Was the Later Wittgenstein

a Transcendental Idealist?

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the BA Degree in Philosophy with History

Student Number: 09002615

Course: PHI-30025

Final Word Count: 8,194

Date of Submission: 30/04/2012

Was the Later Wittgenstein

a Transcendental Idealist?

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the BA Degree in Philosophy with History

Course: PHI-30025

Final Word Count: 8,194

Date of Submission: 30/04/2012

Table of Contents

Abstract 1

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Kant and Transcendental Idealism 2

1.1: Early Wittgenstein and Transcendental Solipsism 6

Chapter 2: Bernard Williams: ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ 10

2.1: Criticisms of Bernard Williams’ position 16

Chapter 3: Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy and its Nature 21

Conclusion 28

Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?

Abstract: Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,

scholars have attempted desperately to decipher the cryptic meaning that

Wittgenstein took pains to communicate to us. Amongst the various subjects of

debate is the question of Wittgenstein’s subscription to ‘linguistic idealism’. Those

who argue that Wittgenstein was a form of idealist have often attributed his position

as following the work of Kant. By contrast, others suggest that Wittgenstein was an

odd sort of realist. Others, including myself, argue that Wittgenstein does not

subscribe to a place anywhere on the traditionally conceived ‘philosophical map’.

Rather, his philosophical writings, particularly in the later period, reflect his desire to

turn his back on philosophical theories altogether and instead merely describe the

view that we have always had.

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to examine the idea that the later phase of Wittgenstein’s

work, notably the Philosophical Investigations (PI), is engendered by the Kantian notion

‘transcendental idealism’. I argue that Wittgenstein does not admit any place on the

philosophical map, which precludes his subscription to transcendental idealism. I begin in

chapter 1 by establishing what ‘transcendental idealism’ is with reference to Kant. In section

1.2, I sketch Peter Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein as a transcendental solipsist as

endorsed by Bernard Williams. This approach feeds into chapter 2 which specifically

evaluates Bernard Williams’ approach towards answering the question of the later

Wittgenstein’s transcendental idealism. Finally, I will advocate the view that Wittgenstein in

the Philosophical Investigations is not concerned with advancing philosophical theories,

such as realism or idealism but merely wishes to clarify the use of our language so that we

may resist the natural urge to position ourselves upon a philosophical map.

1. Kant and Transcendental Idealism

Before it is possible to assess whether or not the later Wittgenstein was a transcendental idealist, we

must first establish what is meant by ‘transcendental idealism’. In this chapter I will provide a

general definition and explanation of the term in relation to the particular kind of transcendental

idealism as held by Kant. Section 1.2 explores Wittgenstein’s transcendental solipsism and is

important because it provides useful background knowledge for chapter 2. To begin with however,

we will focus on what transcendental idealism is by deconstructing it and explaining each part in

turn with regards to some neighbouring concepts with the intention of creating a useful contrast.

In order to get a firm grasp of what is meant by ‘transcendental idealism’ we turn to

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant is the champion of transcendental idealism; he coined the term

within the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1971) and was the first person to develop a

philosophical position of this kind. For this reason it may be useful to treat Kant’s formulation as a

touchstone when attempting to understand interpretations of Wittgenstein as a transcendental

idealist. The question is then: what is transcendental idealism? To talk about ‘transcendental

idealism’ is to refer to a metaphysical position that holds that the rational human mind conditions

possible experience of objects. This requires some further explanation. It is a metaphysical position

with epistemology at its heart. That is to say, it breaks away from the traditional conception of

metaphysics which is centred on ontology and moves to blur the boundary between the questions

‘what exists?’ and ‘what can we know about what exists?’ (Gardner 1999: 39) A ‘transcendental’

study is therefore primarily concerned with the conditions for the possible experience of objects

such as cars, trees and rollercoasters. Wittgenstein provides a loose, but useful analogy that

illustrates the relationship between that which is transcendental and its conditional role to

experience: the eye is conditional for the visual field and yet you do not see the eye (TLP: 5.633).

Similarly, the transcendental is conditional for experience yet you cannot find the transcendental in

the world through empirical investigation. As a condition for the possibility of the visual field, the

eye must necessarily exist a priori – before experience. To reiterate, the transcendental is an a priori

form of knowledge which is concerned not only with objects, but more specifically with the

conditions that are necessary for the possibility to experience those objects (A11/B25).

Kant was not a metaphysical realist. Rather, he is a metaphysical idealist. It is useful to

briefly touch on these terms and contrast them to further emphasise their features. When we use

the term ‘realism’ in connection with metaphysics we refer to the belief that what we represent is

objectively found within the physical world. That is, what we represent constitutes objective reality.

The object of knowledge for any representation is therefore ultimately answerable to the

represented object and is considered external to the subject experiencing it. For instance, if we were

to perceive a chair, the object of knowledge ultimately lies within the nature of the chair and how it

exists independently of human sensibility. To say this differently, we represent exactly what is found

in the physical world and our minds contribute nothing to its representation, it merely mirrors

‘reality’.

