completed draft - with bib

Andrew Ferguson 1084815193

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How did the Irish people react to the Government of Ireland Act, 1912-1914?

Andrew Ferguson - 1084815193BA History (Hons) - University of Sunderland

April 2015Supervisor: Simon Henig

Word Count: 13,729

Sir Edward Carson signing the Ulster Covenant - PRONI INF/7A/2/48)


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Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction Page 4

Chapter 2 - Overview Page 7

Chapter 3 - Unionist Reaction Page 12

Chapter 4 - Nationalist Interpretation 5

Chapter 5 - Prospect of Civil War and Page 33

Partition

Chapter 6 - The Great War on Home Page 43

Rule

Chapter 7 – Conclusion Page 52


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Illustrations

Visual Map of Ireland showcasing election - Page 23result of Dec. 1910

Male and Female version of the Ulster - Page 24Covenant

Graph showcasing use of Civil War by - Page 24Nationalist Politicians in Westminsterduring 1914

Copy of Statement by Eoin MacNeill to - Page 50-51The Irish Volunteers


Chapter 1 - IntroductionLast year was the centenary since the passing of the Home Rule (H.R.) Bill and the encompassing

debate. Events such as the marking the Great War overshadowed the great debate, set to tear down

“the walls of Jericho”1 which the 1801 Act of Union created. It should not be easily forgotten, as the

crisis is one of the most defining aspects of British and Irish history. Despite its longevity, the

collective consciousness has been overshadowed by the Easter Rising, which inspired a greater

amount to individuals.

The H.R. crisis was brought about by the introduction of the bill on the 11 th April 1912. Undoubtedly

the Easter Rising is fondly remembered and attributed to the rise of the Irish Republic. The crisis

shifted Ireland from, what was, a generally united Ireland, albeit with religious difference, to a dis-

united Ireland on the verge of civil war. Though to even the most historically minded Irish people,

the event has ebbed, unsurprisingly, into obscurity.2 While it seems that the Ulster Crisis has fallen

off the collective public memory, it is undeniably significant to the creation of Ireland’s Nationalism

and Unionism parties, the major groups during this crisis.

For those with any incline into the crisis, the simple narrative is clear. The Unionists dominated the

majority of the North-East, however, did not dominate other areas of Ulster such as Donegal, and

favoured keeping all ties with Westminster. The Nationalist preferred some form of Political

independence. Republicanism, at least in the mainstream, was never discussed as potential policy;

the H.R. bill was to be an early form of devolution. Whilst at the same time, we must not draw too

much into modern devolved Parliaments, as the current ass embled powers are not comparable.

We must avoid taking too much into account of the violent aspect which followed the crisis. As for

the H.R. crisis, this was a largely peaceful affair, even with the prospect of civil war, which

consequently did not occur.

1 A.T.Q Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, (London, 1969), p. 232 G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, (Cork, 2014), p.13

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Despite the narrative, the reason for their reaction to the H.R. bill is undefined and not as simple as

Unionism and Nationalisms. For the Unionist, much is made of the religious aspects surrounding

their loyalty, although increasingly revisionist historians manifest the economic impact. According to

these historians, Ulstermen feared the loss of economic prosperity with the new Parliament “being

economically retrogressive.”3 Can the religious aspect be truly dismissed though, especially since the

religious aspect continues to be retold in news stories relating to Northern Ireland? Consequently an

area of concern, as further economic reasons created a unified effort against the H.R. bill or religion.

This matter is of great importance owing to the fact that these issues amalgamated Ulster allowing

for a clear reaction against.

We shall also examine how the crisis evolved from a Nationalist perspective, while clearly the initial

passing of the bill largely existed due to the political situation in Great Britain. The political

manoeuvring by the Irish Parliament Party (IPP) represented a political goal, stretching back since

the creation of the new United Kingdom. We shall assess the effort which this crisis impacted the

Irish resolve in the political process from passing the bill to partition to suspension at the beginning

of World War 1 (WW1). From the beginning of the crisis, all effort focused upon Constitutional

Nationalism, defined by Stanbridge as, “those committed to attaining Irish autonomy through

constitutional means rather than by armed violence,”4 to revolt four years after the crisis began.

There is a clear shift in which the revolutionary aspect increases as the H.R. bill debate drifts on.

Much has been made of whether the crisis could have sparked the first British civil war in centuries,

that or the first revolt since the Glorious Revolution. However, the situation was apparently striving

towards a monumental breakdown of order never seen in living memory. Without the interference

of the WW1, would have all the rhetoric, mainly for the Unionists protestors and politicians, would

3 P. Bew & H. Patterson, The British State & The Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher, (London, 1985), p. 44 K. Stanbridge, ‘Nationalism, international factors and the ‘Irish Question’ in the era of the First World War’, Nations and Nationalism II, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2005, p.22

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they really rebel? Could they have really “threatened rebellion for the sake of loyalty and plotted

treason in the name of the king”5 Similarly, could they have truly fought their countryman? When

explained in this form, it seems a clear no, however, the amount of preparation indicates otherwise.

Finally, the last course open to interpretation was the reaction to WW1 in relation to H.R.

Consequently, the debate had last over two years with momentum fading, Ireland was requested to

prove her loyalty and to fight for, whom some seemed by now, their overlord, England. The Bill

having been suspended, the focus for Politicians changed to ensure that the fighting men, many

participated in training in anticipation combat in Ireland, joined the common cause. There was in an

increase of revolutionary behaviour, coming from the disillusionment in the system which had not

delivered autonomy.

The H.R. Crisis, and the Irish reaction, may appear obvious where loyalties lie; however,

controversies remained and voices left unheard. The general narrative, which is believed not greatly

false, but needs to be rectified to ensure these voices and differing views were not lost and confined

to history. The crisis cannot be over simplified to fit the modern day narrative of Northern Ireland

and the Republic, debate ensues surrounding the reasoning for Ireland’s reaction and how this

crisis/debate would come to affect the future course of Ireland.

5 P. Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire: 1781-1997, (London, 2008), p.299

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Chapter 2 - OverviewPrior to examining the 3rd H.R. bill, we must have an understanding of events preceding 1912. These

play a direct and pivotal role in ensuring introduction of the bill. It is vitally important to examine

the concept on the religious impact in Ireland before the turn of the century. Religion was a

dominant factor in Irish politics both before and during the crisis.

Returning to the beginning, Ireland was absorbed into the UK upon the Act of Union 1800, enforced

in 1801. Intended to modernise Ireland and secure British dominance, owing to the attempted revolt

lead by Wolfe Tone in 1798. The Act of Union removed the Irish Parliament, having a large amount

of legislative independence, occupied solely by Protestants, and combined it with the Imperial

Parliament. Significantly the decision to combine the Parliament was not endorsed by the Irish

Parliament or consented by the Irish people. Unsurprisingly, due to voting rights being determined

on property ownership, restricted due to the Protestant Ascendancy limiting non-conformists, was

enforced owing to the fear caused by the attempted revolt and the ruminant fear emanating from

the French Revolution.6 Ireland was given her place in the Imperial Parliament which is the

subsequent cause of the whole events surrounding H.R. The Union was naturally unpopular as

detailed in this magazine in which a meeting by freeman and freeholders, “Resolve unanimously,

that the petition to the King’s most excellent Majesty, praying for a repeal of the union law, be

adopted.”7 The bill proved to be unpopular throughout the 19th century, as we shall further review,

ultimately resulted in the 3rd H.R. bill. Ireland and Irishmen, in the 1910 election, had greater

enfranchisement, wished to see the return of a Parliament which governed Ireland that could

respond to the nation’s will accordingly.

6 E. Porritt, ‘Ireland's Representation in Parliament’, The North American Review, Vol. 181, No. 585, 1905, p. 2647 F. W. Conway, ‘Repeal of the Union’, The Belfast Monthly Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 27, 1810, p. 310

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Clearly, this was not the first attempt at the recreation of a Parliament in Dublin. The first in 1886,

led by the renowned, Liberal Prime Minister, William Gladstone. Gladstone initiated Irish reforms in

attempts to quell the rising Fenianism evident throughout Ireland. H.C.G.Matthew believed the

reason for the creation of H.R. was a result of “the United Kingdom created by the Act of Union of

1800 was becoming seriously overburdened”8, with Ireland being the main headache. Gladstone

intended to pacify Ireland, in the boldest of all possible attempts to save Ireland from Fenianism. In

the 1st Government of Ireland Act, Ireland would receive its own Parliament, albeit no representation

in Westminster which still could over rule it. The 1st Home Rule bill, whilst Gladstone or the

Government would admit would have effectively repealed the Act of Union and “re-established the

status existing in the eighteenth century.”9 However, the attempted devolution failed due to

Gladstone’s overestimation. Gladstone’s party proved unwilling to agree with their leader. Liberals,

such as Joseph Chamberlin, resigned from Gladstone’s government, with the proposal eventually

being rejected to 341, with 91 Liberal voting against, to 311 voting for.10 The Bill fragmented the

Liberal Party into two factions, Gladstone Liberals and Liberal Unionist, after its defeat an election

was called giving power to Conservatives, removing H.R. from the discussion. The first Government

of Ireland Act had many flaws and Gladstone’s underestimation of his party proved to be the

downfall rather than any reaction.

Gladstone and H.R. returned in 1893. The Bills difference allowed MPs to remain at Westminster,

consequently, more a reform than a return to the system which predated the Union, although only

voting on matters relating to Ireland or Imperial issues.11 Despite the changes, the act remained

doomed to fail despite the Liberal party not fragmenting. Instead a different threat, the House of

Lords (HoLs), demonstrated that the Bill could pass the Commons but not the Lords; peers rejected

the proposal 419 votes to 41.12 The Lords, predominantly Unionists, with vested interests, had the

8 H. C. G. Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898, (Oxford, 1999), p.4679 W. J Shepard, ‘The Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill’, The American Political Science Review,Vol. 6, No. 4, 1912, p. 56410 Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898, p. 50611 Ibid., p. 58812 Ibid., p. 591

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notion that H.R. was not in England, the ‘predominant party’ in the union, interests and as such the

majority opposed any such Bill.13 Subsequently the defeat of the 2nd H.R. Bill went down in England,

“almost without protest or murmur from the greater part of the country.”14 The HoLs proved to be

the biggest hurdle, they would never approve destruction of the Union, therefore, vetoing power

remained, H.R. would never come into being.

