command and general staff school quarterly·
TRANSCRIPT
THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
QUARTERLYmiddot
September 1938 Review of Military Literature VOL XVIII i 70w
~ r Volume XVIII Number 70
1938
THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
QUARTERLY REVIEW OF MILITARY LITERATURE
LIEUTENANT COLONEL P R DAVISON Edit07 MAJOR E M BENITEZ Assistant Editor
September 1938 Third Quarter
TIm C01l1iAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL QUAI~TERLY-REshyVIEW OF ilIILITARY LITERATURE is published by The Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth Kansas Entered as secondshyltIa-is maHer August 31 1934 at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth KaTls under the Act of March l 1879 Subscription ratc One year in the United States and possessions Cuba and Mexico $100 foreign $200 a year
Books bull
Thc Navy A History-BIJ Fletcher Prall
The Lost Battalion-BII Tho11as Iohllsoll alld Fletchcr Prall
The American Civil War-BII Carl R Fish
Thc American Civil ar lSil-fii-lfl Major E W Sheppard OBEbull Me
The Last FiveIIour or Austria-BIJ Euyelle LelllllwlT
Japan in China-BII T A Bissoll
China FiRhts for lIer Life-UlJ fl R Ekills aml ThlOlI lIriyht
China FiRhis Back-BI JiJlIcs Smedley
And so to War-BIJ HulicrlHcrrillJ
America Gocs to War-By Charlc~ C TWlsill
Action at Aquila-BlllcrvclI Allell
A~drew Jackson-BII Marquis Tamcs
Roosnelt-BIJ Emil Ludwig
Tarnished Warrior-BI Major a11cs R Jacobs
Jamcs Madison Builder-BJ 4bott E Smith
(corg-e Mason Constitutionalist-BJ Harriet Hill
RORer Shermau Sig-ner and Statesman-Bn R S Boardmall
Labor on thc March-By Ertuard Levinsoll
The Politicos-BJ Matthew TosCTzSOll
The Big Four-BTl Oscar Lewis
Comments on the contents of the hooks listed here may be found on pagcmiddotW following-
Contents CD
Page lechanization _ _ __ 5
7tlilitary Ncv- Around the Vorld _
The Spanish Ciyil War _ -~--- 28
The Sino-J apanelt(gt Val __
Foreign Military Digests __
Digests of important articicc from foreign military periodicals the remaining articlet- for each magazine are lbted
Tallk AUack Agalllltt Antltank Guns __ _ _____ 3
Crossing of the Andes in 1817 ____ _ _______ 14 ____________________ 41
Is It Nc(cs~ary to PrpltCrvc Mounted Formations in the Cavnlry
The ImYltabJlty of Contmuous Fronts _ 44
The FIgt3tlOn of FrflntE _ 46
The German Army in HJl7 ________ _ ____________________ 47
Book Reviews and Reading Course for Officers ____________ _ 19
Let We Forget (The United States in the World War) _____________ _ _56
LIbrary Bulletin __ 58
Books recently acces-ionccl which arc of particular significance
Academic Noles CampGSS
Current School material which affcct~ instructional procedure or tacticHI doctrines
Rotcr of Instruct()rgt _______ 59
___________ 59 Rolttel of Regular CIalt 1938-1pound139 _
Map Problem No 25 (1938) ______ _ ___________61
Direclory of Periodicalgt ______ _
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles _ _70
A ltYHtematic reviev of the contents of selected military periodic~lIH Foreign-language peri shyodicalH are digclted to a degree to furnish an adequate idea of contents and significance
Reader Guide and Subject Index _
All subject-heading~ are arranged in alphabetic sequence and can be con~ultcd liIC a dicshytiollary Note abo List of Periodicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations
Errata ____ _ _________________________________ ___________________________________________ ~5
Mission TIll objtmiddotct o[ tid pullicatioll h a sytematic review of eUITflll military litpraturc thr()u~h catalogshy
JlIg artille~ oj lrnft~i()Ial vailh ill ~llttld military awlnaval plriodieals ill the domeKlic and foreign field
Artilltmiddot- from forciVIl IHriCitiit al an tnat ld b~ I rall-lal jotl- of 1itles and dig-csis of contents matershyial of partkular iIl1jll)rlanlt b toprlti more txten-hmiddotI~ in a middotwdifJll of Forcign lli1italY Djgcst
t Llhrary I~llllllll Ktll ion lit- boo]s 1LC(11t I aClc-siollcd which are of particular significance
Thi (JOlt f I I h Pllhljlpd a a ~uldl to lllOripoundrn llllillary tendencies amI to in4pire vigorou thoughts on t he ~1l1IJ(lt t nakd
Acknowledgment Till dllos of 1hi C)iIII I II dtmiddotill til lxprl- t heir thanks and appreciation to the mallY pllSOnS who
have aluahl~ a-btcd ill 111l plcparat ion of material for thi issue The work of cOlltributor~ has been dl)ll~ ip add it inn in their o he dutie awl on tIllir own time We arc very grateful to the following ofiiccrs 1m their ~(llerOt1- dOIld Ion
Captain 11 lartl1c~ nir KmfljahrkamftrllJlIJi (lIareh AprillIby 1~38)
11 al or T R Phillip (1 Frollcr Jilitnirr (18 Ftllluary 5 11 Malell 1J-20 April 1 10-11 July In~~) 11( 11iil(I SlIissr (lknmlllr l1n tJallual~r FlllIuary If1~8)
Li(uillltnt J Y Hutlolph Book Hcvicws
~liJtr IL lt Tllldall If 11 (rIIIllullrI (J anuary February March 11~8) RCI)U( Jlilitnirc ( II( (II (TaJ11lry Fdlluary ilarch 1138)
1a1(11 L 1 Trll--cottJr 1111( rll Crll)(l[rrir (Jmualy-Fplnuary March-Apri11938)
The Cover llliled Statgt Almy arrnond car M-l u-ocd fol n(middotollnai~~HI(
1qnippld wiih GO and W (alilH1 ma(hirJ( ~uns radio and armor plat(
Mechanization Ily LIEUT COLONEL P R DAVISON Cavalry
and ifAJOI~ E i1 BENITEZ lOW Artillery Corps
This article do(s lint nrcc8Wlily exprrss thr idc((s policics tcachings 01 beliefs of The Command ((ld (IIflal Stafr Scwol It slOlfld not he cn~trucd that the uutlws ([1C aftrmjltinll to introduce i( If olld stmlflr id((fS to 0111 (JIiee The sfudy is writtcn to l)1(srut mechanization in a general chflracter as it is fOllnd t~)dllJ hi jive fltrai llatirlrIs An hypothrtical -iflf(fiiol itgt used as a vehicle 1(]lOn which to load ([ sUnrtrst((Z mcchadzed force Should this study inphC a g1(at many differences of Opillioll it has thcll clcatCd thought on the subject and in so doi11U itR mission is accomplished
j The Republic of ATLANTIS~ i-gt considered the wealthiest i~on m the world Ii b a peace-loving country desire~ no ~randllcment of territory and up to the Jlre~ent time she ~ enjoyed a ~ecurity from invaion that ha~ been greatly
Imiddottrained
- sted br her geographical position She ha maintained a ittlOnal policy of al()ofne~) freedom from alliances and tical entanglement- ith other nations although she has erially assisted other Powers with men and materiel to _ guard their integrity and to preserve their democratic Is Her lofty aims and her invaluable assistance have
always been duly appreciated She maintains a strong Yand a small but highly efficient Active Army and
Territorial Guard It would take several for ATLANTIS to put a large army in the field and it
y to her national policy and (0 the will of the people in a large standing army to safeguard her illtcrcstr
ome and abroad The tactical doctrine of her army il middotd upon offen-tive action The unsteady world condition~ and the realization that no longcr pos~ible to conceive military operations which
lot r(gtquilc the u~e of armored vehicles have awakened ANTIS to the fact that she needs some kind of a mcchashy
nized force At present she has practically none she is therefor( ~talting from scratch r
Acconlingly the Chief Executive of ATLANTIS has sent the following directive to his Secretary of National Defense
THE EXECUTIVE MANSION OF ATLANTIS 10 August J[JJ8
TilE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEIENSE
My Dear Mr Secretary
Modern means qf transportation communications size of navies and especi~IIY the capacity potentialities speed and range of airplanes today and thoge planned for future use have tJken from AUallti~ the security that she has enjoyed from her birth due to her geographical position
Our National Defrl1sc is -plencUd in all its brancheH arms doctrines allli ladies Cxcept that it cumpletely laclHI mechanization We have partial motorization but no mechshyanization
It is requested 1hal the appropriate Rlatr section make without delay a study of the mechanization of England France Germany Italy and Russia considering for each
~~2~~~u country without mechamzatlOn poIicili doctrimmiddotq ~r country at lea~t the following fubjecis
5
1 )lidon of the illmetl forces ~ The terrain or probable theatre of operations 01 The organization of m(gtchal1izcd folcl- 4 The 1tmament of combat vehicle 5 The doetlillt of lJlCchanization fi Prolal)j 1ac1ical ~mJllornH1l1
d Submit tu me 01- -oun a- po-sjblcgt rccommclHlation-gt for HJI nnmlliatlffti (If a I1lv~ hal1iztgtltl Ullit or force which po~~
-popo t~ll bl paton 1)1 thlgt five WlIIl1S above mLlltirJJ)(d adtlling It In 0111 OIJ Wfrj alld -1Ilh additional iJlfolmashy
tllJIl a you may (II lIll tit
SlIlcenly
A (III f 111 riltI lltllIti
TlI (ltlJr ldf hi lllllg III mind that a Pnident (1IIJIiri)-l (Jllr ltlid fill h Jjll IHfflJ wty flf t1mlillg Ollt
v hd iJlJuJd Ill dlll 1hlJl lJ~ dltplmilllllg what has b((11
d(IlH rf~ned 111 tlw ]la)~( of hht()l) forl -tudy of the
()1Ij11l and demiddotjpmlllt (It flll(llullzeci Wtap()Il alld tilllf prdcl1(aJ appli(tI lOll 111 the lJ1I11t1itJd
FIl))I 1))111 11 IlIdl LIII]gt III ad Ion
~Jll tIll JWglllllH~ of drftll it ha- bttll 1(eoglIized
1I1cmiddot ~al III 11t1 ~Jnw Idnd of ohocllt 1 loop to pierce illt illinl t 101lt HannIbal lif of elephant- as a -pealhead 10 cr~h 111(gt Ilief of tlw lomall LlJdoll- b pcrha])s Uw
Illl Idmplt of 1hI-- 11 of fOI cp III that ca-gtc the expcnshyIlllllt ~- 1101 put IllJy lHfnJ iJelltluse the elephants beshyitIJlI rll ()lalllipd alld )llld HO II( cOlltrf)lled oli the InlUItshy
lIPId Thd Itla t)111 llJay have uelJl thl g-uidlllg
JJJIH pll lor 1111 l~l of imilar mdhod~ of tarfare during til lJrld ar homiddotpr )ll~t a- III the case of IIannibaltlw n-ut l a faitJn~ in tho-l ta-e when medliluical defects Ilthlfd II WhfIP irnplfllHr lacl]al ilS wa Ilw(kmiddot of tlll~p
v(afrlll-
fll 1 til TJrd Val hy lh ylll ]~lG mohility or lclWll
had blIll 101 aJld as a rcult of the machine gUll and the barbed wire eJltangltmcllt tagnation had taken placl all aloJl~~ ttl V(ctf~rll Front Ill( Allic theJl resorted to tlw lank whllh iI- tl]( oilly lYIH of mltcitanizalioll known at Ihal 11111lt fhi w(apoll Wli d(vised uy the British as an
anlidoe 10 the machine gUll that wa playing such with the lives of the infantry that it was sheer send men agaimt Rtrong-Iy defended positions
The British used 1anks for the f11-t time Battle of the -iommc in the summer and fall of 1 in lmiddotlauders and al CamLgtrai Their value uecame
(dUWtlld lJi1adiI FlIIH( lrIH~r1 fOI ollP of tIll IJdll (nd Hlilt hpl
from the outset in pitp of the fact that they moving mechallically imperfect machines and wcre poor taetical employment by lllCxplrienCtd hands
The French tl~ed tank in the Sois-ions oITen-li() for the purpoc of JldUllllg the Marne Salient at and in the Septemuer-OcloDer 1918 offensives ( and Guise)
Till ((nlllttlI~ lirsl employed tanks in the gre~tt otflllsi(gt near Sl Quenli1 21 March 1918 a1d thercafter in all major operations up to the (nd of with varying degree of suecess
6
lxhII No 70 M echQllization
LIGHT MpoundCHANIZED DIVISION (DL~
FlrURF 1 -French LIght lIIechanized DlvlslOn
c
ni
~
It may be aid that the followlllg priflciple~ goverlling tactical employment of tanIgt can be deducted from the
orld War
1 That terrain i-- d controlling- and vital fador in tank erations
2 That Kurprbe when po~ille is extremely valuable in ank attack
3 That tanks WWll u~ed ill rnagt properly SllcCJ1cd and pported by artillery have the opportunity to make a dcpp netratioll into a uefensivc zone 4 Ihat lmk- are Cxtremely vulnerable to artillery fin en not adequately -ltreenccl
5 That tilt abPllcc of an trtillery preparatioll or other dent means of dealing with the ~lIlmy antitank vcallon~ yes intact ho-iljp weapolls that may he ahle to intfl11l1 ectively agaiJ)-L a tank attaek and cauI heavy ioses
6 That altillery cOlillterhatltlY -upport i- of great sistancc jf lot a Il(((dty tn advancing tank throughout e attack
7 That the tallk dltack (leading tanks) -hould include rapid advance to prcdetermined obJcctIves the most (1ishynt of which is the rna of the ho-lile artillery llaralyring e enemy~ commullicatiolls and command system
We thus ee that the World War developed a new faelor the art of war that has opelled new horizons whose po~~ishy
Hties the workl is- beginning to realize and that the idea of eoffen-ivc- of 1018 in the Vetern Front and thosccontemshyated for 1Dl D wen L1lP origin of the operatiolls alld COIlshy
ption) oj the mechanized force of the present da~ Since the Vorld Var themiddot major POWCIS have ucen
perimenting with mechanized tWIts and t(~tillg- tlH()ric- ning mechanization It may he inferred therefore
t a nelmiddotd is anticipated for a mechanized force HlP ha-ic irement- of vhich are great mobility and striking power When the Unitfd States mfchanized force came into
ing in 1928 the Var Department directive said among her things
Tank are the principal attack elements of a mechanized force The tactics of the force as a whole shall be predicated upon supporting and assisting the attack of the tank elements and upon quickly consolishydating xeculing and exploiting the success gained by the tank atack Other arms are added as auxiliaries to furnish thc clement of holding (which tanks lack) security and maintenance of command fire support facility of movement and supply
The term mechanized unit as We understand it today include all units equipped with armored combat vehicles whether they be scout cars combat cars or tanks All major powen arc mechanizing or motorizing as far as their finanshycial and indutitrial resources permit and for this reason it j of llltlrlicular importance to cast a glance at what those natIons are accomplishing The information herein given lla- heen obtained from foreign press reports and due to the mallY change) and experimentation that is continually taking place It may contain slight errors in organization
FRANCE
The French military doctrine is based upon a national policy that does not seek territorial expansion but desires to maintain intact what she now possesses The French visualize only one enemy-Gcrmany-her big heavily armed neighbor defeated in the World War but now determined to get back the territory and power of which she was stripped by France England and the othcr Allies therefore all their plan~ and organization are designed to stop effectively any German aUack The French defense is based upon the Mnginot Lill( an immensely strong HericR of underground forts running from the Belgian frontier to a point along the Swiss bordel If they are atacked around either flank of this line they expect to blocl the advance with a mobile defcllRe until they are roinforced by allies
8(0 CampGSS Q1UI1~tmly June 1938 page 46
7
C amp GSS Quart
The terrain of operation of the French Army is 011 ito own soil or in adjacent territory on its northern fronticr where there is an excellent r(mu 1l~t
IVlcchanizatioll is NUll ill a state of flu She has ol1e complete mechanizpd dhi-ioll OIl( ill t hI pro(t~ of formashytiun a third tentatively planllvd and a fOllrt h -u~_~(kd Her light mechanized dimiddotj oll (I )ivi-inn kgiIP 1)1(lniqlil
rgt~1L) IS orgalllz(d Hit) t f) brigulp- -110 II III FWllll 1 rhe dragolJ- jll)rttmiddotc art tlplia]clll 10 motorized illfaJltr~ Ow alP mountfmiddotd ill light trull( aile an Jlrllyidpd With traniportatioll for all pepfJllwl and lapOJl-
M(chaniztcI enalry Ulllt havp ))1onlcI that I( COlllshy
pallY lilO-t rd tilllf ear ( a h[)Jdill~~ llhloll tnd lor lOlllshymunicat ion IHlrjJrhf- 111 pn11l1 1PIHlflllY III 1 hl~l ullit i to ill(laof nl)Jiit jI1 at hI 11)(11-( nJ IH) (I I )U( 11)
the (((lIllIl rold liP II Jrlllt thh --Ilm j (l1llt --alishy[acto)y
TJw Frellch mechallizld [IJll( j it J1owlrful IHIH)1l providfd for Ihl high commalld It i d(-igllld to (If(lI dishytant and rapid ncollllaiuHt ilivolvillK combat to Olcnpy and 1loJd-1 rahgic po-il iOl p(lldin~ alrial of PI IIlop to carry out cavalry missions With increased -peed and radius of acti()f and to InPpt th( al1aek If ialgl host ill l111halllyld f~rc(1
TIl( Fnnch btditvl thaI lIH(haJlizd fO](l will play an
after a tiuccc-sful aUach Howevcl they helieve tha order to break through a strongly organized llcfcl1siyc v tion the attacker mu~t still rely Oll the mperiority of arLillllY tu Uplll the way fol IllS llliantry
Mtlhanizld ullits are lo-otiy to clIak and to main
tllll for this lltKOIl mechanizalioll ha- bClll -olely confi to till cavail) Tiw FJIlllh AnllY t rend are iowards n)(
izatlOll ralht1 tlHlll o mechanization They Illlien l armils 111u-gt1 make greater use of fl-t moving ehich-- 1 --l t lH army of till future as the largL ll my u-ld during orld Vu 1101 mccha1lizcd Jut Ilwtori-ld They t11l1l1 Il1llillIlizaLioit as lttmliyjllg to a -opeda nlLChallized f(JI~~ Thele -~eIllS to be little -ympathy wil II I hc t hOIlg-ht 01 -r 1lllIip- ill futllre war This i- (~t1itt~ lIatural as the culo IC-OUllt- III manpower an~ too great all as d to he lidl
put aside III Irance the proponent of mechanizatIOn ht not IHPIl as actIve as thoe ill otiHr cOlllltril but 011 ~ other halJd plans for motorizatioll arc very tomJrchelJ~ The lHst French thought concpivl- Owl the army l11IJ-ttmotorized a- ~)Oll a~ po---iille alld that fa-t moving llladu are Heeded to IlJclea-e the moiJility of modern fOlll r
Ihp Frellch doct rillt ~1 ill is lrtillflY takps tilt JllIl
tht iJlfalltry oeeupie-gt cJl~olidatp- and hold it
(111lt1 BRITIgt
TIll British have tltditiollall~ relicd Oil -ct IH)lII I
reinforccd by air pOll for prollcti)l1 of th( lHllllllalllL the cololllal empire She 11l- lOllll to JPg-anl till Illl lmeaJl --ea as -lOI1llw]wt hpj cl1 pllljllrty lwclthl be~
(iblaitar at till wpstlln Plltralllp and cOlltrcll 1h( ~t
ClIla ill the eal plating J1lt1 ill a faurabk jllIition (If ((HI 1111 1oul to Illdia If lightillg lIlClilS it ill prok take plaCt 011 -otne otllll lIatioll- snil Tht isualize lise of the army 011 the continlnt or lhrollghllllt the Emr (~reat Hritalll ha~ no Olle paltill1lall~ lltIll~ tratiiliOlI her pulicy is ill oppusition tu the con lriptil military --er of Continental Europe
Brit i-h lllt husiaom fol tighting machineo began IImiddot t he men who fir-t sa tallk- ill ad inll alld t hi 11lthU~Imiddotmiddot inclPtsLld after the ml-hillg attalk or Hearly luur hUllt tallk-gtat (amIJlli By till lIHI or tilt rorld Yal the Iln ~
had Uw lJl-l tallks il1lbtlllll and tlw~ had ltlc(luired dll~l ldeas of how to U-l UIlIll lIll rl~lltlllnhl( Clil and mih~ leadll afe dlfilliteiy cOfllfllilttd to till Jlolicy of mol0rrJ aJlilatioll and at IHP-lllt alilllralltl~I)attaJioll at ilolll(tt~ iJCtlll lomplL1tLly JJl()tnMllltliJanild
The Ulitih Army j- organized and trained prima a an e]editiolltlY foret III Indilllw mnt likll~ -ecn (onllilt j- 011 the lIort h t front itI ill l Illountainous 1(1 ntillly IlJl-uit(tl to mtchilll arran lOIlStIl11Plltly
IndilIl Army dots llot nquin the full nHa--llll of llwchan lion that io d(inti rill hl)JlW llllil- (u-Ill- iJltllJlllmlmiddot and Je- in Palc-tine may attain l1ch ploportiolls t (IIal Britaill l1la~ iH lomp(lI(d ttl gtPIHI til lxpllliti(lr rOlC( to PJl-Pll Onill then nriJ I h fOleig1l policy Jl
aks 1UlOlH as a vcry jlossiulp tiwatpl of war there the rain i- gcnelally suiiallIl [or mcehllliztd warfan mol(1 if a nlitish Army Pl lights 011 European soil it will pr ably be along-side of the French Army Uuder such cOC
lions the expcditionary force might (ll he top 11llY
XVIJI No 70 Mechanization
12 expeditionary force mu~t be ready vthen the need adses for this reason the immediate organization of mechanshy
d forces if considered urgent On 7 March 1938 bull Mr Chamberlin ill a -gtJ)((Lh ill the
ue of Common) designated the OiJ)ltclIVl- of Cnat ltains policies as follows
1 i 1 The protection of Greal Dritain lt The preiclvation of the trade )oul(- upon wlll(h
t hi this country depend for it food and raw f i materials
Lf~ ~ The defen-e of Britih territorIes onr-ea from ~ attacl whether by -ea land or air j 1 Cooperation in t he defen~e of tht tlrrjtoril~ of
g I allY alIie we might have in ca-c of wltl1
[ j After the Prime IiJlitcr had indicated the military olJ t j~tnt- of Creat BritalJl~ IJolicy the Secretary of State for lWllr ~lr IIole-llelisha marie it clLar that a Dritbh (Jlcdishyti4narr force in the future auld not con-i-t of a few h-stercotypcd divimiddotdon- From no 011 he -aicl there arc to
Highlanders are iJeing converted in~o machine-gun batshytalIOn and are being equipped with armored machine-gun carriers In addition thc 3d Carabinicrs and the 1721st Lancers arc being cOllcrted to light I tank units This is part or the x~htme to l(~llace the fivlt Brilih hOl-)cd regishymentH plus the eight liglil tank compahics in India by four Dritbh cavalry light tanl( regiments
III regard to tactical doctrine the Britih remember the iL~-on of the Vorld War They foresee the future possishyhilil~ of again being called upon for a military effort in Europe They vigtuaiizc a rapid moving hard ~triking force Capahl 1)[ Ixccuting- wide encircling operation or quick deCp penclrltion- into rear area They would avoid above Ill the thfenxive action and stabilized warfare of the past
Ten of the 22 cavalry reg-iments will be mechanized or lllot ()Jlzed The two-hrigade (avalry divisions of the expedishytionary force will be converted into a mobile division COTIshy
-itillg of units Rhown in Figure 2 The importallt factor regarding mechanization in the
Briti-h Army that Hhould always be kept in mind it that
I
I JoIrORF 2_Hrltllh MechanIzed Cavalry Divisioni 1
I 11
Jj 1
ll tW() typc- of diviions and variations within the typc~ e type will be a motorized division based on the light
_ chlllc gun much the Sdme as exi-tlllg dii~ion- which arc ~ eatly more than 50 per cent mutorized The other type 11 b( a mechanized armored divl-ion based on the tank -~ lfgjJj lhp hell) nwehillc-gun hattalions a proportion
the-op will Ill retained to cOJP-l troops the remainder will (f)flprtul into light machll1 _~rLln hatlalion-l and will form nuctu- of the motorized div il lU 11 0 The strength of til(
clern army 111 IIore-Belishu continucd is based not - the indiVIdual hilt rather on fire units which combine
POer and mobility Thp Hnti h HCgulal Army ill Inclil is being mechanizpl
a~middot of fallinJ-( into lint with home plutiec four Blitigth talions the 1st Royal Fusiliers the lRt Devons the hit yal Scob Fusilier and the 2d Argyll and Sutherland
according to it mission the Army will probably be fighting in conjunction with one or more continental allies-and in that case it will fUlnifh as a matter of fact the mechanized force for the allies WIth whom it may be associated
GERMANY
The mission of lilt German Army is aggressive at presshyent -Ccking aggrandizement of national territory in the direct ion of Czechos]ovalda 01 Poland By )1(1 recent annexashytion of Austria an area approximately equal to that of the stale of Maine has b((n added to her territorial limits and 11lr population has increased from 66 millions to about 74 milli()Il Th Austrian Army of 70000 Regulars and the 1nOQOO reserves are being rapidly transformed into PanshyGerman forces Her next most pressing military problem is the elimination of Czechoslovakia Traditionally the enemy of I
9
n
11
(lItlIIl 11middot1middotllrdmiddot I() JIJIf1rh hI- Ib1lI lllllOJcd dlmiddotjshy
j()n hi(h tn Iwing (middotpandld into --l The divi--ion orshy~aflildil)ll i iwlu d tIl )( t hOrll ill thl (hart (It~iglrl
L)
The (trmall tat i(al d(l(1 rillf cOllI tmplatt t ~11OIlj
swift lttplk(gt ltlhtaillVcl by llltlll)(JPJ 10 maintaill lh( (lllshy
flict in hl)-tile territ()jY Tllt-l nllehanized divi iolls arC dl-iglllmiddotd to provide a 1)1)11[111 fa~t ~t riking Itpon for --urprif 11- ill 1111 illilid tal~I- of thp ltampaig-Il Thigt mfchallizld fore( rIll ~t rib hard Pllough alld far ellough Into hol II rril()rr 10 frll tral(middot Ill (llIIllY fllohilizalioll alld dbnljil OJ( Iltlll illitial ddlhlt dbpo iliolh ill ~l1ch a
way 1 ha1 1fw -llpJlorl iJlg (frnwlI forcti ill hI ahlp tn -~curf an larly vilfIY All amplp of the -pld with vhich ((rmany IXHCt to mo( hj rnc(haniz(d force Witgt
j~iv(~n h Ihf 11~hlllillg-1ik( rapidity with which that Jl()(lshy
ful forc ol COllt(ntrai(d ill VilIl1tl la-t Match rllttchllW finllIlfl [gt1- ~ hffoj I Ill -1IlIJIjtd Tt aiiangt fluId IIllil 1)p
seimJe f)f Ao)tria (erlllany attacills great importance to the early h()llr of the val tllli Ihlllfol( lwl sllatpJ~ i- ha~ed UPOIl a war of (illiek dlli-ioll WIH1l 1Hl war machill-l
on land and air wlll vij~qr()IH)Jy st rikp (hIring the firRt days or wcelu of Uw war and inflict defeat upon the enemy
thaI (oun1ry ao shc did four years later Many haLmiddot lJ(litvl thaI ~Iu--oIiJli lt1- pr))]]Y tllatcd lJy HiUCl hen~ m ilttUti tncJ Autlia [liiall who rrmcmlJc) Caportlt Ill) love for (ermany and despitr Hitlers as-uranCe pract flifIHhhip and the promise that Brelllll --halJ fori nlllaill Ill( illvinlatp frolltiPl IJP1llll the two (ounl 1hlfI) will alwa)- IH a jllt-1 lflll ill Ihl Italian mind ao tok -llH(rity of thl--p promit-- parlklilarl~ (on--idiIW thlle are l1early thJ(C-quaricl of a million ((1111lt111 J
North(Jn Italy IUtl b V(gtly ulJHraIgtJp 10 a tlllllg -(a )()lr bl
prestIII she i --t1Ollg ill Ihe ~Iediler]llltal1 due to tilt
nus -tllJlnarine alld air ha~l that hl hl~ prepared which thnatlll thlt lift-lilll-- of bolh (Ilat Dlitain VrlIHt Silt i--lIalizt Fralltl 1- In lllg prest igp
Jat in llat iOIl nnd t lOIl) dy d(~irC to auml that
f)nlillJ~ til( la-t ItW ytalS Italy has her11 ovnomiddotinlenill
wlth major l1uits of thrp( distinct tvJC~ the divi~middotd()lI t lIP molOiizld tli i-joll and tIlt mechanized
The IHlrpuse of the fa-1t division is to make rapid movements and to arrive on time t1WlI at nated place to deploY fire power sufllcicnt to
~ _ rshy1)1ech(mizul ion C amp GSS Quart
France -hc ha- huilt a -pcfldilt1 road lwl in Uw ~olltht t especially uitable fill tlw u( of mcchanizcd force~ It i-
reliahly rCllorlcd that Hitler is rapidly [Ilrtifing- the Rhine frontier to meet tFrcl1ch attack
r The terrain of ojgterltIOll- of tIl( (prnJall Army ill fJ(gt itlitiallx at hast on gtllJ1l ()IlP of thl Iirhl)olillg llat 1011 -nil ~ Germany form(gtrly tied hy t11( IH()middotIioll~ of IhE Tnal~ if Veriilh- WlllCh 11( 1lldJatpd ill 1~)-) ha llladl IWI--plf fnl to tlqllin the m)1 mlJltrll (fjUill1llnt IllJlquipllHlJt i~ new alld n1lJl)til- all lllElIfn improtl1wnt (1Jllla~-lll
thoC nat jOlb hich hayt IlI(1I wvilJ~ alrlll It II Iheir (lId matflili -OIlIi of vjlltll tiatl lllI 101111 01111 rar Sll( itlltitlpl kIt I Ilh all ldpr~al~ --1 roJW ill arlllOfEd vfgtllic1p Th( illf1111 ry dll-illll j lqllIPIHd Illl 11 aliI itanL VIlIl- which l1 lJf ill()-t II tIl 7~ an(lrclil~ to ]Cpnrt~
TIl FIIIHh di1 IllI hamiddot 1-
ol
ITALY rt
The mission of the Italian army il for the defensc 01 it homeland and the presPlvatioll and enlargement of is colonial mpirp upun which Italy is dcpelldlllt for her Ie matpriab Slw ]ool s fOlwani to power and (xlIarl through fulul( domination of the riLditlllanCan Sea til plaeing Cl(at Brilain ill t h(s Wulll-- All invasion r (If
tIll lloll 11 t hrouglJ BnllIltl Pa-s lIa alway __ l)(c11 the up mlhl COllctln of the Italialls fully nn1tml)(gtring that ~l
til( days of Hannibal all illva~ic)lls of her oil have c Ihrouldl this --tratgic Pa--i Italy Hnttl an inc1cl Au--tria as a buffpr state uectuic Germany a~ too hig trollg a IIcighhOl fOl comfort Oll~ July llt t ll1flbiliztu troops 011 the Au~lriall Lorder to protect Aust iJl(l(JltIllt1(IlCt~ When Austrian Nazi-- ldlled ChalllCllor nol
alld (elmaiIY Was then middotmpPoiecl to he planning the seizur
10
01 XVIII No 70
mission To this end the division is composed of two rts cavalry motorcYclits and fast car~ f01 speed i portee its and artillery for fire power It is a long range recortshyissance and combat force extremely mobile and little ex-
ground or air attacks The cavalry and the cycli-Ls tiaie diJIkult terrain and fngage and hreak combat
eae The fast diVl~ion is particularly i-gttIItahle fOJ tiom in the Northern frontier he jlUlllO-C of the motorized division is to dl(jop the occlsioll demand it d very high power fire It is
-uiJlttance an infantrr riiyi-ioll transported in mo1or- IS capable of ]ong- rapid movements but at the moment of
~L tion it ieav(s it motors and fights like an oldinary divishy - Jll reinforced by a -trong mechanized echelon Naturally middotdmiddotmiddot is tied to the roach and once commilted to action it beshyI mes 11Il ordinary foot ullit and lose it- value as a Ir - echal1lzcll force
d j These two unit- opposed each other in the Italian mashyT uer- la t Augut on the plain of Venice Thfir identity Lijf doctrine and equality of forces led to a -talematC The ~ motorized diviion cut off the fa~t diviion from its base and r ~e fast division fell upon the rear of the motorized divi-ion tisblating thi- unit from the main body of ib furce~
Mechanization
The purpose of this unit is to break the enemyR line to open a gap through which other troops may penetrate and break duwn the enemys further resistance The mechanized brigade is therefore the keen edge of the pellet ratillg wedge but it can reach ib objective only when plolcrly provided with ~uppolting arlillery a~ otherwise the pnemys guns can prevent the l)li~ade from r(aching the dcfeni-ive line or at lca~t inflicting heavy loss(gt~ As the gap i~ opened units from the r(lltlr- fast motorized 01 ~elf-propeJled-sbould be llu-hed into it to calise the enemy- general collap~c leading to what Napoleon called the denouement Many Italian military I(-uler~ helieve that the mechanized hrigade -hould he termed the mechani2cd divi-ion and that it ~hould have one battalion of tOO-mm and another battalion of 105-mm and be furthe reinforced hy army artillery as the ~ituation may require
The national policyof Italy calh for a war of -hort durashytion necessary hecau~e of shortage of es-ential raW matershyiab Accordingly her strategy is based upon a quick victory hich is essential uccause her industrie canllot he mainshytained nor her people fed if the gateway to the Meditershyrnnean flOm the east and we-1 arc clolcd to hey 1n accordance with Musolinis declarations Italy evidently
MECHANIZED DIVISION
General Pariani in his final report of these maneuvers ark- thai these two new types of unit- were used to
each other but this should be comddered aR excepshyfor these unitgt arc intended for use in collaboration
obalJly a~ embled in larger unit~ Thi~ would make it Ie to make a more logical di--tribuUon of duties for t po-scssing great peed and maneuvering power
ving a combination vhich volild have great combat ngth
The mechanizcIl )rigaue (hrigaia corazzata) I as tested the maneuvers held in Sicily la~tAugustt b hOW11 in
gure lt1
Sp( cctrss Qnartcrill March 1938 page 75 tSec CampGSS Quarterly March 1938 page 71
will usc her ail force more 01 less in accordancl with Douhets theory striking terror and dlstrllction into the hostile territory She has placticcn thb type of arfare during the Ethiopian War and more recentl- in Spain and appH~ntlY helievQ in the -oundnc-h of thii- doclrin~
RUSSIA
The mision of the Rusfian Army contemplates a war against Tapan in the Far East or againt Germany or Germany and ItaJy combined ill Europc or poltsibly a war ~n the two theater at the same time The organization plan of the Red Army call Jar a lwogram of defense all two fronts thousands of miles a]lart
11
C amp GSS Quart
According to n~ports thpound Ru-sgtian Army has five dhi~ ~iom~ and nine independent brigadeN f~llly motorized and a total of from 1000 to 1000 tank motly Chritie manumiddot factured in RUiia The mcchani7pc] force aceolding to the foreign pres-- cmprics t 00 motorized tllviiuns six armored car rcg-inwllh awl (i~~hten armoJ(d car gTOlP A numocr of lImb are (quipppd with amphibian armored alrS with a mt-jmum -plImiddotd of 10 rnilp- pel hOU1 on law]
anel -(VIU mih3 jlPl hOllr Oll wat) All tlw cavalrr rlivbioJl have IHeJl proidrmiddotd with a nwCilallizLd group of thre( --quadshyr()h of ljght tank alJd al mllnd caf- lgtUt to U1I lioak of cree maillttinld it b Ilracl]cally 11l1jHJ-lhlf III glV tlw organizal ion of t hi lll(haJlild 101 CI wit h ah agtlutf (l(llracy
but tillyL -llnl II) Ill litt douhl that HII--Il i thinkingshyalong- mlchalllzld Jill~- and that probahly lthin a fp ypar- Ill rnay avlJi(vf 11111 idlraldl rntlnpIIlPllt III rnlClalllJati()ll
TIH comhat flJlIWipk flf tlH Ilrl Army tre ha--rt Oil the employment of mVChallllal lqllJjlIlWlll Todern a-tuit eapolh e-I)lcjall~ lal1k arlllllJY 1 lat lOll and mechanized force lmpJoyc(1 011 1 11n~l (alp makp IHblhle the nrganizashytil)n of a -imultalHolh attuk of Ihe tlllmy on hi entuc hattie fronl so that w may iJp jola1ld (omplptrly stlr~ rounded and dttrytd (Pal 1]2 FSR l)~G) And again the mallllIVpl alld at lark tIl Jl1lchal11zlllllllih -houlcl bc SUJlshy
r)(lrtlcl hy tiatiotl (Pdl 7 FSR 101()
thQ mechanization of tho Army of Atlantis The Grand study is attached as an appendix
In arriving at the recommendations the factors YOll
preRsed wel~e kept constantly in mind and in addi1 ion following were con~idercd
1 The tactical doctrin(~ of the five major powers r ird 1( frequently influenced by riitinctivr factor of graphy and of national Ilolicies
2 A military contlict of the future j- inconcei Without the participation of air and armorccl forces questionahly the evolution towards the machine b accentuated daily
t The incontrovcrtiuly established importance of all tion requires a speedy aggresHive and strong power ontj 1~rollJH1 to supplement and retain th( results gained fft~
aerial reconnaiHslmce and combat r1 1 The dCiCIl-livc power of the older arms is not gr~
enough to repube the attack of trong hostile armored for nor is the penetrating power mobility and speed of the o arm~ Hufficient to drive the attack sO rapidly and deeply the hotile front a to deprive the defender of uflil] tIme to taic countermeasures shy
5 Improvisations of mobile unit- have provcn to k little value as it was uornf out hy the organizatioll Of
IMECHANIZED BRIGADE
AA SshyMotorshyTank Regr Reg
Anti Ton (Mor)
cycleBerSCig(U1 FA Unit Detsco
FHLfn 1 ~ItaJln Mechanizld Hllgwic
C(j(U middotS) German cavalry in U)]middot1 A Hwift armored divIsion 4holl) organized that will form the nucleuN of t he mechanized f
1 a f-ult of Hl ahf) tudy the ChIef of Staff ~lIbshy of Atlantis in case of war a force receiving apptopriatJmitt d hh llport 10 Iht Sfcrdary of National J)cf(nsc dircctly for its improvement and dp(Jopmcnt not as a Hal dOll th CfHHlu jfJlb till StIdary ()mmIHlkatrd to Ow of any hranch hut a force to which all hranche of the se(hif Efcntiv(L1 fnIlI-
lllu-1 (ontnhutc whoc tadi and training will break (nlircly from the method that wer t hotl(ht Ul(qlllle
lJImiddotIAIltTE~T OF NATIOKAI llEIEtltSE the cavalry 01 for the infantry awl think maUers Ollt f j(UIIBLIC OF ATLAtltTIS an (ntire1y freHh basis This should ill no way )Jll(JltIf f IJfl tllJl I lll)
eavlary and t)1(gt infalltrv C)()1ll acquiring slich mcchani71 TIn (11111 EXl-CllTIVI 10 the (xtpn1 IWeeHSalY to PlUlhl( th(gte armg to bctterc J(IIlBIIC OF klfANIJS out their pregcribed tactical functions The fact that
My dear Chief mlehallizld unit tight in support of the infantry or th~
Tn (ompJiamp vlth Ollr dllfctive of 10 Aug-uHt 1938 I carries out a role onCQ filled hy cavalry is an incident11 m
1IIbmit illJ(with 111l IvComnwllciatiol1) of mv de mrtmcnt for ter
-olXVIJl No 70 Mechanization
6 This mechanized force which we shall call the Swift obstacles and road blocks and can render important service rmored Division should be used for strategic missions and as a holding force Since the infantry regiment and the field r exploitation of a success and its principal mechanized artillery regiment canH-ist of three battalion~ each aIle batshy
are the scout car and the combat car These ele- talion may be attached to each mechanized regiment in case s will be organized into three echelons rcconnaisancc that circumHtances may make it desirable to do so
~ ort and assflult The division reconnaissance unit at the disposal of the ~~~ 7 The basic principles underlying the employment of division commander give a tool of reconnaissance makingr- e Swift Armored Division are movement Burprise and unnecessttry the detachment of similar vnits from the other l---e objective It will be employltd on defensive misisons elements of the division ~ Iy in case of necessity and Ib relief from such mis-ions The obRervation Hquadron furnishes observation of the
t - ould be effected at the earliest opportunity j terrain over which the division will advance and fight will T 8 The Swift Armored Division iR eHpccially valuable inmiddotr furnih battle reconnaissance and lay if necessary smoke ~ ruil and delaying action Its great mobility and tire ltcrCCIlS to blind or deceive the enemy The attack aviation ~ - wcr enables it to operate on a broad front to beat the which will always be avaBable for attachment can render ~1 - emy to defiles and other critical localities to carry out great altli~tance by aUacking thoRe objectives which cannot I dt~truction on the enemy route of advance or retreat to
strike the enemy in flank or rear or to deliver repeated g- attackgt against his flanks Jr 1 9_ The Swift Armored Divi-liull is especially adapted to C it In an envelopment or turning movement and in the exshy -~ llatlon of a breakthrough The most important factor to IL con~idered in this type of operations is the terrain and itL bull
wl be the mi-sion of the reconn~lt~ance echelon to rlconshy~1iter and ~eize faorablc terrain for the action of mrchall shyt iud chiclegt From this favorable terrain the $upport echcshy
lolt ahb the attack of the asault echelon and occupie- the ObJcctIHgt ~(curcd uy the laHer Thus the $upport echelon become the ~JlringiJ()arJ from which the u--ault echelon ntkc It Iucccssive bounds to gain the ultImate objective
lU Since there arc three echelon- the Swift Armored Dh jlOll -hould huyc three typc~ of mechanized vchicles fat -[out and or light armored cars medium combat vehishyde~ 1Ild lombat vchicle-- of a heavier type which will take carl of the three different phacs of battle reconnaissance de L]opment for comLat and attack The reconnaissance eiEnltnt of the mobile division -yill cover the uhision anti _~llctrate or outflallk the enemys -creen This echelon will tbti rClllfoned by the support echelon to develoll the cncmy~
fcnle dbpoitlOll- and gain a suitable terrain from whichf attac~ finally the assault ((helon comprising th( mast-
f the dVhlOllS mcchal1lzed force vIll be launched by sllr shyill I~e and in several waves ag~linst the enemys front 01 f nk 111 order to gain a deciive -llCC(-S ~ 11 ATLANTIS has a large seacoast to defend and a highlyr
bull bIle force like the Swift Armored Division viii be exshy1ely valuable as a mechanized general reerve capable of hing any threatened locality in a comparatively short
Thi strong reerve centrally located in rear of strashy~ections of our coa~t can meet the enemy at any point Wide World Photo
e a hostile landing is attempted_ Gelman eombat cars on the march in Austria_ It is believed that the propooed Swift Armored Divimiddot
n (Figure 5) is suitable to carry out all these missions and be fired upon by the artillery Its objectives will be thereshyparticularly adapted to the terrain of operation~ where it fore hostile antitank weapons hostile artillery and reserves II be employed_ It i~ a well balanced homogeneous unit beyond range of our own artillery 01 which may be unknown elements of which have the Rame rate of march to the artillery
13 Thc three mechanized regiments constitute the Attack aviation may be the only means available to the cleu of the fighting force which supported by motorized enemy against a Rurprise attack o( the mobile division howshyantrYt artillery and aviation posesses speed mobility and ever bombing must be used because the effect of aerial
ock action it i-l in short a modern weapon of llronounced machinc~gun tire against fast moving armored vehicles can iking puwer The Bupporting motorized infantry will be discarded It is important therefore that the Swift der valuable assistance in clearing defiles of hostile troops Armored Division be provided with antiaircraft defense
t 13
11 pI (IdJl1l tlv( iIdlllhltmiddot fOl alLHhnHl1t
j(um 5-S~lfl Armored Vivl1ior) of Atlanli
Ji~ch(riz(tion
Th S lft lIllo)ld i)lJ-jllll nlll-t hl lharaltlri7fd h~ high JIlflhdil trahieal lOd Htltai --Impii(itr and flexishybility 4IIJJJllJl nqlljr~ thal oldy ltmiddot llltial (jellllllt-gt be ill shy
cilllti(d It nqllllt a 1 iJtldHced -llf-ngt]iall1 nrg-aniza1io) which h withill it If lillllllan tOI)llomt oll1el( that will hi (ltOllnllJfd dlllllW tilt adVilllt E and ill tIll hlLtlltJltld Tid llqlllli til (IWIIHlj Hllit incI it i Itiltpd that
d dfmil II Iii l)d dJt((jmiddot or t1 kind IIIit ll (d ttl til 1(gtlll
It r J 1
l~ldl() I 11U1l11llcIlJlll J-- 1 -1111 ial to tlw COllllllOllld and hI I I till t t ~iJtld lill 1-- Illtlar
~illlldllll lllay Ill lllIlltl h~ limitailOll-- oj tlIcils to 1((-1 ll~-Jld( lPI~ (l1ll1Iat ear- -i1flllld hl ~qll1ppld 11111111t 1 II Iii llll 1hi I clllia11Ilg prolurtment 1rUJllllg
lltl (llllllll Ill]] uppl~middot
FI(11J1111 11 qUI] t Ill tllgtljt1I()ll lhal ill lHllllit Ill( t[ 11l1l1l1 lt111]( I dlll~ Il h d llwtori-ld Illfantl~middot airshy
r~(1 and 111J fur ~jllllal operatIOns til a addItional -IIP])Ii 1]H] 11 Jidlll 1)(1(1
Tlli qlIh t LdhI- 1hat nJtThallJlcd fOlLt- 1re nut OJlly
1111 Indo ) ] ~Illl lll nd J( (- ~aly lot he arlll~ of AI LA -11- Lll 111t 11wll I (d Jfll iii hI falilitai1d for the folJOing
c amp GSS Quart
1 The domestic facilities for the manufacture of mored vehicles in Atlantis is UllilUlpasscd oy aJlY lIat10 the world l11dwtrial material scientific and tillar leoUILI1S an mol( than ample to pruduce and rnaintan lHel~4aly lquipnwlll
2 It ha ht11 loaid that oil will domillate the H(xt q
a1 and that it is (veil more importallt than mUllitioll~il mell to mock Ill lig-ht illg lIl1it- Atlantis has an ovcrhelnj uivalltage 011 hpIside Napoleol1- armlPs moved on tJ
-omaeh- hut thl nlllliPlll motorizld and Il1lLhanizld anl JllOVl Oil gasolilll The (Clman highly motorized I nHchalliztl army had comdderahle dillkultie~ ill it- mr (Ill VipllIla alld it j said that a ian-e portion of tl1P mel) iZld and motorizpc lin it (rt I(ft 1ralldetl Oil the load~i IllVI1 saw Au-triHll -011 The Fnllch General Staff wri Arllo J)ogth-IIfIllol ha- iig-Ulld out that the oil neel motor alld Idnieatillg oil-of modern armie~ navies ane IllPt- i- -0 glcat that ill the event of war the tIlmali Europl fOI war purpo-(gt alone would be nearly th1l( t iuropl (llUre peacetime nced-- Germany is --UPpJIllg
pIf today from coal J1lo-11y low grade coal and Iiglll millioll tOll of fUlj a year But in till vent uf war til Ollly a Ira(t iOll of 1Jc oil lhal (prmallY will Jllld fOT
lannil- Shortagp of oil will paralmiddotzc tho-l nlOtorizedj Dllcilanizlcl force Thl la-t harrLl uf oil of a iJlilagu army will be as dramatic as Ow last eartridgr
~ Tlw (hmand for gltatlr S1Jlld alld mohillly h il anonl with Atlantis plan of llat jOllal defeJlsC a plan ~f 011 a -mall highly lliilitnt fOlll The citizens of Atlantl t hOlotlghly accllstomed to the li-e of mechanical devicl-t havp a larger Ilumb(r (If TIWChallllS t han allY otlw) Hatil
the world lIemiKls of Parliament apprlciatl the nll1 Jighting macilille- n~logllizl the lllcd- of a well (qUI) mmiern mechanized furle so that a~ an entirely iluh dent entity it wiJllJe ill a favoraLle position whell thel lome to grant the nCl(~~arr funds
4 Fighting nwdlinc-gt -uit the natIOnal eharader of thL dtizells of Atlallti~ They appeal ttl 11wir dL--irf (lllrgl1 ic and -ift dCd~i()ll
g SecretaIll XatioJal VI
SerVice Ur7lts and
TrClns~ ~pPorting AUXIII
-~
01 XVIII No 70 Mechanization
The authol~ have cnd((lVOled to prltClcJli in thi -ludy a alanced mechalli~crl force of -trong fire lower great mobilshy and heavy hock action inuepemlent in organilatioll a rce pertaining to no one blanch On tlch a cOlltlOvcl-ial bject it can hardly be cpccted thai thtlC will be unanimshy
o( atrcenwnt Thh gcnelltli lndy i IIllSlntcd a thl
ba-ih of dicllt)-)ion of a problem the sathiactory solution of which -)hould be under constant discussion The mission of thi publication will have been fulfilled if thi~ ~l-ticle serves to inspire vigorou~ thought on one of the most widely disshycU-ised subjects that is occupying the minds of the most brillianl mi1il~lry leader~ in the world today
)
fn ~(lmc c()untrie- of th( orIel man is held ~hlJap In
the lInited Hiate on the other hanel e have the utrongtt
re-ped for human lifl C()n~equcntl~middot in our national
tlefcn~l program of today e have placed great emphasis upon equipment ~upply and transportation We have de CiOPld an autoJ1loth e program which looks tnward an
alm~ Oil whcel hich ill Oplrate more -lileedily fight more eflicicntly and -mlTer le~~ ~cyelcly than our military forces of ~ c~terday
~middot1lt~isflllit Seci efury vf Irar Louis Johnsu
c S Ir COnI Photo TIlII d ~1i14 1 III AntilllCItft tI(4)]h
15
Military News Around the World By ~lJOI( E -1 BENJTJ~Z CAC
I TIl( gaolilw Ijt~l lllrdlJr alld til adaptatlHIl of arnw if ll machllll 1Ia t [Ot1 Imiddotd a wOlld-widt dllmiddotjI)Pllllllt of
nHlilaJJizati()fl anti l1l()iorill1iolJ Japalll~( lall]-gt rllllhlillj~
through Chilll arillond (II IUII11HriIW tllrolwh rtllllld tfJwn in SPltlill ((rllltlIlY PaIl1tr dimiddotj j()l and ((cl1oshyovakia IlVdltlllt d llllit lll[ll(I(Ilillj III llllmic wal IrancE dlplayi1Wmiddot It n1lLhlI11lld IIllit It t hl rtlTIlI mill aI rcyipv in hOllllr IJf the nril hh -Ilrlirll Italy Tl1otn-n1lch llliz(d fon J (middotill l ill) III 1lit J)(Ji()111111 p- JJd Sicily and melilallizld Cl al r IIn1- lei Ill I ron lqr-- pract iti Ill the -Iifl Jmpla(al~l a--anlt 11J(j Ill( world II) 111(( t hat war l1laChllll-gt 111 Il tl-d III Ill 1111111 011 bljIl -lt1t than h~lI hitlwllli jill kllll III 1(1 01 Plllllt a1-
Thee molhilli m()l III jcI()lllH alld tlwllforl tho-gtl (fllIlltli( whiih han Ill l1lllI01 til nrld 011 lPllur(p III ha( til ()PImiddot]nlllJg 1IlIl1lgP ffll thPll idt It -fpm apprnpnll 1lt1 lIHI liJ II1ld- nil production a- ginll iwio
Tht olln ill) WIl) from Illlvrllatlllllal 1troll1l1l1 f rlfl(middot 01 I 11 L hl IIlI Illltt1111lllJ pJncliHIl 01
) t rolltlm III Ih 111ld dll nllt I hi 11 1~I~~l 1~l~G alld 1~Jrl
0
IRON
0 COAL
B OIL
111l11 (ud
lugh )LSUl tu establish themjcs The dlcnmiddotfi IflpctiYl 1 Odober ID~8 and i- H111kr~toud to have Ii i drawn il(tltlu-( or Ilw L1at nnmiJ(l of Cllltlal ilIlOPf j dlilill)( to (111(1 Argentina ~
11 -1 111gt
I [1lt ((I (t (
II rJIrjIHI bullbull 1)1 111 lhflJ7hll
I 1 ~td IilII IFI iIIIIh7
- ( llll 1 2 11 III jih
11-lj 11 1 -dIlI f)
bullfr- -111 j)l 1iIJJ
t rldJ( ildl 17171
IIll~l)i h lrj-
1 lt0 1111 lIli
1j bullbull Jjjjnl
i JrIl 2111 1 7 1 I Ill
(11 J~I-l I I h7
[r li)I) 17iJ1i r)Iill J 1117 iJl jjtji
1Idr 7i I I)-
BiI bull ILl II))
middot1gt 11 )(r dtdl(
11 )7
(11
I Id
jllll IJ1n j1 11011
(gt10 li)l 102 h
lIn JUt I
~ I ~ h7111 I
i 7lt7-11
n If)7)
~ 1 1217(i
middot1()117
I 7 mWi
I(J fII
III 17 Hi7
(JIi ]n2W
III 2111
122
1
2) BELGIlDl p~
Bplgiulll i NUllOtllllled by lIeighhol~ po~sl~sillg- hug( anwtda- ald C()Il-lqt1llltl~ S1( fllrs ti1( ruin of cit ies If
I COll(- This explains wily the lklgilll gOYllnmenl lod working ipvprishly to protlct the ciilian populatioll ag~
III air attacks n) According to reports air raid shelters already havel
11K cOl1structfd ill many Belgian cities Some shaped like hivIo (til u(ommodatl ~o p l~()l1- A few call hold a~
III a 700 011w) shrlters have hlell built in unciergll ((liars Ail raid alarms are carritd out on Sunda) HllIstOnl tIll Illopl awl training lhl inhaliitant- fOlair l)fC(aulions
(f7111fra r
1l0llVIA
A n_f(middotntillil ha (kcll(d iIL barriers agaiIl~t r()reig-ner~ A century old dillille belween Bolivia and Para~ to 1-1)]( (lp(1 ivp innnirrat iOIl prpjprallly of farnllr with which has lttlSlU much hloodsl1Ld over a boundary in
Hi
the terms of the treaty of peace friendship and the 100000 square miles of Chaco jungle and
will be divided Paraguay which held the upper hen hostilities ended will get most of the wilderneg is assured a free port on the upper Paraguay River
her access to the sea
BRAZIL
All branches of the petroleum industry of Brazil were nationalized by decree-law a35 of 2a April1938 The supshy
N eW8 Around the Worid
The winners of six engineering scholarships annually granted by W R Grace and Company in collaboration with the General Electric Company to university students of Peru and Chile were announced last March The scholarshyships were fint awarded ill1937 to Chilean graduate stushydents ard the re~ults according to the donors have been mORt successful
CHINA
Anking captured 13 June was the ninth Chinese proshyvincial capital to fall to Japanese armies since the undeclared war on China started on 7 July last year There are still fifteen unconquered
I n the order of their capture the other conquered capishytals are Kalgan Chahar Province Paoting Mope j Kweisui~ Suiyan Taiyua11 Shansi Chinkiang Kiangsu Hangchow rhckiang Tsinan Shantung and Kaifeng Honan
Nanking the nationa1 capital was captured on 13 December
phing of petroleum is made a public utility which means tHat the production importation transportation and sale of
de petroleum and its derivatives and the refining of imshyrted petroleum are subject to regulation by the Federal vernment All refineries of national or imported petroshym must be owned and operated by native Brazilians and
t e percentage of foreig~ employees may not exceed that ablished by the general law on this subject
BULGARIA
Bulgarias old enemies the Allied powers of the World ar choru-ed approval of Balkan action freeing- Bulgaria
m postvar treatv restrIctions on armaments and armies At the same ti~e there appeared to be no bar to similar
lion by Hungary the only nation still nominally bound by re~triction-1 imposed by the victorious Allies Other of the wartime central powers-Germany alld
rkey-already have thrown off reannament bonds
Chinese Commumcatiom through French Indo-China
Now that the Japanese are making serious efforts to cut off the Canton-Hankow railway the Chinese are reshydoubling their efforts in Yunnan Province in order to have an emergency gate of communications with the outside world Plans have already been made for the improvement of all highways leading to Kunming the construction of a new highway to connect Kunming with one of the railways in Burma and the repair and extension of the highway to Sinkiang Yunnan will be therefore the new keypoint of Chinas communications with the outside world should the Japanese succeed in cutting off the Canton-Hankow railway which ha~ been the main supply line of the Chinese armies
I (Ncw York Timcs 7 August 1938)
COLOMBIA
One of the worst aviation disasters of modern times occurred at Bogota Colombia on Sunday 24 June 1938
17
Mili~hrll News Around the World c amp GBB Quart
when a stunting plane crlgthed into a rci(middot in~~ -taml killingshy35 peron- and injuring mo( than 100 Pnidcllt Alfollo Lopez and Preident-ellct Eduardo Hauto who wpre rcYicwshying the military c-llliJlt Htll WpJP Ilnhurt
(OST mc Th (hif( (-pnrh ill 117 pre hanana cacao and
turrCl The Clltci -tal (plt lriLtlll alld (PJlllall~ ill
the ordd Jlanwd li 1 hI Cillmiddotr IH1Jcha middotr flf ((jta Hilall prl)(twt whilt tIl l1l1t((j Stttl (lrmlll IuILtp11l Inlll lIppl~irlJ~ 1Il1prll t
nB
Thl~ (uhall IJ (rITllIIJ 1()]ItIT(d Ulqll la lIl Alldr
)ummpr Hnwlttn thl ()rd] f)f (middottrlo 1tI111I dE middotmiddotmiddot pldlmiddot
(uba~ hiJilelt)1J1llqrlat AUVIl- Thll- If) (tJ- afttr till fgtVPllt dill Cllbfl hf))lltlr 1hi iJPl1) who canlld till llHWl tJ (arcia It wa- all ())11 J1l(--agt from Pn-idlll rcIinll~shy
tf) (Illeral Callfq (tlrl]l IIadll nf tlw (l1lJall ill-ulg-(nt mquirillf- ahout tIlt --trltwth of tlw (l1)lll fnlTI that wln
I (ol1ahJrdl llh thll- -- rlll~ lllligiltlJl) tilt -pllliard-shyill (uiJa
CZICIOlo 11
Hld H rII [v
rimiddotmiddoth ] lkltn Utd) [) PdlII th cj)Ut of PIl~lt
Accordillg to n]lf)rt the (zlch deflll-c sy-tpm ]- iJalteci on a t ripif ring of fort fi(middotld (()()ed with barhed wire and mif1ld rouh alld iJridVI fhl Jirt lilH dinTh on the lordptmiddot 1- -tarltd -Oll) --1(1) (u- WIl Sill( t he anllexashy
tion f Athtria tlll Jillf ha IJff1l (-tpIHjpd -0 that J]OW It (()VPl- 1ill Illlgt h of fhl (Jrnall fJoll11f1
AlJotlt ~o mill-- iJlhiJld lhf fir--t lillP h a -PCOJlfJ lttriJlg of forf ifiratils Thi h t hI 1-gt1 rOllgl-j r t hI t 11111 alld j lw OIW the zfdb arp c1tclmilltd tf hold
rt aplwars to lw ttl( inknt if) or ttl army In dt~t 10 jill
Skoda munitiolls W01k- at Pilslll and tlalsft~ the emplomiddotycc- most ()f whom arc (t(c hi to ~hadow faciorir- which haVe been huill in Sinvalda
The army thin)ci II (all han IOOOO()() nalI tinder arms ilL the (IHI of a week all defellding the second line each
equipped with a subwmachinc gun for no Czech sol carries the ordinary rifle
The third line is around Prague about 15 miles f lh eill limih II will ) defended al all costs but go nWllf officials will moVe to Kaschau in Slovakia
This war-bolll republic which fears dismcmbcrmen Ihe hands of (crmanl has iucd eeral military det r((ntly t(gtIIlt1inv to strCllgthell hClnational defense C PlIj-Ol military training- wa- slPcified for all children 0
( wit h 1 hr (x((pt jon of tllO-C who norlllaJl~ woulc11w exe from phy-ical j raining Boys not attemling ~chool are quircd lIoW to devote 70 hour- annually to military trairJ ulltil tlHY arc 17 a1ld Lhcl(aflll no hour annually until 7
plltp] military selvicp (irl- must dplotc 10 hours annu~ io filt aid and air defense training nntil tll( ag-c of 21t thJaft(rW hours annually unfilthc age of 10
011 JUII ~ th (zlth()~l()vakian J-(I)vclnment deershythat all motion-pictun hou~egt mll~t be equipped with ll1a-I~ for pa11f)1l~ and (mploYfegt within a month lJ JloJicL will allot gagt rnagtk quotas on the basis of the -eati t[padtip- of the nation- theatres
TlEN~IARK ~ I
Thr 1hird of t h( nw submarille tIllder construction the Royal Dallish Navy has heen launched recently t~gt~ christellld th( Iavfreun It cli places about l~lO tons it~ an armament of five 18 torpedo tuhps nne ~-lIlch gUlH
t
two lG-illch antiaircraft Hapons 1
1))mXICAN REIIBLIC
Oll ~7 Fpbrllar ID~8 the IlldepclHlCl1c( Day of f l)oJ11iniran Rplublic Plgtmiddotddcllt Trujillo ple-tlltcd tOi 1 National Congress the account of hi~ admilllstratioll forf i Ptl 1f)~7 ( HLvtlIue- loJ 11~7 Illwd a tntal of ~11)61868l i~ IlllTLa-e of $7lOGOO ocr the pilllding- year The prini~ c()l1ullodilil- (xporltd Wlie stll(ar cacao cofTfl tohacco (orn 1
T
EctlAIlOIt
Fronti(r clashes between Ecuador and Peru OCCUlTto ~
Jlllll ~ in tIll Napo ngtgioll ()lr which hoth llatiolls cLr sovr(Jvn1v Delegates of the two llati(lll~ have Leen mN ill Va-hinglon since Sepilmhel W 1)~6 ill an eTort tO~i amicahly t hi old houllclalY qtlst 1011 1 hut their fl (onfplPllCf-l have so far ploduCld no ~Oll1tiOll to the la1ld division prohPJ11 It is hpiipv(fl htlI(l 1hat a f snilltio1l1o 1his (1I1Pstjoll illl)( fOUlHI
FINLAND
The 1T40 In(ernational Olympic Games will be held lI(~lsingfOlt- capital of Finland
8
PERU
FRAICE
The French allti Portugllc-c go(~rnments have reached liccord giving Fra1~CLl the right to u-e the AzorC Islands the Atlantic ocean a a iallllinJ IM-C for a French North
tlantic ~viation fcrvicc The United Staies Great Britain and Germany all have
ffceivrel permilsion from Portugal to llSC ihe Azores for ~OPo(d trans-Atlantic Iinc
j
On June 14 the French cahinet an110unced it had opted a decree increa~ing the number of oflicers and men e third large increase in France armed forces within
t
j
News Around the World
three month~ In additon to a reneval of recruiting of an unannounced number of Holdier~ for the Regular Army prepshyarations were made to take 4000 captain and lieutenants from the reserve forces
The French army now 800000 -)tron~ i-) expected to reach 900000 by the last of this year In l)1O it is to be 1000000 the figure at which it wiII be -tabilized unless the llle-cnt two-year term of CltJnllHlbury elvice i-) increased
A measure to consctipt the entire nation in war time Wa approved by Parliament 011 J1lIH 17 Thi bill was originally introduced in 1J23 and it wa- talen off the shelf thi) year owing- to the war scare created by the German annexation of Austria and the German threat to Czechoshyslovakia It was rushed through thc Senate and approved with some amendmpnts by the Chamber on thc same day This hill provides for mobilization of all the national forces in time of war as well as for coordination of war preparashytiolls in time of JHalC The enUre population men and womshyen alike ill he concripted fOl zome kind of work in the event of war and all profits arising from production of munitions and war materiab are to he nationalized
An oreIer was placed on July 6th for 1750000 gas mask to be distributed free to Paris resident The funds for the purchase of the masks were advanced iJy the city but it will be refunded by the national government elt some later date
The French Foreign otncc disclo-ed on July 1 the occushypatioll of the strategic Parace I-iand) in the South (hina
FrUlCC neeup Pm 1((gt1 hand
Sea h(1e French and Japanese interest cla~h and neal thE sea ]wes between Great Britains Far Eas1 olltpost~ HOllg~ kong and Singapore Allhough only a group of coral reefs their sLrltegic importallce is rated high as thty would serve as excellent seaplane bases in event of wtr They lie 150 miles southeast of lIainan and 250 miles east of Tourane
I
19
News Arollnd the World CampGSS
d
0111 of hI prillllpd port 01 1 hE l-I(Jn loa-1 of French Jndo-(hllll
IfilluJto titmiddot dlcpl hat )111l llllrlp~ although (IW-(middot tliwr1ll(1l bt nlted IhlJ1l fl)r glHPraioHs in -parch of turtil and Jird lllh lcconling to French rf)lf)ri j H~ir on Ilpatioll wa t akpf a- a llrtCltlutiul1 iII the eVCnt or Japancle eizurc of Haman
Lat TUll Fra1lce alJd Endalld toasted th(ll 1Hrff(f prlltHII a Pari (middotJllhlbla-ll1ally j~ll(itl King (lOn~p ami
(llllfll ElizaiHlh BritaIll and FraTl~e took this Qcca-ioJ1 to alll))lnc tf) tI orld-- CIHclally Home and Berlin-that thir allianCf wa l)1rml111rll and lllbnaJabJr As IiIlg
(Ofg1 (xpnl~(middotd It our n~Jal iJJh hav(gt IHVPI IKPIl mol( illlimat
FralJfp parndld I1Pr lTIllltary power for the Briti-h middotHPpivn King rrnrgp and OUfPll Elild)(th drovr hrshytWflllllJlI of modn FrPIHmiddoth lallk~ ill tlw ollleial pr()l(-~ioll
in Parilt on TlH~dat lI JlllW a1(1 on Thur-lday a military nvipmiddot Va -Itag(middotd ill fHir hOlor at Vrai11~ ill which 0000 men participated
AC(flniing- to Prflti rpport 1hr French Governmrni is (middottHhiriflring tll( 1Ill of I~f)und camouflage to deceive the
lllemy hy imitating the noise of gunfire troops in the march throug-h loud spCakels
HLe camouflage sonore may be adapted to tcl iUll in ordtl to lI(ctlngt the entmr and lttan I Joud spPlkers will carry t he Round of lnoying trains iIlg infant ry fumbinv f nlCks~all snl1-ltsting a troop movement Vhlt (lHmy troops art hpingshymCft this thJ(gttf it 1taJ afllck may ht JaUll1wd el4C
GERlIIANY
Now that German border fortifications are aI11Ht1 aJ)(lVP th( ~rOllll(I tlw Gtrman goP1nH1lmt prorlamation on W Jul~r dcelaring- the entire we-itern a eiosrd ana which noborl may (l1lr without oflkiaJ idpnt ilicatioll pallPI4
Ill ciosltd area (forlified area) is between 50 miles wide and incltlde~ the Netherlands Belgian hOI1 n6nn French and Swis~ rronti(ls
Germany haR adopted a flexible system of which taking advantage of natural stlonlOIOlltls several Unes of fortified points with strong rtoru~
20
M ilitar News Around the World
heavy gllllS tank troop- and bathed wire Eniangie-
The Germans beliee that the French Maginat Line is rigid already outdated alld aisert that it can be broken
The German flying boat Nordmeer was catapulted from the deck of her mother ship off the Azores 21 July and landed in New York in 17 hours and 42 minutes later after a nonstop flight of 2a97 mile~ The ship carried a crew of four men th( pilot the co-pilot radio operator and flight
GRItAT BRITAIN
ar Secretary Horc-Belisha announced recently lower retIrement ageH and higher retirement pay for the army 1110 than 2000 officers will be promoted 1 August The S(cretary abo promised speedy action on plans for evacuatshyillg Londoll and other cities in the event of war
The term British Empire is obsolete There is now a Brlti~h Commonwealth of N-ations Canada Australia New Zealand South Africa Newfoundland and Ireland are equal) in law with England India and Southern Rhodesia also have the statu~ of dominions fn foreign affairs
The Dominions of Canada and South Africa are full member states of the League of Nations If England were involved in a war the dominions through their elected parliashyments would decide whether to intervene or not They could in theory remain neutral