Idealism is an antithesis to realism in the sense that, upon the rejection of the realist

conception of reality, idealism is an alternative view to adopt. Kant rejects that we could ever know

anything about what he calls the noumenal realm, or objects as they are in themselves and apart

from human sensibility (A246/B303). As Kant says:

“Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not

thereby come any nearer to knowledge of the constitution of objects in themselves.” (A42-

3/B59-60)

This means that knowledge of the noumenal realm is transcendent, above and beyond experience

and therefore unknowable. Hence we cannot have knowledge of reality as it is in itself because we

cannot escape the influence of our own sensibility. This is why Kant is an idealist. When we use the

term ‘idealism’ we refer to the belief that our representations are indebted in part by the

representations themselves. The idealist believes that the form of the representation plays a chief

role in the way in which we perceive the physical world. Therefore, the form of representations

ultimately depends upon something that the subject contributes and not the object itself. For Kant,

it is the sensibility and understanding of human mind that is responsible for the form of our

representations, which is to say, responsible for perceiving objects within the pure a priori intuitions

of space and time (A21-2/B35-6). When an idealist looks at a chair, its form is not ultimately found

within the chair but inside the mind experiencing it. The extent to which the mind is responsible for

our conception of reality is often debated amongst different kinds of idealists. An alternative

idealism was held by George Berkeley1 (1685-1753). His was a radical form of idealism called

‘empirical idealism’ which means that representations as we perceive them constitute everything;

everything is the product of our mind. He therefore excludes the possibility that there is a material

world independent of mind. Transcendental idealism differs from empirical idealism insofar that it is

merely the form of our representations of an object that ultimately answers to the mind. It does not

deny that the objects themselves have an independent existence; merely that we cannot represent

or know about that existence independently of human sensibility. Whilst empirical idealism and

transcendental idealism are radically different positions, the two positions do share the belief that

the mind has a (varying) role to play regarding the comprehension of reality. It i s this shared belief

that makes them idealist positions (Dilman 2002: 37).

We have seen what ‘transcendental’ means and also what it means to be an ‘idealist’ but I

have yet to answer the question at hand: what is transcendental idealism? For Kant, it is the view

1Berkeley, G. (1948–1957). The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (eds.). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 9 vols.

that our conception of reality ultimately depends upon the mind of the experiencing subject; it

depends on human sensibility. This dependence on the mind does not entail that the mind creates

reality as George Berkeley would assert; more that when we intuit something, our mind conditions

our sensibility so as to render the intuition within space and time. Further, the conditions of our

experiences are not themselves identifiable at the empirical level of reality (Moore 1997: 122). That

is to say, the conditions underpinning the form of representations cannot be found within our

representations. The conditions of knowledge ultimately lie within the mind rather than the object

themselves, therefore these conditions must in some sense be ideal and hence we have

‘transcendental idealism’.

Kant believed that the a priori conditions for possible experience were ultimately found

within the mind and its particular structure. The early Wittgenstein however, it may be argued,

thought that language ultimately fulfils the role of conditioning our world. This kind of reading often

focuses on the passage: “the limits of my language mean the limit of my world” (TLP 5.6). In the

following section I will sketch an interpretation of the early Wittgenstein as what has been called a

‘transcendental solipsist’.

1.1 Early Wittgenstein and Transcendental Solipsism

Following P.M.S Hacker’s seminal reading of Wittgenstein within Insight and Illusion (1972), Bernard

Williams in his paper ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ (1974) designates the early Wittgenstein a

transcendental solipsist within the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). It is not difficult to see why

some interpreters see Wittgenstein as following in the footsteps of Kant when Wittgenstein says

“logic is transcendental” (TLP: 6.13) and that “propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the

world, or rather they represent it.” (TLP: 6. 124) Williams’ kind of reading may be considered as a

form of ‘linguistic idealism’ because language contributes to the way in which we represent the

world. The Tractatus has also been called ‘neo-Kantian’ by Robert Hannah who considers the thesis

of the Tractatus to be a reformulation of strong transcendental idealism with Wittgenstein’s own

linguistic element as inspired by both Kant and Schopenhauer (Hannah 2011: 21). Hacker’s and

Williams’s interpretation will be sketched with little assessment at this stage to serve the purpose of

showing how this kind of position might be employed within Wittgenstein’s linguistic system of

philosophy2. Furthermore, this section compliments the understanding of chapter 2 whereby

Williams argues that there are elements within the later work of Wittgenstein that may properly be

called ‘transcendental idealism’ left over from his early philosophy.

To explain what transcendental solipsism is and how it might be considered a strong version

of Kant’s transcendental idealism, some key features of the Tractatus that Williams pays attention to

have been laid out:

(1) The limits of my language are the limits of my world (TLP: 5.6)

(2) The limits of my language must found by reflectively moving around ‘inside’

our view of things i.e. no God’s eye view (Williams 1974: 85)

(3) The solipsistic ‘I’ is metaphysical and therefore goes above and beyond

empirical enquiry (TLP: 5.632, 5.641)

From points (1) & (2) we can see that solipsist’s position might be described as idealist. The world

owes its constitution to the private language of the solipsist; or that which is privately thought. To

clarify, the way in which Hacker is interpreting the word ‘language’ is broad, one that means

something similar to ‘conceptual scheme’ which designates everything that is comprehensible

2 However, Williams’ dependence upon Hacker’s reading may serve as a useful point of attack regarding

Williams’ overall suggestion. Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein will be touched upon in section 2.1.

