competing urban agendas in south africa

C O M P E T I N G U R B A N A G E N D A S IN S O U T H AFRICA

RICHARD TOMLINSON

A c o m m o n percept ion of the South African economy is that it is relatively prosperous and that now, wi th democracy pending , the country will enjoy a bright future. This is not the reality. Reflective of an economy which has been declining in per capita terms for over a decade, South Africa was recently reclassified by the World Bank f rom an u pp e r middle - income to a lower middle- income country. Symptomat ic of the decline is that formal black un- e m p l o y m e n t now exceeds 40 per cent. About a half the black popula t ion , three-quarters of the country 's total, live in poverty. This poverty, moreover , is rendered all the more bitter by the fact that South Africa is d is t inguished by an exceptionally h igh level of inequality.

Increasingly, these problems are u rban problems. The level of urbanisat ion of the country 's races are: Asian - 91 per cent, black - 50 per cent, ' coloured ' 81 per cent, and whi te - 89 per cent. South Africa is experiencing the urbanisation of a low-income popula t ion , the majori ty of w h o m can afford to pay neither for formal hous ing nor for u rban services as the reader migh t conceive of them.

However , the issues are not solely one of economic decline and material hardship, for they are closely in te r twined wi th the current violence in South Africa. Thousands of blacks have d ied due to 'black on black' violence. This is common ly presented as inspired by r ight-wing vigilantes or par t of the struggle be tween the ANC and Inkatha, or occasionally also as par t of a struggle be tween ANC and AZAPO or PAC. The reality, of course, is more complex and the struggle over u rban resources - over issues such as migran t worker hostels or control of the few water s tandpipes in the area - exacerbates other divides. The result is that u rban policy is of great economic, political and humani ta r ian moment .

WHOSE URBAN POLICY?

It is natural that there should be alternative perspect ives on urban policy. It is probably correct to discern three perspectives, which are men t ioned briefly, but the aim is to move quickly to:

COMPETING URBAN AGENDAS IN SOUTH AFRICA 93

CI the fundamental divide between the style and policies of the World Bank and associated institutions in South Africa, and local urban social movements - the civics; and

~1 whether the civics can present a viable alternative.

The present government is the least relevant group, if only because its longev- ity is circumscribed, and one looks to the ANC for guidance. The government has abandoned its earlier restrictions on black urbanisation and is increasing its expenditure on engineering and social services in areas formerly designated for black occupation. It has also introduced a capital subsidy to enhance the supply of serviced sites. However , the major feature of the government 's policy orientation is that it has sought refuge in market forces. The outcome is somewhat disingenuous since, while there are now no legal prohibitions to residential integration, few blacks can afford to 'move in'. The notion 'move in' arises from the form of the 'apartheid city', which is akin to a doughnut in that the highest population densities occur 20 to 30 kilometres out. This is where, in the past, blacks with urban rights were forced to live and also where there is a notable absence of jobs and consumer and social services. Now, not through coercion but because land is cheaper further out, and because that is where there are fewer obstacles to informal settlements, adherence to the market serves to reinforce the form of the apartheid city.

The reform group, which includes the Urban Foundation, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Independent Development Trust, overlap with both the government and the ANC. On the one hand, they serve the government as a source of policy advice and certain institutions within the group assist the government to implement its partial reforms. On the other hand, these groups also serve as a policy forum for the ANC and, in particular, the civics.

The reform group also speaks in favour of market forces, but is more conscious of the need for interventions to address past inequities. The Devel- opment Bank and the Urban Foundation probably have the best available data and, by this fact alone, have positions of influence. The Urban Foundation, in addition, has been especially active in evaluating alternative policies. Through employing some of the country's most talented people and engaging in comparative work, the Foundation has a well articulated policy repertoire (which is evident in its Urban Debate 2010 series). It is especially notable that the three organisations have an intellectual rapport wi th the World Bank, which in approach and philosophy is a part of this group. The Bank will probably adopt the lead since, while its intellectual resources and comparative experience are daunting to critics, they are convincing to those similarly inclined. The Bank's urban agenda is thus of considerable significance.

