Human Ecology, 1Iol. 15, No. 4, 1987

Comment on Vayda's Review of Good to Eat:

Riddles of Food and Culture

M a r v i n Harr i s ~

PLAUSIBILITY VS. TRUTH

Good to Eat (Harris, 1985, 1987c) attempts to show that an integrated set of theories of human food preferences and avoidances can be constructed using a parsimonious set of cultural materialist principles. Since foodways are among the least understood of sociocultural phenomena, it is as a rare compliment that Vayda has found some of explanations "quite plausible," even if they have not been supported with "clear cut evidence" and even if basic theoretical principles and methods according to him are all wrong. Ex- planations in the social sciences, including Vayda's, seldom achieve a degree of truth greater than plausibility. At any rate, Good to Eat is nothing more than an atttempt to present plausible theories.

PRINCIPLES ARE NOT AXIOMS

Vayda's criticism of Good to Eat focuses in large measure on his rejec- tion or misunderstanding of the epistemological status of the principles of sociocultural selections set forth in the paradigm of cultural materialism (Har- ris, 1979, 1987a, 1988a). These principles state that the conditions under which the probability that a sociocultural innovation will be selected for or against will be increased. Paradigmatically, innovations are selected for or against in conformity with their net contribution to the etic behavioral satisfaction of a small number of human biopsychological drives and needs, measured in terms of currencies appropriate to these drives and needs. It is important to note that the theories presented in Good to Eat are part of a larger corpus

1Department of Anthropology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32605.

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of theories dealing with the evolution of diverse aspects of sociocultural sys- tems ranging from the origin of warfare and pristine states to the demographic transition and the demise of the male-breadwinner family, as well as with food preferences and aversions (Harris, 1977, 1979, 1987b, 1988b; Harris and Ross, 1987). The rules which guide the construction of all of these theories are principles not axioms. I claim that these principles have exactly the same epistemological status as the Darwinian and neo-Darwinian principle of natural selection. Natural selection as a theoretical principle merely suggests how to account for selection for and against genetic innovations in general; it does not specify nor can it be used to test theories that account for particular in- novations such as avian wings, shark jaws, or primate stereoscopy. The same holds for the cultural materialist principle of cultural selection.

QUANTITATIVE IS NOT THE SAME AS METRICAL

Vayda's rejection of a cost/benefit approach is based essentially on methodological considerations. Even my plausible theories and the princi- ples responsible for generating them must be discarded because the mea- surements needed to test the theories cannot be quantified. My response is that quantitative measurement is not, as Vayda implies, synonymous with the precise metrical measurement. There are also nonmetrical forms of quan- tification such as counting the number of different adverse and beneficial consequences and roughly estimating time and effort expended on different activities in terms of more, the same, or less. These are technically known as ordinal measures (Bernard, 1988).

For example, in arguing that cattle represent a better cost/benefit bar- gain than pigs in the biblical Middle East, Good to Eat provides the follow- ing rough reckoning (although not in tabular form; see Table I). Here, we can conclude that the balance of costs and benefits must favor cattle since there are more types of benefits to be derived from cattle than from pigs, fewer types of costs associated with cattle than pigs, and not a single cost that is less for pigs than for cattle. I see no need to apologise for this rough- and-ready accounting since the prospect of carrying out a more detailed study of the costs and benefits of animal husbandry during Mosaic times seems rather remote.

Naturally, science places a premium on precise metrical data (and as Vayda points out, Good to Eat is not devoid of such data). But to reject theories couched in a scientific and quantitative idiom merely because pre- cise metrical intervals are not available is to let the tail of methodology wag the dog of knowledge. Furthermore, the question of what it is that should be measured precisely must precede the actual metrical effort. And finally, Vayda

Cominent on Vayda's Review 513

Table I. Cost and Benefits of Raising Cattle and Pigs Costs Benefits

Cattle Feed (Cheap grass) Traction for carts Herding (little labor) Traction for plows Disease (brucelosis, anthroax) Meat

Milk Dung Hides

Pigs Feed (Cheap waste) Meat Herding (much labor) Dung Wallows Hides Shade Disease (trichinosis, anthrax)

is in the position, as we shall see, of demanding a level of quantitive preci- sion f rom others which he does not demand of himself.