(Hacker 1972: 68). The use of the term ‘language’ and its relationship to the world might be seen as

similar to the way in which Kant uses the human mind and its relationship to the world. As sketched

out above, for Kant, we perceive objects physically in a spatio-temporal framework as a result of the

particular cognitive structure internal to subject. In a comparable (but not identical) fashion,

Wittgenstein’s metaphysical self or solipsistic ‘I’ represents the boundaries of the world in virtue of

‘language’ that it conditions or ‘limits’. That is to say, the solipsistic ‘I’ is a necessary a priori

condition for language which in turn determines the limits of my world based on what can possibly

be thought of or grasped with the logical conceptual scheme as exemplified by our linguistic

practices (TLP: 5.62). The horizon of the world i.e. everything that we could possibly represent, is

demonstrated by that which is conceivable; anything that cannot be conceived of simply does not

exist. Point (2) specifically epitomizes Wittgenstein’s idea that it is nonsensical to attempt to use

logic (and therefore language) to denote what can and cannot exist within the world because that

would “require that logic go beyond the world” (TLP: 5.61). Instead, the only option available to us is

to ‘move around within logic’ sensing when things become increasingly incomprehensible (Williams

1974: 85). That is to say, we cannot ascribe logic a view from both sides of what exi sts and what

cannot exist; this would render logic as having a ‘God’s eye view’. We must assess logic from within

in order to determine what makes sense to us; anything that does not is cast aside as

incomprehensible. It is in this way that Wittgenstein attempts to draw the limitations of what we are

able to represent; to draw the limits of what we can know.

Point (3) Confirms the transcendental nature of the solipsistic position because the

metaphysical ‘I’ (TLP 5.641) makes language possible but is not i tself within the world and therefore

cannot be subject to empirical investigation. Hacker draws a parallel between Wittgenstein’s claim

that “the thinking, presenting subject: there is no such thing” (TLP: 5.631) and what he calls a

standard Humean position (1739: I-iv)3, namely, that the ‘thinking self’ cannot be found within the

3 As pointed out by Hacker, P.M.S. (1972) Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the metaphysics

of experience. London: Oxford University Press pp. 59

world. We are not talking about the body of a person which is within the world, rather by ‘self’ or

‘subject’ we mean a ‘metaphysical self’. The metaphysical self transcendentally conditions ‘language’

which is in turn responsible for the solipsist conception of the world; “the language which I alone

understand” (TLP: 5.62). So to drive this point, the idealistic characteristic of this thought is fulfilled

by ‘language’. The idea here being that we can only conceive of the world from within the logical

conception of the language available to us, if ‘something’ were to evade our logical language, then it

would be inconceivable to us, hence “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (TLP:

5.62). The transcendental element is the metaphysical self, which serves to condition the language.

Williams pays close attention to the fact that the transcendental nature of solipsism cannot

be said, but merely make itself manifest (TLP: 5.62) (Williams 1974: 77). What is meant by this the

idea that the truth of transcendental solipsism cannot be meaningfully represented using conceptual

schemes because language can only be applied to that which is within the world, as the

metaphysical self is not, it cannot be talked about at the empirical level or even identified within the

world without saying something imminently false (Moore 1997: 119). Williams takes the preclusion

of coherence at the imminent level to mean that Wittgenstein is participating in metaphysical

philosophy, namely, transcendental philosophy. Whilst this particular reading is plausible, it is not

devoid of difficulties. In the next chapter we will look closer at Williams’ suggestion that it may be

illuminating to interpret the later Wittgenstein’s work in relation to the early Wittgenstein’s

philosophical position. Then in section 2.1 we will assess Williams’ suggestion.

2. Bernard Williams: ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’

In his paper ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ (1974), Bernard Williams makes the positive assertion

towards this end, suggesting that Wittgenstein’s later work contains elements that are reminiscent

of Kant’s transcendental idealism4 on the grounds that the later period continues in a similar vein to

the early period. In the previous section I sketched the early Wittgenstein’s of transcendental

solipsism as Williams presents it. Williams presses the idea that the transition that saw the rejection

of solipsism from early to later Wittgenstein need not see the total rejection of idealism, theorising

that idealism constitutes a fundamental part of his philosophical thought throughout his career. He

concludes his article with:

“The new theory of meaning, like the old, points in the direction of a transcendental

idealism, and shares also the problem of our being driven to state it in forms which are

required to be understood, if at all, in the wrong way.” (Williams: 1974: 95)

4 It should be stressed that it Williams is careful not to overtly express the view that Wittgenstein was a

transcendental idealist, however this is perhaps more to do with the difficulty in substantiating such a move

rather than through a lack of conviction. p. 85

Williams believes that it is a fruitful exercise to interpret the later Wittgenstein in terms of the early

philosophy, postulating that it would illuminate otherwise puzzling elements within his later

philosophy. For instance, Wittgenstein’s use of the first person plural ‘we’ may be better understood

if we consider it to naturally follow from its early counter-part, the solipsistic ‘I’ in the Tractatus.

Williams clarifies that this shift can be translated into something such as aggregate or communal

solipsism. In this section this suggestion will be explored. Following this, Section 2.1 focuses on the

difficulties that surface when Williams’ suggestion is followed through.

