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Analele Universitii Constantin Brncui din Trgu Jiu, Seria Litere i tiine Sociale, Nr. 1/2009

Annals of the Constantin Brncui University of Trgu Jiu, Letters and Social Sciences Series, Issue 1/2009

77

CAPITULAREA DEMOCRAIILOR N

FAA DICTATURILOR: POLITICA DE

CONCILIATORISM FADEGERMANIA

(1935-1939)

Lect. univ dr. Hadrian G. GorunUniversitatea Constantin Brncui din

Trgu-Jiu

RezumatAcest studiu ncearc s demonstreze c

democraiile pot fi slabe. Ele ar putea fi uor nvinsede dictaturi. Liderii statelor democratice au

considerat ca dictaturile au avut acelai sistem devalori. Dar, daca ar fi sa ne gndim, n astfel determeni, la un regim totalitar, am observa ca au fcuto mare greeal. Germania, condusa de liderul nazistAdolf Hitler, a profitat de toate greselile Franei iAngliei n anii 30 ai secolului XX.

Cuvinte cheie: democratie, dictatura, politica deconciliatorism.

Studiul realizat mai jos intenioneazs demonstreze c politica conciliatoare ademocraiilor occidentale Anglia i Frana,manifestat fa de statele revizioniste dup

primul rzboi mondial, ndeosebi fa deGermania, n a doua jumtate a anilor 30 aconstituit unul dintre motivele eseniale ale

izbucnirii celei de a doua conflagraiimondiale. Aceast atitudine de clemenadoptat de ctre cele dou state n relaiilecu cel de al III-lea Reich, cunoscut subdenumirea de appeasement(conciliatorism) afost evidentn timpul crizei renane din anul1936, n chestiunea Anschluss-ului (martie1938) i, mai ales n problematica crizeicehoslovace din 1938-1939. n acest sens,apogeul poziiei conciliatoare a fost marcatde Conferina de la Mnchen din toamna lui

DEMOCRACIES SURRENDER TO

DICTATORSHIPS: CONCILIATING

POLICY TO GERMANY(1935-1939)

Lect. PhD Hadrian G. GorunConstantin Brncui University of

Trgu-Jiu

AbstractThis study tries to demonstrate that the

democracies could be weak. They could be easily

defeated by the dictatorships. The leaders of thedemocratic states considered that dictatorships had thesame system of values. But thinking of a totalitarianregime in such terms, they made a big mistake.Germany, leaded by the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler tookadvantages from all the mistakes of France andEngland in the 30s of the XX-th century.

Key words: democracy, dictatorship, conciliatingpolicy.

The next study intends to prove thatconciliating policy of Western democraciesEngland and France towards revisioniststates after the first world war, especiallytowards Germany, during the second halfof the 30s, was one of the essential reasonsfor the second world war. This attitude of

clemency adopted by the two states in therelations to the third Reich, known underthe name of appeasement was obviousduring the Renan crisis from 1936, in thematter of Anschluss (March 1938) andespecially, in the matter ofCzechoslovakian crisis from 1938-1939.The apogee of the conciliation position wasmarked by the Conference in Mnchen inthe autumn of 1938.

The appeasement policy of western

democracies towards Hilers Germany


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1938.Politica de appeasement a

democraiilor occidentale fa de Germanialui Hitler a implicat toleran, ingduinfa

de aciunile agresive ale celei din urm ichiar concesii, compromisuri [ 1. Le Breton,J.-M., Europa Central i Oriental ntre1917 i 1990, Editura Cavallioti, Bucureti,1996, p. 37], n sperana cpacea ar putea fisalvat n acest mod, recurgnd la cedri irenunri. Personaliti politice engleze ifranceze precum Stanley Baldwin, NevilleChamberlain, douard Daladier, AnthonyEden sau lordul Halifax au sperat ca printr-oconduit mpciuitorist promovat cu orice

pre, prin intermediul negocierilor directe cuGermania, stempereze, sdomoleasczelulexpansionist al fhrerului. Prin politica deconciliere, occidentalii vizau prevenirea unuirzboi generalizat. ns, efectul nu a fost celscontat de ctre oamenii politici occidentali,ci chiar unul neprevzut i nedorit.Dimpotriv, contientiznd slbiciuneademocraiilor vestice, conductorul nazist atins s acapareze noi teritorii, simindu-sencurajat n proiectele sale hegemonice i

agresive. Atitudinea ulterioar a Germanieidemonstreaz perfect sintagma rspnditmai trziu, potrivit creia Appeasementbrings aggression.

Conciliatorismul se fundamenta pecteva principii, dintre care cele maiimportante erau detestarea rzboiului iconvingerea c dictatorii au revendicrilegitime care se impun satisfcute ntr-omsur ct mai mare, scopul urmrit fiindrealizarea unui nou echilibru n Europa. Laacestea se adugau nencrederea fa deangajamentele diplomatice n Europa,contientizarea slbiciunii militare britanicei credina ntr-o diplomaie personal, de laom la om. [ 2. Dicionar de relaiiinternaionale. Secolul XX, volum coordonatde Maurice Vasse, Editura Polirom,Bucureti, 2008, p. 86].

La sfritul lui ianuarie 1933, AdolfHitler a devenit cancelar al Germaniei . nc

cu opt ani mai devreme, el i-a expus destul

involved tolerance, indulgence toaggressive actions of the latter and evenconcessions, compromises [ 1. Le Breton,J.-M., Central and Eastern Europe between

1917 and 1990, Cavallioti Press,Bucharest, 1996, p. 37], hoping that peacecould be saved in this way, by giving upand renunciation. English and French

political figures like Stanley Baldwin,Neville Chamberlain, douard Daladier,Anthony Eden or lord Halifax hoped thatthrough a peaceful behavior promoted atany cost, through direct negotiations withGermany, they could moderate, mitigatethe expansionist goals of the fuehrer.

Through the conciliation, Western peopleintended to prevent a generalized war. Butthe effect was not what they had expected,

but an unpredicted and unwanted one. Onthe contrary, being aware of the weaknessof Western democracies, the Nazi leadertended to conquer new territories, feelingencouraged in its hegemonic andaggressive projects. Germanys futureattitude perfectly proves the further phraseaccording to which Appeasement bringsaggression.