After the 2nd attempt, Gladstone was forced to resign, never truly recovering from defeat.

Gladstone’s enthusiasm to the Irish question, not shared by others, pushed the idea of devolution to

the forefront of national thinking. His ‘obsession’ with the Irish question showed his willingness to

attempt to repay Ireland for the famine and other events surrounding England in Ireland. Upon his

departure, the loss of Gladstone’s “apostolic zeal and tremendous reputation”15 was the greatest

defeat to the Irish. This is the main reason that H.R. disappeared for nearly 20 years, there was no

great leader and the creation of H.R. was borne out of another political need.

Moving forward to the 20th century, Liberals returned to power, implementing radical social reforms

aimed at creating the beginning of a welfare state. Similar to Gladstone in 1893, they discovered that

the HoLs prevented reforms. The Lords remained a bastion of conservatism, with significant

legislative empowerment even if they “suffered in an election defeat,” 16 as was the case in the early

1900s. Significantly, the HoLs were drastic enough to destroy most of the Liberal’s reforms.

Consequently, the Government called an election resulting in appointing a small majority of Liberals,

allowing for the IPP to be in a position to sustain any government of their choosing. Resulting in a

deal with the Liberal’s in which support for reform of the HoLs in return for the passage of H.R.

owing to the clear fact that Conservatism was effectively Unionism.

The alliance, brought by needs of reform to the HoLs; hence the 3rd H.R. Bill was brought to

Parliament. This suggested that if the December 1910 election was fought solely on the grounds of

13 E. A. Smith, The House of Lords In British Politics and Society 1815-1911, (London, 1992), p. 16814 Ibid, p.16815 E. D. Steele, ‘Gladstone and Ireland’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 17, No. 65, 1970, p. 6216 H. W. Horwill, ‘The Problem with the House of Lords’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1908, p. 96

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H.R. the Conservatives and the Unionist stance would have won over the majority of the English

electorate. A.V.Dicey, writing in 1915, outlines this exact problem, that despite the large number of

electorate opposing the bill, they received no attention from the majority in the House of

Commons.17 Therefore if the debate was circled around that one issue, it would have been

impossible to predict that the Liberal’s would regain power, being the majority party in 1910 by a

margin of one seat in comparison to the conservatives. Thus the 1911 Parliament Act not only

allowed for the passing of a H.R. Bill, but also the agreement that the Bill would be introduced and

passed by the Liberal party in this term, through political manoeuvring by the IPP. The Liberal P.M.

Asquith was not a vivid supporter of H.R., in 1902 he spoke out against any intention to introduce

H.R. in his government. “Is it to be part of the policy and programme of our party that, if returned to

power, it will introduce into the House of Commons a bill for Irish Home Rule? The answer, in my

judgment, is no.”18 Notwithstanding he became a steadfast enthusiast upon its introduction in 1912

and he “never abandoned the principle of an all-Ireland parliament, even if he never understood the

extent to which his own gradualist approach undermined it.”19 Whilst borne out of political

necessity, bound partly to a constitutional crisis, it became part of the Liberals agenda for their

whole term.

Finally, before approaching the main aspect of the question, it is quintessential to examine what the

3rd H.R. bill had to offer the Irish people. Similar to the 2nd bill, it ensures that the Irish people would

be represented in Westminster. Although reduced from 103 to 42 MPs, influence remained over

matters that would not be covered by H.R., i.e. defence. Also a clause in the Act the Parliament

would have control ‘over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland,’ however, ‘the supreme power

and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished

over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof,’ therefore the remaining MPs

would be crucial for Ireland’s future.

17 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London, 1915), p. liii18 H. H. Asqutih, House of Commons Debate, 12 April 1905, Vol. 144, cc 149619 N. Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921, (London, 1968), p. 177

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The Parliament itself would consist of two Houses, an Upper Senate with 40 members and an Irish

House of Commons with 164 members. Both Houses would be overseen by a Lord Lieutenant, whom

carried a veto. Whilst many Irish would prefer further devolution or rather independence, it

represented a compromise in which the Act of Union would remain in effect, hopefully, favouring

moderate Unionist, along with a recreation of an Irish Parliament which the Irish people could have

pride in.

The 3rd H.R. Bill or the Government of Ireland Act of 1912 represented an ongoing effort to recreate

an Irish Parliament for Ireland. Whilst subsequent attempts fell afoul of political situations, both

foreseen and unforeseen, the ensuing removal of the HoLs veto and the coalition removed the

shackles that preventing the passage. The Unionists efforts against the earlier acts were silent in

comparison to future annotations, with adherence to “pressure politics adopted in contemporary

Britain,”20 this was to change dramatically. Therefore the stage was set for the introduction of the

bill which would tackle the biggest reaction by the Irish people to a proposal in Parliament since they

joined the UK 111 years ago.

Chapter 3 - Unionist Reaction

20 A. Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884-1911, (Oxford, 1989), p.322

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The Crisis between 1912 and 1914 is renowned for the Unionist reaction against the H.R. bill,

although the simple reaction by Unionist, mainly in Ulster, undoubtedly defied this bill,

underestimated by most of their Nationalist opponents. Asquith, upon bringing the bill to

Parliament referred to Unionists as only “an irreconcilable minority.”21 However the minority that

Asquith refers to prove louder than the majority of Ireland. Asquith, by stating this, underestimated

the resolve of the opposing Unionists. The Unionist reaction defined the crisis, going from the grand

scale protest to potential military means, indisputably detesting the bill. How did they protest and in

what way did they target to influencing the bill? The cause of the reaction must also be examined.

Why did Unionists reaction prevent a clear passage of the bill? Asquith’s ‘irreconcilable minority’ was

to shock Ireland in a unique protest resolve.

Firstly, we shall examine the reasoning for Unionists reaction prior to their response. The debate on

this amounts to sectarian fears which made Ulster discontent over the bill, or economic concerns,

owing to the possible loss of links to the Empire’s shipbuilding contracts. The importance of why

they distended the bill is that the Unionists needed unity to overcome the bill, generally gained by

focusing on one of these issues.

For P.Bew, looking from a revisionist perspective, states Unionism was incumbent of the economic

situation in Ulster:

“Unionism was built round the contrast between bustling progressive industrial Ulster and

‘backward’, ‘stagnant’ peasant southern Ireland. The political argument was that rule from Dublin

would be economically and socially retrogressive; this was of particular importance in integrating the

Protestant working class into the Union movement.” 22

Ireland was diversely economic, with the North-East benefiting from ties to the Empire through

shipbuilding (maritime and military) contracts, whereas the South predominantly consisted of rural

21 R. Rees, Ireland: 1905-25: Volume 1 Text and Historiography, (Newtownards, 1998), p. 15522 Bew & Patterson, The British State & The Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher, p. 4

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farming. Fear resided that the new Parliament would have control over taxation, placing heavy

economic burdens on Ulster.

This feeling was unmistakable in Ulster, illustrated in the book, Perlis of Homer Rule, by P.Kerr-

Smiley:

“Even if Ireland was not asked to contribute any part of the Imperial charges, she would have to

increase her taxes, and as a result would be that heavy additional burdens would fall on the

industries of the country, which are mainly owned by Protestants. Businessmen in Ireland are under

no doubt as to the evil that would follow Home Rule.” 23

Clearly, if men of capital, naturally having significant influence, had reservations, there are grounds

to see that revisionists have a clear case over religion. Businessmen were in no doubt endangered,

destined to lose much of the lazier-fair business in a country where Parliament was geared to more

rural aspect of life, hence safer to keep the status quo.

Returning to shipbuilding, during this period, it would be justified to describe Belfast’s shipbuilding

industry as a ‘golden age,’ launching the Titanic in May 1911 and employing approximately 30,000

people. Similar to the Scottish case of Independence, would shipbuilding contracts remain under a

different Parliament? D.M.Jackson illustrated, “Shipbuilding towns, with their reliance on upon naval

contracts, were often distinguished by their distinctly Tory leanings”24 consequently, there was

plenty of other, safer shipbuilding yards on the mainland thus threatening job security. W.Crawley

states that there was sense of despair:

“On Friday the 12th of April the Home Rule Bill was introduced into Parliament. The following Sunday

the titanic struck an iceberg. Amongst Unionists the sense of depression and an air of impending

defeat, was palpable.” 25

23 P. Kerr-Smiley, The Peril of Home Rule, (London, 1911), p.424 D. M. Jackson, Popular Opposition to Irish Home Rule in Edwardian Britain, (Liverpool, 2009), p. 51 25 W.Crawley, The Ulster Covenant, Television program, BBC Two Northern Ireland, Belfast, 30th September 2012

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It was perceived that the ‘golden age’ of Belfast’s shipbuilding was drawing to a close, their greatest

ship was lost, pride damage, and future industry was unclear.

Finally, the economic argument was not a new phenomenon; it existed in previous debates over H.R.

and Gladstone cautioned that “the Irish legislature would act in a spirit of hostile to the Protestant of

the North, and even attempt to block their trade.”26 Thus the economic argument stands great

ground.

Unionism was a surrounding force, incumbent not only to the dockworkers and business leaders but

the majority of Ulster, therefore, was it not religious fears creating a unified movement?

Before entering the religious argument Monypenny notes a clear distinction within Unionism:

“In Ireland men are nearly always Unionist or Nationalists, because they were born into one or the

other camp; there are a few protestant home rulers and perhaps a larger number of Roman Catholic

Unionists, but practically the political line is also the religious.”27

The fact that the differing sides both, Nationalist and Unionist, undertook these positions cannot be

ignored; there are examples, such as the Protestant C.S.Parnell favoured H.R., exception aside there

is undoubtedly a religious line. By defining your allegiance by right of religion allows bigotry to

flourish, no exception in Ireland. Bigotry allowed the spreading of fears relating to the possibility of

Papacy interest in Ireland (Rome Rule).

