comprehensive eia for proposed rapp unit 7&8 at rawatbhata rajasthan

Comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessmentfor Proposed Rajasthan Atomic Power Project

Units 7 & 8 at Rawatbhata Near Kota, Rajasthan

Sponsor

Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, Mumbai 400 094

National Environmental Engineering Research InstituteNehru Marg, Nagpur 440 020 (India)

May, 2005

FOREWORDM/s Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) proposes

to set up additional two units of Pressurized. Water Reactors(PHWRS) (RAPP 7 & 8) of 700 MWe capacity each at the site ofRawatbhata Atomic Power Project, Rajasthan. Presently four PHWRunits (RAPS 1 to 4) are generating electricity and feeding to theNorthern Grid and two units RAPS 5 & 6 are under construction.

In order to assess the potential impacts arising out of theproposed project activities, M/s NPCIL retained NationalEnvironmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to undertakeEnvironmental Impact Assessment studies for various environmentalcomponents and to prepare an Environmental Management Plan forminimizing the adverse impacts.

This report presents baseline data collected for three seasonsviz. summer 2003, post monsoon 2003 and winter 2003-04 for air,noise, water, land, biological and socio-economic environmentalcomponents including radiological parameters with a view toidentifying, predicting and evaluating the potential impacts due toproposed activities. An Environmental Management Plan has alsobeen delineated in the report.

The cooperation and assistance rendered by the staff of NPCILin preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.

Nagpur (Sukumar Devotta)May, 2005

Project PersonnelNEERI, Nagpur

Mr. Awatani, K. Ms. Lata, kumari Ms. Sunar, Rakhi

Ms. Ahuja, Rashmi Ms. Moharir, Ashwini Mr. Singh, Prabhat

Ms. Dongre, Rajashri Ms. Mukherjee, Deepali Ms. Sinha, Rashmi

Ms. Baby, Rani Ms. Malik, Ruchi Mr. Sarmokadam, Ganesh

Ms. Jain, Monika Ms. Mukherjee, Manisha Mr. Shukla, Parth

Ms. Sahasrabudhe, Sunila Mr. Mudaliar, Ratankumar Ms. Suple, D. Sonali

Mr. Ingle, Sourabh Ms. Mishra, Sandhya Mr. Satramwar, Sharad

Mr. Kumbhare, P. S. Mr. Pathak, S. K. Mr. Swamy, Aditya

Mr. Kamble, Rahul Mr. Pingale, A. Shrihari Ms. Mishra, Pawanrekha

Ms Kumbhare, Prabha Ms. Puntambekar, Smita

Secretarial Assistance

Mr. Dhawale, A.H. Mrs. Srinivasan, P.C.Mr. Nair, P. Mr. Kale, S. G.

Project Leaders

Dr. Chaudhari, P. R. Dr. Ramteke, D. S.

Dr. Wate, S. R.

Project Co-ordinatorDr. Devotta Sukumar

Director

Project Personnel-RAPS, Rawatbhata

NPCIL, RawatbhataShri. Mittal, Subhash(Site Director, RAPS 1 to 4)Shri. C. P. Jhamb,(Project Director RAPP 5 & 6)Shri. K. M. Joshi,SD, RAPS 1 & 2Shri. P. K. Datta,SD, RAPS 3 & 4Dr. Verma, P. C.(QIC, ESL, RAPS)

NPCIL, Head Quarter, Mumbai

Shri. Ramamirtham, B. Shri. Singh, S. K.(A CE (HPE)) (Engineer (EM))

Engineer-in-Charge (EIA), NPCIL

Dr. Singh, Jitendra

Sr. Executive Director (Safety), NPCILShri. Bajaj, S. S.

ContentsItem No.

Chapter 1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.3.1

1.3.2

1.4

1.4.1

1.4.2

1.4.3

1.4.4

1.4.5

1.4.6

1.4.7

1.4.8

1.4.9

1.4.10

1.4.11

1.4.12

1.5

1.5.1

1.5.2

1.5.3

1.5.4

Particulars

List of Plates and Figures

List of Tables

List of Annexures

Executive Summary

Introduction

Introduction

Project SettingSalient Features of 700 MWe Design

Safety Approach

Protection Against Common Mode IncidentsPlant Description

General

Layout ConsiderationsReactor SystemPrimary Heat Transport (PHT) SystemModerator System

Instrumentation and Control System

Reactivity Control Reactor Shutdown System

On Power Re-fuelling

Shut Down Cooling SystemEmergency Core Cooling System

Reactor Auxiliary Systems

ContainmentServices/Conventional Systems

Active Process Water System and Service Water SystemFire Water System

Turbine Generator SystemSecondary System

Page No.

(viii)(ix)(xiii)1-7

1.0-1.341.1

1.2

1.4

1.5

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.7

1.7

1.8

1.101.10

1.111.111.121.12

1.12

1.131.141.141.141.141.15

(i)

Item No.

1.5.5

1.5.6

1.6

1.6.1

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.9.1

1.9.2

1.9.3

1.10

1.11

1.11.1

1.11.1.1

1.11.1.2

1.11.2

1.11.3

1.11.4

1.11.5

1.11.6

Chapter 2

2.1

2.1.1

2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

Particulars

Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System

Electrical System

Safety Classification

Safety Classes

Seismic Classification

Quality Group Classification

Quality Assurance

Design

Manufacture, Construction, and Commissioning

Operation

Scope of EIA

Methodology for EIA

Air Environment

Data Collection

Baseline Background Radiation Data

Noise Environment

Water Environment

Land Environment

Biological Environment

Socio-economic Environment

Figure 1.1-1.5

Table

Baseline Environmental Status and Identification ofImpacts

Air Environment

Design of Network for Ambient Air Quality MonitoringLocations

Micrometeorology

Reconnaissance

Ambient Air Quality Survey

Page No.

1.15

1.16

1.17

1.18

1.19

1.20

1.21

1.21

1.22

1.23

1.23

1.24

1.25

1.26

1.26

1.26

1.27

1.27

1.28

1.28

1.29-1.331.34

2.0 - 2.201

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.3

(ii)

Item No.

2.1.5

2.1.5.1

2.1.5.2

2.1.5.3

2.1.5.4

2.1.6

2.1.7

2.1.7.1

2.1.7.2

2.2

2.2.1

2.2.2

2.2.3

2.3

2.3.1

2.3.2

2.3.3

2.3.4

2.3.5

2.3.5.1

2.3.5.2

2.3.5.3

2.3.5.4

2.3.5.5

2.3.6

Particulars

Baseline Status

Suspended Particulate matter (SPM)

Repirable Suspended Particulate Matter (RSPN)

Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)

Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx)

Radiological Observations

Active Gases

GeneralDerived Discharge LimitsFigure 2.1.1-2.1.3Tables 2.1.1-2.1.21

Noise Environment

Reconnaissance

Identification of Existing Sources of Noise

Measurement of Baseline Noise Levels in the Study AreaFigure 2.2.1Tables 2.2.1 - 2.2.3

Water Environment

Reconnaissance Survey

Availability of Water SourceDrawal and DischargeGeohydrology

Baseline Water QualityPhysico-chemcial Characteristics of Surface Water

Physico-chemcial Characteristics of GroundwaterBacteriological Characteristics of Surface WaterBacteriological Characteristics of GroundwaterBiological Quality of Fresh WaterRadioactivity in Water Environment

Page No.

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.6

2.8-2.10

2.11-2.41

2.42

2.42

2.42

2.43

2.44

2.45-2.47

2.48

2.48

2.48

2.49

2.50

2.51

2.51

2.51

2.52

2.52

2.52

2.54

(iii)

Item No.

2.3.7

2.3.8

2.3.9

2.4

2.4.1

2.4.2

2.4.3

2.4.4

2.4.5

2.4.6

2.4.7

2.4.8

2.4.9

2.4.10

2.4.10.1

2.52.5.1

2.5.2

2.5.3

2.5.4

2.5.5

2.5.6

2.5.6.1

2.5.6.2

2.5.6.3

2.5.6.4

2.5.6.5

Particulars

Radio-Active Liquid Effluent Management

Thermal Pollution

Flood Analysis

Figure 2.3.1

Tables 2.3.1 - 2.3.29

Land Environment

Reconnaissance

Geology

Baseline Data

Physical Characteristics

Chemical Characteristics

Microbiological Characteristics

Radioactivity in Terrestrial Environment

Solid Wastes

Solid Waste Management

Land Use

Landuse Pattern Study Using Remote Sensing Data

Plant I - II

Figure 2.4.1 - 2.4.2

Tables 2.4.1-2.4.15


Introduction

Study Area

Sampling Locations

Survey Methodology

Biodiversity in Study Area

Floristic Structure and Composition

Bhainsroadgarh

Jawahar Sagar

Borabas

Gandhi Sagar

Aklingpura

Page No.

2.54

2.56

2.56

2.57

2.58-2.84

2.85

2.85

2.86

2.87

2.87

2.87

2.88

2.89

2.89

2.92

2.92

2.92

2.98-2.99

2.100-2.101

2.102-2.116

2.117

2.117

2.117

2.117

2.118

2.119

2.120

2.120

2.121

2.122

2.123

2.124

(iv)

Item No.