T H E Q U A N T I F I C A T I O N OF E V O L U T I O N A R Y P A R A D I G M S

Again, there is an important lesson to be learned f rom comparing the genre of quantitative theories and supporting data in Good to Eat with the theories and supporting data of evolutionary biology. Were Vayda's rigid metrical standards to be imposed on evolutionary biology, the principle of natural selection would have to be abandoned. For this principle as much as the cultural materialist principle of cultural selection requires that its theo- ries be tested by summing costs and benefits with respect to a quantitative variable, namely the rate of reproductive success associated with a particu- lar innovation. Yet, there are virtually no precise metrical data to be found in evolutionary studies (as distinct f rom experiments with and observations of contemporary species) which demonstrate that the propagat ion of a par- ticular biological innovation was a consequence of that innovation's contri- bution to a net increase in the reproductive success of the individuals in whom the innovation occurred. (It is instructive that, in The Origin o f Species, Dar- win provided no metrical reckonings of rates of survival and reproductive success, and few quantitative data of any kind).

S U M M I N G COSTS AND BENEFITS

A more difficult methodological challenge is presented in Vayda's dis- cussion of the problem of summing costs and benefits relevant to the satis-

514 Harris

faction of different biopsychological drives and needs. A solution to this problem could conceivably be achieved by studies aimed at establishing the differential power of diverse types of reinforcements under various states of deprivation (but one would hope, not, with human subjects). In the mean- time, there is a simple (and painless) solution for one important set of cul- turally selected behaviors. If the costs and benefits of satisfying each of the main drives and needs associated with trait x, but only some or none of costs and benefits of the main drives and needs associated with trait y, sum posi- tively, or if each of the costs and benefits of satisfying the main drives and needs associated with trait x sums more positively for trait x, than for trait y, then the theory that trait x has been selected for in conformity with the net balance of costs and benefits can be operationalized even given our present incomplete state of understanding of the relative psychological force of com- peting currencies, drives, and needs. For example, the preferences of foragers for meat over plant foods involves different currencies associated with differ- ent needs: calories, proteins, fat, and minerals. Since foraging for meat usually yields more calories, more proteins, more fats, and more minerals per unit of time or energy than foraging for plants, there is no need to sum all of the costs and benefits to test a cost/benefit theory of the preferences for meat. (As discussed in Good to Eat, the consumption of foraged meat does not involve the health costs associated with cholesterol and saturated fats).

To conclude this discussion of methodology, the reader is reminded that Good to Eat was written primarily to counter the influence of anthro- pologists whose approach to foodways starts with food as thought and is couched in a purely qualitative idiom. It was not designed as an exemplar of methodological rigor but as a source of plausible nomothetic explanations about foodways for which no plausible nomothetic explanations previously existed.

VAYDA'S ALTERNATIVES

Vayda proposes that the theories offered in Good to Eat could be im- proved if the principles of methodological individualism were substituted for those of cultural materialism. The specific improvement he seem most insis- tent on consists of adding an element of intentionality to the theories as presented. Vayda claims that if an activity is associated with a net benefit, the benefit cannot be regarded as the cause of the activity unless there is evi- dence that the actors intend or desire the activity. For example, he writes, if we knew that poor farmers derived "a sense of pleasure of satisfac- t i o n . . , f rom eating dairy products or from having their fields well plowed" then we would know better why they loved their cattle and were averse to

Comment on Vayda's Review 515

eating them. This is a little mystifying because Good to Eat describes in con- siderable detail (as Vayda acknowledges) the sentimental motives for cow love. It is quite clear that among other things, farmers derive a "sense of pleasure or satisfaction" not only from "eating dairy products and having their fields well plowed" but from grooming or even just looking at their animals. But this lapse has little bearing on the paradigmatic differences be- tween Vayda and myself. The issue is what role such sentiments play in the selection for or against innovations. In cultural materialist perspective, cow love, in all its sentimental manifestations, however closely contextualized, cannot be regarded as an independent variable in the selection process. Vayda refers to this aspect of cultural materialism as "a Harris b~te noir," but fails to present, much less refute, the reasons why the mental and emic compo- nents of sociocultural systems cannot be treated as the primary causes of the cow slaughter taboo, reversing the causal relationship between benefi- cial consequences and cow love. If arbitrary sentiments, desires, intentions, etc., are taken as the principal constraints on cultural selection, two insuper- able problems result: why did one intention rather than another arise in a particular culture, e.g., to love cows rather than pigs? And why did similar intentions arise or not in other cultures? Good to Eat provides plausible an- wers to these questions in terms of the costing of alternative systemic strate- gies for optimizing human welfare under specific demo-techno-econo-environ- mental constraints and opportunities. What are Vayda's explanations? How does he propose to avoid the infinite regress of idealism and historical par- ticularism, the mysticism of cultural creationism, and the continuous miraculous conception inherent in voluntarism? How does he propose to produce an integrated corpus of theories out of the endless arbitrary diversity of human intentions, plans, rules, goals, wishes, dream, etc.?

Of course, there would be no objection to, and it would indeed be wel- come, if Vayda could make any contributions to our knowledge of the emic mental state of the individuals who originated and perpetuated the sacred cow complex. As repeatedly emphasized, the emic and mental components of superstructure are not merely superficial parts of sociocultural systems but are as vital as infrastructure in maintaining the system of which they are a necessary part. But this is not to say that the emic mental superstruc- ture is as powerful as the etic behavioral infrastructure in selecting for or against innovations. Infrastructure is the interface between culture and na- ture, and it is at that interface that dreams and intentions get tested for their costs and benefits before they can be materialized as culture patterns and institutions. And that is the fundamental reason why the principle of infra- structural determinism cannot be turned around to make material benefits the accidental or determined consequence of wishes, intentions, and other components of the emic and mental superstructure. Of course, all this has been said before (Harris, 1968, 1979, 1988a; Harris and Ross, 1987).

516 Harris

VAYDA LIVES IN A GLASS HOUSE

Vayda has left little choice but to use this opportunity to make invidi- ous comparisons about the respective merits of the aforementioned paradigms. By concentrating on what he regards as the fatal methodological impasse created by the problems of measuring material costs and benefits, he inevitably invites a critique of the methodological implications of his own paradigmatic stance, partially characterized by Vayda as follows: "Actions or their consequences are explained by being placed within progressively wider or denser spatial and/or temporal c o n t e x t s ; . . , explanantia for actions in- clude not only features of the physical and institutional contexts but also the intentions, purposes, knowledge, and beliefs of the actors . . . . " A ser- ies of methodological problems immediately attract one's attention. For ex- ample, how wide and dense should the spatial and/or temporal context be made? It is all very well and good to talk about context but there is nothing that stands between American beef eaters and Aurignacian horse eaters if not space and time. As for the "intentions, purpose, knowledge, and belief of the actors," Vayda seems unaware of the fact that people as individuals and in the aggregate simultaneously possess contradictory intentions, pur- poses, knowledge, and beliefs. I should like to know how Vayda intends to add up all of these intentions, etc., a task he seems ill-prepared for since he is at a loss when it comes to adding up a relatively short list of fairly straightforward costs and benefits. Vayda's methodological problems get even more severe when he urges us to set aside "covering laws" and "rely on the experiential judgments about the appropriateness of the actions for achiev- ing certain kinds of aims in certain kinds of contexts." Whose experiential judgement? Which aims? What contexts? (This reminds me of Radcliffe- Brown's famous "law of segmentary organization" which, to paraphrase Robert Lowie, had an as yet undefinable scope and worked in certain specific but unspecified conditions). It ill-behooves someone who advocates these un- bounded, unquantified, unrigorous, and unmethodical principles to throw methodological stones.

Let me close on a friendlier note. I thank Vayda for directing my at- tention to aspects of cultural materialism and of Good to Eat which are in need of clarification and improvement. His critique, while scarcely fatal, must be taken seriously. As for the invitation to join him in methodological in- dividualism, thanks also. But it will take much more powerful arguments than he has advanced to get me to abandon a science of culture, however imperfect, in favor of a paradigm whose basic premise is that such a science is perfectly impossible.

Comment on Vayda's Review $17

R E F E R E N C E S

Bernard, H. R. (1988). Research Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Sage, Beverly Hills. Harris, M. (1968). The Rise o f Anthropological Theory: A History o f Theories o f Culture. T.

Y. Crowell, New York. Harris, M. (1977). Cannibals andKings: The Origins o f Cultures. Random House, New York. Harris, M. (1979). Culture Materialism: The Struggle for a Science o f Culture. Random House,

New York. Harris, M. (1985). Good to Eat: Riddles o f Food and Culture. Simon and Schuster, New York. Harris, M. (1987a). Cultural materialism: Alarums and excursions. In Moor, K. (ed.), Waymarks:

The Notre Dame Inaugural Lectures in Anthropology. Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, pp. 107-126.

Harris, M. (1987b) Why Nothing Works: The Anthropology o f Everyday Life (Revised Ed.). Simon and Schuster, New York.

Harris, M. (1987c). The Sacred Cow and the Abominable Pig: Riddles o f Food and Culture (originally published as Good to Eat). Touchstone, New York.

Harris, M. (1988a). Ships that crash in the night: Four paradigms. American Anthropologist. In press.

Harris, M. (1988b). Culture, People, Nature: An Introduction to General Anthropology. Harper and Row, 5th Ed.). New York.

Harris, M., and Ross, E. (1987). Death, Sex and Fertility: Population Regulation in Preindus- trial and Developing Societies. Columbia University Press, New York.