Many feared the nation would become more in line with Catholic values/interests than currently. An

interesting source, which played into Protestant fears, is by Reverend O’Nolan in The Spectator:

“We shall have a free hand in the future. Let us use it well. This is a catholic country, and if we do not

govern it on catholic lines, according to Catholic ideals, and to safeguard Catholic interests, it will be

all the worse for the country and all the worse for us. Here it is that religion and nationality meet,

and may, and should, go hand-in-hand.”28

26 Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921, p. 18827 W. F. Monypenny, The Two Irish Nations: An Essay on Home Rule, (London, 1913), p. 1628 The Spectator, 5th July 1913

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While we can question the influence of O’Nolan, he continued to reiterate Protestants greatest fear

for the future of Ireland. Was Ireland to become such a nation where the rights of Protestants

would be hindered, similar to the ascendancy? With hindsight the Republic was certainly guided by

Catholic interests resulting in a legitimate fear.

O’Nolan was certainly not the only one preaching for a Catholic orientated Ireland; D.P.Moran, the

editor of The Leader, echoes the sentiment of a Catholic state. “Ireland was above all a Catholic

country in which Protestants would be made welcome, but only on Catholics’ terms.” 29 Whilst his

language is softer, his context remains clear, that Parliament should follow the main religious

following. Continuing later, he stated that “We have full tolerance for a Pagan or non-Catholic

Irishmen, but he must recognise that, and have respect for the potent facts that are bound up with

Irish Nationality.”30

Though we cannot believe that they dreaded repercussion amounting to fears of the lives as

J.H.Stirling wrote:

“We are not stupid bigots who fear that the tragedy of Scullabogue barn- where, in 1798, Protestant

women and children were penned in and burned alive- may be re-enacted. Even in Catholic Ireland

the world has moved too far since then. But we know that the same result- the extermination of the

loyal Protestant minority- can be affected just as surely by the taxation of their property and the ruin

of their industries.”31

Returning to industry, he explicitly states that Catholics would target Protestant livelihoods, which

they had worked tirelessly to achieve, in a similar manner to remove them. It is therefore clear that

the Protestants feared that they would be targeted and industry was a clear target.

To Unionists the Catholic person, in the case of H.R., is more akin to the Devil who has come to take

away their livelihoods. For J.J.Lee this approach to making Catholics appear in this way ensured a

29 D. W. Miller, ‘The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland: 1898-1918’, in A. O’Day, Reactions to Irish Nationalism, 1865-1914, (London, 1987), p. 19630 The Leader, 27th July 190131 Ballymoney Free Press, 14th March 1912

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unified front against H.R. and a common enemy, therefore imperative “to sustain Protestantism as

the symbol of racial superiority”32 over Catholicism. In contrast A.T.Q.Stewart states “He did not fear

his fellow Ulsterman, but the powerful and world-wide organization behind him.” 33 The extent of

Papacy’s influence is clearly over played, borne out of fear/ignorance of the Ulster people,

nonetheless, a very successful claim. By concentrating on Catholic, allowed Protestants to visualise

their enemy, though I disagree to an extent that it was racially motivated, rather a fear of the

organisation that Catholics followed. Protestants dreaded losing their prosperity with de facto

segregating religious areas further heightened tensions.

To R.Ress, “The introduction of the 3rd Home Rule Bill had raised the sectarian tension in Ulster,”34

clearly illustrated why the amount of circulated propaganda that Catholics were attempting to seize

from Ireland through a Papacy plot was paramount. While individuals did not help the nationalist

cause, the fact that “industrialisation wore a Protestant face”35 combined the fear of Unionists, in

which Catholics aimed to hurt their livelihoods. This Rome Rule fear was to be the greatest reason

for the overwhelming rejection of H.R., it posed a threat to rich and poor alike, the sense that the

Pope wished to control all of Ireland presented the greater threat.

Economic fears were undoubtedly frightening, the greater fear of sectarian prejudice against them,

which included their jobs, was the upmost reason for Ulster/Unionist’s reaction. Together with

existing prejudice and use of propaganda, it galvanised all aspects of Ulster life in a single bloc

against H.R.

It is now, if not before, clear why Ulster emphatically disapproved both the principle and the nature

of the Bill in Parliament. We shall now explore several Unionists responses.

32 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge, 1989), p. 333 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 4334 Rees, Ireland: 1905-25: Volume 1 Text and Historiography, p. 15935 L. Kennedy, K. A Miller, B. Gurrin, ‘Ulster: Communal Conflict and Demographic Change, 1600-2010’, International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities & Nations, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 2010, p. 321

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We have concentrated on Ulster, the crisis itself is generally known as the Ulster crisis, owing to the

fact that Unionist generally concentrated in the North East. However this does not mean that it was

confined to the North, as Buckland states southern Unionists were,

“Small, scattered, though wealthy, minority in the south of Ireland so that they made little impact

upon the generality of British politicians and electors. They never threatened to resist home rule by

armed force, or even to do violence to nationalist politician.” 36

In the south there was no real community/culture of Unionism and the vast majority of Irishmen

were Home Rulers with IPP having a nigh clean sweep of Irish MPs (see illustration on Page 23).

Unionist only numbered around 250,000 amongst 2.55million in the South.37 This is the reason for

the concentration on Ulster; represented a minority, surrounded by the hostility of Home Rulers. To

engage in protests, would be a marginal increase in Irish hostility to H.R. Sir Edward Carson, the

Unionist talisman, originated from the South, was becoming an honorary Ulsterman owing to the

scattered nature of Unionism in the South. This is the reasoning for concentration on Ulster; simply

they were a minority in a hostile land.

The grandest protest came about on 28th September 1912, in creation of Ulster Day. Ulster Day was

the biggest propaganda event organised by Unionists in clear protest of the H.R. What makes the

first Ulster Day so paramount in the crisis was the Covenant, signed by both Ulster’s men and

women in rejection of the Bill.

A copy of both contracts, signed on the day, is illustrated on Page 24. Ulster’s people were clear and

absolute in defence of Ulster opposing the bill, stating clearly that, males ‘solemnly and mutually

pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority’ and to resist by ‘all means which may be found

necessary,’ of the new Parliament.

36 P. J. Buckland, ‘The Southern Irish Unionists, the Irish Question, and British Politics, 1906-1914’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 59, 1967, p. 23337 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, p .1

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What makes the Covenant significant, including the 471,414 signatures, 234,046 women, was the

sense of togetherness it brought within the community. Even with the domination of Protestantism

there remained slight differences, “There were religious, social and regional tensions within Ulster

Protestantism, especially between the two main denominations, Presbyterians and Episcopalians.” 38

These differences existed since the Plantation many centuries ago. However, during Ulster Day these

groups came together with “368 Ulster Day services were advertised, of which half were

Episcopalian and a third Presbyterian”39 Probably a smaller number than what took place as it only

represented those advised, however it does show the unifying affect, stressed by the Covenant.

Once again, we return to religion as a major player, while this crisis had much to fear economically,

the fear of Catholicism unified all Protestants.

The event was a clear demonstration to British people with events marring the Covenant signing on

the mainland. In Manchester, citing a ‘Romish Conspiracy,’40 all Manchurian Orangemen were invited

to sign the covenant, while the article does not specify a precise number it highlights the religious

distaste towards the Catholics as Mrs Ward states, “It is, a conspiracy of the devil, there is no

question about that, working through the Church of Rome.”41 Other such events convened in

Glasgow and Liverpool, by the end of the year, 24,217 people had signed outside of Ulster.42

“The Solemn signing of the Ulster Covenant in Belfast City Hall on 28 th September is one of the most

famous episode in modern Irish history”43 according to Jackson. It was clearly a propaganda success,

it exemplified to England and the rest of Ireland, that Ulster was to vigorously fight more than before

and with the carefully use of the words ‘using all means which may be found necessary’ leaving

resistance open to interpretation.

38 Ibid., p.339 D. Fitzpatrick, Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories since 1795, (Cambridge, 2014), p. 11340 Manchester Guardian, 7th October, 191241 Ibid. 42 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 6743 Jackson, Popular Opposition to Irish Home Rule in Edwardian Britain, p. 71

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Women, as with much of history, are largely ignored, as a result of focussing on men and their

influence. In Ulster, similar to the rest of the UK during the early 20 th century, women began taking a

greater role in the political sphere. As previously outlined, women had participated in the Ulster Day

in signing their own version of the Covenant, however in this debate we see a more involved version

of participating women attempting to influence events.

The main political organisation having the most influence by women was the Ulster Women‘s

Unionist Council (UWUC) formed on 23rd January 1911, the sister organisation to the Ulster Unionist

Council (UCC) both aimed at defying H.R. Whilst women would adopt a new effort in unity against

H.R., it is important to understand that women still accepted the traditional roles despite the new

political focus. The UWUC quickly became the main female political group with the single aim

mentioned; “within a year of its establishment the organisation was easily the largest female

political group Ireland had ever seen, with an estimated membership of 115,000-200,000

members.”44 This amounts to a greater number than the Ulster militia group and certainly the largest

female political group Ireland has ever seen.

The aim of the group was simple, to “co-operate with men’s UUC in promoting religious, economic,

constitutional and imperial arguments opposed to Home Rule,”45 although more in the background.

This is why I have concentrated on the UWUC rather than the male counterpart, to prevent them

from falling into the depths of history despite their role and importance. The dissemination of

propaganda was the forte for the ladies organisation focusing on public relations in England and

Scotland.

Ensuring that Britain was informed of their situation was paramount, such as informing people of

Motu Proprio, which condemned marriage between Catholics and Protestants as invalided, to which

44 Ulster Women’s Unionist Council Papers, PRONI: D109845 M. Sheane, Ulster Women: A Short History, 1840-1940, (Devon, 2010), p. 69

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Mrs Sinclair stated “the more it is known in England and Scotland the better for our cause.” 46 Along

with scare mongering such as Lady Londonderry’s speech in January 1914,

“We have always recognised that the question of the separation of Ireland from Great Britain is a

question of concerns Great Britain as much as it concerns Ireland. Is England prepared to have a

hostile Ireland on her flanks?” 47

The aim was to show Britain that they both had things to fear as a result of H.R. in the aim of

convincing the electorate against H.R., along with the constant religious fears which hoped to strike

a religious link with fellow Britons.

Utilising women was critical to the Unionist agenda, aiding to create a solitary Ulster, with a single

goal. Having women play their part in their own organisation was preached in the Covenant, with

UWUC’s aim to target the British electorate, clearly demonstrates unity. While men, such as Carson,

naturally, took up more of the spotlight in history than the UWUC, the unison and support women

gave to the cause is vastly understated.