Bernard Williams’ article Wittgenstein and Idealism affords a place among the most famous

or, perhaps, infamous readings of Wittgenstein that associates his later work with transcendental

idealism. The article is a critical response to Peter Hacker’s book Insight and Illusion (1972) in which

he asserts that the transition from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations involved a

“refutation of solipsism and hence of idealism” (Hacker 1972: 59). However, Williams is unconvinced

by this relation of ideas, instead suggesting that “the shift from ‘I’ to ‘we’ takes place within

transcendental ideas themselves” (Williams 1974: 79) and therefore preserving the ide alistic nature

that he purportedly detects within the later work. As previously mentioned, part of Williams’

incentive for engaging in this exercise rests in the hope that it may illuminate Wittgenstein’s

enigmatic use of the first person plural ‘we’ and the role it plays within his later works. Williams

illustrates this suggestion by comparing claim that “the limits of my language are the limits of my

world” (TLP: 5.6) from the Tractatus may evolve into “the limits of our language are the limits of our

world” (Williams 1974: 82) within the later period. The evolved state of this claim, Williams explains,

results in a form of aggregate solipsism or transcendental idealism. If Williams can secure the idea

that there is continuity between the early Wittgenstein and the later, then this will lend credence to

the claim that the later Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist.

With the goal of clarifying his suggestion, Williams instructs the reader how he thinks that

we ought not to understand the metaphysical ‘we’. Wittgenstein did not mean for his first-person

plural ‘we’ to be interpreted as merely a tautology and we can see the value of this assertion in that

the purpose of the analogous singular version from the Tractatus did not warrant this sort of use

(Williams 1974: 83). He points out that if we were to interpret it as a tautology, then it would read as

‘whatever we understand, we understand and what we can speak of, we can speak of’ which is an

inconsequential truism. Furthermore, Williams discourages an empirical reading of the word ‘we’. At

this point in the article, Williams carefully navigates the reader away from what he considers to be

detrimental interpretations of other features of Wittgenstein’s terminology. Williams warns against

erroneous uses of ‘language’ and ‘the world’ here, firstly noting that on the one hand, we ought not

to understand ‘language’ in the narrow sense and on the other hand, the ‘world’ should be

understood in the broad sense.

To take Wittgenstein’s meaning of ‘language’ in the empirical sense would refer to a

particular community of ‘language-users’ found within the world (Mulhall 2009: 390). For example,

we should not take Wittgenstein’s use of ‘we’ to refer to the group that consists of English speakers

as opposed to group of Chinese speakers; this would generate a picture whereby the world be

limited different simply as a result of the method of communication employed. This kind of reading

of ‘our language’ would misrepresent Wittgenstein as an empirical idealist5, a position he does not

intend to advocate (Minar 2007: 190). Regarding the latter, ‘the world’ as Williams understands it, is

meant to be construed technically as the logical space of reality which admits not only to what is,

but also to what is possible. He thinks ‘the world’ means ‘what could possibly be conceived of’ rather

than the sense in which it means ‘the earth’.

Having omitted the tautological and empirical readings of ‘our language’, Williams believes

that we should understand it as a descendant of the first person solipsistic ‘I’. That is, as a first

person plural ‘we’. ‘Our language’ i.e. that which constitutes the limits of our world, should be

understood as transcendental - as the conditions for the world that are not themselves empirically

5 Whilst it may be possible to understand Wittgenstein as an empirical realist, this is not an issue that I will deal

with in this paper.

identifiable within the world (Williams 1974: 82). The logical form of language relates to the logical

form of the world insofar that the world is dependent on language in order to conceptualise it or

represent it (Moore 1997: 150). This ‘dependence’ of the world upon our logical conceptualisation of

it should not be taken as ‘if it were not for my logical concepts- my language- then the physical world

would not exist’. This is an empirical reading which is quite clearly a falsehood (Moore 1997: 118).

Rather, the dependence should be taken at the transcendental level, itself not being part of the

physical world but the conditions for it. Williams is driving at a related point when he says:

“What the world is for us is shown by the fact that we can make sense of some things and

not of others: or rather - to lose the last remnants of an empirical and third-personal view -

in the fact that some things and not others make sense” (Williams 1974: 84)

Any empirical investigation into ‘our limits’ or ‘our language’ – essentially ‘our conception of the

world’, would render the ‘limits of the world’ both inside and out of the world th at they are

supposed to limit. To put it another way, an empirical investigation into our language or conception

of the world, would necessarily be coloured by the very thing that the investigation seeks to

elucidate (Cunningham 2008: 125). Wittgenstein hints at a similar point: “logic pervades the world,

the limits of the world are also its limits” (TLP: 5.62). To attribute these limitations as empirical

would be tantamount to assigning logic a ‘Gods eye view’, thereby providing a perspective from both

sides of our conceptual scheme i.e. that within logic and outside of it. Wittgenstein does not believe

that our logic works in this manner and it is for this reason that logic cannot say that the world “has

this in it and this but not that” (TLP: 5.61). Instead, logic works from within, or from our side of the

conceptual scheme, so to speak. It is for this reason that we could not explain why we fail to

understand something outside of our conception of the world- we could not come to explain our

‘non-understanding’ of it because whatever ‘it’ is lies outside of that which we are able to

comprehend. Williams holds therefore, that an empirical explanation of Wittgenstein’s metaphysical

subject is necessarily nonsensical and must therefore be understood as the framework for

conceiving the world. Herein rests Williams’ formulation of the ‘transcendental character’ that he

claims to detect within the later Wittgenstein.

