinstaffbe warned

s

quickly

s

possibleso

that

theycould evacuate

the

air

craft s soon s itcameto rest. Should there

bea landinginvolvinga hung-upundercar

ria ge leg th e c a bin c re w h a d to b e a wa re

that

the aircraftcouldeitherbe restingon a

wingtip or more awkwardly on its tail. n

eithercase a quick decision hadto be made

regardingthe deployment ofescapeslidesto

ensure that p asse ng ers c ou ld slide to th e

g ro u nd safely. D urin g a n igh t e v ac u ation

thecabinlights wererequired tobe dimmed

so that crew and passengers could adjust to

outsideconditions quickly.

BELOW Air France used essentially onlyone basicfinish on

its Con cordes.

This

was

based on the

tr icolour withthe

EU

star

symbol overthe flash on the

fin.

Here F-BVFB

prepares

to touch

downat snow-covered

Charles

de Gaulleairport.

Bernard

Chares

Instead of t he m ore rigid irlin scheme British Airways l t r

adopted

series of styles

as

ethnic .

That

applied

to

Concorde

was

based

on

the Chatham

Naval Dockyard flag.

to be one of t he m ore

popular

schemes. By

thetimethis

picturewas

taken

the

e s full titl hadbeen restored

to

the nose the previouslyapplied British having been

to criticism. BBA

Colecton



TRI LS

ND

TRI UL TIONS

TRI LS

ND

TRI UL TIONS

Magnificent

isthe onlvword thatdescribesthis

view

of a

Concorde leaving

LondonHeathrow on another flight to JFK Airport.

New

York. Colecton

Concorde G BOAA

with

i tsvisorin positionfor high speedfl ight;not longafter.the afterburners would

be

engagedand theaircraftaccelerateacrosstheAtlantic.

Colecton

also be e nobje c ting

to

the aircraft. A

ble reverse effect involving trade be

t h e U S A and the Europeans wasalso

as a pote ntia l c ons eque nce of such a

With

the way clear for ope r ations to

both Concordes

left their

home

ai

and headed

across

the Atlantic.

Although a triumph

of

technica

operational achievement,

the

total pr

tion

of

C onc orde s , inc luding proto

and preproduction

a irf r am e s, w ou ld

o n ly t w en t y i n a ll . The reasons b

s u ch a short run stemmed from

the

or

over-optimisticordering by foreign a

and a n ina c cur a te e s tim a te that

worl

requirements c o uld r e ac h 2 40 . I llu s

this is the Pan Am order p lac e d in

1 96 3 f or s ix

Concorde

S ST s, t hi s

goings upe r sonic ove r a ny pa r t o f t h e

t i nent al U SA .

Other

r a rt s o f t he j ud gm en t h

down

by

Coleman covered

many a

of C oncorde ope r ations; thus Britai

France w ou ld b e most careful to co

since

t he econom i c

impact

o n t he

tr ie s a m i thei

I

ai rI in es w ou

Id

be gri

should Concorde be banned from la

due to a ny inf r inge m ent. Should s u

event

happen i t w o uld , h o we v er , la

U S A o p en

to c laim s

of

favouritism

regard to their own airlines, w hi ch

completely and carefully avoiding

the

impact

t h at t h e

existing fleets

of

subsonic

airliners, pr oduc e d m a inly b y Bo ein g and

Douglas, were h a vi n g o n t h e

environment

due to their use

of

inefficient turbojet

e n gin es . I n

the event, Coleman

granted a

limited,

sixteen-month

a c ce s s f or

Con

c o rd e t o conduct scheduled flights to the

USA, beginning

on

4 February.

The

crite

r ia a s la id

down

allowed for two flights per

day

i nto John

Kennedy Airport

in

New

York and

one

p e r d a y into Dulles Airport

in Washington. Further restrictions placed

upon

the

aircraft

m e an t t h a t

it could

not

land

w it h in t h e U S A

earlier

t han 07: 00hr

nor depart a f ter 22:00hr local. In common

with the authorities in Br ita in and France,

America

w o uld a ls o ban

Concorde

from

det erm ine t he effects that s u ch a n aircraft

could have

on

the quality

of

the

human

environment.

Making

the

Europeans

joint

case

to William Coleman, Secretary of

Transportation, wererepresentatives ofA i r

France, British Airways, government offi

cials from

both

na tions a nd representatives

from

the

airframe

a nd e ngine m a nuf a ctur

ers. Standing in opposition was a collective

of e nvironm e ntalis ts w ho would

attempt

to p o rtr ay

the

Anglo-French

Concorde

as

a s i ng ul ar s ou rc e

of

excessive

pollution

that would poison North America, while

Routes an d Sales

etting to

this

momentouspoint

had

been

an

u p hill s tru g gle

since t h e A me r ic a n

a uthoritie s m a de s tr enuous efforts t o b an

the

aircraftfrom la ndinga nyw he r e within

their borders.

The

legislativetool employed

to confound t he A nglo-French

proposal

was t he N at ional E nvironment al Protec

tion

A c t o f

1969, requiring

that

a f ull e v al

uation

be presented

and

investigated

to

January 1976

at

1l:40hr

G MT , si m ul t a

neous departures took place

from

London

H eat hrow and Paris Charles de Gaulle air

ports. These were

not

ordinary flights since

the

stars

oft he

show were

both

Concordes.

possible t o o p en i t f ro m the passengerside

by a key This might s ee m l ik e a

point

of

vulnerability; however, there was al so a

mechanical

bolt,

an

o b se r va tion m irr o r in

the ceiling a n d a n observer-scopebuilt into

the door. By contrast, the toilet doors we

manually locked but could be

opened

from

outside by using a special tool.

Although much o f t he foregoing may

s e em like a catalogue

of

potential accidents

and

disasters,

the hardest battleConcorde

would

ever

f ac e w ou ld b e

t h a t o f gaining

permission to fly into New York. On 21

a

warning

light

that

flashed

amber should

the line pressure exceed 70psi 4.9kg/sq

cm). Once

the

pressure increased above

8 5 ps i 6 .0k g /s q

c m) t he w ar ni ng

light

should

go

out. Should t here

b e a f ai lu re i n

the oxygensystem there was a manual over

ride knob available

that

would mechanical

ly override the barometriccontrol, whichin

turn would pressurize

the

oxygen system.

This would be the case until the emergency

o ve rr id e r et ur ne d t o n or ma l.

The

cabin

crewwerefully briefedin the use

of

the oxy

gen system

under

emergency circumstances

and in individual cases where an

ill

passen

ger might require the gas.

oncorde h a d tw o d o or s f or p as s en ge r s

and

f ou r s e rv ice d oo r s. A ll w e re outward

ope ning,a lthough only the forward passen

ger and service doors had observation win

dows.

Other

doors

on

the aircraft included

an upperbaggage

compartment door

which

c ou ld b e a cc es se d f ro m the o u ts ide , a l

t h ou g h t h er e w as a means

of

opening the

compartment

from

the

inside by

an

emer

gency handle.

T h e o t he r hatches

covering

the lower baggage hold and other miscella

neous compartments couldbeaccessed only

from

the

outside.

The

flight-deck access

door

was electronically locked through a

striking plate controlled b y a s w itc h o n t he

flight-compartment roof panel; thisensured

that

only

the

c r ew c o uld open

the

flight

de c kdoor

from

the

inside,

although

i t w as

forwardpassenger cabin was in use, normal

ly only s ixtee n people were on board and

thus evacuation,

guided by

the

senior

cabin

crewmember,was

by

the left-hand, forward

door.

Once

the warning

of

a crash-landing

had been given those in the c a bin ne e de d

to

be briefed,

the

galley

equipment

t o be

turned off and the cabin dividers placed to

o pe n a nd t he doorways kept clear of such

th ing s a s the aircrews nav bags.

Once

completed,

the

l igh ts w er e s e t

at

dim

and

the captain

informed

t hat t he c a bin a nd

its

occupants w e re r ea dy f or c r as h -la nd ing .

Once

the aircraft had stopped, the selected

door

must

have

i ts e m er g en c y ligh ts

on,

after which the occupants could evacuate.

Not

every i ncident on b o ar d a n a ir cr a f t

involves collision with

the

gr ound; how

ever,

there

a r e oc c as ions

when the

emer

gency equipment needs

to b e u se d.

The

most likely i t em t o b e u se d is the oxygen

system, w hic h c om es into play when

the

cabin altitude

exceeds 14,000ft

4,300m).

When this happens the regulator pressure

is increased to 90psi 6.3kg/sq cm) and the

therapeutic v a lv e a lso opened.

O n ce t he

pressure line was

open

i t f o rc e d

the

pas

senger cabin m as ks t o b e presented and

provided a continuous flow of oxygen.

O n ce t he

cabin altitude stabilized below

10 OOOft

3,OOOm)

the

o xy ge n f lo w w as

reduced

to nor m al

pressure.

While

this sys

tem was in use the c r e w ne e de dto monitor

Possibly

the

most difficult

event to

deal

ith

is the unpremeditated crash-landing.

or there to be survivors the c re w n e e d t o

quickly and decisively. If time

is

avail

t he captai n

will

order an

immediate

a cu at io n o f t he

aircraft

and define

doors and e s c ap e s lid e s a r e to be

The unpremeditated crash-landing

is

announced over t he

PA

that

all

a r d m u st P r ep a re

for

crash-landing .

passengers are warned via ei t her t he

or

the

flashing

of

cabin signs t o s t ra p

in. On

t he d es ce nt t he

first

erwould call Brace,

brace or

flash

the

lights at 2 00 ft . E xi t d oo rs a re nor

until the aircraft c om es t o rest,

r w hic h

the

c r ew a re e x pe c te d t o h e lp

passengers to

e va cua te ,ha ving

defined

set

of

doors to use. The c a bin c r ew

t heir ow n duties to p e rf o rm b e fo r e a

similar t o t ho se for

ditch

thus

a ll l oo se i te ms

of whatever

need t o be s ec ur ed and stowed

y. Passengers are also warned about

and

other

items, afterwhich

cabin attendant

will

report that

passenger cabin is ready for the events

follow.

O n ce t he

a ir cr a f t h a s stopped

crew would operate o n l y t h os e doors

cted byfire

or other

hazard.

The

pas

ers would then be directed o u t o f t h e

a n d t h e crew a uthor iz ed to use rea

f or c e to ensure

t h a t t h e

evacuees

kept

moving.

As the

passengers

the forward door and i ts s lid e

would be urged to Jump, jum p,jum p ,

the

instructions for

t h e c e nt r e

r ea r d oo rs a re s li gh tl y m od if ie d t o

to the slide and jump .

When

assist

passengers down a

sl

ide

the

crew are

to

move

them

physically along,

only

below

shoulder

level,

the

foot

or

kne e c ould b e u s ed i n the small o f t h e

tip them down the slide. Although

slide down

o n t he

buttocks is

the

pre

means

of

departing,

to

hurry up

the

a n e je ction in any position is rec

Obviously the c r e w c ould

not

evacuat e t he

aircraft

o n t he ir o wn

s o a s s is ta n ce in

the shape of

four-able

ie d p e rs o ns w o uld b e needed to help

e of f the slide and awayfrom the air

O nce

all

the

passengers were clear,

c r ew m a ke

their

departure.

Not a ll f li gh ts i n Concorde w er e r ev

someflights were for training

delivery purposes. Since most

of

the

pa nts dur ing th es e tr ip s w e re a irc r ew ,

evacuation instructionswere complete

d iff e re n t. D u rin g th e se f lig hts only the

98

99





government i n to an 80/20

profit-s

scheme.

This

arrangement l asted

1984

when

the

Concorde

purchasede

finally completed.

Other

financial ar

mentscovered repaymentsto British

space and R oll s-R oyce t o cover de

ment and

support costs.

Although

Airways readily

accepted

these

to

them

from

an on-going

financial

co

ment

across

the Channel , the Frenc

shocked si nce t his

part o f t he Con

development

treaty

had been

overl

by

the government ;

after

much

shrugging

and procrast inat ion

the

eventually

pai d up.

Whi le t he

obli

fi nancial m anoeuvri ngs w ere going

number of product i on Concordes

still

being

used for

development

tria

;.

rilillh ~ ~ ; ~ J ~ ~ . -

.... . ~ : : ~

.

-- 2 t:::

H;

,,_a.

BAG-BFKWstartsitstaxi movementtowards theHeathrowrunways. Eventuallythe

aircraft was reregistered as G-BOAG.

BBA

Colecton

d is pe ns e w it h i t a lt og et he r.

The

deal

b etween t he

airline

and government

allowed British Airways

to

buy five

of t he

Concordes

for £16. 5 m i ll i on each, w hil e

theother

twoweresold for

the knockdown

price

of

£1

each

f o r a f le et

ofseven that

cost

the

taxpayer

£164mil l ion

originally).

Included i n

the

arrangement

were all

the

spares,

including

engines,

that

w ould be

needed

tooperate the

fleetfor

the

foresee

able future,

although

separate

contracts

were

negotiated

with Rolls-Royce, British

Aerospace, Aerospatiale

and SNECMA

fordesign

engineeringauthority and

major

overhaul

s up po rt . A

further

financial

advantage

was gained by British Airways

during 1978-79 when

an

outstandingdebt

o f £ 160

m i ll i on w as

converted

by

the

British airwa \

::

or

1 J;1.r:.

- .

-

-

. .

British

irways

Concorde G-BBDG

was

used for hot-and-highplus intake performancetr ials. hence the

special datummarkings on thefuselage to calibratethe tracking cameras.

BBA

Colecton

was

the

ten-yearsupportrequirement- nei

t her t he

British

nor t he

French negotiators

felt ableto offermore

than

a five-year block

f support;

the other

five years would have

to be renegotiated

to account

for

the

possi

bility

of

rising costs.

The

final phase

of

negotiations ended unresolved in February

1983,

the

very

month t ha t

Federal Express

had hoped

to

start theirnew service.

During

this periodBritishAirwayswere

operat ingtheir Concorde

fleetfullysubsi

dized by

the government , al though such

a

state

of

affairs, requiring taxpayers money,

could obviously

not

continue.

The subject

finally

came

to

a h ea d i n

the

first years

of

the

Thatcher

government , when

British

A irw ays w ere gi ven

t he o pt i on e it h er t o

purchase

t he Concorde

fleet

outr i gh t or

structural

strengthening w ou ld a ls o b e

n eeded i n

localized areas

o f t he cabin,

w hich w ould need t o w i thstand l oads up t o

9G.

A

II

the

cargo

nets

were stressed

to

absorb

the

s am e l oa di ng s; b o th n et s a nd

mounting

couldbe moved toaccommodate

vari ous l oads. Federal E xpress st ipulat ed

that

they would require three modified air

fram es, support ed by B rit i sh A irwaysfor a

period

of

t enyears, andadded t ot hi sw oul d

be

an

extensive support

contract

supplied

by Britain

and

France i n

which both

air

linesand manufacturers would be involved.

Although the

study

conceming the

struc

tural modifications

was

undertaken

success

fully,

the

negotiations for

the

supportcon

tracts

soon

ran i nto t rouble

and

eventually

brokedown altogether.

The

sticking

point

of

the

lease, the deal

fell

through. Allied to

manning

problems were those

of

sparesand

maintenance

costs and w hich part y w ould

foot

the

bill.

Eventually

British Airways

stepped

in

tooffera form

of

counter

propos

al

w hich required B A

to

supply

an

aircraft

andcrewsto

fly

the route

London-Bahrain

Singaporein

retum

fora share

ofthe

profits.

Only

a singl e ai rcraft w ould be i nvolved

and

i t w as

painted

in

Singapore

Airlines

colours

on the

port

side,

retaining

BA

colours

on

theother

side. By 1980this ser

vi ce w as

cancel led since

passenger loads

wereuninsp iringand, more importantly,

the

flights wereloss-making.

While

thiswas tak

i ng pl ace at tem pt s w ere being m ade t osel l

off

the

remainingfive white-tail

Concordes

to

the

Philippines

and South

Korea. After

manytestflightsand presentations by teams

from

Bri tain and

France,

both countries

eventual ly rejected Concorde, al though

at

least

one

passenger

is reported

t o have

increased her footwear collectionconsider

ably

during this

period.

Asthe s t ored

air

frames were

complete

air-tested machines,

theyeventually enteredservice withBritish

A irwaysand A i r France, w hi ch gave each

airline a seven-strongfleet.

One final

attempt

was made

to

sell

the

Concordes

in storage;

the

expected opera

tor

was to

be FederalExpress whichwished

to

use

the

aircraft in

the

high-speed freight

carri er rol e. A st udy i nto

the

feasibility

of

such a conversi on w as undert aken during

1981-82.

As

this

was

to

be a

complete

change

in

the

aircraft s role

most of the

passenger-based

equipment

would

be

dis

pensed with; thus

the

cabinoxygen system

andai r

conditioning

would beremovedand

parts

of t he

undercarriage emergency low

e r in g s ys te m w ou ld n ee d t o b e r el oc at ed

since

the

frei ght pall ets w ould cover t hei r

original access points. A certain

amount of

quickly followed by TWA s, which

tenta

tively placed

an

order for a furthersi x.

The

totalorders

and opt ions

for

Concordes

are

shown i n

the

table left .

Many of

t hese ai rl i nes had pl aced

their

orders

under the

assumption

t ha t t he

cre

a t ion of

sonic boom s

over

l and w ould be

acceptable.

The

study

of

the

effects

of

such

disturbances

in

Bri tain, France

and

the

USA

had

proved

inconclusive;

however,

the anti-Concorde

movement had

in

creased

its

influence

especi all y as

US

Senator

Proxm ire hadgi ven his aid

t o t h e

cause. A s

the

pressure

mounted

against

Concorde t he

enthusiasm

of

the

airlines

w aned, l eavi ng

only

Air

F ranc e and

BOAC l a t er Br it i sh

A ir wa ys ) a s

the

only confirmed customers. Not only

was

the contentious

issue

of s on ic b oom

given

as a r ea so n

t o cance l

by

Pan

Am

and J

AL,

but t he iI adherence t o

tradi

tional

accounting

methods

meant t h at

t hey coul d

not

accurately

determine

any

profits or losses from operating

Concorde,

although

t hey w ere si l ent w hen asked

the

same quest i on

concern i ng t he

subsonic

airliners

due t o

be

ordered

by t hem . One

o f t he

s tr a ng es t r ea so ns g iv en f or

can

celling

an

order w as

that

the

aircraft did

not

come

equipped wi th an

auxiliary

power

unit

to

provide

independent

power

supplies

and engine

starting.

The

initialtake-up

ofthe

production air

frames

meant

t ha t o f

the

sixteen production

aircraft, five were placed instorage after test

flying unsold. In Britain airframes 214 and

216sat unusedand in France ailframes 203,

213and 215 were parked, awaitinga buyer.

An attempt to interestSingaporeAirl ines

wasonly partiallysuccessful. Originally

the

airline required a wet lease,

completewith

crews, forfour years. As

the

manufacturers

felt unable to providecrews for theduration

4

6

2 11

4

2 21

5

4

2

6

3

2

3

3

2

6

2

6

6

4

2

8

3

4

6- first

order

- fnal total is 8

6- first order - fnal total is 8

6 +2

81

inc . options.plus

16

delivered.

1965

Air Canada

Air India

Amercan

Braniff

Eastern

JAL

Lufthansa

MEA-Air Lban

Dantas

Sabena

TWA

United

Concorde Orders and Options

1972

Iran Air

Air France

CAAC

BOAC

/984

British Airways

98

Air France

1966

Dantas

Eastern

1964

Amercan

Air France

BOAC

Contnental

TWA

Total

1963

Air

France

BOAC

Pan Amercan

G-N94AD wearsthe titlesof Singapore Air l ines on i tsportside as partof acombined operationto

apore viaBahrain.This service

was

eventuallyca ncelled

as

uneconomic.

BBA Colecton

100

101



TRIALS ANDTRIBULATIONS

Eleganceand artistryare less than adequatewords

to describethis moststr iking ofaircraft. Foxtrot

Bravo of Air France is captured on approach.Those

with keeneyeswill alreadyhave noted thecurving

shape ofthe nacelles andintakes.

Bernard Chares

BELOW: Surrounded by ground equipment,BA

Concorde G BBDG on therampat Tengah,

Singapore.

The

aircraft,

on

loan from British

Airways, was being used intr ials required to

refine theoperation ofthe ramp control system.

BBA Colecton

6 January 1977 Capt Brian Trubshaw lift

ed

Concorde

202,

C-BBDC,

from Filton s

runway t o u n de r ta k e t e st f li gh t n o. 4 28 .

The route to ok it to Tangier in 2hr55min,

of

which just over 2hr were

spentat

super

sonic speeds. The maximum

height

reached

was

54,000ft 06,500m , t h e m a xi m um

speed achieved being Mach 1 .8 5. T e st

f ligh t n o .43 3 w as misnamed as i t was, i n

f a ct, a CA A training flight which saw

the

aircraft flying between Filton

and

Fairford

w it h a f li gh t t im e of

Ihr

lOmin.

Aboard

were Capt

E

M cN am ar a a nd C ap t C .

Wilkinson

of

the Civil A viation A uthori

ty; the Fligh t En g in e e r w a s D .EB. A c ka r y.

Pastures New

While

Concorde

was scoring a range

of

enviable

f ir st s, i t w as a ls o

involved

in a

series

ofdevelopment

trials,

but

for

these

production

aircraft wereused in preference

to the preproduction aircraft. The first trip

TRIALS ANDTRIBULATIONS

been t a ke n t o carry

o u t o f

a series

of

upper

atmosphere

intake

development

tr ia ls in

order to

refine

the behaviour ofthe intake

ramps under various heights and flight con

ditions. During 1979 Concorde

C-N49AE

was flown from London to New York under

thecommandof C apt

BrianWalpole; from

New

York

the

aircraft was flown

to

Balti

more and Philadelphia to undertakeCate

g or y 2 Instrument Landing SystemValida

tion flights.

Jn-service operation

o f C on c or d e

by

Britis h A irw a ys g o to f f to a s h ak y s ta r tw ith

the company s concern over the costs of

operating the aircraft. The p r ob lem h a d its

r oo ts w ith the directors o f B OA C , which

hadbeen subsumedtogetherwith BEA, into

British Airways in April 1972.

They

regard

ed Concorde a s a n e x pe n siv e lux ur y that

w ou ld c os t f ar t oo m uc h t o purchase and

operate

at

anysort

of

a profit.Eventually

the

offer

of

public money helped

the

a irline to

m a ke u p its m ind to e x er c is e its p u rc h as ing

options.

Adding

to

the

emerging British

J u ly 1 9 77 . Tw o further flights were

taken

in

1 97 8- 79 w he n t he t h en

a irf r am e s 2 1 4

and

216

undertook

maiden flights. The former, registe

BFK W, le ft Filto n on

2

A p ril w ith

s ha w a t

the

controls. After a

sho

round

the

Bay

of

Biscay and s o me

landings

a t t he

Fairford test base,

t

craft returned th e re . D u r in g thisrun

than 1.5hr weresupersonic. Airfram

registered C- BFKX, flew on 20 Apr

Tr u bs h aw a g ain in

command.

Afte

t o t he

Bay

of

Biscay

a nd 4 9m in

sonic, t h e C on co rd e r et ur ne d t o

a nd w en t i nt o storage; eventually

A irw a ys a c qu ir ed it. Outside i ts n

a ir lin e d u tie s

Concorde

also assist

RAF

on 1 A ug us t 1 97 9 in

an

e

North Sea

the

a ir cr a f t in v olv e d w

B B DC , simulating a s up er so ni c

attackingover

the

North Sea.

When Concorde finally entered

w ith Br itish A irw ay s in 1 97 6

the

p

i ni ti al r ou te s w er e q ui ck ly

extend

Concorde Alpha Echo parked atHeathrow

with

i tsnoseful ly

up

andits visor

fully

retracted.This

photograph

was

takenwhen theunpopular British ti tling wasapplied

to

the nose.

BBA Colecton

102

=:

c::) :

.

;

involved production

Concorde

202 C

B B DC , w hich

undertook

a

development

t ri al t o

the

Middle

and

F ar E as t d ur i ng

August-September 1974. Trubshawwas in

command for the 7 A u gu s t d e pa r tur e , the

flight taking i n v is it s t o Abu Dhabi, Iran,

Qatar

and Singapore. On 5 A pr il 19 78

Concorde

202,

C-BBDC,

wasflown under

Trubshaw s

command

f ro m F il to n

to

Casablanca to undertake aseries o f h o t a n d

high performance trials which would occu

py

the

aircraft throughout A pril and May.

The return f lig ht to Filto n w as made on 5

M ay . I n

C asablanca the opportunity

had

Airways concerns was the excessive slip

page

of

delivery dates,

which

would throw

the

airline s plans

into

disarray. Deliveries

to

Br itish A irw a ys s a w

C-BOAC

leaving

Filton for Fairford to undertake a series of

shake-down f lig h ts b e fo r e acceptance.

Proving that a r e g is tr atio n sequence had

no

bearing

on

deliveries,

Concorde

206

C

BOAA left

the

British

Aircraft Corpora

tiontest base at Fairford to

fly

to H eathrow

on 14 January 1 9 76 , s o me months after

AC .

Airframe 2 08 , a ls o known as C

BOAB, followed on

30

September, and C

BOAE,

airframe 212, was delivered

on

10

103

in clu de tw o r o un d tr ip s to N e w Y or

although i t w ou ld ta ke u n til 1 97 8 f o

objections to be overcome. In contra

Washington/Dullesservicewasgreete

bunting and

speeches

w he n t h e

fi

France and Br itish A irw ay s Co n

landed almost simultaneously on 2

1976. The f igh t f or Concorde to o

into

New

Yorkeventuallyspilled ov

boththe

legal and

the

political arena

New Y or k Po r t Authority tried t o

f ro m la nd ing th er e . Ev en tua lly t h

ruled infavour of

Con

cordesinceit h

cessfullycomplied with all

tbe

deman




TRI LS ND TRI UL T IONS

Concorde s CulinaryDelights- British irways in

2000

We

are

going

to

rerun the

first

commercial

fligh

Bahrain t og ve

the favour

of

travel ng

by

Conco

Brtsh Airways flight BA300 aboard Concorde2

G-BOAA crewed

by

Capt Norman

Todd,

in comm

with Capt Bran Calvert act ng as Frst Offcer,

John Lidiard as Flght Engneer, The c ab n c re w

thisoutboundleg wereMisses

Carvie and

S.

ham,

pus

D.

Brackey, J Hawkins,J. Hitchcockan

Tayor. Chocks werepuled

clear

at

11

:20hr

GMT

the aircraft

was

pushedback.

The

nose

was

dro

to 5 degrees with thevisor

retracted,

Concorde

ingt o t herunway t hreshold. Cearedt o depart

Heathrow

runway 28 left, the throttles were pu

forward

and the

thrust

augm ent ers engaged

11:41 hrt he aircraft

left the

ground. The rout ng

G-BOAApass

over

Midhurst,

leaving

Engand

atW

t hi ng , c ro ss n g i nt o France,

p as s ng P ar s

Ramoui et

before enterng

Italy

and

overfying

Banc

in

the process.A slght detour over

Switze

was folowed

by

a re-entry intoItaly before the

craft passed over Brndisi and headedpast G

beforedong t he

same

past

Cyprus and

Crete. N

of

Beirut Concorde

altered

its

course

slghtly

no

overfy

northern

Lebanon, Syra,

Jordan

and S

Arabia before

lning

up

on Bahran. Durng thepa

the flight over water a maxmumspeedof 1,320

2 125kmjhr) was reachedat an altitude of 58,

17.700mj. At a dist ance of 250m ies 402km

Bahran, t he aircraft began t o

slow

down, b

t ouching down at 15:18hr, havng t aken 4hr

chocksto chocksto

complete the

entre

journey

ingcovered 3,000 nautcalmi es

15,500km).

BA301 was

the

return

flightwhich

was under

on22 January, this t m e Capt Calvert wast he p

command

and

Capt Todd w a s F ir st O ff c er

remainder of the

crewwere

the

same

and the

home

to

Heathrow

wast he reverse of t he outb

flght.

except

for a slght diversion

overBiggi

The

total

a ir bo rn e t m e w as 4 hr

13min, wit

supersonict me being

2hr 1

Omin

in total.

A Concorde Flight

Withits nose drooped to 5 degrees and its vi

retracted BA Concorde, G·N81AC, taxies aw

t he r am p a t Heathrow

before

departing to th e

BBACollection

p rop e ns ity to finis h its o wn fle et in b rig h t

disruptive colour schemes. The first flight

was undertaken

on

l2

january

1979 by

an

Air France Concorde ro ute d fro m Paris to

Dallas Fort Worth v Washington.

The

returntrip was flown

the next

day. Yetagain

passenger revenue failed to live upto expec

tations and

the

relationship ended.

While BOAC

later British Airways was

dithering over whether Concorde would

enter

commercial service Air Fran c e h a d

no h e sita tio n in a c ce p tin g its a lloc a tio n of

the fleet since the French government held

the

m a jo rity s h are ho ldin g in

the

airline.

While British Airways and Air France had

initially concentrated on breaking into the

North

American market

the

latterwasalso

looking towards the South American mar

ket to extend itsavailable routes and gener

a te m o re re v e nu e .All

the

flights wererout

ed v New York from th e re two flig hts

would cont i nue on t o D ul le s w hi le the

remaining eleven flights

continued on

to

Mexico City.

Other

flights would also land

e lse whe re in La tin Am eric a

at

such desti

nations as R io d e

janeiro and

Ca rac a s in

Venezuela. During the period in which Air

France was instigatingthese routes to Latin

America it was suddenly

hit

by

the

respon

sibilityfor the day-to-day running and oper

atingcosts

of

its Concorde fleet.

The

result

in g re d u ctio n in government

subsidies was

followed by a c o st-c utting e x erc is e to c o n

trol expenditure and thus

the

LatinAmeri

can r ou te s c ea se d i n A pr il 1 98 2. F ur t he r

cuts saw t he t e rm ina ti on of

the

route to

Miami in

March

1984

and t he Washing-

ton section ended in November 1994.

Where the Concorde

fleets really made

their

profits wasin

the

provision

of

aircraft

for charter flights. Some we re ju s t ro un d

the coast type pleasure trips but o t hers

were

of

a

more

h igh p ro fi

Ie

nature.

The

fo rm e r ty pe round the coast or Bay of

o n t he operators concerning noise genera

tion and pollution control.

On

a typ ic al

BritishAirways Concorde flight to theUSA

a nd b ac k

the

aircraft left Terminal 3

at

Heathrowdeparting at

13:00hr local with

an expected arrival at Dulles of 12:lOhr

local. The flightwasscheduled insucha way

that connections to

several airports

i n t he

USA could be achieved without rushing

toO much; therefore passengers were able

to connect to Atlanta

Boston

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland Dallas Detroit

Houston Kansas Los Angeles Miami

Nashville New York Richmond

San

Fran

cisco and Tampa.

Havingobtained landing

rights in

the

USA attention turned to

other

zones

of

interest. The first to be looked

at

wasAus

tralia; however this destination was never

managed since

the

route

extension

reached

only to Singapore

v

though this

was

only

a

co operative venture with Singa-

pore

Airlines

begunon

9

December

1977

as an extra leg to

the

Ba h ra in ro ute

the

dedicated aircraft being

G BOAD which

had Singapore Airlines markings painted

on

its right hand side. The return leg was

flown

t henex t

day

the

pilots in

command

included Capt j.W. H i rs t and Capt A.

Meadows outbound;

Capt

B.j.

Calvert

and

Hirst

overe

the return

legs.

But

servi es

were suspended afteronlya few flights since

the

Malaysian

government

raised strong

object ions to the

aircraft s

overflying the

Strai tsof Malacca. Negotiations between

airlines and o ffic ia ls a llowe d fligh ts to

re su me in e arly 1 97 9

but

finally ceased by

1980since the earnings and passenger load

in gs we re

deemed

insufficient. Another

joint

venture involved servi es sharedwith

BraniffAirlines; originally the whisper was

t hat one

side

of t he

a irc raft wou ld b e fin

ished in Braniffcolours and titles although

thiswas quicklydropped given the airline s

ABOVE:

Wearing

the

combined

BNBraniff registration

G-N94AB, applied in 1979,

this aircraft i s a t Heathrow

undergoing pre-flight

maintenance

before

flying

to the

USA.

BBACollection

Apair of Concordes touching

down

a tOrla n d o International

Airport on

18

October

1982.

To the

front

is

a BA machine

with

an

Air

France

aircraft

to

th e re a r.Th e y were going for

the dedication o fth e British

a n d th e Fren ch pavilion at

theDisney

EPCOT centre.

BBACollection

For those

with

enquirng

mindsand discerningpalates, mango. For those fnal little spaces a mixed seasona credentals. theirwine choices werealwaysof the

best

the appetzers consisted of a canape

selecton which

saladwas served

with

a vinaigrette

dionnaise. To

fol- and t hus passengers on Concorde coud

expect

to

included

foie

grasmousse. smoked halbut. c av ia r a n d l ow . t h e d e ss er ts i nc lu de d c r em e brOee, favoured with choose fromthe champagnes Mo e te t Chandan, Cuvee

sourcream

barquette.lf

thiswas

not

enough.the appe-

va ni a

enrched

with

doublecreamandg azedwith

nat-

d e Da m Pergnon 1980.Pommery. Cuvee Speciale Lous

tzer

menu

also

offered

mousse

of

samon

and trout

ura brown sugar. The

oblgatory

cheese board had

a Pommery

1981, G H Mumm Cuvee Rene

Laou

1982,

enveloped

in

thinly slced

Scottsh

s al mo n, a l b e n g

se le cto n o f Stito n, L eicester

and tomme

de S avo e. and

Krug,

8rut, Grande

Cuvee.

White

burgundies on

served with pinwheels

of

buttered

brown

bread. After with

butter, crackers and

crudites. To

wash

this

down.

offer

included Chabls,

Grand Cru

Les

Preuses,

Domaine

strugglng through

this,

passengers

were

given achoice coffee,

with

or without caffeine, andtea

were

avaiable.

de la

Maladiere 1987, Pulgny-Montrachet. Cos

du

of t hree m an courses.

The

first

was based around a

The

caterng

department was especialy p ro ud o f t h e V ie ux C ha te au L ab ou re -R o 1 98 6, Pulgny-Montrachet.

prme fillet of

beef

dressed

with

herb butter and served a irln e s wine celar, overseen by experts including Trufferies Lous Latour 1985,Beaune, Cos des

Mouch-

with tomato,

broccol spears,

holandaise

and baked

Michael

Broadbentand HughJohnson. The former is

a

es Joseph Drouhin 1986, For those with

a

slightly

dif-

potato.

The

second

consisted of

crayfsh ta is

poached

MasterofWine, adirector

of Chrst e s and

head o f th ei r f er en t t as te , a range ofclarets

was

offered thatinclud-

with

white

wine and fnished

in

acream

and

D ol ce la tt e w in e d e pa rt me nt .

He is

one

of

the few

Brtons

to have

ed Domane

de

Chevaler

1983, Grande

Cru

Classe

cheese sauce,

this, in turn,

beng

garnished

with been

awarded

the prestgious French LDrdre Natonal Graves Leognan Les

Forts

de

Latour

1976,

Paul ac Les

sauteed

pimento,

asparagus spears and saffron rce

du

Merite.

Hugh Johnson is

a Docteur

de V n

of t he Forts

de

Latour 1978, Paul ac Chat eau Talbot 1978,

piaf.

The

third choice was lighter - h on ey -g la ze d d u ck - A ca de mi e of t he Conf rere desChevalers

du

T aste vn G rand e Cru Casse Saint-Julen, Chateau

Lynch

Bages

lng

breast

and

country-style

h am g ar ni sh ed W it h f r es h a nd t he

author

of numerous books on

wine.

Gven their 1983, and Grande Cru Casse Paul ac.

7 4

7 5



_

ay trips were frequently

advertised

as

flights and lasted about 1hr

w it h a

short surersonic

burstas

the

The latter

type

ofchart er

were

a lly booked by s u ch c o mp a ni e s as

si

who

w o uld h ire F-BTSD from

Air

a n d h a ve

it

rerainted

in

the com

colours in which g uis e it w as

out

i n A pr il 1 99 6. A more unusual

more

restrained

venture

was

spon

by

t he A m erican

lingerie

comrany

Secret but

little was

changed

TRI LS ND TRIBUL TIONS

externally only a discreet logo a r r1 i ed t o

the

tail most

o f th e

d e co r at i o n b e in g

reserved for

the cabin. Addingsrice

to

the

occasion w e re a b e vy of super models who

h a d b e en i n vi t ed t o grace it.

Fewrealized

that Concorde

h a d a fan

and

a supporters club b o th o f w hic h booked

the

aircraft for trips in 1 97 8.

The

first trip

involving G-BOAE Capt Peter

Duffey

took place on November lasted v r 2hr

a ndtook in the delights

of

the Bay

of

Biscay

whilea second flight with

the

same aircraft

crew

and

r oute took place seven dayslater.

[n addition

to

regular and charter flights

both airlines provided

Concordes

f or V IP

flights on request.

The

first notable to take

s u ch a flig ht w as Princ e

Philir

who flew in

Concorde 002 on

12

January

1 97 0. [ n

Fran ce Pres ide n tG e o rge s Po mp ido u h a d a

similar

e xr e rie nc e on

7 M ay

[97l. While

Concorde

gained

column

inches from

the

ta blo id s for its ric h and famous passengers

the

aircraft frequently filled in

on

domestic

routes to use upsome capacityexcess.

RIGHr

Takingthe Pepsi challengeis this irFrance

Concorde touching downin Madrid

JoseM Palacios

BELOW: The tailwheel requir inglessfluid issafely

stowed and thenosegearis fol lowing Closebehind

arethemain undercarriageunitswhose innerdoors

have cycled open to

allow

them in

Phippe

Noret

BOTTOM:

FoxtrotCharliehas everything stowed

away

to begin theclimb before

it

reachesthe acceleration

pointoverthe Atlantic The thrust augmentorshave

beendisengaged and

will

not be relit unti l the dash

acrossthe ocean begins Phippe Noret

TRI LS

ND

TRIBUL TIONS

irFranceFoxtrot Bravo isawaiting its

nextpassengers forwhom theforward

accessstepsare in place

To

thefront

of theai r craft i sa

power

supplyset and

avehicle to

tow

it clearonceConcorde

hasbeenclearedto depart

P

Russel

Smith olecton

BELOW:

FoxtrotBravo lined

up

on the IlS for

afaultlesstouchdown atParisCharles

de

Gaulle

Even

indaylightal l theexternal

landing lightsareselected to on

Phippe

Noret

7

7




TRI LS NDTRI UL T IONS

view ofConcorde G BOADshowsthe aircraft on therampbeforemovingintoposition

Heathrow. The nose is

the5 degreesposition with thevisorpartly retracted. BBAC o e cto n

The

U SA a nd t he

world-famous

koshair event would also begraced

b

corde.

This

t ime it w as a irf r am e

G-B

under thecommand ofC apt J.D. Coo

took i t t o thehome of America s hom

and

vintage extravaganza

a t t h e e n d

1985. This was n ot t he f ir st f lig ht

North

Americasince

G-N94AA

wa

from

New

York after delivering its

ger s t o t h e C a na d ia n Internation

S h ow a t

Toronto, flying past

an

im

audience on 1 September 1979. N

w ou ld itb e the onlyvisitof

Con

cord

s ho ws s in ce i t h as f re qu en tl y v is it

Royal International A irT attooat R A

f or d. La tin A m er ica h a d a ls o b e en

earlier that year when during 6-7 A

B O A B unde r t h e c o mm a nd o f

Cap

pole

and Capt

Mas sie a r riv ed in L

having s tag ed th ro u gh New Yo

Barbados to reach Rio de J

During the Barbados-New York re

i ng w as t o u se

G-BOAE

to makean inau

gural flight from Sri Lanka

to

London.

The

first legwasfrom C olomboto B ahrain, this

b e ing f o llo we d b y

that

f ro m Ba hr a in to

Paris,

C h ar l es d e Gaulle. This

was

an

unscheduled stop since a n u ne x pe c te d

headw ind had reduced

the

aircraft s fuel

safety margin.

With

refuelling

complete,

the

final

short

stage to L ondon wasmade.

There

was a

contrast

in s tyle s

w he n G

BOAB

t oo k a m ix ed l oa d

of international

bond dealers and En gla nd f o otb all s u p

porters

to

Helsinki

on

22 M ay 1 98 5 as

flight B A9 08 3 C; t h e return f l ig ht w as

made

the

same day. A f li gh t

t o New

Zealand during e ar ly A pr i l 1 98 6 s aw G

BOAB land

at

Auckland.

On the

return

flight

on 7-8

April

the

aircraft was

under

the

command of Capt

John

C ook, making

the

f a ste st f lig h t f ro m

New

Zealand

to

London in 19hr 6 m in , s e tt i ng a w or ld

record in

the

process.

what

t h ey h a d b e e n missing after

the

can

c e ll a ti o n o f t h ei r o wn

SST

programme.

Concorde

w ou ld a ls o r e ac h p la ce s i n

the

F ar E as t

a nd t he A nt ip od es w he n G

BOAE, p ilo ted b y Capt H .C . McMullen,

wi

th

J L Chorley, flew

t o C o lo m bo t h en

proceeded to Perth, arrivi ng on 14 Febru

a r y 1 9 8 5 a s ight BA9060C. Having com

pleted the turnaround

in Pe r th ,

G-BOAE

flew to Sydney u nd er t h e c om ma nd o f

Capt

McMullen and

Capt

Leney.

The

fol

lowing day the same Concorde le ft A u s

tralia to fly on to B ahraintaking

9hr

5min

t o d o

so. Aboard

the

aircraft were several

senior p il ot s s uc h a s McMullen, Leney,

Chorleyand

Massie, all taking i t i n t u rn t o

occupy

the

flight-deck.

D ur ing this

phase

Mach 2 w as achieved, with an altitude

of

b et w ee n 5 7, 0 00 a n d

60,000ft

17,400

18,300m) throughout. H aving landed in

Bahrain,

the C oncorde

was then flown

on

to Colombo. The

purpose

of this

position-

Surrounded

by

the

Red

Arrows Hawks. a

Concorde flies past

an

admiringaudience.

BBAC o e cto n

hock-to-chock

t im e w as 3hr

52min,

air

borne time26min shorter. British Airways

alsobegan British internal flights;

the

first

trip

into Birmingham and

back was

on

1

Ma y 1 9 81 , u s in g a irc r af t

G-BOAA,

Capt

Lemay;

the

total

airbornetime

was

65min

for both l eg s, w it h a maximum speed of

Mach0.6 beingreached.

Scotland

was

the

n e xt d e st i na t io n, t h e

f irs t G la sg o w

and

back to London flight taking place

on

11

October

1987.

On

12

September 1982 C o nc o rd e G

BOAE, piloted by Capt J.D. Eames, made

an

inaugural flight

to

Rome,

the

flight tak

ing 2hr52min, with 36min

at

Mach

2

On

a further trip

C oncorde G -B O A A

flew

to

Larnaca, in Cyprus

on

14 November 1984,

the

pilot being Capt Walpole with

the

return

leg

u nd er t he c om ma nd o f

Capt

M as si e. T wo d ay s later Eames took

G

B OA B t o S ea tt l e

T ac om a , v ia B oe in g

Field, to show the aircraftoff and secretly

t o s ho w

the

Boeing

Company

precisely

This

Concorde wears a united UK/USA registration. G N81AC foruse on the

combinedBraniffand British irways operation. BBACollection

the

pilot in

command

being Capt

A.R.

