communist strategy in china || marx and lenin in china

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Marx and Lenin in ChinaAuthor(s): Benjamin SchwartzSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 15, Communist Strategy in China (Jul. 27, 1949), pp.174-178Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3024355 .

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Marx and Lenin in China

BY BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ

With the Chinese Communists now in control

of a large part of China and preparing to set up a new government, the much debated question of the nature of Chinese Communism assumes new importance. The Chinese Communists are, of course, Com? munists. This statement tells us little, however, unless we have a clear idea of the essential features of Com? munist theory and practice, and how they have been

developed and applied in China.

In speaking of doctrines, I prefer to use the term

"Marxism-Leninism" rather than "Communism," for the

two are by no means coextensive. The influence of

Marxist-Leninist theory as an interpretation of human

affairs has extended far beyond the confmes of the Com? munist movement; it has become one of the dominant forces in Chinese intellectual life. But the development of a doctrine cannot be studied in a vacuum. We need to know how doctrines have been twisted and mani-

pulated by living men in concrete situations.

Theory and Essence

By "Marxism," as the term is used here, I do not mean the work of Marx, but the philosophical system which has been derived from his writings by later dis-

ciples, of whom Lenin is the most celebrated. It is the

popular theory which has influenced events in China, not the finer essence of Marx's thought.

Leninism is a continuation and in some ways a trans? formation of Marxism. Lenin shares Marx's vision of the ultimate ideal society and his Hegelian belief that the processes of history will inevitably lead to attain- ment of this ideal. Unlike Marx, however, Lenin does not rely entirely on objective historical forces. In his

pamphlet What to Do he tells us that the capitalist mode of production will not automatically produce a

revolutionary consciousness among the proletariat. On the contrary, if left to its own devices the proletariat will tend to develop a deplorable bourgeois trade-union consciousness. Another element is necessary, namely, a

tightly knit authoritarian group of highly disciplined revolutionaries which will lead the proletariat on the

path indicated by history. The Communist Party thus becomes the agent of history and her chosen oracle. Lenin later drew the corollary that numerical prepond-

Mr. Schwartz is at present a research fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, where he is engaged in a study of the history of Chinese Communism through Chi? nese sources. He served in the Far East during the war.

erance of the proletariat, stressed by Marx, is no longcr necessary. Even a small proletariat in a backward area can become the torchbearer of revolution.

The fiction is, of course, maintained that every act of the party is based on an "objective Marxist analysis." Politics, however, operates in the sphere of the con-

tingent and the unpredictable, and the art of the politician does not derive directly from the science of the

sociologist. The success of the politician depends on his ability to gauge the strength of political forces at a given moment, and act accordingly. Lenin was above all a politician; to the consternation of his colleagues, he ruthlessly thrust aside his own past theoretical form- ulations when new situations required it.

The Communist movement, where it has been suc-

cessful, is Lenin's heir in this respect. The record would

suggest that political leaders like Stalin and Mao Tze-

tung act on the basis of their estimate of the existing political situation and then attempt to jusify their tac? tics in terms of a Marxist-Leninist analysis. Thus Mao

Tze-tung realized that the discontented peasants, not the proletariat, provided the only possible mass basis for development of the Communist movement in China. This realization appears to have been the mainspring of his actions, while the concept of the "Democratic

Dictatorship of Workers and Peasants" was the theory he borrowed from the arsenal of Leninist formulae to

provide his actions with a doctrinal base. One must not, of course, be dogmatic in such an assertion, for the

thinking of Communist leaders is deeply imbued with Marxist principles, and their interpretation of a given situation must often be colored by Marxist preconcep- tions. Where there is a clear divergence between theory and fact, however, successful leaders tend to gear their actions to the fact and revise their theories to fit.

Adaptation to China

The new ideas, and above all the flexibility intro? duced into Marxism by Lenin go far to account for the remarkable spread of Marxism in China. A study of Chinese organs of opinion before the Russian revolution reveals that Marxism in its pre-Leninist form aroused

very little interest among the advanced intelligentsia, although they flirted with every variety of Western doctrine from Adam Smith to Nietzsche. Pre-Leninist

Marxism, which kept its eyes firmly fixed on the indus- trialized countries of the West, must have seemed ir- relevant to conditions in China; but Lenin's innova-

tions, with their emphasis on imperialism, made it ap? pear relevant to Chinese problems.