Integral to this line of thought is the ‘say-show distinction’. This is the idea that whilst

transcendental truths cannot be meaningfully said, they can be shown. This is important because if

we cannot grasp our non-understanding of something due to a limitation to articulate them, how

then can we establish the truth of the metaphysical subject? The idea is that whilst we cannot say

anything about ‘our language, but certain features of reality make themselves manifest in the way in

which we live, which is to say that these manifestations hint at an ineffable truth of the metaphysical

subject. Michael Kremer explains this brilliantly when he says:

“The ‘logical form’ which a proposition shares with the reality that it depicts cannot itself be

made the subject of depiction, but is shown in the proposition which possesses it.” (Kremer

2004: 2)

In relation to Williams’ claim, this means that the truth of the communal or ‘aggregate solipsism’

cannot be stated without saying something meaningless on the grounds that anything that is said

would not capture transcendental features; it would be stained with the colours of that which it is

meant to condition. These truths manifest themselves within our interests, concerns and activities

(Williams 1974: 85). The logical form of ‘our language’ is so interconnected to our conception of our

world that its form is implicit in how we live. Williams believes that it is this ‘like -mindedness’ -i.e.

shared interests, concerns and activities- that warrants his designation of ‘our language’ (and

therefore the later Wittgenstein’s use of ‘we’) as a “kind of idealism” (Williams 1974: 85). To express

this idea differently, Williams’ use of ‘idealism’ here is intended to be regarded in the same way that

Kant asserted that we all share the same cognitive faculties as rational human beings. In the same

way that we share cognitive faculties, similarly we share ‘like-mindedness’ with respect to the ways

in which we engage with human interests.

To take stock, Williams suggests that it is illuminating to examine Wittgenstein’s later work

through a ‘Tractarian lens’ so to speak. He attempts to understand Wittgenstein’s use of ‘we’ in

relation to the solipsist ‘I’ as per Hacker’s interpretation within Insight and Illusion (1972). If we

understand ‘our language’ to mean the transcendental conditioning for the logical form of our world

in the same way that the Tractatus conveys ‘my language’ then we have the transcendent element

within the later Wittgenstein. The idealism is shown in our ‘shared conception’ or like -mindedness

concerning the world and our very nature; its logical form is shown through our activities, concerns

and interests and never through propositions. If we take the theory to be sound, then it is not

difficult to see why Williams made claim to detect transcendental idealism within Wittgenstein’s

later work. However, as we shall see in the following section, taking his theory to be sound may

prove problematic.

2.1 Criticisms of Bernard Williams’ position

The first criticism of Williams’ position is by Ilham Dilman (2002), whom thinks that Williams is wrong

to attribute Wittgenstein’s position as a kind of idealism (Dilman 2002: 86). He makes this assertion

on the grounds there is a disanalogy here between the positions of Kant and Wittgenstein. Kant’s

idealism sought the source of the possibility of experience. He attributed this to the rational human

mind which is fixed and necessarily conditions all our knowledge and objects of experience. For Kant,

the ‘transcendental conditioner’ is found within the mind. According to Williams, the transcendental

feature within Wittgenstein’s early and later work is found within language. Whilst the mind’s

structure necessitates the forms in which we experience the phenomenal world is fixed, grammar

and natural language is subject to change over time or the culture in which the language was

formed. Furthermore, Dilman explains, the grammatical structures or ‘language -games’ are not

‘above and beyond what the speakers do’- talk of language within Wittgenstein’s more developed

view is therefore far from the realm of transcendental idealism (ibid). Rather, it seems more akin to

an historical explanation which may serve to show us why we use a concept in one way and not in

another (PI §43). Notably, this sort of reading might compliment Wittgenstein’s thesis of ‘meaning as

use’ (PI §43). In sum, Williams’ application of ‘idealism’ to Wittgenstein’s later period is a tenuous

one at best. Furthermore, it flies in the face of significant remarks by Wittgenstein in his later period

as we will see in chapter 3.

A further point of concern is Williams’ reliance on Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein as a

transcendental solipsist. Williams is “substantially in agreement” with Hacker (Williams 1974: 77); if

doubt can be cast over Hacker’s interpretation, then the foundations upon which Williams ’

argument rests breaks down, thus losing any sense of plausibility that it might have had. If Hacker’s

and Williams’ interpretation of the Tractatus is misrepresentative of its true purpose, then the

‘Tractarian lens’ through which Williams judges Wittgenstein’s later work serves to distort rather

than illuminate. Therefore any claim made by Williams regarding the engenderment of

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with transcendental idealism loses further credibili ty.

For this kind of criticism I turn to Cora Diamond who argues in her book The Realistic Spirit

(1991) that Hacker’s interpretation of the limitations of language misrepresent Wittgenstein’s

intentions for the Tractatus as a whole. The problem with Hacker’s account, according to Diamond,

is that it “chickens out” (Diamond 1991: 181) by choosing not to take seriously Wittgenstein’s claim

that the philosopher must “throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it” (TLP: 6.54).

Consequently, advocates of Hacker’s reading are forced to say self-refuting statements about what

the unsayable is; they are forced to say the unsayable. Diamond argues that this is exactly the sort of

nonsense that Wittgenstein attempted to warn his readers about in the preface of Tractatus:

“The book will... draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but to the expression of

thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both

sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the

limit will be simply nonsense.” (TLP: Preface iii-iv)

Diamond understands Wittgenstein to be warning readers of nonsense within philosophy that stems

from the deep-seated urge to peer beyond the limits of logic; beyond what can be thought and

therefore said. For Diamond, this instructs the reader how to read the work as a whole, which is in

stark contrast to that of Hacker’s and Williams’ reading. She regards sections ‘6.5-57’ and the

preface within the Tractatus as examples of how not to use philosophy and the confusions that

ensue if we attempt to go beyond the logical/conceptual scheme that is available to us in order to

provide explanations about the world (Diamond 1991: 182). As a result, Diamond believes that a

reorientation of the Tractatus is necessary to understand that Wittgenstein’s view is closer to the

notion of not being able to advance metaphysical positions, rather than clutching to some ineffable

truth about reality. This is a position that will be explored further in the next chapter.

