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Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 27:43–51Copyright C© Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1040-2659 print; 1469-9982 onlineDOI: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1000191

Community-Based ProtectionMechanismsGEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

The global burden of conflict in the last decade shows that non-combatantsare among the most affected populations in conflict zones, particularly incases of protracted, low-intensity armed conflicts. For humanitarian actors itis thus crucial to increase the capacity of vulnerable populations by supportingthem with tools to recognize threats, reduce impact of violence, and mitigateconsequences of armed conflict.

The modalities of community-work to safeguard capacities is derivedfrom the soft approach of “unarmed civilian peacekeeping,” stressing

the “agency potential” civilians have due to a better understanding of thepolitical, economic, and social terrain of a given conflict situation. Withadequate responsive and sensitive mechanisms that can be devised for ef-fective peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the use of community-based Early-Warning/Early-Response (EWER) mechanisms gains utmost importance.

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) was invited to Mindanao by local organiza-tions working for peace and justice in 2007. Some of these organizations areformally involved in monitoring the ceasefire between the government andthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). NP deploys internationals to workwith local peacekeepers, contribute to their safety, help to maintain ceasefires,and advance the peace process.

This essay is based on the field-work conducted in Mindanao, Philip-pines, in 2012 and 2013 as part of the NP team. It presents and analyzes atoolkit of components that strengthen communities living in conflict-affectedareas. The study primarily draws on case-studies from Maguindanao, aprovince of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Theessay is based on field immersion observatory analysis as well as interactionswith community leaders and combatants.

For decades, Mindanao and its neighboring islands has witnessed armedconflict between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Mus-

lim separatist groups who are demanding self-rule, most recently by the MILF

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44 GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

and its splinter group Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).The re-gion experiences significant presence of paramilitaries, private militias, andcriminal groups. Many localized conflicts, often concerning land entitlements,are manifest in clan feuds called “ridos,” which are aggravated by an abun-dance of small arms and can draw in armed actors and provoke spirals ofviolence. The cumulative effect of the conflicts have led to bitter divisionswithin communities, widespread displacement, and deaths. The GPH–MILFconflict alone is said to have caused the death of 120,000 civilians. It has beenestimated that, in the last decade, approximately 40 percent of families inCentral Mindanao were displaced at least once, and in Maguindanao provincethe figure rises to 82 percent.

Despite the ceasefire between GPH and MILF from 1997, violence waswitnessed in the years 2000 and 2003. August 2008 saw the most recentlarge-scale fighting between the AFP and the MILF due to rejection of a pro-posed peace agreement by the Filipino Supreme Court. Hostilities displaced750,000 people and while since then, smaller clashes and ceasefire viola-tions are a periodic occurrence. From 2011 onwards, the GPH–MILF PeaceProcess has progressed following an unprecedented meeting between Presi-dent Aquino and MILF Chairman Al-Haj Murad in Tokyo in August 2011.In October 2012, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) wassigned. It was followed by a number of agreements on specific issues and theComprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed in March2014. Currently, the “Bangsamoro Basic Law” is being deliberated in theCongress and it would pave way for the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority(BTA).

Most of the grievances voiced out against the GPH–MILF peace talkscome from armed groups left out of the process, and apart from the protractedarmed conflict, there are other factors that derail the arrival of “normalcy.”Central Mindanao is exposed to communal violence between the Christianand Muslim communities grounded in a political culture whereby politicalelites exert their domination through private militias that operate with (quasi)impunity. Clan members compete with each other, primarily through processesof elections and everyday exercise of political power and arms. Ridos, a regularcause of violence, insecurity, and displacement in Mindanao, draw in actorsfrom multitude of backgrounds, including armed groups. In addition, rogue“lost commands” from non-state armed groups create a pervading sense ofinsecurity as the lines between conflict, politics, criminality, and shadoweconomy blur. This contributes to heightened militarization in Maguindanao.

Today, most UN peacekeeping missions have incorporated the protectionof civilians as one of their mandates. This resulted in greater emphasis

on the protection of civilians and closer linkages of peacekeeping missions tohumanitarian actors in conflict and postconflict scenarios. These approaches

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have included nongovernmental organizations working within communitiesin an effort to increase civilian safety. Keeping these developments in mind,operationally unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) missions cater to issuesof civilian protection. Building local or grassroots networks and capacitiesof the community affected with armed violence to find contextual and timelystrategies for safety is the key. While most of these initiatives are community-driven, they at many occasions involve armed and unarmed stakeholders inorder to make these community initiatives effective.