2.5.6.6

2.5.6.7

2.5.7

2.5.8

2.5.8.1

2.5.8.2

2.5.8.3

2.5.9

2.5.9.1

2.5.10

2.6

2.6.1

2.6.2

2.6.2.1

2.6.2.2

2.6.2.3

2.6.2.4

2.6.2.5

2.6.3

2.6.3.1

2.6.3.2

Chapter 33.1

Particulars

Nalikheda

Padachar

Green Belt Exist in and Around Plant Area

Wildlife Sanctuaries Present in the Study Area

Darrah SanctuaryJawahar Sagar Sanctuary

Bhainsroadgarh Sanctuary

The Fauna

Vertebrates, Their Status, Distribution and Habitat of MajorAnimals

Fishes

Figure 2.5.1Table 2.5.1-2.5.16

Socio Economic EnvironmentReconnaissance

Baseline StatusDemographic StructureInfrastructure Resource Base

Economic Attributes

Health StatusCultural and Aesthetic Attributes

Socio-economic SurveySampling MethodQuality of LifeAnnexure - A

Annexure - B

Annexure - CAnnexure - D

Figure 2.6.1 - 2.6.2Tables 2.6.1 - 2.6.6

Prediction of ImpactsAir Environment

Page No.

2.125

2.125

2.126

2.126

2.126

2.127

2.127

2.128

2.129

2.131

2.132

2.133-2.151

2.152

2.152

2.152

2.153

2.154

2.154

2.155

2.156

2.156

2.156

2.158

2.162

2.163

2.164

2.165

2.168-2.169

2.170-2.201

3.0-3.21

3.1

(v)

Item No.

3.1.1

3.1.2

3.1.3

3.1.4

3.1.5

3.1.6

3.2

3.2.1

3.2.2

3.2.3

3.2.4

3.3

3.3.1

3.3.2

3.3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

Chapter 4

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

Chapter 5

5.1

Particulars

Radioactive Pollution

Radiation Dose and Public Health

Occupational Exposure: Radiation Monitoring and Alarms

Emissions of Radioactivity

Micro Meteorology

Conventional Air Pollution

Figure 3.1.1-3.1.3

Table 3.1.1

Noise Environment

Identification of Sources of Noise in the Proposed Plant

Residential Areas

Commercial Area

Impact on Occupational Health

Water Environment

Impact of Radioactive Pollutants

Impact of Thermal Discharge on Water QualityCompliance of NPP to MoEF Stipulation

Land Environment



Tables 3.6.1 - 3.6.3

Environmental Impact Statement

Air Environment

Noise Environment

Water Environment

Land Environment


Aesthetics


Sensitive Habitats

Environmental Management Plan

Earthquake Design Basis for Construction

Page No.

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.4

3.5

3.6-3.8

3.9

3.11

3.11

3.11

3.11

3.12

3.12

3.13

3.13

3.14

3.15

3.15

3.16

3.19-3.21

4.0 - 4.4

4.1

4.2

4.2

4.3

4.3

4.3

4.4

4.4

5.0-5.38

5.1

(vi)

Item No.

5.25.3

5.3.15.3.25.3.3

5.3.45.3.4.15.3.4.2

5.3.55.3.5.15.3.5.25.3.5.3

5.45.5

5.5.15.5.1.15.5.1.25.5.1.35.5.1.4

5.5.25.5.3

5.5.3.15.5.3.25.5.3.3

5.5.45.5.55.5.6

Particulars

Table 5.1Construction PhaseOperational PhaseAir EnvironmentNoise EnvironmentWater EnvironmentTable 5.3.1Land EnvironmentRadioactive Solid WastesTownship Solid WastesBiological EnvironmentGuidelines for PlantationSpecies SelectionBiological EnvironmentFigure 5.1 - 5,2Tables 5.2 - 5.6Socio-economic EnvironmentPost Project Environmental MonitoringAir Quality Monitoring ProgrammeMonitoring ParametersSampling StationsSampling FrequencyAir Quality Monitoring - Equipments RequiredNoise EnvironmentWater Quality MonitoringSampling FrequencyAnalysis MethodologyMonitoring LaboratoryStaff Requirement for Environmental Quality MonitoringBudgetary Provisions for EMPRadioactive Monitoring and Surveillance ProgrammeFigure 5.3 - 5.4Bibliography

Page No.5.25.35.45.45.55.55.75.85.85.8

5.155.155.155.20

5.22-5.235.24-5.29

5.305.325.325.325.325.325.325.345.345.345.345.345.355.355.36

5.37-5.381.4

(vii)

List of Plates and Figures

Item No. Particulars Page No.Plate I False Color Composite Having 25 km Radius Distance 2.98Plate II Landuse /Landcover Map Having 25 km Radius Distance 2.99Figure 1.1 Location Map for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPP) at 1.29

RawatbhataFigure 1.2 RAPP 7 & 8 Plant Layout 1.30Figure 1.3 Study area for EIA Studies of RAPP, Rawatbhata 1.31Figure 1.4 Exposure Pathways for Atmospheric Releases from NPP 1.32Figure 1.5 Exposure Pathways for Releases by NPP to Aquatic 1.33

EnvironmentFigure 2.1.1 Sampling Locations for Air Environment 2.8Figure 2.1.2 Windrose at Rawatbhata During October - November 2003 2.9Figure 2.1.3 Annual Wind Rose at RAPS Site for the Year 2001 2.10Figure 2.2.1 Sampling Locations for Noise Environment 2.44Figure 2.3.1 Sampling Locations for Water Environment 2.57Figure 2.4.1 Sampling Locations for Land Environment 2.100Figure 2.4.2 Textural Diagram for Soil Composition 2.101Figure 2.5.1 Sampling Locations for Biological Environment 2.132Figure 2.6.1 Sampling Locations for Socio-economic Environment 2.168Figure 2.6.2 Employment Pattern in the Study Area 2.169Figure 3.1.1 Annual Gamma ISO Dose Curve Due to Argon - 4 1 and 3.6

FPNGFigure 3.1.2 Total effective Dose at 1.6 km During 1997 to 2001 3.7Figure 3.1.3 Dose to Members of the Public in Various Anualr Zones 3.8

During 2001Figure 5.1 Green Belt Development Near the NPP Site 5.22Figure 5.2 Section of Green Belt Development 50 m Away from Nuclear 5.23

Power PlantFigure 5.3 Components of Post Project Environmental Monitoring 5.37

Programme for NPCILFigure 5.4 Recommended Organizational Set up for Environmental 5.38

Quality Monitoring (For Non-Radiological Parameters) forNPCIL

(viii)

List of Tables

Table No. Title Page No.

1.1 Operational performance Detail of RAPS 2 - 4 1.34

2.1.1 Details of Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Stations 2.11(Summer 2003)

2.1.2 Ambient Air Quality Status (Summer 2003) 2.122.1.3 Ambient Air Quality Status (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.132.1.4 Ambient Air Quality Status (Winter Season 2003-2004) 2.152.1.5 Cumulative Percentile Values of SPM (Summer 2003) 2.172.1.6 Cumulative Percentile Values of SPM (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.182.1.7 Cumulative Percentile Values of SPM (Winter Season 2.20

2003-2004)2.1.8 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Summer 2003) 2.222.1.9 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.23

2.1.10 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Winter Season 2.252003-2004)

2.1.11 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Summer 2003) 2.272.1.12 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.282.1.13 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Winter Season 2.30

2003-2004)2.1.14 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Summer 2003) 2.322.1.15 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.332.1.16 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Winter Season 2.35

2003-2004)2.1.17 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around RAPP 2.37

Environment During 1998

2.1.18 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around RAPP 2.38Environment During 1999


2.1.20 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around RAPP 2.40Environment During 200f


2.2.1 Ambient Noise Level (Summer 2003) 2.452.2.2 Ambient Noise Level at Rawatbhata (Summer 2003) 2.46

(ix)


2.2.3 Noise Level at Environmental Survey Laboratory (ESL), 2.47Rawatbhata (Summer 2003)

2.3.1 Sampling Locations for Water Environment 2.58

2.3.2 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Summer 2003) 2.592.3.3 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.602.3.4 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Winter 2003-2004) 2.612.3.5 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Summer 2003) 2.622.3.6 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.632.3.7 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Winter 2003-2004) 2.642.3.8 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic Parameters 2.65

(Summer 2003)2.3.9 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic Parameters 2.66

(Post Monsoon 2003)2.3.10 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic Parameters 2.67

(Winter 2003-2004)2.3.11 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Summer 2003) 2.682.3.12 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.692.3.13 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Winter 2003-2004) 2.702.3.14 Water Quality - Bacteriology (Summer 2003) 2.712.3.15 Water Quality - Bacteriology (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.722.3.16 Water Quality - Bacteriology (Winter 2003) 2.732.3.17 Water Quality - Phytoplankton (Summer 2003) 2.742.3.18 Water Quality - Phytoplankton (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.752.3.19 Water Quality - Phytoplankton (Winter 2003-2004) 2.762.3.20 List of Species Identified (Phytoplanktons) 2.772.3.21 Water Quality - Zooplankton (Summer 2003) 2.782.3.22 Water Quality - Zooplankton (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.792.3.23 Water Quality - Zooplankton (Winter 2003-2004) 2.802.3.24 List of Species Identified (Zooplankton) 2.812.3.25 Quantity of Wastewater Generation (Unite wise) and its 2.81

Characterization2.3.26 Specific Activity contained in Liquid Waste 2.81

(x)


