compilation cases consti 2 search and seizures

7/30/2019 Compilation Cases Consti 2 Search and Seizures

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-Martiniano P. Vivo : acting commissioner of Immigration

-Petitioner Calacdays citizenship is being questioned

-Petitioner seeks to enjoin the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Vivo from taking them into custody of conducting deportation proceedings against them or cancelling their identification certificates on the assumption thprevious decisions of the Board of Inquiry, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Commissioners declaring them Fcitizens, had become final and conclusive

-Based on this assumption, petitioner contends that respondent Vivo is devoid of any authority to take steps to dep

them under the appropriate provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.WON the warrants of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration (Vivo) for the purposes of investig

and before a final judgment of the deportation proceedings is issued, are valid.

No.

Art III, Sec 1 (3) states, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to bdetermined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

(the following is from Cruz, page 147) Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purof carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not fosole purpose of investigation or prosecution. As held in Morano v. Vivo, The constitutional limitation contemplatorder of arrestnot as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legaof deportation, issued by the Commission of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domes Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his seescorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed b


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assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, althhe himself suffered a gunshot wound.

-An investigation of the incident then followed.

-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the MunCourt of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, FlT. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple mfrustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.

-After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:

. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminaexamination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuof a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, N

Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio KhoLiwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.

- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations wsubstance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry orinvestigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the exista probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to themandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himbeen personally convinced of such probable cause.

- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminaryinvestigation.

- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesse

whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them.-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations anissued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote,In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information

-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix(statement immediately preceding this paragraph, italicized) .

WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certificationrecommendation that a probable cause exists.

The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of MakaJuly 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.


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As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there shoulnecessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge

We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depenthe circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination isvested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certificatiand investigation report whenever necessary.

As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Althoughgeneral rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a ntrial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the reof the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnin view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.

In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gatheresponsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judsound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrarrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certificand issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personaldetermination of the existence of a probable cause.

Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, attorneys fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros OccidentCity.

- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with the petitiowherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfullyoccupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.

- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.

-Attached to the MD were the following documents:

1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela SugarCompany, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;

2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong;

3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and

4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.


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- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent byISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

- Respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed thadocuments were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidencethe RTC knowing that they were falsified.

-City Prosecutors Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probabguilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Arof the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the asignatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documewere falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the recoCivil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adoptedanswer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the MuniciCourt in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied due process because of the no

observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such couaffidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complainaffidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Mothey claim that the respondents affidavit was not based on the latters personal knowledge and therefore should nobeen used by the court in determining probable cause.

-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitiorefused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to besettled by the court.

-MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the warrant of arrsaying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners could no lonquestion the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.

1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to preliminvestigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;

2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properlyissued;

3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and

4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.

Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.

For issues numbered 1 and 3:

-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the aforesaid issues:


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SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining wthere is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court hacommitted and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognithe Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the followmanner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of thecomplainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there arerespondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, stateprosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary pubwho must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed andunderstood their affidavits.

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on SProcedure.

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure

outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidand other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.

-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the complainant and did not requirepetitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreohe is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the balone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rightpetitioners.

-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclupersonal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is nrequired to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existencprobable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probabcause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and requiresubmission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probabcause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory befor

judge could determine probable cause.

For issue number 2:

- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and

circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been commiby the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.

- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed by therespondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used btrial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.

-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Therespondents claims of the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.

- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify


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personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the executiothe documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made aassertion

-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonabdoubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere susWhile probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with caprevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fplay, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holdingarising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

-On April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the CFirst Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his application; "Thathouse of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nio St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certainof opium."

- Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the grofloor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lt. Torralba wanted to be suand for this reason, he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went awto find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segothe town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lt. Torralbhis subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized articles which were all with connection tousing of opium.

- A criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners herein, cthem with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested.