The final response we shall examine is the creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a

paramilitary force, aimed at opposing H.R. Although evaluated later, it is important to understand

their creation. The creation was a failsafe of the last regard, to prevent the enforcement of H.R. by

force if it came to be.

The UVF came into existence in January 1913, made of signatories of the Covenant bowing to defend

Ulster from the dreaded H.R. The creations importance of a militia to defend against H.R. was

moving of the goal-posts. It marks the combination of traditional political protests with fear of direct

action, perhaps being the first paramilitary force in Europe. Unlike later groups it was in reaction to

events not to physically push their agenda. The force was legal due to British law, ironically, that

46 Letter from Mrs Sinclair to the Marchioness of Londonderry, 7th March 1911, DRO: D/Lo/C/686(33)47 The Irish Times, 21st January 1914

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allowed militias to maintain the UK’s constitution and protecting rights and liberties,48 which Ulster

cited.

Ulster, in making a unified force, trained to a standard set by a professional army. Even with the help

of British officers, to which many had sympathy.49 It would provide extra security at Unionist events

across the country and an emergency Ulster police force, occupying a greater role than a traditional

army.

The debate surrounding whether the UVF would actually fight is discussed deeper in a later chapter,

served to be Ulster’s influential depth, a threat in itself, spawning a Nationalist counterpart, with

opposing aims. The UVF created another aspect of unity, by May 1914, nearly a third of Ulster’s

adult male Protestants were known members of the UVF.”50 The volunteers were an unwavering

force highlighting that Ulster was not going to be subjected against her will. L.Amery, upon reflection

noted, the anti-H.R. campaign would have “amount to very little unless there was something more

than political demonstration,”51 which the UVF proved to be. The large protests would have likely

come to naught if the UVF had not existed in any form with a clear agenda to fight H.R. The action

was a direct and clear response knowing that the HoLs could not protect them.

The reaction of Ulster illustrated unity while aiming to influence the British people towards their

cause. The unity of Protestantism validated that their plight and shared problem as M.Sheane

stated:

“Unionist leaders were aware of the importance of maintaining unity and discipline within their

ranks; it was important to present a favourable public image of Ulster Unionism to the English

electorate. Many attempts were made to show that Unionists were respectable and had valid

reasons for resisting Home Rule.”52

48 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 6949 T. Bowman, ‘The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1913-1914’, in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, (Cork, 2014), p. 31550 Stanbridge, ‘Nationalism, international factors and the ‘Irish Question’ in the era of the First World War’, p. 2451 L. Amery, My Political Life, (London, 1953) p. 44052 Sheane, Ulster Women: A Short History, 1840-1940, p. 72

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Sheane agrees that the overwhelming goal of the Unionists was to demonstrate the real threat and

all attempts were legitimate and not rebellious individuals.

The H.R. Bill to Unionists was a combination of their worst fears. Their unique economic position

within the Empire, allowed them to reap commercial benefits unavailable in rural Ireland. Unionists’

main fear was losing their religious liberties. Propaganda revolved around the issue, striking a tone

greater than any loss of economic prosperity. Both fears had the same impact, it galvanised the

Unionists, unifying in wider condemnation of the bill. Emphasising religion allowed the enemy and

supporters of the bill to visualise and create a Protestant community. Having the community around

it, encompassing all sexes, Protestant connotations, and social status allowed for a joint effort in

which propaganda, mainly aimed at the British, to have maximum effect.

Clearly Ulster Day and other protests worked in an effort to protest the bill in traditional means, the

creation of the UVF was a political move, different to the reactions to other bills. It was to be a

combination of these efforts and a failsafe should the bill be implemented. It was to be more than a

pressure group, though its existence meant that Ulster could not be easily ignored, making this issue

not as simple as passing legislation through Parliament. Ulster was to fight by any means necessary.

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United Kingdom Parliamentary election in Ireland, December, 1910

Showcases the clear domination of Irish Parliamentary Party in the South and Unionism/Conservativism in the North of Ireland.


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Ulster Covenant- Male (Right), Female (Left)

PRONI Reference: D627/429/67


Chapter 4 - Nationalist InterpretationThe results of the December 1910 General Election, gave the Nationalist power, otherwise politically

unobtainable. They held balance in a hung Parliament where power could be given to either the

Liberals or the Conservatives. The Conservatives, being steadfast opponents to the IPP’s main goal,

and the Liberals goal of removing the HoLs veto. This was the greatest blockade for H.R. thus there

was only one decision for the Party led by J.Redmond. As a consequence of IPPs backing, the Liberals

People’s Budget passed, alongside the Parliament Act, leaving the 3 rd H.R. Bill being presented to

Parliament a year later. The Constitutional Nationalism was proving to be the course of Nationalism

satisfying the Irish’s craving since the Act of Union. This was to be a legislative body answerable to

the Irish people in accordance to their requirements and the potential prospect of additional future

powers.

To observers it appeared the long fight for devolution was finally complete with the battle already

won. W.T.Laprade, in the American Political Science Review 1912, firmly believed that Ireland would

see a new Parliament.

“The fight is already won, for no discriminating observer affects to believe that a majority of the

British people are any longer hostile to the policy of Home Rule. Its adoption in some form seems to

be only a matter of time.” 53

From both an inside and outside prospective, it would seem clear that H.R. would pass by the end of

the Parliament, 1915, at the very latest. Clearly no man would uphold themselves to H.R. as did the

late Gladstone, however the zeal of Asquith to put to bed the Irish issue for good was enough for the

Irish people.

53 William T. Laprade, ‘The Present Status of the Home Rule Question’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1912, p. 545

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Whilst not examining too much into the celebrations held by the Nationalist, I will depict some

events, such as Asquith’s visiting the island to obtain a brief understanding how greatly it was

celebrated.

Asquith visited Ireland on 20th July 1912, speaking at the Dublin Royal Theatre Hall, the scene was,

according to the Irish Times, ‘remarkable’ the “entire audience rose to their feet and waved hats,

handkerchiefs, and papers, cheering enthusiastically”54 Though the contents of his speech relayed

how confident the Irish and the government were over the passage of the bill:

“The Bill will, I venture to predict, be sent to the House of Lords before Christmas – (cheers) – and

whatever may be its immediate fortunes there – (laughter) – the House of Lords, thanks to the

legislation of last year – (cheers) – no longer possesses the power to override the considerable

judgement to the elected representation of the people (cheers).” 55

The crowd resembled a carnival atmosphere, celebrating what they had slaved away at for over 25

years, although there was a clear underestimation of Ulster’s resolve. By determining that the bill

was virtually past, demonstrated how deep the misunderstanding and the only opponents were in

the HoLs. This is critical, the rallies of support and the clear belief that democracy had produced

legislation, creating devolution despite the bill being in its infancy.

Although we have had a taster of the monumental greeting of the bill, it is also important to

examine why the bill was favourably reviewed despite its blatant misgivings.

The financial problems, an outcome from this limited devolution, while largely ignored were still

discussed. Ireland would retain some control with taxation and expenditure. The Westminster

Government would continue to levy certain taxes, oversee trade and domestic matters such as the

ever problematic land issues and National Insurance56, although not exhaustive; the Irish Parliament

would need to find the funding for such issues; consequently, Ireland could not be completely

54 The Irish Times, 20th July 191255 Ibid.56 Annie G. Porritt, ‘The Irish Home Rule Bill’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1913, p. 319

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financially independent. Finally the Lord Lieutenant represents a clear preventive of democratic

processes owing to his un-elected nature and vetoing power. For journalist Erskine Childers, during

the debate denounced the plan of Ireland’s limited pecuniary capabilities:

“It is not Home Rule. It annihilates the responsibility of Ireland for her own fortunes, and is indeed

altogether incompatible with what we know as responsible government… Nothing could be more

cruel to Ireland than to give her a financial freedom, and then to complain that she did not use it

well.” 57

Known Irish Nationalist, Childers, a future President of Ireland, whom favoured full independence,

knew the limitations of the Parliament; clearly it is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a powerful

economic being. Childers view was due to additional £6million revenue transferred annually from

the British Exchequer, crucially paid in proportion to the receipts from the various Land Act of the

previous century. This condition implied that if the farmers failed to pay, the cash for Parliament

would cease. Childers’ reiterated the act failed to give Ireland financial freedom. Redmond himself

stated, abet only in his book, that the British condition was a safeguard ensuring “that the whole

revenue of Ireland is thus held in pawn.”58

Clearly, with its financial power, combined with its limited powers and its Lord Lieutenant, it is a

mockery of a devolved Government not fit for purpose. Nationalist Ireland, previously outlined,

reacted with upmost positivity, despite Bartlett calling it a “legislative mouse.”59 It is difficult to

comprehend why this deplorable legislation created such fervour not seen in Ireland for an

insurmountable time.

Another theory could be the idea that the Parliament, gave dignity to the Irish people, absent since

the dissolving of the Dublin Parliament. The Parliament would represent more than its current

57 E. Childers, The Framework of Home Rule, (London, 1912), p.304 58 J. Redmond, The Home Rule Bill, (London, 1912), p. 23 59 T. Bartlett, ‘When histories collide: the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’, in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, (Cork, 2014), p.24

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powers it would allow Irish people to govern themselves, a romantic vision, reminiscent in Irish

society.

The H.R. Bill offered a return to a national parliament, representing the interest of those in Ireland.

The last Parliament, in Dublin, gave dignity to the Irish people and represented everyone’s interests.

However the last Parliament, despite the romanticised idea, was far from a representative body to

which Home Rulers gave it credit. The Parliament was dominated by the greatly resented Landlords

whom provided the biggest headache during the 19th century, and also dominated by Protestants,

proves its nature of being unrepresentative to Ireland’s predominant Catholic population.

Despite the clear and obvious failings of the previous Parliament for those Home Rulers it was a

mark of Irish dignity, to rule them. Romanticism has always been a feature of Irish Politics,

“National sentiment in Ireland had long found a romantic refuge. The unhappiness of the present

counterbalanced by legends of a golden age long ago or by dreams of the happiness that would be

realized once national independence were regained.” 60

For the Irish people the old Parliament was a rallying call for an improved future, using past failings

to source support for H.R. To romanticise the past was a form of escapism from the evils/plights on

Ireland; those caused by England and allowed to happen likewise. It is unequivocal that an Irish led

Ireland would have reacted differently during the Famine; consequently, the H.R. presented a

greater focus on Ireland’s plight regardless of troubles.