174 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



Much can be learned of the impact of Marxism- Leninism in China by studying the intellectual develop? ment of its first leaders, Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu. These men, the virtual founders of the Chinese Com? munist Party, were among the few intellectual leaders of the radical Westernized intelligentsia in the early twentieth century, and their experience to some extent

epitomizes that of the radical intelligentsia as a whole.

Early Chinese Marxists

A study of their writings reveals that they were led to embrace Marxism-Leninism not merely by long in? tellectual cogitation but also by the emotional impact of external events combined with the magnetic pull of Lenin's messianic message. In the years before the Russian revolution they had both turned their faces

against tradition and eagerly looked to the West for a solution to China's tragic problems. Chen Tu-hsiu

thought he had found such a solution in what he called "Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science." "Democ-

racy" was democratic government plus economic lib- eralism. Chen advocated a constitutional republic and unfettered private enterprise. "Mr. Science" was identi- fied in his mind with a crude type of materialist philosophy, valuable not only for its practical application but also as a corrosive in dissolving outworn tradi- tions. These were, in his view, the two forces which accounted for the vitality and dynamism of the West, and which would produce similar results in China.

Li Ta-chao, a man of fundamentally different tem-

per, moved more comfortably on the metaphysical plane. In the years before the Russian revolution he had developed a Weltanschauung which was a strange amalgam of Chinese and Western elements. Despite the

seemingly abstruse nature of his thought, however, we soon find that Li no less than Chen is preoccupied not with the search for ultimate truth but with the plight of China. His philosophy, though expressed in abstract

terms, is essentially his defiant reply to the charge that China is a dead civilization with no further possibilities of development. Chinese traditional culture may indeed be dead, but the Chinese nation can shake off the dusty accumulations of the past and experience a new spring. The regeneration of China, however, will be part of the regeneration of all mankind. To Li all the dis- turbances of the early twentieth century, including the first World War, were signs and portents of the com- ing liberation. We are thus not surprised to find that he is almost the first to respond to the messianic message of the Russian revolution.

Meanwhile the growing failure of republicanism in China was sorely straining the faith of Chen Tu-hsiu. His discouragement was stemmed temporarily in 1919 by the influence of John Dewey, who was then lec-

turing at Peking University. Dewey insisted that democ?

racy was not merely a political form but a way of life which must begin at the grass roots. For a brief mo? ment Chen enthusiastically embraced this view?but

only for a moment. The momentous events of these

years?the betrayal of China at Versailles, the Soviet renunciation of unequal treaties, and the feverish ac- tivities of the students, together with the magnetic pull of the Leninist world view, overcame his resistance.

Dewey's undramatic program would require decades of prosaic effort. Here, at last, was a creed which con? ceived of the world in terms of a stark melodrama in which China could play a part; it offered the intelli-

gentsia a spectacular role, and held the promise of a

sweeping ultimate redemption. By the middle of 1920 Chen Tu-hsiu had fully embraced the Marxist faith, while Li Ta-chao had managed to overcome his last mental reservations with regard to Marxist doctrines.

In entering the Marxist camp Chen and Li carried with them a group of student disciples whose names were to figure prominently as both leaders and apos- tates of Chinese Communism. Among them were Tai

Chi-tao, Chou Fu-hai, Chang Kuo-tao, Chen Kung-po, Shao Li-tze, Chu Chiu-pei, and Mao Tze-tung. Mao has acknowledged that the influence of Li Ta-chao (his employer at the Peking University library) and Chen Tu-hsiu were decisive in carrying him into the Commu? nist fold.

Organfzatfon of the Party If the primary attraction of Marxism-Leninism lay

in its messianic message and its melodramatic world

view, its most enduring contribution in China was the Leninist philosophy of political organization and poli? tical action?the formula of a highly disciplined elite

group which worked to gain power by basing itself on the masses and making itself the mouthpiece of their needs. Certain evidence would indicate that Chen and Li, who had been academic leaders and not pro- fessional revolutionaries, did not appreciate this aspect of Marxism until Moscow had sent envoys such as

Voitinsky and Maring to educate them politically. It was not until the congress of July 1921 that the Chi? nese Communist Party crystallized as a political entity. Curiously enough, Sun Yat-sen, who had stood apart from the intellectual movement in Peking, but had long been wrestling with political realities, seemed to show a keener awareness of the political possibilities of the Leninist formula than the leaders of the Communist

Party themselves. Theoretical considerations aside, it would appear that the Stalinist group in the Kremlin realized this fact and decided to base its main ef? fort in China on the practical possibilities of the Kuo?

mintang rather than rely wholly on the professors and

JULY 27, 1949 175



students of the Communist Party. There is indeed some evidence indicating that the policy of Kuomintang- Communist collaboration was framed over the heads of the Chinese party leaders and against their desires.