Conciliatoriness is based on a fewprinciples, among which the mostsignificant were the hate towards war andthe belief that dictators have legitimateclaims that need to be satisfied to a higherextent, the purpose being the achievementof a new equilibrium in Europe. Thesewere completed by the lack of trust todiplomatic commitments in Europe,awareness of British military weakness andthe belief in a personal diplomacy, fromman to man. [ 2. International Relations

Dictionary. 20th Century, volumecoordinated by Maurice Vasse, PoliromPress, Bucharest, 2008, p. 86].

At the end of January 1933, AdolfHitler became the chancellor of Germanu.Eight years before he had explicitlyexposed its external policy priorities in the

paper Mein Kampf [3. See Hitler, A., Mein

Kampf. My Fight Beladi Press, Bucharest,


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de explicit prioritile de politic extern nlucrarea Mein Kampf [3. Vezi Hitler, A.,

Mein Kampf. Lupta mea, Editura Beladi,Bucureti, 1994] elaboratn timp ce se afla

n detenie la nchisoarea Landsberg, duptentativa nereuitde a nfptui o loviturdestat, la Mnchen n noiembrie 1923.[4.Milza, P., Berstein, S. , Istoria Secolului

XX. Sfritul Lumii Europene, volumul 1,Editura BIC ALL, Bucureti, 1998, p. 180 ].Programul enunat de viitorul dictator nazistcuprindea trei etape: n primul rnd, elinteniona eliberarea Germaniei deconstrngerile militare mpovrtoare impuse

prin tratatul de la Versailles din 1919, apoi

reunirea tuturor populaiilor de originegermanic ntr-un singur stat, vizai fiindaustriecii. ntr-o ultim faz, era vizatcucerirea aa-numitului Lebensraum (spaiuvital) pe seama Uniunii Sovietice i a altor

popoare slave. [5.Ibidem, p. 341]. Potrivit luiHenry Kissinger, secretarul de stat americandin timpul preediniei lui Richard Nixon, luiHitler i se datoreaz prbuirea ordiniiinternaionale stabilite cu prilejul Conferineide pace de la Paris precum un castel de cri

de joc. [6. Kissinger, H. , Diplomaia,Editura BIC ALL, Bucureti, 2003, p. 251].

Adeptul unui discurs foartedemagogic i deosebit de penetrant, Hitler aspeculat la maximum orgoliul rnit ifrustrrile germanilor dup cea dinticonflagraie mondial. El a obinut adeziuneaopiniei publice interne pentru politica externhegemonic i anexionist. Planurilerevizioniste referitoare la tratatul de laVersailles au fost ncununate de success idatorit ineriei de care au dat dovaddemocraiile occidentale.

Pentru a-i pregti n liniteapropiatele lovituri de for, Hitler a decis sretrag ara sa din Conferina pentrudezarmare de la Geneva i din Liga

Naiunilor ncdin toamna anului 1933.Hermann Gring a fcut public

intenia celui de al III-lea Reich de a-iconstitui o armata aerului, iar n 16 martie

1935, Fhrerul a adus la cunotina lui

1994] written while being in Landsbergprison, after unsuccessfully trying to puttogether a coup d etat at Mnchen n in

November 1923. [4.Milza, P., Berstein, S. ,

20th

Century History. The End of EuropeanWorld, 1st volume, BIC ALL Press,Bucharest, 1998, p. 180 ]. The programestablished by the future Nazi dictatorincluded three stages: first of all heintended to free Germany of the weighingmilitary constraints established through theTreaty from Versailles in 1919, and then toreunite all Germanic populations into onestate, focusing on Austrian people. In thelast stage, it focused on conquering the so-

called Lebensraum (vital space) based onthe Soviet Union and other Slavic people.[5. Ibid, p. 341]. According to HenryKissinger, the American Secretary of stateduring Richard Nixon, we owe Hitler thecollapse of international order establishedat the Peace Conference from Paris as wellas a game card castle. [6. Kissinger, H.,

Diplomacy, BIC ALL Press, Bucharest,2003, p. 251].

Supporter of a demagogic and

extremely penetrating speech, Hitlerspeculated the injured ego and frustrationsof German people after the 1st world war.He got the approval of public opinion forthe hegemonic and conquering external

policy. Revisionist plans referring to theVersailles Treaty were successful due tothe inertia of Western democracies.

In order to prepare its next strikes inpeace, Hitler decided to withdraw itscountry from the Disarmament ConferenceGeneva and from the Nations League in theautumn of 1933.

Hermann Gring declared theintention of the 3rdReich to establish an airarmy, and on 16th of March 1935, theFuehrer informed Andr-Franois Poncet,Frances ambassador to Berlin, that it gavea law that reintroduced military service inGermany, establishing the number ofdivisions to 36. Although it was an obvious

breach of Versailles Treaty provisions,


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Andr-Franois Poncet, ambasadorul Franeila Berlin, c a promulgat o lege carereintroducea serviciul militar obligatoriu nGermania, stabilind la 36 numrul de divizii.

Dei era vorba de o primnclcare flagranta clauzelor tratatului de la Versailles,Germania a adus ca argument n favoareaaciunii sale renarmarea celorlalte puteri:Anglia, Frana i Rusia. Poncet s-a mulumits protesteze mpotriva nesocotirii tratatuluide la Versailles i mpotriva metodei faptuluimplinit. [7. Duroselle, J.-B. , Istoriarelaiilor internaionale 1919-1947, vol. I,Editura tiinelor Sociale i Politice,Bucureti, 2006, p. 138]. n demersurile sale

mpciuitoriste care vizau reincludereaGermaniei ntr-un sistem de securitatecolectiv, Marea Britanie a semnat cu aceastaun acord naval n 18 iunie 1935, prilej cucare Reichul dobndea dreptul de a deine oflot de rzboi egal cu 35% din cea aAngliei i totodat un numr egal desubmarine. [ 8. Milza, P. , Berstein, S. , op.cit. , p. 342; Kissinger, H., op. cit.pp. 258-259]. Reprezentanii Marii Britanii i Franei,alturi de cei ai Italiei, reunii n cadrul

conferinei de la Stresa, din 11 aprilie 1935,s-au mrginit sprotesteze contra metodei dedenunare unilaterala tratatelor. [ 9.Taylor,A. J. P. , Originile celui de-al doilea rzboimondial, Editua Polirom, Iai, 1999, pp. 82-84; Johnson, P. ; O istorie a lumii moderne1920-2000, Editura Humanitas, Bucureti,2005, p. 314]. S-a vorbit de un aa-numit

front de la Stresa, Italia lui Benito Mussolinisitundu-se atunci de aceeai parte cu MareaBritanie i Frana. Evoluia ulterioar aevenimentelor a marcat ns ruperea acestui

front de la Stresa, sesiznd, cu precderencepnd cu rzboiul civil din Spania,izbucnit n 1936, o apropiere ntre Italia luiMussolini i Germania lui Hitler.

Atitudinea lipsit de energie ademocraiilor occidentale a stimulatdemersurile revizioniste ale Germaniei, careva proceda la aceeai politic a faptuluimplinit n relaiile cu Marea Britanie i

Frana. Conciliatorismul celor dou ri nu

Germany argued the rearmament of theother powers: England, France and Russia.Poncet was satisfied to his protest againstthe breach of Versailles Treaty and against

the accomplished fact method. [7.Duroselle, J.-B., International RelationsHistory 1919-1947, vol. I, Social andPolitical Sciences Press, Bucharest, 2006,

p. 138]. In its peaceful actions towardsGermanys inclusion again in a collectivesecurity system, Great Britain signed anavy agreement with it on the 18 thof June1935, on which occasion the Reichacquired the right to have a war fleet equalto Englands and an equal number of

submarines. [ 8. Milza, P. , Berstein, S. ,op. cit. , p. 342; Kissinger, H., op. cit.pp.258-259]. Great Britain and Francesrepresentatives, together with Italysreunited at the Conference in Stresa,from11th of April 1935, only protestedagainst the method of treaties unilateraldenunciation. [ 9.Taylor, A. J. P. , Originsof the 2nd World War, Polirom Press, Iai,1999, pp. 82-84; Johnson, P. ; A History of

Modern World 1920-2000, Humanitas

Press, Bucharest, 2005, p. 314]. A so calledfront of Stresa, was discussed, BenitoMussolinis Italy being on the same sidewith Great Britain and France at the time.The future evolution of events marked the

breakage of this front of Stresa , observing,especially beginning with the civil warfrom Spain, from 1936, a closeness

between Mussolinis Italy and HitlersGermany.

Western democracies attitudelacking energy stimulated Germanysrevisionist actions, that was to proceed tothe same policy of accomplished fact in itsrelations to Great Britain and France.Conciliatoriness of the two countries onlyfacilitated and help this. In this context, the3rd Reich was preparing the field for newactions meant to breach the provisions ofthe peace treaties from the end of the 1stworld war. In accordance with the peace

treaty concluded with Germany on the 28th


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fcea dect s faciliteze i s mijloceascacest lucru. n acest context, al III-lea Reich

prepara terenul pentru noi aciuni menite sncalce stipulaiile tratatelor de pace de la

finele primului rzboi mondial. nconformitate cu tratatul de pace ncheiat cuGermania n 28 iunie 1919 la Versailles, nSala Oglinzilor ( n mod simbolic, avnd nvedere precedentele istorice), regiuneaRenaniei, desemnnd malul stng al Rinuluitrebuia sfie n permanendemilitarizat, cai 50 de kilometri pe malul drept. [10. Milza,P. , Berstein, S. , op. cit. , p. 98]. Germanianazist a denunat pactul de asistenreciproc franco-sovietic, semnat n 1935 ca

fiind ndreptat exclusiv mpotriva sa. Hitler aconsiderat pactul respectiv ca fiind o violarea acordurilor de la Locarno din 1925, acesteacuprinznd o clauz de neagresiune ntreFrana i Germania. [11. Dufour, J. L. ,Crizele internaionale. De la Beijing (1900)

la Kossovo (1999), Editura Corint, Bucureti,2002, pp. 82-83]. ncheierea pactului franco-sovietic a constituit un pretext pentruGermania, care a dispus remilitarizarea zoneirenane. n pofida semnalelor oferite

guvernului su de ctre ambasadorul francezla Berlin, autoritile franceze nu au adoptatmsurile de naturspareze lovitura nazist.Totodat, n ciuda unor obiecii ridicate dectre generalii si, Hitler a decis, la 7 martie1936, ca 30.000 de oameni s ocupe zonademilitarizat a Renaniei. [12. Duroselle, J.B. , op. cit., pp. 147-148]. Reacia Franei nfaa acestei flagrante violri a tratatului de laVersailles, precum i a Pactului de garanierenan, din 1925 a fost modest. Guvernul adispus ocuparea liniei fortificate Maginot.Mai mult, ministrul afacerilor externe alMarii Britanii, Anthony Eden a sugeratfrancezilor o atitudine conciliatoare. De fapt,aceastarnu avea vreun interes real pentruo Renanie demilitarizat. Angliei i repugnaideea de rzboi, chiar dac alturi de Italiagarantase Pactul de la Locarno, prin careGermania recunotea frontierele sale vestice,cu Frana i cu Belgia. nc anterior

demonstraiei de for germane, soldat cu

of June 1919 in Versailles, in the MirrorsRoom (symbolically, if we think of

previous historical events), the region ofRenan, namely the left side of the Rhine

had to be permanently disarmed togetherwith 50 km on the right side. [10. Milza,P., Berstein, S. , op. cit. , p. 98]. NaziGermany denunciated the French-Sovietmutual assistance pact, signed in 1935 as

being exclusively headed against it. Hitlerconsidered the pact as a violation ofLocarno agreements from 1925, as theyincluded a non-aggression provision

between France and Germany. [11. Dufour,J. L. , International Crises. From Beijing

(1900) to Kosovo (1999), Corint Press,Bucharest, 2002, pp. 82-83]. French-Soviet

pact conclusion was a reason for Germanythat ordered the rearmament of the Renanarea. Despite the signals given to its govern

by the French ambassador at Berlin, Frenchauthorities did not take any measures forfighting against the Nazi strike. At thesame time, despite some objections made

by his generals, Hitler decided, on 7th ofMarch 1936, that 30.000 people occupy the

demilitarized area of Renan. [12.Duroselle, J. B. , op. cit. , pp. 147-148].Frances reaction to this obvious violationof the Versailles treaty and the Renanguarantee Pact, in 1925 was modest. Thegovernment ordered the occupation ofMaginot fortified line. Moreover, the GreatBritains ministry of external affairs,Anthony Eden suggested the French aconciliating attitude. In fact this countryhad no real interest for a demilitarizedRenan. England hated the idea of a war,even if it had guaranteed the Pact fromLocarno together with Italy, in whichGermany admitted its western borders withFrance and Belgium. Before the Germandemonstrations of force, ended with theoccupation of Renan, Great Britainsupported a solution for the matter, thatinvolved advantages, rejecting an armedintervention: Great Britain and France

would rather begin negotiations in time


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ocuparea Renaniei, Marea Britanie pledapentru o rezolvare a chestiunii, care simplice avantaje, ns respingnd ointervenie armat: Ar fi preferabil ca Marea

Britanie i Frana sintre la timp n negociericu guvernul german n vederea capitulrii nfuncie de drepturile noastre n zon, ct timpaceast capitulare nc are valoare n cadrulnegocierii. [13. Kissinger, H., op. cit. , pp.265-266]. Pe de alt parte, apropiereaalegerilor legislative fcea dificilnfptuireamobilizrii. La aceste raiuni care audeterminat conduita francez se adaugconvingerea francezilor c germanii erausuperiori din punct de vedere militar, precum

i pacifismul opiniei publice . [14. Milza, P. ,Berstein, S. , op. cit. p. 346].

Consiliul Ligii Naiunilor, dei a deciscGermania nu i-a respectat obligaiile, nua dispus niciun fel de msuri concretempotriva acesteia. [15. Dufour, J.-L. , op.cit.p. 84]. Aceast realitate a nsemnat i ovictorie morala lui Hitler. Pe de altparte,securitatea statului francez a avut de suferit,dup remilitarizarea Renaniei, Frana fiind

privat de o zon-tamon vital. Ea nu mai

putea interveni nici n favoarea aliailor sidin Europa Central i de Est, acest lucruavnd repercusiuni negative asupra

prestigiului su.[ 16.Ibidem, p. 85].Mersul evenimentelor avea s

demonstreze din plin c ineria puterilorvestice nu a fcut dect s stimulezeagresivitatea Germaniei. Asistm, dupcrizadin Renania, la o basculare evidenta Italieictre Germania, care s-a concretizat nedificarea Axei Roma-Berlin. Dupdebarasarea de clauzele mpovrtoare aletratatului de la Versailles, Hitler putea

proceda la anexiuni teritoriale, realiznd cdemocraiile erau fie incapabile, fienedoritoare si opuno rezistenputernic.

Marea Britanie a influenat Frana in timpul rzboiului civil din Spania (1936-1939), decizia cu privire la acordul denonintervenie n conflict fiind adoptat lasugestia britanicilor [ 17.Dicionar de relaii

internaionale. Secolul XX, p. 86], acord care

with Germany in order to capitulatedepending on our rights in the area, for aslong as this capitulation has still valuewithin the negotiation. [13. Kissinger, H.,

op. cit. , pp. 265-266]. On the other hand,legislative elections getting closer made itdifficult to mobilize. These reasons causingthe French behavior were completed by theFrench belief that Germans were militarilysuperior, as well as by the public opinion

pacifism. [14. Milza, P. , Berstein, S. , op.cit. p. 346].

The Council of the League ofNations, although had decided thatGermany had not complied with its

obligations, did not order any actualmeasures against it. [15. Dufour, J.-L. , op.cit.p. 84]. This reality meant also a moralvictory of Hitler. On the other hand, Frenchstate security suffered, after Renanrearmament, France being deprived of thevital buffer area. It could not intervene infavour of its allies from the Central andEastern Europe, which had negativerepercussions on its prestige.[ 16. Ibidem,

p. 85].

Events course proved that theinertia of Western powers only stimulatedGermanys aggressiveness. We faced, afterthe crisis in Renan, an obvious swinging ofItaly to Germany, materialized in theedification of Rome-Berlin axis. Aftergetting rid of the weighing provisions ofthe Versailles Treaty, Hitler could proceedto territorial conquers, as he realized thatdemocracies were either incapable eitherunwilling to resist.

Great Britain influenced Franceduring the civil war in Spain as well (1936-1939), the decision regarding the non-intervention agreement at the Britishsuggestions [ 17. International Relations

Dictionary. 20thcentury, p. 86], which wasnot complied with, mainly by Germany andItaly.

Year 1937 marked a relative peaceafter the tensions from 1935 and 1936. It

was very clear that the appeasementpolicy


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nsnu a fost respectat, n principal de ctreGermania i Italia.

Anul 1937 a marcat o relativdestindere dup tensiunile din 1935 i 1936.

Era ct se poate de limpede c politica deappeasement fa de Germania va continuadup ce premier al Marii Britanii a devenit

Neville Chamberlain., iar ambasador laBerlin, Neville Henderson. O primconfirmare n acest sens este realizat prinvizita lordului Halifax la reedina Fhreruluide la Berchtesgaden. Dup ce Halifax asubliniat rolul important al Germaniei ncombaterea primejdiei bolevice, el i-aexprimat solicitudinea fa de anumite

revendicri mai vechi ale germanilor, precumn privina Austriei i Cehoslovaciei. n modtacit, Marea Britanie consimea asupra unormodificri n configuraia geo-politic aEuropei Centrale, cu condiia nerecurgerii larzboi. Mai mult, se pare cForeign Office-ul, prin vocea lui Eden, a dat de neles cerade acord chiar cu anexarea Austriei de ctreReich. [ 18. Taylor, A. J. P. , op. cit., p. 113;vezi i Aster, S. ,Appeasement and All Souls.

A portrait with Documents 1937-1939].

