comparisonofcooperationmodesinatwo-periodclosed-loop...

Research ArticleComparison of Cooperation Modes in a Two-Period Closed-LoopSupply Chain System considering Green Manufacturing

Chunmei Ma

School of Economics and Management Chongqing Industry Polytechnic College 1000 Taoyuan Road Yu Bei DistrictChongqing 401120 China

Correspondence should be addressed to Chunmei Ma macmcqipceducn

Received 5 February 2020 Revised 20 March 2020 Accepted 13 April 2020 Published 22 May 2020

Academic Editor Francesco Zammori

Copyright copy 2020 Chunmei Ma ampis is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Licensewhich permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited

In order to improve the efficiency of collection and green manufacturing level in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system themanufacturer invests green manufacturing efforts in product design and production process and intends to cooperate with otherCLSC members to achieve excellent performance In a two-period CLSC system consisting of one manufacturer one retailer andone third-service provider a game-theoretical approach is adopted to compare the optimal decisions and profits of the three greenmanufacturing cooperationmodes namely the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer and third-service provider respectivelyand the noncooperation mode is a benchmark Moreover the impact of different cooperation modes on CLSC decision-making isanalyzed as well ampe results indicate that the influence of difference among cooperation modes on CLSC decision is significantand cooperation is always better than noncooperation From the perspective of consumers as well as recycling and profit althoughthe collection rate of used products is not the highest when the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer the price of product isthe lowest and the green property of product is the most obvious thus this is regarded as the suitable cooperation mode after acomprehensive analysis Besides a coordination mechanism is designed to solve the inefficiency caused by double marginali-zation Finally numerical examples are presented to intuitively observe the relationships between decisions and profits and theimpact of different parameters on them in the three modes and some management inspirations are proposed ultimately

1 Introduction

ampe development of technology contributes greatly to theprogress of human society consumersrsquo lifestyle has beenchanged due to a large number of high-tech commoditiessuch as automobiles household appliances computers andmobile phones Although these products will bring conve-nience and diversity to consumersrsquo various activities theyalso consume a lot of resources during the process ofproductionamperefore if the products cannot be fully reusedand processed properly after being scrapped it will causeserious environmental pollution and waste of resources [1]Taking the automotive industry as an example the total salesvolume of the worldrsquos major auto markets was approxi-mately 67939 million units in 2018 which implies an in-crease in the number of scrapped automobiles ampecomponents in scrapped automobiles contain hazardoussubstances such as plumbum mercury brominated flame

retardant and polyvinyl chloride plastics However theabandoned automobiles are not without merit they can beturned from waste into treasure if rational utilization isimplemented For example steel plastic rubber nonferrousmetals and other resources present in scrapped automobilesare extremely valuable Environmental and resource issueshave also received widespread attention from governmentsand societies around the world amperefore somemanufacturing enterprises actively implement the ExtendProducer Responsibility (EPR) and part of the governmentstake EPR into consideration when formulating policies[2ndash5] such as Waste Electrical and Electronic EquipmentDirective of European Commission Specified HouseholdAppliances Recycling Law of Japan Waste Vehicle Treat-ment Regulations of Germany and Extended ProducerResponsibility System Implementation Plan of China [1 6]ampe closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which was proposedfirst in 2003 and has received extensive attention from the

HindawiMathematical Problems in EngineeringVolume 2020 Article ID 9202370 19 pageshttpsdoiorg10115520209202370

academic community due to both forward and reversesupply chain management is included in it

Because of the sustainable development requirements ofregulations and market and the enterprisesrsquo aspiration oflong-term development as well as the other reasons someenterprises have implemented CLSC management andproved that it can bring economic and environmentalbenefits For instance Volkswagen saves 70 in cost byreusing recycled car engines and other components In-terface Inc chooses to lease carpets to carry out CLSCmanagement to obtain the residual value of those products[7] From 2003 to 2015 Hewlett-Packard reused 438 millioncomputer parts and used more than 80000 tons of recycledplastic to produce new ink cartridges and toner cartridgeswhich reduced greenhouse gas emissions and costs How-ever recycling efficiency cannot be improved simply bycollecting used products and reusing them unless theproducts are designed with ease of remanufacturability andrecyclability [8] which requires manufacturers to carry outgreenmanufacturing such as selecting rawmaterials that areeffortless to recycle and optimizing production processes [9]Besides the positive impact of green innovation in productdesign on remanufacturing efficiency is very significant [10]As everyone knows green manufacturing innovation is ahuge challenge for many enterprises thus innovation shouldnot be confined to a single enterprise it is also necessary toseek for external cooperation to improve the efficiency ofgreen manufacturing [11 12] Simultaneously it is alsoimportant to choose a suitable partner which can com-plement the scarce knowledge and resources [13] and im-prove the ability of green manufacturing It is obvious thatin the context of advocating resource conservation and greenmanufacturing innovation a comprehensive research ongreen manufacturing innovation and cooperation modesbetween members of the supply chain can enrich the the-oretical study in the field of CLSC and provide suggestions ofdecision-making for enterprises and government ampereforethis paper for the first time explores the abovementionedissues by establishing a dynamic two-period CLSC modelwhich involves a manufacturer a retailer and a third-serviceprovider taking the manufacturerrsquos green manufacturinginnovation into consideration as well More specifically

(1) In a two-period CLSC system what are the optimalgreen manufacturing levels collection rates pricingdecisions and profits when the manufacturer col-laborates with different supply chain members

(2) What is the impact of cooperating with differentmembers (ie different cooperation modes) ondecision-making

(3) Who is the best partner for the manufacturer (iewhich cooperation mode is optimal)

(4) How to solve inefficiencies in decentralized CLSC

Hence the contributions of this research to academicsare reflected in the following aspects Firstly the influence ofdifferent cooperation modes on optimal CLSC strategies andprofits is investigated when the manufacturerrsquos greenmanufacturing innovation and CLSC dynamics are

considered synchronously Secondly the optimal coopera-tion mode is analyzed from the point of view of consumersgreen manufacturing recycling and CLSC system thus thispaper is valuable in both theory and practice ampe rest of thispaper is structured as follows Section 2 reviews the relatedliterature Section 3 gives the description of problem defi-nition of symbols and basic assumptions Section 4 presentsgame theoretic models of different cooperation modes andequilibrium results Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium re-sults in Section 4 and managerial insights are obtainedMoreover a coordination mechanism is designed to im-prove the efficiency of the CLSC system Section 6 shows thenumerical examples of the propositions mentioned inSection 5 and additional implications are presented Finallywe conclude the study in Section 7

2 Literature Review

In this section the related studies are reviewed to set forththe necessity of this research We mainly focus on threeissues which are shown in three sections In Section 21 weaddress the literature on CLSC Section 22 illustrates theliterature related to green manufacturing innovationSection 23 reviews research on cooperation in the supplychain

21 CLSC Due to the environmentally friendly nature ofCLSC and the differences compared to the traditional supplychain scholars have shown a high research enthusiasm forCLSC ampe literature on CLSC mainly focuses on threedirections namely the channel selection of used-productcollection analysis of optimal decisions and CLSC coor-dination More specifically Savaskan et al [14] introducethree channels for the manufacturer to collect the usedproducts namely the manufacturer retailer and the thirdparty is responsible for collection activity respectively Agame-theoretical approach is adopted to analyze those threechannels under the scenario that the manufacturer is theStackelberg leader and they find that when the retailer isrecycler the operational efficiency is the highest ampeir studyis so classical that many researchers have expanded on it andreferenced it such as Savaskan and Van Wassenhove [15]study the structure of collecting channel in the case ofconsidering competition among retailers Huang et al [16]shift the focus of research to dual collection channel whichencompasses a retailer and a third party competing witheach other in collecting used products Meanwhile bycomparing with models of Savaskan et al [14] the condi-tions of constructing dual collection channel are obtainedBesides both Hong et al [17] and Liu et al [18] supposethree optional dual collection channels for themanufacturermore specifically the manufacturer and retailer collectingused products simultaneously the manufacturer outsourc-ing the collection activity to a retailer and third party andthe manufacturer and third party jointly managing therecycling business ampe results of their studies indicate thatthe dual collection channel consisting of the manufacturerand retailer is superior to the other two obviously

2 Mathematical Problems in Engineering

Moreover other researchers pay attention to the optimaldecisions of CLSC members and consider more practicalfactors for example Huang [19] investigates three mathe-matical models of CLSC in which the used products arecollected through trade-in strategy and the competitionamong retailers is also considered Gao et al [20] take thecollection effort and sales effort into consideration to explorethe impact of different channel power structures on CLSCrsquosdecision-making Gu et al [21] investigate the particularityof electric vehicle battery CLSC and analyze the optimalpricing decisions of the manufacturer and remanufacturer

On account of the existence of dual marginalization indecentralized CLSC some researchers propose coordinationmechanisms to solve this issue In order to coordinate theCLSC Zhang et al [22] design two contracts for CLSC withsymmetric information and asymmetric information re-spectively and game theory is adopted to obtain the mostsuitable contract Hasanov et al [23] study the coordinationamong order quantities and shipments quantities in a four-level CLSC by establishing two mixed-integer nonlinearprogramming mathematical models He et al [24] comparecontract and authorization mechanism to affirm which onecan improve the recovery efficiency in a decentralized CLSCand their results indicate that the contract mechanism issuperior to the other one

Apparently the aforesaid literature is confined to singleperiod CLSC which implies that the products sold can becollected in the same period However the products such ashousehold appliances computers and automobiles have acertain life cycle thus they cannot be recycled immediatelyamperefore a part of researchers have investigated the two-period CLSC for instance Giovanni and Zaccour [25] es-tablish a two-period dynamic game model of CLSC to an-alyze the conditions of outsourcing the collection businessAnalogously Genc and Giovanni [26] develop a two-periodStackelberg game that considers the profit seeking of con-sumers and retail competition to find the best recyclerWang et al [1] study the influence of reward-penaltymechanism on decisions and profitability of CLSC by de-veloping a two-period game model Xu and Wang [27]develop a two-period model where the consumerrsquos low-carbon and remanufactured preference are considered toinvestigate the decisions and profit distribution of CLSCHowever the content related to manufacturersrsquo behavior ofgreen manufacturing innovation is not included in theabovementioned studies As stated in Section 1 if themanufacturer not only recycles waste product but also carryout green manufacturing innovation in the productionprocess then better environmental benefits can be obtainedamperefore it is necessary to consider this in the study

22 Green Manufacturing Innovation As mentioned in theprevious section relying solely on recycling cannot improvethe operational efficiency of CLSC it is necessary for themanufacturer to implement green manufacturing innova-tion during the design and production process Reimannet al [8] study the relationship between remanufacturingand the chance to reduce the variable remanufacturing cost

via process innovation and point out that the optimalstrategy of managing process innovation in the forwardsupply chain cannot be applied directly to CLSC Genc andGiovanni [26] adopt a game-theoretic approach to constructmodels to investigate the influence of innovation-led leanprograms in a CLSC their results show that these programshave both strategic and process innovation effect which areconducive to manufacturer and sustainability Arfi et al [9]analyze the impact of internal and external knowledgesharing on green innovation and organization performancevia empirical research Cherrafi et al [28] adopt StructuralEquationModeling to analyze the data of 374 manufacturingenterprises the findings indicate that the relationship be-tween lean process and green innovation practices issynergistic and it is important to improve green supplychain performance Liu et al [10] explore the impact ofproduct design on operational efficiency of a two-echelonCLSC the results show that remanufacturing cannot ensurethe profitability of CLSC members whereas the adjustmentof product design strategies can remedy this problem ampeabovementioned literature mainly focuses on greenmanufacturing innovation of CLSC from a macro-perspective While more detailed exploration are carried outfrom a micropoint of view by some scholars such as Albinoet al [29 30] Messeni Petruzzelli et al [31] and Ardito et al[32 33]

We can find that the topic of the aforementioned lit-erature is the innovation behaviors of enterprises and thecooperation between enterprises in the supply chain is notconsidered In the context of the supply chain managementit has been very difficult for companies to achieve com-petitiveness through single-handedness due to lack ofcapital and technology Consequently in the CLSC man-agement research on the cooperation mode between en-terprises is also one of the important issues

23 Cooperation Because of the difficulty of greenmanufacturing innovation for most firms thus cooperationor alliance is an important way to improve performance Daiet al [11] use a game-theoretical approach to compare thecases of cartelization cost-sharing contract and noncoop-eration in a green supply chain in which both the upstreamand downstream firms tend to establish Research and De-velopment collaborations they discovered that cooperationalways benefits consumers and environment Zhang et al[34] build an evolutionary game model to investigate themodes of technology diffusion and the impact of low-carbonpolicy on technology diffusion in the alliance Based on theanalysis of a large amount of data Doblinger et al [35]emphasize the crucial role of government to be a partner inthe technology development alliance which will facilitate theinnovation process Elia et al [13] point out that the impactof cultural diversity among an alliancersquos partners is notalways negative such as in an explorative alliance the in-fluence of cultural diversity is positive ampese articles onlystudy the issue related to cooperation between enterprises inthe forward supply chain while how enterprises in CLSCshould cooperate and which cooperation mode is most

Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3

beneficial to green manufacturing innovation have not beenmentioned

According to the existing literature we find that thedirections such as CLSC two-period CLSC greenmanufacturing innovation and cooperation are all involvedand these studies lay the foundation for the research of thispaper However a comprehensive study which combines thetwo-period CLSC and the cooperation of greenmanufacturing innovation has not been given sufficientattention and relevant research is scarce In contrast to theexisting literature this paper investigates the optimal de-cisions of a two-period CLSC in which the greenmanufacturing innovation of themanufacturer is consideredin three cooperation modes Specifically the research con-tent of our study includes not only the two-period CLSC andgreen manufacturing innovation of the manufacturer butalso the cooperation mode between enterprises ampe scope ofthis paper is wider and more realistic and the results of theresearch also have higher theoretical and practical signifi-cance In addition we also discuss the impact of differentcooperation modes on CLSC membersrsquo decision-makingand the optimal partner is proposed via comparisons amongthe three cooperation modes A coordination mechanism isproposed for the optimal mode

3 Scenarios and Assumptions

31 Problem Description Considering the new productssold today cannot be recycled immediately these productswill be collected and remanufactured only in the futuretherefore dynamic modeling appears the most appropriatesetting [25] ampis paper investigates a two-period CLSCconsisting of a manufacturer a retailer and a third-serviceprovider As shown in Figure 1 the manufacturer doeswholesale business with a retailer to sell its products at awholesale price wi i indicates the period index and i 1 2then the retailer gains profits by selling products toconsumers at a retail price pi and the third-service pro-vider is exclusively responsible for the collection activity Inorder to implement its social responsibility and attractgreen consumers the manufacturer invests in green ac-tivities such as adopts resource-saving production tech-nologies and equipment designs product towardsenvironmental protection and reduces the carbon emis-sions of each product In this two-period CLSC the re-lationship between the manufacturer and other agents isdescribed as a Stackelberg game where the manufactureracts as the leader and the retailer and third-service provideras the followers More specifically the manufacturer de-cides its wholesale price and green manufacturing effortsand then the retailer and third-service provider determinetheir retail price and collection efforts respectivelyMoreover the manufacturer has a tendency to cooperatewith other members to improve the green manufacturingefficiency the collection efficiency of end-of-use productsand achieve the goal of increasing the performance of theentire CLSC system ultimately

For the purpose of obtaining the optimal wholesale priceand retail price and optimizing the green manufacturing as

well as collection efficiency in two periods the manufacturercan confirm who is a suitable partner simultaneouslyamperefore we propose the Stackelberg game

32 Definition of Symbols Based on the abovementioneddescription some symbols are included in the mathematicalmodels to construct Stackelberg game models ampe defini-tions of symbols are as follows

a is market potentialb is consumerrsquos sensitivity to retail pricepi is retail price of unit product in period i retailerrsquosdecision variableθi is green manufacturing innovation level of unitproduct in period i manufacturerrsquos decision variablewi is wholesale price of unit product in period imanufacturerrsquos decision variableϕ is consumerrsquos sensitivity to green productsζ is discount factor of second-period profit 0lt ζ lt 1λ is collection rate of end-of-use products third-serviceproviderrsquos decision variable 0lt λlt 1cm is unit cost of producing product from brand-newmaterialscr is unit cost of producing product from recycledmaterialsΔ is saving unit cost from using recycled materialsΔ cm minus cr

cf is unit transfer price of used products from the third-service providerr is average recycling price of used products from theconsumersI is investment parameter of green manufacturinginnovationK is investment parameter of used-product collection

Apparently the subscript i represents the period indexi 1 2

33 Basic Assumptions In order to achieve the purpose ofthis research and establish the mathematical models somebasic assumptions based on previous literature (eg [14 25])should be proposed

(1) ampere is no distinction between remanufacturedproducts and new products and they can be sold inthe same market at the same price

(2) ampe CLSC members are risk-neutral and all infor-mation is symmetrical

(3) ampe third-service providerrsquos investment in collectionactivity in period 2 is assumed to be an increasingconvex function C (λ) and K is assumed to be suf-ficiently large to ensure 0lt λlt 1 this implies thatremanufacturing is so costly that all the usedproducts being collected is impracticable ampis kind


of cost structure and corresponding description issimilar to Savaskan et al [14] which is given by

C(λ) Kλ2 (1)

Analogously manufacturerrsquos cost of greenmanufacturing innovation is given by an increasingconvex function C (θi) and we also suppose that I issufficiently large to describe the difficulty of greenmanufacturing innovation such a cost functionstructure is commonly used in relevant literature[36] and is given by

C θi( 1113857 Iθ2i (2)

(4) Manufacturing products with new materials is morecostly than returned materials from used productsthat is Δ cm minus cr gt 0 Simultaneously only whenΔminuscf gt 0 is satisfied we can ensure that the manu-facturer has the motivation to remanufactureMoreover cf is composed of all the reverse flowmanagement costs such as collection transportationclassification inspection and other activities It iswell known that only part of the collected productscan be used for remanufacturing however in orderto analyze the optimal strategies of supply chainmembers without loss of generality we suppose thatall returned products can be remanufactured suc-cessfully [20]

(5) With the continuous development of the economyexcept the basic function of products consumersrsquoattention to the green level for example energyefficiency of products is gradually increasing ampusin order to attract more green consumers themanufacturer will improve the green manufacturingefficiency amperefore we assume that the market

demand q is a linear function of the retail price andgreen manufacturing innovation level and q is equalin two periods which is defined as

q pi θi( 1113857 a minus bpi + ϕθi (3)

Obviously the market demand is a decreasingfunction of retail price and an increasing function ofgreen manufacturing innovation level [27]

(6) In this paper we suppose that there are three co-operation modes between supply chain membersMore specifically they are noncooperation mode(NC) the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer(MR-C) and the third-service provider (MT-C)respectively Because the purpose of our study is todetermine the optimal cooperation mode and thebest partner therefore this paper is different fromthe research of Capaldo and Messeni Petruzzelli[37 38] and Ardito et al [39] which mainly focuson the impact of proximity dimensions betweenpartners on cooperation dynamics In order tosimplify the mathematical model and achieve themain research purpose only the case where thetightness of cooperation is the highest is taken intoconsideration in this paper other scenarios such asloose cooperation and closer cooperation can benegligible

4 Models of CLSC under DifferentCooperation Modes

41 Noncooperation Mode (Model NC) In this scenario allthe CLSC members are profit seeking and make decisionsseparately amperefore the profit functions of three playerscan be formulated as

First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer

ird-service provider

Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer

No-cooperation(NC)

First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer

Cooperation of manufacturer and retailer (MR-C)

First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Retailer

Consumer

Cooperation of manufacturer and third-service provider (MT-C)

Manufacturer


Forward logisticsReverse logistics

Figure 1 ampe structure of two-period CLSC under three cooperation modes


ΠNCM wNC1 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 minus I θNC11113872 1113873

2

+ ζ wNC2 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC2 + ϕθNC21113872 1113873 + λNC Δ minus cf1113872 1113873 a minus bp


21113876 1113877

ΠNCR pNC1 minus w

NC11113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 + ζ p

NC2 minus w

NC21113872 1113873

2a minus bp

NC2 + ϕθNC21113872 1113873

ΠNCT ζ λNC cf minus r1113872 1113873 a minus bpNC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 minus K λNC1113872 1113873

21113876 1113877

(4)

ampe equilibrium results in this mode will be super-scripted by NC Consequently the manufacturerrsquos objectivefunction is as follows

MAXwNC1 θNC1 wNC

2 θNC2

ΠNCM

ST

MAXPNC1 PNC

2

ΠNCR

MAXλNCΠNCT

Subject to wNCi p

NCi θNCi gt 0 0lt λNC lt 1 agt bp

NCi i 1 2

(5)

For the purpose of obtaining equilibrium decisions weadopt backward induction in the calculation section and thesequence is similar to Giovanni and Zaccour [25]

Proposition 1 Assuming an interior solution exists theequilibrium strategies of CLSC members in noncooperationmode are given by

wNC1

4IK a + bcm( 1113857 minus Kcmϕ2 minus aB

KA minus bB

PNC1

2IK 3a + bcm( 1113857 minus Kcmϕ2 minus aB

KA minus bB

θNC1

Kϕ a minus bcm( 1113857

KA minus bB

qNC1

2IKb a minus bcm( 1113857

KA minus bB

λNC Ib cf minus r1113872 1113873 a minus bcm( 1113857

KA minus bB

wNC2

4Ibcm + 4Ia minus cmϕ2

A

PNC2


A

θNC2 ϕ a minus bcm( 1113857

A

qNC2

2Ib a minus bcm( 1113857

A

(6)


where A 8Ib minus ϕ2 and B 2Ibζ(Δ minus cf)(cf minus r) 7e corresponding equilibrium profits are as follows

ΠNCM I a minus bcm( 1113857

2[KA(1 + ζ) minus bζB]

A[KA minus bB]

ΠNCR 4I2b a minus bcm( 1113857

2K2A2(1 + ζ) minus 2KbζBA + b2ζB21113858 1113859

A2[KA minus bB]2

ΠNCT I2Kb2ζ a minus bcm( 1113857

2cf minus r1113872 1113873

2

[KA minus bB]2

ΠNCS I a minus bcm( 1113857

2K2A2 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857(1 + ζ) + b2ζB2 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857 minus 2KbζBA 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857 minus IKb2ζ cf minus r1113872 1113873 2Δ minus 3cf + r1113872 1113873A21113960 1113961

A2[KA minus bB]2

(7)

For an interior solution some conditions should besatisfied We shall insure that the values of wNC

i pNCi and

θNCi are positive and 0lt λNC lt 1 agt b pNCi where i 1 2

ampis implies that Agt 0 KA minus bBgt 0 and KAgt bB+

Ib(cf minus r)(a minus bcm) more specifically Kgt (Ib(cf minus r)(a minus

bcm)+ 2Ib2ζ(Δ minus cf)(cf minus r))(8Ib minus ϕ2) and these condi-tions are supposed to hold

42 Cooperation ofManufacturer andRetailer (ModelMR-C)In the MR-C mode a partnership is formed between themanufacturer and retailer they determine their strategiesjointly instead of making decisions separately such as theretail price and the green manufacturing innovation leveland their common goal is to maximize the profit of thecooperative organization Because of the cooperative rela-tionship between the manufacturer and retailer thewholesale price disappears reasonably in this scenarioObviously due to the dominant power of the manufacturerthe MR-C organization has sufficient ability to act as aStackelberg leader and dominate the whole system andthird-service provider is the unique follower amperefore theprofit function of MR-C organization is defined as

ΠMRminusCC p

MRminusC1 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

MRminusC1 + ϕθMRminusC

11113872 1113873

minus I θMRminusC11113872 1113873

2+ ς1113876 p

MRminusC2 minus cm1113872 1113873

middot a minus bpMRminusC2 + ϕθMRminusC

21113872 1113873 + λMRminusC Δ minus cf1113872 1113873


11113872 1113873 minus I θMRminusC21113872 1113873

21113877

(8)

and the profit function of the third-service provider in thisscenario can be defined as

ΠMRminusCT ς λMRminusC

cf minus r1113872 1113873 a minus bMRminusC1 + ϕθMRminusC

11113872 11138731113960

minus K λMRminusC1113872 1113873

21113877

(9)

Analogously the equilibrium results in this mode will besuperscripted by MR-C and the MR-C organizationrsquos ob-jective function is formulated as

MAXpMRminusC1 θMRminusC

1 pMRminusC2 θMRminusC

2

ΠMRminusCC

ST MAXλMRminusCΠMRminusC

T

(10)

Subject to pMRminusCi θMRminusC

i gt 0 0lt λMRminusC lt 1 and agt bpMRminusCi

i 1 2Again we adopt backward induction to calculate the

models and obtain equilibrium decisions and refer to thecalculation steps of Giovanni and Zaccour [25]

Proposition 2 Assuming an interior solution the equilib-rium strategies of the cooperative organization and third-service provider when the manufacturer cooperates with theretailer are given by

pMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

θMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

qMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

λMRminusC

Ib cf minus r1113872 1113873 a minus bcm( 1113857

KQ minus bB

pMRminusC2

2I a + bcm( 1113857 minus cmϕ2

Q

θMRminusC2

ϕ a minus bcm( 1113857

Q

qMRminusC2


Q

(11)

where Q 4Ib minus ϕ2 and B 2Ibζ(Δ minus cf)(cf minus r)


7e corresponding equilibrium profits are as follows

ΠMRminusCC

I a minus bcm( 11138572[KQ(1 + ζ) minus bζB]

Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT

I2Kb2ζ a minus bcm( 11138572

cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS

I a minus bcm( 11138572

K2Q2(1 + ζ) + b2ζB2 minus 2KbζBQ minus IKb2ζ cf minus r1113872 1113873 2Δ minus 3cf + r1113872 1113873Q1113960 1113961

Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)

Again some conditions should be established to obtainan interior solution Namely pMRminusC

i θMRminusCi gt 0

0lt λMRminusC lt 1 and agt bpMRminusCi i 1 2 and the values of Q

and KQ minus bBare positiveFurthermore KQgt bB + Ib(cf minus r)(a minus bcm)hArr Kgt

((Ib(cf minus r)(a minus bcm) +2Ib2ζ(Δ minus cf)(cf minus r))(4Ib minus ϕ2))we suppose these conditions to hold

43 Cooperation of Manufacturer and7ird-Service Provider(Model MT-C) It is obvious that the manufacturer choosesthe third-service provider as its partner in this scenarioamperefore they jointly determine the wholesale price thegreen manufacturing innovation level and the collectionrate Similar to the previous scenario the transfer price doesnot exist and the cooperative organization is the Stackelbergleader and the retailer is the follower ampus the profitfunction of MT-C organization can be defined as

ΠMTminusCC w

MTminusC1 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

MTminusC1 + ϕθMTminusC

11113872 1113873 minus I θMTminusC11113872 1113873

2

+ ζ1113876 wMTminusC2 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp


21113872 1113873

+ λMTminusC(Δ minus r) a minus bp


11113872 1113873

minus I θMTminusC11113872 1113873

2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)

Simultaneously the profit function of the retailer in thisscenario is defined as

ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w

MTminusC11113872 1113873 a minus bp


11113872 1113873

+ ζ pMTminusC2 minus w



21113872 1113873

(14)

Similarly the equilibrium results in this scenario will besuperscripted by MT-C and the MT-C organizationrsquos ob-jective function is defined as

MAXwMTminusC1 θMTminusC

1 wMTminusC2 θMTminusC

2 λMTminusCΠMTminusC

C

ST MAXpMTminusC1 pMTminusC

2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)

Subject to wMTminusCi pMTminusC

i θMTminusCi gt 0 0lt λMTminusC lt 1 and

agt bpMTminusCi i 1 2

In order to obtain equilibrium decisions we adopt thecalculation method which is similar to the previousscenarios

Proposition 3 Assuming an interior solution the equilib-rium strategies of the cooperative organization and retailerwhen the manufacturer cooperates with the third-serviceprovider are as follows

wMTminusC1

4IK a + bcm( 1113857 minus Kcmϕ2 minus aR

KA minus bR

pMTminusC1

2IK 3a + bcm( 1113857 minus Kcmϕ2 minus aR

KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC

Ib a minus bcm( 1113857(Δ minus r)

KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)

where A 8Ib minus ϕ2 and R 3Ibζ(Δ minus r)2


7e corresponding equilibrium profits are given by

ΠMTminusCC

I a minus bcm( 11138572[KA(1 + ζ) minus bζR]

A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR

4I2b a minus bcm( 11138572

K2A2(1 + ζ) + b2ζR2 minus 2KbζRA1113858 1113859

A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS


K2A2 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857(1 + ζ) + b2ζR2 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857 minus 2KbζRA 12Ib minus ϕ2( 1113857 minus KbRA21113858 1113859

A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)

Analogously an interior solution can only be obtainedunder the premise that some conditions are satisfied Morespecifically wMTminusC

i pMTminusCi θMTminusC

i gt 0 0lt λMTminusC lt 1 andagt bpMTminusC

i i 1 2 and Agt 0 and KA minus bRgt 0 MoreoverKAgt bR+ Ib(a minus bcm)(Δ minus r)⟺Kgt (3Ib2ζ(Δ minus r)2 + Ib

(a minus bcm)(Δ minus r))(8Ib minus ϕ2) we assume these conditions tohold

5 Discussion

In this section the equilibrium strategies of different modelsare analyzed and compared to comprehend the effects ofdifferent cooperative structures It is important to note thatcomparison of profits for the three modes pose some degreeof analytical complexity and algebraic comparison is almostimpossible to complete therefore we resort to numericalcomparison of profits in Section 6 and this kind of method isalso adopted by Ghosh and Shah [36]

51 Analysis of Green Manufacturing Innovation Level

Proposition 4 7e green manufacturing innovation levelssatisfy the following order

(i) θMRminusC2 gt θNC2 θMTminusC

2 θMRminusC1 gt θMTminusC

1 gt θNC1(ii) θNC1 gt θ

NC2 θMRminusC

1 gt θMRminusC2 θMTminusC

1 gt θMTminusC2

Obviously whether in the first period or the second periodthe green manufacturing innovation level of MR-C mode isalways the highest 7e manufacturer is the leader of greenmanufacturing innovation and is familiar with its productsand the retailer grasps the consumersrsquo demand for productswith green features accurately these are the primary reasonsof this result

amprough a longitudinal comparison of the three modeswe can find that the green manufacturing innovation levelsin period 1 are higher than in period 2 it is mainly because ofthe absence of collection activity in period 1 hence themanufacturer can invest more resources to improve thegreen manufacturing levels Overall the cooperation of themanufacturer and retailer can achieve better greenmanufacturing efficiency

Corollary 1

(i) (zθNCi za)gt 0 (zθNCi zcm)lt 0 (zθNCi zI)lt 0

(zθNCi zϕ)gt 0(ii) (zθMRminusC

i za)gt 0 (zθMRminusCi zcm)lt 0

(zθMRminusCi zI)lt 0 (zθMRminusC

i zϕ)gt 0(iii) (zθMTminusC

i za)gt 0 (zθMTminusCi zcm)lt 0

(zθMTminusCi zI)lt 0 (zθMTminusC

i zϕ)gt 0

In the three modes the green manufacturing innovationlevels are monotonic increasing functions of the market po-tential a and consumerrsquos sensitivity to green products ϕConversely they are monotonic decreasing functions of unitcost of production cmand investment parameter of greenmanufacturing innovation I

Corollary 1 implies that the increase in potential marketand consumerrsquos green sensitivity will enhance manufac-turerrsquos confidence in green manufacturing hence the levelof green manufacturing innovation will increase Howeverthe increase of the manufacturing cost and investmentparameter of green manufacturing is a kind of economicpressure for the manufacture which has a decreasing impacton the green manufacturing innovation level

52 Analysis of Price

Proposition 5 7e relations of the wholesale prices andretail prices are given by

(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC

1 wMTminusC2 gtwMTminusC

1

(iii) pNC2 pMTminusC

2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC

1 gtpMTminusC1 gtpMRminusC

1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC

1 pMRminusC2 gtpMRminusC

1 pMTminusC2 gtpMTminusC

1

Proposition 5 suggests that the wholesale price is lower inMT-C mode than that in NC mode 7e partnership betweenthe manufacturer and the third-service provider reduces thewholesale price therefore collaboration is more beneficialfrom the recyclerrsquos perspective On the contrary the retail pricein MR-C mode is always the lowest the main reason for this


result is the disappearance of wholesale process in the co-operative organization which reduces the costs of the retailer7erefore from the standpoint of consumers the MR-C modeis optimal because of its lowest price

ampe longitudinal comparisons of the wholesale price andretail price show that these two prices are higher in period 1invariably However according to common sense thetechnology will be more mature and the market will be morestable in period 2 so the price should be lower In this paperdue to the consideration of the used-product collectionactivity in period 2 the manufacturer will invest more toimplement CLSC management which increases the price

Corollary 2

(i) (zwNCi za)gt 0 (zwNC

i zcm)gt 0 (zwNCi zI)lt 0

(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0

(ii) (zwMTminusCi za)gt 0 (zwMTminusC

i zcm)gt 0

(zwMTminusCi zI)lt 0 (zwMTminusC

i zϕ)gt 0(iii) (zPNC

i za)gt 0 (zPNCi zcm)gt 0

(zPNCi zI)lt 0 (zPNC

i zϕ)gt 0(iv) (zpMRminusC

i za)gt 0 (zpMRminusCi zcm)gt 0

(zpMRminusCi zI)lt 0 (zpMRminusC

i zϕ)gt 0(v) (zpMTminusC

i za)gt 0 (zpMTminusCi zcm)gt 0

(zpMTminusCi zI)lt 0 (zpMTminusC

i zϕ)gt 0

Some inspirations can be obtained from Corollary 2 Forinstance if a and cm increase the manufacturer will sell itsproducts to the retailer at a higher wholesale price to get higherprofits thus the retailer reasonably sells products to theconsumers at a higher retail price Because of the positiveimpact of ϕ on demand therefore the increase of ϕ will lead toan increase in demand and then the demand exceeds supplycausing the rise of retail price However the increase of I willlower the price As mentioned in the previous propositions Irepresents the difficulty of innovating and the increase of Iwill reduce the collection rate and green manufacturing in-novation level at the same time in which case the manu-facturer will invest less in green manufacturing innovationand recycling the total cost is reduced thus reducing thewholesale price and retail price

53 Analysis of Demand

Proposition 6 7e demands satisfy the following order

(i) qMRminusC2 gt qNC2 qMTminusC

2 qMRminusC1 gt qMTminusC

1 gt qNC1

(ii) qNC1 gt qNC2 qMTminusC1 gt qMTminusC

2 qMRminusC1 gt qMRminusC

2

Obviously the CLSC system enjoys the highest salesvolume in both periods if the manufacture cooperates with theretailer By combining the conclusions mentioned in Propo-sitions 4 and 5 the aforesaid result can be intuitively drawnon account of the lowest price and the highest greenmanufacturing innovation level of MR-C mode 7is expla-nation also applies to the longitudinal comparisons of the

demand In general all the CLSC members can benefit fromthe cooperation of the manufacturer and retailer (MR-Cmode)

Corollary 3

(i) (zqNCi za)gt 0 (zqNCi zcm)lt 0 (zqNCi zI)lt 0

(zqNCi zϕ)gt 0(ii) (zqMRminusC

i za)gt 0 (zqMRminusCi zcm)lt 0

(zqMRminusCi zI)lt 0 (zqMRminusC

i zϕ)gt 0(iii) (zqMTminusC

i za)gt 0 (zqMTminusCi zcm)lt 0

(zqMTminusCi zI)lt 0 (zqMTminusC

i zϕ)gt 0

It is observed that the demand increases as a and ϕ in-crease but decreases as cmand I increase According to thedemand function assumed in this paper a and ϕ have apositive impact on the demand clearly However the risingcost of manufacturing can lead to a higher retail price andthen a reduction in demand appears As mentioned inProposition 4 there is a negative correlation between I and θthe increase of I implies that θ will decrease eventuallycausing a reduction in demand

54 Analysis of Collection Rate

Proposition 7 7e collection rates satisfy the followingorder

λMTminusC gt λMRminusC gt λNC (18)

From Proposition 6 we see that the demands satisfyqMRminusC2 gt qNC2 qMTminusC

2 and qMRminusC1 gt qMTminusC

1 gt qNC1 thus the col-lection rate should be naturally the highest in MR-C modeHowever it is unexpected to notice that the collection rate inMR-C mode is relatively low this can be attributed to thecooperation of the manufacturer and third-service providerFirst of all the manufacturer is familiar with its products andpossesses the ability to accurately determine the parts of usedproducts that can be recycled efficiently hence the manufac-turer will share product information with the third-serviceprovider after establishing partnership so as to make the processof recycling more precise and purposeful Secondly the third-service provider is able to communicate with the manufacturerabout the collection activity whenever necessary Furthermoreit is observed that the collection rate is always the lowest in NCmode this illustrates that collaboration is conducive to re-sources recovery and circular economy

Corollary 4

(i) (zλNCza)gt 0 (zλNCzcm)lt 0

(zλNCzI)lt 0 (zλNCzϕ)gt 0(ii) (zλMRminusCza)gt 0 (zλMRminusCzcm)lt 0

(zλMRminusCzI)lt 0 (zλMRminusCzϕ)gt 0(iii) (zλMTminusCza)gt 0 (zλMTminusCzcm)lt 0

(zλMTminusCzI)lt 0 (zλMTminusCzϕ)gt 0

Corollary 4 reveals that with the increasing of a and ϕ thethird-service provider will correspondingly improve its


efficiency of used-products collection 7is can be put down tothe positive role of these two parameters in boosting demandwhich directly affects the number of products that can berecycled as well as the collection rate However the collectionefficiency will decrease with the increasing cm and I which canbe attributed to their negative impact on demand 7ereforethe reduced demand leads to a decrease in the amount ofrecyclable used products and reduces the recovery efficiencyultimately

55 Coordination Mechanism According to the previousanalysis we can observe that the cooperation of the man-ufacturer and retailer (MR-C mode) is optimal amperefore acoordination mechanism of this mode is designed tomaximize the operational efficiency of CLSC Given that theassumptions and symbol definitions in Section 3 are satis-fied the objective function of CLSC under centralized de-cision-making is as follows

MAXΠCC pCC1 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

CC1 + ϕθCC11113872 1113873 minus I θCC11113872 1113873

2

+ ζ1113876 pCC2 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873

+ λCC(Δ minus r) a minus bpCC1 + ϕθCC11113872 1113873

minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)

Subject to pCCi θCCi gt 0 0lt λCC lt 1 and agt bp_ iCC 1 2

ampe same method is adopted for calculation the optimaldecisions and profit of centralized CLSC can be obtained asfollows

pCC2


Q

θCC2 ϕ a minus bcm( 1113857

Q

pCC1

2IK a + bcm( 1113857 minus Kcmϕ2 minus aY

KQ minus bY

θCC1 Kϕ a minus bcm( 1113857

KQ minus bY

λCC Ib(Δ minus r) a minus bcm( 1113857

KQ minus bY

ΠCC I a minus bcm( 1113857

2[KQ(1 + ζ) minus bζY]

Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)

where Q 4Ib minus ϕ2 Y Ibζ(Δ minus r)2 andB 2Ibζ(Δ minus cf)(cf minus r)

It is apparent that the following conclusions hold iepCC2 pMRminusC

2 θCC2 θMRminusC2 pCC

1 ltpMRminusC1 θCC1 gt θ

MRminusC1 λCC

gt λMRminusCΠCC gtΠMRminusCS qCC1 gt qMRminusC

1 and qCC2 qMRminusC2 can

be obtained via comparison of price amperefore comparedwith the centralized CLSC the green manufacturing inno-vation level collection rate and total profit are lower indecentralized CLSC while the price is higher thus theoperational efficiency of CLSC is not optimal Althoughcentralized decision-making can maximize the performanceof the system it is difficult to achieve in practiceamperefore acoordination mechanism should be proposed by the co-operative organization composed of the manufacturer andretailer to maximize the efficiency of CLSC while ensuringthat the interests of members will not be affected Based onthe existing research we design a mechanismλMRminusCC FMRminusCC to coordinate CLSC More specificallythe third-service provider pays a fixed agency fee FMRminusCC tothe cooperative organization for the qualification to conductused-product collection and completes the target collectionrateλMRminus CC ampen the cooperative organization determinesthe retail price and green manufacturing innovation levelampe objective function under coordination mechanism canbe formulated as follows

(CC)MAXΠMRminusCCCC p

MRminusCC1 minus cm1113872 1113873 a minus bp

MRminusCC1 + ϕθMRminusCC

11113872 1113873

minus I θMRminusCC11113872 1113873

2+ ξ p

MRminusCC2 minus cm1113872 11138731113960

middot a minus bpMRminusCC2 + ϕθMRminusCC

21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC

middot Δ minus cf1113872 1113873 a minus bpMRminusCC1 + ϕθMRminusCC

11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST

λMRminusCC Ib(Δ minus r) a minus bcm( 1113857

KQ minus bY

ΠMRminusCCTC ζ λMRminusCC cf minus r1113872 11138731113960

a minus bpMRminusCC1 + ϕθMRminusCC

11113872 1113873

minusK λMRminusCC1113872 1113873

21113877 minus FMRminusCC geΠMRminusC

T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)

Subject to pMRminusCCi θMRminusCC

i gt 0 0lt λMRminusCC lt 1 and agt b

pMRminusCCi i 1 2In the above two constraints the first one is similar to the

incentive compatibility constraint while the second one is anindividual rationality constraint ie the third-service pro-vider will accept the coordination mechanism only when hisprofit is not less than that in the decentralized CLSC Againwe can get the following optimal decisions and maximumprofits under the coordination mechanism


pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC

Ib(Δ minus r) a minus bcm( 1113857

KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC

minusI2Kb2ζ a minus bcm( 1113857

2(Δ minus r) Δ minus 2cf + r1113872 1113873

[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC

I a minus bcm( 11138572[KQ(1 + ζ) minus bζY]

Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)

Compared with the results of centralized CLSC anddecentralized CLSC without coordination mechanism thefollowing conclusions can be obtained θMRminusCC

2 θCC2

θMRminusC2 pMRminusCC

1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC

1 θMRminusCC1 θCC1 gt θ

MRminusC1

λMRminusCC λCC gt λMRminusC ΠMRminusCCCC gtΠMRminusC

C ΠMRminusCCTC ΠMRminusC

T

andΠMRminusCCSCC ΠCC gtΠMRminusC

S It is intuitive to note that theoperational efficiency is improved obviously due to the co-ordination mechanism and the profit of the third-serviceprovider has not been affected In addition the increase inprofit of cooperative organization is determined by its marketdominance which is also its motivation to actively coordinatethe supply chain

6 Numerical Analysis

In this section numerical examples are presented to intu-itively analyze the coordination mechanism the impact of aϕ cm and I on equilibrium strategies are visualized throughimages ampen the impact of ζ on profits is shown graphicallyto draw some conclusions and propose more managementinspirations In order to comply with particular conditionsand the assumptions of this paper specific values will beassigned to parameters

ampe numerical results of coordination mechanisma 600 K 500 0 b 10 cm 50 Δ 35 cf 20 r 6ζ 08 I 100 and ϕ 5 (refer Table 1)

ampe impact of a ϕ cm and I the values of commonparameters are as follows K 5000 b 10 Δ 35 cf 20and r 6 ζ 08 With the values of a ϕ cmand I varying in

the range of 600 to 700 5 to 30 50 to 60 and 100 to 500respectively (refer Figures 2ndash6)

61 Analysis of Coordination Mechanism and EquilibriumStrategies ampe corresponding numerical results are sum-marized in Table 1

Results in Table 1 prove the effectiveness of coordinationmechanism proposed in Section 55 and the efficiency of theclosed-loop supply chain system is improved

As shown in Figures 2ndash6 the relationships betweenequilibrium strategies in different modes are presented in-tuitively and consistent with Proposition 4ndash7 Moreover it isobvious to observe that the impact of a ϕ cm and I onequilibrium strategies is depicted clearly in Figures 2ndash6which confirms the rationality of Corollary 1ndash4 as well ampenumerical examples of decision variables are also in line withactual conditions Taking the automotive industry as anexample the wholesale price of a car is mainly affected by itsmanufacturing expense and the wholesale price directlyaffects the retail price so the effect of cost on the retail priceis also obvious ampe price increases with the cost while thedemand will decrease due to the higher price Furthermorethe impacts of consumers preference for greenmanufacturing products and potential market demand onretail price are significant as well For instance if the auto-mobile manufacturer observes that the potential market fornew energy vehicles is large and consumers are willing to buythem the price of new energy vehicles will increase withoutgovernment subsidies Simultaneously the automaker will


invest more in new energy vehicles which will lead to acorresponding increase in the green manufacturing innova-tion level However if the manufacturing expense is relativelyhigh it will aggravate the cost burden of the enterprise andreduce the green manufacturing innovation level

62Analysis ofProfits In this part profits in different modesand the impact of ζ are analyzed ampe values of parametersare as follows a 600 K 500 0 b 10 cm 50 Δ 35cf 20 r 6 ζ 08 I 100 and ϕ 5 and ζ is varied from0 to 1 In order to confirm whether cooperation has apositive impact on profits the sum of manufacturerrsquos andretailerrsquos profits in the NC mode is regarded as thebenchmark of the MR-C mode similarly and the aggre-gated profit of the manufacturer and third-service provideris the benchmark of the MT-C mode ampe explanationmentioned above is important for profit comparing andanalyzing ampe numerical examples are depicted inFigures 7ndash9

(i) ampe relationships of profits among cooperation andnoncooperation scenarios are as follows (referFigure 7)

ΠMRminusCC gtΠNCM+R

ΠMTminusCC gtΠNCM+T

ΠMRminusCC gtΠMTminusC

C

(23)

Obviously Figure 7 indicates that the cooperativeorganization can obtain a higher profit invariablyFurthermore the profit of cooperation organizationin the MR-C mode exceeds the MT-C scenariofrom the propositions mentioned previously it isnot difficult to observe that the MR-C mode enjoysthe highest green manufacturing innovation leveland market demand as well as the lowest pricethese factors are important in improving profitamperefore the manufacturer should actively estab-lish partnership with supply chain members andthe retailer is the most outstanding partner

(ii) ampe profits of the retailer and third-service providersatisfy the following order (refer Figure 8)

ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)

Table 1 ampe effect of the coordination mechanism

Mode w1 w2 p1 p2 q1 q2 θ1 θ2 λ ΠMR ΠT ΠSMR NA NA 5402 5503 6055 5031 015 013 008 50401 2874 53276MR-CC NA NA 5249 5503 7605 5031 019 013 022 55283 2874 58157

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60Unit cost of producing product from brand-new materials cm

100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500Investment parameter of green innovation I

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62

5 10 15 20 25 30Consumerrsquos sensitivity to green products φ

600 610 620 630 640 650 660 670 680 690 700Market potential a

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

Figure 2 Analysis of the wholesale price




Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

Figure 3 Analysis of the retail price

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

Figure 4 Analysis of the green manufacturing innovation level


Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

Figure 5 Analysis of demand

0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

Figure 6 Analysis of the collection rate


It is natural to find that the profits of the retailer andthird-service provider under cooperation scenariosare higher Again Figure 8 proves the advantages ofcooperation which is not only conducive to bothparties in the partnership but also beneficial to therest of the CLSC members

(iii) ampe total profits of the CLSC system satisfy thefollowing order (refer Figure 9)

ΠMTminusCS gtΠMRminusC

S gtΠNCS if ς is higher

ΠMRminusCS gtΠMTminusC

S gtΠNCS if ς is relatively low(25)

From the perspective of the entire CLSC system we cansee that the profit of CLSC is the lowest in the NC modeAccording to the previous conclusions the greenmanufacturing innovation level market demand and col-lection rate are the lowest but the price is higher than theother two modes under noncooperation scenario thus theperformance is naturally the worst However it is

unexpected to notice that the CLSC systemrsquos profit in theMT-C mode is maximum when ζ is higher ampe previouspropositions clearly show that the equilibrium strategies inthe MR-C mode are optimal hence the relationship of totalprofits should be always described asΠMRminusC