On the whole, the years between 1923 and 1927 were not a period of creative thinking in the Chinese Communist Party, despite the momentous events which

they witnessed, for it was in this period that the Chi? nese party looked most slavishly to Moscow as the source of all wisdom. During these years we must look to the minutes of the Comintern and not to the Chinese sources to gain insight into the internal conflicts which

split both the Russian and the Chinese party. Nevertheless it was in this period that academic

Marxism first emerged as a major force in Chinese intellectual life. The early twenties saw a feverish effort to translate Marxist works from Japanese and other

languages. A rather schematic form of Marxism became

widely accepted even in conservative academic circles far removed from radical politics. For example, the late Hu Han-min, once a leader of the Kuomintang right wing, is also known in China as one of the most eminent interpreters of dialectical materialism, while Tao Hsi-sheng and the Hsin Sheng-ming group, which has always stood close to the Kuomintang, consider themselves orthodox Marxists.

Developments after 1927

The collapse of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance in 1927 marked a turning-point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. A close reading of the writ-

ings of Communists as well as those of splinter opposi- tion groups which developed after 1927 suggests that Moscow's direction of affairs in China had become much more tenuous. The Stalinist majority had burned its fingers in China and was now bending all its ef? forts to the task of building socialism in one country. Apparently the Chinese party was henceforth left more or less to its own devices, receiving official praise when successful and denunciation when unsuccessful. The Chinese party leaders of those years?Chu Chiu-pei and later Li Li-san?faced a difficult problem. The white terror was rampant, and after the debacle of 1927 Communist leadership found it difficult to enlist working-class support. How could one have a Com? munist Party without a working-class base? In despera- tion, Li Li-san hit on the tactic of using Chinese Red Army fragments to seize urban centers, thus forcibly cre- ating proletarian bases through the use of peasant troops. This tactic, of course, failed and brought with it the disgrace attendant upon failure.

Yet while the doctrinaire, urban-minded party lead? ership in Shanghai was breaking its head against hard reality, Mao Tze-tung was forging his more successful

tactic in the hinterland of Hunan and Kiangsi. Mao had learned well the Leninist formula of a trained, disciplined elite at the head of a mass movement. But as a man of keen political penetration he realized that

only the peasantry could furnish the mass basis. The

attempt to base a Communist movement squarely on the peasantry is, of course, a rejection of previous Leninist dogma and of the basic concept of Marxist

philosophy. It is, however, entirely consonant with Lenin's insistence that theory yield to political fact.

Mao Tze-tung doggedly pursued this policy from 1927 to 19303 often in direct contradiction to the line of the central committee in Shanghai. By 1930 the Mao formula was the only one which still held any hope of further development. But a close reading of the evi? dence does not suggest that his rise to power was de- creed in Moscow. On the contrary, after the recall of Li Li-san we find Moscow sending back to China a

group of young graduates of Sun Yat-sen University, apparently with the idea of having them take over the party apparatus. Li Ang in his Red Stage has

plausibly maintained that Mao Tze-tung's rise to power was the result of his own effective tactics rather than of a decision made in Moscow. Power gravitated into his hands because he had actual control of a specific area, commanded military support, and was able to raise his own revenues.

While Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh were attempting to "apply Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions," the urban Marxist intellectuals who were unwilling or un- able to follow them into the fastnesses of Hunan and

Kiangsi were applying their energies in a different di? rection. In their view, the efforts of the Communist

Party from 1923 to 1930 had ended in dismal failure, while Mao and his guerrilla bands did not at the time seem to hold much hope for the future and were fur- thermore of doubtful orthodoxy. Like Marx himself, who had retired to the British Museum after the fail? ure of 1848, they felt that the time had come for a theoretical stock-taking.

Controversy on China Analysis The question they asked themselves was: Why have

we failed? The obvious Marxist answer was: We have failed because we have not understood the nature of Chinese society. What then is the nature of Chinese so-

ciety5 in terms of Marxist analysis? This question gave rise to a controversy which engaged the energies of the whole Marxist intelligentsia until Japanese aggression turned its attention to more immediate matters. The conflict raged in books5 pamphlets, and periodicals, and engaged the attention of Russians and other Euro-

peans?both Communist and non-Communist?men such as Madyar, Godes, Dubrovsky, Radek, and Witt-

176 FAR EASTERN SU RVEY



fogel. While the basic concepts in dispute may have

originated abroad, Chinese Marxists applied themselves with zeal to the battle, which came to involve Stalin-

ists5 Trotskyists, and all sorts of academic Marxists not even remotely connected with the Communist move? ment (e.g. Tao Hsi-sheng).