Cea dinti tentativa Germaniei de anfptui Anschluss-ul (alipirea Austriei laGermania), s-a produs nc n 1934, prinorganizarea puciului mpotriva cancelaruluiaustriac Dollfuss, dar s-a izbit de opoziiaopiniei publice austriece i a guvernuluiitalian i a euat.

Hitler a prezentat planurile saleexpansioniste viznd Austria i Cehoslovaciacelor mai apropiai colaboratori, n cadrulunei conferine secrete, cunoscut subtitulatura de Protocolul Hossbach, ntrunite la5 noiembrie 1937. La nceputul anului 1938,Germania a purces din nou la realizarea

proiectului su, mai ales cde curnd, Italiancepuse si manifeste dezinteresul fadeAustria. Liderul partidului nazist austriac,Seyss-Inquart a fost desemnat ministru deinterne. Cancelarul von Schuschnigg aintenionat s organizeze un plebiscit nchestiunea independenei rii, dar la 11

martie 1938, a fost nevoit sdemisioneze sub

towards Germany would continue afterNeville Chamberlain became primeminister of Great Britain and NevilleHenderson ambassador to Berlin. The first

confirmation for this was given by the visitof lord Halifax at Fuehrers residence inBerchtesgaden. After Halifax underlinedthe significant role of Germany in fightingagainst Bolshevik danger, he expressed itsopinion on certain older claims ofGermany, regarding Austria andCzechoslovakia. Tacitly, Great Britainagreed with certain alterations in the geo-

political configuration of Central Europe,on condition that war was not started.

Moreover, it seemed that Foreign Office -through Eden, let to understand that itagreed to Austrias annexation by theReich. [ 18. Taylor, A. J. P. , op. cit. , p.113; see also Aster, S. , Appeasement and

All Souls. A portrait with Documents 1937-

1939].The first attempt of Germany to

perform Anschluss (Austrias incorporationby Germany) occurred 1934, through theorganization of the putsch against Austrian

chancellor Dollfuss, but found Austrianpublic opinion and Italian governmentopposition and failed.

Hitler presented its expansionistplans about Austria and Czechoslovakia toits closest collaborators, at a secreteconference, known under the name ofHossbach Protocol, met on 5th of

November 1937. At the beginning of 1938,Germany began to accomplish its projectagain, especially that soon it showed lackof interest to Austria. The leader of theAustrian Nazi party, Seyss-Inquart wasappointed minister of interior. Chancellorvon Schuschnigg intended to organize a

plebiscite in the matter of the countrysindependence, but on 11th of March 1938,he had to resign under the pressure of the

Nazi leaving Seyss-Inquart in front of thecabinet. On 12th of March, German armyentered Austria. It is interesting that

Anschluss was ratified with absolute


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presiunea nazitilor, lsnd locul lui Seyss-Inquart n fruntea cabinetului. La 12 martie,armata germana intrat n Austria. Interesanteste c Anschluss-ul a fost ratificat cu o

zdrobitoare majoritate de ctre populaiileAustriei i Germaniei.[ 19. Taylor, A. J. P. ,op. cit. , p. 121-122; Le Breton, J.-M. , op.cit., p. 40-41; Milza, P., Berstein, S., op. cit.,

p. 351]. nfptuirea Anschluss-uluicontravenea tratatelor de pace de laVersailles i Saint Germain en Laye, semnatecu Germania i, respectiv Austria. Cu toateacestea puterile occidentale, cu precdereMarea Britanie au consimit tacit asupraanexrii Austriei, iar apoi au trebuit s

accepte faptul mplinit.Conform celor stabilite de protocolul

Hossbach, urmtoarea intpentru Germaniaera reprezentatde Cehoslovacia. Acest statcu o economie nfloritoare, dominat deuzinele Skoda, se bucura i de o poziiestrategicdeosebit. Cehoslovacia interbelicreprezenta un stat democratic, multietnic. nafar de comunitile maghiar i polonez,foarte important era minoritatea etnicgerman, care nsuma aproximativ 3,5

milioane de suflete. Germanii dinCehoslovacia locuiau n regiunea MunilorSudei, Sudetenland.

Cel mai important i popular partid alminoritii etnice germane din Sudetenlandera, dup 1935, Sudeten Deutsche Partei,avndu-l n frunte pe Konrad Henlein.Partidul lui Henlein se afla n strnse legturicu Germania, angajndu-se, ncepnd cu

jumtatea lui martie 1938, s respecte toateinstruciunile Ambasadei germane din Praga.

Anschluss-ul a fost privit cu ngrijorare dectre autoritile cehoslovace. PartidulGermanilor Sudei a elaborat programul de laKarlsbad, care ntre altele, revendica:egalitatea completntre grupul etnic germani poporul ceh, stabilirea unui guvernautonom, o legislaie protectoare pentrugermanii aflai n afara regiunii sudete,dreptul de a mbria ideologia nazist,crearea de servicii i autoriti publice de

limb german n teritoriile sudete. Dar

majority by the populations of Austria andGermany.[ 19. Taylor, A. J. P. , op. cit., p.121-122; Le Breton, J.-M. , op. cit., p. 40-41; Milza, P., Berstein, S., op. cit., p. 351].

Anschluss achievement did not complywith the peace treaties from Versailles andSaint Germain en Laye, signed withGermany and Austria, respectively. Still,Western powers, Great Britain mainlytacitly agreed to Austrias incorporationand they had to accept the accomplishedfact.

According to the provisions ofHossbach Protocol, the next target forGermany was represented by

Czechoslovakia. This developing state,with an economy dominated by Skodafactories, enjoyed a special strategic

position. Interwar Czechoslovakia was ademocratic, multiethnic state. Beside theHungarian and Polish communities, theGerman ethnic minority was also veryimportant, as it represented almost 3,5million people. The Germans fromCzechoslovakia lived in SudetenMountains, Sudetenland.