The economic situation was overlooked as reiterated by Bartlett when examining the powers of the

new Parliament;

“In short, nationalist Ireland, led by John Redmond, was prepared to settle for a cash-strapped

assembly with little powers because it appeared to offer the recreation of the glories of Grattan’s

Parliament” 61

60 Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921, p. 24661 Bartlett, ‘When histories collide: the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, p.31

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Clear upon examination, the old Parliament, the new Parliament would be incomparable. The

economic problems would leave Unionists concerned, and it is extremely unlikely that it could

recreate the ‘glory days’. Ireland’s former glories were a hot issue, participation in traditional Irish

past times through the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League were revitalised, albeit

artificially. With the playing of ‘British sports’ heavily despised by these organisations representing

cultural revival.62 The resurgence of the Irish language and culture created a distinct nation which

could be easily diminished from England. As D.Hyde stated, “it took all kinds of people to make a

nation; and, in so far as they had in their ranks some of all kinds, they were really building up inside

the Gaelic League a little Irish nation.”63 These organisations were unifying to create a nation, which

could be significantly different and earn its place as a European nation not a sister of England. The

glory emanating from the Parliament was certainly endorsing their own nation.

The romantic idea of the Parliament is similar to those who sought H.R. as a stepping stone towards

full independence. The approach the Parliament gave alongside Nationalist’s cultural groups was the

aim of recreating an Irish past. Despite the obvious gaps in the H.R. bill the fact that it resembled a

part of Irish history prior to 19th century problems, was a legitimate reason for the great response to

the act. Ireland had the beginning of a nation state again.

Evaluating the affects upon the revolutionary members of Irish society; the charge towards

independence had become entranced into the H.R. process. The revolutionary groups of the

previous century resulted in coercion techniques by the British, and the Land war further weakened

revolution positions.64 Upon introduction of the Bill, Asquith hinted at the possibility of greater

future powers and the possibility of dominion status65, therefore unsurprising for the

revolutionaries, this was a stepping stone of a long but worthwhile process. Without doubt the

revolutionary activity was curtailed as a result of the seemingly imminent passage of the H.R., with

62 M. Mullan, ‘Opposition, Social Closure, and Sport: The Gaelic Athletic Association in the 19th Century’, Sociology of Sport Journal, Vol. 12 Issue 3, 1995 p. 26863 D. Hyde, The Gaelic League and Politics, (Dublin, 1914), p. 864 T. Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics, (Dublin, 1981), p. 6965 Rees, Ireland: 1905-25: Volume 1 Text and Historiography, p. 155

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efforts refocused on Irish Culture.66 The Gaelic league allowed those to “let loose a lot of energy for

the good of Ireland which would otherwise have been lost.”67 Unsurprisingly the league would come

to produce many leaders of the New Ireland at the turn of the decade.

The H.R. debate was a catalyst for the continuation of the re-emergence of Irish Culture. Unifying

moderate and nationalist factions to work in harmony towards a better, culturally significant Ireland.

Revolutionary activity would only counteract to the debate allowing Ulster to gain more sympathy,

by adhering to the Constitutional process to benefit Ireland.

Finally we examine the Nationalist militia created in the crisis. Similar to the Unionists, the creation

of the National Volunteers is engrossed in the Nationalist side of the debate. Therefore ensuring that

irrespective of negative reaction, H.R. would be implemented. This came into being at a meeting in

Dublin on 25th November 1913, as a clear response to the UVF influence.

Though from a constitutionally standpoint the formation represented a headache, both from a self-

determination standpoint and an escalation of the situation.

“Redmond had resisted their formation for at least one very powerful reason. He knew that unionists

would claim that the formation of a force which it could be said was designed to coerce a community

into accepting home rule made a mockery in their eyes both of profession of moderation and the

rhetoric of self-determination.” 68

Indeed the situation appeared that the Nationalist wanted to impose H.R. against the population,

similar to the British imposing their will. The importance of the forming Volunteers outweighed the

potential effects of swaying a few Britons against them, but to influence Government focus on the

passage of H.R. over the attempts of Ulster. While in the North American Review, F.P.Jones states

the Volunteers duty was to enforce the Parliament by the “bullet and bayonet,” 69 consequently, it

was to be used not as means for enforcement but rather a ‘threat in being’ ensuring that democracy 66 Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics, p. 6567 A. E. Clery, ‘The Gaelic League, 1893-1919’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 8, No. 31, 1919, p. 40168 P. Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912-1916, (Oxford, 1994), p. 2569 F. P. Jones, ‘Home Rule: And After’, The North American Review, Vol. 200, No. 704, 1914, p. 55

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“was not undone by the ‘wooden guns’ of Ulster”70 Though it is unlikely upon their conception that

they desired to be pitted against the UVF in a civil war, merely a threat.

Whilst the Volunteers demonstrated an escalation, clearly to some the Protestant UVF was

attempting to salvage their privileged position illustrated in a respondent in the Leinster Leader:

“They are now under Home Rule about to lose that and it is all for their own material selfish interests

that they are fighting at the present time and it is not for the benefit for Ireland or the glory of the

empire, of which they sometimes profess to be loyal subjects”71

The UVF to this character was not the body to prevent the horror coming to Ireland but Protestants

vying to keep control over previous gains at the Catholic’s expense, however, such comments would

not help the situation but clearly divide Ireland.

The National Volunteers were the counter-part to the UVF, they were to train, drill and even import

arms. Whilst they were distinctly influenced by the opposing group, and an unwarranted escalation,

for the Nationalist they were purposeful force reminding the Government that failure of H.R. would

result in Ireland being ungovernable.

For Nationalist, this was the moment they had visualised this moment for a long time, Redmond

remarked that “I personally thank God that I have lived to see this Day,” 72 although he clearly had

reservations. Emphasising the problems that this Act held were blatantly clear to the world and

Ireland. However for all of Nationalist Ireland it was the revival of Ireland of the past, culturally and

legislatively, consequently, willing to ignore the failings to gain a sense of the better past. Whilst

National Volunteers represented a darker side of the movement, it was largely unified and lacking in

revolutionary, the volunteers acted as more of a safe guard rather than a violent militia. Overall,

Nationalists interpreted the bill fondly as it was governance for themselves, with the potentially of

recreating the ‘golden days’.

70 M. Wheatly, ‘Ireland is Out for Blood and Murder’: Nationalist Opinion and the Ulster Crisis in Provincial Ireland, 1913-1914’ in D. G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire, 2006), p. 18871 Leinster Leader, 26th July 1913 72 Bartlett, ‘When histories collide: the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, p. 24

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Chapter 5 - Prospect of Civil War and Partition

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We have seen how each debating party reacted to the initial proposal to the bill, however, moving

forward in the crisis, the idea of partitioning became a realistic idea solving the differences. Although

the extent and length of partition proved, once again, to be an issue with seemingly unworkable

conditions, despite the Governments belief that partition would prove to be the best compromise

viable for the island.73

Hints and rumours of partition were clearly evident in the latter part of 1913. The Irish Independent

desisted the idea that the Government might raise, “an Offa’s Dyke between the North-East corner

and this country.”74 Therefore, this potential compromise was detested from conception, however,

in principle both sides preached the concept of self-determination in which this represented.

Consequently, The Independent gives an indication of how it was abhorred, but in a speech by

W.O’Brien was clearer:

“We warned you … as to the Amendment Bill for the mutilation of Ireland. We warned you the Liberal

Government were pledged, and are pledge up to the lips, to an Amending Bill that will partition and

mutilate Ireland; we warned you that the majority of Ireland’s own representatives publicly assented

to that enormous crime against the integrity of Ireland.” 75

O’Brien defines partition as mutilation, for good reason. Ireland did not have separate identities to

such an extent before this crisis, while Ulster may have been slightly different, it was always

considered part of Ireland. The Parliament was no longer one that represented the Irish people but a

split nation broken apart from sectarian fears. Also the economic prosperity, mainly confined to

Ulster presented a problem towards the economics of the Parliament, without Ulster’s

financial/industrial power, the remainder of Ireland would inevitably struggle.

The unnatural barrier that seemed to emerge across Ireland was further proof that this bill was not

the anticipated romantic dream. Rather more of a shadow of its former self, all to appease the

73 P. Maume, ‘The Irish Independent and the Ulster Crisis, 1912-21’, in D. G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire, 2006), p. 21074 Irish Independent, 9th October 1913 75 Speech of Mr. William O’Brien, MP delivered at a great open-air demonstration on the Grand Parade, Cork, 10th May 1914

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Unionist who represented a minority, threatened to tear apart Ireland for selfish gains. However this

does not, by any means, determine that Ulster was happy at the prospect of partition.

Partition, according to L.Amery amounted to, “accepting Home Rule for the rest of Ireland, has been

absolutely detested by the rank and file of the Party,”76 so on this ground the Unionists and

Nationalists could agree. But no longer could Ulster could kill H.R., they could only compromise.

However partition was admittance that they could no longer protect those Unionists in the south. To

Stewart, in partition,

“If they support it, they would seem to be abandoning the loyalists in the other parts of Ireland; on

the other hand, if they opposed it, they might well be accused later of turning down the offer of the

peaceful exclusion of ‘those districts they could control.’” 77

The prospect of peace, and the assurance that they could protect their own counties, proved to be

the greatest possibility of fighting H.R., therefore, concentrating their efforts.

Which were the districts they controlled? In a letter by M.McCarthy, he outlined reservation against

the prospect of segregating Ireland in a different way. Rather than a mutilation, he believed it would

be abandoning loyalist, through negations by Bonar-Law.

“I fear very much that he is negotiating with Asquith about a partition of Ulster by which Donegal,

Cavan and Monaghan are to be handed over to the Dublin Parliament as well as part of Fermanagh

and Tyrone… It is not good enough for them to be cut off from the rest of Ireland.”78

Fermanagh and Tyrone were the major issues, owing to the clear population differences, with

Protestants amounting to 44.6% and 43.8% respectively.79It would become apparent that Donegal

etc. were all to be included in H.R., simply because the majority of the counties were too full of

Nationalist hence exclusion, despite any misgivings by Unionist.