We cannot discuss here all the ramifications of this

complicated debate; suffice it to say that by 1935 it had become abundantly clear that neither Marx nor Lenin had simple answers to the problem of China. The controversy produced no solution, but rather an utter confusion of opinion which remains unresolved to this day. What it did prove was the difficulty of ex-

plaining the history of non-European societies in Marx- ian terms. With a Communist victory it seems likely that the controversy will be settled by official decree.

Anti-Japanese Coalition

In practice, after 1935 the Chinese Communist Party shifted from the line of the "Democratic Dictatorship of Workers and Peasants" to that of the "New Democ-

racy." While this change coincided with a shift in Kremlin policy, its enthusiastic adoption was due as much to the pressure of conditions in China. During the 1930s the problem of Japanese aggression as? sumed major proportions, and anti-Japanese sentiment became widespread in many strata of Chinese

society. There is every reason to believe that the Chi? nese Communist leaders sincerely shared this sentiment. At the same time, they were presumably not blind to the advantages to be derived from placing themselves at the forefront of the anti-Japanese movement, es-

pecially when?before war broke out in 1937?the Kuo-

mintang policy seemed to be one of appeasement. Be? fore they could appeal to the anti-Japanese bourgeoisie, however, it was necessary to abandon the doctrine of class hatred, stressed in the Kiangsi-Hunan period. In

addition, the destruction of the Kiangsi-Hunan Sov? iet Republic may have convinced Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh that any immediate hope of destroying the

Kuomintang was out of the question. Finally^ the practical experience of the Communist leaders in dealing with peasant society may have helped to persuade them that the realities of the Chinese agrarian situation de? manded a new approach.

In his New Democracy and other writings Mao Tze-

tung attempted to fit this new approach into a Marx? ist framework. In Mao's words, "The Chinese bour?

geoisie is a semi-colonial bourgeoisie and therefore even in the epoch of imperialism it still maintains, for a cer? tain period, the revolutionary characteristic of opposing imperialism." In view of this fact, he advocates an alliance between the proletariat, the peasantry, and the

bourgeoisie to resist imperialist aggression and "semi-

feudal" reaction. The present stage of the Chinese Revo?

lution is described as a bourgeois-democratic phase. But

during this phase, conscious leadership is to be exer-

cised by the proletariat, i.e., the Communist Party; hence the phrase, "New" Democracy.

Postwar Theory Since the end of the war the theory of the New

Democracy has itself undergone some profound modi-

fications. Through all these changes of tactics and doc?

trine, however, certain essential elements have remained

constant: 1. Mao Tze-tung's formula for achieving power by

operating from a specific territorial base?preferably a

peasant area?has remained unchanged. This formula,

contrasting as it does with that used by the Russian Com?

munists, who were able to seize the central government,

may indeed be accounted Mao's most original contribu-

toin to Marxism-Leninism. In recent weeks, it is true, the emphasis on the peasant has been ofricially modi-

fied, doubtless as a result of the party's success in gain- ing control of large cities. At the last plenary session of

the Central Committee, held in Shihchiachuang, it was

decided to shift from a rural, agrarian orientation to an

urban, industrial orientation. This is the fruit of vic?

tory; the peasant orientation was the cause of victory. 2. The philosophy of party organization bequeathed

to the Chinese Communist Party by Lenin has remained

unchanged in theory and, where possible, in practice. The party remains a hard, unchanging core in the midst of change. Since 1935 the party has, in its rela? tions with the peasant masses, adopted a statesmanlike

policy stressing local initiative and popular participa- tion in government. It must be remembered, however, that all this concerns the implementation of policy and not its initiation. The internal organization of the policy-making organs remains true to the Leninist pres- cription.

