comments by rear admiral paul m. robinson

2
Operational Systems, Logistics Engineering and Technology Insertion off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software into legacy systems. There is no question of whether or not many of these projects have been effective; they certainly have. Rather, the question is whether this technique solves any problem over the very long haul, whether the problems recur and what is to be done about those multitude of obsolescence issues which exist, but for which funding cannot be accommodated under SHARP To illustrate, consider hypothetical system “A” de- signed in 1982 using uniquely designed electronics boards and milspec processors. Today, 15 years later, the system is performing its mission well, but maintenance costs have been rising, because the electronic components used in the design of the system are no longer available and ex- pensive redesign of many of the electronics boards is being done to accommodate replacement components. None of the redesign is being directed toward improving military performance of the system although some improvement wdl naturally come from the use of faster, more capable electronics. An lnfusion of R&D funding to redesign sys- tem “A” to accommodate COTS assemblies would be a mechanism to carry out a maintainability upgrade of the system. Assuming that this is done, the impact will be dramatic. Maintenance costs will drop, system availability and reliability will improve and in many cases military performance will also improve because of the increased performance of the more modem components. Everyone will be pleased, but unfortunately, most of the improve- ments will only be short term. The obsolescence of mod- ern commercial electronics wdl require frequent repetition of the process, but by that time SHARP will have moved on to other trouble spots leaving system “A” to face its fate alone. What is needed most and more than the infu- sion of limited R&D funding is an ability to manage a system’s life cycle in such a way that maintenance funding could be committed to doing the necessary COTS inser- tion as part of normal system support. To use an analogy to weight loss programs, this use of SHARP funding can be compared to a crash diet, which, when not accom- panied by life style changes, will not produce lasting re- sults. Although Health of Naval Electronics (HONE) seeks to develop tools to help manage electronics Me cycle in this way, it cannot do what is really required, which is to put a systems life cycle under total cost oriented management. To assess the economic viability of a system upgrade, the total life cycle cost of system sustainment has to be known. Unfortunately, for most systems life cycle management re- sponsibility is fragmented and funding split between many pots (repair accounts, stock fund, etc.). If the costs were known and responsibility consolidated, the business case for COTS insertion and its attendant Life Cycle Cost Con- trol (LC7 would be straightforward and direct. The inser- tion itself could be O&M funded from existing accounts on a continuing basis and the long term life cycle savings realized without waiting for the allocation of scarce R&D funding. Almost every legacy electronic system requires or will require COTS insertion to allow cost effective life cycle support; it is unrealistic to expect that the SHARP program can cover them all. What is needed is to build on the SHARP model, only within the normal O&M arena. We must organize our management of life cycle support in such a way that LC3 is possible. Insertion of commercial technology has to be able to be accomplished freely so that support costs can be minimized. This can only happen if we develop both the ability to measure total cost and the management structures which can capitahze on that data. Again I wish to thank Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skohck for an excellent paper and one which I hope will generate much needed discussion in the critical area of system life cycle support and logistics. Rear Admiral Paul M. Robinson VICE COMMANDER NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND nce again, our shore technical establishment has 0 risen to the current challenges that face the read- iness and sustainability of our operating forces. Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skolnick have identified and progressed a s i g n 6 cant opportunity to employ the rational concepts of the technical R&D world to assist and accelerate needed change in the operations and maintenance world. Their approach adds to the growing universe of assessment techniques available to the Navy that help focus our re- sources onto the most profitable outcome for the operators and maintainers. Their selection model is a useful tool, both for the technical centers and program managers, to assess their alternatives to reduce overall lie cycle costs. Reduction of our systems’ overall life cycle costs is a key strategy and goal in DoD, Navy and NavSea strategic plans. I would like to discuss further some of the opportunities the SHARP program has opened up in the Navy’s strategy to reduce total ownership costs. These points are made in order to emphasize the continuum of technology inser- tion methodologies that the Navy is employing today as well as to share experiences such that our overall ability to reduce ownership costs is enhanced. NavSea product lines are gaining experience in the Lo- gistics ECPs financed from the stock fund DBOF account. They require a commitment of “other” funds to buy the newly improved equipment “out” of the stock fund, and this has previously been a stumbling block for the LECP efforts. The SHARP program’s focus on the longer-term R&D technology insertion should afford the system spon- sors sufficient time to plan for the appropriate “buy-out’’ of the new products. As Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skolnick have correctly stated, the emergence of a “transition agent” to NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL May 1997 221

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Page 1: COMMENTS BY Rear Admiral Paul M. Robinson