-Defendants urged: (1) that the search warrant of April 30 was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the GenOrders No. 58 had not been complied with in its issuance(specifically (a) because it was not issued upon either of the

grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No. 58, and (b) because the judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath) ; (2) that the searches and seizures made on May 1st had beenmade without any semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3) that the seizure of the defendants' books and lewas a violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against hiand protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.

WON the defendants positions are with merit.

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements osection 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernali


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which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of suchomission of the judge.

2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, didrequire another search warrant.

3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation wopium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutrights.

(Contention # 1)

-SEC. 96. of General Orders No. 58 provide: It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the following gro1. When the property was stolen or embezzled. ; 2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the meancommitting a felony.

-Suffice it to say that, whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of the word "felony", which is used inparagraph 2 of sec. 96 above quoted, the Court believes it would be the height of absurdity to hold, upon technicalgrounds, that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of whiforbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property.

- Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for material so kept as to endanger the public safety.

- A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. The issuance of both is restricted by the same provision oJones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows:That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

- In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized hbeen actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper we are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seiunder said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.

(Contention # 2)

- While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted to mean thasearch warrant can be used every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day. This would be absurd.

-It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in the court below that thesearch for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was not completed on April 30th; it was interrupted by thnecessity to ascertain who the owner of the bodega on the ground-floor was, because the petitioner Uy Kheytin faldisclaimed ownership thereof. In other words, the search of May 1st was not made "for a different purpose," nor cobe considered "another search," but was really a continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown by that during the interval between the two searches the premises in question were guarded by Constabulary soldiers, the petitioners were made to understand on April 30th that the authorities were not yet through with the search andwould continue the same as soon as they found out that the bodega was also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin

(Contention # 3)

- In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to bseized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.


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- That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as evidence agathe petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrasecond, because, even if they had been mentioned in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a searwarrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce hisprivate papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against hi

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization know

Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the PhilippineLegislature. He was also the manager of the club.

-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gamhouse. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verifiefact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, appliedobtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to thepremises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was thedefendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso rand told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contagambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consin conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso inin his refusal to submit to the search.

-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with hresistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injurepoliceman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey ashouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downs

At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.

-The warrant read as follows:

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the


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Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has goodreason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the buildingoccupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle

Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of theGambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensilsused in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keepsand conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them inviolation of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10)days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the housesituated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the abovedescribed devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are commandedto bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.(Sgd.) L. GARDUO

Judge, Municipal Court

WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.

Yes.

It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a search warrant shall not is

except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched athe person of thing to be seized.

The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknthere must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.

A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard R"whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be appreheand such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the bestdescriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must bsufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by of which he can be identified.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searas "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficiendesignation of the premises to be searched.

As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by hNo. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.


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-On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dtwo others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear.

-On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a lcomplaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incidletter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides nonewhom was, however, identified and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately theProvincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter andrequesting that "all cases that may be filed relative (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985 ,"be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases ."

-No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985,a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed asNo. 1748. On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru (his) closed and direct supervision ," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latteanswers. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest " against thefourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) John Does.

-An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty. PamaMuti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground thJudge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been

propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of basis.-The petitioners contend:

- that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the procedure prescin Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;

- that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to thissuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest;

- that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.only ... " and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day" ;

- that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator. ";

- that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges "... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same; and


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- that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional provisiorequiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

WON the warrant of arrest was null and void. More specifically stated, WON completion of the proceduredown in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Sawarrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent Judge is directed toforward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in CrCase No. 1728 of his court for further appropriate action.

Sec 3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the procedure in conducting a pre-investigatiany crime cognizable in the RTCs. Although not specifically declared the said provision actually mandates two ph

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and otherdocuments offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either:

(1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmthe order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or

(2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry andushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's evidencean opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct ahearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding threspondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate act

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrantarrest may be issued.

The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's ar

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- xxx xxx xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial juconducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainhis witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessiplacing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a warranarrest.

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuingwarrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with theprescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable caunot the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation .


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- EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: REQUIRING ALL GOVERNM AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE ANIDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURP

- Section 3 of the said EO provides that the data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall belimited to the following: Name; Home Address; Sex; Picture; Signature; Date of Birth; Place of Birth; Marital StatNames of Parents; Height; Weight; Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; Any prominent distinguishing featuremoles and others; Tax Identification Number (TIN)

-Petitioners allege that EO 420 is void because it violates the constitutional provision on the right to privacy : (i) Itaccess to personal confidential data without the owners consent; (ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguor penalties for any violation of its provisions; (iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necess420.

WON EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

Petition without merit.

- On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collectrecorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. Moreover the data to be collectedroutine data for ID systems and are less personal compared to the medical records of patients taking prescription dr(Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977), good to note, see * below).

-EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the priosystems (which even before were not complained of) which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

-The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

* Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information. In WhU.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reportsidentifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a computerized database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribingdoctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who wankeep their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to publicagencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably ocharacter of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the heathe community does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific darequired for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal.


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-On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of PuHealth entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Hous

Code. The building's manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of thground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appelrefused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.

-The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused to allow an inspectiocitation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When appellant failed to appetwo inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law topermit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code.

-Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a compwas filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code.

-"Sec. () 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, smay be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them Municipal Code. "

- Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments iit authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause tothat a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. He also contends that he may not be prosecuted under 507 forefusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by 503

WON administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendmrights as enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is concluded that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to seaand that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection

-The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard thprivacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.

- The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonagovernmental interest. Reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusioncontemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.

-In the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on aparticular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical mand in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likthat warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or theother satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry.

- In this case, there was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to thebuilding in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained, and thus appellant wasunable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the


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portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does not contthat such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant's premises.

- Testimony of arresting officers: On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known onlBenjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, witvolume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. AnSudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

-Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988 adeployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasolinDividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant postethemselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.

-While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and babumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two femaa male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying atraveling bag.

-Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced themselvesNARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the

-Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash KatuThe team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature

Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

-Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, PMarlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive resmarijuana, a prohibited drug.

-Defense contended that the search and seizure of the items were illegal thereby violating accused-appellant'sconstitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

-Defenses version of testimony: She (Rosa Aruta y Menguin, accused-appellant) claimed that immediately prior tarrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the roold woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrestand asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred thatwoman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown toby the arresting officers.


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-RTC of Olongapo relied on arresting officers testimony since they were unconvinced by the defenses version of testimony; convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana fBaguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 197this appeal.

WON the search and seizure done on Aruta was illegal.

Aruta was acquitted for lack of evidence.

- The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his libertmost basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warraarrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specificallyprovided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 aprevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuittheir official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectprivacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to pr

cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

- The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawconducted.

- Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that wengender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime.

-Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellabag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.

- In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that theymore than twenty-four hours to do so.


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The officers got arrest warrant for the defendant (referring to Vale). They then went to the defendant's house wheresaw the defendant making a drug deal. The officers arrested the defendant outside his house and then the officers w

inside the house and in the back room, where they found drugs. The defendant was convicted and now he appeals argues that the evidence obtained in the house was result of an unlawful search. The Supreme Court of Lousianaaffirmed the conviction by ruling that the search of the house was incident to a lawful arrest.

: WON the search of the back room of the house incident to a lawful arrest?

No

: The court ruled that a search is incident to a lawful arrest "only if it is substantially contemporaneous with theand is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest." The court ruled that since the defendant was arrested outsidhouse, the back room of the house was not within the immediate vicinity of the arrest and also since the officers dihave exigent circumstances, or the consent of the defendant, they had no right to search the house. The conviction reversed.

:

The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of the SCsdecision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void, that respondents are enjoined from

introducing evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities obtained would still be retained, wprejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and that it should bconsidered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant was based. Petitioners on the other haon the part of petitioner Aguilar-Roque, contend that a lawful search would be justified only by a lawful ar

And since there was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that the personalities seduring the illegal search should be returned to the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede that the searcwarrants were null and void but the arrests were not.