The third group consists of the ANC, unions, civics (urban social movements) and left- leaning service organisat ions which p rov ide technical assistance and policy advice to the preceding bodies. The ANC does not really have an urban policy. The Freedom Charter, to which it adheres declares:

94 URBAN FORUM 3:1, 1992

THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY AND COMFORT!

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;

Unused housing space to be made available to the people; Rent and prices shall be lowered,. . . Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have

transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;

However these represent long-term goals without guidance regarding how they might be achieved. It is in the nature of the ANC's being a movement , not a political party, that it is best viewed as still debating the issues and conside- ring its options. The ANC debates options both with allies from its political past and with the government, the Urban Foundation, the Development Bank, and the World Bank. When the next government, presumably with the ANC playing a leading role, comes to power, it will be desperately short of resources and in urgent need of visible projects. Clearly, there is potential for the ANC to be swayed by those with both good arguments and substantial resources.

The last point is critical. This paper is premised on the belief that (i) the policy recommendations of the World Bank and the reform group will have considerable similarities, (ii) that the next government will be significantly influenced by both their intellectual dexterity and their resources, and (iii) that civics and service organisations will not be influenced to the same extent.

There are three reasons for asserting the relative independence of the civics. First, the World Bank, and indeed to a large degree also the domestic institutions, presently engage in discourse with numerous institutions, but this is largely due to the absence of a legitimate central government. Ordinarily, the World Bank's style is to relate directly with central governments and, even though it may wish to engage others in policy debate, its ability to do so is circumscribed by the host government. Will South Africa's future central government happily consider what may often be dissenting views?

Second, the civics have engaged in a long fight to get to where they are, namely as participants in numerous local initiatives in cities around the country which are intended to rationalise the racial borders of the apartheid city, set policy in respect of the provision of housing and services, and promote economic development. Other participants in these initiatives include the private sector, political parties, major utility companies, local authorities. In effect, the civics have achieved a position of considerable prominence and their influence will suffer if these initiatives wane. If urban policy is directed from the centre, and more especially if it is influenced by the current World Bank urban policy agenda, then these local initiatives may well decline in significance.

Third, if divisions such as those ment ioned do surface, they will exacerbate existing tensions between the ANC and the civics, and these tensions will likewise take the form of a struggle for intellectual hegemony between service organisations and, principally, the World Bank.


The other side of this coin is the feeling among many in the civics that they will be necessary under a majority government in order to ensure both that decision-making is democratic and that bureaucracies remain accessible to the masses. According to Pat Lephunya of the National Civic Association, this feeling is informed by the experience elsewhere in Africa where liberation movements all too quickly became undemocrat ic governments. The Associ- ation brings together between 600 and 700 civics which are commonly united by regional federal structures. The Association specifically rejects the possibility of civics becoming branches of the ANC. The goal is that they should be autonomous, mass-based structures.

THE W O R L D B A N K ' S U R B A N P O L I C Y

The purpose of the World Bank urban missions to South Africa had been to prepare the Bank for its eventual involvement in South Africa. Formal relations with central government were intended to begin when the country acquired a majority government. In the interim the Bank missions had been meeting numerous influential organisations and also with technical experts in order to gain a sense of local perceptions of policy and project priorities, and also to set up structures which would guide research and build consensus a round those policies. The process of Bank participation has since been speeded up: Lewis Preston, in discussion with Nelson Mandela, gave the assurance that the Bank would become engaged as soon as South Africa had an acceptable government and that money would flow about 18 months thereafter. Reportedly Mandela was horrified by the delay and the Bank is now hurrying the process of project selection.

There is suspicion among progressive groups in South Africa that the Bank has its own urban agenda. Indeed, they only have to look so far as the Bank's Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s (1991) and its Urban Management Program, under taken wi th the UNDP and the UNCHS (Habitat), through which it is investigating how national and local government might implement the new agenda.

Bank staff protest that there is no fixed 'World Bank view' and that there is flexibility and latitude depending on the context. Two examples are pertinent. The first is that whereas the Bank wou ld ordinarily favour a leading role for the private sector, in order to implement projects as rapidly as possible, the Bank's urban mission to South Africa desires to exploit the capacity of the (soon to become integrated) white local authorities. The second is that the Bank proposes the formation of Technical Committees, with wide representation including that of the civics, to guide research on urban development problems and to formulate policies.

One should, I believe, concede the point that there is no fixed v iew and that the Bank prefers to foster local consensus and ownership, but then not forget that the Bank is orientated to free markets, the removal of price controls, and


the removal of state ownership (and hence to privatisation). None the less, one should also not hold that the contributions of the Bank and like-minded institutions in South Africa are in any sense 'bad'. Comparative material and an understanding of what 'has worked' elsewhere should inform domestic policy. In this respect, the Bank urban missions identified urban problems which were already known to liberal and leftist urban scholars, but the Bank's comparative insight helped define the problems more clearly and had the effect of giving them a wide hearing and also legitimacy among establishment figures.

Conversely, the Bank's preliminary discussion regarding potential remedies are often less well known among liberals and leftists, for they are often unfamiliar with comparative material, frequently make do with lazy assump- tions that South Africa is unique, or simply are predisposed to believe that recommendations emanating from the World Bank must inevitably reflect not 'what works', but 'what works in the interests of capital'.

It appears that offers of participation with the Bank in, say, Technical Committees, are being treated with suspicion by, in particular, civics and service organisations. They have long endured the vicissitudes of South African politics where the appearance of co-optation can be extremely damaging. In addition, the service organisations have rather tended to monopolise the credibility stakes among civics and the ANC when it comes to technical assessments of urban problems, and there may be an element of 'turfism'. For them, exceptionally difficult strategic choices are at hand, for while they might well develop profound contrary analyses of South Africa's urban problems, they do not have the material resources and so do not have the Bank's influence.

THE N E W A G E N D A

The World Bank is changing the urban agenda away from 'neighbourhood interventions' like site and service shelter schemes in favour of "city-wide policy reform, institutional development, and priority investments' which serve 'broader objectives of economic development and macroeconomic performance'. With an eye on the macroeconomic impact of urban intervention, the Bank emphasises the promotion of urban productivity, the relief of urban poverty, the creation of environmentally sustainable urban environments, and related urban research. The first two issues are central. The mission's addi- tional use of research to build consensus and promote local ownership is appealing, but one wonders whether such participatory structures will be sustained when the Bank is dealing with a majority government.

With respect to urban productivity, the Bank stresses:

C3 Strengthening the management of urban infrastructure...


[] Improving the city-wide regulatory framework to improve market efficiency and to enhance the private sector's provision of shelter and infrastructure.

CI Improving the financial and technical capacity of municipal institutions through more effective division of resources and responsibilities between central and local governments.

[] Strengthening financial services for urban development.

With regard to urban poverty, the Bank differentiates between managing the economic and social aspects of poverty and creating a safety net for the "ultra-poor'.

The economic dimension involves:

[] Increasing the demand for the labour of the poor through government policies to encourage labour-intensive productive activities.

[] Alleviating the structural constraints inhibiting the productivity and growth of the informal sector...

El Increasing the labour productivity of the poor by reducing constraints preventing-labour force participation...

The social dimension entails:

[] Expenditure for human-resource development . . .

[3 Increasing the access of the poor to infrastructure and housing. . .

rn Supporting... community initiatives and local, non governmental organisations.

Targeting safety-net assistance to the ultra-poor comprises food assistance, health care, employment, and other measures to moderate a decline in income. The presumed context is one of short-term economic setbacks arising due to, say, structural adjustment programmes.

We should note that there is no ment ion of a proactive economic role for local initiatives, as is anticipated in South Africa, and also that community organisations are only considered in relation to the social dimensions of the relief of poverty.

Comparison with the Urban Missions to South Africa

As a result of apartheid, the Bank's mission found a situation rife with problems in South Africa. It refers to 'Deficient service provision, deteriorating infrastructure ... and distorted spatial settlement patterns and distribution of economic functions within the urban areas [that] constrained the productivity


of the urban economy and its ability to generate increasing incomes, employment and services for the growing number of urban poor. ' The attempt to remedy the form of the apartheid city has become a central focus of the Bank's urban mission.

The Bank also bemoans South Africa's over-regulated urban markets and calls for regulatory reform at both the national and local levels which will increase the supply of, and lower the cost of housing, finance, infrastructure and developable land, and increase business opportunities. It should be remembered that the country has long endured prohibitions on black entre- preneurship, deliberate constraints on the supply of land for black housing and for industry (in order to restrain employment creation in the cities), government control of the black housing market, and so on, all of which has been regulated in minute detail.

In the case of the regulatory framework, however, when the Bank speaks to the authorities of reforms in the system, increasing market efficiency, and privatisation, it is very much a case of preaching to the converted. Regulatory reform, which in many instances is intended to change the respective roles of the public and private sectors and to enhance informal sector opportunities, is being implemented. Importantly, though, these reforms are encountering serious opposition from the ANC which now justly claims that the government should no longer undertake unilateral change, and from unions who fear that the privatisation of municipal infrastructure and services will lead to job losses.

On the positive side, the Bank welcomes the administrative and financial capacity of the white local authorities and is sanguine that 'for most urban areas there appears to be a capacity for establishing viable, self-sufficient, self- financing local government on a sustainable basis, through integrating African and white cities.., without dependence on fiscal transfers from the centre.' The Bank also anticipates that unified local governments will be technically capable of delivering services.

However, one gets the feeling that the Bank rather too quickly blames it all on apartheid and too easily envisages the future rearrangement. South Africa is, after all, a labour surplus middle-income country with a GNP per capita of $2 470 (1989) and limited technical and financial resources. The Bank's tend- ency to blame it on apartheid is probably responsible for the fact that despite the high proportion of the population living in poverty, the Bank prefers to focus on inequality. It might be objected that a decline in poverty requires a decline in inequality. The point is granted, but when the wealthy are few, the economy is declining, and the 'ultra-poor' will be with us for generations to come, one cannot but wonder whether the shift in focus is a function of good politics.

When the Bank examines what can be done at the level of the cities to alleviate poverty, it points to the obstacles faced by small-scale entrepreneurs in gaining access to capital, infrastructure and markets. Is the informal sector an alternative? Estimates of the size of the informal sector in South Africa include 6,5 per cent, 20 per cent, 30 per cent, and 40 per cent of the GDP, with


the two extremes being the most carefully calculated[ My guess is that the informal sector contributes 6 to 7 per cent of GDP and offers little alternative for the urban poor.

As noted, it is in reference to the social dimensions of urban poverty that we find reference to community groups. This represents both a rather benign view and an unambit ious stance. In the first instance, civics in South Africa have a decidedly more radical conception of their role as advocacy organisations. In the second, America's communi ty development corporations (CDCs), as an example of that into which civics could evolve, often play a role in employment creation and influencing a city's economic strategy. It is no wonder that civics should promote urban policies which more directly serve their constituents and should themselves wish to intervene as development agents. What can civics, in the form of local initiatives, hope to do in order to improve the situation?

DOES A M E R I C A N EXPERIENCE L E N D THE CIVICS CREDIBILITY?

Local development in South Africa has been driven from the centre, from Pretoria in the case of the public sector and from Johannesburg in the case of the private sector. There is no tradition of locally initiated economic development based on collaborative planning amongst an area's prominent economic and political actors. It is crucial for the civics that they establish whether these efforts are viable and whether they should participate in the newly established local coalitions, and also whether they should act as advocacy organisations or as CDCs. Indeed, it is the American experience wi th local development planning which informs the issue of whether the civics are credible in offering alternative development scenarios.

In America local development planning is intended to facilitate economic growth and employment creation within an urban area, and to contribute to its tax base. Many would add that it is also intended to enhance a communi ty ' s ability to assume greater control over its economic destiny. Local development planning is under taken by city and state governments, the private sector, and by communi ty organisations. (Unions may become involved when planning occurs at a metropolitan and regional scale and when the focus is on the targeting of specific economic sectors.)

Public sector efforts are often equated wi th "smoke stack chasing', but this is the "traditional approach'. The assumption here is that growth is st imulated through capital relocation or decline prevented through capital retention. The result is competition among cities and states (and nations) for investment from established, potentially mobile industries. The competition takes the form of low taxes or tax abatements, cheap land, and measures such as low-interest loans or loan guarantees which lower the cost of capital. Once the concessions are widely available, they fail to distinguish one location from another. More- over, they have failed to slow capital flight and job losses.


The more common approach nowadays casts the city in an entrepreneurial role. The origins of this approach lie in the structural transformation experienced by America's cities since the 1970s, and also in declining federal aid to the cities. This is a proactive approach in that the local government attempts to facilitate new business formation and small business expansion in the given jurisdiction. It either avoids competition with the private sector and focuses on investment opportunities that the private sector may either have over- looked or be reluctant to pursue, including opportunities in new markets, products, and industries; or works in partnership with the private sector on selected projects.

Enterprises are selected for assistance through a strategic plan undertaken with the private sector. The common focus is small, high technology, export- orientated firms. The policies employed to assist these firms include low-interest finance or the government taking an equity position in high-risk enterprises; venture capital programmes; university research parks (although these are extremely popular and seldom successful); and export promotion.

The entrepreneurial approach escapes the criticism directed at the traditional approach, that it does not contribute to net employment creation, but the entrepreneurial approach does not reach the urban poor, except indirectly via employment multipliers.

In a few cities such as Chicago under Mayor Washington there has been impatience with the type of local development planning which tries to cajole business with subsidies of one sort or another and hoped for 'trickle down' benefits for the city's poor. Instead, progressive planning attempts to serve low-income neighbourhoods more directly. Progressive planners have four characteristics. They:

[] are willing to question whether market-determined outcomes are necessar- ily better than distributional judgements made by government,

[] are prepared to challenge property rights, to impose rent controls, to support cooperative housing, and to assume responsibility for or to regulate the supply of services,

El use participatory planning as a vehicle for deciding on the city's future and how the city's resources should be allocated, and

[3 supplement contact with the council and the direction of the bureaucracy with contacts with community organisations.

The policies they favour include: indigenous development, but in this case the reference is to businesses owned by minorities and women; procurement set aside for minority owned businesses; housing subsidies and alternative forms of housing supply; and equality in the supply of municipal services to high- and low-income areas.

Progressive administrations seem quite possible in South Africa. However, the difference between lip service to a progressive agenda and the attempt to

COMPETING U R B A N A G E N D A S IN SOUTH AFRICA 101

deliver to low-income communities will probably depend on organisation among the poor. My saying this is premised on the increasing disaggregation of interests among blacks. Unity in opposition to apartheid is easy. The articulation of a party line and the targeting of constituencies is more difficult. In most societies the urban poor are seldom viewed as an important consti- tuency.

In respect of the private sector, in most cities companies and private sector development organisations foster public-private partnerships either for the purpose of undertaking individual projects or for helping to influence or occasionally even formulate the city's developmentstrategy. Most partnerships take the form of offshoots of municipal government linked to private or not-for-profit firms such as CDCs. Public controls occur through elected officials, but these are generally limited to instances when public funds are allocated. Thus, partnerships are generally insulated from day-to-day over- sight. The actual role of the participants varies according to who initiates the project and how much public intervention is required for the project to be implemented. The fact that government is to some degree relying on private resources means that partnerships limit the scope of action of public agencies. Indeed, from the point of view of the government officials who actually manage public-private partnerships, their purpose largely coincides with the objectives of business. Correspondingly, the requirements for citizen participation are negatively affected. This is evident in the fact that less than 10 per cent of cities emphasise directing economic benefits to poorer neighbourhoods.

Public-private partnerships have produced a turnaround in a number of cities. The partnerships have been synergetic because they combine government powers with private sector flexibility. A turnaround means that they improved their performance relative to their regions and reversed the net loss of jobs. The reversal is attributed to capable local leadership and the willing- ness of government and the private sector to co-operate; and also to the ability of that leadership to identify a growth strategy which gives a city specific advantages.

The negative side to partnerships results from the fact that partnerships are inherently unequal. They exclude participation and democratic processes and bias a city's development strategy in favour of specific interest groups. The exception to this rule occurs when communities are well organised, for then they are often included in decision-making processes, win favourable budge- tary allocations for their neighbourhoods, and obtain resources for development projects.

In respect of community organisations, they seldom define their interests as exclusively economic rather than social in character. In addition, many community organisations vacillate between whether to operate as advocacy organisations, which have a confrontational style, and community development organisations, which are collaborative and usually operate as partners with government and the private sector.

The civics have historically been advocacy organisations, but they are


beginning to straddle both roles due to their participation in the local initiatives referred to earlier. A few civics wish to start their own enterprises, for example, to construct housing. The American experience with the latter is that CDCs which started their own enterprises generally failed, with the notable exception of the rehabilitation of run down property in low-income neighbourhoods. The corporations now play more of a facilitating role, for example, seeking capital for neighbourhood enterprises, establishing business incubators, and providing training.

The limitations of the American experience with development corporations suggests that, for the time being, the 'comparative advantage' of civics is that of an advocacy organisation. The significance of this conclusion lies in the nature of the country's future economy and the role of government therein. While the future government will no doubt be guided by a desire to promote redistribution between blacks and whites, the probable concessions made during negotiations will limit the extent of redistribution; and will probably not reach down to the urban poor.

Inevitably, the next government will be hostage to those who are well organised - petty bourgeois groups, the unions and, of course, the private sector. In this light the civics are critical if they become a force which advances the needs of the poor.

C O N C L U S I O N

The issue is whether civics, service organisations, and progressive local administrations can use the American experience of local development planning to advance a credible, alternative urban agenda.

Traditional planning has little to recommend it. Traditional incentives may, at the margin, affect the distribution of employment, but they do not promote employment creation and they serve to distribute resources from communities to businesses.

Proactive engagement is encapsulated in the entrepreneurial and progressive approaches. The two approaches lead down different roads and the choice between them is dictated less by clarity of perspective than by political stance. The entrepreneurial approach is, in a sense, the more modern approach in that it represents the attempt to restructure urban economies in response to global competition. In a number of cities public-private partnerships, embrac- ing governmental powers, private flexibility, and capable leadership, have enhanced growth and diversification.

Partnerships in South Africa assume a different form since the membership is much more inclusive of a city's economic and political organisations. In the form of coalitions engaging in development planning they are especially desirable since they include civics and thus are more likely to promote fair outcomes.

The progressive approach lingers on from the 1960s with a focus on

COMPETING U R B A N A G E N D A S IN SOUTH AFRICA 103

minorities and the victims of discrimination. The incorporation of these groups was the priority at the time, but gave way to economic development due to the later economic decline. None the less, the progressive approach is important for its persistent emphasis on 'development for whom? ' Progressives are t remendously important in articulating how government can efficiently address the needs of the poor.

In respect of the civics, their decision is whether to operate as advocacy organisations or as CDCs; and then whether , if they prefer the CDC model, they should operate enterprises. Advocacy organisations are often rather successful in influencing the allocation of resources to low-income neighbourhoods. An Amer ican example is communi ty organisat ion against bank redlining which led to the Communi ty Reinvestment Act and released billions of dollars in low-income housing finance. In my view there are strong arguments for an advocacy role when the comparison is with a CDC. This is because the goal of organising is to influence the actions of government bodies, utility companies, and private companies. The resources which they might potentially allocate to a communi ty so exceed those which a civic can ordinarily expect to obtain for a few small development projects that the balance will often weigh in favour of mass action.

However, civics might well consider creating a separate structure so that they can have it both ways. On the one hand, civics can retain their organising and adversarial role. On the other hand, a number of civics can create an arms- length institution which they control, and which engages in collaborative development projects with government and the private sector. The formation of such an institution will also serve the important function of providing jobs to civic leaders and thereby enable them to resist the allure of jobs in government. In addit ion, arms-length communi ty control of the deve lopment institution will enable the communit ies to avoid a common problem in America. This occurs when professionalisation occurs and technical staff come to dominate, organising capacity declines and one finds a CDC in search of a community!

It is another thing, however, to argue that the amalgamated CDC should operate as an enterprise rather than as a facilitating development agency. If American CDCs, with superior financial and technical resources, failed in the operation of enterprises, are we to believe that the comparative advantage of civics is as entrepreneurs?