Beginning the 1938 seneb of survey flight acrOss th2 Atlantic the British pick-a-back plane Mercury took off from it mother hip off Foynes Ireland 20 July and landed in New York 25 hours later The ship carried only a twoshyman crew the pilot navigator and the radio operator
The Air Ministry has announced recently the formation of three Balloon Barrage Squadrons for the defense of Lonshydon and it environs Eventually there will be seven Each quadran will have between 40 and 50 balloons about 500 being required for LOl1don
The object of the barrage as is generally well known is to force enemy aircraft to a height at which they can be effectually dealt with by airelaft and antiaircraft guns Being moored to motor trucks the balloon barrage can be quickly towed to any threatened nrNl and constitutes a mobile barrier
The antiaircraft defeme of London according to a bleech made in May 1918 by MI HOle-BeliRha had a
21
~ ~ shy
lfilita11 Nelcs Around the WOOld C amp GSS Quart
-tllllgtll 011 -Iay 1 Et)6 (If )7S0 nHitcl- and nWJl On May 1 1~)t) it Wltl-- ~~)tlli and tlt PIP-Pllt is 0tr that llumber
II ~I 1- If ~ I I ~IJ )ly l~)U)
111 JUJle JlJ ill S(tjll Flo lilt T qf the (lrman lIojlllial jhlltimiddot llIj1 (rr)~- l KllrtUlt ()jllllld the va[l-
tJ~l Iltcl It 1 1J)l n Illlll than tW(llty (~rman hip llltllllld thl IJllljth IIlIlh o Ill arnll-t( whlth loyal HI) -Jn 1 Ill jdllllll rttbj thall (1 tIl(gt nt+~ J1l t1
th Alii For 11l11Ij1(Il al tllb hajjl(hl]ll~ III till mud It Ihl hottOl nl Ill ~I )111 11J (I(gtat Brlt-ull 1llIb -crap lIll jill ]11 r TIlWhllll~ tlld tilt I)IJ~ 1Ltlpilip h[- h(til
rt 111 IIII 1hi ~ljIll I
11]IJrHw11 IIill (r- Vdl old thrdlr l)lrallll tlw lir shylrl~lrlllll Ilj IrrLllld 1lll1ir tll 11( (ol~lilqljlll 111 a lInl 11lli (nm(lll~ al J )Illllll ( tl~ll( qll 2-) T111l1 In- I a P)n(-tshy
tlli f 110 apJldlttli I) JI~(-~l t hp (Il11tldlnC( III i)I) 11 Irt]alld
(lld flrlhllll 111middot111ld Dritl h ]1)111- ~latljllld at f()]llkd lrJ--h Jlllrt i111w
I ]dl(Id h r]l~h -lei]11 llld it h llIHi(middot]-lll1ld thaI IH
IrllJl~ Jll 111 IIl~ttlll d l- ~llll III tlH~I ftlrllllc1I1111b ll
fl 1 Id t ~ (lid
----I DAMASCUS
o
AI
Serious riots between A rabs and Jcw- the WOllt-lt ~r
1~)6 have recently occurred in Palc~tilw Iain trol1lJle~~ ise ClC IIaHa chicI porl of Palestine and terminu~ of theJ-i- rpE
oil pipe linc Jerusalem amI Jaffa Report- t(l1 of the tratilill into thtgt Jloly Land of Tlall-jorltlanian Arabs to~ an 1111il fdlow 1ralgts of PallitiJll ill the strug-g-Ic againstt Id 1 Tews tlld (]llt Britain
Ju-t a Y(tlr ago without prIOr publie dehate and win Igo Clllbulling- Hw vishcs oj itilll Alab~ or Jew~ the Bri iJ 11Iprnmtnt adopted it plan for a tnpartittmiddot partition Pa-tilw Tlw 1Ioly Land Wagt to be dividtgtd into a 1 j jpl-h -11 It all ilah tate ufJi1ld with Trltlnlt-jordaniac i 1 lrJtbh 1l1lluIldt 0(1 01(gt hoI pla(p-i with a lorrid)1 it~ j
J(ru~ai(m to tlw -)(a It ha- Jlot hell Jlo~sibk to putJhpa palllllto dfll tlw plan prOVIng- to he er~ ulJPopularitO)rm rtll fIWS alld Arahs due t
thrif (HEECE wcnk
gDme The torpedo boat (corgt I built uy Yarrow and (
]lallY wa~ laulldwd 011 ~ March 11 ha a -pccd of if) t
kW)j ii di pJatmiddotn1PJlt of ljO tUH- and il-- armament isl of rOIl 7-1I1th j(tln- G or 7 antiaircraft mach11lq ltllH1cighl 2J-in(11 tflll)do tuhe
(l _ r X(It IIlttltllC llI(UrlUlJf lui) ]Jfny lttient Mexi seate
i lesolutlOll of ~K JalHlalY InHl 1iXllt1 180 lW--Ogt I
of a qlwtzai) pCI da~ a- till minimum agl for lab0middot~ (hracelos) engag-td ill agricultural ork
hensi depri
HAITI roigh
TIll minimum wago of (mployeo aH1 tidY laborer ~~st public ~lrvices III Haiti (nut incl~lding paid ~lomr~tic ftd~p~ tnb) h to be 1[)O g-ourdl- Jlel day alHllt ~halllJ()t hell~Jj to atiaciInwnt J)yond Olll-ttllth of it~ total aecon1ingJ3G law ur to Al1gu~t 1~)~H not more than one-third of the~~ 0
salary of salaried ll1ployc(~ and clprl i~ liahle to a~~
[)lent llJdi (nllldw of the [all 1))I liJIIIliioll Tul~~~re
ITALY IIc ()n til( ollasioll of Hitlers hit to Ital lat 1lu ~ n
olli-lher lhoIJach1lt pnhlhwd a Inilf ~lle(Jllllt ~f ~j nt italIan A Irll
Allordillg to 1hat pllllhcal io]) Ilw Jl aJiln Army 1~ _f4 (quipped diseiplilHgtd and trailltd it lla- all rffretiv( fur 2O()()() llHlI it is all army cnnlpowd oC cadn-l willct hrought up til ~1nllgth dllrJllg (lrtaill periods of they~-It cornprisc~ middot1 Army (roups 15 arm~ corps ~4 infrl~
divhi [j 1llgt1I1l1aill diviioll 1 fast divisions 2 motD U divisions and ~tv(nd independent mechanized brignde~ lli
this should he added the armand corp- -qlCdal troop J
can raise all army of ~OOOOOO mrll IJ( li
22
Military News Around the World
The Colonial army in Lybia and Eastern Africa cornshyises 100000 men- hite and lolored of this number two rps are stationed in Lybia
The mission of the Italian Army i~ to protect the EuroshynJrontiers and safeguard the Italian intere-t- ill North
d East Africa ~ The Italian Air Force b a highly tlailleU unit COlhiishy
ibg of from 60000 to 70000 meni
JAPAN
La~t July thegt Tapane-e Cabinet recommended that jflpan lthdraw its 11lltatlOl1 to hold the 1910 International OlympIC Game in Tohyo The Cabinets move wa probably d1c to the co-tly tr ill rhina the Ilccl-middotdty for national thrJi and the helief thlt tIll Japane-e pit-it would be weahcncd hy the lIlternatiollai ~IJlrit of the Olympics The ~mei will be held at IIeblllgfor- the capital of FlIlland
~IEXICO
A lontleal firm the Canadian Car anti Foundry Comshy~11 hugt entered into contract with the Mexican governshyaient for the COlltructlOn of aircraft in the military shops of M(ICO CIty 10 tralllll1g machl1lcgt and 40 military tmiddotoshy3elter having been agreed to as an Initial order
(Unitul SI I tlCC~ He I II II)
-ETHERLANDS
Lipan military campaign in China has aroused appreshy~ell~Ion ll1 Netherland India If open warfare happened to ieprire the Japanese of the American supply of oil Japan mght pUh south toward the rich fitorc of fuel in the Dutch 8nt IndIcs ~ Xetherland is creating a big fleet of heavy bombers orpulo craft and mine layers The army ~trength laudgt at about 40000 (32000 in l~36) Two tlivisionfi thoroughly equipped could be put nto actlOn1 There are now about 7000 Japanese in Netherland iqdia There are 1200000 Chinee of whom around 700000 iVere born in China
The Dutch Army is to be increased by 7000 men and ~o~e who ere due for return to civtllife la~t March have ~n retained and ~ent to reinforce guards on the Dutch ktmt1er
NICAHAGlTA
The urveyeu route of the proposed Canal across Nica~ un ~tart1 from Greytowll on the Caribbean via the San n Hiver and Lake Nicalug-ua to Brlto on the Pacific It would take a ship 25 to middotW hours to pass through the
(i jected canal in contrast to 7 to 8 for the Panama Canal t
PlojUllu Nicaruguan Canal
NORWAY
The annexation of Austria has completely reversed Norwegian minds in regard to national defense In April 1037 the unusual amount of 21000000 crowns was approshypriated for national defense slightly against the wish of the caiJinet Thi3 same government has just proposed extrashyordinary appropriations totalling 52000000 crowns a sum abont equal 10 that of the national defenses ordinary budget
(La Yacht)
PA~A
Panama shipping tonnaVenow stands first among Latin American countries Foreign firms have found it very conshyvenient to register their ships with the Republic of Panama and at present her registered mElchant fleet consists of 120 seagoing vessels The increase on this years registry is 12 gthipgt of which 6 were an exchange from another flag
(U S Naval Institute Proceedings July 1938)
PERU The Peruvian exports in 1937 amounted to $151363000
an increase of 13 per cent over 1936 Imports from the United States in 1937 showed an increase of 30 per cent the next competitor is Germany
At its meeting of 1 June 1938 the Governing Board of the Pan American Union approved the final text of the proshygram which will serve as the basis of deliberations of the Eighth International Conference of American States to be held in Lima next December
POLAND
lIajor Vaclew Makow4ki and four other Polish fliers landed al Warsaw Oil 5 June eompletillg a I6500-mile flight by a roundabout route from California
~ 23
~Miit~my$iew8 Around the WOlld t amp liSS UDI
The five flying a twin~endnc Lockheed American ila11shy
port pianc left Los Allgeles ll lIlay They flew to South America and crossed the Suuth Atiantic from Natal Brazil to Dakar French Vc-t Africa
IORTlJ(AL d
A PorluguPl Air ~li-siun is to vj-it Eng-laud III the Illar
future to takl c1eiivpry of 15 (o-1ler (ladidof -ingt--lltcr pursuits onhr(middotd hy the Portugllese (Ollllment lal Janushyary
En~~lalld hv had a rniiltJ~ Ttl]-o) III Portu)al -11111
la-t February It j- njHlrldj that -h( hLlS dlricierl to -uppl~ P()rllll~al wilh hl-a and livht arfilliry and (middot pHd UiJtallshytwllolns or credit- to lIpI Idd ally alarm(d by til(gt appanl1t delermlllation of (3prmallY and Italy to 1- tlill 1 -1 rallldt hold on SlJain and to uomillate Port ugal
H i- -aid that the Roel of (ibraltar nJH (OlhHiflt d impregnable iII be modernized with somp of thp lat(-t artil~
Ifry and antiaircraft hatterjt~ for deftn~c againt reported Itd(l~(lrnJan ) Ill- at Ah(lll 11 and (Tlf a 110t t () IllllltlOll
b()mhinf~ plalH from Spltlm Spalli-h 1111lUll1l and tht Bill~ aric hIand
ItDIAIA
queen iI-anc of Rumania one of Europes mo t colorful pcr-ol1aiitie died 18 Tuly in tlw royal palace at Sinaia at 1he ag of ()2
IWSSL
The Sovilt io ha at present from 11 to 36 cavalry dh-i()ll~ 2a of hilh an ill Eulopt
III Europl h-Jf of th(l Clyalry is stationed in the thrce wl tern military di trich (l (llingrad Vhite Ru~sia and El)
Sn Ill If Hllllt d (llIlll wh~ln itUlWIl IUlIl lapHllllL lrOOIshy
rrhe cavalry tationed at the frontier is reinforCed three mota-mechanized diVisions and by strong air force
The cavalry division comprises two brigades un ar - lery regiment (horse) one chemical 1quudron one englr~ti lquadron 10 communication squadrons and a nlOlo-mampt~ anizt1Ilgroup of three squadron- with 51 tanlc t~
f (l~a 11a1CC Mllitairc 2G Febl uary l~
Diplomatic )rlatiolls bdween Japan and Soviet Ru~~~
J1(and tilt hlpaking point as clashes between armed fo~ of the twu llatioll5 occurred 29 July over a small hHfl ~ hal)v]mf t1~~ ~H1 tht Smiel 1I~n(hukllO1l1 hOcicl near ~~ Important SOVIPL xeaporl and al r base of Vladlvostock t ~
fort itipd hill which bolh Japan and Russia claim is indk]J~ by the arrow Hu-sia claims that Changkufeng heigh1-~ parL of Soviet territory unuer the terms of an 1886 tr~ ltabli~hillg the fronticr with China
For the fillh time in four years an edict from the K lin has removed its viceroy in the Far East The Far EJ-~ ern uiJLrict is Olle of the three or four 1110-t importl~ provincial posl- in Rusia It ilJ(lude~ SlV(l1 provinc-leJt largcr than the usual Soviet province grouped in onc adrr isilativ( unit becau~e of the fear uf Japanese attack
i
SA~l I ~iams Navy is being strengthened Two gunboalsw1middot
to he delivrlcd by Japan last July they hayc a displaccm~ of 1100 tOllS and speed of 17 knob
(U S Naval mifilufc P)oC(cdin[Js July 1
SWEDEN J The Foreign l1inisters of Finland Denmark No~
and Sweden met in Oslo on 5 April to discus their coml~ defensp ploblemK in the event of war The result wns aJ_~ e1al agreement to refrlin in the future as in the past fil joining tHY gTOtlps of nation and to maintain strcngthelltheir poiililul and ecollornic cooperation with -~ end in view f_
( US N(tIallllntllltll J 1 l11middotI(Iillfq AllUlttE~~
SWIZEHLAND
Oil 25 Junc Italy joined Germany ill a formal pror III Swil-tiand 10 JPiIHt1 1111 llflulralityt- long HH slw rn laills her traditional aloofness from international COl
Oil 11 May tlw Ltagnp of Natiolls apPlovpd S lands request freeiIl)~ her from any obligation to PH ill -oallctiolls such as tlw ccononllC and finallcial ) taken agaiIlHt Italy because of the Halo-Ethiopian Vhlll Rwitzrrlalld joilwd the Lcag-ue it was with a s ion that he should not be required to join any milit action under the League Covenant
24
-~
~1XV[I1 NiJ70 Military N eW8 Around the World
TURKEY
IOn 6 July 1938 Great Britain approved a loan to Turkey mounting to $80000000 to be devoted to the purchase of
~ rmnrnents made in Britain ~ Recent diRpatchcs show that Turkey is planning mcchshytrnization of her army and extensive purcha~es of airplanes ~nd submarineR
AIlt)(lHHlrltta outlet of SYria
On ~ July a Franco-Turkish pact wa signed which rovide- for Franco-Turkbh military cooperation in the lexandretta ditrict with France and Turkey providing rmcd cuntingents of equal strength
The Sanjak of Alexandretta is just a strip fifty miles wide and seventy miles long with only two towns of any size-Antioch and Alexandretta But Alexandretta though a small town is important because it is the only natural harbor on the eaRt COHRt of the Mediterranean except Haifa in Paleo tine and the maritime outlet for the trade of the City of Aleppo and the Syrian hinterland
Turkey i~ interested in Alexandretta because the port there is a potential naval base and affords easy access to Turkih territory With independence approaching Syria the Turks arc ~aid to he anxious to bring Alexandretta under their influence and prevent it from falling into hostile hands
URUGUAY
The Constitution of Uruguay approved 19 Aprif 1934 provides that just remuneration and length of working day arc to be fixed by law with special regulations fQr women and minors Several decrees have been promulgated at various dates putting into effect minimum wages for workerR in variouH industries
VENEZUELA
On 12 July Venezuela withdrew from the League of Nations
The republics of Latin America are gradually drifting away from Geneva Of the twenty American republics originally belonging to the League eight have resigned or are about to do so
For the first time in history the United States is linked with Venezuela in a one-day fiight
Intermediate points on the Pan-American airways route include Puerto Rico Haiti Cuba and the Dominican Republic
Around-the-World Flhrhls
25
c amp CSS Qummiddoti
d
Frontier clashea oocur beshytween Ecuador amp Peru 3 Jtmamp
1938
Eighth International Conference ot Amorioan States will be held in
Lima lleoerrber 1938
bull 11shy
~lxvillNo 70 Military News Around tlte World
27
IThe Spanish Civil War
f
It 11 1 1 f tl 11l SpUIl
VIH1l thl rllll htglll rumhling in -pal11 on lR July
m(Jnth ~et it 1-- t1l1lring- tilt tlllni ~lar and both id( are l111tornpromi ing lilil -(J ddelIllIllld to go to tbt iJithr lIHI thd th(r( ~(tmiddotm In he nnthillg ilIa vall --top 11H (()llflk
5pmi
F]fl)m Tht Il1ltgtUl)~ent Drive on Vllpneia
28
The Insurgent spring drive to the sea culminated J~ the capitllp of Villaroz Oil 11) Aplil thll~ ~plitting Govea mpllt territory illtwf) Heet iOlls Tlw In-unCnts tried in middot1 10 captule 10(0 Ilaquooy cily Oil Ih( (alern bank of the Ebl~ FralllO Ihcll (hcided upon a swift drive with Valcnciat3 llw oiJIeetiv( which would not only g-ivc him control of tk1 important city but would at the same time cut off ~Iadnc~~ lifflillP ami thll the old capital isolated and starved wo1~1 hl furCld to surrender 1
I Th IWiUII(Cnt plan fol the drive south from the Ten(
--iIJocacer lilll wa~ ba-ed upon the converging movernt of 1 WO army (OIPS to pinch out the -lalient On the left It Army Corp of Galicia ((cl1cral Aranda) moved downtJ lrditerranean coast toward Castellon and Sagunto Onu
l
rivht of the Teruel-Alhocacer line the Army (orps (stille (General Valera) moved alonl( the axis of the Te~) -~amlllto highway Itorming Iiaisoll )ptween the wing~ th( fnsurgent Arm werc various divisions among themt Firsl of Navarre under Garcia VaJino t
The terrain is very mountainous with fp roads a~t able a region uifIlcull to traverse (P11 in ppace timl TIl (overnmen1 force- prepared stllt)Jlg defeTlltic positio taldng advantage of the strong terrain
The drive to Valencia has l)((n bitterly contestedf~middot
lhe Insurgents wcrc r(wanlfd on 1~ TlIlH with the caPtur1e~shyCasfeIl6n a seaport of cOllt-oiderablc yaluc only 35 miles f ~~ Valencia The Government f()rce~ arc t-otilJ offering re5~] tance along thp Mijare- RiYcr ~~
I 1 j
In the north Francos lroop bombarded the L()st Division out of its P1l1rP1Whpd po-ition ItltllCh frontil1r and OVPl 1)000 omcer~ and men fled Frallce
Resuminl( a drive on a front long dormant in the WCl the Insurgent forces captured Blasquez and the region surrounding it (Figure 3) Then suddenly
News Around the World
Vhat effect will the Gandesa offensive have in future operashyHom is a matter of conjecture
~ ReNcH
o SPANI5H
Flum 4-Spamh Tlllitory occupied by the French in 1811
Franco has an immew-IO superiority in the air a far more ample supply of guns and munitions than his enemies Moreshyover in order to placate Italy France has officially closed the Pyreneean frontier across which large war supplies of all kinds had been passing to Government Spain That frontier
FIGUF(f 1---Glllllltnt Olftlll( Itll (aIHiL-1
i 90vernment forces who had been yielding the stubbornly lteld ground on the -outh ~aJient of the Insurgent Salient Hurled an unexpected thrust into the llorth flank of that $lient The Government advance swept forward a dozen Jiule and reached the strategic cit~ of Gande~a (Figure 3) ken by the Insurgents last spring after some of the bloodshy3t fighting of the war The Goernment forcci however cre shortly after thrown back from the gates of Gandesa e Government offensive has relieved Insurgent pressure in
e south temporarily at least and seems to indicate that the O(rnment fOlces arC -tlll (ltlpahlc of stubhorn and effective
anee that their morale is still high and that the gents are not likely to vin the war before next spring r in the war the push at Ilrullclc paralyzed the activity Insurgent Army of the North which had just taken The Government drive on Belchite forced a months
tion between the conqueltt of Santander and AsturiaB
ha yet to become watertight and Barcelona still receives some munitions from other sources notably Mexico the Balkan countries and [rom private ources in Europe but this b not sufficient to oVercome the handicap to which the Government forces are doomed for lack of equipment in comparison vith the Insurgents whose superiority in guns tank8 airplanes and munition-5 increases daily
Italy ha- already lost more men in this war than she did in the EthIOpian Conquest and in addition the conflict has proved to be a drain on Italian finances and war materials For this reason Mussolini would like to see Franco win as --oon as possible
A Franco victory has been repeatedly deferred but few would now question its inevitability in the end Whether it can be accompliRhed this year or next spring however is not for Ul to predict The future alone can reveal the durashytion of thi struggle where we find not only armed forces pitted against one another but the indomitable will and do-or-die spirit of two irreconcilable factions
The bravery of the Spanish soldier is the heritage of a race ready to die for the defense of itf- lrincill)cH Thl heroism of the Alcazar of Toledo and the epic of Madrid had its inspiration in the memories of a g-)OriOUR past
-JHihll1ru Commentator J(anWB Citl StHr
29
The Sino-Japanese War
Ill
I
)l I ~f 1 Ill Llp1l1middot( (apt lInlI Suchow ~trategic rall ~ IUl1l ]1111 of i hI Lurwhu an(1 1h( Ticntin-Pukow r1l1wa It tllf)) a j)) (middotrflll fquipptgtd army of O( 20DOOO 1lll1l -uj)lorlt tl b~ alrpLllll- and tank- -lvlral months to
Wide Harld r~
1aIHllj(middot1 ohbl)o in thl Yc-l1ow River overflow where th( Peipille--Hankow railroad crosses the Lungri-The fall of thi~ strategic jl1nctlOn seemed imminent T~
Chinese blasted the dykes between Kingshui just north Cheng-chow and Kaifeng 50 mile to the East The Yen River ~wirling over hundreds of square miles blocl_shyhlJl[mese [ruuls before Chcngchow and forced them bac~ far as Kaifeng- cll-tr)jm~ lllormouc Japanese war m~r riel and lauslllg many los-es in property and lives The -~ river rolled relentlessly leaving starvation and ruin inf wake but the ]05 Vas nut all Chinas for the Jap armies uogg-l(l (lon wholly bested by the high water T Chinas Sorrow as the Yellow River is nicknamed be~
lt1111 1111 ChlCl fortl-- to the Vest SaIWlllltry llatl(- 111111) the Lung-hai railway followeu
1hi tall oj lltiJow pnrt ICllally al Lanflllg 50 n1l1e~ to the 1 wlllJt I (hilll CnuntlrllfTel1gtic llccecltied in su1shyilllltu]lng 1tpIl- lIHk lilJ I)ji-inll commanilpd by (ellshy
(rd 1)fIIIlra til1 ]1 nllLl of JIallchuria Thi forte vas )Illr aYt d IIIll lit kr cJlmiddot Ilit I ion t hnnwh timely arrival of rgtll1f01(II ~
Ill JaJlal]~( tJ((l~ I in till Lunghai Corridor nuw ~I(rn(d to ()jH1l ulIJllill 111l1 of lilt 11 the capture oj IIanlf) ollic]d gtd Ilf till ChiIlPl National (onrnmrnt afttl thl fall of ankirw The Japallll expected io captur( Hdlh1) h~ it IWII-fold malltlr Hv hnd following- the Jgt1JPJllJ~llalkrJ rlttiha~ lIJrnbilHd v-ith all (xplditioll up IIi YllWlzl Hlt wilen tllP 1apaJlc-c Navy had concenshyt rt11d a jlfIgtrJll Ilpll All ll11fol(gtltePll faeLo] hO(v(1 1
11Ihld t 1](( lanfll pnpal td pJan-i It jt ran ytar for China not to itnQs~ a thmd either
qf Ihl- YllIfJW Ilr ttl( lll)tZ( Hiv(T Some of the f1oolti-i haVll lJrr-1l J)It1 cal it Iuph llotably that of 1 Rill) A Hel srviral YIar I)f orii lluhr 111( -llIJPlviioll flf ff)reil~1l P l1 fdnrpl- I Ill (hllll had 1)lill dybmiddot ~lld had -ll((PLtipd ill l((pillg the lov ItlY(r alolW it ~ Ilorrnall()lr(
Ojl lJ Jlllll tIll JapallC-e Army 1lt driving- furiously for the IHJ-c-iol of Chcnvchow important junction city
(hinas Savior and the friendly rier dragons fUllli~hlt the most effective natural defense in Chinas moment t great national peril Flood strategy succeeded where et fii and guns had failed ~
1_ FHam 2 YIlI) ltlVll I
TIll Yello RIver 2700
30
(
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Military News Around the Worid
ellow mud which it carries at times more than 40 per cent y weight Thi~ ricr ha~ a more I4pectacular history than
Itinr other in the world and has wanderedfrom its appointed middotay (Figure 2) man time- It- v3srtliei ill th( sumnier hich is the time of high water are unpredictable
mperor Wu in 2297 Dc attempled to tame it by ing it into several parallel channels At 011(gt time it
wed north to Tienblll and entered the ~ea at Taku and it aintaincd that cours(gt for a number of centuries After
AD and until 1194 it flowed northwest of Tsinan ptying into Laichow Day later the river changed its
urse and flowed south through Kiang~u prOVIllce to the eHow Sea At other timegt it has -hiftcd between the-e two ints occasionally emI)tying into the Yangtze ncar Nanking
r~e which it ic followin1=f at this time The pnHnl Iir)od may (xc(cd that of 1fI~5 when 3000
quare miles were inundated 8()000000 worth of property estroyed and ~OOOOOO made homeless
YAGTZE CA~IPAIGN
Jpan(c lIfHlltry near Kiukiang on the Yangtze Riv(r
ready making arrangements for supply of munitions through French Indo-China to offset the lo~ of the supply line Ihlough lIang-kong and Canton The warlike clashes with Soviet Ru--ia have already caused withdrawal of troops from Northern China to Manchukuo but sO far Japans drive down Lake Poyang has shown no signs of slackening
1 Having been stopped by the River of SorrowH in the North where the great flood forestalled the Hankow drive lhe Japane~e Geneal Slaff immediately decided to push the ~angtze campaign vigorou-iy Anking was quickly capshyturcd but the Japanese have encountered stiff resistance Jhereitftcr However they have Hucceeded in ~ecuring Kiushy- iang great pottery center which held them for a month find gunboals have been senl through the moulh of Lake royallg They continue to pres~ up the Yangtze but the
lnain drive seems directed along the easier roule down Lake Toyang v Nanchang greateHt Chine~e air baHc Nauchangs all and the cutting of the Canton-Hanlww railway would l oom Hankow The Chinese Foreign OfTice with its archives
~ llld mosl foreign embassies including the American have Iready moved to Chungking 500 miles up the Yangtze
~ ankoVl cannot hold out indefinitely The Chinese are al-
f
FWURF 1 ~Th( HonRkong~Cnnton Rmway which Japanese bombers havo failed to d(~troy
Japan continues its Hir raids against Canton in an effort to break up the railroad to Hankow In spite of these air raids the Kowlon-Canton Railroad which is the main supply line of the Chinese armies continues running and rendering effective service
July 7 1938 marked the first anniversary of this war which started as a clashmiddot between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge outside of Peiping and has now become the greatest armed conflict which Asia has witnessed in 32 yearH
More lives have been losi more property has been destroyed and more money has been spent to keep the embattled armieg going than was the case in the Russo~ Japanese War
31
h
~
Military NewampAroulld the World
FHIJfU f) Id) of (mton hleh fo) month hac J II ltllhJ ell rl to J arllll( L Hlr lu(h
This war h~Lq no swept 100O()() quare mllCs nillP provincial capitab out of twenty-four ha~ heell captured by the inaders the lo~ of Chil1fs( lil-gt according to Japanclt(c p-timat(s which probably art too high is aiJout l~WOOOO li(- It is actually imp0slhlp 10 pslimap llw dlctrllrtioll of proper- ~11](1 wealth in (hina Thre(-fourth- of the ships of Chinamiddot 1ltY have beCn c~q)tl1red or destroyed alld the (hinec $~()lrnnllllt 11a- 11lOrL refugees than It can aiel Till 11llt- ) (hinl- raila~ ~~I(m haE Ill(11 tagg(lshy
U de 11 nrld Jb
IapUHlt combat (hie 1Il Norlh ChllHl
Japan ha- mod(rn WfHIJOIlH China 1Of)O y()ar~ of hisshytory during which )w has hllJl (OI1(IUered hut nev( al1t-orhcd
-From (hinn Fiyhts fo ifr Ekins and Wright
ing Yct in spitc of these appalling ImibCl Japan hal) fa to brillg China to it knee~
In January of this year Cabinet members were ex inl the peoph to )llpale foJ a three or four-yeal ar no~ depressed by the setback which the Yellow River gave thc lJJVaderH army in Honan Var Minister S Ilagaici declares that in his opinion Japan must be pre to fight at least ten ycars Japall is maintaining an ar over 1000000 mell in China and the war is costing h proximatliy ~rOOOO()O a day The (hillKe game lIoW
to bc to make the J apanCbC pay an exhorbitani pri may cauc a collap-c and cvcry days delay in the J apal1ri~
invasion j SPlll as a measure of victorv for China by Jlt c
creasing the already staggeriJlg co-t of the war tJ A JlC complication has come up The armed claslt j
bdWel1l J apltlncsc amI Rusian troup may prove to be tl j
first batth of a major war It is possible that the trou 4 may he localized and cttletl by diplomatic Rteps but th)i-H arc oh-erver- who argue that the Soviet Union believe) t tens the moment hus arrived for the following reasons 1
~ien 1 Rusia bplievc-gt that Japall is near financial exha Com
1 ion and a 1l0W or nev(1 moment ha4 arrived to fight a V ~
alld fOle-gtlall attack oy Japan in the future ~~ 2 Rusia fear- that China may collapse Rho
Japanese capture Hanico and sever the Cantoll-1 railway which is the main ChillC-c munitions artery I_
L RUKsia may IJliievc that the Siherian situation cant on kept within the Lound of a minaturc war without seri)l danger to the Soviet Union jildh
~- res OUwr obKenerK believe that the border trouble pC
mLrlly a Rll~~iall effort to prevent troop movements frl~ th MallLhukuo to -trengthen the Yallgtze Yalley Campaign-J
II haK been predicted that Japan will make peace Otiirod turcs to China after capturing Halllww and that Hhe eXPf(-~ng to end the devastating war ill the very n~ar future
Fighting- almost with bare hand against a armed adverary there is no sign of surrender yet b Chinebe government and people Encouraged by th( R Hians Chinc-c rcsi-tancc may stiffell
In 1812 the HUKSians deliberately burned ill(bCOW
order to minimize the FrClwh capture of their capital aIld embarrass Ow illvadpr The sl1uwuent collapse of Icons emJlil(~ has brrll attriuutLd Ly hi-torians to that 1 act The d(otruct ion of the Yello Rivcr dykeo 111a prmI to be HllOilHr act of self-sacrifice that may ~llso the dreams of another great empire
t~ er J
in nk 1 n ns hel qui OUI
ith
TANK ATTACK AGAINST ANTITANK GUNS
Condensed flam the HUltqHl AIllnfluyC_ IUllkU Xlufwz 11 1ll7]
AKTITA~K Gu~s IN DEFENSE
The advent on the field of battle of a lIe offcl1(-ive arm Lthe tallk-ha~ called into being abo a Ill means of deshyfense a t-opccial type of antitank gUll At the pregtcnt time the armiegt of all cQuntripgt are gtufiishy(lently familiar both vith tank(- alld with the mean of combatting them 1 In the opinion of Eirnannsbclgcr to each ldlometcr of
Ollt there must be 8 gum or to tlw divbion 61 gUliS to hich arc added ]8 guns at the dislln-itioll of the division Jmmlllder a total of 82 guns for the 8-kilometel defense
front of the division that b 10 gun- to each kilometer of tront i Such a tatulatioIl of the dcfell-e with alltitank gUllS i~ fudlcative of the fact that the attacking tanks arc being presented with a new situation
j Durillg the last few years a change ha5 occulTed also ih the qualitative state of the antitank arm i The 50-mm antitank gun of the Rheinmetall factory ireel 1929 has a muzzle velocity of 2000 fs a maximum ~nge of 6500 yards a practical rate of fire of 15 to 20 shots ~er mll1ute a weight of projectile of 171 kilograms The ~jrojectllc is thus enabled to pierce armor plating of a thickshy~~S up to 30-mm or 40-mm at a (lilttance of 1000 yards t A 37-mm gUll with an initial vclocity of 800 yard~ maxishyum range of 7000 yards and projeclile weight of 066 Iogramgt has an armor-piercmg -gttrength at a (1i~tance of
~_ 000 yards up to 20-mm or 10-mm rC~s(niJlg- of the djshyi- nce by half inclca-gtcs the penetrative power of the projecshy Ie by about one-fourth According to the French Rrvuf dATtillfJic there has
r
ten introduced into the armament of the English infantry4n antitank rifle I All the accepted methods of tank allack upon antitank
nS_HPil1cers front flank-which once Were COllshy
~ Rted retain their importance in a favorable situation that t in ctgtc of low saturation of the defense front with anti shy~_ nk g-un- and in cafie the tank unit act in JcconnaiRsance _ a broad front The degree of ~aturation with antitank
ns however which prevail at the precni limp demands ~ her methods of combatting them a different tactic That - quire a new effort in the field of military and ~cientific
i~ ought
-~
Foreign Military Digests Digestlt of important articles from foreign militarlf periodicalgt til( remaiui1l1 articlegt 1m each
lIlajaziu (( ( listed i11 C((trd(u (If Scrret( d Jgt( riodic([ Artielfs
j ~
SmEKrTH OJ THE TANI AND OF TilE ANTITANK GUN
Let us compare the strength of the individual light tank ith that of the antitank gun Conceiving the situation to
be one In which the tank ix approaching nn antitank gun which has been sct up on a firing position there is the folshylowing to be Imid the antitank gun thanks to its stable Jlosition and to concealment on the locality is less con~picshyll0W than the tank moving in the open and readily observshyable Because of that fact the initiative will almost alvays remain un the ide of the antitank gun The antitank gun is the first to open fire from a diRtance of 500 to 1000 yards and has the possibility of making a few aimed shots before the opening of tire from the tank With tho hots the antitank gun may put the tank out of commission If it doc- not then the tank will begin firing
The tire from the tank is tire from a machine in motion upon a poorly observable target on an unstudied locality and for this rea~on its accuracy wHi be approximately half that of the fire of the antitank gun However since the tank has armor and in addition to the gun haR also a machine gun it is more correct to consider that the vulnerability of the tank is much ICHH than that of the untitank gUll and its fire power much greater But the initiative as before will remain on the ide of the antitank gun All that is indicative of a cershytain preponderance in the fire power of the antitank gun over that of individual tunks
THE STRENGTH OF ATTACKING TANKS
What is true of the attacking tank and of the defending antitank gun taken separately can not be extended to the massive and skillfully organized tank attack
The rifle battalion engaged in supporting the tank comshypany will conduct its offensive in a zone 600 to 800 meters wide Assuming that the adversary is satunited with anti shytank guns in accordance wjth Eimannsbergers calcuJationg the company wiII me~t at the forward area of such 7one 5 to 6 antitank gun At some depth it wil meet with entire batteries of regimental or battalion artillery Consequently against each 2 to 3 tanl(t~ there may appear one antitank gun We have already seen above that when 2 to 5 tanks go to meet one modern antitank gUll the final ()utcome of their collision can not be predicted
In that case the situation for the tank is not brilliant to attack is po~sible but the risl is very high and the losses will without doubt be great How call those losses be avoided and What is the best method for attacking the front of the antitank guns The best way out of the difficulty must be sought in establishing a definite ~mpeliority of forces in the decisive direction That can be attained by closing up the combat orders in the direction of the main blow
Ag-ainst such a solution the foJ1owing objections mny be raiecl There will take part in the battle not only those antitanl guns which wi1l appear in front of the tanls but also those which will be on the fianl of the attacking cOmshypanY so that the humber of antitank guns must still be inshy
33
middot roreirII MililwY Digestq C amp GSS Quart
creaHed bv lor S Thal Itgt tlU( a- l(gtld- tlw -ingie comshypany ltutng- separat(l~ _ But eVell for -uch a company if it operatc~ dth 1lthcl --mall tomlmt interval eeltain adshyvantages are created illee tht numher of antitank gUllgt actmiddot ing again-t it will IJl clhicillahly II p hl( to take into
consideration maJJlly till ma-h( tall attack cIllCe the - employrnellt of tanh- III t he offrll in~ mut Ill majL
(FR-~(i Art 7J (()Il-(Cjuentiy the Lllll( (ompII1Y will a a rule not attack -illgl~ 11w attack gt111 )( parlicipaltd III
al-o hy 11~Hr cf)mpallir acting- at ngilt and hmiddotft
Till 1clIltWr- rif tlH attacking tank (IIl tlw alltlshy
ltl1k glllh lPIJlll illjf tlHir atLlck arc (middotmblHImiddotd III tIll ac11shy
IW p gt of fill offI-- flj Ill( dflJ) Till adl--lry dlall
when t1(gt dp~11 ~ and Ltlllreate a gtujl(ril)rity (If fon ill Ih dtciiyp dinmiddot(titJll Ttw pl1ly OJ till d([11l t artl oIT tIll attack Ill)t v hr he dhlrt-- but WiHlt I hI adnmiddotr ary atshytackgt that 1-- hi- (t]fJJh will c]pplld ()Il hl dllfjoll of t11l
asailant Bpcau e (If that fact lll mil )p ](ady pr~shy
wher( to J(pubr the lt1lt1Irgtar That circumtallcP ha always hmiddotd awl will lpad til dijllrlllll (If forn flll Ill( part of thp dtffn lmiddot lnrI In adY(llta)~( Oil I Ill part Ill tht otYPll-l(
Alld thlht l(halltql- llllht bl pot to u p for proppr 01shy~~anizati()n Df tllt t101 attack ~hltpfr may Iw the -nturashylion of 11w (Itf~ll with antItank gUIl-- it i~ 11wl~ po~ibIr
to create in till dllilp dlrlctioll a prlJlolHiL-ranCI uf tanllt attaching It1 COlljHlatlnn jtll till ttrtllleIY If the cnrmy has 1-1ahll--hcil ollf lntitmh gUll for each IOU yards (that is a high -gtaturatlUll and to create it is not uch n simple matshy101 a- may apptar at firt glance) t the nttackcl may have ill 111 offensive 70ne of 100 yard 1 to 6 or more tanks In that (asc (111 Hot countl11l the po~ibility of creating the same prepunderancc in artillery the advantage of the fighting a clcarly 011 the ~id( of the taId And therein lies the ltuperiority of the- at tacking- tanks oYer the antitank gUllS That nquirl~ of t1w organizer of the offensive an excellent military mind and thl rapality to lmplny tatlk tactics in (onformity WIth Ow IwculJaritic of the -iluation
In tIll ()lf~UljZllioll of thp tallk aUack th(gt 11101( the advpr-Iry lltllltioll b dilracld from the tIinction of the main blow the fewPl will oe the meall- of antitank defcJlsP which 1( will have aIoll~~ t hat direction anti the mure sucshyce[ul will be the tank attalk For this reaoon the preparamiddot tion of the aUarl of tan] an~I infantry mnt alway~ he can-fully concraJpd ill Ow dfejjvp rIir(ctiDll by Ow lmployshymenl of camouflage and by fligned activities ill ~econdalY dinctioll- The -uddllllW of the attack alvays has a -tunninJ~ effect
In tomlitiolh of limit(d obltcrvaUoH (ill twilight in pre-dawn fog) tIl( firE of artillery and antitank gUllS is poundndclfd (gtxtr(~n1PJy difn(ult and it is 11Iwly tl(hP condishytion which turn out 10 he highly favorahlp tl) the aetiyities oj th attaekillf~ tallls That is provpd abo by Ilw pxpprifIHP of th( Vorld War Tn all ea-C- a Jh~ht -mokp cllrllin ill front of lhf af1a(kifl~ talll is lllpflJ
lhe directions selected for the tank attack must have no obstaclr~ whi(h Hw tank--t art ill(apllhl of oVllenming Thc-iC conlt-lideration place highly 1chponiblp mi~ions upon tank r((ollnaih~alHmiddot( Thi-l lPCOllllaisstlnce must (stablish the character and Htnngth of the antitank guns and obstacles
and al--() tlw plteulialitics of the tank movpment on the
[ ~
ous sectors
StllIIE~middotaON OF TIlE ANTITANK (~llN~ III tillt (tt of a eOl1tillllOlS frollt of lntitlnllt gllll ~
a cI011sity or JIll HUll to (arh lon ranIs the aet iOll- of ralt~shysmall lalll g-roUJl~ (or a to Ii tan ) not united hy a gCI(middot olnmand ale unfavorahl( alHi an llot likel to tnrn ()ntl middotf CtSflllJy (~onsellueIl1Iy it is Hot adisahie t () assign lJ~ taJlih hy platoo)ls to the infant l lo01ptnil It h mJ blltll again-t a continuoll~ front of antitanllt gUlls to 011lt_ atl with a HtrollgPl1 with a whole comhat order of tad middot1
lompallits amI battaiioll-gt Ill( (ombat order of a 1lt1 J tlltnpall~ or hal tali on j- lapahle of comhattillJ even a r i 1illllOllS front of antitank gUll-
Tank pIed oon~ rna properJ~ be a-signed to infm (ornpltLnh-I in ca-c in which thell arc vanguard tank cr lOllS con-iUng of medium or heavy tanks and whose t 1
-ioll It is to suppre llw antitallk gUll- Tn 1he cae of a (()JltillUOU~ front the antitank gun
~uppr(sfd hy the mn]p powerful fin of Uw attacking- ta j
alld -u]lporling- arlill(ry Tlw tallks attacl in 1h( adormiddot d lomiJal order tllldfl (OYII of tlw firf of tlwir artillpryJ~ conduct fire nol only upon th( antitank gUllS which htJ been dicerllcd hut al-o upon suspiciotH 11lac(~s uf every 1] where fmch gun--t might be cOllcaied That deprives thc~middot~ tanle gUB8 of the adnllltal~(s of the illitiatip and make-~ il more difficult for them to make lle of aimed fire The tamiddot 4 mal1(gttlVer with a view to (1(at in) a mOlp favorable I Hi
tion for the attack Tlms for examplc when they t suppressed the antitank guns along 01lC direction they lgt r rndcavor 10 dphollch into thlt flank of other guns hut tlga alwaygt act in full combat order t ~O
middot~uil The Ain
THE CIWSSI-iG OF THE DES IN 1~1j
I~o[DII nd(niiilPllanr EI Pa-n til L(gt Andes 1m Jahle 1817 By Gentlal Knaus Crgtndenccd from 1I1I1IdlllIltI()ltrll( ftli(lr HlilelIIIIIcn nlllmllll PlOD 1~o71 iini
t udBy CIIlK II ~ IIRTKE~S Infantl
In 1808 the Frellch orrupicl till grcallt1 part of Spanish penimnda Lut --t(arllly any mfml)fl of th( Sl eolonilt- (oIlsirlprCd thi--t O(CUlTelHC as an opport UIli
-(utth Spanish domillation ill t Ill Spalli~h American nics All important positioll~ in 1h(se dependencies occupied by nativ( horn Spaniards EYPll th(l Amen 00
horn Spaniards ele rllu)atld to pusitions of serond 81 imloriaIwP IIlllrs they had bCPl1 enucaten and trnil1~ lac ~pain It WH only ill t hr minds of a fe broad i~i[ ll1f1l thai t hp idltt-- (lr ill( FnIlCh levolut ion rOllnd nccptf nIl
On2G 11ay uno a Junta I)lglll it distllSsions in 13m lis
Ail thpl a lily or 700()() Illtllapilli or 11 lrown col lie Rio dpla Plata (AlgClltina) In spite of frequent persmr he Challgc- this Jullta exhibitCd a heroic activity and ficial quality g1patly instlul11Cntal in achieing and taining frl(dol1l for A rglIltina
The ~eal of Spain- main power lay in the crown co of Peru Only by destruction of Spanish maslcry in t land did it appear possible to achieve independence for
34
VolXVIIiNo70 Foreign Military Digests
_nltV-S _gtrl-9~I
1 lJOOOOOOr
YI1m- 1 San brtm- OperlltlOns III 181
J ~ther areas Therefore the Junta in Buenos Aires disshytiatched shortly after 25 May 1810 an expedition to Alto - Feru (today Boliyia) and other expeditions were ordered ~tainl the Spanish in Paraguay and Montevideo On 7
omiddotember 1810 the Argentinians defeated the Spanish ncar ~uipacha and freed the most part of Alto Peru (Bolivia) Theieuro operations were conducted beginning at Buenos Am and extending to Lal(~ Titicaca over a distance of
i 3hout 1500 miles the last 600 of which were at an elevationIOf approximately 13000 feet An armistice which had f heen signed was broken by the Spimiards and the Argenshy lmJan Army was defeated and scattered as a result of a
Sudden surprise attack In consequence Alto Peru (Bolivia) ~as lost and the remainder of the Argentine troops retreated
middotto Salta and Tueuman (about 800 miles) On 2~ SeptemberlrlSl2 at Tucuman and on-20 February 1813 at Salta the ~f rgentiniarlH under General Belgrano defeated the Spanshyto ards under General Tritan The Argentine Army again ~ dvanced into Alto Peru but in two battles east of Lago ~~ oopo vas deciRively defeated on 1 October and 14 November tf 813 Belg-rano withdrew again to Tucuman and was 1Cshy
~ laced by General San lITartin Don Jme San Martin was born 25 February 1778 in
apQju (today San 11mUn) in the province of Corriente~ i- parents were Spani~h He attended Reveral schools in
Aire and in 1788 entered a ~eminary in Madrid At of 11 he became a cadet in the Infantry Regiment and at the age of 15 was commissioned a sub-lieushy
With audacity and great hravery he took part in ~ ampaigns in Morocco Portugal Spain and in a sea-undershy
li king against England In 1811 at the age of 33 he became lieutenant colonel In order to be able to participate in the dependence of his home land he left Spain and traveling
by way of London reached Buenos Aires on 9 March 1812 Vhen he offered his services to the government they were acshycepted and he was commissioned to organize a cavalry unit according to European pattern Sun Martin fir~t formed the squadron uGranaderos a Caballo This Hquadroll proved to be an excellent Behool both for developing the highest love of country and in promulgating the bet military virtues (today the regiment Granaderos a Caballo h a distinshyguished unit which performs daily its guard service in uniformH Huch a-) it wore when first organized)
III the beginning of 1813 San Martin was able to dpmonshystrate his excellent leadership capabi1itie~ when he was entruited with the protection of the right bank of the Parana norlhweRt of Bueno- Aires A Spanbh flotilla ascended the Parana River San Marlin followed it vlith his mounted men Early on the morning of 3 Februar) 250 Spaniards with 2 cannon landed near the cloister of San ILorenzo and began to advance against this place San Martin struck this force from either side of the cloister with such surprbe and such strength that it was defeated in a short time and was forced to retreat and reembark under the protection of the guns of the flotilla Although of little importance in itself this batshytle gained for the Argentinians freedom of traffic and comshymerce on both the Param~ and Uruguay Riv~rs since the Royalists did not again dare to send expeditions up those streams
In February 1814) San Martin was named commander of all troops in northwest Argentina He rccognized immeshydiately that the troops located there wcre not suited for operations over the long ltlnd difficult routes by way of Alto Peru (Bolivia) to move against and destroy the center of Spanish might ill Lima In lIlay 18B San Martin reshynounced based on considerations of health a plan whereby these difficult routes would have to be used and recomshymended that the province of euyo (today the provinces of Mendoza San Juan and San Lui) be used as a baRis of operations over another route against the Spaniards in Peru
THE ROUTE OVER THE ANDES TO CHILE AND PERU
According to San Marlins point of view it was unnecesshysary to sacrifice man and money for an undertaking by way of Alto Peru in this area the defense should be entrusted to the blave Gauchos those rah and hnrd riders of the proshyvince of Salta and to several tried squadrons In the area around Mendoza he desired to form a small ell disciplined army which in cooperation with the Chileans should preshypare an end to the Spanish mastery in order later to break the center of Spanish authority in Peru
When San Martin was placed at the head of the governshyment of the province of Cuyo in September 1814 he found such a small force (D85 men with insnHicient equipment) that it was impossible to begin the intended operationR at once His first job was to create the necessary tool and the ncc(sary means In the encampment at Pllmerillo IP~ miles northeast of the city of Mendoza (Fig-lire 2) he began his difiicult tURk the formation of his army the instruction of itt) components and the development of its spirit and morale It is interesting to 110te that he laid a special fmphaltis on target practice on field firing on close combat md upon the flower of decision by the lower commanders
l
35
r [oreiiin Military Digcais C amp (88 Quart
______ 1 ___ _ knoll ~
shy 1~~~-- ~---- (1
=
~t
L
-
l((f rhmiddot nvutl 01(1 tlw Antlc
For 1tw ft-Ul1011 1)1 hl- plalJ- San l1artlll required 1DOO pll tll1wd s]itihl~ tfJIl1l]l((1 di ciplined soldiers ucu-11olllld til hard lipld ~1JIlp cOIHlItiolh AH t11P iJaiH of his force San fart1l1 had t Iw iil-t and -ccoud -quadnms of hi- Gran1frch a (ahalll) and Iht (hillttll troops of GellshyeraIOIIimlJl- To thl-l wpre addcrllater 1200 voluntpCr- the th12ltl and f01111 h -qutdrons of GranadQros a Caballo and ltorne arlillfry III pltc of 111 effort- ill SLptemlJ(r 1816 the army llumhlreu hut 2HJO elfpdive- lI1stpad of the necesshy-lilT -1000 Agt a Jf-ult of the freedom of slaves 710 ltulditr (iJlatk HlId mulattu) PIjgt PIIJoJJpd alld fnlDI rhi]p 1evcral immigrant dtachmlnt were forml with the result that at the hinnllW of lRl7 lh And Army had rmellOr a total of tlO~O men lllc1uuillg all tafT
As auxijiariclt there crc empJoy(d
(C ] 200 mtlHjl for tilt tralbJlorl of all dIp tlld t h( ~Iunty of Ow Jill( of -llpply
II 120 nJilHI1 froTH hlldoza 101 work till road c A detachment of mountain guidps r 11a~j(r4 for 1111 pacl animals
Tillt four infantry haftalion (No 17 H 11) each COl1shy
Hi~tcd of fOlll infantry cOJnpallic~ a grenadier company and
it reconnaiiSHnCe compaIlY The legiment Glunaderltr Caballo a- c)mpo~(gtd of four combat t-qu1uron and accompanying --qlladron for the staff Tlw artillery bat ion had 16 to lD (allllOll~ some I-inch ~()mc 6-inch T --(afT olllti-tecl Ill li7 BWll The ltlJ1lll1l111itioli allotment it~d II ~70 rounds JlPI man (aB tol(1 ~)(WOOO) md 1 rOllnds 1)(1 canl10n (all told 2[20)
VIH1l till two (ohIllHI l1urched fJlllll Melldoza pre all told lO7)] hl)]o(- and llluh- 1600 snddiLmiddot [or tillt nIT alld fht (tdrr 72GD uJdlt mullgt alld pack millegt III addition 1020 ridlll~ and pad anim (()tnpallid detachment north and ~outh of the main co For pteh mall 1helt W(tmiddot ai)(lllt 1 hOlp- Ol mllips l~p
During Uw 111a](11 111( clalry alJd tIw -tafr~ crc( ale lowld to ride nJlh the mules in ordl to -l( the norses en lW ill ()mlmL ~rhc infantry tlw artillery IJcrollnel th( 011111 1)(JollJlPI tgt)( mIJlllJpd nil nlul in ollhr to co tlwir trength and 10 Iwlp ill ~ln1iJlj off a pCculiar ffi(shy
lain sillness COmmo)] to the Allck ~y~ Thp tubes of the (JillIOn Yen carertlll~ lap]I(d w_ aD
wool alid slwed into a lOvcr of hOl (hidp On -tlp sl 0011
tlw-lp (J(~ hrought fOlvard bv meangt of la oe attachec~ ~ tJ( ptck laddl(- )1 f 0 mullgt ~()lll followillg t hr oj Wl J~- U 1
hundred militia --oldilr a~i1(d ill this nHtlls of nu f[fion
The food tak(11 along Va aq folInw- about pound of dried --alt meat 700 edti( Oil the hoof 70 round loaves of Corn nllai zwieback dry chC(-( n J-u ply of win(gt and brandy a w~l1 as a goodly supply of An advanced supply ba-oe of food and forag-c protect militia was -tablishcd 011 the route of thl Ilorth colu tween Plumeril10 and Los Jlanantiaie4
III nnicI to proide durabk t~llif()rm~ fnr the diffi( llIuiertaldng- a cloth manufactor~ Was built ~ The M( id Luis HcUJan pstablishcd an arm factory Provision imiddotlls t made fur the manufacture of Jlmnlcr 11
San 1ialLin wa~ untiring in his efforts to train h to raise to the utmost (heir morale to JlrOLllrL~ the ne equiprnent and a1m- tn Cstablish an effective com fions and pr ~~~t(m to -((UI( tholoHll krltin rce ance reports lIe had strong ~ttpport from the gO(lll
of BUentiK Alnmiddot and frnm till J1oJlulation of the ploilltt (U~(I Till (lHhll l onl rihnttmiddotd t hlil lll~JlY to the l
liw~l Iriti-h 1ll11hUlb 111 rlltllOS lill- to hl)~e ir pst it H~ In (t tJll O(lthO of ~palljh d)l11illaliolli
ili(1l iar~~p nlllnlllJt~ oj sllJlPIiI nn lTldit ~~ The Ioral ~1aIlih a]m~ in Chill llJlchJ the agrd PI
dlnt GCl1eral nO~l Flanti lo l11lCO del Pont num 7OO nl~ttI lntl ~O() olililil Tn (ll~ t1lJi1 (1 Spar th ltoldi4n- yet tIll llla~ ltlll-itld of Chilem
Notwithstanding the IlUnllrical superiority of thee all AI Cl~ )111 lartlll tilddtll tn (IIT~middot thltHI5h the CA lioll ltlgdfl~t (hIi( A a Il-Ult PI 111 (lllg years in
IIIHl()~a 1J(j[ 11( had a 1h()1Ol~h IdWhdgl of tlw teT ro]l illlll jljJfWl toJJdillOIL of ill( nrCH as wLi1 a the Ihilll~ or asltI~t~lllll to hb OlhratlOn by an uprising of nathc-- of (hi]r n I
rtgilllliIlJ~ If Stpl(llliJtl lX]G San llaltll1 under nit IllJotiatioI Jtll the ChH[ of Oil Pehuenlhc Indians in CarlON (60 miles outh of Mendoza) with the elsible re tention of ~(cu1ing IHrmission to advalHt through the
36
01
middot
~
--~ shyolxihIl No 70 Foreign Military Digests
f itory of thrse indll)(ndcnt nciian1- m order to gtrikc at the paniard~ J~ a~ (If the E Plammiddothm d paRS During the colutlOlI the 1hllVJld1l~ maintall1(fi a neutrality although
( Spalllard lHdun orNl by lt111 kind of precnts to secure -~ 1eir alliaIllC again-t tlw Aljllltil1lans and ChiJean~ Durshy
g the di-ell-~I(Jll- S-111 Marlin propo~cd that the Indian~ rodtlP -uPJlh(~ fJr hi army ior which he would pay well nel fll]uilWU lh( -tllt et -iCCnl from the Indian Chief f~ allOtllldll Olle tL(Jj(JU~hl~ familial with the Indian manshy
cr he 1dll tllv Jnddll- ould tranflTIlt all informttion at m to L1H SpiI1lilJ U I holt dually happclled
iJj Jlalo dll Pont thl ~ranhh((lmll1ander in (~lile SOOI1
vPlllhld -tnllg 11)](-- 110nl lantIago to thl Iclmty of ttlC(l Iii) ndl Dutil oj SantlHgn In order to furthel his
-futenllull- Ill delude thmiddot Spaniard- San iIartin sent a fOle QJ till 1lll bl)l jJl~ (Jld I all -Id nlll)())- t() be clnulated 1 hat rih mllll allll uuld -)Oll 11Idlth 011 the pas About the ~ld vi (kloln) 1i5lLi San ltirllll tolllpleted negotlation- ()l the lIpll-ng of till Chillan 1Il lhL provincl- of Colchashyaua and 1Iltlul~ Thi~ upri-ing detached omc 2000 Spani-h ijuop ~(ltlY i1()11l the nJalll operatwns and toward itself
-i FOl all OIH)atlun dgal1~t [Ink 12UO miles long and middot~O null WIde l)IJ iderlllg ~eog-rapillc tlimatic and ciVlli shy
~ tJtlun londitlm-o olll~ tile f(ltIie and aluable areas 111 and ~OLIl1d ~11tJ1l_-P ere to be lUllsidcled ts the theater of dpcratJ(lIIc- )orth ChIle contained many saltpeter Wast(~ middoti1d and Ill()untam- ludl uffered little llO-1-iiJility of supply ran 11111 thollgh Inall Thl -ullth purtion (Iatlgonia) ~lIlel -dt1ed a~ uut of the que~tlOn South of the plOVshytile of )Iaulc there lleu the Arancano Indians an indeshy(f=-Jtndcnt extl ltwrdlllallly warlIke race which were not l p1CllCd unt-Ii 1870 In Ionsequencc the operations zone t~d hmitcd t6 that area lying Letween the 27th and 37th ~Id lllh- III thi~ a na ~0l1le G73 mik~ wide the terram ~~ the follo lllg charnl telistIc
UdClll the 11011 of the PadlIc and the Desaguadcro t_ ncr ttluWlllg illll1l 110rth to ~outh and in the south called Ie Culorulo) il the Andes hllh r~alh theIr hIghest elemiddot l ~tlllll in the ilenuozl-Santiago area The mass Aconcashyj 11 llU hl- a hlght oj 23O()() ftet to the south the i- c-t Jjju T1lllUllgito 22UOU 1ed nurth of Aconcagua the1crlldal]) 21UO() JClt In t1111- alect the pa~~es average an - evltlUl or ljO()O ftL In the variuus charts and m~p~ 1 ( c1eatlllll Vumiddoty The -110 Ime averages an elevatIOn f Of 15000 to 1G000 feet From thb cel1tr~l mountain range - mIll oj rh e1 no l~t to the PacIfic anu flow east
th~ Dlaguudlro Detycen the main mountain range thl Utaguadelo lie the rami lieu le~cr ranges and caRl
the a iell gelllrall) a~te fairly level area Only It the watercourse were to be found fruitful and cultl shy
cd a rl-t Nul only du Vc lUlU lc-~er cast and west range- (ll tilt AJlde-o (Hl11I range) and the Pacilie but a
I dllgl g11111 ally pal t11cl to th( coast which rises to jl)() t(~t tut at Interal~ by the -treams flowing into utll Uetweln ilw coatal range and the Andes lay vltdll~ from G to 23 lllile~ lJ1 width and with nn elevashy
ot GOO to 2f)OO ieet lopiou-lj- atered ullromlllOnly tfut till granary of Chile
The rllOst important pa--l- ill Ihe area of upcratlOn~ ere the followmg
Come Caballos (14400 feet) from La Rioja to Copiapo
h Santa Rosa 14000 feet) from San Juan to Coshyquimbo
c Lo Patos (1l000 feet) frum San Juall or Mendoza north of Atoncagua to LOR Andes
d La Cumbre (12500 fect) from Mendoza by way of U~pallata south of Aconcagua to Los Andes
EI lurtillo (13800 feel) frum San Carlos to Santi shyago
I Elllalleholl (lAIlO rltct) from San Rafael to Talca (150 miles south of Santiago)
III addItion there arc nUlllerOUR other routes which how(jI al( often very narlo vcry steep very difficult to ( rno- and in glneral unusable for military operations
Of the -ix main routc- named above the two northern (1) and (h) and the southern (f) lose lomdderable imporshytance bpcause of their distance from the Mendoza-Santiago 1IS of opcrations
Unly on a few of the passe were small shelters acshyIommlldating a few persons to he found In the mountain a 11 ( - were pa-tule lands Vater was adequate in the Alldc- (main range) in super abundance on the west slopes and in Chile but found only in the valleys to the east An army cro-sing the Andes will fmd pasturage and water in cuffiLient quantities Jul all other supplieR must be guaranshyteed along a line uf communications
In audition to the diHiculties of the poor roads and steep tony ascents and descent a force must contend with the adverRities of tne weal her In fact a crossing can be con sidered only during thf summer months (December t March) Even during thi- 11crioci at a height of 12OO( feet sudden RI1Uwstorms and LliZlalds can create havoc and dc~truction
In many sedions of the Andes puna (mountain sickshy11(-iR) aITedlt many traveler- Not only is it very disagreeshyaLle Lut it often results in death Common indications are cllfllcult breatlung suffocation decreased heart action exshyces5iYe tiredness great deSIre for sleep loss of appetite vomIting no~e anu cur bleechng Many people familiar ith the Andes attribute t he particular Andes mountain ~icknes- to the tremendous amount of rich ores the numershyOtiS underground wat~l tOl1rseS and the magnetic attracshytions As an antidote ra onions and garlic are eaten the nu-trils of the alllmah are rubbeJ with these two vegetables in order to inclea~e the11 breathing rate and blood flow At a height of lOOO meters a persoll with a full stomach will probal) be a1fected
The maw (11 Cf advallced over two routs (Figure 3)
(a) fIll right (nortli) lllalll column advanccd from Plumerillo In a northwesterly dIrection across the eastern ranges theuce by way of Los Patos
(b) The left (south) (olumn moved by way of URpnlshylata and La Cumba on Los Andes
On 15 January horsts of thL -tafI and of the Grunlt shydero) a CaLallo were sent aillud on thl north column route to the 10-gt Manatiale~ (3172 meters) area (an area proshyteLled against hostile threatR) ~o that they could become accustomed to the steep rocky a~cents and the weather
37
~ r Farciyn JIilitarY Digests c amp GSS Quart
d
JJ
ildlllI (ll] I Jdlllli 1-~ (dltlv Lljan Ilwing- to TAl
jItntllld(~ d lIn lrd -lIpph 111 HIln ltJIIIl fur 111 dd iI ltIii illd JUIIllt 1 l-Illlldlfl
Iii lt1Iil ~ IIi d IIIHilr (lllld I)()Jl 11jlIp -ohr lldllljtd tl1I 1lIllIJjlla tollo
Ir Jf[dlIJI Ill Jllt~fll(dlfll(lfll(lI(ll((lcr(J-a
(middott1ldlll II 111 1 (llddHj OllPlIl~ Jlld ICOlllla-anVl
(llIlIl Il 1lt1I~l ilt11dll1l ()lt I lnd ~ that 1 n -n h 01 till ~I I llljllllJ til lldd four V()1ll11111H and OTll
1111(1]111 lj 11lkJ 1(11)] JJOll )l ( IiliaIl InO IdI( 1 11 d --qtlti)oll of Ill (nnadlros a
[tldll ljldil1 1[]1111 0 I and -)t) lrlltrymill with ) jIJIl til 1lJ r IH IIi (j 11111 [1(lll ludi-llldo Alyarado
III lib I) fh ltll](l (( llild J)()1l 1irJlarto ()Ihggins L I] d I 11
I)ll ~I Idl) j jlll]l middotnlllllry (11111)a11I(- of Infantry i 111 dlfllJ 0 -I ~ Ill 1111 ltllllOil
IJl 1111] J lOll JltillIlry (lJnjJ1ls of Battalwn 1 ~ jllflIlJlil()td Illlll cd 11)( lafr --quadrOll
Ill ~ll llll lilmiddotI lilt ~d --qlltdron-ofthl (nI1shyIdtll)-- 1 (lhdo
Oil ~ 111]111 1111 I( flldllJd( l of Ow utilllmiddot or th 1111111 ld1ltlI1l 11lt 1)1111 dId lIllY IHtdqnlltlIgt
I hi ((IlltlI (1lllllldlHkd jn fllOllEl I)oll (ItgOJI 11
111 flIId flqrlJ Pill Idlo 1gt folo-
IIJ 1-IIIII1middot 1IJdlll Ilttalion-oll (i(lHpltn p ) 1) (rIItd]u-l (Lildlll trO()plr 20 artllkryfnetl
) I dllllll 1 )11 llJmiddotmiddotmiddot IjdlJJ -jJaJ fllglilfI)gt Ilh lt10111 1
111 fl [Ilat hll
()I lIJallll(r~ I (lll[fIIJ-- alld hlJllI) 1Ill 1l11l1lia quadII]1 qj Sail LUh alld a dtachnllllt of Pllgllllpr
Ih] IldllllllJ 1 lldl()Id 1) ~Il ralthmiddot
The Illft column was givcltn the initial miHsion of rcachi the Ultpallata arca and blockillg the valley of the Me river It should halt then~ until the north columl IIHliHmiddotd ltIll fllIH lttpproxirllatplyto fll w(t (the route IlIlrth (()llilllll a~ IllUlil l()ngl1 and mor( dHlkult) 1Ill 011 Ii I (lIIlHill IWllld -tizl llw IHight~ ast of La eu drmiddotrpd ill Spalllsh [(lrt- Oil the t~t -Iopes of the (malll lall~) alld (~taiJlish (ontad with lhe right (0 ()n t IlP (middot 1 ~df)IH~ 01 tlH ndp- the lpfi column should till tPPIOadl or t he right toIUI1111 Vh(l1 right nl( hlli 1 (Ianila dl 1( hupalla the left xhould h~g adtIJ(( Oll --ianta Ho-1 lnil -hould not enkr thi ton
to X F(llll1tIy i
Th Ijglt (nort 11) 011l1t11l should atvlJlle a- rapidlyf 1 l)(I~-1il)ll III ()ldpi to rltch If)S Iato- at an early date fr 1 Vhlli It Voltld fH pO -lhie (I1lploymg native guides to po jr out route ithtl SHit of the AcolHagua to cstahIiRh cv ~er J1llmitatiol1 with th gtouth toJumn From LOB Patos l~a(i should PlI-h on fa~t atmiddot 1)-- the Andes and vain the exit fn ~r()
the valJl~ oj tlw PuLlellcio j~Jlr It -hould -eize the helV 1 lorl II 01 ChacaJIlco pd
Tht advHI(( f)f tlw l(ft (solth) (01111111 paI
I I
Thi (OiUnlil Va- to Ilcwh li-paliata 011 21 Ja1llHlylffil
ait thelv until t1~ ~Hrlh lf)iumn had advlttllll(l a )lOftltrh tlOnatldINtal1(middotp 1111rtll1l1l1liltlallll1l wcre at the r(latllt~)(
1ll11l11]lortHlit fortiflcd po-itioll al Jiliwuta Against th r~( tWll advanced via JlIIlcai (--ollth of ACOI1eaglla)-VarL l two Spani-h compallllS (ahout 200 men) under lIa 1 largnclli A night march by 30 Spamards over PlcsUt)tl(( Illy illlpa-gt-gtahl( ouk- l(slIltd III a surpri-c attack on f~$u (hluta Iarly 21 January Some of the milItia Were kll--i the otlll1r ltptulld ailil the raitilI1g party withdrew toV~)1 Potrerillos (uluIlel La~ lIela~ ordered the immediate f ann of tiw glllladH] lOI1lJlany of the 11th DaUalion and Ifr Granati(ro- a Caballo under ~IaJur Don Enrique ~Jr tint At 4 00 A~I 23 Janl1ar~ after a forced march olin milts ill 1) hotll- lajor ilallilwl rcadwd the trong hoJ~ po--ition at Los Potrerillo-- At -t 30 I without furf-a-a n~~onnai-s(~nle ht attacked till Spanidl position at ttJt-lIl 1I0111t~ Alttl a Ire lIght of ~12 hourRll1s ammunitlOll (xhw ted )( ord(rtd nAinmt111 to Vacls But the Spl ian] withdrew lir-t initially to the pa~s at La CumiJrl iatpl farlher to the west
At 7 00 PM 1 February till columll I tltllhld tht dt
(Uia-- tl(1 (IOGO() [cpt) Faoltd hy the moonlightmiddot troops IH~an their a-c~l1t to the La CumlJle pass ( ridge line) at 10 00 111 ThlY arried at the hci ~ Il) AiI 2 FtilrUHlV and dlllillg till day tonlin
Iuneallllu (U200 feet) Thilt march i pluibly the ignitilltlnL nig-ht march at -111 lllights I ccorclt~d ill h )i-talllt 11 mill a-rlllt ~WO 1(It dlS(lnt 1WO (hI a FllJruary ulone La Ihra- Onlllld 1lajtll In llh 170 Illollllttt 1I1iPnwIl and W CranlIlelos a (a to attacl tilt SplIl1-il po-gtiti()ll tuardw Vipja liasrd dpl lIitd III f() I llla I 1011 of Ioul p a provided hy a natie all the -mall fortp advanced However I)(cau~(
xtl (Ill dillkuitH- (til ()untplld along 11w routes rocky -iOPl- and uf the Ilclcsity for terrain ltlonnaignn about 15 milt Vere rcquir~d in Ittlhing Ilw Spanish p tion
38
1 06 men attaekcd the pmlishyAbout one-hnlf the fon (
and rear
iOn frontally hde the remainder D6 men advancing over Ifficu1t vcry Stt~lJ and rocky terrain struck the position in
After 11 ~ houlr- fighting 40 Spaniards fallen 49 had t-uncndered and the remainder under
L vcr of darknc- fled towtld4 Los Andes rh The main -outh column reached Guardia Vieja on 6 I~ JFebruary Shortly after nOJIl 8 Fehruary it rcachCd Santa ~ iRosa n~i)O llHjprlt) whIt 11 the Spamard- had eacuaiec till ll- duy Lefore The lOUlllll had HllOmpii-hed its initial mbshyr ~ t-I(n On 8 February l(gtI1lWdloH with the 1l00th column at Sw Felipe wa a-gtdJLd
Thl nWI( h of til Igllt (north) column
r 1 The mUlIl (right) column began its mallh from Plumshylnllo on 11 falllltlmiddotY alld nlarciHri III ltix groupgt one group J)er day leaviJg the camI) Oil 2) January after his troop~ )lad aU mOiIi (Jut GlIltlal San 1Iartin took hie departure
fr from Mendoza f The hrst tq glOUp llndel General Soier formed the
advance guard The mo-t important instructions given GenshyE ral Soler were (1) the to n of San Felipe as to be leached un 8 FebrualY (2) lOIlnnuniLatlOIl was to be estahlished ~long the rlCOlllagsl rle- with the -outh column (3)
) fhould the ituatio1 1lHi thl hostile dispo~itions and size permit it Santa Ro-a-Lo Andes was to ue attacked ( 1) it I of utmot importance that the heights of Chacashy
L )JUfO he tUIHd () lIry dTort ~hotlld he made to surmiddot llri-c and fJyelptn tl til( SpanI-h ou110ts in the Andes
rt (6) should th[ ataIHc guan be attacked by tonsiderably 1 lunerJOl 1011(- It wa-- to fall balk on Lhe following columns_ i The advalH t of tlll~ (uiumn Va executed according to
plan III Pltl or the difilcultw or terram and at the Leginning of water Hlpplr the objcdives set were reached
1 b ~~hedl1ll until the crl--t uf the Andes was reached the v yenre~lest part of the malch was made mounted on mules ) jncludIng ill( infantry1 I From Lo Paio-- San Iartin despatched a flank Jeshyt tachment of 200 Illell under Ialor Don Antonio Arcos via tj ~middotltlk lIlrmUi ClIlllga (when a Spanish po~t wa- known to IJL talIoncd) and Alto tit (usn to Lagt Alherpal1as ThiS
ftrca ~huuld be OLlllpied ltlnd defended to permit easy acces- Jpf the main body into the broad valley of Putaendo River t ~ The adaJlCl guard Itltlthld the camp eat of Cuesta (iLgt
el ~LllteJl on IltlmiddotlJruary On 1 Feuruary the detachmcllt t~ [(O- -lLulcd the dlltil at La Guardia de la- Achupalla~) n1middotpefeatin~ a force of 100 Spal1lanli defending theretk Tl1l adiun guarant(l(~d to the main force the exit from dhfhe difliLlilt mountain terrain General Soler IJushed forshyd ~ a d rapl1Jly with the aUIJmpdllying StlUaliloll and the ~d lt ntl th SquadrrlIl- Graladero- a (ahallu he speeded upjt he adanu of the inflntry awl ar1illery On 6 February t)~~ he trolll)gt of the adVallll guard tlC uilited in and north of ~Ji an Antunio de Putaelldo Captam ~e(ochea with 110 n~yen Granatlcros a Caballo wa ordered agaillst La) Coimas On l~ he morning of the 7th this force ellcountered a Spanish deshy~ t ltichment of 100 cavalry ~oo infantry and 2 cannon in a t()~ trolJg jJ(Jmiddotiltion a1 Las Cnima- General Soler immediately arm copatched reinforcemen1s-two sltiuadlon of til(gt Clanashyp~ crJ- a Caballu and two mfantry companic-l to Cq)tain
eCuchta 0icloehea howeyer dJd nol aWait the~e reinshy
Foreign Military Dige8t8
forccments lIe feigned a1douule envelopment of the Spallshyjqh position AH the envelopers approached closely he feigned failure and a wild retreat A- he contemplated the Spanish cavalry stationed on eith~l flank of the SpaniRh infantry jumped to Lhe attack and purtluit When the Granaderos a Clballo had drawn the Spanish cavalry sufficiently far from their infantlmiddot~r and artillery support they turned ~t JIIlk and demqra1izcd th( Spafli~h cavalry In the disshyorder and disruption the Spanish infantry also took to flight Th( SpaniRh force far Rupcnor in numbers fled to San Flipe There was no pur-uit by Necocheas force
The advanCegt rested on 7 February riwaiting the arshyriaJ of the main body As planned the right column reached San Felipe on 8 February the lpft column reaching Santa ROfm the -ame day After reconstruction of the bridg-c (destroyed by the Spani~h) over the Aconcagua River near San Felipe the Andes army was united on 9 February southwest of Los Andes A squadron under iIajor Melian waJ pmhed forward toard Chacabuco to observe the enemy middotand reconnoiter the terrain
By his viclorie of 4 Fehruary (Guardia Vieia) and of 7 February (Las Coirnas) General San Martin became master of Aconcagua provinc( and thereby was enabled to provide his army with supplies and additional horses On 8 February San Martin sent a message to the President in Buenos Aires in which he expressed his great regret in being unable to follow the Spanish at once but would require at least six days to secure replacements for his horses and mules incapacitated on the march from Mendoza to Los Andes Of the 1600 horses ~nd 9191 mules which began the march in spite of utmost care taken only about 500 horses and 4300 mules reached Los Andes in a usable condition
Between Los Andes and Santiago there lies but one major terrain obstacle the heights of Chacabuco These heights form a half-moon shaped ridge between 4500 to 7200 feet high extending from east to west and forming a connecting- link between thp AndeR and the coastal range The north (Jopes arc very steep the south slopes are much gentler dolted with small hill and receding gradually to Chacabuco
As they reLired from San Felipe to the south the Spanshyiards occupied the heights neal elevation 1820 with 2 comshypanies and 25 cavalrymen in order to block the route
When General del Pont learned on 9 February of the results of the engagements in the Aconcagua and Putaendo valleys he di reeLed that all forces Routh of Santiago asshyemble there to defend the cit) and he despatched Brigadier laloto with to half battions Lo Chacabuco Maroto arrived at Chacabuco the evening of 11 February he pershyqonally lodl to lhe 10 tomjJmlie~ on the norlh slopes (1820 elevation) and ordered them to defend to the utmost Only whenihalf their force VDS decimated were they authorized to withdrHw On 12 FebruaJT MaroLo intended to occupy the heights with hig entire force
Meanwhile San Mnrlin had sent two esp(cially well qualified guidc8 to Santiag-o who kept him informed of the Spanish movements On 10 and 1] February two engineer oHicers protected by v ~quadron of cavalry reconnoitered the heights and the hotllilc position The weRt slopes (1432
39
On
C amp (SS Quart
Ol-liggins Thi~ attack pushed through and into the artillery position~ Cannon Were cut down with the bel As the cavalry charge in proglC--s the leading clements (2 rifle companiCfI) tsoIPl~ loillllllJ whost advancp hH1 bllll accelerated tati(d lillwisl the hft liallk of the Spaniards many whom Cdl 10 the hayonet The stalT and llh Squa middot(iranadelo a Caballo U1Hll Major Necochea had In
farther w(gt1 almot sirnulLallcously with the other aU Ill HI ruck thl SplIlish left rear The-e three attacks aga t IH Spanihh Ipft and rpar ltlu-eo confusioll and disorder HTPat lo~-l on thi~ flaJlk -0 that OHiggins second at
af~ailll t 111 lil~ht fnUlld a much dbcOl1certed and u Plteruy-rl-1I11 -Iompiett ~lIlT~- The Spaniards attack~lt ril
middotkl1rei~ lIilitarg Digests
melp-) tPIHlll~d mon -uiLlhle fol tlll a ccnt than thu tllt-lt
(22n Jilt~lt)
Ull I FlIJrUl1 olt of the gmde-gt returned with inshyformatlfll fn l1i~lhd Ly an agtnt ill Santiago It wa) an cxtrad of ( lWl ~d rj 1 j1oHl~j f)dEl (lopiNI 111 hih own oOle-e) which dirtlltd till JIIIJt of ftillfonlmPllh to (haclshyUuco (()IlqUllltiy hiI aft(lllo(JIl (11 FdJluary) San lll~t II (tll t h- lJ Irdllltlt (oJlltlllaquondtI~ anci -ttltd thal I had j t 11 In flll)ti IldlIlI)H] 11) attal ] 1 Felnuary lllI 1]middot [)i(l IJtlld lllJt Ill lull nmiddotad- ulltil then hut llll Jll -iillln 11llrn SdlfldO dt111lIldld Iarli(1 action ThIll (1111 III hld (jltlll~1 d ili- pltl 1I1d vutild IWllth Ith d IUJ Jll p [d fill J ~ lttll llal ilj~aJlhl till (nelll) III
flrdr 10 did( k luJIl iH r Illt lIt (luld hap to f()nl~()
11Ilj II LIIIJ dll i 11( I)uld )it thv Imiddotllm no tillle to Initl Ill Jl I III Iltuld cilf(al lum ill udad
Till lldl IIJl tidlLd III tVII C(JII1l1111 The lI l qltllll ([U rd OIqiJlh wilJ 1~I()I lllt 11 (1 ~t2d tlld ~d
Squad rOil Ilf Llll (ldllltilnJ a (tullo Illiantry bllshytalj(lIh I 1]1t S (( h ith [our rllll COl11ptlllll- and tO
gllll) had til mi ioll )f tiXlll~ the (l1lm~ III [rullt The ( 1 OlHlll11 rWItl ~()ltr 1111 ~10() 1l111l (the ~tafr ami
Uh Sqtladloll If tll( dllultJn (abalJo lllLullly Igtatshylditlll I dlill 11 Idd 1gt1 IOllr rillE- lllPlllit- Oil gTlIlLdil1 tlld (111( 1( ldllld ~llllmiddot( I ltl)lllldll Ill gIllIldlel awl ret(Jllshy
1lImiddot-dHI (lllllIIlH of inLllltlY IJattali()ll~ 7 and 8 and t~1l Itllh) hld till 1ll1lnll of atlaeldllg tlw ho-tili ]pft (11) llll lllcl 1IHlllllg I Ill d(tl~]()ll
lt llI) ~l 12 February the UiYIIlCC IJlg lll IIlItially
III Illlt C(I1111111 Srdlr I fUlljgt ivldillg Ollig-gingt ~ent illshy
llllllY )llldllll ~ to till la~t ttl gll tIlt impnlull to the 1llllIl) 1 htl 1hI 11lt1 1dl rwht would 1)[ Pllvtloplf1 and lllcishydl Iljtlly to tll(l thp ho-tij( atttntlOl1 aay from the actual (middotInI11111t1ll1 -I()l Sldtormiddot Cldul11ll turned to the southwcst ()IIirl~IIl ll)lllillUed --I)ulh Oil the Chalaouco -lopes ) II ijlll Jllitl 1111 --jllll h 1-1 (lft) Iillk and 111 a
h1 p lJilllt I dilir droL il hack TIll Spltlllitrcl ithdllw 1) lILt ()tllh jllll-uld )- tIll hl Squadlon (ralladCro a (Iiltllo TllI reinftlrlvlllllh UlHlPr (rn(ral Malolc) had I Ill Ulltlll If) nmiddottl1l 1111 htighh of Chacauuco as the results II tIll lIl)W nt 111 hlltlll IHI1l )JI)oo ()J(knd the tlClUshy
II tlllIIjlcilllt 1( jHI-III111l nlllt2-)Jllilt IlOlthof(middothallshyLIIUJ (lll) Tlll~ plt1 1tlllj) aiHlllt t Ulllt III width IJiolktd ill J(-~ Ill ll 1tlJll arm lllll tiIp plains
San Iartw tlllh()fJId ()IIiggin to pur-lIe Ith illshyf~lllry hat1all)Jl x1hc SI)tlllard IIceing- from the Chacahuco hi hllI)11 unti( r IIIJ (JlHill lIn to hrillJ ol a 1~1lItrd llIgtg(shy
HWllt again t ht IW JlIJ illfJll until thl (tva]ry had passed th II tilc Iyillj~ 1)( 1laquo111 tlw height which had JU~t iHrn tlkl II ltd tll l)fh1tiIJIlIIIupifd l)y ilw forc( I)f 1lroto Bu1 () II WFlll 11 h a )lrlll1W din to ~wUle this thing himelf dJll1JlJt (Ji)t till f)rdlr~ II( advancld with hattaliolls 7 ami Illll lhf poilion and Ililn a wI11 plallllld nnc1e(lIkd
lin hnth inflIltry and arlill(ry His troop ufT1rillg gllat Ill I -11( ICJf(Imiddotd II) vilhdraw San Martill himplf apshyIWiln d 1)1] Ill 1i1leI wit h 1111 i~t awl 2d SquadrolJ ( ralla~ tilmiddotrO a fahallq alld l tl1l Spulih (tvalry awl illfalllry aclvtll(illg ill pur Ult 1)1 OHiggins furce lIe orclprcd Soler to attack h~ h iJ Ift lIank imm((lially hil h Jlrshy-I(lnally led thpound two quadr()ll~ III attack for the rclilf of
40
from Ibn sidt Jlghl to form a square bUl UJlsucccifull~-gt Vild flight to jhl -outh followul (enclal ~(Jlcr launcI~ u~ hi malJl forle ill Jur-uit TIll cavalry pursued 1) mil
T af
0
-Oll h of ChacalJllco Spalli-h lo~~es 600 dend over 6 r(aptnld J OO() rillr~ 2 canllon and all the traingt
And Army lJad 1~2 killed and 177 WOllIHkd ~RI
Thi IOllg prpparatiolls the well planllPd mea-urea irf I e (
the gTlat On-lnlZlr Irailler and cxccllCllt comrnClIH CI S~ C ar Marlin jt)HlId lill fruition in th( hattie of Chalabuco t~
II htory llconl (w hattie with far r middotching polf ~~ cal COII-tltLIlIHl- This baltllt ~ho()k the Spanlh mat~i-middot an at its root gltlVP 1lH maJor portion of Chile it frCcdom a~~ art gutlank(d -tit(I-- to till -tnwglps by Argelltina for in~ tar pcnd~ncc It paved thl way for further operations agairt f1 tl the Spanish ill PCIU f all
The CJoSlllg ords of Sail Martins mcsagc to the COU~fhE eil ill fhwllOS Air( wlittLll 22 Fcuruar- Vcre thcc tiJr ~hall be forevlr the glory of the Army of the Andes thatflaquoU81 21 days it lomplltld a campaign crossed the highest mo~l~ee bin chain (If thL earth closed accounts with the tyrant ar~ frc(d Chilcgt ijsel
After Chalahucll thc Spanianh con-idcl(d furthpl le toe lance profitless During the I1lght 12-13 February H~f t (vtcuatNI Santiago and 11((1 to Vaiparain (GO mill~s) Fl1ilJe here ome Were tlanported by ~hiJl to PQlu others to SOLt~a Chile (TalcaiJualla) The artillery p(rk at Cuola ll-tlll Prldo [Pll into tht hand~ of fan Ilartlll ~~e
Vlwll 0ltln lIla1 ill lealned during the Illght 13- _ c~ February or 1lw Jlight of all Spanish otlicbls r]())n Sant hL dLpatchLd Captain Aldan wit h 30 Granadcros a Cab ill puruit alld prompt Iy tarleti the remaillder uf his lHovilW Oil -altlit~() II elltered tht tity Oil lhl Iah g
by tnlllendou- delllollstration from the pOllulace Iflth San llallin wa ChOSlJl to Ul SllllCmc Direct() ltflhld tillt hOllol llll prnpnld (Plwrai OHiggins ho prornptly lielled Oll 1he 16th
C(n(ral dpi Pont a tely -ick mall and his immc (lItollnlJ~l Wll lapturld --oulh or Valparaiso the night of FtbltwlY and hrought hae] tn -antiago
III ~()lIlh Amlrica lrilits charge San Martin with roll()iIlJ~ llIilII- aftt) hi ictolY at Cl1acabuco
(1) Failure to 1lru rtlcnllcssly with all his forces
(2) [he advance Oil Santiago evacuated by the Sp on 1~ Fcbrwuy rather than directly on VaillllaiRo to off the Spanbh access to the sea at
(3) Failure to launch a campaign immediately against alCllhuano (south of Santiago) where-the Spmish had good esources strong positions and excellent harbors
4) Failure in these particulars resulted in the Spanish ning masters in parts of Chile for more than a year
Foreign Military Digests
Right column Plumerillo to San Antonio de Putaendo 223 miles executed in 17 marching days or an average of over 13 miles per day
Plumerillo to Santiago 301 miles in 27 days (elapsed time) 01 an average for the leading echelon of over 11 miles
Y1 ore dI ~) In answer the author writes 0~11 The crossing of the Andes demanded from both leaders ~Ct tnd men tremendous will power and physical endurance ~~~t ltAfter he united his army in the Lo Anum area San iIartin ~ lionsidercd a halt of six days nCCCRary to get up all his artil shy~ fery to procure animaf replacements and to provide his t~ i troops with proper food and mpplics Yet thi- Cxtraordinshyc~ 4rllyactive and capable commander after but two days rest ~ Ihunchcd his tired troop~ in attack at Chacabuco in pursuit ~ tk Santiago and dcspatched a moullted purmit force to the
coast t Based on the information he received 11 February Sail
1 Martin knew that hii opponent was a~scmbling his troops for the defense of Santiago He multt assume that such a
~~ defense would be made not that the Spalllsh forces would tharch off to Valparaiso the night of 12-11 February without living battle Had San nartin had timely information of
0_ this Spanish move it might perhaps have been posihle for t- Ban Martin with orne of his force to have fltgt(tched Valshyz ~arafs6 simultaneously with the Spaniards but it b an old r ar experience that the pursuer ~eldom marches as fast 11 ti the purllcd 11orpove1 the march of tl1P Aneles Army on
Valparaiso might well hwe been a blow in the 111 On the G other hand the occupation of Santiago guaranteed ~upplies for the tired army ~toppecl plundering by the mobs and
It guaranteed the early provision of a new government for the r treed country
The Spanish reaction in the area south of Santiago made iLelf felt under the capable leadership of Colonel Ordonez
c- To COlmteract thil1 San Martin de~patched Colonel Las Hera~ t~ at the head of ] DOD infantry cavalry and artillerymell to r ~e south with the mision of defeating and dispersing the oJ ~anish San Martlll himself had lt1 g-reater objective in ypmd The freeing of (hile was Jut a preliminary step in t~e emancipation of Peru where Spaill ma-icry had ib
3 i tpcal point But for an undertaking aglinst the Spaniards(if Peru the forces thCll ill (hill were wadclJuaic H(gtipi trom nch BUPllOS Airc~ wa~ Hccc--ary in order to provide at the ealiIt-t a Heet hl(h III turn would se(ure masitr of
rr ~e Pacific and thereb -eCllle the Chilean and Peru~ian e~ tlt Therefore a ~onth after Chlcabuco San Martin t elled to Buenos Airclt to lay hi- case b(fore the power
Overcoming many obstade he -ucceecied in hl~ misshyon and on 20 August 1820 the army under San Martin d the fleet under Admiral Lord Cochrane all told 8 warshyipl 17 tralJiports 4000 men iailed from Valparaiso
t ward~ Peru f t The campaign in Chile demoll-gttluted the great cap ashy
t~lilie of San Martin his far-seeing preparations his dttermination of purpose his indomitable leadership
8 L A brief Rtatement of the march accomplishments of the l oop~ would ~eem in order nl~ In the plans and ord(rs ilt-ued by General San Martin e marchc to be excculed daily and the reullH of lhe road
ater wood and pasturage reconnaissanccR are recorded
and for the 2d 3d 4th and 5th echelons 185 192 20 and 13 miles per day
Left column Plumerillo to La Villa de Santa Rosa Qxecutcd in 10 marching days or an average of 166 miles per day This column marched a total distance to Santiago of 217 miles
The question might be asked What would be the inshyfluence of modern organization and equipment on an operashylion ill the Andes today It must be remembered that these mountains rise to great elevations (12000 to 23000 feet) that the valleys are often narrow and steep That fliers gas or tanks would prove especially effective against a force marching in multiple columns and echeloned in depth is questionable Of course the picture changes once the force reaches Los Andes That the movements of the columns could and would be observed by observers in planes is probshyable and that the hostile high command using rail and motor transportation could concentrate his forces to strike the still gtcparated columns is possible and probable
Autogyr08 and wireless would faciHtate the communishycation~ and spy report service Parachute troops especially in defiles might be employed with surprise by both attacker and defender Modern engineers and engineer technique would certainly relieve many route difficulties
IS IT NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MOUNTED FORMATIONS IN THE CAVALRY
[dFautmiddotli consel vel des formations a cheval dans la cavulcrie By Lieut Colonel Dario Condensed fOm RevH de ClLvalcnc January-February 1938]
By MAJOR L K TRUCOTT JR Cavalry
A question disagreeable to cavalry ears Belgians reply in absolute negative England 50 mechanized tends to total mechanization Germany retains but a single large unit a brigade in east Prussia Considering the question may lead to useful reflections
The idea of substituting motor for horse came logically a result of the waf From its beginning the horse was forbidden the battlefield Haelen sounded the knell of the doctrine of mounted combat by large units The years 1917 and 1918 saw tanks cross fire-swept zones penetrate hostile di-position sow disorder and put enemy at the mercy of infantry-a role of cavalry masses for centuries Off the battlefield cavalry transported maneuver masses rapidly over great difltances the truck transported greater masses more rapidly over great distances The truck permitted the audacious wide and sustained play of reserves that characshyterized 1918 During the critieal days of 1918 when large cavalry units engaged dismounted llrmored cars in gaps contacted and surprised enemy columns informed oriented and rallied elements of withdrawing troops On the battleshyfield the molor was sucessfully substituted for the horse
However at the end of the war the horse had argushyments In March 1918 what but mounted formations could have regained contact as quickly with German rear guards
41
C amp GSS Quart
of HCrU-iS the area devH-tatrd by them In April 1)]8 what ehw could have moved lPinforc(ment to the north aeros the communications of Engli~h annie preparing for the new battlc ~lonths latef what eJ(middot could have clung to retreatshying- German-- acro-- ruins ami lilid~ of FlandPlmiddot Vhat else could haccfOS(middotd 1hf 1llkll1 nllllllldll lllrntll I1ulg-arialJshy
dGerman rcojtance fOlccd capitlilati()lh ill a few hour and reachrd the Danulw III a fn ((1 Vhat of innul11Clabh patrol- gliding aco wood and mar h -willlmillg river-- (Irarillg uJ-taclt- -Ilmiddot1Jlj~ tlw P1wmy ithout J)pinf~ won or heard di-cIJ--JIlV hi Ill) lnHlIh IHnding entin da~ JUlIll hb lim and rltnrllltW iJy dt-Vi()lh route with rich lllfo] shy
mlti(JJl
If it llm( d (Jgcd to ~UlJ-tJtllte Illllt(lr for ho re 11lt ub 1 it lit if1I (an 1)( finly parI wi and dl)( lnt l1JIorabl~
tonrifllIll til hqJ~ It Illlghl )( jllllnp If Ihp]( W1
actllally all all IflTtlll middotdll(middot Ej)(middotri(middotllcl ha- (alrnl(
Pllthultjam and pa- ~ lull 10dll ( h nO t ht t t Iwlt Ill)
mcchaniz-ed all hlT~llll that till 111 tt-rr(lll llllcle is likely to proglt off r()ad Il arJIlV dcgru I(onling to the modr of llopllllOll Jut aha~ lp-trirtrrl alld alway at great coj that th( all tprraill i lprtain tfmiddotrrmiddotain
By dlpllllll nrp pnwer at at ild -=prr(l rfady for inshytant actioll l11t motor 11Iin~ lll Illlhnprd onlutinn to thc problem of lili0(JII of In illld 1ll0tnwnl It spr( el proshyttdioll and an1allHllt hac changld COllClitlOn~ of reCOllshyllaiance llld cOlltar fxtlnding- the ladill~ of action ill width and dr-pth Tn 11anpo1t -qwrd and radiu l)clmit acshycclcratin~ mU-emcllt- to the front and incrcaillg di-tallceo tu thc rear TI1U~ the motor ha~ mudified preyiou concepshyt iOll of lxplqit ing (ontact ~(curity orgtllizat ion awl fUllctlOl1111g of erdce It has changcd combat and malllll shyycr iJy modifying nwthoci of ((cu1io11 lllcl rflldrring- posshy~ihlp what forn1lrly wa lut Certain ulclat ions ill South ~loror(() and cry JlTobahly till ~ampaig-n in Aby--dnia are not diflicult opprationlt madp etlsipr by tllt( of motor thl~
arl oJlpratioll lill1ll1wht haYI Ill(n imp()ssih1e without thlll1 But Ow motor hac rlgnrnuo limitntionlt
JUf rhlliifgtl lilll it(lf 1111 middot~I()tlll~ CoIl0IW]( a Iltioll of ga- cl(t(Jmilwrl ill Ilature and quantity mopovpr importfL The ration allows lwitw -Ilbotilution 1101 rpchHliol1 For maintenance tl1l molor rcquin~ at dcilllitp lpriod work llld
replacement which ~ufTer neither --ubstitution nor reducshytion Repair-today Htth more than lx(hallf~p of worl
part for lH-nCjuill 1Hcial parb ill -IlPcial quantity for pach model of vehicle At a particular time lacking tlw-p parts IPpbCNllfllt lt- hours of worl goa tilt motor -tops slrvicp Thpll alf 110 motors tapahlL of fllrthCr (1shy
vice 011 -hort allowance or orn out provided they lecciv(- (JJ1~id(rati()n and tolerance thpre are motor Jlfrf(ctl~
ltpn(d thai move or motor that do nol mo(-
)IojoJ formation mwt he emploYfd within a limitCd definitely kllO1l radith (JI tied to road on a system of cir shyCulat ill Ir10PIlWllt and ImpJoymPIJt of dT(( ini an hound to rcql1inmcntlt of maintel11I1Cl (omba1 engines arc vulshynerable antitank cannon and mille ravagf thpir nlllk After (om hat a -plciai sl1ice must immcdia1rly collpei and repair damaged matpripl and failure ri-lo~ losing costly mat~ricl that could have been restored to service
l(ITll1U limit((iols-DiHpiacement of automotive v cles dependsmiddot upon consistency of ~oil and aosence ~tacles Lacking bridges rivers are alnmlute obstac moulltaini marshy cOLlntries WtHlls or in had wea llOgtS-(otlllt lY vehich)K must middot(ck loul~ 1 hlre1or( mo dt-fPlui UpOI1 nature alld dllhitv of roadlt
Fllllc it)lIIl liltlf([tif)I-~ From chicles armored nary or moto]cyeit oh(lvatioli is poor while in moe 011 Ul( other hand (Iliclfs an eaiiy seen and marc iward Vphicl-s a1( cllmIHISOHl- (olumn- an dim aswmblf put ill march swlter conccal break up disaUvfllltagtS forbid u-e for short distances Vehicl column arc (gtxposed to ambuh and depending UpOIJ
of vlllltlaililily to all forms or --urprise (~ 01 r C
bull
rc Consequently While pos-iLiJitics of the motor renamp ~ W
Its lIiC as 11lCCSsary a~ powdcl thc motor has disadvantarj ( that limit and at timegt forbid Hi employment IIechann ~ j~
formations have takell IloSltCsioll of the battlefield forbidd-- Ol
to the horse Alotol formations arc taking over rapid f 1f( diitant trmlipOlt of nla(i Left to thcms(lv(s CV(-11 elI - nl billCd t1l(se formations lend thcmwiv(-s hadly to details itl actions their (ontacf g-ivc- only a ~Jl(cial definition tJ ~ calillot be dil(etly [xploitcmiddotd by 01 hel I roop they hi 1 diHkulty ill maintaining- contact once matlc For short ~ Oni placement of motor formatio1l (lltrmkillg security circihn latioll alld detlucking COl1sUnle ~Hlantag(gti of spre ~ Mechanized formation cannot operate within h(~avy COYt
Motorcycles while invaluable f() communication Hnd 1 for distant surfacE reconnaissancE are of questionah cill1(y fot sc(urity during approach and contact F mOllntains marsh~ reg-ion certain brollten and cover area like tllO-1e found ill the north an foruiddftl motonmiddot formati011s unle~R exits are as~urrd thev are forbid~ mechanized formatiolls cxcept in grllCral ~ alignment 0 ill progressing fron1 Demolition ompromi=c movem(llt5~ both unforesecn they cause massing that adation will n14
mortal Fog freeze snow can immobilizc entire f tions finally failure in circulation ~uppJy or maint exposes motor formatioJ)4 to (ompl(10 paralysis restrictions an ppccially leti( ill offplliv( manCu(gtfpound in defensive situations tlw dlfCndtl is usually master oft terrain his r(a1 and security
Thll(fon if then i Ilccd 1111((1 all eilc1l111stl11CCc force mOle rapid 1han infantry a Huhl ltllHll1lastic c III lll 1 to t IlP motor is ll(((ar~ 1hii cOlllplenWl1t (all the horse While Ihe field of battle i forbidden to the I the approach is less forbidden than to th~ truck units have not 111( illPrl ia of automobile units tlwy ltlimir vulilllability by formations and rapirl dislWlsions Til patrnl alone arc capahle of a~sl1ring- full l)(onllais~a
l(l1~dll fol tlllt illfa1l1JY Tlwitmiddot (ollj~l(t is Jilp thal fantlY and is immpdiaiply lltiliablc wit hout t lanspor TJ1Pil (OIlIJllllS sllppJp and fluid call crOSH womb and impfl1pt rahl(l foJ motors or terrain broken by demol JlflHtratl mountaill labyrinths Rwim rivers Final horse finds suhsistfll(p nrarly rlrywhclC Th( horse ltlllr~i fatif~l1e and fJriat ions hc S(-lVCS (-VCll wh perfectly HClved i a worn horse column drags l)elhaps but moves and a few days rest will reestablish it SU11plcn~
horse units their fluidity their simplicity of mainten3
particularly to circumstances and terrain forbidden r formations Motor and horse are therefore com pleshyone to the other portion between hor~e and mOLor involves all the of national defcn~e such a~ the nature of the ar
esecn the general orientation of operation~ density middot infantry possible nature of terrain and climate in theaters
Foreign Military Digests
In an organization born of the war on the West~rn Front of reinforcements individually justified we have reached the point where the division which by origin and definition should bn the smallest group of combined arms thai can be efficiently employed can move only by breaidng up and forming mixed groups WOlse-not special to the cavalryshyin desiring to put these unitA in position to fight new means
i f operations clcdits and pel~onll(l Clvailabl( for the ~ otor i~ costly in money and effective national resources
articulally breeding which imposei a millinmm of (ffcctives n time of peace finally on the degree in which conduct of arcan be left to mercy of ~uppIi~1 that depend on the molshy
lle of the real and good will of fOlcignrll COlllequently jlJ]utlOilS difler in different countries Belgian will differ trom British or German Olll- may diiTCl from othergt The iwo nations that have gone farther in favor of til( motal are VlOse faced with particular war cfmditioll Delgiurn (gtnshy11-agcs only a defensive action waiting intervention hy dlied forces Great Britain counts on air and -ca fleet fol insular protection maintdnc a colonial army for defellse and if it ~ngages in a continental war chooses its conditions In a +tuatlOn Ib defini~Et the German ~oltltioll j less dcgtcided
)lo1e in question iq how to ernploy our remaining horse unit for thcir role is not the 8ame a formerly Admitting that the missions of cavalry are unchanged the motor can ~ke over some of them thelefore tlH missiongt do not (xist 1()r hone formations alone From that we can (ollcei(~ the
tV role of hOI-e formations under to forme a normal - ole hich vill do what the motor call1lOt or which the horse n do more easily at less cost or at 1(-gt risk an eventual
~ole which will be to supply momentary defic~cncic- of autoshygtllOblie formations ~ This employment demand light and fluid unit able to ~lter through woods climb mountain slopes penetrate rohell and covered country where the motor cannot and
middot ihere ucres will be not to the strongct5t but to the first f annmiddote This u~c requjre~ supple and plastic units thai l n (stablieh and maintain contact without gap even on a I oing front so thai infantry can determine when to end s approach march and properly orient its deployment middot nit capable of cooperating with moto fOJmations llch a~ y con-titutillg a pivot of maneuver for a motorized maneushy
ering force unit- capable of making up for deficiencies of otorized and mechanized formationc of taking great idths I)f accompli5hing far from -UPPOll mi ~ion~ that may
ad to actions in force and for that capble of absorbing ~~_ overfu reinforcements Will not our cavalry division in which 16 squadrons of ~ ounted men are a minority in effectivES and volume be tmiddotmiddot ore adapted to the eventual role than to the 1100mal Theyt rc eq~ipp(d for independent action they havpound mean~ of peratmg far from support mean of force provisionF ~ helon services engineer mean They are powerful but eavy But large cavalry units that could execute a distant id during the war as that over more than 100 kilometers
om Macedonia to the Danuhc which cut an army from its ~~ il1e and captured cities wac a formation without baggage lt artillery and which aHllted and received no other ~Hlpp1ies
an horseshoe nails dropped by airplanes To fulfin such mission we should abandon the modern cavalry division
we havc not taken into account that they might and should fight with their support
The molor diminished needs but thcre was more to do Motorizing trainfgt by replacing wagons by truckR increases weight because the truck is heavier and more cumbersome than a wagon and require~ more to supply maintain and reshypair it What would have lightened immensely would have been to comdder that trucks in a few hOllrs over hundreds of kIlometers can deliver to units when required equipment that had to be carried at a11 times when trains were animal drawn Similarly if mechanization for horse regiments has no other purpose than to provide antitank means and greater armament it iR a drawback but if we consider_that enemy tanks arc a threat only where Ollr own can operate then mechanization can be for cavalry the ideal antitank mean- prCRent when needed absent when not In Ruch case to Rive horse unitR support of mechanization is to reinforce and protect and not to weight them Mechanized fractions operating with horse units can be used under circumstances terrain and conditions where employment of mechanized mas~es would be impossible There is difference in employshying a platoon of armoled vehicles on a long forest road vhere cavalrymen scout the flanks and employing- a long column incapable of observing its own flanks
Considering capabilities of the motor aerial as well as terrestrial horse formations should be reorganized The influence of employment of motors not only on distribution of cavalry missions but on the mission~ themselves should furnish a basis and orientation
We observe at once that the role of mobile fire reserves primordial at one time i~ no longer peculiar to the cavalry Ve note that missions of exploration no longer have place of first rank which was once theirs Rapidity and intensity with which situations change today have lessened interest in information obtained by exploration Further to hope to obtain information other than by ~udden contact with powershyful mechanized means risks being a dangerollR illusion The offensive can draw only the same advantag-c from rapid means of transport as the defense
On the other hand the primordial impurtance of securshyity misRions is always increasing security of the commander for there iR rhd of being caught and losing liberty of action nt great dhtance Recnrity of troopR for the approach march should begin at a distance with nttendant risk of lORing direction intermingling and fatigue
These obgervationR may lead to stopping nrguments with infantry where cavalry risks mobility without hope and to abandoning the costly mirage of uexploratlOll and pure cavalry mis~ion~ which by cruel irony fall more and more mto the domain of the motor Further these observation~ may puint out the very real necessity of distant security
Without going as far as the Germans who divided large cavalry units into reconnaissance groups the formula may
43
11shy
its~ e
4
Foreiiin Jlilifary Digests
be found in a modernized version of the old firt1t linc brigade rlhe character of distant ~(curity relative proximity of inshyfantry po-3ibility of rapid reinforcement oppose all tempshytation to weight llllit~ TIH llecessity of covering a corp front imposp till pffpPiin minimum The llCcesity of operating- in ~mall dpjachlllellb fiuin a nch suhaltern
(cadre vanld 1Om (Jf rl1l~si(JllS ohligation of maYleuver l1(c-ldty 01 ab~orhilJg reillforc(m1lllb fn(IIlPntly rt~qtlir(-
same nchllC-- ill ~uperi()r cadrL-- othing -hould hindtl groupillj 1)[ ullit tor mb ioll- of another Jlatlln and of reinforeilW tlllIll tmporaJily with splcially Il(te-~ary
meangt
Tilt IH ctalJ 111111--- hould lH tilt diiloll WIth two 1)1 three ilflre nyimellt a nlPchanLed n)J~imlllt 1lllCarily lfJmprbiJlJ~ a Jqwlrfnl lilt Itank annanHlIt a ~r(lllp of a1shytilhr~ nlflrl(r ratHr thlll gUllgt 1 --ignal detachment all
lttntilInlaft d( tadlJlfllt a II cqtllPPld -talT IIorLregishyl1Hllts proitif-d WIth l trolW platooll (Jf motorcycle megtshy~(llgers would he fltlwrYh IwIlI ill motor anri train- lomhat trlIlI- hould lw It~t()l(d tn tilt m()hilit~middot of unit~ hy
rdulning- to animal drawn m(an~ (cttain ~ubdlvl~lOn~ 11(h as tIl( ~pahi~ hI) ~ri D1ollntalllllfs should Il equipPld and traiwd t() mount arfan
In piact (If tItI Ij Cl airy livjiJlh a Tlattr Iluml)l flf 11Or~p f()rmtllolh pll III hmd mnhilp lIpple and light without 1lt11W tt1 ()tld lllrlllit fllrnhhlllg large units Pllgagillg ill d(Icafl IlWntIIClS with thL dbtant -ecurity rrrillired 1111-( -amp formatIOn- grouped or alone would bl able to 11lrfllrm Ill miloll- formerly deolving 011 the eaalry divll()lI~ Furtlwr tht~ would be able 10 cooprrate with mol)r f()nll~ti()Il ~llllplenllllt them or in (1lte of need to talt (IVlr l part ()f tlIP front In a implpound comhination would be found the rolf and place of the two clements that Join today in giving (lyalry it mohility and power thp motor and tIlt hor~(
Torn from th~ (Olltrlfllttllll that tries at Olllpound to make 1l1lllJll Id IJlI Jlt I tlld nllllllllIIlll( cmiddotalry hecome lig-ht waill hy illlluIJoll thl tlJr-l fOrillatioll- would again take the hahit of malleUHr a la legere They would find again for applll at ill 11 ill JJnd(ln ~IIITolll(ljnJ~ old qualities that dpldo ld li~ht tIO()lb ill the so-calpd war of advanced jlo-h Thb (Julcllw t)f J-Tlat advaJ1ta~~p to iJlfantry which would altJ I)(lon)( mUWl rahl The dcvplopmcnt of scienshyt Ijllt mean hould lalt rather than wcaken the orignal characteritic of tlw old arm fir~l l)((aup they arc aided ll a(j(Jl1 and nJipmiddottd of dutIl seco1ld olcausc to assure th pr(Liioll and illcd IIPcP-ary for employing meant) more lod nlOll varitri qnall unit and regiments mut be taken from a lomph~middotily alld f1n~anic instahility that accommushydal( n(gti1lwl intruclioll Jlor mailltenance
It i noi a qu(lion of 1(Ilrllilll~ to th( tlntiq11 -implishy(Ifmiddot of Hl( thrr f arm- 1111 11 i lHIls-aIY to OITPct an Illshy
vtllizd ion which by fortf of (ir(mn-taJlcP- was lealizNi h (dr)J11rl- lIld q(middotE~ EOIT(middot(tions New fOlmaiionH )11111 ~ajn in knowing llwir matprifl l)(tiP) and mort quilhlJ in acquirinr practice and in testing results As for old arm collahoration with nlO(icrn lllgil1(-l should be a rshyf urn Iq prllHiplC and to making he-t use of particular rnall~ III a flIOl( r(stricipd field indIvidual qualities will ltipjfrmiIlP tlm~clv(s
C amp GSS Quart
THB INBVITABlLlTY OF CONTINUOUS FRONlli
[La fntnlitc dt-s fronts continus By General RoullurroJ CondpJ1sPu from HClr Jl1litajlC SlIiEM Declmher 1D37]
By MAJOn T R PIIILLJlS Coa~t Al tllllry CorJl~
We shall not recommence trench warfare is a fa refrin to all who lived througPt it But what do they about it
It wa the effect of caUHes already old but none iJelli(erants had paid attention to them
The queHtion whether it will be in our power to p the formation of continuous frontgt and the trenches characterize them depends upon the survival of the cau~
An anonymous author in a gttudy on the evolutionf tadics wrote in 1891 We do not agree with those ill claim that the offensive hue lost nothing of its value defensive is not as has been said an attitude whose a 2
resides in purely defcmdve advantages It has virtues And further One of these lines (one oft t 18 opposing fronts) unable to xucceed in front will attemp ~
envelop the other this one in his turn will prolong rd front and it will he a race as to who can extend the Ir( t r within the limit permitted by hi effectives 01 at I~ 5- things would develop that vay if Ol1e could extend indt~ O-J nitely but nature imposes obstacles The line will stoP~ier point of support the -ea a mountain range or the front of a neutral nation t
Thece prevision- were unheard in the concert ofmiddot e ~ thoritativc voices proclaiming the headlong offensive tical instruction continued to spread the blind offensive the first combats of 19J1 The prophetic sense of a wa eonfticting- so violentlv with current ideas had motivat anonymity of the author He was revealed in 1914 as Lii Colonel Emile lIlayer to whose reputation as a miliu writer nothing neeuH be added now
On friendly terms with 1I1arshals Joffre and Focht Jng
had vainly sought to make them understand his ideas l~n ( This ancient history is not without interest at it m er
when certain spirits attempt to turll aside the 11fCOCClI t of a new war of trenches by hypotheses on the causes Htabiliation of 1914 Can one not see states one the r l of a series of accidental causes or of General Falkenh ft particular conception of the conduct of war ~I
In theHc two cases there is no reason for th( eff((~ a the (au~(s which have disappcareu lo occur anew ~7
No on would dare hold that the realiation foreseen more than twenty years in advance and foJ irreproachable logic was the result of fiimple coincide of chancC
As for the hypothesis of the personal influence l~ral von Falkcnhayn on stabilization it appears to be d hy his first acts a~ mprtmc command) of tlll Ge armies 12 September J 91-1
Aetually fter mid-September he orltllrcd the Gc Fifth Army lHt WPl1l the MCUHC and the Argonne to adv An analag-uliH order wa~ given at the same time to the de ment of General von Strantz to mo( from the region of toward the heights of the Meuse These movements m fesUy had as object the investment of Verdun The displayed by the troops charged with these missions sho that they were stopped after inconteHtable tactical succ
OlXVlI No 70 Foreign Military 7Jigests
ot by order of the Supreme Command but by the resistance ey encountered
~ We are thus led to recognize that the formation of conshy~nuous fronts in the Varld V~ar was the logical consequence a higher causes Lieut Colonel Mayer indicated them in
91 Are they still effective They arc (1) the power of rmmet particularly favorable to tile defensive and (2) ~ e increase of man power in modern armies Both have olved since the World War but uniquely in the sense of ~gmentation This first verification is decidedly of a $ture to lead to the belief that it~ consequences have fo1shy1bwed the same progres~Honi The essential characteristic8 of modern materiel appear ~confirm this iirst supposition Ve shall examine from this ~int of view the actual possibilities of artillery aviation ~echanjzation and motorization and finally of gas These are the branches of modern materiel whose perfection since the war might lead to serious modifications of the tactics of lin8 i When we took the field in 1914 ranges in exces of 7700 ~rds were considered exceptional for artillery The greatshy4t range of French cannon was about 11000 yards for the JfJ5mm long and 3000 or 4000 yards more for the German IlO-mm_ The range of the giant German and Austrian howshyItzers dId not exceed 13200 yardR i Artlllery observation posts ere always diRtant from the objectives and the uncertainty of unobserved fire genshyJaBy prevented its employment In the courxe of the war CI~tiation coming to the help of terrestrial observation pershy- ltted the use of observed fire from the extreme range of e guns Careful ballistic btudies supplied the methods of efficacious map fire especially by the me of concentrations of fil-e
under these conditions and thanks to present long 4nges batteries spread over 10000 or more yards of front ten execute concentrations of fire vmiddotithout direct observation_ 1
or the whole of their front Thee possibilities were evishy nt on many occasions during the course of the World Var t It IS evident that they have been augmented by the inshy
--clt eaF~ of the rangep of the gun and the superior instruction the artillery personnel This gives an advantage to the
atfense the organization of which can easily be Huperior to at of the attack because of its stabilization Among the examples of concentration of fireamp that the
World Var furnishes us two are recalled which can give an feuroa of the services to be expected of long range artillery in ~e future
1 In January 1915 the German XVI Army Corps held the ont of the Argonne from the Aisne to the height of Vaumiddot ois still famous for the bloody combats of which it was the cater This front included a wooded part the Argonne
Vi ere the German troops attempted to advance and a part s covered between the Argonne and Vauquois included
_ e latter part having received a defensive mission was nstituted aA a distinct sector from the forest under the
ders of the artillery commander of the army corpR He 8 particularly apt to get the maximum returns from his ament In fact although this German ector was held bull very small infantry strength for its extent it held
ainst all French attacks_
In the -egion of the height of the Meuse in November 1914 a concentration of fire of forty pieces opened in less than a half hour quickly ended the menace of a serious Ger~ man attack
It results from these conHidelations that modern prog~ re~~ in artillery gives new postiiuilities of extension and to forces on defensive fronts
Aviation gave birth Lo great hope for the attack Camshyouflage of terrestrial organizations and the custom of making important movement at night have reduced the effects of its activity singularly Its role in reconnai8sance at all distanshyces is considerable but it cannot hope to prevent all disshycovery of movements by the enemy_ It is thus logical to believe that all efforts at envelopment will collide with an exten~ion of the front attacked under the same conditions as m 1914 to the degree that reserves are available
At the present time it is difficult to form an accurate opinion of the cap-abilities of parachute infantry Without drawing definite conclusions from the experiments in France during the autumn maneuvermiddot one can say that they have not thrown much light on the utility of this novelty Until proof is given to the contrarythe actions of the parachutists do not seem to be able to exceed the limits of very rIsky episodes
Aerial superiority certamly will glve an advantage to the contender who has it but nothing authorizes the belief that it will be decisive It will not prevent the inferior conshytender from establishing defensive lines in front of which an attack may receive a bloody check
Motorization of the ground forces gives the same facilishytIes to the enveloping maneuver of the attack and the counshyter-action of the defense Like all technical surprises the tank at its outset gained the success due to surprise But on a modern battlefield this SUCless will be difticult to renew against a defense using artificial obstacles mines and antishytank cannon The Abyssinians who were nothing but savage warriors even found the means to trap a dozen Italian tanks
Isolated feats by mechanical engines can never be preshynmted But in mass they are not capable with their own means of carrying through an attack and their employment in mass requires an extensive artillery preparation
It is certain the motorization and mechanization will extend fronts inordinately At the same time it increases the difficulty of protection In the British maneuvers of last autumn one of the sideR was entirely mechanized the other was partially and included foot infantry and horse cavalry the reconnaissance elements of both sides were able to reach the command potjt of their adversary In the same maneushyvers the defender was skillful enough in the use of obstacles to canalize the attlck of the enemy tanks_ They were caught in a trap and fell under the fire of antitank guns A coufltelshyattack by tanks completed their defeat This episode was an affair of tanks and the infantry does not eem to have played a role
One flees in the modern tank the Ruccessor of the arshymored knight History shows the many successes of the latter Bllt firc um-l ~loVly pCliPrlfd IinaIIy chased him f)om the field of battle What will become of the tank as artillery becomes perfected to destroy it This is a secret of the future that exercises of peace have failed to unveiL
45
In an~ (il In the pnlnt Rtatc of armament tlll Ctll shy
ploynHn of tank dOl flt (eIn to fan) OllP ide more than the othll HI lJmlltt Thp oiJ-IlYcr of the last British mallvilI-- (dl (-1llt11 that fliPY gie the an~er advanshytagp to the dl1n-l
I (1 dta( k III I 11 dc vlth(llt doubt local ppi-odl- C~mJlal i-vll II tfW11 (Ifj tIll nUwk and dlfell--e can furlllh 110 oj hI) (nil lu jll)) Ihtll Jll( art IlII1 t hey will lH of ~reat 1-1 ldLlll~ 1f 1hI dt tll I
lhl--I (In-lrlltltllllh 1(n1 to C()ITOh))at( for tlw fushylun tlH l Idl 111111- Id- J]IIlI (IjOlll1 ~Llrlr whith () ]1111(1] lH l~] I TIlI lOnJillll tllt lIlUr--l of OpnllOI1
illl Il III III d I 1 I 11 JI)(j of t hI 1111lt1 Var pnt ril)ld tlll I )l1I 1l1 IJ] 11(1 -i( jlOltIIJll awl t1li fnllllatioll of
II ll)( llal Jt I (( 11 shy
FIJI (1() 111 pI dnlllillall tl)1I11)JTO on the Jlcld of 11111 iltft 11 dl ~Ill 1- lllt-Ill Ith atlTUeU YlUlenn lnd dvplh dnln tiltmiddotljIWn oj )()rnhaldmlnt tiatioJ1 and the llHlll-t-d 1 tlnge vi gUl Such 1- the -latement in til pII~rdl Id till FtI111 h JI)--tltl(tion~ for tIll employment of lalLT 11011 llf l~ Allglht l~jC In It l1w offcn~ivl and dc fl n ~I I lll I 11 ttl tl form ot al for hidl -olclicr- should
iJl lIIIh 1111IIllvn TIH lndn( it rctlldcd in GlrnlllI 111111111111 IP1111 II) --11) Yllaltl prlfCllIlCl foJ the ofshy
tn-lI
()JTLIl--J( - tgUll- a front or)-anized 111 ulpth en~n III-I il~ 11 I -) rllillllj III the II-t Ylal- of the orld Var that tllll (llt~ k IH1-tl1lltcd a lritablc yictory for the uPshy
fllHel fhi 1-- -ho11 II1 the e~ond hattie of Cham jldllll III 1litlriltl lfl1-) the lJatllp of the Ai-ne Il1 1~1l7
dId agalll III Frllltl and Flander~ in 1larch and April 1J18 fll I Ill LtLt 11 t (11 ht fIlIUl e of the Glrnlans to break the line- hul dl tlll lll()jd 1tHrt I---iOll of a grac deftat The 1il I)ln- 1)1 arlll(lltTlt llIl onJr tlcentuate thIS tendencr Jll
111 flltUft
11 d lillI lr thaI iClhlllLal -urpri~L nll contradIct 1 Pll 11))1 llldllltetl e do not think -0
(Jill I 1IIllln-]1111 Illlll Ill that de-pitc all the arguments IItI]1 nl (Ill -Idlllllt1IOll fir fronts JIl a gnat war
11)(1 III -ldl (1 Ill -[lJ Jlri-l of unknown devices war hLshy
111 II JI ill JIIlti Il Iltt JIIlJ III lvolve rapidly toward -tahshy1ItlIIIlI LIlt J-ur~
[LJI))lill ltl1I 01 front By LlluL CI)Io I 11 I f )jO]f II d f) ltl1ll i1 I ill lld)lfllI ( -i11(
1111111 IqIK J
ill th 1)( llmiddotlldH J 1--111 of UfIII( Jlilillllf 811( GC11elshy
d f j~JUtPl1 Id fliP III d (()jllll1l IaYLr- prediction luiJlI-hed In jK~JI IJ lilt fnlUlt llblliatIOTl of fronts of hattIe In Ifl II nlntHl Lt~l ()ljlSl his iueas un the -ubicct dld I plaJJb liHlr tIlI-l
Ill tit 1 HjJllHllt of jirIIHJ(1 of all types of w(apons
11 1i111d HI 11 aJJlltl 1Illolaldt rlont [o(VIl this dul uot Ill-Illy a I lIJOUIllerIlL Ilt of til( slluggle aml giving up of atttmIlt tn -(J1Yt~ tlw prohlltll 111l1s p()~wd It alt lH((ssary to fOil f II 111111 orle of tilt p)treI1lJtH~ of the line to iale till pOI]Oll III till ll11 A Oil as an lllvclopmcnt is noticed by llf fHIJl ((11 though It lIlay nul be Wide the threatened
46
c amp GSS Quart
wing wilh(iras almot instill(tivel~
mPllt it finds itltelJ hetwcll1 two IirCs converging on it unahle to ripn-te in two different directions it renOUll UlHlJual stn)le
IL i tpparllll that tlw dt~rlllder lan protpound~lt his agaifl~t a 1111 f1111g f)lO(Hllnt of mall amplitude hy foriiilt-ati()ll alld tlIP cla-sil procedures against flu J1I()I~lll(llt 1lIt d the ll1vllopment is malti at tO
aide dblan(( and with important forccs the (on seq al( IIlIl(h flInj( J(cllluhtHblc Lines of communiratio 1luat lOll will H endangL)p( RaiIlm~di and roads vill hloclpd
Thlh 110 III() J(Jf of -tahiiitation i-gt an impllgnal flail] r 11ldd( 1 hi dPliluk -td~mlJlt in the Rente JIilltwc I
SIIlt( ill la 11()2 I said thPll that to maintain the rigl i-altI~1 it~ of t hp I rUllt it 1l1U-t be sUllPorted ag-ainst the sea ~ff t k
If f I ec11l01Ult a III rUlgL or a Ilcutra ron tIer In urIe bull an 0 )S~f k 1hal tould lleither he turned or foncd These two conditio~1 ~ i ~s fire Po(J alid imprpjnable flallk~ are indispensable tot ]IlC tH
conlinuou front lhe 1)
FIn j)()Wll is a relatIve term In this c(U-)c If thc( 1lcc I I hi I t 4ePOSllW 101(es arc tljula en as a woe Cit 1er as 0 I lrh
mean- thev PO-IS or tht llumlHl of (f[rlLives the j t ll j hility i a~-I1I(d In pJintipll If the oppo~ing for ~ very llIHljunl if cquIiibllum doe~ not exist or if it is brol ovel a Z()JW suflidlntly extlJljn the front is in danger i(ing- fontd bu k alld pierccd in t hjlt region
Some ypars parli(J I had explained my ideas to toillradp Toutct thelI director at the Ecole SlIpcricure Gllern lIe ohiected that a division could not hold a Ir m()rt Ihan a ieagllt (tilnl rmlls) AClording to T jrc our twenty army torps would be a1gt1pound to furnish twenty-IT lh a adlYC divL~i(lll~ till others were not considered of valu ~ adiu
1tilU- the linc of rCSltante (auld not exceed twenty-I ~-ere
ICagllC~ apploximately th distallCeuro from Dlinkitk to r ~ 11 th fort iIy contradictor concluded that the establishment elf f a Imc of re~istal1ce on our northern frontier would ilb~ t the total of our aetl( trvolls and there would be nonef fur OUI other frontiers or for an llnportnnt re~erve
AfUl thp fOllllatJOJ1 of fronts in ll1t huLh sidc~ 1
~hort of ammunition If the inadEr~ at that time had well supplied and the FreTleh supplies exhausted a iJ through could hayc hecn made with a frontal attack pJtlonclPlIlHt tfluld hl( lgtlll1 ohtaincd by different m Early lISC of gas lI1ight hayc up~d it The continuolls f ttll Ill hI 01(11 if th(I1( ilt a ~llilkient disparity of force stabilized front h the result of approximately equal and Im)lCglwhle tlanks
If I tlilIilult to -oPt that aviation would lie abl( to lurll tillS HLatlmcnt but I lll~itate to malw a prophecy fad I did nut prophllY III Bn und 1902 I never atten 10 lilt IIkdp 1l1~ flilHh Jofrn and Folh with illY i(lla ~illlpl~ to 1gt1Oadpll theirs Both had a precise idea 0 fill 11 wlluld lit rOllght and I told tlWI1l tlwy ll~ WI npl(~Illt it to llilIllltllvl a priori and that thc future Jd tIll lip fo tlwir pJlvisioIlS Above all I though ~
deceived themselves in Ia(ing their confidence in the I 1JIlJ~ offlIldVt I 1011 in LOpini(m in May 1DO) iJ iilvl that llll-l theory IS false I believe it ~ven mol gerons than fabc (May I not ue permitted to say t thcRc two lines are those I am most proud to have wrillpoundlt rus
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Foreign Military Digests
THE GEmA-I ARlIY IN 1917
[LllltlllC allqnunde lil l)n By Colonel voni X~landll CUIHlllhld frum R( 111( lJdtrulc ~Olt~r
1 Fbruuy lJlR 1
1 By MUJ[t T n PUll J 110 (nat AllJilllY Corp
J Colonel von Xyland(gtl German Arm Retired i a well jno~n mil~tary ritCl Hnd i- I10 nne of the profes~ors of imilt1JI h~~toIT at the Krigakcde~lic in BeTm Thi 1artlc]e ltllltall1- 1 OIl-dll ahle InformatIOn about the German jlrmy that prevIOusly h- not heen available middot The gJIHi (Irmarl l1M 11 Cln er- of September 1n17 in lthL reg-IfIll ()l the Illti( Slltt ere an imp01lant event they lttradl d t (JIlidll al)k flllClgl1 at lention The maneucr- 1nftheglOtllld 11)1 ( t ok pl( ( in tern Pomerania and III
b[(lklenL1l1)r a hlTltlill or rnlllll1 hil- Clit vith llumerou ]he and -OjlH COle -t Til jll (-lIH c of three army COn)
Inriudll1g nllmlIll1 ~fltorj d and lrmolNI forcc- rendered the mamlI el lIlt)ll Important than any of tho-e that had prl-ltdetl1t in G(lmln~ and eell 111 forclgn lotlntric To ih(~e a- ~ddc(~ the lolIaLoration of the navy and aviation fIhL field oj actIon of the latliJ ww LOlHidcrably more exmiddot tcnJed than that oi the two ground armle The fleet mashy1fller Ino] plll l Oll tilt HaItH Spa IIlIl in It- large I ~IlW~ the tilCIlL of the manLUlr~ middot A UIl1YO 01 troop tlHl1-IOIL had heen sent from Ent l)lU~ Ja 11 a tnward SwiJwlllulHh--Stettin and had oe-t-n ttltllked hile en loute by till alt(lcalY This ollasioned omLat~ on the -ld aIllI 111 till all a- vel as the start of a
middot omncltialcontlll t Each pal t) had a large air force The bjtlthl a-illcd to the all fonp~ exceeded greatly later Jlly Jnd in depth the front etalJlishcd on land Vithin the LdlU uf allllli act tty eXElCI~es of passive aerial defense (re uJlldulteu dUllng the entIre week of the maneuvers ~~n tilh fahion the C1 il population as able to prepare it shyelf for modern 1 at uttainly rill not spare them
j 1 hl-l lOl1lblIled lilal1CUVel a~ecting th~ armies of the and ~l-t and all -upplitd a IlIlCIOUS occasIon to test the 0mmltind ()rgdllatioll 11111 Olhllld in Germany and which ~olllri ltUll thl lollllJnlatlOll oj the~e three armies with a IC to realization of thell common oUJedives The exelshy
bull lleS hllh utnnol be lxplained in detail aroused for thi~ Ca~l)ll (11 extl(Illel~ 11 (Iy fnleigll mtlrest and have prushy
joked many perllnent JI--cussiolJs on the development of the ew Gel man army
In dred the maneUver~ Wele the result of a year of inshy truLtion during whiLh in lonformlly WIth the laws of milishyar) concllption the re~toration of the army advanceu ethodlcally For the first time In the autumn of 1937 men
vho had tompleted two yeJr- traiElIlg henceforth normal ad )lt1l HllIster(u out Dy the u(cree of 24 Aug-ust 19~6 11 n1ln ho Ire lit for clvice lcccivcu this instruction
ther In the armies of the land -ea and air In addition ome iJluntl~l- could IJC engaged for longer duration and
~middoterc a-Jgn~d to [undwll rtlulring special knowledge Older men ho Junng the period of limitation of armashy
middot Jenb had nol lecived military lIitlu(tion and who (ould ot bL uilled for lwo yettl- trainlIlg took part as reservist nan eiJdll veLd (OUlS( of in-tudlOn In the autumn of 937 the da-s of 1915 as well as the 1912 class in East russia had been called normally to arms after having been
in labor camps The conception of obligatory military sershyvice effectively realized in Gelmany calls for an arrangeshyment between those who have been called for military 8ershyyicc and from this fact have submitted to a restriction on their ciyilian ltllCl aBel tholC for whom this is not the case To eITcd thi~ purpose a military tax hab been introduced effetive 1 September 1937 it affects for the present only thooe mcmbels of the cIoss of 1914 and 1916 who have not been lalled into service The tax is due until the end of the YLar in hilh the contlibuiol lealthes the age of 45 It is (dculalLd as follow~ during the first two years (which l onCS]lOlHl to normal service) at 50 ~~ of their income and after thal at G
The law on aerial defense published last year does not indilatf an extension of ohlig-atory service for it does not reqUIre 1I1l1 f (lJI Hervices It should be interpreted as follo~ All Glman~ are relluired to take part in aerial deshyfen E The service of alert Becurity first aid and of indishyVidual indutrial protection are constituted in groups harged with organizing aerial defense The Reichsluft shy~(hutzbund OlganlJlex and ir1Ftttmiddotult reams for self-protecshytion In other domainH it functions in the quality of (nttn4elol
During lf)n the regulations required by the introducshytIOn of two years -gtervice were put to test Military service is a service of honor for the German people It requires the 4oldiel to give him4elf to assure the existence of the nation even to the ~acrHice of his own life This fundamental a-ertion is destined to place in evidence the moral and psyshychic forces of the combatant as well as his physical and milmiddot tan training Veracity absolute obedienle punctuality exactitude and severity are indispensable qualities In turn they provolw will courage resistance the sentiment of honor and the modesty the soldier should pmsess Reciprocal confidence between the leader and his men on the one part and comradeship on the other should constitute a solid lien in the organi7ation Drill is ronsidered as an indispensable means for the formation of soldiel~ but not a~ an occasion to conduct formal exercises without purpose
Th( objective of the second year of training is the edushycation of the isolated combatant and instruction in special hranches In addition upon completion of the first year they Hhould be able lo function as leaders of groups and instructors During the second year special importance is lattached to the education of reserve officers
The formation of actIve officers who in their quality of instructor have heavy tasks is given special attention The numher of oflkers to be educated having been considerashybly augmented due to the introduction of two years of serw
yiee it ha~ heen neCe8Sar) tu reduce the period of instruction from four yltars to two and one-half yearf This has reshy-ulted in Illimllc regulation of time to gain the greatest benefit and it heavier effort 011 the vart of the students During tlH Hlst pal tIllt Falllwnlunker (aspirant officer) partilq)ates a~ a simple ~oldier he is nominated six months latLr If lIE prOlH to hae the nccessary qualities for adshyaneLmelll and lerImnntp4 the eyrIe of imlhuction ag a nonshy(ommi-~ione1 oiHcer B Ulb time he should already have demon~trated his qualities of leadership Next the future officer is ordered to th( war ~chool where he receives theoretshyical instruction A first examination must be paRsed before
47
C amp GSS Quarter
his nomination of Fahnrirh (aspirant) The final examinashytion decides whether he will become Oberfahnrich (first aspirant) The latter still goe two months to the school of arms vhere he acquire-gt ptciaI knowiedg( for the em- ployment of th( diverse armlt Aftf1 r1 new staRe of two m~nth-l of pract iral -gtrrvice th( selection of ameen takes pfc1ce In advancement to the urade of lieutenant the charshyact(l whkh a Ilail(l -hould have plays it dd()rminin~ rolr as compared to rlult~ obtaiJwd in prH ileal and theoretical ltervice
In 1937 the new army shows that it wiII follow i~ pIicity in the traces of its predecessor The traditions oft ancient RoldielR transmit them~elves to the present -~
neW units arC in intima1c relations with the aSRociations~~ former comhatants MpaSlllCS have been taken to aid Sl)l~1 diers ill civil empioymen1 after their service Particuhgtt-J attention i- -dV(l1 10 l1oIHommjs~ioncd officers of long s4 ~ vic to aid them in their future in civil life fmiddot
49
I
i bisto ~ighl build
[ book viIII
I~ho 1he f Becor[
few I~fthl
jng 0
the s pline with
troft work
middotmiddotn important arlantagc of the Ilie~cl engine is that Acad it i~ ~t affected hy wcath(r lOlHlitinns since it has no delishy Eri
guid
more the Diesel engine docs 110t hayc tn he shielded rate electrical apparalu~ to hecome out of order Furthershy
to P to permit the efficient U-e of radio (ommunication It is a fougl
prohIem to -hi(lrI t h( gaoline eng-ine when used in military Iandn~hi(I(~ to permit the operation of the now vital military radio communication sy-tem nUl to the greatly incr(as(()
Ie1110hility of mcehanizlC1 armies t he importance of radio C0111shymunication fne from all interflrence cannot he undershy modi l-timated
i PratAt the prccnt time great pr()~res~ with f)il~el cngines saryand trucls is heing made in Germany and FratHc-Germany contha ving- over HOllO Ililmiddot rl t ruclls and Francc ovcr 7000 Great j powBritain has over 100 To the United States belongs the Jlmpccredit for the first commercial ])iesel engille to he put into ~~obregular senicc Thi- eng-inc wa~ a (iO-hnrs(IH)V(r 2-cylinshy
=~hoder unit huilt at st Louis in lHIH fi -U(ftgtr ( Sunu rs Armu Ordnance
l~ lnan
en ate]
48
Book Reviews By LIEUTENANT J W RUDOLPH Infantrll
THE NAVY A HISTOHY
By FJETCIlCR PRATT
49amp pages bullbull Garden City NY Doubleday Doran amp Company
The stirring traditions of the American Navy its colorful history and the men who built it are vividly portrayed in this highly personalized account of the United States Navy The builders of American seapower are the supports upon which the book is built and they constitute a stirring roll call The work Iltil1 rank among the most popular histories of the Navy
Periods of naval history are reviewed in terms of the men who dominated them Assisting at the Revolutionary birth of the neet were Jones and Biddle with Barney and Barry in
secondary roles- these men created a tlaVY which bequeathed few victories but a wealth of courageous tradition The days
of the Barbary pirates and the War of 1812 witnessed the flowershying of a small but efficient fleet - a generation dominated by the stern and unflinching Preble whose uncompromising discishypline trained the outstanding ballie captains of the second war with England
Perry the sailor who opened Japan and the civilian Banshycroft stand out in the pre-Rebellion period Bancrofts greatest work as Secretary of the Navy being the creation of the Naval Academy The courage of Farragut the technical genius of Ericsson and the ordnance skill of Dahlgren were the naval guide posts of the Civil War Dahlgren built the great guns to put into Ericssons revolutionary ironclads while Farragut fought the battles
The great theoretician Ivlahan in the years between 1865 and 1898 propounded the strategy fulfilled victoriously by Dewey and Sampson at Manila and Santiago The World War Was a triumph for the teamwork training and ingenuity of oW
modern navy As a colorful swiftly moving story of our naval past Mr
Pratts history is one of the best although marred by unnecesshyi my minor errors of detail which rob it of much value It Ii contains little of naval policy administration and thought however and therefore fails to answer many pertinent and ~mportant questions In general the author has done a good -job presenting a brilliant panorama pf blue water and the men
rho have sailed our fighting ships I
THE LOST BATI]ALION
By THmfAS M bullbullJOHNSON ANDIFLETcmm PnATT
338 pages New York Dohbs-Merrill Company I
On 2 October 1918 790 men tif the 77th Division comshynanded by a New York lawyer Major Charles W Whittlesey vent over the top and into the Argonne Forest FIve days I ater 194 stumbled out In those five days the Lost Battalion
I
forged an immortal legend of eourage horror and sacrifice Twenty years after comes the complete story of that heroic incident of war
Five days in the battered tangle of the Argonne left indelible scars in the brains of the few who survived -~ scars that drove Whittlesey to suicidal death and sealed the lips of the men who came out Rarely is a survivor found who will even mention that he experienced the nightmare
Horror - not so much the horror of shattered minds and bodies but the frustration of helplessness -- stalks the pages of this book Men expect to be killed in battle but not by their own artillery When they die because the food and medicines intended to save them fall into the hands of their enemies before their very eyes death becomes truly tragic All these things happened to the Lost Battalion
Many myths which passing years have thrown up around the battalion are exploded by this book In the first place the battalion was never lost It was exactly where it was supposed to be and everybodY including GHQ knew it The charge of violating orders that supposedly hounded Whittlesey to his death is shown to be unfounded The gallant major obeyed instructions to the letter It was not his fault that having capshytured his objective with a body of new troops he was cut off and unable to withdraw
The Lost Battalion deserves its specia1 history - a story that is stark and true without robbing the battalion of an iota of glory The authors have recreated notably a vivid picture of five heroic days with a graphic account that is both simple and authentic
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAH
By CHARLES R FISH
Edited by William E Smith
531 pages bullbull New York Longmans Green amp Company
Critics acclaim this posthumous book of Professor Fish the greatest interpretive work ever written on the Civil War It is a book concerned with causes and results rather than narrashytive consequently the account of military operations is of minor importance to a thorough study of the background and effects of the sectional struggle
On many of the familiar aspects of the war Professor Fish takes sharp issue with traditional beliefs He does not accept the economic explanation of the outbreak of the conflict neither does he regard the war as inevitable The North did not have the edge from the start and did not actually clearly see victory until the fall of 1864 He even goes so far as to suggest that in the light of 1861 the South had the advantage since a successful defensive Will was the only necessity for victory III these views Mr Fish concurs with Major Sheppard (See review following)
Not Gettysburg Vicksburg nor even Atlanta were the decisive ~att1es of the struggle The real decision was reached
49
-
BIilk Ile-Liews
oehind lhp ~()rth(rn [rem in ovlrnlHJ ]-Gl Tilat (llci~ivp evellL was the nmiddot(lCtion of Linloln lhlllilfll a rf~ssured Fedshyeral gOVClnmlmiddotnt qpiitmiddotd t lk Iln-Utgt 1hat [Htdp lH outcome
inevitahle PrJl(Jn~(d n--ttllh tIl IIJrr(Jl[lldnl lld dlIPI])Il1) 1l11pllishy
gWHe and hrillia1lt iilfllfI gtl yit rnlki tIllgt anI~ of the 11
Ifetw(gtpn the ~taf(~ a Iil1111 nWll10rial tn Ihe author lroflor Smil h who (Il ihutuj 10 1 middotl1elll lhq)1 r on Wolf lintIltIshyand 10111 JrJjJlIlltW~li(jll hj- --1 prj l ylIulhll or] lhill llhout Illgt I dllllf- Hllld lll( htI IH 111 flllhh-Hmiddotd
It 11lIY III 1 J1IJI [I) (Ul(lltll(lal~rI LIW lhtl AllHrlCanshy
ought to qli1t r1tin al)[tlll 11H (vIl YII and klp it 101))1
Engli h (( rlJnh (lUI n 1 fll ml of Ill 11P lOIWPl nin Ill( Hfh(IJtgtl1 man of tIl 111111 Ollllnd1l1~ piI- hl 1lHl1e from
tIll jllll of lldbJ -f)ldltr- ll1111 1 ~l11jlptd ha addtd tlot hpj I(l - ~ tIl 1laquo Jj d of hi hrollll1 ~-lll-llnb it h a h(lnk jll(l I Illl] 11 ]11( tIll Iii)]] Ilf pcr l)llctl
OH Ian fil--iI ndll 111 jWrhqh--o lWlr thr -((11[ and tll1W
of til (lil 11 tILlI Ihl- Tli~ tIl( ()()d fnr tIl( tnC~ ~ot
-0 ~laJflr ~h( llldld 1111 ~II (ll halk 111 ltIll al111opllll(gt of unplliudlttd 1IlJ JJtltlH and ~l1(kh hi fat ono o11light dmvn tIHmiddlt [11 11 bliff plLPlw hl~ (ompn pd mo( truth hnUl IIUI (1 il lr than nlll 011 historjll1- h1( llCCtl I1hlC
1) injl1I mIll l1t11 bulky (lilligt
To 1J1ll ~hqITIJld 1])( I ntical pPlll)(l of lllll (in -ar 1 lilt (j ytmiddotll ~trplh of 1~)1-j)-gt nt unlil tlwil did tIll [-1111)11 plll illlo fgtltLUlon a ~rltlt~i( pbnalcubted to Il the 1 Ill plan t~ t ]1 t 1 Ill ( Ilnd Em (middotIOplllllll Iarried on 0 ( rll1 arCl (jf 1hflI~all(h fJf -lillll Inlh of -OllW of till 111o-t dl~Illl and dJ(]-I ItIlill nil (11111 hJp (llnt IwId LC( in 1iI( (-11 ~llllllLlll Lltll 1ill )H1 or thi (onfldll wyand t 11ln )llJWJWtl Ihl 11111111 I 1 111 (I) IiJill h hrilHin~ tlw horror Ir ar lllto 1111 lW1l1 of rhl -Illth III (llll~ Ihl- way wa-- it ii) Ihll 10 ill 11]( ( tl 11 lll 1 IIH lil--t truly nashy
tl()lld Jllljwj wh t11l tll11ll lI 01J] ((- 1110)11 -Itlllgth and
fJpuLt11f)J10f tll -1111 1111 l()llIld into tIll tJuEmiddot~~l( I)eftab of arrntp WI 11(11 11l0Utr]l t hf matlllaJ of war and t hI will tn
fiht had to Ill dCiJOImiddotd Ill hlok (()llilllh ~~(fllfl1t -llllltlJlI iIgt of 1111 lIlU(lgt of
tlw htlIi)llflll ll11dllll ~h~nlll not -uImiddoth a 01 llllrn -upv]1ority alt 1 Lad IHfn t auhl 1() 1Hlil~middot D(u---ioJ1- of campaig-ns tlld 1111 ([v a1( TIlIltllmiddotr]lilmiddot( f flf ICltIi-I 1I1~at Jla]~fd (tlit Y
Till IS FIVE IIO(fBS OF (STlr
At ~~ q]ock in thl afternoon of 11 larch l~I~X Etlr(m~
LfllnlHlff fdilof of Ihl 1111 11 (I(IfIlh WIS mlitillJ a 11-1shyminllu ~ttI(llWnl from 1hI Au rian gOlrnnllnt loJl(erning the Iwdllld pllhi1 ill 11 --10 1gt11 it (han(cllol KUIt von S(hwdl11i~~~ ollIHI(d j he dfat h knell of indellcndent Austria
c amp GSS Quart Vol
lIerr Lemlholf fled toward the Hungarian frontier Through the last five hours of Austria he had his finger on the pul~( events which were happening too fast even fol his t rained senE(p~ Ilb -tnry of those last hour-- while ha-tily writ ten is a -plen~t1 joh of rtI)(Hmiddottorial writing i-c~
Loyally Austrian and vio]pntly ~nti-Nali Lennhoff coJ-t not hl allyl hlllg hut partial lIe minec no words in hIS opinlt~tt3inc of t Iw IIit Ie) ~~ov(rnment yet he hold- hi own gOV(lIlrn~~~onJ largely p(JIihle for the d~harlc Had tile AListrian gov~Auni IlIPIit rnd it- prohlplll -quarely had it nol fumbled it opprJmiddotmiddotttua tunitie-- the (Iever and inevitahle Nazi llenetration wouldrl ~pap( have heen possible ~ On il
SIhuchniggs incapacity to meet the -itualion is the dOl ~o tI ~utlnant theme of lIerr LonnholTs book Tile bookish and patriK iIhelhalleeHor (ould not match Nazi ruthkmiddotsnc-- and miIitUlyprg
aralion with reason and love of country He trusted the Veuro Jtho khemPil who hetrayed him and was unahle Lo take the dcfJr
~tand that might have saved Aulria Yfars hefolr Ieee loo
L(nnlwlr tells tile tory of the death throc with alit drama of an inspired playwrighl an aUlhor who4c memorr I
pfouart too fre-h however to permit a (on~idlrerl dis(u~-ion T~ Iow hook d()(s have the value of trlling the -tor~ of Austria falll ll1i tIll fir~L iflll II is vivid authOritative iml)Ie and bitler t inc
r two W]S
badJAPAN IN CIIII
By T A BIssO real 17 l)ai~(lt -cv York Thf ~LltlTHlltn (urnpUlY Qf (
pro selfmiddot
T A Hion Far Eastern expert of the Foreign Pol onl) isoriatioll has ~ritt(ln the most penetrating and auther~ Chi l(onnt thaI has appeared to datc on the haCkground and ed ~tru
pha-cs of the war in China As a rc-umc of eyent and polirgt pHIlt
of the pn-t five year the book is a valuahle Contribution tot to]~ alal~tti(al study of the conflict Ir IEs-on has gather~1 O(f( wealth of facts and weldell tlwll1 mtn a sllic~ of eOl1yinc tonclusions 1hE
Japans drift toward Fasebm and China- 1loliLieal umb- 11hh lIOn idf l3is4on (on-iders the two most 111011wntolls phJS6 ~ket lontemporalY Far Ea~tern history Tins Chl11E5e nation]b ordi whi(h IH~llgtpd draw down upon (hina the wrath of Jap~lll foc 11(gt it~ root in lill ~tudcnt mOYlment gainrd monwntum with ~llrrender of the South China militarists to Chiang Kli~Sk and culminated at Sian in Ihe lnited Frollt
The author i~ obiously more at home in tiw study~ JapanesE affairs than upon the China ((11( His accounti-1 1l11tlllal JaplIH--p politicc i4 xlplllIlt and is till hl--is for)1 eOTlciusiol1 as to war guilt In his (onsidered opinion qJ Japanese militarists alone are n~ponsihl( Discredited in tti~ 1t tefllJlIl- to fa~tn Fls(ism 1I1HIll tlH people llw military e1iql~flI Jllunged Japan into a foreign War ill a dCppratp hid t ()-t Ilngthr~ llt t twir -Iipping l)()wel r~ 0
The a~t ual lory of t I~( ~yar iR of vital ill~pOllanCe ~~_ ~~l frolll a ltidulcd slttdy of the lI1eldent at Lukowchlao Tlr BIsy makes no prediet ions but gives the impression that he hold5~~
err ultilllal(~ vi(tory highly probable The calamilY of Japan~middot vietory is powerfully analysed in a chapte on the subj of Manehllria a damning verdict against NipPollesf impc ism
50
--~ Vol XVIII No 70 Book Reviews
Cn~A F~G2T Fun ia~n LIFE 11 Ii It 11 llJ TmON HGIIT
1 York hlttklt( JIOUSl McGnm-Hill
One of the firt booh pLlhi~hed 5JJ1Ce the outbreak of the Smo-Japanese War ueigned and wrilten in the light of that conflict is the work of two Far l1ltlern corrCspondcnb of the iGnited Pre~~ Frankly nolll1tClldeu to be a scholarly historical ~tudv the book is un (tremely 1l3dlhle piece written as n(gtwsshylpapermeJl would he expelted to Tite the ~t()ry of what IS going on in China The tory of the war helf i of minor importance to the jllcture of China- -trugg]e fol national unity which the author~ hae picked up b(g1nin~ with the Reolution of lBll 1hc greater part of the honh i devoted 0 the background of the pre-(gtJ1t ~itllal inn a bwlroulld through whilh Chiang Kaishybhek move a an e el-II1(Tet-II1g fh~Ull The attempt to explain rccent Chinlc hitory In tCrlll of DIll man is 110((1 a little too simple anJ a-- at hanilj ItTer pOlll ~ (Hll mi lcading
At least twice in his n~e to powCr Chiang Kai-shck ran afoul of Japanese intenbts Both timC~ he was forced to back down vith rCsultant 10s of f~ce hoI h at home and abroad lmtyin China Leing I he lat thing Japan desired a conflict was ineitabie sooner or lateI Eel1 Aia b not large enough for 10 strong llllpill- (hL1Jlg i)(lld to ~upCrior force but he only hiding his time until he wa strong enough to strike kiCk In a fe more I car he would hac been ready
TIl( Sian (Oup of De(tTllher In~(i shnc](d Japan into a
rClhlatioll thal time wa~ )et tin) shorl The uneApected display oi ChlllCsC solidarity indicated that Chinese national unity had prore~lteJ farther than the odd had Iealized while it was self-eident tb1t tlw KU()llintan-Communist settlement could onty hae an anti-Japanc-e foundat ion RCtHzinp that a strong China nlPant the end of her dream of Asiatic hegemony Japan ~tru(h while thcre wa yet lune TIl(gt war that folloed is as much a Japanec fight for life a5 It b Chinese A Japanese vicshytor means lcfluCtion of (hina 10 )ipponcsc 1assalage while def ill topple Japan frolll her -tatuf af a vmrld power
Both (l ent and pcr-onalltic- haC been vividly portrayed The lUthol- have a )idcd the pit [alb of rnYliad unpronounceshytble (hin~l nallllS I)) a -(rH ()f pi hy and killfuleharacter ~Jetcht~ 1 he result i iu~t hat the doctor ordered fol the ordmal) rcuhI who J molO than ctually inter(-ted in what l~ (gte 111 tlW he~dIll
CIlI-A FIGHTS ILCK
YCdr hef()re ~h(gt evpr -aw the (bine~e Reo Armies Agnes f)medley WltI nthu~iasti(allY r((ording lheir cXIlioils IIer very Fnthu~iasm long denied her the l)lIvilege of visiting the Chinese OVieb fly aLlraLling the attention and clo-e observation of the hince Central Government In 1136 however she entered
~he Communi-l di~tricts in the -orthwest where she has l emil-inerl moltt of the time ~in((gt At the oUlhreak of the Jlre~ent Sino-Japanese conflicti Ii~s Smedley in r~ite of an jniur~d ~pine ac(ompanicd lho
1 ~Ighth Route Army mto Sham1 Provlnce where she shared thef ardshipamp and adventurcamp of the ort guerrilla campaign against f
the Japanese Constantly on the move suffering from exhausshytion and her injury she wrote when and where she could posting her dispatches piece by piece Thus her RtOJy grew as it is here published with little more than neee-sary ~tructural editing
(ilina Piohls lIark is a vivid first-hand arrountof the early days of the North China War to the bepinninp of 1938 Of little military value the real worth of the book hes in its raphic picture of the relations between the peasants and the Eighth Route Army On thal relationship hingc much of the future development of the Chine~e nation
Miss Smedley is a personal friend of Chu Teh Mao Tseshytung Chou ~n-lai und all the other famous leaders of Chinese Communism Her book contains many true life portraits of these men But Miss Smedley unconsciouoly jJaints someone else as the mo~t interesting personality in the book herself Bitter atheistic and belligerent she is leaving her mark on the history of China the new China which she does not expect to live long enough to sec One may disabrree with her social anLl political philoltophy but never with her ~incerity A most unu~ual book
AND SO TO WAil By IIUBEltT HEIUtINl
17~ Imgp1- Npw JIavIL Yie (lrnvlTSlty Pr(gtllt
Professor Raymond J Sontag of Princeton reviewing this book for the Ialurduu Rcnt(U ()f 1Ierafure wrote that Dr Tanshysilltj book took ten year~ to write 1lr Herrings apparently as many days yet both reached the bame conclusion From 1914 to 1017 the rulers of America betrayed the interests and lhe wishes of the AmeJic3n people
Vheleas DI Tansill (on fines him~elr to the background of our entrance into the Great Yar IVlr Herring uses the Vorld Var merely as a stepping stone to present conditions His thesis obviously and frankly partIsan holds collectie security to he a dangerous futility and strict neutrality the only way to kecp out of quarrels which we can neither understand nor solve He fears that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull are about to repeat the mistake of Wilson and Lansing Neutrality as dislingubhed from isolation is more likely
to help the country and the world than participation in future wars Mr Herring wishes the lnited States to keep out of European and Asiatic wars in which essential interests are not involved and to steer clear of a11iances cooked up by nations intent upon prEselving the status quo against Hhave not counshytries
Since 191) the nation has resisted constantly increasing pressure to join ageneies whose ideals have been distorted into attempts to enforce the Versailles Treaty In spile of repeated refusals to become involved in foreign entaIlgiements the counshytry is still confronted with persistent pressure This hook is the CQfe for the other side briefly but convincingly presented Vhethel the reader agree with the luthol 01 not he will find these pages provocatlsc I
AMERICA GOES O WAR
By CHAm cs (AI LAN TANsl(1
no page Bololl Litlle 13rown amp Company
After ten years of exhaustive resbareh during which he had access to sources hardly touched br previous historians Dr
51
Tan~ill hae produred what h generally aedaimecl aR thc outshyblanding -1 udy of the hwkground of Amenca entry into the Vorld Var III~ ma(rid indude- the Bryan manuscripts the paper~ pf ilon [out ()lonf1 flowe Iaming and Knox as wpJl as tIl(gt Admiralty ar[hin- of ((middotrmany and the files of tilgtjl (ornmiUl( whih 1m v tiJatpci war p)litltrin~~
Dr Tanill di agITl ith t he popularly held opinion of Bryan 1lIlIl fOUl tnd olllPl -1 all n1l1l of I he war J)lrifJd Ill oft1l rid]( ukd liliam Jenning-- Bryan wilt) ni~lHd hj- portfolio - -I[rllary of Stalt 111 protl1 aglin t AlllPlict-shy(our h hl- 1111 HI [111 Ihl1 hld 11 011 taklll Bryan tlhi( flu I nitfmiddotd Stati ~otllcl hm( 1H11l parrd tl1( -tcrificp I)f 1II 7- 1 (1111 I I IJ llil 11 kti 11- of II( PII(I tr HOIl--f and Jtn-ilW 111) Imiddot d Ill flt~ld(nl mIn war
Hnli-( I~ trtwuarv Jllfifd wilile LanltlI1g j tarnl h a jdorillld 1 t )rl~I )1 1 twr higt JHhlt ( III alJt)( hb (middotoll-(lerWl
Yili 1)1 TIHll 11[ 1Jll-i fill ()l1w of Ian ll)middot l(tion h ~f[gt- n() ~()Ild in YiJr)l IlnllW arhlII 01 dll the foni~n dlplomat-- ill a_~hlll~iJll fall any tOf) l1l (ount BernltlnrJf appfal 111 tilt 1l1f faY(Jraht light of all
(haptel- lin nHrilan track ith tht Allic-- (oTl1pletl with ml- rmiddot~ of tlli-J( )ll a (()lllprthlllltingt yipw of thp ponomie pit tun lI1I1(II1h tlu auth()r tI(ltgt not CO]lt11r ith thl llfort-shyof 111f ~lt~f COllllllittll 11) ]llmt that Big Hu-lTlC-- drol tlIP nat 1011 IntIJ 11 11) protI It l1l0JJntlu ltl(--tll1ent- It IS
o---ildl Iw ldmu I hal 11011 npondcrl 111 part t 0 prp~-urcgt Lut Ilw]p 1- Ill Hjt Ilt of 11 Tlw jI)-pa)C Iork whilp it dops lll dll)(l~t IIf 111111- QU1 ~Wll i all indipPIlltahll guid( 10 till --Iudy of (lllr (nl]alWI inlf) war wh11h will hplnnw --tancialu
piI)P fill 111tllY -(Ir 1)1 jl11L It (llll 11] (If or tlf AIlHlIlln fItstory and Dran
rtf illt (~rddlilt ~(horl Ilf Jlllri(an (111 (I-ity a hington r )C hl I)(ll 1 1 (((lInif(rl authorit- on Ameri(an diplomatic i l~jOI for mII1 (lb For ttll ~lar- lw Va arivi-or tn tIll (li1rllltn of t IH -lllat( F()ri~n Itratiol1s Cmn111ittee for whom irmiddot Jlll Iht IfjIlrt 011 o11d ar npoJl---ihility fie la letshy~llf d III hi fivld 11 John Ifnplilh and ill ~eCral GCrman unishy 11-1111
(Tlo T ()liIL
1 I ~ - (I ~ York FUflf amp Hilllhlft InC
H(-np II(-n lir t nmC1 -in([gt hi monumental Anthonll 1flf( h In -rikinl~ (ontra1 to hie (arlir and Jnore ICnglhy vor hain~ lt)((r till -tlJll ba-icmiddot atlrilmle of eardul hbshylcJri( al nialth In I(ari of Ihe broad eer shifting arena of 1111(1 hiIl)I of I I) (in1 aris (onclntratldin both timl and pLI -llh (olJ)paratlf 1OIl()rny of chara(terizalioll all
f 1lIlltllrly happilY (tlldinld onl to quantity YOlllhful (ojOl1t] FlanLIIII (omrnandpr of a [ilion ctdry
rnlrnfn ()n ouJJ()-t duly ~~lIardlllg the pa--(- tiJ)(JUgh thtmiddot irshyjllllt Ulfllllltino tltill hi nlfllnt in ih heauliful and ]lPHpfIlJ
-t 11 illll InflllwJIlr pnwl t illal ing 0(1 all ulIpltttnt duty_ In a nrlrJI ltiddlll dlrmiddotv 1 10(ly -oul IIPI n I~(nt hwoman tp hratv Wit h Iwr flaughttJ vait ing for word fro III her husband a maj(~r In the (onfcrlr-ratp Irvi((
Franklin in 10(1 With IHl cannol hring himltClf to tile 1a-1 Ifon 11IlO Ihal of trmiddotliin) 1111 t hat her hushand is dead II is t hI frll~1 rt1 iOIl I hat paCP- the romm(e of the story against a
52
C amp GSS Quart Vo-background of impending conflict and the futility of war Me Rt while the young otTIcer does his best to lighten the burden the refugees f 1
Inlo the peaceful imlation war flnaly comes in the ear~ ~ win1ltT of IHGj when a Conferlelate force tries to break throu ~j 111(1 pas~(s In a vividly recreated battle sequence Frankllnl~ rpginwllt is wre(ked in a rather u-elcfs engajZement which enl 1 with a (onfcclcmtfgt c1efeat at loes hardly worth the pri~ -land ThlreaftCf the war move on leaving a badly wounded offiri 1stul IO(ked with hi reful~ee ill the owhound valley Through jPre long white winLer the tangled ~kein is straightened -iintE
The 1I0cl carefully and colorfully written is good readiu of t but not as profound a it i-- daimed to he An interesting faew In its 11)efJalttion is 1 be hi--Iori(al research hehind it Accordi~ ~und to Mr Allen mot of the Laic is true the story having bee Ctan pi((pd together at fir-t hand often from the lip~ of those wk poli participated in the events turt
Irol pos
TilE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON phe thrf
By MAH(l 111 sod
Ii pawgt with Ilnlf mdfx 8 hlb1o~raphy New York Bohh~Mcrr had life terr
The plf(t inn of Marquis Janll xcellent life of Old Hid des ory as the Pulilzer Prize winning biography for 1938 wasr -urprbe to those who havC read the- two volumes issued fo of t yean) apart The preent edilion combining both volumest par
one should he an imperative item in everV lihrary -1r Jam~( ha has amply earned his laurels with a truly ~onumental work - will life hitory that lanrls head and shoulders above the eonsid rna able ilia of exeellent writing that has already appeared abo pro
Andrew Jack--on
In The lionler ioploill published in 1933 11 James cam the story of jackson from the early pioneer days before t Rfvolution through his rise to prominencc in Tennessee to t laurels of New Orleans and the Florida controversy JackltI who has been too prominently portrayed as an uncouth front democrat Was here shown as he really was - a striking a impubive peronality but for all his nrc a gentleman and conserva1jve who knew the niceties of society and who stl)
~u(for order and moderation in goern1l1ellt to
Thelcccntly isltmiddotmcd sClond volume Portrait of a Presider -M(l has nol let thc earlier work down 711 James has not OIL ~iail uotained but has hci[htencltl the piteh as capturing the rn~ bar of Jacksons retirement from public life in 1821 he revie ~ t (alPpr in the llationallJolitical arena desrrihing and ana 00
til ad ions allli the forees with whieh Andrew Jackson e j an era in American history t~rJ
](Pll1arkable a a life story thp wOIk is equally strikingl~~hE a 1Jic(c of hi~tory Not content wit h revealing a mnn tlJiit lC
hi()glaphy l(~rral(lS an r)(wh coloringann emjrhingthat perioc ~j ~i l
With II t11( ltIftacl Ihal hils out t11( hare bones Winch perl13~U1 h not -U)prising sin(( AndrCw Jackson and his era are inSeuro) TU1 arable i rc
A magnifiepnt and pain--taldnp study of a greal man J
Ti Lfe 01 Andrew Jackson sets a new mark of biographical lence The publishers have recognizer its worth with an a tively constructed volume
IVOliVIiNO70
~f~OOSVELT ~ SllDY IN FORTUNE AND IOW~R By E~f1L LUDWIG
[Translated from the German by MauricE Samucll
350 pages New York The Viking Prp-~
Emil Ludwig renowned biographer of Napoleon Bismarck ) and Goethe has applied his psychological technique to the
study of a world figure at the height of his actIvity His life of President Roosevelt studded with typical Ludwi( hrilliance is interesting reading but will never rank as a definite life history of the present American Executive
In the first place Ludwig is cheerfully and frankly nowed under by the celebrated Rooevelt charm Vhat is more imporshytant he has a profound ignorance of American history and politics without vhl(h no wril cr can produce an adequate picshyture of our public life At the same time the author freedom from the prejudices of our lIfe and environment is in a lmiqup position to make some candid and revealing- comparisons
Arranged in three sections labelled Fortune lTctamorshyphosis and Power the book presents a theme of tramjUon through sutTering Young FrankEn D Rooseuroyclt was a clever ~ocially con~cious aristocrat so favored by fortune that he never had to develop his latent talents Struck down in the prime of life he fought a grim otruggle for health and cmcrjed with the temper and the de~ire to champion tilamp underprivileged He deserted his class to help those who did not have his advantages
Perhaps the be~t pa~-a~c 1I1 the book is Ludwigs de~(ription of the atmophere of the Executive oflices There is also a comshy-parison between the first fioYe months of Roosevelt and Hitler that is excellent The sugar-coated hero worAhip of this book inll handicap its popularity while many minor errors of fact~ mar Jts histoncal value Approach lhis biography with the proper suspicion and you may find it interesting if not authentic
TARNISHED WAIUUO)
Bi gt1JoH JACS R JACOHlt
Xcv York T)Hmiddot Mlltmll1an Company
Several years ago Gamaliel Bradford gaIned considerable succe~ltlnd c- ahli-hcd a hIOgraphical prccedent with hIS crusade fa cleanse some of the stain from historys accepted villall1- )Iajor Jacobs follows the trail hlazed by Danoyer Souls bul fails to achieve equal result~ in this hiography of ilajor General
~ames Wilkinson The fault however lies neither WIth thei ~uthor nor his effort Vhitewashing James Vilkinson 1- iiimply ~oo big a job
~ James Vilkinson commanding general of the United States r frmy and virtual ruler of the Mississippi frontier was one of )the 1featesl (harlatanl in American hblory For thirty ycar~
1C utilized his high posts in the interests of Spain whose highly f3id ~llyhe was Not ahove selling out either side whenever it fUited hIS pocketbook he covered his trackh so well thal a undred years paRSed before the full measure of his villainy was revealed
From the beginning of hi military and political career durshyl1~g the Hevolution he disIJayed the Tlpr~li~r talpnts whieh ~t0ught h~m to the top Charmmg and indispensable when ~ ork was lIght he always managed to he conveniently elsewhere
t Book Reviews
when d~nger thre~ten~d His sponsJrs and friends exe~PlifY the familiar axiom of birds of a feafher - Benediet Arnold Charles Gates St Clair sponsors whom he promptly betrayed when it behooved him I
Wilkin~on participated in every m ajOl conspiracy of early lAmellcan hIstory from the Conway Cabal to the Burr Conshy
spiracy In each one he escaped puni~hmenl by betrayal at the propel time It took the War of 1812 to show his true ability or Jack of it yet even then he talked his way out of his just deserts
lvJajor Jacobs has written a careful but unconvincing story nf Vilkinson Unable in Lhe interests of truth to justify his suhject he was apparently reluctant to throw him to the wolves The reultant middle-of-the-road study leaves Wilkinson a colorless as well as an unprepossessirtg rogue Iiajor Jacobs self-appointe(l lask was just too heavy The tarmsh on Wilkinshy~()nR name i too deep and too tough to be removed
JA~IES MAlliSON BIfILIJEJ
By ABBOTT E SUTH
Nfw York Wilson-Eriellton
In a new estimate of a memorable career to quote Its subtitle a highly significant impression is here created of the fourth President of the Pnited Slates James ~Tadison has sufshyfered from the one phase of his life for which Ihe was not fitted but his faults as a war lime Prebident arc herein belittled in the lIght of earlier and more enduring work As a master builder of the Constitution l1adhmn emerges ~tS a striking and colorful figure
Two men are largely responsible for the ratification of the Constitution James Madison and Alexander Hamilton teamed to build the compromise framework of our fundamental Jaw performed yeoman work in the ratification struggle through the pages of the classic Federalist then parted company on the interpretation of the new law An important phase of this book lS a clear analysis of that collaboration and split
Hamiltons attempt to make the Constitution do what he wanted was based upon a policy designed to oerthrow the power of the agricultural South lIadison was a southerner shya Virg-inia planter and landed proprietor and a representative of the threatened class He saw the issue and broke with Hamilshyton to join forces with Jefferson for states rights and ~grarianism
Ultimately he failed but his earlier work endured A scholal a man of infegl1ity and a statesman Madison WlS small only in physical stature The biograI1her has done a service to American hi~tory by retouching the picture of the fleeing Presishydent of 1814 to its true color as a character of real significance and life
GEOIWE MASO CONSTITUTIONALIST
By IImmiddot]N lIlI
100 pag(gts bull Cambridgp IIarvlrd University Press
Of ~t11 that -elellld group who wrangled their way through the tilling Philadelphia summer of 1787 to end up with the document known as lhe Constitution of the United States George Mason has been the most neglected In a century and
I
53
~
iook Revieus c amp GSS Quart~
a half only two hioJrraphirs of 1 ho ir~inian have beCll written of which thi- j- tlle --colld The iir-t lpppared fifty years ago
Ceorgl )IaltOIj wa all tlllu-ual man with a curious mixture of abilitiC- and limitation Onr of tIllt fio(-t mind~ of his gen~ eration )Ta--(Hl It a P()fllPOllf lIIlu-( who fiplejpd politirs and Jmb1i( lifl ~Tft ill IhI cOlllln of hh parohlal work he 1gt
capable of thinkin on a natIOnal -eall Ill( hurly-burly of Itlilaingt fJtll)(i [nad hun ill ~middot(t no (Jun(1 or (ornmitt(l h~Hl a ]HlH I l1ll1d
lI-()Il ]Hditi(middottl llllity WIgt ((lIdifltd to th in~illia
(()TlfntHJl (If 171~ and t 1)( lhllad(middotlphia (Oll PillIon of 1hj
yr 111- 0)1 III lrp Jflllhlic CUTlld LlImiddot IIp wa Olll of the fir to achIJlilr a (CJlltlllClltal (om~f( dthllUh he IIfucif
If) -it III If nrl II( rrJ( till illlllla 1111 of Highb which hflpfd infllllnl(Il(Jt Illll IJIlI Iklhrllilll1 (If Tlldf]lcllIlllllf hut ll1l rcoltll])lll tlflllht fJf iU1llpl The irginia Stal( (011shy
middottJutiOIl a rr1f~j1 of II Llld Wl Ill 1(Jrk a were th( fir-t ten anHllfirlllll I) ILl Fjd(rl (OIl-I1)l
rAftfr 1lllplflL flaml Ill (OIl tltuI1()11 ra~f)n oppo-nj il~
rat liital iO[l ld1tl- lIJ)(lll 1iIHll1l1-o that alpr (PCrlP1W( prnnd
rJlht bull a Il-uJl I)f lll~ nilj(Ilj()n~ l1H lil~t amlIHlmenh Wlle
1l1cgt()i))(I)lfll ]111r tll 1ll of ~blr uJtill1atpl~ boft oul hi- Hrl in tlH In 1111
J1~ lilil lIfl of bl)ll I lot tOI) lOll i l(luratC and 1I IOIl--tnwil 11 ~1H prcc1l1- a mall 110( contributions to (Ill lltllnnllI 11middot1 IItrll ln(llIl~
ThE lndll li) IlllII]W I)t(jlratioll of Hlght~ Dp(aration i j ndlplndl1l1 ] 1middot]middot Ilf (()Ilfrdpral ion and the COIllttitution fir -1 1gt a lll~rh plll t in IllCrwan hitory Yet ~uch are the i_rIIlI (If fIII1I 1111t IIJ~l -hlIJl1t1l I)f (OJ1Jw(tilul the only llltll III 1111 Ii ~IrlltI UII IIJPIJ all four fundamental dOluments Ilf 1JlI)Idll ltlIlJldi) hh h((11 WU lligh forgottrn Ir 1IJlrdllllll hlllllp]l (middotlil 111~middot n(ll(-o this influlntial and 1 11 l f()l1)lJ tlr Lt1 hi r from a (pnt ury of unlllPritpd ()h~(llril y
-hrl1lt1l ~ Iji ~ln111Jll~ CI( humhlpound (l1cl]gh 10 ~athJy any -lII~ I III 11)) n IIIl 1 colonial farm Ill earned hi parly li- 1Ilg alt a hnernaL(-r In an atC notoriou~ for its inlellectual lJ((rl y hc (middotdUf all d III 1l1-11f tnd J)(amp ill onlpr a ~ll((c-ful
tormiddotI(f)r -lll I~ Dr iuhlhiwr and lawyer Then he turned 10 Idlhli( dfail-- ITlI] --Iner fl)n~piLu)wly a~ a member of the (fllo[)jd 1ldmiddotlalIJn on 111f hidw- (our or (onnC(ticul and a- IntlItl of Yth (ollmiddotr
1 till onllmt1 of Ill I(olution 1oler Sherman went inl (j I hr (ollt inc1l1 al (onrl c [or Ill dural ion or I he war when Iw-tl ()fl thC (OtllITJltiPP- that drnflerl the Decmiddotlaration of Righh and o[ illdrp(IHl(IW( alld h Art iflls of (on[pderal ion Afl pr
I hi wn )1 rl 1I11l(r Iii (Ol1lH(II(llt ofli(middote- 10 whilh va addd I ill Ill) flf blll I)f W lfanll
1 h(1 Yltr 17x7 found the dour Puritan in the ConstItutional (nnwnfinn whprp hi-o ll1ocl(ralJOIl and (Oillmon -CI1(l -av(d mon~ than (1I11 ]Hatpd -l~ifln IIaving -igned the Constitution -)hfrrnan rOlllh for it latifialOn and then rcpresenctd his I all in th Ilou of l(epregt(ntatics and later in the Senate
II1r Boanlmans generally [ellent life of his iIIustriol ancestor may be forgiven a ecrtalJ1 awe in the presenleuro of th f1i
selfrighteous old statpgtrnan It is a reacbble contribution ~ fil
RevoluflCHlary history 11It11 11~lUtS a dp-op]ing but hither( m Tlpglp(cd figulP 10
tl
tto
LAlaJI ON TIlE lARCH
lhl ~Ii ~v
One of the most amazing pllPnonwna of (ontemporar ~1 Ameri(a h been I he rioe of II C I lL an I the nulting eh~ j~~ 111 the ranli~ of lahor 1uct wilen lahor lppeared to be comir 2 jI I I I I I can1I1to lb OWI1 1e llttllI1SS gfnclai(( J)Y t 1at-p It las co or ~h
the viewjloint of all ohvers he they C I 0 h~mpalhize fui A F of L adherent - or perplccd by1 andCr~ who catch 11 l full sound and fury of batLie folll boil ide
Mr Levin~)ll has kepI hi~ head in till full ~tnngtlJ ofl~ --torrn An open parll-an of tIl( C 1 0 Iw has written admirahly f(lItraiIlPd and (arfflll ~tory of lllllt lahor hi-o Anyone who rarr j n lrad will Ifarn Illlwh frum hi olrrant nr I balul(ed ddene of Ihe I l O t
First prcmh-e of the author IS that tIl( C I O i moJ sinned again~t than ~innin AI any rale it if hanllv the rer ~ lutionaly ogre its cnCllllf- ha( ]laill(ci it The mo~(n1(nth~~hu ~pommred some pntty rougil ~lllIT lmt Anwrican labor L~ht fought more destrwliPI in Ihl past with Ies results 1[
John L Lewis i- adequattgtIy dtfpl1tied against the ell of Communbm and 1~) It) l]pgtidlll ial a~piraljOlrs 1(lw iicvCs in capitalbm balanced h~- a strong labor front he knoT- hr there an leds in hi-o unions but H(- no more rCa~on to smct Co them out than to impo~e political qualincations for union me) to lwrship An(llast Jy J r I ej~ cln(~ not larpound to be PrC~ident i ~h not now anyway lH
Lnhor on flie l110rrll I~ a Rohel lHlll of Callable writing Ar i on( in1eCsted in the 111)01 Il1m(llllnt a fipld army oflkct~e1 arc plone to dis(~al(l wl1 plntit in tlw hoole So 111 Lbu C I 0 IJ~
+tUlTilE IOLlTl(() l~)middotl~ ~I
~( York llarlonrl HHP amp (I)
lJatthew Jo-ephson is nne of t 11( outstanding 8 writers in the Pniled Rlates lorla a fa(1 whhh should ()Vrooktd ill r(aclil1~ thi- nllllllt At thl ~atl1e time I earlful historian and a colorful fo(c-ful aut hoI with a linack 11 ~~ story telling Vbatpll his -olial thcorils and 11( us(s tl
hook Llt a vehicle for hi- philo npliy 01r 10(l1hon has IT i ten one of the brst i((Ollllt-o of our politieal hi~tory flnm~ Civil Val to the Bryan ](middotolt ~I
A few ymr a~ ~1r ]ocplon puhlihed The EM 1 Harol ~a -lory of the ri-l~ of I ~i~ JUSil(SS a~HI it~ masters ali ~ 1865 J hf SllfCC-Ss of thrs( lmlZll) imamwl pIrates was t J 011(gt Hide of a particularly ltonlid period in American histo~ lt-~ The Politicos completes the picture of the American social see and becomes a companion vork to The Robl1er HarOlls Do are excellent reading
Book Review8
The Politicos were the politicians - the professional key _ meo of American politics ho united with the unscrupulous
lt financiers io get a strangle holJ On the wealth and the governshy-ment of the reunited states They were a thoroughly unSltlYory lot and 111Joseph~oll ~pares nothing in painting them so At ~thesame time he has little u~c for the men who fought them for ~to him the reformers were small men who didnt really mean lV hat tlHY did ami -aid
All til( pr(~id(nts from Johnson through Garfield suITer at I middothllt hands Alhur he calls the most effective President since
1
I lLmcoin hut he ha- an unflattering opinion of Cleveland TIll l~tory of the ri~( of the Popuiibt movement occupies a large
portion of t Ill hook and b a notable study of (lass struggle Except for an Incon igttent habit of setting up irrevocable laws middotand then (1 ilicizing his subjects for reacting to those very laws hlS hook i~ an Ifedin addition to a ncglc(tcu period of our hIstory
THE BI( FOUR
By OSrAH LE IS
-cw York Alfred A Knopf
In the decade before the liil War young Theodore D JUd3h made such a nui~ancC of himself talkmg mcessantly about
-~ nmln(ontirltolal railroad that hiraliforrlia aS50elarh thought llIm s1ifhtly balmy lIis pcrsuasiv(1PSS was not lost ron fo~r
~a(ramento shopkeeper however WIth the result that Judah s ~~ lrfltlm became a renlity and the Sacramento quartet became I the most powerful financial and political figures on lh~ Pacific fOJL The slory of the rise of iIark Hopkins Charles Crocker [olis Huntington Lcbnl Stanford and the railroad empire _I l~ey built b the burden of one of the most absorbing books of
tLc ~umme sea~on Judah died hefore hi ision had come true and therefore
h o received any of hi~ deserved credit The four unemotlOnal - but eminently practieal merchants g-oL all of that Not that
~ f~(y didnt dc-erve a lionmiddots share for they did build the railroad brucomint inlreJible ob~tacles to do it The ~tory of that
hUllJing and the ~rreat monopoly into which it grew makes i1elilbtfuI lladillgI Four more different peronalities would be hard Lo find
lrhere vas Crocker j he florid man of action who drove hipgt jvork crew through the mountains and then promptly lost
IJnterest in the completed task Leland Stanford was the lstuffed lthirl of the team the front for the railroad and its
I
tl
I
~tlj01
manipulations as Governor of Cahfoll1ia President of ihe Censhytral Pacific and United States Senator
Quiet frugal Mark Hopkins had little use for wealth and never knew how to spend his money but as Tleasurer of the fenLral Puifk he nurRed it s lender funds into great fortunes for himself and hb a~sociates Brains of the four belonged to old Colh~ IIuntinglon tI~e shr(gtwd and cynical manipulator with no morc sOlll Ihan it shaNe
1r LCwis gild no lilies for hi~ ~ubject~ They were often di~hontsl and hl plainly saY1 ~O hUl he gives Lhe imprCssion of a blwahing- admira1 ion for the ofd fellows especially Huntington He ha~ w]ititn an interesting and colorful boole
READING COURSE FOR OFFICtRS
War Department Bulletin 1928
Lbt of S(kclpd lOoltlt relating to hictorieal llohtical (conomIC and mlhLlry gtubjetllt published for t11(gt informltion of tl-je ervice
This h1t lB divujpd into l(ction corrrlponding to thpoundgt several periods of an ompr lrVIIl RtmaillHl -P( liongt will appfar in future editions of the Quart(gtrly (For FlrlllNltHl e( tw Tune 1938 Quarterly page lt2_1
SECOND PERIOD (AVERAGE FIVE YEARSI
(f~T(rtVAI HETWETN COJANY mnnms oenSE ND ADVANCED laquo(jRSE)
~poIlWN4 MAIS OJ WAlt WrIJ NOTES IIY GENBHAL BUR~OJ) 1 vol ((i(gtorgfdAguilar)
BATTLE STUOJeS AN( IeT AND MOlImN BATTLE 1 vol (Charles T TJ Ardant du Pieq TranslatlOll by Col John M Greely and Mal RC Cotton)
llLtl(AN GOEtNMENT AND POIITICS 1 yol ((hark A Belrd PltTY HATTImiddotS OF Tim 1AnmoN ERA I vol (Claude G Bowcrsi A HISTORY OP TlIJ~ GR~AT WAIt 4 vols (John Buchan) HISTOltJ OF THE UNITED STATES 5 vols (Edward Channing) ALEXANDElt ~ vols (Theodorf A Dodg(j CSR 1 vol (Theodore A Dodge I GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 1 vol (TllPodore A Dodge) HNNIHAJ Z vol (Twodor(gt A Dod~() TilE CRITICAL Pmnou Or AMEHlCAN Hl~TOtY 1783-179 1 vol (John
Fiske)A (YILE or ADI LFTf1~t 18Gl-1 SO) l yolo (Worthington C Ford) )lOL80N TlIl FIRST 2 vol (August FOllrnipr Tramlated by Annie
KAdltlms) A SnORT JIJSTOl~Y or TliE ENGLISH PLOPLl~ 1 vol (fohn R Gr(en) TENTYFIVb YEARS lR1l2-WI6 ~ yollt5 ISir r~dward Grey) 1111 OPlmATIOKS OJ VAR 1 01 Sir Edward B Hamley THE VIltGINIA CAoIIAIGN QIo 61 and 65 1 vol (Andrew A HumphnYs) HISTOR) OF F1UNCE 3 vols (George V Kltchenl A GREATER THAN NAPOLgON 1 yol (Balil H LlddC1I Hart GI~OIWE WARHlNGTON 2 vols (Henry C Lodge) LH~ OF ANDREW JCKSON 3 vols (Jam(ls Parton) LIFE AND TlIES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 2 vols (James Parton) HISTORY OF THE A)nmICAN FRONTIER 1763-1R93_ 1 vol IFrederic L
Paxton) bull FINAl REPORT OF G[JN[~IlAJ 1 J PFUHIIN 1 voJ I Gen 1 r PerFllllng)
(War Dept) Fum PRIVATE TO FlEtI) MARSHAL (Sir WIlhlm Roh(rtson ~IEIOIRS OF GENERAl WILLIA1 T SIT1~TtMAN_ ~ vols (William T Sherman) TilE WAR WITH MFWo 2 vol lTuHn II Smithl THE MILITAln POLICY OF Til UNITj) STATES 1 01 IEmory Upton)
(War Dept) THE PIIILIPIINES PAST AND PHESENT 2 vblfl (Oflln C or((stltgtri FnrmCBlCK THE GTmAT t vol (Nonvood Yonng)
55
-VoLest We Forget TIlE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE WORLD WAll
On 11 ~l)ycmlJlr 1~j~~ Wf commemorate the 20th anllil-Ial~ of Uw Yolld ar Armi-1ice which ended tll( ffJ(at(-t war I hat tlll world ]wd (11 bullillH-(d llar-hal FOlh t(lpl_T~I11 lnl1()tlllllllg it nad a- [0110--
fIJ-llJtH will h( -topped on tIlt PlltlI frollt
1Hjlllllinpmiddot at 11 )O AilI Novlmlwl 11th (Fl(lllh linw) Iht dJ) d 11 IHJi) 111] )J go l)f ond tIl lIllI J (I J1d l
that hl)lll tlltha da1f until further order
VIIl oIr b dlllalvd tiHJP VIll only ~oon()() mpoundll III thp lIltl d Stallgt rrn~middot Two-thild- of 1Jw-p (1( nJ~ushy
ar and (1I1t-fillld dl(Jft (wtlthnltfl who had WllI (dled to FClll-ral --fI)II 1)) d1l1 tloliV til( I(middotiltll jHlnllr Illi nnr had ()j) hand IlIarly fj()fl()()() ~prl1wfi(ld nnec TlH lI P of maeillllp ~Ulh Illl a larg-l -caie i- a dpliopn1lllt of the o1ld V1L III the AnwrJcUI 1my thl diOtIll ill 1~112
wa only fOllr mlchilH gun llll rL)inlfllt 1rhrll War Wa- c1(ld)(d Ilerl Lc llll~ li)ht ~lrlilllr1 -l1flkifnt to eqUIp an arm of )t)fl()(IO nWll Tank t had llollt Vp had lG t I J JI 11 I I 1 PllIW () t hit h 1 tJ t I JId t oJojptl and tIll Il llll t V 11h dt Clllt
rllttl lhl tl f1llti11i Ill l(Iliar 1111 had IHPll illshy
I n to 1 1111 Illllt It-- ()llgillal -11 FOllr million nWll
(Itd In till rn1 l)f Inch 208L1H reached Fralltl To 11111 If tlllI nf 11li numJer saw activl criccgt at the irulll Ill t I tJlJf)JJ otliCtr Dr nnf pjJjllt for lach 20 lHtlL 1(l11~ -1) dii jnn- pfl -gt(nl 10 FranCP pllh divi ~lnn lll11j lll) q1 about 1000 UIliCllS and 27000 men Of 111 llllmiHr J (Inj jltl1t ill lclil comhat lrdll III St hhll alolll ~)~)o()nn AmLrictll W(1( llIgagrd the artillery llJ(d 0(1 J (lon(Hjn hl III four hOllr -t1H mn t ltCnw
(11 illlY (l)lllI111 I allOn I Lconitd ill hblulY The lllallufa~shy1111 01 Ij~ l~ lpCdlhd tlw Anwrictll Enfield rifle wa~
d(~WIImiddotd dIll pHI lIt 1l(lt1JtIOll -0 that the tolal plodllcshy11fll 01 hnllt 1 Jil ~ til 1I1h - hlti lllli1ld OPI ~JO()()n() hy thl tl1W t lw Alnll~l Jtl 1 -wllpd Tiw Brownillg automatIc Ill ld lill J~nl Ill))) IlJn Illl( Villi p)1 dtmiddotvIlopfd during tlw al lut lilt) jlltlltlt productioll and lh(d ill largl
Illlm)r in tIll t]1d iJatt] )Il Frallll Illi art illll ~h(Jlt We 1gt -ld 11 tl IfWlllll jlIn- fill trailllllg H1lpOP and I IJulJJlinJ llll fll1(1- 111 Fral1cL with artiller Innformin)Z to lll FJ (IHh IHI IJH J~h 1lndard (alillll- III I nund nllmshy
)II t had ill lrallll ~)(I) PI(l(S of ariill of wbich Jltll~ iOO ( lrlIt1 III An1trilltI
TIl PIOdIIlIJlIl III fIJI i~-(ylllld(J Irlilllr ttlgIII ll
lrHfllI chlj f)JltnlJ1JtHJIl In aviation T~w tf)ta l11shy
(JiIII1 111 I ht All ~I j(( Illtlca-pd from 1200 at tht outshy
hnak Ill tIll tr If I w nrlv 200000 a1 it (ondllioll
AmlmiddottlllI air -IJlIadrlJlh pJald important rl)ll~ at (hallallshyThl n -1 lilJi alld till TlusHAIVOIlIH 11111 hrl)tlJ~hl
dIIWl III fllll)d 7-)) lIHn1YmiddotpluII whill UtltIII1J~ a 10 of (In i ~J 7
At thf~ tnd of t hp war Amlricall productIoII of -mollteshy1( plfhl n 1 pll 1111 glfa (l han hI Fnllh and Bnl jh PllHilld illl1 rl)millmd While the plolt1ud 1011 Jf high 1p1o hI wa III 1)11 (Ill 1~1tdtl 1hall (Jlat Britain and )JPJriy dOlbll thlt of Franct
Anllnla lun h~ well proud of it~ Arrny The achielt ~ melll- of the AEF in France have been vcrS briefly state ~l iJy elltral PCl4hing- as folloW-i 1
Blwen Seplember 26th and November 11th tWenlj i t vo American awl -ix French divisions with an appronl
~~~~ ~~~ll~~II~~t1~t~l~(~~)~(~~~ ~~~~O~l ~~~~r~~X~~d~ 1 ~agld amI ltleehdvcly beaten forty-three different Gerrna i1l
diviion with an etimated fighting strength of 470O~ Of the twellty-two American divisions four had at difTere~ 1
times during this period been ill action on fronts other thi 4 ollr fHVJl j
The enemy uITered an estimated loss of over lOOOj ca ualtic- in thi-gt battle and the Fir-gtt Army about 117O(~1
Jhf lotll strength of thc Firt Army including 1350 j
French troops reehe(~ 101IOOO men It captured 26N1 HISoner- H71 canllon 000 machme gun- and large qww f tics of material
TIl( transportation and supply of divisions to mr1 from our front during this battle was a gigantic ta~k Thefq Were tweHtY~-1ix Amcliean amI seven French divisions ~rl side huntiredK of thousands of corps and army troops mm-_ ill and 0111 of t lit Amlrican ZOIlC A total of 173000 rn)_ Were evacuated to the real and more than 100000 re menl were recevi12d
It need hardly be related that Our cntry into t gave the Allie Ihe preponderance of force itally n to outweigh the tremendous increase in the strength Germans on the Western Front due to the collapse of RUi and the cOllsequent rclea~e of German divisions employ- against her From the military point of vicv we began aid the Allies parly in lUI8 when our divisions with iUll CiCllt training tu talc an active part in battle were senl 1 I h( inact ive front to relieve French divisions in order tf4i I hey might be ed where needed in the fighting line 1
The as1J1-tallce we gave the Allies in combat begall May with ilw tlcee~sful attack of one of our divisions t (anlignY Til wa followed early in June by the enlrs into battle of the two divisions that slopped the Germ advance 011 Paris ncar Chalrilu-Thierry and by thrcQ Otf)~ [hal were put in [he defensiw line In July two Amen clivIHiol1-) wit h OIl 1IUlllccan division formed the ~PCarh)i of the LIHII11)attaek against the Chateau-Thierry mlient which nine of our division~ participated There was a to of approximalely 300000 American troop engaged in I SlloIHl nat til of thl iIalllt whith involved vcr se fig-hi illg and was 1101 completed until the Germdns W
lrivel1 heyond [he Vesle in August In the middle of amp Imh)ln arllly of tllltlll Americans reduced the 81 Mil sdie))t The latter part of September our great battle of l1PIIH-AlgoIlJH was l)(~lll1 lasting through fOltY-8Pvendf
of intrllst Jig-ht il1)~ aIHI llhlillg brilliantly for our First S((olld Armie Oll NOLm1Jer I ]th after mure than 1200 Ampri(tln gtoldi(ls had participated
On the twentieth Anniversary of the Armistice it s proper to recall some of the Armys aecompliRhmenl that great emergency Lest We Forgct
56
Lest We Forget
DtTlu ltlIl VI~ILQL~I~CT I tYI 11 10 )~ ~ ~
I
Iltpound)Utqo~ frVtflG
- -----shy
~ cf I~M-~S~f Sshy
Dv-AulIJo+j
or J~Ulo1r~~
~oGtI5 copyl i
nmiddotwt J 1___
~L~ - _
57
I
Library Bulletin
j I
Thlt 10rrI ~trlocf 01 th Untd ltt t lt
Tr ~n()~t Itn de~ 10pOl nt n tt UnIt d Ot tmiddot I II I
Ih PQIlct 1H youth
( ~ d of d r
(~r t Itd If Ch I
11
rp O ~ COfllnl1j Imiddot I ~ I
I I_ K-- hlney n tho 01laquo 01 M bullbull rIHt HII McCrir I
gt Tr It1rl Ivlt Ilon of N pnhnn I I I I I~ - I I
MIIr~ clttlhllthtTHnt pproprltn fJlII for 1111 If I 11 I)
~ I
Tllr nor I hltrd I 11 III
0 r Ollrrhllrult It I 1111 I dlf iiII1
lrA chlrlt rI lUt 1 I - bull J ill
LmiddotgtlconmiddotdllGUtrrcdmiddotE~plln( I Ill I
JlUI h I It Tho Inv 510n of Chln~ b) tho Wlllttern worl Illgt 11 d
1 I ro J 111] Tho pO~l-wlr world middotIorl 1middot1 I I h 1[1 Ill 11 II I 111(I11j
1 L J I) I~ Gavltrnrnfnt gul1tlor1 of tr1nlportltttwn lUk tlxlll
J lop ~roo 11 I 1 X lraI I I Lr Tho Lo t Batttlton JII) 11 lin) I( r iI(ie)
I ph 1llh~ Tho polltleo~ 1865169( Ill I I I
hl) 11 lellltron~ mIHttlrcS til la Iucrro elvll (n [~pJn1 I) h 1)lIill lt frp ih 1 ar 1 1 1)11 11 liE ]
111 1 II -tIJnullr Irn Americlon relef 1I 111_1
I IIdI mj Lifo of Proldont Rooltltlvclt A ~tudl In fartur lnd pO f j Bl~ WI)j
1 I (f) II Tho philosophy of tho tct (1 111 11 If atd I tr J Im PM))
~~nlnnl I~r) (rnmII ror runlUt Twentymiddotthlrd nnuat report of Nltlonoll Adv1~ory Commlttlte for Aeronautics 1937 I(If7 11 rO Ij
Nltw lntrnltlonlll Yer Book um fIlllIm of ttl rid prlr ror tj ~nr E jp pnlj
l I)) t I)r f a) A ~tudy on th( opltrlltlon ofn Int(IIIlt n(o_offccl~ r ran 1111 frm II In nrll l i I elll e I lmldl1l 1 Ill 11 II I
I fall Ill 010 Wlthrwlrt~chaft do~ totln Krlcgts I rUd f hr I tllt ~ I I HI [01 1If)- ]
llflhr Tho Navy Ahl~tory I) nr rmiddot 1 )IP ]K f Ij
lr WI))n Children ortho RisIng Sun Ill Imiddotmiddotmiddot-)
1iI r lIuulluHI
Oltr DlenstUntorrlcht 1m Hecro 1J 11 f- ) gt H to r I til Ju ltI furl nrmj- Iu) fnr 11]0 raal_ymlt) 1 lH 11 ~(-t 1 q I
Ofr DIltn~tuntfrrlcht 1m H re 11 Jl) -101 11 11 t I rlllll1J1 IU fm 1)11 r] 1117 [1 ~l I 11-(]
1J11middot11I1i1 nf IntnwtI1d [f
International ~llnction5 fII( loy 11) f 111lt111 r 11 ttlllllltdut( In( 110) [LlT 1~)]~ [I~ ]
Tho Rcpubllc~ of South Amlricil npnrt h -1Ul jrltgt]1 [ mllrqn ItlllI 11)1)11111 of tllonltInI Afr q ) (j t1
-IIIflrth LI ( 11 1lt lrqr Der Untcrfuhrer der Flilkilrtlllcrie 11 hl U d ~It] u) r I t 1I1)IlIlrUllt nrtllry] l~n [1 07-12- 1 III
flhtl rool~ 1
Th( (clution of phylc Imiddot i 1
middot11 r
Ch (lilt for her Ioflt 11lt 11 I )
fd t 1 Hport r S (ond r(rl( 1 ~d 1 I 1 [0 I l~ t I I [I
is
~ I I 01
unt lllJH~
I P
1 11 Il lIh 11 11)
Intrutlon~ for tlH tlct1 rmploympnt of Irltf I bull 1 111 IlIt I l I I) 11
Trnport tlon on t W t rn Front I ] 1 I Igt lt
J JI h _ loj
Imiddottru~to for rllOHlHnt cont~Ql OVrol In WlT
111 J()lJrnyto r
~c
11 LI
fbull]
j
d I I 111 10) dI 11)lt_
II
I I I 11 I If I]]
I I I l J~ i 1 01 ) I - III
I) I Braxton Brago Gonertl af til Confcdlrlcy 11 III BIO]
Ofr SprlchBrockhmiddotH~ 11 nlllwlra f ld
-[1 r iI11um I[))) FolkwlYs tuh I Ih _ell 11 II1lPflr[ 1I111IH P rll10111 mtlt nlld mrnl~ IHI~ 111
ulhllt-ltlolhI1II tnll1J( r t ( Fighting pbnls of thl orld 12)
[ t ltII ~ loar ( allan Arncrlct UOl~ to 1r 1lt) l~ 11 llll-I l-f i q
Ifd ( Ctgt ut ~o11 d Iarmo ittllonn qull ] h 1 1))111 1 tI [1LlIUIl rnl 1Ilt ]101-( W1
IItnh Lad Thorouuhbrfd rdJ stock lnd it~ bullbull ncolitors rIn f pur 11( 1 1 fI1 1 1
hlt1lrllmlull Puerto Rico nd It plopl Illilt [17211
WhO5 who In Jalla 1936 th Ihuhuo nl lw) Pilll I~~ 1I1~1
011r HIltI 1 Ild rlhur 111 Tho Hoov politic 111
tr ii nr1 ( The Glrrnan Octopu Jillh r 11 f r rid 1 r 11111 11 Qi~
rI r - The Candlans Thl) story of II people 11J1i [171- 1
1111 I hWII TIll SlllomiddotJlprH~ confllct lnn til LNilUl of Ntlou lItIImiddot1
JII III~( Ill J looldnll bDhlnd tho tonsor~hlp 11 IX (1 ~Il 1 f]
ACADEMIC I
J1Uj)U GllLL ( 1 BliKDlL U S Army COllmandant n~n]lIE1t (ELL F II00Ji( U1T U S Army 4sgt(i1 (IIIIffdi
J 11 ITT iT COLOJEL F GILBREATII CayallY SrcJ(flry
DIRECTORS
l~qlllaJ I ~ ________ _lOLONEL K B Epl1u--ns (avall
~1IId Cia alHI Elell jllll CourbCS _______ COLONIL C I (IWeKCTT Infantr)
CHIEFS OF SECTIONS
I OJIllhJiL UPllltltiotl ______ _____ LUUT (OLUNELG It (UOl Illfalltr~-
II lilt Lll igCl1Cl Ihmiddot tory alld Slratcgy _____ LIEUT COLONEL F V g()LEr Fi(ld Artillltmiddot~middot I I I I)(fensivC Opcratiulls ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ LIEUT COLONEL G H MEYER Coa--t Artillery (nrp- 1- Suppl) EanntlOll and Logitic~ _ _ LIEUT COLONEL C F ILLIIS Cor]l~ or Enllllll
I_cclialll011_ _________________ LIEUT (OLONEL Il E ~ICqllLLN (11middot
l
ROSTER OF INSTRUCTORS
i ~Ld~ KllllH n (t
It I (tr) I Inf
1(gt h inPDltl 0 F Lt 111 (()L~~II~IIltIl) Thn B Cntrl t( 1q( n ( ( t~~lgl))rlH~)l~ 1 ( tlJm~ Charlln F r E l~drrhll1 L(i K t l
PCF tl~~di~lI~()1rnd k ~~~ Eri ilJlDl E FA ~atz Flod R Inf p~rd SJh~tlmiddotr I) r j
~~r Hlm( II H InC rlg Jln1()nl F inL
I 1 ~~rt ci~~I~llnL( I~ IWmCIDlt1gttIt L Inf ~d L IllMd H InL a(rHoml E InL IrFarlnd AndHw I illf
anlOrk An D Inf Hry Bl-ll 11 FA
c urn r Augu~tu M F 1 mlth AIIrt ( (~v
Qta -1ltmnan IJ Inl Idrlahnn William lt InC mWn Hompr C Inr uthm RlchJrdmiddotT FA
lIorlgltun laul A CE
N~~~i~~ ~~lll bn~ c Ttior Herhert W MC TOll1lt Dwight F C E
middoti~~PA~~h~~(P~ C~~middot fandpll ILlfold C Cav Brett S(fIIlU E Inf
(lmp1ill William A FA Ehrll Ir(gtl~r)l L InL HlIlwy Ullfu S Cav Brook Jdward II FA ugur Wayland H Cav 1lfllt Ward H bull FA Clmpiwll William F QMC Hultman Hfrbert FE CAe TnlltCott LUIlan Ie Jr Cav Pnrtlr Hay K Inr 111111 John K InL ililburn Rrltm L CAC Lflwr lLIll 1- lllL Hkd-o William P FA Karlstad Chups H Inr GriclllY CecIIJ In
Rook Lowell V InL (tdIe John U D lpndfrgrat Grady H Inf Hrt(gtI1P Rohfrt G C Irvil1l WilarJ V CAC Bl)I1()1(gt E~IoIrt F C S Phillip Thomas R C AC rlhE Sam LbullC 11011 John II C Ae HarkPr Jnhn Dc F AC
(middotlITIN Lorpncc Walter Eo CE IIartllflt Harlan ~ InL Jpnkm Reubn E InL Lanah1l1 Frtll(l~ 1l Jr SigC
ROSTER or RtGULAR CLASS 1938-1939
NAE 1lkPrrnan StlphpJI 0 Adamf1 Hugh P AIbrpcht Frank M Aldprman Crdg Andersoll KelllHth s Rack George 1 Balwr RussrU A Barher Edward Barl Ruwrl O Harndollar Marlin 1) II [llrlptt L(lUrIIHP V
B(gtldrrlinden William A Bplldpr Arthur I-I Ikqqlll~l Earl C Bplt)etLP Leo A BIfIdl WIlliam S 3d Binnl John J Bl(k Frldprilk IJ Blizzard John C oTr lIoaIlHr Haydoll L HuatrHr Marl M Jr Bohzien Edwin B Rohlpndpr John F
ItA~k llHANCli (lptall1 htfantry (LptUll FA (aplam CEo (Iptalll illfantry itljllr Infantry Captam Slg C Captam Infantry (Lptal1 C AC (IJlalll 1lSMC MaJOr lllfllltr~ Clptain CAC (aptull FA (apltin ( AC CtltUIl Infantry ~t1J()r Illfmtry raplam (avalrv
(tplam VA iLIJllr FA tllajor Infantry Captain Infantry Captain CE l1ajor Air Corps Captain Me
59
w _~~ AC(ldemic Notes c amp GSS QUUlmiddott~
IL It~h HILII NArlH RANI
UUWII Frud S Ir (aptain Infantry Hettinger John A Major Cavulr
BOWIH JaTllh C lr laptalll Infmtry Hill Tame P Captain lnfant~ HurjlIlit WlUfl) L (qtltlll1 InfllItr IIohlnthaJ William D MIJeH CA C
Bur((1 LI t ( (11[1111 F IIntmiddot Charp n Captain Clo S1 eg Sc
BU1IH1l ta1h bull r 1 ~d tjlt11Tl ( ( lIolllwr IiI) W Captain
Idh jtllph K ( algt lill lnfllltn Ilorn hlrl A Major Air Corl~ bull ~~ (mltl IiWlrl (tPLL]11 C I IlorrrH 1lt (iil11 I Captain ~1C
Sc (lIllltlll (Lf i) ( L)IUII IIILtllrJ Ilottllll Iohn I~ Clltam
(ttL II (I r (qtllll Il1fllllr HOIIl rh~lIl r Major
111 11 Id rd (111) Illftfr II()~JJ JLnl(l I Jr CLI)tain
llrJJIvrdj 1jr Jllf1I1r JIIW HobPrL L Jr (ljlLdn
(LLd ~()rml J ILl) 1 IIYlJllg Clyde L Malor
II Illld I I I ( II d ll JlI fl1l1r llJhn()Il I)OUgill V Captain
I Ir ~ il] 1fHtr JOhWJIl Elrlf A Major
J (In bull I~ (1j1Hl lr (q ohnull Howard It lpLIIII
(IIll HI) l Ii (till) 1 1Illi IlhOl WIllIlmiddotl1 n CapLlin
[d ffll I J (11lt]1 -11 I 111 (~harkl P CapLun
I rIl I i (tn Wllhlm B Captlln
rHoiL ( I trmiddot r I n (1) lfltUlj Franlc A Major
(IlIlIlJ1l) I lt I t)ll Ipm HamId I) Captain
ln 1r(sjIJT1 If ( q ~ K(bfr LaUtitHP B ~bJur
1)1d I Llm - I~ ljL Itf11L1r hlIHli Alvan C olljor
IIL I[O- Ir( nmiddot Kllt I au Jbullbull Cwllin J)llr1middot]middot(rrIH 11111 ul) K 11111 John A 11IJor
1)111 P lI l~ ( ljdl) (( Kohlgt Vlbiw n (apt a)
[)rlr( il I 11Jr (1 dry Jrwl (por)W K l1ljllr l )Ilgt 1 11] I If (IImiddott11I Irdilltr KrLltlhoJf -innw) CaplllI
Jl lllrt I I lr tIry LuHIvin Joltgtpph Captain
fnIrII Ii i (Ill1l IT Cliff LlIlham Charlp~ 1 Captain
111111 rtIL) I Ll]r lr ()fI LawrIl(I Charlp~ V Captnll
11 i ( rtd II ( H III llf I1dr ilwtoll VllIiLIn S Captain I II It ITmiddotl ITlt ( Lumhard StlpIH1l C ClpLllli
I-kill illl 1)1 dl r LUVIIl Juhn H Clptalll
1 -11) Inti II( I ( qLdll (I LYIllh Grorgf 1 Cljlltlll
Ir ]tJrlll (QI L1ll I Mahie RIl~(1l L C1)la1l1
lt f 1 I Id td 1 1lJl1r Idr Mtldonald John C ~Tajor
IlL r It doI (qgttllL lr rl~ Mlrhdl Iloyd illajor
rj TILllll [ ( t[tll ( ~ ~lartiJl 1Lrlin C ~LLj()r
1)f loll Ilt ( qgtt11l I Mathpwoll LptnllPI (Ipt-till 1- d n 1 l~ltl r1 I (lltlill ( ( iay Edwin T CaptLin
111r lnf JilIn Il(hr~4tal IItrhfrl 1 Cptain 1[oIlt1ll F ~1 (ClUff Mlr] Captain
LdlJI H IIIJr F 11p(ulough Samuel 11ajor ( I I~ f [tdl Ir (liII) JnLlll] tl1d((I Riehard G Cllltain r Ij ( 1)i J ( lIdUll (lt( Md~UtIIl John C Ca))ILlIl
Il Il l[ iIIIII IlIfI)ll1 Illlt(~nulth Wilbur R 11jor
(t rd H rl ( (qd llll I -llmiddotloy Guy S Jr Captain ( r]n T O) l IIJr IT ( rl~ 11nfTlt Htlbell C -I1Jor ~ l r IJ I 11 ~Ij ( -ll)r)rtmiddot Brywt I 1aJor (dI 11 d II (1]11111 [lIfl1tn Ilurphy John B lajllain
(1 H hJ lilli I 1Jr ITImiddot)fJ M~frlt Culby M Captaill
1 U dlll II I1 (1 ir (oq ~ NVIlll (pon 1) Cljltalll
(~Ii t 1 rII i~ L (IIllll JnflIltrv 1nhil Charil13 II (ptLin
(~dlJr jllldri shy (ljllltl 1 -llf~(III Rkhm K laptaill (lId L 11)jn I (II)lllll Ill ()middotJ)llllti Iohn W Major
(rI [ Ill ir ( ljllIll Sl~ ( Partndgpoundgt L1o~ d S lajor (r IIltmiddotr Ld) ( (IImiddot1i 111 (lvdr P(phw G()r~( B ()Itlin 0
(rdhl jl fl Il jf (1J1L11l Infantr Io~(lll WJlhun I) I1ajpr (r 111111 ljlllli -IT (orl 1ral hpr Hlthard ( ~aJltalll
II n II JlTIll II 1IJr illLllllr ltdl Slatlll Jo Captain i) ILr] llJlIT lnfIHtT ILIIllY TIOma~ II ~lajor
Ibl 11 ILId ~ Ir 11 Lt 11 (qfJh Hplc1 Widlr J Major
ILlllll johlJ H (qtll1l I ItplI- Andrew R Major IIrl It 11 11)llf up (ldwidrfpr Ilarr Major SIR ( j II nd J1fntl II (IItllll lr(TI itlnlll Alhrt (apllill (I- ~i Illrfl (IIYiJ o1]r (C ltwhanbol Willi11ll L (apt ll1
ILII11]1 (lplllI 1 itldlllo1lr (Iryll II Major ~i~~orI(1Iiard II ~ f d rll J (qLIIll C AC HqJrrts Thomas A Jr Captain FA J Heilllltl I hmh H Cljllal1l FA Itr)(lIlilponarcllI Captnin Air Cor~-middot
II I )~fI)]1 rg t 11 rt I o1ljor AU (orp HI)t1wllI JalI4 S Major (ava1) ~
Iff ILlr ILlrrl 11 II r) (apt1I1l (ldn Hnl~pl11 Gurdon D Captam Cavaln ~
Hln]lIJ) flrll olljor JnflIdry HohfoiCnherg(r Carl T Major Cavllr~
1fl11V Vdlfr H Jr (tpain FA Rothrrmich Albert Eo Captam lnfantl)
60
Infant) IllfIIltr
In(ntl) -
InfmID ~ Q ~C ~ Air corfi t A ~~
i
f2XVIII No 70 Academic Noles
NAME
Roycc Charles H _ Ran Cornehus E
gnlle Gordon P jiltchc1lller Frederick F schlattrr David M 1Schulgen G(gtorge F1Scott WilLlrd W lSilt~r-l RthmllOn ~rormdur Haymond L JSoane Charlp~ C bull Jr Sltlth 101m A I Jr (Snith fJgtIph l~rruthJ Holwrt MlK ~ltl dl-nw n
I ~ rJry )hrrow Imiddot i5~ldmg J)lJllad 1 15tafiurd Bpll ~3f1lr Th)Illll H llhfl~ AlhPrt K TT
Franlb H
-rt nrl Otto P lt Donald G tltIqJfD
Thr)ma~ D )1- fohn L
It Juhn F ljd-t PpLrnC (
j7 [-)1) CIIHlllf A ) i7 I rr~ fohn 1
l~~~~I~~rd T
jl_ hlm~ Lumn L 1IOln l1ltDJ] E ]Ilton Walter K Jr
i lilm~att RoJert Wefl jllrgLt Vlllard L l t ital Wp~lpy V
jYe2ger Hohart R ) -rmiddoton EHrett M
jiUlll Char)( W
) I
1 ri n ~)
HANK
Captam Major Captam Captlin Captalll Captam Major Captain Major Captain Clptain CapLlin (aptalll
Captul1 CapLun Major Major ClptlIn Captain Captam Captalll Captain Captam Captain Captum Major Captain Clptdn Captain Captam Ctptain ~IaJ()r
(aptalll Captain Major Ca]ltaln Captain Major Captain CaptJ1TI Captam Captain Captam MaJor Captam Mljor Captalll Captalll Captlin Major Captain IstLt CU11tam Captain Captain Major Major Major
UfANCI
Infantry Infantry AIr Corp CA C AIr Corp Air CorpshyrAC lt1-
-Infantry Infantn FA Alf et1 Dn F CK Infmtrr InrlIltn CE InfuntT) Infantr Alf CorpltshyInfantry CpLC Cc FA Air Cnrp FA CAC InflI1tr~
AIr Corp Atr Corp5 CA C Infantry Infantry CWS AIr Corp InfanttJ Air Corp Air Corp cr- C~lalry
Alr Corp Infmtr Air Corp Infantry Cavalry FA Cnalry FA Infantry QMC C E Alr CDrp ( A(
Cavalry Air Corps Infantry Infantry
TIlE C01~IANJ) AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Fort Leavenworth KalLltas
1937-1938
Map Problem No 25
15 Mar(h 193x
Tim map prllhlpm whi1 dilfprPllt from anything that has Iwpoundn ucltd m thl P-t at Ill Commmd and (jPlwral it lIT ihoo is nut eJ]tlrely new to mllhf lIl-trudiiltL ~L1Jor John H Burngt Infantry hl-gt writtrltll at ngth (O)Hrllll~ Ih]lt ypl of prohll11 In hN artide 111f11( Ihf lIo) ProJIlin jlllbhlt-llld lt 1h( SIPtmJPr-tktolPr lgtU of lIlP Injrtllir[()1rJwl
llv llfoblem I Oil I of Ilpejjon 0 rrawtl that It ((is mfnrmatlOn to llll lttIHjnt In ti(gt furm of fUmmMI(gt (very hlJf hour The soher is r(4U1red to llldt a rlllIlrt at th (1111 of pltlfh half hour on the actions taken an-I orders If my( tudly lilUIt hy til (ommanrlcr In thig tYfJ( of problpm the solver mu~t JUidl wli11 I)f Ita ufiICipnt informatIOn and WiWll till time j ripe for rnalrlg riprisj)lIs
Althnll)h thi b a corpg prohhm th( eJwmp lt lnu~trat(lt may be vljuIltI iIlIXIII-HI mvoh-mg ltmtlir unit
Prfmiddotllh~
Sl fTlll- I ArlVtIH SJClt t-2 II Sppud SltuHtinn ContintH d ~9
III Hnilltlfll to r IlIlU--iull 11 14
SEIltON I
ltiancc Sheet
General ltUat lOll spceJal situation
1 (l~NIHAL SITUATION - - (I 1110]18 Sperial iIap A herewith Scale J inch ~4 miles
lJ Boullclaries- The Pennsylvania lIaryland state line forms the boundary between two hostile states Blue (north) and Red (south)
c Opposing forces - It is known that Red war plans conshytemllbte the concentration of a reinforced corps of two or three diVlsion~ in the area helween South IVIountain and the Susqueshyhanna River
2 SPEfIAL SITUTION Q loncentralioll 11) I lorps rewforcer The I Corps reinforced Lieutenant General A comshymanding consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions organic corps troop~ and aUaehecl troops as indicated in paragraph 1 Table J page 7 TaIzes oj ()rganization CampGSS 1037 The I Corps concentrated with the 1st Division in the viCInity of Hanover (374-746) the 2d Division in the vicinity of Gettysburg (350shy750) and the corps artillery in the vicinity of Biglerville (349shy762) The corps service elements are to concentrate in the area Lemoyne (380-800) ~ Carhsle (355-79)middot ~It Holly Springs (355-785) - Bowmansville (~1l3-792)
(2) The 3d Division (detached from I Corps) with 903d Cavalry Squadron ultached and certain artillery tank and motor units concentrated in GHQ reserve in the area shown on Special Map A
(3) Other Blue forces concentrated in the area east of the Susquehanna River
b Misson oj the I Corls~The mission of the I Corps is to mvade Red territory and develop the hostile situation west of the Susquehanna River
c Krents prior to liouliaht 15 Morch - (1) The I Corps completed ib concentration late on 12 March The 1st Cavalry Brigade reinforced protecled the concentration Early on 13 March the I Corps preceded by its cavalry crossed the frontier and advanced to the south the 1st Division marched on Manshychester (384-729) the2d Division marched on Keymar (350-721)
61
0~ i~ YSRURG SHEET EDITION OF 1934
STIlt_ TEGIe ~LP GEiTYSm-Rc~RICHMOND ___ Tc
- 3middot
1 ( ~_I-ampJ---=
SPECIAL MAP A SITUATION AT DARK 14 MARCH
THE COMMAND AND GEN-ERAL STAFF SCHOOL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS
1937-1938 TO ACCOMPANySECTION I
MAP PROBLEM NO 25 (160) 25 MARCH 1938
or -
1cademic Noles
(2) The ht DiviicJI1 l1lluunl(gtt(d hootile infantry along the line Silnr I~lln fjf)S-j~~ I I inebun) (~tG-I~6) and attacked late 1 llarth
Il) The ~d ])1 on Jatl on tllf aft(rn()on of 1 lIarch lpadwcl tllC Ernmitltbl11~ ~11-7~) TaT1(gt~l()Wn ~)-72R)
fpad aflPJ bill ltldll ClJlJIfJ-ltion (4) Earl~middot 11 Illfh Ill hI and 2d Dimiddotbinlc und(r (owr
of f(j~r wlti h 11(d thnll~h)ut the day lauf(hprl a (()ordmatpd atlttk aralll lilt h)~1114 fonl al()n~r the IIIH SiIVl nun
IIJ(middotil()l() I i l~ J111 1 h~ld (onidfllbJ( W(middoth and hy dad 11 Ial (il L(d d11 II 1111 lu) till f)J l bw to fl1 lint Plea alll al(middot I ~Ii-i----) Ihl) d ~7x-7n ) (ul)p(wdp1 (~XX-I~ I)
I ~)J illl 1 i blll Ill 11 I11Llnl rv 1- 011( ht t illOfl Wl~
Jrl()fr1 to ) TtIrlh )fi-Il1) ITl (()lJh ItttnC l)r(pared for Illl)fll 111 1111)111 lrl1por I
(1) TIllIoll 11lri llldltl -upporld llHWtllJJ] of the 2d and hI I)J l-iIlJi~
II) J-ll1 till Ih IlllJjllllW of l~ )Iarcl 1IIf hogtlik (~1-alry pemratlmiddotd gtI lllw OUlltlj rtmiddotlOllnai- al(( ~(r(en in lil(gt middotjlmiddotinity ()fSl1trI C l()11 11l~1-~11 alld 1lll1Tilvd ()Il Yorh lij7~lf~raquo) By dark 11 ~I~n h t hf 1lt-1 (tya1ry nrwulpound ninfofCld had drivcn Ill 110 1ill la 11 1)11 1II Itt nm1 had onto a -trong pDf-ilion in 1111 willi 1 )- ~lll-hun 1)-(1~) S11IJhlown
~ Ill 1llfh J~J1Ldd( ()r () rll1fnr((d b pr(JIt(tllll~ tilt lint pf Oll1llll] 1tlI)11 f 1)1 (OJ p-
)11[ fIIIllf)fi il Hr(td llload- -hown in -ohd 1IH ()ll Ill ~r I I ( ~ill 11 P IfI ~111t ddpound for t 11-IY mot or t ltfTic
h) n (uti I I lit ( J lu r 111 hllll conl A Wlvy mit1
n~ (Ild 1111 lt 1)(11(11 ~(Ilth 7Iollnttln ~nrl the Sultqucshyhtll11t 11 11 Ill 11 IJl (h Imiddot()rc(a~t at Ii 110 Pl 1-1 I1JTh 111111111ltd I)F) iurlll11 Ihar III tIll Jatl 1f(rnnol1 of tii )Jar(h
(I ltIJlfl Tiltmiddot Su-qlHhllllll and Potomac Rivers are unfordtbll -II Pt1ljh () 1~1(r h unfordahlp -outIHlst of it i1llt()11 ~l-)j~ lth ))Ih 1ra11(11 l)atap~(o I1ierall other ]1(1111 II f f()r]ddl
InrHvrph
--llll 1 -11 t IIO (II 111 IP 1-l(lIh of Jfi Uarch Tbl plall~ for tlH ()fllLttlolh qf the (orp~ on IC) llareh
TJrovided for a ((ln~l1udtJII~ I)f the al1lIk hy the 1sl and 2d I)jvil)tb and II(middot J 1 (tYdn BrigHh
JHutlllallt (111(1 al 1 al hi~ (ommand post al IIano-el 111111 tlJ (lr p~lt ()f 11)( Tllorning of Ii) 1lareh ~tudying the Illllt)l 1TI1P llld tIll In flrllinv rIporli
J 11 ll() AI hi d lVlrpound of till foll()wing --ltuatlOn
(It tIl f1(1I1t (Jf IIII 1lt-1 (Iall) Briglclt the ho~tile eayalry had LfIll for(Imiddotd)ll VJl11drl to tlllaquo ~(Jlth and at 1000 A1 Ih( 1~1 (aalry Briradp had aun encounlpled hOllijp cavalry ni lalllIalorw rllf I1 Ialylal1d LitH (to1~7~f)) orli-villl ( f 1)-r~middotf J
On ill flllill f IIII 11 JlJj~iflll til 1100Idl force had allHlud ~l1nultalll)u-ly with thl attaek of the bt Division Thi rnlltt ha hnlJH1 pl1 Ilhtral ion and tlloveHwnl No gain~ hy (ilhe fOIl( ~(11ll to ha(lw(ll mlltll
On 1 Ill frollt or t 111 ~d Dn iol I he n(d~ launched a surshypn~( allwJ Ht dayh~~ht again t 1( right flank of the 2d Division
This attack was supported by tanks and caught the 2d Div~ in attack formation The tenor of the reports and m from the 2d Division indieates thal the Division is in sen difJi(ulty but in no imminent danger
Lieutcnant (jeneral A vbitcd the (ommand post of the Divimiddotion at Bandanna (mi-7lH) at 11 10 M where he fo the commander and staff gr~atly dhappointecl with the res of t he mornings hat 1 Ie The divi~i)n wa- reorganizin~ and paring to resume the attwk at about ~ 00 PIvl It expCte after reorganizal ion j hat two and po-ltihly 1hr(gt( hatt alions co be made available fol the new effort Lieutenant G viiled the command post of the 2d Dimiddotision at Galt (J
al ahout 121 PM The slarr of the 2c1 Division appeared ~()mewhat (hagrined uy the events of the morning vr tonflictIng and contradictory reports had been received [11 ~ the ~uh()rdinate uniL~ It wa~ almost impossihle to gain a co beer pie e or clear picture of aITairt- on that front pres ltertain fa(lS were cle~~ however The attack of the~ing
DIVISIOn had faIled the dlvJ-lOn had been thrown on the defrshy~ive and about noon had heen drinn back and appeared to~ -tuhhnrnly defending along the ~(gtnclal line Tane~tuwn i Pleaoant Valley (altualtie- ~llfT(rcd (ou1d not be dctcrmirw i with any dpgrpp of WlurlfY Iajor C(llpral ~d DivisionrjJ just fPturned from a viltit jo his hrig-ad(~ Iommanders whow 1 found reorganizing their fOI(e- and strcngllwning 1heir defenvl Two infantry battalions werc in diYi~i()n lCsCt( The divis cavalry ()ppo~ed l)y hOStllp (lvalry wa~ protc~ing the rightfl~~ along the c1cel about t wo Imle~ nort hwc-l of 1 aneylown 1la ~
General 2d Division in spite of the reerses of the day Ii calm and unworried ~
Vhilpon 111(se visits Li(utfI1ll1t General A studied thest at ton but did not i~ltuc any orders He rct urned to hb (ommalt~ post at Ilanover at 1 10 IM in time for the rouline daily rJ lonfercT1CC ~Imiddot
The Corps Reenc (1st Infantry less one battalion) at~ $ril hour was sLiIl at Two Taverns prepared for movement hy mo i t ranspClrL hndl
OTIS len Hp1U1n(- of llfornlltion f((IWei tt til( COfp Commallli Post i 1
l~u(d at half hour iHtervalsommfllClIlr at 1 15 P)l LnLi endmg at t15Pl~ 10 ~ In making fepofts ~tud(nh will nutp thp HIJuirpnHnt (ar(fllY~J
no impoftHlt OfiPf i HlloUIlImiddot((1 or 1ctl)1l tIIill tilt f(marc N()Il(il~ pntffd on till flport
L HI hriff Ill dfllJlllp
SE(JlO- 11 IConlinutt1)
Special Situatiun Continued
)rwiai ~ltUlt1UtJ (onllnt(d
1 -IEClALRItlAtlON (ONIIl111n lipon a1Tialat~ command post at 1 )0 11I Liputenant General A was met his Chief of Stair who prtsente(I him with 1he following me dal(d Cflq 1) Ilanh 10middot1) P~1
The fOI(p OPlHl-ld lo the 1 (orps is eslimatrrl to~ (orp- of not more t hall two divi-ions Your mi (hal1gtlti You will a(Imiddotll1lte wilhout delay and capt 1IMUtE The ad Division with surIkient GHQ motor pOIa1ion 10 move the essential (ornbat elements of on gadc reverts to your corps effective at once
The daily staff conference was called to order by the C of Starr at 1 45 PM Lieutenant General A the chiefs of
og ~
- ~
or
I
~olXlJl No 70 Academic Notes
general staff seclions and certain special stafl officers were presshyent The Chief of Staff briefly outlined tlu situation as already described above after which the following reports were made
Corps G-2 stated There is some doubt as to the strength of the hostile forces confronting us G-2 GHQ inclines to the belief that it is a corps of not more than two divisions We have
Jed two divisions Red deserters claim that four divisions were in the area Baltimore - Vashington about 12 lIarch Knowing Red Lieutenant General Js reputation for caution and prudence I cannot undertand his attacking us this morning unless he i~ quite certain that he IS superior to us It is quite possible that General J has been relieved However I han~ no mfonnation about thIS Of course the hostile commander Genshyeral J might be miinformed as to our strcngth I am striving
Ito gam morc definite information as to the hostile strength Unfortunately due to the continued fog the air service has
jbeen unable to Ioeate the ho-tile r(cIVcs 1 cstimate that at present they are west of Parrs Ridge favoring the Reds envelopshy
Iling attack i As to Red capabilities shy
ii 1 He can continue his attack today
He can renev his attack tomorrow enveloping our nght flank or with less ease our left flank
He may defend actiyely or passively northwest of or I on Pans Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
He may delay or withdraw
-1 Corps G-~ stated I1 SineC rny bA report to the Chief of Staff the following
Information has been received i I From the bt Cavalry Brigade dated 1100 AlIT -The t] hostile cavalry has been oriYen slowly south to the line bull ~Iaryland Line or1i5il1pound Am about to aUack
j Information has been slow in arriving from the 1st Cav~lry1 1 havc ~cnt a LiaIson Officer to that headquarters The 3d Division reports that its artillery is all truck-drawn I that plans have heen made to move the essential combat ricments of onc infantry brigade by GHQ motor transport on
two hours notlt~e 1 The 100 Pil weather forecast predicts rising temperature fJg ohouhi clear in a few hour~ continued dry I ~Iy section ha~ roughly prepared the following plans
To move I he 1d Divl~ion 10 either flank for an attack late this aflernoon or early tomorrow
To relieve the 2d Division by the 3d Division this afternoon or tonight and resume the attack -11
To withdraw to a defensive position southeast of etshytysburg in order to assume the counteroffensive with the
JI i 3d Division from the vicinity of Hanover
G-4 stated A check is being made by my section to detershyine how much motor transportation can be used for corps elical operations without disrupting supply I expect the
eport soon ~ The Corps Chief of Artillery reported that he was studying he Gmiddot3 plans to delermine the ose of the corps artillery and
location of ammunition The Corps Engineer reported that Red road demolitions as
uth as the Emmitsburg - Taneytown road on the west and the line Glenville (388-741) -- Shrewsbury -- Stewshy
town on the east flank were ninety percent repaired Road
signs were being put up throughout the rear areas The position southeast of Gettysburg was being reconnoitered
Requirement-Report the actions taken and orders as actuw
any issued by Lieutenant General A at his command post between 145 PM and 215 PM 15 March if any
Time allowed for solution 30 minutes
SECTION II (Continued)
Special Situation Continued Innwnlh
SpeCial ClltuatlOn continued 5
5 SpgCIAL SITUAFION CONTINUED---The following is a resume of messages received at the I Corps command post between 215 and 245 PM 15 March
From the Artillery Information Service
Mass of hostile artillery appears to be west of Parrs Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
From the 1st Cavalry Brigade (message delayed due to encoding and decoding)
Drove hostile cavalry to the south from the Maryland Line - Norrisville position at 11 45 AM Am following up My men and horses are greatly fatigued Casualties have been heavy Indications are that hostile cavalry will resist again in the vicinity Parkton (404-727) - Shawsville (418-725) Will attack
From the 2d Division
Am preparing to launch counteroffensive at about 430 PM Have three battalions southeast of Galt as maneuvering force
From the 1st Division
Will renew the attack at 3 30 PM in the direction Bandanna-Ebbvale-Carrollton Have three battalions available for the operation
From Liaison Officer with 1st Cavalry Brigade (Personal Report)
1st Cavalry Brigade is in dire need of rest but their morale is very high The commanders seem to be more weary than the troopers Hostile cavalry withdrew in disshyorder from Parkton - Shawsville position at 145 PM
Corps G-4 reported
Sumcient trucks of corps quartermaster train to move the essential combat elements of one brigade can be made available on two hours notice without disrupting the supply of the corps
From the Corps Air Service
Fog seems to be clearing expect to send out first misshysion at about 245 PM
From 1st Division
My division cavalry attacked the hostile cavalry on its front at 1 30 PM and drove it south of the Gunpowder River southeast of Gunpowder (388-734) Believe the hosshytile infantry on my front is preparing to resume the offenshysive
65
Ac~demic Notes
Ufljllifl]lfllf Jlporl tlH -a11Hh laln and orciN (1-
(lCtual1y i--ued hy LilUl (~n~1I1t CPIHrai A at hi mmnand lot hetween 21~) P~I and 21~ I~I 1 ~Ialltil if an
IllItgt a[[llltf flJ (dotu HI minu~
SI 1111 II ilolllillwmiddotd)
--1H(ial --ituilliolt (ontintHd
ii -IU Id SIll ]111 (f)lj1 I) TIltmiddot folloIIW 1
IP-lIIW of IIifl)llllalloll lllll IllIgtlI- ltlII(middotd 1 11ll I ((In
OlrlJIlllld 1)1) I hI (ll ~ 11 alld 1-) 11 l~ bnmiddoth FJ om ] -1 (l 11ry Hn- tdl loll] Jll--IIl~rtr J
Iffl iiI- (middottdl) vil1111t(middot ~Hllhi(~ II (llll]l)dl]
Vall lU(middotr 1 Plll)] jlaHd Illgt 111 of (~lI1P(Jd1 Fall- U( rd ~IJ PJ 1 Il(lIjJ~ IllUl 1tmiddot It1 and f()od 1I(1 hl1ild 1)1111 of 111 [nl I 111 (1_ 1 (ff PlIilllll
IIap lap~urld ~()(J l~(d 1ttlnllltIl dIll frl](ldll1) t1H)l)
to lorpgt ll~l
From bt lJi i-l[) 11
llllrLt~ld Ill-illt 1) )01111 jldtlI hIgt 1)(111
tlold I 1~1 Ill j) 111l( i (jlll 111 lit 1(1 11middot1 illl oil 111
pom1 -1ll1 1Ill [I 11 fl III 1hltl l~illorl flnnl llilIIII (ollll1ltldr~ Ind]ltJl (11 1( Ill 11 (If I~ld lflI1-
1-1 llll ~d 1)1 i ol
I~id (l1n tlld lllrllllJ~ 1111 I lit frllll (If 111 ~(12d
(ltlry ~qladroll 111 P mit itl pd all (Ih 1111 p Ill -pndlllg
t 1 (Inlllll)--lltt illl lhllHl1t to r(lllfOlTt 11l~ (1 airy 1XII(I1 jll1ll1I nmiddot Ullljll jOll of Ill olTllhl I liy Ipd qUill
-()I)IL HlqULgtt -UPIl hy 1(11) nllltIY hi 1()IHIntlalld on frnnt of1d I )1 I ion I fa t I hrlI h1I Ldlllh of infanlry at (~tl l~riitd(gt hl I)nl~ 11lilllllllllll llII(- 1IlHllllni~
lion -upph j UlPIIli1 IIaI 11( onnnilllld 1(tl pn-ltifll1
Iprlh of J1l jllII (It I) lWHun (I)J Ind [llHlll IJlb iiJ~7lOJ Fill k I I 1llllL tnd hn lll( lin i 11lIolllin llHIIil lll)[(I(f(illI
Fnllll lil --1 J ]1 I
Fil nlht of i 111 da~ or Ill p J iat ion will take ()If tt 2)0 11 III IIld( IImiddotIiJ (Ill i1 f) local hn lill jlITl and J(lnfflf( 1ItlIIlt
From Artilllry Illf1lrtlllljllll ~(l WI
IIotih 1~)-lTllll julgt b bl tll ltwalld lllli IJW(-t of
f-uni~l I(r apTJtrllll ty Ii)lut ~ 1)1j tdioll- I kty 111 tlin (1))1 Ill I t io I llllllJliIld falliJ~ Ol
qur litH in ilillil~ I)f I)lll-lIll alhmiddot at ~O jl)I 1) lllfonntI inn frUffl dn J-iull Lmiddotallr -illlp lgtf( )fHlgt nport
(((1111](11(11 l~llfl till 111)1111 ldf1l and (Jnhr t
all ually h Ifd by I Hlll 1lt1l1 (lIwrd A 11 111 (ullllllalld po t
ht t W(middot( 11 ~A) FT Ild ~ 1-) Pl 1) larel jf U]
Tfu 1I11111l tf 11f I)IlflI j() IniJlllt~
~J I iro 11 ((jlJlllld
~1H(j11 IIlIIJon (ontinlHd 1gt1 111011
7 SIlII SlImiddotIIO (OI0I1L1 Ill f()l1)win~~ h a Ifmn( uf illforl1llflllll alld IJlI-agflt Il((id 11 th( I (()IP-
((Hilmand po t plW(lll LlJ 11)1 and ~1i Pf L) jTanh
c amp CSS QUaImiddotten Yo shy
bullVrom (orp~ Aviat ion
o hoslile f(r(e~ of any ~ize dbloven~ll ea-t of It lim Parr Ridg Dug Hill Ridgc Ileay railroad ttl lllOVPIl1lnt- alol1)) Iinls tilroll)h a-hingloll BalLimo-
lIa dr (lltl (1)7-717) BulJ~ of truck movcmer [rom A-ht-lo- t~77~70l) toward Vl-tminsPr
From 2d I )iviiol l
llo tile attwk again-t Plea-anl alky ~trong-Iys~ port (lt1 by arlillry wt 1il1HlHrl Jt UH) PI Continumiddot hO lill Jll ~Url (gain-t tilt divi-IOll cavalry jJy reser
of Illl(l haltalion- till ~()llll1lat of (~dt
[rom 1-1 rJivi-ion
S I()ll~ igtfl attHk laulwiltd in itlmly of llmon M at ~ot) J)jVl Tili at tad ll(lllld by fiftlln~minute arli1t pllparation [fo-till l)~mJll gun fire ha heen receit from arlil -outHa t I)f PIlacant allpy Ha( reonr teted new po-ition for my righl approximalely foul m] w(~1 of Ehhvalp behind erpLk aIled DlPI Run (nOl Strategic Map)
From hI CavallV II igacip
[lav pat nj~- --tIJchill) t IH lllt 10 (1 ( of CUllI10) Fall ItilJ 111 hO lill f)]((- -Ill to haHgt ithdlawn t wv-L of (unpowdpl Falls niH Belil l main body ho~ 1 Ilalry b a--llllhI llg 111 till WilllY of Hereford (10i~71~~ct Jlavl halted bulk of Illy forc( ll t of PII-JtOIl for lE~tltbel fund Command po-t Parkton t
IIqlttiJ( demolitions on Clct IbnJ arp -Jighl villJmiddotlj IPpaired hy dark load marking detaJl have (omplel1 marking road- to ilinily (If [l1lmibLurg and lullCytOlITI ~
U(lliliflIj( RlIHlrl I Ill allions laken and Oder~~ act ually it-lslIed hy I l(utll~ant CClleral A at hi~ lommand Pl ~ hlllVcen u) 11 and U r~I Jr Iarlh if any ~
Tim (l1ollnlor solutwuW minute
SI(llO-J II (olltinuld)
Special Situatiun Contilluld lurishy
x SII~IIL ~11tT lIlli (1I~ 11- I Ell Till foll)wing i I IlJum( of lJ)ormlllon and 1l1l- aJ~ rCT1ld at tIl 1 Cmiddot Iolllllland po hllln ~gtl) )~l and 11) P1l 1) 1lt11111
From (~Ulp- All SelTicl r i nalloOll Oihll dlon b-tlll hIIlIHd hy grOllndhl1
IJlladullenl- of t1)lih trot)p hae been located at GI I dOll (~~S-IOti) loslyn I~IK-lin~) and Baltimore IL~ JlUIlIHl- (If jrtl(k~ Ill in Ihr vilmity of (Ivndon jf t rials of ariou kind art pli(ct along tlw 1ail1o)(1 trJI ~ ~(ltlH inllvlwhilW j in ]llojn-- in 1111 icinity of oot burg llh~7111) aud Aldlild lOX-iii )
Frolll l-t (avalry Brigade I1
I fa( IlabliIId IOntaltt with 101sl Cavalry Sq~lt ron at t ream (Iossing over Gunpowder Falls RivCl ail miles wcsluf Parkton ilolile (avahy still holds ~k Lon 14t11-72t1) and Glencoe 007-711i) Olherwse thea
66
Academic Notes
to northeast of GunpOvdel Fall River over wluch we have passed is dear of hostile fOI((~1
From 1st Division
Hostile (oreel- along lntilc front of 1st Division launcheu a vi~()rous attack al 100 PiYI It appcal- that the main effort is against right of bt Division Cnion 1Iills is in l-rrave danger as the attack there h supported by tanks and heavy cOl1centratiom of artIllery 10 definite information of condition at the front available at thi- time Defen-ive position along the line Silver Iun Bandanna ha been relonnollln~d Have committed none of my general rescrv( a ypl
From 2d Dij1011
Jly cavalry is making a 1irm -land along the Emmitsshyburg Taneyto1l Road a- [oncd to commit two batshytalions of the dn hlon rec(rn to fill a gap in the line we-t of Pleasant middotallc~middot -logttlp att~Hk i~ carried out with vigor ~trongly ~uppolmiddotted hy artill~ry and -iome tanks Pleasant alley is reported to be in hand~ of enemy Vill ~onfirm this later Hu e one battalion left in divbion reserve I3elice hostile attack will epntuully be directed against Taneytown Diiion air enile has reported mall troop concentration mm ing tovard that areL
) I HCIINreflenf Report the actions taken and orders as i lctually bued by Lieutenant Gelleral A at his command post
between L1fi 111 and 11) PI 1) i1arlh if an~- Till( altolf for s(Jlulion m mlllules
[t1 iI~1 i SJ(]IoX II lContinued)
Special Situation Cuntinuedrll
fl SPtLJ SI1P]TCl C()II--lTI~n The following is a he rcumgt of information and messages receied at the comshy
I3rd poct I CoIP~ bet (en middot115 P)1 and 4 45 P11 15 IVIarch
From bt (lyalry Brigade
After hartl fight ho~tile forces have withdrawn farther Et and ~outh of (unp()vrieJ Fall River Hostile infantry believed to hmiddot hLtwLen Ilereford (405-719) and Corbett bull4118-716)
From ht Divijon
Hostile forces have entered emon Mills severe handshyto-hand fighting guing on there 1t Division forced ba(k abou11 mile on front (nion 1ilb Ebbvale My reserve three battalions ahout ~ mile cat of Littlestown (364shy740) 0 large ho-tilp re-erve- loeated
From 2d Divj-jol1 ro 10middot IIotile fo]lt(gt han rpulhed Big Pipe Creek near
Cnion Milk IIo)tiie force hac captured Pleasant Valley and are iiiowly forcing our line to the north Strong attack developing around Taneytown Do not believe we can hold the town without committin~ remainder of division rbenpound Divihion re~erve j- or~anizing a poi-gtit ion )(11 W(el1
Harney (~l3-7~5) Galt -0 large hostile )c~ervef) loshycated yet
From Corps Aviation
No large hostile reserves located -0 Red reinforceshyments found in rear areas Railroad tram movement Vashshyington Baltimore Havre de CIUCl (ontinues heavy Appalcntly hostilp l)oRition heing- organized between Woodshyensburg and Ashland Convoy of about 60 tlucks moved from vicinity of Vestmimtel toward Hereford at 115 PIVI
R((JuirtIUlil Itepolt the actions taken and orders as uetually issued hy LIeuroutenant Ceneral A at hb eommand post )etveen 415 PM and 4113 PM 1) 1Ial(h if any
Tone (llloucd fnr wlution ao minutt--
SECllO III
A Solution lunwrnph
A -1)UllOll of rlIUlrem( III 10
10 A SOLUTION OF REQUIHIIn~N I Adions taken and orden as actually itsucd by Lieutenant neneral A If any
Between lf() and 215 PAl Upon completion of the report~ LlLutenan1 leneral A
directed that he be kept constantly informed of deyelopments He went to his altice having directed the chief of staff to accomshypany him He discussed briefly the ~ituati()n and future plans with the chief of otaff
Between 215 and 245 Pill Continued discussion of tituatioll and future plan~ He issued the following directive
The corps will attack early 16 lmiddotIarch ene]oping the hostile right flank from the vicinity of Whitehall (407-723) and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead (385-723)
The 1st Cavalry Brigade will continue its attack and seize the ridge west of Gunpowder Falls Hiver as far south as Glencoe and prevent hostile ground reLonnaissancc to the northeast thereof It wi1l protect the movement of the 3d Division and will on corps order assis~ the attaek of that dlyision early tomorrow
The 3d Division will- move by motor to the vicinity of Vhitehall under cove~ of darknes~ tonight It will attack early tomorrow mOll1ing on corps order and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead
The 1st and 2d Divisions will not resume the attack until daylight tomorrow Details will he annoullced later
The 3d Division will be strongly faorcd in the matler of artillery and other support
The corps reserve will consibt of the ht Infantry less one battalion and will assemble at Littlestown by daylight 16 1larch prepared for movement by motor transport
Bet1Neil 245 PllI and 415 Pili Lieutenant General A announceclto his Chief of Staff
J am going on a visit to the 1st and 2d Divbioll troops and command posts by motor Aide One will accompany me Aide Two will be at your dispoal Keep Illl informed as to deelop~ ments in the situation I will direct the 1st and 2d Divisions to conserve their reserves for the altack tomorrow Have a staff officer visit the 3d Division at once and go over our plans with their Chief of Staff I will visil the 3d Diviion later
67
UlI(CU ~lj PJl (lml 44i PJU RetUlning to tie I Corps command post at about 4 10 P~
Lieutenant General A familiarized himelf with the situation and plans Accompanied by Aide One he then departed by motor for tlw command po of t Ill ~d J)jvi~JOn Before leaving 11w (~JlP~ (olllllland PfJt lH approved tlw l)lan of allalk a IUtiillld to him hy the (hilf (~r lalL
~( 1to-- 1
I)j(middotu-gtioll
llIqfl I
Ttll()P Jt tdlll II l~
Tun I)f lltlfllll 11 lt1 Ttl (lin 111
i~lIJt 11 11
11 I I I~I()J I I( jlllljIOi--I of till probhlll j 1() illt] I alt the applicatton of thl tattwal principle of an inrippencilnl (()rp in all al1a(k and the tnlop 1llding- oy tile cor-p comrnander
12 TI~(J()l LI 01-( The (I)rp~ commander has a large and lll- I lIntd -tafT at hi-- dl-pn-al who-c function is 10 reji[( the iOJllmanikr ofa~ nlllh dr ad l~ l)()~ih( ill t 1( fUllcl inn of the -Ialf 0 lmiddotdtHl lTllat nw~l of information to In-itf ~UTUshy atl 1Pll()rt~ rhl~ df InUt ~rp that problcl1l~ rC(luinng (leciion trl lIP vllltd 11) tIl( (olnmandlr ill ~uffi(1fllt time to a[O for
w oldlll lIJtHtmiddotrllllt in Ill (Illtioll of hi~ dttbillll~ If the ((Illlllallrpr at I P1l111l- to fnl1nw the now of information into the illnlllland PII-1 lIP 1111 flOn bVIolllc ~o Illolycd that lw cannot ldtquately p111l ahead The con--pqUlll(C of thl~ -tatp of atTairs - u--udly a -vnc of fllfrgCllry dlri~ions illlol11p1tte inujpshyqutlv alld tOi) Itll to be truly elfeltiyco
TIll hnl ()f detul l~ul1lcd by the (olllrnanltitl will of ( (JUI-U delrnd upon jw (haraltcrbtic- of t h(-gt cOl11manuer and i W jl(r)llali it If hi-- vlmJ of st alT lllrl principal - air olilr] 0
U i~lrdlt- of 1 litO Ilit- for dlaii of tIll lomlnander he musl I lliru t J- ldf ~rllh OjojV po--ible duty ithin their capabilishy l-- HI dol ll()t -hifl hi- nH)lihilit it by -0 tIllingo If he jli lull )]()Jl1lh (lIljlO hh gtIalf 111 is llIilty of Walll1g his tOIH 11 and fLllln 10 mtke (Jlcli( i llt algtliiti(s and (nlrgirs of lht-- I1
III t ldf hllh ha lllll1 VOrioll Ingethtr for ~()nll time o~uh a- I he onl hll jOIlIIltidlred matH of t he detail- as 10 tactical fl1l hnd (If 111( (tITlllIltlllhol nll ill wlll known to the ~tajr Thi~ [)01 t ](lIlvt-- 1 he 10] 1 (()mmanltier of the nee~ity of always I-oin~ Into dpd III ill-gt illtlu((jon~ Only when Ii( wbes to rnak~ a hln~rl Il form] t1w hnd~ will it he IHl~~aIV for him to gn into any gnat amount of detail
In thi -jlUd lOll I hl ~d Divi~ion ha- ju~t revertpd to (untroI
of til( J (orp~ Jt j tlJlgt (lIiion ~(l(ded to make the main aUwk of 1 he corp and llwrffor( ih (Oondition and -tate of morap and 1rlInin~~ are of jreat inl(r~l to the torps commander 111( jqrfJ~ ~it uation at 21 Pl i~ -gt1ifh Iha1 no major lhang~ vhi(h 111 pr(tnl til( atlatk 011 IG )Iarrh (an he expcdeo Even a WII hdrawal Oil 1hp lo1 flank will not jeopardizl t 11( (orp- plan SufIWI111 djaik a 10 the conduct of operatlOll~ today and IOmll)) mv haf i W(oll JJ1JWIJIl(Opd by tlit corps (omlllalHi(ro I fowshyc er he ~hould per-onally check conditions in the ht and 2d Jgti-ioth Thel( lS danglr If h( remainf at his command po- thaI unl( hp 1- an unu-ually phlegmatic person he may he tPmpltd to difialp too IlHHh of the details of operation He can do much more for lw sll((e~ltgt of the corps in its attack 16 Ivlarch
68
If he goes on a visit to the commanders of the 1st and 2d Di sions and later visits the 3d Division
Upon his return to his command post at 410 PM the commander received the information that the Reds had res their attack This was not unexpected as G-2 had annou this a hostile capability The plans so far prepared ha been examined by the eorps commander and presumably rn J1l( his approval we next consider the best aclion for the CltJ
(ollmander to take He had already informed the 1st and I )iviion I hat thlY wpre to at tack tomorrow and that they m (on~lrve their rcs(rve~ today It is about time that totlllnanrier iHsued the necessary instructions for the Ihi ](t11 by the ht ant 2r1 Divisions It will be quite late night when the final resolls of the days fight will be known 111lt (oq command post It is helieved that the corps CltJr
man del (an rnalw the most effective use of the next few hOlt hy makmg a visit to the ad Division ~ea
While on thee visits to the divisions he not only getslir ne hand information of the tadial situation but also of the slll WI
of morale The visits of t he corps commander may be a POWcrfi VI
stimulant to the morale of the subordinate commanders ~ tta would probahly nol issue orders direct to the divisions bUll i1J he doeo do so his aide wjJJ immediately report them to the cor~1 chif of stalf
1 TIME OF ANNOIIN(]NG DlC1Sj()N - In the dev of (vcry opcla ion there arrive crrtain times when must lit made It is the duty of a f(eneral staff so to 1 t lllir rlporb as to rctcivc delbions early enough for the effective It is the responsibility of the commander that done It b never ea~y to relognize the exact point in the d nwnt of operation w11(n a derision must be announc~d tlliH -jluation the situation bas dee~oped to such a paint~ Ibnut 21 PM At this time the l1ank from which to atlacl~id WII hin the Iapabilities of the cavalry to secure There is litl ih the enemy (an do between 215 pr and dark to prevent to Corps from attaeking at daylight tomorrow Darkness is 71S Pl amI the 1d Diyision has made no reconnaissances] h1 not marked out its routes Therefore it is believed that dirldivC if Issued latcr than 315 PII may result in impro preparation confusion and ineffectiene~ Instructions IT he iI(gtd rlier than )1[ Pi( directinf( the ld Division pnpan to rnoc and the final decision mipht then be issushyialer in thl day As said before the situation is such al2 P1l as to permit a dlli--ion to he announ(ed To delay beyc 11G IM indicates indcciflion and vacillation due to the demiddot I fur ((lJ more information The moement of the 3d Diw~ is dillkult and will n1uire the determined efforts and con tration of everyone to make it a success It is wrong in prinel to kccp subordinate in doubt over long- periods of time ast1 what is wished A direetive should be is~ucd just as soon 3St~
situation has deveioped to the point where the decision canb 1 made We will never have all the information we would lik We must al lim tal( lakulatld risks as to the probableca~ hili ies and llos-ihle reactions of the hostile forces
1)ltbions rll(llld llarlv oftpn hav0 to be modified in SO~J
nf Ill(iJ det aib hy Ialll delopmcnts Therefore the directi i isued by t he commander must be sufliciently general Or brogt in its terms so as to allow the staff leeway for adjustmentc minor malleIS Only such changes in the situation as wow make a directive impossible of successful execution should allowed to dictate a change in the directive Frequent chan lead to a lack of faith in a eommander and the faith of
1
l
Academic Notes
dinates is a commanders most powerful ally There is in this situation developed after 215 PM which calls change in the cGmmanders directive THE DIRECTIVE- middotThe I Corps has bcen directed to Baltimore without delay The 3d Division is ready to dark tonight and the cavalry will have gained a suitable
y position for the 3d Division The fog is clearing and e can expect the hostile forces to gain a clearer idea of our
and dispositions and to readjust his line of action to r offensive He may be strong enough to continue the
ttack tomorrow but if he does he will find himself grpatJy
As long as the hostile force attacks our holding attack force the latter will best perform its mission by defending Therefore to insure reserves for an attack tomorrow when the hostile forces may be attempting a defense or withdrawal the corps comshymander should prevent these two divisions using up their availshyable strength today
The directive must be definite- about tilc movement of the ~d Division That division can ~ove by motor transport and gain some surprise by moving at night Since this transport must be oul of the way or concealed by daylight we do not haY(~ any loa much time even with a long night In view of the
andicapped by our attack against his exposed east flank (arly possible changes in thehostile situation during the night and in omorrow morning Offemive action is clearly demanded by he message from General Headquarters
J ~ i An attack of the hoctile we-l jeft) flank has some attractive
features If succeful illmmedlalely will be more eOotl- to the neroy It will mObt quickly halt his attack against our right ~I (west) flank It has very pronounced undesirable features Even if initially successful the hoStile forces will have to he 51 tttacked again in front of or on t~e line Parr Ridge Du~ i lIi11Ridge It also drives Red back on our objective t hm requirshy0- fug us to find him again and again The objective for thegt first ~aisaction is the high ground in vicinity of Hampstead The
tapture of this terrain feature will completely dislocate the hosshyJ llleforce The easiest avenue of approach to this feature i~ from ~ le vicinity of Vhitehall Either flank is equally accesqible ~ lthough the situation on the west flank is not so completely poundmiddotl~ wbilized as on the east flank The movement to the east flank J ~ the most direct route to the hostile line of communications ~ fhich seems to lead from Baltimore At 215 PlI the (orps commander is aWUie that the bt and
bull ~d Diyisions are about to resume the offcnshe He knows that 1 irose two divisions will constitute his holding attack tomorrow
order to allow our feints demonstrations and attacks by the 1st and 2d Divisions to have effect we direct the 3d Division to attack on corp order rather than at a definite time
The directive to the cavalry must be definite The whole plan o[ the collmander m~y be disrupted by the action o[ the rayulry if propel instructions are not issued It is therefore the duty of the corps commander to tell the cavalry commander what he wants done and when and where the mission is to be performed After being relieved by the 2d Division and its cavalry the best use [or the cavalry brigade will probably be 10 attaek in conjunction with that division vVe cannot be sure of the --ituation at daylight tomorrow therefore we direct the cavalry hrigade to await a corps order before ltlttarldng
In order to provide a strong weapon in the hands of the (orps commander in many situations we would like to hold a brigade of infantry in corps rcservc In this situation the hostile forces have so definitely committed themselves to an attack that a large reserve on our part is not so necessary as when the hostile force has committed only a portion of hiR force The Blue bitushyation has become so involved on the front of the 1st and 2d Divisions that it is diflicult to envisage holding out a large reerve even if the situation did indicate its desirability
DECISION-To the natural horn leader if there i -u(h ~ pctmiddott-on the power of decbiun is a ~(cond nature It 1 inherenl 111 the man The I(arier mllst he dfcisive He mu-t have confidenc( in himself and heri a~ain he must have Imowlcdge ltPHI he [lh irally and mentally fit A pour decision prom)l) rendei(d and lignrous1y followed is inshys finitely hetter than no dtci-ion at aiL Vacillation has no place in the make-uIJ of a real leader However wrong deshycbions if made too frelUentiy lead to loss of prestige and lack of tonfidence The real leader is never a straddler
-J11laquo 01 (Jfcrnl Ii I Brees U S AT1ny
69
I
d
Irghling Forl rourn~l uf till JOllrnai qf til i llmlmiddotdSlrjmiddotmiddot
rmy 1qart r
Directory of Periodicals
IO(hlfllllTl tlll dirpclory up only those periodicalR from which nrtich~ havpound h(gt(gtn HPelted -- altt) Llltlt of ltrJlHiwniq Indfxed and Kpy to AIJhrfvitltiollI
MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS
Joint Farcus
(rl~t J~ftaln 1 1~1) LlI mtd ~(r](1 111lt11tllUl1l CPt Hntallli 7) lt 1- r- II ( hi tltlll1qll of Inlha (rlt Bntun ItHhll if) Emiddot (rIHntIJIl HI
Gcncr1 Military
I il Hr1 tin) if) Hlllhtlll 11) Ii II bull 1111111[1 rillllll1nl 7f) CanaulJ7l rJI r Ii r flI Iri rl (lfldILI 71 La Fran(t ~llilt I r [1( 71 -11liLlrwi I (I hI 1 Itt 1111ll1fll (iult-tnl 7K
71~~~~~(I~(r (1 rll til I l2
Rpoundvu( ~11Iitalr (q Tmiddot I r111(p) xi) Rtvul -l1l1t llTC ~l~ --Ji7frbnri) x7l
Armgt ilnd Scrvlcc~
m An It(d IT r r ltJrtmiddot rl (rlt HnUill) H)
ltTILI In
(f)Ilt rtlill r Inrn 71 lIPid rtdl rmiddot 1 71 InIPjt flf Il (rllt I1ritlIl I if) fLtmiddot 111 t (ll ( d~ 1
( ALHY
(wnlrshy 71 (ldn (TI Hrl1lJl 71 HI 1)1 il ~I rH1C 2
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
TIll (lIon atdo) tIlt lr(]pound-- ~llect(gtd from LIbrary periodicals for the current quarter Periodicals in this Catalog lITIlgt(i allllalJmiddottically
ARMY ORDNANCE
Mly~Junc 1938
1 It ~C 1l1t (llll -(T1Nf OlijlltEINTS II1IT Tim 1 IBLlt (11 111 Lr If L II~Tgt -lajur General lJrtgham
Til ilL 1-1 q So rr IUd ~~II 1111 IHLrAREnNfS~ POLICnS OF A 111)(1 IS Jtll II Jllc()l Ctptdn LlldlJiILlrt
jlltlI I~ rI] 11 A -rtlyen W HWIrSTHIL MOlI]I7ATION 1 llj()r (Hid
July-August 193B
Tn Thl I --1middot1 1( [l Tlll r 1111 ro 1011 PAn ITH TJ~CH-11 bjflr(ImiddotIIrl Ilfr
TtJTI(d~ [I f lin I 1T1ltJAI~ Im1It HblATION Tn OtlR NA~ nltj 1 --1 I~II r I J Li III (q]n)1 Itfl~~r I
ARMY QUARTERLY I(Pt ilritlIll)
July 1938
Im (11JJ It lllL III TIll Hili No XVI APIILltR HJDGr 9TH or ~fAi 1911
Im 1 1 r--l ] 11 -1T1L 1gtIL1J1T10N IN CHINA (II) LNlrquin
70
ENGINlxns Military Engineer _ Pionicrc (Germany) Rall-lrrna di Ctlltum Mtlllarp (Italy I Hoyal Enginccrfl Journal (Great Brlbin)
INFANTRY
Infantry Journal
Uld~ntu~lC)MCdi~~~~~~ (Greut Brituin) Military Surgeon
Army Ordnanc( QUARTLlltSTCR
QuartrmafJUr Hevl(w Itoyal Army Service Corp-l Quartprly (Grplt Hntlill)
lNhgt
Kraftfahrkampflrupp( (Germany) Royal Tank Corpl Journll (Grtlt Bnlain)
Vlttrrinary Bulletin
Navy and Marines Manne Corps Gazctt( Naval In~titut( Proccpdinhl
i u
I]
____- I~
l 1
o J~ 1321
b ~if
TIlE MAJOR TCTI(S Ill- Tin INIlllnell B TTLg BrigadJ(lT gomery
ANTI-AIHCHAIT Hax
BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES Inlgul
By -1JOlt E11 BINITJZ COIII Artillpry (orp
Janulry 1938
lilSTOIW OF Tim INSlECTOltAn~ GCNEltA ltW TilE An Alll BELGIAN TRAINING (INTERS DURllOG TilE WORLD WAR
lHbtoir(gt d( lIlIflppdioll G6neralt d( lArm(gt( et d(gt CentTrH Hlrudinll BII~CH ptlldant la GUerrp Mondiah 1lH~191SII LilutGll1(ral de Selliers de Maranville
Ih( iHllhnr WI Inljwctnr Grl1eral of tlw
~(olli I~~l ~~ ~~~ ~~l~il (1~ I~~1 g ~~m
j
hv
I~~ He ~ nti
f n~ I
jar
h
I ~
~~II~h~g~~~~~~ldd1 ~~~t~i~~tr(i~l r~~p~~~~~ qlttlr l~l fr~11d~ ~~11lail~~11 t~lo~~~11cliiDcuit Cir(IlTllltal(Pl uIHhr whih 1111 HCgilIl forcP rpcnlitld and III1Jlpli(cl
At tiU time of til( retr(tt of til( nplf~ian army Ul author had undpr hi ()mmlllHI ROmf t ROOO recruits in France scattered in six diviqional depot~ of 3000 men continued their advance tl1P1f men wer( tallten to Fecnmp whill nfW depotfl were opPlled in various toWtll Normnndy with l1fadquarters at RoUln
01 XVIII No 70 Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A YFAlt OF AR IN SPAIN (JUIY 1936 JUlY 1937) rUne nnn6e de gucrre en Eltpagnp (Juillet 1936 - JUllleurot 193711
(II) Major Wanty Conclusion of Major Want~ g account of the first i-Ear of the Spanish
(11 War
~ilrh~I~~~I~~p~~~I h~dOhd(~~er ~(~~~~~t~~~rlal~~~IJO~I~~~rnI~~h~r~f pnrdofllcrrs The Jarge extenslOn of front and Ol(gt comparatively igtmull numlHr of
t~~~~~af7~~~i fl~l~~~a ld~i~f~( ~~~l~ of I~~t~~~~l~r~~n~~igtOt~I~~ ~~ t~t~(~q t ~hi~~ ~Oeuror1or to thmi( of tlw GoCrnmrnt fortP TI bavegt hpPIl ltoll1what nf lcsappomtmpnt hO((gtT thry ould probahly havp Jllaypdt marpound mflushyftalro1(gt hart tl)rr hrPIl mfantr- rpad to follow til(m llr GtnllJ1IIom) hedplttrofd mlny tlnt or put thpm (Jut of Utoll Ilotor17lrl (nlumn hea~o hpPIl Ifgt ff(ctlC and dlfIllUitlh at thp hpld of tilgt olumn h rrrOl11litrd thf (-l1tirp (oloy TI)e~ (olnmnlt haY )1rOPI1 to 1(1 fr~
_~~~r~~I~ldair alta(- Tlll~ remarkgt lrp prohah mldf vlth (Jua
1 Tnr lJoulwt thpOT ha ftllPd to ingtPlff natiollalllrrnT on tlw (ontrlnt $1 tacticgt havo c(lnltoildatfd puhllc -pnlin1middotnt and tifT nld tIl(middot ]1 to r-ltt to tllp a~t
DImiddot 1lI1TION OF UH C110-1 l IUfjOAL TIt 11 01 11lf nu (LN S()I OlI]
Une tXpoltjtion fip pI rf(gt(i(1nnrmrnt (ultllnmiddot1 fI prnfl-inllwl ain-i qUl dorganI~ltioll dllt 11~lr du lt)lu11 J
~ A regimental commanrpr (jpltrTlption of the pducational and 0(1shyt ~a tramlllg of t1l(gt Bflgian ltoJellPr mel the factiltw ofTfrprj tlw oowr to ~_-e traming hilp in the seTiN
February 1938
Tm f)LFbsC OF DI~lmiddot[lF 17 OTOBER TO]n I1l1middotIHLlt 1)J 1 Pagplt (lhlto(lirr dp lArml lltp all (Ollr~ d la GUerr(gt ]lJ1-1HIh
j I)lxmmlrgt 17 odoilTC-lllnoWmirp 19111 III) faJltlr Want Tr(l econd inlttalmpot of the dpfcmp of Dixmudf drgtlt(niling til(gt operashy
~3 from 20- Octoher 1911j~
ibull I Th~ tlt)wn v a a ltIrlt gl( rofi and rlliway ccntN of Bllgmm and for
rt1-00n tlw G(rmall- mul( grlgtlt pITnrh 10 ( lpIUff it TlH hndldHad
~ -~ tgc~ ~f~r~I~11~1~~( ~Zll1~l~t Ji~l~ ~l~~I111(i~1 F~~~~ t fI J~r~hf~~~111~ il~~ r artly in tIl( dppoundIlp of the cIty
[1 -- shyHISTORI OF TIll bltIICTORTr GrSJRAL OF TUB Alnn ~n THE
nEJil- TH JX1S(j (E1ERs 111IOS( TilE Vom IJ H ~ Hh1oire de lInltpectwn Gill(oral( de lArmC poundt dCs CCntrEs dInshy
struction TIplglt ppnd1l1t la GUNre 110ndiale 191j-lJIR 1 III) LipuLGrmprai de Spiller dp ~foranvlile
Ii _~ ~p(ond inlttaln1Pnt glVrc a detailed account of the ralsinJ and U-- r n mrn ior tw nfigian arm v during th(gt World War with iull dptail (1 gt-1ng t1Plr frdill) (Io hm~~ HId Hlmltllf-trat ion At alrpadv (Xp1LllWd ~ r CPrllllf IltU( fill( to the raplr C(fmall adI11(eurogt tralllln) (pntPrlt k1 to llt f~tlbhf-llfrl III XormalHllP vlth the tsltlstanee of the Frpneh G~rrLfnt Soml 40000 mpH ~ 150(1) rc(nllh or the ltiacl1899-Hnl u12jnro or the 1914 clalt - Hf( tTuJllrl in t11(ltp (pntNe
March 1938
THE DEFENSI OF DiIUDE 17 Onomm TO 10 NOIMIIEH~1914 ipar dlllgttOlrl rIp lArmp(gt 1plvp all (lure ltIf b GU(gtfrc 1)14-191R Dixmurlp 17 octolmgt-lO TJ(lvlmhrl 11l1J (Ill) Major Wanty
~ The third inlttalment (overing th oJ1(gttationlt from 22-~5 OctollPr m C Leh thr author dClt(flhes in ddail th(gt hIroic attemptlt to hold tlw position
trough tile hifTlJ command had deCld-d thlt Dixmllrr mllltt he lbamk)Jwri
~e f~~~f ~~t l~ill~~~~hr~~~~~~~~~~~ Ifli~tal~~i~alvN~n~~h~s~~71~1~~~~
l~Clme penlous Heavy lo~gtplt Vore inflicted on th( GPrmans who werl
astl ooung mpn of tlw new ReiNe Corplt ThCla( of rfltrrv(gt) thr(gtw _great ~train upon hoth French and TIplglal1lt particularly tl1P attfr who
uld not fpn or)imi7C tll(middot FutHh ltYltPlll or lt11ort rlllpfs The machinp ~nnrs In particular hul no r(st day or night Tl(SP operationgt arpound fcnbrd In grpat detail
1l)TOItY Of TilE JNSPE( TORTE GI~FltI ltH Tim AIWY AN]) TilL1 BrrGfAN THAININr CHIH~ DUilINf TIH~ WOHfn WAR rHl~toir( cir lInltppctOn G6nfralp dr JArmpe (gt1 drCl C(gtntrplt dIn-
Btruction B(gtll-C pendallt la Gl1(gtrrf Mondialp 1914-HI181 rIIl) ] Lifut GrnCral de Sflllfrs h1IIJratlvil1f f The thml ingttalmrnt (overing thp pCflod 5 January 1915 to Fehruary
19 bull
CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (ClIlada)
July 1938
CND~ ~(jIliiIN luLHY 13) the Hight IIollourahlp WL MallPllzl AI AR~IY THAT CAN ATTArK - A DIVIRION TJlAT rAN IlI~FrNJ) Captain
rJWBLl-~ljS OF DEFENCE ON THE PACI~IC Colonel Letson A SYSTEM OF ANTI-TANK Dl~FENCE Captain Kormann TANK OR ANTI-TANK Major Sieulrg
CAVALRY JOURNAL
May~Junc 1938
1)w TilL) KNOW Jlm) Major Schwi(gttl
July-August 1938
Tm ROU olt AVIATION WlIU ~mrHANI~~P AVAIItY CalJtam Sehlatter DLI EN~E MA1NST lIt ATTACK Captun Nohle Till lOlTNIIP ATTAf IN OPgN OIWtlt Colonel itrwart Late 15th
JallC( rs IIHhan Army rOlINIJ CONTHOL CmlMOlilCATiON A REGIMENTAL VIEW-
lUl~middotr Jwul (olun(1 Grim(s
CAVALRY JOURNAL IG-nat I3ritaml
July 1938
A (AUn OFFIllm~ EXIEltlENJSON TIlE INDIAN FltOSTIER DURING TIlE WAR LHutCololel BCaman
CnL1lY BAfTL~ HONOlJHS TUE r8NiNSULAR WAR - PART 3 TAshy1ntA ~7TJ[2KTH JIILY 1809 Major Edwards
~l(ItALt (I01l1IlER TO RIJOUiiHml Lleut-Culonp1 McCrp(ry
CHEMICAL WARFARE BULLETIN
July 1938
~I (TRIT OJ TilE IIWI(E m fliPLY nri(adlfr Genpral Tyn(r
COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
no~IDING OIEltATIONS IN TilE ZONE 01 Tlln INnHIOJ LJ(utColonel (olton
Am IOvBIt AND moO MOg1ENT Major Phillips ANTIAlRCILll COl~IUNHTIONS Captlin Bartlett
July-August 1938
DEi ENS OF TilE 13ELGLN COAST 1914-1918 Licut CulOlH1 Tilton BUIJlAlwomNT TACTlCS Brigadier General Pratt THUNDER IN TllJ EAST Lieutrllunt Rudolph Tng SPANISH WAIt A REVIEW OF TIfE BEamp1 FOHEIGl OPINION Captain
Johnson
FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
LBSUNS lItml SPAIN Colonel Lanza ARE PHlATE SOLDums Ni~CESSARY Upson Cml~IUNI(TiON WITJTlN THE LIGHT BATTALION Lieutenant Dishman
July-August 1938
MOlNG TARGET TiRIW NJrJ1T UVEIt (ftOSSING
FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain I
June 1938
AN(iO-FHENCIi CO-OPE1ATION Right Honoraillpound Winston Churchill PRIT Commmdcr Grellffll Am fOJUE KPANSION fly Our Air Jiorc Correspond(nt
August 1938
TIIB H()1BER WiLL r-OT ALWAYS GET THROUGH By Realist TilE HATTIE OF TIm WIlnEHNE~S Licut-Colonpi Burne
LA FRANCE MILITAIRE (France)
Il MJOR T R PlIlLLlPS Coast ArtIllery Corp
18 February 1938
INFANTRY TU~AINS TilE qurEN OF BATTIES ILinrantNip dpoundm(lrp a nl1P rips l1atalllpound1 J
Tl author T((all thal it il not today only that 0111 admits that battle hal loltt Its dl(iqiVl lmractPr This information was obtainable from the R11iill~Japallte War And it sppms that tllP only method or overcoming thilt4 inconvcnwnce is II IlfW mobility of operations mohihty which requires tactJ(ai continuity in til(gt prOI~rrgs or the attack
[n all armill thil truth has been recogniz(d ltnd all undeNtand equally that taniHI have not fulfilled all hopes placed in them It is not tanks that
71
C~tald(j of Selefteci Periodical Articles C amp GSS Quart ~~~~~~~~~==~--==-~==~--~~~==~~~~-~-~~~
wll be ahlmiddot to Tmg dppiltlOn m hattIe and it jq n(((ltIary nnew to tum tnwllrd the ptfrnai infantry It 1 mfalltry whirh Rhoulcl proVIre the solutJOn to
the )r~~~~ptt~~~~j~lli~i~~SL~t~i~(a~~~~~~~itty to gam continuitsect of moyprnfnt for the iJIIMltry uffmiddotnltIVf Equdl it j~ indlspenltahe to furshynith (lvidtnrl fnr rIo ~~llptrl flf thE infmtry lttalk aJulhlp information on thi NubjPft hal 11middotpl1 illlwil frlln Sptin Ind tlll O[wnt in till pl~t yar Al Captain gtIclmlra -11] III Tlw Onit(d Sr i(~middot HI-lW 1PrJ IVJltlOfl
i~~~ I~~t~~l~ll ~n~I Lr~li I~~ I~ f~~t J~l )Iiiirt ~~middott~i~~ ~~l)fd~l~~ i)if~ TJlI arlion f)f Jill] n VJll Lf call1ta In th( atta( 1llt mrantry rlnnot prnl~t( middot1 agailj~t rn lIhnp VllIlC 11 lilt C)gt n d h~ t1l11 rtllli ry (rtll~ Will I1WI) tr i lip tIl jllCll1nn hut lamiddot[( mel thrn l mLlilnll IUIl 11 nrnlll til plr) I lif 1(1lCl of tllP ltlfLury ullttl till 1 )nki rft tn work n fhl nL
It wlldd 11111 dllllnd wntl Ldnr ~)(Lln IhLId 1 middotInmiddotI of 1 fll7 II 1-0 ILt I ilL W Jim t hlt II d ltIqOn 1 If) Ill PHmiddot(middottl ltI llllt 11
Ihl ollIIIJI)) 1 Tltnrkdlp InLLTltn InfHlrmiddot I lr~ 1llV tlldlY 1IIfl vnlh IIJ( na~()n ti h lt-tlll l1l1
I qlld rillmiddot til 1111 If lIlh II will 1 )11 Ihd m1l(h Jllltn lIrr (If Uf tI n lrnj drl plapj dill It lmmPfiLtp PrlP 1 pry-ttIPI hnilld I d ITound 1ilf mfan1 r llld til i1 I v hy III Jl)~lnd 1 I ap 111 Illlli III mf111n dljcifill
Illl Il Ir L dd 11111 dflllpllllnt of dlIJo)~Ir lrllllilri t hI 1I1Ltlil r [ 11 T II frlll ttl hlh t himiddot Imprl rJli til trr)l t IIf (0)]lt11shytll iqn IJf llllJfl rn mfln r rj fWlrL1l11 III ill Iji muq Ip t hrgt founrllIl1lll f 1 bull 01 )r~ ( lit Irm
ljrrn Infilr I fin (fol)l1 Ill toolLv )llll 11IflItry 11 not llVrj rn hgt(I1 It J () ~ ltrmnrrd antlt1Il1 ~I lIOn- Ulri f~r(llarj( threli~shyr It Rill nd i mrjrn lJ1l it III Id t hi 11 Hll 11lrilmlllt in IH Of 41lfi Hl pflrt(( thl arm ITI)(II d I dll1I~ in Its f rlr and Jndoll Ih Ir (rror nr (oilgt rint tlu m- hl- 1l) 1111111 (llffl UI
5 M1rch 1938
Ill (iT -i THr1 TII Itll Till- lt01 Till ltT 11 It tl- ( nl1m r II Sud-I- I (olm]l HlHltl
n r Fr LllCO ~fdlLrtraquo o( I SIpkmlIr 1917 til liltlOr I n1 ntl ot nf till flur l~rollp-1 nf Ilrl~p Gprman mlhtlfmiddot unitlt
II 1 )llli]tif thlt O1kht td piL(I Olle r(lItllIIi- ronshy111 Ir 1 j lIl1ru IPImiddotIlrmiddot tn bf Ibout to Cd p1uP Thi IS I
) tI In r I) tll Trl j r 11l -llnnlk1 (( Il Ld middotr rfll1r lin HIICJllllI ~ 1m hLi c()mmmd( d hl II
rrn ()Tp 11 11I11Ilth ha b( nn (111 (1 In tlil command of tl1(gt ttl Groupshyf11 III of iLf[1 Ilnl~ It l ljll lwrl Ill rpphr -1 GPJlrrcll 011 lntlh l~ 1 III ( 11i1111 17lt11 In fTt -I Gf Iltrtl on HI HlWIlUI ejpml to hr dll lo
11111( Inj r 1 I- f)Ir)j I rilTlrllflll Ilf til mlr armv (nrp -fatlnIlP(1 011 tlt frotl f f CIgtfJlh)rn lUt md U1~tfil tJr- 11 Inrpi It -11J1lwh I Illfd f IllLtnlr- ItltIr nil Sthotrl thf Xill (UTlI II uremhuTf ~ nmiddotrll If CIll r middot 1111 llh tIl(gt 1middot COTll at Dndpn GpnfgtTal of
Infllllnmiddotnn S(lnldkr ill 111 (nrp at Hfl~11tll((llPrall)f Infantry foil] In adilltln hp ] t nIlrlan milUlllllIl lln~d(gt at Lmdlll tIlt d j)nlflll Igtf (jllnmiddot dt Brr-~lll llld thp 1ltt ~d mel ilh Armorrd l)jVlmiddot
11 II PlIlllr 11r7hlr)~ Inri nr(lt]all Th 011 HIlrl 11n11 (rn11]1 Ihu (llilstitUplt 11 Ixmiddot(l1ent nlPtll for
1111)1rl1ll1 prlllTP on Alllttri md Cz((holovlkl-l ThL l~fnllfJ em IH JrtlrI h I l1ornr r (If arm (orp c1f1arhpd from thp FJrct and Srconrl
ll HfrlJl and (tmiddot 1 vlfliuul (hturillnJ thp Lngp covCrinr fnrcfc I 11 dlll L lill I 10~ d1 tlJ rl j()Jh fflllll Poland or Franrp Faring
Inl Frlll I I- (middottHIIl lIll 1) 111 lin Ii 1 thf Y and XII Corplt al ~I1Ilrt In I] 1 Hl n TIl(gt r()prin~~ fllrcplt will 1( (ommlndtd hy CIIlril JI111I latlnlwil d K(IlrJultlrtl Fl(inl~ Pulanr1 j (lu Flrlt CnllP I 11llTl1llld d c III r d nll Hllll-IImiddotIIl ~hlfh ilhuril till 1 II III lid III (uI th hmiddotldlILLrfgtr ll J()JllgqlIrg Stlttin ttldin anrl Bn -1111 SInP t1 1 J I (oTl- 1(longH 1111 in thf ofTlllIV (roup of von Il Irll nUl if III II Tfr1L1middotd in Itlt cl)v(gtTin~~ mlcion tJwlrd PoTtnd hy I 1llh~fllr 1Il11~ JlroLlllly rrl)lllfd llndr tlH OrdfrH of nIIPral von KPlit
Tljl rl n m lltl- tlilll tl 11Igtl1rl tIll nfTInlvP 1111011 If till Hlldwlllu rnllP tIll T IX X XI lIlcl XImiddot COnl the ~ld and Hh Armorpd IJlvi-lOlll
dd Ihl ht (I1r 1)ll--lnn TJ1f (man Army cw thll- throw two cU(shyt hrmI-middot1 Vvlrd til(gt crplllHadmiddot III Ihl flTlt hi Ihl Fourth Group In(IlI1rrL~ md r tl1 Irdl r1 flf IlImiddotril VOIl HCilli(gtnau fOllr army (nrpl a Inmiddotllltolln hrJgult thrmiddotp armorl rliidnnl and a flvalry djill)l ill thl (JlrllllH IllP Tlmd (rup illl IlPadqllartprq at Dndpn mduding fi(gt
I)fr t- IrTlllrirl dIVllf1n9 an1 a livilon of cavalry Ar tIl 1 r III Ind (1 tht 11tklall armir lapaI11 of fl[ ini~ til llorpltltlntl of lTlllmiddotqrlulp Inri lldity
19 Mnrch 1938
Itl HLlIfTOC IlN THE GJltAN AltIY IUfI raquoiIJt r 1 1llr Jarm(p allpmnnrif I (orl1l1l Choumlo
j hI ~Ilr IJl7 hai paH(1 RlthoUI tlw war whlCh many (gtqwlpoundd and IJlk 10 ( Ih nnlr qW-Itj(Jn With ITIltfr allxidy Thiq qUlltllln dPJJInd~ )1 11IIm lrmmy liJr fI1l1 Olmtry wllfn pnJ)aratlOn fur war IS tIll fnnrJlrJ III a ImnllIlt of nal imal li(I Bllt IJIl Spfltt lind hll (il(III rt lml Iltllj 11]p I 0))1 of tlw orld Var witlId to prepow a rLpid WHr lJt Id alm1 hmiddotlv 01 lmiti An arm~ Wlll(h will)o allIIl all llllllY Hutldfnl~ Ind ly 1llrprl-f ~I intprt1t ihll( nwr in tIll HptNI of tiwir tanlq lhw in tllfir 1Tmor anrI armnmpnt Yon flppkt dppmrcl it )HCpqqary to rfinshy(re hll armlJrr II land (or(I hy a IhOllllllHl nirplanfl
011 Spfkl ~I th( nrt1 fnr()lIltrrpd conqidprahlp rtliHtanc( atnonK tlH rlf(tltativImiddot If thl old rNmlIl (ipnfril BtafT lmt 11HY C01HIUlrtd comshy
middotPllblbIJld yenIrior to tlJl GfltTman-Aufltrian union
72
plctely tht new gentml iOll wuch had )10 War eXj1(gtTlenc( and whose mllilt- lIlstrtlction wai Vpry hrJPf during tIllt perIOd of Glrman army limitation ~ 5C new academy heacitd by GClleral Libman nn intimat( advi~fr of til( Fuhn til ha~ only functionCc1 for two or three y(gtam and the firgtt officers who ht~ au grauuatfd are till doing thCir ~Crvice with troopg ar
Iwo t(gtIHlcllciP WIrf formpti in til GfIITal Staff Corps and lCpafll1 tb tlw old otlilfri who had )P(gt11 forlnd in tl1l war (ofCge in llerhn nnd~ (0
fOIlI~ht Ihl war and till yOlllll~ oHtlr wlthuut Wlr txlpritI1(( md graduall D( frorntllt ahlinvialld IHII wlr )tafT (our The olli(iai organ of thearrry tlP Mi1itar~WI)fIHnhlatt iI duplicated now hy the Deutsche We~ of organ of tll1 IIIW Glrrnan nnlitary thOIlIht j in oppocition to the idCM016 old (lIIITal StaIL 1hp OPI)()-itwil had tlndd (0 mov( the point of ~ of tIl nld(r ofjHtr toward till Frltllh taetitll idpas which con-ist of ga I IIllP to pprmil 1ll1)]ilLatlOn (oopnnv troop awtiting thpound ()(my Oil prc~ J))litionq WIth jlanlj wfl ltufil)orttli allfi Irqnl~ r(lt(gtrvpc fot ()untrratll 1ll middotIl of IlPld
Thl hwrn)(rl of (IL( olt G(Ilfra Staff wllh von Blomh(gt(R hrldtbt HIIa and haliwti1hlm up ith (xpIriel1ltl In Splin whllh was not avon~ to rapid tanl TIHI ltPI)lratpfl from thr inLmtry (VPO thotl~h victoriOCl w(r dl troYId lJ antitank 1~1J1l1 and Ivet) fifld artilhry aft Ixilauqt(ti t Iwir ammull1 Hill Tank JI tlH an(iPllt rullint harr World Wlf mlld 11 (olnwfd elmfly II till ilJfmtrv flut sin[(l 10 tlu printlpitl of Im ~ppld I nuy Iwulrl )1 falt It followed that try hl)uld Ill Iarripd In mrJJrlt ExplrilIH1 -Ith thi~ tlHory Wa~ obta at 1111 Hatth of (lIatItlapra H-~3 ~1tr(h 1937 when the aviatIOn tr fllrllwd Plll)rmOml (Ilitllllll of motrs mIll a ma~~ of iroll junk
Till r (XIINiIIHP1 lrml-frJ lif rpll(tiongt of the partlmll) or sudigt ~ttt(k Ithoul a detarallon of Wdr (i1Tman militan pub1icatIOIlH wL IVf1I rprPlllly hII fmpha-i7f11 till TfTlltrkahle fjualitll of UWlr laril I-pp(iatly tiwir fgtpIId which Icrmit tId (1t1-1Vf hioWH are now Pl1hi5r~ ](ttlr (())IlldtT(d artitlr notably tho by (j(lleri Elnlanbprger ll a AUlriJ1 lank autbonfimiddot_ III dlfan lt thit at lIat a yplr WJill)( requl tn manllfaelurp lIHlI~h tm to havf an fff liv Ilp(riorily uvert aclpmary Imdff tlw mo1 ftorabllt condition And til ~liht hJLtt Writll thaI rlpit jl1Ji whilh Iplrtlro ll](m~IIt from an a (ontrHlidion to tllf fundamlnLil Hlpl of tIll wpoundqmIl (I(onling to I Ill 1Ir of thp nldlr Cftnm (i(lpral Staff omngt there I)~ lonlT allY qllPtlOn of a Ilrldln at tack 1lId It wJ rquiT at (a~t a)i til miIlUfLctIlTl mattnd ~llfli(j(gtnt ill 1111Il1ity and flnllltr
At tIlt Ilml flltlfr (lmp inlo IHIWlr till HiPl of rapid war W
of (lfmaIl11tratlIY and thlt i ~ 11 till lill tltor could amrn~ III that 11 would aplHlr uddlnly hfon Ihgt PIlf01y hy urpnI hUll 1h( ~PIl(falf of Ihp oldlr (hoo n(uo(d to nloI tlf Fuhrr oert rolliltl md Fivld 111r11al HlnmllCn l1tholJg-h m anlnt National Socia5shywac not ahlfgt to rfIlOtln( phi Tllllitln (()Il IdlOll Hpoundlidplt fVPII I luperfi 1U (xmullllion of German millt[ likrtllrp ltho(lt1 that tllP ~t Hlomlwrg- d[vtrlld from th(gt politjd lImlt of 11)(gt Fllhrfr alld ~I rr from (oPrillj(lt1 lt(ra((~ htl lld -(1IIhl wr a JOIl tll1H to ud (orrflte(l J)oulwt qratil~Y It
Onl of fhf Ividlnt proofl tillt tIlt GfnPLll Staff hlIl rPllotlnCld 11 ~~~~d~i~~gt ~ltr~~~I~)fh~II~~c~rl~~I(I~~~i~ ~l~(lt~lt~))~ll~i~f tl~l(V~~~~~~~for~ -~( lTn1ond divi~ioll E(n til( orgmizlum of thf 11)) njvL~jf)l of I n already (lltup1ptply ready lIltl dctinpu to 0((111 tIll inclll-InII rrglr Q Flllfrffhl-TIarnwl1 hll bcCn topppd at prlltent n
Aftpr having rfgtdiz(gt(l that tank unite ~llon( could not l1nri(rtaheuro-~lpriOIIS op(rltion~ tl1pound I)r~ani7prlt of thl Il(W Irmy dtcid(d to pro(rd the r(irrinrrllllfllt of th 1notori7fd lIlLllItry lt0 th)t It woult not bL IJlhind til( tanl1 and III the fift hdf of 19n 11 reHlwnts of infantr~l hCfn motorizCd IItH C er tlw Rittle of GtucLtlaiarl l1pr( the motoshyinfintry had I](pn hpakn halt forced tilt Gprmall (~ IHrd Rtlff to am-ltL tlH fllrlhlr lnotorilltlllll of tIlt infalltry
1))1 (rfltors of til( np GprmlH dodrinp of ar Ire compIltCly TV Till IlPW aputtgt of tanls (i(lIfrd Eimltlllbl Tlr Iipllin thlt If I~ hIVP not U(((Ilti(rt tip in thl prtfnt it il bt(luP tlw havlt not becn proppriy anti JI(gt dp(Lm- thlt they ~hol1lclllP tlltainprl in ~he off(nsiwL~ ollk hy 11Ifltltry 11111 With pnlTflll 1r11i)T llpporl which ml~ hrlJ to f(lllow tht1ll TIp iillt al(llT(hl)l~ to -hwh tIl(gt lanks d~tiIlPd flltl repJa((gt tllC Irtilllry III onipr to tin lay it h Ihr Lrliry prlarlto)lwi qllllllll(] tll( lIILIIk bull hollid nnw lp gtupportftl hy thil lfllP lrtilllIY
~ H
~ ~
Lit lHIJl1(I a1 lll)tlty Ind intTI-ld molortlatioll If til arlllltryb rIHllllOIlll1lllHld lImHpr ill many f th( dIVJ~i(ll artlllpry T(gimentIil
thinl pclion fur the ~upport of tllll- art I ~ft unorganiild Tlw GPrmall~ ha(~ tlm r(llo11nlfd theirfith lt1 tIll rfation ofa
ml all( ulnHtil(1 tiH Frll1(h thlf It I 11l1 an witll tll ~trat~ lvlatlllll Tltl nIt (~Prtll1Il ((I(gtr11 StlfT hI tlWlY~ htmiddotjd (Jut the miinn of aviallon a to altl tilf ~roun(l troop and only tftpr qucll req~ nHntl had hPll Ilwt to u1drrtalI nnw indlptIHPIlI oppratiOIlllll theft I( rahlq on thp mo~t important CPJjtl[l from a lllJlitary point (l( vip h rp(Pllt arlitj( in tilt Militar-V()dl1nh)III Ct11ollt1 Braull tlll1011stn that 111 thotliand airpianpl and tilt -1uddl1l attHk arl qUlitions o~ lWlOTHI Melir and that II ilIHI(clry ahoy all to latify tll( lviationn i
of Ihf Iround armgt lnd al1) tilt rpquirllHlnq of III (111 and mo~timC tall ((ntlgtr4 of lip Itllllllr (or Lllfinirlfd( dt(I11( 11( 1tt(li(tted OmIt army (orPq -Iliuuld hayl nillt f1tOnnaLltltHt plaut thrll [or artillery]) vBlinll Hlllthrhl for iaiH)] lteh armY (ight((lr((onn31~sallc( pl~ c nilll Tmrquit and niJlP bomilarrim(ut Icll flank dlVIllOn a quadron of airplant lLf(l Hh mnllllp dliion Jplll(r tank or cavalry Itl nme
or tllf dffpwt p( impnrtnllt point it is 1l(gt((lCllry to (Otllit on 1t a flquadroll of niTll Illallpq flllh the frontiCr cannot hC l(ft without drJ and thf prohahle route of inva~ion of an (Iwmy raid mU1t be cnrrdl (on~(lu(gtntly aftPT hUYir fmtiqfiCd [Ill the IHfpoundis of tllf atm~ andof J I aircraft dlfensf tlwrf WIll not remam many Illnnr4 for ulnal raids II
c
L
~
the country_
thOUl3nd airplanes and if these needs ate not satisl1ed the army might he ampflously menaced and VIllagegt and important poinLI suhjected to destrucshy
~~ aTr~ili~~e tll~t ~h~~ner~de~r~ie~ta~ ~~~ed~ritadrt~~ ~~~r~~l t~~c~~ The day after the taking of supreme command or all
forces b) Hitler a decre(- annollnc(d the Unification of t][gt INial ~ i~iair armielt Calkd division nr group~ with centers at funich
~ ing had personally dircctpu an aerial maneuver the theme fawhICh was a war between Gc~many and Frpnc(gtbull and In WhiCh Rlrrultaneshy-1~ Dusly with a sudden attack agam~t the MagmQt hne a thommnd airplanegt ~ left the SlUltgardt Iirdromls and complplcly d(mtrol-ltd Pam The conclushy
sOIl3 wrrp bent by llltkr to Blomberg and the representatives of the Rtiehsshy wehr declared that the strategy of GOlrin~ might have heen rortunat but that it could aho 11lc led to complete disaster Bcsidgt eVtn in alte of t j ltucC(I~ therf Wltlgt no r(lton to admit that the will to rsist would b( hrolwn
i~d th~t the French vould r(gtnounce prolonging the war lgt As far a preparatiOn for var IS concertld the organization of the ~Irmy lt land Its penonnel should be conildered Thp Gprman army tralllformed In
~ l~f~d~~i~~ l~~duVl~gtn~~ l~h~~(II~)~fc~~l~~i~~l~I(1 ~~~~~~a~II~~ ~~~l~~~ ~ ~duatlOn from (houl are ghcn a su~wrflCJaI pxlmillatlUn if they wish to
~ i~~~~p~~~i ~la~~r~e~i~) tn~~~I~)~l ~t~~ll ~~~~~ ~l~~i(~~ (gt ~Il~Ii~ ~~I ~~~f~~~l~t~~~ l~~ 1e~nt~th~I~~1Till~(~r~~Sll~r~ijl~~ ~m~~~~O~r~ sO~i~I~~fnh 1~~~~i~~~I~~ I~nd the gpirlt of It~ offJceflt rtqiq II ow on a d()ubiful baltC dpprlvpd of th(
- lLadltlOnamp of the old army ~- 1 Furthermore while m the Fnmh rm)- all the olleers of the grade of ~ ft3jOr and above took part III the Great War In the German army fVfn a ~ ja part of tllp officers of the grade of colonel 01lt (gt11 as all tholtc under thiq
i ~~~~o~nf~Udg~~~IIPCre1na~t~ ~r~d~rmiddotca~~l~i~llfr~ld C~~~[l~~ il~ ~~~ - ~de of major The Frpnch Genertliqmo Gamehn was chipf of sttfI of a ~~ ~cup of armipi during the ar while the commandcr or the German forpgt
~i ~ Gfnel~l ~~a~g~~~~~~i~~l~~(t~iiil~r~~I~~Irl (~lr r~I~~lh~~~r~lgll~~~hfu~ni~h~dmiddotmiddotmiddot-i~ the ~oldier of the RNchltw(hr llld for til( reltt thre(gt school havp been I tltuted It Potsdam Bibrrich and Vetzlar IImveoer Berthod Jacob
- ~ates that there hai not yet I)(en a slll~le graduate from th(~e schools ~J For recruitment of ~cneral staff officerq the duration of the course at
~_J_ I-e WarColfg has he(ll rrduc(d from thrN tf) two yfars hut in consNllencf
~ i f~~~~km(~a~~f~~~t~a~r~f rS~~~~~~in~l~gt~p~~~ ~~~~~~~lt~~a~~ ITIf~G~~~~~ ann has (ven redlpd former general s~aff officprl t~ service from retlreshy cnt among others Colonel IIerke (Illd of the RUilway Bureau to Ow r ~ rmiddot~tfgtr and Colonel HfmarICh ehlPf of the topographical section 1 r The GlrnJan exam pip i (ol1yincm~ once more that to create an army gt~ t3 not ltuflicifnt to as~(mbJc men and arm them it is still 11(C(Slary and 1 ls IS more difficult to crrate the bkeleton the corps of officers and nonshyI lcc~mlSslOnPd officers _ Colonel Choumski tcrminlteg Ius study in saying With appreciation the
~~ ~~~t~~~~~i~~e~~~i2~je~~ti~~~t r~~dY~~~~I~~ d~ffi~~ltd~l~d 1~1~~J~~~~ai~ l2t rnmiddot tlut vould he gwen it by an European war The German army lack~ gtJ ~~l detlrmllwd military doetrme a compact and tested group of leadprl
vnor and inrtdor 101 well a th matfnel it nepds -c I_ J 19-20 April 1938
I IRON DISCIPLINE 1lt lOH1~ N1middot~CESSln THAN EVEH IN Tim SovmT ARM
IUne dl~ciplll1P mllItme de fer e~t plu~ (jUt jarnaio ngtce~aire dans larmcc IovietHjUP]
1- In the issue of 20 Mrch 19a~ lrOlsnaia ZVlPzda the organ of til( emiddotmiddot PHi army ati~lm th~ leLdN an~l poJt~al cummissar who do not maintain eI~ lDe-dIscrlme III thr orgamzatIOns rcl A mIlitary dilcipilne hke fan wnt(gts the author ll the foundatIOn of t tre aptItude for combat of the Red army and of the victory of the Soviet gt~ ~ope OV(f the (Ilemils of th( -ocilllltt ffvoluti(ln Th(gt Party I~ gOing to rI eestro the Trotkyist traitors who stru~gle a~ail1sF tlCorganlzatlOn of the ~l regular army and againt the strengthemng of Its dlsclphne
Our army is the mOlt homogClleous the helt or~all1zed and I)(~t dlCI
Itt f~~h~r i~n ~7~h~l~~i)H~~ ~lr~henn~d(~~~i~(I~a~~dv~~Wth~ ~~~ f~~c~~cid~~~ ~ of the comhatants of the Ipadors and the political ommissars and on their I devot10n to til( party of Lenin-Stalin and the socialit fatherland Our
~ III modern tcehniquf lnd the role of etlch fwldifr and rnch Irader
owed an
YHlCf(lIltld Ulldlf t1He (ondl~])ll flilcipin( ~ium(s an enormous C th ltJlight(ltt lark of rJclplme (xl(utlOn rhfTerent fran lllltruCshy
ruin modern merhanilm and lower the value of tllf umt~ of the
d((gtiRlve role in the lltru~gle to he carrlNl out to maintam 111 iron falls to tlw lrgtadrgtr9 and the politleal commlSlarH th(y arc rlpOll-
It Unfortunately there are in the Red army RomP leader and rll who hav( forgotten that WIthout iron dllClplme one cannot MY nor ffsolve the problemB of military and political prfparatioll
hI author thln cites 8)me concf(te eaRP it is in this cate~ory he riteJ that bclon~ for exam pIC ~he commandN of an aviatin formation III White RUR~ta in thiH organi7atlon th(rt I ll control nothlllJ hut held~ essnfgtS9 orders arf not obeyed neither rpgulatlOls nor llllltruct~ons r~ rolshy
order to lead the flights had been given to Captam NIkltJne ikltine did not execute the order hut transmittcd it to Lieutenant Polo vow
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
who in turn passed it on to a subordinate Consequence div(gtrse damages
wrec~afad~rc~~~d~~~t~~l ~~f~~~sioi~~~~~~~~~i~ ~~ll~C~~~~ice ceases to be a leader and should no longer have the conftdnee of the Party and the Government The fight to obtain Iron dlSClpIilO is in the firnt place the function of the political commissar he is tilt r(pr(~entative of the Party in the army he reprlsents Stalins central committe(l he ~hotlld bethe pershysOlllfieatiOIl o( the high BolHlwvlst discipiinpoundgt but unfortunately there are eommllsars in ill(gt H(d army who are not equal to their task for (xample in the organization to which Commissar Petrow is assigned the soldiers absent themselves fit will tlwy abandon themselv(s tomiddot drink and Commissar Ptrow dops not even think of remonstrating with them for this lack of dlgtcipllllP 1]( c(nsfS then to he a commiBSar
Th( leaders md the commiBsars who act thus are not true BolsheVist (hiefs let tiwm he relievd of their commands and thpoundir commiltsariats
TIl( InemiCH of the people the traitors to the fatherland the partisans of TroLltjky-Bukharin have attempted to destroy the iron dbcipline of th Rld army to weaken Its military abilitv they have not succeeded and will lot ltucceed Consequently it is neceary without delay to reillforce thiq iron discipline it is nccelSJry for the le~ders and (ommisars to occupy themshysplvps every day with their Hubordinates watching over the execution DC ordNS given until they aro accomplished not tolerating the least transgresshyHlnn of ord(l1 Those leaders and commissars who in their daily service fali to purllue the stru~gle to obtam iron diciphne are pitiful but it will only be ohtained where the efTorts of both are combined to understand the needs of thp men and to satisfy them
The truggle for iron discipline is the task of the Party men the organishyzatIOns of the Komsomoi in the army of all Bolshevists of men who are not even in the Party
The communists and the adher(lnts to the Young CommunIsts should dally impregnate the soldiers with the spirit of discipline and bolshevist or~amzation but the discipline of the ~()ldiers depend~ ahovfgt aU upon the dlampClpline of the leaders
It 1H hardly ntcel~ary to make any commcntantB on this article The nlder is left to draw the elementary deduction d(r1vlng from It
1 July 1938
CAN RUSSIA MAKE WAR jLa Russie peut-elle falre In guerrel
In Deutsche Wehr M Petenlcn under the title La Russie peatshyelie faire la guerre sur deux Ironts exposes the Scandmavian point of view
b~ic~iri~~r~e~rPt~~~g~~lli8~~~~i~ ~~~~)re lfhh~r~~~u~~degi~i~~d~dC~ Russia Make War
When in January 1936 RUSSIl announced the grand lmel of its fourshyyear plan with a view to development of its mIlitary forces many military specialists were skeptical it was knowIl that Russia had an immense human reservoir but it was demanded if thLI rpoundscrvolr that could be mobilized would
be w~I_k1~s~c~f~cl~~I~ltJkdd~~f~h~~egi the plan had modified the physlOgonomy of the Russian army in changing the proportIOns existing between the active army and the reserve If prevlOusly it was admitted that the active army should be one quarter and the reserve three quarters of the whole of the ground army Tuchachevsky considered that the reserve should not represent more than 250 of the Soviet army it was necessary besides to increase to a hardly imagined degree the material of war
O~e can estimate that in February 1938 the Russian ground army was ~~~~~~omae~~~i ~~~ill~~d~~he aviation and the navy the total would
For these two million men there is in general the necessary modern materiel aside from a few shortages but for an army of mobilization of eight miiiion men there was a total lack of equipment and the largest part of these elements could not be compared to the troops of the European powers the considerable masses oC arttllery and of machine guns which would Je necessary to equip the total did not exist the materiel and munishytions existing arc defective
Tanks are about 5000 in number and of these a large part llre no longer
~~tt~~~~~k~rp~~afoa~~~ ~~~~ro~~~ ~~i~hsihr~11~~e~bt~~~n6~O~g~~~I~kt~~~At the eighth congregI of the Soviets last year Stahn demanded that
the manufacture of airplanes be tripled so as to prOVIde 15000 machines by the middle of 1939 it waltJ desired to incorporate 500000 new specialist worlwrs but all this w~lUld not permit the achievement or th~ plan by the hour desired und even If they dId succeed Instructed and mo])hzahle efTpoundgt(shytIVIS for th machine were missing and even more iu( in Russia a large part of tllf aviation IS dpltille4 for the mission of independnt operati9ns which reqUIre personnel of the hlghcst cahbfr there call be no Just pretensIOn that the Russian aviation as contended in certam European circles is Huperior to the aviation of the great European powers
ltrat~i~ ~ll~l~~~la~i~~ ~~~0~~~~~idi~ld)~(~~t~I~r~~Ce9n ~N~~~~ ~eO~~~f~f which ten are III European RUSSia and fiv( m ASia the Iltrongest military potenti~ll i in the WPRt and the thr(C military rcpiolls of Lltmingrl~d und ~he North Sea include half the army and more thall half of the motorIZed Ufllt~ the FmniBh frontier has ulso bcen lnrgfiy reinforced recently if one adds to thlH account the military regions of Moscow and Kharkow Qne call say that two-thirds oC the Reel Army is concentrated on the western frontlet
Tins dIvision is comprehensible adds the author for European RUSSIa and the Extreme Orient constitute two theaters absolutely distinct and in spite of the development of aprial traffic it is impossible to displace great
73
C~1laloj of Sde(ted Peliotilu1 AImiddotticl(~ nlH-ltp oi ItJ middotpr two frolll~~ I woltr)rmiddot mounLlillt dl1~l it III ltJat( RU--ll d T)
Htllt~il (llIllt I il bull tlJ gt~ HlI d I ] II) t-
III diLI1 ( I Imiddotmiddotr ll tTIll J( J rlH 111
~I itlt~~~lT_ ft tl lItlshy urtlwrll d L )-fil fr dmiddot)) d i P bull I ltI I
1(lrII Jl vl11 (JLl J) I rl bull IlI ll) t T) 1 1111 lP tll- 01 I ~ d -
Illi l) 111 d l
dol fl
hll ~ I Imiddot 1101 OJ)) I hlr d )1 of f I I T d II
~I t ) 11 I Emiddot II )1 til I 1 gtjt t (1111 11111
t
( 1 d 11 r i bull i I til 11 1 ~ I 1 i I I III
l~lIr)lt~ tl d lt01middot fjr~f ~ 1) jlldI r 111 1 I Itt I bull Idol 11 I I 1101 r I llr I r I l I ~ l r 1 t I ~ f I j n 1
II HI I I q lIItIJ L 1 Ill f 01 1bull I IIf11
III f 1 III t
jr
111 i j j
1011
r1 ~ 11111 )j I
j Ill IIgt[t 11 11111 11 i
-ill llil d I
lId t d t rq 1 I It
Ij Ilr ) Itl 11111
1 11 Ip
j
lil lel oJmiddot t 1) 11 J I
] 11 rt]
1Ii r llll d I 1 ] T 1 I p Irt Pi tlll
11 1( 1 I Oll 11 ~llll1 l L 1 It r
t~ 11 t 11 d lt 1 I It j If l~ 1 d Ii 11 tr f I I Vlr j]) 1)rll]1I
11]1 1 bull 11(
In J r Ii I
il IlJljn 10111 II 111
r _111 II) f I~ ~ T 1
l I d 111shy 1- I r1III f1 shy - 1Ill L
+ ( n 1111 r f I
1))1 d I I Illlt I 11 I mor d of IIH II llgt]I 11101 I d lrq t Ii lq+lialllll dllhq prI(llnll
I n d IIItol Ir I j( IIH f Ir Itd S 1 rLllld IlI~~llnll p ll)shy
11I~ 11 1111111 hll(middot h l11 1111 Inti (Il itll Ilwgt fl v(rl lllin r llthlll T 1 ltlll of 11Ilh 1) or
fLO I d 11111 (1 Ilh 1111 fnrtnlr oint of I H tll ILl lIIlIlITl Imiddot tl] ]dmiddoth f l+rollIlnd 1 I
lfld roil11 prlllH d 111)1 tOl hlldrlll in 11l1 1 II ]ITt ]I 1Il1l1d 1( Wt llt ini~ dpllui1 d
C amp GSS Quate~ V
upon hut I1 1936 a 1leuroIid Ihonl for tIlt formatilJn euroIf mplrior P(middotNOnn 11
uld V~~lJJt~lrt~~ ~~~ll~(IItIZlt of tIl l(11prilllCI lnd tu PfOl(Pf In I~ tan anH flgthiofl I)u)fplvp 1
Tn I)rdpr not to t1i~(ard tli n~Ulizatlnn alnHI lIgttin~ it would1 IOl1t11 tn dlidl Ihl Inlllltry min ~wrial ddllgtl ndUl] corTl~pondin~t 1 mlilllLr rl1ltIJlH fld tl 1tltp in (t(h of tlHll1t ltlllllmlI)(ltr Uld an otg of 11Itrql 110111 -(1I1Zl t~ til pprulIIlll IIPlaquo(gtlry [ltJult 1)( rlit(Illd frv~ t~IhI 1I111l1 1r (fI(I whllllr t lip an rlltrod ullin r or dd plejprl cho3i jlf fur IP Id pt It Ildl All t hIgt pfrltollllll will( h 11OuhI hI olunher hit 10
) ~I 111lt IlId]]I))lhl llH in trudllll llld III IhlUI~h tlll)- lire n l of
1rfYI~1 ~)_~Jrl(itl~(r~i~~~alltI 1lntrulI1Y mlhtlr) auhorltip3V~ - of
To (-Hn 1111 dU(Lhlll of til populttlon Illd Ihl rltTIlllmlnt ()tk gr 1I1l11 111) f Ilul1Idld of olilllllr 1I(I-lry all inlfllp prnpagan~ ~ 1)lIlId lI ltlIPd 1111 IllP 0111 ql1d If I Ill t]lld dlllwr ~hlwUJg I
I~lln Ilr~~J 1 ~ ~)Il ~ 2 SItl~I~~11 ~h(O~I ~~~~I~~IIii ~uti~h~~~~~l~tIT~ ~I prltlJl1l~1I1ILL hnlild bf]It(d ~ ill (f(ruwll ll1d 1Il Ihl ()thpr (ountm3iJ( l 1111 Plllllq dln pd fir1 10 t 11Ildrt I III 111fmiddot -flin)] Ill 1 tallillJ~ to tiff 1 1111l14 dl1 III Ihpir 111T 111 II llriOllgt dullII II and nMly to reecho 0 11111lt1)11 111 Il lly 11)( Ir - irI lHlIlk 1Ollftrfl(p Ind till (mema 19i
10-11 July 1938 ~)
~ I(II~r~ ))~jJt~I I~~~I~ Jn Itf ~ jL 1 ~ TIll llr 11Iltlun rltlllin-gt antI [JuTt lln l(r III fltl pla(p am0j -l~
II)1i h llr It( I Iratl)lgt Ill j~Tiat matTlt (Horl lIrrmiddotfl rt 1117d ify p~ ~ tiLl of madlill frum Hnil h lilt AliI TlClll mlIIl1fH 11Irlr I ldlOWIl B -1
I t ~I1~~ ii)~ ~~~J~~ri~~ Ij~~~rtff~l~~l ~~1~~1~ Jl~~t~I~~~h~ js(
luwlpr of tT a1l11ll1l)I 1lIlHlrdll Illd flOIT)lll1 till unal ddtfegt in of I Ill IIrritllrv ~r
1]lt1 IIflllltlllh1H1H f tllll dlllrtll+l itlll I Ill ~nlt pxttlll oft It~ T flflll Ih 1111111111[1 1[1 lmpJII ]t]r1Il)~ Iut lll IH hI lntwu_l nlIn II il 1111 litII If (()lllllHlH ~Jh ill f tIIllll( hI dtllland -~u JlrlII~IOIl 11l JUllnt of dLlll Till pqlr 11 11ll I 11Irlry (volp ]Qj I
~I~~) ~ It1~~11 1Ij 1111 ~~ ~ ~l)I~ ~llii~~lb t1~ 1~lllf ~~~r~~~ll~II~~S 5ntl~~ I 1~ Ill II 11 It I 1+ 11111 111 Ifllfl ])I Illi Il lId rnl1t~ for i ] lIflampa~r h Ilf pl) Ill IllW rfTll1h 11
bull bull bull t b
1111 Illawt lrurd11 11l1Hfhljt lp tltlt of tlllt Hoal AIr Foret Tf~li lr)]IIll] 10 PWvllt fur till lit iltzalIIlll llld mllllt(IL1Hf of tIl( HW materr w11l1h h 1[111 hInti lIf[ rlf till LlnlrlltnP hH)1 l1lrll)rhHl1lcliL~lr III (middotlf~ If
Ill( holll htt 1111 pllIIIHci fo for appn-lllll four for fut-middot- I( 1lhIgt ll (rulthlltl (lI1L1Il 11)(middot iIIWll1lh Kinin tWlnty IHW airdroT (
~~ ~ I ~JI~~~I~~ hiSl~~ ~IIld~l~t~~~ ~~t ll~l~~~ n~ll ()fl~lxl~1l~~lli1Jllla~o~~~ i Ill 1)ltltltJn- ()f [11111 hII tinldy ]PPl plpfled mll~t of tlHm ill t IHHth uf Jollgiami 11ld SIlt1111d Without hlullt tu ILHl tPnl in lt(Cllr
I)~lln t uddlll ttt1I k l In lHrgto111lPl 1 large lITort ] dll11Ullh d ~OlO )11100 550 o)qno
~illtlO ltlrbr IlIl ri~J-(r aooo tuJfllt I lt1 Irangt tlw (pllll b- ()[t1lltlr~ VtljIIllwnl IIi fI HI nnw dd~ i I
Ill tltp tdullIgt 1~fP(ltlII)ll tIll pilot lfl (Hnl11blOllpd for short Ie bull-1 tlr eti( and ti llr n eTt + Inlt Ilh th( ltlPllortllnil V for pPTITIlr (I)llmiil)lI AI 17 I ~ ~ Imiddotar to ~fi ~ Htr It~ lIId tll) 1 11 (P 110 hIgt 1l1ll1d~
lip 1111H1 I alll)rh 1r 1lllllrdh 1( fl(lT d Hul I hI pr()llllflll~ hdlllr II 111lu tl flnt (Ill many l11lll
1l1]IIlHllh lrp lHIhd hUi ~Ir KlIlgl~ (Hld h(p[gt~ tu h1t IP11l1 II lOllgt whuh Will Pfl11l1 him tn (nllill thC irlTllt in Ih lIllifln I II H HIt~ llJ(d I~ HlIl)~ 111ulmiddot 11 Ihl j)11Hlinllln ( ftllrdlllJ~ lllt 1 IIdllHitf (II I( rlln1l1J f1 phYildl~ WIll I-II-( 1lld
Tid 1[Tllrt dll~ not pnlnl -lr llortmiddot-Hiltllt Oll hiidl fr)m allllum In tlllt lIP] g-oill) tl (llnl] thlgt IITmiddot( tiIgt of the antiainraft dtgtfpn-t fOT( In lltl II hJlhltkd -Ol)ll nWll and dlIlHi1d llpnll Ilw i1 rntoTl11 aTll) A( II1dly hi hl I flIIoI t ll tl1 l-H] 11ll1lI1 tIl tIl lI())O Ill n Till li~1Irf 10) IlP douhlld to llllll 100000 i
[1 tIl nrlH tlllll th1 (lmrnluri i lHn~ rt)rl-anizpoundd ~ot t)nlrI5~ gt~l
lrlll11~11 hlft~~~(f~~i111111~ l(l~lr IrI ~t~ Oi1 II ~ligt~) I~l( II~~ ~ I~~ f~Hl~ _ I fVIIlI1d dlld gnPII Il md 11111111 lIlt lI11portall(I J
Ih 11lt dl ]gtl 111 Iw Ulldlf II( Ilnlpr ()f a lllrp tl)mmaHle[lI 1 IhI 1r11 If li111 ll 11I1 rIIr II flIHlIl-lhb flr tHr lp dBI t hI offill 1 If 1Ill llr OIlJlllI1I11111V till (l1llImllt Hllll -I
In thl ~l111lry ltIf 11 a dIJall from th( (hid If tlH lll~r 1 ~~~ 1~~ 1 f)~ I~~~ i~~ ~~gifI~ll ~ ~t l~ ~I~tl ~l~ t~~i ~~t~ I(~I~~ III il~~1~ila 1 IIndr hi orlilT dlrlllltlr (Jf itlltntltllll llld of nrmiddotl~alH7Jllllln of antialrcr J dd1Ilp hainl till rull of hnltdlr )IIllrtl 1
TId r(()IIl1l1~lt InJl of t Itt Inllllland whkh rIalb hl~htly I hat w~gt j t1f1middotuly ((ht III lrl1l1I hac for ohJllt thpound (lmiddotntrahrtllI If 1(rythL ~ plrt alllln~ tn d(flllt t1~alJlltt air al tl~ ]
Ill( total Ilf t]1I( rlform ~hlw~ Iarly whal Illlllt)rl alll1 n11 BTl jl al ta(lll to air dTlir and till worry artJllImiddott b~ Ill1 dllqtr tlf ril Ila~l~ ~
~
74
iQlxlJU 0 70 Catalog of Sflected Periodicat Articles ~___m
They~re but the esampential steps of the general rearmament of our neighbors and Jr[ends a sure guarantee Q( the future_peace ormiddot Europe
-
FROM THE REICHSWl~lm 1933 TO THE REICfSHEER 1938 IDe In Reichswehr 1933 aU Reichsheer 19381 Colonel Baron
In 1933 when Adolf HitlCr was called hy President lIindenburg to agiumepower the Reichswehr included ten large units that isseven divisions ofinfantry nnd three divisions of cavulry
These divisions were broken down in twenty-one regiments of infantry offour battalions (o( which one was a recruit battalion l eighteen regiments of cavalry of five squadrons seven regiments of artillery of three or four
~ htrsc artillery of a cavalry division) Signal corps groups seven groups of
groups of automobilf trains and seven medical groups f large and small unhs sufficed for the professional army
or 4000 officers and 9bOOO men impos(d on the Reich by the Trpaty of re~mes It Wal insufficient as a nuchus for a modern army destined to rereive and in-ttruct one or two classes each ot 400000 young soldiers and to mobilize in thf future several million relervists
The first task whieh was imposed 011 tlw IWW Chanttllor desirous of ghing Germany a miitar force capahlf~ uf realizing its plans of GPrman expansion consisted tllUgt of augmenting the llumLfr of units of the Army
The Chancellor and his military coumrgtlofl Generals von B10mherg and von Frits(h had the clink illtwppn two pro((durefl one to Imse the
n the sIst(m of units of tradition (each regishynny (ing in gem~ral represented by a comshy
ter~middot in the Heilhw(hrJ the other heing to content ially with the tripling of existhtg units ns or which the most important was the lack of he second plan which was ldopted
licient to prepare the frame work of units of imtrucshyas necessary also to foresee the adm inistration of the as of the instruct(middotd mservcs It was also necessary
worganize the instruction at Ipat summarily of the fifteen classes (Gershymans born between 1900 and 19141 which had not received any military instruction
Parallel with the tripling of the activr tUlIts it was thus necessary tu create orgalls of recruitment and administration these were the inspections and districts of recruiting It was necessary to create at the same time rapid or~anization of instruction similar to the centers of instruction of the World War these were the ersatz units hattalions and batteries) commanded by ersatz oflkers retired ofilcers who had served in the Reichswehr or even m the old nrmyl
This period of prCparltltioll eXtlllded from January 1933 to October 1934 At the latter date each hattalion (except the recruit battalions) and
each artillery group of the Reiehswehr (except the horse artillery) transshyformed iLgtelf into a regiment of infantry of three hattalions and a regiment I)f arti1ery of three grouJl~ Each battalion of engineers gave birth to two
otters Each SibTIul medical and train group expanded into three groups Alone the cavalry rcginwllts ald the horse artillery were not touched by the
~ tripling However the 3d Cavalry Division (Weimar) became the 1st - Armoied Division
In this manner the Reichswehr expanded in the winter of 1934-35 to includl tWlnty-one divisions of infantry two divisions of cavalry and one armored division Side by side with this and in its service twenty-one ins~ctions of rptruiting and alollt ~OO tccfititing- districts were constituted
commanded and trained by eratz otncers (retiwd officers called to active duty
~ Compulsory military service was d(creed in May 1935
~ ~~ ~h~e~~~~ i~ ~~~~r~~gCl~~~I~i~I14o~dtll~edt~)~~~~le~~h~~~~~~~~i~~~~
of the German arm v had to ~urmotmt to recall certuin essential facts The number of oOleNs of all gradCs and all arms retired by the Reichsshy
wehr in itgt fourtefn rcargt of ltxistcncp could not hllve (xc(eded four or five thQusand of which not morf than three thousand at the most cOllld be used in 1934 Thes( Wfre for the most jlart required by the inspections of recruiting and the ersatz units
The active units of infantry engineers communications and traingt were able to draw new leaders from among til( officerl and noncommissioned offishycers actin and retired and from the state police ISchupo) This resource hardly existed f~r the artillery which only disposed to fulfil its triple obligations of its own cadres of 1933 It was not possible to obtain from the military schools of artilery instruction without a delay of at ien1t two years a triple production of lieutenants In spite of this in thC course of the wintpr of 1935-36 six divisions of mfantry and twoarmored divisions w(re creatd hy drawing on the twentyshyone divL~ions of infantry and the armored division whose existence only commenl(d with the preceding wintpr These new creations were not of a nature to um(gtlioratea prohlem already difficult It wafl thifl army of twenty-seven infantry divi1ions two cavalry divishy
~IOnl and three armored diviRions framed summarily enough and composed In the maiority of young soldiers of sev(n monthgt service that was available o the Reichsftihrer when he undortook the rcoccupation of the Rhineland In May 1936
rorm~~ ~iiiia~l~J9~~Iw~n~Ct i~~i~~r~lgrj~~rtheer~tl~~a~~s~~~nikr~~~ sur-lc-Main It was in 1936 also that the Challtcllor decided to extend military sershy
VIce to two yenrs and to increase the number of divisionf or infantry to
thirtr~~~ autumn of 1936 when ~he class of 1915 joined the class of 1914 in the active services the new Reichsheer included thirty divisions of infantry
~~~~l~dt~nret~r~~ieJ~Jl~i~~~ divisions and one ndepe~~dcnt brigade or
Beside it thirty-rour recruiting insJllctions fUnctioned disposing of 270 distric~ of numerous ersatz units
In 1937 the number of infantry divisions was inpreased to thirty-six of the ormal type and one mountain in Sljltomlier of the same year the class of 1914 passed to reserve and was replaced in Ll)(l ictive corps hy the class or 1916 bull
In FellTtmry 1918 wlWIl the murch on ll1HIIl took place the active German army inciud(gtd about MOOOOO soldiers about half having sixteen months of service and about haJJ four months but in whieh tho officer framework hud neither in (juantity or quality Cllleciully in the artillery a value corresponding to the Importance of thf eJTectives in soldiers
Since the Reichsheer has ahRorbed tlw Federal Austrian army whose illlmbers seem to have been reducnd to six divisions (three o( the normal type two mountain and one urmorpd)
The new army is articulated in sixt(en army (orps thirty-nine divisions of normal type three mountain division five armored divisions and five cavalry hrigades
It is an imposing total which to become equally IS powerful as imposing gt
must wait the slow and patient formation of leadem
INFANTRY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
Am POWER ANI) TltOOI MOVEMENT Major Phillips SOLDIElt LOOK AT THE SEA Major Dupuy TUE CASE FOIL ANTITANK Captain Greene A lRACTICAL GENERAL STAFF Major General Mosehy MIIITAltY MOTOTtcCII~S Captai~ Wheeling
July-August 1938
SOME HKFLE(TIONS ON INFANTRY MATrHmI AN) TACTICS rfajor Genshyeral Lynch
TUUNIJElt IN Tlfg 1A5T flmiddotm )IONTIS OF Tim WAit It-lt CIIINA Lieushytpllant Rudolph
TJII~ SPANISH WAIL A HEVlIoW OF TIIB HEH FOltEIGN OPINION Captain Johnson
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL AflMY MEDICAL CORPS (Great Britain)
May 1938
IMPROVISATION AND PltA(TICAI WOItK IN CA~IImiddot Major Bayley Tim PROBLEM OF MECHANIZATION S IT AFFI~crs Tim ~IEDICAI SEltVICE
LieutColonel Atkim
JOURNAL OFTHE ROYAL ARTILLERY Greit Britain)
July 1938
TRAINING RUMINATIONS 1937 Lieut-Colonel Lambert COUNTElt l3ATTFIW IN MOBILE WARFARE By Tweedledum
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUilON (Great Britain I
May 1938
TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LESSONS OF THE WAI~ IN ABYSSINIA Colonel Laderchi
THE BATTLE OF WAHSAV AUGUST 19Z0 AN EXA~IILE OF TilE COUNTEltshyQIoFENSIVE Major Mahony
MODEltN WAlt AND ITS MAZE OF ~IA(H1NES Brigadier Wilson AmCHMT AND ~tE(IIANISED LAND AIUItE rilE BTTLE OF GUlJAshy
LAJAltA 19n Captain Poulain French Army Reserve WAS GERMANY DEFEATED IN 1918
JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain ~ India
April 1938
ABYSSINIA TODAY Major Snelling PEACE Olt WAR Colonel Rich PItOPAGANDA LiclItColonel Dimmock THE INFLtmNcg OF Tim IltliS IN GliBAT BltlTAIN ND AMERICA Inglis
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMPFTRUPPE (Germany) By Clptldn UN Hartr)ss InflUltry
March 1938
NEW WAYS FOit MOtOR ANIgt HlDmt lNclte Wege Hlr Motortmd Reiterl rllijor General Eyb
Belore discussinlt the fmbject the author depicts some experiences from the Wllr in Ahyssinla He notes the rapid road eonstruction there was shyachieved primarily because motors were able to advance materIa across countr~and construction could he begun simultaneously at various points
75
~ ~ ~ Cllialof of Selected Periodical Articles
A nlW dlplrlUt( lt1 iJlrli~h tl in tllP trltlbportatlOJl hy motor of 1JfI lH of hurdIll to Lf(b lrnpa~aj til mllugt HllfJ from tiwn thr lllimals pn Ult( d to (arry llu tru(k InH1middot L1Tlhi r -tollJtd nCollllaif-ltanlI Wll of httl(middot (OIlIqHH It 1 TV tllI JIllgt 1 Vli unUH7fd ltpy and cout SPfVICP providtd (X(l 1l11It lllf()rrnattJH Smail i1t-moving- achanCrl or flank Ullltgt rOIIgtttmiddotd of LlIlIlt IIHI mltortl Ii Ilifantry In artll ry wlilch for tlw mnltt fart n lt1I1Ih d 1~ lIr
Bmiddottwlll -) An lld J -11 IIJ til ~IIdtd ~Llf(h (]f till IffJl
~~~ l~~1 ~~~gt Ii I ill~~l IH~I~ 1~~1~~ il~Ylllllt~~ 1~~iI(j ~~I~k lt1ll111middot l-lWlll1 lr~J 1tuh tmll 1 I nl In rlllruw IIFI rJtldill~ tIll rOM1 kl1 Ir Ullrh 1]o II I)))qlll~ ilv tIll Cnlllnlll Irl lillIIlltl llllIlllllllllnll 1111 11 fd 1)1111 ~ 11lt1 n1h 1111 ~ I i1ld Ill [lfr 1(01) tlnll I (lil k It II I XlI pll)]) I fl lfdmlr middotoIllnllmiddott Id Imiddoth Ii
1111 Illlt [f lIIt If 11drmiddotlinlll f qlltllllllI ItLvL Illi IIItr(1i r It Illi all1 r lrlt) t ~ 11111 hur Ill 11 -I lrl1111 n lld 111 It- Ullf dnTllll I ~lld 111]1 lt1 In llllthmiddot t l)rtlllflfIld (ldry 111 JIIl (III 1I1llr 1] tfmiddotIIIln 1Ilt)nIJlHh 11l1lWJt Hut Illlpltdlltontfl 1 llItl)tl1 lit lOf till nj111IIll of mllr Ill gtTllm HI ltq Ifnl
Ill ~Iod rlj r 1 i I ] II I l1lnd 11 Iii r If LI) 1)1)1 tl rt
If I thl I i) rllill h Jtlf-i )I lh mI()f lrI1 1 1 1 1) fllh r 1tlgt111 1t11r r1I1 4 1 H)
I d) IJlo rI 11 r Inil LIt h f Ii)( mwt III tUfn ut -1U)
I n n 1lt)1 rdln LIHl mIlr Il)tl r middot1[1 111111111 flld 1llhIlIl11dldullll111l
gttf 1(j11 til I till tIll Ir 111 Iltln JIlt IIgt Tw 1 L rrldh 101 1 UI lr1 of H tJJh )lnfl )middotr II h I 1 Ihnt nf P I ~ tll1 1 bullbull il 11HI Ojlltl InmiddottIn hi Hili r rl)llhrl nnr ~ bull Int 1nt ill ~ li d
In fd r t t I ~ Ill tltl tIlll mu-t rnri to fl I rrn1JII
t I t) dd111 t I I llI r L(IT~ 1 ~IId (f i nlaquomiddotr 1111 j 11111UIIJ(ld Irlltly L- 11(
d 1tl 11Imiddotlll~~ A IlflhllnhII~l- tllltfllflalllhrlmdlr j 01 r l]r jltr ~i ii 1111 nwtr tihlalw t)tIl1l dllChmiddot
)~gt1LlllI i f 11 ]1 1 r 11( r1~~~~~ ~td~~~~~fflrW~)~~~~~(middot~~~~~l )f( If ]11IIHImiddot1 ) 1Efll middothlCl ~ bull
f f 11 dhulvl1l qI In f lei )~rl t1lr I il t hlch lPJIl If llimiddotl)tIr1 oil and tlIP (oll~ III jllt 11111f mm illn thn that r(quITld fOf
I1r 11IHlIl III g-dIIlJl (In 1ltmbJI mot( Jrjlft1Ill (or pombal the arIlr nllll11 lit to
IIl( rl 1IIIr ll) I P rind of tlml Ihll a rI fnf l-gtImiddotmhl pll no Itrgp rolf
Ihl In I) I)() mIle Ipr dl g)Ili m lglllflcanCl 1hat 1lt lInportlnt i tlw
1l1ll~ lltlmiddotnutl Un1 r trlmiddotpllin~ 2(1 hdIJrltt dlgt B l1ch cticlllatioll and trl(llltl~
dlltLII1( ( of 1-0 ttl 1~O mt s thlt L~ 0
rt t1 till 1)1 lldllll 1IIl Iltlli7d Xp 11)( IJf ol))]1t and I I 0 II f Ii) rn r rI d~I lnnl 11 llrly hllt to or i 1 Ill) I n11 [d Ilunl whlt1I 11ll nhll)tl I full till ltUlt)lIIIshy
f 11 ldol mI I Imiddotl~ lfy ~r()torgt can tljllTlP 1 hour r d III I 1lllmupl I lndlll~ )nltly k lt(nb tIll ir h(
rIlImiddotr 111 n1 middotrdlvlIndludIYll1drgtmolllrIIPlh11 t 11111 r 1 lrn1llf Il nil 111 of I dl TIjllirl- all I rlqrdllllnl~
J 11 Ill Iii III II I ~t nt IlfY llln frolltlt wn ~(f(rgtly OY(f ii I II HI 111111 i I r 1)lldlnraquo Ill (11 l11nt ((lvtiry could mo aero
1lt1 middotn II h 1 rf 111 a 10111 lltllq~ ordinarily 1 thHI jorII1 1 jr hld Ill 1Ilhllt ltIlled and cro cIl11try
nllI till 1lttt frllt igt mmy mlll 11lI11 and thp I I Id 111gt11 IV mtlltt r((rlll WIth lIHmiddotrpalt(d
I d lId I frlf tIOna )Ilfl of tIll limp (on-
I film I Irl nI Id d~ llfTl n no III tIll ratlgt tlf mar(h of motur and Ir 1h Il II f trw lrtlll~ alllmallt lor (jon to 1)0 ]HHIlHh ill
I 1)111] )1llr (111111111 Slfh 1 Xfll ri11lfllt hll hpl ~ ~ l I tl r _
l ITlOJllt of fllll lwh hllt In vnt(middot1 ahout tlH trlmcndol~ jlIJf tl fr Ilr lllltltJtlbull ] OllllnlI11J 1gt a (Ollqlllnrf of Ilnh
1 bull 1 (JlJII)IInIlI1 [111 A hrilf (fmpln~TU mIY ill in onhr )1110 1 jlllJd 1( (III v I lrlll iOfl 11ll Itr two lillI of pay 111Hi or If) nIllt ttl I Ill frill 11ft II In III nltjUlr fllr fO-mi]1 march dayJ (IJ1lllnl 1 t dI il) fll[li rtlllll ~hTlh rllk0l1lr1 only at 7 l poundgt t l 11t JIIldfoj pl 1lt1 11 ~nll ~2~1 ]Iund or Ihoul fiV(lllllf tl
f I t to 1lIn d 11middot rrjmiddotr )1f1r1vlr fill Iloll dtyof rr I llId dL1 f JJ I 1hi IpJr I rl 1IIlT~ fllltj llfh]1lt III (lll III ]Ifl) ImiddotLIII d rrllll 1itf
I Jll 1111 IlJ rndlnllil afll fIJr hofl IlllIl Slr~II LlnfllodEralply I fl1 1111 tJmiddotIn I [11 IlInlltllll fllr ftllf tlrtl( wltl)ll fHI TIll 11middotIr 111 1gt1 ]rodld lIb 111 Irllt rdlo11
1 l IIIIJI tq ur lt1111 and lrlllllfY IIr A TTlotllf f11I1II1
rI 11I11 11 Ii III r1 I lt11 1)1 I 1 ht 11 il 1ljI~ III llr bullI Irl rllfr al t I J 1 I IltlId l IJr url witilh lan IllOVgt Lerw IIJulltry whplJ t III I dI1I~Ir~ tri Art llhry Ilnlll nil d m)tor nlllllnn will fin(l a mnvinK and r Tf mlrIT tH11 All llf ill 1 I Ur1N Ibl lIlIVIIII 11IUIllIl tJH TlJ JIf1ll1l If 1 lt (( I j low Ii t1I k h- plalll 111011(1 proll Vry cugt ly t d ur IJIll
[ III dldlllllllllllj IIt dh) 1 ltIII IIf IIII IlllltllriZld infantTY TfIIllTf only a (I~ Iolld tllur Ihw t1I dl rJlmiddotrltI)tl [)( 11l1rching infllltry qr cavalry
76
C amp GBB Qllarierq VI ~~ ~
MOTPl)V(lr grlatlT flhm(mml is nhtainllulr from mojoTR l)(cam~laquo th(gt (olUrJ olt li much longer tot
(5) Trall~ltion (rom march to combat and VIlt versa - The 10 toll nlem(n whu nde Oil the two Side seats in light truck can detruck frot (tII thrgt halted vhir plae(gt tIIPm1Clvcs lit 1 diltanc( of 10 to 12 yards f~ out 1111 tTllLk and Ill rlady to fir III 7 or 8lwconds
Jj(ltrllclcin and (Iltrll(ollg from 5 to 7-ton trucks rCquinll mot(l tillil wi t dllrulk al111llt IH ti((ond~ tu lntruck allout lO wc()ndl
III ((JIlPlflll111 til following tim(H hav bpI found neC(Bsary for cavriliJ i pal prlparltiOlIl From the halt to di~moulit takl a dbtHlle of IO to 12ya1amp vic Hul Ill pnptr(ci til fin rna
IU Whltl nd1l~ hy thr(gtps or HXlS the 1valryman nearest the hone- Vb hllldlr 11 nlIly IJ l ((ollch th otlHrs rtquirp 15 twcond ~ 01
~ ~ ~V~I~l~i~~i(I~I~Jl~~~rt~(~~i-Jti~)l~I~I(~~i~ i~rl~d~i~~~~~(~u~~~ ] pf( 1)101111 (leh 1IIIId hill f)WIl hopp alld lJl nady to fin in 10 second or I2l 1 rmall TIlIHHlIpl and he r(tdy to flrp III 9 -(condg 1 ah
OhVIOI1lt]Y tIll infantry In truckg IS at som( disadvantage agailllltl 1 Ilr)ln( Ittack Un till other hand til( digtJnc( hetwcpn trucks and tbt ) tin )111)11 lilli pfodlH1 1lc(gtWd IltltIVlIltlt1 to attaek from th Hank Tk i rllr If~ It lC~~~~~~~~f~ilI~llr~~~~f~~(~~~~~~l~r gtl~~~~ ~~1~1~~~~~Ptlllin~ J~ flvllrd)ltmiddot fxjl(rillltlI lJl to thl (ro)gt (UuntfY lpaJilities of motor vehlc1a ~ HUI Ih 11m of yar till typP uf ground and the ma~~ of motor vehice 1UBI
~llf~I~~~JI~~n~~gt~J~~I)~~))I~~~ ~I~I~~~ ~~()l~ll~t ~~~t~ri~nr~~Jljb~Ft~~ j ~ tn lltI~Iht~li~I~I~l~~ttl( I arev whrre TOlds or tralllre in abundane~ ~ ~ ~ll)1~111~I~JI~ ~i~~I~if~~)ln~ldl~~~I~i~J~J~~~h~~1o~~~)t~~i~~~il~~~l~l~tl~f~On~ tTl tn pn 1111 Evn In a thrnly lt(ttlfd but fairly nrln tNralll the light ~t (an lIrfurm ao wpH if nut b(ttpr than motlllt(gt(1 own tllP l1Ptlampltary rlconac 1111~ bull 1
Hut III wllotd 1rfIgti wlHTI road1 and traIl lrl klrCf til m()Un~ IIIHI 10 vtlullIlI in bet Illdlgtplllltah]l It 18 hI who (an (omh the aru ~ 1 thorull~hly gtllliy and IVlth fPlativ(iy little nOl~ It 1lt fwre that thcvtl~
11~~I~llI(I~vl~~~~lr~~~t~II~~I(~~~t ~t~~~I~~~~lll~t t[l~~ ~f nl~~J~~i(~~~l~~~~ t only a few mountud men Will gtIfJiCe lor thl purpo)C TIl(gt (omhat will It tlkfn ovpr hy tnotlJrltYltiJlttlt 1allk fInd lllotonwd IIlfantry
(7) Hoad tongflt10l1 An advmta~~p ac~ru(g to the motor c~lllmnfl I With ItH trll(cl tf1YI]hll~~ With (oI1 CI(prahl( dlgtancp bCtw(ell veillcles at 1 II (ollsel)u(l1t t1pxibility tjllg~lJon md hh)(king Will not occur so frequentiJ ~j o a with hnr~p~drawll vlmiddoth(lp Motor COhIllHl (an rfOgtgt one another It~ ~ ltlnly a qU(ltlOll of a (frtnn l()lt~ of tUnf It
lri) ~1otor noises atHI hghts - EXjlCripncl hag shown that spen
~1~~~ita~~l~~~~~lI~n 1(ll~(~Jlt[~~((~l~~I~middot~r l~~~~l~r~~~]e W~~nl~~d~t~~1 ~1 tl pruvidld In tttiucp fxhnugtt noises Other n1(gt1I1S of camounaging the mok IH1I-l of tanb IHarily arl Jlog~lhle such I tir actiVity and the usp of noil) Hlltnrl in otlJ(gtr lte3S and by artillefY fire
By (mplnyilll~ hhlP glass light) can be so dimmed that even at fall middot10lt1 rmglgt thp Ian not bp dl-tinguilthed from the front By proptshy(lllployil1)~ Iwh lightlt nil tlickpnng hem~ will diclosp the approach of t Vlhilk yet t11() will Jllrmit a rlo~f tudy of tilE adjacent tCrrain
(()llIl~I~~i~i~7s~rr~J~P~~~hf~1~~ ~)rr~~ti~~~(~ft~l~rt~~~~~I~~c~~~~~n~ll~~~ ~nal dItlllII hptwC11l I(hide to h(c)m( Cparat(d or to take the wrq foute To aVOid such errors the following means of correction and 3SSLStat~
~1~~I~~~~~~ll~(i~l~~Or~~I~~~i~~~~~~~~t(~~~1~~~f~~~l~c~l~~nr~~f (~r~~~chf~ difTlTltnt fi~lrp or lacll mut (ompIIIY hattdien etc blocking off TO nol to lIP 1I~ld lITIJ1lnYllli~ lll()torcy(hgtt~ as guidlS and rlir((torn
110) BrplkdOlll or forced stop of vchicles - The freate~t obstai~ I l tlf prnplnynllnt of till commcrtial type yphicl( in military opfgttat)[ In thlt thl( v(llIclt V1t tulmiddotk on lofl roadgt llfotiatp stepp gTldes I (xtrlml ditltlully nr not at all and Itl VNY ltplsith( to road and hridr d(~trll(tlOll hy tlH (IWllly It is tml that hOf~c~drawn vehicles and sma fourwhlll dJvl or 1-~hlll trulkf) WII Qv(rcomc these ditHcultics mn TladJlv HUI thl Ilfl of tht prohiltn lil in tlw utilization or the commNcl vehicle for TllIiitar) plrpU~ts How un the ma~ of tlwsC vehicles neOlshyplbh g1tiflHtllrliy t days march dunng which ~o to 50 small and 1aJi 011tIC]- dptru(tion pte ne cnCOlllltprpd We may ptesuppose tb
e
0 a
d a
l
tll hrll) I 11l1vPft1 ((1 arl dpltroy((i hut lhat ahw llf(lUPPoltes tb1 11111(11 lit 11111 ha1 IJt1 ltLvlllahlp to the tllpmy fOf Much dtlslructlOna 1 lltlt III ha~ IItl1l1(( fllll 11I1 opportunity Motor columns can ordinarl ~ dltotlr (nVlrla1HillllH or-two hld ~Jlot But a thorl)ugh test of capnhihOOj Iwuld hp mad t1JlIltally Hinc( III mot terrain d(truftiolls and obstaekl ~ 1
~~i~( ~~~(t(lh 1~~~~~~I~II ~~~H~t I~~~~f~~~~~t~lnd ~imilar flltUf] ~ A l(gtchniqlll tnll1 hI dlvllo]lld whwh Will O(f(OIl1( tl1ls(l handiCIIIl ~j
I-qII]lIIlt1II 1II11 III dvlinpld lnd 1111111 For iIlHlmHt t11( tIJl of rore lnd jlHII(Yl hoI h hI( and motor lllcrIId It hlluld not be difl1cult U pfolplt bllth flllllnr ml It)rigt hy proplr ((lvlring alld packing ngaw( wllfr n pill itt 10 what dlpth fordlll~ hy thll mlmH is possible we do~ Imow hut WI Jhould iparl1
A IlHlOr 1llIlInll middothoulrl J1PrhapH tratllport with it material to ns~ist~ middotroini~ ~(d ~IHlt til f(plIr hridgcs and (vento onstruct bridg(s
~~~~(~I~~lt~~~~~ 11)d ~~~ItCl(lt~1tll~(ll~~~g~V~~~1l~~~ve~r1~~a~~~~I~r in Illattrial at tl1l Ina of 1Ilgt and on tune will Ill thoroughly undt 1IlYOIP who has actually participated in ptwllIit Thpound actual pmpioy
I
bull
1 bull I
C alog of Selected Periodical Artlcles
1
1
I
I
( d~~h~n~~~~it~~1~~wt~~t~o~~r~~middotwefe of smull cnRequence
Tests should be made to determine the relative efficiency of animals (truck transported) and small tractors (truck transported) in gcttingtrucks
oat U~~ t~gea~~~i b~~~rec and rider ih this new rapid force what
will ~e~tb~elhe history of war in the past that the cavalry horse
=~3e~1~~r~~~~~~~~~~1ef~~r~ ~~dc~ot~~~~~~ ~~~~u~~cti~d~i~ mated the mounted Units as though a pest had struck in consequence of which the marching capacity of the cavalry waH d~creascd to or IlPlow that otinfantry
Therefore in time of pence the followiug mCaSllrCl mu~t h( bkcm 10 prepare the horse for the rigors of campaign ahle ~~~ fr~o~~7~smiddott~iJ and strong weighing not owr 700 poundH luilshy
(2) Cavse the animals to undergo fast or hunJfr ppriods at the Ham time doing full time work
(3) Accustom them to winter cold Have no stalls Provid( prottction a~t the wind and rain hut no morp than that afTord~d by the CanVH tDPof a truck
4 Protect the winter coat of the animal [nstead of the ~urry-comh ore the vacuum cleaner
Favorable results have been ohtained with the vacuum deaner hut it5 use has been forbidden hecause combing and bruRhing furtlHr discipline and improve the skin and digestion (hunger periods would improv( the digegttion
ProT~ployjng the vacuum cleaner would releusp more grooms for com hat
train~~rt_haired animals should be eliminated for military Jlurpose~ ~~ ~~ ~~e~~e~~oi~g~~ ~~i~~dfo~n~~~h~di~~o~~~ 3~a~~)~~~~ns~~(7) Competitions simulating whr conditioml using th~ following rulfs
(a) Time of competitions November to March in gnow and rain No stalls i
(b) Previous and continued hunger periods ic) Animal transport by truck Loading and unlouling tesLlt (d) Use of animals in pulling trucks on roads and out of bad
stretches
The author offers an example (in general) of tlw possihlp or~anization olan inrantry battalion (truck transportcd)
Attached to the battalion should be a number of motorcycles small tanks and tractors
Each rifle and machine-gun company to be provided with about 18 trucks which ill transport peroonnel equipment and upplics
To each company and fo the staff section an additional four trucks each transporting three horses together with riders
The animals are to serve the following purposes 9 n) Pull trucks out of holes around bad stretches etc
(2) When the battalion marches afoot to move thp combat trains Ismail perhaps trailer type vehicles)
(3) To provide reconnaissance during foot march (4) To mount the unit commanders (5) Where the opportunitv arises to group all the mounted men into
one organization (reconnaissance and security)It will be noted that these mounted men are not a cavalry unit rather
an all purpose unit AI told the battalion will have some amp0 trucks Thf lar~e number of
drivers (truck and motorcycle) can he tmined in infantry pon(gter duties
and icta~~~~~~~I~o~~~~i~~FeB~~lh~P~J~~ ~ d~~h
ARMORED MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZEU UNITS OJ FOJUm~N ARMIES 1937 IN RETROSPECT
JPanzer- mechanisierte und motoriqierte Verhandc fremder HeNt Ein RUckblick auf 1937J
(See digest middotCampGSS Q)larterly June 1938 page 97)
April 1938
TANKS - ARMORiD RECONNAtSSANCE VEHICLES AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST THESE
IPanzerkamptwagen - Panzersptihwagen und die Abwehr dagegenJ New French R~nault tank - De Militaire Spectator describes the
new Renault which shall serve as an infantry accompanying tank It weighs 12 tO~8 carries one 37-mm cannon and one machine gun has (l
speed of 14 miles per hour with armor of 25-mm to 30-mm (about one mch)Ita crew consiqts of two men
Rapid tanks in Poland -- Revue dArtillerie reports theRe tunkH which weigh 243 tons are 258 yards long 178 yards wide and 131 yards high A 40 horse pow~r motor provides a TOad speed of 27 miles per hour a cross country speed of 11 miles per hour They are capahle of c1imhin~ n 46~ slope of traversing water 20 inches deep and usc 7 gallons of gasoline per 60 miles Ea~h has n crew of two men is armed with one machine gun (with 2360 rounds of ammunition) and haq armor plat~ 3~mm to 8-mm thick
Russian hea~ tank HM l-Krassnaja Swjesda reports as follows on this tank type In the main turret are a cannon -nd a machine gun In
each of two s r forward turrets are a heavy and d light maehin~ gun Its weight is 18 tons crew 6 men With a 250 horse power motor it has a road speed of 27 miles per hour ~ngth 72 yards breadth 273 yards height 293 yards Climbing ability up to 43 degrees aple to knock over trees4 yard in diametermiddotcan cross water 12 yards deep-nhd ditches (deep)
~~erra~issi~~eis ~crm~~~i~ee~~~o~~ ci~~r~~~~~~and each is Sas pr~of The new Eng1ish mobile armored division - According to the United
Services Review the new mobile division will be organizeda~ follows
yen~~t~a~~~~a~~~h~t~~~hit~l~~~Sregiments ~ach One artillery brigade Motorized infantry Motorized engineers Motorized signal uniis Motorized supply elements
This division will be assembled for the first time during 1938 and will undergo tests llt Salisbury Plain
Other reports indicate that eachmiddot of the five home divisions will be
~iftb~~~la~fe~~rt~l~i ~~~t~~~~os~n~ ~1ray~~i~~~f~iirtebh~~~~hi home from India
Four light tank regiments are to be provided in India Employment oC tanks in the defense - La France MiIitaire deals
with this question According to the discussion tanks in the defense are employed
g~ ~rc~~~il~atti~~nk defense f It is contended that the 25-mm antitank weapon is neither numerous
~di~~b~rsR~~Ise~~f~~seOe~6nO~~~n~~~~h~~~ ~~~ou~eo~ftr~et~k~ mobility a rapid assembly of these vehicles at a threatened area should provide a massed defense But such employment must be planned and prepared
Tanks are equiPP(Jd with cannon so that they cancombat tanks they are not made mobile in order to move to a fixed deCense position Tanks employed in the defense must employ their mobility in order to strike (with fire) hostile tanks a~ a disadva~tage
French views on antitank defense ~ Utilization of terrain and tank mines When the defender places himself behind natural obstacles ordinarily the enemy haq the better observation The preparation of obstacles against tanks ie trenches mines felled trees (abattis) requires much work and time On a 1000 yard front a tank mine field can be laM by 30 men in 8 hours but infantry and cavalry are not especially Vained tor this work It is questionable whether an adequate number of mmes can be prOVided and laid in the time available
Consequently the most effective weapon against tanks is the antitank gun The equipping of French units with greater numbers of 25-mm antitank weapons is to the Fr(nch mind a most salutary measure This weapon employed in conjunction with obstacles forms the backbone of the antitank defense It should not however be employed in a linear defense nor as indidividual guns such employment invites penetration at the weak areas and consequent envelopment
To avoid dispersion it We d~fense there should be retam~d a reserve of antitank weapons held In readmess ongood routes along WhICh they can advance for emploYment in accordance ~ith the hos~ie tank situa~ion Only thus are retained the necessary mobJllty and elastiCity of the antitank
defeI~order to counterbattery effectively the artillery supp-orting the tank attack the defenders artillery should be reinforced
dAr~Il~~r~(lfo~~~~~el~g~)ShoJ~ ~~~~~~i~0~~rtt~~h~~~~r~~6f various supe~avy mac~_~~ _____ L __
- Range I Rat~ lVeight Caliber Muzzle (MeterilY of WeiahtOf
Kind in Velocily--middot -I--- Ftr Gun oj MM (Meters) Hori- Vefti- pc (Kilo- Bullel
ontal cal Minfte grams) (Gram~)
~J ~ ~~ Vkk---- -127 914900middot 5000 3i~50 -280--~ Browning l27- -middot800 8200 2~OOO 550middot60 -165-5~ Brownin~--132-800 9000 2000 ----(---165--~ ---- ------~-- ----------Hotchki~ _ ~~_~~Il _3~01l1~~~ _5_0_ Scotti 132 _~Il~==_~~===_5_2_ I3rdn 140 )000 5000 4000 20 100 60
NOTE one ounce =283495 grams I one kilogram = approximately 22i pounds
77 I
I
M y 193B
-IIJii~TI 1 Ill) (1lt ~ I II IITlo - 01 O](I TlII shyTl(~ 111111 1 ) 1lIIJiHf J- JIlIH_II HEgt
I HI url-efltll- fl ~ dr fl ~lH uilr lIh rUllR u~rll-1 IH- lJLd r~ lldnl III frnd] JII Itl n 1
-rlollnllrI I) 1111 ITt ddr TiJl Ir Iq illlll f tbf Srutli
S~~~ Ir(~~tlr ~ 1~1 I I 1~ ~ (1 I IJl I 1 ll~ II 111~11 111L~ 1~ aJ~l~I~~~1I1t110l1 1 q elFl 1) f ~ I ( llt 1 f fullf 111111 FImiddoth plltmn 1middot1 f 1 r )rgtdlfI 11 iIlol 1 rTlllIlr In) Ii 111 nl i I) 1111 lid nIl
1 I 111fllf d]l r ~I dill t r 01 I rlft pllll) III 1I 1111 1111 full 1( Irrj Ii 111 l [ - 11111111shy
I ) ~llrJ r I I I lIf gtlll)I
11 (IIIlt If j- 1rlIlIlIIlr I
11 j d II Irq I I rIrll II III If 11
ii rill]gt 1]1 If I jII n
d I rmiddot I I I 1 frld
rdll n to Kf1 nljt tl rH c 10 I ]lW~ rllll~
I) 11 111 tin) iltlll 1 Jr Lrl)lj 1 f
~II r 111 HLJijolfl1
i It
i ~ rmiddot
I
r dh Irl I j
11111 1) j TI
bull Ij L P
I d 1 r r ll-
1 1 111 loi1 - r 11] I 1middot
d r Illto i I L nl
J 01 l 01 d ]1 1~1)l1 ) tfl ]i) d 1 r I f I~ f ill ~
Ilr l ~ 11 1 lOllfr)ldh l1dl1l1~llp1llf d 1IIdl
pltlllltJ1l ~d I (pid )1 I lOll
11111middot111 llIj 111~ Illlnn d dl 1shy I H d
I J It
1 d I )
r I]
1 d II
-r rpt1
l j bull Id 1middot11[
1 d 111 - 1 d
( 11 rd 11 nlj t 1middot
1 Jd
nmiddot I
1 I Ir ~ I] d d
) I I flllqf1 oj lt11 J
li 11
II]
I I ~
nfgt Ii I ltof)
jtrl 1 j 11 (1] r I) Ill 11) Irmiddot Ind IIIi I rI) I 1111 IlI ~ll dl
It 1 I 1lIlH Il r l II h tin 1-111 (
Ld 111+ lrll ljt11 d 11 III Irtll] r
t1 1) llJlt 111 I rll11 (11)1 Ill )jl 011
il] I I I I II n[ tJ 1 llr tqllIHl1t~ bullbull1 Blr-I I tlln~ 1)(1 i ml hllll -llll (1lT1111l I)ll
1) d llid niH ltnr~ ltttdlllll 11 III) 1l111lll IlJllllrrrlfl
j 1
f I~q l[ lIn rlIHmiddottlt~ 11h of lwlt)
) d
ii I 1
I)
1111 11ll 1l1IlTl d uHIl 1ll111nflld l llqr I lid lIItr 1I1dmll I Lud 11 I Ilj)IH I t upply Hld ltwlld
I dILl 1)1111 11lt a Ir flJllghl by I )r gtllll a I Ir IlHJIllnrlli()J) and
]ltmiddot11 I (nl111 (IJIlIIjll lhtI 1111 Ir I dIILl1lrJ Till fqdd dililti1l WI fllllrId I I iI1 t11)1 ltof fin Itr tLIl1~ IlIllh I tlllrilr
rt d ]1 J 1t)1I rl Jlllr ltUPIlrt 1111 It h d ~h 11J))Id 11111d rl(1ll11II~ II
1111 1111 1llIrl mnill 1IIIIIdl Ilt1I k Iud 111 adlUII1jy proliel
]111 a tapul (orp v11I (otjtllnl
I~Jd lId 1I)If 01 I J Tln f)gadl 111 It dv AI ordill)1 ltI~ ll~I (li (Ir I f
j
1 111 nlfrlllIllllI irp rI and I J H II til ITI Lr ~)l LI 1ltQllHltld 11 In rn lrtrlllrlt1
Tf (1011 It ( 11 r I 1 d Illd t1l1 111111 II 111111 1r I) fllllr II dr I 11 rd III [111111 1)( fnllr 1UHlfOll Hltl a
m( 1111 -~H it) Till (rtnIJrl rl rr (fllllti~ aller- ~Ipwrlfon I a 1111 111 f 1111 101
jj I lnll dl PJ)) I 11ljU 1gt11 d 1 r )lllltilt1nC IJallalt()I Inri lrlddlltllItl IllllllllL 1111 lit bur r fl iI()lI
1 Iliflllnl d 111] Il I 0I11 d Lrl)ld ~t] II f Jr~anizd 11110 a talll Iri dl
c amp GSS QuCrt~
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
Jun~ 1938
STltImiddotAjLIlJ J (l11 rLI- Lifutfllmt Tuhnun WILL Till Hllm (()I1il1l TIL 10 Till AmI Lipul (ojuIll (jpI all
IVIILlTARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN IAll tna
H tlAloi Imiddot 1 IBmiddotgtIJ (01-1 rldllr~ Corp
Janunry 1938
Till Vll IN 11ft Ff ]--1 II) r K 1111 I IIt 111 II1It 1 (llIrd If iljllf
A fllltllllJJiIOIl of I pfl lOll nllll nil t I --11gt JpllU Ir AI trlllll) 10 t Ill lIlt III If 11 I II I L) 11 SI1II1)II11 tlrl~ in OHIT
1~)l7 tli ItIOtjr alt liJwd tlIht of thpl ]JI(tlt III gtorth Cillna 1111 fI-1 Ilr III aftlI 1gt dlvlltd II II fl]lIrtIIIIgt 1Il JIopPI prol
llld IIH III (llPllilJll ()f Tl1lllll
10) 1111111 Nil liU I iln J(I 11 phfPOltli(h I I r~( ht] r 1aJjr CPIIIrd Ialt(lw]
A fIII (f Ih ~Ilrlcl ltIffdr lllflllj tIll ltp(fJld hllf Ilf jir-
F~bruary 1938
Al I(tlnn- J I-I I-A IILD Hllrln ~I f)oi IFtlllfHIlCII1l11l1 rt1lrlt KrJI~~()1l11 I Fwld lt1lrlthd lOrI
IJrfwr
Tlu I)II Militlf Sl hll)l (11(ILdl lt11 (Ii~htfifth 1TInJvpr~ar I NovlmLtr J117 TII~ trlIl1lll lt()1 fr till l~uartfmllttrr Cfnm SIlff (If th fmlPrtt1 Arrn ~l 111middot111 ll11 It Ill lIr(lk If tIll Wr Var 11 rae- rIPIII d III 1n I
iorIJUIff) 11 LtI( lr()tOrtinl1ll~ lind 1111 rtrrpl I (llgttlin un Bin7lr
~
gas 1 sligh
born ~tPP nore
light
1 The fare e
~A (lii
mal
1n(H 11011
~8~~ beu
I
WfltI~lp~ )]~ )~ j~lnl~i il1 ~I(rI ~ ~1ljr~~ ~ In11) i~~l~llt f~t~~~~Vi~-l~I~~~I~~~ foj ~~elt
1111 dvpjopnllll f 1111 mHhlllf gl111 pnnjdri thf drfpl1lt( WJth I Jdli WPljJOll With whlh tltl olllkrl)IIII1(I HlvanlaRfC of tjw off(gtnsr T]H (tlllt of ffnnt Hul tl1( l1utnl)lf of llf1 pngaged mad nlltllank~ ~
~~~(~In~~~t~)~I~~)~~~lit II ~~ I1~ifI~~ ~ll)i~ ~~lJli~r1 1tll1 t~17~~f ~~i -I l dlrin) IIH olflIIIVI lIul frf~h n ~fnl hrlq~hl liP 1 tlip dpfpns(l (Pl1lm tJand hll11 up I hI at tar k 11111 111111 Ill tulk t hi 1 pOll Im (lf oilly off (ilsm~ I rlartll lt01IlL11)1l Ill If h)wlri tit11 ( n fnl m atl II] ylll r I hngl
trahzld In l)lrW furm of l(f1( In 1111 llIt hllr Op1l1Jnll ~talllll1(d warl at nl I a thll)~ Ilf Ihl Pt bull11111 tlw nft If thlnl In mnlnTlZatlOI1 Will [ rar 01 mllIlll(f
IOl[11l 1 -lt1 IlUTlt) HIIL jithrpohl iIJmiddot I Ir-II hI] I J LljOf (llgtft Pllhpk
Ill authof fPIPlt llit fulloltlg orld lfLlIf~ to itllluol 111 Jar inl
1) J11f Igllf If lIlon- I~ Allialllt if l~lIr()]lldll In1 r~ Ilt 111( Sino-faplllPltf Ir Ii) TIH nritlh En1jJrf 15J The Brll~tllt (lllIftrPIHI
fl Irldp allli nmnwr 71 Hplrmllnlnl
litlwrt1la clwk hllwI Ihl (rl11 BriLon 1 lllf 1111 nlnr(gttr gtitUttloll 110t 111 111 Ihl d( If --ijldoll ltIt durin) tilt Tllrhl
Till tnll~th of Ih lim 1lI~ lilt ur fnfl nf all mIJnt 110 llOwn In tahullfd form
Till (111 H 1 -IAI 11)[r HUfglrluli III SpanjPII I GtllPrd WwmgPf
TId lrtlll( i Ihf fifth inLllnwnl (If tlH mthnf JlOllllt of th( Sp (lv1l lr dptrihinl thl IlhHq~IHt n1r1lnll HI AtulJagt
In il~ uf Iott11 1 11 It tb aUlhr (lIl1tIltIl11gt III tpganl tu thrrt( of tllP ((lIrlHl1lnl olunltrnJrllh1t at Tptud 111 J)pcpmhlf arl frronlshy
March 1938
Alit HAII- SII 11lLln II LII~ ILuflm~rlff lind ihn- irlmnIlI I (nltlllll -)1hlul
Tlltrl If(gt II pr u I hIt 1 11 of Iml1) III 1 hi1h III ml d t rtwtl Ill ) IT I follo
(11 1I11~h (110-11 t wll Ii 1ltlntI(1 or iIlly-lllinn fUfgtl I~ I In(Illfhlrv lJ (a
In Ihl Ilaln-Ah-lIILUl r tlllrt 1- I fcaffity of targelgt ~plllih (jvil War FrItwo hflJI) a HpltlIlIlrd ha trill to ~a( thr ~ huildmgl of Madrid mil lur thi fI~on tlll- eity ha-1 ~uff(r(d (nmp fllight damag(-1 only Flr norf ltrionlt dlmlg(4 and many more ( must he (xpPltcd ill futun Wanl
mrr
Russ
and
78
i
i
ftXllriJ-O70 ~ bull Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
Both in China and Spain only high expo~iyeomh5 have heen ~5ed MILITAR-WdcHENBLATT (Germany)~~~~~~~ri~~~~~~t~h~iru~~~ ~a~116d~~~~Ji~~e~ ~~~~~e~h~aratJveJY By MAJOR EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
bom~it~~ltg~t~t~fr~~~~heI~~~e~~~~~n~Fni~iJ)J~o~~rhp~~f~~~ ~eps are taken~ It is very important to anticipafe events and take the
lecessary precautions ahead of time
1 -li
ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND THEIR E1I1ILOYlllENT LFlitgtgerthwchr-Waffen und Ihre Vervendung I l1-a]or KrzIHn_k
There arc four kinds of antiaircraft welljJons ~uns heav) machine gun ~ tight ma~l~jnc guml and searchlight
I 1 lntlUlrcraft guns may be classified 3lt follows
Light guns (up to- SO-mm cali her I Medium guns (up to IOO-mm caliber)
Heavy guns (over lOO-mm caliber)
eerr~m7~~i~~f ~~h~ni~~Jails whi1P til(gt light and m(gtdium tYJlP Heavy machine guns are oriinarily of from 25-mm to 40-mm calihtr
Adirect hit by the 37-mm or the 40-mm (an hrin~ down In airplan(J hilt malier llhells e~U1not be riepended upon to rio ~o I Light machine gum - caliiJ(nl from 125-mm to 20-mm are parshyiitkularly useful against low-flying aircraft ] middot1 ~1
EXPEpoundUENCES IN II1~ RAID PROTECTIONI lLuftschutzerfahrungen LifuLColonfi Trimm rery little is known today from practical experience of the efTed of
incendiary bombs and shells because the experienc( of the civil populashytion during the World War as regards air warfare was very limited The Gennans used incendiary bomhs against Rheims but the fires causpoundd hy ilem were (asHy extinguished The efTict of the inc(ndiary shell that will
be used in the future is yet to he determined - On the other hand much is known about poisonous gases and with
timel preparation and training effective protection against gas attacks can be obtained
CUIOUFLAGE ANn BLACKOUTS lTarnung - middot(rdunkflungj LicutColonel Schurgi
atural camoullage mEthods consist of planting trees to make roadR and buildings less conspicuous to air ohsprvers Artificial means consist in uing nets find shadow outlinegt Roads and roofs should b( of a dark color bright tints should hI uvoidpd Complete blackouts is lhe best prot((tion
at night
PnICAUTIONS AGApoundNST GAS ATTACJ~ iBrandchutz im LuftschutzJ Major Gcnpral Zar
1 Gas attacks may he (gtffectPd eithtgtr by mfans of bomhs or by Rpmy from ~airplane5 Atcfrding to tIl( author a gas attack will comp aft(r an air ~rald ~rhigh Ixploltj( bomb in ordlr to prevcnt or interfere with the salrage ~tork
) PHYSIOIOGJCAI l-nmiddotJ-CT 01- GASISmiddot Gift- und Gaslmmpfstoffc und ihn phYfliologil-cl( WirkungJ Liput
Colonel Mader A description of the effects of variaugt gases on the human system
~
~ IJ ~ Gasschutz cler Zivilbevolkerung im AuslandeJ Major Hirsch Most countries in Europe are taking precautionary meaflures against lair raids and have adopted gas masks for the protection of the population
Suttable types are the Swiss C mask the German VM 37 and the GT 6 as ~ell asthe Italian and Czech types
ANTI-Am Rlw nUILDING CONSTltUcTION UhfT Imutechnischen LuflflchutzJ Colonel Bodenstein
Roofs should he conHtructed of reinforced concrete or of a non-inflamshymaterial as a precaution against incendiary hombs Steel frame
are suitable types Well-huilt shpliern for the population are ecessary
AIR RAID smITEitS Der Schutzraumj Major General Palla
Air raid shelters should ofTer protection against high explosives gas nd incendiary shells
Shelters Rhould he huilt in hasements completely underground if posshyible and should not accommodate more than 50 persons l~ach pCfllOn hould have an air space or from 105 to 140 cuhic feet and a floor space or bout 7 square feet The author offers suggestions for design of a shelter nd (or its ventilatJon
1 April 1935
TilotWIlTS ON TilE DUitATION OF l-llTUitE WARS G(dallken fllwr die Dauer von Zukunftskriegen Major Mende
CCWlEltATION lIlTWI)BN INPANTltY ANO ARTILIERY l7wmmmlllwirkell von Infmt(trie und Artillerie1 LieutColonel
Lancell(gt fhi importHlt qu(sdon will always hegt the subject of discus1ion because
cOOpNatlOrl hetween the two arm neVN attained perfection during the World War
The artillery officer mut visualize the situation of the infantry officer Th( main difference hetWfen infantry and artillery is that in the infantry pwh man fireR 11 WfapOIl while in the artillery only one man directs the fire
- the hatllry eummander --- who in turn is Hubordinated to the hattalion commander All nUwr mcn perform suhordinate duties
Artillery should not ()(l subordinated to the infantry but both shouJd work in dmlC cOI)l8ration
The infantry regimental commander indicates to the artillery battalion commandN the assist~m(( required by the infantry leaving the artillerycommander freedom of execution
Th( maill value of an artillery battltlJion lies in the fact that the fire or all )atteries can be concentrated where the inIantry regimental commander de~If(s it most The performance of the artlllery mission - above aUt the Huddn concentration of all hlltteries on a particular sector - requires the pnergetic ~tIJfrvjsion of the battalion commander The effectiveness of artillery fire IS of such great importance that it justifies the granting of ibdeshypendent action to the artillery hattalion No special missions should be ugtsigned to hattmiel
Am ATTACKS ON GIWl1ND TROOPS jFliegerangriIT auf Truppen und seine AbwchrJ LieuLColonel
Greiner The author divides this subject into three parts (l) Attack on troops while entraining _ The object of this attack
may be the destruction of railway ihstalJatons so thllt they may not be tvailahle for loading troops Such an attack will also disrupt train schedshyules The troops must organize a system of aerial surveillance hut fire Iwuld only be opened when ordered by officers
(2) Attack] against troop trains in movement ~ While travelling in open cars evpr~ availahle machine gun should be in r(adineslI to repel the air attack
(3) Attacks against troops ~It the moment of detraining - The same precautions must he talt(ll as when entraining troops It must be rememshy
~~f~ ll~~~~~ trll~~t ~lt~k~Cpl~~e~I~~el~~ ~h~rroJ~dI~~t ~rgehiy~~~~= ahle that troops dpoundtrain at night but even so antiaireraft defense is impreshy~(indihh
rlll~ CYCLIST SQUADRON IN TilE RECONNAISSANCE 1NIT IDie Radfahrerschwadron in der AulkliirungsabteiJung1
The author compares the efficiency hetween the cyclist squadron and the cavalry platoon which form all organic part of the division recormaisshysance seetlOn
According to German Field Service Regulations and to German leading military thought the cyclist squadron has three missions to perform
(1) Security missions (2) Combat missions (3) Messenger service
Hegulations prescribe that cyclists may be attached to mounted recon~ naissance platoons
According to the author cyclists can travel from 25 to 30 miles per day while l mounted Jllato~n requires 10 hours to cover the same distance and at the end of the journey the cyclists are fresher than the horsemen While it is true that cyclists cannot be employed where roads are not availshyable yet enemy movements in such sections can hardly be expected
Does the cyelLl1 offer a better target than the cavalryman Neither (an obserVe woll while in movement However in a sudden encounger the
cyclist wiU have the advmtage Even at a few yards distance the cyclist cun throw himself 011 the ground take eover and commence firing The cavalryman always offers a target whether or )lot he gets off his horse or zigzags at a gallop In an encounter between a cyclist and a hOOScman the mounted man is lost
The cyclist also posseSses advantagC$ in reconnnicsance and surveillance as he can stop anywhere lay his bicyclpoundt on the ground and Qhservc At night he cln move faster thail the mounted trooper ilnd wjthout lights or nohw
THEN) OF THOUGHT ON INFANTRY qUESTIONS IN THt UNITED STATES
Jnrallleristill(~he Fragcn in ~meriknnischer Beleuchtung
79
Cdtaloof Selelted Periodic~l Articles
THE SP~IltHI WAll THE nECITlnu Of TEllUEI Tm lrmo R1VlR DIlIl
Iom spanid) n K rh~ Di icdrgtrPfoherung on Tfrue D(gtr Durrhhruch cudhch d(s Ehro J Coonfl v Xylander
An aecount of the Iwurgrnt opprations that led to thegt r(cptuffgt of TpTUP] and trw hr~~lIInlllK of thp ririVl to till q L tn ltHhuif tll( captuf of Ca1pp on If obrch 1 il
8 April 1938
TIIEgtt Hltl--r WAf I~ 1915 11)(( lil1t~lm( K d(~ ram~ Ilflj dmlrll Rlchmann
(rtnl~IJ IJH(IZATlOi r)F THE Am fOlHt lIton(TlO1- of JHshyIIln1 (IWI~ Tf) HlJS~IN 11-
II )1 lld flltJrlulllttOI dr LuftwlIT( J)fr Schut7 (hr lltl~~hlr II
rLI II ltInf nltl rUc TIlflJriPIl 1 Cnnnf agli
~tltrl ~h J~d Im rIll lilt tirrraft (llfl -uJllci(middotntly ahpld nf tim II Ioid Ihrl fUI) Tin dld m(1I1IlP-~lln bull dl()11 lllld (IIldlilll
Ijmiddot d flllP 111111
(anl()ufLw r1] t t(middot bull tltlily 1((1 dummy roId IlIIH ImJltd I pTftdllli hIT qr - llld Ihd plrtl(ltllr (ttrntlon lthlIzld 1( f11 n III I IfIl(HlLIIIIIf t j1 bullbull 1 I d PI ld Ial t hi l11nol ho I hi 101 II Inn of Ih 11nlrt All I IIgt IT lIlllllr rlft PIltIOI1 (1111 111111r ddltlI( mE Illlt
Vl11 ]1 1middot(01 ~ 11 I d d I hUTlIll llrJ rl ~dl 1 I-TO Jill d LI If (iI 11H I from Il( I Ttll 1111 t
Hill til1lr il-tdlltlll Lf)llI] I 1Il( ILllrd HIgtlp to I IHmv 1llt(lt-gt 111 orriN to atlr1(t Ittntlfln InrI dr(ph thrm
1111 Ptli(H I III m altw) C1Il I mlnlmlZerl ] fn idilll~ nul til( InmiddotlIIllI0I 111 infO (dtnlaquollflq d 111111 1)lhlr h1l1fll or In ~rOUH at thp middottnmltip of t1 filII 1th I dhIlUP of frolll IOO tn nn vardl IHtlll 1 h 1l1IInlj lHi mlllljOlll- ~f 1 ltholdd Ill Ld n to hIYP mplll1lt at hmr II) Tijlnr Itlllut dr Ll (ratfr-middot (111 f d IJ Plllll bomh
flJ1 r11middot of pltl1)ll I Xl-I cnne rIllnf und rr(lIlHI hI1Wlr Ihp rTf nciI 1lHl1 t h fll
15 April 1938
1111 1- TI I I 1lt1 ( L lt] H II I lltCl1 TIll IT1 iA J()I---T Of lEW It r Ill] n~) ~ lchrl(hUlldlpll I a(11 ltahcnlsclfn Amjebshy
t n
It 1 I 1 1 1111 lllfnrlllllllll lol11Inllllf~ olhrr nat 1011 l1l order lrpn m tJnll of ar Tlw mJJl uhj((tlt to ht (ollltj(lt rpd trl
( nm( Illd nlhLlr nutt(gtTgt Thll mfllrmatinl1 Will n1lk( It h 11] du TLIIll rlllllllqltlll~ that will ddill( thp attitudr that r1 III) II]H) ~I1J II Ilnri r 1( rIal elr(t1mftann
Tfw IH f Illll 1d Ill Int Ihhn)C lrVII hnuld POo-(4 -Ultah11 rlquirl shytt Ill Illlt I Jnli l tlll j 1I(h In tlnl(lt lbl1tt- tn ob1[ nWlltd
tI n~I1 1nd l hlghl- dllopld gt11)(gt of patriotl~m I~l lI1 1 Il( lllI)- nltaillfd llY 01(111 of Uhmlrlll1 Ilr1 shy
n r- f l1JfP71l111l
MILITARY ENGINEER
July-August 1938
llll1II n iT r- (ff~ RIJJt Lllutfnant Thomplton Till lilIH(TfO1I Till BIUTH 11(1 ~faj)r I1fllold Bnti~h
MILITARY SURGEON
April 1938
Til 11t1TIJ 11 1 TIlTL~ Or TilL -lEIJlCAL DEiAltnIEr-T 01 TH) Jt- TilL 1II)hT 1 I Or II Ill IN] IN NATIONAL lhl EN-E ~laJ(jr (lt III rd HI~ nold
TI IrA L 1u)f1 H ~I(f I III HI-I Till CIIAWN 11lt EnIIUII 1 IJIr 1IlJlrltl Fr( tlltl rm-
May 1938
Tm fI(I-IZTp ~j) rrgtTd)l-ltlt III nn MIIHfAL SrR(IS IN ltlI1111 (JjJnT11)~ II 11 ~ltII ~jA tlJlU E II) (aJlloIin gtLtlIl (1)(1 11 II C 1111 IIIlHI
June 1938
TlIL nfl(lIAT11) 11 f I r TI1INfgt IIf TilE ~lEnJ(AL SIln Wi ~ IN ~lmiddotI ltJImiddotUTI- f Nh 1~1) ltJ II n)HIu III Capllull faun lind L ll ()I HIII IJ
July 1938
C oltlHIHIIIIiIN OJ fW IIHLtI VIIIl ro j1I AiJYANl II tf ()j 11J)shy
f IL fh VhlelIrJl Jn1 ELlY JJ17) MIJor Frifll Illgt ]fAI IlLHAPY IS Till NLT WAlt (aptam Lowman
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
June 1938
TllI JJTlIWISI I)In 001 IN TIIi OlmNT Captalll Knox 1111 TIItI J flU J JllT OF TItHlTOIlTAI WArEItlt LiltlfCommandlr
ffIllgtl rt TilL JJoT 11NDIHLfl ~A)i 1-lt IlihTOIlY Smith
C amp G88 Quarterlj ~ - -~
July 1938 Li(
JAPANS IUSING SUN LiCut(gtnant Eller ~ TIllS NAVAL nAn LjCutCommander Hamilton ~ Im REBEL HAMS Pratt ~bullbull
August 1938
llWNI TSAO LipuLCommandlr JlOVC1l l Lei lIlt~~SSllN 11AItNtl AT SIIANlIiAI IN Ifl12 Li(gtIHCommttJ(]Cr Smt~
PIONIERE (GNmIIlY)
By M AJOH Ilt~f BENITEZ Coaft Arti1lCry Corp
February 1938
LNIJ IOHTlFJeATIONs 1(pfiltllwn zur lltuzlitlichell LandeslwfCstigungj Colonel Dittrr i
BI1f(lufJOn tll fxpNipncf gainCtl in tJ1C Vorld Var tIl( French ha~ ~ dlvllo]Hd 11)(gt ltm-ealllri fort ifwd rtl~iolJl Inginn fortifi[c1) rhmiddotfpn rmiddot By~t~ j
m whieh (OIWrttl and It(11 Irl tXIIIllIVfly lld lEalh ngion fortifi( IUll t fulfill the following conditions bull (1) Thl (XlllIt o[ the front multt loe such that all attachr cam i
ollll1anlgt tlH pfl~itiun nor can tlw (Twm 0 lrtlllfry prpvfnt moV(menta 1j brr IroOPH Within the furlln] 20111 in~ hold~~) Slrong lIank fith(T Tf1ting on tprram ffttufP or artllicial IItroq t~h~
(1) EeflIent eommunlation netwurk tnsurinr~ rapId movpmfntHwit1 i wil Ihf ZO)lf and al o rapid eommunieatlOn to the r(ar ~
(4) Illpound front mtlt he fldly protect(d and 1rIngtlJ(gtllrri by lililf-rnnlul j lP
or artlfiial oh1I1(Jlaquo1 lme (5) Comfort mU1t hp provided fur the garnon hy tllp on-trllctlOnc
living quartlrH and otlHr eOIlVfn1IIl(Pl Thi 111 altUf r(flt during (I j nat fi(htinl 1Ild at nll plTio(k j tle~
In formlf tinHfI fortnhW1 W(f( hflrI w a mafr If hOJ]or and~1
l~~j f ~ Ii ~~I~ifl M Tfllf~~ i~f~ 1~r~~I~~~(~~ ~ailr~ ~li~ t Ih~I ~~)t I~I~I~~tt ~ the ~pe tlip almntlonmPllt of H(gtiml and LJ ltlfl hy Juffre hdnfl tlp fint Jat t of tIl( MapH and th( ahandonmlnt h IIlIIdenJurg tnd LupoundilldorfT oft I
forI r~ii~I~)(IIIt~~hII(r~~ ~I]If~ I(YI~ ~~llfIW( fnrtlfieat ion ~Yfgttrm ~ ti II prrnt (rv IJ()lI Hul tll land forlllieIIIOil (If t)(la~ pnoopss rna ~Co arivantagflt ltlVlr thop of fnrnwr timl I Th
it(O
-- Im TlLININ(f OF JMINI~IR LJPElt- tP ~II- -i ~~ lS(hultl1~g 011 PllgtTi~rr(lhnrIl IlBd Trupp] LIIut CIOllPI Dlrmiddot -1m
lt~ (0101111 Oll i(hlPwell pre
ln~IIl((f8 III In lfhllllaquo( through dolt( (ountr An lCount Of 4~middot t( t 1lt l IM n N-l ~lrrtl d out hy tlip 2d lngtn lr BIIIlllOn in tJw reg- f r northll~t of Bn IllLll
Attllk of r1 ef IIllf A Imllar a((ount of 1 I 1ctlCJl pX(gtrcISl It vh
ul by t1~lnl~III~~~~ II~~I~I~~~~dglng ltllltpmPlt ti~ I(rgln von Fluzkiwln 1Il dC1l RIlC11l1 CapllIn Schroder en
dccrlptioll Illustrated hy photographs of til( work (arrl(d OU1dJO till 3d Motorized ComplIlY of the 5th Fngill(pr Battalion laying rlwrmiddot ()vCr til( Rhil)l )t COllftallC(gt
Thl work Wt~ dOll I h- congttrucHlg a ponton imdge laYlllg the c~ Jilt on til hridg( d((k lilt ltlJOtt~ thlm ~ra(hlllly by pa ing tbC1ll 01 drllm whIlt dirnLlltlJIIg til( hrll~( II gt((tiOIl from south to north
Nl -mTlIo[)S Imiddotnlt tlto~~lli( HIJltS It OTnRIZEIl tNIT~ INIIJ( VIg(gt 1111ll Fluzuhprglllg dtr mntori iprf1l Einilfltf1l1
Mtjor l1lrlullg
A (ontinuatlOn of m articlf publihpl in Novfmlwr lHHI ful TIlt authnr~ idp i~ to COllfltrud a bridgf COTliltillg of two strelbull - shy
(dJI l on which motor vphiC(s could ridp if I)TO idpd with a l1)cial rlrr~ J aHachld til (hI ()utllHh of Iadl whfPl ~
III tld1 iU1Llinlllll Major JIartllllg prop(l~elt tll( Up of two amphih j lanl each of vhich Inn~ a drum around whih cahlf jlt wound i JjtlrumR ITl rotIIt-1i II) 1111 tank lll~ilH H]11 tlw ahl m he paid oul orwo ~ _ 1IJ1 mechal1ldly Ill( tlIlkl talpound up thpir Il(Jltllioll on OPJlo-it( iri(s (lft II rir with tilt twn (dllj drftdwrillltt frnlll onl 10 th tillr 11)[ aTl ((urld to IiIi grouud hy Illltnl of 1111 pil14 drivlll thrllul~h nJWnl~l Fr In till loor and tllPY arl fllrlhpf IlPPllrltd hy I nIh 1
ThiH irpa hWI nol 11 IHPII 11111 111 IfllIic lInti lOIlW tl1ldlfiratl i(( lIlay hI 1(lIImry In 11Illlr middotllfHllIry nlull ~~_
~GT QUARTERMASTER REVIEW Fa
May-June 1938 JTh THE HOLE OJmiddot 11ll- NI~TllEnLANJ)fi IN THl- IOTtLpound) OF TonAY Dr a_
Akpoundon ~ PLANNIN(f BRANCH COr-~TRu(nON DiISION OFFIn~ O~ Tim Qp ~
TEIlMANSTEIt GENEHAL Captain Lamh
80
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A comIERCIAL VIEWPOINT ON THE ARMYS rIOTORIZATION 11WGRMl LieutColonel Rockwell _ ~
MASS PROCURE~lENT OF SUPPLIES FOlt WAH fohn Mille
JUly-August 1938
Am-FEP ARMIES OF TOMORROW THE SUPPLY OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN DEFI~NSE Lieut Colonel
Lederer RAsstGNA 01 CULTURA MILITARE (tly
(Formerly Rivistn di Artiglierl e Genio) By MAJO~ EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
January 1938 (Commencing with this i5ltue ttle iRivista eli Vanteria and the Rivistu di Artiglieria e Genio have been combined and wi apppar as one publication However the parts dealing with artillery engineer and infantry Hubj(cb arc Iwpt separate from the genffal mattff ~It(~ tion)
WMt AND ll-CtJ [La gucrrc c In pacej General Corsclli
For over more than 3400 years beginning with 149b BC to til( Dulshyhreak of the World War in 1914 many att(gtmpts have h((( made to srttll intemationltlJ affairs hy conciliation and mediation Ill( uague of Nltiolls and the Kellogg lact among others hwe resulted in failuTs HistoTY hov3 that war is inevitahle and human palt~ionl and natIOnal interpsts ~11 predominate over all the methods created to prpwnt war
War says ~lusso1ini is a piH(I01ll(IIJl whirh u(ompanit- thlgt deelopment of mankind 1t is a tragic destiny that will always wpigh uponmens shoulders Pacifism Oil til other hand is not a husing tmiddotitlwr shy
War is a social tonic which stimulates the enerpy of a rale and the national virtues it destroys all political social psvchical and moral impurishyties that accumulale in times o[ peaee
Modern war is totalitarian in characttr and rfquiregt tht pr(paratlon of the entire nation for wur
A BmDS~tn VIEW OF THIlt YEH 1937 IIanno 1937-XV in una rassppna panoramica]
A summary of the chid evcntgt of thp )last year in Itldy ano ahroad Considerable progr(lss has h(gt(gt1l made ll(ordin~ to tlw author in Italy The budgfmiddott ha~ hpPtl halatllp( and the army navy and air forer haY(I h((n reorganized
In regllrd to the army thl XX Corps was crpated and ~pnt to Lyhia oganWd to suit the ~pe(ial conditions thfrp ImproenHnt havp I)(cn made in the organization of the Cast division the motorized diyi-ion til moto-mechanized brigadp and til(gt cltalr-- rfginHllts Th( army hal )((Il
provided vith tilt r(relltly adopttd machine gun antiaircraft gUll ~O-mm -ii-mm antitank gun 81-mm mortar for the infantry ali(I the 75118 hatterils
for the division artilterr and for the artillery of til fast-division t The ar of quick decision h not an empty phrasC hut a dodrill( ~ hich depends upon a qui(k and dettTlllinCd preparation
~the 1t~~~i~a-~~~o ~cl ~l~~O~it~~i~~lte~h~Shi~l~~l~~lS j~l~~dcl~~fdthe c-uipoundErs Cavour Cesare Doria and Duilio The Italilll NlY when tll
present program is eompleted will hay a total of H20OOO tons (()nsi~ting of the [ollowing ships 6 battleships 7 heavy efuis(rs (10000 tOil 1lt1 light cruisers 10000-8000 tOil) 15 destroycrs 44 torpNlo chasfls 3lj torpt-do
boat5 98 luhmarines and auxilia~~~~~il~
1 Tile Nl~W TItJNIKG RFGUlATIONS l Illnuovo regolanHlnto di isttuziollPj ~ These regulations supersede ~~_~)Ii~hed in J9HJ
ij TilE I~~~E~~ ~t~ ~~~~~middot~~~I~~~~~~T AND Tim CHARACTEHshy
A (Lattuale eorsa agli armamentie Ie c~rat~erigLicllf delli flolt del ~ futuro Consul-General GmocclJ)cth A review of the comparative strength of the six principalllJ val p()vcrt asI follows _ _ _
i -- i I
Balle- I IDclfrOl1- SIIJ- I A ircrnft 1 1 hip (middotndlcr cr i 1IrtrilICH ((l(rhm 1oM1____ __ bull__ I_~__t ____I~__ 1--1---[ 1011WgC
_i~~--~--I~--~--i~--___ ~ _Imiddot I ~_ 2 1~_ i ~ i~~ ~ il~)(j I __~~ _ 610000
France 6 4 20 tmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot[ 851 I 8 ill 715000
G-T613 -~ 9r7lfiiiTI36 1--2 13ampLOOO
~ nrita~I~~ 2 111 ~ I~~II~~I- ~~ ~I~~lll ~1~-i71O271135~81r~~- 34 ~f--~~1600
middotObsolescent tModern under construction or projected
-
Accordingmiddot to the author navies Of the future will not differ fundashymentllly from those oC th~ last half century Battleshipswill continue tn form the backbone Qf the fleet there will be a large number of armored cruisers and destroyers and even a larger number of submaTines and a few aircraft carriers
TilE SINo-JAPANESE W An La gtH~rra cino~giapponesc1 (I) ColonelOxilia
The hiltory of the present war may be traced bllckto 1894 when the ~apanesl seized Korea In 1900 the powers sent OJ strong contingent to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion
Russia had its revolution in 1917 China had hers in 19U Japan johHd the Allies during Worl4 War cl1)tured Kino-Chiau
and obtained mandalpound ov c islands by the Treaty of Versailles IntlfIlal difwrders in opportunity for Communist peneshy
tratioll trom Hus~il In ai-Shek came to power and had to maneUvr between RUBsian pressure on one sid amiddotnd Japanese expansion on the other The prCSelt struggle is very similar to the situation in Spain
- a fight b(tweell th~sp two influences JapItl rommercial expansion requires a market for her goocia She is
~tricUy an agricultural country U1d lacks coal and iron mine oil and cotton whit-h arc (ssential to her industrie China offers Japan a solution to her Irohlms
TII~ SlNISII WAH lLa guerra di Spagna1 il) Captain Mele
fll( revoll hcgan in Morocco on 18 July 1936 The greater part of the army went over to the Insurgents while the navy with the exception of (JIll haltlfship tnd four cruiflcrs remained IOYlll to tllf government
ily 1 August the Insurgents had gainpu control of a large portion or Spain Tolosa fell in August lrun in September to be followed by San Sfb1stian 1m Toledo rhe Iiege of Madrid hfgtgan in October where desshyperate filhting continncd well into January On R February Malaga wa (allllred
J)ISTRlllVTlUN OF IIIE [middotN(JEEltS OF TIII~ ALPINE Dl]SION IN A )IOB1LJo~ WAR
II reparti del genio della divisi6ne alpina nella guerra di movishymentoJ (010n(1 CUJlJnis-ini
The Alpim Divisioll c()n~ists of two Alpipe regiments one artillery reginHnt om engineer COmT)(UlY and service LroQjIgtI TIl(gt engilleer company con~istgtl of five platoon4 with about ~OU ~peeialiHts ltlnd 150 drivers Their IfJuijJment consiltts of a light mountain hridge 30 kilometers of win 3 parchlilhts and 1~ rttdio slations In the Alpine Division the engineers eonstitutp only ppr cent of the whole strength a5 compared with 6 per C(nt in 1m ordinllry infantry division The author shows that the engineer stnngth is illsllflieient antI sUJgests an organization consisting of two engineer (ompanies specially trained Cor mining work a signal company providf(1 with tp1pgraph wire and radio crjllipment and a searchlight section of six scarehlight Ilw intirf engineer foree to 1)( commanded hyan engineer oiliecr
February 1938
A loHTLtUl~ECllON1CLE OF THE E-IHTION OF DON CHRISTOshyllllm Di-~ GAMA INmiddotABYSSUIA
I Vna cronaca Jlortoghese sulla spedlzione di don Cristofaro de Gama in Abilsinial 1) Prof Naldoni-Centenari
1he Portuguese expedition under Don Christopher de Gama consisting of 400 ~oldiers well trained and equipped with Over 600 rifles sailed on 9 fune 1541 Da Gamas hrotherwas Goernorof the Portuguese East Indies This Purtuguese force was sent to help tJlP Negus of Ahyssinia lgainst the King of 7(gtila
Im SINO-JAlANESpound WR ILa guerra cino-giappones(1 (U) Colonel OxiJia
In this instalment Colont Oxilia gives a brief description of China and then analyzes the strength of the armed forces of the two nations at the beginning of the war
The cause of the Mnflict may he attrihuted to the strong anti-Japanese feeling after the cstablishment of Manchukuo in 1931 which led to many local quarrels between Chinose and Japanese troops
The author believes that the origmal Japanese plan was to cut off all lontact hetween Russia and China cross the interior of Mongolia and the occupation of the live provinces in North China Hopei Chahal Sulyan Shansi llid Shantung At present it is hlrd to determine the Japunese plan
The Chinese plan is even more difficult to follow At first it -appeared that tilt Chil(se favored the operations at Shanghai in order to splitmiddot up the Japancie forces but these operations assumed far greater importance thall wa anticipatcd
ROADS AND rIOTOHS [Stmde c mutori mcntalitit dplla motoritltzione[ LieutColonel
DlmtC di Marco 1h( imjl(lftnnce oC roadH hus become very evident in the last few years
Committed liS WP are to a wal of short duration it becomes npCessary to have adequate roads to deriVe the benefits of speed offered by motor moveshyments
81
1101
Ca~al()i~f Selected Periodical Articles
111 rll ~ll1 L 10(1 1dl Hl--L I It (1lt1111 J 1( dLmiddot ll 1) 11 II
ld-ll)l ~ --1gt1111 t ill HIIII) If thmiddot Jill f th 11)11 f ~atlull TIll ) II u dl~ lL tLI lItJuj of till r II] 1 _ tuvlrdshythl Jnll-h lril1l1lhlrt1Jn ld dlUltlfl lj ~dnr 1( 11
Plrltlld nJ)l~ HI tl)11 nlI]
d 1111 ~nl H Ill ILl ~lrrl I ] 1)1t
I r II
tlldtlh r
11) 11l 11111gt11 1~ I
[ HI I I 11 I
~ I dmiddot d) )j l) f r bull
h 1111 111 J Imiddot [r1 d IlL )1 I r I II
) fl II I rl l f r gtI )01 t Ilrpl
ill I( 1)ljl I 11J
Ll II ~ r)i 1 bull I 1 11 I
~1 middotI)roIll Ir 1
1111111 II)
d )1 (1111 I i I ~
1middotrIi r 11 t III 1
RESERVE OfFICER
Junt 1938
(111 I
REVUE DE CAVALERIE 1111)
Jllury-Februny 1938 I 1
l r ITnillpll ill ] L~t I) 1 rllt n Ii (1111 II
JI1 1) J IJll 11 j
1 III T II I I iII J HI ( gt1111middot1 Il nJ11 I
Lt J
f l j Irlp r IT I I rmiddot lId 1
f l-fll 1)1 uLlt1 ] 1 r
11111- rLd 11a1 )IIt( I-
I )01- d ) PIIIII Ill
II (qlt 011 i1 1111lt111 nt I 1 I 1 r I oil
I lld - I II] I d t]r I I r I d I dlddI llf I ndljll 11
111--11111
-11 1111) 1111)) Jmiddotft
n dill lin rmUlI( II I dunn tlllh
f Illlt )ullr 1 IILd ll tholl
tJ I till ji
fL I I I] 1]1
bull middotr 1[i J (f I Jr IIT 11middotIf d 1) d
( It rl r(
I II j I f 1 1
Ild 1 1111)) Imiddot ll ltIII
( )1 PI itr )r f J I I f If 1 gtr f Ir
lId jf lit I]n 111 11101
JllJ HIlJd -II )(1 - )1 lflljmiddotInl 1l11llj111 111111
rio _ If lilli I )nlf) 1)0 (rl 11 f 1middotIIIId 1t11 IIrl I) 1ilJ fll ) III
jWj )1 hlllll l I il Id 1 t oj hl llli I I
dll) ltl II dl III I f ICd11 Hid 1)) 11 II 1 11l1)1r1
H II t HrJlllll I a H 1)1I of 1111
nilt Jlfln Thb H1IIII I lInllmiddot
C amp GSS Q1WIterii Vo -~ -
rapidly till rtmiddotlllrtUc])llH thaI th (1))1 llOUid i()J~1tally han and Whl IIHY han har Till yfgtl1 In I Ill nvdlIill~ of tltl )lottion dlarl(t(~ ~i I)y Illl(flIlal u lllkftgt inlln iv( r(annlilwnt gllwrl rcnr~IIIiali()n ~ Il1Hil)1l1111ion of I ill arm
1 FinIIHmiddotid and rflrnllIlWnl 11(riOnmiddot In Flruary 1f)3 Cu~ THOll ari()I1ccl I Inul dh lilt d 1) If li Ylr- o( 1()(1 million IOllIHI ~I(lrhr I IU)IIIlt 111 1 IIf Wal 11 and dr IU1111lt nmiddotL If Ii in llld~(tCii Icili 1HIIIIllII) Iwe
II 1t)n111ll 111lt)11 I~PIII lal IIlPI 11r - 1I11middotrnill~ tIll Ilwhiledi lilli Ih luLltllr dihi)l Ih 11I1h )ll1n1llHI arm
Illi mnllll dll lltlf h Ihl IlHJ t oritJ)tl wI dlrill~~ Irtltlnn 011 t~rr 1 II IlIIJTllt I IIJl~l(Iomiddot nf 1lIk If 1 1111110)) ~ nH~I)ilr hrigaa mpn JIllI d nf r Illll)lb of ill lank Ind IIdlll1 o(molurLd IIlrant~ 3 ca 1 n lflllllll of (ILlrv trlllri II 111- Illl ltlulIlmiddotd hllr- arlllilr 1ll(Jto~ f1an lIl)1 r mil llnd lllll- eml
B 1111 IlLllllrv 1111 in hh Ihl follOJllll lhrumiddotkrJ li~ IpllIll(mt~ prot 11 I 111 1 llr d IIIfcl IJ Cllll-lllllll I rlImiddotlllnll Il1( l~r)JI) 1111( mNr~ mitl 0)1 II ltdL111 rv of I Itl ii l f))1 i OIllIHJ-1 II IIf ~ lilttahtlllgt of muhuw gu hav 11101 3 lrlIllb- pf )IJI tdiOlh I Il h dli-illl 111 lbr Ill IrlJ mulofzd Tf Hlu I Jl d IIOlt I Xlll in Plll hut fInl (r II Ion of (orp -1111lt11 lJlIt~ a~ gral llI hill Vlll hll diltJn [nr 1--1 I v rd IIIIl (0r) al 1l(I~illllnl~ of war
( Illmiddot hll)) (()llIlllll)ll mjllomiddot( Ill til I nIlft -uIr10r If Count 1 ill I I t ()f IJlIH IlHllliJ( r- of whJlm fnllr lfl Il1lhtlry (lidlr lflilror h I II 1111 C d hy j O1I11r lli1 II Ill ]I )-t f I~-II 1IIl IhHf of 1tiT haq I Imiddotptdoli llId
III gt1 1(1 tIJIli111l rof 111 trlll Cl tllmiddotrd I ruel UTI of t )11 lrllJ I) Hnl III lllllltlllilild hut tlllllrlZltlll Illd 1l1(middotlilallllllllgtlJ
Jdl-IJd lnUI )~)lh IllJIltlnZltioJl 1 adlnld nnly in RU JJlllfllllnlrIIJlI 111 IIH Ldry llllIlHltr- mil infantry t w mrl
1illImiddotxI~I III TOflI lllllld IOJll1lmiddotl1ldj( m ]1Tl)rLI1t llOtOrtlllfJh ~ klli 111 lmiddotlJIJlII]d lnn and loLd motoriIIlI in llil Illi IrgtJIJltJht1ll lrIn In cull l Lin I lIllw r l~lInc nl lf nlOnnl d 111 II 1 III lOf IlHhlllll cl TIl( t~ SOl middotJJnmiddot III prltI Jf r(middotQntIlIll1Ioll ill Ilf Il)i hrl)uh f four I of1 Llhll II light lId fo1JT Illnld thn nf Irlll tlllk- infant 151
11]1111 11ht I (lmplIIH 1I1 ludl i ammiddot A FII h 1-1 tT hllltit 1lJard lalll-l orIl1ll]n I du IO) 1)1[
III) 1111 VI1I1 rlI I))OlIrLtll1111 i Ihll11 ln hl tJI 101 Ill ~ll)l Bntl h mtllLlry nc II 1)11 It huld 11lt1 d Illl tit )11- h of 1111l11fgt lld lcIl1l1ll11( ftI- ~ ltilJJ rtll HntlHl dUI
Tl~ ImltLlry rpl-nll rojl Flrl 1III1IId IIIlJj~ tl IIl-lILLr r ldiI-- 1 Inal ddt n ro to na ell
Ild ur TIIltIl1l111lti rOfll It hHllI IUI nl lllJll1l(middotd rdl lhltarmyfi~1 ~ Illn f 11 I t prlt)1 1 Ill 1rnl)r1 1)1111111 Ili In 1111 llwlropohs orl -HilIIll I)t (on ar mtinlilli Ii 10 I r11111 rIllltll~ llnblllllIlJ a urp I ~
~~~ ~lf ~~ r~l n~ ~~~ I~[~na 1(t~~j i~~ l~l J~l~ I~l~~llt~ ~~ ~I~i~~~i~ fi of [1111 r Thh ]lllIr 1 qJIIILLllI ly fln prnINli)l1 Illfl 1l10hL11tJ 11
[hII~~ t111I~I~)~~~11~)I1~~lI~I~middot1~)I1II)~II nl of 1 Plllpiw Ihl d~ pn I lilt 11 1lll lIl1lll]Id Iv Ill] 111 n __ ~lr for ~11111] (rpll Bnt1l11 i-Jwulda nN pn illOll ~Ir uf OIlJ dnrllllll 11kI Jl1 L ()nl mOlIOlrllltlOlI L11e mrrk I~t
It lOll 111 11lmil a 19nrUI- oTmiddotII i I rlllU el lltlll ~X Third llllUIOf)I(1 lrmy rpuirr llUlllrnll1 1)(middotI)I11--gt dllicult 10 recr h
111lt1 Ill rUel Htll thlllk II) Ih pr)ft ~Illd -oldippmiddot inat Brittin G
111 forlIl tILI lwcmiddotIt1i-t It hl III tldlt I(jint a 1l1lrlHd advanlagec- tQ lllllJal LCPI lrJl 1(1
1lw-p hndl~ Irt thl 1l1ditary rhln tlut qrm tilt hl i of at_ hf( il)II IIllIII) Hri(bh mLlltr~ nwn 11 ri IT th P(Olllll1)I rlltOll~ t~ II
n11LfotlP (hIlI for Flr-t Hrill~h rt-tHlrmiddot HI fnragt ar nmiddotdllllmiddotd r_)ure-- in gltl~OiW~1 act
11lI1taulttlbll ~ SPlt ltlnd 1ll~~lani I I -nILlll~ 11 uhlll~tntl Hltltr lllolorJzlllunr Il~
1111 folOf It 11IT 011111 1l1ll1 nl - dir Third IlWIhI11 d 11)111 uHi Irlurlut 111 hI mon 1-1 t
purd Ihm Irqr~I- lIld fILlgl 1
111 llonOlll( llIci nuILII [II-ll fJrci thp Britih lrm tllo~ 1 ~11 1ll01Ilnlllon lIIri 1llllllllitlIOlllmiddot illlprnIllWnl ill Iqllilllllnt md r i ~~ tltl( tltln of IIIW (nl~ll -- I Ii III J lhrl1 11 umpn-middot Llnt- af]l])ftfl - I I
ld Ir(or Ih hlhl jwl 11lr- (lrellll 11llll has l lrl (fl l bull h~ 11)11 n Y]CIpl tllIltJl1H llll 1lH mlltlnk 1111dllH I~un Thl mid 1fr~
11 l~~I~If~~t~~ ~I~I~middotIi~(~rt~l~~i ~II)I~~~~~~ 1IIi~df~(~_~~~~ illl
-Irnllg nnnr Hlr LI](l 110111)11 Ihlt houlti Iuhl it to lI~t un
~ iI~1 ~(I( II u~~ t 1~t~~lllI11~I~ ~ 11 ~r-lll ~I i r II~I~~ )i~f~~I~~~ I~ ~)1~11~1 ~ll]~t g
1 onmiddot ()IIlt f tL Illll- lll I Ihl to 1m lilnn~- mtJIllwnt j ~i lvtlr Irl I lIr I dl 11I11middotd tu tlan pl1fll umh1 qlld Tltl 1ltIn p(nlul- Ir ~ n I 1- lrmnllmiddotd mlll1ll1 for mlI hull 11111- 111lt11 rI( in hltlJc III I~ fIiI Illl lil~hl tlnk~ lwi II1lttrttl l)liltrtloll 1HIUPIl nh~ln lIn]lI lhlimiddot fill t Ill Finlh r ll1l1fllI- 11111 1111 tnr 11 lt t lldly Il n-l11 rll1m 11 III~ 11111111111111 md il JIllI 111 IXjllrlllllllllll lll~ 1l11] 11 11 I)f 1lli 1))111lt11) I Ill Yr lilrlflfl hayl Ill 1(IIl
r ~Ir) ~l in ~i t 1iI I~Ir 1 ~ l l~lllll~~~ ~ t~ r ~~I 11~1h~~ 111 I r~I)llIJ (a I 1 HII pIll] Ipm In hI1 gi (11 ~II i rt(t Illn C(l1lltu i
~I lll~l~t 1rt~ 1111(1 1)~~II~~~I( I ~I~I~)t~~itl~~~~hr t Yllf~~ I(~rll~il L~ll~ l~j~~ dlCltlt r mel plrtHu11rl ululrahit (In lIr lind arlJ11III tlwir I 1 thmiddotll1 tl Ilc ]Id ~111llIlrmiddot proId 1Jut I hI (lf(llj1 r1 -IlIri)r1ly 111IItlly ani Itank and lIllllalrNaft Lll u- ~uan JITImiddot(middotllqtllf jnrlglnltnt Itmiddot)rj)lllallll If tlw Hriti h lnny 1lt toll for mfurmat](lll til Ill llln lllpfjmiddotr dlfmitlmiddot it hnnltllw rltl1IfoPt 10 illfn IIOll of a middotlllllinlIlt1i vlr llot pl 111(11
illl 110
In 1)0
ll~ t~
0 sh ~ th
Catalog of Selected Periodical A~ticle8
March Aprii 193~
~~~a~~ ~jII)~i~middotSi~~O~~~i~l~it1(~~~~~~colon(gti Oario
~hdl~~~t~fht~~e~J~h~tl~~~se~~tsttlhrr~~~~~le~fthke~lf~~~ C~n~~l~~~ tiely recent comhats In Morocco
The firnt example illustrat(s t n(lInnulf1Rlmc( hy two platoons of armored cars (6 cars) and 1 half-seetion of tmks (2 tank~) to reeonnoiter terrain and dispositions in a locality TIl cfIJIHI pxample il]uRtrates employshyment of Il squadmn of armored ears (3 platoons of 5 carf and 1 platoon of 1 cars) to attnck the hostile flank and nllr to asht the main forlt wnos(gt Ranks ana i(ar were t11r(lt(tI(d hy the mmy TIll third example iJlustrah~s (gtmploy~)(nt of ollcylatl)cHl of three arrnofPd (ar UB a (nvcrin~ dptachment pr~tectll1g roudhlldltS Il (ach ca-( employment of cars in depth pcgtrshyTlItte~ Uco~phshlng th~ ry-tlsslon without los~ of cars lack of depth would ha~e Jeopardlz(d the mUISlOn and would hav( lost cars Each account h illustrated by a sketch showing lisposit iOlll and movemllts and hy photoshygroph~ showing gCneral tlaturP of the terrain
HgNNgN(A~JFS HAW I Tim 1( WITH CHlN IUn raid de Hpnnrnkampf dans la gUNr( dp ChilC1 By M 1(allfiavant
A hri(f narrativ( of a raid b) (illwral RellHlIkanwf distinguishedRusltian cavalry Ilucifr during tlw Huian lIwasion of Manchuria in 1900 ineident to tl1(gt Hoxir trnublls Jtelllwnkampf statitJ))pd at Tchita in Tral1sshybaikal was ordenmiddotd to bring rlinforcemn1 tn OIl qf th lIorthlm invading columns sprpe time afhr hotilitips IHgan Dptined to return to Tchita he sought 1)euro1mission to participatp in tlw ampaign and was giv(gtn commmdshyof an advaJHCd detachment Vith this impruviRed detachment 110 marched
~n~~r~~~U~lliii~~~ ~d~~lr~~i~s ~i~~l~~~d ~fipl~~lu~i~i~~~d oa~~~ three capitals of ~ranchuria ami deftated llUmrrOlls Chinese forces vastly superior to his own handful of Cossacks R(gtnnkampfs audacious conduct of this detachmcH was thf most important pjpmpnt in Hussian success during the camplIgn and hrought him mallv honors Against other Russian columns Chillpg fought wrll and wlh somp SUllCSS against HCllmmkampfs Cossacks and IllS skJifuU Ipadlrshlp tlwy were J(gtlpless The account is illustratpd with maps and a photograph of this great (tvalry leader
middot()[UT10N OF HIClTISIl CmiddotiLltY I~volutioll de la caval(rie hritanniquej LieutColonel Cuny
Change in organiZation usually slow are at times accentuated as at present for Rrilih cavalry Changil are imposd hy permanent factors of needs possiuilitirs and traditions of the arm whogtc peculiar characteristic is that it mURt h at the same time contitwntal and colonial Bffore studying HftltrimNlt~sincf til( war it i~ Illc-mry to c()n~ider dominant trafts witilOut which evolution would han 110 meaning
Equestrian resources of the United Kingdom - England is horse counshytry par excellencpound there the thoroughbred was developed the chase pershypetuated raees organized alld polo horn Horse sport is n need of national life and the claiRic figure of fohn Rull remains that of a portly cavalier clud in red coat and ridill~ boots rr~llln dvilizalion has not eliminatfd the taste for the horse hut it has chmged and commercialized it While horse actities remain It common hond hetwNn crowll 11ristocrlcy md the p(Ople iJreedlrs eOlH(lltrat(gt dTorls on produ(tion of de luxe horses and the less distinguiilhed horsE of army t) pe ha~ almost disappeared This slow dimunition in hor-f population IlPforC (ver illcwltlsing llumberll of automobiles to one of the principal (alls of nlelimnizatioll in BriUsh cavalry
The English cavalier As cverywhere else the mounted man feels a s~nsation ~f supclior force promptn(gt~gt and attraction that beinf mounted g1middotes TIll ~wntlm(nt dfvlopll rapid and hold methods of mind broad iskm j balancing (hsires and means ill a word seJf-eolltrol Master of his hoe the English gentleman hecomes mallter of himself it was not hazard that recruited the majority of gnat [ltnglhh leaders during the war trom the cavalry (Allenby Frrllch Haig) Ih( 1~llglish cavalier is more ~nterested in sport than in fine and learIPd pquitatiorl before everything he IS the rough and hold eavalier ready to ride at an obstacle without too much lculation and reflection The team spirit that characterizes the Anglo-Saxon IS manifested ill til( ta~te for rarCs hUlltll and game Excitation of til struggle team dhwiplin( sllit the (IId and slow tmperament This spirit or association is found throughout thp history of British cavalry where brilliant isolatd sections ire til exception comhined actiun the rule Finshyally the Englih flavr becomr ma~trR of brding caring for and training hOIllel With them horHcmastrrRhip is pla(cd ahowgt horsematlship
Thl Briti9h cavalry -- Thf traits are inherittmiddotd hy Britih cavalry III ilg higttory two currents can he diting1ishrrl the cavalier of gentlemen bold and undisciplined the puritan of 1c1 brilliant citizens who triumphed by energy and diseipline With the c01vaJiffs EngJiHh cavalry was bold and keen with t~(gt hourgeoilt it heetlmp methodicalllnd ordered and has so remained middotictorigts of Mnrlborough lnd Cromwell were due to powerful shock of rigid cavalry after preliminary fire preparation From the ueginshyni~g of the eventeenth ecnturv English ~avalry possessed a fire arm and tned c(mhination~ of fin and movem(gtnl ThrRe attempts developed during the eighteenth century by sp(cialization in mOllnted Hms of which truces are ound in divPrse organizations ronsidcred sincr the war
When the Empire waH ound(d and nlonial scrvi lldded to continental service platoons of preceding days were grouped under a colonel and given an organization suited to modestneeds of colonial war and garrison service
Th~ platoo~ system suiting ttllditiuns and ontingfnt ltituations persisted until the f11ddle of the nmete~nth c(ntury The larRc ravnlry unit L still
th pxceptJOn Ill England for- It doe not fit ne(d~ or colonial serice and reliels Of 20 line ~(giments Ii are ill I~ngl~nd 4 in ERJlt 5 in India Nea~ly hult ar-e st-tlOlled ~)frleas RQ are rlwied periodhaJly Colonial SETVlCe reqUlr~s tillS rehef and also a life eqmpmfllt rfffetiv(gtl and tactics
~~~~t i~~~~~l O~l~~~J~ of Jc~)li~i s~~~(~rt~~~nr~it~u~~~dnhrdi~~~~~l~ yCt illterc1mngeah)p this ItN(Hity explains the dela~ sand hCRitntion in reorJianization To nec)s of (oionial S(rvle(gt must hr add(d needs of a contmental war F~nlllsh (tvalry is thTgt ouly Oil( that fa((gts such a doubl ohhgatHlI pr~amza~loll mllst bHlupplp PllfJu~h h) nllpt nLd of II small
~h~rSil~kII~~ee~~~~t~~~l~ ~it~~Si~~~I~~~Io~V~a~I~i~~i~~~~~eit ~~i~ri~~forced in case of llcld ~ t
m(lnt~rmiddot~~~i(i~~a~~i~r~i~~~~l~t~~(gtc)~~~~~~~ ~~lt~I)( tI~r~~~o~~~~ e~l~t7~~ dplwntis (8scntmliy on perfe(twil III fire arms and means of transport As great as may he the esprit of corps and caste in the British cavalry it still reognizes the necclity of adapting it~(lf to the cxigellies of the tines by adoptilll newm(alls offerod byindustry frlwrfforf Ill mean are adoptedhut eSlmt pr~H~lpl(gts and miSSIOns rfIDalll thr unpoundgt tiS in tIll past
EVOLUTION SINCE TilE WAlt
Modifications sinee-thc war hay blen influenced bv battle experiencesSin(e 1870 lingJish uvulry has not w(n an arm ormollnt(d attackmiddothy Jarge units it has been the arm of recollnaisance and fire-powpr The South Afrkan War confirmed these views At the eve of til( war British cavalry was therefore farther advanced than continental cavalry Its fire weapons and fire instruction was Iluperinr to _that of infanlry This fire-power did not exlude the mounted attack hut favortd it it lwrmitted fixing the (memy mU1Huvering thenmiddottttac1dng with the armo blanche Cavatmiddoty was therefore trained to fight by shoek firp or (ombination uf both It was the arm of security and was utilized to hold ground and to constituteL mobile reS(gtfve British cavalry Rhowed the benefit of these conceptionR under differllt regions and conditiolls during th(middot war During tiltmiddot earlv days of the war llll thr(gte cavalry divhioll rllHlpred $plpndid sprvi(e badly used
~~~i1~~~r~~Jtol~lrf~i~~ti~e~e~I~~l~l~~r~si~~t~t~~~l~)~~~~~ti~~executed a march of 320 kiiompterH in 3 days and caused the dehacle of the Turkish armies From these different and contradictory operations some would have reduced cavalry to a IltIroly colonial roh others affirm that augmentation of fire-power and motorized materifgtl authorized a role in continental wars The Britlh high eommand without dpeiding between the radical opinions formulated the following conciu-ions to he drnwn from employment of cavalry in the last campaign
(1) Importallce of division eavulry and [(gt((gtit) of attachillg a regiment illstpad of a sqnadron to eaeh infalltry diviRion
(2) Distant rpconnaissallce i~ tll( fundioll of aviation and armored cars cavalry executes clostgt and dplailpd nconnahNlll1(
(I) Impossibility of llsing t large cavalry unit pXppt as mobile reserve to explOIt succ(ss
In resum(~ avalry ~hould endor to cOlcilialr two opposing factors mohility md fire-power and to this end it hns worked for eightcn years
TIJ[~ f~VOLUrION FIW~1 1119 TO 1937
Four stfPS in evolution can be distinguislwd dllring this period the overloadEd c~lvalry mixed cavalry or h011pound motorized pure cvalry mechashynized cavalry Changes howe been due to progress in means available Principlcs of employment and distribution in the Empire have remaillfd loll~tant to new weapons and vehicles tlmort (omlliete transformation of British cavalry call be attributed
(1) Overloaded cavalry 1919-1929-- Increas( in means of fire after the war reduced mohility of regiments I)(low that of 1914 The horse beClrne a beLlt of burden crushed under weight of materiel and was incapable of aRsuring fluidity and rapidity of movement indisl)ensable to cavalry missions Between 1919 and 1927 elvalry was reduced from31 regiments to 22 from a proportion of 77 ~ in 1914 to 5S f At the same time guard regiments werc reorganized us line regiments and lancers dragoons and hussar amalshygamated into a lingle orpll Bgttwe(gt11 1927 and 1929 fir(-Pnwer of rc~iments
~~~~S~std~~t~~~JI~~~t eO~p~~~~ ~r~~lm~~~If~~rt~~~~~l~~~o~~~~~il~e~ ihor~ drawn lhe hrigad(gt fntirely horfc contained thnf ngtgimlnts Imd disposed 66 automatic arms Only hi till division did motor~ app(gtar mid tilt division existed only 011 palwr it had 18 can nOli 227 automatic arms 9000 horses 434 wagons and only 361 automohiles
(2) The haIr mechanized cavalry --Progress in v(hicles permitted augshymenting mohility lIld fire-power and r(ducing rfT((tiPs without reduchlg number of units In 1927 tht Wllr Omce adopted the six-wheel tru(~k and the armored car The six-wheel truck permitted first light(lling by H3 kilos loads trallsported by horses extending radius of action 16 to 20 kiloshymetern second transport ill truclR of machine guns j munitions and rolling kitchens The motorized sig-nlli deta(hnwnt could he left far behind llnd still rejoin when npoundcded Cross-country carriers permitted doubling the number of automatie nrtn Thus transformed the regiment bacame a more powerful unit able to cover 36 to 48 miles at a rate of 5 or 6 miles an hour It waR comtmsed of a squadron of armored (ars cOIllltituting tho motorized
Woel~i~~n~~11~d t~~~~~~~1(~~~~lf~il~~r~r~ c~~~~~~~it~ i~19~~ Modifications indicated accomplished in 1929 occasioned a reduction of 1300 men and 1400 horses-for the cavalry During this period two types of cavalry were cre~ted entir~ely mechanized units (armot-ed car) Ind mixed
83
V lttlaloff of Selected Periodical Articles
Ullll U- d 1l1lr W 1111lt1(11 (tvdry or llHhptlldll1l hrlathl that (oll]d
form lvalr~ Ull lu]l fhl orgtnlzaliOll (hd not htand tIl-LltI III IPs- than tvo [armiddot anntht r t1r~anJ7tl(m lparatcd hO[I mri motor pfmrnts and rIlkd h~ht T i~ur( lib JJ Uklng nwtorJ1w tralll- (mplYlIlg light marhin( ~Ull III plan tf till dl1iurnltll nIl
11) PUfl dr) 1lItli (IVIIT and n1fChaniz(d fpoundguiatlOll Q In 199 rlmiddottonHl1lmd lInplu)-IIIl1l1 of nod rn nllanI fnJatJrIl 1lHIhalllZ(l v(JHclp armurlli (ar~ m( ~n of Jlillllll)watlOll) to pruvlcl mnlHbty and firf-pmnr ltl1iultlllify 1artllu11T qu till If or (Lvlir Till fullcmlll n1l111 (rt III
(( two (ari lt r It Ihlll blt HLHIIW glIH rfpiaing t))chuJl gUll tntl ~IJtJflltll
rtn~t LInd Ij]middot f IrIIrt oil addl II 111 111 d Ihlj 1 Blhy Jutm PjUlpraquolmiddotd l1h rlIllO fur
01 ndllJ II ilII1i 11l armor ri (ltdI1l Ild Ltl Ql1llr IlItI liu )101 HI r 1 I tllIljlV n I rUL pori phll h II lt Iimiddotj nddlll thtll I In 1laquo- ]11 II r ( ~
fJl LIT) dll r oWlhlt]Il lrlll] r I HIIJII III f Ir I( T rLIl~~Imiddot P Trnltllllf tllllhulH JH 111
IfJliI
JIl l)~ 11 r Irlll Til I l I I d of 1 uulrl)j )11 ~I Ing lllrht ml[ hIli IrlnIHr j r Ill dl 1 1111 l11 r lUlrirlm qf] p1ltn011 (Ih 1 I1ILI fl d 1lrl 110 Plllhlll 11111 plulrlln ju 11IPIlt1d
IIIHIlII r f 1II r I d frorn tltl a Ill nUl1l Ilt P0gt-I I rI 1 ll)hl III I 111 1111 (I) Tltll for dlmiddot-mnunllclrfHlIl TIlf Br(11
)flIl) 1 [lIlItltj 1 II) r fr Tr Ill Irl HlltlJH of frlt rnfhIIlIifd trlnl)rl I rll]It dill 11JIII) ill l]tl If IIll) dunl nl lTj rlt IT Thl10r)1111l shytlOJIl hlIl til fl (I rlun Iut nlllll t llluhJilt) illort qUdllltH II UJ IU IIJlII Illmiddot r 1111 Ill Ifl drmiddotH~rHd fnf dn 1l)1l rItlr- I)f for
Tlll1111 UTilI V ()-I rll) 1 di nlJlrl Ifl I hi n llilt 11I1) nl-l~d (Irl-~lIllltllll of thl Innlill 111hlllll mlnr7 1l1ll1 nt or a cflm)mltllln ()f thl
I TlIlfl )flllllt lIlll 11 11 Illdj rI Oil nl1gt111111 dll] m )1- ~I 11 t1J -1))1 1ll1 dIU) lllrd-J II Ill BnlJh Hilly
lllll-II I ( ~ 11)1) HI 11l 1lrI Ilf Ill( flnigt Callr eompmlllit I Itf)middot ~Ttllltllld 110 ljllth of thnl f()IflHnt I lr()Up of
r lId IT ~ I 111111 IJKd jOPI cIdry flltUfJtd hy rnotlfrn l I ill y lId r ro It ~()II In n 111111gt wllPrl mllhll)rl Llnnot
) fdl)1 lll~ d I 1 rrllll 1( Ii 11 hor (nd rnlChllluld llnltltl 11
I 1 llllll f lrnl I ri 11111 Thl 11 11Iil tlll- (hlll ((0 H I t rr (II lr Illn Illfl Ilvtln 111 hI[ IlO IllIlTp
I ( r I 1Ij~ t 11 h lillI d 1tlr 1111 jln ( dill qrgtlllllillIl lt1 not (oil
111 d I III middotf 1ll11 fI I fllr 1IrlTntmiddotnlmiddot WIth ni~ IWldl I lllllllil dl](jmiddotrl III 1~)11 til f(nrKIIlIZ Ih
rwl 111 Iry II) fllnn 10 Il1lthll1lpt hTlfldl- ll dn)IIIIl In 11 Iptntr Ijl) till IT ()jJUt
UI~ fr llmiddotrlI) hljl rl~1l1lllIh IIllu J f(flnlllIh IIf Jlurtpl ld f Itll tulk l11l0 luH rlglnlrnl IH 1Hn
d ld d L () n ilr lnd fl 11 dllnii~ I n till 111gt grlujltd I [lI(l~f
III Enrland 1 111 Eg pt 5 hnflt f(~lshyTld rllnlnI7ltlOn tIiTi11 tlw Ilorllld
lrjdllillQ tIll 1l1l)1l]middot dlIIIlJ dllt(Iod dunnl T11ull If (lalry (mhl~fd ofl rfglllwllt
Td IIf jJllrtt1 (lvdry jngIJl IIf Llnkl of 1 bull 1 llJldrJI1 )f pngllHtN ll1lhanizfd COIllshy
r~allllItll WI lot (onllllu(middott iftlr 11middotIc 11171111 WlrUIII( lIT crlllmiddotd 1111 rolloWlllj~
1 [lpht r 11l1 III f Ill jllllIlf rl 11 drj to lu (on(rt lilt]) h~hl d Illlll lb I bull flJllllllt Ill) d I)f It)ht tank lIul porl drl~()Ill frU nllill 1 til IP)P Irrl)~ jIlrll IIlllt
1111 n )111 Iii lull dVldld lHtwIIlI dn 11O1l (lvilry and I lid IJl rt)Hh I1(h lnnlr orgUl1ltOIl Th htLgtadll tl) Clltlillt
Jlfh~ Lmk r lm Illlt 1IId bull btttllll]1 IIf Ji)rl(1 lllflntry tgtI1(ally ontII shy j fr till III ~ ToJ lIld ( Ili-llt n ((JI)Jal~aJn and ahlJ( tlk llllult1 I ImlJJf tlth fIrgtlllzttllJll lll1r_ of till 11Ilc consisted uf ~ armored car r 111 llt~ hi LIdmiddot r )IIP nt lIld 10 jllrmiddot r4glm(llb of wllleh) Vprp in IIdl1 (Il Il IIf II l1Jdlll1 fOImiddotflInHmiddotnt 1111 1I(l4lry InfuTf till Il t 1(I Tl illlnt l[d jl Ilil 11111111 II alltI (ollfIPl1n n gtlltld ill de( Iioll to t r r-(lrt1l 1 n 11111 III 111 111lt111 illtl) h~ht tank n~~JnHllh lUi r(turn thl r III I JIlllld T)Irt fltJr III l~Jh l(vt1ry uf tIf 110(gt will (olllist of 2 r 111 11 If lfIJn d Ir~ 1 r mv III of hht Ilnk~ bullllltl ~ burH rqirrlllltl rlt 111 d rf tltllll nl r I II
Irvmiddotrlld Iqr of itLl cudmiddot rlt flJfl1 1 1I I far from detmite 1n Hl17 lllLlt1 tJf jJr drIVI n unltlmiddot1l mto platoolll and thlT1 Igt
lP fJlllIll1lji Iidqqr f li)ht tndl Lnrl plltoOnq of ]Jorligtf cavalry Jtrolt
Tl f bull lltlrf h (Ill rltllllmiddotd mohd rllviil)lI I 011 t1IlpJ1Ifti dllrl1l lIIH wai tf 111 1 IllllJdl of 1 )rtlIllf t1111 Ilf hattailllll (Of[(1l11Vt IPIlWllt J rld f i[vdry Ih IIImp)d IIf ~ tank fIfimpnh and 1LltlIion [ )r1l lllf (Ilry ITlIIIII lt111( 1)11 1( Uril) middottllHllt 11 1rllll If Itl IIllt Iltmiddot nJl 11 lInd) Ir arm Ind hlrVH FtJlOlillf~ mllHIlVpr or lln I II Ir ClUll III I HI d tlld(p 1hi IllnJlIi lIiv) i1~~htf mllTt hOlllI1~~tnOI lllr P(II dill alld I fi for 111I1 modlh(d till or~allllatLUIl 1hl port(( IIdlntrj WOIi Llklll rllm till hTl)ld fldu(fd hy half and organi(illlto a IhI-IHl orJLnIlltJ)IJ (har~1 rI WJth qf(ornim n~ll~laJJ( that tallkfl (allllnt ltf (llnl tl1 (J( jlfIII~ l1ld hlrldul Ilrrillll -I(h il loday th organization nil vliHh Brill Ii Idr h 1lt1 h(middot oqllHZftl and tranllu Entirely mcthashy1I11d II h(lr l h11 llllriv dhIPIIITNI for iJg-ht tanIH Lmd mechanizeu
b4
c amp GSS Quarter~ - ~ ~
(ONCItISIOtgt
Thll1 for f1ghtf1 y(ar~ HrHirh (valry ha- IWN ylLbtlt1 tl)rtalllzin~t contmuoUR attpmpt-q La 1)l)cJ1JlU two apparlllily lrr(gt(mHllahlf faew~ mohility and lirl-powpr Thi~ evolution ha- TIgtull(d from pfrfplti(m~ rnat6ri(I f1jlpoundcially erool Otlntrv ImllHjlOTt thi(l( ftrf(lltlll uf math haH elirninatNl t he duality IJ(lWPPIl (ontilHntnl anrlluionial (lvlirv Malo fi~ ~ ~ll111 1~lt ~~~l~I~ ~ ~llt~ ~ll~t11~~l1 ~1l~ I~~ 1~)(17 ~ i~~91~ r1l~eo1U
l ~n nlf r~iill(l1l~ WPrl nWlhalllztd tOlllY 111 pTIlllort IOn is eomple~~ rlv~rHltl ox ll1fyliatllZld fur ~ horop) l1ld IllPlropuhtm ((aIry j- aIm
(I1trrMI~(~~lnll~~I~ tllH qf thic rW cltlyalrj It Itgt ~t111 too ~non (014 ~ It paS~Il through a pltal of tfllformLlll1l with ILet of llhl1rkl men a trlill(gti (allrt It (allllot Ill Jlld~ttl lJlf()TlJ-1~ IXl-tlt and 1lt trUllld bull
Jlowvr tldn JrlPlhUlllld (Lvdry IHj)l ih 1lvt1rv cpiril It I 1t4 pur and II t radilll)gt alld pmiddotfu 1 to 111 clmfllundl d with lilt tall IHI AItiloUf(h cppnIc of tIlIir bur( It oIIHlrl pnlrVI the ~am( I the trlill tllIl1~lvl with tHlt care [or tlwir I1PW roll If ehangpound poi pamCui If ltllOultl hro nmiddotIo~Il1fgtr thai till (Ivdry 111gt -Ilfnltrod thl mllrmll alld lia adapttmiddotd 11lf wllh up)l() and prllIlId 1Ilgte to III tha IW(ti~qtl(l o[ tht tinH~1 1M
-oBH1 tinmtl that UI1Y hI1 10111 tOl Llr If1 till WLY of nlcchamzath 4oUI IIIIY a~llt If thl molJl1 dlII)IJ (middotlrnpl)gtmiddot(l (If Iliht IIlllt Jilhout l(rllltfl1 CUI pllwpr will hI (apIIlI of fUfmountmg HhLllH rllIforctt with 11 W~ anlitank ann JIIfY r(mlrle Oil tJf dlvlr~lty of unit 1111 Inp sa) Oland jPlIfth of (OlUTnIlI (Ilnrnwu Ilfrd for uppIy and maint In~ Othprl npiy to tfwp objet t11l11 that tJ( 11r)~I UTllt will not ~u 1 lJOlI lOl ttlllld Iwfort tlH middlmiddot f JaH It th bull1 It (1111( mHllIlIci ill the IXJlIThllI( TIll hi rony jJTlJjlflrtllJ1) of Ilf1d 11111 1111 io~lrj to hp liml unib in Egypt lndil mrl Jllfdmd (I111idf1ng till whlf of thl (aa~ an of thl Jmplrl blHh oc til Ix 11 Ill rq~1rlHnh ))1])1111111 tblrl lxlsi for natlVI hor(middot f(gmllllb III IndIa Hul )tgt hllr TIgmHIllt 11f 1 Ilnllllrl a hel Seoul 11 nil 1111~lilh tlrnllrJd army Atli(lligh till (lnll1Wln- 11IY (oll lt In
~I(~~~~gl~IJII~ f IS ~I~ ~11 I ~~~I~H~ I ~i~ ~ iN ~ 111 ~~t~ll ~t(itI r~ HIluJar (Ivdry tillt TI ff( (IltltUit 11J~ I (nnllfltn(I -1
of lhl IrnjJ(middotrial (lytlry It 11I11middotttlllmiddotgt tlJf 11111)(1 jllmi thmiddot enlt
lII~aJ lir41 on tlH halilp filld [t- Tj~lllllll)ll 1]111 tI or will lat 1laquo trallrnrnllll It h (llftl lilt ltt I fOII~ hilt 1 fllur J1)1I1l1 Ill ItllltfJert~ rtf fortigt lh
ltlthE
Ttl ~llPIIIl- 11 11 HII(~L lolUlltlt( N SH1A ~~~FtlOlli nl I fool ~it Ill Ion 11 I ~~IIlTl d (1 l)~ tin h tl 1rdllmiddotI11 flmiddotJ (apta hu
H1J()1
Thi tudy (1)111111lt thl ~Imiddotl))~rljlh f-j rlt Il~ III( Ardl I(IIlt ~l~lll
~~~t~ ~~ ~f 1~It~ll~I r~1 t11~~11~ [~ It ~~ f(l n ~~rLI I~ ~~I~~~~~ ~~ ~h cllIgt for lmprIlV(I1I1IlI Illlt HI 1(] 1 illu rtlld It h phIIl-taph of he IS
IYln 11 h
I 1HAl lION In I nn 1 ]1 nlll)j I ltll1 I nit ~T Iioxlrtilhlll tiP 1d1middotunlmiddotth iqu I plrlll du mh I (1111111 dl Br iJ
l11~ lrtill(middot dh(ll~i thl prlltiu linn If ih~ 111)111 fr0111 (nlll lld ullporLLllIp hv ria~Oll of gramiddot a1t of pllrnhlI111 III FrlIHl
REVUE DINFANTERIE FrlII Ih LIUH lUi TI()IJ Inflllln
January 193B
Till A B ( 01 Hl1L1EHY II]U IIA 11 ( du tlr dt 1lrtllkf1I I (ltltHh I 1Jmiddot-nngtIIIL
A Implltitd di-( U~-IH1 of artilh T 1111l prdhltHl
TANI- IN ( ItI Illl NI E rH [I[I Flit Altl 1ldl ~shy l~ lly lBlh
ILlgt dlln dlll 1 ddlll~I( A 111 1ft rnlt1 ILvril~1lI1I19H l~ Lilut(1l1I(middotj l1rn
An ICqtlllt by 0111 of til( Itatiing Frtl1 h Llllk mthoritw of tht trtl l~ ~~ tI~~~~v~~~~~1~ltl~I~I~Ir~~~I~)I~ltl ~~ I~i~ J~li))~~l~I~~l~I~fi~Imiddotll~t~lr~~I~~ ( tilnyX J1ay i)JX TId lrllll 11 (Uir( 1) t 1parlll tilfu ill QuHter A ~I No fD rUlll 1lX pag X4
tl TIm AllTOlOJllll Silo 01 191 ~1l11~ U1ITAI INTltLr f ILt ~l~l~og~~~tll()llohlh dl ) 917 ltmiddot J1lllllnlllllltttlrtmiddot 1 ClIjlU ~
Thl fori flf Frll(h alltoll1nblltmiddot 1111nllfllll lIT1r til Id rtlIl1h III Hlig i_1 l(jllIllllp lnl I)f fwmhlll IIIP ajljltarIlHI nf 111 I 1lIgllloc tnd uf llladllT~ ~I Ihlflf~ otlHmiddotr fUll tlt11I 111111 lri ttlJIgtlrlIIImiddotd (If fr(lt illtlnct g
February 1938
TANk~ IN Till (OUN ntt1 fIIC Till I otrNTI~ltATTACl or ~[at ~~ Hl1lOY II-I hllH IJih
[Lt (barR dlIJH la (Ilntn~altaqu( 1a ontrlmiddotlttIlUt de hUn Bdloy (11-13 juin JJ1X] LwutCoh))wl Pprr md Mw AUHCnac
Spp dig(~t in (~uartlr1y No 69 hlllP 1)IX IllL~i ~middotL
-
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articies
MARKSMANsmr TltA1NING FOR THE 60-~~M AND 8I-MM BRANDT
lMet~~~~tir fietH ~~ur martier Ba~~[d~ 81 ou de 601 Captain Loubiere
Method by which practice may be gained in correcting fire data as a result of actual observation at ranges of several hundred yards wi~hout the firing of liv( or training ammunition
March 1938
THE MODERN TANK ITS CAIAUILlTll-S AND EMPIonENT IN Tim ---_ATTACK )LI char moderne Sea pOHsihilitiilt mn emplai dllnH rattuque1
LicutColonel Pprre The tank is not a weapOIl which will win wars quickly lind painlessly
neither hafl it provpd a ailur(- in the Spanish War In an article which ill the reproduction of a conference hefore a large group or reserve officers he points out that if the tank has armor RutficiEntiy thick to protect it against the fire of antitank weapons striking it at 30 degree angles at ranges greater than those at whieh thf tank Irlw (an sec ancI return the hostile fire immedishy
~~~~h~~Cotr~~EC~j~~HI~~11~h~~erl~~t~~1s~i1~~ti~~frni~~)titl~~Il~~o~~~ cumbtd to antitank rifles He attributes this to the fa(t that these weapons ere unabl(middot to pemtratp the armor of tanks at other than short ranges and say the fact that tlw tanks Quid spot these weapons at such ranges and instantly return effctie fire was the reason He also points out that on the battlefield most of th targets which antitank guns get will he sitch that the bullet will not strike llCrpcndicularly hut at an angl(
In speaking 01 Amprican tanks tor some of which a sp(ed of 60 miles an hour are claimed he says that there is little advantage in sllch speedsshyfor one does not fight at 60 miles an hour He draws a great distinction between the maximum speed of a tank its average marching speed it speed in varied terrain and its comhat speed The latter he says no matter how
fra~~~~clitl~~mdilftce~t~ ~i~i~rn)iti~in~~~~il~~ ~ohl~t~r saee~Osu~~ search the terrain or to fire accurately This hrings out the essential differshyence hetwepn the French gtlchool of thotlght on tanks and the British The btter hag insisted that gpe(d is the hcst protection for the tank and takes precedence over armor The French school answered No since you are ohliged to ahandon tllis speed at the moment you fight effectively that is at tre time you run the grlatest dan~er
Colonel Perre says the expenence of the Spanish War confirmed the French reasoning and add~ that thf British and their followers arc now husi1y engaged in augmenting the armor of their tanks
He brings out that while modern tanks can make one days march of approximately equallpngth to that of truck columns the strategic mobility l~ much le~s A complet(gt overhaul is necesltary after 3000 kilometers and thererore every tank movemeurolIl must IW (awfully weighed to see whether it
nside(-l the most difficult type of tank attack that against in a defensive position an enemy who has had time to coordinate He first poinLc out that tanks are ablE to approach hostile resistshyfirp at colte range and hence obtain a maximum effect with the
expenditHrf of ammunition On the other hand tanks run great Itn ther llrc immohilized in combat and consfQuently cannot ound Their vision is ~mch that they cannot fire effectively nt
00 meiers and their presence in a zone only insures a temporary 11 whilh is likely to vanish when they move on Likewise the erent to varied terrain the necessity of locating the enemy and
tanks to provress with relative slowness from the moment fff(tiEJy~ Tlw autllOf thus concludell that when opposed
pable of strong Tlsistan(( tanks must act in close liaison IIlth the ot IN arms infantry artillerY and aviation This permits the infantrY to occupy terrain held hy the enemy and to mop it up The infantry
idly the (ffc(t of tml action which is essentially fleeting r(middot tllln rpmind(d thosl (If his auditors who had participated what til( infantry dreaded most when moving to the attack ouYd of ma(hine gun fire grazing machine gun fire coming
from a zon(l of temdn vhib)f from th( line of rlrparturp aurl at the most 1200 met(rg deer
If shortly after H hour this hand of terrain is invaded by tanks in depth protected and ~uppoIted IW other arms all or nearly all of these deadly automatic weapons will he silenced and thp infantry can advance Colonfl Perr~ spraks of this as the notion of tank employment in Ilretlg as opposed to thp linear emplovmltnt ff th() last war Th~ most powerrul tanks 3hould lorm the advanced ~middotchelons and since they have to coordinate their advance with lTtil(ry fires theuroy me under the orders of the commander of the arge unit tllf~(ommon (hier of the infantry and artillery
Not J($S Ir)gically he contends thf lightr-r tanks constituting ~e rear echelons n(fd not be fiO fust They IJPnefit from the protection of their Iurger hrC)tnera and or the fires of til infantry Sineeuro they are the IoseRt to the inrant~ ancl mUHt r(gtguJat(~ their advanceon that of the infantry they aro
bordmated to the infantry commanders olonel P(rrb points out thlt luch a systlm is cllpllble of powershythat with it attacks can he arranged much more qUlckfy than
Iistonmiddot d(middotcisive battles have occurred only when armllshyent pcrmittfi the (jomiJiiling I)r mallllVN with an action of frontnl rupture his combination was tIl(gt (RSPHl of Napoleonic- maneuver When fronts reinvioJahle flanking maneuvers mcrcJy throw huck the enemy He points ut that tlH- tank now giveR the high commllnd n hattering rllm capllble or ~ning a deep hreach and that this perhaps will give back to Victory those Ings which the pitiless automatic weapon had shot off
TaE AERIAL INFANTRY MISSION ILa mission aerienne daccompagnement de Iinfanterie aU combat1
Lieutenant Roy fhe author states that under modern conditions the infantry mission
(contact-liaison mission) haa become almost impoa3ible because of the deadlishyness of fire from the ground It therelore must be abolished No plnne
W~~1d eWaCrcrnt~rr tci~~~~a~YHu~t ~rdi~~g~ltitudes required during the
The befit that can be done is to combine this mission with dose reconshynaissance missions or rather to modify til( latter slightly When the ceiling is very high the plane occMionally can dive down to aRcertain one or two definite points A specific queRiionnaire should be given the observer belore the start or the mission Most of the information will hetransmitted hyradio
go od~th~~~I~ sc~~I~~~t~s~~nWUh~ 1~~i~ili~~~hol~~l~flla~~ ~e~ the lines at low altitude and have the benefit of surprise appearance and rapid disappearance However nothing much can be expected in the way oC informatIOn unless the observers are well trained in such work and unless only very simple things arc demanded of them for example Does the enemy occupy Iuch and such awood Have our leading elements reached the line x - Y Why does not such battalion progress rn such a case the speed of the plane will permit it after droPl1ing a message at the division command post to land at its airdrome and furnish by telephone information to the staff a few moments after obtaining it The use of radio in the latter case will be less important The author believes thut persevering in old methods would he fatal at the present time
THE TitANSFOItMATlON OF INFANT1W AND JUiVISION OF TERMINOLOGY [Les transformations de linfanterie et In refonte de la terminologieJ
Major Laporte
Changefl in terminology neccssitatcd by changes in French inCantry organization
~NGINEEILS AND MfCnANIZE~ UNITS lGenie et unites bhndees Captain M
THE LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR ACCORDING TO TWO RE(ENT AlltlCLES
[Les enseignements de In guerre dEspngne daprfs deux puhlicashytions reurocetesj Major CailiouX
A discussion of the accounts of Dr Herman Klotz a former German naval officer and of GeMral Temperley It is concluded that tanks and aviation are merely auxiliary arms of the infantry which remains the Queen of Battles Antitank defense and antiaircralt defense have been effective The tank no longer can count on technical surprise it is on an even basis with antitank defense and the morale of the eivil population ltan resiit bombardments by air forces Militia when engaged as interior units on a continuous front have been able to stop better trained troops and a situation not unlike that of 1914-18 has resulted
REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE (pmcc)
By MAJOR RG TINDALL Infantry
January 1938
NOTES ON THE HIGHER CONDU(T Q WAR FROM 1792 TO 1797 ANn FROM 1914 TO 1918
Notes sur In conduite Buperieure de Ia guerre de 179 i1 1797 et de 1914 it 19181 (I) Marshal Franchet dEsperey
tionalr~ ~~~~e~7t~lt~lyi~h~I~1t[~9~~ei~~~r~~r~h~~~~~r~I~~il~ effected through Carnot who middotat times even supervised the actions of the various fourteen army commanders
NATIONAL DEfENSE [La DCfense Nationale] LieutCoJonei Fabry
An article advocating a single chief [or the army navy and air forces of France Incidentally simultaneously with its pUblication the French government took such steps The actual reorganization effected ia covered in a Hueceeding article in the March issue of the Revue Militaire Generale
COMPOSITION AND POWER OF THE NAVY ITS ROLE IN NATJONAl~ DEFENSE
[Composition et puissance de In flottc Son role dnnA 11 DMense nationale1 Vice Admiral Darlan
The author brings out that France cannot fight n successful war unless materials can he imported from abroad and troopR transported from her colonies Thus the tllsk of the French navy is to keep the sea lanes open for French commerce and France must have n fleet at least equal to that of
d~~~~~f~afe~~t~h~t~amp~i~nnheei~~tl~t~~~t~tI~~g~~~~~~~~ed ~ao~hi~~~~~~~ ground-air~l]aval cooperation although he points out that thlS
85
- rl [ro 110 I r Vn-Ilth nr f)HP
-ltlldd I lt1 ltI I rl Ilmiddot in--i-h (1) orniudnv rr r I 111 (If tlw air forI IVI 11 1 111llIhl jill 11l IlllllllrIt pt did 1 i 11 I d In nrdl f I
f Ii Ii I Iii] rt) jltI III 1 1lt1 I I I 1111 1))11)1lrmiddot 1111
11lt d tllll If 11 lmiddott f I II h()~ 1h1 I I 111t itlljP 111 I I I r hll lldl ]l[ lId I L 111 ti I ]II
Irl 111 I~ r f 1 dr middotn n I Imiddotltl -1 I( I bullbull r I v n ttl oj 11 I jdlf III pI 1)1 I I old 11 I11TI) rlo fI dlt middot)dI]IT
J(rl~~Ir1 I~~I I r J
11 bull L II I( 1111 11111 I II
II I I I I 01 I I I Idl d
fflr I II Ii (
i t Till
I-UlImiddot1 I tr 11 bull I Id) I) Lt I
rlId1 I n oJ I I) It
)Jiid tf f r r I trtlJ
(1111 If II pli 1 H r H)d d i r d 1 1 d I) I lt I o
fr middotf 1 Iil Ir f bull II 1 I) I fr I
middot1 ft1 1 f 11
q I I bull -I d II Ir rt~ j j II
fr Ii
I ii fI j
11 1lt l I
11 1 (It]( T
rII I r I~ 1 t In 1lt1 h 1 I 1IlllJJIlll~ hu III d b I 111 rt
uljag huj ll rll
r qJfOIIl1llth In)) llgt~ II ul r nth
Ill 11l1 II fiTiIIIO 1
Ilhl 111JllmITJ11 1
ld r l~ll t lp mil ( jlgtI 11)1) 01 lIld 11~middotd tl 1 Inn 11 11nl1 1 f r qPH rj 1
f r 1 j nlil 111 fr
Till J 11 r II 111 11 J 1raquo -1 JJL) L r j ]j) r I (gt1 I)trd
[I imiddot II 1t d to( -Ilfllh )11 r -1 I 1 IlJLd L11 1 f lll)r
I tri jlj d cpU rtf t ll
11111 I L d)middot 1 HI (1)(1 jlilll 1 )1 I 1r1 I J I qr i Off 01 rltllJ t I 1lIlIlll llll I I~ II ~t I~ II f d TI I Id t fIr tl If ltgt1011111lt)1 d
l~ IIj ( r I I 1 rJ Illlldlllt dlHd inrH) lJllII II I d fl II II fld- f dl )Illo
Iilt In HIl 1llTiIlll Ir llj I I II I r)jfllll pll H Ll h I iOIl
I Ill II d [1111)11 f rl I llIld [Illt o I ( i r ( fl dl d liP tt 1 I nllt L11
101 II I dt r 1 f 1111 ltI [ r h f 1[1111
1 11 I 1 I I I I 1 III I] t tIl 11111 d (I rlr I gt
d d Ill r h IWI nIhlllqht nllt ill
Ii II d till pr J1ftflllll fnr Iltl r j] 1middot1 d 1111 Illltllil IlllllrIPI wa I)f nJIIIo
II 1J III I II 111lt1 r If I 10 r11 l III~ t hlll~1
8fi
c amp GSS Qummiddott~ Vo ~
KlLO)OO()() mdl lrmgt (if fid~( 1O()()OOO art HI(r) j-JtgtIL~ aIIOOOIJO hand J-r( nl]h nb~
1Irt of tllfP mppltl Irl olitwwd Jv Illtl1ill~ lllohiJillIliol1 lJlplt~ l whi(h Wfrt t IWII lta 111~ nlllllt 1 lImiddotIII illdll 1ry WI Illordinal(d L ~ orde 1llr 1 lahlid11ll1nl iJhe
TIll ralh) WI 11ll)1 1111lllIII alII I 11 flllil lrily Two hips ftn J rti middotlallllI l t lilT Ill (11 I l1I--1 (1111111) l1lltll1~ II Llt)middot inrfroz1 llHat lminl 11111Ipl 1 mItII1 rlldII 1Ial~ fill 1JlJlllf h I nirlltUII produ - Iro~ IllllWn I IIWr)Oll ItTII 11l1 IJllIIILUi ]l11f(hI~Igt of nat fl mad~t of jI
AWImiddotIItHII 1)1lt111 lId 1lI II or 1[1 Itllgti pn-mnlilly 1Itf)[lJll d t
111 1 ~iJII~l h~~ ~~i 0 r I r~ ~II ~ II~ ~ II~~I~~I- III Lilli Ividual ~lalu 1~on~ (111 11 r ilrl 1111111( 11 pll d ~Idl 1) -Ill ~ 11 111 plrtltloll hrlwf1 irlng Imiddot1t II II IInlY llId tIll nllIIrj r1l1 II II L Ill If I hI XllPdltlo1 i IInI r ~~~~~~II~~I t~lItlJfI~ 1( ~it( ~~ ~ ~ ~11 I~ II)~I~ nt~~~~(j~ag~l J~emi ~( Ij I~ 11 j I~I 1~~~IL~~1( I hHl I It IJ I II I hh IIt Il1 11111 t hI nH1 h 111 l(llJPt~ 1i1~f~1
llllfm dciJe
llIL OII1 Lit IN TIll lln thr ILollllipt dall 11 (111111 LIjltlf I)I Ildlrmiddot mati
111laquomiddot11 )011 of III rolt ltif Iflp Vr II] rhcPf Ill Jl-ltilJll il ffgardl OpUo~ 1111111 Ilid 1111 FfIIl] (hTlflr
0 1February 1938 ~ (middotrrot
-oll-Ot- 1111 1I1dllll 11-111 11 1t lltll1 17~2 111 17n ] [IJI 1l1 1 1 1111
nI llr la cnllil 1111 111flllIrlt dl ll J-IITr til 17l~L 17fr7r til 1~11 t I l~ll I I II llr-lttllrlIlftpI r11 IrY
Thl FOfll1lmiddotr I fHllllltld r f 1 llf SIIllIl-1 IflB 1111111gt ll~ -lrtfS IVlfl1lll 111 d oIHflll IIf H 1~ middot11 r 11 Ih Hill lor d If If ill 19il~ ( ([lIl t Imiddot FrlIHli ~OlrllJ1l( lIfprplr d fur 11 r]I lJ) d- of war F i~ond IVn it 1)1 [wrtlllalil y f ( IIIL )nITr -1)111] rI h I1l 1 Wa IH)lS1 ~Ytl llldlf IIII I If( 1Irr1Illl I d I Illlllllll IIllllllr din 11111 Thill lftlf 1 1deg of 11hIIl1lgt1011 I) I~ till 111 gt1 111~Irl I lnnlnl nllllll ha[pd ~J jMgt] Ill gJJfdl +11[1(111111 If I hr ll I hI 1 f 11 fnllTwnl InlhlarlldUIi
~(il~I~- ~I(~ ~~III1II~ I~~ ~ I~ l~ iI 1-111 I~ ~~rlll If ~lfJ l~~~ rlll~~~~~r ~~ lRd1 Imiddotr 1lllt ronlt t hltIfIIJImiddotI11 fq 11 1 IllI11 if (I)mrrll1ld hut ttl~ ~el WIS lirnltld In IIH --llfn 11)tpr f]OiT(I
I111I l~~~~lI~~t~II~~ 1)t i~ ~ l~ 11 r~)~1 I II 1 ~l~Th~~~~I~ji(~I~k hllll tIl h1 L ltJllllICmiddotrj Ill 111 ti fl II Id PIli Ill Ill Innh I hn III I- 1(middot d)[ 111111111 Ilt fo tiltgt ltl1I111 fllf
1[ ingthl- th ]1 IL lI--tti III lPll f 1I ri-Ill Ihl Ix(rllth p a r[~tlLtl IH1fgt 11 111111 [ If I 1111 II) IlIml ItrJll whi(h Ill[rshy1lmnll))1 ~lllllld n[llrllr
TAl 1I PI )LrLIUf) -]) pI TltltoH)tq llLl~ 111(1 (lip jhll f 11 dmiddot IkllllI11 I (11I d lpn
Thf Iuthof I in rpmiddot)hltlll 1lltl11l-t pf - nlplLt Ffillth tUmiddotlmiddot II) fshy1it-11lr tIlt 1lHplo-mfllt If LIgt1 Itllk 111 rIl11t tIll -tlry r II( I(3 of 111 1llt Ind l)Jj In gthw 1111 111 )p~r - 111lt1 lrJmiddott I(ht III 11111 m1)1IY of an wflll n Irl Illtf 11111 Inti (0l111jllff Ihpp nh It tu k of Cln)hrtl Sn~ltllh 1lJlI mlll- Iilt t hn 1)Hl1illl hi 01 id_
011 III ldnryt11~)~ti~~~I~ ~~~Il~~~~~~ -lIfprN Ill J III illltq~- ~t~ tit onl antltanl 1lii ~hllh 11111-1 ll 11 1111 Iwl TIll lIltll~lt ma ~llll (If today lrmiddot lfJI 1j-litl 1 Jr~~lrlh lrmrmiddotJ 1111 hilt II nr~6 X(( lIJ(TII IIH armor )[ IIii Illd 1)111 111 tnlltllll wljum IllIIt hr IT Iq~r 1IIe tlllnmiddotfllJI llJr i l1d~middot Ihl t llll~ 1lll Ilwll lo(L(gt Llrl ttlbull llrt tjlllll nlh middot11 (1 hn
If till 1middotIWIll hI 1111 111l m1l11 olllllh~( IJJlhl III dprltd Ld ar(llilr wh l)(lt ht th (lIl- dll Illt- tI nlI1111l al tl1 111)( nf rarp ~tain wllh II IlWl )-Ilt)gt III Ir~llgt 11111 Imlllr th 111ll lP(Iar~middot fortmiddot J
Mtdlt-Q Iq dll Iln1f I rlg 11[1 whlt 111 1tImiddot Ih lank Iodnl Ilon clogtp ral~1 Tit 1111Ir 111 dl) It Llr Ililtpr Ill qUWIlf ill1 (l1Hlu~i~~ iur
III dIJl- lilt j h t) til) thlllt Irtillf ll)ljlllrt Imt 1)( ltlPtl inf adql1ld Il IhL Igthl I)f liltgt LIllIgt Ir 1middotlIl1p] Ill wanl t far grelt ~ IJI of Intj)Il11 wI gtllJO IIltmiddot dll Il hIgt lillll 1lt1111 fltlr arlilil p ~b 11ft III all lltI1 1111 Ill Irtll t~ qtIP1 IJ1~ IIill dur1llg an tttar~middot rei t 1)1 IllrpO( of an lrll1 n dl t]llllll III Ilf fj ld]lhtl1ll1l of nlwf It(1n~ Ph( Itnmiddot ~JImiddoth hthlh hIIIIIIlJlI rtmiddottmiddot Illdl illt 111I Fnllch ltlrlll~ r~iE nmiddotdIIY Ihlgt~ an HUr l muhlllr1 11IIllt(d II 111l1lt tlI lllllCIII ~lld I f 1 f lrltll) II lt11111111 flllllllil Hp)lrl d 1111111laquo tH th~ ~)Ini Ill dimiddotappPlf llh tilt (Ill tll) (Imiddot tllllll gt1rth lw Link i d (I1111on~Jlln IH rIII)P ~
Sill 11 hmiddot If I ln I IhlL 111 It IT tin Irt t1ltry nhlnmiddot(r Ill fol~-I In i Ill pnl~~nllIn If Llllk l1l1l1t lormiddot It ih I hlll I hal of mfalltr IlII mn ttfl o r jllll 1111 ullllt (In rIr litll] lltlll1 anti qlUltlnn h fldio) ~Iw
[1 ~IIIr~I~~lil~ fIJt(~t II~l ~~Jiil~~~~I iJ~I~riJI~~)~In~~~1 ~~d~~~ hp 1111011 JIl ngarltl In dlp1lImiddotII1P llt- ~
Sl1r)))jmiddotp IllIIY1I IJllin ft11 tltll if It I 1I11lly IXpll)ltmiddot 1l)tllw adl i ary j not ~ion tinw to brin up fflIlfuflllIHIlIltt Tht Link is (mmrL shy~llltahl( to rtLiir( urpn ( hut nnly If fgtl1lphYlillll InIlt on a WHIp front amiddot ~ ltv(fll (1l1)11~ (lPIp Ill( llI1 Iwr m~It IIll p(middotlwlnllllWIlt ill dtlI h of tapt t-ltO a1 to mhmPrg(gt -itnuitanlnl1ly 1111 Illtif illLlJllry JlllsitHl) of tilt (ILPn - )[1
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles =shy
Behind the tanks the infantry mU~t push forward a3 rapidly as pos1ihle The author docs not wish to (mtircty eliminate ~alts on succ(gtslivc ohj(lelivLgtH althe following pUHlagc will show but he wiahc~ t~ rcdttcc these in time
Halts must not be prear~anged except wh(~re thp horizon changs in order to reconnOiter the terraIn herOiC movlngmlo 1t and because thNe the attacking troops find shelter behind the protecting crest against Olseishy11tion and lire But these stops must tJ( t(gtciuced to the minimum II [W minutes and not a few quarlNs of an hOUf ll~ long- ll1 the j)lfm is not broken as long as hill artillery has not helm reached Olnd r(main~ apthl( ofl toiler(nl rea(tion
~we~h~afil~tO~I~d~~tist ~~I1~~II~ll~~f~h~(tii~~~[ekt~~~~w~e l~s~~lli~l~ marguJ OfSUf)CrlOntgt httle by httle a the Infantry reaches the limit of t hf range of Its supportmg cannon