2.3.27 Concentration of H-3 in Water Samples Collected Around 2.82RAPP Environment During 2002

2.3.28 Concentration of Sr- 89+90, I - 131 & Cs - 137 in Water 2.83Samples Collected Around RAPP Environment during 2002

2.3.29 Concentration of H-3 in Well and Pond Water Samples 2.49Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2002

2.4.1 Details of Soil Sampling Locations within the Study Area 2.1022.4.2 Physical Characteristics of Soils Within Study Area (Summer 2.103

2003)2.4.3 Chemical Characteristics of Soil-Water (1:1) Extract (Summer 2.104

2003)2.4.4 Cation Exchange Capacity of Soil in Study Area 2.105

(Summer 2003)2.4.5 Fertility Status of Soils in Study Area (Summer 2003) 2.1062.4.6 Heavy Metals in Soil Samples (Summer 2003) 2.1072.4.7 Microbiological Characteristics of Soil (Summer 2003) 2.1082.4.8 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items of Samples 2.109

Collected Around RAPP Environment During 1998

2.4.9 Concentration of Sr89*90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items of Samples 2.110Collected Around RAPP Environment During 1999

2.4.10 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items of Samples 2.111Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2000



Characterization of Radioactive Solid Waste at SWAMP RAPS 2.114Landuse /Land Cover Classification System 2.115Landuse/ Landcover 2.116List of Sampling Locations for Biological Environment 2.133

Formulae for Analysing Phytosociological Characteristic of 2.134Vegetation

List of Plant Species Recorded from Study Area 2.135List of Family Members with Species Count 2.138Simpson's Diversity Index of Plant Species in Study Area 2.139Density of Plant Species in Study Area 2.139

(xi)

2.4.2.4.

1314

2.4.15

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5.

2.5.

2.5.

.1

.2

3

4

5

6


Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Bhainsroadgarh 2.140

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Jawahar Sagar 2.142

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Borabas 2.143

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Gandhi Sagar 2.145

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Aklingpura 2.146

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Nalikheda 2.147

Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Padachar 2.148

Details of Plantation carried out by RAPP 2.149

List of Fauna Present in the Study Area 2.150

Major Carps Percentage in Total Fish Production 2.151Distance and Direction of the Villages Surveyed 2.170

Demographic Structure in the Study Area 2.171

Summery of Demographic Structure at a Glance 2.185

Socio-economic Profile of the Study Area Basic Amenities 2.186Morbidity Status as Available in PHC at Bhaisrodgadh Period 2.200January 2002 to December 2002

Quality of life Existing in the Villages Surveyed 2.201Computed external Dose Due to Ar-41 and FPNG Release from 3.9RAPS 1 to 4

3.6.1 Prediction of Qualitative Impacts on Socio-economic 3.19Environment

3.6.2 Expected Change in Cumulative Quality of Life 3.203.6.3 Expected Change in Subjective Quality of Life 3.215.1 Summary of Impacts, Problems and Appropriate Management 5.2

Plan for their Mitigation

5.3.1 Details of Water Requirements/Waste Generation and Green 5.7Belt in Respect to DAE Residential Colonies at Rawatbhata

5.2 Species of Plants Suggested for Greenbelt Development 5.245.3 Drought Resistant Species for Greenbelt Design within the NPP 5.25

Area

5.4 Species Selected for Plantation along the Road Side and 5.27Township

5.5 List of Trees Having Peak Flowering Season 5.285.6 Pollution Attenuation Factor (Air) for Green Belt of Different 5.29

Widths

(xii)

2

2

2.

2.

2.

2.

2.

2.

I.5.7

!.5.8

I.5.9

5.10

5.11

5.12

5.13

5.14

5.15

2.5.16

2

2

.6.1

.6.2

2.6.3

2.

2.

2.

3.

6.4

65

6.6

1.1

List of Annexures

Annexure Title Page No.No.

I National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 1II Indian Standards/Specifications for Drinking Water IS: 10500- 2

1991

III Noise Standards 9

IV Indian Standards for Industrial and Sewage Effluents 10Discharge IS:2490-1982

Y Information About Various Nuclear Power Plants with Respect 13to Environmental Requirement for Discharge of CondenserCooling Water System

(xiii)

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

M/s Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) has proposed to constructadditional two Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRS) (RAPP - 7 & 8) of 700 MWecapacities each at the site of Rawatbhata Atomic Power Project, Rajasthan in theadjoining area of the existing plant. Presently, four PHWR units (RAPS - 1 to 4) aregenerating electricity and feeding to the Northern Grid and the units RAPP 5 & 6 areunder construction.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited retained National EnvironmentalEngineering Research Institute (NEERI) with a view to establish the baseline status withrespect to various environmental components viz. air, noise, water, land, biological andsocio-economic including parameters of human interest. The present ComprehensiveEnvironmental Impact Assessment (CEIA) report is based on environmental datacollected during three season i.e. summer 2003, post monsoon (2003) and winter (2003-2004) seasons with a view to assess the present baseline environmental status, evaluateand predict the potential impacts due to the proposed activities. An EnvironmentalManagement Plan incorporating control measures has also been delineated in this report.

Project Setting

The RAPS (Latitude 24 52'N and Longitude 75 31 'E) is situated on the upstreamon right bank of Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS) at a distance of 6 km from the dam, inBegun Taluk of Chittorgarh district

The study area of 25 km radial distance from RAPS consists of Chambal Riverand its tributary, and lakes viz. Rana Pratap Sagar, Gandhi Sagar, Jawahar Sagarand three sanctuaries.

Executive Summary

NEERIBaseline Environmental Status

Ambient air quality was observed to be good with respect to SO2 and NOx.However, Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) and Respirable SuspendedParticulate Matter (RSPM) were found to be slightly higher than the nationalstandards set up by CPCB.

Among radionuclides, the only significant radionuclides that are likely to bereleased are tritium, fission product noble gases (FPNG), radio iodines, andactivated particulates. The Geometric Mean (GM) values for gross alpha and betaare 0.08 and 1.18 mBq/m3 and were below detection limits in quarterly cumulativesamples analyzed by gamma spectrometry. The levels of activity for radiocesiumand radiostrontium in annual cumulative rainwater samples were below detectionlimit.

The noise levels were within the stipulated limits in residential areas andcommercial areas except slightly higher in commercial area in 5-10 km distancearound RAPP. The noise levels in infrastructural buildings were slightly higherthan the standards.

The physico-chemical characteristics of surface water sources are within thepermissible limits for drinking water. The nutrients were observed to be within thepermissible limits. Heavy metals like iron, lead and chromium were found to behigher than standards at some places in ground water.

The ground water samples collected from study area showed high mineral contentand pH ranging from 6.5-8.5. The inorganic constituents in groundwater(hardness, chlorides, sulphates) were observed to be lower than the Indianstandards for drinking water in most of the samples collected. Few water samplesalso showed higher levels of heavy metals in them.

All the surface water samples showed contamination of water, while 40% ofgroundwater samples were found to be contaminated as evident from presence offaecal coliforms. Plankton population in surface water showed slightly pollutedwater or 0- mesotrophic quality of water.

Most of the surface and ground water samples showed the activity of Sr8990, I 131,and Cs137 below detectable limits.

The project would be adopting cooling towers thus there will not be the problem ofthermal pollution in Rana Pratap Sagar receiving the cooling water discharge

Executive Summary

NEERI Waste management centralized facility (WMCF) is planned to cater to the

management of solid and liquid waste of RAPP 1 to 8

The values of radioactivity recorded in air, water, soil and dietary items are muchbelow the permissible limits

The results of environmental surveillance programme, 2002 show that the dosesreceived even by a hypothetical man staying at fence post (1.6 km) is 37.1 uSvwhich is less than 4% of the dose limit of 1000uSv per year prescribed byAERB/ICRP

Flood analysis indicate that discharge capacity of Rana Pratap Sagar is less thanprobable maximum flood. Hence, the guidelines issued by Govt. of MadhyaPradesh in the Operation Manual of upstream Gandhisagar dam should be strictlyfollowed

Soils are microbiologically active but cultivation of crops is very much restricteddue to shallow soils with stones and their poor productivity

Good biodiversity of flora and fauna is recorded in the forests and sanctuaries instudy area.

Population density is less in study area. The main occupation of local people isagriculture. Infrastructure facility with respect to safe drinking water,communication and employment opportunities are poor. The average QoL indexvalues are low i.e. 0.51-0.53

Assessment of Impacts

Conventional pollutants are given out in air and water from the township area viz.dust, sewage and solid waste. Presently treated sewage is discharged in nallahwhich is contaminating water bodies. Solid waste needs treatment and recyclingto protect environment

The noise levels in study area are below stipulated limits

Most of the surface and ground water samples, air, soil and dietary items showedthe activity of cesium and strontium far below detectable limit. Therefore, there isno radiological hazard through various routes

The wildlife sanctuaries especially Bhainsroadgarh Wildlife Sanctuary is greatlyaffected by increasing anthropogenic and grazing activity. Five tree species and

Executive Summary

NEERIsix faunal species from the study area are included under rare, threatened,

endangered, vulnerable and intermediate category

Quality of life (QoL) is poor due to poor infrastructure facilities.