76 Letter from Leopold Amery to Andrew Bonar-Law, 25th July 1914, HLRO BL/33/1/4677 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 5978 Letter from Michael J. F. McCarthy to Major Crawford from, 20th July 1914, PRONI: D1700/5/17/1/3379 Rees, Ireland 1905-25: Volume 1, Text & Historiography, p.152

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Now, the prospect of betraying the other two counties, excluding only four counties, Unionists were

uncompromisable on this issue. The Nationalists, naturally, demanded these counties be included on

the grounds of a majority. We must remember by this point, the UVF was an organised force

operating in these areas, therefore how could they realistically abandon them, especially if we

consider the existing fear as a result of Unionist’s propaganda? Ulster could no concede further as it

would mean abandoning too much.

Even though partition was the only course of action, an anonymous letter detailed the extent of

betrayal felt by some of the more radical Ulstermen:

“You [Carson] and Redmond have long made up to give Home Rule, two damnable lawyers whose

very business is selling passes, but when you are in Hell along with Judas you will pay for every time

you have sold the Orangemen, for don't you mistake that there is a God who repays the people who

sell his holy religion…You are known now as Judas Carson but when the Unionist come to reckon with

you, you will feel the smart.” 80

This illustrated extreme language to the man who had, undoubtedly done his best to prevent a

seemingly unstoppable process of H.R. creation. However, this source indicated that Ulster wished

to see H.R. eradicated from Ireland. Though the work of a more radicalised Unionists, it still

showcased the hatred this crisis caused along with the unfavourable compromises.

To resolve the seemingly increasing hostile reaction, the King, in an unusual constitutional

manoeuver, called, what was to be known, the Buckingham Palace conference. The King stated in

the opening of the conference that, “the cry of civil war is on the lips of the most responsible and

sober-minded of my people,” thus the settlement of partition must be drawn up in these talks.

Not all Unionists had given up hope of complete abandonment of H.R. In letters to the King “urged

him to live up to his role as defender of the faith, and not to handover Ulster to the Pope of Rome,” 81

as their Protestant leader, it is no doubt that by now partition was the only solution to the crisis.

80 Anonymous letter from Ireland to Carson, 4th May 1914, PRONI: D1507/A/6/181 H. Nicholson, King George V: His Life and Reign, (London, 1952), p. 297

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At the Conference, Unionist allowing no further concessions insisted that exclusion would be

permanent. With it Fermanagh and Tyrone groups, predominately vocal Unionist, this issue was the

main snagging point. On the grounds of the idea of self-determination, Redmond’s adherence to

ensure only the counties with a majority of Unionists would be exempt, hence included the two

counties. Reasonable to many, the Unionists had already abandoned so much and any attempts to

abandon more were to be rejected. The Buckingham Palace conference failed by the 24 th, over as

Churchill described, “The muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone,”82 where neither side would

relinquish these counties, while the settlement on exclusion time remained undecided.

The Buckingham Palace conference, achieving little, played an important role. For the Unionist it was

concluded that they could no longer kill H.R., it would happen, all that was to remain was to protect

Ulster. The Nationalists leadership also accepted Partition and understood the Ulster would not

accept imminent H.R., but maintained a possible belief to ensure that the Nationalist/Catholic

majority counties were adopted under H.R., with Ulster joining eventually. Lord Lansdowne defined

partition: “Ulster does not like it, the South and the West do not like it, Mr. Redmond and Mr. Devlin

do not like it, the government itself does not like it.”83 While written prior to the conference, it

demonstrated many compromises, no party endorsed, although it was to be accepted, irrespective if

they felt it was mutilating Ireland. Nationalist view was that Ulster continued demanding an

unreasonable amount, while Redmond was seemingly willing to bend to their whim. Though Ulster

had compromised significantly and was not the hardliners that some Nationalist saw. Carson,

initially, wished to eradicate H.R., but conceded for Partition when he put forward a resolution in

January 1913; next giving up Donegal, in the north, and Cavan, in the south, however he would

ensure that the six counties remained permanently excluded.

In reality the two sides were not so far apart, however the unwillingness to compromise further

made the gap look like fjords rather than a near conciliation. The complex and varying Ulster border

82 M. Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, (London, 1991), p. 26483 The Irish Times, 2nd May 1914

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region communities, as well as the exclusion time zone, made it nigh impossible for a settlement in

which both sides could find acceptable.84

It is clear that partition was not loved by any one, but how far was it detested, enough to warrant

war? The conference was no détente; as Carson stated that he saw nothing but “darkness and

shadows”85 however did this truly mean that he had accepted war? Was it now time, seeing as the

hope of a feasible solution for Ulster had past, to engage in the first armed resistance of the British

government in centuries?

It is clear that the IPP did not see such threats as seriously as others. P.Collombier-Lakeman notes

that “for the leader of the Irish Party, threats of civil war were dismissed because they could not

represent a genuine form of democratic opposition; a civil war could be nothing else than a

rebellion.”86 This is the main impasse raising an army to fight for the status quo. Though this does

not mean that War did not appear on the minds of Nationalist Politicians, there is a notable increase

in the use of the words civil war in 1914, when the crisis built up (see below). 87 The context of the

speeches, in which the words civil war varies, some used it mockingly, it still empathised that it was

expressed in the Commons.

Redmond himself often “scoffed at the Unionist appeal to force as ‘playing at rebellion.’” 88 Though

we can say that all Home Rulers thought this was the case. P.Pearse thought differently to the

mocking tone, “I think the Orangeman with a rifle a much less ridiculous figure that the nationalist

84 Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997, p. 17785 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 22386 P. Collombier-Lakeman, ‘Myopia or utopia? The discourse of Irish nationalist MPs and the Ulster question during the parliamentary debates of 1912-14’, in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14, (Cork, 2014), p.12787 Ibid., p.12388 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, p. 18

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in Parliament


without a rifle.”89 In a context describe by Pearse it is rather surprising to think that the Nationalist

had such a laughable tone over Ulster’s intent. McConnel believes that,

“The available evidence certainly does not suggest that in 1914 Irish Members seriously believed that

they were preparing for war. In part, this may be because Nationalists did not conceive of civil war in

terms of two standing armies confronting one another on the field of battle. Rather, many MPs

expected any conflict to resemble the Belfast rioting of 1912” 90

McConnel’s belief, based on the fact that they saw UVF as a political tool, similar to their own

organisation, not as a real force intent on seizing Ulster to protect it. As a consequence for a passive

idea on the issue, they could not believe the hypocrisy that Ulster was intending to fight. However,

Nationalist had so far underestimated their resolve to resist, this would be another

underestimation?

Contrasting the evidence available, as negotiations stalled, Ulster was preparing their resources and

morals to engage in conflict. The rhetoric was clear that H.R. could mean war; from the Covenant,

which stated that they would defy H.R., by any means necessary to speeches such as Bonar-Law’s:

89 P. Pearse, Collected Works of Padraic H. Pearse; Political writings and speeches, (Dublin, 1916), p. 185 90 J. McConnel, The View from the backbench: The Irish Nationalist MPs and their work, 1910-1914, (Durham, 2002), p. 139

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Apr-12

01-May-

12

06-May-

12

09-May-

12

15-Jan-13 (O

'Connor)

15-Jan-13 (O

'Brien)

15-Jan-13 (D

illon)

16-Jan-13

09-Jun-13

9-Jun-13 (O

'Brien)

9-Jun-13 (D

illon)

10-Jun-13 (R

edmond)

10-Jun-13 (D

evlin)

07-Jul-1

3

9-Mar-

14 (Red

mond)

9-Mar-

14 (O'Brie

n)

9-Mar-

14 (Hea

ly)

19-Mar-

14 (Devl

in)

19-Mar-

14 (Dillo

n)

1-Apr-1

4 (Dillo

n)

02-Apr-14

6-Apr-1

4 (Red

mond)

6-Apr-1

4 (Heal

y)

25-May-

1402468

101214161820

Relative frequencies for 'civil war' (per 10,000 words)


“In our opposition to them we shall not be guided by the consideration, we shall not be restrained by

the bonds, which would influence our actions in any ordinary political struggle. We shall use

whatever means seem more likely to be effective.” 91

Ulster was clear in their intention; they could fight which became indistinct through other events.

The Curragh incident, where soldiers in March, 1914, anticipating military involvement imminently

resigned rather than facing their, loyal, countrymen. The legacy of this event was that Ulster

understood H.R. could be resisted if they were fully determined in a combined effort. Now it was not

when, but “if England was sufficiently determined to enforce it.”92 This was the Unionists greatest

fear, in the event of a civil war between Nationalist and Unionists, having the Crown forces

intervening was, without doubt, the worst outcome for all Ireland93 as the UVF would quickly be

overwhelmed. The event gave hope to the Unionist and the UVF; it appeared the army would not

have the moral capability to engage. The armed forces hesitation served as a valuable recruiting

exercise for the UVF, both in the understanding that England was looking at potentially engaging and

the fact that they would not be fighting the army. Bowman details, the Unionist were struggling to

recruit in the minority of Ulster to join the UVF “in any significate number, until after the Curragh

incident.”94 Undoubtedly this event aided Ulster’s efforts to reject H.R. by military means.

When reviewing whether Ulster would have had the stomach to engage in this rebellion it’s prudent

to look at the strength and training of their recruits. In a commentary compiled by F.MacNeice, post

event, he in depthly describes the moral of the UVF,

“In Ulster it was indeed a wonderful time. Every country had its organisation: every town and district

had its own corps. The young manhood of Ulster enlisted and went into training. Men of all ranks and

occupations met together, in the evenings, for drill. There resulted a great comradeship. Barriers of

class were broken down or forgotten. Protestant Ulster became a following” 95

91 A. Bonar-Law, Speech at Blenheim, 27th July, 191292 M. Kelly, ‘The Irish Volunteers: A Machiavellian Movement?’, in D. G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire, 2006), p. 7193 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, (London, 1969), p. 16694 Bowman, ‘The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910-1920: New Perspective’, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire, 2006), p. 25395 J. F. MacNeice, Carrickfergus and Its Contacts: Some Chapters in the History of Ulster, (Belfast, 1928), p. 76

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Inevitably the underlined importance unity had in affecting moral, the togetherness of the

community, aided greatly should they seize Ulster. The ‘force’ numbered 100,000 men presenting a

competent force, willing to train with sticks to ensure training. After the various gun running events

and weapon purchases, especially at Larne with an additional 25,000 rifles and 5million rounds of

ammunition96, Ulster commanded an equipped forced. Although difficult to obtain exact numbers of

rifles possessed, Steward quantified 37,048 rifles97, however his number represents those returned

for use in WW1, clearly not all rifles were returned. Therefore Ulster could immediately equip

themselves and to seize their territory.