3. The Chinese Communist Party has remained faithful to those aspects of Marxism which are still a

living force in Leninism, namely, the vision of the ulti? mate ideal society and the whole Hegelian mystique. In

addition, it is committed to the totality of orthodox Marxism as a verbal structure no matter how much it

may diverge from it in practice. What then are the new elements which have been

added since 1935? The most essential ones appear to be the following:

1. Nationalism. Chinese nationalism has been appro- priated by the Communist Party, or conversely, Chinese Communism has adapted itself to Chinese nationalism. This is illustrated by the adoption of Sun Yat-sen as a

spiritual ancestor of the Communist Party and the ap- propriation of his Three People's Principles as an ex-

JULY 27, I 949 177



pression of the New Democracy. The exaltation of Sun Yat-sen has increased rather than decreased during the

past two years. Another manifestation has been the drive for chung-hua or Sinification of Marxism?the adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions and culture. This movement has gone so far that we find an official Chi? nese Communist philosopher, Ai Ssu-chi, calling for a search for evidence of dialectical materialism in traditional Chinese philosophy.

2. The policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie during China's capitalist phase of development. This element is5 of course, well known. It is interesting to

note, however, that since the end of the war, the new situation has required a new definition of the bour?

geoisie. The Kuomintang leadership, it now appears, is not part of the national bourgeoisie, but a bureaucratic

capitalist class subservient to foreign interests.

Finally, what is to be said on the crucial question of the relations of the Chinese Communist Party with Moscow? Here, or course^ we are on slippery ground, and all we can do is to weigh the various factors. We know from the experience of Yugoslavia that a common Marxist-Leninist philosophy, even a common devotion to Stalinist techniques, is no guarantee of loyalty. Fur-

thermore, there is strong evidence that Mao's rise tc

power in China was the result of his own efforts, not of Russian backing. It should also be noted that since 1930 the Chinese Communist Party has borne the re?

sponsibility of government in areas under its control; it has had to make spot decisions based on knowledge of local conditions, and has developed policies and prac- tices which are in marked contrast to those of the Soviet Union.

In the light of these factors, considerations of the

psychology of power would suggest that the present leadership of the Chinese Communist Party would not

willingly submit to the dictation of the Kremlin. On the other side, however, we have the incontrovertible fact that nowhere, in the whole body of official Chinese Communist literature from 1930 until today, do we find one word derogatory to the Soviet Union or critical of its policies. In spite of this immensely important fact, however, I would venture to guess that in the event

of a clash of interests between the Soviet Union and a Chinese Communist regime, the Chinese Communist

regime would pursue its own interests. It is, of course, possible that a clever policy on the part of the Kremlin

may forestall such an eventuality.

Congress Defeat in West Bengal

A provincial by-election assumes unuvual significance when a strong Congress

Party campaign fails by a wide margin to defeat its main opponent.

BY RICHARD L PARK

The unqualified success of Sarat Chandra Bose ? (Socialist Republican) in defeating the Congress

Party nominee, Suresh Chandra Das, in the June 14, 1949 by-election for the West Bengal Legislative As-

sembly, South Calcutta constituency, is an indication of the dissatisfaction with the Congress government, both in the province and at the center, held by large numbers of people in West Bengal. Out of a total of

24,886 votes, Bose received 19,030 and Das only S^O.1 A provincial by-election of this sort normally would

not be taken very seriously as far as all-India politics are concerned. Sarat Bose, however, posed this election as a direct challenge to the Congress. Basing his cam?

paign on an "expose" of West Bengal's Congress gov? ernment, Bose asked that the voters show their opposi- tion to the state of affairs in West Bengal by electing him

Mr. Park is a Fellow of the Social Science Research Gouncil. During a field trip to India this year he has been studying the history of the Congress Party in Bengal.

1 The Statesman (Calcutta), June 15, 1949.

?the founder of the Socialist Republican Party?to the

legislative post by a wide margin. The Congress an- swered the challenge by marshaling local party workers for a strong contest. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar

Patel, Dr. Sitaramayya and other leading Congress statesmen issued statements in favor of S. C. Das, the

Congress candidate, giving special weight in their pro- nouncements to the necessity for upholding Congress governments throughout India. The importance at- tached by the Congress to this by-election, followed by the party's clear defeat at the polls, makes the result more significant in assessing the position of the Con?

gress Party in West Bengal.

Sarat Bose had a number of advantages over his op- ponents in South Calcutta. First of all, the by-election was held to fill a vacancy left by the death of Sarat's elder brother, Satish Chandra Bose. Secondly, Sarat is a member of a famous Bengali family; his kinsman, Subhas Chandra Bose, is honored above all other men in the province. Sarat Chandra Bose, himself, is a man with considerable political experience and prestige. Moreover, his candidacy was backed by the Forward

178 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



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