Operational Systems, Logistics Engineering and Technology Insertion

off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software into legacy systems. There is no question of whether or not many of these projects have been effective; they certainly have. Rather, the question is whether this technique solves any problem over the very long haul, whether the problems recur and what is to be done about those multitude of obsolescence issues which exist, but for which funding cannot be accommodated under SHARP

To illustrate, consider hypothetical system “A” de- signed in 1982 using uniquely designed electronics boards and milspec processors. Today, 15 years later, the system is performing its mission well, but maintenance costs have been rising, because the electronic components used in the design of the system are no longer available and ex- pensive redesign of many of the electronics boards is being done to accommodate replacement components. None of the redesign is being directed toward improving military performance of the system although some improvement wdl naturally come from the use of faster, more capable electronics. An lnfusion of R&D funding to redesign sys- tem “A” to accommodate COTS assemblies would be a mechanism to carry out a maintainability upgrade of the system. Assuming that this is done, the impact will be dramatic. Maintenance costs will drop, system availability and reliability will improve and in many cases military performance will also improve because of the increased performance of the more modem components. Everyone will be pleased, but unfortunately, most of the improve- ments will only be short term. The obsolescence of mod- ern commercial electronics wdl require frequent repetition of the process, but by that time SHARP will have moved on to other trouble spots leaving system “A” to face its fate alone. What is needed most and more than the infu- sion of limited R&D funding is an ability to manage a system’s life cycle in such a way that maintenance funding could be committed to doing the necessary COTS inser- tion as part of normal system support. To use an analogy to weight loss programs, this use of SHARP funding can be compared to a crash diet, which, when not accom- panied by life style changes, will not produce lasting re- sults.

Although Health of Naval Electronics (HONE) seeks to develop tools to help manage electronics Me cycle in this way, it cannot do what is really required, which is to put a systems life cycle under total cost oriented management. To assess the economic viability of a system upgrade, the total life cycle cost of system sustainment has to be known. Unfortunately, for most systems life cycle management re- sponsibility is fragmented and funding split between many pots (repair accounts, stock fund, etc.). If the costs were known and responsibility consolidated, the business case for COTS insertion and its attendant Life Cycle Cost Con- trol (LC7 would be straightforward and direct. The inser- tion itself could be O&M funded from existing accounts on a continuing basis and the long term life cycle savings realized without waiting for the allocation of scarce R&D

funding. Almost every legacy electronic system requires or will require COTS insertion to allow cost effective life cycle support; it is unrealistic to expect that the SHARP program can cover them all.

What is needed is to build on the SHARP model, only within the normal O&M arena. We must organize our management of life cycle support in such a way that LC3 is possible. Insertion of commercial technology has to be able to be accomplished freely so that support costs can be minimized. This can only happen if we develop both the ability to measure total cost and the management structures which can capitahze on that data.

Again I wish to thank Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skohck for an excellent paper and one which I hope will generate much needed discussion in the critical area of system life cycle support and logistics.

Rear Admiral Paul M. Robinson VICE COMMANDER NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

nce again, our shore technical establishment has 0 risen to the current challenges that face the read- iness and sustainability of our operating forces. Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skolnick have identified and progressed a s ign6 cant opportunity to employ the rational concepts of the technical R&D world to assist and accelerate needed change in the operations and maintenance world. Their approach adds to the growing universe of assessment techniques available to the Navy that help focus our re- sources onto the most profitable outcome for the operators and maintainers. Their selection model is a useful tool, both for the technical centers and program managers, to assess their alternatives to reduce overall lie cycle costs. Reduction of our systems’ overall life cycle costs is a key strategy and goal in DoD, Navy and NavSea strategic plans.

I would like to discuss further some of the opportunities the SHARP program has opened up in the Navy’s strategy to reduce total ownership costs. These points are made in order to emphasize the continuum of technology inser- tion methodologies that the Navy is employing today as well as to share experiences such that our overall ability to reduce ownership costs is enhanced.

NavSea product lines are gaining experience in the Lo- gistics ECPs financed from the stock fund DBOF account. They require a commitment of “other” funds to buy the newly improved equipment “out” of the stock fund, and this has previously been a stumbling block for the LECP efforts. The SHARP program’s focus on the longer-term R&D technology insertion should afford the system spon- sors sufficient time to plan for the appropriate “buy-out’’ of the new products. As Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skolnick have correctly stated, the emergence of a “transition agent” to

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL May 1997 221

Page 2: COMMENTS BY Rear Admiral Paul M. Robinson

Operational Systems, Logistics Engineering and TecnnOlogy Insertion

sponsor the production and delivery is a key element to these insertion programs’ success. In the case of the LECP program, the investment in the product redesign/ change is not made mtil the production “buy-out” funding has been identifed. Both SHARP and LECP are ground- breaking programs that can learn from each other’s successes.