Jean Paul Lederach outlines three levels of actors who can facilitate“current and contextual peace:” Track 1, top military, political, and religiousleaders with high visibility; track 2, middle range leaders, academics, intel-lectuals, and religious leaders—with respect within the grassroots networks;track 3, local community and indigenous leaders who are most famil-iar with effects of violent conflicts. As a part of civilian peacekeepingdiscourse, most civilian-led peacekeeping efforts are direct interventionsat track-three and track-two levels. The linkages facilitated through thesegrassroots-led initiatives can be successful in engaging stakeholders at trackone level as well-creating a harmony in efforts at all three levels: diplo-matic, civil society, and people living and directly affected by conflict.It is through these engagements that most practitioners deem peacekeep-ing as a stepping stone toward peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflictsocieties.

An integral part of UCP remains embedded in principles of neutrality andimpartiality through presence of international actors in situations where

civilians or non-combatants may be susceptible to be viewed as support-ers to one of the conflicting parties. In the context of Southern Philippines,the presence of international unarmed civilian peacekeepers ensures safetyand protection of not only the community, but also of local civil societymovements/actors working on contended issues as human rights violations,rido-reconciliation (specific to Mindanao), and protection of non-combatantsfrom state actors. A working definition of UCP as civil, society-driven peace-keeping efforts could contain two core principles of, one, monitoring agree-ments between conflicting parties and, two, protecting civilians from armedviolence.

The three following case studies based on fieldwork in Maguindanaowill elaborate on UCP efforts paving way for peacebuilding initiatives, cre-ating grounds for more strategic, and effective peacebuilding initiatives oncea peace agreement is put in effect. In Mindanao, NP works as part ofthe Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team(IMT), which was established as part of the peace process in 2009, byinvitation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and theMILF.

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46 GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

UCP advocates for capacity-building between warring factions and thecommunities supporting these movements to use nonviolent methods for res-olution. Since the focus of the work is to enable and find localized methods tocontrol the impact of violence on civilians, community work is the backbonefor an effective protection strategy. The use of dialogue with stakeholders,inclusion of the affected civilians to engage with combatants, and state-basedarmed actors increases the chances of creating an environment where involvedactors understand their accountability toward civilian protection. In the ex-perience of working on the GPH–MILF conflict, capacity-building initiativesprovide the appropriate space to engage with communities. Such practicesbecome more and more relevant when there is plurality of armed actors thatmay or may not be recognized by international or national institutions aslegitimate movements.

Capacity-building is a method to engage communities and harness theirskills to operate efficiently in a conflict context. One way of capacity-

building is the building of tools for early warning and early action. EarlyWarning Early Response (EWER) gives tools of support during violent conflictto those who need it most (grassroots level) and those who can use thisknowledge to further operate in the area of concern in sustainable ways (localcivil society) and create an EWER structure.

The goal of community-based EWER trainings is to give individuals thetools to recognize conflict in its early stages by training them on detecting earlywarning signs or indicators. Moreover, those monitors who then comprise anEWER structure could be further trained on ways to formulate appropriateresponses to de-escalate tension or to be linked with institutions providinga response. Hereby “linking” becomes a very crucial activity, as it ensuresthe sustainability of the structure by connecting the monitors to the localgovernment units, line agencies at municipal and provincial levels, peacestructures, armed actors, and other NGOs and Service Providers. EWER alsoplays an important role for local civil society because these locally rootedorganizations are well-grounded in the context and in a position to identifyearly conflict and to seek a timely resolution and this is especially true in caseof ridos. The need to include organizations in EWER is a crucial task, sincelocal partners can take the lead in creating and nurturing the EWER structuresmentioned above.

Most EWER trainings for communities and civil society partners followthe similar pattern, albeit with minor differences. The first section of the train-ing gives an overview of the concept of early warning, objectives, and aims.The succeeding modules deal with early response applicable for mitigatingviolent conflict, and attempt to identify issues crucial from the perspective ofrelevant service providers. Most of the modules have case studies and scenar-ios to give a very practical perspective on the theory behind EWER, although

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of course the real life situations are very complex and the case scenarios areonly indicative of such a context.

Another approach to UCP in Maguindanao was the Zone-of-Peace ini-tiative. In the following, an example will clarify this approach. Marred

by conflict during the early 1970s and ever since, the city of Datu Piang inthe province of Maguindanao, although corroded of its luster, still remains inthe imagination of the population as an important historical site. The prox-imity of villages in the municipality to the marsh as well as the mountainsmakes these areas suitable for presence of armed actors, criminal syndicates,and lawless groups, serving as safe havens for them during volatile times.Although the armed conflict between the government and MILF has subsidedsince 2009, the area has been the stage to several clan feuds damaging prop-erty and displacing civilians. Moreover, the splinter-group BIFF, which hadopposed the peace agreement, initiated waves of attack on military detach-ments since August 2012. Skirmishes and clashes have led to considerablecivilian displacement and a general feeling of insecurity in areas controlledby the BIFF.

In that time, NP Philippines was approached by community-based orga-nizations to facilitate an initiative that would mitigate violence, provide safespaces for civilians and non-combatants, and facilitate return of displacedpopulation. The concept of “Dar-Us-Salam” (“house of peace”), a genuinezone of peace, was the leitmotif to work on that initiative, something thathad been previously established in Mindanao in the 1990s. In order to get thepeace zone in place the field team initiated a series of consultations with itscommunity monitors, local NGOs, MILF, Local Government Units, and theArmed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to ensure inclusivity and acceptance.

The first round of consultations with the main partner organization re-sulted in an unanimous decision of marking spaces such as the madrassa,primary health units, and primary and secondary schools as “peace zones.”In order to capture the expectations of the residents from affected barangays(village settlements) as well as to involve them in the process, NP with itslocal partners then conducted a second series of community consultations.These consultations let the team fathom the needs and expectations of theresidents and collect grievances related to security and livelihood.

I n subsequent months, while community monitors were actively monitoringthe security situation in the areas, the team with local partners conducted

even more specific consultations involving local armed actors (state and non-state) informing them about the initiative and incorporating their opinions foran effective intervention. Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)was drafted. This was considered as a written agreement between the conflictstakeholders to adhere to protocols drafted as code of conduct (in the MoU).

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The code of conduct put an embargo on unnecessary display of firearms andelaborated on finer modalities of conduct of combatants in volatile circum-stances.

The initiative marked some positive changes. During the consultationsthe local partners and community leaders met with AFP commanders. Thiswas a remarkable step. In a conflict that has spanned for more than forty yearsand the communities were often victims of counterinsurgency operations, theirrelationship with state security forces is marred by mutual mistrust. In such acontext, the walls of mistrust and suspicion broke down and opened space forconstructive dialogue where safety and peaceful resolution took priority overindividual or institutional prejudices.

Another outcome was observed when the community articulated to thecombatants about unnecessary display of fire-arms. In a context where preva-lence of arms is high, arms and use of force are considered “normal.” While foran outsider, this causes a sense of alarm, for generations of people living withconflict, possession of arms is probably the only way to safeguard their ownsecurity. The zone of peace initiative, however, led to a discussion on issuesconcerning proliferation of arms. While such discussions did not lead to anyimmediate visible changes, the initiative provided a space for communities toaddress sensitive issues that are normally considered outside the purview ofcivilians.

I n a highly militarized setting such as Maguindanao, engaging armed actorson civilian protection is pertinent. Access to armed groups on the local level

enabled by NP’s long-standing presence, the trust gained and the relationshipscontinuously nurtured, is an asset that gives NP teams the possibility to em-phasize norms that strengthen compliance with ceasefire norms and buildpeace potentials. Knowing the rules of combat and rights of individuals intimes of peace and conflict is a necessary precondition for ensuring rule oflaw and awareness of international norms for armed actors.

The AFP and Bangsamor Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), representativeof the conflict parties, the government, and the MILF, are bound to agreementssuch as the GPH–MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities fromJuly 1997, as well as relevant humanitarian law and human rights laws. Whilethe upper echelons of Higher Commands are certainly aware of the legal statusof those documents, the rank and file forces are not always aware of them.Here are a few examples of how NP has tried to spread awareness about theselaws: First, thorough orientations on Human Rights Law and InternationalHumanitarian Law to MILF–BIAF, NP conducted trainings for members ofthe 118, 107, 106, 105, 104, and 109 Base Commands of the BIAF. Moreover,it has organized training to members of the Provincial Police Force (PPF) of theMILF, comprising twenty municipalities and more than hundred participants.NP introduced basic principles of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and

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dealt in particular with issues such as occupation, checkpoints, police rights,and individual rights. Second, through trainings to the AFP on Human Rights,Humanitarian Law, and Child Protection, several battalions of the AFP inMaguindanao province have been trained by NP teams on those topics. ChildProtection issues were particularly interesting to the AFP; as schools are oftenthe targets of direct or indirect conflict, certain humanitarian rules pertainingto child protection such as prohibition of school occupations are discussedwith the troops in detail.

Third, through ad-hoc interventions or follow-ups on civilian concerns,through its monitoring structures, NP gets to know minor breaches of theceasefire or other civilian concerns relatively fast. On several occasions suc-cessful interventions were launched: proactive discussion with the AFP aboutcheckpoints or detachments close to civilian areas such as health centers,schools, or mosques. Mostly, the detachments were either removed or movedto distanced location; engagement with BIAF, AFP, and the IMT in case ofuncoordinated movement of armed actors in civilian areas; and follow-up onspecific instances of human rights or humanitarian law violations, in particularthe documentation and verification of the Six Grave Child Rights Violations.

Grounded from field work over a year and a half in the Southern Philip-pines, the essay proposes three spheres of influence through which UCP

is effective: first is enabling communities to respond to incidents of violence.EWER trainings are the most effective tools that enable communities to re-spond to incidents of violence. Through consistent engagement and identify-ing of community monitors, the community members are constantly engagedwith local combatants on issues concerning potential upsurge of violence. Asuccessful indicator of such an activity can be illustrated by NP’s learningduring the July 6, 2013 military operation against one of the factions—BIFF.Before the military action was conducted, both the military commanders andthe community monitors were duly informed about the operation, leading totimely evacuation of civilians to safer spaces.

NP focused on the “role of women” in EWER and added a module onelection-related violence. While not directly monitoring the elections, localpartners and grassroots monitors could nevertheless grasp and analyze thesituation on the ground, informing NP of any significant incidents. A majorstep for this capacity-building was NP’s partnership with the MaguindanaoPeace Advocates (MPA), a coalition of local organizations monitoring “safeand fair municipal elections.” NP capicitated members of the MPA on EWERand its use for election-related violence—a prevalant reality in the province.

A second sphere of influence involves building community resilienceand local peacebuilding potentials. Apart from the analytically clear EWERinterventions, there are instances that primarily target communities in con-flict, yet ultimately help to create local space for follow-up peacebuilding

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activities. The Zone of Peace started as an effort to strengthen the local part-ners in vulnerable villages through regular engagement in the community.Subsequent community-driven work was supported by various peacebuildingactivities in the form of linking the local partners and community leaders withstakeholders from the army, LGUs and MILF Base Commands. The draft-ing of the MoU and Code of Conduct led to a healthy discussion betweenactors on sensitive topics such as disarmament and finding local solutionsto dangers of arms proliferation. These linkages play a strong role in build-ing mutual trust between actors potentially engaging in future peacebuildingactivities.

The third sphere looks at creating future space for peacebuilding. Regu-lar capacity-building on the themes of human rights/humanitarian law raisesawareness of the primary parties to the conflict and can further move theseactors to comprehend “rule of law.” Thus, in cases of violations it willbe possible to report those to the armed actors concerned and enable aresponse to be made to the situation. The series of trainings conductedwithin the province led to emergence of community leaders who subse-quently took the lead in negotiating with conflict stakeholders. Examplesof that approach are the orientations on human rights to AFP and MILF,which have created a comfortable space for dialogue, knowledge of relevantnorms, and linkages between these actors and local civil society or communityleaders.

I n the context of Mindanao, UCP is a diverse set of methods to civil-ian protection that derives its strength from community-led interventions.

We consider UCP as a contextualized toolkit of components whose pri-mary focus is to strengthen local capacities in prevention of conflict fromthe grassroots and creation of space for future peacebuilding activities. Thecase studies highlight the potential UCP has as a program strategy for bothpeacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives incorporating a participatory ap-proach moving beyond the conventional track one diplomacy efforts in conflictsituations.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Berghof Foundation. 2009. Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation. 20 Notions forTheory and Practice, Chapter 10: “Peace Peacebuilding, Peacemaking.” Beatrix Austin,Hans J. Giessmann, and Uli Jager (Eds.). 59–64.

Gordon, Stuart. 2013. “The Protection of Civilians: An Evolving Paradigm?” Stability: Inter-national Journal of Security and Development 2(2): 40.

Magno Torres III, Wilfredo. 2007. Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.

McCoy, Alfred. 2009. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

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Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore and Mary Judd. 2005. “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines:Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend.” Paper No. 24. Social Development Papers(Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Schweitzer, Christine. 2010. Introducing Civilian Peacekeeping—A Barely Tapped Resource.Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Work and Nonviolent Conflict Transformation.

World Bank/World Food Programme. 2012. Violent Conflicts and Displacement in CentralMindanao; Challenges for Recovery and Development Rome: World Food Programme.

Georgi Engelbrecht and Vidushi Kaushik worked in Central Mindanao, Philippines with NonviolentPeaceforce, Philippines. The organization is rooted in principles of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. WhileGeorgi has a background in international relations and human rights, Vidushi comes from an inter-disciplinary background of emergencies, conflict, and peace. E-mail: georgi.engelbrecht@gmail.com andvidushi.kaushik23@gmail.com

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