Meadows, with an airbornetime

of

49min.

Fivedaysearlier

the

sameaircraft with

the

same pilot in command h ad b ee n u se d to

fly the

Queen

from London t o K uw ai t i n

4 h r I m in . The

f ina l leg

of

this

tour

was

flown on 19 February by the sameaircraft;

the

pilot in

command

was Capt A.J.

M as si e, w i th M e ad ow s a s

supernumerary

crew; t he t ra ns it t im e from Dhahran to

Bahrain

was r ec or de d a s l Om in , w it h a

maximum speed

of

391mph 630km/hr)

being reached. The c re w for t hi s f li gh t

included

C apt N orman

To dd in

command

with Capt Brian Walpole as First Officer.

I n au g ur a l f lig h ts b y Br itish A irw a ys

con

tinued unabated, oneof the last undertak

en i n 1 97 7 was

on

23

November

with

oncorde

f in al ly e xe r ci s in g i ts r i gh t t o

l a nd i n New York as flight BA170. Oper

ating

under the

guise

of

BA173,

the

twice

d aily f lig hts b e ga n

on

1 June 1 97 8, w ith

aircraft

G-BOAD,

Capt

John

Hirst.

New

00

occasions in

Concorde s

histo

have included the first transatlantic

t from Washington to L ondon

on

25

y 1 97 6, w it h B ri ti sh A ir wa ys f li gh t

7 8 , th is b e ing the return f ligh t a f ter

24 M ay tr ip;

the

a ir cr a ft w as

G-

Capt

N.v.

T od d in

command.

of

the earliest

charter

flights involved

from

London

for

San Juan,

Puer

Rico, then a r e tu r n t o L on d on which

a

Concorde

f ro m 2 6 to 29

June

6 , w ith Capt Duffey.

A lthough C on

and itssupporters had won

the

legal

to

l and in

New

York,

the Port

insisted

that

t es t f li gh ts b e

to measure

the

noise levels generat

by

C oncorde w hentaking

off.

This

was

n e o n

20

October

1977 and required

C oncorde

land

w ithan on-board

load

174 tons l77 tonnes). Piloted

by

h Airways Capt BrianWalpole,

Con

left

the

13,400ft 4, 100m)runway

at

ph 370km/hr) generating a n oi se

of

88dB, as recorded by

the

Federal

Authority, the Port Authority

b e ing 1 12 .

This

w as f ol lo we d b y a

n t A ir

France/British Airways

Con

e landing t wo d ay s l at er . The first

tis h A irw a ys Ro ya l Fligh t w as under

k en o n 2 November 1977 wi th t he

on board aircraft

G-BOAE

for a

to Ba rb a do s ; t h e t i me t a ke n

chocks

was

3hr

29min.

A nother

such

occurred

on

1 2 Fe br u ar y 1 97 9 w ith

first leg departingH eathrow to Kuwait

aircraft

G-N94AB.

Five d a ys la ter

the

t wasflown from

Bahrain

to Riyadh,

7 8

709



I , tl c ; • \ ~ . : :,,+

. , ,: , .

TRIALS

AND

TRIBULATIONS

TRIALS

AND

TRIBULATIONS

up Concorde fordeparture was quitecomplicated as this

view

shows.

To

thereararea pai rofair

to turnoverthe engines while tothe frontarethe access stepsfor passengers and another

theexternalpower leads.

C.P. Russel Smi th Coecton

ABOVE: This

Air

France Concorde

F-BVFC,

hashadmany

windows

blanked out

since it is on hireto theInstitutWeizmanndes Sciencesfor thestudyof asolar

flare.

BBA Coecton

BELOW:

Air

FrancesFoxtrotAlphaflaresout as themaingeartouchesthe

runway.Prominent inthis

view

i s theneatway thevisorstows awaywh

thenose isdrooped.

Phippe Noret

s et a n ew wor ld r ec or d of 2hr

n for this distance, much

of

it flown at

2

at

60,000ft (18,300m).

The

aircraft

been chartered

by

Cunard to collect

gers from the

QE2

l iner after com

ga world voyage.

Th e outbound

leg

of

ightwasmade

on

5 ApriIfrom London

Brazil, th is taking

8hr

45min with

Capt

Capt

Bradshaw and

Capt

Massie

ingit in

turn

to b e in

command. Anoth

trip to America would begin on 28 April

when

G-BOAC

left Heathrow for the

The

total a i rborne t ime was

4hr

the first landing beingin New

York.

depositing the passengers to catch up

the

QE2

the aircraftstaged

on

to Indi

with Capt

A.R. Meadows.

The

urn journey was t h e n e xt day, with G

staging via jFK Airport, before

the

supersonic trackfor Heathrow.

journey time was 4hr 41min, flown at

l7,300m) with a maximum speed

Mach 2.02.

Concorde

hasalso been used

promote the o

British week which was

its zenith in 1985;

the

aircraft arrived

at

Airport, Stockholm

on

28 Septem

having

flown low

over the

city to show

to asmany people as possible.

The

o t h er C o nc o rd e

operator,

Air

nce, was also

active

in

promoting

its

ugural flights to unusual

or new loca

One

of

the most adventurous trips

undertaken

over

12-l3 October

1992

e n t he airline a t te m pt e d t h e

fastest

round-the-world flight. Known

S u nc h as e r O n e, t h e

publicity for

the

flight promised

that

the C oncorde would

fly so fast around

the

world

t h a t t h e

sun

w on t have time to

set . Beforethis ,

Con

c or de 0 01 , F

WT S S

flew t o a nd from

Dakar during

25-26

May 1971,

the

return

flight

taking2hr 52min. This

wasfollowed

by a

training

f l ight to

South

Africa

over

the

period

23-24

February 1973 with

Con

corde 002.

W he n t he

aircraft finally

entered revenue-generating

service

with

Air France, airframe

F

WTSC undertook

an

endurance

flight from Paris to R io d e

j a n ei r o a nd back

in

january

1976,

this

being the airline s inaugural commercial

flight with Concorde. A

joint

venture

with British Airways followed on

24-25

May

w hen C oncorde

F-BVFA,

operating

as flight AF053, u n de r t h e c o mm a nd

of

Capt

Pierre Dudal,

went

from Paris to

Washington,

Dulles,

taking 3 h r 5 0 mi n t o

make

the

journey. The return leg involved

a British Airways aircraft under

the

com

m a nd o f C a p t

Todd,

which

left

Washing

ton

for

London,

using aircraft

G-BOAG,

the

flight

time

was

3hr 40min. Air

France

flight AF002 was

of

great significance to

the airline

as

this

signified

t he e nt ry o f

their aircraft into jFK, New York

on

23

November

1977. Five years later an

Air

Francefirst flightwas

not quite

so

dramat

ic since this involve d a flightfrom Paris to

Luxembourg and back

on

20 May 1982,

taking

28min. A s light ly longer journey

was

undertaken on

I

October

1983

when

F-BVFF f lew f rom Par is t o D ub li n a nd

back,

u n de r C a p t

G.

jacob,

in 1hI 9min.

710

The following yearwouldsee the same air

c r a ft m a king itsfirst landing in Rome

on

8

july

1984.

Capt Gilles

was in

command

t he e nt ir e flight lasting Ihr 55min,

of

w hich 20min weresupersonic. In

the

same

year

Air

France

took Concorde

to Austria,

when

i t f l ew a

round

tr ipfrom Paris , land

ing

at

Linz a nd V ie nn a o n 26 October.

Nuremberg

was

o n e o f t h e n e xt

placesvis

ited by

a n A ir France C oncorde, w hen F-

BVFF, operating as A F4860, la nded

on

19

july 1986. August

o f t h at

same year saw

oncorde landing at

Tel Aviv

Interna

tional from New York o n t h e 1 7t h as AF

4160. The inbound aircraft was F-BVFF,

while

t h e C o nc o rd e

u sed for

t he n ex t

departure

to Par is was

F-BTSC.

In 1987

Air France Concordes visited Kathmandu

and

Delhi duringOctober,

and

in Decem

bera

short

flight from Paris

to

Toulouse for

charity purposes was made in support

of

a

cancer

trust.

Concorde

F-BTSD flew from

Paris

toStavanger

in Norway,

transporting

financiers for a

meeting, returningto

Paris

the same

day. During

the

period

1-17

November

1993

Concorde

F BVFA

undertook

a wor ld

tour

v ia Barbado s a s

flight AF4853,

Capt

Franco is Rude. A

change of

flight

number

t o A F 4 8 57 c o v

ered

t he n ex t

leg from Kuala

Lumpur

to

New Dehli, with the s a me p i lo t in com

mand. The final leg b e ca m e A F 48 5 9 a n d

included a

departure

from Bahrain to Paris

w i th R u de

in

command

as before.

On

24

August 1986 Air France flight AF4862 sig

nalled

another

first for

C oncorde w hen

it

made

a

return

flight to

Hahn and back to

Paris. Flight F-BTSC was chartered to fly

French football fans

to

Liverpool for a

European Cup game on

25

August

1979.

Another

charter involved a f li gh t f rom

Paris to

the

Island

of

Kish, or ja z ir e h

Ye

Queys, a luxurious holiday

development

0 the coast of

Iran,

on

24

january

1978.

This

wou ld be

the

start

of

a semi-sched

uled

charter fl

ight

thatcontinueduntil the

overthrow of the S hah.

Criticisms and Accidents

A l t ho u gh C o n co r d e

finally

proved

a

money-spinner

for

both

operating airlines,

the reasons given for the cancellation of

orders by

other

airlines extended far beyond

political

and

media opposition.

Some

could

squarely be laid a t t h e door o f t h e aircraft s

designers, who had insisted on incorporat

ing some features

t h at t h e

airlines did

not

r eq ui re , s uc h as a

moving

map display

711

which , in rea li ty , was u se le ss g iv e

oncorde spent much

of

itstime flyin

water. Also viewed with some scep

was the a utoe ngine m onitor ing syste

was designed purely for use

on

Con

the

airlines suggested

that

they

mu

fen ed

an existingsystem to be incorp

Similarcircumstancessurrounded th

a product

of

Sagem-Ferranti,whereas

tial customers hadexpresseda prefere

a systemmanufactured by Delco and





ABOVE: Complete with a shimmeringsmoke haze an ir France Concorde taxies

towards itsparking slot.

Even

intheseconditionsthe nose issl ightlyloweredto

improve visibility. Phippe Noret

BELOW:

Asnow covered Charles de Gaulle Airport isthe venue for

ir France Concorde F BVFB landing afterf lying fromthe USA.

BBA Colecton

II

/l Il l l

1111

I

Engine starting was a ls o a b on e

of

con-

tention with the airlines requesting the use

of

an

extemal airstarter whereas

the

proto-

types were fitted with gas turbine starters

and the preproduction machines were fitted

with

an

MFPU.Units werealsocontentious

many of the airlinesbeing used to observing

system pressures in pounds persquare inch;

however

the

French as

is

their wont insist-

ed that all measurements be displayed in

bars. Doubts were also raisedabout the via-

bility of the droopnose and visorassemblies

a nd t he ir c on ti nu ou s an d safe usage

althoughextensivetestingsoon proved

that

the

equipment was safe. hen the airlines

began their investigations into Concorde

112

they raised

concems

about

the

visor in the

raised positionand the resulting lack of vis-

ibility.

his was

quickly explained away

as

beingapplicableto

the

prototypesonly and

t hat t he

production machines would have

visorswith agreatervisiblearea.Having had

these fears assuaged they then raised con-

cernswith reference to the behaviour ofthe

ABOVE: With an air startertrol leyplugged

intoNos3 and4 engines an

ir

France

.concordestartsengines before

departing on a post maintenance

trials flight.

BernardChares

RIGHr With its burnersquietened the ill-

fated AF Concorde F BTSC passesthe

camera with vapourplumes bleeding

from theouter

wing

panels.

BBA

Colecton

113



TRI LS

ND

TRI UL TIONS

f

RIGHT This nose on view ofthe XF 92 reveals

thepure delta shape ofthe wing andthetapered

fuselage

To

curethe XF 92 ofits problems it was

redesigned gaining an area ruled fuselageand

a revamped wing leading edge The result was

the XF l02

CourtesyNASA

TOP: TheConvair XF 92 wasbuilt as the

prototype fora new seriesof fighters Due to

theshapeof thefuselage it didnot perform as

well

as expectedand therefore

went

to NASA

for trials use Courtesy

NASA

Having

declined

t oj oi nt he

British

andt he

French i n pursuit

of

a

multinational

SST,

t h e U S A

gave every indication

of

forging

it s o wn

path

t owards supersoni c glory.

A l t hough t he A m eri cans had ent ered t he

jet

age belatedly,

t heir can-do

attitude

allied

t o t he i nform ati on

gained from

the

wreckage

of

Nazi

Cermany

spurred

them

o n t o

push forward

w i th t heir ow n

devel

opment

programme.From theseefforts

the

first

of

a seri es

of

straight-winged

jet

air

c ra f t w ou ld a pp ea r, m ai nl y p ow er ed by

centrifugal

jet

engines.

The adopt i on oft he

axial

j e t e n gi ne a n d

its improved

thrust

utput

plusits improvingreliability

meant

t hat t he A m eri can

aviation industrywould

advance t he

airframesthey were

mounted

in.

The

first expression

of

this

new

tech

nology was

the

seminal

N ort h A m eri can

A i rcraft F-86

Sabre

single-seat fighter.

With

this

the

sound barri ercould be

com

fortably breached.

Having

proved

that

a

jet-poweredairframewith sweptwingswas

t hepat h

to follow,

the

military

a n d t h e U S

Air

Force m ade great

d e ma n ds o n t h ei r

manufacturers

to

produce supersonicfight

ers

and

st ri keai rcraft; t hus w oul d be born

t he C ent ury

series

of

fighters, comprising

the NAA F-I00Super

Sabre,

t he McD on

nell F - I 0 l

Voodoo,

the

Convair

F-I02

Delta

Dagger,

t he L oc kh eed F -I 04

Starfighter,

the

Republic F-I05

Thunder

c h ie f a n d t h e C o nv a ir

F-106 D elt a D art .

The lerican

CHAPTER

SIX

Transatlantic Interest

a f li gh t

outbound

from

Shannon

when

No.3

engine

needed t o be

shut

down,after

w hich a returnw asm ade t o

Shannon.

Fol

l ow ing a si mi l ar

pattern

to

the

reported

engine

problems,

near

misses were unusual,

although

this

happened in

A ugust 1998

when

two

C oncordes came w i thi n

820ft

250m)

of

vertical separation in

the

vicin

ity

o f N e w

York.

Structural

problems

con

cerningConcorde

were likewise fortunate

ly few

O nl y o ne

i ncident concerni ng

fuselage integritywas reported, affecting

an

Air

France ai rcraft i n w hich cracks w ere

found rounda passengercabin w indow. A s

a safety

precaution

the

captain

deci ded t o

return

t o N ew

Y ork and reduce

the

cabin

pressurization to

the

minimum.

Other

cracks

have

beendiscovered in wing struc

t ures, t hesecom i ngt o l i ght i n A ugust 1994

on

a British Airwaysmachine.

InJuly

2000

BritishA irwaysbegan to subject

their

fleet

to

extensive

NOT

checks

o f t h e

structure

during

maintenance.

D uri ng t his process

minute

cracks were discovered in

the

wing

spars, which led

t o t he

temporary ground

ing

ofone

aircraftfor further investigation.

In contrast,

Air

France carried

out

the

samesequence

of

checks,

but

allowed their

fleet

t o cont inue

revenueoperations.

A ll t he s e

incidents

w ould pale

into

insignificance following

the

events that

took

place

on

25 July 2000.

\

This rear

view

of an ir FranceConcordeshowsthe burners still alightafter

take off andthe slightly flattenedunder fuselage nearthe main undercarr iage units

plusthefair ingscoveringthe

PFCUs BBA Colecton

frequency

of

fai lures w as reduced, t hey

w ould never be complet el y el im i nat ed

as

sections

oft he

rudder

continued

to

come

off

the

airframe,

the

last casebeing reported in

October

1998.Fortunately

the

elevonswere

morerobust, although

o n a t

least

one

occa

si on a sect i on w as t orn cl ear

of

its ailframe

i n May 1998 from a B ri ti sh A irways

Con

corde, w hich result i n

the

aircraft s making

an

emergency return to

New York

Concorde

engine

probl em s have been

fortunately few most beingspurious,

but

all

resul ti ng i n

an

em ergency di versi on for

safety reasons.

One oft he

most difficultfor

the

engi neers t o di agnose

concerned C

BOAC which

reported a low oil-pressure

warning light illuminated for No.3

engine

intransit from

New

Y orkt o L ondoni n May

1994. A s a precaut ion

the

engine was

shut

down, however,

the

s am e l ig ht f or N o. 2

engine

a ls o l it u p, r es ul ti ng i n a p re ca u

t io na r y s hu t do wn . A s uc ce ss fu l l an di ng

was made

at

H eathrow and

investigations

revealed

that i ncorrect servi ci ng proce

dures had

been

followed, resulting in

the

engine

oiltanks beingunder-filled. During

2000 British Airways began

to

experience

a seri es

of engine

failures.

The

first hap

pened i n January

on

a fli ght t o B arbados

which required

that

the

engine

be

shut

dow nand

emergency vehicles be in

atten

dance. A second

engine

failureoccurred

on

nose radome assembly in

the

drooped posi

t i on, t he rout ing

of

the hydraulic system

pi pew ork and

electrical

l oo ms in

the

vi cini t yof t he

engines.

Three

sets

of

mod

ificationswere required beforeall weresatis

fied

that

a catastrophicengine failure could

be survived

by

these most vital

of

systems.

A s w it h all a ir cr af t,

Concorde

has

evolved

as

t i me has passed

and

incidents

have

occurred.

The

first , a precursor

of

events that

would follow,

took

p la ce i n

June

1979

when

a n A ir

France

Concorde

leaving Dullessuffered a blow-out

of

tyres

N os 5

and

6

and t he di sint egrat ion of t he

wheels,causingdamage

t oN o. 2 engine to

three

fuel tanks

a n d t h e

hydraulic system.

The N at ional T ransport and

Safety Board

recommended that the

undercarriage

shouldalways remainlocked

down i n

such

circumstances

and

an

emergency landing

made

as

soon

as possible.

Similar incidents

al so occurred i n Jul y

and Sept em ber t hat

year. In contrast, B rit ish A irw ays w ould

not

h a ve a r e po rt ab le

occurrence

until

September

1980

when

C-BOAF suffereda

tyre blow-out.

Other

faults plagued

the

computerized

engine m onit oring

system,

which

resulted in a British

Concorde

hav

ing

t o di vert

to Boston as a safety precau

t io n o n a t

least

one

occasion.

One o f t he

m ost seri ous i nci dent s t o

affect C oncorde i nvol ved A i r France air

craft F-BVFD, which

was

badly damaged

duri ng a heavy l andi ng

at

Paris. Such

was

the

extent

of

t hedi st ort ion t o

the

aitframe

that

the

aircraft was withdrawn from rev

enue

service i n D ecem ber 1994 for spares

recoverybefore being scrappedsome twelve

years later. During 1989

the

British Airways

fleet began tosuffer a seriousspate

of

myste

rious failures to sections

of

their aircrafts

rudder sections.

The

first recorded incident

was

reported

in

April, being followed

by

similarincidents

in

January 1991 and March

1992. Other problems

continued

to plague

theConcorde

fleet, especiallywith regard to

tyre failures

o n t h e

main-gear bogies. In all

these incidents damage

was

alsosuffered

by

the

engines, fuel t an ks a n d h yd ra ul ic

pipelines, and

o n a t

least

one

occasion

the

sweeperbar

for

removingFOD

o n t he

bogie

fai led, t urni ng t he remnant s i nto shrapnel

that

punctured

the

wing. Modifications

were

then

ur ge ntly p ut in h an d to fit

strengthened undercarriagesweeper bars to

the

British Airways fleet and a further pro

gramme

was

begun tostrengthen the rudder

section mountingsand reduce

the

potential

for play in

the

operati ng cont rol runs.

Although

muchwork

was

expendedand the

774 775



The civilian

branch

of the aviation

industry, on the other hand,

was

slow to

get any benefit from

the

militarydevelop

ments being made available. One reason

was the surplus of retired military trans

portsavailable

for

the established and new

airlines and the development of similar

aircraft specifically for

the

same market,

thus

the

BoeingStratoliner, the Lockheed

Constellation

and versions of Douglas

transports went intociviloperation. Possi

bly de Havil land and i ts Comet airliner

would be

the

spur for

the

appearance of a

turbojet-powered machine in America.

THE

MERI N SST

All of

the

initialcontenders, Boeing,Dou

glas and Convair,

concentrated

on similar

looking aircraft, with four podded engines

mounted two perswept wing.

The start

of

the Anglo-French project

was

first regard

e d w it h s ome s ce pt ic ism in the USA,

although NASA

and

i ts predecessor

NACA

had already undertaken extensive

research

into

swept-wing behaviour. To

prove these theories NASA developed the

'X' series of research aircraft to push the

boundaries forward.

Having

explored

the

possibilitiesof high-speed flight, itsapplica

tionto thecivilindustrywas quietly shelved

116

and

all efforts were aimed towards the mil

i tary. All this changed when the aircraft

industry and NASA began to takenoticeof

the Concorde project.

To stimulate the industry, the Federal

Aviation Administration issued a request

on

15

August 1963 for designsfor a super

sonic transport; this came from

the

'Pro

ject Horizon' initiativesponsored

by

Pres

ident Kennedy inan effortto stimulate the

stagnant

American

economy. The avia

t ion i ndus tr y' s r em it was t o

outline

a

des ign for a horne -grown SST.

Giving

backing and impetus to thi s e ffor t were

In ordertocatch up with therestof theworld the

USA used air launched rocket powered aircraft for

itshigh speed research. Thisis theBell

X 1

in

fl ight. Althoughprovidingvaluable data on the

physics offlying above Mach

1

i twas recognized

from theoutsetthatrocket propulsion was not

acceptablefor civil transport. Courtesy

NASA

BELOW: Afterachieving Mach

1

the nexts tepwas

to breakthe Mach2 barrier.

To

thatend Douglas

builtthis X plane; as before the aircraft was air

launchedfrom a carrier aircraft. Courtesy

NASA

Kennedy

a nd t he

Congress. Before the

appropriations were made the President

decided that a full investigation i n to t he

costs to thegovernmentand the economy,

and

the benefi ts, should be made.To this

end

Vice-President Johnson c ha ir ed a

cabinet- level committee, beginning its

investigationsin May 1963.

The

FAA,

the

driving force behind the project, made the

strongest representat ions and its report

stressed

the

great benefitsto

the

economy.

Their arguments were strong

enough

to

convince

the

President that approval

shouldbe givenand the compet ingmanu

facturers informed; thus on 5June theSST

programme was launched, although ironi

cally

Pan American

Airways had signed a

purchase

option

for six Concordes justtwo

days earlier. Following

on

from this con

firmation, Najeeb Halaby delivered an

address to

the American

Institute

of

Aero

nautics

and

Astronautics which was in

tended topromote

the

SST, not only from

an economic

view but also as a j um p in

technology that the project would bring.

The stipulationpresented to the majorair

craft

and

engine manufacturers in August

required that they take

notice

of

both t he

commercialand the technical aspects and

applicationsof theirdesigns; the resulting

a ir cr af t had the re fore to be a super ior,

commercial, supersonictransport, appeal

i ng to the world's airlines, not only from

the

poin t o f view of t echnology but of

operating economics.

Other

pointsrequir

ing attention included the price per air

craft that each customer could afford to

pay safety, and a reasonable deliverydate

for entry intoservice.

The

aircraftproject

ed by the

FAA

needed to havea sustain

ablecruising speed in the region of

Mach

2 .2 , c ar ry ing a pay load of 30, 000 t o

40 OOOIb l3,600-18,00kg , t hi s t ot al

i nc luding 125 to 160 pas senger s over a

range ofabout 4,000miles (6,400km).

The

accompanying advertising conveyed the

impression t hat the aircraf t would be far

safer than andsuperiorto any other avail

able from elsewhere.

The development

of

the American

SST

was

seen

as

requiring a three-stage plan.

The f irst would encompass the design

competition

i ts el f and was scheduled to

beginin January 1964. The second part of

thisstage would begin

once

the

engine

and

airframe manufacturers had

been

chosen,

and required thatthe FAA, manufacturers

and a ir li ne s get t oge ther to move to

the

next stage. In

the

second stage the chosen

manufacturers would begin to flesh out

THE MERI N

SST

theiroriginalsubmissions, while

the

third

stagewouldcover

the

development, design,

manufacture and thorough test ing of two

preproduction prototypes. Funding for

stage

one

wouldcorne mainlyfrom

the

gov

e rnment; t he second and the thi rd pha se

would be supported

by

loans with repay

ments coming from thesalesachieved.This

did not guarantee any purchases by or on

behalf

o

the

US gover nmen t; but it

promised that i t would provide all assis

tance necessary to capture sales overseas.

At

the end of the second stage interested

air lines would beasked to pay a royalty of

200,000 perairframe ordered within six

months , whi le those coming on-boa rd

afterwards would beaskedto pay 850,000

per aircraf t. Further payments garnered

from the airlinesafterdelivery would be a

1 5

per cent royalty

on

revenue generated

by

seat sales , which would be paid to

the

government

as recompense for

the

devel

opment,

whichwould lastfor twelveyears.

The

FAA Takes Command

The

guiding agency charged

with

oversee

ing

the development

of

the

American

SST

was

the Federal Avia ti on Authori ty ,

whi ch s et up the Supersonic Transport

Development

Office under the guidance

ofNajeeb Halaby,

an

FAA Administrator;

this would work in conjunction with rep

resentatives ofthe interested airlines.

This

group would cover the f irst phase in great

detail, their remit embracing

the

manage

ment, t echnology, oper at ions and eco

nomics of operating an SST. Technical

aspects were subdivided into six areas: air

craft systems, sonic-boom effects, aerody

namic behaviour, airframe design, propul

s ion and systems, plus cert ificat ion and

tests.

Operations

and economics covered

flight operations, safety, economic para

meters, ground operation costsand train

ing planning.

Management

covered com

pany

competence

evaluations, managerial

organization,

development

and produc

tion

facilities,

development and

produc

t ion master planning, management con

trolskills

and

subcontractorcapabilityand

competence. Successfulco mpletion of this

phase would allow the start of the second

stage; this was expected to last for twelve

months. At the conclusion

of

both stages

the final productswould berevealed,these

being mock-ups of

complete

airframes,

partial airframe mock-ups, engine mock

ups and full experimental data .

Although

117

the

airframe

and

powerplants were

great prominence, there was also

development work being undertak

volving the avionics and flightcon tr

tems forwhichevermanufacturerem

as the eventual winner.

With all these reference points

lished it appeared

that

the America

was

all set for take-off in 1963. Ho

the

75-25 per cent cost spli t led th

tion industryto complainabout i ts l

financial risk.

The

alternative was

cost plus incentive fee that would

the manufacturers' risk. In turn, th

ernment rejected this proposal and

mate ensued. Realizing that t hi s s

affairs could

not

be allowed to con

Halaby advised President Kennedy

the f inancial community for advic

arbitration. The chosen specialists

Eugene Black, r et ir ed pre sident

World Bank, and Stanley Osborne,

man

o f O li n Mathe son, t o r evie

financial risk assessment

of

the SS

gramme. They delivered theirrepor

December1963 to

the

nowPresiden

son. Their report resolved the dif

and recommended that

the

risk splits

be c ha nged t o a 90-10 per

cent

r

favour of the manufacturers, which i

ed an easing of the penalties for an

overruns incurred, althoughit was al

ommended that

the

airlines should

strongervoiceconcerning the overa

ception of the SST.

In

addit ion to

financial recommendations, Blac

Osbornealso warned that sucha cra

gramme

as

this could be dangernu

technically and economically. Thei

warning was that to

enter

into a rac

the Anglo-Frenchconsortiumcould

to be far morecostly than was at fir

ized

Although

t hi s was a s tr ong r

mendation

it was not accepted ou

butJohnson,at the suggestion of th

BudgetBureau Director,set upa hig

SST overviewcommitteeto keep an

proceedings.

This

Presidential Ad

Committee on

SupersonicTranspo

sisted

of

Halaby, Douglas Dillon fro

US Treasury, Luther Hodges fro

Commerce

Department,James Web

NASA,John McCone from

the

CIA

Blackand Osborne.

With

the costingarguments close

olution, the groups of manufacturers

to plan their initial submissions. Th

sen airframe manufacturers were B

and Lockheed and

the

designofthe e

was given to General Electric and P



THE

MERI N SST THE MERI N

SST

Atthe otherend ofthe designspectrum NorthAmericanproduced themassive

six-enginedXB-70 bomber. Althoughcapableof performing thetasksset forit

it neverentered US F service because ofits prohibitivecost andthe improvements

to Soviet air defences.

CourtesyN S

81014

pitching

momentof

inertia

at

lowspe

offset these difficulties Boeing added

of canardwings to the nose which in

selves would pose problems. Wind-

testing

of

the new combination s

that, contrary to expectations, the c

would make

the

handlingworse as

th

gitudinal stability of the a ircraf t

become even moreunstablethrougho

completeflight envelope. Further in

analysis showed

that

additional weig

strengthening would be required to s

the canards and counteract their in

t ion and to reduce the aitframe's ae

ticity. This was beginningto develop

catch-upsituationwhere each modif

generated i ts own set

of

problems

then requiredyet a furtherset of fixes

out, andthismeantthat, as eachwasa

to the design and the wind-tunnel m

the situation worsened.

Furtherstudies involvedmoving th

pivot points to various distances fro

aircraft'scentreline;but theiroptimu

tion was a s close to the centreline as

b le to gain the benefits of subsonic

with variable-sweep wings. This opti

not

feasible from

an

engineering

p

view; the alternative was to move the

outboard. And this brought further

lems as there was an increase in the

ments of the aerodynamic cen tre

resulting changes in

the

flight spee

angle of attack. Tocounteract the ou

relocation of the pivots, the tail s

neededto beincreased inarea; this w

requiredeven when canards were in

F rom a pract ica l po in t

of

view, the

pivotposition also caused

the

lift:dra

to suffer a t b ot h subsonic and sup

speeds. Moving the wingpivotsfurth

board also reduced the benefits o

sweep

at

lower speedssince there wa

of

available wing area to produce use

Even after Boeinghad introduced a

weight reduction the airframe was sti

cent aboveacceptable limits.

Structurally

the

Boeing 2707 con

of

closely spaced, shaped frames

co

ed

by

numerousstringers, all beingco

by a titanium s ki n whi ch was d

capable of acceptingthe kineticgen

by speeds

of

Mach 3;

the

airframe str

itselfconsisted o f a n alloy

of

9 0 p e

titanium, 6 aluminium and 4 vana

The

wing glove extensions which h

the wing pivot points were built ar

closely grouped pressure web beam

ture, to

the

front

of

which were l

edgeslats.

Aft of the

wing pivotswe

The Boeing Bid

Boeing's first a tt emp t a t the design was

known as Model 2707-200 (Dash 200), the

most outstanding feature of which was its

variable-sweep wings.

This

innovation had

beenproposed since it wouldgive

the

Boe

ingaircraftgood performance and stability

at all points of the speed and flight enve

lope. A furthergainwould bea lowerland

ingspeed, which, inturn,wouldreduce

the

length

of

runway required for

both

take-off

and landing.

The

only proviso was that

sucha swing-wing mechanism should not

e xc ee d 4 p er

cent

o f t he gross structural

weight of t he aircraft.

The

dimensions

given for this version

o f the

Boeing

SST

included a fuselage length of 318ft (97m),

the wings in their swept-back condition

would have a span of 106ft (32m) and in

the fully forward position the wingspan

would increase to 174ft (5301).

The

gross

weight wi th 292 passengers and luggage

was calculated at 675,0001b (306,800kg).

The

intended powerplants would be four

General Electric augmented turbojets,

each being rated at 60,000Ib.st (267kN),

thisin turn was intended to give

the

Dash

200 a maximum speed of Mach 2.7. Since

the Boeing

SST

wouldbe a long, heavyair

craft, it was decided to incorporatea form

of

direct lift control which used spoilers

placed infront

of the

flaps to improve flight

control during the landingphase. The air

frame would consist mainly of steel and

titanium, thus allowing the designers to

push for a topspeed

of

Mach3,shouldsuch

an increase inspeedbe desired.

Overall,

the

Boeing Dash 200 was a far

more exciting design t h an the competing

Lockheed/Pratt

Whitney proposal; how

ever, it had already been realized

that

the

cutting-edge machine from Seattle was

not

inany state to be constructed as quickly as

was first thought. I t was at this time that

problems started to arise.

The

first to

appear was the swing wing, which, after fur

ther study by Boeingengineers, was no t the

boon i t was f ir st held to be.

Not

only was

there an inherent balance problem caused

by

the rearward mounting o f t h e engines,

the close coupling of the flight control sur

faces to the aircraft's e.g. meant that there

was an unforeseen increasein the high trim

drag coefficient and in the pitching move

ment at lowspeedswhich completelynegat

ed the supposed safety benefits. It was later

revealed that the swing-wing aircraft suf

fered f rom poor mass d is t ribu t ion due to

the

aft location

of the

engines, plus a high

evolved intoPhase 2Bwithout anyobvious

progress towardsa final selection. Secretary

ofState Robert MacNamara and hisdepart

men ta l o ff ic ia ls were a lso coming under

pressure inearly 1965from Halabyto make

a decision

conceming

the

SST

programme;

but MacNamara was still insistingupon fur

ther feasibility studies.

Having survived numerous investiga

tions, the study o f t he final submissions

began in September 1966. After due con

sideration, the result of the designcompeti

tion was announcedon 31 December,with

Boeing and General Electric beingchosen

as the preferred developers. However, even

thispart of the process wasslowed as Presi

dent

Johnson would

not

give

the

final go

ahead until 29April 1967. With Phase 2C

successfully completed, the chosen manu

facturers immediately began work o n t he

development

of

theirown parts

of

Phase 3.

At

the end

of

this phase

the

selected con

sortium would not only have two pro to

types , i t wou ld a lso be on course to com

pleting the airworthiness certificationand a

planned production schedule for the air

lines.

The

funding arrangements were des

tined to remain

a t t h e

same level

of90

per

cent from the government, although it

would insist that each interested airline

should contribute 1 million towards the

final programme cost

that

had been calcu

lated to reach 1,444 million. Eventually

teno f fifty-two interested parties agreed to

s tump up thei r share o f t he risk funding,

which allowed Phase 3 funds to bereleased

and the contractsto beissued to Boeingand

General

£Iew ic on

1 May 1967.

This

in

turn allowed the projected first flight date

for a p ro to ty pe t o b e s et for the closing

months of 1970.

The

Boeing design office

startedwith a series of concept drawings of

which sixteen were seen as having further

development potential.

The

lead design

wasalways the 2707-100variablesweepair

c ra ft , a l though i t wou ld appear that the

company were alreadycoveringall the pos

sibilitiesshould this version fail.

The

inter

nal model numbers for these designs were

964-404 for the swing-wing aircraft, 969

321 , which fea tu red a h ighly swept , cam

bered arrow planform with fold-outcanards

on

the forward fuselage, while

the

final

back-up proposalwas known as Model969

302, based arounda plain delta wing. Alto

gether the newBoeingproduct hadattract

ed optionsfor sixty-threeaircraft, an ironic

twist being

t ha t BOAC

had p laced an

option forfouraircraft, which made

the

air

line unpopular in Britain.

Evaluation

not be required since the sonic boomruns

had proved

that

they wou ld be an unwel

come

nuisance over populated areas.

The

trials werecarried out over Oklahoma and

lasted six months, and elicited over 8,000

complaintsand more than 5,000claims for

compensation.

By September1964all four companies were

ready to hand in their submissions foreval

uation

by the

FAAand

other

interested par

ties. Comprising over 22,000 pages, they

wereread by over200 expertsfrom NASA,

the USAF, t he FAA and t he C iv il Aer o

nautics Board.

The

proposals from both

groupsweredisappointing since

neither

was

ableto coverthe range requiredand payload

requiremen ts , and both wou ld a lso have

higher than expected operating costs.

The

engines too would fall short of

the

design

parameters; but both General Electric and

Pratt

Whitney were lucky enough t o b e

g ranted a fur ther s ix months in which to

improve their offerings. Given this situa

tion, itcame as no surprise thatthe Depart

ment

of

Commerce was asked to undertake

a further financial study

of the

entire pro

gramme. By December 1964 Phase 2A had

Edwards AFB to under take sonic -boom

flights to determinetheir effectsupon peo

ple

on

the ground, buildings and the envi

ronment

in general.

The

aircraft involved

with these trials included

the Lockheed F-

104, the Convair B-58, the North Ameri

can XB-70 and the Lockheed YF-12A.

Th e

trials were intended tobe run in two phas

es; however it became clear after

the

first

series

of

flights

that the

second set would

Wh

itney. Inearly 1965 the preferreddevel

opment

teams had crystallized

into

two

groups, thesebeingBoeing/GeneralElectric

and Lockheed/Pratt Whitney. Changing

the way that the government , FAA and

manufacturers looked at theAmericanSST

was one external factor- the cancellationof

the

BAC

TSR2 by the British, which

was

seen

as

creating a delay

in

the development

of the Bristol/Rolls-RoyceOlympus engine

forcivil supersonic use In response, theUS

governmentdecided to extend the develop

ment time allocated to the SST.

Having

stretched

out the development

period, the redesignated Phase 2A got

under way; this nowmeant

that

the devel

opment

period had been extended from

twelve months to eighteen. This allowed

a ll fou r manufac tu rers to resume their

research efforts for the design/production

part o f t he contract. Within this phase

each manufacturinggroupwas expectedto

provide detai led des igns , mock-ups

of

major parts

of the

airframe and engines

and experimental data. By the conclusion

of both phases the government had esti

mated

that

development cos ts wou ld be

24 million for the first stage and lO mil

lionfor

the

second, covering

the

airframe

designs and

the

two

engine

designs.

While

the technical aspect of the

SST

was final

ly g at he ri ng momen tum, t he FAA was

undergoing an upheaval, with senior and

middle managementchanging and unfore

seen fundingproblems

coming

to

the

fore.

Once t he FAA

waves

had

se tt led , i t

resumed contact with other organizations,

o ne o f t h e first being NASA.

The

first

request to

NASA

was for a irc ra ft f rom

One

ofthe best-knownexponentsofthe delta-wing planformin the US

was

Convair

who successful lyintroducedthe F-l02 andF-l06fighters andthe B-58Hustlershown

here.

Colecton

118

119



THE

MERIC NSST

THE

MERIC NSST

Movable forebodyhinge. downward to g iv ep ilo ts

added

vis ibility at subsonic

speeds.

2 F lig h td o ck.

3 . Entr y d o o r .

4 F i r t ~ c a u passenger

seots

four abreast

5.

Nose

gear.

6 Stowage console

7. Galley unils.

8 Six·abreast tourist closs

pouenger

seats

extend

o ft t o

cargo retaining bulkhead

9 lower·deck

cargo comportment

1 0 . Bo dy f r ames.

1 1. Lead ing - ed ge . I ots.

12. Rib•.

13. Floor blooms.

l Pressure w structure

1 5. F u el to n k.

1 6 . M ain lan d in g

gear

well.

1 7 . W in g p ivo t.

18 Outboard wing section pivoted forward to

30·

sweep.

19. Flops.

20. Spoilers.

2 1 . A ilero n .

22 Wing sweep actuator

23 Main landing

gear well.

24. Engine.

25. Cargo retaining bulkhead.

2 6. Car g o d o o r .

27 Maindeck cargo compartment

2B Elevon.

29 Elevator

30 Preuure bulkhead

3 1 . V entr al f in.

32. Fin.

33 Tail cone

34 Emergency exit

m ai n- g ea r b ay s w h ic h w er e c o mp l et el y

covered i n fli ght w hil e w i th the gear

extended

the

minimal amount of under

carriage bay was exposed t o

the

airflow.

Each ofthe four main undercarriage units

wa s a b og ie u po n w hi ch w er e m ou nt ed

four wheels to allow forenough clearance

upon retraction and the main-gear units

were slightly staggered two forward

and

outboard of

the

aftpair. A similar arrange

ment appl i ed t o

the

twin-wheeled nose

undercarriage whichwasmounted well aft

ofthe flight deck

and

would require some

careful steering

by

the crewto remainsafe

Iyon the tax iwa

y

To

the

rear ofthe aircraft

were the delta-shaped fixed tailplanes

which werealso

home

to

the

podded pow

erplants two perside.A similar methodof

a ss em bl y was us ed in t he se s tr uc tu re s

although

t he y w er e m ad e c on s id e ra bl y

strongerto absorb

the thrust

loading of

the

engines

andthe

aerodynamic forcesgener

ated by

the

inboard-mounted elevators

and the tip-mounted elevons. The wings

w er e f ai rl y s le nd e r i n n a tu r e s in c e i n

the

s we pt -b ac k p os it io n t he y f or me d a d e lt a

with

the

fixed t ail planes and i n the fully

forw ard posit i on a ful l range

of

sl at s and

Fow ler t ripl e-sl ot t ed flaps w ould al most

double

the

t o ta l a re a

of the

w in g a nd

extend

o v er 8 5 p er cent of the leading and

trailing edges. Roll

control

was dealt w i th

by ailerons

mounted

close to the tip ofthe

wing.

The

wings themselves were mount

e d a ro un d a s in gl e p iv ot h av in g t hr ee

selectable positions. In

the

forward swept

position

the

leading edgesweep was set at

20 degrees for l andi ng the intermediate

position was 30 degrees for take-offand at

supersonic cruise

the

l eadi ng edge sw eep

was 72 degrees.

There

was an intermediate

position between

30

and

72

degrees

which

c ou ld b e s el ec te d f or s ub s on ic c ru is in g.

Mount ed above

the

rear-most section of

the

fuselage

and

its tail-cone was

the

fin

c o mp ri si ng a m ul ti sp ar s tr u ct u re i nt er

spersed with spacing

and

shaping ribs all

covered

by

a

titanium

skin. T o

the

rear of

the

fin w as the multisection rudder each

element being powered by i ts ow n PFCU .

Flightcontrol

at

low speeds in lateralmode

wa s p r ov id e d b y conventional ailerons

and

the elevators catered for the pitching

moments. Once

the

wings were fullyswept

back flight control w as achieved by

the

pivoted tips

of the

tailplanes these being

the onl y m eans of

control. The

G

Electricengines were GE4 turbojets r

60 0001b

267kN ,

each having an

burner

and

variable inletand exhau

On

5

January 1968 Boeing after

months of trying finally admitted

with the design of the Dash200 aircr

a sk ed f or e xt ra t im e t o r ev am p t h e

design completely. In effect the co

had managedto create

an

aircraft tha

easily cross

the

Atlantic but empty

FAAagreed to

an

extension until31M

not

only was

the

prestige of the Am

i ndust ry at st ake but

the

agency w a

c ha nc e to re co ve r so me o f t he

already expended. B oei ng t ook t he

back t o t he draw ing board al thou

provisogiven by t he FA A was that t

design mustbe ready for construction

i nt w elve m ont hsand a prot otypere

a first fli ght i nMarch 1972.

Boeing

Try

Again

Boeing s answer to its designcrisis w

the

2707-300 which featured delta

w it h a l ea di ng e dg e s we ep a ng le

n

lJ lJ

l 1L Jlll lO

i

······· R 0

Thissecond incarnationof theBoeing

SST was

known

as

Model 2707 300;

i tsdevelopmentinto acommercial ly

viableaircraftwas notpossible

SSA

Colecton

BelOW:

TheBoeing swing wing SST was intendedto have fourmainundercarriageunits plusa nose

unitto carry itsimmenseweight The multistagenose

was

intended to obviatethe need forsecondary

external sensors as Concorde didwhen itsnosesection was drooped Thelocationof theenginesand

theswing wings endedthis version SBA

Colecton

ABOVE

This diagramrevealsmany ofthe internalfi tments

thatBoeingproposedfor the Model

2707 200 swing-

wing SST being at an earlystage thedrawing lacksthe

canardsfitted lated BSA

Colecton

120 121



THE MERI N SST

THE MERI N SST

Boeing designed

two

versionsotthe

27 7 SST

This isa mock up ofthe second theDash

3 Gone were

he swing wings replaced by adelta plantorm Had it beenbuilt i twould havebeen twice thesizeof

Concorde CourtesyBoeing

and

a

span that

w as s imila r in s iz e

o

tha to f

the Boeing 707, this being based

the

Mo de l 9 6 9- 3 02 . I t w as

not

dissimi

ar

to the

losing Lockheed proposal, a fact

ot

lost

o n t he

design

team at

Lockheed.

hangovers from

the

carlierDash

00 design was

the re tent ion of the

alI-fly

ng

tailplane

assemblies.

The

deleting of

he swing wings a nd t he associated flight

s ys te m l ed B oe in g engineers to

ig n a h igh - lif t s y ste m

i nt o t he

wings;

h is w as b as ed

on

tr a ilin g e d ge f la ps

and

laperonsfor improved roll control.

At

this

oint

in

the

aircraft s

development

in

June

L969

the

p ro je ct e d a ir c ra ft w ei gh ed

50 ,00 01 b 3 4 0,9 00 k g) g ro ss w e ig h t w ith

for 234 passengers, later to

e increased

to

250,

and their

baggage

over

r an ge

of

3 ,5 75 m ile s 5,800km . Other

nnovationsput forward by Boeing includ

a d o ub le -s te p,

droop

nose

which

gave

he

pilots

an excellent

view

duringthe

low

handling phases such as take-off and

a nd in g, w hi l e i t a ll ow ed

the

detectors

oun ted on the

nose assembly

to remain

oin ted a long the line of the aircraft

instead of relying on a s e co n da r y s e t.

The

abin

layout

meant tha t

for tourist seating

heycould

b e c a r r ie d s ix a b re a st, s inc e th is

ection extended f ully a f t to the cargo-

re taining bulkhead, a lthough,

in

common

with other aircraft types, it was highly like

ly

t h at t he

2 7 07 in s e rv ice w ou ld have a

small section

of the

passenger cabin divid

e d o ff f or f ir st -c la ss p as se ng er s i n l es s

cramped, four-abreastseati ng. Underneath

the

forward

p ar t o f t he

passenger cabin

w ou ld b e a

combined

freight baggage

hold

and a further compartment aft

of

thecabin

on

the

upperdeck was set aside for the same

purpose.

Serving the

passenger

compart

ment

were

at

least

two

g alley u n its ,

matched in number by fixed toilet blocks

that

w e re p r ov ide d w ith external

cleaning

points. Access

t o t he

aircraft was

by

four

entry d o or s in the forward fuselage, which

also allowed for cabin servicing trolleys to

be

exchanged. Should there

be

an emer

gency, two f ur t he r d oo rs w er e mounted

above

the

wing gloves to allow escape.

Dimensionally the

Boeing design would

change

as i t

evolved,

growing larger

with

each modification. The o r ig ina l Bo ein g

Model 733 had a w ing s pa n

of

98ft Sin

JOm),

an

overall

length of

271ft

82.6m ,

a height of 45ft 3in 13.79m and a w i ng

area

of

5,019sq f t 4 66 .3 sq m ).

The

pro

posed

engines

were four

General

Electric

GE4/Js.

These

were

needed to

lift

an

air

frame

that

w ei gh ed a maximum

of

500,0001b 228,000kg ,

w ithi n whi ch

were to be s e ated 250 passengers, being

pushed a long a t Mach 2.7 at a maximum

altitude of

65,000ft 09,800m . The pro

jected

r a ng e w as

es timated to

be

3,480

nauticalmiles/4,000 miles/6,440km.

The 2707-100 had

an increased wing

span to

174ft

3 in 5 3. 1m , w hi ch t hu s

increased the wingareato 9,000sqft 837sq

m).

The

fuselage length was also increased

by a f ur th er 3 0f t t o 306ft 93.27m).

The

powerplants remained

the

same,

although

the top speed had increased to Mach 3 and

the

passenger

complement

to 2 77 .A

II

these

changes

l ed t o a g ro wt h i n

t he maximum

weight to 675,0001b J07,000kg . The trav

elling time between New York and London

w as g ive n a s ju s t

under 2hrand

from Seat

t le to To ky o v ia Honolulu wasestimated to

take just over 3.5hr.

The

appearance

ofthe

2707-200ailframe

saw

the

wingspan rise by a f ur th er 3 ft 2 in ,

but in contrast the f us elag e le ng th w as

reduced to 298ft 91m , a lthough enough

of

a redesign had beencarried

out to

,dlow

the

passenger loading to in cr e as e to 2 92 .

Yet

again, the c h an g es led to a n in cr ea s e in the

a ll- u p w e ig h t to 6 80 ,00 01 b J 0 9,0 00 k g) .

Having admit ted defea t with

regard

to

the

swing-wing version ofthe SST, Boeing

ABOVE: A photograph ofa NASAwind tunnel which

dwarfs

thescientistandthe

SST

mock upabout

to be placedinside Courtesy NASA

RIGHl: Thisnosesectionwas fromthe final Boeing

SST

submission; by thistimethe multistage nose

hadbeenreplaced

b ya n

assembly

similar

tothat

on Concorde CourtesyBoeing

proposed a fixed-wing design. Designated

2707-300, the a irf r am e h a d a w ing s pa n of

1 41 ft 8 in 4 3m ) w hi le

the

fuselage was

r ed uc ed i n l en gt h a ga in t o 2 80 ft 8 5m ).

Beinga slightlysmalleraircraft, the passen

ger

complement

fell

to

234;however,

the

all

u p w e ig ht h a d g o n e u p a g a in , to 7 10 ,0 00 1b

J22,000kg).

The

maximum speed was also

dropped to

Mach

2.7.

Whenthe

first proto

typedrawingsweredeliveredthere

had

been

a

few

changes from the Dash 300 prototype.

Th e

wingspan was extended by a f u r the r 4 in

and

the

fuselage had grown by a further 7ft.

These alterations allowed the passenger

number

to

increase

to

250, commensurate

wi th a g row th

of

m ax im um w ei gh t t o

7 50 ,0 00 1b 3 40 ,00 0 kg ) . A s if

the

written

details were not enough, Boeingproduceda

mock-up to the judgingpanel with

the

usual

Hollywood razzle-dazzleto show it off.

Governmental Scepticism

The report was

handed

over to

the

gov

ernment

agencies.

The

FAA

and

its project

office reviewed

the

design

during

Decem

be r L968 and f o un d it much more accept

able,

not

only f ro m a technical

po in t o f

view,

but

a ls o f ro m

the economic.

To

muddy the situation

further

there

was a

change of administration, w ith Pr e sid en t

Nixon

returned to

theWhite L Louse

One

of

hisfirst

actions

was

to

f or m a

committee

under thechairmanshipof the Under Sec

retary

of

Transportation, James Begg, to

review

theentireSST

programmein

depth.

One of those commenting upon the Boeing

SST

wasDr Raymond Bisplinghoff, who, at

the

time,was a well-respected aeronautical

engineer and Dean of the Schoo lo f

Engi

neering

at

the Massachusetts Institute of

Te ch n olo gy , w h os e input concen

upon

the

impact

of

sideline,

not

engine,

noise from

the

SST,

which

not

be reduced

without

a further red

ing of

the

entire aircraft.

Other

a

concern

included

the

economic , na

financial

and environmental

aspec

the

technological f a ll- ou t. A s w ell

financial risks,

the committee

stress

environmental

issues,

oneofwhich

w

safety

of

passengers and crew and a

t he c on tamina ti on o f t he

u p pe r

phere

b y w a te r v a po ur . The airline

alsocausingproblems

since theyhad

ed

tha t the

original six-abreastseati

t oo c ramped

and

they p r ef e rr e d

a b re a st in ste ad . Bu ta s

the

aircraft h

proceeded much beyond the d

b oa rd , B oe in g f el t a bl e to c o mp l

potential

purchasers wishes.

722

723



THE MERI N

SST

THE MERI N

SST

This slightlv indistinct image isof the lockheed l 2DDD SST mock-up.Although it

would appearto be themostviabledesign it would losetothe competingBoeing

model. Courtesy

Lockheed

Martn

With its afterburnersblazing this lockheed SR 71 leavesEdwards AFB on atest

flight. Itwas rumoured that lockheed used thisdesignto develop their

own SST

BBA

Colecton

Whitney PW JTFl7A-201s, althoug

General Electric GE4/J5Ks were pro

as alternatives, both sets being ra

60,0001b

267kN)

thrust perengine.

imum all-upweight was given

as

480

(217,720kg), to travel at a maximum

tude of 80,000ft (24,400m).

The

pro

range was around3,480nauticalmiles

miles/6,440km.The airframe

was

con

ed main ly of t i tan ium alloys with

amounts

of

steel being used in areas o

stress, such

as the

undercarriagemoun

I t was the L-2000's simplerdesig

won it friends among some of the a

and some political supporters; howe

regards civilian transport aircraft B

h ad t he grea ter in fluence and thu

swing-wing aircraft gathered the m

even though the Lockheed machin

seen as

t h e o ne

design

that

would

America to produce an SST t ha t

easily rival

Concorde.

Lockheed we

pushing their partner'sengine, the P

Whitney

JTF17 , asa far more able

which, because of i ts fan je t s t ru

would also achieve more success t h

GE

offering, which wasa straight tu

Lockheed a lso used i ts exper ien

both transport aircraft design and

works' aircraft to promote the L-200

many observersbelieved that the SR

Mach 3, double-deltaaircraft, was ac

a virtual prototype for

the

L-2000. H

canards and the swing wings; noneof these

was in the Lockheed submission.

The

sim

plerairframe was also slightlysmaller and so

the L-2000's capacity of 230 passengers was

smaller than

that

ofthe Boeing2707.

The

dimensions given for

the

L-2000

seriesincluded a wingspan

of 116ft(35.4m),

a fuselage length

of

260f t 79 .3m) and a

heightof 47ft

11

in

l4 .6m). The

wingarea

was specified

at

9 ,026sq f t (838.5sq m).

The

original engines were four

Pratt

The Other Contenders

While Boeingand GeneralElectrichad suc

ceeded in gaining the SST development

contract their rivals, Lockheedand Pratt

Whitney, were still investigatingand devel

oping theirown submission. The Lockheed

machinewasdesignated the Model L-2000,

with the company's designation

of

CL.823.

This

would feature revolutionary aerody

namic innovations that drew extensively on

the work previously done by

NACA/

NASA. The

basis

of

the wingcentred upon

a double delta-wing planform which would

supposedly assist the aircraft in reaching a

Mach 3 cruising speed. From this it would

appear

that

everything about the L-2000

wasrevolutionary,

butthat

would

not

be

the

case

as

Lockheed used their normal design

philosophy of si mpler, safer,bet ter'

to

create

their machine. To the rear

of

the double

delta wingwerea full range of elevons anda

multi-section rudder and leading-edge slats

that gave a total of sixteen flying control

surfaces. By contrast, the Boeing 2707-200,

with itsvariable sweep wings,was bedecked

w it h f if ty -n in e f li gh t c on tr ol s ll lf ac es

that included triple-slotted flaps, movable

investigate the source of the 350,000

recently pledged to support this organiza

tionand

whether

i t had been provided by

the very corporations that would benefit

from the continuation o f t he

SST

pro

gramme. But even

at

the t ime

t h at he

was

speaking to

the committee the

fate

of the

SST was already decided.

AIthough the SST is state-or-the-art techno

logically, it is not economical norenvironmen

tallyfriendly.

Seat

permilecostsarenow fartoo

highdueto risingcosts,whilethe damage to the

upper atmosphere is too dangerous on t h e basis

of present knowledge. I beli eve i t wou ld be a

mistaketo become

committed

toa multi-billion

dollar SST programme without the reasonable

certainty that SSTs will be practical economi

cally ancl acceptable environmentally.

to a s teep inc rease in fue l p rices. Given

these concerns, many airlineswere report

ed to be

unhappy

with

having

to sign firm

options for an aircraft which existed only

on paper and was increasing incost, as well

as their confirmed orders for

the

subsonic

fleets.

At

this

point

a

comment

by

Charles

Lindbergh

on

behalf of these concerned

airline officials was read out. This telling

declaration stated that:

At

this timeLockheed Aerospace were in

financial trouble and Rolls-Royce had just

filed for bankruptcy; thus the chances of

Boeing going

the

s ame way whi le s ti ll

be ing involved in

t he SST

project were

extremely high. Unfortunately, the closing

statement cent red on the sudden loss of

aerospace jobs

that

had afflicted Rolls

Royce and would

hit the SST

builders just

as quickly.

The

second argument placed before the

committee centred on the environmental

issues whose risks were

not

fully understood

a t t he time for lack of research. Although

scientists would be called to provide more

experttestimony,their statementsrelated to

the potentialdamagecaused by an SST, and

the

effects

of

subsonic aircraft and

other

fossil-fuel burners were overlooked. The

final point p laced before the committee

concerned American national priorities.

orrectly, Udall stated that, although

the

SST was technologicallyadvanced, itsben

efits in theend would applyonly to an elite,

wealthy few, and was unacceptable, even if

the SST

were profitable from

the

outset.

Such vast amounts

of

money already

spent

and promisedshouldhave beendeployed in

support

of

economic, social and environ

mental gains. This was a lso the t ime when

manyprogrammes, such as the Lockheed C

5A Galaxy, were overrunning theircosts by

great margins.

Having pu t

forward a variety

of

argu

ments against the SST, Udall then raised

the spectreofthe pro-SST lobby.

Whether

this wasdiversionary was

not

revealed, but

he

did state

that the commit tee

should

implications may have strucka chord with

the

media but

the

knock-on social effects

were even more d isas trous with Boe ing

layingoff 7,000 in all departments almost

immediately the announcement was made

on

18 March. A similareffect was seen at

General

Electric where more

than

6,000

were let go. Although these were the big

announcements, the cancellation o f t he

American

SST

wasfelt across the whole

of

theUSA.

The Opposition

None

of this imp inged

on the

Citizens

League Aga ins t the Sonic Boom, whose

avowed intent was to first stop Concorde

entering America by any means possible,

a fter wh ich they turned thei r attention to

their home-grown products. Led

by

Senator

Proxmire, the movement was growing in

strength daily. Fighting a rearguard action

against cancellation, was

the

unenviable

task fac ing Secre ta ry of Transportation

William Magruder, whose department had

assumed responsibility for the

SST

project

from

the

FAA in April 1970. Possibly

the

final nail in the coffin was hammered home

before the Transportation Sub-Committee,

of the HouseAppropriation Committee, on

2 March 1971. Delivering this requiem for

the American SST was Stewart L. Udall,

who a t one time had been the Secretary of

the Interior. Hisstatus was

that

of represen

tative

o f t he

Coalition Against the SST,

basedin Washington,DC. Hisopeningcom

ments were based around the original argu

ment

that

the aircraftwouldbe damagingto

the environment, a statement based on t he

beliefbysome anti-SSTscientists that super

sonic transports would cause irreparable

damage to the ozone layer. This view had a

few holes in itsince thecurrent subsonicair

liner fleet had engines that generated vast

quantities of pollution,astarkcontrast to the

efforts madeby the

SST

engine manufactur

ers to reduce hazardousoutputs. Udall then

moved

on

tostate

that the

efforts

of

Ameri

can technology could better serve people

materially and with regard to theirenviron

mentalhealth. During hisperiod

as

theSec

retary of the lnteriorUdall hadappointed a

team of scientists whose primaryaim was to

rubbishall SST projects.

Three statements

were put forward by

Udal l on beha l fof the Coalition.

The

first

stated

that

the American airline industry

was in a parlous state, especially as the oil

crisis was beginning tobite;this in turn led

The

report that thisbodydelivered was

in

the

ex treme , bu t even so the

Secretary,

John

Volpe, rec

on the

advice

of the

FAA,

that

1April 1969 that theprogramme should

This decision was eventually rat

by Nixon in September,although with

reduced budget, which was approved by

by

the end of the year. Whi Ie Boe

was struggling to produce a workable

, itspress and publicity department was

sy promoting

the

need and virtues

of

an

SST to counteract the threat of

oncorde.

The

material pumpedout at this

tha t the Boeing aircraft would

capture at

least

20

billion

of the

25 billion

SST

world market

1990. A further argumentwas that,even

the

American

SST

were slow in coming

service, itsability to carry more pas

than itsrivals would sooneven up

market.

The

following year was the turning point

the Boeing programme as numerous

ups began to co-ordinate their opposi

to the project o n t he grounds of cost

potential damage to the environment;

only were theycomplainingabout their

home-grown aircraft, they were also

ing their attention to the perceived

posed by Concorde. As ifto reinforce

feelings of the opposition movement,

signed the National Environmental

licy Act, which committed all relevant

departments to protecting the

The

supporters of the

SST

ramme immediatelybegan to lobby on

as they feared that it would bepre

as a sacrificial lamb on t he altar of

tingnature. All of this came toa head

n 1970 w hen t he Senate voted on 3

er against the 1971 funding appro

Since two versionsof thesame bill

been presented to Congress, a reason

compromise was

reached that allowed

nt funding to continue, albeit at

reduced rate. However,a further twist

was

out dur ing March 1971 when both

es voted heavily against spending any

money on the SST programme. Even

s hada sting in itsince terminationcosts

not c ome che ap ly a nd e ve nt ua ll y

million.

Thisthen

would

the end o f t he American supersonic

sport dream and all that remains are a

drawings, photographs and mock-up

in museums.

At thepo int o f

termi

1 billionand 8.5million man-hours

d been expended on creating nothing

than

a paper d ream.

The

financial

724

725



THE

MERI N

SST

The MiG-21was oneof themostsuccessful delta-wingedaircraft built inthe USSR

although

it

still reflectedthe beliefthatthis

wing

planformrequired atai lplanefor

pitch control.

BBAColecton

So Close:

t

Tupolev Tu 44

CHAPTER SEVEN

One ofthe first Sovietattempts atdesigning a n SST isencapsulatedin thislayoutfromTupolev designated the Tu 4.

BBAColecton

Competition from the East

Whi le t he

Anglo-French consortium

was

creating

an

SST

that would be

the

most

thoroughly

tested aircraft ever

bui l t and

t he Americans

were

c re at in g onl y on

paper)

the

most thoroughly

untested

SST

never built,aircraftdesignersin

the USSR

were forging

thei rown

version

of t he

SST

and

would

beat t hem

all

i nt o t he

skies.

Un like the

American

and

the

western

European offering,

the

Russian aircraft was

very

much

politically driven;

the

others

were expressions

of

a financial and

techno

logical need.

The

technology

to

createsuch

an aircraft was already available since

the

military within the Soviet

Union

were Ay-

ingdelta-winged fighterssuch

as the

MiG

and

the less than

successful Myasischev

Thisartist s impression isof theNorth

American offering closely resemblingthe

XB-70 bomberfrom which

it

was derived.

CourtesyNASA

LEFT WhentheXB-70was cancelled by

the

USAF

theprototypeswere passed

toNASAfor usein exploringhigh-speed

fl ightandthe behaviourof thedelta

wing

throughoutitsfl ight envelope.

CourtesyNASA

ABOVE Although the XB-70

would

not

enter USAF service it wasthe basisof an

SST designput forvvard by NorthAmerican

Aviation.

CourtesyNASA

to

assume that

ei therthe General

Electric

or

Pratt

Whitney

powerplants would be

chosen.

The

projected range for

the NA

60

was given as 3,480 nautical miles/4,000

miles/6,4400km.

North Americaneventu

ally pulled

o ut o f t h e SST

project since

they needed to

concent rat e on t he

prob

lemsbesetting

the

XB-70 bomber.

At the

time

the

projects

ended , t he

USA

had

spent

1,035 million

on R D,

testing

and

mock-ups. Britain

and

France

had

bothspent

a similar

amountof

devel

opment

funding,

the

difference being that

oncorde

was

on t he

threshold

of gaining

full certification.

Onlyone othercompany

putupa design

for

t heSST

project:

North American

Air

craft,

who

based

their

design

on t he

exist

ing XB-70 Valkyrie.

This

machine would

be

known

as

the NAC-60,

which featured

a conical, cambered, modified delta wing

and

fixed, forwardcanards,all derived from

the

Mach 3 strategic bomber. The

known

characteristics

of

this a ircra ft inc luded a

wingspan

of

121ft 4in

37m),

a leng th

of

1 95 ft S in ( 59 .6m) , a

heigh t of

48ft

3in

04.7m)

and a w in g a rea

of

6,417sq ft

(597sq m). The

accommodation

was given

as 170, travelling

a t Mach

2.65.

Although

the

engines were

never

specified, it

is

safe

ed their design as hard as they could,

eed weredisappointed to receive

the

that

they had lost

the

SST

competi

on

3l December 1966. During

the

eed design phase

the

aircraft under

three initial iterations, known as

the

sh l , 2 and 3 , before f ina lly set t ling

on

Dash 7 layou t as

the

production ver

. Boeing's victorywasseen assomewhat

uded since their aircraft would undergo

le redesignsbeforebeingcancelledin

1. Lockheed then stopped its develop

supersonic transr0rts,preferring to

uea variety

of

military projectsand sub

wide-body passenger jets.

126

127



SO

CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144

SO CLOSE: THETUPOLEV TU-144

40.31ft 12.29m a nd a height

of

15

4.71m). The maximum take-off w

was 19,8411b 9,020kg). The fitted po

plant

was

the R-l3F300

turbojet, rat

8,972lb 39.92kN d ry t h ru st , w hi l e

reheat engaged the ou tpu t increase

14,3071b

50.32kN .

Other characteri

o f t he A na lo g i nc lu de d a t op s pe e

Mach 2.06

at

altitude; at low altitude

s pe ed w as 745mph 1 ,2 00km/h r ,

l a nd i ng s pe ed w as 139mph 224km

and

the

greatest altitude achievable

65,656ft 20,025m).

The selection of such an aircraft w

l a yo ut h ad b ee n

the

result

of

a h a r d-

battle against the more traditional air

and

aerodynamic engineers within

Soviet hierarchy and ministerial ve

interests who wereoriginally

bent

on

ing

an

aircraft

with

a ta ilp lan e .

To

r

this point, extensive wind-tunnel tes

of

models with and

without

tailplanes

been

undertaken, the

collated

data

fin

proving that a carefullydesigned and e

neered delta wingwould perform far

b

with the tailplane removed.

By

the

end

of

1969

at

least

l40

test flights

had

been undertaken

in

supportof the

Tu

144project, duringwhich a maximum alti

tude

of

6 2 ,30 0 f t 1 9 ,00 0 m) w as a c hie v ed .

D u r in g th es e f lig h ts the A-l44 r e ac h ed a

top speed

of

Mach 2.06 l,3I7mph/

2,120km/hr). Once

the

first

Analog

had

completed itsflight-testprogramme,it was

used for generalflying during which i tw a s

lost while performing aerobatics; the pilot

on thisoccasion was

V

Konstantinov. The

second

A-144

w as d e liv e re d to

the Cro

mov FlightResearch Institute fordevelop

ment

flying, after which i t was us ed to

train

the

f ir st t wo p il ot s f or

the

Tu-144,

including EV Elya n , w h o p u sh e d the air

craft

to

a

maximum

speed

of 1,550mph/

2,500km/hr. On its retirement, the aircraft

wentto

theA ir

Force Museum at Monino,

w h e re it is alongside an exampleof the Tu

144. Such was the performance and stabil

ity

of the

A-I44

Analog

that serious con

sideration wasgiven todeveloping it

as

the

MiG-2lLSH,

heavy armoured

attack

air

craft Shtun?lOvil< . The

A-l44

h ad a s pa n

of 37.72ft 11.5m , a f us ela ge le n gth of

To

assistthe TupolevOKS in designing their SST a MiG 21 airframe w s rebuiltto incorporate the

proposed wing Afterthisconversionthe machine w s redesignated as the A 144Analog

Rea Wings Photographs

provide aircraft based

o n t he M iG -2 l

to

tr ia l a n y of the selected wing shapes. The

converted MiG-21 was a taillessdelta, des

ig na ted a s

the

A -1 44 A na lo g in i ts n ew

g uise , a n d to b e b u ilt a t t h e Voronezh Air

craftPlant, locatedsome

370

miles 600km)

south of Moscow,

as

would the airliner. Two

Analog prototypes were built; the first was

u se d to d e v e lop

the

elevoncontrol system.

I n a s im il ar manner to the Tu-144, the

elevonsectionswouldoccupy the complete

trailing edge

of the

wings, while

the

wing

leadingedgeswereswept backquite severe

lyon

the

inner sectionand

the outer

wing

p an el h ad i ts a ng le

of

s w ee p r e du c ed . To

record

the

behaviour

of

the t es tb ed i n

f lig ht, r e co r din g c a m e ra s w er e p lac e d in a

fairingbehind thecockpit and on top ofthe

fin. To simulate

the

changes in e.g. expect

ed w it h the f ull- size d a irline r , a 6 4 0lb

2 9 0k g ) b a la n ce w e ig h twas incorporated.

This

c o uld b e m ov e d

either

fore

or

a ft, a s

needed

by

controls in the cockpit to alter

the

c.g. The

A-I44

Analog, alsoknown as

the M

iG-Zll,

madeits maiden flight on 8

April 1968, the pilot being Gudkov.

l.35, 1.45kg/hr). First runs

of

a te stb ed

engine were undertaken in 1964. Although

the K u zn e to v O K B w er e f airly s ur e

that

their

engine

would work, an insurance pol

icy powerplantwas put underdevelopment.

This

w ou ld b e a s tra igh tfo r wa r d tu rb o je t,

under the guidance o f t h e P O. Sukhogo

O KB . A s the d e sig n loa d in cr e as e d, s o me

waspassed

out

to

other

design bureauxsuch

as

Antonov, w h ic h w ou ld b e co m e h e av ily

involved with

the

design and manufacture

of the aircraft s outer wingpanels. Tupolev,

havingassembledhis preferred team,which

included Yu N. P op ov a nd B. A.

Gant

sevskiy, t he n w en t t o meet the Politburo

and b e g ive n th e ir in str uc tion s r e ga r din g

the p r oje ct; th es e in clu de d the develop

ment t im elin e a n d t he n umbe r o f proto

types required. The former required

that

the p r oto typ e s h ou ld b e r ea dy f or its m a id

en

flight in 1964, and

the number of

aircraft

n e ed e d w a s d e te r min e d to b e tw o .To a ss is t

the T up ol ev O KB in t he ir development

programme, the help

of the

Mikoyan

B ur ea u w as e li ci t ed . I ts r ol e w ou ld b e to

c:::>

and

that

some

of

th es e f ligh ts w er e ta kin g

inordinately long.

Although Tu po le v w as the preferred

deve loper o f the

Ru ss ian SST,

the

dis

graced Myasischev, out o f favour after the

oun er f ia sc o, w as s ti ll d ev e lo pi n g h is

o w n d e sig ns f or an

SST

even though his

design bureau, OKB-23, hadbeenshut and

its participants dispersed.

Some

would

progress towards aerodynamic m o de ls in

the

M-55 series, although

none

actually

appeared as aircraft. Like Myasischev,

the

Tupolev OKB was approaching an SST

d e sig n f ro m s c r atc h , a f ter

having

rejected

ideas of basing the new aircraft on th e Tu

n s u pe r s on ic b om b er . A s imila r situation

faced

the

d e s ig n a te d e n gi

ne

designers

N .D . K uz n ets ov , w h os e p r od u c t, la ter d es

ignated

the

NK-144, developed from

the

enginesassigned to the

Tu-l35P

proposal,

h a d b e en s u gg e ste d b y

the

designer S.M.

Jager.

These engines

w er e tw o- s po o l tu r

b o fa n s w ith a f ter b ur n e rs a n d had a specif

ic fuel consumption in

the

supersonic

regime

of be tween

2.97

and

3.19Ib/hr

Supportingthe Tupolevdevelopmentprogramme were apair ofmodifiedMiG 21s

whose main feature

w s

theinstal lation ofthe double cranked wing as shown

here

BB

Colecton

M-50 Bounder heavy bomber. In civilian

air transports

the

Soviet

Union

was almost

on a p a r w ith th eir We ste r n o p po s ition as

several Ilyushinand Tupolevairliners would

show.

The

Po litbu r o b e ca m e a w ar e that

Britain and F ra nc e w er e b eg in ni ng t he

design work necessary

to

build

an

SST,soon

to b e co m e Co n c o rd e , a n d th e ir a r c h r iv als

the

Americans were also thinking

of

doing

the same. In response, the Politburo con

v en ed a m ee ti ng i n e ar ly 1 96 2 i n M os co w

w h er e A n dr e i A n dr e ivic h Tup olev , s o n

of

the famous designer Andrei Nikolaevich,

andcurrentlyhead ofthe TupolevOKB, was

approachedto begin to investigatea Russian

SST. This decision was ratified by Premier

Kruschev

on

26 July; h e f avoured t he

TupolevOKB above the othersand charged

them with creating the a irc r af t s o on to b e

known

as

the Tu-144, known to NATO

as

the

Charger.

Justification for

the

project,

s ho ul d s uc h b e n ee de d w i th i n

the

Soviet

Unionat th e tim e, w as thatthe stateairline

Aeroflot needed to

fly

long-haulroutesover

s o me d es o la te p a rts

of

i ts m as s iv e e m pir e

128

129



SO CLOSE: TilE TUPOLEV TU-144

SO CLOSE: TilE TUPOLEV TU-144

closelyspaced ribs, allcovered

by

alu

u m a llo y s k in s m a n uf a ctu r ed f ro m i

the

majority being

of

VAD-23, a

aluminium alloy.

The

trailing edge

w ing w as line d by the elevon sectio

which th e re w er e f ou r p e r w in g, a ll d

by a p ai r

of

powered flying

control

P FC Us ) e ac h, t he r ed un da nc y

r eq ui r ed a s a s af et y f ea tu re . E ac h P

c o uld b e driven by

o n e o f t h e

three p

ry

hydraulic systems, and thus only a

failure

of

a PFC U or a catastrophicsy

failure would stop

the

PFCU from o

ing. As

the

elevons w e re in

part

p lac

the g as s tr ea m generated by the en

they were skinned with t i ta n iu m t

tect against

overheat i ng. C om pl eti n

fl ight-control s ys t em w as t h e t w

rudder, which wasalso driven by PF

these a lso f e atu r ed a

redundancy

cap

i ty i n a

si m il arm anner t o t he el evon

were also titanium-skinned.

It is i n te r es t in g t o n o te

that

b ot h t he

Tupolev and the Anglo-French designers

settled upon thiswing for their design, and

the Americancontenders

would, discount

ing the Boeing swing-wingeffort, settle on

the double-cranked deltafor their twomod

els. The Tu -1 4 4 w in g w a s a b le nd e d d o u ble

d e lta in p lan f or m, w h er e the forward sec

t i on h ad a s we ep s et at 76 degrees, which

would flare out to t h e o ut e r wing panels,

swept

at

57 degrees. The aerodynamiccom

plexities o f a n excessively multi-cambered

wing wereavoided by Tupolev by building

the

w ing a cr os s a s ing le p lan e ,

although

a

certain am ount of wing leading-edge fixed

droopwasapplied t o t h e aerofoilto improve

the

airflow across

the

upper surface.

Struc

turally the wingwas built around a series of

multispars, which gave the assembly great

strength and provided mounting pointsfor

the

enginenacelles

and the main

undercar

riage legs. C onnect i ngt he spars weremany

trialled by pilotless aircraft

capabl e of

fly-

ing a t M ac h

These were designated the

Tu-l21 f or h i gh -s pe ed r es ea rc h, w hi l e a

further

development

would become

the

Tu-l39. The

final wingdesign

chosen

was

that

o f a n ogee shape of a composite com

pound nature. The result

of

this indepen

dence

w o uld b e

seen

in

the

f ir min g u p

of

the Tu-144specification, which g a ve a top

speed

of

Mach 2 .35 , a r a ng e

that

w o uld b e

over 4, 000

miles

6,400km),

w it h a pa s

senger com pl em ent of 1 21 h ou se d i n t wo

cabins, plus their baggage and some cargo.

I n a s imila r

manner

to

t hat

experienced by

t he A nglo-French C oncorde

te a m, th o se

at

the Tupolev OKB w e re a lso evolving

their design, and so

the

final aircraft which

appeared

i n 1 96 8 h ad

changed

from

the

original layout w hen t he design wasfrozen.

In comparison t o i ts nearest rival,

Con-

orde,

the

Tu-144had aslightlylongerfuse

lage mounted upon an ogee-shaped wing.

In

a

similar manner

to

their American rivals.theTupolev bureautested

their proposed

designs

in

massive

windtunnels. In today s

design

environment powerful computers would

be

used forthe same

purpose.

Real Wings

Photographs

design. Supporting Tupolev in their devel

opment efforts was t he T SC Ac Gc I , t he

Institute

of

A e ro d yn a mic s, w h o s tu d ied in

depth

information picked up from Western

sources and passed on the resul ts to

Tupolev. Bothorganizationspresented their

r es ults to

t he C ou nc il o f

Minis te r s, w h o

confirmed t h a t t h e aircraft would be desig

nated the Tu-144

on

1 6 J uly 1 96 3 under

ounciI

Order

798-271;this was confirmed

by

contract

order

MAP276,

d a ted 2 6 J u ly .

T hi s cont ract covered the construction of

five ailframesduring

the

period 1966-67;

of

t he se , t wo w er e intended for extensive

fatigue testing. In a similar m anner t o t heir

Westerncounterparts, the Soviet designers

and

engineers examined numerous layouts

to determine which w ou ld b e the most

aerodynamicallyefficient. [ncharge

of

opti

mizing

the

aircraft s aerodynamics was

G.A.

eremukhin, whose

counterpart

in

the

engine depart m ent was VM. Bulem. Ini

tially, Tupolev andt he AerodynamicsInsti

tute investigated

ten

differentlayouts, some

of which involved the fitting of a conven

tional tailplane, although this was quickly

discarded since trials proved

that

i t w ou ld

destabilize the behaviour oft he

wing, espe

c ially in the low s p ee d p a rt o f t he flight

r e gim e. Ma ny of

the

w ing d es ign s w er e

I

•

I

I ••

< ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

, . . . : : - _ T . - - - - - - ~ l . . = . = - : . : : - ~ : : : - - - - - - - - ' T

I I

I

i

I

}

I I

0

I( )t

I( ]'

II

stopped by

the

French

Secret

Service, who

concocted a substance

t hat

resembled rub

ber-tyre scrapings, but would, upon testing,

p r ov e to b e u n s uita ble f or tyr es c a pa b le

of

w i t hst andi ng t he rigours o f a n S ST land

ing. Britain and itsprimary Concorde man

u f ac tur e rs w e re a ls o

not

immune from

at t empt s at

espionage. One

o f t he many

and most blatant w ou ld b e the visits to

Rolls-Royce at Bristol by numerous Russ

ia n d iplo ma ts, a ttac h es , jo ur n alis ts and

other functionaries displaying an unhealthy

interestin the metallurgical secrets behind

the

Olympus engine. The upshotwasa dis

p lay m o de l

o f t h e

Tupolev Tu-144

a t t he

1963 Paris A i rShow at

Le

Bourget. At first

g la nc e it c los e ly r e se m ble d C oncorde and

h en ce t he

press bestowed

t h e n i ck n am e

C on c or d sk i o n t h e

p r oje ct. H o we v er ,

closeobservation revealed

that

there were

major differences between the twoaircraft,

including the

grouping

o f t he

engines

together a s in the first prototype and a fuse

lage

t hat

w as m or e o va l i n c ro ss -s ec ti on

t han t hat ofC oncorde.

While,at firstglance, Russiandesign and

development w ou ld a pp ea r t o b e d r a wi ng

their inspirationfrom scraps

of

infotmation

garnered from the West, the Tupolev OKB

w as , i n f ac t, f ol lo wi ng i ts o wn c ou rs e of

o .

o

c

--

i le t he designers and engineers were

g flat out, rumours were surfacing of

attempts

by

t h e t h e

KG

B

In

the

es te rn n at io n s t hi s p os si bi li ty h ad

e a dy b e en b ro ug ht t o t he a t te nt i on o f

he

Anglo-French

Concorde

design teams

nd

to a lesser

ext ent oft he A m eri canSST

esigners. One o f t h e first commentscame

rom the press, w hi c h p o in t ed to the

ppearance

o f a n S S T

model

o n t h e

stands

f t h e TupolevBureau during the Paris Air

Show l oo ki ng j us t l ik e Concorde , a

pat ent l y unt rue

statement

as subsequent

events

showed. However,

the appearance

o f t h e rear-engined Ilyushin IL-62 airliner,

which bore an uncanny resemblance to the

BAC

Vickers)

vc tO

seemed

to

rein

force the charge of espionage.Further inci

dents

that

e m er g ed f r om th is p e rio d w e re

centred

within France. The first

concerned

the head o f t h e Aeroflot m iss ion in Par is

who wasarrestedwhile preparing t odepart

to

Moscow with a briefcase allegedlyfull

of

oncorde

blueprints.

A not her concerned

attempts to bribe an a ir po r t w o rk e r at

Toulouse to provide rubber scrapings from

oncorde s high-speed taxi trials for analy

s is in the USSR. T h is o n e was apparently

rty Work foot

diagramillustrates the

prototype

Tu-144. characterized

by

the

grouped engines

within

one

nacelle

block.

BBA

Colecton

3

131



S O C L O S E: T H E

TurOlEv

TU-144

S O C L O S E: T H ETurOlEv TU-144

flight test engineer, with flight

engin

T

Seliverstova. Throughou t t he

flight

the

undercarriage remained

down

and

this mostradical

of

shape

Ru ss ian s k ie s

made

a s af e,

untro

l a nd i ng . F ro m t hi s poin t, the flig

schedule p r og r es s ed s m oo thly , w i

second

flight, lasting

50min, taking

in e a r lyJanuary 1969, once all the t

t ry h ad been analysed. The f irs t T

finally achieved supersonic flight

May

and

speeds

a bove Mach

I

achieved a shorttime afterwards on 5

During test flying

on

2 6 Ma y 1 9 70

t

144finallyexceeded

Mach

2

at an a

of53,480ft

16,311m).

Further

high-

flying saw t h e t es t c re w p us h t o a

of

1,242mph 2,000km/h

at

55

l6 ,970m and the

maximum s p ee

a t ta ined la te r tha t

year

when

1,51

2,430km/h was passed. Further dev

ment

ightswere

undertaken

to p r ov

behav iour of the environmental co

system, the variable intakes, inertial

gation and

the

autopilot/autoland sys

The l as t w as i n va l ua bl e i n returnin

Tu-144

to t he ground when

all

M os co w a i rp or ts w er e blanketed

white-outand blizzards. The system w

accurate

that

the

aircraftwas landed

p lete ly in automatic m o de . To a s sis

pilots, a CRT display was mounted i

centreof the

main

instrument

p a ne l

of

publicity

concerning the

n e w Tu p ole v

product escalated. This adversely affected

the

maiden flight

date

that was already

pencilled in by

the state-controlled

media

and began to affect the aircraft s produc

t io n a nd i ts f ligh t-te s t s c he d ule . To this

e nd , t he c ompl et io n o f t he

first

a nd t he

building of the second prototype werehur

r ie d i n a n e ff or t t o k ee p up with

the

pro

paganda. The roll-out

o f t he

f irs t p r oto

type,

CCCP-68001, took

p la ce i n e ar ly

December 1968, withthe maiden flight set

f or la ter that

month, once

a f ul l r an ge

of

ground,

engine and

t ax i t ri al s h ad

been

completed satisfactorily. When r e ad y f or

The second iterationof the Tu 144 s w theenginesdivided into two distinct nacelles

whil theaircraft was supported on revampedundercarriage units. BBAColecton

itsfirstflight, the prototype was stoppedby

that familiar bugbear that besets many air

craft

and their

anxious design teams:

the

weather.

Thus

poised

and

ready,

the

Tupolev team had to wait until 31 Decem

ber for

the

f irs t f lig ht, r e qu ir in g 6 ,2 35 f t

1 ,900m of the

runway

at

Zhukovski.

Unlike Weste rn a i rl ine test crews, those

f ro m T u po l ev w er e seated

on

ejection

seats,

although

th e y w e re not r e qu ire d to

use

t hem on thi s

first

uneventful

flight

of

38min. Initially the flight-test crew con

sisted

of the

standard tr io p lu s a f ligh t- te s t

engineer not

required for

the production

aircraft). The crew for this firstflight con

sisted

ofchief

testpilot E.v. Elya n ,la te r to

b e m a de a

Heroof the Soviet Union,

M. V

K oz lov a a s

co-pilot,

V.N.

Benderova

as

N .D . K u zn e ts ov NK-144 engines, devel

opedfrom

the

earlier NK-8, and

their

after

burnersweregroupedin paired nacelles,

the

original single-box assembly having been

abandoned as inefficient. Each powerplant

was capable

of

d e ve lo pin g a d ry

th rus t o f

28,6001b

119kN ,

w h ich w as in cr e as e d to

38,5801b

l72kN

with reheat engaged; the

latter

option

was

not

e x er c is e d in c r uis e

mode. During

the

early series

of

test flights

the crew reported overheating and vibra

tion problemswith

the

engines operating in

the

subsonic regime.

Overheating

affected

not only the engine nacelle assemblies but

also around the rearfuselage. Rectifying the

reported harmonic v ibr a tio n w as f ina lly

cured by replacing

the

prototype power

plant RD-36-5Is with pre-series production

e n gin es RD -ZB-5 1 , w h ic h w e re f ar better

b a la n ce d . Fu r th e r p r ob lem s w e re e x pe r i

enced

with

the

engines in

that

a

change of

fuel was causingcorrosionto thecom buster

c h am b er s , w h ich , in

tum,

led initially to a

d e gr a da tion in p e lfo r ma n ce

and

in

one

incidentcomplete engine failure. The over

heating problem would becured only when

the

single engine-nacelle box was replaced

by

tw o s e pa r ate and distinct u ni t s w i th

improved cooling alTangements. To supply

the

e ngi ne s a t ot al fuel c ap ac it y

of

19,230gal 87,500Itr) was available, being

h el d in i nt eg ra l t an ks i n the ou te r wing

panels,

the

leading-edge wingsections and

the

lower section

of the

fuselage. To allow

f or tr im c h an g es in f lig ht, the Tu-144 was

e q uip pe d w ith tr im ta n ks in the fin and the

f or wa rd f us elag e, f ro m w h ich f ue l c o uld b e

pumped

to maintain

a correctc.g. through

out t he full range o f t he flight envelope.

The fuel consumption

of

the prototype

engines was fargreater

than

h a d b e en p re

d icte d. I th a d been expected thatthe reheat

s el ec t io n w ou ld i nc re as e consumption;

however,

the

higher f ue l u sa ge in

the

sub

sonicregime

came

as a surprise

and

needed

further investigation. The results of this

revealed

that

the intakes and their sec-

ndary

vent

d oo rs w ou ld n ee d

to

be

redesigned; however, given

the short-turn

usage expected from the f ir st p r oto typ e , it

w as d ec id ed t o l ea ve a ny r ed es ig n to

the

preproduction

and the

production version.

First

Appearance

With

the first flying prototypeand fatigue

specimen steadily taking shape, construc

tion

having started

in 1 96 5,

and

a p r ov i

sional date f or its appearance, the

amount

s e c tio n b e in g G .F. Naboyshchikova, ably

supported by L.M. Rodnyanski

who

had

undertaken s im il ar w or k f or the eng ine

d e ve lop e rs P.O . Sukhogo and for

the

Myasishchev OKB. The

AFCS

wasdevel

oped from

that

installed in

the

earlierTu

supersonic bomber. Other factors

that

Tupolev took into consideration were

the

existing airfields, aircraft

handling

facili

ties and air-traffic control systems, the

replacement of which would have pushed

the p r o je c t c o s t u p a s tr o no m ic a lly . The

OKB also took account o f u p pe r a tmo s

phere radiation and its effects upon bo th

crew and passengers, and thus an

attempt

w as m ad e

t o p ro te ct t he o cc up an ts

by

incorporating s hi e ld i ng i n the fuselage

structure.

Supporting

the

T up ol e v T u- 14 4 w as a

most unusual undercarriage.

The

main-gear

units consisted of twelve-wheel bogies, with

the wheelsgroupedin foursalong each axle.

When the

undercarriage was selected up,

the legwould moveforwards and

as

i td id s o

the

bogie would

rotate

to lie f la t

on to p o f

it

beforedisappearing into

the

slender under

carriagebays. Movingin

the

opposite direc

tio n w as the nose undercarriage assembly,

d e riv ed f ro m a n e a rlier Tu po lev p r od u ct,

the Tu-ll4

turboprop airliner.

This

wasfair

ly conventional in concept, having only

tw o w h ee ls mounted, one p e r a xle . The

braking system was applicable to

the

main

wheels only

and

c o uld b e

supplemented

by

a tailbrake-chute mounted in the tail-cone,

w hi c h c ou ld b e d ep lo ye d i f n ee de u. The

loaded by using either

the

ventral access

doors

or

overwing

conveyer

belts. In

com

mon with Concordethe Tu-144 used main

ly aluminium alloys throughout i ts a ir

frame, althoughsome use was made

of

steel

and titanium. The

former was required

to

hand le the loa ds in h igh s tr e ss a r ea s and

the

latter in areas

of

high temperature,

the

designer

having

realized from

the ou tse t

that th is w o uld b e a m a jor p r ob lem . Unlike

the Anglo-French consortium, the Tupo

lev OKB already hadsome experience with

h ea vy a ir cr af t t r av el l in g

at

supersonic

speeds, having uelivered the

Tu-n

Blinder

to

the

Soviet

Air

Force. Other

than

struc

tural

and engine

considerations,

attention

w as a ls o p a id to the deve lopment o f lubri

cants, fuels and sealing compounds able to

withstand drastic changes in temperature

without

breaking down.

The

powerplants

a lso r e qu ire d r e wo r kin g to w ithstand the

temperature changes, although

the

Tupo

lev Bureau

had

already

latched on

to

the

idea that thei r aircraft and engines would

operate at their

mostefficient

at

very high

altitudes.

This

in t ur n brought its own

p r ob lem s , s in ce n e w

air-conditioning and

p r es s ur iza tio n u n its w o uld a lso b e needed

for t hi s far m or e r ig or ou s environment.

Since

flyinglong distances manuallywould

b e v e r y tir in g, itw a s d e c id ed f ro m theout

set that

the

T u- 14 4 w ou ld r eq ui re

an

autopilot, AFCS, autolandand an inertial

navigation

s ys te m t o b e c re at e d.

Control

of

the aircraft was

by

electro-mechanical

means,

the

departmental h ea d f or this

n e o f t he more obvious alterations from

models shown

a t t he

Pa ris A ir Sh o ws

that

the

f us ela ge c r os s -s e ction h a d

from

an

oval

to o ne t ha t

was

circular in shape with an external

terof

just over 11ft

JAm .

Punctu

ng the

fuselage

main cabin

w e re tw en

ve small windows and a p ai r of access

each side. Forward

of

the passenger

was

the

flight

deck

w ith p r ov isio n

three f ligh t c r e w consistingof a p ilo t,

ightengineer, and in f r o n t

of

flight deck was

the

droop nose and

retracting

visor

th e

green

which gave the c r e w im pr o ve d

dur in g t he l an di ng a nd take-off.

etween

the

crew

a nd t h e

visor were

the

direct

v isio n p a ne ls,

t o t he

rear

of

wereside windows for lateral vision.

assembly was capable

of

ueflecting

to

a

maximum of

2 degrees

was hydraulically driven in either

ctionwith mechanical

locks

to

h o ld it

position.

The

passenger

cabin

was near

87ft 26.5m

l on g w it h a

maximum

nal diameterof 10ft 3m and a m ax

he igh t o f

7ft 2.lm .

Within

this

e a w as s e at i ng f or 1 26 p as se ng er s

and

b in a t tendant c re w, a slight increase

the

e a r lie r s p ec if ic a tio n , a ll c a rr ied

f iv e- ab re as t s ea ti n g. F or

t he c on

eyance of freight and baggage the Tu-144

equipped w ith h o ld s at

the

front and

he rear

o f t he

fuselage which c ou l d b e

production version ofthe Tu 144 wasfitted

with

canards locatedbehindthe cockpit.These had both

and trai l ingedgeflapsthatassistedtheaircraftin take off and landing.

BBAColecton

ilar, Not Identical

732

733



SO

CLOSE: THETUPOLEV TU-144

SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU-144

with

Concordeso with the Tu l44 theinnercabin was laden

with

test and

monitoring

equipment mounted in

passengerswould later sit. BB

Coecton

speeJ anJ locational and navigation

data. Before the prototypes were retired

ISO test f l ights were under t aken. Many

ere

made between

Khabarovsk

and

Yuo

osibirske

although

to reach either desti

ation required t ha t t he Tu-144 be as

ightiy loaded as poss ible otherwise there

asa chance

that

the aircraft could run

out

fue\.

A publ i c

showing

of the Tupolev Tu-l44

ad

already

beenmade

in the USSR on 21

ay 1970 at Sheremetvo Airport near

oscow; however o ther than intelligence

eports the aircraft was l i tt le known in the

est . Duringits

development

trials the Tu

144was f lown extens ively

within

the Sovi

t Un ion during May andJune 1971.

The

irst Western appearance was in May 1971

hen the Tu-144 was revealed a t t he Paris

ir

Show.

Rout ing to

Le Bourget was via

Sofia the flight

time

f rom Moscow last ing

no more than one hour. I t is highly ironic

that, as both the Tu-144 andConcorde were

makingtheir

world debuts

American

politi

cians were effectively kil ling off

the irown

SST programme.

After

Paris the Tu-144

returnedto theUSSR and would not appear

i n publ i c again until 1978 when the first

production

aircraft was rolled

out

from

the

manufacturing

facility at

the

Venyukovsky

fi tt ings plant . Th e f irst f l ight by this

machine was on 27 April af ter

which

ex

tensiveflyingtrialstook place_This progress

c ame to an abruptha l t on 2 3M ay when a

p ip e i n

one

of

the engine compartments

split allowing fuel to ignite on

the

hot sur

faces of the engine. Fortunately the experi

enced tes tcrew of

Popov and Elyan were

able to bring the damaged Tu-144 in f or a

belly

landing

because the undercarriage

4

could not be lowered. This was not

without

casualties as Elyan was injured and

two

of

the flighttest engineerswere killed. Itwould

be left to the final three completed produc

tion

aircraft

to

finish flighttestingbefore

the

Tu-144 was c1eat ed for

Aeroflot

service.

Design Changes

By t h is t ime

the

airframe had undergone

some radical

changes.

The

most obvious

was in the double-delta

wing

a nd t he fit

ting of retractable canard foreplanes just

aft

of the fl

ightdeck. The reworkingof

the

wings

increased

thespan

and

changed the

l e ad ing-edge c amber , whil e

the use of

more advanced

materials

reduced the

weight o f t he airframe

at

the s ame t ime

increasi ng its structuraI strength. The

BOVE

Wearing its

Paris

Air

Show

number 345

Tu 144CCCP 77102

crashedatthe show on

6

June

1973

killing all

on

board. BB

Coecton

RIGHT

This

photo reveals

the

height of the Tu 144

undercarriage as it dwarves the people around

it atthe Paris Air Show.

Real Wings Photographs

75.5ft

23m

long

engine

nacelles

also

underwent a complete reworking under

the aegis

of

the Institute

of

Aerodynamics,

becoming similar

in des ign

and l a yout to

those

fitted to Concorde . They too fea

t u re d va ri a ble

intake ramps a nd d ump

door s to contro l the airflow to the com

pressors

at

the sametime a more efficient

anti-icing

system wasf i t ted. At the o ther

e nd o f t he

nacelle

boxes the engine ex

hausts had

also undergone some redesign

work being much improved in functional

ity a l though no th rus t reversers were f i t

ted.

Originally there had b ee n

a require

ment

to

fit

thrust

reversers

to

the

two

outboard

engines,

a l though , due to thei r

complex ity a nd t he efficiency o f t h e taiI

brake chute as shown by the prototypes,

this was rejected. Alterations were a l so

m ade t o

the

undercarriage:

the

nose

leg

had

been extended in leng th and been

brought forward in the bay a nd t h e main

unde rca r ri a ge unit s had been complete ly

redesigned. Replacing the multiple wheels

on each

axle as f i tted

to

the

prototype

bogies

those

on the reworked

aircrafthad

the wheels

reduced

to e ig ht a nd t h e legs

retracted into bays located between the

engine i n takes . Each ma inwhee l had a

diameterof37.4

inches 950 mm and was

pressurized

to

297psi 21 kg/sq

cm .

The fuselage had also been

increased

in

length by over 20ft 6m , which in turn led

t o a n increasein the number of cabin win

dows to thirty-four. These then served

an

increased

number

of passengers the

com

plement growing

to

140. There were

three

5

separatecompartments, the forward

first-class passenger with a seat layou

two plus onea t a spacing

of

40.2in

l0

while

the

other

compartments had

layout of

two

plus three wi th a s pa

34.25in

87cm .

Entrance to the

was by a hydraulical ly-dr iven door

forward left-hand side o f t he fusel



SO

CLOSE:

THE TUPOLEV

TU t44

SO

CLOSE:

Ti lE TUPOLEVTU 44

I

ABOVE:

Captured during aflyby at le Bourget in

May 1973 isthe preproduction Tu 144 CCCP 77102.

Althoughthe wing planform was double deltain

layout there

was

some subtle blending ofthe

harsheranglesin

an

efforttoimproveaerodynamic

behaviour

P

Russel Smith

Colecton

RI Hr When Tu 144

CCCP 77102

crashedat Paris

muchof thedebris

was

scatteredoutsidetheair-

fieldboundary Thisis partofthe wing assembly

with partofthe conditioningpipework Rea Wings

Photographs

BELOW: The retractable visorassemblyfi ttedto the

Tu 144 was far less subtle inconstruction being

likened toa greenhouseby many Behindthe cabin

side windowswere thefair ingsforthe retractable

canard P

Russel Smith Colecton

collision. Before this the chief pilot Kozlov

hadtried tooutpetform the previousslot air

craft, Concorde. At

the

opening

of

the dis

play

the

Tu-144 had madea slow flyby along

runway 060 - s o s lo w w as i t that watching

journalists commented that they were wor

ried about itsreducingairspeed.Close to the

e nd o f t he

runway

the

afterburners were

fully engaged and the Soviet SST made an

a lm os t v er ti ca l c li mb . C le ar ly t hi s was

beyond the stress design limitations as the

lef t r e tr a cta ble c a na r d w as to rn c lea r

of

its

mounts

and

smashed

i n to t he

w ing r o ot.

The impact ruptured the adjacent wing tank

andcausedan explosion that resultedin the

aircraft scrashing.

Other

investigationscen

tred onthe captain smisidentifying the des

ig na ted f ly by r un wa y. The subsequent

attempt to reposition the Tu-144 threw the

c o- pi l ot , w ho h ad b ee n f il mi ng the show

from

the

air,

i n to t he

flying controls.

This

r e qu ire d a s wif tr e a ctio n f r om b o th p ilo ts to

recover control. Unfortunately, their efforts

were far too enthusiastic and a m a in a cc es s

panel came adrift and caused

the

aircraft to

come apartthrough over-stressing.

In spite ofthe accidentand itssubsequent

investigation, production

of

the Tu-144

continued

for

the

only operator, Aeroflot.

G r a nd io se p lan s w er e laid f or c o mm e rc ial

f ligh ts a r o un d the w or ld , a ltho u gh the

burgeoning reality was different since this

_ ; = : ; .

Disaster in Paris

stood out from the fuselage a t a n angle of

90 degrees; upon ret ract ion the canards

folded back

into

fairings

a t t he

rear

of t he

flight deck. The p u rp o se f or f ittin g

these

extras to product ion a ir cr a f t w as to im

prove t he handl ing dur i ng take-off and

landing,

their

deployment

meant t ha t t he

elevons

would

act

more likeelevators

than

flaps during these phases. They also assist

e d in r e d uc in g the runway length require

ments and improved handling in the low

and

slowarea

of t he

flight envelope.

The first production aircraft made itsmaid

en

flight in August 1972; itsfirstsupersonic

f lig ht w as on 20 September while flying

b et w ee n M os co w and Tashkent. The

i mp ro ve d T up ol ev T u- 14 4 m ad e i ts f ir st

a p pe a ra n ce in the West a t t he Paris Air

Show in June 1973, although this aircraft,

CCCP-77

102, and i ts s ix o c cu p an ts w er e

l os t i n a c ra sh f ol lo wi ng s om e v io le nt

manoeuvres and another eight were killed

due to fallingwreckage. Several claims were

made about the crash, the most ropular in

t he USSR

being

that

a F re nc h Air Force

Mirage IllB on a photographic and filming

sortie alongside the

SST

h ad c au se d i t to

undertake evasive manoeuvres to a vo id a

illustrates

well

thecomplicated methodusedto retractthe mainundercarr iage unitsintotheir

e nacelle bays

BBA

Colecton

l asfurther mechanically-operateddoors

c a bin a cc es s. Much o f t he passenger

in in ter io r d e c o r w a s p r ov ide d by orga

ions in East Germany. To give

the

pas

ers moreconfidence, the ejectionseats

the f li gh t c re w w er e r em ov ed and

by more conventional seating.

improvements had been

undertaken

t he nose-cone and its associated visor,

latter having glazingpanels of increased

E xt ra fuel t an ka ge h ad a ls o b ee n

ded to increase

the

available on-board

to 26,I00gai L18,750Itr).

The

fuel

contained in the wings, which was also

lo ca tion f or the f or wa rd e .g . b a la n ce

Other

c h an g es w e re m a de to

the

trim

em, with the introduction of a f or e and

rapid transfer capability to augment the

e a dy in sta lle d f ue l b a lan c e s ys te m; its

had beendeemed necessary to

any

possible imbalancesexperi

duringtake-offand landing.

Although the changes to the wings and

fuselage werefairlyobvious,

the

great

area of

modification to

the product ion

to the ret ractablecanardfore

n e s. Ea ch

of

these spanned 20ft 6m ,

were almost rectangular in shape_ At

forwardedge

ofeachcanard

were lead

g e dg e s la ts a nd t he tr a ilin g e d ge w as

d with flaps. When derloyed,each

showed a m ar ke d anhedra l and

136

137



SO

CLOSE:

THE TUPOLEVTU 144

ingout atParisin May 1973 thisTu 144 hadits nose fully droopedand thevisorretracted forbetter

vision Notethe prominent PFCU covers on the

fin

and ruddersections P Russel Smith

Colecton

SO CLOSE:

Ti lE TUPOLEVTU 144

CCCP 1111

Theexpanse ofthe elevonsandthe rudderfi tted tothe Tu 144 are clearly

shown

here as isthe careful

blending ofthe

wing

leading edge This

aircraft

is a productionTu 144S CCCP 77110

with

theParis

display code

345

Afterservice with Aeroflot the aircraftwas preserved atthe Museumof Civi l Aviation

Ulyanovsk P Russel

Smith

Colecton

Tu 144 CCCP 77144 at

le

Bourgetin June 1975 wearing Aeroflot titling Aftera l imitedflying career the

aircraft

hada second

life

as a NASAtestbed P Russel Smith

Colecton

ngry aircraft

heg<m to enter

rev

service during the 1973 oil

The escalatingprice

of

fuel wouldbe

e o f t he

reasons why

the

Tu-144 was

from service far carlier

than had

originally planned. However, having

the

first supersonic transport

the

world,

the

Russians

and

Tupolev

determined

to

put the technology to

and therefore an intensive devel

programme was put in p la ce

to

the

aircraft yet further

both

in

the

a nd on t he ground.

and Outof Service

result

of

this was the Tu-144D, which

Aeroflot service

on

I November

Although

numerous commercial

ghts were carried

out between

Moscow

Alta ,

Khazakhsran,

the

impres

gained by most observers who trav

on the

aircraft was

that

it was

very noisy

and subject

to

numer

s in -f l ight eme rgencies . In total, 102

gerflightswere made before

the

ser

e was cancelled as

uneconomic.

The

nal airframe was

never

fully

competed,

was retained a t t he Voronezh manu

plant for spares usc. During this

the

passenger load wasrestricted

to

an

increase to

the maximumof

140

would

have

reduced

the

available range.

Then came the crash of

a

Tu-144Don

23

May 1 97 8 while on a t es t f li gh t.

This

would turn

out

to b e the lastflight

of

aTu

144 to carry passengers,

although

freight

flights

cont inued to the more distant

parts

of

the Soviet empire.

During

the

l at e 1970s

the

Tu-144Ds

undertook

numerous flights,

a t t he end of

which

a limited

Certificate of Airworthi

ness was issued restricting the aircraft to

service within

the

Russian sphere

of

influ

ence.

Dur ing a

subsequent

series

of

test

fl

ights

the Tu-144

was subjected to a series

of

range-payload trials, the upshot

of

which was

that

with a

IS-ton

15.3 tonnes)

payload

the

aircraft could

fly

supersonical

ly over

a

distance of

3,312miles

5,330km)

and wi th a load 2 tons lighter the range

increased to 3,417-3,541 miles

5,500

5,700km).

Wit h t he

payload reduced

to

jus t 7 ton s,

the

range increased

to

3,852

miles 6,200km). During the 1980s the Tu

144s

continued

to be used for flight tria ls,

mainly

concerned

with developing a sec

ond-generation

heavySST. Yet

other

trials

inc luded upper atmosphere tests, ozone

layer depletion studies, sonicboom effects,

the

thermal effects

on

materials

and

struc

tures,

aerodynamic

studies, flight perfor

mance and behaviour, the observation

of

the

boundary layer and

the

study ofanom

alous

phenomena

in

the

atmosphere. In

7 8

July 1983

o ne t he

Tu-144Ds crewed by

chief

test

pilot

S.

Agapov and co-p i lo t

B

Veremey established a

sequence of

world

records, including an averagespeed around

a closed loop

of

621.4 miles l,OOOkm

of

1,262.4mph 2,032kmfhr) w it h a l oa d

of

30 t on s a nd

a

maximum a lt it ud e o f

59,710ft 18,200m).

Whi le t he

production a i rc ra ft were

undertaking such

trials

anda t tempt ing to

establish

the

type as adequate for passen

ger and freight use, discussions were being

held

on

improving

and

developing

the

air

craft further.

The

first projected upgrade,

designated the Tu-144DA,

required

the

redesigning o f t h e wing, which would be

increased in area, while

the

engines would

be uprated

andmatched to

reworked vari

able

intakes

to

improve both

sub-

and

supersonic performance. As the wing had

an increased area and volume, it was

intended that

125

tons

127.5

tonnes) o f

extra

fuel

should

be added.

This

in

turn

would see an improvement in the load

carrying capability a swe ll a s an increased

range. The

number of

passengers would

also beincreasedto a

maximum of 160 and

the maximum range was set at 4,660 miles

7,500km).

This

project was, in

the

event,

stillborn, a s were

many o th er s t h at

fol

lowed.

These included the Tu-244,

also

known as the SST-2, and several military

versions. The first

of

these was

the

Tu-144PR, intended

for use as a long

range interceptor; the Tu-144P, intended

for electronic countermeasures;

and

two

contemplated

strategic versions,

the

Tu

144K

a nd t he

Tu-144KP.

The

former was

i nt en de d t o launch stand-off missile

attacks againstground targets and

the

lat

t er was to

attack naval

vessels. The

nascent Tu-244

wouldalso

have

a

handful

of

military derivatives env isaged for i t;

however, these, like those

o f t h e

Tu-144,

remained no

more

than paper

prospects as

the

less

than

successful

Tu-160

swing-wing

strategic bomber was designed instead.

The Russian space programme also bene

fitted from

the

Tu-144

since at

least

one

a ir cr af t w ou ld b e us ed to

simulate the

Buran reusable spacecraft.

While the

Tu-144 was being us ed a s a

tes t b ed for v ar iou s p ro je ct s ,

strenuous

attempts

were

be ing made t o c re at e a n

economically viable aircraft,

n ot one

heavily

dependent

upon state subsidies. A

benefit not available to Aeroflot

was

the

7 9

succession

of wealthy businessme

celebrit ies who used Concorde a

fastest means to cross

the A tlan tic

type

of

disposable capital was

not

able within the Warsaw Pactuntil a

collapse, by which t ime most

of

th

viving Russian SSTs were grounded

museums. Also working against

th

144

n ea r t h e e nd o f

its

career

was a

ing official indifference which gra

saw support being withdrawn.

Alth

t he Tu-144 p ro je ct

had

garnere



SO CLOSE:

THE TUPOLEV

TU 44

SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEVTU 44

The Tu 144LL was amulti agency/

companyventure designedto

investigate the NASA sponsored

Hi Speed Flightprogramme.Although

deemedsuccessful only one more

fl ight was made to theUSAwhere

aprivatebuyerhad purchased it for

display. CourtesyNASA

BELOW: Seenfrom underneath this shot

ofthe

Tu 144LL flyinglaboratoryshows

thattheTupolevO were close to

achievingthe correct configuration

fora viable

SST;

themissingingredient

duringthe Aeroflotdays

was

reliability.

CourtesyNASA

one of the

remaining a ir fr ames was

reworked a s

the

Tu-144LL laboratory ,

which

began

test

flying

around

March

1996, s o on a f te r its r o ll - ou t a n d g r ou n d

testing. The airframe chosen for this was

the T u-144D,

77114,

o ne o f t h e

last

to

be

b ui lt a nd wh ic h h ad

flown

o nl y s om e

83hr, most of w hich involved flight test

ing. The modifications embodied in

the

Tu-144LL flying laboratory included

the

removal

o f t h e o ri g in a l N K- 1 44 e n gi n es

and theirreplacement by uprated NK-321

augmented turbofan powerplants, origi

nally

developed

for

the Tu-160

l ckj ck

swing-wing

strategic

bomber. To

t h is e n d

the engine nacelles and their systems were

modified to allow these more powerful

engines to be safely fitted.

These

engines

were

c ap ab le o f g en er at in g

55,0001b

24 5 kN ) o f t h ru s t e a ch , p u sh i ng t h e air

craft s top speed a b ov e M a ch 2.3 quite

comfortably and increasing

the

range to

4,040

miles

6,500km).

The maximum

take-off

weight

for

the

Tu-144LL was 410,0001b l86,400kg),

of

Resurrection

Fortunately,

this

would not be

the

case

since NAS A, plus interested parties from

t he A me ri ca n a nd t he

Russian aircraft

industry , were in

t h e m a rk e t

for a super

s o ni c t e st

bed for

N AS A s H i gh S p ee d

Research Program, w hich continued its

activities for

both

civilian and military

needs. The

American companies

included

Boeing,

McDonnell

Douglas, Rockwell,

Pratt Whitney a n d G e ne r al Electric.

P ushing this forward politically was Vice

President Gore, w ho countersigned the

agreement

with

the

Russian Prime Minis

t er V ic to r C he rn om yr di n. T hi s pro

gramme had begun in the early 1990s and

culminated

in a ser ie s

of

test flights with

the

purpose

ofcollectingdata

for

in-depth

comparisons with that garnered previous

ly

from t h eo r et i ca l a n d w i nd - tu n ne l

experiments.

S i nc e t h e

airframehad been

constructed

by Tupolev

ANT,

i t was de

c id ed t o n om i na te t hi s o rg an iz at io n t o

upgrade t he i r o wn p ro du ct . T o t hi s e nd

a .I

Tu 244 was intendedto be theversionthat would correct thenumerous failings ofthe

Bythe time i twas schemedenthusiasm for the Russian SST was on thewane.

BBA

Colecton

of a prestige rrogramme,

the

support being

given to

the

seIl

of

militaryaircraft such as

the MiG -29

soon outstripped it. The harsh

reality

o f t he

overseas market

that fighters,

not

SSTs, made

better

and

wou ld , i n e ff ec t,

s ou nd t he

ningof the end.

The loss of a Tu-144 marked

the

e nd o f

attempt to

use

the

typefor revenue ser

w ithin and

beyond

theS oviet U nion,

therefore other useshad to befound for

aircraft. Most

of

these concentrated

the

study

of and

trials

concerning

behaviour,

engine

perfor

vementsand the earth s ozone

and i ts reported breakdown. The

collapse

of

the Warsaw Pac t in

9 seemed to many observers

to

be

the

knell o f t he e nt ir e Tu -144 p ro

me since a lack of general and specif

threatened to lead to

the

penna

grounding

o f t he e nt ir e

airworthy

which

by

then

consisted

of

just

three

140

141



SO CLOSE:

THE TurOlEv

TU 144

SO CLOSE:

THE TurOlEv TU 44

Tu 144ll

NASA Handling Report

IIIl

Thishead-on view

o fth e

Tu-144LL shows that,from certain angles, its looksrivalled

Concorde s,

Courtesy NASA

f1

mg testbed; some

the changes

made

hose

from a

Tu-160 bomber,

BBA

Coect on

?

.A;

1

f

I

dl

;

C:l

L.J

[

==--

l

c::;:j

I

I

J

I

t

Ia:

Tu-144f

ASA

hireda late prod

included replacing th

Experiments

carried out

on the g round

i nc l uded the

effects of

the

airflow

as

it

entered air-inlet

structures and

the

effects

on engi ne per formance when

supersonic

shock w ves rapidly changed position

in

t he e ng in e a ir i nl et .

During

the

second

series of test

f l ights the

crews

concentrated

on

further

investigations into

six

of

the ai rborne

exper iments from

the

first

equence.

For this, further instrumentation

was

installed by Tupolev technic ians to

assist

in the acquis i tion of

data.

The

pri

mary

purpose of these

fl ights

and

the extra

equipment

was t o monit o r

the deflection

of

t he w in g. Mos t

of

the equipment

was

American and included

transducers

and

sensors their purpose b ei ng t o measure

sonic boom

pressures angle of

attack

and

ideslip

angles

with improved

accuracy.

Th e crew

selected to

f l y thi s p rog ramme

were Robert Rivers from

NASA

Langley

and

Gordon

Fullerton

of NASA

Dryden,

who eventual lyco l laborated on an exten

sive report on the

handling

of the

surface

unde r var i ous tempera tu re and

pressure loads the internal structure and

engi ne temperatu re , bounda ry l ayer a i r

f low behaviour, the wings ground-effect

characteristics, interior and exterior noise

profiles, handling

qualities

in several

parts

of

the

flight envelope, and the flexibility

of

the structure

in

fl ight.

Some

of

these

behaviours

wereidentified as duet ot he pilots

aggressive

handlng

of

the aircraft. Durng Flght

23

a smootherstyle of handlng wast red; this resulted in a

strong reducton in pitch bobblng and

a

gentler transition

between

manoeuvres. On

this

fnal

flight both piots commented

that

changing

their handlng

o f t he

Tu-144

reduced the workloadconsiderably

and

madethe aircraft easier t o f y .

The flght-path dynamicsof the

Tu-144LL

wereinvestgated

in

boththe subsonicand

thesupersonic cruise conditons.

Difficulty

wasexperencedin keepng vertical speed

and

flight-path control when following the

VRI

durng

the clmb

becauseof

two effects:

pitch attitudesensitivity and a

perceived

lag between

pitch

attitude andthe

flight path

responses.As the total length

of

the flightswas

short,

it was not

possible

to determine

whether t helagwas caused by instrumentation lagort he aircrafts dynamics. Further

discrepancies were

experenced

between

the

power settngs

and

pitch

attitude when

cruise

altitudes were

captured

at speeds between

Mach

0.9and 2 although, once

set,

the aircraft waseasyto control.

Once

at

Mach

2 the

Tu-44LL

was found to

handle

well

in turns,

although

the pilot hadto maintain an attitude within the

3-3.5

degreesarc to

maintain a

steady turn. Durng these flights the

piots

both commented on the fact

that,

durng c.g. fueltransfer,

their workloads

increased

dramatcaly.

Overal, t he NASA p io tsfe lt th at there was adverse harmony between the controls

caused byheavyforcesdurng the rol;

it was

discovered that inputting

a

rol command

caused an

inadvertentpitch

command

input, which,

in turn,produced relatively large

pitch control transients leading

to

cross

couplng between

the

axes.

Otherareas

that

g av e r s e t o

comment

were thatof throttle adjustments

since

their friction

damping

was so

stiff

as

to restrict movement to two a t

a

tme.

Such

behaviour ledthe piots to

over-control power

durng

acceleraton

and

deceleraton, which

causedsome problems

durng approaches and landings. However,

some

f nesse of

control

could be achieved

by adjustng the

pitch of

the aircraft, otherwise the

engines

behaved

as

advertsed in

normalcruise flight.

One of t hem ost detaied part s of t he

analysis

concerned the interestingly named

Neal-Smith pitch bandwidth

criterion

trials. To

ensure

thatthis

datawas

colected

cor

recty,

a

lead

lag

compensator and

pure tme

delaymodule

were

put

into the control

loop t o

represent

a simple pilot m odel, t hust he loop betweenpitch attitude and stck

deflection transfer

functons

was closed. Thecompensator could be adjusted to meet

specific

cosedloop

characteristics

and reacted

to

meetthe

presetcharacteristics and

maxmum

ampltudeof the

frequency response

of the

closed

loop. The

data

gathered

durng

the flight trials indicated that the piots werecorrect

in

theirobservaton that

the aircraft bobbled,

and

this increased depending on the severity of themanoeuvre.

The data

retreved

from these flights was carefuly compared and reveaed that the

most

sensitve area in handlng

was

around the pitch

axs,

where

both

piots

com

mented on thetendency to overcorrect

an

over-pitch, while trying to

capture

apitch atti

tudechange. Much ofthis wasexperenceddurng Flght 21; bythe tme thedata from

Flght

23 was analysed the piots hadlearned

not

to

overcorrect

the

pitch-up,

thusthe

aircraft

would

capture the

pitch

attitude change

quite

easiy. However, in the super

sonc regim e t he pitch-up

tendency was

reduced considerably a nd t hu s t he piots

learned that reducing theirpitch axs urgency would

create a

stable cosedloop pitch

response.

The conclusionsdrawn by

theNASA

piots report

centredaroundthe use ofthe

Neal

Smithdata analysis as

appled to theTu-144LL flghts. They hed that more

accurate

fying was possible by usng

an

inertialy-derivedvertcal speed feedback, as opposed

to

pitch

attitude as required by the

analysis

loop. Overal, however, t he piots com

mented

that

the Tu-144 could

have been

developed

into a better

aircraft had the

tme

and

funds

been avaiable; hadthe Tu-244 been

developed

many of the faults with the

Tu-144

might

havebeen

successfuly eradicated.

generatedwhen theai rcraft

was

travelling

at

speed. The first sequence of

nineteen

flights

began in June 1996and

included

six

flight and two g roundexpe rimen ts i n the

maiden flight

schedule,

which

were

con

cluded in

February

1998. The experi

ments, which original ly

totalled

fifty,

v-

ered

the behaviour

of

the aircraft s

cxterior

Four

handlng testfl ghtswere

conducted

with the

Tu-144LL

SST with the object

of

col

lectng quantitative dataand qualitative pilots reports.

The

datawas thencompared

with previous vaues and covered Neal-Smith

short-period

damping,

tme

deay, con

trol anticipation parameters, phase deay,

pitch bandwidth

as

a functon

of

tme

deay,

andthe flight path as a functon ofpitch bandwidth.

The

baselne usedto comparethe

data f rom t he

Tu-144LL

was that generated bythe Lockheed

YF-12

and SR-71 andthe

North

AmercanXB-70,

al

of

which

hadalreadybeenoperatedby NASA. TheTu-144LL

was

controled by a conventonal

column

and

rudder pedals

and

ratefeedbacks

were

addedt o ad

damping. Turn

co-ordinatonwas

aidedat

speeds betweenMach 0.9and

1.6 by an aileron-rudder circuitinterconnect. At speeds higher t han M ach 1.6 sideslp

feedbackwas added for

stability augmentaton.

The two

prmary instruments

useddur

ing

these phases

were the vertical

rate

indicator whichdisplayed

the

aircrafts

altitude

and airspeed

with the profies

for

the clmb to

and descent fromcruise

flight)

and the

attitude ladder which gave its display in0.5 degree

increments). The

Tu-144LLwas also

fitted

with

an autopilot and an autothrottle, used

only

in the

landing

pattern.

The first handlng

flight test was

carred

out

by a

Russan

crew

who undertook

a

shake-down flight,

Flght

20, snce t he aircraft

had notflown

for an extended perod.

Afterthis flight and its

subsequent

rectification,

the Tu-144LL

washanded to

an Amer

ican crew of two p io ts and three engineers.

Flght 21 was

dedicated to investigating

thesubsonic

handlng

envelope and

concentrated

on take-off and

landingcharacteris

tcs

and

aircraft behaviour

in

subsonc cruise

flight

at

Mach0.9. Flghts 2 2 a n d 2 3

cov

ered flying at

Mach

2 although the to ta l tme a llo tte d was

only40min.

Durng

these

flights specifically

defned

manoeuvres were carred out.Known as the integratedtest

block, these manoeuvresincluded

pitch

attitude, bank-angle,headingcaptures, steady

heading

sideslps and a deceleraton

and

acceleraton

manoeuvre.

A slow flight

manoeuvre

was aso carred

out,

involving

the

p u ln g back of

the

control coumn

to

achieve

a

specifed deceleraton to

capture

theminimum speed before the stal. Ths

was

carred

o ut i n b o th

level

and banked flight.

A simulated engine-out

manoeuvre

involved throttling

back

of an outboardengine

to itspower

minimum, after

which

flight

was

stabi zed and the crew

performed

a

heading capture. Each of t he

take-offs was

made

with

thenose canardsextendedand thenoseset at

11

degrees droop.

The

nom

inalapproachand landing

was a

visual one,

with

thecanards extended,geardeployed,

the

noseat 17 degreedroop,

and

autothrottle engaged. Approaches

and

landings

were

also

carred

out

beyond the

normal parameters,

such

as

lateral offsets, retracted

canards

and

with the nose

up. Flghts

with the throttles

set

t om anua and

using

the

instrument

landing

system localzer

were

aso undertaken. Ot her investigations in

these flights included

le ve l n g

off

and maintaining

subsonic

and

supersoniccruise

alti

tude,makng levelturnsunder supersoniccruise

conditons

at M ach 2 and

clmbing

to

and

descending

from

supersonic cruise

flight.

The

pilots

comments concerning the lateral directionalcharacteristics pointed out

theheavycontrol

wheel

andrudder forces.

Although it

was

possible

to

rol

the aircraft

without

too

much trouble,

t hey dd comm ent

that, with modification,

the aircraft could

be madeto

handle better,

buteven so the Tu-144LL

was

assessed as

adequate.

The ful

range of manoeuvreswas

carred

out int he lateral axs,

although

the piots thoughtthat

thesteadyheading

sideslps

required largepeda forces.Yaw damping wasconsidered

satsfactory,

the

piots

commentng

that

heading captures

were

easy

to

perform.

Around

the pitch a x s t he piots

noted

that the controls were

moderate

to heavy,

although they werenot as deficient as the lateral axs. Durng pitch

up,

both piots

notced

that the aircraft had

a

tendencyto bobble durng the

pitch

attitude

capture

task

in Flght 21.

Ths

in

turnpresented

the piots

with

few cues which led

tosomeover-con

trol o f the aircraft. They

also

indicated that to control the pitch

a x s w a s

a hgh work

load task,

especialy

d ur n g c l m b t oand descent from the Mach

2

cruise

conditon.

224,000Ib

(101

,800kg)

was fue l.

total

cost of these

modifications

and

including

the

installation of a

re M d i gi tal data

system was

35 0 million. Further insta l led

included thermocouples, pres-

e sensors

microphones

and

skin-fric

gauges

to

mcasure

thehea tand noise

742

743



SO CLOSE: THE TUPOLEV TU 44

NASA Experimentswith theTu-144LL

er ganged sw it ch

was

l if te d u p t o e

t h e a u gm e nt a ti o n.

The

b ra ke s

released

a nd t he

blended

delta

air

began t o rush

d o wn t h e

tarmac strip

ever increasingspeed with

the

wind

back.

The

r ec or de d d ep a rt ur e t im

14: 42 l ocal t im e;

within

2min

the

wasover.

Uh r 58min

Crew

Concorde

for

New

on

E ch o 2 6 we need

the

whole

leng

26 right

1 4h r 0 7 mi n

Controller

plan

fo

right [Crewconfirm

and

read back]

1 4h r 1 3m in U se e

So

total

fuel

I ve g o t n in et y- s ix f ou r w it h n in et

three

for ninetyJfive

on

board

14hr

13min46sec

First Officer

Fir

tection ;

Flight Engineer

Tested

1 4 hr 1 4 mi n

17sec Ca nain

The

ence

speeds are

VI

150knots

VR

18

220 240 280 it s displayed

o n t he

1 4 hr 1 4 mi n

28sec

First Officer

T

Captain

It s

thirteen

degrees

luxury liner

MS

eutschl nd

around

Latin

America.

The

scheduled

departure

time

had

been pushedbackby

the

latearrival

of

the

main

luggage

collection

from

Ger

many

and

its

subsequent

delayed loading.

A d di n g t o t h e

delaywas

the

need

to

recti

fy

a

N o.2 engine thrust

reverser problem

whichhad required

the replacement of the

Goodyear pneumatic

actuator. Eventually

the

passenger

complement

of

ninety-six

Germans

t wo D anes

one A merican

and

one

Austrian plus

the

flight

a n d c a bi n

c re w w er e a bo ar d.

The external

walk

a r ou n d h ad b ee n

completed the

engines

started

the

t ug h oo ke d up

and

the

Air

France

Concorde

w as pushed back.

With

the

tug

disconnected the throttles

were

advanced to

gi ve t axi speed

the

aircraft

proceeding

under

ground

c on tr ol t o t he

runw ay t hreshol d.

Cleared

for rake-off

Concorde

was

throttled

up

and

swung

round

t o p o in t

down

the

runway

centre

line.

With

brakes applied

t h e t h ro t tl e s

were advanced after

w hich the

afterburn-

CHAPTER EIGHT

As

It Happened

e th

n

is ster

Concorde Concorde

z er o 4 59 0 y ou h a ve

flames you have flames behind you

l

The

controller s voice was tinged with fear

and

di sbeli ef- t his

was the

flagship aircraft

of

Air

F ra nc e a n d i t wa s

on

fire.

This

short

phrase marked

theend

of

Air

France

Con

corde F-BTSC and of

one

of

the

most

impressive safety records in aviation histo

ry

And

yet

the

warning signs had already

been flagged up i n

the

type s

incident

logs

which carried reports

of

tyre damage

and

failures

engine

fai lures and punct ures t o

the

wing lowerskinning.

On t h e m o rn i ng of 25

July

2 00 0 A ir

France

Concorde

Sierra

Charlie

was

on

the stand at

Paris

Charles

de

Gaulle

Air

port scheduled

to depart

w it h a g ro up

of

passengers with

the

flight

designation

AF4590. It was

under charter to

a

German

·tour

operator

w ho h ad s p on so re d a

com

bi ned t rip i nvol vi nga fl ight

to

New

York

to

be fol lowed

by

a c ru is e a bo ar d

the

On

ahappier occasion

F-BTSC

the aircraft lost in th e crash

on 25

July

2000)

touches down

at

Paris

Charles

de

Gaulle.

BernardChares

Tu-144LL.

The

first three flights

ofthe

sec

ond

series included

h a nd l in g a t b o th

sub

sonic

and

supersonicspeeds while

the

final

four covered purely

data

collection. After

the

analysis

o f t h e

generated dara seven

moreflights were carried

out between

Sep

t e mb e r 1 99 8

and

A pr il 19 99. A ll

the

flights were carried

out

from

the

Tupolev

airfield

at

the

Zhukovsky

Development

Centre.

Once t he y h a d b ee n c o mp l et ed

the

T u-144L L w as agai n grounded si nce

NAS A

a nd i ts c om me r ci al p ar t ne r s h ad

lost

government

fundi ng t o

continue

the

further

development

of

an

American

SST.

The

purpose

ofthe

flights wasessentially

to

investigate

the

t echnology base for a sec

ond-generation American

SST.

The

goalS

set for t hi s

next generation

included envi

ronmental

friendliness

and economic

per

formance.

This

second grounding w ould

mean

that

y et a ga in

Concorde

would

remain

as the

onlycommercial

SST

in

the

world

the

others beingbut dreams.

Handlng

qualities

assessment:

a

supersonic

aircraft has

different handlng characteristics from other types,thus

an in-depthinvestgaton wasthoughtnecessaryto deter

m net he

behaviour

of anext-generaton

SST

Coeffcient ofpressure coefficient friction

and

bound-

ary layermeasurements:

these

required

the

taking of

seventy-five wingstatic

pressures.

These experiments

concentrated on the aerodynamicdrag generated

by

a

supersonicairframe and wouldgive

abetter

understand

ing of

design

criteria.

Structure/cabin noise: thisrequiredtwenty-five flush

mounted pressure sensors, eight microphones andsix

accelerometers.

Hgh speed

travel through

air

generates

a substantial

amount

of

noise, thusthese

experiments

were needed

to

measure the noise coefficient, which

wouldgude the developmentof adequate sound proofng.

In flight

wingdeflection

measurements:

t hese exper

ments wereundertaken so

that

the

safest

coefficient

of

elasticity could be

engineered

into the

wing

structure.

Surface/structure equibrium temperature verification:

this required the installation of 248thermocouples. Its

purposewas todetermine

the

types of

material

needed

t o b u i d an

aircraft

capable ofcarrying

300 passengers

at supersonicspeeds.

Propulsion system

thermal environmentdatabase:

this

required

the installationof a further ninety-six

thermo

couples. I ts purpose wast o

determine

the detrimental

effects heat had upon engines driving an

aircraft at

supersonic

speeds and,

as

a

side

experiment,

t hebest

way to control the flow o f a i r i nt o the engine s com

pressor face.

Slender wing ground effects: the infuence

of

ground

effect on more

conventonal

airlners was fully under

stood; however, the behaviour

of a

supersonic aircraft

wasnot ,

and

t hus t heam ount of push back by the

air

under the wings

and

the p io ts

reacton to

it needed

investigation.

Tu-144D

CCCP-77112 was originally

on

displayatthe Tupolev OKB, Zhukovsky, before

being

sold to

Sinsheim

Mu se um in Ge rma n y. He re cranes u n loa d th e airframe

from

its special barge. Asimilar procedure

was required with

the

retiredAir

Fra nce Co n co rde so ld

to

th e sa me mu seu m. ealWings Photographs

744

745



DEATH

ND

DISASTER

DEATH

NDDIS STER

CONCOROE

T KES

OFF.CREW

UN W REOF

FIRE

UNTILW RNEDBY

AIR

T FFle

CONTROL.

NO2ENGINESTARTS TOMALFUNCTION.

14h43m 23.7 25 3s: NO engine at

4

percent th

NO 2

engineat

12

percent

thrust

14h

43m

26.2 28.4s:

NO engine

thrust fals

to 4

cent; NO 2 engine throttle to fully retarded po

14h43m

28.7 29.3s: NO 2 engine shuttng down

14h43m

28.3s: Nos

3

and

4

engnesoperatng in co

gency

mode

at f u l power

14h43m 35 5s: NO engineoperatng in contng

mode

although

thrust no morethan 5per

cent

14h43m

59.5 44m 11.5s:

NO

engine underspee

and

suffers fnal

surge

14h 44m

24.7 27s:

Nos

3

and

4

engineleversreta

possibly by

crew attempting

to equalze asymm

conditon of aircraft

Engine Performance

and

Warning Data for F BTSC

14h43m 11.7 12.3s:

a fourengnesoperatngcorrecty

14h

43m 12.7 13.3s: deviatons in N1/N1 parameters

engine NO 2

14h

43m 12 13s:

engine surging

Nos 1

and

2

engines

14h43m

12 1 14.1s: the GO lamps

go out. NO engine

14h43m

15.7 16.3s:confirmation of surge

NO

engine

14h43m

16.1 18 1s: NO engine GO lighti uminates

14h 43m 16.7 17.3s: NO 2 engine thrust dropsto idle

14h 43m

18.1 20s:

No 1 engine GO light

goes

out;

Nos

3

and

4

engine GO

lghts

go

out

14h43m

19.7 20.3s:

NO

engine thrust drops

to80

per

cent

14h

43m 20.7 21.3s: NO 2 engine recovers thrust

to

15

per

cent

The wreckage still smoulders

as the

fire services turned

up

to

douse

the remains of

Concorde andthe hotel it hit. Rea Wings Photographs

14hr

43min

41sec Engineer:

The gear

No

l4hr

43min

42sec Controller:

at

your

convenience,

you have priority

to

land

14hr

43min

42.3sec [Second fire alarm

sounds]

14hr

43min

44,6sec CO-/Jilot:

I m

trying

l4hr 43min

45.6sec Engineer:

I m

firing

it

14hr43min

48.2sec Pilot:

Are

you

shut

tingdown engine number

two?

14hr

43min

48.2sec Engineer:

I ve

shut

it

down

14h r 4 3min

49sec Controller:

End

reception middle marker

14hr

43min

49.9sec

Co-pilot: The

air

speed

l4hr 43min

57sec

Co-pilot: The

gear

won tcome

up

14hr 43min

58.6sec [Third fire alarm

sounds]

14hr43min 59sec-44min

03sec

GPWS

a/ann: Whoop whoop

whoop, pul l up

...

whoop whoop

whoop,pul l up

14hr 43min

59sec

Co-pilot: The

air

speed ;

GPWS

alann: Whoop

whoop

whoop, pul l up

14hr 44min

05sec Fire Service Leader:

De Gaulle

towerfrom Fire ServiceLeader,

authorization

to

enter

twenty-six right ;

ontroller: FireService

Leader- theCon

,

corde

1don t know his

intentions, getinto

position

near

the

southern

parallel run

way, Fire Service Leader correction:

the

oncorde is returningon

runway

09

in

the

opposite

direction

14hr44min

14.6sec

Co-pilot:

Le Bour

get,

Le

Bourget, Le Bourget

14hr 44min

17sec Pilot: Too l at e, t oo

late

14hr 44min

18sec

Pilot:

No

time,

no

. ,

time

14hr44min

18,5sec

Co-pilot: Negative,

we re trying Le Bourget

14hr44min

20sec Co-pilot:

No

l4hr 44min

2lsec

Fire Service Leader:

De Gaulle

towerfromFireService Leader:

can

you g iv e me

the situation

of

Con

corde?

[Pilotnoises- sounds

of

exertion]


of

exertion]


of

exertion]

[The cockpit

voice recorder

made

its

lastrecording

at

4:44:30pm;

the

recording

ended at

4:44:31.6pm]

14hr45min

10sec

Controller

to FireSer

vice Leader:

The Concorde

has crashed

near

Le

Bourget, Fire ServiceLeader

PARIS,

CHARLES DEGAULLE

AIRPORT

®

14hr

43min

11.9sec Co-pilot:

Watchout

14hr

43min

13Asec Controller:

Con-

.

corde zero 4590

1

You

have

flames, you

have

flames

behind

you

14hr

43min

14sec

Flightdecl< voice

not

identified :

Right

14hr

43min Asec

Engineer:

Stop

1 4h r 4 3m in

17sec

Co-pilot:

Well

received

l4hr 43min

Asec Engineer: Break

down

eng-,

breakdown

engine number

two

l4hr 43min

22.8sec [Fire alarmsounds]

l4hr

43min

24.8sec Flight Engineer:

Shut

down

engine number

two ;

Flightdecl<

voice

not

identified :

It s burningbadly -

huh

14hr 43min

25,8sec Pilot:

Engine

fire

procedure

14hr

43min

27.2sec

Co-pilot:

Watch,

the

airspeed,

the

airspeed,

the

airspeed

14hr

43min

28sec Controller: It s burn

ingbadly

and

I m

not

sureit s

coming

from

the engine

l4hr 43min

29.3sec [Fire

handle

pulled]

14hr

43min

30sec Pilot:

Gearon retract

14hr43min 31secConr:roller: 4590, you

havestrongflame

behind

you - as youwish,

you have priority for a return

t o t he

field

14hr

43min

,5sec Engineer:

The

gear

l4hr

43min

32sec Controller: Begin

ning

reception

of

middle marker

14hr 43min

40sec

Co-pilot:

Yes, well

received

AIRCRAFTLEFT

MAIN

GEAR

STRIKES

MET L

OBJECT

ON

RUNWAY, RESULT NTD M GE

PUNCTURES

FUEL T NK

5

ND

,

CAUSESFIRE.

CREW

CARRYOUTFIRECRILL

TTEMPTM DETORAiSE

UNDERCARRIAGE.

2MINUTES 31 SECONDS

talked about,

we

land

back

on

runway 26

right

14hr40min

19sec

Captain: How much

fuel

have we

used? ;

Flight

Engineer:

We ve

got

800

kilos

there

14hr 4 min

09sec Flight Engineer: Brake

temperatures checked one hundred

fifty ;

Ca/Jtain: I s i t

ho tte ron the

left

or

the

right

there?

Flight

Engineer: It s

aboutthe

same

14hr

40min

02sec Controller:

4590

line

up26 right ;

Crew:

We

l ine upand hold

on

26 right

4590

14h r 4 2min

I7sec Concroller: Air

France 4590, runway 26 r ight , w ind

90

degrees,8 knots, take-off authorized

14hr42min

l7sec CO-/Jilat:

4590 taking

off26 right

14hr 42min

20sec

Pilot:

s everybody

ready?

14hr42min

22sec Co-pilot: Yes

14hr42min

24sec Engineer: Yes

14hr42min

3lsec

Pilot:

Up

to

100, 150,

top

14hr42min

40sec Engineer:

We have

four

heated

up

14hr

42min

54,6sec

Co-pilot: 100knots

14hr 42min

55sec Pilot:

Confirmed

14hr42min

57sec Engineer: Four

green

14hr

43min

03.7sec

CO-/Jilot: V

one

14hr43min

5sec

Pilot:

Confirmed

14hr43min

1O.lsec[Noise recorded

on

CVR over

t he n ex t

few seconds to

14hr

43min

l3,8sec]

FAILUREO FNos 1 2ENGINES FOLLoweo

BY

FAILURE

OFPORT

WINGFLIGHTCONTROLS.

AIRCRAFTB NKS THROUGH90 DEGREESWHICH

CAUSESLOSSOFPOWERTO

Nos

3 4 ENGINES.

CONCORDEDESCENDSROLLING

LEFT

AND

ALMOSTVERTICAL

T il

FIRST.IMPACTFOLLOWS

HOTEL

L

PATTED OIE

GONESS

14hr 14min

53sec Ca/Jtain:

Next

the

control

lever

is

at

fourteen

and

you ll

have

N2 of ninety-seven and

a b it ; Flight Engi

neer:

N

inety-seven

14hr

34min

Controller:

Air

France

4590,good morning, taxi

to holdingpoint

26rightviaRomeo ; crewconfi rmneedfor

the

whole

runway

14hr 37min

51sec

First Officer:

Hey

you ve got

the

indicators going

into

green

all

the time

14hr

38min

55sec

Flight

Engineer:

you re r ight , we ll s tay in yel l- , i n

green

l4hr 38min

59sec

First Officer: We ll

stay ingreen,eh?

14hr39min

04sec

Ca/Jtain:

S o t he

take

off

is

- at

maximum

take-off weight,

one

hundred

eighty tons

one

hundred, which

meansfourreheatswitha

minimum

failure

N2o f

ninety-eight. Between zero

andone

hundred

1stop for anyaural

warning

-

the

tyre flash.

The

tyre flash

and

failure call

out

from youright. Between 100

knots

and

V1 I i gnore

the

gong Istop for

and

engi

ne

f ire, a t yre f lash

a nd t he

failure call-out.

After

VI we

cont inue on theSID

we

just

The lastflight of Concorde Sierra Charlie was

tragically shortwhen. afterstruggling to maintain

height and

speed.the

aircraft crashed

on to

a

hotel.

BBA Colecton

746

747



E TH N IS STER

E TH N IS STER

statements

may

s ounds ta r k

in

nature,

but

theyare takenfrom

the cockpit

recorder

tape and the air trafficcontrol tapes.

Their

ccuracy

is without doubt,

unlike

the

media

ccounts,

mostly hysterical

and

inaccu

rate,

that

followed this m os t tragic event.

he baldness

o f t h e

taped

conversations

xhibit an

icy

calmness which

is remark

ble

considering

the

c l am o ur o f

gongs,

alarms and recorded warnings

that

were

urrounding the crew

as

they

struggled

to

bring their stricken C oncorde under con

trol

and

return it

and

its occupants safely

t o t h e

ground. Eyewitness reports garnered

jus t a f ter t h e e v en t stated that C oncorde

began its take-offrun w ithout any trace of

a problem. At

the pointof rotation

a flash

of

fire was o b se rve d in

the vicinity of

no.2

e n gi n e, t h is w ould quic kly

grow

into

a

long streak offire, estimated

at

180-275yd

200-300m)

in

length, that

did

notappear

to besubsiding.

A lthoughthe

aircraft

man

aged to take-off, it wasseen to be struggling

to

m a i nt a i n h e i gh t a n d

forward airspeed.

The direction of flight

was

seen to waver

slightly

before

Concorde

reared

up,

obvi

ously

o u t o f c o nt r ol .

As it

continued

its

climb,

i t ro lle d

90 degrees t o t h e g r ou n d,

totally

o ut o f control,

before falling

o ut o f

the sky i n a s ide s li p a n d l a nd i ng

on

the

Hotelissimo, La Patte

d Oie,

in Gonesse 3.7

miles

5.8km)

from

the

a ir po rt . I n

the

resulting impact and fire ba ll, a ll 1 00 p as

sengers,

the

crew

o f n in e

and fou r h o te l

employees werekilled

and the

aircraft

and

the hotel annexe

were destroyed.

At

the

time

o f t h e

crash F-BTSC had completed

11,989flying hours

and

3,978 cycles.

eeking an xplanation

O nce

the

smoke,

dustand media

feeding

frenzy had subsided,

the

crash investiga

tors

began their inte nsive s e ar c h

for

the

cause

o f t he

tragedy.

To

this

end

all

the

wreckage and debris were carefully noted

and

collected

for further

examination

and

reconstruction

in a

hangar at

Toulouse. In

t h e m e an t im e , t h e British Airways

Con

corde fleet

continued

to fly

albeit

after in

depth

special checks;

those o f A i r

France

were

immediately grounded.

Initially,

the

investigators looked

a t t he

possibilities of

a terrorist

b om b a n d e n g i ne

failure as

the

prime

causes.

These

w er e q ui c kl y d is

counted since

the

flight characteristics

a n d t h e

debris

pattern

did

not

fita n y

ofthe

known

crash profiles.

By this

time,

the

French

accident

investigation organization,

the

Bureau Enquctes-Accidents BEA),

with s o me a s sis ta n ce fro m

the

British

Air

Accident

In ve s tig a tio n Bran c h, felt

that

e nough e videnc e h ad b ee n g at h er ed and

processed to allow

them

to iss ue a p relimi

naryreport,

which

dulyappeared

on

27July.

I n i t the BEA stated:

Duringtake-off the aircrafthauexceededV

One

when the c o nt r ol t o we r w a rn e d t h e c r ew that

flameswere streamingfrom the rear o f t h e air

craft.

The

cockpit voice recorderrevealed that,

uponrotation,the crew

announced

a failure

in

No.2engine,addingshortlyafterwards that the

undercarriagewould not retract. Analysis o f t h e

flight data recordershowed

that

duringr otation

therea loss of powerin engine No.2,followed by

a t e mp o ra r y l os s of performance from No.1

e n gi ne . D ur i ng i ts h r ie f f li gh t, t h e f li gh t d a ta

recorder revealed t ha t t he aircraft s forward

speed had barelyincreased and that itsaltitude

had changed little. Although N o. 1 e n gi n e h a d

regained full powerafter

one

minute, the power

plant starteu to malfunctionagain. Shortlyafter

this, the C oncorde hanked sharply

to

t h e l ef t

and crasheu.

The

resultant wreckage was con

centrated

in a limited area;

although

a certain

amountof debris was spreaualong the aircraft s

flightpath, there was also some debrisfound on

the runway at C harlesde Gaulleairport.

A follow-up reportwasissued

by the

BEAin

August,

that recommended t ha t t he Cer

tificate

of

Airworthinessbe

withdrawn

from

the

remaining

Concorde

fle et. In th is

the

French investigatorswere fully supported by

t h e A i r A c c i de n t

Investigation

Branch

in

Britain.

O ther

conclusions drawn in the

same

document

involved some

o f t h e

caus

es

o f t h e

accident.

This

h ad b ee n

pinned

down

toa wingfuel

tank having

beenpunc

tured by sections

of

whe e l a fte r a tyre had

suffered

catastrophic

explosive failure. Due

to the

lack

of warning

systems in

that

sec

tion ofthe wing, the crewwould ha ve be e n

unaware

o f t h e

source

o f t h e

fire

and

there

fore

their

first,obviousconclusion would be

t o c o nt e nd t h at there w as a p ro bl em w it h

either

No.1

or N o.2

engine,

or

both.Further

investigationswere being

undertaken

to p in

d ow n t he

cause

and

thus

the grounding

order wasstrongly recommended

to

contin

ue. To this end,

the

Certificate

of

Airwor

thiness paperwork was removed from

each

f li gh td ec k, w it h t ho se p ar ke d a wa y f ro m

home b e in g s e ale d to prevent removal. In

D e c em be r 2000 the

BEA iss ue d

another

and

moredetailedreport

that expanded

fur

ther upon

the

investigators previousefforts.

T he document

revealed

that C oncorde

F

748

TheBEA

report

wascompied inaccordance of Annex

13 of t heConvent on on

Internatonal

Civ

Aviaton

and

EC Directve 94/56 and

Law

No. 99-243,

dated 29

March

1999, wh ich state sth a t its

conclusions

and

safety recommendatonswere notintendedto appor

ton

blam enort o assgn

responsibi ty.

The

report

began by outlning the circumstances

surrounding

thecrashand folowed

with

themake

up

of

the investigation team.

The

BEA assigned the

majority of investgators under t he comm and of a

principal

investigator who was nominat ed as the

investigator in charge.Included in theteam

weretwo

investigators from

the

AAIB and

experts from BAE

SystemsandRo s-Royce.Other

observers

camefrom

Germany, the BFU

and

the

NTSBand

the

FAA,

the

Amercan

regulatory

bodies. Yet

other

experts were

drawn in,

as needed, fromRo s-Royce,SNECMA and

Air

France.

With the teamchosen,

the

French Minis

ter

of

Equipment, Transport and Housng

formaly

establshed the Commisson

of

Inquiry

o n 2 6

Juy.

By this

tme

the investigator in charge had

estab

lshed

seven

working

groups with distinct areas of

responsibity: site and

wreckage, aircraft systems

and engines,

preparaton

and conduct

of the flight

pus

personnel

information, flight recorders, aircraft

performance, witness testmony andthe examinaton

of previous events. On 16 August the BEA and t he

AAIB issued

their

first

safety

recommendatons,

which

were

formaly

publshed on

31

August

2000.

With the initial fndings

in

the publc

domain

the

investigation was slm m ed

down

to concentrate

on

four areas: wreckage, conduct of the

flight

andt he

aircrafts performance, previouseventsp us certifica

ton,

and

regulatons and technical

research. The

wreckage

team concentrated

on

the left-hand

sideof

the aircraft, in particular t hedry

bay,

wing andt he

landing-gear bay. There hadbeen

some

delay

incol

lectng

wreckage from that area

and

assemblng it

for

investigation

because of

the

presence of asbestos.

Complcatng the whole

procedure was

the need

for

the engines, the flight engineers pane. t yre

debrs,

partsfrom NO.5 f ue t ankand t he landing gear,

al

of

which were subject

t o t he

paralel

judicial

inquiry

with a l th at th at imple d .

A

descripton

of

the flight

and

t he cabn crew fol

lowed

this

in

which

partcular attention

was

givento

eachmembers fying qualfications

and

medical his

t ory, none of which was f oundt o be deficient. With

the personne

dealt

with,

attention

turned

to

the

air

craft

itself.

Airframe

F BTSC wasdef ned as a Con

corde

Type

verson 101 with the

constructors

num

ber

3. The

aircraft

hadentered Air

France

servce

on

24 October 1979; however, its airvvorthiness

certifi

cate

had

originaly

been

issued o n 2 3 December1975

and wasvald

unti

29 September

2002.

Up

to

thedate

of

t he crash SierraChare had

completed

11,989 fy

inghours

and

4,873 cyces.S nce itslast

in-depth

ser

vicing, a type 01 general overhau completed on

October 1999, the aircraft

had fown

576 hours and

181

cyces. The maintenance cyce completed

just

before

the fateful flight hadbeen

undertakenbetween

17

to

21

July 2000, this beng

a

schedued A01 check

that h ad a s o i nc u d ed t he r ep la ce me nt o f t he left

Summary

of

the rench ccident Report

man

gear

boge

which

hadbeen done in

order to correct an acceptable deferred

defect

which

related t ot he under-infaton detecton system. Snce the A01 check

and

rectifi

caton

the aircraft had flown on servce

between 21

and24 Juy.

Defects

requirng

rectification before the final

flight

included slight

thrust

surges in

cruise at Mach

2

with illumination of a

start-pumpwarning lght. Rectification includ

ed

in-depth checks of the thrustcontrol units

and replacement

of the N1 limit amplifi

er. Further checks

were

carred

out on

the EGT sensng

lne. The

brake overoad warn

ing lightfor

wheel

No.4had i uminated, requirng the replacement of a cable

and

a

slow leak

had

been

detected

in theblue

hydraulc

system that

had

required thereplace

ment

ofthe connectng

joint

on the

artificial

f ee cylnder. The

fn a lite m

requirng

atten

ton

was

thetyre

on

wheel No.5, the whole

assembly

beng

replaced.

Before itsfn a l f lig h t SC had beenp aced

on

standby for

F BVFA

which hadbeenthe

planned aircraft for AF 002t o New

York,

while F BVFC hadbeen alocated to

flight

AF

4590. Due amaintenance

requirement,

F BVFA hadbeen repaced by F BVFC since the

former

had

become unserviceable.Th s

meant

that F BTSC was the

only

aircraft

avai

able f or

flight 4590.

Before beng

alocated

to

this flight

SierraChare

hadbeen con

frmed

to have

no

acceptable

deferred

defects in its

log,

although the Garrett

pneumatc

motordriving the NO.2 engine secondary exhaustnozze buckethadbeen replaced, after

which it

was

declared fit

for

flght.

Havng

confrmed

the

last

known

defects

to afflict Sierra Char e and t hecircum

stances surrounding

itsal ocation

to

flight

4590, the report concentrated upon the sys

temsdeemedto havepayed

a

significant part

in

the crash.

The

first to

be

defned

was

the

undercarrage

and

its detectors,

in

particular the under-inflation warning system.

Ths system lg h tstwo red tyre-warningl ghts on each of t he pilots instrument panels,

wh ie t here was an amber

warning

on the second p io ts pane

which

i uminated a

wheel lght. There

w as a s o an ambertyre

warning

light on theengineers panel.

Ths

detection

system was

inhibited

when

thespeed of the wheels was below lOkt

or

the

steerng

angle of

thenose

wheels

exceeded

degrees

and

none of

the

throttle

levers

was

in the fully forvvard positon.

The

red tyre-warning lghts would notilluminate if the

indicated

air speed exceeded 135kt.Th s system

was

self-monitoring and

would illu

minate

a yelow system

warning

lightthat

was situated

on t heengineers pane

and

would

light

up

shoud a

fault

be found

in

the under-pressure

detecton

system.Retrac

t o n o f the

undercarrage was

controled

by a

lever with

three

positons:

up,

neutral and

down. To retract the undercarrage electrical power needed to

be

avaiable, although

up coud

not

be selected unti the

left

gear

weight-off

microswitchindicated that the

shockabsorber

was

fully uncompressed. Durng the

retracton

sequencethe gearwas

fully upand locked

after

12sec.

Otherundercarrage itemsdefned in

the report

included

the way

in which

the

brakng

system operated and was indicated, while the

main-gear

defectors

were

covered in

detai. Located to the front of each main-wheel b og e t he r o e o f t he deflector

was

to

shift

water

lifted

by thetyres from enterng theintakes.

These

weighed

approximately

91b

4kg)and were

made

fromcomposite

materials,

except

for

the fasteners. In 1995

the

defectors

were subjectedto an

optonal

Servce

Buletn,

SST 32-103, dated 12 Janu

ary 1995, which proposed thattwo cabes

be inserted in

the

leading

edge of the defec

torsto reinforce t hem incaseof faiure. AlthoughBritsh Arvvays dd t his, Air

France

declnedto do so.

The

wheels

and

tyres instaled on F BTSC were manufactured

byDun

lop

and Goodyear,

respectvely.

Al

had been fitted durng theprevious

two

months. It

wasaso noted

that

the

use of

retread tyres

had ceased

on

Concorde

durng

1996.

The

report

then

moved

on

t ocovert he fuel and

the engines, it beingnoted

that the

aircraft had received

a

final top-up of Jet

A

f uel at 13.55hr,

when an

extra 66gal

3001tr had

dispensed

t o t anks 1 2 and 4. At th is p o in t the total f uel load

was

208,0001b 94,470kg).

The

engines

werenotatednext,

the

includeddatacoverng

the

individual

serial

number,number

of

cycles

and of flying

hourssince installation,and

the

date of installation. The longestserving powerplant

was in

the NO.2 position, hav

ingbeen installed

on

August 1999. G vent he factthat Concorde was the onlyair

liner

that used thrust augmentation or reheat during take-off, it was

no

surprse that

there was

aback-up system in placeshould an engine fail on take-off. Known as the

contngency

mode, it could be

activated

either by manual

or automatic

means. In

either case, the

following

criterion

neededto be

satisfied: reheat needed to

be

acti

vated on

any

engine,

the take-off monitor was

armed

and that

the

N2

reading

of any

engine hadt o fall below 58.6per cent indicated. When contngency mode wasacti

vated,

the

remainingthree

engines couldincrease thrust automatically toreach a the

oretical maximum

of

105per cent . There is also a

reheat

cut-out which engaged

should the engine

o u tp u tfa l b e lo w 75

percent,

although

the

functon was res

when

output reached

81

per centthrust.

As the

fre detecton

and

sensngsystemsp ayedacrucalpart inthec rcumstance

roundng

the

crash,

their

functonswere defned in depth. The detectonsystemco

ed of

two loops,

one ofwhich detected

fre around the

engne and theother detec

torchingf ame in

the vicinity

of

the

combuston

chamber. For

an

engne fre

warning

ton to i uminate, bothloopshadto detect

a fault. Once

ths happened, an aura

wa

sounded to reinforce the i uminated light

and

the

red

fashing light on the indiv

engine-fre

hande. Operaton of thishandle

had

the folowing resuts: the air

cond

ing beedvave cosed,

the

hydraulc

shut-off

v a ve d d

the same,

as

d d t he HP

an

LP f ue vaves,

thereheat

f ue vaves

and the

secondary air inlets.

The fnal

effect

p ul n g o f the fre hande wast hecosng

of

thethe auxiary groundrunnng fap, W

tests

were

carred out

on a

servceable Concorde

it

was dscovered that these ac

were completed in between 5 and 7sec,

against

a regulatory requirement of 3

Each Olympus engine consisted of twelve modules,

the

maintenance

ofwhich

undertaken by Air

France,SNECMA

services or by GEAES depending on

the

dep

engineerng

required,

with the fnal

assembly

beng

carred out by

Genera

Electrc

craft Engne Servces,

The maintenance

covered

included visual

inspecton, p

refurbishment

and

complete major overhauls, al based on the Oympusmainten

manual. Supportng themaintenance

effort

werereadingstaken by the flight eng

durng supersonic

flght;

these included

EGT

and fue

fows.

Weights

and balanceswere

computer

generated and

based

on threesets

of

par

ters.

The

first was the

Phase

forecastthat was

determined by

enterng known

age weights forpassengers,baggageand anyintended freight. For SierraChare

firsttotal was

411,

100lb 186,864kg). After

correcton

the

fnal

tax weight was c

lated

at 411 9521b

187,251

kg), down

to 409,7521b 186,251

k g a t

the point of tu

on

to

the

runway fortake-off.

The itemsnoted ab09rd F BTSC included 122 piec

baggage, calculated t o have

an

average weight

of 45.51b

20.7kg)

giving a

to

5,5551b

2,525kg),

although

only103

were noted on

the manifest. Each passenge

given an average weight of 1491b 84kgl peradult and nib 35kg)

for

each

chid

1321b 60kglof newspapers. Gven t hese

calculatons

Concorde Sierra Char e

slightly overoaded

at 407, 1541b

185,070kgl

forits projected

journey. C.g. percen

were

the next areacovered, these beng predictedat 52.3per

cent

at

zero

fue we

increasing t o 54.2 per

cent

for taxing with fuel. For

a

take-off weightof 406,7

184,880kg) the

c.g.

had t o

be

at 54 percent , t hust o changet he original percent

was noted thatat

least

1,540lb 700kg) of fue

would

need to be

transferred

for

fromtank 11. In fact,the

investigation

discovered

that

the actual c.g. was54. 2

cent,

whichwould need atleast

1,7601b 800kgl

of

f ue t o be

transferred forvvard

tank 11 t o g v e

a

correct

c.g.

Shoud Concordes weight

and

balance

be

outside

parameters, there was

an

alarm fitted to warn the

crew

to carry

out

correctve a

Havng

determined

the weights and balances,the other informaton requirng a

ton

were thespeedrangescoverng the

handlng

of t he aircraft with

either oneo

engines shutdown.

In

the

flight manua

the zero-rate

clmb speed

with undercar

retracted and

three engineswas 193kt,

which

increased

to

262kt

with

only

two en

running. With the

undercarrage

extended,the fgures changed to

205kt and

less

300kt. These fgures were

vitally

important in the

operaton

of Concordes nce f

below

them

wouldresult

inthe aircrafts becomingunstable,thusleadingto asta

f gures generat ed f ort he

distance

needed for a

three-engine take-off

were 3,6

3,370ml.

the entre take-off run

coverng

4,046yd

3,700ml. The tailwind

of8kt

an

extra

ton of cargo

were

determined to

be

neglgible

in

causng the

accident.

The

behaviour of the flight control surfaces

and

syst em s weret he next area

investgated.

An

explanaton

ofthe

hydraulc

systemsrequiredto operatethe

fligh

trol

system

folowed,

thenoted

point

being

that

power

to

the

PFCU

synchrovalves

derved from

common sources.

The

avionics

were also

investgated

in depth,

the

beng the SundstrandMk.1 ground proximity warning system, which

had fve

fun

modes.

The

alarm nose identified on the cockpit voice recordertape reveaed tha

GPWS wasselectedto Mode 3

which

indicatedthat thenosewas at 12.5degree

radio altimeter

height was greater

than 50ft

15m),

although t helossin altitude

previously

was

greater than thatalowed.

Havng coveredthe majorareas

of

the

and

the

aircraft, the investgators

turned

theirattention

t o t he

meteorological

c

tons. Over

Europe

at the tme therewas

a

succession of low pressureareas, wh

the vicinity ofChares de Gaule t he wind speed overrunway 26

was

4kt,although

increasedto 8 gust ng t o 9 intermittently.

749



DEATH

N

DISASTER

oncorde Sierra harlie Wreckage isposition

DEATH

N IS STER

The

debrs trail for

Concorde

F-BTSC

began

on therunway

where

partsof

the left

under

carragewater deflector

assembly

were discovered 5,384ft 11,642m)from the end

of

runway

26R. Cose

by

th is p o in t some

sectons

of NO.2 tyre

were

also discovered,

including

the

cut

secton.

The strip o f

metal

about

17n 43cm )

long was

found

in

the

same area

on

the runway shouder. It still hed som e o fits Cherrylok rvets.

Also

found

in the vicinity was partof the lower skn surf ace f rom f uel t ank NO.5. Slightly further

alongthe

runway a

brake servo valve cover

showingoverheatng

and

deformatonwas

discovered. From this

point, further

along

the runway,

sgns

of

an explosion

anddam

aged concretewere found. Indicatonsthat Concorde

had

begun to slew off the

runway

were

revealed

by

the

discovery

of

a

broken

light

cover at theedge of therunway;

it

had

been hit by Concordes

left undercarrage.At

the

5,925ft

,B07m)

point,

marksmade by

adeflated tyre were

noted; these

lastedunti the 7,672ft 2,340m) point

and

were con

sistent

with

that ofthe NO.2 wheel. Furthertyre tracks contnue

intermittently

up

t ot he

9,279ft 2,B30m)

point.

Fue andsoot marks

were

found to start at

adistance

of

5,967ft

1 ,B20m) from

the

threshold. These contnued

up to

9,OB2ft

2,770m)

fromthe thresh

od,

after

which the burnevidence contnued over t he grasst o t he 10,377ft 13,165m)

mark. From theend of the

runway

t ot he crash

site

further

wreckagewas located:

at

the

3,280ft ,DOOm)

mark

a secton

of elevon

was

found, as was t he

tai-cone

anti

co lsio n lg h t, a

severely

fre-damagedinspecton pane f rom t he left winglower sur

f ace, pus seven inspecton panels

without

fre damage evidence that had originally

been

fitted

t o t he

left

wing upper surf ace dry bay. From the 3,2BO t o t he 8,200ft

,000-2,500m)point further wreckageconsistng

of

another

dry

bay

upper

inspecton

panel. a

fre-damaged

ductsecton and fre-damagedsectons fromthe tai-conewere

discovered. Assome of these itemswere burning when they hit theground,

there

was

supplementary fre

damage. Further smal

items

were discovered slightly further

on,

many of whichwere fre-damaged;

t here wasalso

a

trail

of fre-damaged structural

items,

including

rvets,

honeycomb panels

and

sectons

fromthe rearfuselage.

At

the crash

site

the team surmised that the aircraft

had

been heading along 120

degrees

with little forward speed. On impact it

broke up, distributing the

wreckage

mainly tothe south. Oue to itslow speed,most

of

the wreckage was concentrated with

in astrip some330by 165ft

00 by

50m).

exceptforthe cockpit

secton

which was

out

sde

this

zone. Inside

this

area, the

wreckage

was severely

fre

damaged;however,the

frontfuselagesecton had largely escaped. Other items were found outside the prma

ry

zone, m any bengbured t hrough t hef orce of t he im pact. Complcatng matters was

the

wreckage

of thed estroyed hotel.

although,

perversely,someof the important

debrs

hit parts of

the

buiding,

thus

Nos

and

2

engines

were

found restng on

a

water tank.

Inspecton of the undercarrage units

revealed

that t helegs

remained

in

the locked

down positon, even thoughthe crew had attempted a retracton.

Inspectonof

the

cockpitinstrument

panels revealed

much

pertinent data

to

theinves

tgators. Thusthe

engine

gauges

revealed

that

the

thrust levels of

theengines

were

at

2 B , 4 ,

80and

85per cent forNos to 4, respectvely; however,the fuel

flow

indicators

were

mainly

burnt

beyond recogniton. The indicators

for

the brake system showed a

discrepancybetween

the

left and

the

right

sde,

that to

the

left

beng no more than

400psi

28kg/sq em) whilethat t ot he right displayed

1,500ps 105kg/sq em).

Both p io ts panels

weresuccessfuly

recovered andnotes

were

maderegarding the

positonsof

thegauges,leversand

switches. The first

officers pane revealed that the

nose visor selector

was in thedown

positon,

the

undercarrage selector

was

between

the

down

andthe mid-selection positon, the

rudder

indicator

revealed

that the upper

secton

was defected left by

20

degrees, while the lower

secton

had deflected 12

degrees

to

the

right,

both

wereoperatng

fromthe green

hydraulc

system.There was

no evdenceconcerning theelevonss nce they

were

in mechanical

mode.

Observaton

of

the

airspeed

indicator showed that the forward speed

was90kt

while

the

STBY

fag

was

showing,

the V2 bug

wasset

at230kt. Navigaton instrument readingsshowed the

HSI

at

105degrees.the AOI showed

a

3D-degree

rol

t ot he left,

with

the

nose se ta t

32 degreesdown;

some otherinstruments were

unreadable

although the altimeter

was

indicating 240ft 73m). Thepane cockwas reading 14h 45m UTC.

The captain s

instrument pane showed an HSI heading of 105degrees, the ADI was

at

15

degreesof

rol to

the left, the

nose wasindicating 75

degrees down,the standby

horzon

wasat 90

degrees rol t ot he left, with

18

degrees nose

u p. Tr m

indication

was

at54.3per cent. Thecoaming instrumentation revealed that the autothrottles Nos

and

2were selected to

O FF,a s

were

autopilot channels

and 2and

the

flight directors

Nos and 2were a s o i n t he

OFF

positon. Autothrottle speed

was selected

to

285kt,

the altitude selecton was 9,500ft 2,900m). the left display wasreadng a heading of

329 degrees and course 285degrees, wh ie the right

display

showed338degrees

with

a

course of 287 degrees.

The

overheadpane

displays

revealed

that

the

servo control

hydraulc selectors wereat

normal,

theauto ignition switches

for

Nos 1,2

and

3were

s et t o O N , while No.4had

melted.

Theengine

ratng

mode switches

for

Nos 1 , 2 , 3

and4

were

at

TAKEOFF and while the

HP selectorswitches

weredamagedthe

select

ed

positonswere still visible andread NO.1 OPEN, NO.2

was

broken,

No

3

wasshut

and No.4 wa sa t TAKE OFF The NO.2 engine shutdown/fire handle was puled and

pointng

upwards added to

which

the fre

extnguisher fred

indicators

were

unread

able.

The investgatorswere fortunate to fnd the fying control indicator panel:

thus

the

auto

stabwas unreadable on

Channell,

while NO.2

displayed pitch

a x s t o OFF, the

rol

axs was unreadable and the

yaw

a x s w as

at

OFF.

The artificial

feel system

showed

that Channe NO.1

wasusing

the

blue

hydraulc circuit, the pitch axs

was OFF,

t he rol axs wasunreadable

and

the yaw axs was UP. Channe NO.2 was operatng

fromthe green circuit, while the

pitch, rol

and

yaw

axs

we re a l

selected to OFF. By

contrast,

the

invertercontrol

was

difficult toread;

however,the

investgators

surmised

that both t heblueand

the

green

channels

were set t o

O FF. The

flight control mode

selectors

were

damaged, although there

was

a strong suppositon that the outer and

middle

elevons

were

in m echanical m ode, t he inner elevons

were

usng t he green

hydraulc

system,

and

the selected rudder

circuit

w as b u e .

The anti-stall selectors

Nos

and

2 were unreadable. I twa s n o t possible t oread t he central warning pane

since most of thebulbs and covers

were

missing.

The flight

engineers pane

sectons were

recovered, the

first secton reported

on

bengt he fre panel, which showed

that

the

fire

loop

selectorsindicated NO.1 at BOTH,

NO.2 at LOOP A, No.3 LOOP B , a nd N o. 4 a t neutral. Engne system pressures for

P7

showed that Nos 1 , 2 ,

3

and

4

engines

displayed

readings of 18,12,

18

and18ps 1.27,

0.84, 1.27

and

1.27kg/sq

em).

respectvely.

Furthersystem readings showed

thebrake

hydraulc pressurewas reading

6,000psi

1422kg/sq

em)

with

an

indicator

fag,

thebrake

fan switch wasat

ON ,

andthe brake

temperature

reading was170°C.The pane cock

stopped

at 14h45m

UTC.

The

enginesecondary

nozze indicators were

shown

to

be at

0,

15

and

5

degrees and unreadable for

Nos

1,

2, 3

and

4

engine,

respectvely.

The flight

engineers

central

fuel

and air-conditioning pane was recovered but dam

agedand therefore the investigators

were

able to determine the state of thefuel tanks

and their

contents:

tank no

9:

fue quantty indicated: 11 tons;

left

pump to AUTO, rght pum pt o ON

tank no : fue

quantty

indicated 12 tons;

left

pump to OFF ,

rght

pump to AUTO

tank no SA: fuel

quantity indicated 2.4

tons; both

pumps to

ON

tank

nO 7A:

fuel quantity indicated 2.2tons; bothpumpsto ON

tank no 5:fuel quantity indicated 2 tons; bothpumps unreadable

tank no 6:fue

quantty

indicated4.6tons;

left-hand

pump unreadable, rght-hand

pumpto ON

tank no fuel quantity indicated 4.2 t ons; bot hst andbypum ps t o ON , m an

pump

to

ON

tankno : fuel quantity

indicated

0.11 tons;

a l thre e

pumps to

ON

tank no

7: fuel quantity indicated 6.6tons;pump switches

unreadable

tank no 8. fuel quantity indicated

12.B

t ons; bot hpum ps t o ON

tankno 3: fuel quantity

indicated

4.3 tons; pump

switches

unreadable

tank nO 4: fuel

quantity indicated 4.3

tons;

pump switches

unreadable

tank 11 71: fuel

quantity indicated 10

tons;

left-handhydraulc pumpto AUTO ,

right-handto

OFF; electric pump indicators unreadable;main

left

in vave

SHUT; overrde

not

readable; man

right inlet

valve

and

overrde unreadable.

The standby

inlet

vaves Nos 5, 6

and

were selected OPEN, while NO.2 was at

SHUT. Standby

inlet

valves Nos 3, 4,10 and

7were

at SHUT and NO.8 wasat OPEN.

Fue jettison

switches NO.1

and

3were

in the

intermediateposit on; No.4

was

OPEN

and NO.2 was SHUT.

The

masterjettison and trim ppe drainswere

unreadable.

Other

fuel readings include a zero fuel weightof 91.9tons with ae.g. of 52.29 per

cent

and

the total

contentsindicator

was

at

7B.8 tons

with awarning

fag

showing.

The hydraulc indicators

on

the flight engineers pane

showed

that the

green

circuit

had a level below

zero

with awarning f ag; Nos and 2pump shut-off valves showed

indicator fags and their

switches

and indicators

were

at

ON .

Hydraulc pressure

showed2,000psi

1141kg/sq

em)

with

an

indicator

fag.

The

yellow

circuit indicated a

totalcontentsof 6 US gal 1231tr) with awarningf ag; pumps Nos2and 4shut-off valve

showed warning f ags andt he pumps and indicators w er e s et t o

ON .

System pres

sures

were

unreadable.

The

bue circuit showed

a total contents

level of

2.7

US

gal

Otr)and

the shut-off

valves

for Nos 3

and

4wereshowing warning

fags.

Nos 3

and

4hydraulc pumps were at ON andthe selector for NO.3 pumpwas at OFF; NO.4 was

at OFF.

Hydraulc

pressure was at 6,OOOpsi 422kg/sq em) with a

warning

fag. Al

alternator

switcheswere at ON , althoughoutputs for Nos 1, 2

and

3had

unreadable

outputs,that of No.4showed

an

output of 60kW .

The

flight

engineers electrical control pane did not revea manydetais throughbe ng

badly

burnt,

however, some information was

retrievable

as t ot he

state

of the electri

ca

system

at the t m e o f thecrash.Data

from

this

pane showed

that

the

transformer

rectifier

unitswere outputting, thus NO.1 wasburnt beyonduse,No.2 wasbroken, NO.3

30AandNo.4 70A. The TRU

selectorswere:

TRl unreadable, TR2 NORMAL, TR3 ISOL,

and

TR4 wasmissing.

Al fo ur

engine

nozze indicatorswere

at NORMAL

but

damaged

and

t hef uelt ank pressurewas

at

zero. Otherdata

recovered fromthe pane

included

the passengeroxygen pressure at 40ps 2.8kg/sq em), the

crew

oxygen at ze

selector

was missing,

and

the

fourfire-extinguishercartrdgeindicatorswere at

although thecheck selectorswere unreadable.

Whenthe investgators began to interrogate therecoveredwreckage the first ob

t on t hey

made

was that theuppersecondaryexhaust nozzes forNos 1,

2

and

4

e

were in

pacebut

NO.3 had

separated.

Asimiar situation

was

dscovered with re

the prmary exhaust

n ozze s.No

nozzesect onsshowed sgns

of

overheatng no

anysgnsof an uncontained engine burst found. Observaton of theengnes show

nozzes

Nos and 2

were at

21

degreesconversant with

either

the

take-off ort h

down of

the engnes,

and

the positons of the

other

two

were

at

zero.

Investga

NO.2 compressorshowed that t heenginewas barelyt urningat t he t m e of

impa

showeds gnsof

FOD

damage, as dd t he compressorof

NO.1

engne. By contras

Nos 3

and

4

engnes showed

indicatonsof

operatng

at a

much higherthrust

th

matching pair

on

the left-hand sde. None of t heengnesshowed sgns

of

fre da

Next on the

investgators list

were t he wheels.

NO.1

wheel was

completely

although

therewas no evdence

of materal

separaton,

thehubs

were complete

thebrake unit

had separated

from the

wheel and

axe; a l we re besmirched

by

soo

wheel showed fre damage

and

the two beads were

no

longerlnkedby t he t rea

outer

bead

ofthe tyre wascomplete

but

theinnerwas broken, with the reinforcing

showing through.

A

sectonof

the

tyrewas

found to

be missng. The wheel

hub

was

to

be

complete

and

still

retained thebrake unit.

The

other

two

wheels

on

the

lef

boge, Nos 5

and

6, were f oundt o

be

complete with somepost-crash

fre

damag

wheel

hubs

were still in pace with

brake units

still mounted.

The

reconstructon

of

the debrs concentrated

around

the left-handwing

and na

However,a ful reconstructon wasnot possible since there hadbeen destructon,

cialy in t he vicinity of the

main-gear

well. Much of the

material

from NO.5 fue

was

not

recovered.

Another area

of t he

aircraft

for

which little

was

found

wast h

cone, although NO. 1f uelt ank situated just forward revealed much material pus

tain amount of the

vent

system pipework. The

fre

spread to the tai-cone v a t h

iliary

tailwheel gear door.

The

investgators aso

took

tme to ascertain

the

positons of the crew seats,

were found to be

in

the correctpositons fortake-off.

As

the

undercarrage

had c

problem s durng t he crash, t he

positonswere

of serous interest t ot he BEA a

AAIB. Examinaton showed that both m an legs

were

locked down

butthat

the

gearlock hadbeen broken

and

that thedoors

and

t he leghad started to move.

Havngcoveredthewreckagefrom Concorde, the investgators

turned

theiratte

tothe DC-l0 from

which

the

metal

strip

had

come. Ths was

quickly

identified as

bng strip from a

CF6-50 engine

thrust

reverser

cowl. Acheck

of

the

departure

r

for Chares

de

Gaule reveaed that the strip had com e f rom a DC-l0 registe

N13067 andoperatedby

Contnental

Airlnes to

Newark,

NJ as

flight

COA 55.

T

frm this,

helpwas requestedfrom, and

granted

by, the NTSB

and

the FAA. Wh

aircraft was located

and grounded

for investigation it

was discovered

that the

left

wearstrip on the right engine was missing. It wasaso f ound that the replac

strip

had

been incorrectlyfitted. Servicing

had previously

beencarred

out by Israe

craft Industries and at

Houston,

where

parts

of

the

cowl

rubbing

strps had

replaced.

Snce it is difficult to seethese strips whenthe thrust reverser cowl is

normal positon the

fitting

of an incorrect

part

was

noteasiy determined.

h ad t ak en o ff f ro m r un wa y 2 6R

ing a take offspeed upon rotation

of

t. During

the

take off run

the

left-

main gear hadrunovera st rip

of

metal

had fal len off a

Continental

DC IO

hadlefta short t imeearl ier. It

w s

later

t hat one

of

the

engine rubbing

ipshad become detached duringtake off.

the

investigators followed this lead

t hat a t an

earlierstop

the

DC IO

been

found tobe missing a rubbingstrip

that

thereforea replacementhad been

ally manufactured

by the

inspecting

mechanic and fit ted. Unfortunately

the

material

w s

of the

incorrect specification

being toosoft

to

beheldin place

by the few

re ta in ing r ivet s. Such w ere

the

stresses

induced during

the

take off run

t ha t t he

strip

w s

pulledover

the

rivetsand fell

on

to

the

runway.

This

innocuous piece of metal

landed

at

s uc h a n a ng le s t o f or ce its

upwards edge

into

No.2 tyre

on

the left-

hand

main undercarriage

of

the Concorde.

This

in

turn

caused explosive decompres-

sion

o f t h e

t yre and som e dam age t o

the

hub.

The

force generated by

the

tyre failure

5

converted sections

o f t he

t yre i nt o h igh

speed projectiles.

These t henhi t t he

under-

sUlface

o f t h e

wing puncturing No.5

fuel

tank.

The

shock

ofthe

penetration appears

tohave deformed

the

fuel tankwalland

sent

a severeshockwave through

the

fuel.

The

resul t caused fue l t o l eak under pressure

from

the

rup ture and

t he vent ing fuel

swirled

about

like

an

aerosol around

the

undercarriage bay before ignit ing.

The

resulting fire

then

caused malfunctions in

both

left hand engines

the

final cause

of

which still needed

to

be determined. Still

ablaze

the

aircrafttook offwith a stabilized

flame plume streaming behind i t.

t

this

poin t t he

No.2 engine fi re warning l ight

illuminated to which

the

response

of

the

crew

w s to

announce

their

intention

to

shut the

enginedown.

lthough Concorde

w s

airborne

the

a ircraf t was unabl e t o

accelerate since

the

undercarriage legs were

stuck in

the

down posi tion and because

of

the

behaviour

of

the

port engines.

One

matter that

w s quickly discounted

from

the

investigation concerning

the

undercarriage

w s

a bearing spacerfound to

be missing from

the

left hand bogie gear

mounting.

lthough

some eyewitnesses

had mentioned

that Concorde

appeared to

be dri ft ing s li gh tl y t o t he l ef t dur ing and

after its take offrun this was ruled

out

from

causing

the

undercarriage malfunction.

The

intense fire

in the

wingwasdeter mined

s

the

reason for

the

undercarriage staying

down

either

through failure

of

the electrical

controlor

the

hydraulicsystems or through

a complete

or

partialfailure

of

both.

t

this

point

the crew reported

that

the

aircraft

w s

stable even though i ts speed

w s

not

151

increasing; they also stated

that

th

confidentenough to

fly

the

strickena

on

to

e

Bourget since this would

themto makea virtuallystraight in la

Shortlyafterthis report

the

portengin

virtuallyshut downdue toa combina

hot

airand fuel in

the

intake whichb

off

the

airsupply to the engines.Also

to

the

mix was a structural fai lure

vicinity

of t he

intake box assembly

caused distort ion to

the

mounting

imbalancein engine powerand a fol

failure

o f t h e

flight control system



DEATH ND DISASTER

DE TII ND DISASTER

SECTIONTHROUGH

BOGIEPIVOT POINT

]j lei

• That Air

France

shoud improve theemergencyprocedures

in

theConcorde O

tons Manual

indealng with emergencies.

•

That

Air

France should

instal

enginedata recorders

thatmonitored their

par

ters everysecond; this dd not applyto British Airways Concordes which already

such

a

system instaled.

• That t he

FAA

should carry

out

a fu l a u dit

on

Contnental Airlnes and its sub

tractors concerning the applcation and adherence to maintenance proced

• Thatthe manufacturers

and

airworthiness authorities shoud improve theana

coverng t he

functoning of

the aircraft systems and improve the

correctve a

response.

•

Thatthe IACO shoud

confrm

dates

for the installation

of videorecorders on

b

aircraft undertaking publc transportflghts.

•

Thatthe DGAC and

otherregulatory

bodiesshoud institute

a

programme to

in

externalviewers

so

that

crewscould observe hidden parts

of

the

airframe for

age

or other problems.

• Thatthe same organizaton shoud improve the sweeping and colectionof deb

and from airfields within France either

by regulaton orby agreement

with the

vantorganizatons.

• Thatthe IACO in

conjuncton

with

manufacturers

and

other

authorities shoud

up the proposals

and implement

them

to

identify

al

knowndangerous substa

aboard eachtype o fcivi a ircra ft.

•

Thatthe DGAC shoud carry out

further

investigations and

regulaton

concernin

craft

tyres and

their conformity to requirements.

•

That t he DGAC shoud undertake an

audit

of

Air

France

Concorde operatons

maintenance procedures.

The

recommendatons

specifc

to Concorde

operaton

as recommended

by

the

and

supported by

AAIB

included:

A

The BEA Final Crash Report

At the tme

of t he

crash

the aircraft

possessed avald Certificate

of

Airworthiness, and

the captain s andthe first

engineers

documentaton

and

certificationwere

up

to

date;

however,the

first

officers lcence became invald after 8July 2000. Thespacer in the

left-hand landing-gear

boge

was

not reinstaled durng

its replacement

on 7 July

2000; however,

its

omission dd

notc ontribute

tothe crash. As regardsthe paperwork,

the aircraft had

no

outstanding acceptable deferred defects

and

the Concorde

was

operatng

within

lmits. Although the al-up weight wasover by 1 ton, the effect

on

take-off performance

was

neglgible. Durng take-off, after reaching V tyre NO 2 was

cut by

a

metallic

striplying

on the runway;

this had come

from

a

DC-10

which

had

departed 5m in earer. Ths

strip hadbeen

replaced

at

Tel Aviv

and laterat

Houston. In

the latter casethe manufacturers instructions had not beenheeded. Damaged

sectons

of t yre and NO 5 fuel tank

were

found on t he runway; t hep ece of tyre had set

up

a

hydrodynamic pressure surge in thefuel

which had

t hen f orcedf uelout on

to

the run

way.The

f uel was

then ignited,

probably

by electrical

sparks. The fames

were report

ed tothe crew

by

the air traffic controler;their responsewas to shut

down

NO 2

engine.

Further problems

were

experenced

with

both left-hand engines, which included surg

ing.

Although

theConcordewas travel ng forward

slowly,

its speed and height

were

diminishing

as problems

were

beng experenced

with

the

retractng

of

the

undercar

rage.

Ths hadbeen

traced

t ot he incomplete

opening of

the left-hand main-gear

door

which stopped the gearcyclng through. With the fnal loss of thrust to NO engine,

the aircraft adopted a pronouncedangle of attack and

rol

attitude. Theloss of thrust

to

Nos 3and 4

engines

was

traced

to a

delberate

retardatonof

the throttles

and

surg

ingcaused by

excessve

airflow disrupton;

however,

its effect

wast o

reduce

the

rate

o fro l.At the point

of

impact the aircraft was travelng forward,below safespeed,was

losing

altitude andhad

almost leveled

out. On contact with theground, a buiding was

destroyed

and

thewreckage consumed in

a

violent

fre.

The

investigators

concluded

that,

even

if

the engines had been

operatng

norm aly, t hedam age to the

aircrafts

structure

and

systems would h av e l e d t o t h e

eventual

destructon of the Concorde.

The probable causes weredetermined as starting

with

thehigh-speed impactof NO 2

tyre

with ametal strip

on the runway,

which

led

to itsdestructon.

Ths led

to

thepunc

turn g o f

NO 5 fuel tank

which, in conjuncton with

thehydrodynamic forces

imparted

uponthe fuel. caused a

massve

leak. Ths

in turnwas

ignited by either

an

electrical

arcfrom a damaged loomin the undercarrage bayor contact

with

the hot part sof t he

engine, orbot h. Ths ledt o a sheet of f am e

streaming

behind the aircraft, which, in

turn, causedmassve damage

to

the

structure and

the systems in the

wing

pus

a

severe

loss

of

thrust fromNos 1and 2engnes. Althoughnot a prmary cause

of

the accident,

the

impossibility

of

retractng the undercarrage

and

its

assistance

in retaining

and

sta

b i zing of t he f am e st ream p ayed a significant part.

T his general head-on view of

the

main undercarriage bogie

mount

showsthe location

o fth e

missing spacer

that was thought at first to have contributed to th e events that overtookSierraCharl ie. Althoughnot directly

responsible,i t did callinto question some of the engineering practices applied to the French Concorde

fleet. BBAColecton

Aseach stage

the

investigation report was

released itwasgreeted by mediaspeculation

most which wasill-inFormed. GivenCon-

c a rd e s s aFety rec o rd in c o mp a ris on with

other

civil airliners it had always been the

intention ir

France and BritishAirways

t o r et ur n t h ei r Concorde fleets to service.

The

First

part th is p ro ce ss was to c o ns u lt

with

the

twoair accident boards plus senior

representatives from

the

manuFacturers.

AFter a series meetings running in paral

lel with the investigations the interested

Returning to Service

the

aircraFt angle

attack

and

bank

to

increase beyond the aircraFt s flight enve-

lope parameters. This then c au se d a th rus t

drag imbalance which coupled to the

asymmetric thrust

the

two re ma in in g

engines pushed the aircraFt right over so

that it was travelling

at

righ t a ng les to the

ground.

Now

totallyoutside the designpara

meters

the

remaining two engines

Nos

3

and

4

then

experienced

uncommanded

shut-downs due toslipstream distortion into

the engine intakes.

Now

totally

out

con-

trol

the

airliner crashed.

The

o n ly a rea

investigation

t hat t he

British and the Frenchcould not agree upon

was the source

the Fires

Three

points

ig nition were ide ntiFie d: e lec tric al

hot

engine contact or contact

with

the

emis

sions From the air vent in the undercarriage

bay The last was thoroughlyexamined by a

team from

B e

Systems who conclusively

proved

t ha t t he v en t

was

n ot t he

source

since the emissionswere not ho t enough to

ignite any fuel whateverits then condition.

This leFt

the BEA investigators and their

British counterparts to lookmore closely

at

theother two possibilities. They pelformed

a simulation

that

would mimic as closely as

possible

the

behaviour

a large object strik

ing a large flat sUlface and

its subsequent

aFter-effects. This simulation showed that

the s ki n p an el s uf fe re d a s ev er e b e nd i ng

moment which caused a hydrauliccycling

efFectinside

the

fuel tank.

Thisthen

caused

the motion the fuel tosplit the inner tank

skin open Followed bya rupture to the outer

skin. Hydraulic pressure acting

o n t he

fuel

F or ce d i t t h ro ug h

the

r up tu re w he re i t

swirled into a vaporousstate. Furthertesting

prove

that

the original source ignition

was electrical this being supplemented by

morefuel s igniting

on

a

hot

engine sLilface

Yet again the missing bogie bearing spacer

was Fou nd to h a ve h a d no effect on events.

SPAR52

REAR

SENSING

ELEMENT

RIB22 RIB23A

RIBt

RIB25A

\ \ \

R I ~

\ R IB 26 A R I B2 7

~ 1 B 4 f l 7 . . 7 f } K ? 7 M ~ ~ . , 1

RIB21

\

S P A R B ~ ~ l f 7

illustrates the fire-detection system fitted in th e port engine nacelle the

rboard was similarl. This system informed the crew about a spurious fire in NO.2

in reality,

the

fire

was

in

the

wing

tank

which had

no

detector system.

ENGINE 1 3

OPPOSITE SIDE IN BRACKETS

CENTRAL

SENSING

ELEMENT

structure surrounding No.5 fuel

tankwas

quiteclosely

spaced,

imparting great

in

that region;however, it was unable

to

restrain the hydraulicallyejected

venting into

the

airflow. BBA

Coect on

75

753



DE TII

NDDISASTER

DE T II ND

DISASTER

that although each

a irfra me s e c tio

constructed on jigs each Concord

virtually hand built. Modifications

French

Concordes

were

undertaken

A i r France m ai nt enance d iv is i on

assigned a team of twenty-five to th

who firs t lo ok e d a fter

the

stored ai

beforemoving

on

to incorporating

the

ifications.

When

this programme wa

geared up over a hundred engineers

assigned

to

it

augmented

by thirty

s

metal workers drawn from Orly

Le

B

and

Riossy who werespecificallyassig

the

fuel tanks.

Three engine techni

werealso

seconded

aswere teamsfro

av ion ics and m echani cal worksho

undertake component

overhauls. I

background

the

logisticsbranch also j

in their ro le b e in g to oversee purch

and warehousesupplies. After the mod

tionswerecompleted

on

each aircraft

inspected by

the

Direction

Gcncra

l Aviation and the Civil Aviation Au

ty beforebeing certified for return tose

F BVFC

.

T

..

and

its

engineers

were

beginning to mod-

ify

Concorde

G BOAF

Alpha Foxtrot.

A lt ho ug h t he

m odi f ica ti ons t o

the

hydraulic

and

electrical systems went with

out

a hitch there were someproblemswith

the installation o f t h e Ke vla r m a ts in the

fueltanks.

These

hadbeen manufactured by

using

the

original drawings; however

when

the time came to ins tall them they would

not fit. Afterdouble-checking the drawings

and

t hen t he

given measurements against

the intemal structure ofAlpha Foxtrot the

engineers found

that there

were discrepan

cies.

Th e

d e cis io n was ta k en to u n de rtak e

s imilar c h ec k s with

the

remainder

of the

British Airways fleet. These too revealed

that

the intemalstructure

of

each tank floor

was m arg in ally d iffe re nt. A re qu es t to Air

France to undertake similar checksshowed

a similar situation and th us it was d e cid ed

that

each

o f t h e

remaining aircraft would

n e ed to b e in div id ua lly m ea s ure d to e n su re

an accurate fit

of

the Kevlar mats.

The

con-

clusiondrawn from theseinvestigations was

I • • • • • • •

RIGHr

As

well

as theimpounding stickers theair-

portauthoritiesplaceda tailsupportunderthe rear

fuselageto protectthe airframefromaccidental

damage. Justn

Cederholm

ABOVE: Afterthe Concorde crash inJuly

2000

all

others

were

groundedand impounded.This is

F BVFC complete

with

impoundstickersover

thedoorsand windows. Justn

Cederholm

looms.

The

total modification cost was ini

tially estimated at £l7 m illion for e a ch a ir

craft added to w hi ch BA h ad d ec id ed t o

refurbish

the

interiors

of

their Concordes for

a further £l4 million.

While the

interested

p a rties were d isc us sin g the modification

programmeand itsrequirements

oneof

the

impounded

Air

France

Concordes

was

flown home from JFK. This machine F-

BVFC had completed a transatlantic flight

to

theUSA

and was waiting to return when

Sierra Charlie crashed. To allow the aircraft

t o l ea ve

the USA

a s pe ci al l ic en ce w as

authorized to covera single flight although

only

the

c rew were a llo we d to trav el p as

sengerswere strictly forbidden. This would

be the last flight for several months.

It would

not

beuntil 8 January2001

that

Air France Concorde F-BVFB left Charles

de Gaulle airport for a short l ight to Istres.

Herethe

aircraft

underwent

fuel-flow

and

d isp e rs ion tria ls in

advance of

a

return to

service. While the French authorities were

undertaking

their checks British Airways

parties produced a blueprint for action

that

allowed

Concorde

to resume revenue oper

ations.

The

mainareashighlighted for mod

ification included

the

fue l ta nk s and the

structure surrounding

the

undercarriage

bays plus the adding of further protection to

any pipework

and

electrical looms.

The

pri

maryform

of

protectionchosen for

the

mod

ification programme wasKevlar a synthetic

fib re d e ve lop e d b y Dupont d e Ne mo u rs

manufactured into specially shaped panels.

K ev la r h ad b ee n c ho se n s in ce i t h as g re at

resistance to high-speed impacts from hard

objects and thus is d ifficu lt to p e ne trate .

The

h y dra ulic s ys tem p ipe lin e s wou ld b e

further protected by fitting reinforced con

d ui t s o ve r t he m a nd s imilar p rote c tio n

wou ld b e a p plied to

the

vulner<lble wiring

ABOVE: Duringthe modificationprocess many of

Concorde smain components such as theengines

andthe majorityof the wing accesspanels were

removed.

Courtesy Britsh

Airways

view s h ow s a BA engineerfi tting oneof theimpregnatedmatsin thefuel tanks.

modification

was

requiredto

allow

a

new

Certificateof Airworthiness

be

issued.

Courtesy Britsh Airways

75

755



DEATH N DISASTER

DEATH

N IS STER

on the ramp. More thorough inspe

and maintenance needed hangar sp

carry out. These s ta rted with a

Che

carried

out v ry

210hr a nd consist

preset checksplusany special requirem

Check Bwasto becarried out

v ry

4

ing hours and required a preset gro

c he ck s pl us a ny s pe ci al r eq ui re m

Check

C was

to

be carried

out v ry

flying hours and followed a similar

p

to the

two previousinspections. After

flying hours Check was mad e

required greater in depth inspection

maintenance again plusany specialre

ments.

The

final

maintenance

requir

was

Check 0 or

a major overhaul.

required the a ircraf t to b e g ro un de

about a y ea r and was required after 1

flying hours. As part

of

this the Con

wasstripped

of

most

of

itsoperational e

ment which

was

then sent to the re

contractors for a full rework. Once th

frame was in effect empty i twasto b

jected to full inspections repairsand

fications plus extensive non destr

testing for cracks

and other

defects.

the

ailframe

had

been virtually rebu

systems components would be reins

a nd t he aircraft subjected to extensiv

flight testing.

While the

airframewas

overhauled the e ng in es wou ld b e

hauled

either

by Rolls Royce and

S

MA

on

behalfof British Airways whi

Air France ones were refurbished und

guidance

of

the Air France industrial

ticsbranch.

British Airways.

This started with

a p re -

flight

check

before

v ry scheduled depar-

ture

followed by a d ai ly

check covering

routine operat ions and inspections v ry

24hr both

of

w hic h c ould be carried out

After

633

flying hours.Concorde 101 G AXDN was retired tothe ImperialWar

Museumat Duxford Cambridgeshire

on 20

August

1975 BBA Colecton

A New Servicing Regime

Support ing the modificat ion

programme

was

an improved servic ing schedule to

be

fully

adopted

by

b ot h A ir France and

BA Concorde G BOAAwas one two airframesnotsubjectto themodification programme; it thus remained

instoreat Heathrow. BBA

Colecton

Theprimary modificationappliedto the

remainingConcordesin ordertoreturn

them to service included instal ling Kevlar

l iningsinthe fueltanks as shown here.

BBA

Colecton

• UNMODIFIED T NKS

D

MODIFIED

T NKS

Aftera successful post modification testfl ight. F BVFC landsat Charles de Gaulleairport. Bernard Chares

156

157



DEATH

N

DISASTER

E TII N IS STER

•

0

I

.•..

1

Picturedat Fil ton awaiting maintenancewas BAConcorde G BOAD which underwent post crash

modificationat Heathrowand returnedto revenueservicein September 2001 SSA Colecton

de AlphaBravois theotherairframenot modified;

it

tooremained atHeathrow

SSA Colecton

Training

final aspec t of re tu rni ng Concorde

service

concerned

the training

of

the

ami

cabin

c r ew s . Fo r

Air

France

s m eant

that

twelve captains eleven

t officers and el even flight engineers

continuation training while Con-

was grounded.

Unlike

British Air-

Air

France c r e ws w e re

hired on

a

yearly basis from the general pool of

airline s crews. The training undertak-

keep up to

date

in relat ion to

Con-

each crew

to fly 4hrof

group

simulatortraining comprising

three

take-

offs

and

landings.

Further

flight

simulator

missionswere required toensure crewtype

rating currency. When

Concorde

was

beingclearedforserviceafter modification

the

crews

undertooktechnical

verification

flights followed by non commercial train-

ing flights. Supporting these flights were

additional simulator missions and ground

classroom training.

The Concorde cabincrewswereseventy

six strong rostered as r e qu ire d to cover

e ac h c om me rc ia l f li gh t. E ac h c ab i n c re w

m e mb e r n e e de d to h a ve

at

least three years

experience and pursers needed

at

least three

years seniorityin postbeforebeing consid

ered for Concorde. A ll c a bin s taf f w a n tin g

to fly on Concorde were required t o have

excellent

English

and

a second foreign

language.

Once chosen

f or tr a in in g th ey

were cleared only when the deciding com

mitteehad interviewed them indepth. This

committee comprised seven instructors six

female and

nine

male pursers plus others

drawn from twenty-six female and twenty

s e ve n m a le f lig ht attendants a ll w it h a n

averageage of 32 and eitherthen serving or

recently retired

Concorde

cabin crew. The

training

o f t he

cabin c re w i nv ol ve d t wo

courses: a safety course followed

by

a th r ee

day marketing course. The first consisted of

a n i nt en si ve t he or et i ca l s ec ti on d ea l in g

w ith s af ety e q uip m en t s af ety in str u ction

presentation and

features specific to

Con-

corde. This was followed

by

a practical part

covering evacuation procedures the testing

of

equipment such as fireextinguishers and

oxygen masks plusa familiarization briefing

covering Concorde and itson-board equip

ment handling. The marketing course was

h e ld in

the

in-flightservices school and was

attended

by those

cabin

crew

who

had

passed the Concorde course. This course

coveredcust omer profiling interaction with

flight crews and ground staff the Concorde

lounge

at

Charles

de

Gaulle airport briefing

preparation product promotion in-flight

catering plus for the pursers cabin man

agement. After the Concorde crash cabin

staffundertook c<lbin simulmor training to

familiarize themselves with the situations

that

couldbe

encountered

in flight.

Maintenance and

Modifications

When the Air France Concorde fleet was

grounded after revocation

of

their Certifi

cates

of

Airworthiness

the

airline began

a s e qu e nc e of maintenance checks that

included running the engines and systems

every fifteen days. In parallel with the air

frame modifications

the

tyre manufacturers

Mic he lin w er e u n de r tak in g develop

work on a new tyre known

as

theNear

Growth Tyre that would be resistant t

kind of failure that h a d a ff lic ted S

Charlie. The f ir st two a irc r af t to r e tu

serviceswere

sent

to Istres for trials wo

BVFB was used from 8 January to 3 F

a ry 2 0 0 1 f or a e ro d yn a mic c h ec k s on

leakage and dispersal and F-BTSDwas

f or Mich e lin tyr e tr ia ls f ro m 7 April

May. An extensive series of tax i a n d f

te sts w e r e ta k e n to p r ov e the validity o

n e w typ e and to reinforce the data ga

from

the development

programme in

laboratory. On 8 June t he trials ended

weredeclared a success.

Modifications continued apace on A

Foxt rot w it h t he a i rc raf t begi nni ng

atug attached by a towing armto the aircraft Concorde G BOAC ismoved fromtheramp Afterthe

h modificationshadbeenmade theaircraftreturned toservice on July 2002 SSA Colecton

After

it

had flown nearly 13 000hr ir France F BTSD was deliveredin June2003 tothe museumat

Le

Bourget SSA Colecton

7 8

7 9



DEATH

N

DISASTER

DEATH

N

IS STER

Optimism

Restored

While the aircraft were undergoing mo

fications

the

public relations

departme

of

each airline w as a ls o l i mb er i ng u p

modify the public perception ofthe type

asafe

and

fast mode

of

transport now

ev

safer to fly in

than

b ef o re . To th is end

massive worldwide consulta tion and m

keting

e x er c is e w as

under taken whi

wouldask justone question: Do ournorm

Spar 72; applied to the rearspar this mo

fication was carried out on all the aircra

whether

c r ac ks h a d b e en detected

or

n

FR N E

retention cablefrom

the

undercarriage and

the reprofiling of deflectors to accommo-

datethe changed tyreprofiles. A modifica

tion was alsorequired to

the

anti-skid pro

toc ol s t o t ak e note

of

the changed

mainwheel tyres

and

a f lat- ty r e

detector

s ys tem w as a ls o r e qu ire d .

This

detection

s ys tem w as d e fin ed as a

NOGO

item

s ho ul d i t f ai l i n o pe ra t io n.

One

further

change w as ins isted u p on in

the

aircraft s

operating procedures concerning the oper

ation ofthe

brake-cooling fans which were

to b e s w itc he d o f f d u r in g the take-off and

the landing phase. While both Concorde

fleetswere safely in

their

hangars

the

oppor

tu n ity w as a ls o ta ke n to incorporate Mod

With i tsnose still drooped ir France Concorde F BVFA speedspast the camera; it hassincebeen

deliveredto theSmithsonianInstitutein Washington DC Bernard Chares

Wearingthe ChathamDockyardflag on itsfin BA ConcordeG BOAC roarsofffrom Heathrow its undercarriage

units retracting quickly.

BBA

Colecton

Airways decided

that

its restart

date

would

beslightly earlier inOctober.

The

mandatory modifications required

toallow

Concorde

back into

the

air includ

ed the fitting of the Kev1ar linings

of

Michelin Near Zero Growth Tyres instead

of

the normal type and

the

protectionand

reinforcement of the hydraulic pipelines

and electrical looms. Each of the mats was

saturated with Viton a waterproof sealant

developed specifically for Kevlar.

The

new

eyre w as m a de f ro m c o mp o site m a te r ia ls

that

d e fla te in s u c h a

manner

as to protect

other parts

of

the undercarriage. Secondary

modifications also declared

as

mandatory

included removal

o f t he

water-deflection

and i ts F r en ch e qu i va le nt t he DGAC

undertooka thorough

r v w

of the

modifi

cations proposed

by

the manufacturers.

On

5 September

2 1 the

authorities jointly

issued a mandatory airworthiness directive

that

allowedeach Concorde toreturn toser

vi e

and regain itsCertificate

of

Airworthi

ness as each completed the modification

process independent inspection and sign

ing off.

With the

paperworktrail beingcom

p lete d e a c h a irline m ad e p lan s to restart

supersonic commercial flying. Air France

o p te d f o r a r e sta rt in Novemberand British

British

airways

both subsonic

and

supersonic speeds

the

Concorde

turned back

and

landed

at

RAF

Brize Norton A s er ie s of intensive post

flight inspections were concluded success

fully

The

aircraft left three d ay s la te r f or

another verification flight after which it

landed backat Heathrow.

During

the

following August and Sep

tember the final piecesof information need

ed

to

return

Concorde to

revenue-earning

servicewereappearing. BothAir France and

British Airways crewswere taking refresher

courses in the

simulator while

the CAA

G · . i . ~

j-

trials

at Heathrowon

4 July.

On

17

July

the

same

machine

left

on

itsmuch anticipated

testflight. Aboard for this momentous flight

were Capt Jock Reid acting

as

an observer

on

behalf of

the

ivil Aviation Authority

and

Capt

Mike Bannister the senior Con-

cordepilot

for

BritishAirways.

The

purpose

of the

flight was to s imu late a c o mp le te

tr a ns a tla ntic f lig ht to s ee h o w the n e w lin

ers and th e ir w eig ht w ou ld a ff ec t the air

craft s behaviour and trim. Itwasalsoimpor

tant to s e e h o w w ell the fuel acted as a heat

sink. Having flown out over the Atlantic at

With i tsvisor fully retracted BAConcordeAlpha Echotaxiestowardsthe runway atHeathrow. It re entered

servicein September 2001 alongside Alpha Delta. BBA Colecton

Thisalmost head on view shows graphicallythevisorand itslocationwhen retracted.BA Concorde

G BOAF would be the first post crashmodifiedaircraftto re enterservice in July

2001 BBA

Colecton

160

161



DEATH

N

IS STER

AF

Concorde

F-BVFC flies

pastthecamera on its

way

to the USA FoxtrotCharlie subsequentlywent to i ts

Toulouse birthplace

for

display

B B A C ol ec ton

i tems were covered in

protective

plastic

coverings, each identified by t he Con

corde logo baggage tag.

At

each destina

tion

the

baggage was pushed through cus

toms to expedite formalities. As Concorde

passengers had paid overthe oddsfor their

tickets

they

were granted yet

other

privi

leges.

These

includedexclusive lounges

at

each destination airport

that

at Charles

deGaulle being the airside l Espace lounge

in

Terminal

2A where passengers were

granted a full-length view of their aircraft

and direct access to it. Passenger transfer

wasalso expedited

at

both Paris and New

York; at the fonner a courtesy taxi service

was offered and at the la tte r a limousine

was provided.

Althoughthe fares charged

by Air

France

to its Concorde passengers might seem

E T II N

IS STER

between Par is and New York, although

they had to travel together over both legs.

Before relaunching their Concorde ser

vice, Air France released some interesting

statistics

conceming

their passenger break

down: two-thirds travelled on business, of

whom 80 per cent were male.

The

clientele

by nat ion inc luded 50 per

cent

from the

USA while of the remainder 48 per cent

were French.

Other

facts released included

the information that most Concorde pas

sengers

flew

on the aircraft a minimum

of

four times a year, anda substantial number

travelledalmost monthly.

Other

benefitsfor

Air France passengers include a frequent

flyer programme which allowed passengers

to accrue credits for each supersonic flight;

togaina free round-tripConcorde ticket a

passenger needed to amass 160,000 miles.

ailframes through a complete rebu

Dur ing th is per iod i t

was

estimate

each Concorde would complete

8,500supersonic cycles. While taki

in

the modification development p

British Airways would also undert

investigationinto extending theirfle

to

complete

at

least 10,500cycles. H

programme been done, the airline e

ed that Concorde would retire be

2015 and 2018, by whichtime the air

would beforty or more years old. Alt

these p lans in

the

e nd c ame t o n

British Airways was hoping that a

fac tu re r o r conso r tium would prod

oncorde replacement. But on 10

3 Air France and BritishAirways

a joint statement that they would d

tinue Concorde operationsduring th

French

Cuisine

in

the Skies

To celebrate the

return

of the Air FranceConcorde fleet to

service.the

airline

engaged

a wel-known

chef

pus Ph i p p e Faure-Brae world sommeler champion

of

1992 to

create

something extra special.

Their creaton

covered two distinct menus one for AF002 the

flight

from

New

York

and onef or AF001 the

Pars departure.

The

New

York menubegan with champagne

and

cavar this beng folowed

by

a

choice

of hors

d oeuvre

consistng of lobster with

baby vegetables or

pate de foie

gras in port aspic bothbe ng

accompanied by

fresh

garden salad.

The

man courses offered included panned tenderloin steak served

with

celery

puree pus

eggplant

ratatouillewith oyster mushroomsand

o l v e o i ;

the alter

natve was

turban

of

soe garnished

with

blackolve puree

with vegetable

confit and

cheese

raviol.

both served

with a

medley

of

vegetables. Passengers

were

then

offered

a selecton of

fne

cheeses

and

a fresh fruit platter of

melons

mangoes and strawber

res. Shoud t here be a smal

spot

requirng further

nourshment

thecabin crew coud

offer

chocolate

eclairs

strawberry andcoconut

tartlet

or ava ni a macaroon.

As

the

departure

f rom Pars wasscheduled t o

arrve

at

breakfasttme

in

New

York

the

menu

was

adjusted

accordingly. For openers. passengers

were

served

petals

of

mango and kiwi fruit

garnished

with red fruits. Ths would

be

folowed

by

a

choice

of

hot orcod dishes whichfeatured t hechef s

special;

this comprsed scrambled eggs

with

truffles

and

me da lo n s o fMa in e lo bster served

with

creamed white morels. To

caterfor vegetarans

therewas

ahotpotof a tmbaleof

polenta

with a

medley

of

sprng

vegetables.

There

wasalso

a

gourmet

platter

of f oie

grasmarbled with truffles gar

nished with Bordeaux-nfusedaspic. A fnal mea offered was a seafood platter con

sisting oflayered

monkfsh truffle

and chanterele frcassee served with sauteed kng

prawns seasoned with paprka.

Supportng

t he m a n m e a

were a selecton of

French

regional

cheeses

and raspberry

tart. ganache-fi ed

gateauor

va ni a

macaroon.

Asthe menu was intended

as

a

gourmets

delght the wine list

was

intended tocom

plment

it.

ThusfromNovember 2 to January 2002the list

consisted

of Champagne

Cuvee Specale:Champagne Dom Pergnon1993 BourgogneBlanc Meursault 1er Cru

1996Laboure Ro Bourgogne Rouge

Nuits

Saint Georges

Les

Porets 1993

Antonin

Rode Bordeaux Rouge

Pomerol1996

Chateau

La

Crox Du Casse and Bordeaux Blanc

Liquoreux Sauternes

1er Grand Cru Casse 1994Chateau Reussec.

The

list from

Feb

ruary 2002 t o

March

2002

consisted

of Champagne Curvee

Speciale Krug

Grande

Cuvee. Bourgogne Blanc Chabls Grand Cru Les Clos 1997 Simonnet-Febvre Bour

gogne Rouge Vonay

1

er Cru Les

Tai epieds

1996 Bouchard Pere et F s. Bordeaux

Rouge Paui ac

Grand

Cru

Casse

Chateau

Ba ta ie y

1996

and

Bordeaux Blanc

Liquoreux Sauternes

1er Grand

Cru

Casse 1994Chateau Reussec.

Subsequent

wine

lists

consisted of

avariety

of

these wines and

contnued

until the Air

France

Concorde

fleet was withdrawn from service.

AF Concorde F·BVFF pictured justaftertake off from Paris This machinewas notgiventhe post crash

modifications andits fateis uncertain

BBA Colecton

oncorde passengers want

the

aircraft to

re tu rn to service and, even more impor

tantly,wouldthey wish to fly in it? Fortu

nately for the airlines

the

passengersvot ed

yes, and so

on

7

November

2001

the

two

despatched a Concorde each ostensibly

on

a

routine

flight, from

Charlesde Gaulle

and Heathrow. For Air France, getting

oncordebackinto the air and backas the

acknowledged leader o f t h e fleet was laid

down in a press release runningto fourteen

A4

pages in

October

2001; consisting

of

four sections, the press statement covered

the p lan to p resent Concorde to its pas

sengers,

the

revised training given to

the

flight

and thecab in

crew,

in-depth techni

cal modification assessments, and several

annexes coveringrelated matters. Much

of

the

information covered

the

bare facts,

although some were trumpeted more than

o the rs, such as pointing out

that

an AF

Concorde was

the

first aircraft

of

the day

from Europe to land in

the USA.

Flight

departure from Cha rl es d e Gau ll e o n its

scheduled service

toNew

York would sub

sequently be

at

10:30 instead

of 11

:OOhr

Thischangeenabled the aircraft to land at

JFK Airport at 8:20hr local time and thus

passengers would have more time to catch

internal flight

connections

plus

there

was

the added advantage in the reduction of

the previous long wai t

at

customs and

immigration.

The

re tu rn f ligh t lef t New

York

at 8:00hr

local

t ime and

was

sched·

uled to land at Paris at 17:45hr local

time; thisallowed passengers to depart on

162

prebooked flights to

at

least sixty major

cities within Europe.

Unlike other airline passengers, those

boarding Concorde wereallowed

to

choose

their

own seats, while

other

complimenta

ry and pre feren tia l services were a lso

offered, such

as

hotel booking, car rentals

and office and conference space

at

several

airports or centres. To speed theConcorde

passenger through to his or he r seat, there

were dedicated check-in desks at the

French and

the

American airports; this

allowed the passenger to check in 45min

before departure, instead of undergoing the

normal, interminable wait. Added to this,

experienced staffassisted

the

passenger in

any way possible, Baggage was also given

the special Concorde treatment; thus the

steep, the pricedid include the flight to Paris

from airports

within

Europe.

The

fares

charged at theAir France relaunch includ

ed a r ou nd t ri p Paris-New York-Paris for

8 000

euros/£5,509/ 8,621,

although

this

dropped to 6 600 euros/£4 545/ 7 I l3 if

the ticket were purchased four days before

departure.

Other

fares included travelling

one

way

in Concorde

with a return in first

c la ss subsonic for 9 280 euros/£6,390/

10,000 , whi lea s imi lar t r ip wi th a retu rn

in business class cost 8,274 euros/£5,697/

8,916. Asa bonus,a companion fare of 50

per

cent

of the original, full fare was avail·

able for anyoneaccompanying a passenger

travelling

on

a round-trip

Concorde ticket

Optimism

Dashed

In comple te contrast to the receptions

given t o t he aircraft in earlier years, the

simultaneous landings in

New

York were

greeted with tumultuous welcomes,

both

airlines deeming the flights successful.

A ft er r et ur ni ng t o t he ir n orma l f li gh t

schedule, the Concorde fleets settled back

in to thei r s tandard

pattern of operation.

Once the aircraft were flyingagain, the air

lines issued a jo in t s tatemen t that given

steady usage,

the

fleetswould remainin ser

viceuntil 2010, at which point it wouldbe

decided whether to replace Concorde with

acompletelynew buildtypeorpu t selected

163

The

statement concentrated upon th

son for the aircraft s retirement: the r

tion in passenger numbers since Con

had returned to service accompani

increasingcosts, which

meantthat th

was no longer economically viable

Francewas the first to withdraw Con

from revenue service inJune.

Before then however, British Ai

flew

the

usual Barbados flights, begi

on 26 July a nd e nd in g o n 3 0 Augu

well as the normaldaily runs to New

Ifthis were

not

enough, a final trip t

Royal

International AirTattoo

wasu

taken during 19-20 July, where many

an emot iona l last farewell t o t he



DEATH AND DISASTER

CHAPTER NINE

into th utur

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From airframe 217 theConcordeproductionstandardwas scheduledto switch over

to the B designshown here, Unfortunately, manufacture stoppedat airframe

216

BBA Colecton

Really

th e

End?

Now that

Concorde

has finally reti red

from commercial service, wil l this be

the

e nd o f

supersonic fl ight for

transporting

passengers

around t he

globe)

The

first

attempt

to replace

or

extend

Concorde

was by

t he A nglo-French con

sortium.

Having

run

the

full

gam ut of

pro

totypes,

p r ep r od u ct io n a n d p r od uc t io n

m achi nes t o

deliver

no

more

than

twenty

airframes,

t h e n e x t

twoscheduled produc

tion machines

were identifiedas airframes

217

and

218.

These

were destined

to

be designated as

B

Concordes.

Changes

from

the

first

production

version included

extended

wingtip

outer

panels

and

leading-edge

flaps for

bet ter handli ng

at

lower speeds.

The

flaps were designed

to

beselectable in

three

positions: in

the

fully-up position

the

airframe was cleared for supersonic flight;

in

the

mid position

the

flaps

catered

for

subsonic cruising

and

the

initial

approach

to

an

airfield; in

the

fully-down position

the

flaps would be used only

during

take

off

and

landing.

This

version

never

ent ered product ion and

thus

No.

216 was

the

final airframe.

A l though t he

majority

o f t he

airlines

that

had expressed interest later cancelled

their options, leaving just British Airways

and

Air

France to fly

t he C oncorde

flag, a

further

contract

nearly came to frui tion.

This

was

the

interest expressed

by

Federal

Express for freight carrying.

Three

plus

crews were requi red from BA; however ,

contract

wrangles eventually ki lied

the

entire

deal.

This

left

the

handful

of

remain

ingwhite-tail Concordes lookingfor useful

employment

before their final acquisition

b y B A and

Air

France.

One

idea was to

use

at

least

one as

a supersonic flying test bed.

The

projected changes were regarded

as

minimal;

the

greatest

change

was

the

installation

of

canard wings

o n t h e

forward

fuselage for improved stabi li ty while

an

external

load was beingcarried

on

a pylon

under

the

fuselage.

This

was

i ntended t o

carry

e it he r a n

engine or

other

stores,

Afitting closing photograph forthis chapter isthat

of

F BTSC

blasting

away

fromthecamera

with

all

four burners lit. BBA Colecton

delta. Events

planned

for

the

BA

Con

corde fleet before

retirement

included a

visi t to

Toronto

on

1 October,

to

be fol

lowedby visits

to

Boston

on

8

O ct oberand

Washington

Dulles

on

14 October.

Once

the

North

American

t rip had

been com

pleted

one

aircraft was be used for a series

of

farewell flights around Britain

during

the

period

20-24 October taking

in Birm

ingham, Cardiff, Manchester, Belfast and

Edinburgh,

On

24

October

a Brit ish Air

ways

Concorde

landed

at H eathrow

after

returning

from

New

York,

shut dow n

its

engines,

a n d a n

eradrew

to

a close.

In a

not

unsurprising move, Sir Richard

Branson,founder

of

Virgin Atlantic, offered

to purchase

the

five remaining BA aircraft

for£5 million to

continue

operations,a mas

sive increase from

the

original offer

of

just

£5

However, his approaches were quickly

rebuffed by

the

chairman

of

BA,Lord Mar

shal l, who stated

that

Airbus Industries/

EADSwould be

ending

technical

support

allegedly

at

the

behest

of

British

Airways

inlate 2003, although AirFrancewerecited

as

t he m or e

likely

candidate

for

such

a

move.

The

withdrawal

of

technical aid

and

its

attendant

engineeringauthority support

would require

any

new

operat or t o

reap

ply for type

certification

with itsmassive

expense and

the

possibility

of

failure; this

c.Iifficulty

would becompounded

by

the

need

to

find

an engi neeri ngaut horit y and

sup

port organi zat i on. A l t hough t he chances

of

Virgin

Atlantic

taking

over

Concorde

operations

were looking increasingly slim,

Branson had

been

in

touch

with

the

BA

board

concerni ngt he

formation

of

a char

itable trustwhosesole

concern

would be

to

keep

one

or

two

of

these aircraft in semi

commercial service. To reinforce its

com

mitment

t o C o nc o r de

Virgin

Atlantic

promised to

donate

£1 million to

st art t he

ball rolling.

There

werestill problems

to

be

resolved

with

this plan,

although

British

Airwayshad expressed

an

interest in keep

ing

one airframe semi-active

for special

occas ions . However , a ll t hi s

ca me to

naught w hen

BA decided

to

dispose

o f t h e

entire

fleet

to

selected museums

around

the

world, thus

ending

any

speculation

about t he

future

of Concorde.

Disposalof the Air France and theBritish Airways Concorde Fleet

Air

France announced the disposal details for its Con the

major

cities.

Thus

on

20

October

2003

Birmingham

corde

fleet

before British

Airways.

On 12 June 2003 saw the famous delta G BoAC whilethe

following day

BVFA was f l own to Washington for display in the

Smith

Belfast was the venue with G BoAE visiting.

On

22

sonianMuseum.F BVFC

was

returned to its birthplace of October

Manchester was

visited b y G BoA G while

Toulouse

on

27 June

while F BVFB was promised

to the Cardiff International

followed

the

next day seeing

G

Auto und

Technik Museum at Sinsheim

Germany upon

BoAE touching down.

The final visit

was

made to

Edin

payment of

a

symbolic

Euro. Thefinal flyable aircraft

burgh

on 24 October by G BoAG. Just

prior

to 16:00

BTSD was

despatched to the museum

at

Le

Bourget

dur hours that afternoon the final

three

Concorde flights

ing

June

t o jo in the prototype F VVTSS The fate of the

were sighted inbound

to London Heathrow.

In

succes

final aircraft F BVFF is undecided although

as anunmod

sion G BoAF G BoAE and G BoAG

touched

down. At

ified airframe i t is l ike ly to

be

a

candidate

for scrapping. 16:05 hours on 24 October 2003

British

Airways

became

The

aircraftthat facedthe mostcomplicated journey just another airline.

The

Americas were not ignored

was F BVFB

which landed at Karlsruhe Baden Baden

either

as

earlierthat month

Toronto

Boston

andWash

on

24 June 2003.

However this

was

notthe

end

of

its ington

Dulles were graced

by the elegant

delta.

journey and

a

certain

amount of dismantling was Prior

to

the final flights

of

the BA Concordefleet

there

required so that the aircraft could continue first by was much speculation about its final disposal. There

ship then

by road

to Sinsheim. Even with the

outer was

talk about retaining onefor special flightsand air

wing panels removed

the roads

needed

modification to displays. However

financial realities

meant

that such a

road

signs

and

the

like

to allowthe

aircraft through.

The

plan was soon

scrapped

andthe

dispersal

plan was put

greatest difficulty that faced the museum was how to

into

place.

The

first aircraft to leave Heathrow was G

get

the

aircraft

off

its transportation ship. This

was

BOAC whichlanded

at

Manchesteron 31 October while

solved

by

theuse of

a

pair of

special cranes. Foxtrot G BoAG was

flown acrossthe Atlanticto

Seattle

for dis

Bravo finally

arrived

on

18

July

2003. play in

the

Museum of

Flight on 5 November.

On 10

There is one furthertwist in the Air FranceConcorde November G BoAD was

flowninto

JFK

Airport

for even

tale concerning

aircraft

F BVFC. I t was impounded on tual displayon

a

bargealongside the retiredcarrierUSS

the orders of

Judge

Christophe

Regnard

soon

after ntrepid A

weeklaterG BoAE

was

delivered

by

Captain

landing at Toulouse.

The reason

was an attempt

to

dis

Mike Bannister to

Grantley Adams

Airport in

the

prove the

thoroughly researched

BEA

crash rep or t and Bah amas .

The

final remaining flyable

Concorde

G BoAF

attempt

to

blame the accident on the absence of the landed at Filtonon 26 Novemberthis beingthe

last

ever

spacer

in

the left hand bogie. Findings of

a different Concorde

flight.

Of

the three remaining machines G

cause would

possibly

exonerate thetyre

manufacturer

BOAAis due

to goto the

Museum

ofFlight.

East

Fortune

Goodyear from legal responsibility. Scotland in

sectionswhere

itwill

be reassembled

while

Although Air

France

retired their Concordefleet with G Bo A B i s

slated

for display at Heathrow. The one

little fanfare British Airways decided

that

such

a

singu remainingaircraft

G BBGD

is scheduled to leave Filton

larevent

should

bemarked

with

more

ceremony. To this where it hasbeen used as

a spares

source for eventual

end

a

tour

of Britain

was organized that

encompassed

display at BrooklandsAir Museum.

764

765



SST INTOT

FUTURE

SST INTOTHE FUTURE

New American

Interest

ATSF3

989

In

t he USA, cance ll at ion of t he

in

nous

SST

programme left

the

particip

c ompani es i n a

state of

limbo.

H

gained much data t h roughout t he

d

opment

programme

and

learned ho

to

apply it,

interest

in

an American

still lingered, even though no funds

available

to

pursue

the concept

furth

wou ld fal l to

NASA

to

pick up

the

baton

and

take i t fur the r as part o

Superson ic C ru ise Resea rch Pro

whi ch h ad s ta rt ed l if e as

the Adv

Supersonic Technology Program.

N ot e t he a ba n do nm en t o f

super

transport

in

order to

spare Congress

blushes.

This

project began in 197

ended in 1981 with

an

annual bud

between 12.5

and

17.2 million

£8

mill ion ) . In this per iod

NASA

dre

conclusion

that

there would be an

98

ATSF

wing layout

and mount ed

four engines.

Only

the ATSF

I

retained the

conceptof

engines

in nacelles ina similar

manner

to

Concorde. The other

two designs placed

the

engines

in

separate

pods

under

the

wings.

Changes

were a lso made

t o t he

engines

themselves:

gone

would be

the

pollution-generating Olympus

engines

to

be replaced by more efficient powerplants

t hat no t

onlyburned fuel moreefficiently

but

greatly reduced

the pol lut ion output .

Three

distinct

types

of

powerplanthave

been

under investigation by

the

Anglo

Frenchconsortium and

its

counterparts

in

the

USA,

all substantially different from

the

preceding Rolls-Royce Olympus and

its SNECMA

thrust

augmenter, as

the

studies

concentrated on

a

turbine

bypass

turbojet,

the

double bypass turbofan

and

t he t an de m

bypass, a proof-of-concept

engine

offering

both

a h ig h

and

a low

bypass mode.

978

ATSF

969

CONCORDE

1ERVOL

FIRST FLIGHT

;

EVOLUTION DES CONFIGURATIONS ETUDIEES

AEROSPATIALE ENTRE 1979-1989

HISTORYO CONFIGURATION STUDIES

T

AEROSPATIALE 1979-1989

Althoughattr ibuted to Aerospatiale.this diagramof projectedConcordereplacementshasbenefited greatly

from inputby British Aerospace.

Colecton

come as no

surprise

thatboth

were heavily

involved in

the development

of

a replace

ment

for Concorde. Although

Concorde

lB had seemed a distinctpossibility, in real

ity it was

no

more

than

a minor upgrade

of

the original. Therefore Airbus began to

des ign a new

SST

while drawing

o n t he

advances in

the

understanding

of

aerody

namic

behaviour gained since

Concorde

was designed.Added to this was

the

ability

to model

by

computernot

only

the

aircraft

designs themselves,

but

their behaviour in

flight before

either

models

or

prototypes

were built.All

the

designs were

much

larg

er

than

Concorde and

featured

engines

mounted

in a var iety

of

positions.

These

studies ran until 1989 before

the

funding

wasscaledback and

the

project

puton

hold,

although

the

studies

continued.

Before

being

scaled back, Airbus had prepared

three

designs

known

as

the ATSF 1,2 and

3 . All were based around a double -del ta

ABOVE: One ofthe first

proposalssuggested

forConcorde included

modifyingsomeof the

thensparewhitetails

foruse inthe high speed

freight role on behalf

of Federal Express.

Colecton

LEn: This diagram

il lustratesthecurrent

thinking atAirbusIndus-

tr ieconcerning areplace-

mentfor Concorde.

Whetherthis isfeasible

remainsto be seen.

Colecton

REAR

ELECTRONICS

O ~ O O ~ ~

SNAPHOOKS

ELECTRONICRACK

PROTECTIVE COVERS

REAR STREsseD

BULKHE D ACCESSDOOR

15.5FT

in

the United

Kingdom the British Air

craft Corporation became part

of

British

Aerospace, laterrenamedBritish Aerospace

Systems. In F ra nc e S ud Avi at io n h ad

evolved into Aerospatiale, before growing

into Airbus Industrie. Both organizations

wereheavilyinvolved in

the

design, manu

facture and production

of

numerous ver

sions

ofthe

Airbusrange and thus itshould

CABINLIGHTS

PITCH8FT

of

the

supersonic transport was

not

com

pletely dead. The situation in

theUSA

was

similar,while in Russia

the

indigenousaero

spaceindustry managed to resurrectits

SST

programme,al beit only briefly,

at the

behest

of NASA

and its partners

s Chapter 7

since

there was

no

funding available from

the

Russian

government

to

continue

any

flyingor development.

126FT

CABIN

SMOKE

DETECTORS

S

RESTRESSEO FlOOR

MOUNT INGPOINTS FORWARD

UNOERFLOOR

N OS E GE AR F RE IG HT H OL D

EMERGENCY

OPERATION

INDICATOR

C RRY ON

TOilET

RELOCATION

R\

UNDERC RRI GE

EMERGENCY

OPERATION

theconcept

slightlyf urther forward,

here were

sl

ight rumblings from

the M

in

stry

of

Defence concerning a heavily mod

fied version

of the Concorde

asa replace

ent

for

the

ageing Vulcan

B 2

bomber;

his wou ld have been known ,

not

unsur

risingly, as

the

Vulcan B.3.

Noneof

theseevermatured. But

the

pop

larity

ofCon

corde

meant

that the

concept

766

767



SST INTOTH UTUR

SST

INTO

TH

UTUR

. :;;

available to

the

development team

werealso tasked

wi thcreatingmathem

models of thesematerials in order to

their useful servi e life and to plan m

ical trials

of

structuralsections,which

simulate long-term flight conditio

effects of fatigue.

It was during this phase

that

Boei

gested that

the

a i rl ine market wa

Pratt Whitney inconcert with General Electric were eventuallyto pooltheirknow

andresourcesto create themixed flow engine portrayedhere. swith many SST pr

itscontinued developmentwas inabeyance.

BB Colecton

standinghightemperatures and their associ

ated manufacturing techniques. The mate

rials under investigation included interme

diate temperature aluminium, aluminium/

lithium alloys, high temperature titanium

alloys, hightemperaturepolymers and com

posites, highertemperaturepolymers,metal

matrix composites and carbon/carboncom

posites. As high-powercomputers were now

all

ofwhich

wouldbe neededforsuchexot

ic disciplines

as

ceramics, intermetallicand

meta l mat r ix composi tes , a ll n eeded to

withstand

the

great temperatures

at

the

core of any engine . Ai rf r ame

contracts

were handed out to Boeing, Lockheed and

McDonnell Douglas, their role also being

to investigate the development and appli

ca ti on of

new materials capable

of

with-

ABOVE

Thisi l lustratesthe second stabthe USAmade atcreatingits

own SST

Much advanced development

work on

airframestructures andengines hadbeen

accomplished beforethe programme was cancelled.

BB

Colecton

NASA s

Plans

To further the development aims o f t he

HSR

programme NASA issued contractsto

cover specific areas

of

investigation.

The

most important of these went to General

Electric and Pratt Whitney,whoacted in

concert with

the

Lewis Center, under the

title

o f t h e

Enabling Propulsion Materials

Program. Their expertise was neededin the

fields of fibre analysis, fabrication of com

posites and structural analysis techniques,

reversed this decision and a recommended

restoration

o f t he

technology budget was

pushed through. Following this decision

NASA felt that enoughhad been achieved

for them to issue development contracts to

Boe ing and McDonne ll Douglas for the

design

of

a second-gene ra tion SST, to be

called the High Speed

ivil

Transport

HSCT .Three

years laterNASA upgrad

ed the programme and renamed it

the

High

Speed Research Program.

This

was seen as

an essential first buildingblock in the subse

quent development

of

a joint industry/

government high-speed ivil transport.

The

purpose

o f t he

exe rc ise was a imed more

towards environmental standards develop

ment, not to the furtherance of technology,

much o f whi ch was a lr ea dy c om in g t o

fruition. The threekey

environmental

areas

undergoing assessment

as

part of t he High

Speed Research HSR programme includ

ed the depletion

of

the ozonelayer by engine

exhaust emissions, airportand surrounding

community a rea noise , and the e ffec ts of

sonicboom. This last point required further

in-depth analysis since itscompulsory con

finement t o t he subsonic regime overland

would reduce a newaircraft s

economic vi -

bility.Within

NASA

fourseparate divisions

were involved: the Langley Research Cen-

ter in Virginia, the Lewis Flight

Center

in

Ohio,the

Dryden FlightResearch

Centerat

Edwards AFBand the Ames ResearchCen-

ter in California. Langley was charged with

the management of

the

entire programme,

as well as development work

on

aerody

namics, airframe materials and structures,

flight deck ergonomics plus aitframe/sys

tems integration. The Lewis

Center

(later

renamed

Glenn

was responsiblefor engine

and propulsion systems, and Ames and Dry

den wereresponsible forcovering any flight

test requirements. Joining the four

NASA

divisionswere teams from Boeing Aircraft,

McDonnell Douglas, Honeywell, General

Electricand Pratt Whitney.

-

-

Thesethreetypesof engine were

investigated by GeneralElectric and

Pratt Whitneyforthe new generation

SST

being sponsored by NASA.

BB Colecton

-

toge the r to inves tiga te a

j oi n t SST

pro

gramme, withNASA enteringduring 1980

to further the developmentof all possible

and potential technologies. All the partners

eventually agreed

that

a viable second-gen

eration

SST

cou ld be in service by 1990.

The joiningtogetherofMcDonnell Douglas

with British Aerospace was a continuation

of

an earliercollaboration

that

had involved

Rolls-Royce in

an

investigation

of

noise

reducinge ngine exhausts.The addition of a

government agency would end fairlyquick

ly since the administration

of

President

Reagan felt

that

therewould be few benefits

forthcoming and t hat t he funding could be

betterusedelsewhere. As ever in American

politics, persuasion and political muscle

BYPASSFLOW

CORE FLOW

SECONDARY

EXHAUST DUCT

HIGH BYPASS

VALVE

TANDEM FANCONCEPT

HIGH-BYPASS MODE

REMOTE

FRONTFAN

TURBINE-BYPASS

TURBOJET ENGINE

-

::::: =S

I

p ~

DOUBLE-BYPASS

TURBOFAN ENGINE

FIRSTBYPASS

SECOND BYPASS AIR .........

L

b:=:t

~ ~ ~

-

BYPASS

rde market

for

at

least

300

SSTs,

ially if t he US airlines could be per

t o t akea t leasthalf. While NASA

spearheading

the

SST

concept

on

lf of

government

the

aircraft manu

turers were also researching

their

own

ideas. Boeing came up w it h a project

around a blended-wing/fuselage

which derived itspropulsion from

le cycle engines,

and

Douglas

con-

n tr at ed on an aircraft based around a

wing, an idea that Lockheed were

so studying closely, although in

their

the

engineswere podded

and mount-

above and below the wing.

In the closing months of 1978 British

pace and McDonnell Douglas joined

168

169



SST

INTOTH

FUTURE

SST I NT O

TH UTUR

oughpowerful computers canmodelmuch ofa projectedaircraft s behaviour it is

alto want to seethe resultsin reali ty. As currenttechniques now enable wind-

be

producedmore cheaply more

quickly

and moreaccurately

it

is

ibleto producechanges

within

days. CourtesyNASA

of

taking on an

economically

and environmentally acceptable

ersonic transport. However,

getting

e two aspects

to

ge l i n

one

airframe

ld be

the

difficult part,

and

therefore

manufacturers suggested a

joint

indus

working party to pushdevelop

further. The topics that cou ld be

with most easily included low-emis

n engines, noise suppressors, variable

high temperaturecom-

es, high-lift devices and t hei r

AFCS

ems, all

of which

werequickly achiev

le. Longer-term goals

o n w hi ch

some

earch had been

done

included

advance

i ne and

airframe

concepts laminar

control

improved

high temperature

and a c ompl et el y n ew i dea

thermal-stability fuels.

S in ce much

of

this technology was

ady well advanced,

NASA

decided to

ing forward Phase 2

of the H SR

pro

amme, which had been penci lled in for

6. But by 1993,

the

environment-based

P ha se 1 h ad b ee n c ompl et ed a nd

so the

technology phase

was

begun.

This was

a

joint

ventureand required

that

the wording

needed togain

the

appropriate Federal fund

ingplayed moreupon the positives

thanthe

negatives, thus much

was

made

of t he

eco

nomic benefits,

the

number

of

highly-paid

jobs

that

would becreatedand the improve

ment

in

the

industrial strength

of th e

nation. However,

the

slightly negative side

was

the

cost, estimated

at

4.5 billion,

which would beneeded before

the

aviation

industrycould

even

begin construction and

certification. As this was

an

era

of

political

and economic uncertainty, it was suggested

that

the

government

should cover most

of

the

development costs since the manufac

turers felt unable to contributeany funding

until

t he H SCT

wascloser to reality. It was

also stressed

that

as much

of t he

proposed

developments were high-risk, the manufac

turersand their subcontractors would have

to waitup to fifteenyearsbefore gainingany

financial reward for

their

efforts.

Although

Phase1

had been completed

relatively easily, it was recognized

that

the

three a reas p rimari ly involved in Phase 2

wou ld involve g reat r isk and d if ficu lty.

These

were ailframe technology, propulsion

and the ergonomics

of t he

flight deck.

The

airframe part was intended to bui ld upon

already available aerodynamic technolo

gies,

although

the goa ls were s t ringent in

theiroutline,these beinga33 per

cent

range

increasecoupled to a 50 per

cent

reduction

in

the

noise footprint

of

any new aircraft.

Alliedto

the

aerodynamics was thedesire to

develop

materials

and construction meth-

ods

that

could reduce

the

aircraft's basic

we ight by up to

40

per

cent even though

there

was still a

requirement

for

the

s tr uc - ,

tures to beable to withstand temperatures

up

to IS0°C

with a fatigue life

of

60,000

flying hours.

The

structure

o f a n

airframe

built

to these specifications would follow

many earlier ideas, based around compos

ite frames

and

ribs to whi ch wou ld b e

attached honeycomb

compositepanelling.

At t he poi n ts of grea t

hea t , such as

the

nose,

intake

lips

and

leading edges,

the

structure would be

titanium honeycomb-

based. Ina

change

fromprevious concepts

only formed

honeycomb

panels would be

used in

the manufactureof theouter

wing

panels, fin tip

and

rudder.

Unlike

Britain,

which

has only

one

pri

mary enginebuilder, thereare severalin

the

USA

and thus any collaboration between

the

major players was unusual. But

both

General Electric

and

Pratt

Whitney

soon

realized

that

to worktogether

on

suchapro

ject

cou ld only benef i t both , even i f

the

home-grown second-generation

SST

failed

to

movebeyond

the

drawing board. During

their collaboration

the

companies investi

gated materials capable

of

withstanding

temperatures up to

3 000°C

and

the

use

of

ceramic matrix and intermetallic compos

i te s in

t he ho tt e r

sections

o f t he

engine,

including

the exhaust

nozzle.

During December 1995 a single design

was chosen to be

the

focus

of

an intensive

technology drive

that

would

concentrate

all those involved in

the

programme for

the

next

three years.

The chosen

design

intend-

ed for use

as the

Technology

Concept

Air

c ra ft was based

on

a

concept

that

had

evolved from

the

earlier Boeingand Dou

glas HSCT designs.

This

would accommo

date 300

passengers, seated in three sepa

rate

compartments

travelling

at

a speed

of

Mac h 2.4 o ve r a d is ta nc e

of

5,000

miles

S,OOOkm . The

initial design

was

carried

out

on computers using extensive

mathematical modelling, followed by

the

wind tunnel testing

of

precision manufac

tured models.

This

kind

of

modelling,it was

postulated,wouldenable

the

design team

to

create

an

aircraft

of

superiorpetformance

to

satisfy

the

most stringent environmental

requirements.

Such concentrat ion

would

also allow

the

developers to narrow their

perspectives, thus as regards

the

engines,

two designs based

on

a modified turbofan

emerged:

the

mixed flow turbofan

and t he

fan on blade. In each case the a im was t o

reduce engine noise

on

take-off

and

land

ing.

This

would be ach ieved by mixing

ambient

air withengine exhaustgases.

This

inturn would lead

on to

researchinto mixer

ejector nozzles, which meant

t ha t t he

mixed flow turbofan was

chosen

as

the

pre

felTed powerplant. The use

of

any

engine

in

b ot h t he

subsonic and

the

supersonic

regime

is

alwaysa source

of

conflict andso

it

is

surprising

that

a mixed powerp lan t

arrangement was

not

investigated;

the

Concorde

designers had looked

at

this idea

but

hadshelved itdue

t o t he

projected air

f rame 's s ize. As

t he A merican

aitframe

wouldhave been larger, itwould havebeen

possible to build efficient, subsonic turbo

fans into

the

rear

ofthe

fuselage forusedur

ingtake-off, landing

and

overland cruising,

while

the

turbojets mounted externally

could have

been

used supersonically.

The

LEFr This is

an HSR

testshape

to be run intothe wind tunnel f

testing.Notethe useof tai lplan

althoughin thisinstance theen

areunderthe wingsnot under

tailplanes as inthe early Boe

model. CourtesyNASA

BELOW Thesame aircraftmode

from underneath;notethe eng

mountedto therear ofthe wing

CourtesyNASA

777



SST

INTOTHE FUTURE

SST

INTOTHE FUTURE

ABOVE

NASAproposed the

XVS

eXternalVision System, as a moreadvance

meansof controll ingthe HSR aircraft.This would combine sensors and vis

aidsto replacethe cockpitwindows,the visorandthe droop nose. Remov

thelast

would allow

for

an

increasein payload.

Courtesy NASA

ABOVE

With

an

American dime

forscale purposes, thisis the

laminar-flow wing panel and

its micropores as installed

on theF-16Xltestaircraft.

Courtesy NASA

RIGHT

NASAF-16Xl, 8 8

in flight

with

the micropore

laminar-flowcontrolpanel

installed

on

theleadingedge

ofthe portwing.Although

the tr ialswere successful no

commercial applications have

yet appeared.

Courtesy NASA

through for purposes

of

comparison.

Other

potential hazards

of

flying above 35,000ft

10,700m), and rarely considered, are cos

m ic and sol arradiat ion. A s

the HSCT

was

i ntended t o operate

at

altitudes between

52,000and 70,000ft

l5,900-2l,300m the

hazardfrom

both

types

of

radiationwas mea

surably i ncreased and t hus

the

E-2R was

used

to

gatherdata for analysis.

A lso being exam i ned i n

depth

was

the

possibility

of

making laminar airflowa dis

tinct

reality.

This

version

ofthe

test aircraft

em pl oyed m icroholes i n w ing skins i n

the

a re as m os t s us ce pt ib le t o a ir fl ow t ur bu

lence.

Smoothing

t his t urbulent ai r w ould

r ed uc e s ki n f ri ct io n d ra g w hi ch in t ur n

would reduce operatingcosts sinceless

fuel

w ou ld b e n ee de d. T o t es t a l am in ar w in g

section inaction,

oneofthe

NASA

F-16XL

development

ai rcraft w as fit ted w it h a sec

tion

of

wing

and

flew trialsfrom

the NASA

Dryden Flight Research

Center

at

Edwards

AFB,California.

Whi le t he

more

conventional

SST,

capable

of opera ting

in

t he M ac h 2-3

ai rframe desi gners w ere also l ooki ng

at

new ways

of

doing

things;

one o f t h e

first

to

gain

their

attention

was

that

of

the

visu

al requirements

of

the pilots.

Concorde,

from i ts outset, had

been

beset by restric

tions

when

the

visor was fullyup,

andeven

with

the

bi gger cl ear panel s fi tt ed

to

the

production

aircraft the crew s visi on w as

restricted.

By contrast, NASA a nd t he

manufacturers

had

every

i n te n ti o n o f

eliminating

windscreens entirely.

In thei r

placewould be computer-aided vision sys

t ems w hose result s w oul d be di spl ayed

on

cockpit

screens.

Although

it was

accepted

that

such developments

would

need

ex

t ensi ve t esti ng for accuracy, safety

and

consistency,

the

saving i nw ei ght bydel et

ing

the

nose-droop

mechanism

was

thought

worthwhile.

This

would

have

al lowed for a sl ightl y l onger nose, w hich,

i n t urn, w oul d

have

reduced

the

airframe s

dragcoefficient.

To

t est t his t echnol ogy, t est flying w as

carried out during

1995-97

using a

NASA

B oei ng 737

and

a Westinghouse-owned

BAC-l i l

t est bed confi gured for avionics

test usage.

The

firsttrials involved

external

sensors capable

of detectingother

aircraft

and

major obstacles

o n t he

ground; these

were followed

by

flying approaches

and

l an di ng s w it h a f ul ly -e nc lo se d

cockpit

installedin the passenger

cabinofthe

Boe

ing.

The completion

of

thesetrialswas fol

lowedby

another

sequence

which

also used

the

B oeing, i n w hich

an

external vision

s ys te m, X VS , wa s f it te d

i nt o t he

main

p il ot s p an el . D ur in g t he se f li gh ts r ea l

w orld visual cues w ere compared i n

depth

with

the

display

on

the

X VS panel s.

Although

a few probl em s w ere experi

enced,being rectified as theyoccurred,

the

t ri als w eredeem ed a

complete

success and

convinced

all

the

design teams

that

the

windowless

cockpit

was more

than

feasible.

While

the technicaladvanceswerecom

ing thickand fast, scientific ones were also

happening apace. Special ists i n envi ron

mental studies were gathered from

allover

the

w orld t o devel op computer m odels

of

the

eart h s at mosphere and

the

effects

of

engi ne exhaust s

on

stratospheric ozone.

Although

computer m odel li ng coul d pre

d ic t s om e r es ul ts , r ea l r es ea rc h w as a ls o

needed.

Th is

took

the

form

oftheNASA E-

2R high altitude research aircraft, based

on

the

Lockheed

U-2R

reconnaissance plat

form.

This

long-spanned ailframewas ideal

for high altitude atmospheric samplingand

was also employed in sampling

the

atmos

pherebeforeand after Concordehad passed

ADVANTAGES

SYNTHETIC XVSRANGE OFVISION

LL

AIRFIELDS CAT

III

ADVERSE

WEATHEROPERATING CAPABILITY

UPTO 50 REDUCTION

IN

RESERVE FUEL

AKEOFFGROSS WEIGHTREDUCEDBY15 )

FIXEDNOSE RANGE OFVISION

DISADVANTAGES

1,500-2,000

L S

EXTRASTRUCTURE

AND SYSTEMS

DROOP NOSERANGEOF VISION

OVER20,000LBS INCREASE

IN

~ O W G ,

somediagrams to illustrate why anyfuture SST should have XVS fitted

eadof having to rely on thenormalvisualcuesfor thepilots.

Courtesy NASA

thisinstancethe

HSR

model isbeing used tofl ight-testthe

wing

and

so

the

anes andfin have been removed.

Courtesy NASA

172

173



SST

INTOTH

FUTURE

SST INTO

TH FUTUR

tured landing atthe Zhukovsky DevelopmentCentre nearMoscow isthe Tu 144llflyinglaboratory

rcontractto NASAandinterested

US

aircraft manufacturers.

CourtesyNASA

e, wasbeing investigated, someeffort

also beingmadein researching

the

pos

of a Hyper soni c Nat ional Aero

ce Plane. A similar project (known

as

was also being investigated

by

i tish Aerospace in co-operation with

This

unique machine

was

ded to fly on theedgeof space. evel-

began in 1982and the project

was

sonably well advanced, with a detailed

ine design and mock-up, by t he t ime

British government stopped its funding

the mid-1980s. HOTOL would have

offhorizontally, with a transition to

re r oc ke t p ropu ls ion i n the Mach

speed range, followed

by

an ascent

to orbit . A moderat e r e- entry profi le

reased the thermal loading constraints

HOTOL re tu rn ed via a glide

oach to a landing on normal undercar

e unitson a

conventional

runway.

Redivivus

the

USA

was

pushing ahead

th a high-prof il e development pro

me, the Europeans wereforging ahead

larideas,albeitat a lower level [n

r ch 1989 the two origina l Concorde

nersmet in Toulouse on the

twentieth

versary of the type s first flight to dis

ss a possible collaborat ive project for a

d-generation European SST. Its ini

l costing was estimated at 10 million,

service entry in the early years of the

century. While these discussions were

being undertaken, the potential partners

were inves ti ga ti ng the ir own proje ct s.

Aerospatiale wereengaged upon the Avion

de Transport Supersonique Futur (ATSF),

which was i n tended to c ruis e between

Mach 2 and 2.5. Running parallel to this

programme

was the

Avion a

Grande

Vitesse,a hypersonic transport intended to

ope ra te between Mach 4 and British

Aerospace were investigat ing their own

machine,

known

as the Advanced Super

sonic Transport . Both companies took

their projects to the negotia t ing table in

May 1990, f rom which emerged a joint

declarationco ncerning the second-genera

tion aircraft.This agreement was extended

in Apr il 1994

when

Deutsche Aerospace

joined the partnership. The threepartners

declared their collaborat ive venture to be

the European Supersonic Research Pro

gramme.

The

outlinesketch ofthe aircraft

to replace Concorde

was

a Mach2-capable

aircraft which could carry 250 passengers,

seated

in

three classes, over 6,210 miles

(lO,OOOkm). At this point thepublic rela

tion

people stepped in todeclareoptimisti

cally thatthe potential market for such an

aircraft

was

between 500and 1,000units.

All this talk of European collaboration

seemed to worry the Americans,since they

invited the Europeans to a conference in

NewYorkin May1990. At this wererepre

sentatives from Boeing, McDonnell Dou

glas, Aerospatiale, British Aerospace and

DeutscheAerospace.The outcome

was

the

formationof a

joint

studygroupto createan

international , next-generation SST,

by

774

now named the Supersonic Commercial

Transport. The f irst inklings of i ts work

were unveiled during the September 1990

SBAC show a t Farnborough, when an

announcement was made concerning the

formation of two specialistworking groups:

the first would concern itselfwith the busi

ness practices needed for a collaborat i

project and the second would concentrate

on technical and marketingaspects.

During 1991 the Italian manufacturer

Alenia

Aeronautica,

the

Society of Japan

ese Aerospace Companies and the Tupo

lev Design Bureau joined the consortium.

Three years later, at a European confer

ence, delegatesfrom five ofthe companies

presented an overview i n which Ameri

c an , Eur opea n a nd other technologies

might be co-ordinated

in

a predevelop

ment phase, to be followed

by

a full-scale

development programme to last through

the 1990s.

While

much of this looked promising on

paper, the real progress

was

being made

by

NASA and its partners, who were actually

spendingmoney to push

the

technologyfor

the

HSCT

project. Leading the industry

side were Boeingand McDonnell Douglas,

who were operating under a 400 mill ion

NASA

contract

on theHSR Phase 2 tech

nologies. Honeywellweredealing with the

avionics and flight-deck development. [ t

was estimated

that

thefinal cost to

NASA

would r each 2 bil li on, with indus try s

contributions possibly reaching 4 billion.

The

upshot of this expenditure was that

the development of an actual aircraft was

pencil led in tobegin in 1995,with the first

del iver ie s to be made in 2001. To speed

some of the technologies already available,

NASA hired aTupolevTu-144Dairliner

as

a fly ing t es t bed . By August 1997 the

NASA

scientific teams were reporting that

the

critical, high-risk technologies were

coming close to fruitionand therefore that

the

HSR

programme should be progressed

to

its conclusion. In mid September 1998a

refocusing of t he H SR programme was

undertaken by

NASA

and its partners, in

that they would concentrate upon super

sonic research instead of pushing on with

technologies that would lead toa prototype

aircraft.

The

change was brought about by

the realization that the originaltechnolog

icaldevelopmentpath would not bringto a

culmination a viable aircraf t for deploy

ment

by

2010. There followed the complete

cessation of the whole programme

by

the

e nd o f

that

year. This had, i n par t, been

caused

by the

decision of Boeing (now

the

ownerof McDonnell Douglas) to

abandon

RIGHT: waiting

i tsnext researchtr ip isthe Tu 144ll

RA 17114 Hard by theportnose arethe entrance

stairs leadingto the flight deck. Courtesy

NASA

BELOW: Withthe localequivalent of

an

aircraft

tractorhooked tothe nose leg theTu 144ll is

moved towardsthe hangarfor furthermaintenance.

Althoughthe visorwas likened to a greenhouse

it faired intothenoseextremelywell. Courtesy

NASA

775



SST

INTO

TilE

FUTURE

SST INTOTHE FUTURE

Radical Technologies

because

of

a d ve r se w ind conditions a

rescheduledfor J4 july,

when

it was bri

delayed again. The

test

m od el was t o

l au nc he d t o a n a lt it ud e o f 1 2. 5 m

(20km) over South Aus t ra l ia on the b

of a

rocket

b oo s te r . I t w o uld then h

been pu t th rough

a series

of

manoeuvr

dur ing which te lemetry measureme

w o uld b e

taken

as i t

re tu rned to ea rth

nearlytwice the speed of sound. owe

the scale model,

36ft

(lIm) long,

and

t ed w it h

over

900

sensors was launch

correctly

bu t then went

ou to f

control a

c r a sh e d in f lam es ; the c au se w as d et

mined

to bea software failure. The proje

which involved Mitsubishi eavy Ind

tries

and

the Nissan

Motor Corporati

h a d c o s t 80 million. Japanese research

h a d a ls o

spent

five years

and an estima

350 m illio n in r e de v elo p in g Woom

for

the launch

as

part of the NEXSTI

p

gramme. NAL planned f ou r m or e

flights at

Woomera

for 2003.

Helping to push the deve lopmen t o f

next-generation

SST wererapid

advan

in

materials

that were not

only light

also

exhib ited grea t s t rength and

re

t an ce t o high

temperatures.

Impro

ments

in the accuracy

of computatio

flight dynamics a lso a ide d developme

Computers contributed extensively to

proved flight control systems

since

th

speedhad increased

dramatically

from

period of Concorde.

Powerplants

a

underwent

radical

changes,

with

the

v

able

cycle engine being the preferred ty

The arrival

of these new techno log

spurred on bot h

Boeing

and McDonn

Douglas

to g rea ter

efforts,

a l though

PR departments seized on the informat

to projectthese newtechnologies

as lo

range, high-altitude aircraft

capahlc

of

ing across the Pa cif ic in a f ew h o ur s . T

first of

these

new

transports

was estima

to be ready for

commercial

s er v ic e

2010.

The designs

put

forth

by both

organ

t i on s w er e r e ma r ka bl y s i mi l ar i n l ay o

the main difference be tween them be

the flight envelopeeach was trying

to

fil. Boeing proposed an aircraft capable

travelling at

Mach

2 .4, w h ile

McDonn

Douglas p i tched thei r design

to

re

no more than Mach 1.6. This design

h

the benefi t o f being slightly sllulkr

lighter, which would lead

a n·dll(l\on

A lt ho ug h t he USA ,

Britain

and

Russia

have currently shelved their supersonic

transport development

programmes,

the

baton had

been

picked upby the Society of

japanese

Aerospace

Companies

i n 1 99 5.

This h a d b e en m a de p os sib le b y the Soci

ety s

involvement

with

the

study group,

w ho s e in f or m atio n f or m ed the basis of

their

research.

This

programme,

under the

guidance ofthe National Aeronautics Lab

oratory

of japan,

had

three

primary aims:

Th e

r e su lt w o uld b e

an

aircraft

capable

of

cruising at

Mach

2 .2, w ith a r a ng e

of6,340

miles (l0,200km) w ith a p a ss e ng e r com

plement

of 300. The

intended span

of this

SST w o uld b e 1 4 2f t (43.3m), with a fuse

lage

of310ft(95m).This

w o uld r e su ltin a

w in g w ith an area of9,200sq f t 8 5 5s q m),

which

in

turn

would

support

a

maximum

load o f 3 9 9 t on s 407 tonnes), of

which

2 43 2 4 8) w e re

allocatedto

fuel.

To

flight

te s t th is d e sig n and conduct research on

r el a te d t ec hn ol og y, t wo t yp es of scaled

supersonic experimental airplane, consist

ing

of

two

non-powered and

two

jet

powered experimental aircraft, were built.

On 1 4 ju ly 2 0 0 2 a p ow e re d m o de l

ofthe

japanese SST w as l au nc he d f ro m the

Woomera Test

Centre

in Australia. The

National Experimental Supersonic Trans

port,

NEXSTI,

project is

a t t he

leading

edge of a p us h b y J a pa n s

National

Aero

space Laboratory,

NAL , t o

create a new

generation of supersonic commercialairlin

ers. The test launch, originally scheduled

f or a f ew d a ys e a rlie r, h a d

been

postponed

i To a c qu ire

and

establish

advanced

air

craft integration

technology

by developing

scaled supersonic

experimental

aircraft

and

conducting flight

experiments.

ii.

To

use

computational

fluid

dynamics

(CFD)

and

flightverification in the design

of aircraft bodyshape.

iii . To in cr e as e the

sophistication

of

com

posite-material

techno logy and

other

next-generation supersonic technologies.

Japanese Interest

the

p r oje ct in o r de r to

cut operating

costs.

The departure of Bo ein g le d to the disinte

gration

ofthe

study group in

january

1999.

A f in al pronouncement by Daniel Goldin

of

NASA

s ta te d th at,

The

H igh Sp e ed

ResearchProgramand the AdvancedTech

nology programs are now

discontinued

for

the foreseeable future.

The

Assessment of NASA s

High Speed Research Program

In 1997

a

m eet ng washed

to

thrash

out a

report on

Am ercan supersonic comm ercial aircrah. There

were two bodies present: the Committee on Hgh

Speed

Research and t he Aeronaut cs and Space

Engineerng Board,formingthe Commisson on Eng

neerng andTechnca Systems,

which

was

to

report

to

the Natonal ResearchCounc.

The

Committee on

High SpeedResearch

drewits

membersfrom numer

ous

organizatons including the USAF, Genera Eec

tric,

Becan Engineerng,StanfordUniversity,Boeng,

Northrop Grumman,Amercan Airlnes and the

Unit

ed Technologies Research Center.

The

Aeronautcs

a nd Sp ace Engineerng Board also had

a

diverse

membership, onceagain Boeng, Lockheedand the

USAF were prominent.

The assessment began with

a descripton

o f t h e

NASA High Speed Research HSR Program and

defned it

as

a focused technologydevelopment pro

grammeintendedto leadto thecommercialdevelop

ment

of

a

high speed

civi transport.

The HSR Pro

gram wasnot intended actualy

to

design

or

test

a

commercial aircrah; thiswas the responsibity of the

aviaton industry.

The

HSCT was

seenas

a second

generaton

aircraft with

a

better performance than

either Concordeor theTupoev Tu-144.

Phase

1

of theprogramme wascompleted in 1995

and concentrated on environmental issues, including

noise

and

engine emissions. Phase 2, to be complet

ed by 2002 but canceled in 1999), was intended

to investgate propulsion,

airframe

materials,

struc

tures, flght-deck systems,aerodynamic performance

and systems integration.

The

HSR Programwas con

frmed as a wel-m anaged operat on on target to

complete

its

goals.

The

concludingparagraph stated that, following on

f rom t he complet ed Phase 2, t he t echnology and

informaton gleaned from it

would

enableAmercan

industry t o buid a second-generaton

prototype

for

testfying in 2006.However,oneproviso was that the

industry alone

would

not be abe t of und

such

an air

crah

and

thereforethat government support in depth

would

be required.

The Commisson concentrated mainly on Phase 2

and

itspotental.

and

thusthe nextstep,the Techno

ogy

Maturaton Phase, would

n ee d to

be furthered.

Ths

wouldinvolvedefning amanufacturng

base,

pro

ductvity demonstratons and the ground

testng

of

ful-scale components and systems.

Ths

phase shoud

aso coverthe developmentof theengnes and shoud

incude a pair of

ful-scale

demonstraton engines.

The

difficulty

of

buiding

a

second-generaton

SST

wasalready underst ood snce t he

X-33

programme

and its management

had

already demonstrated that

it

was

feasible.

On

a

more parochial level,the HSCT

was

seen

as good

for

Amerca and its economy and

that it would give t he aviaton industry a much

needed

technological

boost, leading to spin-offs

for

the consumer market. Other areas that came in

for

praise included t he dynam ics of t he

integrated

air

craft, the propulsion, flght-deck systems,supersonic

laminar flow control

and

manufacturng technology

and durabity testng.

BonoM: Although the Tu-144 did

n o tsh a re th e success of Concorde,

it

did

lookelegant i n t h e s k y .

Courtesy

NASA

BELOW: Captured just after lift off

the crew o fth e Tu 144ll are

alreadyretracting the canard

wings intotheirfairings behind

the

cockpit. Once

set

intocruise mode,

the afterburners are

shutdown

and

n o tu se d

again,

since the Tu-144

was capable of exceeding the

sp e ed o fso u n d without them.

Courtesy

NASA

lEFr. Parked on th e ra mp is the Tu

144l l dedicated to th e HSR

research p ro gra mme .As th e

hydraulic systems have losttheir

pressure, the elevons are fully

droopedhard against th e ra n g e

stops. Courtesy NASA

.

lIIiil \\

176

177



SST

INTOT

FUTURE

SST INTOTHE FUTURE

LOW PRESSURE

TUR INE

natureand was to be cantilevered out

the

fuselage

although

i t would inc

rate a transverse wing carry through

section to impart reasonable strengt

rigidity.

An

imaginative

element

i n

multi-part winginvolved the use ofex

sion

joints

between each section to

the stresses generated

by

thermal bui

to be safely dispersed a vital need

the

dissimilarmetals used in its

cons

tion with their differing expansion

By contrast to the

wing

the

fuselage w

be

built

as

one structure

with

the

radome and tail-cone being the only

rate items.

The

primary load bearingm

b ers in thi s a re a determined that it w

consist

of

individual frames to w

wou ld b e

attached

Z section stringe

give strengthand shape; as before the

ering skin would be

HPC

bonded

to

frames and stri ngers.

With the

ailframe manufacturers

ing progress

the engine

builders beg

give their part

of

the project serious

sideration

in

conjunction

with

NA

who were advancing the idea of a

engine concep t

under

the

title

o

HIGH

PRESSURE

TUR INE

TUR OF N

ENGINE

COMPRESSOR

COM USTOR

EXH UST

NOZZLE

/ A A \

sections whose outer panelswere intended

to be

of

highaspectratio witha relatively

gentle

sweep angle.

The construction of

theouter

wingsections was intended to be

ofthe multi-rib

type

sheathed

in a

honey

comb skin manufactured from high poly-

meric composites

HPC .

The

outer

pan-

els would be attached to the main spar and

its

attendant

sub spars for it was here

that

the

main load bearing

s t rength of each

design was concentrated. Attached to the

main wing section would be

the

engines

main undercarriage units and t he trailing

edge of

the

mid wingpanels.To emphasize

the st rength and heat-protect ion

require-

ments of thi s majo r component i t was

sheathed

in a fou r l ay er

titanium

skin.

Mount ed on the forward face of t he main

sparwas

the

mid wingpanel whoseprima-

ry

purpose was to

act

as a

housing

for

the

main undercarriage units. These would be

constructed in a s im il ar

manner

to

the

outer wing panels also being encased in a

skin

of

HPC. To

the

front

of t he

mid wing

section

was

the

wing strake assembly to be

of

a l igh te r construct ion than

the o ther

wing sections.

This

was

of

a highly swept

F N

SHOCKSYSTEM

\

i

NLET

CENTRE BODY

The original engine requirementspostulated by NASA werebasedarounda poddedturbofan engine the

airflow of whichwould be controlled by themovable centre bodyat thefrontof thepowerplant as in

the 8 58 Hustlerbomber

CourtesyN S

IR INT KE

production and design costs. The con

st ruct ion of ei ther

aircraft would require

t he deve l opment of more exotic metals

the

currently available range

of

alloys

being

thought unsuitable

in this

instance.

The materials

then

available

that

were

seen as usable in any newaircraft included

titanium, elevated-temperature alumini

um

and high-temperature

polymer com

posites examples

of which

were already

under c lo se s tu dy and in some cases

already being flight tested.

Although

opti

mistic forecasts had been given for service

entrydates

of

an

American

SST some cau-

t io n was b ei ng

sounded concerning the

deployment

of

such new materials without

proper

development and

testing.

In spite of these reservations the basic

airframe layout foreach version

of t heSST

had

already

been

defined

through exten

sive

comruter

modelling which enabled

the

designers

to alter

details as required

a nd t he n test t hem wi thout spending

scarce

development

money

on

solid mod-

els every

time

for

wind-tunnel

testing as

had been the c ase in the past. The wings

destined for

both

aircraft consisted

of

four

MAIN WING

BOX

t ijf

This diagramil lustratestherangeof materialsthat would have

been used had an HSR HSCT been built Courtesy

N S

MAIN WING BOX

TI

HONEYCOMB

SANDWICH

FUSELAGE

PMC SKIN STRINGERS

OUTBOARD WING

PMC HONEYCOMB

SANDWICH

WING STRAKE

PMC TI PMC

HONEYCOMB

SANDWICH

SECTION

FUSELAGE BARREL

SYNTHETIC VISION SYSTEM

lthough no aircraftwere everbuilt as aresult ofthe

HSR

and HSCT studies

ASA went togreat lengthsto determinetheextent oftestingrequired

eforeany such machine was clearedfor fl ight

Courtesy N S

178

179



SST

INTO Til

FUTURE

SST

INTOT

FUTURE

testspecificaircraftbehaviour thedesignersand scientistshavesectionsof

it

acturedseparatelyfor wind tunneluse.

In

this

view

themodelhas

no

rear

agesince thetr ials areconcerned more with theinteractions between thewing

and

the fuselage.

Courtesy NASA

Cycle

Engine Development Pro

Their s t ar t ing a ssumpt ions were

on the

available power, fuel efficien

andt he twomain constituents of pollu

n : nois e and particulate matter. The

or players were General Electric and

Whitney.

The

General Electric

was based o n t he variable cycle

which offeredgood power

output

would require further development

to

the noise generated. Pratt

Whit-

y had s et tl ed on the turbine bypass

which u sed a convergent diver-

nozzle coupled to a

chute

suppressor

that would, it was hoped,

control

the noise

output. A s both types of engine had good

points

i t was d ec id ed

that

a

combined

engine known

as

the mixed flow turbofan

should be deve loped

by

both companies.

I t s hould be noted that

NASA

were

not

in the business of designing or supporting

any particular design for a second-genera

tion SST.

Their

purpose was to foster the

advanceofthe several technologiesin con-

junction with the primary manufacturers.

When

the programme had been running

fo r f ou r y ear s J am es F le tc he r, a NASA

adminis tra tor , was called before Congress

180

to confirm

t hat t he

organization was

not

actually developing a n S S T b u t was leav

ingit to industry. The statement presented

inJanuary 1975 confirm

that

the superson

ic research programmewas not specifically

directed to the design anddevelopmentof

anSST

but l imited to

the

identification

of

any major problems and the development

ofthe technologiesnecessary for their solu

tion.

Further oversight

was exercised

by

Congressin April \978 when the Office of

Technology Asses sment was tasked w ith

investigating the

potential

benefits of a

second generation S ST a nd t he funding

associated with the

SCR

programme. Two

years later t heO TA informed a Congres

sional committee

that

the programme was

delivering value for money; however, they

commented that unless the funding were

increased, there wou ld b e a r educ ti on i n

future technological benefits.

In

support

of

t he O T A findings, NASA

commissioned

further research into aircraft designs capa-

ble

of

operating

at

Mach 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5

from McDonnell Douglas , Boeing and

Lockheed respectively.

Whil e t he

ailframe manufacturers were

s ti ll i n the process of sketching out their

designs for the SST, rapidadvancesin tech

nology were leading Boeing and Lockheed

to revise their studies to incorporate those

seen as important in supersonic flight. One

of t he most significant of these was fly-by

wire a nd t he associated AFCS computers

needed to control aircraft behaviour; simi

larly, advancesin the field of aerodynamics

w er e a ls o r el ev an t i n second generation

SST

design, especially in the application of

high-lift devices . Thus both disciplines

wouldbe incorporated into the second-gen

eration designs with alacrity. Further input

came from Boeing who had flight-tested

some developments on the ir B.757 test bed.

But the most important

advance

was lami

nar flow control which wasseen as essential

for smooth low-level, low-speed handling.

Flying Test Beds

Havingdeveloped the theories andsome of

the technology it was time to put them to

the test. Given that

no

supersonic transports

were available in t he U SA and that all the

Air France and British Airways Concordes

werefully occupied, NASA turned itsatten-

t ion further afield to f ind a flying test bed.

Before the Concorde option was dropped,

Alan Greenwood from British Aerospace

had proposed in February 1980 to

NASA

and

i ts a ss is ta nt a dminis t ra tor Dr A .M.

Lovelace that a Concorde would be ideal for

the

SCR

programme. A joint technical

team from NASA and BAe investigated

oneofthe airframes at Filton inOctober. By

March 98 a wholly pos it ive r eport was

delivered. This was based o n t he fact that

Concorde had been in commercial service

for fiveyears and thusa highlevel of under

standing o n t he operating of a supersonic

aircraft was available.

The

report specified

the six goals

that

Concorde would be used

for: advanced f ligh t procedure s for noi se

abatement the assessment of handling qual

ities, the analysis

of

intake aerodynamic

surge loads,wake vortices measurement, the

measurement of ailframe skin fric tion and

engine nacelle drag,

and

the measurement

of airframe noise due to supersonic speeds.

The

test-flying programme would be based

in Brita in, with engineering and

computer

simulation support from British Aerospace.

NASA

had 500 ,0 00 t o f und the whole

exerc ise; howeverin March 1982 the

entire

SCR programme was be put on hold

as

the

Rea ga n a dm in is tr at io n h ad d ec id ed t o

reduce the technology development budget.

Fortuna te ly th is dec is ion was eventual ly

reversed by the mid 1990s, although by

that

time t he chanceof using a Concorde had

gone and therefore another aircraft type

would berequired.

This

was

the

TupolevTu

1440 airframe, of which a

few

remained air

worthy, having been grounded by Aeroflot

as uneconomic

to operate.

Since

they were

readily available, the most servicable was

reclaimed by Tupolev for overhaul and

upgrading. The backers of t h is venture

would be NASA the primaryAmerican air

frame and engine manufa cture rs and , to a

certain extent the Russian manufacturers,

w ho hoped t o g ai n f ur th er i ns ig ht into

advanced

SST

flight behaviour. Designated

the Tu-144LL, the a ir cr af t unde rtook a

sequence of successful test flights. Given the

political uncertainty

that

alwayssurrounded

the American SST, i t came

as

no surprise

t hat t he programme was suspended due to

lack of furtherfunding. A subsidiary reason

was the absorption of McDonnell Douglas

by Boeing Aircraft in 1998, which reduced

t he e le me nt o f

competition

favoured

by

American politicians.

The

publ ic pro

nouncements gave the reasons as a p er

ceivedchange in

the

projected salesfigures,

plus the technical r isks in pursuing such a

programme.

At

this point

NASA

also

placed the High Speed Research Program

on a lower priority; the whole project was

finally abandoned inearly \999.

Hope Springs Eternal?

Although i t would appear

that

the quest

fo r a s uc ce ss or t o Concorde has for the

time being beenabandoned by the major

manufacturers and associated government

bodies,

some

smallerorganizationsar

pursuing this moste lusive of goals.

U SA Reno

Aeronautical are

conce

ing on something smallerin the

shap

Mach 1.5-capable, twin engined bu

jet . A l so in America Gulfstream, the

known business jet manufacturer, wo

in conjunction with the Russian ai

manufacturer Sukhoi OKB, unde

joint designstudies fora four-engined

ness cum small airliner des ign - l at e

celled

due to

differences

between

partners regarding design concepts. M

while in Europe, both Airbus lndustr

British

Aerospace

continued low

development both individually and

ly

although

neither

would commit t

form of product ion

since

no govern

funding was forthcoming.

Given allthese half-started, half-fin

programmes, will the

Aerospatiale

oncordeend

by

being the only one

kind ever to be built? For all

the

trial

tribulations that beset Concorde sinc

day the idea was conceived the ai

eventually proved to be a w inne r. L

hopethat any successor is

as

good.

Af i t t ingend isa view of a Concorde prototype

It was and still is the onlysuccessful supers

transport not badfor an aircraftdeemedto

b

a

white

elephant.

BBA Colecton



Fuel system

rank I: 9,36l\b 4,255kg

tank 2: to,2071b 4,640kg

tank 3: to,2071b 4,640kg

tank 4: 9,36l\b 4,255kg

tank 5: 16,072lb 7,305kg

tank SA: 4,9631b 2,256kg

tank 6: 25,8891b (ll,678kg)

tank

7:

16,5251b 7,51 Ikg)

tank 7A: 4,9631b 2,256kg

rank

8:

28,6451b 13,020kg

tank

9:

24,7471b

(II

,248kg

tank 10: 26,6181b 12,099kg

t ank 1

l

23,2181b 10,554kg

unusable: 1,021lb 464kg

total: 211,797lb 96,27lkg

Pressurization

normaldifferential: 10.7±0.Ipsi 738±7mbar

temperature range: 15-30°

lectrical system

main: 60kVA 200/1 15V, 400Hz

emergency:

26V,

1,800Hz

batteries: 24V

Hydraulic system

fluid type: Oronite M2V

caracity: 74.8gal 340Itr

pressure: 4,000psi 275bar

aggage holds

combined total: 697cu ft 20.03cu

m)

forward lower: 227cu

ft

6.7Icu m)

upper hold: 470cu ft 13.32cu m)

Weights

maximum take-off weight: 389,0001b 176,445kg

maximum taxi weight: 404,0001b 183,251

kg)

maximum landing weight: 245,000lb I 1I,130kg

maximum permissible weights-tax iing: 41

1,1361b

186,88

take-off: 407,1541b 185,07

landing: 244,4861b (lll,13

zero

fuel:

202,5761b 92,08

Landing

gear

main-wheel

base: 59ft8in 18.19m

track: 25ft 4in 7.68m

tyre:

47

x 15.75; pressure: 187psi 12.9bar

steering range: ±60degrees

NZG tyres: 43.3 x 15.74; pressure: 230psi 16bar

nose- tyre: 31 x 10.75;pressure: I74psi 12bar

rail uni t - tyre :3 .20 x 120; pressure: 294psi 20bar

oncorde ata

APPENDIX I

Range

Movement

yaw: ±30 degrees

pitch inner clevons 15 degrees up/l7 down

pitch outerclevons 15 degrees up/I 7 down

roll

inner elevon: 14 degrees up/

14

down

roll outer elevons: 20 degrees up/20down

maximum range- innerelcvon: 19 degrees up/I9 down

outer elevons 23.5 degrees up/23.5 down

ngines

Rolls-Royce/SNECMA Olympus 593

reheat thrust: 38,0501b 16,925kN , at sea level

specific fuel consumption at 53,000ft Mach 2:

1.1

91b/

Ib thrust/hr (l.

19

kg/kg thrust/hr

levons

area: 172.2sq ft 16sq m)

Fuselage

length over ll 202ft3.6in 61 .66m

external height: 130.7in 3.32m

pressurecabin length: 129ft 39.32m

maximum internal height: 77in I .96m

maximum external width: I13Ain 2.88m

maximum internal width: 103Ain 2.63m

Rudder

area: 112sq

ft

10Alsq m)

Fin

height:37ft I in 11.32m

area: 365sq ft 33.91sq m)

root chord: 34ft8.7in 10.58m

Wings

span: 83ft tOAin 25.56m

area: 3,856sq ft 358.25sq m)

root chord: 90ft 9in 27.66m

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183



APPENDIX

II

oncorde

ncidents

Operator

Registration

Location

Remarks

AF

N/K

Caracas

wheel damagedafter

hitting

runway beacon light

AF N/K

mid

Atlantic

engine

problem

AF F BVFB

Paris

No.2

tyre burst

AF F BVFA

Washington

No s 1

and

2 tyresburst

due

to foreign

object

damage

AF

N/K

mid

Atlantic

engine

problem

AF

N/K

Dakar

tail/engine

damagedue

to

misjudged landing

AF

N/K

mid Atlantic

engine

problem

AF N/K

New

York

engine shut down

before landing

AF

N/K

N/K

No.4

tyre deflated; treadseparated

BA

G BOAD

N/K

No.2

tyreburst; hydraulic leak/deflector damage

AF

F BVFA

N/K

No.7

tyre burst

AF F BVFA

N/K

No.1 tyre burst

BA

G BOAC

New

York

engine shut down

aftertake off; secondary airdoor unserviceable

AF F BVFC

Washington

No.2

tyreburst

AF

F BVFC

Dakar

N os 5

and

6 tyres burst; wheels brakes

and

No.1

engine

replaced

AF

F BVFC

New

York

No.6

tyre treadfailed causingdamage

to

wing

and

hydraulic

and

undercarriage

AF

F BVFC

Washington

Nos

5

and

6 tyres burst

on

take off causingdamage to

undercarriage

control

circuits/fuel

and

hydraulic systems;

aircraft

returned

to Dulles foremergency landing

AF F BVFD

Washington

tyrefailure caused damage

to No.2engine

compressor

AF F BVFD

Dakar

tread loss

No.3

tyre/wheel

and

No J

engine

replaced

BA

G BOAA

Heathrow

No.4

tyre failed causing damage

to

N os 7

and

8 wheels

andN os

3

and

4 engines

AF

F BVFD

N/K

tread loss

to No.7

wheel

AF F BVFD

Washington

aircraft

hit

two

deer

on landing causing damage

to

right

main

gear

BA

G BOAB

Heathrow

tyres burst

on Nos 5 6

7

and

8 wheels

BA

G BOAD

Heathrow

No.8

tyre burst causing damage todeflector/brakes and

hydraulic system

AF

F BVFC

N/K

No J

tyre burst

BA

G BOAF

Washington

No.8

tyreburst

on touchdown damagingengineand

airframe

AF

F BTSD

Washington

Nos

land

2 tyres replaced afterforeign

object

damage; aircraft

diverted

toN ew

York

784

CONCORDEINCIDENTS

Date Operator Re gi st rat io n Lo cat ion

Remarks

13.7.81

AF

F BVFF Paris tyre

No.5

failed causing damage

to No.2engine

9.8.81 BA

G BOAG New

York Nos 1

and

2 tyres burst causing damage

to No.2engine

and

adjacent

fuel

tank

20.9.81 BA

G BOAD New

York

No.6

tyre burst causingdamage

to N o.2 engineand

brakes

valve

14.12.81

BA

G BOAD

New

York

Undercarriage failed

to

retractafter take offdue

to unbalan

gear truck

26.12.81 BA

G BOAE New

York

No.2

tyredeflated

30.4.82 BA

G BOAF

Heathrow No.4

tyredeflated

3.6.82

AF

F BVFB Paris

No.4

tyrefailure

9.5.83

AF

F BVFB

New

York

Nos

1

and

2 tyres deflated

29.4.84 BA

G BOAE

Heathrow

No.8

tyredeflated

11.7.84

BA

G BOAD

Heathrow

No.1 tyre burst; brake

and

deflector damaged

14.8.84 BA

G BOAA Heathrow

No.4

tyre burst; deflector damaged

20.2.85

AF

F BVFF

New

York

No.8

tyre burst; damage to undercarriage

27.2.85

BA

G BOAE

New

York

Nos

4

and

8 tyreslost t read

on

landing

14.11.85 BA

G BOAE

Heathrow No.7

tyre burst causing brake fire

15.11.85 BA

G BOAB Heathrow

No.5 tyre burst causingdamage

to

main gear

doorwhich

i

turn punctured

No.5 fuel tank; Nos

land

2 engines needed

to be replaced after foreign

object

damage

18.5.86

AF

F BVFB

Paris No.5 tyre burst

11.8.87

BA

G BOAC

New

York Nos

1 2 4 5 6

and

8 tyres burstdue

to

braking problems

locking brakes

on;

damagecaused

to No.3engine

deflecto

and

undercarriagedoors

10.9.87 AF F BTSD

New

York No.8

tyredeflated due

to

foreign

object

damage.

29.1.88 BA

G BOAF Heathrow

tyre

hub

failure causing damage

to No.7

fuel

tank

9J.88

BA

G BOAC Heathrow

No.1 tyre burst damaging hydraulic pipelines

10.4.88

AF

F BTSD

New

York No.7

tyre burstafter tread failed

due

to foreign

object

dam

18.6.88 BA

N/K

Heathrow

undercarriagefailed to retract; aircraft

returned to Heathro

19.7.88 BA G BOAG

New

Yo rk h yd ra ul ic s ys te m f ai lu re r eq ui ri ng r et ur n

to

base; aircraft ve

runway

dueto inoperative

brakes

13.2.89

AF

N/K

Paris

outer

window panel cracked after take off; aircraft

returned

base

12.4.89 BA

G BOAF

Tasman

Sea

failure

of

upper ruddersection; aircraft

cominued

on

toSydn

14.8.90

AF

F BVFA Paris No.5 tyre burst due to foreign

object

damage

on

runway

4.1.91 BA

G BOAE

mid

Atlantic

upper rudder

section

failed; aircraft

continued

toN ew

York

13.2.92

BA

G BOAG

Heathrow

No.7 tyre treadseparated;deflectordamaged

21.3.92 BA

G BOAB Atlantic

upper rudderseparated from aircraft in flight;

No.2engines

down due

to vibration

27.3.92

AF F BTSC New

York No.1 t yre burst due

to

foreign

object

damage

4.9.92

AF

F BVFF

New

York

No.4

tyre burst

due to

foreign

object

damage

16.1.93

AF F BVFF

Paris

Nos

7

and

8 tyres losttread causing damage

to

deflector

undercarriage

No J

engine and

wing root

785



ON ORDE IN IDENTS

Operator

Registration Location Remarks

BA G-BOAF Heathrow Noo4 tyre burst causing damage

to

brakingsystem No.3 engine

I

APPENDIX

III

and No.8 fuel tank

AF

F-BVFC New York loss oftread on No.2 tyre

BA

G-BOAG

New York

No.2 engine shutdown; high oil pressure; No.2engineshut

J

oncorde

n

Tu 44

Fleet

etails

own on approach as a precaution

BA G-130AB Heathrow No.2 tyre b urst causing d amage

to

hydraulic system

BA

G-130AF

Atlantic

No.1 engineshutdowndue to fuel pressure warnings

Concorde

Fleets

I3A G-BOAB Heathrow blue h ydraulic system t otal loss; aircraft returned

to

base

C/N

Registration Series

Operator

First Flight

Status

SA G-BOAE

N/K

Nos 3 and 4 engines shut down due to surging and

low

oil

01

F-WTSS

Sud Aviation

2.03.69

after test flying

was

retired to Paris Le

pressure respectively

Acrospatiale

Bourget 19.10.73

for

display

in

the

BA G-BOAB

N/K

No.2 engine experienced thrust reverser problems

Musee

de

l Air; hours: 812

BA G-BOAE

N/K

No.2 engineshutdown due to problems with thrust reverser

02

G-BSST

BAC/BAE Systems

9.04.69

to

MinTeci. 06.05.69 to MoS 19.02.71

BA

N/K

Heathrow

fuel

emergency declared after missed approach

arrived at RNAS Yeovilton 26.07.76 fo

preservation in Fleet Air Arm Museum

BA G-BOAC New York No.2 clevon sL section ofsurface; aircraft returned to base

hours: 836

7.98 AF F BVFF Paris No.8 tyre burst

101

G-AXDN

BAC/BAE Systems

17.12.71

to MinTeci. 16.04.68;toMoS 19.02.71

BA G-BOAE New

York

No.3 tyre deflated due to foreign object damage

to Imperial War Museum Duxford

for

preservation 20.08.75; hours: 633

BA

G BOAC

Atlantic

partial separation of rudder; aircraft landed at New York

102

F-WTSA

Sud Aviation

10.01.73

to Paris Orly

for

display 26.05.76

AF

F BVFB

New York nosegear failed

to

retract; aircraft returned to]FK

Acrospatia

Ie

hours: 642

BA

G-BOAE

Heathrow

aircraft experienced hydraulic system problems on approach

201

F-WTSB

100

Aerospatiale

6.12.73

withdrawn from usc on display at

1.00 AF F BVFF New

York

Noo4

tyre burst

Aerospatiale Toulouse; hours: 754

BA G-B Heathrow aircraft suffered e ngine failure o n approach

202

G-BBDG

100

BAC/BAE Systems

13.02.74

registered 7.08.73;

for

spare parts usc at

Filton 12.81; owned by British Airways

BA G-BOAA Shannon

No.3 engineshutdown and landing madeat Shannon

For Brooklands Museum 2004?

BA G-BOAF Heathrow No.6 tyre burst

hours: 803

BA G-BOAI3 H ea th ro w No.6 tyre failed due to foreign ob jec t damage; defl ecto r damaged

203 F-WTSC

100/ Acr ospa tial c

31.01.75

reregistered 28.05.75

F-BTSC

101 Air France

crashed 25.07.00

7.00 AF

F-BTSC

Paris aircraft c rashed s oon after t ake-off; all on board killed

hours: 11 989

BA

N/K

H ea th ro w e ng in e p rob le ms on ta ke- of f; f lig ht a ba nd on ed 204

G BOAC 102

BAC

27.02.75

registered 5.01.74

BA

N/K

New

York in

transit engine surged; aircraftlandedat ]FK

G N8 NC

BA

delivered 13.02.76

N81NC

Braniff

joint register 5.01.79

BA

N/K

H ea th ro w e ng in e p ro bl em r equ ir ed a ir cr af t t o r e tu rn t o base

G-BOAC

BA

returned to BA I 1.08.80

BA

N/K

Heathrow cracks d iscovered in outerwindow panel

returned toservice after modification

11.07.02; preserved Manchester31.10.0

1.02 SA

N/K

H ea th ro w en gi ne surge required retu rn to base

hours 22 259

AF

N/K

New York engine failure; aircraft continued to Paris

205

F-BVFA

\01 Air France

27.10.75

delivered 19.12.75

I3A

N/K

H ea th ro w p ar ti al r ud der f ailure p ro mp te d r et ur n t o base

N94FA

Braniff


F-BVFA

Air France

returned 1.06.80

AF N/K New

York

No.3 engine shutdown;aircraft diverted returned to service 02.02;

AF

N/K

New

York

partial rudder failure caused return to ]FK

to Smithsonian 12.06.03; hours: 17 824

206

G-BOAA

102

BAC

5.11.75

registered 3.03.74

G-N94AA

BA

delivered 14.01.76

N94AA

Braniff


G-BOAA

BA

returned 28.07.80;

in

store Heathrow

to East Fortune Scotland 2004

hours: 22 786

207 F BVFB

101

Air France

6.03.76

delivered 8.04.76

N94FB

Braniff


F BVFB

Air France

returned 1.06.80

786

I

787



CONCORDE N TU 144FLEET ET ILS

•

CONCORDE N TU 144 FLEET ET ILS

Registration

Ser ies Ope rat or

First Flight

Status

Tu 44 Fleet

c nt

returned to service24.08.01

R eg is tr at io n Model

First F light Status

to

Sinsheim Auto und Technik

Museum Germany 23.06.03

68001

Tu 144 3l l 68 prototype aircraft scrapped

hours: 14 771

68002

Tu 144

static testairframe

G BOAB

102

BAC

18.05.76

registered 3.03.74

77101

Tu 144S 1.06.71 preproduction aircraft scrapped

N94AB

BA

delivered 30.09.76

N94AB

Braniff


77102

Tu 144S

20.03.72 first

production aircraft; crashed 6.06.73 Paris Air Show

BOAB

BA

returned 17.09.80;aircraft

in

store at

77103 Tu 144S 13.12.73 history unknown

Heathrow;

for

display Heathrow 2004;

hours: 22 296

77104 Tu 144S 14.06.74 history unknown

F BVFC

101 Air France 9.07.76

delivered 3.08.76

77105

Tu 144S 30.11.74

modified

to

Tu 144Ddevelopment aircraft; last noted

in

scrapyard near

N94FC

Braniff


Zhukovsky Airport

1993

F BVFC

Air France

returned 1.06.80

77106

Tu 144S 4.03.75

Aeroflot

used for

cargo flights; currently on display Monino Museum

returned to service

10.01

retired to Airbus factory for display

77107

Tu 144S

20.08.75

on display at

Kazan

Aviation Production complex

hours: 14 332

77108 Tu 144S 12.12.75

in store at Samara Ouchebny Research Institute

G BOAD 102

BAC

25.08.76

registered 9.05.75

77109

Tu 144S 29.04.76

Aeroflot used for passenger flights remainsstored at Voronezh Aircraft fa

G BOAD

BA

delivered 6.12.76

G N94AD

Braniff


Tu 144S statictest airframe

G BOAD

BA

returned 19.06.80; returned

to

service

77110 Tu 144S 14.02.77

Aeroflot used for passenger flights; on display at Museum ofCivil Aviatio

28.09.01; preserved New

York

10.11.03;

Ulyanovsk

hours: 23 394

F BVFD 101 Air France

10.02.77

delivered 26.03.77

77111 Tu 144D

27.04 .78 crashed 23.05 .78 ;remainsscrapped

N94FD

Braniff


77112 Tu 144D was

on

display

at Tupolev

OKB Zhukovsky

sold

to

Sinsheim

Museum

Germ

F BVFD

Air France

returned 1.06.80

77113 Tu 144D was

on display at Tupolev OKB; aircraft now dismantled and stored

damaged in heavy landing 27.05.82

reduced

to

spares 18.12.94

77114 Tu 144D

converted to Tu 144LL

for

NASA

use

then tostoreat Tupolev

OKB;

hours:

5 821

reported for sa Ie 05.01

G BOAE

102

BAC

17.03.77

registered 9.05.75

77115 Tu 144D on display at Tupolev OKB Zhukovsky

G BOAE

BA

delivered 20.7.77

77116

Tu 144D in store in uncompleted state; construction ceased 1984


G N94AE

Braniff

G BOAE

BA

returned 1.07.80; returned to service

28.09.01; preserved Bahamas 17.11.03;

hours: 23 372

F WJAM

101 Aerospatiale

26.06.78 registered 0 6.78

F BTSD

Air France


N94SD

Braniff


F BTSD

Air France

returned 12.03.79

returned to service 15.10.01; hours: 12 974

G BKFW

102

BAE

Systems 21.04.78

registered 2.01.78

G BOAG

BA

delivered 6.02.80


returned to service 19.10.01; preserved

Seattle 5.12.03; hours: 16 232

F WJAN

101

Aerospatiale

26.12.78

registered 12.78

F BVFF Air France


not modified

hours: 12 420

G BFKX

102 BAE Systems

20.04.78 registered 27.01.78

G BOAF

BA

delivered 9.06.79

N94AF

Braniff


BOAF

BA

returned 12.06.80

returned to service 17.07.01; preserved

Filton 26.11.03; hours: 18 255

188 I

189



ibliography

all, T.E.,

Concorde The Story The

Facts

The Figures

(Foulis, 1969)

Brian, Flying Concorcle Airlife, 2002

s, G

Lin

ter,

Aerospatiale/British Aerospace Concorde Crowood/

Airli

fe 200

I)

G COllcorde: The Inside Story Weidenfeld Nicolson, [976

G Concorde and the Americans: International Politics of the Supersonic

TranslJon

Smithsonian Institute

Press, 1997)

haw, Brian, Concorde- The Inside Story

Sutton

Publications, 2000

alsofeatures in

numerous

magazines;

additionally there

is a

wealth of

material publicly

available a t t h e

Public Record

e, Kewfor

thosewho

like

the political in-fighting associated withsuch

projects.

lly, I recommend www.concordesst.com for

the

latest news

about the

aircraft.

9

Advanced Supersonic

Technology Program

167 174

Aeronor 130 136 139

Aerospatiale 73 101 166

Airbus Industrie/EADS 164

166 167

aircnlft

Avro

Type 698Vulcan

10

13,17,31,45,46,59,

61,166

Avro Type720 13

Avro

Type730 13

Avro York

12

BAC-IIII72

BAC 221 26,44

BoeingStratoliner I 16

Boeing737172

Boeing 757 180

Brahazon 12

Bristol Aircraft Type

188

24

Bristol Aircraft

Type 198

18

Bristol Type223

anbena

31

Caravel

Ie 13

18

Convair B-58 118

Convair

F-I02

Delta

Dagger 115

Convair

F-I

06 Delta Dart

115

DC-IO 150

de HavillandComet

12

13,35, 115

de

Havilland Mosquito

10

DH

108

Swallow

10

DH 11010

Douglas DC-3 12

Douglas DCA 12

English Electric Lightning

10

II

F-16XL 173

Fairey FD.2

24

FW 190fTa 1527

General Dynamics

F-III

9

Gloster Meteor 8 32

Handley Page HP115 26

HawkerTempest7

I-leinkel He 178 7

IIlyushin IL-62

130

LockheedC-5A Galaxy

124

LockheedConstellation

116

Lockheed

F-I

04 Starfighter

115,118

Lockheed L-2000

125

Lockheed SR-71

125

Lockheed U-2R/E-2R 172

173

Lockheed YF-12A I 18

McDonnell F-IOI Voodoo

115

Messerschmill Me 1 63 7

Messerschmitr

Me 262

7

MikoyanA-144 Analog

129

MiG-21 127

129

MiG-211 129

MiG-21

LSH 129

MiG-29 140

Mirage

IIIB 136

Mirage

IV 2 6

Morane Saulnier Paris

32

Myasischev M-50

Bounder I

28

Nord

1502

Griffon

26

North American Aircraft,

XB-70Valkyrie21,118,

126

North American Aviation

F-86 Sabre I15


F·IOO

SuperSahre I15


P-51

Mustang 7

Repuhl

ic

F·I

05

Thunderchief

115

Spitfire 7

Sud

Est

SE212 Durandal

26

SudOest 9050Trident

II

26

Super Caravclle 21,23

TSR2 45,118

TupolevTu-22 128

132

Tu-135P 128

Tu-144 Charger

128 129

131-5,136,138

Tu·160

138 140

Tu-244 138

139

Type707 10

Vampire 10

Vickers VC

10

12,22, 130

Aircraft Research

Association 14

AirframeCommittee

22

Air France

18,51,70,94,99,

100,105,106,110,114,

145 149 152 155 157

158 160 162-5, 180

Air Registration Board

14

AleniaAerospace

174

American Institute of

Aeronauticsand

Astronautics I 17

Antonov 128

Annie de lAire

13

Armmong Slddeley 14

ArmstrongWhitworth

9 13

17

Index

ASTFI,2,3167,174

AvionsMarcel Dassault

19

29

Avro 13 17

BEA

Bureau Enquetes·

Accidents 148

152

Boeing 99 108 117 118

124,125,140,168,169

honkers

41

oom Alley 41

Brabazon Committee 12

BraniffAirlines

105

Brisrol Aircraft/Engines 14

17,18,21,24,26,44,45

BritishAerospace Systems

(BAe)(BEAS) 73,101,

152,166,168,174

BritishA ircraftCorporation

(BAC) 18,21-3,26,29,

31,32,100,105,119,

166

BritishAirways 51 70,94,

99-101,104,105,110,

114,149,152,155,157,

158,163,164,165,180

British European Airways

(BEA)

13 104

BritishOverseas Airways

orporation (BOAC)

13,23,104

BritishStandard BR58

22

Brize Norton, RAF 160

entred EssaisAeronautique

de

Toulouse (CEAT) 30,

49

Certificate ofAirworthiness

20 138

148 159

CEV 32

Citizens League Against the

Sonic Boom

124

ivil

Aeronautics

Board

I

18

ivil Aviation Authority

103 160

ivil

registration

F-BTSC 110 Ill, 145

F·BTSD

106 110 159

F·BVFA

110

F-BVFB

155

F-BVFC

155

F·BVFD 114

F-WTSS

32

39,

110

G·BBDG

103

·BFKW 103

G-BFKX

103

G-BOAA 103 108

G·BOAB

103 108 109

C;·BOAC 103 108 110

(J·BOAD 105 108

9

G·BOAE 103,106,108,

109

G·BOAF

114 155

G·BOAG 109

110

114

G·BSST 32

G-BVFF

110

G·N94AA 109

G·N94AB

108

G-N94AE

103

CL.823 125

CoalitionAgainst theSST

124

College ofAeronautics

at

Cranfield

14

Commandantof the Queens

Flight

32

Computational Fluid

Dynamics (CFD)

177

Concorde, BAC/Acrospatiale

7,12,19,20,22,23,26,

30-6,38,39,41,42,44,

46,47,49,51,55,

59-69,71,72,78,79,

81,84-7,89,91-5,98,

99,101,103,105,106,

108-10,112,114,

124-6,130-2,134,139,

145-64,165,168,171,

72

177 180

Continental Airlines

150

ControllerAircraft

14

ountries

Australia 43

109

Austria 110

Bahrain

105 108 109

Ba

rbados 109

Brazil 110

Cyprus

108

England 30

France

20

Germany 20

145

Iran III

Kuwait

108

New Zea land 109

Puerto Rico

108

Singapore

105

South Africa 110

United Kingdom

23

UnitedStates 20 109

USSR

130 134 136

Venezuela

105

Cranwell, RAF8

Cunard

110

De

Havilland

Aircraft/Engines

13

14

Delco III

Departmentof Commerce

118

Deutsche Aerospace

174

Douglas 99

Dunlop 30

Dupont de Nemours

1

English Electric

14 17

Enahling Propulsion

Materials Program

Europe,m Cup I I I

EuropeanJoint Airwor

Authority

73

EuropeanSupersonic

Research Program

174

Federal Aviation Auth

(FAA) 32,116-8,

124

FederaI Express 100 10

165

Fleet AirAnn Museum

Yeovilton 26,44

night;

AF002110

AF4590145

AF4853

110

AF4859 110

AF4862 I

10

BA 170108

BAI73 108

BA378 108

BA9060C

109

BA9083C

109

General Electric I 17-2

122,124-6,140,1

170

Gloster Aircraft Comp

Goodyear

145

Gulfmeam 181

Handley Page

14

17

Ilawker SiddeleyAircra

Group 18

High Polymeric Compo

(HPC)

179

HighSpeed Civil Trans

168,170,173

High Speed Research

Program

140 177

Hispano Suiza

29

Honeywell 168

IIOTOL

174

HouseAppropriations

ommittee

124

Ilypersonic Narional A

Space Plane 174

l y u ~ i n 128

InternationalStandard

Almhphcrc (ISA)



100

154 155 160

1 30

O K I3 1 28

128 133 140

III

a Airport 110

109

bados I

14 163

of B iscay 1 0 6

164

108

114

164

29

32

26

aracas

105

164

108

110

las, Fort Wortb 105

110

110

lesAirport99,

105

110,114,164

164

ds AFB

18

168

173

ord 42,

109

21 26 32

108

romov Flight Research

Instirute

129

III

107 110 114

160

162

122

26

es I

55

FKennedy Airport

99 110 155 162

10

Islandof III

Lumper 110

108

Bourgel 44,

134

151

155

110

I

on 107-10

110

164

30

coCily 105

105

129 130

134

110

York

99, 105 109

114,145,162,163

110

118

105,110,

III 163

ock 30, 59

deJaneiro 105 109

110

108

108

108

122

Sheremetvo Airport

134

Stockholm 110

Straits ofMalacca

105

Tel v v International 110

Tokyo

122

Torol1lo 164

Toulouse

30

32,44, 110

130 174

Venyukovsk

134

Vienna 110

Voronezh Aircraft Plant

129

Washington99,164

Weybridge 2I,

26

Lockheed 117 118 124 125

168

169

Marshallsof Cambridge/

MarshallsAerospace 26

Massachusells Instiluteof

Technology 123

McDonnell Douglas

140

168

169

Messier 29

Michelin 159 160

MikoyanOKB 128

MilesAircrnft, M.52

9

10

Minisler ofAviation21,22

Minister ofPublicWorksand

Transpon

21

Ministryof Defence

166

Ministry ofSupply 9

13 14

18

Ministryof Transportand

CivilAviation 13 17

Mitsibushi Heavy Industries

Model 2707-100

119

Model 2707-200119,120,

125

Model 2707-300 120,123

MorganCommittee

13 17

Ml/see

/Air 44

NACA115 125

NASA 115,118,125,140,

166,168,170,172,173

Ames 168

Dryden

143

168

173

Langley 143 168

Lewis 1 6 8

tion l CrO lflutics

Laboratoryof Japan

177

NationalAerospace

Laboralory 177

National Enviromental

PrOlection Act 99 124

National GasTurbine

Establishment 30,59

National Physical Laboratory

14

Nalional Trnnsport and

Safet

I

Board II 1

NearZeroGrowth

Tyre 159

160

NESTI 177

New York Port Authority

103 108

Nissan MotorCorporation

177

Nord Aviation

19 39

IN X

NormalairGarren

30

Officeof Technology

Assessment 180

OKB-23

128

Olympus22R, 30101,59318,

21 24 26 29 30 44

45 55 59 73 92 93

130 167

P an A m 1 00 117

ParisAir Show 21 130 132

134

people:

Addeley,M.R. 33

AckerI,

D.F.B.

103

Agapov, S. I

38

Alland,

J.C

33

Amery, Juli1I1

22

Asselot, Arnold

29

Bannister, Capt Mike 160

Begg

James

123

Biplinghoff,

Dr

Raymond

123

Black Eugene I

17

Bradshaw,Capl I 10

Branson,Sir Richard

164

Brown, R S 2 9

Bulem

V .M . 1 30

Buron, Robert

21

Calvert, Capl B.J.

105

Ceremukhin, G.A. 130

Chadwick,

Roy 17

Chernomyrdin,Victor 140

Chorley J .L . 1 09

Cochrane, John

33

Coleman, William 99

Cook, Capt John

109

de Havilland,Geoffrey 10

Derry

John

10

Dillon, Douglas 117

Dudal,Capr Pierre

110

Duffey

Capt Peler 106

108

Eames CaplJ

108

Edwards,Sir George

23

Elyan,

EV 129

Escola Etienne 29

Fletcher,James

180

Fullerton, Gordon

143

Gantsevskiy,

B . A. 1 28

Gedge, George

29

Gilles, Capl

110

Godlin, Daniel

177

Gore, Vice President 140

Greenwood,Alan

180

Gudkov OV 129

Guignard,J cques32

Halaby, Najeeb1

17

I 19

Hirst, Capl

J.W. 105 108

Hodges, Luther I 17

Holding,

PA 33

Jacob, Capt G. 110

Jagger, S.M.

128

Johnson, Vice President

117 119

Kennedy, PresidentJohn

F

116

Konstantinov,

V 129

Lemay Capt 108

Leney

Capt

109

192

Lindbergh,Charles

124

Lovelace, Dr A.M.

Macmillan, Harold

22

Marshall, Lord

164

Massie, Capt A.J.

108

I 10

Matheson, Olin 17

McCone, John I 17

Mcmullen, Capl H.C

109

McNamara, Capt E. 103

McNamara,Roben 119

Meadows, Capl A.R. 105

108,110

Morgan, SirMorien

13

Musgrave, Sir Cyril 13

Naboyshchikova, G.F.

132

Nixon, PresidentRichard

123 125

Osborne, Swnley

117

Pelly AirChief Marshall

SirClaude

14

Perrier, Henri

32

Pompidou, President

Georges

Popov Yu. N. 128

Prince Phillip32, 106

Proxmire, Senator 100

124

Puget, Andre

22

Reagan, PresiJel1l

168

Reid, CaptJock 160

Retif, Michael 32

Rivers, Robert

143

Rodnyanski, L . M . 1 32

Rude, Capt Francois 10

Russell, Dr Archibald 21

22,23

Satre,Pierre2 I, 22 23 29

ServantI , Lucien

21 22

23

29

Strang,

Dr

William 21,22,

29

Thorneycroft, Peter

20 22

Todd, Capl

NV

107 110

Trubshaw, Brian 33 34 39,

44,103

Turcat, Andre 32 33 39

42 44

Udall, Stewart L 124

Veremey

B 138

Volpe, John 124

Walpole,Capt Brian

108

110

Watts, Brian 33

Whittle,Sir Frank 7

Wilkinson,Capt G. 103

Pepsi

106

Politburo 128

Power Jets Ltd

7

8

Pratt Whitney I17 I

18

119 125 126 168 170

Presidential Advisory

Committeeon Super

sonic Transport I 17

Project

Horizon 116

QE2110

RAE Ball Hili/::>truclllres

Department 49

RenoAeronautical 181

Rockwell

140

Rolls-Royce 9,

14

18,21,26,

29,44, 101 124 130

157,167,168,174

Rolls-Royce Derwel1l 9

Rolls-Royce Griffon 7

Rolls-Royce Gyron

24

Rolls-Royce Merlin 7

Rolls-Royce RB167-1 21

Royal Aircraft Establishment

(RAE) Farnborough

9

10 14 49

Royal Air Force (RAF) 43

Royal International Air

Tattoo 109,163

Royal Flight 108

Sagem-Ferranti II 1

SEREB39

Short Bros 14

Singapore Airlines

100

SNECMA 13 21 27 29 44

101,149,157,167

Society ofJapanese

AerospaceCompanies

174 177

Specification E.24/43 9

SpecificationE.28/39 8

Squadron,616 8

SudAviation

13

19,21,22,

23 26 27 29 39 166

SukhogoOKB 128,132

Sukhoi OKB

181

SunchaserOne I 10

SupersonicCruise Research

Program

167

SupersonicTransport Aircraft

Committee(STAC)

13-5, 18,20

SupersonicTransport

Development

Committee

17

Technology ConceptAircraft

170

Third Reich,

The

7

Treaty ofVersailles 7

TSCAcGcl

130

Tupolev, Andrei Andreivich

128 130 3 138 143

144

TWA

100

USAF 118

VariableCycle Engine

Development Program

180

Vickers Aircraft 10 14 18

21,26

VictoriasSecret

106

VirginAtlantic

164

Viton 161

Whittle W2/7009

WoomeraTest Centre

177

XVS (external vision syslem)

172

Zhokovsky Development

Centre

144

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