concept of other in anthropology

8/11/2019 Concept of Other in Anthropology

1/5

The 'Other' in Anthropology and PhilosophyAuthor(s): Sundar SarukkaiSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 24 (Jun. 14-20, 1997), pp. 1406-1409Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4405512.

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2/5

h e O t h e r

n

nthropology a n d

hilosophy

Sundar Sarukkai

The totion of the 'other' has become very

prevalent in social sciences. Here the 'other' is examined as it occurs

in

anthropology

and

philosophy,

primarily

through Levinas and Derrida. Based on this, a radical

revision of

anthropological knowledge,

'ethicall)

'oriented and

incorporating

subjectivity

as

an

essential element,

is

suggested.

Finall), it is argued that within such a frameworkfiction has to be considered as a valid ethnographic data.

M N SRINIVAS makes a few provocative

and timely comments n his recentarticleon

Indian

anthropology Srinivas 1996].

Two

important bservationshave to do with

the

notion

of

self-in-the-other nd he suggestion

that ndian

nthropologists

houldnow move

to the studyof the self fromself-in-the-other.

Unfortunately,

he has not

developed

these

concepts in

more detail.

The

thematisation

of the other

and the self is of fundamental

importancend s primarilynformed hrough

philosophyandpsychology. The aim of this

paper

s to

explicate the natureof

the other

and the self as

they occur

in

anthropology

and

philosophy,

hus

addressing he

nherent

tensions

in

ethnography.

After

a

brief introduction o

the way

the

other is

understood

in

anthropology,

the

more

philosophical approaches through

Levinas

and Derrida are

explained.

The

importanceof

cknowledging he

Levinasian

other

in

anthropological discourse

is

underlined.

This

demands of

ethnography

an

'ethical responsibility' owards

he

other

which will go beyond objectifying he other.

Srinivas' remarkson self-in-the-otherand

on

the

relevance

of

autobiography

as

ethnographys discussed nconnectionwith

this other.

Finally, it

is

argued that the

perpetual

absence of the other

which

manifests

itself

only

in

terms

of

its

traces

gives

a

valid reason to look towards

fiction

as a legitimate tool for

anthropological

studies.

The

Anthropological

'Other'

Jacob Pandian n his clear

exposition

on

anthropology

and the

other, suggests

that

the 'Judeo-Christian

ymbol(s) of divinity

and the Christianconceptionof the human

self'

[Pandian

1985:5],underliesthemodem

anthropological

iscourse.The construction

of

the

other was with

'characteristics

which

are

alien

to

the

western

tradition'

[Pandian

1985:6].

Modern

anthropology

arose when

it began to contrastand alienate he cultures

which were different from the

west,

and in

fact the

uniqueness

of

anthropology

itself

'stems from the use of

the

human other'.

The

primnary

ole

of

anthropology

thus

was a

process

of

'inventing

he

human

other'

in order

o

develop

a

theory

of

humankind.

This

anthropological other is basically

epistemological.

It is based on the notion

of

perceiveddifferences and is a

cognitive

process nvolving observation, ollection

of

dataandtheorising.Thus, there s a

plethora

of

human others which appear

in

anthropology.

Pandian lists some of the

dominantothers

used n thisdiscoursewhich

includesthe

fossil other,savage

other.

black

other and the ethnographicother.

In the

discourse

on

progress,development

and

rationality which had

become

characteristic f the west as described

by

themselves.the search for

the

basic human

condition gave rise to the fossil other. The

non-western people were seen to

embody

what the primeval west was before

its

'progress' and thus were seen as 'living

fossils'. The

historicalgrowthof

these

ideas

show inherent

deas

of

domination. Thus,

the

idea

of

the non-western people

as the

living fossil drewsupport rom he historical

and biological theories

of

the times.

Consistently,

he other

stood

for an inferior

human and was even

understood

in the

paradigm

of

the

native children as

against

the

adult west.

Much of these ideas overlap in the

constructionof the

savage other,

primarily

oriented towards

the

Africans and which

subsequently

encompassedeven the Indian

people. Similarly,

or the

black

other,

whose

continued

mportance

ies in the validation

of racism

itself.

Pandian also establishes a

critique

of

ethlnography

and the

ways

in which the

preoccupation

f the west

regarding

he

non-

west still reflectsmuchof theirprejudices.

The reasons

why ethnography tself

'works'

seems to be

more a reflection of economic

and social dynamics of inter-cultural

relationships. In fact, he suggests that

'eliminatingprejudice

would be

eliminating

anthropology' [Pandian

1985:92].

The

basic

problem

n

the

anthropological

other

is

that it

is

never a

recognition

of the

other;

rather t

is

just

an

epistemological

other which perhaps says more about the

epistemological

ystems

of the

ethnographer

rather han

any

'honest'

description

of

the

other.

Anthropology,

unlike other

sciences,

is

not.a

study

of inanimate-ness nd thus has

to

go beyond

the

epistemological

models

derived

fromthesedisciplines. suggestthat

the problem of the anthropologicalother is

due to this process, and one way out is to

look for anotherway to thematise he other,

through a process which will grant to

anthropology its unique status as a study

of humans.The way out is to re-understand

the other and perhaps integrate into its

epistemology an ethical responsibility

towards the

other.

The anthropological other is one based

purelyondifference.Butthisdoesnotaddress

the basic

ssue

of

the human elf constructing

the other.

The notion

of

the othercannot ie

only in difference; if so, thereis really no

difference in acknowledgingthe othemess

of a rose plantor a zebraand hatof a person.

Rightly too, one can make a distinction

between observing the behaviouralpatterns

of

a

community

of zebrasand a

community

of

people.

If

the latter

constitutes

ethnography,

then

ethnography comprises

more than

mere observation and

categorisation of behavioural patterns or

kinship tructures.Whatmakes heothemess

of humans the other is more than this.

Following Levinas, and ater

Derrida,

place

the thematisation

of

the

other

in

an ethical

domain. It is the ethical imperative, an

acknowledgement f thedemandof

the

other

that creates the

responsibility

towards

the

other.

It is this

responsibility,

which fills the

notion of

the other

in

Levinas, that

differentiates he otherness of zebra andof

humans.

The anthropological other, based on

difference,

has forsaken he

responsibility

of

the subject towards the other.

In

the model

of

epistemology of the physical sciences,

it

has

forsaken the notion

of

responsibility

from

the objectivedomain.Anthropological

knowledge,

n

constructing he

otherwithout

theethical mperative,acrificestheotherness

in order o

objectify

humans nto

things

and

subsume he other

nto the

'same'.

Objective,

rational

pistemology

is based on the denial

of

any

ethical relationbetween the

self and

the

object. Founding

its

epistemology

on

thismodel,ethnographys blind o thedictates

of the

other.This

anthropological

thermakes

animals out

of

humans,

if not worse.

A

reprieve

was

given

to

anthropology

n

the

guise

of Malinowski who

emphasised

the

importance

of

studying

alien

cultures

n

the form of

participant-observation.

But

1406 Economic and Political Weekly June 14, 1997

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3/5

Malinowski's

ethnography still remains

a

categorisation

of

difference, a

taxonomy of

humanobjects. It does

not even come close

to addressingthe

fundamentalproblemof

otherness.

Participant-observationttempts

to build on this

but its response falls

way

short.

The process of the

anthropological

'stranger'

seeking

to define

the native

has

made

the native alien

while upholding

the

autonomy

f the

western

elf. In his

scenario,

the alien

who invades the

territory

of

the

native takes

over the spirit of the native

by

constructing hem as the other. The

nature

of

the other in this case is vcry clear: it is

otheras

not-self. The

nitial

anthropological

othersuffers

ontinuously rom his

violence,

a violence of

the

refiguration

of

the

constitution of

the native self. This other

in this

case

is

all that the

ethnographer

s

not. It s this

othernessof the

ethnographer's

self that this

kind of ethnographic

study

yields andnot theselfof the native.

Coupled

to this is

the

distancing

of

subjectivity

in

staking

an

epistemological

claim

to

anthropologicalobservation which further

risks

osing the 'essence'

ofthe native's self.

This

activity s

in

its most fundamental

ense

an

objectification

of the natives which in the

process ends

up

objectifying

the

impartial

observer

him/herself.

In

participant bservation,

he 'distance';

of the

native from the

observer s

sought

to

be reduced

by becomingone of the natives.

The

dress,

the

customs and

language

are

borrowed,

however

imperfectly,

to fit the

gaze

of theobserver.But

afterall he

attempts

at

assimilation,

he

gaze

is still not lost.

Here

the other is understood differently. By

simulating

the

otherness

of

the

native,

the

observer

constructs

his

self as

'not-other'.

Although

in

opposition

to

constructing

he

otheras not-self. The

constructionof self as

'not-other'does

equalviolence

on

the

notion

of otherness. The

observing

self

continues

to remain

the

epistemological

'not-other'.

As

long

as the

gaze

of

the

observer

searches

out for

structuresuntold and

hidden

by

the

natives,

it becomes a

violent act. Violence

arises

here in the Levinasian

sense of not

heeding

the

ethical call of

the other,

the

ethicalcall

whichdemands

responsibility

of

theobservingself towardsthe native other.

Thus,

n

both

hesecasesof

anthropological

observation,

he other s

constructedandnot

realised on a

pre-categorical

level.

Only

epistemological categories of the other as

'not-self and the

self as 'not-other'

remain.

Both

these continue with the

supposition

that

there

is

no

responsibility

to the

other

andremain eaf

o its call. Suchan

abrogation

of

responsibility

is

only because the

epistemological

models

are

understoqd

o

be

so. But this

obviously

does not serve the

anthropological

concern and

opens

anthropology

o the charge of

colonialism.

II

The

Philosophical Other

I would like to

approach he discussion

of

the other n philosophyprimarily

hrough

Levinas

andDerrida.Levinas'coflcem

arises

at

a

pre-philosophical, pre-cognate level.

The

ability to

distinguish humans from

animals is

by

acknowledging the human

otherasother.This

other

s

more undamental

than

any human activity. It is

the

responsibility towards the other

that even

makes dialogical peech

andreason'possible

[Degnin 1995]. In his

reading of Levinas,

Degnin situates the

importance

of

the 'face

of

the other' as

evoking the subject.It

is

the

call

of the otheras one

like me which begets

this ethical

responsibility.Thus, theOther

is

the

first

truth,but not in

a cognitive sense.

Ratherthis truthis

the experience of the

ethical call that

eventuates

prior

to and is

constitutive of

reason, metaphysics and

discourse

[Degnin 1995].

When the self

attempts

to

subsume

the

other nto the

'same',

then

there

s

violence

done

against

the

other. There is an ethical

responsibility not to

violate the other by

reducing

t to one's own

system

of

thought.

The violence arises in

ignoring this a priori

ethical call.

Ignoring

he call is also to

view

the

other

as

an

object

of

knowledge. Doing

so, only

eliminates the

identity

of

the other

and

re-figures

t in

the

eyes

of

the

subject,

'thereby incorporating

he other into

the

identity

of the

constituting ubject'

[Powell

1995].

The deeper problem here

is

one of

representation.

he other s

represented,

nd

perhaps

even constituted

through,

this

representationn the way of the subject.It

is the

process

of

representing

heotherwhich

subsumes

it

into the

intelligibility

of

the

subject

and

negates

its

identity.

Levinas'

writings

on the

other

situateshis

concern

n

the ethical

space.

But thisethics

is

not the ethics

ordinarily

understood as

system

of moralsand

prescriptions.

He

points

the

path

not to a

theory

of

ethics but

of

orientingthe ubject owards

acknowledging

and

responding

o the

'ethical',

before

it is

categorised by

knowledge.

As

Derrida

remarks, what Levinas

proposes

to

understand

s

the

essence

of the

ethical

relation in general [Derrida 1978]. Ethics

has o

be basedon a

'pre-given

thicalrelation

to

which all ethics

responds' [Powell

1995].

Powell makes

the

point

that ethics is

dependent

on a

theory

of the

subject

and the

ethical edifice is

based on the

'active

agent

as the

foundationof ethics'.

Levinas

draws

us to the

recognition

of

the ethical which is

not

based

on

the

hegemony

of the

subject

but

ratheras

one which

responds

o the

pre-

cognitive

relationwith

the other. In

fact,

as

Powell

remarks,

the

very

notion of

subj}ectivity

risesonly because the

subject

is responding o the other, who is

prior to

the

subject n the

sense

that the

other makes

possible

the transformation romsubjectto

subjectivity.

Knowledgeof theother, n terms

of its

representation,omes after his

response

to the other

and

prior

to the

taking-up

of

history, I

have already responded to the

other, he

meaning

of

ethics has

alreadybeen

given, I have

already been subjectedto

the

history of the

other [Powell 1995].

In his later work[Levinas

1981], Levinas

shifted to the notion

of trace

in

order

to

understand

the other. The

Derridean

'differance' would be an

ideal

word to

describe

this

other

-

not

only

is

the

other

different but it is also in

perpetual

postponement. When I

grasp towards the

other,

I

am left

holding,

continuously,

races

of

the other. The traces

constitute the

perpetualabsence of the

other; because he

Other is

structurally

absent

-

always

unreachable

[Degnin 1995].

My

responsibility

towards

the other makes

me

plod

along diligently, going from one trace

to

the

next,

forever

thus

constructing

the

othemess. It

is

in this

acknowledgement

of

theperpetual

ostponement hat

heotherness

lies.

Acknowledging

this is

accepting the

implausibility

of

completeness; the

responsibility

ies in

accepting

what s

granted

and

to

plod

on in

the

path

of

possible

infinite

significations.

But this

responsibility

s

not

ontological, not

so

long

as it sees the other

only

as a

knowable

entity.

The

awareness

of the

other

in

terms of an

ethical

responsibility

is what makes

the

process

ontological. Thus,

in

order to be 'true' to

the

other,

ethnography

hould

base

itself on

the

concept

of

differance rather than

one

based on difference.

Theideaofthetraceis

importanttoDerrida

in his

critique

f the

'metaphysics

f

presence'

-

even as we

prioritisepresence

we

lose

all

that s

present

hrough

absence.

This

presence

of absence is

marked

hrough

with the trace

oftheother.

Keameypoints

out

that

although

the

early

Derrida's work

focused on the

epistemological

contrast

between

presence

and

absence,

his

later

works

show

'emphasis

on the

question

of

ethical

responsibility'

[Kearney1993].Theethical ssue hereshould

beunderstoodnthe

contextdescribed

bove;

as

Kearney

remarks,

deconstruction's

obsession with alterity is compatiblewith

the

ethics of

'increased

responsibility '

[Kearney

1993].

Deconstruction,

unlike

many

mistaken accounts of

it. partakes

a

responsibility

which n its foundational

ense

is

a

search for the other. The continued

onslaught

n the

reduction nd

representation

of the

other

impels

the

ethical

directedness

of

deconstructionwhich

above all becomes

'an openness

towards the

other'

[Kearney

1993].

The above

discussion

suggests that the

apparent

polarity of the self

and the

other

is still immersed n the

subject/objectdivide.

Economic and Political

Weekly

June

14, 1997

1407



4/5

The presenceof the otheralso continuously

points to its absencewhich is manifestedby

its traces. The inevitability of

trace also

points o the impossibilityof having

a 'final'

reference which does

not refer to anything

else. Thecontinual

postponementof rasping

the

other n its fullness s

the absenceof

such

a reference.At the most fundamental

evel,

there is left only the notion of ethical

responsibility

which binds the self and the

other.Languagecannot

ranscend

his;

rather,

it

reflects

hisresponsibility

n its

full entirety

-

'language

is ethics' [Kearney 1993].

Thus, the philosophical deliberations

on

the other strikeat the fundamentalproblem

with the anthropologicalother. This

other

is

basedon

an

artificial

ubjectlobject ivide,

which,as manyphenomenologistshave

ong

argued,

is untenable. In fact, Derrida,

as

quoted by

Kearney,has

this to

say,

...it

is

the other

which invokes and provokes

the

subjectbefore any genuinc questioning

can

begin Kearney1993].Theabovediscussion

perhapspoints

to the

importance

f

integrat-

ing this notion of the other within the

anthropologicaldiscourse,

but

it is a

vexing

problem

as to how

one

integrates

he notion

of ethical

responsibility

withinan

epistemo-

logical system.

Althougha clear

answer is

not

available,

it

opens

us

to

the illusion

of

complete and closed description

of any

'object'

of

inquiry.

It also

suggests

that

anthropologyhould inddifferentparadigms

of

knowledge

whichare

basedon the

critique

of

westernmetaphysics.

One of the ways

of

doing this

is

discussed

in the final section.

III

Self-in-the-Other

Srinivas n his article

(1996) points

to an

underlying

difference'

between

an Indian

anthropologiststudying

Indian tribals

as

against

the

'foreign' anthropologist.

Since

the Indian anthropologist

and the tribals

inhabit the

'same cultural

urverse',

he

suggests

that he tribalsare

never

)tally

the

other.This relationshipof inhabitin-g

n

the

same

space

leads him to

suggest

that

n this

case it is self-in-the-other

which s

operative.

Whether this

will be acceptable to the

practicing

ield worker rom

another ulture

is not the issue addressedhere. My main

interest

s in

understanding

he other andin

this

context

the

other used by

Srinivas

also

carries with it the

baggage

of the anthro-

pological

other. Self-in-the-other

s

not an

ontological

category. The

other of Levinas

towards

which

the subject

has the ethical

engagement

is

'pre-philosophical

and

pre-

cognitive'.

But there

is

an

important onsequence

of

this

self-as-the-other.

would ike to

explicate

this in more

detail

by basing

it on

the

notion

of subjectivity,which, I suspect, s atthe

root

of this view.

If the tribalother is accessible

as a totally

objectifiedother

hen it does not matterwho

the ethnographers. In other words,

if

the

subject/object divide

is

enforced

in the

traditionalway, then the object

s 'out there'

waiting to be

discoveredand categorisedby

the ethnographer. The adequacy

of this

description

will then depend on the

competence of

the ethnographer.

Phenomenologists, in general, have

difficulty

in

accepting

such a facile

subject/

object divide.

To

them,

objectivity

is

intricately

enmeshed

with the notion

of

subjectivity.It is the subject's orientation

which informs what the object

is. Further

discussion on

this is

beyond

the scope

of

this

paper.

The

point

nevertheless

is

important

to place the

self-in-the-other as one more

expression

of the presence

of

subjectivity

n

all

humanactivity, including epistemology.

The perception

of theother.for example,

the tribalother,

is

dependenton

the

subject

who

perceives.

For an enthropologistwho

has a shared

history/culturewith the tribals,

the perceptionof the tribalswill definitely

be differentbecause

of

the

orientation

f

the

anthropologist

towards

the tribal other.

Srinivas' call to a

study

of

the self-in-the-

other suggests

a

revision in

the

way

anthropologists

should think

about the

subject/object

ichotomy.Immersed s they

are in western metaphysicalepistemology,

they

fail

to see the

importance

f

recognising

epistemological

systems

in

which

the

subjective plays

the central

part.

There

shouldbe a little caveatevenamong

anthropologists

o

the

claim that

the

study

of

tribals

by

an Indian

anthropologist

would

be 'different' than by a 'foreigner'. But

serious

disagreements

may

ariseon themerits

of

this

difference, primarily

because

of the

belief

that

there

is some true

knowledge

outside

us

waiting

to

be discovered.

But in

placing hisdebateon thephenomenologist's

position

on

subjectivity, hey

would be hard

pressed to counter

the

importance

of the

concept

of

self-in-the-other.

I

give

a

rather tenuous example

of the

importance

f the

role

cultural

history

of the

subject plays

in

ethnography.

f we look at

the idea

of the

other, primarily through

common

anguage

used

n

India,

we

find

that

the otherhas a different meaninghere than

in the west. There

is, maybe

in all Indian

languages,

a

conception

of the other

which

is

different from the

way

the

word is

used

in

English

or

French,

for

example.

The

commonly

used

word for the other

n

Tamil,

Kannada

r

Malayalam,

or

example,

s

'one

more'. The phrase 'one

more' has different

connotations than

the 'other'.

Firstly,

it

quantifies

his notionof otherness.

Secondly,

it

implies

that the

other

is

nothing

but one

more of the self. The

distancing

of

the

self

and the other s totally different

as reflected

in such usage. This conception hides in it

the notion of self-in-the-other.

n

Hindi, the

commonly used

word for

other

s

translated

as 'second' and ess

commonly,

'one

more'.

Once again, hese arequantified ermswhich

stand for the other and carry

with

them the

implication

of

the other

as

extension

of one's

self. For a person steeped in this tradition,

this

does make a

qualitative

difference in

constructing

he other. think

his,

n

essence,

is what Srinivas' call to Indian

anthropologists

s about.

IV

Autobiography and the

Other-in-the-Self

Srinivas suggests that the autobiography

of an individual should

be a valid

ethno-

graphic ool. 'Why cannot

an

anthropologist

treat his own

life

as an

ethnographic

ield

and

study

it?'

[Srinivas

1996]. I would

like

to

bring

this

importantpoint

nto

the

context

of the above discussion.

The essence of

autobiography

s the

other-

in-the-self. Self-in-the-other respondsto a

relationship primarily mediated spatially

between

the self and the other. It is this

perpetualdistance rom

he

self and he other

which underlies ethnography. A temporal

characters also

present

n

such

a

relationship

but

is not

manifested

in its

immediacy.)

The case of autobiography

s

different. It

is

fundamentally

n articulation f theother-

in-the-self. The self writes its

biography

at

a

given present.

The

reconstruction

of the

self

in

this act is to recordevents

in

the

past.

The autobiographybecomes a collection of

the residue of the self and is

temporally

constituted. The autobiography.s nothing

more than an inscriptionof the other within

oneself.

The self which inhabited itself

becomes

the otheronce

it

goes past

he

iving

moment.

Thus,

a life's recollection

gives

a

series of

pictures of the

other which is

continuously

connected o

the

present, iving

self.

Thisotheriscapturednotthroughpatial

distancing

of

the

self from the

other

but

purely

as a

temporal process.

The

anthropological

other-in-the-self

is

thus

a

recreation

of

the other

which inhabits

the

self.

The

ontological counterpart

f this

is not

available,

at least in

my reading

of

Levinas. But this point of omission can be

rectified. In

autobiography

as

a written

act,

as

self-reflection

of our

past,

the self comes

face to face with the other

which

once

inhabited

he

self.

Coming

face

to

face

with

my-other

has all

the characteristics f

coming

face to face with an-other.Levinasianethics

is

directed o

the

otheroutside

myself

without

taking

into account this

possibility

of the

response

of

myself

to

the other

which

resides

in

me. And this shows the

implausibility

of

the ethical

responsibility ndependent

f the-

.'direction'

of the gaze towards heother.The

ethical response to the other-in-my-self s

1408

Economic and

Political

Weekly

June

14,

1997



5/5

different from the one

towards an other

spatially separated rom me. The call 'not

to kill'

[Degnin 1995], is a

corporeal call

which

neglects the possibility of the other

which resides in me,

unless, in this case, it

is seen as a call not to

commit suicide.

I

would ike to call thisethnographic tudy

of one's own life as

auto-ethnography. t is

easy to

understandwhy such a methodwould

belookeduponwithsuspicion.

Thedominant

reaction

against this

activity will be based

on

the excessive presence of

subjectivity

in such a

process. Since knowledge,

anthropologicalor

otherwise,

has

made a

virtue of making the

subject

invisible,

this

processof

auto-ethnographywould be seen

as

epistemologically suspect.

But as our

previous

rguments howed,

this

forcedexile

of the

subject

is

totally misplaced. The

richness of

epistemology

increases as the

subjectiveelement

is

absorbed.Thus, at the

conflux of

anthropologyand

philosophy we

can situate the

re-discovery

of the

subject

into our

knowledge games.

In this

case,

auto-ethnography

ecomes a valid tool of

anthropological knowledge.

Srinivas'

emphasis

on the

self-in-the-other and his

suggestion

of

auto-ethnography

hows his

underlying

unease

with

the exclusion of

the

subject

romthe

anthropological

discourse.

He,

tops

at

this

uncture

but an

extrapolation

of the above ideas

naturally

leads me to

consider

iction as a valid

ethnographic

ool.

V

Anthropology

and Fiction

The

relevance

of fiction in

anthropology

is not a new idea, as many quotable quotes

by

eminent

anthropologists

attest. What I

shall do here

is

suggest

cogent

reasons to

consider fiction as

a

valid

tool in

anthropology,

ased

on

theabove

arguments.

Fiction tands

as

the

exemplarof ubjective

construction

f the

world.

Anthropologyby

its exclusion of the

subjectiveposition by

objectifying

human

communities

and

by

creating

he

anthropological

other can

have

no

use

for

fiction.

This

distancing

of fiction

is best

exemplified by

the

way

anthropological

theris

constructed,

s

based

on

difference and

clearly

referential. The

ambiguityof the otheris repressed n order

to

get

as

'true' a

picture

as

possible.

Within

such

a

dogma, fiction,

by

its

exploding

possibilities,

n its

refusal o exile the

subject,

is

immediately

ruled out.

If

anthropology

s

willing

to

go beyond

this other it constructsand into

recognising

its

function as

answering

the ethical call of

the

other,

then we

will

have

to

address the

relevanceof fiction as

ethnographic

data.

It

is in the nature

of

the other that

such

a

possibility

arises.

The

other,

as mentioned

above,

is a trace as we grasp

toward,>

t,

it escapes leaving behind just

the trace of

its

presence. The complete grasping of the

otherig

mpossible. t sjust this

phenomenon

which is the spirit of

fiction. A story of

a

community, for

example, is filled with the

tracesof the

other, n termsof itspossibilities

and actualities.The

footprintsof the other

dot the

work of fiction which

when taken

together will allow us

an archive of traces.

It is within

this that the other is constituted.

Fictionis also a

method which allows for

subjective

orientations in

describing the

world.

The richness, the ambiguity and

contradictions of

this description are

anathema

o

the

objective

epistemological

schemes which rest

on the belief towards

attaining

completeness

and non-

contradiction.But as

we

have

seen, the world

cannot

sustain the

burden

of

being

broken

artificially nto the

subjectandobject;cannot

base itself on the

terrorof finite and closed

knowledge.

Thus,

if

anthropology

wants to extend its

domain

beyond 'objective'

ethnography,

f

it

s

willingto accept

ts

responsibilityowards

t4c other,

then the

relevance of fiction

as

a

valid epistemological tool should be

acknowledged. Since the other

is not

an

'object'

which

can

be

completely

accessed

through rational'

pistemologies,and since

its

presence derives

through

its

perpetual

absence,

fiction

becomes one

of the

most

important

ways through

which the traces

of

the

other can

be

identified.

Perhaps

there

is

a

lesson

in

this for

all

social

sciences,

including philosophy.

Philosophy

is not immune from such

a

criticism

and

artificial

distinctions

between

philosophy and

iterature re

also

untenable.

Rorty, who

perhaps hould

be

consideredas

the

spokesperson

or this

view,.shouldhave

the last

word:

...the

mportant

lace

to

draw

a

line is not

between

philosophy and

non-

philosophy

but rather

between

topicswhich

we know how

to argue

about

those

we do

not

[Rorty

1993].

[I hankMNSrinivasorenthusiasticiscussions

which

madethis

work

possible. I

also thank

Dhanu

Nayak or her

manycritical

omments.]

References

Degnin, Francis

Dominic (1995): 'Laughter

and

Metaphysics: Interruptionsof Levinas

and

Nietzche',

Philosophy Today, 39:1.

Derrida,Jacques 1978):

Writingand

Difference,

(translated

Alan

Bass),Universityof

Chicago

Press, p 111.

Kearney,

Richard 1993): 'Derrida's

EthicalRe-

turn' nGary

Madison(ed),

WorkingThrough

Derrida,

Northwestern

University Press.

Levinas,Emmanuel 198

1):Otherwise han

Being

or

Beyond

Essence, (translated

Alphonso

Lingis), MartinusNijhoff.

Pandian, Jacob (1985):

Anthropology and the

WesternTradition,

Waveland Press, Inc.

Powell, Jeffrey (1995): 'Levinas

Representing

Husserlon

Representation:

An

Ethics

Beyond

Representation',Philosophy

Today, 39:2.

Srinivas,

M

N

(1996): 'Indian

Anthropologists

and the

Study

of

Indian

Culture',

Economic

and

Political

Weekly,

Vol

XXXI,

No

11,

March.

Rorty, Richard

(1993): 'Is

Derrida

a

Transcendental

hilosopher'

n

Gary

Madison

(ed),

WorkingThroughDerrida,Northwestern

University

Press.

REVIEW OF WOMEN STUDIES

April 26, 1997

Pursuing Third

World

Women's Interests:Compatibility

of Feminism with Grass Roots Development

-Archana Kalegaonkar

Women's Paid Domestic

Work and Rural Transformation:

A

Study

in

South

Gujarat

-Uma Kothari

Women Panchayat Members

in Kerala: A Profile

-Manu

Bhaskar

Female

Infanticide

n Tamil Nadu:

Some Evidence

-Sheela Rani Chunkath

V

B Athreya

Unmet

Need

for

Family

Planning

in

Gujarat:

A Qualitative Exploration

-Leela Visaria

The Review of Women Studies

appears

twice

yearly

as a

supplement

to the last

issues

of

April

and

October.

Earlierissueshave

focused on: Genderand

Development

Indices (October 1996);

Women and Science

(April 1996);

Women's Rights

and

Social

Change (October

1995);

GenderIssues in

Theory

and Practice

(April 1995);

Women'sMovementinThirdWorld(October994);

Genderand

tructural

djustment

(April 1994), Women and Public Space (October 1993);

Community,

State and

Women's Agency (April 1993).

For

copies

write to

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Manager

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