The fleets have Troubled Systems tracking systems and most program managers are now using a TMUTMA pro- cess to highlight systems that need technical help. OpNav sponsors are consistently requested to support (fund) these problems, generally with their scarce operating and maintenance funds. We are currently examining these TMI/TMA systems for candidates for investment in tech- nology insertion, both from an LECP context and for ap- plication of our Engineering for Reduced Maintenance (ERM) principles. It is clear that the SHARP process offers an opportunity to look at the TMI/TMA fleet items in a new context of R&D level technology insertion. Taken together, these three programs; SHARE ERM and LECP do a good job in covering the full spectrum of technology insertion that becomes available to a program manager or in service engineering agent. LECPs are designed to bring near-term improvements to component and subsystem re- liability and are designed to be largely self-financed by the maintenance and supply savings generated by the improved reliability products. ERM principles are designed to re- duce maintenance costs, and SHARP adds the dimension of R&D investment and insertion generally beyond the reach of LECP and ERM.

With the above opportunities in mind, we still have some work to do on the financial aspects of investing R&D or O&M,N funds to save operating account funds. Again, the SHARP program has identified the key success param- eter, a dynamic and effective “change agent.” In our ex- perience with various LECPs, it is key to understand “who” saves money as a result of the improvements, “how” it is saved, and “when” it is saved. In the Navy’s efforts to increase funds available for force modernization within a fixed TOA, it is essential that such savings be realized and realigned. It is the change agent’s key function to credibly find the answers to these questions and provide the technical and programmatic assurance that the savings are correctly defined and applied. SHARP understands this importance and can be an additional voice in estab- lishing the credibility of the process.

The Navy has gained some good experience from the use of the Broad Area Announcement process for Smart Ship and now Smart Base. Our Smart Ship process dem- onstrated how quickly new ideas and technology insertion can reach the deckplates of a fighting ship. It would seem an appropriate next step to combine the SHARP technol- ogy expertise and the Smart Ship “solicitation” process to both broaden and speed the collection and assessment of SHARP candidates.

Several initiatives are now appearing that include the requirement to maintain or improve reliability of shipboard or aircraft systems. These are generally replaceable “boxes” that can utilize two-level maintenance with con- tractor depot maintenance. These approaches also begin to shift the “configuration management” paradigm to one where certain improvements can be made by the contrac- tor under his configuration management. The approach encourages technology refreshment and insertion by the vendor. While the SHARP role in such a support concept is unclear, what is certain about these support initiatives is that the Navy is serious about innovative methods tc reduce total ownership costs, while placing more techca and reliability responsibility with contractors.

In conclusion, Mr. Grubb and Dr. Skolnick have added another tool to the Navy’s effort to save operating funds. They have produced a refined evaluation and selectior method that is useful to others who are applying technol. ogy insertion concepts across the life cycle. This key are2 of investment to save operating costs is both timely anc rich in concepts and opinions. Their paper adds to the body of knowledge that is needed to turn opinions intc facts, knowledge and metrics. I commend their efforts.

It is a great privilege for us to respond to the comments of our two distinguished discussers. Not only are they renowned as naval officers of great experience and judg- ment, but each has a special record of engineering excel- lence in his own right. RAdm. Robinson and RAdm. Nanos are naval engineers wholly conversant with the laws of nature and fully informed regarding fleet usage and oper- ational demands. Their comments deserve especially careful attention for each represents the perspective of a tested professional currently makmg serious contributions to our Navy and the entire naval engineering community

We are particularly gratified by RAdm. Nanos’ acknowl- edgment of SHARP’S wet cable efforts as a slngular way to insert a technology solution into a fleet problem. Re- garding COTS, we believe his most salient points in the O&M arena are beyond our purview They certainly make sense as stated and we are pleased with his words that SHARP might serve as a baseline for added management gains in identlfylng costs and consolidating responsibility but we are not experts in that broader logistics theater. We are reminded of the old maxim: when the elephants dance, the rabbits should stay out of the clearing.

Tangentiallx we believe there is empirical jus~cat ion in seeing COTS insertions as opportunity rather than risk. This means that we should anticipate more the prospect of good quality out of COTS products than we need fear the prospect of unknown quality Experience has been confinning that expectation. Still, we recognize the need

222 May 1997 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL