comparing radical right parties in government: immigration and integration policies in nine...
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [North Dakota State University]On: 16 November 2014, At: 13:27Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
West European PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20
Comparing Radical Right Partiesin Government: Immigrationand Integration Policies in NineCountries (1996–2010)Tjitske AkkermanPublished online: 16 Apr 2012.
To cite this article: Tjitske Akkerman (2012) Comparing Radical Right Parties inGovernment: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010), WestEuropean Politics, 35:3, 511-529, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2012.665738
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665738
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Comparing Radical Right Parties inGovernment: Immigration andIntegration Policies in Nine Countries(1996–2010)
TJITSKE AKKERMAN
This article investigates the direct influence of radical right parties on immigration andintegration policies by comparing the output of 27 cabinets of varying composition innine countries in the period between 1996 and 2010. A Nationalist Immigration andIntegration Policy index has been developed to measure legislative changes with regardto citizenship and denizenship, asylum, illegal residence, family reunion and integration.The comparative analysis of immigration and integration legislation shows that thepolicy output of cabinets including radical right parties deviates significantly fromcentre-left and centre cabinets, but does not differ much from that of centre-rightcabinets. The quantitative analysis makes clear that although parties matter, radicalright parties do not matter in particular. A case by case analysis confirms that the directimpact of radical right parties on policy output has been severely limited by thedifficulties these parties face in adapting to public office.
Several radical right parties have entered national governments as coalitionpartners in Western Europe since the beginning of this century. This recentdevelopment has raised new questions about the impact of these parties onpolicy formation in general, and on immigration and integration policies inparticular. Immigration and integration are not only the key issues ofradical right parties, but these issues are also central to the concern of votersfor these parties (Fennema 1997; Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007). Negativeattitudes toward asylum seekers, legal and illegal immigration and multi-culturalism prevail among radical right voters and are the main reason whyvoters support these parties (Carter 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Thisarticle therefore focuses on this key policy field.
The results of previous studies assessing the impact of the entrance ofradical right parties into national governments are far from univocal. Most
Correspondence Address: [email protected]
West European Politics,Vol. 35, No. 3, 511–529, May 2012
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665738
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
studies have highlighted the (direct or indirect) influence of these newcomers(Howard 2010; Marthaler 2008; Schain 2006; Williams 2006). However, thepresumed significance of radical right parties has also been questioned(Duncan 2010; Money 1999; Mudde 2007; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel2008). The most elementary question scholars disagree about is whetherpolicy results would have been much different if radical right parties hadremained in opposition. In other words, has the entrance of radical rightparties into government pushed immigration and integration policies furtherin a restrictive direction? A systematic and comparative assessment of thepolicy output of cabinets with and without radical right parties is stilllacking. To fill this gap, an index will be presented that enables thesystematic measurement of legislative changes over time and across nationalcontexts. Drawing on studies of immigration and integration policies, abroad approach to the policy fields has been chosen, including subfields suchas citizenship and denizenship, asylum, family reunion, illegality and severalaspects of integration policies. In all these fields, legislative changes made by27 cabinets of varying political composition in the period between 1996 and2010 will be measured and compared.
A central argument of this article is that changes in immigration andintegration policies cannot be explained without taking account of theinteraction between radical right parties and centre-right parties in (andoutside) government. Radical right parties have in all cases enteredgovernment as coalition partners of centre-right parties. In some respects,the bargaining position of radical right parties in coalition negotiations andin cabinet meetings with centre-right parties has been relatively weak. Theyhave mostly been junior partners.1 Moreover, radical right parties aresituated on the far right pole of the left–right continuum, which gives themfew coalition alternatives (Smith 1991). In these respects they have been at adisadvantage. On the other hand, they sometimes have the advantage ofdominating the political agenda with an issue they own, and where there isno party consensus (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008, 612–13). In orderto provide more insight into the respective roles of centre-right and radicalright parties in coalition governments, a case by case analysis will bepresented in the last part of the article.
To begin with, however, the concept of influence needs to be clarified. Theassessment of influence in office is complicated by the fact that radical rightparties have so far only entered government as coalition partners. Even ifsignificant policy changes occur as a result of their entry into government, itcannot be concluded that these changes are a result of the direct influence ofradical right parties.
The Influence of Radical Right Parties in Office
Even before radical right parties enter office, they are deemed highlyinfluential. A distinction is generally made between the indirect and the
512 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
direct influence of radical right parties. As Schain (2006) has argued, radicalright parties may have considerable indirect influence once they breakthrough electorally. The electoral success of radical right parties variesnationally, but overall it has been increasing over recent decades and there isno sign that this trend is reversing. On average, support in national electionshas grown to 10 per cent in the most recent national elections, with peaks ofalmost 30 per cent in Austria and Switzerland. This indicates that there is agrowing pressure on other parties to reconsider their policy agendas withrespect to the key issues that radical right parties have successfullypoliticised. If other parties decide to compete by also taking a tougherline on immigration and integration issues, the indirect effect may be thatpolicy agendas and eventually policy output will shift towards the morerestrictive and assimilationist line favoured by radical right parties (Baleet al. 2009).
The pressure of this increasingly important element in electoralcompetition is weighing most on centre-right parties, because the appealof radical right parties is most tempting for voters on the right side of thepolitical spectrum. Many scholars, therefore, have regarded the increasinglyhard line on immigration and integration issues that centre-right partieshave adopted during the past 15 years as a reaction to the electoral successof radical right parties (Marthaler 2008; Schain 2006; Williams 2006).Others have questioned the idea that radical right parties have been soinfluential in this respect, arguing that centre-right parties have changedcourse before and independently of the electoral rise of radical right parties(Bale 2008; Boswell and Hough, 2008: 339; Money 1999; Van Kersbergenand Krouwel 2008).
Social democratic parties are also assumed to have been pressed by theelectoral success of radical right parties to follow a tougher line onimmigration and integration issues. Some scholars conclude, however, thatmost social democratic parties end up mixing and matching rather thanadopting the position of the new competitor (Bale et al. 2009: 423). Othershave asserted that there is still a clear distinction between left- and right-wing policy agendas, even though the left has become stricter on someaspects of immigration policy (Duncan and Van Hecke 2008: 434; Lahav2004).
Radical right parties have potentially direct influence over policy outputwhen they gain office. Whether these parties have indeed profited from theiropportunities in office to influence policy output directly is a matter ofdispute. The significance of radical right parties entering government forpolicy agendas has been assessed mainly in case studies and findings varysubstantially. Some studies indicate that gaining office made little or nodifference for policy output. The policy results of (some) coalitions includingradical right parties do not deviate much from previous or subsequentgovernments, according to these findings (Duncan 2010; Geden 2005; Tarchi2008). Some scholars have emphasised that radical right parties tend to
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 513
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
perform weakly in office due to difficulties they have organisationally inmaking the step from opposition to government (Heinisch 2003; Mudde2007: 266, 281). In contrast, other findings indicate that radical right partiesin government had a substantial (direct or indirect) impact on policy output(Lucardie 2008; Minkenberg 2001: 16; Zaslove 2004).
Part of this disagreement may be a result of conceptual differences ratherthan empirical findings. The central concept of influence is being used indifferent ways in these studies, some focusing more on direct and others onindirect influence. This article will focus in a case by case analysis on themost direct forms of influence that can be exerted by radical right parties inoffice. Whether these parties will manage to deliver the promised goods oncethey are in office depends on gaining the crucial ministerial posts and on theperformance of their ministers. Direct influence is conceived here as havingtwo dimensions. It is direct in relation to its object, that is policy output inits final and decisive stage. It is also direct in relation to the actor, in thesense that this influence is not enacted through an intermediate actor or achain of actors. Effective input in negotiations about coalition agreements,for instance, may be conceived as direct with regard to the actor, but thisinfluence is indirect in the sense that these agreements are intermediate stepsin the process of policymaking. Purely indirect forms of influence – that isinfluence through other actors and on policy agendas rather than policyoutput – are prevalent when radical right parties operate outside theexecutive arena. Indirect forms of influence may remain importantmechanisms once radical right parties have entered office. As Minkenbergconcluded, the interaction between centre-right and radical right parties isnot only a crucial issue outside government, but also in office (Bale 2008;Minkenberg 2002).
Cases
Since the beginning of this century radical right parties have participated innational governments in five Western European countries. In Austria, theFreiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) assumed office in 2000, succeeded bythe Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich (BZO) in 2003. In Italy, Lega Nord (LN)joined the second Berlusconi government in 2001. A year later the DutchLijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) was invited to participate in a government coalitionled by the Christian democrats after the radical right party had won alandslide victory in the 2002 elections. The Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)had been represented in the Swiss Federal Council for many years, but in2003 the radical wing of the party got the upper hand in the council when itsleader Christoph Blocher was appointed to this executive body. Finally, thecase of the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) has been included, even though the partydid not formally enter government. It became a support party to a minoritygovernment led by the Danish liberals in 2001, and de facto the partybecame a coalition member.2 Although the Danish cabinets supported by
514 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
the DF are categorised as coalition cabinets with radical right parties, thesecabinets will be evaluated as special cases.
Thus, by now six radical right parties have participated in nationalgovernments, either as full-blown coalition partners or as recognisedsupporters of a minority government (see Appendix I).3 As one of theseparties has managed a second term, the number of coalition governmentsincluding radical right parties (RR coalitions) totals seven.
Nine cabinets directly preceding or succeeding the seven cases of RRcoalitions have been added. The preceding governments were all incumbentat the end of the 1990s or around the turn of the century. In this period, theissue of immigration was already high on the political agenda in the fivecountries (Bjorklund and Andersen 2002: 110; Hofhansel 2008; Perlmutter2002: 290–94; Van Oers 2008: 43; Williams 2006). Moreover, in all thecountries but one, radical right parties were electorally successful in the late1990s. The exceptional case in this respect was the Netherlands. The radicalright party Centrum-Democraten only got 0.5 per cent of the votes in thenational election of 1998 and withered away after that. The new radical rightparty led by Pim Fortuyn (LPF) entered government in 2003 only fivemonths after it had been established. Governments that succeeded coalitionsincluding radical right parties have also been selected for comparison. Suchcabinets came into being in Austria (2006), Italy (2006) and the Netherlands(2003, 2007).
To avoid selective bias regarding the electoral strength and officeopportunities of radical right parties, four countries have been added inwhich radical right parties have not participated in any coalitiongovernment so far. The electoral performance of radical right parties inthese four countries varies substantially. In Germany and Sweden theelectoral performance of radical right parties has been relatively weak; inFrance and Belgium radical right parties have been on average strongelectoral competitors. In these four countries all the cabinets in the selectedperiod from 1996 to 2010, – a decade in which immigration policies werehigh on the public and political agenda in Western European countries –have been included. In total, the policy output of 27 cabinets of varyingcomposition in nine countries in the period between 1996 and 2010 will becompared.
Measuring Immigration and Integration Legislation
In order to assess the influence of the radical right parties on immigrationand integration policy, an index has been developed that measures to whatextent new legislation has a programmatically (radical) right-wing character.Comparing policy change across national contexts and across time requiresabstraction from the specific policy goals that each radical right partypresented in its election programme. Therefore, the index has been derivedfrom the ideological characteristics this party family has in common.
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 515
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
The elementary assumption upon which the index is built is that theideological core of these parties is nativism. Radical right parties are anti-immigrant because they regard newcomers as a threat to a homogenousnational culture (Betz 2003; Mudde 2007: 18–20). Radical right parties arealso characteristically authoritarian; their ‘law and order’ preferences areclosely linked to their anti-immigration position. Immigration is associatedwith crime or terrorism, and radical right parties underline that nationalsecurity concerns prevail over concerns for the rights of immigrants.
As manifesto research makes clear, Christian Democratic and Con-servative parties are also authoritarian and nationalist. These centre-rightparties are preoccupied with restricting immigration, because theirideological raison d’etre is to defend national security and nationalcommunitarian values.4 Policy differences regarding immigration andintegration between the mainstream and radical right can be perceived asa matter of degree rather than as outcomes of diverging ideologicalperspectives (Bouillaud 2007). The index, therefore, represents a continuumthat runs from the policy goals of the mainstream right to those of theradical right.
Right-wing and left-wing immigration policies, on the other hand, differmore substantially. The left has not been immune to the politicisation of theissue: research shows that mainstream parties of the left have becomeimportant contributors to the increase of legislative initiatives concerningimmigration in the course of the 1990s (Williams 2006: 183–6). Yet thereremain clear differences between the programmes of the mainstream left, onthe one hand, and those of the mainstream and radical right, on the other(Duncan and Van Hecke 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav 2004).
Based on these considerations, the Nationalist Immigration and Integra-tion Policy (NIIP) index measures qualitatively to what extent the legislativeoutput on immigration and integration of the eight coalition governmentshas a (radical) right-wing signature. The index includes only the moststraightforward indicators, excluding policy outcomes and involving onlylegal aspects. As Helbling (2010) has argued, simple indicators are quiteadequate to measure immigration policies. Moreover, it is important toseparate policy output and policy outcomes. In line with these principles,two fields have been distinguished in which radical right parties seek toaffect policies: 1) immigration policy and 2) integration policy.
The first field is that of immigration policies in a broad sense. Citizenship/denizenship legislation is central, because this is the subfield that has beensubject to fundamental changes during recent decades, while it alsofundamentally divides left- and right-wing parties. The nationalist outlookof radical and centre-right parties implies a preference for citizenship basedon cultural and ethnic affinity. Such an affinity can be acquired naturally bybirth or through the process of cultural assimilation. Right-wing parties willhence be in favour of a ‘thick’ cultural notion of citizenship. Empiricalresearch affirms this thesis (Howard 2010: 747). The liberal policy of the left
516 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
is principally opposed to the nationalist and authoritarian values of theright. The left tends to conceive of citizenship as primarily being based onjus soli – i.e. children of foreigners born in a country’s territory can acquirecitizenship – while the (radical) right privileges jus sanguinis to guaranteecultural and ethnic affinity. Moreover, whereas the left tends towardtolerance of dual nationality, the right tends to regard dual nationality as athreat to national homogeneity and loyalty.5 Finally, the right tends topromote many and high barriers to residence and naturalisation for non-EUimmigrants, again with the exception of those belonging to the cultural orethnic ‘family’. The right-wing concern for security is, for instance, apparentin demands for a strictly clean criminal record as a condition for a residencepermit or naturalisation. In sum, in the subfield of citizenship/denizenshippolicies, positive scores will be given to policies that strengthen jus sanguinis,heighten barriers to naturalisation and residence, and restrict dualnationalities (Baubock et al. 2006; Groenendijk 2006; Howard 2010;Odmalm 2007; Vink 2010).
A major part of legislative output can be subsumed under this heading,but in order to be comprehensive three other subfields have been added tothe NIIP index: asylum policies, family reunification and illegality. Withrespect to asylum legislation, radical right parties endorse highly restrictiveasylum procedures, with less right of appeal. Family reunification legislationis mainly being used as an instrument to reduce immigration by raising thebarriers to family reunification. Legislation that deals with illegalimmigrants will be strongly motivated by security concerns and deterrence.Making illegal immigration a criminal offence, opposing regularisation andminimising access to basic goods are goals promoted by the radical rightwith regard to irregular immigrants.
A second field that should be distinguished is integration policies, a termused here in the strict sense of policies that support and regulate civic andcultural integration. In this respect, right-wing parties not only tend to bemore restrictive than left-wing parties, but they also value culturalassimilation and loyalty to the nation. Civic integration policies can beregarded on the one hand as instrumental for the civic and culturalintegration of immigrants, but they can also be regarded as potentiallynegative sanctions affecting one’s legal status (Goodman 2010; Joppke andMorawska 2003). Language tests as a condition for entry, for instance, canbe used to restrict immigration from poor countries. As various researchershave noted, civic integration courses have been used to raise the barriers toentry, residency or naturalisation (Baubock and Joppke 2010). For the NIIPindex it is therefore relevant to focus on what Goodman has identified as aprohibitive strategy that combines high hurdles for eligibility with increasedemphasis on assimilation through integration tests (Goodman 2010: 765).Such policies set relatively high standards for knowledge of language, extendintegration requirements to civic orientation, history and culture, and tendto demand loyalty oaths and commitment to political or cultural values.
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 517
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
This exacting and assimilationist notion of integration will turn into aprohibitive strategy when the passing of integration tests becomesconditional for entry, residency or naturalisation (Jacobs and Rea 2007).(For an overview of the indicators and an explanation of how policy changehas been measured, see Appendix II.) In order to assess optimally the rangeand substance of changes implied in new legislation, varying sources havebeen used. Apart from scrutinising primary legislative sources, expertreports, articles and books have been consulted for contextual information.6
Policy Output Compared
Figure 1 shows that there is a significant difference between right-wing andleft-wing cabinets (see also Appendix I).7 Centre-left parties in office mainlyscored negatively on the NIIP index, which means that they passed
FIGURE 1
POLICY OUTPUT* OF CABINETS OF VARIED COMPOSITION**
*The mean of the total scores of output of each cabinet in proportion to the number of months
each cabinet held office (including caretaker periods).
**CL¼Centre-Left; CR¼Centre-Right; RR¼Radical Right.
518 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
immigration and integration legislation that was liberal rather thanrestrictive and assimilationist. In other words, the policies of left-wingcabinets deviated ideologically from those of centre-right and radical rightparties in government. The only exception to this is the Schroder II cabinet(2002–2005) with a positive result, albeit a small one. The main immigrationlaw of this cabinet, the Zuwanderungsgesetz (1 January 2005), was the finalresult of long negotiations with the opposition party CDU.
The output of centre cabinets, including centre-left and centre-rightparties, varies from slightly negative to slightly positives scores. The Dutch‘purple’ cabinet Kok II (1998–2002) stands out with a distinctively positivescore. In contrast, the Belgium ‘purple’ cabinet Verhofstadt I (1999–2003)was clearly liberal; this cabinet passed, among others, a nationality law thathas been called the ‘Snel Belgwet’ (a fast lane to Belgian citizenship).
Centre-right cabinets score on average much higher on the index thancentre cabinets. The main exception is the Swedish minority cabinetReinfeldt I (2006–2010) that managed with the help of opposition party theGreens to pass a liberal migration law in 2008. In contrast, the Frenchcentre-right cabinet Raffarin (2002–2007) introduced various restrictive andassimilationist measures when two so-called Sarkozy Laws were passed. TheDutch Balkenende II/III cabinet (2003–2007) also scored high on the plusside of the index with two laws on integration – one with a language/integration test taken abroad to be passed as a condition for a visa forfamily reunion with a spouse in the Netherlands – and an Aliens Act thatraised age barriers for family reunion.
Finally, cabinets including radical right parties scored on average as highas centre-right cabinets. Within this group the results varied substantially.The Danish minority cabinet Rasmussen I (2001–2005), supported by theDF, stands out as the coalition government that succeeded best in shiftingimmigration and integration legislation to the right. The Danish coalitionwas highly productive in this first period, producing various amendments tothe Nationality Law. Family reunion was drastically restricted by a ‘24 yearsrule’, that made settlement in Denmark after marriage with a non-EUpartner or a Nordic foreign national only possible if both partners are 24years or older. The reduced welfare benefits for immigrant workers werealso remarkable. Generally, terms of access to citizenship were tightened.The second Rasmussen cabinet (2005–2007) achieved far fewer changes inthis policy field.
Next to Denmark, immigration and integration policies have changedmost substantially in Austria. The Schussel II cabinet (2003–2006), whichinitially included the FPO and later the BZO, also produced several lawswith a radical right profile. The Austrian parliament, for instance, accepteda new Asylum Law in October 2003 that, among other things, restricted theappeals process of asylum applicants. This law was eventually declaredunconstitutional by the Austrian Constitutional Court. Moreover, natur-alisation requirements and civic integration demands were raised in the
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 519
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Settlement and Residence Act 2005. The policy output of the first Schusselcabinet, however, was moderate.
The SVP, with leader Blocher as Minister of Justice in the Swiss FederalCouncil (2003–2007), was only marginally successful in putting its stamp onthe immigration and integration policy of the Swiss government. TheAsylum Law, initiated by Blocher and accepted by referendum in 2006, wasclearly restricting the rights of asylum applicants and increasing coercivemeasures. The Immigration Law accepted in 2006 was relatively moderate,however. The party also lost two referendums it had sponsored in 2004. TheSVP opposed, among other things, the right to appeal against negativeoutcomes of naturalisation requests, but lost the referendum that wasrequired to change the constitution. On the other hand, the partycampaigned successfully for a referendum to reject legislation that relievedthe requirements for naturalisation of second and third generations ofimmigrants.
Lega Nord in the Berlusconi II cabinet (2001–2006) had even moredifficulties in bringing about policy change in the preferred direction. Policychange – mainly based on the Bossi–Fini Law – could only partly be markedas radical right. The Bossi–Fini Law put a heavier penalty of imprisonmenton breaching orders to leave the country and restricted the renewability ofresidence permits, but the law also brought the largest amnesty in Europeever for immigrant workers ‘sans papiers’.
Finally, the Dutch cabinet with the LPF was the least successful, with a nilscore. This cabinet lasted only three months and therefore no new legislationwas passed.
In sum, notwithstanding the remarkable results of some cabinetsincluding radical right parties, the immigration and integration lawsintroduced by these cabinets have not been more restrictive and assimila-tionist than those of centre-right cabinets. The mean score of the threeexclusively centre-right cabinets (þ1.14) almost equals that of the sevencoalition cabinets in which radical right parties have participated (þ1.18).Note that the Danish cabinets have been counted as coalitions includingradical right parties. If they had been regarded as centre-right cabinets, thelatter would on average have scored even higher than the remainingcoalitions including radical right parties. The conclusion should be thatright-wing cabinets generally have clearly endorsed a more restrictive andassimilationist policy line since the late 1990s, but there is no evidence thatradical right parties in office are directly responsible for that change ofcourse.
Varied Patterns of Impact
Why have radical right parties not managed to make a difference in office?Looking at the cases more closely, a distinction should be made betweencoalitions that achieved remarkable policy gains in a radical right direction
520 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
(with a score higher than 1.00 on the NIIP index), and others with moderateor minimum results (scores of 0.5–1.00 or 0.00–0.5). The first group consistsof the Danish Rasmussen I cabinet (2001–2005) and the Austrian Schussel IIcabinet (2003–2006). The Swiss cabinet of 2003–2007 and the Rasmussen IIcabinet (2005–2007) belong to the middle category. Finally, the cabinetswith minimum or no results are the Italian Berlusconi II/III cabinet (2001–2006), the Austrian Schussel I cabinet (2000–2003) and the DutchBalkenende I cabinet (2002–2003).
Beginning with the last group, it is clear that the LPF, the FPO and LegaNord failed to use their opportunities for direct influence in office. The LPFdid not make a bad bargain at the start of the Balkenende I cabinet. Thecoalition agreement on immigration issues emphasised the need for a morerestrictive immigration policy and for a resolute fight against illegalimmigration; it also made successful integration a condition for a permanentresidence permit and full allowances, while raising the costs of integrationcourses for immigrants (Werken aan vertrouwen 2002) However, theinfluence of the LPF on this agreement should not be overrated. Thecoalition partner Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) had alreadyadopted a more restrictive position before the LPF was launched (Pellikaanet al. 2003: 40). Notwithstanding this promising start, the LPF was out ofoffice after three months and no results had been achieved. The fall of theshort-lived Balkenende I cabinet had been due to the organisationalweakness of the LPF. Internal conflicts and two openly quarrelling LPFministers made the centre-right partners Christen-Democratisch Appel(CDA) and VVD decide to end the coalition. It is remarkable though thatin the two years following the elections of 2002 both the centre-rightcoalition parties, VVD and CDA, shifted their policy programmes further tothe right, even though the LPF was no longer a serious competitor after thenational elections in 2003 (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008; Van Kersbergenand Krouwel 2008). The LPF was severely punished by the voters and wasreduced to an opposition party with no teeth. The centre-right partiesindependently followed a more restrictive and assimilationist course afterthe defeat of the LPF, demonstrating their commitment to the policy line ofthe formerly made agreement with the LPF.
Like the Dutch cabinet with the LPF, the Schussel I cabinet did not sit outthe regular term to the end. When the FPO had entered government it wasplagued by problems due to a lack of cadre and lack of party discipline ofministers (Heinisch 2003). Moreover, the internal relations between theparty on the ground, the central organisation and the party in office wereweak, with Haider as governor in Carinthia openly opposing the FPOministers. After three years, the majority of the FPO ministers resigned, andthe party was severely punished by the voters for its apparent inability tofunction successfully in office.
In Italy, Lega Nord was also not very successful in shifting immigrationand integration policy to the right. While the LPF and FPO failed due to
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 521
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
organisational weakness, this was not the main reason why the Lega Nordachieved so little. Although the party also had to replace several ministers inthe Berlusconi II cabinet, these replacements were not due to weakrecruiting procedures of the party. Lega Nord was not new in the executivearena. The step from opposition to government had already been made in1994. In the second Berlusconi government (2001–2005) the coalitionpartners were committed to making a success of their renewed alliance. LegaNord leader Bossi had used the time in opposition to develop a strategy thatcombined radical rhetoric with strategic flexibility in order to manage thetensions in the party between grassroots activists and high-ranking partyofficials (Albertazzi 2009; Tarchi 2008). Bossi managed in cooperation withAlleanza Nationale leader Fini to transpose part of its immigration stancesinto legislation. However, Bossi had to reckon with the moderating stancesof the Christian Democratic coalition partner UDC and the increasingdistance of the positions taken by AN leader Fini (Fella and Ruzza 2007).
When we turn to the group of cabinets with moderate to high policychange, the direct impact of radical right parties does not appear to beevident. In Denmark, the policy change made by the Rasmussen I cabinetwas most impressive; immigration and integration policy shifted more to theright than in any of the other countries. The centre-right bloc of Liberalsand Conservatives had already changed their focus to immigration issues in1998. When the smaller social-liberal party defected from the right-wingbloc, its moderating influence no longer restrained the centre-right parties.The Liberals in particular made a sharp turn under a new leader (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 373). This paved the way for a coalition withthe radical right.
Of course, the DF did not have access to ministerial posts and could onlyindirectly affect policy through coalition agreements. The cases of the LPFand FPO show how difficult it can be organisationally to make the step fromopposition to office, and especially how difficult it can be to recruitcandidates for office who are sufficiently competent. The Danish People’sParty has not so far had to pass this test, and it is still an open questionwhether the party would have been able to obtain results if it had formallyentered office.
The substantial policy change of the Austrian Schussel II cabinet cannotbe credited to the FPO/BZO. A comparison with the Dutch case isinteresting. In contrast to the Dutch case, where the organisationalweakness of the LPF had also brought down the cabinet, the OVP gavethe FPO a second chance after FPO ministers had resigned and earlyelections had to be held in 2003. However, the FPO remained a weakenedcoalition partner and the party split in 2005. Its centre-right coalitionpartner OVP took the lead in policy change. Similar to the Dutch case, thecentre-right coalition partner used the opportunity of the weakened positionof the radical right party to take over the initiative on immigration policy(Bale 2003; Geden 2005). The high scores on the NIIP index of Balkenende
522 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
II/III and Schussel II are results that can be claimed by centre-right partiesrather than by radical right parties.
In Switzerland, the SVP succeeded best in holding on to its restrictiveimmigration and integration policy in government, notwithstanding the factthat it had to reckon with coalition partners of varying political colours. Theparty was not a newcomer in government, but it did have some adaptationproblems after it obtained its second seat in the Federal Council in 2003.The problems were due to the existence of two factions within the party. Theradicalisation of the party in the 1990s led by the Zurich-based leaderChristoph Blocher implied a considerable reorganisation, but the party waswell prepared for government (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007). Tensionswithin the party remained under control until the elections of 2007.Moreover, the other government parties, the centre-left SPS included, madeno serious attempts to marginalise the SVP. Newcomer Blocher succeededas Minister of Justice in presenting a more restrictive Immigrant andAsylum Law after just a few months in office. The SVP could follow arelatively independent course, because coalition governments in Switzerlandare not bound by preceding policy agreements (Geden 2005: 79). Moreover,the SVP exploited the opportunities of direct democracy, mobilising popularopposition to legislative proposals it did not agree with (Frolich-Steffen andRensman 2007: 129).
In sum, radical right parties do not gain much credit for delivering whenin office. The main reason for their failure to use the opportunities ofexecutive power is their organisational weakness. The SVP is the main andonly exception. In all the other cases, the direct influence of radical rightparties on policy change was rather marginal. That is not to say that theseparties have not indirectly contributed to sometimes substantial shifts to theright. The case of the DF, for instance, indicates that indirect influence inoffice should not be underrated.
Conclusions
Right-wing cabinets generally have realised a change of course towardsmore restrictive and assimilationist immigration and integration policiessince the late 1990s. Left-wing parties have not followed this trend: they stillappear to be committed to a distinctly liberal immigration and integrationpolicy. The comparison of policy output as measured by the NIIP indexmakes clear that parties matter. The idea that the direct impact of radicalright parties in office has been an important factor in policy change shouldbe discarded, however. The one and only exception in this respect is theSVP. Gaining not only an extra seat in the Federal Council in 2003, but alsothe important Ministry of Justice, the party managed to make a difference,albeit a moderate one.
Centre-right parties, however, are primarily responsible for the change ofcourse in immigration and integration policies. Ideologically, the distance
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 523
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
between centre-right parties and radical right parties had already beendiminished with respect to immigration and integration issues at the end ofthe 1990s. Centre-right parties can rightfully claim the main credit fordelivering when in office. Their impact came most clearly to the fore in thesubstantial policy change realised by exclusively centre-right cabinets, but itwas also manifest in coalition cabinets with radical right parties. The latterparties tended to miss the opportunities for directly influencing immigrationand integration policies. The disappointing achievements of radical rightparties in office can be best explained by their organisational weakness.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Anouk Kootstra for her research assistance, and I amgrateful for the valuable comments of two anonymous reviewers.
Notes
1. In the 1999 elections the FPO beat the OVP by a small margin. However, the two parties
gained an equal number of parliamentary seats and the OVP took the lead in the coalition
negotiations. The FPO was forced to acknowledge the strong bargaining position of the
Christian democratic party and had to grant it the chancellorship. The Swiss situation is even
more complicated, since Switzerland is not a parliamentary democracy. The country is not
ruled by a government coalition, but by the Swiss Federal Council in which no distinction is
made between senior and junior coalition members. Thus, even though the SVP emerged as
the largest party after the Swiss election of 19 October 2003, it only appoints two of the seven
members of the Swiss Federal Council.
2. Radical right parties that support minority governments are de facto coalition members,
because they are part of ‘a more or less permanent coalition that ensures acceptance of all or
almost all government proposals’ (De Swaan 1973: 85; Strøm 1990: 60–61).
3. From 2001 to 2005 the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FRP) also supported a minority
government, but its position was less formalised than that of its Danish counterpart. This
case is therefore not included in this article.
4. That is not to imply that the mainstream right could easily take an equally clear hard-line
stance. Shifting to the far right side may interfere with other core values. Christian
Democrats, for instance, often also value charity and hospitality as part of a social-
conservative tradition, even though this may be more manifest at the grassroots level than at
the level of the party leadership (Bale 2008; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008).
5. That is with the exception of dual nationality for residents belonging to the nation, but living
abroad. They should not be required to discard their original citizenship status.
6. The primary and secondary sources that have been consulted for the NIIP index are too
numerous to be included here as references. Please mail the author for an overview:
7. The conducted ANOVA test reached significance for the difference in mean scores for right-
wing cabinets (M¼ 1.24, SD¼ 1.33) and left-wing cabinets (M¼70.24, SD¼ 0.27) on
policy output, F (9.564), DF (1.16) at 0.05 level.
References
Albertazzi, Daniele (2009). ‘Reconciling ‘‘Voice’’ and ‘‘Exit’’: Swiss and Italian Populists in
Power’, Politics, 29:1, 1–10.
524 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Bale, Tim (2003). ‘Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and the Extreme Right in
Europe’s Bipolarising Party Systems’, West European Politics, 26:3, 67–90.
Bale, Tim (2008). ‘Turning round the Telescope. Centre-Parties and Immigration and
Integration Policy in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3, 315–30.
Bale, Tim, Christopher Green Pedersen, Andre Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter
(2009). ‘If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to
the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe’, Political Studies, 58:3,
410–26.
Baubock, Rainer, and Christian Joppke, eds. (2010). ‘How Liberal are Citizenship Tests?’, EUI
Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.
Baubock, Rainer, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, and Harald Waldrauch, eds. (2006).
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European States. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 329–67.
Betz, Hans-Georg (2003). ‘Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western
Europe’, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.), Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-
Nationalism. London: Merlin, 193–210.
Boswell, Christina, and Dan Hough (2008). ‘Politicizing Migration: Opportunity or Liability
for the Centre-right in Germany?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3, 331–48.
Bouillaud, Christophe (2007). ‘La Legislation Italienne des Annees 2001–2005 Porte-t-elle la
Marque des Nouvelles Droites?’, in Pascal Delwit and Philippe Poirier (eds.), Extreme Droite
et Pouvoir en Europe. Brussels: Universite de Bruxelles, 265–91.
Carter, Elisabeth (2005). The Extreme Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. Success or
Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
De Swaan, Abraham (1973). Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal
Theories of Coalition Government Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Duncan, Fraser (2010). ‘Immigration and Integration Policy and the Austrian Radical Right in
Office: The FPO/BZO, 2000–2006’, Contemporary Politics, 16:4, 337–54.
Duncan, Fraser, and Steven van Hecke (2008). ‘Immigration and the Transnational European
Centre-Right: A Common Programmatic Response?’, Journal of European Public Policy,
15:3, 432–52.
Fella, Stefano, and Carlo Ruzza (2006). ‘Changing Political Opportunities and the Re-invention
of the Italian Right’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 8:2, 179–200.
Fennema, Meindert (1997). ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-
Immigrant Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics, 3:4, 473–92.
Frolich-Steffen, Susanne, and Lars Rensmann (2007). ‘Conditions for Failure and Success of
Right-wing Populist Parties’, in Pascal Delwit and Philippe Poirier (eds.), Extreme Droite et
Pouvoir en Europe. Brussels: Universite de Bruxelles, 117–41.
Geden, Oliver (2005). ‘Identitatsdiskurs und Politische Macht: Die Rechtspopulistische
Mobilisierung von Ethnozentrismus im Spannungsfeld von Oppositionspolitik und
Regierung am Beispiel von FP}O und SVP’, in Susanne Frolich-Steffen and Lars Rensmann
(eds.), Populisten an der Macht: Populistische Regierungsparteien in West- und Osteuropa.
Vienna: Braumuller, 69–83.
Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke (2005). ‘European Immigration Policies in Comparative
Perspective: Issue Salience, Partisanship and Immigrant Rights’, Comparative European
Politics, 3:1, 1–22.
Goodman, Sara W. (2010). ‘Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying,
Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 36:5, 753–72.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Jesper Krogstrup (2008). ‘Immigration as a Political Issue in
Denmark and Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research, 47:5, 610–34.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Pontus Odmalm (2008). ‘Going Different Ways? Right-wing
Parties and the Immigrant Issue in Denmark and Sweden’, Journal of European Public Policy,
15:3, 367–81.
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 525
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Groenendijk, Kees (2006). ‘The Legal Integration of Potential Citizens: Denizens in the EU in
the Final Years before the Implementation of the 2003 Directive on Long-Term Resident
Third Country Nationals’, in Rainer Baubock, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, and Harald
Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European
States. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 385–410.
Heinisch, Reinhard (2003). ‘Success in Opposition-Failure in Government: Explaining the
Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office’, West European Politics, 26:3,
91–130.
Helbling, Marc (2010). ‘Which Indicators are Most Useful for Comparing Citizenship
Policies?’, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/380-which-indicators-
are-most-useful-for-comparing-citizenship-policies (accessed 7 January 2011).
Hofhansel, Claus (2008). ‘Citizenship in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland: Courts,
Legislatures, and Administrators’, The International Migration Review, 42:1, 163–92.
Howard, Marc M. (2010). ‘The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe:
Explaining Continuity and Change’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:5, 735–51.
Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2008). ‘What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-
Examining Grievance Models in Seven Successful Cases’, Comparative Political Studies, 41:1,
3–23.
Jacobs, Dirk, and Andrea Rea (2007). ‘The End of National Models? Integration Courses and
Citizenship Trajectories in Europe’, International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 9:2, 264–
83.
Joppke, Christian, and Ewa Morawska, eds. (2003). Toward Assimilation and Citizenship:
Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Lahav, Gallya (2004). Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lucardie, Paul (2008). ‘The Netherlands: Populism versus Pillarization’, in Daniele Albertazzi
and Duncan McDonnell (eds.), Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western
European Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 151–66.
Lucardie, Paul, and Pierre Ghillebaert (2008). ‘The Short Road to Power – And the Long Way
Back: Newly Governing Parties in the Netherlands’, in Kris Deschouwer (ed.), New Parties in
Government: In Power for the First Time. London: Routledge, 65–85.
Marthaler, Sally (2008). Nicolas Sarkozy and the Politics of French Immigration Policy’,
Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3, 382–97.
Mazzoleni, Oscar, and Damir Skenderovic (2007). ‘The Rise and Impact of the Swiss People’s
Party: Challenging the Rules of Governance in Switzerland’, in Pascal Delwit and Philippe
Poirier (eds.), Extreme droite et pouvoir en Europe. Brussels: University of Brussels, 85–117.
Minkenberg, Michael (2001). ‘The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy
Effects’, West European Politics, 24:4, 1–21.
Minkenberg, Michael (2002). ‘The New Radical Right in the Political Process: Interaction
Effects in France and Germany’, in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay
(eds.), Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western
Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 245–69.
Money, Jeannette (1999). Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration
Control. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mudde, Cas (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Odmalm, Pontus (2007). ‘One Size Fits All? European Citizenship, National Citizenship
Policies and Integration Requirements’, Representation, 43:1, 19–34.
Pellikaan, Huib, Tom van der Meer, and Sarah L. de Lange (2003). ‘The Road from a
Depoliticized to a Centrifugal Democracy’, Acta Politica, 38:1–2, 23–49.
Perlmutter, Ted (2002). ‘The Politics of Restriction: The Effects of Xenophobic Parties on
Italian Immigration Policy and German Asylum Policy’, in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg,
and Patrick Hossay (eds.), Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme
Right in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 269–301.
526 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Schain, Martin A. (2006). ‘The Extreme-right and Immigration Policy-making: Measuring
Direct and Indirect Effects’, West European Politics, 29:2, 270–89.
Smith, Gordon (1991). ‘The Search of Small Parties, Problems of Definition, Classification, and
Significance’, in Ferdinand Muller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in
Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives. London: Sage, 23–40.
Strøm, Kaare (1990). Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Tarchi, Marco (2008). ‘Italy: A Country of Many Populisms’, in Daniele Albertazzi and
Duncan McDonnell (eds.), Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European
Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 84–100.
Van der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie (2000). ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties in
Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?’, European Journal of Political Research, 37:1, 77–102.
Van Kersbergen, Kees, and Andre Krouwel (2008). ‘A Double Edged Sword! The Dutch
Centre-Right and the ‘‘Foreigners Issue’’’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3, 398–414.
Van Oers, Ricky (2008). ‘From Liberal to Restrictive Citizenship Policies: The Case of the
Netherlands’, International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 10:1, 40–59.
Vink, Maarten (2010). ‘Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe: International Framework
and Domestic Trends’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36:5, 713–34.
Werken aan vertrouwen (2002). Strategisch Akkoord voor kabinet CDA, LPF, VVD, 3 July,
available at http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl (accessed 12 September 2011).
Williams, Michelle H. (2006). The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European
Democracies. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Zaslove, Andrej (2004). ‘Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right
Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9:1, 99–
118.
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 527
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
APPENDIX
I
THE
POLIC
YOUTPUT
OF
27CABIN
ETS,1996–2010
Case
Country
Year
Cabinet
Composition
Classification
Months
Policy
output
Output/
months
1Italy
1996–2001
ProdiI,D’A
lemaI,
D’A
lemaII,Amato
IL’U
livo,DS
CL
61
74.00
70.79
2Italy
11/6/2001–2006
BerlusconiII,III
FI,AN,LN,UDC,NPSI,(PRI)
CRþRR
59
þ0.50
þ0.10
3Italy
2006–2008
ProdiII
L’U
nione
CL
24
70.50
70.25
4Austria
1996–2000
VranitzkyV,KlimaI
SPO,OVP
CLþCR
46
72.50
70.83
5Austria
2000–2003
Schussel
IOVP,FPO
CRþRR
37
þ1.50
þ0.49
6Austria
2003–2006
Schussel
IIOVP,BZO
CRþRR
46
þ7.50
þ1.96
7Austria
2006–2008
Gusenbauer
ISPO,OVP
CLþCR
23
0.00
0.00
8Netherlands
1998–2002
KokII
PvdA,VVD,D’66
CLþCR
45
þ3.50
þ0.93
9Netherlands
2002–2003
BalkenendeI
CDA,VVD,LPF
CRþRR
10
0.00
0.00
10
Netherlands
2003–2007
BalkenendeII,III
CDA,VVD,(D
’66)
CR
45
þ8.50
þ2.27
11
Netherlands
2007–2010
BalkenendeIV
CDA,PvdA,CU
CRþCL
44
71.00
70.27
12
Switzerland
1999–2003
FDP,CVP,SP,SVP
CRþCL
50
þ0.50
þ0.12
13
Switzerland
2003–2007
FDP,CVP,SP,SVP
CRþCLþRR
48
þ3.50
þ0.88
14
Denmark
1998–2001
P.N
.Rasm
ussen
IVSD,DRV
CL
44
71.00
70.27
15
Denmark
2001–2005
A.F.Rasm
ussen
IV,KF,(D
F)
CRþRR
39
þ13.50þ4.15
16
Denmark
2005–2007
A.F.Rasm
ussen
IIV,KF,(D
F)
CRþRR
33
þ2.00
þ0.73
17
Germany
1998–2002
Schroder
ISPD,Grue
CL
48
71.00
70.21
18
Germany
2002–2005
Schroder
IISPD,Grue
CL
37
þ0.50þ0.16
19
Germany
2005–2009
Merkel
ICDU/C
SU,SPD
CRþCL
47
þ2.00þ0.51
20
France
1997–2002
Jospin
PS,LV,PCF,MRC,PRG
CL
59
71.50
70.31
21
France
2002–2007
Raffarin
RPR,UDF/UMP,(N
C)
CR
60
þ7.00
þ1.40
22
Belgium
1999–2003
VerhofstadtI
VLD,PS,PRL/FDF,SP,AG.,EC.
CRþCL
48
75.50
71.50
23
Belgium
2003–2007
VerhofstadtII,III
VLD,PS,MR,SPA/Spirit
CRþCL
56
71.00
70.21
24
Belgium
2008–2010
LetermeI,Rompuy,LetermeII
CD&V/N
-VA,MR,PS,VLD,CDH
CRþ
CL
27
70.50
70.22
25
Sweden
1998–2002
PerssonII
SAP
CL
51
71.00
70.24
26
Sweden
2002–2006
PerssonIII
SAP
CL
44
0.00
0.00
27
Sweden
2006–2010
ReinfeldtI
MSP,CP,FP,Kd
CR
51
71.00
70.24
Note:CL¼centre-left;CR¼centre-right;RR¼radicalright.
528 T. Akkerman
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14
APPENDIX
II
CODEBOOK
NATIV
IST
IMM
IGRATIO
NAND
INTEGRATIO
NPOLIC
YIN
DEX
Immigrationpolicy
Field
Subfield
Citizenship
legislation
Asylum
legislation
Illegality
legislation
Family
reunificationlegislation
Integration
policy
Measures
*Residence
requirem
ents
firstgeneration
*Applicationprocedures
*Rights
toappeal
*Criminaloffence
*Length
ofdetention
*Children’srights
*Age,
incomeorother
requirem
ents
forspouses
*Language/integrationrequirem
ents
at
entry
*Cleancrim
inalrecord
requirem
ents
*Financialmeansrequirem
ents
*Groundsforexpulsion
*Regularisation,
partialorgeneral
*Agechildren
*Language/integrationrequirem
ents
for
residence
permitornaturalisation
*Barriers
forspouses(years
ofmarriage)
*Fees
*Accessto
basicgoods
*Level
languagetest
*Dualnationality
renunciationrequirem
ent
*Exceptions
*Additionalrequirem
ents:civic
orienta-
tion,loyaltyoath
orceremony,history
andculture
*Jussoliforsecondorthirdgenerationatbirth
orafter
birth
*Fees
*Fines
*Parentalresidency
requirem
ents
*Ethnic/culturalaffinityasgroundforaccess,residence
ornaturalisation
.‘Citizenship
policies’.Anincrease
ofresidence
requirem
ents
willresultinþ0.5
(1–2years)orþ1(4
2years).A
stricter
cleancrim
inalrecord
willvary
from
þ0.5
toþ1dependingonthesentence
(twoyears
ormore¼0.5)andthesanction(tem
porary
orpermanentexclusionfrom
naturalisation).Reductionsof
requirem
ents,easier
proceduresetc.
willresultin
adeductionof0.5
to1point.Theintroductionofjussoliwillresultin
principle
in71,butwhen
this
legislativechangehasmarginalim
pact
only
0.5
willbededucted.
.‘A
sylum
legislation’:0.5
willbeadded
withtheintroductionofmore
restrictiveprocedures,reductionofprotectionstatus,reductionofsocialassistance
or
more
coercivemeasuressuch
asdetentions.
.‘Illegality
legislation’:Regularisationoramnesty
willresultin
adeductionof0.5
to1pointdependingonthescale.Grantingorwithholdingpublichealth
services,publiceducationservices,shelteretc.
willresultin
addingordeducting0.5,when
childrenare
involved
anextra0.5
maybeadded.
.‘Familyreunionlegislation’:theintroductionofaminim
alagerequirem
entwillresultinþ0.5
(e.g.21years),orþ1when
theagerequirem
enthasbeenraised
substantially(e.g.24years).
.‘Civicintegrationlegislation’:theintroductionofalanguagecompetency
requirem
entatanelem
entary
levelwillresultinþ0.5.When
therequired
language
level
ishighatintroduction1pointwillbeadded,orwhen
raised
from
elem
entary
tohigh0.5.Fortheintroductionofaloyaltyoath,aculturalknowledge
testetc.,0.5
pointforeach
willbeadded.However,when
thesetestsare
introducedatentrylevelanextra0.5
pointwillbeadded,because
immigrants-to-be
willhavemore
diffi
cultyin
passingthesetests(G
oodman2010).
Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government 529
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Nor
th D
akot
a St
ate
Uni
vers
ity]
at 1
3:27
16
Nov
embe
r 20
14