S gtΠMTminusCS gtΠNCS

this seems more reasonable Nevertheless some situationsshould be taken into consideration for instance the third-service providerrsquos income only comes from collecting usedproducts and the benefit of collection activity is relativelylow amperefore although the MR-C mode enjoys optimaldecision variable values the impact on the increase of third-service providerrsquos revenue is limited as shown in Figure 8compared with the retailerrsquos profit the third-service pro-vider contributes very little to the CLSC system this leads toa relative low profit of the MR-C mode ultimately In MT-Cscenario the retailer as the Stackellberg follower makesdecisions individually which can obtainmore profit throughretail business in comparison to the third-service provider inMR-C mode thus the retailerrsquos contribution to the CLSCsystem is a lot higher Furthermore as stated in previous

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

Discount factor of second-period profit ζ

ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion

Figure 7 Analysis of cooperative organizationrsquos profit

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C

0 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 101Discount factor of second-period profit ζ

(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)

Figure 8 Analysis of nonparticipating partnersrsquo profit


conclusions the profit of cooperative organization in theMT-C mode is at an intermediate level so it is a reasonableresult that the total profit of the CLSC system is maximum inthe MT-C mode

However when ζ is lower this implies that the profit ofperiod 2 will decrease significantly compared to period 1More specifically a lower ζ will cause a substantial drop inretailerrsquos profit of the MT-C mode which reduces the totalprofit of MT-Cmode obviously and finally the order will bechanged as follows ΠMRminusC

S gtΠMTminusCS gtΠNCS amperefore from

the perspective of CLSC systemrsquos total profit there is nosingle optimal mode it varies with the value of ζ instead It isimportant to note that we only analyze the decision-makingof decentralized CLSC and the manufacturer is the Stack-elberg leader hence the primary goal is to determine whichCLSC member to cooperate with can maximize its profit Ascan be seen from the previous conclusion the profit ofcooperative organization is maximum in the MR-C modethis implies that the manufacturer can get more from it andthe next problem to be solved is the profit distribution withretailer From this point of view the retailer is the bestpartner for the manufacturer that is the MR-C mode is themost beneficial to the manufacturer

7 Conclusions

In this paper we investigate a two-period CLSC in which thegreen manufacturing innovation is taken into considerationand the manufacturer is willing to cooperate with CLSCmembers ampe equilibrium strategies are obtained byestablishing Stackelberg game models of three cooperation-related modes namely NC mode MR-C mode and MT-Cmodeampemain contributions of this paper to the theoreticalresearch of CLSC are as follows A comprehensive study of atwo-period dynamic CLSC is carried out which takes thegreen manufacturing innovation of the manufacturer andcooperation between members into consideration and acoordination mechanism is designed Besides through theanalysis of theoretical models the optimal cooperation

mode is obtained ampis is very rare in the existing literatureIn addition this paper also provides practical managementsuggestions for the actual decision-making of the manu-facturer retailer third-service provider and governmentampe management inspirations are as follows

Firstly the manufacturer should primarily take pro-duction cost into consideration when making wholesaleprice decision In the process of determining the greenmanufacturing innovation level comprehensive consider-ation should be given to the manufacturing expense thedifficulty of green manufacturing the consumersrsquo preferencefor green products and the potential market demand ampiscan be attributed to the importance of green manufacturingstrategy for the manufacturer thus various factors should beconsidered before making a decision If the manufacturerprefers to collaborate with CLSC members on greenmanufacturing the retailer is the recommended partner iethe MR-C mode due to the lowest price the highest greenmanufacturing level and a medium collection rate of thismode In actual cooperation the retailer can take advantageof proximity to the market to investigate consumersrsquo pref-erences for green products and potential market demandand then share this information with the manufacturer In aword the manufacturer and retailer make decisions jointlyand achieve the goal of maximizing the benefit of cooper-ative organization Besides in order to improve the profit ofthe cooperative organization and the operational efficiencyof the entire CLSC without prejudice to the interests ofother members the cooperative organization should pro-actively propose a coordination mechanism to reduce theinefficiency caused by the double marginalization

Secondly in the process of determining the retail pricethe retailer should mainly take the cost of productionwholesale price consumersrsquo preferences for green productsand potential market demand into account ampe retailershould actively cooperate with the manufacturer on greenmanufacturing at the same time

ampirdly the third-service provider should also considerthe prices and potential demand of products when settingthe target collection level ampis is because high prices willreduce the total demand and then a reduction in the amountof used products occurs eventually Moreover the third-service provider should actively respond to the coordinationcontract proposed by the cooperative organization if its owninterests will not be affected which is conducive to theperformance improvement of CLSC

Finally government should encourage enterprises tocooperate on green manufacturing innovation andstrengthen supervision of the manufacturer and force themanufacturer to be responsible for the entire life cycle of itsproducts and fulfill its social responsibilities Due to con-sumersrsquo sensitivity to green products and recycling has apositive impact on the operation efficiency of CLSCtherefore it is necessary for the government to advocategreen consumption and enhance consumersrsquo ecofriendlyawareness However in developing countries such as Chinamany factors lead to recycling in the initial stage hence thegovernment also needs to provide subsidies to reduce theeconomic burden of enterprises to implement CLSC

ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem

Figure 9 Analysis of total profit


management which will make a greater contribution toenvironmental protection and resource recycling as well

Although our research is well supported by the previousliterature some limitations still exist such as only full co-operation and information symmetry are considered ampecoordination mechanism designed in this paper is relativelysimple a multiwin situation is not achieved because theprofit of the third-service provider remains unchangedamperefore a coordination mechanism capable of achievingmultiwin situation should be proposed in further studiesampe impact of proximity dimensions between partners oncooperation dynamics the profit distribution of members ofcooperative organization and decisions in asymmetric in-formation situation are also the directions of future research

Data Availability

ampe data used to support the findings of this study are in-cluded within this article

Conflicts of Interest

ampe author declares no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

ampe author is grateful to the scholars who have contributedto this field of study ampis research was supported by theGeneral Foundation of Chongqing Industry PolytechnicCollege (no GZY201734-YB)

References

[1] W Wang J Ding and H Sun ldquoReward-penalty mechanismfor a two-period closed-loop supply chainrdquo Journal of CleanerProduction vol 203 pp 898ndash917 2018

[2] T Choi ldquoEnvironmental impact of voluntary extendedproducer responsibility the case of carpet recyclingrdquo Re-sources Conservation and Recycling vol 127 pp 76ndash84 2017

[3] B Peng Y Tu E Elahi and G Wei ldquoExtended producerresponsibility and corporate performance effects of envi-ronmental regulation and environmental strategyrdquo Journal ofEnvironmental Management vol 218 pp 181ndash189 2018

[4] H Wang Y Gu L Li T Liu Y Wu and T Zuo ldquoOperatingmodels and development trends in the extended producerresponsibility system for waste electrical and electronicequipmentrdquo Resources Conservation and Recycling vol 127pp 159ndash167 2017

[5] F Corsini F Rizzi and M Frey ldquoExtended producer re-sponsibility the impact of organizational dimensions onWEEE collection from householdsrdquo Waste Managementvol 59 pp 23ndash29 2017

[6] D Dempsey State E-Waste Laws Successful but May beChallenged Scientific American Online New York NY USA2010

[7] T S Genc and P D Giovanni ldquoTrade-in and save a two-period closed-loop supply chain game with price and tech-nology dependent returnsrdquo International Journal of Pro-duction Economics vol 183 pp 514ndash527 2017

[8] M Reimann Y Xiong and Y Zhou ldquoManaging a closed-loopsupply chain with process innovation for remanufacturingrdquo

European Journal of Operational Research vol 276 no 2pp 510ndash518 2019

[9] W B Arfi L Hikkerova and J-M Sahut ldquoExternalknowledge sources green innovation and performancerdquoTechnological Forecasting amp Social Change vol 129pp 210ndash220 2018

[10] Z Liu K W Li B-Y Li J Huang and J Tang ldquoImpact ofproduct-design strategies on the operations of a closed-loopsupply chainrdquo Transportation Research Part E Logistics andTransportation Review vol 124 pp 75ndash91 2019

[11] R Dai J Zhang and W Tang ldquoCartelization or cost-sharingComparison of cooperation modes in a green supply chainrdquoJournal of Cleaner Production vol 156 pp 159ndash173 2017

[12] J L Wadin K Ahlgren and L Bengtsson ldquoJoint businessmodel innovation for sustainable transformation of indus-triesmdasha large multinational utility in alliance with a smallsolar energy companyrdquo Journal of Cleaner Productionvol 160 pp 139ndash150 2017

[13] S Elia A Messeni Petruzzelli and L Piscitello ldquoampe impact ofcultural diversity on innovation performance of MNCsubsidiaries in strategic alliancesrdquo Journal of Business Re-search vol 98 pp 204ndash213 2019

[14] R C Savaskan S Bhattacharya and L N Van WassenhoveldquoClosed-loop supply chain models with product remanu-facturingrdquo Management Science vol 50 no 2 pp 239ndash2522004

[15] R C Savaskan and L N Van Wassenhove ldquoReverse channeldesign the case of competing retailersrdquoManagement Sciencevol 52 no 1 pp 1ndash14 2006

[16] M Huang M Song L H Lee andW K Ching ldquoAnalysis forstrategy of closed-loop supply chain with dual recyclingchannelrdquo International Journal of Production Economicsvol 144 no 2 pp 510ndash520 2013

[17] X Hong Z Wang DWang and H Zhang ldquoDecision modelsof closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing underhybrid dual-channel collectionrdquo 7e International Journal ofAdvanced Manufacturing Technology vol 68 no 5ndash8pp 1851ndash1865 2013

[18] L Liu Z Wang L Xu X Hong and K Govindan ldquoCollectioneffort and reverse channel choices in a closed-loop supply chainrdquoJournal of Cleaner Production vol 144 pp 492ndash500 2017

[19] Y Huang ldquoA closed-loop supply chain with trade-in strategyunder retail competitionrdquo Mathematical Problems in Engi-neering vol 2018 Article ID 1510959 16 pages 2018

[20] J Gao H Han L Hou and H Wang ldquoPricing and effortdecisions in a closed-loop supply chain under differentchannel power structuresrdquo Journal of Cleaner Productionvol 112 pp 2043ndash2057 2016

[21] X Gu P Ieromonachou L Zhou and M-L Tseng ldquoDe-veloping pricing strategy to optimise total profits in an electricvehicle battery closed loop supply chainrdquo Journal of CleanerProduction vol 203 pp 376ndash385 2018

[22] P Zhang Y Xiong Z Xiong and W Yan ldquoDesigningcontracts for a closed-loop supply chain under informationasymmetryrdquo Operations Research Letters vol 42 no 2pp 150ndash155 2014

[23] P Hasanov M Y Jaber and N Tahirov ldquoFour-level closedloop supply chain with remanufacturingrdquo Applied Mathe-matical Modelling vol 66 pp 141ndash155 2019

[24] Q He N Wang Z Yang Z He and B Jiang ldquoCompetitivecollection under channel inconvenience in closed-loop supplychainrdquo European Journal of Operational Research vol 275no 1 pp 155ndash166 2019


[25] P D Giovanni and G Zaccour ldquoA two-period game of aclosed-loop supply chainrdquo European Journal of OperationalResearch vol 232 no 1 pp 22ndash40 2014

[26] T S Genc and P D Giovanni ldquoClosed-loop supply chaingames with innovation-led lean programs and sustainabilityrdquoInternational Journal of Production Economics vol 219pp 440ndash456 2020

[27] L Xu and C Wang ldquoSustainable manufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain considering emission reduction andremanufacturingrdquo Resources Conservation and Recyclingvol 131 pp 297ndash304 2018

[28] A Cherrafi J A Garza-Reyes V Kumar N MishraA Ghobadian and S Elfezazi ldquoLean green practices andprocess innovation a model for green supply chain perfor-mancerdquo International Journal of Production Economicsvol 206 pp 79ndash92 2018

[29] D M Yazan V Albino and A Messeni Petruzzelli ldquoAna-lyzing the environmental impact of transportation in reen-gineered supply chains a case study from a leather upholsterycompanyrdquo Transportation Research Part D Transport andEnvironment vol 16 no 4 pp 335ndash340 2011

[30] D M Yazan A C Garavelli A Messeni Petruzzelli andV Albino ldquoampe effect of spatial variables on the economic andenvironmental performance of bioenergy production chainsrdquoInternational Journal of Production Economics vol 131 no 1pp 224ndash233 2011

[31] A Messeni Petruzzelli R Maria Dangelico D Rotolo andV Albino ldquoOrganizational factors and technological featuresin the development of green innovations evidence frompatent analysisrdquo Innovation vol 13 no 3 pp 291ndash310 2011

[32] L Ardito A Messeni Petruzzelli and V Albino ldquoInvesti-gating the antecedents of general purpose technologies apatent perspective in the green energy fieldrdquo Journal of En-gineering and Technology Management vol 39 pp 81ndash1002016

[33] L Ardito A M Petruzzelli and C Ghisetti ldquoampe impact ofpublic research on the technological development of industryin the green energy fieldrdquo Technological Forecasting and SocialChange vol 144 pp 25ndash35 2019

[34] L Zhang L Xue and Y Zhou ldquoHow do low-carbon policiespromote green diffusion among alliance-based firms inChina An evolutionary-game model of complex networksrdquoJournal of Cleaner Production vol 210 pp 518ndash529 2019

[35] C Doblinger K Surana and L D Anadon ldquoGovernments aspartners the role of alliances in US cleantech startup inno-vationrdquo Research Policy vol 48 no 6 pp 1458ndash1475 2019

[36] D Ghosh and J Shah ldquoA comparative analysis of greeningpolicies across supply chain structuresrdquo International Journalof Production Economics vol 135 no 2 pp 568ndash583 2012

[37] A Capaldo and A M Petruzzelli ldquoPartner geographic andorganizational proximity and the innovative performance ofknowledge-creating alliancesrdquo European Management Re-view vol 11 no 1 pp 63ndash84 2014

[38] A Capaldo and A Messeni Petruzzelli ldquoOrigins of knowledgeand innovation in RampD alliances a contingency approachrdquoTechnology Analysis amp Strategic Management vol 27 no 4pp 461ndash483 2015

[39] L Ardito A Messeni Petruzzelli F Peruffo and E PascuccildquoInter-firm RampD collaborations and green innovation valuethe role of family firmsrsquo involvement and the moderatingeffects of proximity dimensionsrdquo Business Strategy and theEnvironment vol 28 no 1 pp 185ndash197 2019


academic community due to both forward and reversesupply chain management is included in it

Because of the sustainable development requirements ofregulations and market and the enterprisesrsquo aspiration oflong-term development as well as the other reasons someenterprises have implemented CLSC management andproved that it can bring economic and environmentalbenefits For instance Volkswagen saves 70 in cost byreusing recycled car engines and other components In-terface Inc chooses to lease carpets to carry out CLSCmanagement to obtain the residual value of those products[7] From 2003 to 2015 Hewlett-Packard reused 438 millioncomputer parts and used more than 80000 tons of recycledplastic to produce new ink cartridges and toner cartridgeswhich reduced greenhouse gas emissions and costs How-ever recycling efficiency cannot be improved simply bycollecting used products and reusing them unless theproducts are designed with ease of remanufacturability andrecyclability [8] which requires manufacturers to carry outgreenmanufacturing such as selecting rawmaterials that areeffortless to recycle and optimizing production processes [9]Besides the positive impact of green innovation in productdesign on remanufacturing efficiency is very significant [10]As everyone knows green manufacturing innovation is ahuge challenge for many enterprises thus innovation shouldnot be confined to a single enterprise it is also necessary toseek for external cooperation to improve the efficiency ofgreen manufacturing [11 12] Simultaneously it is alsoimportant to choose a suitable partner which can com-plement the scarce knowledge and resources [13] and im-prove the ability of green manufacturing It is obvious thatin the context of advocating resource conservation and greenmanufacturing innovation a comprehensive research ongreen manufacturing innovation and cooperation modesbetween members of the supply chain can enrich the the-oretical study in the field of CLSC and provide suggestions ofdecision-making for enterprises and government ampereforethis paper for the first time explores the abovementionedissues by establishing a dynamic two-period CLSC modelwhich involves a manufacturer a retailer and a third-serviceprovider taking the manufacturerrsquos green manufacturinginnovation into consideration as well More specifically

(1) In a two-period CLSC system what are the optimalgreen manufacturing levels collection rates pricingdecisions and profits when the manufacturer col-laborates with different supply chain members

(2) What is the impact of cooperating with differentmembers (ie different cooperation modes) ondecision-making

(3) Who is the best partner for the manufacturer (iewhich cooperation mode is optimal)

(4) How to solve inefficiencies in decentralized CLSC

Hence the contributions of this research to academicsare reflected in the following aspects Firstly the influence ofdifferent cooperation modes on optimal CLSC strategies andprofits is investigated when the manufacturerrsquos greenmanufacturing innovation and CLSC dynamics are

considered synchronously Secondly the optimal coopera-tion mode is analyzed from the point of view of consumersgreen manufacturing recycling and CLSC system thus thispaper is valuable in both theory and practice ampe rest of thispaper is structured as follows Section 2 reviews the relatedliterature Section 3 gives the description of problem defi-nition of symbols and basic assumptions Section 4 presentsgame theoretic models of different cooperation modes andequilibrium results Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium re-sults in Section 4 and managerial insights are obtainedMoreover a coordination mechanism is designed to im-prove the efficiency of the CLSC system Section 6 shows thenumerical examples of the propositions mentioned inSection 5 and additional implications are presented Finallywe conclude the study in Section 7

2 Literature Review

In this section the related studies are reviewed to set forththe necessity of this research We mainly focus on threeissues which are shown in three sections In Section 21 weaddress the literature on CLSC Section 22 illustrates theliterature related to green manufacturing innovationSection 23 reviews research on cooperation in the supplychain

21 CLSC Due to the environmentally friendly nature ofCLSC and the differences compared to the traditional supplychain scholars have shown a high research enthusiasm forCLSC ampe literature on CLSC mainly focuses on threedirections namely the channel selection of used-productcollection analysis of optimal decisions and CLSC coor-dination More specifically Savaskan et al [14] introducethree channels for the manufacturer to collect the usedproducts namely the manufacturer retailer and the thirdparty is responsible for collection activity respectively Agame-theoretical approach is adopted to analyze those threechannels under the scenario that the manufacturer is theStackelberg leader and they find that when the retailer isrecycler the operational efficiency is the highest ampeir studyis so classical that many researchers have expanded on it andreferenced it such as Savaskan and Van Wassenhove [15]study the structure of collecting channel in the case ofconsidering competition among retailers Huang et al [16]shift the focus of research to dual collection channel whichencompasses a retailer and a third party competing witheach other in collecting used products Meanwhile bycomparing with models of Savaskan et al [14] the condi-tions of constructing dual collection channel are obtainedBesides both Hong et al [17] and Liu et al [18] supposethree optional dual collection channels for themanufacturermore specifically the manufacturer and retailer collectingused products simultaneously the manufacturer outsourc-ing the collection activity to a retailer and third party andthe manufacturer and third party jointly managing therecycling business ampe results of their studies indicate thatthe dual collection channel consisting of the manufacturerand retailer is superior to the other two obviously


























C(λ) Kλ2 (1)


C θi( 1113857 Iθ2i (2)









First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer

No-cooperation(NC)