: WON the articles seized were illegally obtained.

: Yes.

: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any procee(Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experibe the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches andseizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and pofficers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the powthe courts to change or modify. All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifand cannot be used against any of the three petitioners.


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Shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informthere were 3 suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna&North Bay Boulevard.A surveillance plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.As later narrated there were 2 men "looking from side to of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whethe two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber.Smith&Wrevolver w/ 6 live bullets in the chamber.The weapons were taken from them. Mengote&others were turned over toheadquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

-Said accused did then and there unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and cocaliber 38 without first having secured the necessary license or permit.Mengote was then convicted of illegal poof firearms. Appellant contends that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Mengote was constitutional?

the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordereimmediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

As provided in Sec. 5 of the bill of rights, A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a p(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to comoffense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating thperson to be arrested has committed it.

At the time of the arrest, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen.was no offense that had just been committed or actually committed or being attempted in their presence. The arrofficers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed neither mengotes identity.

had was hearsay information from the telephone caller& about a crime that had yet to be committed. A crime mustor actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. Itenough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense muundisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

Sometime in 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant in cotabato, was found lying on the ground w/ several w

in the head. He died shortly afterward in the cotabato hospital where he had been brought by an agent of authoritydeath of Tan Why was imputed to the accused who was charged w/ the crime of robbery w/ homicide. Hconvicted&sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed. When Tan why was found lying, he was still aable to answer laconically Kagui. Lt. Jacaria ordered his immediate arrest. Accused was arrested and had been bto the Lt., where he was asked of the bracelets w/c he voluntarily& w/o protest produced it; he was searchedopposition on his part, it was discovered that he also had the pocketbook containing P92 in bills, Tan whys identcard & a memorandum of amounts w/some Chinese characters & his pocket was a change amounting to P92.68.

Whether or not the search & seizure w/o the corresponding warrant was constitutional?


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The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed; except that part containing a pronouncement in favor oMindanao Rice Industrial Company & it is ordered that the articles be delivered to the latters heirs, w/costs agaappellant.

This is so because under the law, members of Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the mupolice& of chartered cities even of townships may make arrests w/o judicial warrant, not only when a crime is comor about to be committed in their presence but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspecone has been committed &that it was committed by the person arrested by them. In the case at bar, almada, a Gwitness testified that the deceased before he died was able to utter kagui as his aggressor &that on the mornisaw the appellant w/ a club in his hand; said club was found near the place where Tan was wounded. In the absenan explanation of how 1 come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded& treacherously kimust necessarily be considered the author of the aggression& death of said person& of robbery committed on himconstitutional precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches& seizures w/o judicial warrant, buthose that are unreasonable.

Mariano Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from justice of the peace of Tarlac, awarrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria for cbooks, lists, chits, receipts, documents &other papers relating to her activities as usurer. The search warrant was upon affidavit. Almeda accompanied w/ the captain of Phil. Constabulary went to the office of the petitioner inafter showing the search warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper &w/o the presence of the petitioner who wconfined @ the time, proceeded w/ the execution. On several occasions, petitioner demanded from the respondenUsury Board the return of the documents seized.

1. WON there has been waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches& se2. WON the warrant was in conformity w/ the law?

The writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant is hereby declared void& of no effect; the orders of Oc& Jan.3,38 of respondent judge are set aside &respondents are hereby ordered to return& restore to the petitionthe properties, documents, papers &effects illegally seized from her, w/in 48 hrs. from the time this decision bfinal. Without costs.

The waiver may be either express or implied. In the case @ bar, there has been a waiver by implication. It issettled that to constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear 1st that the right exists; 2nd, that the perinvolved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; lastly, that said person had an

intention to relinquish the right. It is true that the petitioner did not object when the search was made because shesick &was not present when the warrant was served upon. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreassearches& seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invadone who is expressly authorized to do so in his/her behalf.