Finally, examining a rather different source from the UWUC in a letter to Carson, this illustrates a

different approach, members requesting visibility of how funds are apportioned. Representing a

shift in the UWUC from normal campaigning to funding the UVF.

“Some of the committee urge that constitutional methods of resisting Home Rule have proved

useless, that force alone can decide the issue and that therefore all funds should be applied to

equipment of the Ulster Volunteer Force... These members would therefore either use all funds

collected in future for the equipment of hospitals or hand them over to the UVF.” 98

For the Council to have an opinion that their funds would be more useful in the hands of the UVF,

highlights that Ulster would have been willing to fight, although not all members agreed. Many

believed that an election should be their main goal, and proposed funding “in order to rouse public

opinion in England and Scotland.”99 Irrespective, the possibility that council funds applied to direct

military spending, thus ‘associate themselves with the men of Ulster’ to fight H.R., demonstrated the

willingness for the majority of Ulster, while rather unwillingly in truth, to fight.

96 S. J. Connolly, Oxford Companion to Irish History, (Oxford, 2002), p. 31797 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 24898 Ulster Women's Unionist Council, letter to Carson, 'Memorandum for submission to Sir Edward Carson, KC, MP.’, 10th June, 1914, PRONI: D1507/A/6/6 99 Ibid.

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Therefore, with the evidence given, there is no indecisiveness that the crisis, without the

interruption of WW1, that Civil War would have unfolded on the island, beginning with the UVF

securing Ulster. Understandable with a topic of study, there are differing opinions, in P.Hart opinion:

“I do not think the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-14 was even potentially revolutionary. Ulster’s unionists

did raise an army and contemplated a local provisional government but neither intended it

overthrow the existing state. Quite the opposite. Even if fighting had broken out… it would have been

little more revolutionary than the standard Belfast riot.”100

Hart viewed these attempts, the drilling and rhetoric directly influenced the political system to

achieve Parliament agreement. Though I must disagree with Hart, it would be highly unlikely that the

rhetoric resulted in a riot and not limited to Belfast. The Unionist belie, which MacNeice alludes to,

encapsulated everyone in its umbrella. A tinder set of anywhere in Ulster would mostly likely set off

the rest of Ulster, similar to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand set off WW1.

1914 was a pivotal year for Ireland; the enthusiasm from the initial announcement had undulated

further depressing realisation. Ireland was to be separated, despised by everyone, even those in the

South whose resolve had remained until 1914 after other H.R. attempts.101 It was universality hated,

although now accepted as the only compromising solution, nevertheless this remained an impasse.

In February 1914, a letter to Carson from C.D'Arcy, summarises the situation: “if it really be

inevitable, then any reasonable compromise which would avert civil war and give Ulster

independence would be far preferable.”102 It no longer seemed viable, Ulster was prepared and

willing to go to war, despite the disbelief of the Nationalist, it would seem that only the events in

Europe saved Ireland from the maelstrom of death which surely would come about otherwise.

100 P. Hart, ‘Defining the Irish Revolution’, in J. Augusteijn, The Irish Revolution 1913-1923, (London, 2002), p. 18101 Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898, p. 642102 Letter from Charles F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Down, Connor and Dromore, Culloden, to Carson, 12 th February 1914, PRONI: D1507/A/5/9

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Chapter 6 - The Great War on Home Rule

The evening of the 4th August represents the time when the UK, were at war with Germany. The

implication on the Ulster crisis would be huge, the government could no longer spend time and

effort on an issue, which in the grand scheme would mean nothing, if the war was to go

unfavourably. Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, stated:

“The one bright spot in the very dreadful situation is Ireland. The position in Ireland – and this I

should like to be clearly understood abroad – is not a consideration among the things we have to

take into account now.” 103

While the war in Europe presented much greater loss of life, with approximately 1million deaths

from the UK, with Irish deaths totalling 27,504 according to D.Fitzgerald, 104 it would ensure that

immediate bloodshed would not occur in Ireland. However, the declaration of War did not entail

that the crisis, had ceased, instead it entered a new phase, where expectantly the two sides were to

prove their loyalty to the Empire on a battlefield, with promises of concessions after the ‘short’

conflict.

Before we examine the response to WW1, we must understand where the Government of Ireland

Act commenced through Parliament. The outbreak of war saw Asquith remove the Amendment bill,

which perused partition, in favour of a Suspension bill. The Government of Ireland Act, alongside the

Welsh Church Act 1914, were both placed on hiatus initially until September 1915, but to be

suspended further if hostilities continued. The bills received Royal Assent on the 18 th September

1914, thus in principal H.R. had passed Parliament. The bill also left special provisions for Ulster,

partition of Ireland, to be resolved after conclusion of the war despite the full agreement on

partition not being absolute.

103 T. P. Coogan, Ireland in the 20th Century, (London, 2009), p. 40104 D. Fitzpatrick, ‘Militarism in Ireland, 1900–1922’, in T. Bartlet, K. Jeffreys, A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996) p. 392

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Upon the passage of the Act the situation was left in limbo. The Unionists were left in disarray at the

use of the war as a means to force the passage of H.R. against their wishes. Although it was passed,

it was uncertain when it would come into being, even after the war. Ulsterman perceived that H.R.

would be forced upon them, despite the protests of the last two years. The situation was similarly

unpopular for the nationalists, albeit not on the same level. So close was the devolution and now it

was to be put on hold. The war meant for both sides, that a new strategy must be adopted ensuring

that the bill adoption, probably after an election, or special provisions remained favouring Ulster.

Apparently both leaders, Carson and Redmond, saw the best approach was to press their claims of

loyalty and not use the war as a bargaining chip. While the Unionist were certainly the quicker, and

the more determined, of the two parties to flock to the battlefield, they had the most to lose from

H.R., thus they had to ensure the Government post war would not forget about their efforts both

pre and post 1914.

The willingness by Carson to show that Ulster was to be loyal and not use the war for political goal

was demonstrated in his speech at the UUC: “England’s difficulty is not Ulster opportunity. However

we are treated, and however others act, let us act rightly. We do not seek to purchases terms by

selling our patriotism.”105 To Carson, Ulster must prove unwavering, no matter where the bill was in

Parliament. For example, to refuse to fight on the grounds that the bill could be forced upon them or

if the Nationalist proved unwilling to fight would only hamper their efforts to showcase themselves

as unquestionably loyalty. To do so would undermine the very concept of their argument for a

maintained union, requiring them to fight alongside their British brothers, regardless of any Irish

brother’s refusal.

Returning to the religious aspect D.G.Boyce notes that the war, and to a lesser extent the debate,

was to “construct an English, British, Nationalist, and Protestant parotic alliance” 106 binding the

Unionist together with the Protestant Briton in a struggle against the oppressor, being Germany or

105 Edward Carson, Speech to delegates of the Ulster Unionist Council in Belfast, 3rd September 1914106 D. G. Boyce, The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1986, (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 32

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the Liberal Home Rulers. Therefore the strategy of unwavering support was the product of

continued attempts proving to politicians and the average Briton that they were the loyalist

members of the Union, sacrificing political goals to serve their country.

While the public face demonstrated unequivocal resolve towards WW1, this does not mean that

suspicion did not exist. Carson promised that they would not use the crisis for political means,

however, the bill was only suspended, meaning that it remained a possibility of being implemented.

The feeling of distrust was palpable, verified by W.Spender’s letter to Carson. “If the government use

the mobilisation as a means of advancing Home Rule, I shall have no hesitation in returning to

Belfast with or without leave.”107 Even though it was Empire first, and Spender being a Captain in the

36th Ulster Division, his position as Quartermaster General in the UVF, he would be vital should H.R.

be implemented. Thus Carson could easily call upon allies to resist if absolutely necessary.

Redmond, similarly preached Irish involvement, his speech at Woodenbridge outlined the reasoning

for the Irish people’s involvement. For J.J.Lee his interpretation and reasoning for entering the Great

War was to recreate a united Ireland. His book illustrates “The logical conclusion of supporting the

war was in the hope of forging a union of hearts between the nationalist and Unionist.” 108 The grand

struggle would hopefully rekindle the brotherly feeling lost through the insulting nature of the Ulster

Crisis. In his speech he preaches that Ireland must fight for the, “defence of right, of freedom and

religion in this war.”109 He speaks clearly about religion and its impact, attempting to highlight that

the rest of Ireland is in favouring of keeping the liberty of free religion safe. This is part of Lee’s

argument used during the war, and Woodenbridge speech to unify the country. However I am

inclined to disagree with Lee’s view on this issue, for Redmond was finding it increasingly difficult to

unify the nationalist cause towards ‘England’s fight’ rather than the Unionist and Nationalists

combined.

107 Letter from Wilfrid B. Spender, en route to Chatham Barracks, Chatham, to Carson, 1st August 1914, PRONI: D1507/A/7/1-21108 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, p.23109 J. Redmond, Speech at Woodenbridge, 20th September 1914

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Redmond’s attempts seemed to underline a unified effort with the Unionist to more of an attempt

keeping the Nationalist groups together through fighting for Ireland in a struggle for nation creation.

Anticipating a short war, he needed to ensure the more radical aspects did not rise up and those

that fought would gain military expertise, undoubtedly useful in blackmailing the British into

upholding their promise. In the very same speech he uses words such as “young Ireland” and in

“reproach to her manhood”110 depicting that H.R. remained a certainty, although Irish people

believed was sinking into the abysses. This was a bold strategy by Redmond, to remain loyal to

England in her hour of need. As The Unionist flocked to volunteer, it remained essential that they

must do the same to save whatever sympathy they could.

We cannot forget that at the last election, the Liberals had a majority of one, a further election after

the war would undoubtedly see H.R. as a primary issue. Therefore committing to fight for Britain in

order to satisfy and salvage any sympathy left by the British public, “for defence of right, of freedom

and of religion.”111 All of which Redmond was hoping to bring to Ireland. It demonstrated Redmond,

and the majority of Ireland’s indication of loyalty to the empire, similar to Unionists, was genuine.