First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Retailer

Consumer


Manufacturer







2




21113876 1113877

ΠNCR pNC1 minus w

NC11113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 + ζ p

NC2 minus w

NC21113872 1113873

2a minus bp

NC2 + ϕθNC21113872 1113873


21113876 1113877

(4)


MAXwNC1 θNC1 wNC

2 θNC2

ΠNCM

ST

MAXPNC1 PNC

2

ΠNCR

MAXλNCΠNCT

Subject to wNCi p


NCi i 1 2

(5)



wNC1


KA minus bB

PNC1


KA minus bB

θNC1


KA minus bB

qNC1


KA minus bB


KA minus bB

wNC2


A

PNC2


A


A

qNC2


A

(6)





A[KA minus bB]



A2[KA minus bB]2


2cf minus r1113872 1113873

2

[KA minus bB]2



A2[KA minus bB]2

(7)


i pNCi and






ΠMRminusCC p



11113872 1113873


2+ ς1113876 p






21113877

(8)




11113872 11138731113960


21113877

(9)




2

ΠMRminusCC


T

(10)






pMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

θMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

qMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

λMRminusC


KQ minus bB

pMRminusC2


Q

θMRminusC2


Q

qMRminusC2


Q

(11)




ΠMRminusCC


Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS



Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)


i θMRminusCi gt 0





ΠMTminusCC w




2



21113872 1113873



11113872 1113873


2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)


ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w



11113872 1113873




21113872 1113873

(14)





C


2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)






wMTminusC1


KA minus bR

pMTminusC1


KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC


KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)




ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References



































































C(λ) Kλ2 (1)


C θi( 1113857 Iθ2i (2)









First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer

No-cooperation(NC)

First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


First period

Manufacturer

Retailer

Consumer


Second period

Retailer

Consumer


Manufacturer







2




21113876 1113877

ΠNCR pNC1 minus w

NC11113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 + ζ p

NC2 minus w

NC21113872 1113873

2a minus bp

NC2 + ϕθNC21113872 1113873


21113876 1113877

(4)


MAXwNC1 θNC1 wNC

2 θNC2

ΠNCM

ST

MAXPNC1 PNC

2

ΠNCR

MAXλNCΠNCT

Subject to wNCi p


NCi i 1 2

(5)



wNC1


KA minus bB

PNC1


KA minus bB

θNC1


KA minus bB

qNC1


KA minus bB


KA minus bB

wNC2


A

PNC2


A


A

qNC2


A

(6)





A[KA minus bB]



A2[KA minus bB]2


2cf minus r1113872 1113873

2

[KA minus bB]2



A2[KA minus bB]2

(7)


i pNCi and






ΠMRminusCC p



11113872 1113873


2+ ς1113876 p






21113877

(8)




11113872 11138731113960


21113877

(9)




2

ΠMRminusCC


T

(10)






pMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

θMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

qMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

λMRminusC


KQ minus bB

pMRminusC2


Q

θMRminusC2


Q

qMRminusC2


Q

(11)




ΠMRminusCC


Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS



Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)


i θMRminusCi gt 0





ΠMTminusCC w




2



21113872 1113873



11113872 1113873


2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)


ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w



11113872 1113873




21113872 1113873

(14)





C


2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)






wMTminusC1


KA minus bR

pMTminusC1


KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC


KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)




ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References













































2




21113876 1113877

ΠNCR pNC1 minus w

NC11113872 1113873 a minus bp

NC1 + ϕθNC11113872 1113873 + ζ p

NC2 minus w

NC21113872 1113873

2a minus bp

NC2 + ϕθNC21113872 1113873


21113876 1113877

(4)


MAXwNC1 θNC1 wNC

2 θNC2

ΠNCM

ST

MAXPNC1 PNC

2

ΠNCR

MAXλNCΠNCT

Subject to wNCi p


NCi i 1 2

(5)



wNC1


KA minus bB

PNC1


KA minus bB

θNC1


KA minus bB

qNC1


KA minus bB


KA minus bB

wNC2


A

PNC2


A


A

qNC2


A

(6)





A[KA minus bB]



A2[KA minus bB]2


2cf minus r1113872 1113873

2

[KA minus bB]2



A2[KA minus bB]2

(7)


i pNCi and






ΠMRminusCC p



11113872 1113873


2+ ς1113876 p






21113877

(8)




11113872 11138731113960


21113877

(9)




2

ΠMRminusCC


T

(10)






pMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

θMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

qMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

λMRminusC


KQ minus bB

pMRminusC2


Q

θMRminusC2


Q

qMRminusC2


Q

(11)




ΠMRminusCC


Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS



Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)


i θMRminusCi gt 0





ΠMTminusCC w




2



21113872 1113873



11113872 1113873


2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)


ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w



11113872 1113873




21113872 1113873

(14)





C


2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)






wMTminusC1


KA minus bR

pMTminusC1


KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC


KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)




ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References














































A[KA minus bB]



A2[KA minus bB]2


2cf minus r1113872 1113873

2

[KA minus bB]2



A2[KA minus bB]2

(7)


i pNCi and






ΠMRminusCC p



11113872 1113873


2+ ς1113876 p






21113877

(8)




11113872 11138731113960


21113877

(9)




2

ΠMRminusCC


T

(10)






pMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

θMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

qMRminusC1


KQ minus bB

λMRminusC


KQ minus bB

pMRminusC2


Q

θMRminusC2


Q

qMRminusC2


Q

(11)




ΠMRminusCC


Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS



Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)


i θMRminusCi gt 0





ΠMTminusCC w




2



21113872 1113873



11113872 1113873


2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)


ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w



11113872 1113873




21113872 1113873

(14)





C


2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)






wMTminusC1


KA minus bR

pMTminusC1


KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC


KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)




ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































ΠMRminusCC


Q[KQ minus bB]

ΠMRminusCT


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCS



Q[KQ minus bB]2

(12)


i θMRminusCi gt 0





ΠMTminusCC w




2



21113872 1113873



11113872 1113873


2minus K λMTminusC

1113872 111387321113877

(13)


ΠMTminusCR p

MTminusC1 minus w



11113872 1113873




21113872 1113873

(14)





C


2

ΠMTminusCR

(15)






wMTminusC1


KA minus bR

pMTminusC1


KA minus bR

θMTminusC1


KA minus bR

λMTminusC


KA minus bR

qMTminusC1


KA minus bR

wMTminusC2


A

pMTminusC2


A

θMTminusC2


A

qMTminusC2


A

(16)




ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































ΠMTminusCC


A[KA minus bR]

ΠMTminusCR



A2[KA minus bR]2

ΠMTminusCS



A2[KA minus bR]2

(17)






5 Discussion







NC2 θMRminusC


1 gt θMTminusC2



Corollary 1








i zϕ)gt 0





(i) wNC2 wMTminusC

2 wNC1 gtwMTminusC

1

(ii) wNC2 gtwNC


1


2 gtpMRminusC2 pNC


1

(iv) pNC2 gtpNC



1





Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References













































Corollary 2



(zwNCi zϕ)gt 0


i zcm)gt 0











i zϕ)gt 0






1 gt qNC1



2



Corollary 3








i zϕ)gt 0








Corollary 4











2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References















































2


CC2 + ϕθCC21113872 1113873


minus I θCC21113872 11138732

minus K λCC1113872 111387321113877

(19)



pCC2


Q


Q

pCC1


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY


KQ minus bY



Q[KQ minus bY]

(20)





MRminusC1 λCC







11113872 1113873


2+ ξ p



21113872 1113873 + λMRminusCC


11113872 1113873


21113877 + F

MRminusCC

ST


KQ minus bY



11113872 1113873



T

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(21)






pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References











































pMRminusCC2


Q

θMRminusCC2


Q

pMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

θMRminusCC1


KQ minus bY

λMRminusCC


KQ minus bY

FMRminusCC



[KQ minus bY]2minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCCC


Q[KQ minus bY]minus


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCTC


cf minus r1113872 11138732

[KQ minus bB]2

ΠMRminusCCSCC


Q[KQ minus bY]

(22)


2 θCC2


1 pCC1 ltpMRminusC


MRminusC1



T


















C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References

















































C

(23)



ΠMTminusCR gtΠNCR

ΠMRminusCT gtΠNCT

(24)



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62



Who

lesa

le p

rice w

Who

lesa

le p

rice w

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w1NC

w1MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C

w2NC

w2MT-C





Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References













































Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

53

54

55

56

57

58

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

Reta

il pr

ice p

Reta

il pr

ice p

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

54

55

56

57

58

59



p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p1NC

p1MR-C

p1MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C

p2NC

p2MR-C

p2MT-C


Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

01

015

02

01

02

02

04

06

08

12

14

005

01

015

02

025

03

035

04

Gre

en in

nova

tion

leve

l θG

reen

inno

vatio

n le

vel θ

0

005

015

0

1





θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ1NC

θ1MR-C

θ1MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C

θ2NC

θ2MR-C

θ2MT-C



Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References











































Dem

and q

Dem

and q

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Dem

and q

Dem

and q

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90





q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q1NC

q1MR-C

q1MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C

q2NC

q2MR-C

q2MT-C


0

005

01

015

02

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

Colle

ctio

n ra

te λ

0

005

01

015

02

0

005

01

015

02

0

01

02

03

04





λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C

λNC

λMR-C

λMT-C













0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References





















































0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600


ΠNCM+R

ΠNCM+T

ΠCMR-C

ΠCMT-C

Prof

it of

gre

en in

nova

tion

coop

erat

ive

orga

niza

tion


50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

Prof

it of

reta

iler

ΠRNC

ΠRMT-C


(a)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Prof

it of

third

-ser

vice

pro

vide

r

ΠTNC

ΠTMR-C


(b)







7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References















































7 Conclusions







ΠSNC

ΠSMR-C

ΠSMT-C


100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Prof

it of

CLS

C sy

stem





Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References













































Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References











































comparisonofcooperationmodesinatwo-periodclosed-loop...

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