The most important and famousparty of German ethnic minority inSudetenland was after 1935, Sudeten

Deutsche Partei, leaded by KonradHenlein. Henleins party was in strongconnections to Germany, being engaged,

beginning with the half of March 1938, tocomply with all the instructions of GermanEmbassy in Prague. Anschluss was seenwith worry by Czechoslovakian authorities.Sudeten German Party drawn-up theKarlsbad program, that stipulated amongothers: full equality between the Germanethnic group and Czech people, anautochthonous government, a protectivelegislation for the German outside theSudeten region, the right to appropriate

Nazi ideology, creating services and publicauthorities of German language in Sudetenterritories. But the Karlsbad program wasdesigned in strong connection to Adolf

Hitler that mutually established with


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programul de la Karlsbad a fost proiectat nstrns legturcu Adolf Hitler, care tocmaistabilea de comun acord cu Wilhelm vonKeitel, planul Grn, care preconiza atacarea

Cehoslovaciei dup negocieri care ar fidegenerat ntr-o criz.Evoluia strii de lucruri pe plan

european era n favoarea Germaniei. nFrana, n guvernul condul de douardDaladier, portofoliul Externelor era deinutde ctre Georges Bonnet, un adept al politiciide conciliere. Cu prilejul reuniunii franco-

britanice de la Londra, reprezentaniidemocraiilor occidentale au socotit decuviinsrecomande guvernului de la Praga

s negocieze direct cu Partidul GermanilorSudei i s arate mult bunvoin fa deacesta. [20. Duroselle, J. B. , op. cit. , pp.163-165; Milza, P. , Berstein, S. , op. cit. , p.353]. Marea Britanie manifesta puternicereineri n ce privete o intervenie militarnfavoarea Cehoslovaciei, considernd aceastar o miz minor i, n consecin, dorinds se implice numai n eventualitatea uneiagresiuni neprovocate. Dup aprecierile luiJean-Baptiste Duroselle, aprecieri probate de

cursul evnimentelor, britanicii refuzauscenariul unui rzboi european cu finalimprobabil, rzboi care s aib originea n

problema Cehoslovaciei. [21. Ibidem, p.165]. Pe de alt parte, tratatele ncheiate deCehoslovacia cu Frana, n 1925 i cuUniunea Sovoetic, n 1935 o puteau,teoretic, pune pe cea dinti la adpost dincalea unei agresiuni. Dar un ajutor militar alU. R. S. S. era dificil de acordat, deoarecetrupele sovietice ar fi trebuit s tranzitezeteritoriile Romniei i Poloniei, iar acestedou state erau foarte reticente n a oferidrept de liber trecere, date fiind relaiilencordate din trecut. innd cont de poziia

britanici de imposibilitatea U. R. S. S. de asprijini Cehoslovacia, Frana se gsea , deasemenea, n imposibilitatea de a-i ajutaeficient aliatul din Europa Central.

n virtutea politicii sale de conciliere,guvernul de la Londra l-a trimis la Praga, n

vara anului 1938, pe lordul Runciman, care

Wilhelm von Keitel, the Grn plan,referring to Czechoslovakia attack afternegotiations that would have caused acrisis.

The evolution of events at Europeanlevel was in favour of Germany. In France,in the government of douard Daladier,Exterior portfolio was held by GeorgesBonnet, a supporter of conciliation policy.At the French-British reunion in London,the representatives of Western democraciesthought to recommend the government inPrague to negotiate directly with SudetenGerman Party and be willing to it. [20.Duroselle, J. B. , op. cit. , pp. 163-165;

Milza, P. , Berstein, S. , op. cit. , p. 353].Great Britain hesitated strongly about amilitary intervention in favour ofCzechoslovakiaand thought this country to

be a major factor, hence its desire to beinvolved only in the case of unprovokedaggression. According to Jean-BaptisteDuroselle, proved during the events, theBritish refused the scenario of an uncertainending European war, originating in thematter of Czechoslovakia. [21. Ibidem, p.

165]. On the other hand, the treatiesconcluded by Czechoslovakia with France,in 1925 and with the Soviet Union in 1935could theoretically be a shelter for the firstone in case of an aggression. By a militaryaid from U. R. S. S. was difficult toreceive, because the Soviet troupes wouldhave to cross over the territories ofRomania and Poland, and these two stateswere reticent to offer the right to pass, dueto the relations from the past. Consideringthe British status and U. R. S. S.incapacity to support Czechoslovakia,Frances was also in the impossibility toefficiently help its ally in the CentralEurope.

By virtue of its conciliation policy,London government sent to Prague, in thesummer of 1938, lord Runciman, with therole of mediating the discussions betweenCzechoslovakian authorities and

representatives of Sudeten German Party,


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avea rolul de a media discuiile ntreautoritile cehoslovace i reprezentaniiPartidului Germanilor Sudei, pentruatingerea unui numitor comun. Cehoslovacii

au fost nevoii s procedeze la mai multeconcesii, satisfcnd n bun msurprogramul de la Karlsbad. Ulterior,evenimentele se vor precipita. La 12septembrie 1938, Hitler a rostit, la Nrnbergun discurs foarte violent, invocnd cgermanii din regiunea sudet erau torturai,cu complicitatea guvernului de la Praga.Dorina de a anexa teritoriul sudet transpreadin discursul Fhrerului, chiar dac nu eraformulat n mod explicit. Hitler fcea ns

referire la dreptul popoarelor laautodeterminare. Discursul su a fost desigur

bine interpretat de ctre Konrad Henlein, careaproape imediat, a hotrt ntrerupereatratativelor cu guvernul ceh i a cerut publicanexarea regiunii sudete de ctre Germania.[22,Ibidem, pp. 166-168].

Au urmat dou ntrevederi ale luiNeville Chamberlain cu Hitler laBerchtesgaden i Godesberg. Dictatorulnazist a exprimat clar dorina de anexare a

regiunii sudete, urmnd, cu acest scop, sdecreteze mobilizarea generaln ziua de 28septembrie. Pacea era n pericol, n pofida

politicii de conciliatorism promovat cuconsecven de ctre democraiileoccidentale, ndeosebi de ctre MareaBritanie.