As we have seen, Hacker and Williams hold that part of Wittgenstein’s agenda within the

Tractatus is to instruct us that we are sometimes deluded in our assertions of certain kinds of

propositions or rather, ‘pseudo-propositions’, because the kind of things that we wish to say can

only ever be shown. In other words, Hacker wants to say that we can still glean illuminating insights

from what immanently appears to be utter nonsense (Hacker 1972: 18). Williams also says that

“attempts to talk about [the metaphysical subject] or state its existence must certainly be nonsense”

(Williams 1974: 78). This strikes me as nothing more than nonsense as a whole, but even if this

position can be looked at with some sense of comprehensibility, it seems to take more for granted

than it explains. Hacker and Williams seems to simply ignore the preface of the Tractatus which

seems concerned with diagnosing and dispelling philosophy of the nonsense that Hacker wishes to

employ as part of Wittgenstein’s doctrine. (Costello 2004: 107). Significantly for the purposes of this

paper, the plausibility of Wittgenstein’s supposed subscription to the claim that ‘the metaphysical

subject makes language possible and thus the limits our world’ is dependent upon this kind of

reading. Alternatively, if we adopt Diamonds interpretation then it would seem that upon

Wittgenstein actually ‘throwing the ladder away’, he rejects that we can sensibly advance

metaphysical theories. To say this differently, if the ‘say-show’ distinction turns out to be an

unfounded misrepresentation of Wittgenstein’s purpose for the Tractatus, then talk of the

‘metaphysical subject’ as being shown within our activities, concerns and interests and activities

seems to crumble apart around itself, leaving the notion of ‘ineffable knowledge’ as pure nonsense.

The plausibility of Williams’ claim hinges on whether or not we employ Diamond’s

interpretation of the Tractatus. If Diamond’s reading of the Tractatus is more conceivable, then the

foundations that support Williams’ assertion are severely compromised; leaving his contention that

the later Wittgenstein was a transcendental idealist in ruins. I wou ld assert that Diamond’s

reorientation of the Tractatus is more plausible for two reasons. Firstly, it precludes the necessary

commitment to the obscure notion of the ‘say-show’ distinction, which arguably goes against the

grain of Wittgenstein’s intended message within the Tractatus. Secondly, despite a new reading of

the Tractatus there is still a profound continuity of Wittgenstein’s thought into the Philosophical

Investigations, though it is not the continuity that Williams had in mind. Rather, Diamond has turned

his method on its head by interpreting aspects of the early work in relation to the later. This point

may have an air of circularity to it with regards to the wider question of this paper. Further, I have

not conclusively proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that the later Wittgenstein was not a

transcendental idealist in his later work- perhaps this is too much to ask. Nonetheless, I have shown

that Bernard Williams’ attempt to characterise him as such is lacking in plausibility and foundation.

The next section will be primarily concerned with providing an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later

work.

3. Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy and its Nature

At this stage it would be an appropriate time to address similar interpretations as

expounded by other scholars, however there is not the space here to do so in as much detail

as such a task deserves. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to simply

acknowledge some prominent scholars and direct the reader towards the appropriate

material. Following closely behind Williams’ position is Jonathan Lear,6 Thomas Nagel7 and

Michael Forster8 all of which contend, for various reasons, that it is apt to designate the

later Wittgenstein transcendental idealist in one sense or other. Rather than sketching their

reasons out and critically examining them, I intend to advocate for a view that short-circuits

their collective position, namely, that Wittgenstein never intended to advance philosophical

theories. Therefore, in this section I will be arguing that an attempt to place Wittgenstein

6 Lear, J and Stroud, B., (1984). The Disappearing ‘We’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes,

Vol. 58: 219-258 7 Nagel, T., (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press

8 M, Forster., (2004). Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press

anywhere on the ‘philosophical map’ with regards to metaphysical theories is contrary the

function that he assigns philosophy (PI§ 109). In this sense, it could be understood that

Wittgenstein redefines what it means to ‘do’ philosophy.

For Wittgenstein the goal of philosophy is to “shew the fly the way out of the fly-

bottle” (PI§ 309). This is a reference to his view that language, or rather the misuse of

language, serves to inevitably lead the philosopher into puzzlement and conceptual

confusion. He believes that the solution is to treat philosophy not as a scientific project

whereby the philosopher suggests theories in order to gain knowledge and understanding,

but as a series of activities or therapies (PI§ 133) designed to avoid the entanglements that

so often accompany philosophical thought. Wittgenstein is concerned with providing a new

method of engaging with philosophy which rejects the advancements of theory as found in

the Tractatus. This point is characterised by the alternative style of the Philosophical

Investigations (1953) in that it does not provide a linear or hierarchical argument, but a set

of remarks that merely hint at his thoughts. It is an elucidatory work, meaning that his

primary task is to clarify our use of natural language through reflection on the way in which

we use grammar, thus dissolving many philosophical pseudo-problems. As Wittgenstein

puts it:

“Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our

problem by clearing misunderstandings away.” (PI§ 90)

Moreover, Adrian Moore asserts that it is not the goal of Wittgenstein’s mature view to

advance ‘isms’ (Moore 1999: 126). Rather, his philosophy is concerned with doing away with

explanation and replacing it with description, thus providing insight into what lies before our

eyes (PI §109).

At the heart of Wittgenstein’s new approach to philosophy is what he famously

terms ‘language-games’ (PI §7). The use of the term ‘language-games’ helps us to spot

implicit assumptions that we make about natural language which are often the source of

philosophical problems (Tejedor 2011: 118). Further, it is meant to show us that language is

a ‘purposeful activity’; a purpose that changes depending upon the context of its use. (ibid)

Wittgenstein hints at this:

“…the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that

the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life” (PI§23)

When Wittgenstein uses the term ‘language-game’ he refers to the rule governed nature of the

grammars that are appropriate to the different forms of life (Dilman 2002: 81). By forms of life, we

mean the way in which grammar instantiated itself within different activities and interests that are

prolific within culture. For example, religion is a form of life; it is an activity or interest that manifests

itself within our culture. Talk of ‘sins’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘God’ are all ways in which we use our grammar

in a way that is appropriate to the form of life (religion). That is to say, when we use these words in

the religious context, we follow the appropriate grammatical rules of the language -game.

It is here that Wittgenstein moves away from an essentialist theory of meaning of language

and instead points towards ‘family resemblance’ (PI §67). Thus, the meaning of a concept is not

found within a fundamental core, but rather meaning is found in the inter-connected, criss-crossing

nature of the way we use it (PI §66). For instance, there is no single feature (or set of features) that

can accurately characterise the different sorts of games, religions or ideologies etc. If we think about

the games poker and cricket, it is not immediately obvious what they share that renders them both

‘a game’. This is because they are merely ‘related’ to each other. To illustrate, if A is shares a feature

with B and B shares a separate feature with C then both A and C are related whilst having nothing in

common themselves. The assumption that there are essential features grounding our language to

the world is an assumption that might be held by the linguistic realist. Wittgenstein’s

characterisation of language like a ‘family resemblance’ underpins the rejection of linguistic realism

and also philosophical theories in general. It is mistaken to embrace the search for necessary and

sufficient conditions in order to reveal the essential meaning of a word in order to provide an

explanation of its meaning. We know this because as we have just seen, words do n ot possess

essences to be found.

The significance of this is that the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is such that he rejects

linguistic realism. That is to say, he rejects the idea that there is some external reality or abstract

entity (not unlike a Platonic form) upon which language-users may refer to in order to agree that an

expression should be classed as a rule (Dilman 2002: 19). Instead, we can see that he believes that

the meaning of a word comes from its relative use within the appropriate context or ‘form of life’;

the meaning of language is internal to the forms of life in which it is manifest (Dilman 2002: 29). By

contrast, if Wittgenstein was a linguistic realist, then the meaning (as it exists independently from

our language and life) would determine the use of the word. For Wittgenstein, the absence of

essential features connecting the meanings of words renders ‘linguistic realism’ as patently false.

Upon the philosophical map, it is often the case that with the rejection of realism follow s idealism.

Yet as we have seen, Wittgenstein does not approve of advancing philosophical theories; meaning

that it is necessary to show how the rejection of realism does not entail the adoption of idealism.

As previously mentioned, Nagel and Lear provide readings of Wittgenstein that label him as

an idealist; they do so with direct reference to ‘forms of life’ or ‘mindedness’ in order to qualify this

classification. Nagel and Lear construe Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ as conditioning our experience

to the degree that any attempt to think of something beyond the extent of their influence is

nonsensical (Nagel 1986: 106) (Lear 1982: 385). From this description, it may be concluded that the

‘forms of life’ in which grammar is interwoven and which constitute s the rules by which our

language is governed are responsible for the forms of our representations. In other words, it is

language that determines the way the world is. However, I believe this to be misrepresentative of

what Wittgenstein actually meant by his use of ‘forms of life’.

Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ are not static or universal influences upon the way in which the

world is conceived. To qualify this, I mean that forms of life are not motionless, they change over

time in the same way that cultures develop by adopting new interests and activities and leaving ‘old

fashioned’ activities behind. Kant, by contrast, holds the view that our representations ultimately

owe their constitution to some kind of intersubjective conditions within the mind. ‘Forms of life’ are

not analogous to how Kant understands mind because they change and are not fixed conditioning

influences. As Wittgenstein describes:

“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and

new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a

multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.” (PI §18)

By this, I take Wittgenstein to mean that our forms of life come and go over time because they are

as contingent as life itself. That is to say, forms of life are not a fixed or necessary as the mind is

within Kant’s system of thought. Our language corresponds to our interests, concerns and activities,

all of which are subject to change. It is for this reason that our ‘forms of life’ cannot be used in an

argument towards labelling Wittgenstein an idealist and hence language does not have metaphysical

import. To illustrate this idea, consider a Catholic person, they believe that God’s existence is

independent of anything they say, but the reality of God’s existence is only meaningfully said within

the religious ‘language-game’ (Dilman 2002: 50). Talk of God to an alien race may be meaningless to

them because that particular language-game has hitherto been unavailable to them. However, it

does not follow that the unavailability of the language-game should have any bearing on the

independent existence of God; God merely has no place in any of their ‘forms of life’. Similarly, the

physical world i.e. ‘mountains, oceans and trees’ existed before language and is therefore

independent of it, meaning that the physical world is not dependent on our forms of life or the

natural languages that grow from them. Talk of physical reality, like talk of God, only has its meaning

within the appropriate language-game. Therefore, forms of life and the language-games that

correspond to them cannot contribute to metaphysical theories one way or the other because the

extent of their influence is internal to language itself. Whilst it is true that we cannot talk outside of

our language or conceptual scheme, it does not follow therefore that we cannot conceive of things

which exist independently of that language; we merely think about that which is independent by

way of the language in which we think.