Will the future majority government support the civics when, in effect, they may be a thorn in its side? Perhaps we should be informed by the experience of Madrid 's Citizen Movement which collapsed with the advent of democracy. Apparently the Movement could not withstand the 'contradiction' between the movement 's political origins, its desire for autonomy, and its unwill ingness to submit to the rules of institutional politics. The following recommendat ions are offered in the hope that the same will not happen to the civics.

There are two arguments for local economic development planning in South Africa. First, in Western Europe and to some extent also in North America,


urban coalitions have sometimes facilitated the reversal of employment decline, more often reduced the rate of decline relative to the region and comparable cities, and initiated new and more diversified growth paths. A poorly co-ordinated array of individual programmes can never suffice, but strategic direction encompassing a long term, co-ordinated investment and marketing strategy can succeed. Second, the process of development planning conveys a better unders tanding of the problems and the resources available to deal with them. When this development p lanning is done in a manner that it brings together the major players, the affect is to build trust and to help repair the damage of apartheid.

It is unclear that the World Bank wou ld approve of local development planning as portrayed above. The Bank is responding to a different set of problems. That is, it is trying to enhance the economic contribution of urban areas and, to this end, it is trying to revive the financial and management capacity of local authorities. The Bank notes that low-income countries have seen a centralisation of power, control of public finance, technical capacity and determination of where investments should occur. The consequent failure of local institutions contributes to urban economic inefficiency. Hence the Bank calls for a redelimitation of responsibilities and access to resources, but does not include in its associated deliberations any reference to development planning.

With respect to South Africa, the Bank makes important points and it can potentially make a valuable contribution, for example, if its recommendat ions have the effect of reducing the cost of doing business through better services, lower tax burdens and the more efficient regulation of land markets. But there are also dangers in the Bank's role. First, as I have said, its intellectual prowess might well pre-empt alternative conceptions of the problem. South Africa has experienced attempts to monopolise the urban debate and it would be sad were the experience to be unintentionally repeated. Second, historically the Bank has dealt wi th central governments and, in part due to the desire of those governments, has tended to exclude other actors. One has to be alert to the possibility that this exclusive relationship will recur in South Africa. If one is correct in supposing that the civics have to organise around urban issues and influence policy for the country's urban poor to be well-served by urban policy, then this prospect offers them little solace.

N O T E S

Civics

South Africa's cities were riven with strife prior to 2 February 1990 and the unbanning of the ANC. The struggle centred on 'bread and butter ' issues - housing and transportation costs, and services; and broader political issues - the black local authori ty system, divided cities wi th unequal tax bases, and apartheid itself. The conflict was led by civic and

COMPETING U R B A N A G E N D A S IN S O U T H AFRICA 105

residents associations which, for the sake of convenience, I refer to as civics. (Civics are led by an unpa id voluntary leadership and their mem- bers retain considerable say in h o w they are run. The civics e m b o d y a radical c o n c e p t i o n of 'd i rect democracy , non-rac ia l i sm, economic equality, and 'people 's power ' . ' ) The conflict took the form, for example, of the refusal to pay for rents and services, the rejection of increased fares for t ransport services, consumer boycotts, and often violent opposi t ion to the black local authorities. The result was that even before De Klerk's reforms there were n u m e r o u s instances of local negotiat ions in tended to address these matters. The civics led the negotiat ions and since they formed par t of the United Democratic Front, a proxy for the ANC, they p rov ided an organizational base and contr ibuted mass action on behalf the ANC's nat ional political agenda.

Condi t ions have since changed. Civics are now cast as apolitical in the sense that they focus on 'civic' issues and seek suppor t f rom a town 's inhabitants regardless of their political persuasion. The na ture of the struggle has also assumed a different colouring - whereas previous ly the style was combative, n o w it is better characterized as the 'politics of development ' . Indeed, certain civics are a t tempt ing to assume the role of deve lopmen t agents and take responsibil i ty for the supply of shelter and bus transport .

This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the conference, 'South Africa: the political economy of transition' , organised by the Nitze School of Advanced Internat ional Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Wash ing ton DC, 10 and 11 April 1992. The paper was wri t ten while the author was a Guest Scholar at The Brookings Institution. The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not reflect on those of the institutions wi th which he is associated.

competing urban agendas in south africa

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