The warrant was unconstitutional because for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cauthe probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any other person In the cbar, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. Hence, the swarrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac.


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On April 22, 1970, Almario Salta was charged by the PNB before the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan for viola# 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Sometime in 1970, Salta filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan against PatrocinRenato Tayag and others.

After conducting an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan dismissed both cases on the ground that trefused to submit documents considered by the fiscal as material.

The PNB moved that the dismissal be reconsidered. The DOJ assigned District State Prosecutor Kliatchko to reinthe case against Salta. Salta, likewise appealed the order of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan which dismissed tProsecutor Kliatchko reinvestigated both complaints.

Prosecutor Kliatchko conducted hearings after which: a) a prima facie case was found in I.S. No. 3934 and an info

was filed against Salta and b) the case against Dayrit, et alwas "with the approval of the Department of Judismissed. While CCC-V-668 was pending trial before Judge Constante A. Ancheta, Salta filed a complainPatrocinio Dayrit, et.al for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The complaint had been dismissed by both the Provinand District State Prosecutor Kliatchko.

The PNB charged Salta before the Provincial Fiscal in Pampanga for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Act comSalta in the PNB Guagua Branch. After an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga found a prima fagainst Salta and filed the corresponding information with the Circuit Criminal Court. In 1973, Judge Ancheta iorder ruling that "unless otherwise restrained by higher courts, the requisite preliminary investigation thereon oncomplaint shall be conducted on January 24 and 25, 1973." Judge Ancheta further held that "until such time whpreliminary investigation shall have been terminated, the hearings on the merits of the criminal case No. CCC-V

hereby suspended."whether or not Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over Salta's com

against petitioner Dayrit in G.R. No. L-42973 and Renato Tayag, the respondent in G.R. No. L-41395.

Ruling: the petition in G.R. No. L-42973 is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of AppealsREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of Judge Ancheta dated March 22, 1974 is likewise SET ASIDE. TG.R. No. L-41395 is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Judges of Circuit Criminal Courts may conduct preliminary investigations in cases they will later try. The given to regular Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations is likewise conferred on CircuitCourts. However, it is clear that even as said courts may have such authority, they must concentrate on hearindeciding criminal cases filed before them instead of discharging a function that could very well be handledprovincial or city fiscal. Section 1, Rule 112 of the present Rules of Court states that it is conducted for the purdetermining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the cobeen committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The preliminvestigation proper is, therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the execu

The preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which only a judge could conduct subjectqualification in the 1973 Bill of Rights, is usually integrated with the preliminary investigation proper when conducourt.


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The respondent Judge conducted the questioned preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 13, Rule 112 Revised Rules of Court, SEC. 13. that upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance w/o preliminary examination& investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge shall either refer the complaint to the juthe peace for preliminary examination& investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and invesimultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding petitions and should find reasonable ground to believe tdefendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest &refer the case to the fiscal fofiling of the corresponding information.

Under these circumstances, respondent Judge Ancheta had no authority to conduct another preliminary investagainst Dayrit and Tayag. Relative to Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, it is stated thereby with clarity that the complaints over which a judge of a court of first instance may conduct preliminary examinatinvestigation are those 'filed directly' before it, 'without previous preliminary examination and investigation condthe fiscal.

- On the evening of 13 January 1964, 14-year-old Pamela Mason left her home in Manchester, New Hampshire. Sreceived a call from a man in need of a babysitter. Eight days later, her body was found many miles away by the a north-south highway. The police immediately began a large-scale investigation into the murder. Police inquiriethe questioning of Edward Coolidge. He was cooperative throughout the entire process. When asked if he ownguns he responded that he did. He agreed to participate in a polygraph test the following Sunday. Police conCoolidge the following Sunday and asked him to come to the police station where he would be taken to ConcorHampshire for the lie-detector test. That evening, as Mrs. Coolidge waited with her mother-in-law for her husreturn, two plainclothes policemen called on the Coolidge residence. These officers were not even aware that Chad readily provided three guns for inspection to the previous officers. The plainclothes policemen stated thhusband was in "serious trouble" and would not be returning home that night. Coolidge was being held in jail ovfor an unrelated charge; during the polygraph test he had confessed to stealing money from his employer. Theyasked the mother-in-law to leave and began questioning Mrs. Coolidge. At one point during the questioning theto see Coolidge's guns and the clothes that Mrs. Coolidge believed her husband had been wearing on the niPamela Mason's disappearance.