Prediction of impacts

The RAPP requires development of water source for its running. The site falls inseismic zone II and development of reservoir may pose threat with respect toseismic activity

Flood level in Rana Pratap Sagar at maximum rainfall may be hazardous to RAPSand RAPP

Radiological pollution through various routes due to the expansion programmewould be higher than the present level

Radiological hazard during operation or accident conditions

Increasing anthropogenic activity would lead to more production of dust pollutionin study area

Increasing population with the increase in industrial activity will lead tocontamination of environment due to disposal of wastewater effluents and solidwaste, threatening ecology and public health

Unless and until some preventive measures are undertaken, increasing populationof man and cattle may affect the biodiversity of flora and fauna in environmentallysensitive sanctuaries and forest area

Discharge of heated coolant water will be responsible for thermal pollution whichwould be detrimental to aquatic flora and fauna in Rana Pratap Sagar

Radioactive liquid discharge in environment without proper treatment may affectaquatic flora and fauna

Soil may be exposed to radionuclides fallout from atmosphere; disposal ofhazardous radioactive waste would pose a threat to flora and fauna

The geographical features would be altered due to construction activity of RAPP

Executive Summary

NEERIEnvironmental Management Plan

Salient features of environment management plan are given in Table 1 and arediscussed below in brief.

Due consideration should be given to water retaining structures such as waterreservoirs to account for induced seismicity and the consequences of dam failureon the safety of RAPP

Considering the flood level of Chambal River of Rana Pratap Sagar at maximumrainfall, the guidelines issued by Govt. of Madhya Pradesh for the operation ofupstream Gandhisagar dam should be followed strictly and selection of properelevation to RAPP 7 & 8 to keep maximum possible safety margin

Radiological emissions from stacks would be reduced by adoption of propertechnology and compliance to the limits set by ICRP and AERB.

Proper planning for safety approach and protection against common modeincidents

Development of good quality roads and afforestation measures as a social welfaremeasure would reduce dust pollution

Air emissions from solid waste dumping site would be reduced by using improvedtechnology of composting and vermiculture with added benefit of recycling andreuse of produced manure for green belt development.

The domestic sewage would be treated in proper effluent treatment plant and thestabilized effluent would be utilized for irrigation of green belt, parks and gardens

The green belt development around plant site and township and naturalvegetation in exclusion zone and sterilized zone (5 km radial distance area) wouldact as sink not only for radionuclides in air but also for conventional air pollutants,and would be effective in reducing the noise levels produced during the operationof the plant

There are 3 wild life sanctuaries in the study area which are rich in biodiversity.These sanctuaries especially Bhainsroadgarh is affected by anthropogenicactivity. Thus these sanctuaries need protection from anthropogenic impact andconservation measures to improve wildlife habitat viz. afforestation and habitatimprovement

Executive Summary

NEERI The impact of thermal discharge would be minimized by compliance to

permissible limits set by MoEF by adopting cooling towers for condenser coolingwater discharge

Adoption of proper disposal of radioactive waste: The radioactive liquid wastewould be collected in holding tanks and will be processed further to separatewater and highly concentrated radioactivity residue. Highly concentrated (up to800 g/l) residue would be solidified through cementation and sent for interimstorage in solid waste depositary

The green belt development and plantations at plant site and township wouldenhance the aesthetic value of the area

Socio-economic aspect is the important issue in the development of NPP project.The negative feelings of local people, if any, arisen due to propaganda by antinuclear lobby should be mitigated by giving proper information to public andeducating them about the benefits, and to create awareness about nuclear powerplant and safety measures. The quality of life in surrounding villages can beimproved by providing various welfare measures and recreational facilities and jobopportunities to local people

Guidelines and recommendations are given in the report for post projectenvironmental monitoring of air, noise, water and radionuclides around the RAPParea.

Executive Summary

NEERITable 1

Summary of Impacts, Problems and Appropriate Management Plan for theirMitigation

EnvironmentalComponent

Impacts and Problems Inputs : Management Plan for Mitigation of Impact

Earthquake DesignBasis forconstruction

Flooding of RAPS

Air Environment

The site falls in seismic zone II

Flood level at maximum rainfall may behazardous to nuclear power plant

Radiological emissions from stacks

Radiological hazardaccident conditions

during operation or

Air emissions from solid waste dumping site

Dust pollution pose threat to arblic healthand wildlife

Noise Environment Marginal problems

Water Environment

Land Environment

BiologicalEnvironment

Pollution due to discharge of domesticwastewater from township

Discharge of heated water to Rana PratapSagar would affect aquatic flora and fauna

Radioactive liquid discharge in environmentmay affect aquatic flora and fauna

Soil may be exposed to radionuclides dueto fall out from atmosphere

Disposal of hazardous solid radioactivewaste

Accidental release of radionuclids would behazardous to terrestrial ecosystem andhuman being

Exposure of flora and fauna to radionuclidsthrough different routes

Ecologicallysensitive Areas

Rare andendangeredspecies of flora andfauna

Aesthetics

SocioeconomicEnvironment

RAPP is present very near to three wildlifesanctuaries

Deterioration of wildlife habitat

Topographical features will be altered dueto construction activity of RAPP

Beneficial effects outweighs adverse effectson socio-economic environment

Due consideration should be given to the water retaining structure suchas reservoirs built around RAPP to account for induced seismicity andthe consequences of dam failure units on the safety of present andproposed Nuclear Power Plant

The elevation from MSL of different units should be decided on thebasis of flood analysis

Appropriate technological measures to meet the limits set by ICRP andAERB with respect to existing and proposed units.

Development of green belt around nuclear power plant and townshipand natural vegetation growth in exclusive zone (within 2 km radialdistance) and sterilizing zone (2 km to 5 km radial distance area) to actas sink for pollutants

Proper planning for safety approach and protection against commonmode incidents

Adoption of improved treatment, recycling and reuse technology viz.composting, vermicomposting etc.

Proper stabilization and maintenance of roads; Development of greenbelt to reduce dust pollution

Development of green belt would reduce the noise levels in surroundingarea

Development of effluent treatment plant (ETP) and reuse of effluent forirrigation in parks and green belts

Compliance with permissible limits set by MoEF by adoption of coolingtowers would be helpful in reducing thermal pollution.

Specific treatment of radioactive liquid waste to reduce its volume andcontainment and secured deposition of concentrated nuclear waste

Compliance to air quality standards related to radioactivity (ICRP andAERB)Adoption of appropriate treatment to reduce the volume of radioactivewaste and containment and secured deposition of concentratedradioactive waste

Proper planning should be ready to handle emergency situations; suchplanning is already implemented for existing units of RAPS 1 to 4

Compliance to radiological standards for air and water;containment and secured deposition of radioactive waste

treatment,

Development of green belt around RAPP and natural vegetation inexclusive zone and sterilizing zone (5 km radial distance area aroundNPP) would act as sink for radionuclids as well as conventional airpollutants

Compliance with regulation (ICRP, AERB & MoEF)Protection of sanctuaries from anthropogenic actives

Protection of wildlife habitat in wildlife sanctuaries and improvement intheir status with respect to food, feed and shelter.

There will be improvement in the aesthetic quality of water, air and landenvironment

Quality of Life (QoL) would be improved due to increase in jobopportunities and improved facilities related to transport,communication, medical, education, electricity and water supply.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 1

Introduction1.1 Introduction

It is proposed to construct two pressurized heavy water Reactors (PHWRs)(RAPP-7 & 8) of 700 MWe capacity each at Rawatbhata Atomic Power Project site in theadjoining area of the existing plant. The site is situated on the right bank of the RanaPratap Sagar (RPS), upstream of the RPS dam, at a radial distance of 6 km from thedam. The nearest village to the site is Tamlav. The site lies within the property limits ofthe existing Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) in Begun taluk of Chittorgarhdistrict. The approximate latitude and longitude of the site are as follows :

Latitude : 24 521 N

Longitude : 75 37' E

The existing Rajasthan Atomic Power Station consists of four units as detailedbelow:

Present Capacity Commencement of Commercial operation

RAPS -1 1 x 100 MWe PHWR December 1973

RAPS-2 1 x 200 MWe PHWR April 1981

RAPS - 3&4 2 x 220 MWe PHWR June /December 2000

All these units are generating electricity and feeding to the Northern Grid. Atpresent RAPS-5, 6 (2X220 MWe - PHWR) project is under construction. The operationalperformance details of RAPS 2-4 is presented in Table 1.1.

The nearest thermal power station is at Kota, about 65 km away from site, with aninstalled capacity of 850 MWe consisting of 2 x 110 MWe and 3 x 210 MWe units. The

NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction

nearest hydro-electric power station is at RPS dam, with a total installed generatingcapacity of 172 MWe (4 x 43 MWe).

Jaipur, the State capital, is about 300 km by road from the site. Coal for Kotathermal power station is supplied by Nowrazabad coalfields in M.P. at a distance of about700 km (by broad gauge rail cum road route) from the site. The general location map ofthe site is shown in Figure 1.1.