Contrary to Nagel and Lear then, Wittgenstein does not hold an idealist conception of

reality based on his use of ‘forms of life’. We can see this for two reasons. On the one hand, it is not

obvious how the forms of life may condition our language in such a way as to determine the way the

world is. Unlike Kant’s conception of mind that is fixed, timeless and a priori, Wittgenstein’s use of

our ‘forms of life’ describes them as existing alongside our language and not preceding it. It is this

feature that affords our forms of life a fluid nature, thus allowing our activities, interests and culture

to change and develop new conceptions of the world, effectively expanding its ‘limits’. On the other

hand, the influence of language does not extend as far as being able to impose conditions on things

that exist externally to it such as the physical world; meaning that our forms of life merely match the

limits of our human world, but they do not condition it.

Conclusion

The objective of this paper has been to argue against the view that the later Wittgenstein subscribed

to a form of transcendental idealism. My approach began in section 1.2 where the notion of

Wittgenstein’s earlier work was considered in a light that lends credence to the suggestion that

Wittgenstein is sympathetic to a Kantian conception of philosophy. I explored what it means to be a

transcendental solipsist in the Tractatus with the intention of showing that the existing elements of

transcendental idealism under Bernard Williams and Peter Hacker’s reading, were not retained in

Wittgenstein’s later phase as Williams suggests. This paper addresses this idea on two fronts. Firstly,

I attempted to undermine the suggestion that there are elements of transcendental idealism within

the early period that might survive to the later period which is dealt with in section 2.1. Secondly, in

chapter 3 I attempted to characterise Wittgenstein’s later work in such a way that is incompatible

with the subscription to any philosophical position and therefore transcendental idealism.

Section 2.1 explores concerns with respect to Williams’ article. Williams’ thesis is heavily

reliant on the acceptance of Hacker’s reading of the early Wittgenstein. I advocated for the

incoherence of the ‘say-show’ distinction with reference to Cora Diamond whom provides, what I

believe to be, a more plausible reading of the Tractatus. If we decided to adopt Diamond’s reading,

then we are able to approach the Tractatus as sharing similar goals as the Philosophical

Investigations as expounded in chapter 3, namely, to clarify language in order to avoid nonsense and

conceptual confusion. Consequently, Hacker’s attempt to glean meaningful insights from the

ineffable may misunderstand the purpose of the Tractatus as a whole. If ineffable truth is rejected,

then the truth of transcendental solipsistic subject which can only be ‘shown’ to be true must also be

dismissed. The transcendental subject makes language possible as it represents the non-empirical

subject, the sum of the person’s experience, without it language cannot limit the world, meaning

Hacker has fallen prey to the nonsense that Wittgenstein warned against; thus his interpretation

collapses. It is not my intention to make a definitive claim regarding the philosophy within the

Tractatus; I merely wish to provide a plausible alternative in order to reveal the weakness of

Williams’ position. I aimed to show that Williams’ suggestion that the later Wittgenstein is

engendered by the same elements of transcendental idealism in his early work falls to the ground

upon a different interpretation of the Tractatus. Consequently, I concluded that Williams’ attempt to

classify the later Wittgenstein with the engenderment of transcendental idealism fails. I come to this

conclusion on the grounds that he lacks textual evidence with which to defend his position or how it

might it fits into Wittgenstein’s later work and more significantly, he does this against the threat of

alternative interpretations of the Tractatus.

In chapter 3, I presented a picture of the later Wittgenstein that is incompatible with the

suggestion that he subscribes to transcendental idealism. I begin by focussing on Wittgenstein’s

aspiration to provide a new conception of philosophy that involves the description of “what lies

before everyone’s eyes” (PI § 109) rather than providing theories of explanation. Subsequently, I

provided a reading of Wittgenstein that rejects the notion that he belongs anywhere on the

traditionally conceived ‘philosophical map’ which holds positions such as metaphysical realism or

idealism. I illustrate how this view can be found within Wittgenstein’s later work by paying attention

to what he calls: ‘language-games’, ‘family resemblance’, ‘grammar’ and ‘forms of life’. These linked

ideas contribute towards the notion that language is a rule-following activity that we engage in

simply by participating in the interests and concerns that our culture affords. This is contrary to the

traditional realist view that holds that an abstract entity of meaning is what determines the use of

words. Furthermore, I argued that the rejection of the realist perspective does not entail th e

adoption of a kind of idealism. Kant’s idealism was founded on the elevated status of the mind which

exists a priori and fixedly conditions all possible experience and knowledge. By contrast, ‘our

language’ is unsolidified and subject to change. Language does open doors to certain conceptual

dimensions within our world such as the notion of a promise, but that is not to say that it is capable

of conditioning that which exists independently from its influence such as the physical world.

The difference between Wittgenstein’s use of language and the use of human minds within

Kant’s system of thought is what leads me to conclude that the later Wittgenstein was not a

transcendental idealist of any kind. Rather, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy does not

contribute to any particular metaphysical school of thought; he merely wishes to show us that the

deep-seated urge to choose a position on the philosophical map is the result of misusing natural

language. That is to say, he wants to show us that important “philosophical problems arise when

language goes no holiday.” (PI §38)

Word count: 8,194

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