La iniiativa lui Chamberlain, ntr-oncercare disperat de a salva pacea, seriosameninat, Mussolini a propus lui Hitlerorganizarea unei conferine cu participareaMarii Britanii, Franei, Germaniei i Italiei.n mod paradoxal i ciudat, tocmaiCehoslovacia, statul vizat direct, nu a fostinvitat s participe. Astfel, la 29-30septembrie 1938, efii de guvern ai celor

patru puteri ( Neville Chamberlain, douardDaladier, Adolf Hitler i Benito Mussolini) s-au ntrunit la Mnchen. [ 23. Goldstein, J. S.,Pevehouse, J. C. , Relaii internaionale,Editura Polirom, Bucureti, 2008, p. 73]. n

schimbul unor concesii, Hitler a obinut

for reaching a mutual agreement.Czechoslovakians had to proceed to severalconcessions, satisfying to a great extent theKarlsbad program. Later on, events

precipitated. On 12th

of September 1938,Hitler said a very violent speech atNrnberg, saying that German in theSudeten region were tortured, with thecomplicity of the government in Prague.The desire to incorporate the Sudetenterritory was also revealed by the Fuehrersspeech, even if it was not explicitlyformulated. Hitler referred to peoples rightto self-determination. Its speech was wellinterpreted by Konrad Henlein, who,

almost immediately, decided to interruptdiscussions with the Czech government anddemanded in public the incorporation ofthe Sudeten region by Germany Germania.[22,Ibidem, pp. 166-168].

Two meetings between NevilleChamberlain and Hitler took place atBerchtesgaden and Godesberg. The Nazidictator clearly expressed it desire toincorporate the Sudeten region and

proclaimed general mobilization on the 28th

of September. Peace was in danger, despitethe conciliatoriness policy of Westerndemocracies, especially of Great Britain.

At Chamberlains initiative, in adesperate attempt to save the peace whichwas in danger, Mussolini proposed Hitlerto organize a conference with the

participation of Great Britain, France,Germany and Italy. Paradoxically and in astrange way, Czechoslovakia, the directlyaimed country, was not invited to attend.Therefore, on 29-30 September 1938, thegovernment heads of the four powers(Neville Chamberlain, douard Daladier,Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini) met atMnchen. [ 23. Goldstein, J. S., Pevehouse,J. C. , International Relations, PoliromPress, Bucharest, 2008, p. 73]. In exchangefor certain concessions, Hitler achievedSudetenland incorporation by Germany.Then, contracting parties to the agreement

in Mnchen committed to guarantee the


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anexarea Sudetenland de ctre Germania.Apoi, prile contractante ale acordului de laMnchen se angajau s garanteze noilefrontiere cehoslovace. Datorit cedrilor

Angliei i Franei n faa voinei germane,[24. Duroselle, J. B., op. cit., pp.168-170;Dufour, J.- L. , op.cit., pp. 90-91; Kissinger,H., op.cit., pp. 271-274] Cehoslovacia a fostnevoit s se ncline n faa dictatului de laMnchen. Putem s calificm aceastconferindrept un dictat, atta vreme ct s-au decis rapturi teritoriale pe seama unui stat,iar reprezentanii acestuia nici mcar nu au

participat. Dupacest nou semn de slbiciunen faa Germaniei, Anglia i Frana ncmai

sperau s ajung la o nelegere cu Hitler.Nici colaborarea franco-britanic nu afuncionat foarte bine, n condiiile n care, n30 septembrie 1938 britanicii au semnat onelegere de neagresiune cu Germania, frca autoritile franceze s fie ntiinate. [25.Milza, P., Berstein, S. , op. cit., pp. 353-354]

Conciliatorismul a avut, potrivit luiJoshua Goldstein, o conotaie negativ nrelaiile internaionale, deoarece Tratatul dela Mnchen a prut numai s ncurajeze

cuceririle viitoare ale Germaniei.[26.Goldstein, J. S. , Pevehouse, J. C. , op. cit. ,

p. 73]Hitler ns nelesese cdemocraiile

erau slabe i i-a continuat politica de forn1939, procednd la dezmembrarea ntreguluistat cehoslovac. nc din toamna lui 1938,Polonia a ocupat regiunea Teschen, n ciuda

presiunilor franceze, iar Ungaria a obinutsudul Slovaciei prin arbitrajul de la Viena,sub oblduirea Germaniei i Italiei. Dup ceSlovacia i-a proclamat independena,devenind stat prieten al Germaniei, trupelegermane au ocupat Boemia n 15 martie1939. Fhrerul a dispus fondarea unuiProtectorat al Boemiei i Moraviei, de faptun stat satelit, iar Ungaria a nglobat iRutenia Subcarpatic.[27. Milza, P.,Berstein, S. , op. cit., pp. 354-355].

Dezmembrarea complet aCehoslovaciei a demonstrat lipsa de eficien

i a marcat totalul eec al politicii de

new Czechoslovakian borders. Due toEngland and Frances renunciations infront of the German will, [24. Duroselle, J.B., op. cit., pp.168-170; Dufour, J.- L. ,

op.cit. , pp. 90-91; Kissinger, H., op.cit. ,pp. 271-274] Czechoslovakia had to obeyto the dictate in Mnchen. We can say thatthis conference is a dictate, as long as itdecided territorial raptures of a state, andits representatives did not even attend.After this new sign of weakness in front ofGermany, England and France still hopedto reach an agreement with Hitler. TheFrench-British collaboration did not workwell, because on 30th of September 1938

the British signed a non-aggressionagreement with German, without informingthe French authorities. [25. Milza, P.,Berstein, S. , op. cit., pp. 353-354]

Conciliatoriness had, according toJoshua Goldstein, a negative connotation ininternational relations, because the Treatyfrom Mnchen seemed to encourage futureconquers of Germany.[26. Goldstein, J. S. ,Pevehouse, J. C. , op. cit. , p. 73]

But Hitler had understood that

democracies were weak and continued itspolicy of force in 1939, proceeding to thedismembering of the entireCzechoslovakian state. In the autumn of1938, Poland occupied Teschen region,despite French pressure and Hungary gotthe South of Slovakia through theArbitrage in Wien, under Germany andItalys protection. After Slovakia

proclaimed its independence, becoming apartner state to Germany, German troupesoccupied Bohemia on 15th of March 1939.The Fuehrer ordered the establishment of aProtectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,actually a satellite state, and Hungariaincorporated Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. [27.Milza, P., Berstein, S. , op. cit. , pp. 354-355].