This site had earlier been cleared from safety angle by AERB and environmentalangle by Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) for additional 4 x 500 MWe PHWRunits over and above the existing four units (RAPS - 1 to 4). Subsequently, capacity ofRAPP - 5 & 6 was changed to 2 x 220 MWe instead of 2 x 500 MWe PHWRs andnecessary clearances from MoEF and AERB were obtained. Present report is forevaluating setting up of additional 2 x 700 MWe PHWRs (RAPP - 7 & 8) instead of 2 x500 MWe PHWRs. The total power potential of RAPP site is projected at 2580 MWe aftersuch addition.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited retained National EnvironmentalEngineering Research Institute (NEERI), Nagpur with a view to establish the baselinestatus with respect to various environmental components viz. air, noise, water, land,biological and socio-economic including parameters of human interest and to evaluateand predict the potential impacts due to the proposed activities. Environmental datacollected during summer (2003), post monsoon (2003), and winter (2003-2004) seasonsare analyzed and presented in the form of Comprehensive Environmental ImpactAssessment (CEIA) with a view to assess the present baseline environmental status, AnEnvironmental Management Plan incorporating control measures has also beendelineated in this CEIA report.

1.2 Project Setting

The land required for locating buildings and structures of additional four units ofPHWRs (RAPP - 5 to 8) has already been acquired, fenced and is in the control of thestation authorities. This is adequate to locate 2 x 220 MWe (RAPP - 5 & 6) and 2 x 700MWe PHWR (RAPP - 7 & 8). Additional land for exclusion zone, where no publichabitation exists up to 1.6 km radius from the proposed layout of Unit 8 (Centre line of theReactor Building of RAPP - 8) admeasuring 326.81 ha of forestland has already beenreleased by Rajasthan State Government. The legal status of the land will remain

1.2


unchanged and project has borne the cost of afforestation of the area as per thegovernment order. This area will be allowed to be fenced.

The ground elevation gradually rises away from the reservoir, with elevationvarying from + 345 m to + 410 m. The grade level for RAPP - 3 & 4 has been fixed at+384 m which is safe against flooding. The area for additional units is south east of theexisting units along the banks of the RPS. The grade elevation for RAPP - 5 & 6 is fixedat 392.7 m. The same elevation as for RAPP - 5 & 6 or above as per topography will holdgood for the proposed additional units. Based on the topography, a grade level of 400 m.appears probable. This could be fixed at the design stage based on techno-economicconsiderations. There are three nullahs in this area. Suitable site drainage scheme byproviding cut off drains and diverting the flows to nearby major nullahs needs to beengineered and implemented. This is feasible. Significant leveling of the area is required.

The land around the site is barren with little topsoil. Agriculture and fishing arecarried out on very small scale within 10 km radius of the site. An area of about 120 ha,around 6 km away from the site has been identified and acquired as an extension of theexisting housing colony. The land for colony is partly private patta land and partlygovernment land. There is no forestland in the colony area. As there is no residentpopulation in the exclusion zone mentioned above, the problem of rehabilitation ofpopulation does not arise.

The area is sparsely populated with the average population distribution of 60persons/sq km in the 30 km radial distance of RAPP. There is negligible population within5 km radial distance from RAPP. Even upto 15 km the total population is only 60,000 asper 1991 census and majority of this, about 36,000 is in NNW sector, comprising mainlyof Rawatbhata (Bhabha Nagar) at about 6 km from RAPP. The population in the 5 to 10km zone consists mostly of workers living in nearby townships and also the villagers.

Gaseous emissions are discharged through tall stacks. The main components ofthese gaseous emissions are Ar-41 (Specially for RAPS 1 & 2), FPNG and tritium andmicro quantities of fission products. The main radionuclide in liquid effluent is tritium withmicro quantities of fission and activation products.

Keeping in view the dry climate at the Rawatbhata site, a solar evaporation facilityhas been in operation since 1979 for the slow evaporation of liquid effluents, therebyconcentrating fission and activation products and reducing their discharge in the lake

1.3


1.3 Salient Features of 700 MWe Design

The reactor size and the design features of 700 MWe units are essentially sameas that 540 MWe TAPP 3 & 4 units, except that partial boiling of the coolant, limited toabout 3% at the coolant channel exit has been allowed. This limit on exit quality isconsistent with the later version of PHWRs operating satisfactorily elsewhere in the world.The process systems have been suitably modified, over, that of 540 MWe design, forextracting the enhanced power produced in the core. Similar to TAPP 3 & 4, the reactorpower is controlled using lonization Chambers at low power (less than 15%) and throughsignal derived from SPNDs (Slow Power Neutron Detectors) in the power range (higherthan 15% FP). Both signals are used in the range 5-15% FP. For the purpose of controlof bulk and zonal power, the core is divided into 14 zones, 42 SPNDs are provided 3 ineach zone, for measurement of zonal and bulk power. The flux mapping system is usedfor correcting zonal power estimates derived from ZCDs. Bulk power estimates arecorrected using selected channel temperature and flow measurements made on theprimary side, upto 87% FP. Above this the secondary side measurements are used toverify the thermal output of the core. Double containment, as used now in all IndianPHWRs, has been provided, to contain the radioactive nuclides. The primary pressureand temperature at the Reactor headers are also nearly the same as that of TAPP 3 & 4,though bigger size pressuriser, and higher capacity Secondary system and auxiliarysystems are involved.

Some of the salient differences from TAPP 3 & 4 units are as follows:

> 2-4% boiling allowed in coolant channels

> About 6C higher primary coolant temperatures viz. 266C at Reactor inlet and310C at outlet header

> Higher size pressuriser

> Enhanced capacity steam generator with modified process parameters,

> Reduced number of pumps (i.e. 3 x 50%) in the moderator system

> Higher capacity Turbine, generator, and condenser

1.4


> Appropriate modifications/capacity increase in Reactor Process Systems, ReactorAuxiliary Systems, Secondary System Process Water and Cooling Water System,and Electrical System

> Improved and compact plant layout with better segregation

1.3.1 Safety Approach

The objective of nuclear safety is the protection of the plant personnel, public andthe environment from radiological hazards, during operation as well as under accidentconditions by incorporating and maintaining effective defenses against such hazard byadopting the concept of defense in depth. This concept implies a series of consecutivephysical barriers in the path of release of ionizing radiation and radioactive substancesinto the environment, and redundancy in equipment and control and other complexengineering and managerial measures for protecting these barriers and maintaining theireffectiveness. In addition there are engineering safety features such as Emergency CoreCooling System, Pressure Suppression System, Radionuclide clean-up system etc. totake care of the accident situations.

The plant configuration is aimed to ensure that the radiation impact on the plantpersonnel, general public and the environment during operation, under anticipatedoperation occurrences, and design basis accidents does not exceed the exposure limitsset forth by AERB as well as the risk from beyond design basis accidents is minimized.

1.3.2 Protection Against Common Mode Incidents

There are a number of postulated single events, which, if not protected against,could lead to widespread damage of station equipment. These initiating events arereferred to as common mode incidents and can be caused by a common external event,failure of a common process or a common environment.

The general philosophy to limit the consequences of these common modeincidents requires that the following capabilities must be maintained.

1. The capability to shut down the reactor

2. The capability to ensure that the reactor remains shut down

3. The capability to remove decay heat from the reactor

1.5


4. The capability to monitor the status of the nuclear steam supply system

It is also a requirement that systems, other than the reactor systems, containingsignificant amounts of radionuclides, e.g. the irradiated fuel bays, not be unacceptablydamaged.

In providing the protection against postulated common mode incidents, twogroups of systems have been identified such that each group can meet the requiredcapabilities. In general, systems in each group are sufficiently separated or hardenedsuch that no common mode incident can cause the loss of any of the requiredcapabilities.

The two-group approach is primarily designed to provide an acceptable level ofprotection for a set of very low probability events of known or unknown origin. With this inmind, an attempt has been made to provide the greatest practical degree of separation ofthose systems necessary to meet the required capabilities. To meet this target of greatestpractical separation in a clear and thorough manner, the number of systems in eachgroup have been minimized.

Group 1 systems include the SDS#1 ECCS, SG cooling and shutdown coolingsystem, main control center and their associated services

Group 2 systems include SDS#2 containment system, decay heat removal byinjecting fire water to SGs/moderator cooling, emergency control room, emergencyservice water system and emergency power supply system.

1.4 Plant Description

1.4.1 General

The plant (Figure 1.2) is accommodated in an area of approximately 700 m x 700m. The two reactor buildings are of 56 m outside diameter and are situated at 100 mcentre-to-centre distance. For each reactor, a reactor auxiliary building (RAB) is providedadjacent to the reactor building and accommodates vapour recovery system and otherReactor Auxiliary systems such as end-shield / calandria vault cooling systems etc. Eachunit has been provided with two Natural Draught Cooling Towers (NDCTs) for condensercooling and an IDCT for safety related loads. Each unit will have its own emergencycontrol room, emergency power DG sets and fuel oil day tank, SUT, UT, GT, SABS,

1.6


turbine buildings, and CCW pump house. An emergency make up water pond catering to7 days requirement is also provided for the twin unit plant.

The Service Building, Spent Fuel Storage Bay, Safety Related Pump House,Stack with Radiation Monitor room, Waste Management Facility, D2O Upgrading Plant,F/M Maintenance facility, CW Intake Structure, CW Discharge Channel, Switchyard, O &M Ware house, Administrative Building and Technical Building etc, are common to bothunits. Physical separation and redundancy have been provided between the safetyrelated systems.

1.4.2 Layout Considerations

Following basic philosophy has been adopted

> Compact layout with due consideration to accessibility, maintainability, and easeof construction, operation and maintenance

> Avoid turbine missile zone for locating buildings structures important to safety

> Personnel movement (walking) required to perform various activities areminimized by suitably locating various facilities

> Locations are so chosen as to facilitate reduction in operating personnel

> Minimize tunnels to ease maintenance

> Facilitate routing of major underground piping and cabling within the building,largely eliminating underground trenches

> Seismic class of equipment is housed in seismic class structures. Consistent withthis philosophy, Reactor Building (RB), Control Building (CB), Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB), and Station Auxiliary Buildings (SABs) are designed for SafeShutdown Earthquake (SSE).

1.4.3 Reactor System

The reactor is of pressurized heavy water type using heavy water as moderator,and heavy water as coolant and natural uranium dioxide as fuel with zircaloy - 4 as acladding material. The reactor consists of integral assembly of calandria vessel holds D2O

1.7


moderator and Reflector. The reactor is having 392 coolant channel assemblies.37element zircaloy claded natural uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel bundles (10.24 cm dia x49.5 cm long) are contained in pressure tubes (coolant tubes), which are made ofZiroconium - 2.5% Niobium Alloy. Though the basic fuel is UO2, some Thorium/Depletedfuel bundles may be used in fresh core for initial flux flattening in order to operate athigher power level even before equilibrium is attained. The pressure tubes are arrangedin a square lattice of 286 mm pitch. At each end, pressure tubes are rolled to AISI 403(Modified) stainless steel end fittings, which penetrate the end shields and extend into thefuelling machine vaults so as to facilitate on line re-fueling. Feeders are connected to theend fittings by means of high-pressure couplings for transport of coolant to the reactorheaders. The pressure tube, calandria, end fittings, fuel bundles, and the contained heavywater coolant together constitute the coolant channel. Around each coolant tube, aconcentric calandria tube, which is rolled into the end shield lattice tube, has beenprovided with an annular gap. Each coolant channel is supported by the end shield at theend fitting location and also supported partially by the surrounding calandria tubesthrough 4 nos. garter springs installed in the annulus between pressure tube andCalandria tube. Carbon dioxide gas filled in this gap serves as thermal insulation betweenthe high temperature primary coolant and low temperature moderator. This annulus gasforms part of an advance sensing system regarding pressure tube leak. Axial shielding tothe coolant channel is provided by removable shield plugs fitted in the end fittings oneither end. At the face of each end fitting, a seal plug is installed which serves as a leaktight mechanical joint and can be removed during refuelling operations.

1.4.4 Primary Heat Transport (PHT) System

The high-pressure high temperature primary heat transport (PHT) system extractsheat from the fuel bundle and transports to the steam generators, which generate steamto run the turbo-generator and produce electricity. The PHT main system is essentiallytwo independent pressurized heavy water (D2O) coolant closed loop circuits circulatingcoolant through the coolant channels containing fuel bundles, the outlet feeders, theoutlet reactor header, the steam generators, the circulating pumps, the inlet reactorheader, the inlet feeders and back into the coolant channels. Partial boiling up to 4% atcoolant channel exit is permitted to extract more heat (i.e. 2162 MWth) from the reactorcore to produce about 700 MWe instead of 540 MWe. The channel flows are matchedwith the time averaged channel power pattern and Primary main circuit pressure is

1.8


controlled at Reactor Outlet header at a pressure corresponding to saturation pressure at310 C. The pH and dissolved gases are kept under control in the Primary circuit.

The PHT system includes a pressuriser and a feed and bleed system for pressureand inventory control and pressure relief system to protect the system pressure boundaryfrom over pressurization. It also includes coolant purification system; high pressure heavywater supply system for fueling machines, shutdown cooling system to remove decayheat from the fuel, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and Inventory Addition andRecovery System (IARS) to maintain core cooling following a loss of coolant Accident(LOCA) or collecting and putting back small leakages back to PHT through purification;and a leakage collection system to collect, contain and transfer the collected heavy waterand to provide venting and draining facility to the equipment.

Salient Features of the System

Ensures coolant circulation to remove core heat under all anticipatedcircumstances. Core cooling is ensured by

> PHT main circulating loop coolant flow under normal operation

> Primary circulating pump (PCP) flywheel inertia maintains adequate coolantcirculation during short period of non-availability of normal power to PCPs anddelay in establishing diesel driven emergency power

> Shutdown cooling circuit pumps and heat exchangers ensure cooling duringshutdown condition

> Thermo-syphon flow ensure cooling during station blackout condition

> Emergency injection from H2O accumulators in the initial phase of loss of coolantaccident (LOCA) followed by long term core cooling phase using suppression poolwater re-circulation

PHT system is well instrumented to monitor and control inventory, temperature,pressure and chemistry of the coolant. The associated control and protection system isdesigned with adequate margin and redundancy to ensure that the safe limits of pressureboundary are not exceeded under any operational states.

1.9


1.4.5 Moderator System

The purpose of heavy water moderator is to maintain criticality in the reactor coreby slowing down the high-energy neutrons to low energy thermal neutrons whereprobability for fission capture is higher. The bulk of the space in the calandria i.e. thespace available between the calandria tubes is filled with heavy water moderator, which iscontinuously circulated with the help of two out of three moderator pumps. Heavy watersued as moderator inside calandria gets heated up due to neutron moderation andcapture, attenuation of gamma radiation, as well as due to transfer of heat from reactorcomponents in contact (total 123 MW). The moderator temperature is controlled at about80 C at the outlet of calandria by passing it through the two numbers of tube and shelltype moderator heat exchangers.

1.4.6 Instrumentation and Control System

It encompasses monitoring and control of various plant parameters. For protectionsystems, principle of redundancy, diversity, testability and maintainability are given primeconsideration. A high degree of automation is aimed at promoting reliability. The safetysystems are designed to conform to fail safe criteria. All visual indication and controls,which may be required for operator's intervention during operation, are located in a singlemain control room. The protection systems are triplicated, the protection functions beingachieved by 2 out of 3 logic. Each channel is totally independent of other channels withseparate sensors, signal processing instruments and power supplies. This arrangementalso facilitates on power testing of equipments of the triplicated channels. In cases wherethe complexity of the system is likely to reduce reliability, as in channel temperaturemonitoring system, only two channels are used with a coincident logic of 2 out of 2. Theinstrumentation for the control and protection systems is kept separate and independentof each other. An extensive operator information system is provided. CRT displays areused for information display and alarm parameter signal on control panels. Also, a limitednumber of dedicated, hard wired window annunciations are provided on control roompanels to cover certain essential alarms. A separate control room is provided, for theunlikely situation of inhabitability of main control room, to enable safe shutdown of thereactor and to maintain it in a prolonged sub critical state.

1.10

NEER1 Chapter 1: Introduction

1.4.7 Reactivity Control Reactor Shutdown System

Reactor control devices are required to regulate the reactor power, to controlneutron flux tilt and for the reactor start up process. These functions are achieved byLiquid Zone Control (LZC) system, (light water absorber in 14 liquid zone controlcompartments), 4 Control Rods (in 2 banks) and 17 Adjuster Rods (in 8 banks).Automatic Liquid Poison Addition System (ALPAS) is provided to supplement theregulating system, with controlled addition of boron poison into the moderator. Boronconcentration in moderator is also used for long-term reactivity control. Two fast actingindependent shutdown systems are provided as part of the protective system. Both thesehave adequate capability to suppress any fast reactivity transient under various operatingand accident conditions and to maintain reactor in sub critical condition for long-termshutdown. Shut Down System#1 (SDS-1) contains 28 Shut off Rods (Cadmiumsandwiched in SS), which are dropped into the core when system is activated. ControlRods, which are normally parked outside the core, are also dropped along with shut offrods. Shut down system #2 (SDS-2) provides fast injection of liquid poison (GadoliniumNitrate solution) directly into the moderator. SDS-1 activation is the preferred mode ofreactor shutdown, from economic considerations due to poison outage and gadolimiumpoison removal requirements, Set points for SDS-2 actuation are kept at a higher levelnormally compared to SDS-1. Some set points are same for SDS - 1 & 2.

1.4.8 On Power Re-fuelling

Two fuelling machines (F/Ms) operating in conjunction at the two ends of thereactor are provided to carry out on power fuelling. On power fuelling is a characteristicfeature of Indian PHWR and is required on a regular basis mainly in view of the use ofnatural uranium fuel. New fuel bundles are inserted by one of the F/Ms at one end of thereactor while the other machine at the other end receives the spent fuel bundles. Bi-directional fuelling in adjacent channels along the direction of flow is adopted to smoothenaxial neutron flux pattern. By using F/M and fuel transfer equipments, spent fuel bundlesare shifted to a shuttle which slides inside a transport tube laid from Reactor Building tothe inspection bay in the spent fuel building. Creating a hydraulic differential pressureacross the shuttle causes this movement. The discharge fuel if required, may beinspected in the inspection bay for any damage before being transferred to the trays inthe storage bay. The necessary inspection facility is provided. Spent fuel is stored underwater in the trays for sufficient time period before it is transferred out of the Station.

1.11

NEER1 Chapter 1: Introduction

1.4.9 Shut Down Cooling System

Shutdown cooling system is used for cooling the system below 150 C to about55C to facilitate maintenance.

Under planned shutdown of the reactor, PHT is cooled down with the help ofsteam generators by controlled discharge of steam through steam dump discharge valveson the secondary side of SG. After the PHT system temperature comes to 150 C, S/Dsystem is valved-in to cool the system further to about 55 C. Two single stage centrifugalpumps along with two heat exchangers provide cooling in each loop. Elevation wise, thelocation of the steam generators in relation to the reactor core is so chosen that duringclass IV power failure and consequent coasting down of the main circulating pumps, heatremoval would be possible by thermo-syphoning. This phase of the heat removal plays animportant role in bringing down the temperature of the PHT system consequent to a classIV failure to temperatures where shut down cooling can be valved-in.

1.4.10 Emergency Core Cooling System

In the event of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), as a consequence of rupture inprimary coolant system pressure boundary, the cooling of the fuel is ensured by utilizingECCS, a high pressure light water coolant injection system followed by long term re-circulation from suppression pool. Passive equipments like light water accumulators,pressurized by N2 accumulator have been provided for high-pressure coolant injection.Subsequently, emergency core cooling pumps are used to re-circulate the suppressionpool water through the core and remove decay heat. Decay heat is picked up by the re-circulating water and is removed by passing the hot water through the plate type heatexchangers. The system has been designed to ensure safety under various postulatedconditions involving different break sizes and locations.

1.4.11 Reactor Auxiliary Systems

> Reactor Vault Cooling System

Calandria is submerged inside a pool of water contained in the calandria vault.The function of water is two fold, one to provide shielding around the calandria andsecondly to cool down the vault walls which serve as a biological shield. The heatgenerated in the vault water and the concrete vault walls is removed by circulating the

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vault water through heat exchangers SS Line. The peak concrete temperature in thecalandria vault during worst scenario is expected to be around 55 C.

> End Shield Cooling System

At each end of rector, steel balls filled end shields are used as radiation shield tolimit the radiation dose in the F/M vaults. The volume of circulating water in the end shieldand the steel balls are arranged in such a ratio that they provide adequate shieldingagainst neutrons and gamma rays. The recirculating water removes the heat generated inthe end shields.

1.4.12 Containment

Double containment philosophy has been followed. The containment systemconsists of an (Primary) inner containment enveloped by (secondary) an outercontainment. The annulus between the inner and outer containments is kept at a slightlynegative pressure with respect to the atmosphere so as to minimize ground level activityreleases to the environment during an accident condition.

The containment serves basically three functions

1) Provide an envelope around the structure housing supporting calandria, endshields, reactivity mechanisms, PHT and moderator systems, fuelling system, andvarious associated systems

2) Provide shielding, and also to permit access to equipment within the containmentbuilding under reactor operating/shutdown conditions

3) It forms the last barrier in the path of radioactivity release to the environmentfollowing a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The leak tightness integrity of thecontainment is therefore important. The peak containment pressure following adouble ended break in the main steam line (MSLB is higher than that resultingfrom LOCA). Containment structural design is therefore, based on MSLB and theleakage integrity specifications are based on LOCA

4) The primary containment is of pre-stressed concrete and the outer (secondary)containment is of reinforced concrete.

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5) During normal operation of the plant the primary and secondary containmentsremain at a small negative pressure.

1.5 Services/Conventional Systems

1.5.1 Active Process Water System and Service Water System

The heat from different reactor process heat exchangers is transferred to a closedloop active Process Water System. The plate type heat exchangers located in thebasement of reactor auxiliary building cools the active process water. The heat istransferred here to SW (Service water) system, which in turn transfers it to IDCT. Thissystem is safety related and the equipment pertaining to these systems are qualified forSSE. Service water system also absorbs heat from non-active water system and transfersthis heat to IDCT.

1.5.2 Fire Water System

The main plant area is provided with extensive hydrant and sprinkler systems forminimizing the consequences of any fire hazard. Automatic sprinkler type protection isprovided for all transformers and non-automatic sprinkler systems for main oil tank,turbine oil tank and associated lubricating oil piping. In door and out door hydrantslocated suitably will provide fire protection within and around the plant buildings.

In case of process water failure, fire water supply will be provided as back up toprocess water to meet, among other things, reactor core cooling requirements. Underextreme emergencies (station black out etc.) also, firewater will be available throughdiesel driven pumps.

1.5.3 Turbine Generator System

The valve wide open rating of Turbine Generator is 695 MWe with 0.25% wetsteam flow of 3840 T/hr at 41.8 kg/cm2, before the emergency stop valves (ESV), and acondenser pressure of 70 mm hg. The Turbo-generator output may vary from 710 MWeto an assured minimum of 690 MWe depending on the ambient condition.

The steam pressure in steam generator is 43.5 kg/cm2 (g). The steam is deliveredto double flow H.P. turbine from steam generators via two sets of ESV (emergency stopvalve) and governor valves.

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After expansion in HP cylinder, steam exhausts to the moisture separator-reheaterwherein wetness is reduced and further reheated in bled steam reheater and live steamreheater sections. Subsequently steam enters the 2 nos. of LP double flow turbines andexhausts to their respective surface condensers cooled by condenser cooling water.Steam is extracted from suitable stages of HP and LP turbine to provide regenerativefeed heating to about 180 C.

1.5.4 Secondary System

The main function of secondary system is to provide heat sink for the heattransported from the reactor core by primary coolant under various operating conditions.Secondary system consists of steam generator (4 Nos.) HP and LP turbines, condenser,condenser extraction pumps (CEPs), LP heaters, deaerator and storage tank, boiler feedpumps (BFPs), feed pumps auxiliary boiler feed pumps (ABRPs), HP heaters, etc.

The design pressure of steam system is 51 kg/sq. cm (g). The steam pressure inthe steam generators is controlled at about 43.5 kg/sq cm (g) at full power. High-pressuretransients may be expected due to sudden loss of demand of steam or by malfunctioningof emergency stop valves (ESV). In such events, the pressure on the secondary side islimited within the permissible value by using the following devices.

1. Steam dump valves (SDVs) which discharge the steam into the main condenser

2. Atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDVs), which will be actuated to relievethe steam to the atmosphere when required e.g. loss of condenser vacuum,turbine trip etc.

3. Relief valves (RVs) which are provided as means of ultimate safety to the steamgenerators and secondary side steam lines.

1.5.5 Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System

A re-circulating type CCW system incorporating a Natural Draught Cooling Tower(NDCT) has been adopted. The natural draught, hyperbolic cooling tower has beendesigned for cooling 175000 Cu.m./hr of re-circulated water from 40 C to 32C.

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1.5.6 Electrical System

Various auxiliaries (i.e. various electrical loads) of the power station are providedwith power supply from off-site and on-site sources. The off site power supply is derivedfrom 400 KV and 220 KV switchyards. The switchyard structures and equipment aredesignated as codal category.

Start up transformers (SUTs) are connected to 220 KV switchyard. These areused to derive start up power for the station generally. Turbo-generators (TGs) areconnected to 400 KV switchyard through generator transformer. Unit transformers (UTs)are connected to the LV side of GTs and serve as an alternate off site source of power.When a shutdown has to be taken up on TG, it is isolated by means of generator circuitbreaker (GCB) and UTs will continue to be available. The number of transmission linesconnected to the switchyard is such that a double circuit line break and maintenanceoutages of bus breakers etc will not impair the off site power supply availability.

The station auxiliary power supply system is classified into four classes dependingon the reliability requirements. These are:

Class 1 system : 220V DC control power supplies from batteries

Class 2 system : 415 V AC 3 phase system

Class 3 system : 6.6 KV and 415 V 3 phase system

Class 4 system : 6.6 KV and 415 V 3 phase system

Class 1 system (based on batteries) is most reliable. It is used for the supply ofcontrol power to circuit breakers, diesel engine control schematics, turbine controlschematics, static excitation for turbo-generator, control schemes for diesel driven firefighting pumps etc.

Class 2 power supply is derived from uninterruptible power supply systemcomprising of rectifier, inverter and a dedicated battery bank. The battery bank is capableof feeding inverter loads for a period of at least 30 minutes after the failure of AC supplyto the rectifier. Major loads on Class 2 include FM supply pumps, emergency lights, sealoil pump and flushing oil pump.

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Class 3 power supply is connected to emergency diesel generators to providepower supply in the event the class 4 power has failed. Diesel generator sets aredesigned to provide power automatically to the class 3 bus whenever class 4 has failed.Loads connected to the class 3 supply can tolerate short interruptions in power supply.

The class 3 power can be restored within two minutes after the loss of class 4.The capacity of each on-site emergency diesel generator is 3400 kW. Four nos of 50%diesel generator (DG) are provided for each unit.

Major loads connected to class 3 power supply are primary feed pumps, powerand control UPS, moderator circulating pumps, ECCS pumps, air compressors, auxiliaryboiler feed pumps, shut down cooling pumps and process water pumps.

Class 4 power supply is derived from 400kV and 220 kV switchyards throughstart-up transformer and from the turbo-generator unit transformer. The capacity of SUTis 80 MVA. There are two Nos of UTs each rated 40 MVA per unit. Either SUT or two UTsare capable of supplying the entire station load. Loads connected to this system cantolerate prolonged power supply interruption.

Electrical power supply system is grouped into two independent divisions. One ofthe divisions is connected to startup transformer and the other to the unit transformers.The capacity of each group, their location and routing of the cables are such that commonmode failures are minimized. The electrical power supply systems catering to all safetyrelated loads are designed to meet the requirement of single failure criterion.

1.6 Safety Classification

To ensure adequate safety to the public and plant site personnel, the plant designmeets following general safety requirements.

> The capability for safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining it in the safe shutdown condition during and after all operational states and postulated accidentconditions.

> The capability to remove residual heat from the core after reactor shut down, andduring and after all operational states and postulated accident conditions andmaintain a coolable geometry.

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> The capability to reduce the potential for the release of radioactive materials andensure that releases are within the prescribed limits during and after alloperational states and postulated accident conditions.

> To meet these requirements, systems, components and structures have toperform certain safety functions. These safety functions include those necessaryto prevent accident conditions as well as those necessary to mitigate theconsequence of accident.

The relative importance of the safety function determines the safety class of thesystems, components and structures performing the safety function.

1.6.1 Safety Classes

Based on the above methodology, the following four different safety classes(Class 1, 2, 3 & 4) are generally considered appropriate in view of the design codes andstandards in vogue.

Safety Class 1:

Safety class 1 incorporates those safety functions, which are necessary to preventthe release of substantial fraction of the core fission product inventory to thecontainment/environment.

Safety Class 2:

Safety class 2 incorporates those safety functions necessary to mitigate theconsequence of an accident, which would otherwise lead to the release of substantialfraction of core fission product inventory to the environment.

Safety class 2 also includes those safety functions necessary to preventanticipated operational occurrences from leading to accident conditions; and those safetyfunctions whose failure under certain plant condition may result in severe consequencese.g. failure of residual heat removal system.

Safety Class 3:

Safety class 3 incorporates those safety functions, which perform a support role tosafety functions in safety classes 1, 2 and 3. It also includes:

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> Those safety function necessary to prevent radiation exposure to the public or sitepersonnel from exceeding relevant acceptable limits from sources outside reactorcoolant system.

> Those safety functions associated with reactivity control on a slower time scalethan the reactivity control functions in safety classes 1 and 2.

> Those safety functions associated with decay heat removal from spent fueloutside reactor coolant system.

Safety Class 4:

Safety class 4 incorporates all those safety functions, which do not fall withinsafety classes 1, 2 or 3.

Non-Nuclear Service (NNS)

This class includes all other systems, which are not associated with any of thesafety functions.

1.7 Seismic Classification

To meet the requirement given in the previous section, a three tier (or level)system has been adopted for the seismic classification of systems, components,instruments and structures, i.e.

(i) Safe Shut Down Earthquake (SSE) category,

(ii) Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) category and

(iii) General (Codal) category.

SSE Category:

SSE category incorporates all systems, components instruments and structuresconforming to safety classes 1, 2 and 3 and shall be designed for the maximum seismicground motion potential at site (i.e. SSE) obtained through appropriate seismicevaluations based on regional and local geology, seismology and soil characteristics.

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SSE category corresponds to Category S2 of IAEA safety guide 50-SG-S1. Theequipment and systems that are required to be qualified for SSE are classified as seismiccategory - 1 .

OBE Category

All systems, components, instruments and structures which are to remainfunctional for continued operation of the plant without undue risk fall under OBE categoryand the design basis shall be a lower level seismic ground motion than SSE which mayreasonably be expected during the plant life. A seismic event, exceeding OBE level,would require a shut down of the plant and carrying out a detailed inspection of the entireplant. OBE category corresponds to category S1 of IAEA safety guide 50-SG-S1. Theequipment and systems that are required to be qualified for OBE are classified as seismiccategory -2.

General (Codal) Category

This category incorporates those systems, structures, instruments andcomponents, the failure of which would not cause undue radiological risk and includes allsystems, components, instruments and structures which are not included in SSE or OBEcategory. The seismic design basis shall be that prescribed by the relevant Indianstandards (IS-1893, year 1984). The equipment and systems that are required to bequalified for Codal requirements are classified as seismic category - 3.

1.8 Quality Group Classification

Quality class of systems, components and structures generally corresponds totheir respective safety class (i.e. quality class 1, 2, 3 & 4 corresponds to safety class 1, 2,3 & 4 respectively).

Quality class 1 shall meet the highest quality requirements. Quality class 2, 3 & 4are of progressively lower quality requirements. Quality class 4 will also include othersystems, structures and components of the plant, which do not fall under any on thesafety classes.

A few examples of the requirements of quality classes are as under:

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> Pressure retaining components of quality classes 1, 2 and 3 shall meet therequirements of ASME B and PV code, section III sub section NB, NC and NDrespectively.

> Pressure retaining components of quality class 4 (Safety class 4) may bedesigned as per ASME Section VII Division 1

> Components supports under quality class 1, 2, & 3 shall meet the designrequirements of ASME section III, sub section NF

> Electronic components used in class 1 and 2 I & C systems are of MIL grade. TheI & C equipment and components are also subjected to qualification testsincluding ageing and seismic tests as required.

> For the purpose of performance qualification, the class EA electrical equipmentare divided into three categories, depending on the location inside or outside thecontainment and LOCA service. The qualification is done by type tests onequipment components /materials and further analysis wherever application.Quality assurance is carried out as per AERB safety code AERB/SC/QA.

1.9 Quality Assurance

Quality Assurance in design, manufacture, construction, commissioning andoperation is enforced in order to accomplish high level of safety and reliability.

1.9.1 Design

The design adopts the concept of "Defense in depth" which incorporatessuccessive and mutually reinforcing echelons of equipment and systems provided toensure high reliability. The single failure criteria have been uniformly adopted in thedesign of safety related systems, which ensures desired function of all safety relatedsystems even in case of a single component failure. The principle is extended further incritical areas to systems as a whole. For example, there are two independent shut downsystems (Shut Down Systems #1 and Shut Down Systems #2). These SDSs get actuatedon independent trip parameters. The design provides multiple barriers against radioactivereleases. Dual failure events are postulated and evaluated to ensure no undue risk ofradiation hazards to public.

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Due consideration is given to avoid common cause failures in the safety systems.Principle of independence and redundancy are adopted in the design to achieve therequired reliability targets.

IAEA safety guides form the basis of Quality Assurance in design. To ensurequality, safety related systems, structures and components are first classified intodifferent safety classes (in line with international practice) based on the relativeimportance of their safety function. Each class of structures, systems and componentsare then designed with the help of codes and standards relevant to their safety class.Safety related equipment, components and structures are generally designed as perASME Sec III whereas Electrical and instrumentation systems are designed to meet theIEEE standards.

All design and analysis is carried out through well established practices and usingvalidated softwares, where ever necessary. Validation of softwares are normally donethrough benchmark problems, comparison of results using different softwares,international exercises etc. The designs are reviewed within the group and also subjectedto independent reviews depending on their importance.

Safety related design and analysis reports are further reviewed by the DesignSafety Committee before their submission to AERB.

1.9.2 Manufacture, Construction, and Commissioning

During the fabrication/construction of various components, stage inspection andquality control are carried out by the manufactures as per the procedures andrequirements laid down in the NPCIL specifications. NPCIL quality SurveillanceEngineers or the authorized outside third party AQ agencies oversee the Quality ofproduct under manufacture. For this the QS engineer ensures that the appropriateprocedures are followed during fabrication, by carrying out stage inspection as well asrandom checks. After completion of the manufacture, the quality surveillance engineerissues shipping release after getting fully satisfied with the product. Vital equipment maybe repeat tested to check their operational capability in simulated experimental set ups.

At the construction site, field engineering cell operates independently as arepresentative of the design office to overview various construction activities to ensurethat the design intents are fully met. Apart from the FE personnel, at the construction site,quality surveillance engineers also work to ensure the quality of construction.

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During the commissioning, proper functioning of al systems and equipments areensured through written down procedures.

1.9.3 Operation

Engineers and operators undergo special training in plant operation andradiological safety. They are qualified from time to time to ensure the requisite level ofexpertise is maintained. Written procedures duly cleared by competent authority are alsomade available to the operating staff. Technical specifications for operation approved byAtomic Energy Regulatory Board are adhered to during operation. A strict control onoperating conditions and periodic in service inspection of safety related components ofthe plant ensure the health of the safety related systems. Appropriate corrective actionsare taken on the basis of in service inspections. The plant operation and maintenancestaff is also exposed to current operational practices and trends during plant peer reviewsby international bodies life WANO.

1.10 Scope of EIA

The scope of the study includes detailed characterization of status of environmentin an area of 25 km radius around the proposed RAPP 7 & 8 units. The basis for 30 kmradius for the study zone is MoEF's recommendation that there should not be any majorurban centre with population of more than one lakh within 30 km area. In addition within10 km radius, there should not be any population centre with more than 10,000population. The size of the study zone is primarily based on topographic considerations.

The Scope of the Study Includes

i. To assess existing environmental status covering major environmentalcomponents viz. air, noise, water, land, biological, socio-economic and healthaspects.

ii. To identify potential impacts on various environmental components during pre-construction and operational phases of the project

iii. To predict significant impacts through identification, calibration and validation ofappropriate mathematical / simulation models

iv. To evaluate impacts of the project through appropriate evaluation techniques

v. To prepare an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) outlining control strategiesto be adopted for minimizing adverse impacts

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comprehensive eia for proposed rapp unit 7&8 at rawatbhata rajasthan

Documents

project director rapp

project personnelneeri

project leadersdr

phwrunits raps

theproposed project

project coordinatordr

potential impacts

adverse impacts