Redmond was gambling on the shortness of the war and the quickness to pass the legislation after

the war. If this failed, as it would, the growing sense of discontent would spread like a toxic weed.

Redmond’s unbending support for war, resulted in many Irish people becoming disillusioned, they

believed he was becoming a native of Westminster or worse a puppet, having sold them for a piece

of unguaranteed legislation , even if not doing so would lose all the support/sympathy he had

gained. He was embracing the system which had promised much and given little, therefore it is

unsurprising that by the beginning of the war, there was clear opposition against Redmond. WW1

110 Ibid.111 D. Gwynn, The life of John Redmond, (London, 1932), p. 392

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and the betrayal by Redmond was the biggest shift of Ireland’s political change until the grand

change, undertaken after the Easter Rising.

It is without doubt that prior to WW1, the imminent passage of the act, despite its misgiving, more

revolutionary activity from fringe groups was certainly curtailed. It would be counterproductive, for

groups, in their efforts to gain additional power to Ireland if they engaged on more revolutionary

activities. The conflict and Redmond’s willingness to sacrifice their lives for Britain, without

representation compelled them to detest the wave of volunteers and Redmond.

A clear example of such rising change is E.MacNeill, in a statement shortly after Redmond’s

Woodenbridge speech. The full statement, Pages 50/51, showcased his position and his attempts to

use the National Volunteers, not as a British fighting force, instead using them to ensure a National

Government which could declare war itself and not England.

In the statement MacNeill is clear on his, and Ireland’s, position of the war. In point five of six he

states:

“To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than

through the free action of a National Government of her own; and repudiate the claim of any man to

offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and Irish women to the service of the British

Empire.”112

Highlighting this point, amongst others, why should Ireland fight for someone whom had clearly not

represented their wishes? Is this dissimilar to Ulster’s call to resist being governed from Dublin? They

did not wish to be governed from Westminster and put into wars, in which Ireland had declared

herself. He is also extremely clear to denounce Redmond, for him to side with the British, despite

112 E. MacNeill, Statement to the Irish Volunteers, 24th September, 1914

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the clear political reasoning, and to use volunteer groups aimed at achieving H.R. for the Empire,

which had not given them concessions, a blatant disregard for the Irish people.

Whilst rare, there is evidence that some Irishmen went to Germany to aid them against their

common enemy. The source in question is a statement by M.J.Kehoe in his involvement in Germany

in WW1. In his statement he compares his work to Wolfe Tone in attempting to achieve a hostile

landing in Ireland.113 Whilst the reply that no German force would land in ‘neutral Ireland’ he gains

permission to attempt for the “formation of an Irish armed contingent for the sole purpose of

attaining the Independence of Ireland”114 through using captured troops, though with limited

success. As already mentioned, although a small group of individuals when you compared with

MacNeill, whom managed to convince a greater number, it demonstrates a developing situation

which could, and would, shatter Ireland’s peace.

WW1 showed the first real thaw in Ireland’s tensions since the coalition between the IPP and the

Liberals. The war sees the two parties fighting for favour over Britain in a show of loyalty similar to

two siblings fighting over a parent’s attention, although the successfulness of the two leaders varied.

The Unionist had a greater call of duty towards the empire and her cause, the underlining suspicion

that H.R. would be disingenuously inaugurated whilst they were distracted, never truly left their

minds. Nonetheless Ulster continued to show that they deserved to be a part of the UK, even if that

meant their ‘brothers’ refused.

In contrast, despite Redmond’s best efforts at galvanising the Catholic-Irish people to the cause of

Britain, and to a lesser extent the cause of the Unionists, the growing senses of discontent at the

Constitutional Nationalism, was becoming obvious. While there was no doubt that the vast majority

of Irishmen, in 1914, supported Redmond, or saw that WW1 was Ireland’s struggle, with only 13,000

113 M. J. Kehoe, ‘Witness statement by Lieutenant M. J. Kehoe, The Irish Brigade of Germany, 1914-1918’, Bureau of Military History, Document number: 741, p. 3114 Ibid., p. 3

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of the 188,000 joining MacNeill from the Redmond115, the journey towards a more revolutionary

agenda began at WW1.

It was becoming easier to convince people, as was published in the Irish Freedom, that Germany is

not Ireland’s enemy or that Redmond’s “kiss is the kiss of Judas”116 for selling the Volunteers to

England. Redmond initially attempted for the bill to be implemented regardless of the war, his

willing obedience was a risk, and a risk resulting in his downfall. His willingness to be the more loyal

one, against Carson, was against many Irishmen whom he represented. Cracks had appeared since

the willingness to strive towards partition, where it appeared Ireland was “being treated as a corpse

on a dissecting table”117 through “legislative dismemberment.”118 Had the ‘accident’ of the WW1 not

intervened, it is likely that the revolutionary fever, existed after and during the war would remain a

niche part of Irish society not the main stream which engulfed Ireland in 1916 onwards.

115 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, p. 22116 Irish Freedom, September 1914, p. 4 PRONI Reference : D1507/A/8/24117 The Irish Times, 1st August 1914118 MacNeill, Statement to the Irish Volunteers, 1914

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Statement to the Irish Volunteers – 24 th September 1914 – Eoin MacNeill

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Chapter 7 - ConclusionOver 100 years ago, Ireland was greeted by the realistic prospect of H.R. and a National government,

which would have control over certain matters, relating to Ireland. This could be the step towards

greater devolution and perhaps dominion status. Obviously the island was not united on this issue

and according to the P.M. there existed those who wished “to thwart and defeat the constitutional

demands of the great majority of their fellow-countrymen.”119 Certainly there were those who

wished nothing less than to thwart this bill and cast it into the realms of history by any means.

Stewart described the crisis as “the most bitter political crisis experienced in Britain since the days of

the Long Parliament”120 it is easy to understand why he believed that. The H.R. crisis represented the

biggest threat to peace since the English Civil War. Plans for rejection of the bill, even if it meant a

declaration of war against a constitutional government, was to the extent of the reaction against the

bill; the loyalist men in the Empire were willing to fight it.

This crisis is undoubtedly borne out of the Parliament Act, as without this act the Irish reaction to

H.R. would be significantly different. Without the change in legislative law, it is doubtable that H.R.,

in any form, would have passed. As during the crisis, the stance by the HoLs was unwavering; with

the bill being rejected by an amazing 257 majority,121 also vetoing it twice. Whilst the HoLs exercised

their power in any way possible, they were ultimately restricted to denying the inevitable. The

evolved state of the HoLs meant that “Unionists could no longer rely on the Upper House to block

the way,”122 therefore Unionist concluded they must adopt this approach and respond accordingly.

Thus the removal of the HoLs gave the situation a new edge to the controversy enforcing the

Unionist and Ulster to act more aggressively.

119 Asquith, ‘Speech in Dublin’, 14th July 1912 120 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14, p. 18.121 Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921, p. 198122 Ibid., p. 197

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The impact of the H.R. crisis remains remnant today with Unionism still existing, mainly down

religious lines, in Northern Ireland. Without the galvanising nature, borne out of this crisis, Unionism

today would present a different face; and certainly struggle to cross class lines prior to the crisis. An

example of this was the Land crisis which pitted Landlords against the peasantry in the previous

century, thus it was unthinkable, in Britain, that rich and poor alike would join forces. Therefore

merging forces in condemnation of the proposal, in line with standard political protests, and armed

men, could easily be considered treasonous, created a new Ulster culture. To this day, in the

Republic, there is no Leinster or Munster identities; the debate created a different culture; it made

Ulster recognise their own identity, different to the south. Unionists had to ensure that their voice

would not be ignored by protests or otherwise.

Protestantism, the main factor in ensuring the movement’s dynamics; naturally it was not

completely split perfectly down Protestantism and Catholicism. In the vast majority of cases, it

defended a person’s stance greater than social-economic status, allowing the enemy to be visualised

easier. Revisionist pointed towards the economic impact which H.R. would have affected, a major

worry for the Unionist, especially as a result of the Parliament’s economic situation. However, Ulster

Catholics did not fear this in the same way as the Protestants. Also religious fears portrayed in the

Unionist Press about Rome Rule and the restriction of their beliefs, hit a greater cord than any other

argument. Thus the reaction against, was amplified by the religious difference which existed on the

island.

The Nationalist crisis, far from being a unified effort on the level of Unionism, was the opportunity

that the island had been waiting for since 1801, the creation of a Parliament leading to greater

future freedom. However, the enthusiasm quickly receded through dissatisfaction and Britain’s

willingness to support Ulster rather than the majority of Ireland. This was certainly influenced by the

underestimation of Ulster resolve; the longer the crisis dragged on, the more it seemed Ireland was

being torn apart. This resulted in an increase in disillusionment of the system, which had brought

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H.R. so close but in the end failed, causing an increase of revolutionaries, bringing about the Easter

Rising.

The accident that WW1 was, saw the greatest cooling of tension for Ireland, no doubt Ulster would

have fought or at least taken control of the Ulster domain. The fighting in Europe was the only

reason that this crisis never evolved into a civil war. Instead of fighting each other, Irishmen united

and fought together against the German Empire. While both sides preached togetherness it was

becoming painfully apparent, on the nationalist side, that cracks were appearing.

Overall, the reaction of the Irish people can be split into two parts. The beginning demonstrated the

euphoria on the Nationalists and detest for the Unionists in the north. The second half of the debate

sees it become increasingly dangerous, both sides unwilling to concede any further, the biggest

consequence being the clear and blatant road to civil war. We have WW1 to thank for the avoidance

of bloodshed, however, the crisis brought about the re-emergence of violent nationalism which

would, in turn, bring the largest headache for the British Government, on UK soil, for almost the

entire 20th century.

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1914 Childers, Erskine, The Framework of Home Rule, (London: Dodo Press, 1912) Conway, Frederic W., ‘Repeal of the Union’, The Belfast Monthly Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 27,

1810 D'Arcy, Charles F., Bishop of Down, Connor and Dromore, Culloden, letter to Carson, 12 th

February 1914, PRONI: D1507/A/5/9 Dicey, Albert V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London:

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completed draft - with bib

Documents