- It was decided that the murder charge, along with a search of his residence and two cars, would provide enevidence to support the arrest of Coolidge. The chief of the Manchester police applied, under oath, for arresearch warrants, which were subsequently signed and issued by the attorney general himself--in the role of

justice of the peace.

WON the seizure & subsequent search of Coolidges automobile is constitutional.

No, it is unconstitutional. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a ruledecided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." The state of New Hamdeveloped three theories in an attempt to explain the warrant's validity. The first theory stated that the searchseizure of Coolidge's automobile were "incident" to the arrest. In order for this to have been the case, it woulbeen necessary for Coolidge to be in possession or control of the vehicle. The second theory postulated by thmaintained that probable cause allowed for a warrantless search of an automobile. It was deemed that this "automexception" was not applicable in this case. Coolidge was arrested without resistance in his own house; the car remuntouched throughout this event, as he made no attempt to escape. The state's final theory relied on the Pontibeing an "instrumentality of the crime" that could be seized because it was in plain view. However, an item of evdiscovered in plain view could not be considered as such unless it was discovered while the search was in progrethe discovery itself must be considered inadvertent. The Supreme Court rightly believed that the police had a suamountof time in which to obtain a valid warrant as the description and the location of the Pontiac were kno


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advance of the arrest. None of these theories validated the warrant provided by the state attorney general; nor did justify a warrantless search.

and vs.

Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which hseized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila gthus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.

- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectiveSrta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.

: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs law

been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be qumoved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant cosecured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutioeffected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) wcommitted, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably belihave committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escapedconfinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or whitransferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels wcaught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension wiwarrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipmedynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

vs.

- Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN Ryear later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that afterJikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

- On June 15, 1962, de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the ProCommander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take cof the motor launch. Delfin Lim pleaded with Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.

- On September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to retseized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same subject of a criminal offense.

- All efforts to recover the motor launch is going to nothing, plaintiffs a complaint for damages against defalleging that Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hthe motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knewell that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property.

: WON Fiscal de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warsearch and seizure even if the same was admittedly thecorpus delicti of the crime.

NO. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to entpremises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure.Under the old Constitution, the powto issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure camade without a proper warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rulrecognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant.


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Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, 2 principles are made clear, namely: (1)the seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in issuing a search warrant the jalone determines whether or not there is a probable cause. The fact that a thing is acorpus delicti of a crime does no

justify its seizure without a warrant.

vs.

- Aminnudin claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of transporting marijuana. He was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding whliked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articleconfiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as maleaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.Later, the information wamended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and liinvestigated. According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.He was identified by nam

Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended frogangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying.

found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.WON the marijuana allegedly found in his possession is inadmissible in evidence arrested because searched without warrant

Yes [Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution]. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search waissued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the avermethe government, the accused-appellant was not caughtin flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had jubeen committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnessclear that they had at least 2 days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminwho was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was procause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with th

The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting teamdetermined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In the case at bar, the accused-appewas not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he

just done so.

vs.

- Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. In the eof 7 May 1989, he left for Baguio City.

- In the morning May 11, Capt. Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) sCamp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain P

for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoinsaid area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana andprohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same moa Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

- In the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the buannounced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) Nofficers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole forriding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

- During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedts waist. Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedtbe a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedts passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to cthe officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned ou


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a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapbrown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned ocontain hashish a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But bhe alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get 2 traveling bags from the luggage carrier.

- Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Fthe teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

- Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet foinvestigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also chashish.

WON the search of the Malmstedts personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search wand, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evagainst him.

It was LEGAL and VALID. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a privatunder the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is accommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and hpersonal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the personarrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgm

temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinemanother. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually

committed by the accused and he was caught inflagrante delicto . Thus, the search made upon his personal effects fasquarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to aarrest. Moreover, theres an existence of a probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastiowned by the accused,or where the accused was acting suspiciously,and attempted to flee.

vs.

- Peter Lo, together with Lim Cheng Huatalias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation oDangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Only Peter Lo and Lim Cheng Huat were convicted.- In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Ph

Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importaillegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information receproject codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created to bust the suspected syndicate. As part of the operatrecruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out. One of those recruited was ReyTia. The latter offered his services to Lim as his ompanion for his business nips abroad. In the course of their min China, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China inLim. As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suscriminal syndicate.

- Tia and Peter went to Guangzhou. They went to a local store where Peter purchased 6 tin cans of tea. Tia sawpaper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned tohotel. Peter kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to Peter's room to talk to him. Uentering, he saw two other men with Peter. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substancepiece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Peter joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted burning substance. Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed thcargo consisted of Chinese drugs.

- When the 2 arrived in the Phil., the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by Peter and Tia and cut ipath forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the bagcompartment. 3 pcs. of luggage were retrieved. They requested from the suspects permission to search their lug


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A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag of Peter. During the investigation, a total of 56 paper teawith white crystalline powder were found and tested and was found out that it was metamphetamine.

WON the warrantless search and seizure made against is illegalThe search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant, is not an absolute rule. There are at least 3

recognized exceptions: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2]a search of a moving vehicle , and [3] seizure oevidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regmoving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accu

warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant bthe vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authoritie

reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the coThe belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, ofappellant was touted to be a member.

vs.

- Theres saturation drives conducted in 12 places in Metro Manila. The petitioners claim that the saturation

follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and munits without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes wbarangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila.

2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their hshouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within to comof their respective residences.

3. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their monvaluables have disappeared after the said operations.

4. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the sphauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are interrogated and 'verified.' T

arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions thaauthorize warrantless arrest.WON the police act is illegal, that theres no need to secure search warrants or warrants of arrest befor

houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested .: Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat

enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion whaving to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements partibecause of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddledcommunities where the "drives" were conducted.

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or cr

activity similar to that of the attemptedcoup d' etats. There appears to have been

. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could nachieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.

vs.:

- Evelyn Garcia y Delima was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling and dwithout authority of law 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. The evidence adduced by the prosecution establishsometime before 5 April 1991, the office of the NARCOM based in Cebu City received a report from an informaccused, a resident of Lorega St., Cebu City, was engaged in the sale of marijuana. Acting upon this informatio


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Esa Hassan, commanding officer of the said officer, instructed Sgt. Basilio Sarong to conduct a surveillance on5 April 1991, Sgt. Sarong, accompanied by the informer, proceeded to the slum area of Lorega and upon thereat, positioned himself at the house of the informer's friend from where he had a clear view of her hanPeeping through a window, Sgt. Sarong saw her selling marijuana to certain persons. He then reported to Maj. Hher illegal activity.

- On 10 April 1991, Sgt. Sarong conducted another surveillance on the accused for the purpose of preparing forbust operation. His surveillance yielded a positive result, which he immediately reported to Maj. Hassan wh

formed a buy-bust team.- On 12 April 1991 at around 12:30 p.m., the members of the team proceeded to Lorega Street. Sgt. Sarongdirectly to the hangout of the accused while his companions strategically posted themselves in a place where themonitor Sgt. Sarong's movements. When he entered the hangout, the accused approached and asked him if he wto buy marijuana to which he answered yes. He gave her the marked P20.00 bill. She told him to wait for a whthen left. When she came back, she delivered to him fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He opened one handcigarette and smelled it. After ascertaining that it was indeed marij