Complete dismembering ofCzechoslovakia proved the lack of efficacyand marked the total failure of the

conciliatoriness policy (appeasement).


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conciliatorism (appeasement). Hitler nu irespectase promisiunea fcut luiChamberlain cnu va ncerca s cucereasc

populaii negermane.[28.Dicionar de relaii

internaionale...., p.87]. Premisele unuiconflict generalizat erau evidente, deoarececercurile responsabile de la Londra i Parisi-au dat seama prea trziu de adevrateleintenii ale Germaniei.

ANEXhttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/muni

ch1.asp

Agreement concluded at Munich,September 29, 1938, between Germany,Great Britain, France and Italy

GERMANY, the United Kingdom,France and Italy, taking into considerationthe agreement, which has been alreadyreached in principle for the cession toGermany of the Sudeten German territory,have agreed on the following terms andconditions governing the said cession and themeasures consequent thereon, and by thisagreement they each hold themselvesresponsible for the steps necessary to secureits fulfilment:

(1) The evacuation will begin on 1stOctober.

(2) The United Kingdom, France andItaly agree that the evacuation of the territory

shall be completed by the 10th October,without any existing installations havingbeen destroyed, and that the CzechoslovakGovernment will be held responsible forcarrying out the evacuation without damageto the said installations.

(3) The conditions governing theevacuation will be laid down in detail by aninternational commission composed ofrepresentatives of Germany, the United

Hitler had not comply with his promisemade to Chamberlain that he would not tryto conquer non-German populations. [28.

International Relations Dictionary....,

p.87]. The premises of a generalizedconflict were obvious, because relevantauthorities in London and Paris realizedGermanys real intentions too late.

APPENDIXhttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/mu

nich1.asp

Agreement concluded at Munich,

September 29, 1938, between Germany,Great Britain, France and Italy

GERMANY, the United Kingdom,France and Italy, taking into considerationthe agreement, which has been alreadyreached in principle for the cession toGermany of the Sudeten German territory,have agreed on the following terms andconditions governing the said cession andthe measures consequent thereon, and bythis agreement they each hold themselvesresponsible for the steps necessary tosecure its fulfillment:

(1) The evacuation will begin on 1stOctober.

(2) The United Kingdom, France andItaly agree that the evacuation of theterritory shall be completed by the 10th

October, without any existing installationshaving been destroyed, and that theCzechoslovak Government will be heldresponsible for carrying out the evacuationwithout damage to the said installations.

(3) The conditions governing theevacuation will be laid down in detail byan international commission composed ofrepresentatives of Germany, the UnitedKingdom, France, Italy and


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Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

(4) The occupation by stages of thepredominantly German territory by German

troops will begin on 1st October. The fourterritories marked on the attached map willbe occupied by German troops in thefollowing order:

The territory marked No. I on the 1st and2nd of October; the territory marked No. IIon the 2nd and 3rd of October; the territorymarked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th ofOctober; the territory marked No. IV on the6th and 7th of October. The remaining

territory of preponderantly German characterwill be ascertained by the aforesaidinternational commission forthwith and beoccupied by German troops by the 10th ofOctober.

(5) The international commissionreferred to inparagraph 3will determine theterritories in which a plebiscite is to be held.These territories will be occupied byinternational bodies until the plebiscite has

been completed. The same commission willfix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to

be held, taking as a basis the conditions ofthe Saar plebiscite. The commission will alsofix a date, not later than the end of

November, on which the plebiscite will beheld.

(6) The final determination of thefrontiers will be carried out by the

international commission. The commissionwill also be entitled to recommend to the fourPowers, Germany, the United Kingdom,France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases,minor modifications in the strictlyethnographical determination of the zoneswhich are to be transferred without

plebiscite.

(7) There will be a right of option intoand out of the transferred territories, the

option to be exercised within six months

Czechoslovakia.

(4) The occupation by stages of thepredominantly German territory by German

troops will begin on 1st October. The fourterritories marked on the attached map willbe occupied by German troops in thefollowing order:

The territory marked No. I on the 1stand 2nd of October; the territory marked

No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October; theterritory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and5th of October; the territory marked No. IVon the 6th and 7th of October. The

remaining territory of preponderantlyGerman character will be ascertained bythe aforesaid international commissionforthwith and be occupied by Germantroops by the 10th of October.

(5) The international commissionreferred to in paragraph 3 will determinethe territories in which a plebiscite is to beheld. These territories will be occupied byinternational bodies until the plebiscite has

been completed. The same commission willfix the conditions in which the plebiscite isto be held, taking as a basis the conditionsof the Saar plebiscite. The commission willalso fix a date, not later than the end of

November, on which the plebiscite will beheld.

(6) The final determination of thefrontiers will be carried out by the

international commission. The commissionwill also be entitled to recommend to thefour Powers, Germany, the UnitedKingdom, France and Italy, in certainexceptional cases, minor modifications inthe strictly ethnographical determination ofthe zones which are to be transferredwithout plebiscite.

(7)There will be a right of option intoand out of the transferred territories, the

option to be exercised within six months


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from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determinethe details of the option, consider ways offacilitating the transfer of population and

settle questions of principle arising out of thesaid transfer.

(8) The Czechoslovak Government willwithin a period of four weeks from the dateof this agreement release from their militaryand police forces any Sudeten Germans whomay wish to be released, and theCzechoslovak Government will within thesame period release Sudeten German

prisoners who are serving terms of

imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29, 1938.ADOLF HITLER,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,EDOUARD DALADIER,BENITO MUSSOLINI.

from the date of this agreement. AGerman-Czechoslovak commission shalldetermine the details of the option,consider ways of facilitating the transfer of

population and settle questions of principlearising out of the said transfer.

(8)The Czechoslovak Government willwithin a period of four weeks from the dateof this agreement release from theirmilitary and police forces any SudetenGermans who may wish to be released, andthe Czechoslovak Government will withinthe same period release Sudeten German

prisoners who are serving terms of

imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29, 1938.ADOLF HITLER,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,EDOUARD DALADIER,BENITO MUSSOLINI.