On the contrary in l tank attack the dehouching of thl infantry should he quite prudrnt IJ(cause since the automatic weapons of the enemy have remained sillnt for the m(J~t part the mopping tip (If the tanks jg stilt itllom~ prete The ap[learancl of the first infantry will cause the weapon of til( defense to open lIJl and permit the tanks to dCstroy them TllPreforp til Ulfantty should beware of (gtxpoing many men at first If HlP infantry dehouched in ms~ as it o(casionally did in tlw World War in orriN to avoid the hostile artillery harrage it risks falling an CaJY prey to thl hostile al)toshyrnatiwctpons But it can progressively become hold(r a thf tankskno(k out the hostile weapons Thus a tank attack will maintain its otiensiv( po~er and the infantry can g-o ra~ter and fastlr inlt(a(~ of Jlower and 5Iow(r
The author llllst-l that thp nr fones Will contribute most dT(~divflv 10 ctory by a close (~ollabomtion with ~round [orces ~tncl dp(rips any mai1
comhatants He concludefl that ofTpHiive tatlics anrI thf organiwtion of Jarg(f
unitsshoilid he bapd upon thcfmrJluyment of powerfully armed mel armor(d mechanized vehicles - He imistl on the impossibility at present of havingshyiarge unillt (qually apt at defcnltc of largp irontR and of atta(k and urgls tbespecialization of units This IIf iays if a nfcessity in modpfI1 limps
To wish to escape this in the domain of military organization is to ill~~mn ourop]middotmiddot to oly hwc mfdiocre units which ar jack of all
trades wher(gtas SlH(SS in war dfmaflds maximum quality and ffi(iPtHY 01 the instrumpnts mploypcl for each task
Prolongp(] staiJili7Jioll says tllp author was a (ollltequPH1 of thl 1~im(gtS Qf tl( offltsw tJ1IatI pmployed in til(gt last war ami will ](gt npro~ duced again if Ill(gt same conditions of lack of prpparaliol) ~llfJuld rp()ur But just as til situation in the last wlr (hallwcl rapidly in favor of that s[de which first crpated an instrunl(gtnt of a~tak 1ppropriatp to the neecis o(the hour 00 i1) the fulllrf that army wlill-h first obtains and learns 10 usc of(ensin mfntll -ititcci tn th (xigtlwj of tllf lge will rapidly pnd tillt war tII icor
TIIf EOIUTlON OF nm oHLITHY NII -IAHITtm H()[~ OF Tim FRENCH COONIAI EIlltJ
jLuvolution dll role militairc et maritihlP elP Iempir ()lonial frll1~ cais1 Major Rpgnaut
di~cusioll of til( defCIlSe of French colonits today and thpound ait tllfY ilght afford Frall(( in all Iuropfgtan war ~ ~
_jj- OllGNI7It( L[AISOl l-l 1 J~nJTlON OF m~IOLlTl()r-S l()rglni~aion dt liailtJIl- dan la Illigtpound (II oCuvre lt1( d(structiOlls1
Colonel Hot1SSfgtU
Thegt author disCllS(S tie 1Ilt(gt of dfgtmolitiIJllS under two glntrt1 CllS(gtgt first a ~ttat(gtgi( withdrawal planllrd well in-adyu( su(h as till ntir(mll1t
of the Gfrmans to tllt IlrndtniJurg Iinp in thl spring or 1917 and slcondly in delaying adion TIl( attr (lse bring Ollt stvlral ditricultit~ in tilpound actual
ion IJf dfmolitloI1S s Oil that smlll (gtnginePr partiltgt will he s(attfrec1 over til(
of tile infantry units preparing (hmoiitions This prltparatioll t it is till matt(r of ittuaily exploding till laid (harglH wllith t must not ht done too (hrly or too late llnd ahove all it t(gtr~ e dOIlI olition will Ilpoundgt IxplodNi in gfncrai on t J1)(ciai unI(r of eX(Ushy
hy th( authority whit-h has IJ(Jell dl1pgalpd to -ie this order ion may he made hy higJwr commanders down to and inlllding talion commandCrs battalion commanfiCr fighting a dpJaying action may find in
Ilumlwr of prepared demulitiuns whieh prohahly will have I)(en df1taehmentJ of (llgitw(lr bplollging to various difTerellt units
moment that is when battalion boundaries arp fi)((d
~~ d~~ii~i~r~fd~E~~7~~~t~lll~~~~~(~h~ ~~m~)~)~~~fg(~~~I~~c1~f~~IYnhljo~I~ nginrcr QIIi((r 1hll~ the tran~missi()n or ordpl1l for thp actual (lxgtculiou of emolitions will require cHreful liaison ~Irrallgments
Golanel HOUfseau points out that this situation whieh is ((flain to arhw n the Cafie of delaying action whcrf thing must he done rapidly docgt not
m to he cowr(i hy l)rescnt French rpgllati01l3 lIe imdsbl that unlNlH he JulStion il )wlved grave (ol1seqtrences might arise in war and IIrg(gts he study or SUdl problems on the ground hy units or all arms
March 1938
OllGANIZATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE [Organisation de la DC(cnsc nationaie (ilflfrai Azan
A hrief discull1iou of the effect of the decref signfd in lauuary hy tlw resIdent of France These charge a Miniltr of National Defense with
coordinating the Ministrs of War Air and the Navymiddot TOl15sist ntm hehas a permanent committe of Nltional D(fense Likew-ise he has at his dtiposhyIition the three Chiefs of Starr of the Army Navy and Air Force and he selects one of the( to act as Chief of Staff of National Defense Likewise a new commiittc has been crertted in order to intensHy the production of war materiel
The Chip of Staff of National Defengte (GcncrrJ Gamelin has been sfl(cted to fill thi~ f)()~t) if churgld in time of peace With the study of those qU(ltionfi (onfidcd to him by the Minister IIf (QordlnntcfI the Army and Air Fur((t plans of mobilization aAd opPflltion and the studies of combined Army Nuvy Air Forc( tlpcratiollR
The ffcdll of tillc measurcs will hring ahout a far more unified direc~ tion of olllratiollH in war than in th~ past
l1II~ WAit IN SIAIN TIIIH9~IIlJNATJC)N 01- Am FOlWEll wITn NAVAL Nt) mWUND FOWES
ILa ~ucrrc dI~sPJlg~l(gt La (ombinahon des forc(gts de Iair avec les furce nlvtics IL avcc larmee de terre] General Armengaud
((Iwral Armengaud of the Frltnch Air Force rccentlyentered Spain and
~~ ~ith)~J~~lg(J~~r~~~ent~~c~viltso~o~ll~f~i~~f ~~~~~J~~ J~~~~~t~~ ~ ill QU1r(riy No (i9 fUII(~ 192H pag1 121
INFANrltY AND CAVALlty Ilnfant(rie (~t Cavalerie Captain VNflicr
A lttudy of the dHfprPllles in Imiddotrench regulation hetween the action of dimlHmted cavalry and infantry
WE U]S1 I)] Till lwO-SI~S CMML 1II falll erltlI(r 1(1 Canul des DPllX Mers C~ptllin TOUTte
Ill(gt author sllgg(stH the digging of a ~lnal from Narvonrte on the ~outllCrn ]middotrPIIImiddoth Meciilfnuwan coast to Bordeaux thull giving France a -hnrt rout from till M(dit~rruwan tf) the CH~eaJl no wants tlii canal to lip wilipound ennllgh to hamill any vfHHt1 Hmaller than thp Normundie The rotltp suggpstPCj would parallel the Garonne river for approximately half itl way His artitl(l appear~ to hVe hfcn fltlggested hy the Spanish War situation
FnOM MAN TO U~[lJ~lt bull IDe lhomme au c1wpound] Captain Manie
A psychological study of leadership of more interfst to- French soldiers t111Il other
REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE (Switzfriltmd)
By MAJOR TR PnltllIs Coast Artillery Corps
Deccmbcr 1931
Tim INEITABIIIrY OF CONTINUOUS FItONTS ILa fatalit( des fronts continus] General Rouqu(rlll
(SI( dig(st page 44)
TACTICi[ NOTES FOR THE USE (jF FUTUItE CPTAINS INotes de tactiqtte il Iusage des futurs capitainls] (1) Colonel
L6derr(y
AlmONAUTl( IATIRIEL ILes materiels acronautiqles1 Captain Sch)
Dlgt(ription of tilt Belgian pursuit ship Renard It 361 and thc Fairey
HaWgt light bomhardment The former has a top speed of about 350 milltgts pltgtr hour at 6600 feet cruising speed of 250 milell ner hour at 13000 feet range of 660 miles aod a maximum altitude of ahout 39000 reet The Fairey Battle can he ucd either for distant reconnaissance or 115 light bombardment All light hombardment it can (arry 1100 IlOunds of bombs It r(gtachc~ a maximum altitude of about 25000 feet has a range of 1000 milCH at cruising speed Jnd has a top speed or 256 miles per hour at 15000 f(gtltt
January 1938
THE FIXATION Of FlWNTS IIimmohilisatioll des fronts LifuvCoJonel Mayer
(fiN digp-t pa Hi) I
hUmSSIONS ANllIiIlRn~N(lS 0 THE SINISH WAR IInljlrcssions et pXluriellCeS de lltl guerre dgspagne] (III) Capshy
tain Bauer Th(~e notCH are a continuation of C~tllain nauers observations ufter a
months tour in Insurgent Spain He notes the fxceltent discipline or the Insurgents (omparing it lo that of peace timp armies in their ohservance of military (ourtcRIPH Soldiers arc dvolld to their officers The officers earn
t~i~h~e~~~t ~~l~~ ~r~jmiddot~~eJir~~~e~i~3~ge~~~~J~~or officers is carried
r Jln~ ~l~~~~~it~~Ye~~~~~~~e t~~d~Pf~r~~d n~~~~i~~a~e~~~nh~~~~ 1)( rought without typewrjters and ink In the Insurgent forces paper work
87
K
r
1
I
1
I 11 d r f ii JI I I I
1 11 I 11111 I 11t1 1 I I ~ bull f I iJ i
I )1 fl doI r
I I
II
11 1
fl 1 jfji II
bullbull I 1 r J 1 oj I rmiddot middot
I d ill 110 I ( I r r d 11
q ) 1111 I I orj I 1fI
i 1 UlIr Itl J d If )) II
gt~ Caihlor~f Selected Periodical Articles
I fnl to hamiddot II hi II i(] I nllllllllHP jnt no amlHmt of It
Ill lllLultj - jlIrd I d Hi II 11LI
difficulty or lwrnlliitJ11Ti middotlllill Th irf liimU (middotll to) 11 dI1l71d- f )middotdlfI I mllt
rl lmiddotr I I r I~
1 ( 1
I nillr4 Pll(Htllltf d TIIl bull r II ( d Ill ~panh jJl1 r TI II PJllImiddot I
If) t h(middot frullI tlkH~ Hf 1
~ftf~I~ middot~~ll) dl~)l ~I ~[I jl LIiIIIl fl It gt1
(I) Lilli HI Ink tn SpI) 1 ttllH fnln 11
-1 Inlf I I
Ilq t I lr d111 fIIT I) rTlIitl) d I
II tH d I ()J d f J I r 1111-1 101) rI II IHld I
1 [ llr
Till ~1 I I - I T I ~
I [I ~ I
jl I III - -1101 -- rdd
I r J d r 1 1 I d 1
l11
11ll j117 L~j 11 1 11
I r II j I r
I 1middot1 d f 1 c
1 11
I I 1 fl 1
1
bull
t 1
d I
I II
I I ~
f I I 1Il I
lJ I d rllmiddot J II llft Ill 1laquo1 1 1]11] I d I I 11[11
I IltJI fr n t trd nIIfol f f I ( In(middot (IrI I d]Ij fr l1[( ) 01111] rmiddotITlttr](j 1111111 111 d~ )1 11
r I I t laquo pI p T 1 Ir -1 P 11 lJfllrn d rll 11 h Io 1 11 ~ I I
I j I t1
f I r I IIIHIII 1 oJ
I J rmiddotI Ir 11 rl I rn]
t 1 )r i I I 11 d1 j i
1 middotrmiddot 1 I fl
dr 1li frq bull rr1 r) T I fmiddotr II) 1 I f ] rl 1
11 111 1 1 I I f 11 I 11) I - ill ljr nd f r I t
] I) f f Iemiddotf Ir II d 1 r 111111
1
l
f 111 I
i
middott Itll f 1 I
1 oj
I f I
r
r
t II 1 1 lIP]) It I I) f 11 1
r 11 lOr Ii I f) III Ill 11II d 1111 TIll rI I nil 1)1
frIll 11d Itld J 11 1r 1 Jill t I 1 I u uf d fllI 1 It I llld
I 1I1ln d r 1ll1 111111111 1lift II~ III
1 r r 1 1 ~ JI 11 Illd II 11 11 togt ( 101 rlllll
11 11 j)~1
1 d f 111lt)1 d ]011 I rI tIl11 11
I 11 I Idl II 11 lll 11 r 11 I] )
] f I I I Ii (1 1 t1 d 1 1 1] 111gt I tmiddotr llq III d
lr ldr 11111 Ill 11j I
c amp (88 Quarterq Vol ~ ~
111 (JInIAN AHY 1- Hl7 t lLarm(middot1 allimlluil Ill 1~1i71 ((lloltl vX-lllIdlr re
Sf dil~Imiddott PI)tl 17 ) 1~fr hllHI j()NS -u 1HJJnc of Till ~ljlIl R ~ i~ IllfIpr~II P1 111 rIlIHImiddot tiP Lt gtllrn 1I]ltIlgl)(1 d Partamp ~ Ihf)
Jt ]1111)11 ~1111l )11 r( d a 1 tl tilll~ lruulld fOT IlIW fapllll11 d(11gt jlh
11IIIU l11P Illld ar 1hlTI b 1m 1I01lld IXImiddotppt)Il flt)wr In i Ojllll l- 111 il 1 111 1lt 111( It Ii 1 J hi In urgPIII Ul~dpr an~ clrCll - from
1111 r 11 1 lnmiddot lgII1 all (11111111 r 11111 lIy tlIlr IIHnlWCi to tIl guar iIIIOlII liP II] AI111OlrqldHTImiddotlrrmiddotL)Imaok OIlIIH)thlrhaD~ pr(~~ Ii IT r III 111 IPdmiddot n IIThd - and l1niill~Iollahly 11)(11 uh prlry i~~1 - lanSi 11IIOlfAI~I1 I~if IIii ~I (1)Imiddot1t iiI fOri of (bout lOn lirpllllf f(Hlm 1j~lIO (1 111111i L 111lt1 iI 1111 0111middot1 IIf till f l(j~t of thlmiddot Imiddot Wft ()hSIJI~ J ascl( 1 Iil 111 11111 (oldmiddotI]r had n(lIuPI tn fUflmiddoti~~n IMUon for h~lr j the~ IIlrdul) 1lt) II ITI Ikfl uri to whom (fI II]IP (an Ill gl In th~ Ins J 111 11111111)1 I] fllt1 IIlIlI mOllths of I Ill 1 11 11 broughl down lh enerr Pfs(c 1]111 ]1lrllll Illl 11)11 IIImiddotrtd Ill ([)filfTllld n(IIld thl 1IIlpngt-1ifmiddot11ISOI 11111111 I ltlr 111 middot1 f 111 wn Fnlul) t)I) HwltIm lIltl tiHflt E))gl~~ I P(C 1)11 h IlH r III IId (i I 11 111 lhL1) TIll Irh1lrjllIt rf(Plvfd an apprOl ~ (If ~h Iii 1 h 1lJd 1I11111Hr dUfll thh IIITlIH 1Illtl III Iddllon fLptUlaquod a numk I Itt f l1llt 1111 11111 Ill Ilil Tlli follllillg inlllh pl1- hrlt)ufht do~ illtcal I 1lld 111qnr~111 lilll ~ (I flIlin II Ind ufri ~1 LlJlfP-XIlUport 171 j lUn( 111 l)l~l Illd 1))10 lJ HrI~IIP1 XIX alld I~ Iol a total of 87 ljr1enl
I lrJ1111 f ))]IlnII111 III If Illagl thl Illllju[lttmaldy g()S~1 111 (Jll1lll1t fnrmiddot ()Il~f) lu If)HlltlIIOInlIPdTftuanwithtwen ~~~~It~ VII 11Jt)~ Ilf 111i11ll lIlli ~rl 111L11I1 Sm thn fIITI-(I hI( olItre] I I r Irl 11 ()lli III jU(g( 11 ~111 (PIdlll) PVIIlI h) futilp ltIh lHJtl1llugsa ~ 1)1111 III 11111111] InI Nil )~ltIInlmilt Tmiddott1I1l111~ Iohtlfal plllr vIli parr l )(1
t1 middotIf t) (ljll1ll1tll t fhlgt ptlli( of t IHlpUJttloll I()gml~ 11((1 at any pril fi Hnll 111- lta( hld thollll] of icllm fpml lIJlll) 1l)1 lttill tIl dfgtcL~ ~ J~~ f waf i~ hI InJ~ q1iLtlllld 011 Ill IItmiddotl of 1I111l1 md no 111fl IIw Onefl- rill
~r~~)I~ olfl llllI I1 111 t1 t I IlllhardllHl1t of Cit It illIL(P t hI law ((1 1I]t~O jLt 1lfJ It rl Itdo](Il mel prlllltlni~~ d thmiddot 1flrol1 of IwlYY artilkl) 1OIl
All tIl(gt grr at al1HI ill thp nOTth WI PffIIlTPd in thi~ ly Such ur I til t I f I ullon r luirimiddot ( In~p colla lIflIl(n wit 11 t Ijp l~rolJlil fOfct and t hi cann t Jll~ Imiddot illl]lr)-middot1 hI 1111 III (illil 111lt thl alllmnrnY of tIl( arm V of the LtJ hl- vir d [llil 1111111- 1)middoth If 1111 Ilnl]r~IHHI HI (middotPTtain tJUntrmiddotiflt llOtalr- l inffJ 1 rlllll 11 n I hi IUlll1))1 f 1 ILt HlI 1l1111r1 to ground llIulllrtion L ll(l~ 1dI1l1111lnlv ndulld f~llhl~~
11nl~lilHT 1111 lrlIld IT Jllollfilmiddot Ill 11HHllt 1111htlr) princlPlelI lilF
ll~llt~IIlf ~llIlrIIT(1 ~ri n~IIII)l~tll Itll~~alr~I~~~ lL~~)I~~ca~I~~J ~~~l~ d)lrl d1 Ilf 11111 angt IIIHI 11 fliT thl fTrnoI ~u Ld 1- IItt a1drr-mrn
1lal~ItlOlIlil--I af 1wl lrolllllln ~5 Tul 1937 tIll Nltltionahl 7jIll 01
1111))[1 ~~1n~~I11li ~~Iit ) f I hp Ifr- let im of purltuit s Jfr1
t lllllJl1q1 h l~ I n1l 11mllltt a TPtlt a t Ith tflOJl~ in thC fi~ nIl - I - I hi jrlllt l1l1llliIl1lTl~ in (Oil limnt and usuC
b llhn1 Ihi lItTlIllnn of lhe hjlwr mlllanthT Tro
~~I~I 1 ~ 1111li~~~~ lI~flll~lqi~~~111( 11( 1~1~~ ~S~ (llI~I~(I~~~ ~~~ ~ti~ 1~lln 1 mln~ fldlt If -Ill Itch 1- tJlI OIH of Ill PCllIllt prlr (nd
I~H~~~lIrI hll ~~f f(lii~~It~~ 1)11~nmiddot~1Iy~ riltlj~nt~1~t~~~~Ih i In 1 1111 (fm1I1 uni lll]illl lant ITt tlld ii~htb lrmuHd alill clnmiddot 1 j~~
JIll fllmiddotd in 101 ( I hI nth- 1 lih ~I( h Link ar u~lf1l1 111 fill f(0I11hlhl
~ 1 II~~I ~ II fIiI l~ I~ ~l ]~ 1~1r 1~I~1 ~~I~~~~ui~1l ~~t ~lf~lIl~O~I~ I ~Ir~~ 11-(1 Hut II 1 IIrlILh)1 1 nt1 Illl llllll1l lilt it- TubllPr lrat~cir- 1 1 ~I 11 hr II -upplu II Lltl1l1l 1l1I~ In 111f t11i It Brll1llll BllellltCL ici tl Jlrtlll Ilut I IIII 1 1h 1 [11 If UfPTi 1 h1gt pIlt td thv hlV( ~1I((lIm~J n~l~l 1]1 111111111 Ill 11 1IIIIlll 11Id 11111 hIII] l~rll)lIl 11llti inlttli 1 hI~llll 111 Ill lh1l1 11111 In middotd Jr IlrOtl] If hlllt lhl Thf(lITClr- 1 Link 1111 11 II) ]w I lo)mlr()nll~ wei -IH 1 liw I]ualilv 111111 (s IllfJll 11 I 11-] 1111 111 lh Illlf h 11111 rtl)pmiddot1 Imlo clIlnt sll11d ll~t 111( l1111n] Iq~ lll III IIIud Ihal It J Impllo lhh tn attachc~I jlrf ~~fll]h lit IlllrlI f tI prOlJIrh ITtllll l11d pnplfld l1HtIl llh ltntt 11011 I 1 IIf t Ill It ilL m )fIlt lll~ Ollt fl(d1 thp 1lInpll ltIf a (rrl~ to ( Hill r i III II ill Ihl [l1rl f IH rd ILI~ II tIll hltll of (lIllhTl1 W f~ h( Itrul Lt I I 1111d Il1lllOkr d 01111 11 11 Brit bh LillI wII It I 111))1 fr) Hlir I
I 1] LIlli til ftr1 h 11 Tnlll 111 ill 1t1 111 1l110~ hoth 111 lHlth Hul drp para
~~1 1 III~ t1111 I~ ~I~ 1 I r1] ~I~h ~ ~11 Il~ h7t II~~ It Irt i11fT) ~(~~ Th ItUmiddotiln mllllnk i~lll of 1~1-Il1l1 1lhlllT hal fIVt1l ~~ont a((ount I
II If 111middotll1ld 11l1JOl)1 I 1 )HLI middotlIhmiddotlltIj~Imiddot It 1l1Hlrfllhat j HIIIIlI 11I11 IhI1 If 111 1] 1-1 WIlli III (E lr~ 11l a nUJor ~ 11 1Lnph Ilf I~ ftll Illiull 111111 Oil Ih lJaI hpPIl wlll1(lt 1 llnllllllll) 1111111 1 dlI( dl11 hll Illr~1l11 ilILlion aruwl Ith~17lt - 111111lt11 hl 11Ild Hl(lI 1)(11 fl[ lltIOl tinllq II Iud
ljUUI 101- IHI IHIJ Imiddot Igt ItImiddot I
d1 HI111lli nt- 1Imiddotmiddotrimiddotll 11) [Tlt~ ~ I (ilIHral ~ilgt~f1 ~
TL 1]1] llliu] 1r1I1111 nf plf1I1111 Jl1111P11l1~ III Ituooja ha~h11 1h r illll of a I rl111 ] IrId Infant f I II 1hi army nlLll1U Irlt ~lf 1 1
IIIfn 111rlclIlrt Iollrquol lTIPntlr Lll1h frlIl()OJtllqlllnlf ~ pI)~liP mug Hal1dIIllPf Pari 19J7
88
f-middot ~- -gt~
VolXVIII No 70= ~
at Kiev and 1936 in While RU~ltlhl and at l~oSC()w lumiddotrgf scale d~hllrkatiol1 were executed partly by paralthut and partly ~ hy fHlccccding landingH of transport Jllanes These exercisel ure inloresting and ontgt calllot deny them some value Olle should howewr (xaminc th(m without prejudice tQaetermine to what extent they are actually practicalle and to whht extent they are artificial and of doubtful value
Individual training is conduded fint wry mplh(ldi(~t1ly in s(iwols whfrf tberuture fmrachuthts jump from high IOWlfl wilh tllP Pllrllimtfmiddot alrpadr opened to overcome tim initial (ar Tlwi Uwn PN(((ti to tetuul jtlmp~ frDm ditTerltnt altitudes gradually pftting lowN hut still high flwtl~h to guaranteltJ the certain operation or Ow paraciltllt Acturaey of Jandilll on a prescrihed Rl(ti~ ~ou~ht t~ fa~i1ital( II( ~rouJlig of a Iumbtr ormtn landin~ at Ollt tunCj with till ohJect th( (pltgtl1Ing of tlw paraehllC IS clelLHrl todimmilh the di-llenionTuITI)s af practicP(l with arms and mLlllitl()IlSI FoUowing this group d(seents are practicd and tlw ffort jl-l made to jWfP lS closely h)gftlwr as poltltilllf A soon as twy rIwh Ow ground tllIY nrilnt themselves march and fire bolh day and night
The dropping of iSl)iaf(] individuals for propaganda or fspiollagl purshyposes e~pcially at night is -implt In a sparsjy pOJHllalNi (()Unlry it is also relatively (as) to drop Hmali groHp (hargpd with fltst rltdions or ollwr pedal tasl5s 1I()Vf(r if tl~ jump la~I1 pJa(p at Iliglt ~h( rfgrO(lpnllntvi the parll(lpants ma be iJfJwult alHIf thpy an to IZP Important poiut it isimproiJabl( that tiWl WIll I)p tlllrlf[en((d If till ohjP[t itgt dttrudioll it can only h(middot sUjJNliliIl imp til jnwlitiol1 of Iar~( w(rk~ will rP1lllir( hundred of pound of exposin and it io diflieut to ltpp how a small dpLa(hshyment can tran]lort thc (xplOJ-ivPl on fooL aftlr landing from a parahult
In Rwsia they visualizf and f(alizmiddotd ill tlI mamIIrs dtfd th( landing Qr Reveral hUlldred mln to ~Il(p important ()hj(Ctivrc alld (middot(n o attack r(sPTPI or the rpJr of hostilp JHlitiolllt But OI( (an lJl lt(lI11Pwhat skeptical of till nsults to he lXI)(tIltd in war and lot ill mallfuvtr This j how they an Ix)(gtctrd to opPTatl
After dropping atest parachute to indicatp th( dir(ttion of tlH wind a first wae of5 or 30 pamchutists is launched Tlwltp I (J ol)lain tllf minimum dipersion do not ulwn their chutf- ttntil as late as polt-ihl( UtiHr wafS follow and ~r(jup t1wmpl(gts with tll(gt pr(((din~ ww(s or at past (oordinat( ith their Htion ~[achinf guns small fhld pil((s and ammunij ion are l1s) dropppri nut it it to hI qH~tif)lHd if till parathu (arrdlg w(apons and munitions will not Ill widely dispersed silwp t lwy eaHn~1 fl( oj)(llpd jU5t hefore they rftch tllf ground as can tholtl of tlw mPH dropped
It is eqwct(l that t1w fleharkmclIb will takp placf in the proximitmiddot of enemy landilg fiplds un(jN tIll llro(pdion of pursuit aviation as wpfl as homharilnwllt or attak aviation to attaek t11f ground dEf(ndlrlt Jt is a
~~~~~~~ltl (l~ ~~~71~Ie~~~l i i~~(kVi~~~~ ~li~~ ~~~I~~~(~ f~l~lmT~~~ t~il~~~(follolling this larglr fonI togltJwr with nM(hinl -gun ca~lllt)u ltlnd ammunition will be 1lnd((1 in plallfo tlwy (In talk of llyinlln Jutolll)hillS and tank Tlwy will thus 1)( ahl( tf dphark ltlIc(fosimiddot( gfl)UI (If l tholisand men (JtlI half an hour wi suUit to unload middotIOO() or 5Ollj nwn a forel aliI to obtain important rpsuts Obi()u~y this rl]uires tl( (mploynWIlL of a
bull talXf numhN of t ranport- Actually ahout 700 m(fj Wlre droPPfd hy paraelmt(gt ill t11P Ki(v manllshy
1 Hi in 1935 111 tlw ~lillk mallPUV(fS in 1lJfi about 1500 HlIll with 15 marhn(gt gUllS and g tnneil mortar__ WPrP dropped hy paralhutp and attaewd a-tandirrg ild 90 mil b(hind tll front In th(gt iloscow 1l1lIlPUprs OOO parachntist W(f( droPP(d in SlcCsshC WtVPS thlY fizlci ltIll airdrolt1f on vhich a compldl rlrimpnt of infantry wa __ d(gtharkri from transports
Oh iOllSI these operations wpre not (olldue(d undfr (fitahlP war mnditioll W(gt do lot know how th( tfrrdin was O((upifd anrlchflndlri In Iar it vmlld hav( IIP1l d(flndNI Till lranltlorl pianps (arryinJ the pJilchutbts f](V at ahout ~j()O ft( Tlwre was thus a good (hanel that thro Qe-ienhf I)lahine glllllt would hae (alJSlci 10i(1 to lw trilll~l0rts crews Jnd paradHlt ist at t 11 (inl of Imding lnd lafun 11HY loulrl rpJroup thrm~(ns and hI afmbkd in (oJHhlion to mallPllypf and fight
Admitlin~ that tllP ~llC(sit wanlt of para(huth(s wtrp ahlt to i-piz[l a landing- (wId alm(j~1 in~tantly altllOu~h it MiIlS hi~hly improilahli tlu defendfT- hpll drivp aWlY would COlltjllll lo t1~h usil1~ IOIlI ran~( machhw gUll lin against tht tranltlrts mlking the latN landings
RUsiiJ1l in~truct ion of paradmtits j tlrtainly priolls wtl is Hh(Ppt il( ofinterlsting rpsults It is IIPfitll(gtlpss plrmissilt to ngtrrl till SP(IuIlt dtScrib(gt(j as of slight (hanc[l of SIIlPo 111(gt1 (onltidPTatir)J]s should not pffient the trainin~ of military paraeilutists with a view to (rtain operashytions which may he posihh in sIJecial eases and which Wf gthould he preparfd to excrute FralHp hoW lt)mmellpd thi work and groups of parachutists have aJrraliy taken lart in sma olHrat ion~ It ilt wif though 1101 to ht our imaginations wltlndpr to (X(lt in tlw maUN It is not sullirient to havl parachutists tflaquohnieJll~ wpl instrueted it is equally important that thrjr instruction and ta(~kal fmploymlIt should be wiicly laquooncehed and conshyduetId
ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY (Glealllriluin)
July 1938
ASIIW)JIE ~1()P1mNliIJl) By th authors of Air Stratq~yl
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articlesmiddot
ROYAL ARMV SERVICE CORPS QUARTERLYmiddot(Hreat Drituitl)
May 1938
PhTItOJ SUIJY IN WAR ~ SO~fE lROBLE~IS Sm-IE TACTICI Ll-SSONS IN CONNECTION WITH MT E~lPLOYED IN
OlEltATION8 AGAIN~T AN IItRTGULAll FNEMY Till MAINTHNANc[] OF A MOIIII1l1middot()IUg HY Alit IHlItINlt ()Pf~IA[IH)NS IN
J)ER-l-~lT COUNTIlY
ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Gnlt nritain) June 1938
Tm USl- UF Im~()ITIONfi IN Tm~ (BIIAIGN IN SOUTH POLgtND DUIUNG O(TOIIEH Ill14 Captain Meltzer
SIt(AOltjl - Tm~ F()UNHlNfi (W Till- mw lJI-FImiddotNCImiddotH CoIOlw1 Malan
ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain I
July 1938
1111 ~lIL)nmNT OF A ImiddotANK IlHlGim AT1I1 IN ~H)j)~HN WAit
UNITED SERVICES REVIEW Grfat Britain)
28 April 1938
-(j~m ligtfII(TIONl of TIII~ ANSCIHllsS CoJOIwl B(adon
5 May1938
HY f-WAN IS IN CHINA Mljormiddot aenamara CAN Im ClIINISP ImSIST lNf)IFINln~ly A (tOHImiddot-- STUnI m Tm~ Pm
KST It Air Commodore Charlton
19 May 1938
J)I~lOCHCllS nmus IlICTATOnSlIIlS Tim nllOltTMCE OF 1~N1TEi) jmiddotW-l Air Commodore Charlton
1middotUDlN( TIII~ I~H~ OF Tim AIlligtfBN LEsSONS OF 11IP AlJlmSHOT IlOAIl ~lOYI~Il-oIr middot)Xlm(lfm KG Mandeville Roe
26 May 1938
nIOTAIN1 ltFiHigtMImiddotNT A 1)1IINSln IUfH Air Commodore Charl-Ion
2 June 1938
Aim w ItHFmNSII OF Am IlmmAIUnllNT Air Commodore Charlshyon
9 June 1938
AlT(ti ANII 1011NnR-ATTAtK IN SPAIN Major-Gelpral Fulpr Im NlIW FOH A j)J)IItTlIENT OF SUIIl Air Commodore Charlton
16 June 938
Fm-Nllt lJtlltW1 IIWDtlCTION Air Connnodort Charlton
23 June 1938
Im TltHTIi AIIOIIT Am WAltFAltl Ajr ComrylOrior( Charlton
30 June 1938
Till PI- iLol-mNl Ill (JI)IN( Air CommodorC Charlton
7 July 1938
1hmss InmHSAL Fun WAlt WBAT TIII~ llI(1TOIt tnliNTIU~S IIVE J[~H-l IN HpAIN Air Commodore Charlton
14 July 1938
Im tIlWROUS Mil PImiddot(tWP N1IONS WllIeH RllPPI) WAit 1IjTEshyHIS Air COlllm(J[jorcgt Charlton
21 July 1938
LJSS()NS OF TIm SIANI~H VI Air Commodorl Charlton
28 July 1938
h110lnANIp ojmiddot Tim Rsqu (OUNTln Air Commodorp Charlton
VETERINARY BULLETIN (~IPJll(nIllt to The Army MCdical Hullptin)
July 1938
~1 oUIIl1m 1I0HSE~IH)J~INt POIt tOAIl lIIAllCIIE~ Liputenan( JOIl(g
89
19
Readers Guide and Subject Index
A flll Vurrllflt Ir Arm AmmUnltlOm Io)lnlllil
I~~~~~~~ itl nllf ntltnnk llllt iI bull r I ~ rr ~ (rnamI Ann r ~r I
middotTlllllfU1 ~ f 1I01wl I ~ru7dln l I Tt
rmrod rlnflr - rllljlI+ Ij
I nnhd IlrlI1 j
Inbull j l~k
~
tilf J jn
If) 11-(gt[
jnrall) IIIIIInrrrSlr
IO
G
K L
I rt
1-nrl ~ f r 1
a
1 j 1-[_1-
I
v
LiST OF PERioDICALS INDEXED
AND
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
A Ord 1 (Irl A Quar r1n Irt linIn)
Bul Bdglt Mil HI) 11-r gtlIUUlrimiddotq 1111shyum)
Cln Dd QUilr c h II fmiddot (lT1i fly II uunda) Cay Jour (dr) rurnal C1V Jour 1GB] (-dr JltlIJrlm 1(pound1 at Ilntam)
Chrm Wlr () 11= d rlan illl111l CA Jour 1 r I rj I nllt fA Jour 111 r1 r 1 ur1 Ftp Forc 1 jh rr 11 Bnl]) L Fr ncc MIl J a lrIll hltaITP 11 rtI)
Jour RAMC ~Jlrnd f II HOIl Army 11lwll (middotrJ Cn 1 BTllulI
Jour R Art 1ur11 ( ltl HlI rllllf~ ((rnl UrllI Jour nusl f 1 bullbull r 11 [(~llOoI nil JI1IUI
ren I Bnta Jour USII Journi f II llld n JIIlltulllm of
101 (1 Brl IJI])
Kr~fl Kruflfahr)1IIprlTlIPI II) MeG 11 (fJ(Ilt
MIl Mltl flhlln~ Llhall 111111 t 11r)
MH~Wo(h )llttrmiddot~ 111111( rmatl1 Mil Eng ~llll1ar It lt r MIISuro Iljlln Nllv In~t Proc - 1
PIon II II rmn~)
QM R tur n r It ~ w
Rn~Orf_Hmiddotr (H1Imiddotr
Rv tift CY ll _II d I allt IIruu)
RY dlnf-ll Ill dlpln ril IIrlllll) Rv Mil Gcn H 11 Idllln (i(nlra[ (irallr)
Rv Mil Su[o itnu(gt 1I11111j[middot SUll~~ (SWIIwrjlllld) AAF Quar ltoynl Ar FUTr IJllarlltly (nnt Bntuln)
nASC aUlr JtuY1l1 nIl) - nH Iri~ (lllllf(rly Gil) Hrlhll
Boy Eng Jour ItnyullI)IHr Jurnulllnnl Ilrllaln) RTe Jour Itul lank (q~ Jourllul 1rlIt Irllln) U5 Rov llnllnl ~Irvln~ Itnl w (Ir at HfI~nln)
Vet Bul VrlNjnll~Y IIlIlh till
Jan Jllnu~rj Jul bull Tullo Fob middotFhruar Aug AJJII~t
MOl tlnrrh Sop Imhrr Apr Apr1 Oct_ Ilrluaf
May 111 Nov Nombir
Jun JUII Dec [Imlr
A
ABYSSINIA
AERIAL WARFARE
I 1 J f)I r ll t HI L) ( I I h rul~h 1 I) I- If UK Jji1)
II pngtj~IL Var n J v f It 1 Ir I UpI)II Jour Jul-UjJJIK)
Vi1 th h1h (ornmlfId 11 0 Ii r IMI (aoshylUI1)
lodrn wllraJd It Jl)7 f lila I dur IU)l HUR)
rrrll )Id (hal oJ Ilmd warmn IJollr I~IISI JUH)
~hmor(gt mod rnI1 d It 1 Quar Jul Ink) Ar 1 IlPIrfllll1~1~( of fl1T Jnmllnrdrnlt nl 11 Itfv
lIm) Th trill h hul aIr Hflln 11S It ~ I lull 1laH) 1 Ir c~ n h l fnr nr IllS n -7 Jul 1~lJ8) Thr hHarq f (I ~ It ~ -I j Jul IJ38) 1-11 of thl Spnlll~h l1r n~ Jt~ ZlJu 1IlH) TIH n r1l11 rlitlWI r - rrlucutOrl of tilt popltllnliull
111 -IJullJIK) rnt Drttummiddot9 Illr lrujm lLa rrnnr hill shy
1118) r rltII1Il1 Ihr lf[I~ (11 111 lllr 1Jl1)
i~~gt~~I~~1 n~f rt~ ~~ 11tI~~~lnt~~~1 n~rj~~d~ M~ll~~ - Ilnr 1l3H)
II-llr mi bUlilh~ rHlq1rlCIfl (11 Mill In19) or rlld Ilhrtr~ 111 l1U- ~l[r 11ltl) r atl-llkltJn IHud rop~ ll1middotmiddotoch-l Apr 1938) n pecunty lind Ill( Ir dTtnl IR 111 (( middotJlln I~~middot inlpr -~Ion~ 11111l P rH nrs of Ihr SplIlllqh Wtr (Ih ~
1lt - Jan l-ltIgt llll)Ih l~n7 hlllII~OrS 1Il II( I1llllrad Ilmiddottru1 Ill
SW_~l J 19)11) AIR ARM
Orglnlzlton and EquIpment
r furclt XllIn~lOn (lI~ I- rc - lUll 191fll bhmore mOIl rmz I H F Quar-Jul H138) Frrllfh rcratt rrllductlOlI ItS H -Iii JUlI (9311) ((f1I1 ilnll1H11 nr plthltm (I[limnmiddot MI J)I~~
I~118) rlalltllt 111111 rlO I I ~II SU1-or -- I)(c IV71
Trlnlng TactIcs
Til rIlt I ililI01l Oth InfChUnlZlrl caulr~ (n k Ju u 1)Hl)
11( IWIIII rntta IInvTour Julu~ 9~~1 Ill Iom r 011 t1 nln~ t throurh (FII-Ilt1fc Ac
11lfl) r J10WN 1I1l1 tngtnp ITH1 InllIt (Inf Jltlur Ml Jun I ll 11h h middot)I1Hl111illlll jllll1r l tll (i JunlQgt Twln1 awl 1dlnl~lrull 1~middot f Ii Vllrll hHmiddotltt~
IJur Iltl-l MI IV) r~rmiddotd IIrl1111lt or tomorrow (Ql HI - Julmiddot l~ 1l3QI
qllmorl llIolh rIIIZJ (ICF tlullr - Jul lillS) Tlw TtJaHltt 11111gt or 11 nwhmiddot fun hy Ilir durllj( 01 tat~I1~
1 10 rl -(nl IltA~( llllr 1IIuv 111)1 [11111111 1111 111[lh mrm (IS It 11 a 1gt~ r llgtT1IIltI1)furlgtnllllurdmIII1 IllS1 211
11lH) ilwlmlhnlHltll mrvnrlllr (l1-1 21J1In 11311)n dnlupln II of 11llnr IU- t~ ao Jln 1l3S1 Ir~~l rrlwnrnnl for Ir (IS It 7 llll JJI) I~ f l ~[I11h VHr (1 It v 1 luI lllH (rrat Ilnll11111 nlr prn]] nI 111 Fww 1111 11)middot11 JJ
l)]~)
Ir raldwd tl(rIltI 11Il1111tHI 1I1nr 1911raquo IXl rlo 1lt HI nT Wid pr(ull I rlll 1I11t ~lur I~~ jr lIIrl~ n lruJ Irop (0111 WllIh I Ir 11l3~1
lr)u1Hi WUtH7l1UOIl of II Hlr rOTl lrl (1 or orpll~J rnlv I 1tu~~inn )1 (1I1l1middotVIHh 8 Apr 19lRi
Thr nnlul hlflllllrj 1l1I~n (ltv dInf - Mllr 1~1ll T ucunty lIJ)d Ihl HT oT(J)I1 (ltv ]11 GlI Jlln IW
Imp~a~ IJ~~l ~I~jl~3~) of t111 fllll11lh WHf (ll M
S Tw
F
lion
Th~
Tho
otl Bom
M 1111 A~tll nll
M
Anll [)~fl
nU1l1
Irr Iu
Tan Th orr
Tar
~r
n
I Imiddot Th
(~II
T bull
Th
M
p
So Tt
n I I
TI
TI
tI
N
T
I
2
(LIIIri1~
10-111
fA Ord -Sl
lIlay-JUll 1918) middotIatlon oltgtufnational
Jour-1I1IIy-J1InI93S) - ~Iay-Jun 1938) ht- Jul 1918)
C]wm War - Jul 1938air 1gt1( Gal-Jun
~XlfljIN-o70~ Readers Guidea1d SubjeetIlidex0=-- shy
T~j-~~(lr9a8) in the IAoninvad IliltricL R~ M~i Or~1~~~il~3gl)n thil PlltCution of d molitlonll (ltv 1gt1H Itenmmkllmrtll raid in the WilT witn China (Rv de CavshyMar~Apr 1938)
troog landinge rrom alrpInnlll In Hu~a (Itv ~1i1 SusS( - ~ The J~l~e ~(J~938n the Leningmd ljHl~lct mv Mil lt~fanlry and cavulry (ltv Mil Gcn - Mar 1966)
Fe ANfMALS11l~8J of Rabat and KhemislCt (ltv
Arab hOT5( hrrtJlng in Syriu ( 19JB)
the aupp y 0 oraea n OUt middotllTm)middot (ltv Mil ~uir~(f - Jun
1938) ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
ntJmiddotairuaftbull (A QlIlT - Jul 1938) (C Jour-shyBo~~~u~~h~~~mln t~l tone of the Interior
A~tlalt~rll(~(omI1UlltntllgtnH leA Jur ~hl)-Jun 1)3K) Aahmore mo(hmiddotrnteltmiddotd (llF qullr _ Jul t1IH) nliir~Talt wellln lind thmiddotor middotmplymlnt (1111 MIlt
Mar 191l) ANTIAIRCRAFT OEFENSE
nli-airer I (AQullr -Jul 13f1) Dtlen~ lIJtainstlUr ~Ul~k ICa Juur - Jul-Au1 W18) BambinKIllrllllo111rl thzonflhltlntlmiddotnnr ICAJoUT
~lay-Jun 11ll8) ~ntltrtrillt fommUlliclltiurll IC Juur - ~ll1)-Jurl 1JIi) St-unty lur tlalIIrviI r ~u)plY ((wm War Jul 1~HI) AJhmore illdmiddotrnlzmiddotd (ItAf quaT Ju119l1l) Theaaial danl(r - Imiddotduclltion of thmiddotJopulatlon (La Franr ~1i-1 Ju11938)
lllurrnft weapon IIrlfl thr cltnfIgtmct (1gt11 -111 MIT 1JlII)
~lairrll1 uui(hfll (m~lrurtln (111 ~II Itr 1~)Pi)
~~~7g~~I~~~~ij~t ~~~i~~~ ~~n~~r~I~middotmiddott~~~~ rr~~rL~ ANTI GAS
Pn-ltoutlOfl tL~njnt Ia~ nttark~ (gt111 ~lItt gtlaT 1938) GLlprotcctlUa or lhe CIV pjoulatlot] ulwad 1-111 -htt
olul31) ANTITANK
R~~rit~~~~~n~~~~~~li~~t~IYHJt~~~~j8)IU 1lIH)
~~IOO nmiddotfle-rtwn lin Infntry mutt mmiddot1 ami tactlr~ Ilnl Juur Jul-u 19JH)
neSpom~h Vllr A reVJ( th hest )] 110 dnt Jour - Jul-AuK 1935
TILnD -Ilrmored rconnngts~anr vmiddothltI(middot~ and rh dfln~ Igamt the~e (Krull _pr I~Jax)
lhp Bnt~~h Army in 197 tl~v laquo( (L I-Fh 1311) jbgt rnooHn tank Its (IIpnl1)htmiddot~ und mgt1) mat m Ow
aacK (ItvdJf-- Mr IJJRJ TlCUe()fYflterday und 01 trmorrgtw (It~ gt111 FI
ICI=~SJ~~~l-~6~rJ3S)ell of the- SpluJ1h War (itvIlI
lak llttack agllinst antitank gun~ IS FnwJn lthtury Dta
ARMAMENT
Ppa---dn=~ in Endlln A sludy r mduHlr1 mohilzaln
B~~~~d ~~~~~~~ I~~~ Itcbull 26 IIlY EJ8)
ARMORED CARS
ART OF WAR STRATEGY
1betlnx in Smin TarII~i~tm fall1 I bullp [It folh tNmiddothmtgt fA Ord - Jul-Auf Hll8) bull
StratlrC and cnt(1l1 mafHinlmiddot Tlu IT rIllgt (1) nUT naljfml lCUnt~ (A Ord - JUI-lUf J~18)
Tle malor tactiClt of thl cncunt r baltIc (A Quar - Jul 19381
nttmy thai Clln llta~k - a l~illn llml 11 lt1middotfnf laquo(no DefQuar -- JullIIJ
A ~y~tcm of anti-tank dr n~middot (ClIlI D( r (lmT -- Jul 1l1II) ~crale (shouldr to IIhould(r) (Cw Jour [Gil) Ju 1935)
yenhS~sa~j~h~~i~ r~~t~r~h urri~~~lrll~~rllon (Inl Jour-Jul-Auo 1938)Counterbalv-ry In mohH warlaT( lJuur It rt ~- Julll38)
Will the hIgh commanlt lak If thgtgt aLr (Me filll -- Jun 1938)
Tldie2l and udministraHlt lessons of the VaT In Abys~mm aour nUSI ~ gttay 1138)
The battl fI War~aw AUlu~t 1920 IJur HU-- - May 1938)
Modern war and llq maze f maChLnl (Jour llVSI -tay 1938)
PCIor waT~ (Jour IJsn - pr 1~13i) Ashmor~ modfmiddotrnigtltmiddotd lJtAI~ QUilT lui 1l8) lltlme tllMka hIWlnR In cOllnfdlUfl wult 1gt11 fmiddotmplu-lt In
~r~ai~r) agllinst un irnKunr 4middotn my (llSC ltjmushy
r~~~kro~ri~no~~n~i~J~~lItmiddot~T ~_tj~i ~~8) - Jul H138)
t~tkrh~a~~tf~-~~t~ckAJSyent~~l_(~~l~rljH) Jun (llll) ~1llI of th Splfllsh War (US llv - 21 Ju 1l81
ftfR~~~ f~~ins the qurrn of haltls ILa FrnnC( Mil - If
Theaerial dangT - cducntion of ~hcppultion 111 Franc( Ml-lJul1918)
Thoullhtlion llll duration of futtlre war U1114 Voch -- 1 Apr1938) _
The rnod~m tank Ita capllbilitll~ lInd mploymlnl In thlt 1 It~ck (ltv dInr - Fh 1(38)
N(J(t On thl bllhr conduct or wnr (rom 1792 tu 17l7 lind rtom1911toJ)16 IlvMIIGcn-Jllnfeb1938
T~~~ Yllwrday and 01 tomCJrrow (nv ~1U Gen - Feh
Th~~~~v~ea~~(j~i~~~alv~ti~~i~~o~~~t~~ghl~sa(lr~Mil SuiIIIC-Fcb 1938)
Me hRlliwllltgtn [Sec Original Military Study) Tal~rK~~~lk against antitank guns IS loftiKn MIlitary
Thelnrvltabillty o(~onllnu()ul fron19 [SlcFJrlI(Jl MlItnry l)lIWlIAj
TIlt fixation or rr~ IS -onign Military IlhttlIs
ARTIllERY
Orgarilzatlon and Equlpmcnt
n )lnv~tlt ~oldl~r nltcUlry (1-A J()ur 11lly-Jun 1IJH) Cmmun1ltatin wlthm thCliht huUalm iImiddot- Juur _bull ~layshy
Jun 19~R)
~~~~l~~~~~ ~~jh~~~~m~~~~f~~middot~~~~[~rij~IU~~ilI Mny 1938)
(lur artlll~ in 1ll5 (Jtll~ (ljl -hl- Imiddotmiddoth 1118)
I Training Taetla
k~~~ ~~~~ltf~~~g (~[~J~~ - ~l~t~~~ l~i1~ Tralfllfll rurrrinntionll1937 (Jour It r - JullllI)
~~~~~t~~~II~t~~7l~~I~I~~a~~ltl ~r~lif~~~(~1Iw)~~a Apr 113B)
11w A II cmiddot I artdlry fir~middot IItv IIn - Jlln Inll)
ATTACK
Ikllt-n~ nIIin~t aor ntrlltk ~(av Jour - Jul-Au 1l8) The mounttmiddotd attnck In open rdgtr (Cav Juur-~ Jul-Aug
1918) _ EqUIpping for aHk r nVNlt (Mit Fn~ -- Jul-AuI In) TIll emplQymlnt of a tllnk IlfiJllldc (ftTC Jour -- Jul 1918) AHack In modern war ItTC Jour - Jul 1911I ttark Ilnd counter-attack in Spalll HJS ltull ~ iI Jun 1J11l) lr atlacks on ground trop$ (~liI4Wochmiddot--l AIr 1l38) Tlw traimngofcnglnpgtrlplldcrllnncl men (PIOn --[-1middot11913) Th mod~rn tllnk Ita cllpnhihllS and empymltnt in It
(Iaack ltv dInf-Mnr 1J38) Tllnk nttak I~hangt antItank guns I~ l-nll~lI Ilitury
Illlltlmiddotgb AUSTRIA ARMY Of)
n PUhly-lh~ar old mlilary schuu (1)liJ Milt 19111) fltJ
BELGIUM (ARMY OF)
I11slry vI the Inspcctorut GeMral [ the Army unll the HIIshylUln tmimng cent durinllthpoundgt World Vnr Hlul DIlI1 lgtJl-Jln-eh MUT 1938)
Ihmiddotsrijltim Qf educatlflnal and vQcational trnlninK 01 thlt Illll(nln SQ1lti1(t (nul Beige ~fi - Jlln 1938)
Aronalltir mat(middot (Rv Mil Suisse - Dec 1(37)
BUlGARIA (ARMY OF)
Motorlzalionothenrma N(wconccpliQngoforlnniznlion Iquipmcnt and emplnym~nt in fflr(iln armilt~ (Kraft- shy
May 1(38)
CAMOUFLAGpound
Air PW(T afld ro~)p 110VCmLnt (lnl Jour -- May-Jun 1938) Tnllllnr ruminatnR 1917 (Jour It An ~ Jul 1938) Cnmoulnlc nnd blackQut (Mi Mitt -- Mllr 1131) Ground orgullTatltm of t~e Ilir rjf~ Prutcction of airpoTL~
lI~rordmg to ItWltB18n Views MJImiddotWch -8 AN 1938 imlT(middotgHlonq Ilnd IXpctl(ncog of the Spanl~ War (itv ~1il
Suissc--Jun Feh HJ3S)
CANADA (ARMY OF)
(anlth~ tltgtrltlgn pohcy (Cup j)1f Quur-middot-JuI191S) lrQhlltms of defence on the PaCIfic (Can I)f Quar Iu
1J38) CAVAlRY
Organlzltlon and poundqulpmcnt
1918)
CHEMICAL SERVICpound
New wllr I(IUI(gtI [Qr uhl (A Ord - Mlly-Jun ll38) SNurly rr thl ReTVic f RuPIlly (Ch~m Wnr - Jut 1938) lrenutionsIiKuinKtluHlIlIlIkll (MllMltt-Mar1938) PhYRiuloKIlal ~fT(lcL nf j(HStfl (Mll Mitt ~ Mar ]9381 GUIII)roI~tlon of Ill( civil popullltIon nbruad (Mil MIlt-
MlI~ 1938) CHINA (ARMY OF)
~ fhl(91~JlIn~ luraquoitiVlt EXjledition in Chlnll (A QUII1-- Jul
fhumifr in tlw EuM 1 mth~ f til( wllr in Chinu (Jntbull JQl1r-- JUI~lUr 1131) Why Jupun i~ In (hina ((lR W -(j MIlY I9JB) (~an 1Ill Chin~~ rl~i~t illdJinitdy (US Itev - ~luy 13H)
COAST ARTIlLpoundRY
Bombinv plratiolll ill Illlt ~)Jl 01 the iukrior teA Jourshy1ny-Jun lJaS)
~~i~i~r~ft th~mDr[~~a~(~~i 1(~itr3~-(E~Yj~~i 9rel4 jullJ8)
IIm)lIrdmnltatiltgtI (f Jour --Jul-AuJ 193H)
COAST DEfENSE 11lt(ltU or the Bdg1Un rna~( HII44 918 (CA J9uf-Jul~
Aur19J8)
COMMAND STAFF AND LOGISTICS I((IJ[lr~dn(SIlt ioElIRlund IItudy of indo~lrjal m(Jbillzation
JllP flrgalliza1ltI1l and runmiddottion~ or the llltiwal Stfvi(g in cumbimmiddotd opmtouns IIf lund and ~tU frorl_ (Mil Sur shyMy Jun 1J38~
jllctltII IIml Idmml~trllliv(middot ll~ of tlimiddot Var in AUYl8lniu (Juur HOSJ - IIIY IJ38)
Air-hd armimiddotq r omormw (lI H Jul-Aul 1l38) 11lI J~e~~~(JiJ38nfulltTY dhmiddoti~irHl in dmiddotrltn~ (QM iev-shy
dw supply in war soml prohlmiddotml dlA~G QUilt - May 1938)
fill 11middot((1 for a d~partmnt nl SUJII) tU-l IlIv- 9 Jun I ~)3)
NftllH un Iimiddot hirtr cdud f wnr rrltgtm 1792 to 1797nnd frum 1914 I 1918 (ltv ~H1 Gell -- Jan (U 138)
National d(fn~ ltv lI1H (itll ~ Jnn 1938)Ihll l~thOrian Campairn 111 s~rice of supply (ltv Mil
(II-Jun 1938) OrgmTatinn Qf national ddnM (f~vom Gn - Mar 1938)Thu lIupply Qf hlgtrsClI in our urmy (ltv igt1J Smpoundgt - Jan
1938)Tlw mlhlCnce on our tn(tilt~ lllthelltroductionnrmllllof
motnmcd and nrmnnmiddotd (hi((H by our n~lghuors itv Mil SUIC - FllJ 1938)
Mprhlllliwtion [S~ OnginJl Hitary Study)
CONVOYS Air powrllnd lrQnp mOYnQnt (In Jour - ~by-Jun 1938)
COUNTERATTACK AUa~k and rou1l1r-al1u~k ~n Spain (Ult(middot J Jun 1938 1l11k~ In tIll d r11~1V Wlth th Fr Army Aril nud Muy
191H_ (ilvdInf-Jun Ul38)
COUNTERBATTERY Cuuut(gtr lJaUlry in mohile warflllltmiddot IJQUr It rt - - Jnl 1938)
COUNTEROFFENsIVE
Ihe hnUle or middotWIlnltlW AUI(Usl 1920 An fxample of tho rltlunter-n(f~nsl JUf ltV -Muy ll3B
)
r I DE~lLpoundS
Ill ImiddotTOlIlin of the An-l(lIin 1817 St Forlln Mllilflty])1gIHj
DElAYING ACTIONS Command -- Conlrol -- Cummun$tions A rtgim~1l1al
viewPQint (Cnv Jour-Jul-Aug 1938) envnlry tllk s to wheels (I~II orr - Jun InR)N(w ways fQr motor and ridr (Kraft - Milt 1938) HOff( hreding In the region of Rabal and Khemil~eL (Uv
dcCav-Jan-ub 1938) Evolution of British cavalry (ltv du env - 11ar-Arot 1938) ThesitulltionnndmodlofArnhhoTIIImiddotlmedlnglnHgtrill (ltv
de (IIV 4_ Mnr4Aflr lI3S)
hi i~~middot~~~rll~orlli rfK~~~1formalllHJ in 11middot ltuIllllryi
Training Tac1los
Did th(y knQw hoW (Cov Jour - May-Jun 1l38) The rol f iution with m~dlRnllmiddotd ravry ((IW Jm
Jul-Aug 1938) IJdcnAe aloinllt or nllnck (Cav Jour - Jul-AuK 1938) Th( mounted Ilttnltk In pen Qrder_ (Cuv JQur - Jul-Aug
1936)
Orgllflllmg hui~on in the ~I(utinn of demolitions (I~v Mil 01 FlJ 1911raquo
DEMOCRACY
)emocru~ middotr~us dlcta1L)llIhil~ (US R(gtv - 19 IllY 1938)
OJMOLITIONS
TInmiddot vtj fll hmlOliliuJlllin th~rllmJ1Li~n inSnulh 1lano during
()r~lfl~~r~ Ut~l~n j~t~h~~~cJu~i~l~t~~~~i1~lons (ltv Mil r4n--b1938)
DICTATORSHIP
1)~mj)rmriltlJ Vltlt~ dirl~tlt)l1Lhip~ (U~ IlIv - - 19 MIIY 1938)
DISCIPLINE
lrnn 1Ii~dplinc i~ mort nClt~SIlry thnn 4r Itt tlw ~ltllil Army (La Ifllnn Mil )-ZO pr 1118)
ECONOMICS
TIlt (middotvnluatiol1 (If lIw Imlire (ftna CuI MlI- Feb 1988)
91
lt1]) )1)
-i )IoIlt1umiddot JIf)
I
lrl It I)
F
rItHH C[ MllITAnv t rMVAll
I)
FOIlTIFICATIONS
)1 11
11
) fFlA-ICf ARMY OF
) lll
I ) t 101 1 JtI
f
I I 1 I )
) I 11 I -I
I l J]101 1 lt1 I 1 I I (~J
I ~
j I 111
111
Supply
1e
I dlII I 01
i I)
fr I 1 lt1 I I 11)
1 I T[
) JII
1 1
rflANC[ NAVY or
11 I 11 (I 1 J
01 r I 111 11
VUTUflE VJlprAPE
Jl I i~ 11
(i
G(OGnAPIlY MILITARY
It If 1 1-1 11
Cf)nmnd and St lit
1 )q~ J 1 I~I J ) I j gtq bull I II d) d I 1 r
OrlJ IJ Hon nd Equipment
Ii III 1t
I
) ))11I
I II I l[)1
IIrp111tHII
d)l It
I a Irall 111
Trdllinn
1111 1 r 11
[I)middot
1111 d l
II III I 101 h
1
GtRMANY NAVY Of I
11 I )f 01110 )1(I )tl In I~ c 1 1] 1 I IIlt I
Gn[AT nnlTfllN nFlMYOr)
I dr I ~ I 11 -
I )))]1
1 I 101)1 Id j
1 ~ I
Orrl1nr1tn 1nd flUlflnHlt
)1)11 I jn
l r 11)11lt) h qrgt 1111 1ul-IJI
1middot -1 rnll d
middotIlf I II
jl 1 I~ 11 11 r bullbull -1 bull ) nrlnp I r L ft ~ hIgt
1 ~ 111 1-lt1r- bull [eImiddot I 11pI+P 11 ) - I 01 ltd 11 III II 11
1 lIlt1 1)lt1(10 11lt)
ril L ~ lt I d1 I~ l
t bull I1
middotmiddot)r J t 10 I 1)1 r11l hr f ) r
fTl I 1-
Supply
p 1gt1111 It-( 11Ie 1
11 rr IrjllrllIrl Ic~ I - I lr 1) 1lt1111
TrlllJlnl
GRfAT ORITIIN NAVY or)
I j ]1 11lq1 gtI(q)middot11 lItO 1
lNrANl HY
Ornn)r Uon lllrl flUi[HPfllt
rllnlng Tlttlcshy
11tIIr
C amp GSS Qualterl Vol -- ~
h 111111 alld 11-1111 ilf1r1
jlnl middotlr]IIgtl1 Ilr lII~)
INTELLIGENCE middotMILITAHY AND NAVAL)
I 1 I ~ f
1 1
ft) I
1
JAPAN flnMY orl
Ip I ~I d1 1 11 II
1middot1 11 d I
JAPAN NAVY Of)
] j lulllli1 I I -I 1 I ~ Ir
Inolc1 lt111middot 11 11 1t1-lll11j Il)
JOINT OPERATIONS
Ifl r 111111lt11 ] 1 11 111 I
1 I 1- 1 rbull ~1 Il 11middot1
L
LflnGr UNIlS
ArlllY
11 middot1 +]11[1 1101 (h I] li-I
92
LAW (MILITARY AND INT~RNATIONAL)
ReadersGuide andSubject Index
MOBILE WARFARE NETHERLANDS
(uolN Imtry III mhil warfare (Jour It Art _ Jul 191fI) The Ie of the Nelherlandll in lhl wlt)rhl of lO(lay (QM Rov lJ malntrlam of ~I mohilmiddot lorc lJy nir durinl tll1NlItiona in - Mayhm 1l1H
dlt~(rt (ountry (ltMC ltlmr gtlal IJIH)t()I()~Illt101l and mllnuwr 111 ~ltl- 1 IWI) NIGHT OPERATIONS Ih~t~~UWt~~fd~rI~]~~l~~1 t~I~~IJgtinc illviniun in II mobile Nhht rill( crmiddot~liug (ImiddotA Juur- Jul-Aul IJHI)
MQBILITY
)nmmiddot rdtclion~ ltHI infantry materiel and t1ctjCgt (In Jour Jul-Auj 1938)
[nII~1IY III waf shy 80ml Ir()bllm~ (ltMC QUat shy MIIY
lw way~ fUf mutor and ridt (Kraft -~ ~lur 1l38) Tllnk~-armor(tl r(nnnal~~arHmiddot( vmiddothidr and the dcfcll~c
agaln~t th~ [Kraft shy pt 1938)
W~di~lh~~ln (n~~7C~i((~~1i~~IdJ lS)
jJl~~~~~~~~~~nt() j~~~~r~~U~ ~~i~~~~t~~~lj~ the cavalry ISlte Forliln Military DiJe8t~J
MOBILIZATION
Industrial MobilIzation
IrlpllrctlIlC5I in 1nllano1 A Iltudy of indu~trnl mohllizatlon (A Orrl- MnymiddotJun 1938)
o OBSTACLES
f1~uI~~ J)fet~IJI~~14~ iRt~~cE~~mJ~~ij~~l~~~)Poland Eludlul tl eytll uf thc airm)ll (US 1tev- W May 1938)
OIL Pelrol 9u1lgtly in war shy flomc prob[cm~ (RASe Quar shy May
1(38) ORGANIZATION
Sllfallliint-d fighting teallls (Me GIlZ-Jun 1938)
p
MACHINE GUNS
1-u-t ~hl~~~1(~~~~~~IA~~(i)~~jlidj and I h J(
MANEUVER IN WARFARE
S- Sani~h Vnr A rcvi(gtw of til(gt It fltgtrljrr 1ltill 1 JldJouf-Jul-u~Il38) (~blQ-z1llon nnd mmlfUcr (gt1ll htt _ F(h II))
4 MANEUVERS ~~t~~~E~Jl21i1~~l~it~~~~~rJ~~~~ ~middot1)illi~hi~ lDaR)
lc~~tJI1Dn of till arm1 -W cnnpptHgtnq f rl-am7~111n
~t~Jf~h~l~)I)~~~~ltI~f~~~ln J~~ (~~~1~1~1 ~u~-Jan 1lJ8)
~ ]3ndmg from arplan1 ill HUI (Itmiddot ~hl SUImiddot shyt r~lt~e~~~ Army In 1)li jStV F)rti)n ~l1lilr) 1)11131
MARCHES
h~i 3lIIl~t air at tap ICny Jour - Jillmiddot u l~laH)
~~~~r~~~~~~~~i~x~e~~ou[[ ~~r_~~J~~~f~)n ID1) YIamplti hltllgt~hudng Dr wad ruard~ ( t Bul -- Jill
il~Y1 (Of mtof Inl rilter (Krafl -- ~Tar lllii) middotmiddot~f1ttJd~ on ITOum trnolq (~111_Wmh -- 1 Al)r 1J3H) 1tJe-=rgo the ollIh in 1l17 ~( Forcir11 ~111tlry ~ [~~laquotal
MARKSMANSHIP
~lrb~~tlJn5hiP lrainillJ for tll )I)middotmrn mill HI_mill Brandl rOftat ltvjTnf Fth lllH
MARINE CORPS
~~~(tmhrlt-d flrhtinl~ tm1 DJ(middot (17 JUIgt 111lt1
~ MECHANIZATION
t~~ElfJ~fJ~ii~~~~~111 (jOlf HA~IC - ~by H)~Jll)
rtltllngrumtnations1937 (JourIlArt-JuI193l) ~lTlftand mechanised land warfare rh BaUle uf GUHlashy111m 1937 (Jour mJS[ - gtlay 1~J8)
JunlnB)unill(orelgnarmi 1918)
ill for~~~o~lf~rh~~~~f~~~ d rlll~h rmy in tn1 (ltv d Cav - Jan-IH nJtHj flMtld vlhir ejmIJll~ In Moroc(o Ill ltI ClV -- Marshy
11l~1~)f nriti~h mvalry ltv I (w -Iarpr ljIB) teutnmnhll Show of IJn amI irmiddotr rlllllary 1I)1rlt~t (WI
dnf-JanJrJ8) n(lnl am rnc hani7d unit~ (Iv dfnf - Ir ~j~8) elnHuenrnon OUT ta t1l~ or Ih 1ntrduIn r muw of IlIDI~riUllandarmrJ ~middotddImiddotIyournrI()rr lit Ij] Sutw-loh IJl8)
k=~~niu ~~~~ri~~h~1i~~1 yen~i~IIIP (aalry I~~oreirn Miltary lJiKtHj
MEDICAL sERVICE
provLoatlln and pradkul work 111 (ami (Jour It Me shylilY 1938) tPloblemofm(chanlzati()nllsilllrrtCtsllltm(djcII~(rvicl
l1otU nAMe _ May HJ3B)
MORALE
lorlllc I~houldcr to shoulder) (Cav Jour JGB) - Jul 191S)
MOnGAN Sir Hcnry (l615-H1HB)
Ih momiddotd ~Iand(rrd mlln in history (Nav InBt Iro( -- JUII lJall)
MOTORCYCLES
lHnary motorryde~ (In Jour- lIlal-Jun 11l3ll) lJc y(li~t quadran In th(gt rcconnlllgsallce unit (Mil-Woch
TI~ l~il~lr)J~~Lr() ([( (R de Cay - JIIII-I~~b 193R)
MOTORIZATION
Ar powIr anllroop mov(mtnL (In Jour - rfily-Jun 1laH) 11htary monrl)rh~ In JOUt- Iay-Jun IIR) omrdlrtlltm~()n mrntrymaterid and ladie (fnfJourshy
rulmiddotAul 1918)TllmiddottIC11 and atimiJ1IHlrntlv 1ltl~onS flf the Wllr III AblMlnla
(JourltllSI-gtlay llaS) ircraft ant m(halli~(middotd land warfare The Battle uf Guadl
A ~~J~r~~~~~~i~7~ihitl~J~ ~h~a~rsl ~lorJzation procrllm QIT Itv-May-Juo 1918)
SlIlH tatkallr-~~nq In rlnlrtion With M 1 fmpIHY(] )11 llrationq alin~t an irwgullr (filmy (RAsG qunrshyMay 1)IH)
Eludllll til( (Y~ f th mmln (US Rev -1J l1ay 1l1R) New wayq [or motor and rid(gtf Kraft - lInr 19J8) ArmorlI mmiddotclultlizmiddotJ ad mutorpd unit~ r foreill1 armLe8
TI~~~7~la~~~Irco~~~f~~a~~I~nl~I~) and the dcfctl~e alain~t thltsc (Kruft-Apr 1938)
Motorization of thenrm~ New conceptionsa1 orgrtnization bull lluJmcnt and cmplolmfnt in forClgn Urmlcg (Kruft shylIfay W18)
Ifntorizatlon and manltlIVtr (lliI [ltt-Feb1J38) tw inmiddottl]()dH fr rrosHlnl rivrrH h) motorized tinlt (1(011
1middotmiddothll)K) (oa and mlor~ (Ita Cui Mil- F(b 1918) Trllt tollitary molnnyd It dv Cav - Jan-Igteb 1938) Ijp Jrll~h rmy m 1~l7 llv d~ Cay -Jufi-Jd lilaH) Ih utnmIJmiddot Show of 1l17 od (~ m[iry IntllmiddotHt (ltv
lnl ~ Jan WaH) T)w mftulw On our ptir~ nr lh in1tnduIiltm of rn ~~ f
UWod aud armord middothid~ by nur ]( IlIhlJorq (ltv 1111 -l1i ~middotmiddot- FdJ 1111)
111~~~1~~~~~~~J ilr~~~ ~~~~~I Irmal I()t~ In tli callulry
N
NATfONAL DEFENSE
Ihc dd~ ( Switt rbnd The (1f(11arltdn~ gtolhieH of n llml In urnwd 1uro]Jmiddot ( Onl - Muyjun iJ18)
lrqrtlnl~ in 1ljtul11 1 fltuly f irlltlu~trilll ftIohih7l1till (A Unl gt1 Jun ll)aH)
StralJlcandrliilmiddotam1l1rml~ Tlwirrlntlnlt(]UUrnnt]oll
j~I(I~~r~tifpoundr~i~I~~~~~~f~~~rllUNlI~ t~lf 1(1~~(~ - Jul I~Q ~
Tinmiddot ur~atlI7an()1l nIH ntlVl1h~ uf tlamiddot Mdk11 illIHlflftlNlt of til Army 1he imIHlrlnm of mNidn~ in IIIHlollUI If~ (Iii SUrl - Aflr 1l18)
A~hmorl uJ-rni1ltd (ltH Quar- J111191H) )IIJ~~Il~~~futiI~(Ul1dlnl of Ih t1lW d(fmiddotl1lmiddotImiddot~ (Hoy jng
IHltai1 f(middotnrmllrnmiddotnl (UH RIv - 2( Mill HJ38) Nnliunnl dfr)IJw [tv 111 (jll - Jntll~Il1i)
C~I~~tJ1( It~I~liG~ ~ ~~ jJli It~j rIlI~ In national Organization of nnlional dlfensc (ltv 1111 Gcn - Mar 19111) l1echanrzation JSt~ ()ri~lnal Milllary StudyJ
PALESTINE
latcHtillC loteH (HUll Cui Mil- Feb 1938)
PERU (ARMY OF)
r1H (rllf~inK 01 the Andltl In 1811 Scc loreigll Military DilcstsJ
POLAND (ARMY OF)
TankR - armored fcconnaiMllncc vlhicJes and lim dcfenBc ngulnntthlc (Kraft-Apr 1938)
PORTUGAL (ARMY OF)
A PurtUlUllIC chronidu 01 the mrpcditlon f Don Chrilltopher (III Gamll ill (lhylinia (UI1Il Cui Mil - Feb 1938)
POSITION WARFARE
11 incvitlllJility ulcontinuoUlfronts IS(( ltorcign MillLary l)il(81f1J
The Ibntiou of fronl JSec Jltoreiln Military Digests
PRESS
Illlt inl1u(n(( of the prs~ in Great Britain and America (JuurUSlI-AprI918)
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda (Jour USlJ-Apr 193R)
Q
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE
Planning Branch Construction Division Offi(( or the Quar termasht General ~Qt Hev - May-Jun 1938)
A (olnmrdal Vl(gtwllOint on the army9molotitnllOn program ((~M ltlmiddotv-MllyJun W3R)
Air-fed Ilrmies of tomorrow (QM Hev -Jul-Au~ 1938) TIIC HUIlPly or an infantry dlmiddotjsion in deflmiddotnflC (Qrt Revshy
JulAug 138) Prt rol ~Ullily in war - somc llwblems (HliSe QUllr - May
]J38) Slme IneUeul [cgtlons in rOnncmiddottion with MT emplollil in
tJPernlinsn~ain~t In krlI~IRr enemy (ItASC QUllt shyMay 1938)
Tim maintenance orn mohile farec by air during opeflltlou9in dtHert Ctluntry (HASC QuaT - May 1938)
R
RAIOS
A~hmnre m(Jd~rnltlltf llo IA9~On~ lOr the SPlJlildl War AirmidHnnd theirffT(cta l~xl)rjenrlJ In GII~ pro(ction
MarHI3SAnt-nlr mid fgtll1ldlnj nrn~lruttlon (Mil Mitt - Mar 11138) Ilr raid shdt(rII (lliJ Mitt- Mar 1938)
RECONNAISSANCE
rile fol of (nllItion with mcrhlni~1d cnvlllry (Cav Jour-JIll-AUf( 111)8)11 yrll~t Rlulldron In Ih reconnaissance unit (Mil-Woeh -1 Apr 1935)
H~NN~NKAMPF Gtllurni Paul (1854-191B)
ltennenkllmpfs mid in th( waf witb Chinn (Rv de GavshyMnrmiddotAp(1938)middot
93
-- - --- --
I
r
Reltders-Guidc alld Subject Index c amp GSS Quarter~
ilvht n r (r r
LlIlppm~ fflr T1Nw 1IllljId [ (f
Fb lil~l
r ~ rmiddot I f
d ROUTES COMMUNICATIONS
1P)IJIWrflId 11 1 I ~ JI IfWIIIr I t II
middot1 ltI ~ 1 IIK
11
VI11ltrwymiddot
I
PUSSIA
1 )1
Ibullbull
1 1 1
11[ 1
11middot
[IWowrn J
SLCURITY
lid I
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
~IGAl SErtVIC(
i 1Jf 1_
SPAIN ARMY OF
middot1lt1
5unMARINfS
1 ]1
ljPPlY
1It
III) 1 11
11 110
1 I~ )1
) 1 I I~ 11 H
middot1 I I) I Un amiddot bull ~I
Pi J- I ~ I J Il n I I )
lr1I))
i (
Ilj I 1
I II 11 If
11middot I 1]1 1 I
SWITZERLAND ARMY or
tf lIf Irlo IhpllllrmlulhlllofmatIPIof ltI fl j -)1lt1 loy ur IvhlT Iltv
F 111gt
T
TACTICS OPpoundRATiON5
LI rlfr 1llllll(tlwr uIIWlHJ I f Jlnrhmiddot IJIIU I lay
j 1 tT-It JunlllIlJ I ll lid mHn jlbIgt Il
I i~ lt bull I I ILl 1 T 11 I 01111101 Ib ~ld
( ]11middot I I I I J n 11lt 1 lllf~
Ollrn~ Cot~It
IImiddot lhItll fluar Jul ) shy
([UHr I111-ullIIK) bull rd r II 1 ~ J ur Jul- 0 111
1 1 bull rmiddot - I fl1 nl 1111111 I~J RI I1gt-)IrJtl 1 lola
1 1
Spc1ilIWilrtilro
r r In JII) ~ joll Jul-AIW 1lllll r II Id~ n IRI7 [ ForI)n ~ftlIH
[ nltlllnUlrPldli 1~f(middotrI1 1lhtnrv
Troop Movoment~
lav-JunlfIR) lui fJH)
War In Abyl~IlI
1+ ~11lY 11ll1 lib til ~UI~
1gt1
TRAfnC CONTROL
1 wtmiddotj IrpJnrnnt 11IJ lw1un Inll 1ludIlmiddot h I II IlIrmrl (0-0 It v 11 III~ Jllkl
TRAN~PonTATION
rl-rdlrlllnlIl[ Ilfluf fUIII[I1ro r 1 n rlnlr~ nl t1 I Inigtlt 11II]t
bd nf 11 fj) 1 UIltll1 11 7 IJnlr It All JulllK) J I lr1 ltI nlmITnll~p 1lt0 of tl1l ur III AhI1rpn
r I ~11lt1 f flV 1l1k) fIJI vnr JI II n~ 0 11lt10111 (f HII Ill
1111 -10 til 11f1I l~ n )) rnn 11gt Wllh L1 Inplyp 1ll
Irolll wjrit n Irrltvla~ I my IltASt ~11-1I1I1yll3f1)
I IIlt mllllllHlllel f a rongtrgt furmiddotI hy nlr dUnnv OIlgtrnliOll~ In (fp~Ht rnunlry (ItAS QuaT- ~fllY IDJ8)
~~~~I~I~~I~() 1~~)(~rl~I~dn g~C~~ M~9t~J~r 19MI Itl~ llud molltgtr I HIl1 ( 111 tl1 - 1111 l~lH) imltltgttNiOll and ltXI rmiddot I thC Spnnlllh VIlT illv)1]
0U1~1 IlIn lph 1l3l)
(T
UNITED STATES IARMY OF)
Commilnd ilnd Stl
1tIIIIHTIlIllIlf IJIfJour Ifngt-Junl)]R)
Orlpnlxltlotl IInd Equipment
J ) f)alllaln Il IIrtlIIlt Ib I(dco1lhrutrttnrntol 1)1 fllI) TIllt mp)r[n~ or nHOrnp 11 1llOnal dpfenll 1 ~urmiddot Apr 1l1lt1
npf -11 nil nIW rnnrt71l1un program ~I Hmiddot~ 11 _1 1)lt)
Trlld flll1I11 11ITIr )1141111]lt lT lO t rfllah II-middotrh I Alr l~IIR)
UNITEO STATES INAVY OF)
Commnnd and Stltlff
I~~ w1 ru I 1 If~t Proc - Jul 1l3H)
Orgilnlxatlon and Equipment
t ()rnl (~avlnHtTr()r-Ju
Trllnlng
I) Hb1 mm I PrIOr lui ngt Ih)lll1 1 In Irr Il) 1111
VETERINARY SpoundRV1CE
gtIhld Jrmiddot~lJ)I Igtr r1 marrhl It Bu-J~l tl1lt)
w WAR PEACE
~tr3Ir nil fticmiddott m1lfnn~ TIl Ir UmiddotlllttOn t Hur nnllnnll rurlfy (AOri- JI-1Jf(EIlll
I~middotqnmiddot frH )Hllll IF JIlr [lI-JUfl 1flaKl irOHT or nr (Jour lSll - pr Ilf) 1~t 1fruHmn1 or 1IPII rnr VM 1(~M H la)
lUT lJJ~) I lip gtarhnrou a)middot lt It 11 Jul ]118) 1IIIra 0 mhtnn n~liw (gt1t1 1l1t~ JIII1 FJ 19J Wnr lIId l1(nclt Iltn4 (ul gt1 -llTI1l8)
WARS
FIUC
ITALY-ABYSS1NIA (1935-1936)
(nmpitlnHll1hwp
hrdt Mar 1~11~) ~-~ 1( i of uply I1h ~_
1
CHINA
BOXM RCbclllon 11(00)
Itllnampr rud 111 II Hr llh (llInll It rio (at shylr Ir 1)lt)
JIPAN-CHINA 1930~
11 1111111middot 111 11111111 (mil 1 IUH -1 Il
111 r ill Ih I~T T11 In 11Ih~ of Ihr wllr til (Inn Jr Imiddotur Iu umiddot)llil
1 dlUrl)ll 1111 ([1 (I (rlt nt (Nfl I~I lr~middotr - Jl lIR)
1( ~gtn~ klrm at ihIl11~h11 It In (Nav In~t lrur - ~cf 13H)
h Jo1lnn 1laquo 1 rhlnn IllS n - r If) lt)1)) (ui tillt (hUllt r l( nllil)lll 11- Itt ~IIV 19~ I)middot War I Ih Ir Ii~( (hl gt-Itl Inn 11l11) Illlt ~1lmiddotalllmiddot Witt 1tl4 (ul 11 -JlI1 Fb 1138)
1lllt()
P(NINSULAR WAR IIBOB-tBI41
(air) Inll lInoupmiddot rIO( 1 nlllmlnr ur middotmiddotIlllllIJ ithrllth Jllh IHill (a~ lollr (Inl-Jul 1)l~)
nUSSIA-POlAND (1920)
II 1111 I fltnI U)III 11~1l 11 Igtnmpl (ll It UIl rnrr nmiddot IJuT HII - Mnv 1~3R)
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 11936_19361
I 1(1~~~1 ill -r~li~~uni~~ltll fnll til krpp parI WI1h lIrhnigt
Tallk ur unt 1 lnl~ (tI1I I It r t~unr - Jul 191f~) J1~~()111 r~om Splln (1 Jour-~ Mny-Jun llJ8) lh S]gtmll~h Vur rllw of thp I)(~t ron ign Ojl1n101 (Jr
I~~rrl--1I~TX~~~~n~~~(1 nnd wnrfllfo flw bllltr 01 Gu~dl Injnfn1931 (Jour nUSI - Mny IU3l)
V~ ~
94
~d eollUlmiddotattaek ~ss~_(yen~uIfl938)9 JUll 1938)
-2IJui193S cmiddot S R(v-28 Jill 1938
1937) (BulBelgeMiI
Feb 1938)eli the Ebro River
Feb 1938) two recent artldlR
en-Mar 1938)
Imt=~J~~~FcetJ~8) of the Spanish War (Ry Mil
SOUTH AMEmCA ~=1K or the A~Tr8~A~ Ponign MililMy
CIVIL WAR (1861~1865)
iR ~~i ~~c 7J~~rI~ pct~J~I193i)1 193R)
WORD WAR (19141913)
C _ Soclo-Economlc History
WuGerm(lny dclcal~ 11l1918~ (Jollr RUSI - lay 1l38)
G - Arm and Selllce~
ARTILLERY
~ ~~l5Il of the Dlginn coast 1914_1918 (CA Jour - Julmiddot I Aug 1938)
OurutUery ill 1915 (HWI Cui ~m - Feb 1938)
CAVALRY
[)Id they know how (Cav Jour - MayJun 19311) A cavalry offieera experhmiddotneea on the Indian Frontier during
the Wat (Cav Jour [OBI - Jul 1938)
ENGINEER
The UIoe of demolitionllin thedmpaign in Soulh Polnnu duro Ing Oclo~r 1914 Roy Eng Jour - Jun 1938)
MFD1CAISEltVICamp
Contributions or the World Wat to the advancement or mfdimiddot cine (MiiSurg-JuI1938)
TANKti
TankB in the ddenaiYc With the Flrtlt Army 111 AJlril and Muy 1916 (Rvdlnf-Jnn 1938)
Mcchnniution [SiX Originnl MiliLnry Study)
H _ Military Candu t of tho Wnr In tho Flold
The other lidpound of thpound Hill No XVI Aubpoundrn Hidgc 9th of May 1915 (A Quar-Julll38)
Jh~ ~~~i~n~o ~fi~U~~nlv7Jamp~fobft~Yi~uNlt~e~~her 1H4
N~~lo~(t~ ~~~h-~~~d~rol~ (rom 1792 to 1797 nnll from 19141() 1918 (ltv Mil Gcn- Jan l~poundh 19311) bull
Organizing liaiwn in the (middotxNution of dmiddotmltllitlons (Rv Mil Gn - Feh 1938)
J _ Campaigns amp 9attlos
EUROIEAN AUF- - Ilul~IAN TIfFJITfm
The u~c of tlemotionll in th campaign in South Poland during October 1914 (Hoy Eng Jour - Jun 19311)
EURONAN Anp - WESTERN TJfAT~n
1914
Did they know how1 (Cav Jour- lnymiddotJun 19311) The defln9C of Dhmudc 17 October to 10 Nov(middotmhcr 1914
(nul Dolge MiI- Feb Mllr 1938)
ERRATA (To June 1938 Quarterly No 69)
Readers Guide and SubjectIndexgt
1915
Tho nthllt ~Ido of the Hill No XVI Aubcftl Ridge 9lb of MaytHU5 (A Quar - Ju(1938)
1917
orfl~~i~l~lbli9MfI the exe~tlon of demOlitions (RvMII
1918
fanks In th( d(teulliv( With thQ FIlI~ Army April and MllY 1918 (Rvdlnf-JanHl38)
L - Nava Hiltory
Thc lIulJrnlirinl war In 1915 (MnmiddotWoeh - g Apr 19111)
WEAPONS
A lIy~tem of antimiddottank delenn) (Can Der Qubr--Jul1938) Some rdl(lonll on Infantry mate~lel and tactics (Inf Jour
JulmiddotAug 1938) Strenmlined lightlng team (Me Gaz- Iun 1938)f and lhe defenllC
Feb 1938) nt (Mil Mitt-
Mar 1938) ImplCSlllons and erperiences of the Spani5h War (Rv Mil
Suifll(l-Jsn Feb 1938) ank atlack agaimlt antitank gunll Sec Foreign MlIilllry
Digestlll
WITHDRAWAL
(1) P(lgc 94 - Title should read MANGIN Counterattack or June
11 lrl)8page 112 Line 9 Muzzle velocity should read 831 mete~ per second (2725 fs) instead or 381 meters per second
I I
95
I
- 1]
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- Untitled
-
~ r Volume XVIII Number 70
1938
THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
QUARTERLY REVIEW OF MILITARY LITERATURE
LIEUTENANT COLONEL P R DAVISON Edit07 MAJOR E M BENITEZ Assistant Editor
September 1938 Third Quarter
TIm C01l1iAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL QUAI~TERLY-REshyVIEW OF ilIILITARY LITERATURE is published by The Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth Kansas Entered as secondshyltIa-is maHer August 31 1934 at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth KaTls under the Act of March l 1879 Subscription ratc One year in the United States and possessions Cuba and Mexico $100 foreign $200 a year
Books bull
Thc Navy A History-BIJ Fletcher Prall
The Lost Battalion-BII Tho11as Iohllsoll alld Fletchcr Prall
The American Civil War-BII Carl R Fish
Thc American Civil ar lSil-fii-lfl Major E W Sheppard OBEbull Me
The Last FiveIIour or Austria-BIJ Euyelle LelllllwlT
Japan in China-BII T A Bissoll
China FiRhts for lIer Life-UlJ fl R Ekills aml ThlOlI lIriyht
China FiRhis Back-BI JiJlIcs Smedley
And so to War-BIJ HulicrlHcrrillJ
America Gocs to War-By Charlc~ C TWlsill
Action at Aquila-BlllcrvclI Allell
A~drew Jackson-BII Marquis Tamcs
Roosnelt-BIJ Emil Ludwig
Tarnished Warrior-BI Major a11cs R Jacobs
Jamcs Madison Builder-BJ 4bott E Smith
(corg-e Mason Constitutionalist-BJ Harriet Hill
RORer Shermau Sig-ner and Statesman-Bn R S Boardmall
Labor on thc March-By Ertuard Levinsoll
The Politicos-BJ Matthew TosCTzSOll
The Big Four-BTl Oscar Lewis
Comments on the contents of the hooks listed here may be found on pagcmiddotW following-
Contents CD
Page lechanization _ _ __ 5
7tlilitary Ncv- Around the Vorld _
The Spanish Ciyil War _ -~--- 28
The Sino-J apanelt(gt Val __
Foreign Military Digests __
Digests of important articicc from foreign military periodicals the remaining articlet- for each magazine are lbted
Tallk AUack Agalllltt Antltank Guns __ _ _____ 3
Crossing of the Andes in 1817 ____ _ _______ 14 ____________________ 41
Is It Nc(cs~ary to PrpltCrvc Mounted Formations in the Cavnlry
The ImYltabJlty of Contmuous Fronts _ 44
The FIgt3tlOn of FrflntE _ 46
The German Army in HJl7 ________ _ ____________________ 47
Book Reviews and Reading Course for Officers ____________ _ 19
Let We Forget (The United States in the World War) _____________ _ _56
LIbrary Bulletin __ 58
Books recently acces-ionccl which arc of particular significance
Academic Noles CampGSS
Current School material which affcct~ instructional procedure or tacticHI doctrines
Rotcr of Instruct()rgt _______ 59
___________ 59 Rolttel of Regular CIalt 1938-1pound139 _
Map Problem No 25 (1938) ______ _ ___________61
Direclory of Periodicalgt ______ _
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles _ _70
A ltYHtematic reviev of the contents of selected military periodic~lIH Foreign-language peri shyodicalH are digclted to a degree to furnish an adequate idea of contents and significance
Reader Guide and Subject Index _
All subject-heading~ are arranged in alphabetic sequence and can be con~ultcd liIC a dicshytiollary Note abo List of Periodicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations
Errata ____ _ _________________________________ ___________________________________________ ~5
Mission TIll objtmiddotct o[ tid pullicatioll h a sytematic review of eUITflll military litpraturc thr()u~h catalogshy
JlIg artille~ oj lrnft~i()Ial vailh ill ~llttld military awlnaval plriodieals ill the domeKlic and foreign field
Artilltmiddot- from forciVIl IHriCitiit al an tnat ld b~ I rall-lal jotl- of 1itles and dig-csis of contents matershyial of partkular iIl1jll)rlanlt b toprlti more txten-hmiddotI~ in a middotwdifJll of Forcign lli1italY Djgcst
t Llhrary I~llllllll Ktll ion lit- boo]s 1LC(11t I aClc-siollcd which are of particular significance
Thi (JOlt f I I h Pllhljlpd a a ~uldl to lllOripoundrn llllillary tendencies amI to in4pire vigorou thoughts on t he ~1l1IJ(lt t nakd
Acknowledgment Till dllos of 1hi C)iIII I II dtmiddotill til lxprl- t heir thanks and appreciation to the mallY pllSOnS who
have aluahl~ a-btcd ill 111l plcparat ion of material for thi issue The work of cOlltributor~ has been dl)ll~ ip add it inn in their o he dutie awl on tIllir own time We arc very grateful to the following ofiiccrs 1m their ~(llerOt1- dOIld Ion
Captain 11 lartl1c~ nir KmfljahrkamftrllJlIJi (lIareh AprillIby 1~38)
11 al or T R Phillip (1 Frollcr Jilitnirr (18 Ftllluary 5 11 Malell 1J-20 April 1 10-11 July In~~) 11( 11iil(I SlIissr (lknmlllr l1n tJallual~r FlllIuary If1~8)
Li(uillltnt J Y Hutlolph Book Hcvicws
~liJtr IL lt Tllldall If 11 (rIIIllullrI (J anuary February March 11~8) RCI)U( Jlilitnirc ( II( (II (TaJ11lry Fdlluary ilarch 1138)
1a1(11 L 1 Trll--cottJr 1111( rll Crll)(l[rrir (Jmualy-Fplnuary March-Apri11938)
The Cover llliled Statgt Almy arrnond car M-l u-ocd fol n(middotollnai~~HI(
1qnippld wiih GO and W (alilH1 ma(hirJ( ~uns radio and armor plat(
Mechanization Ily LIEUT COLONEL P R DAVISON Cavalry
and ifAJOI~ E i1 BENITEZ lOW Artillery Corps
This article do(s lint nrcc8Wlily exprrss thr idc((s policics tcachings 01 beliefs of The Command ((ld (IIflal Stafr Scwol It slOlfld not he cn~trucd that the uutlws ([1C aftrmjltinll to introduce i( If olld stmlflr id((fS to 0111 (JIiee The sfudy is writtcn to l)1(srut mechanization in a general chflracter as it is fOllnd t~)dllJ hi jive fltrai llatirlrIs An hypothrtical -iflf(fiiol itgt used as a vehicle 1(]lOn which to load ([ sUnrtrst((Z mcchadzed force Should this study inphC a g1(at many differences of Opillioll it has thcll clcatCd thought on the subject and in so doi11U itR mission is accomplished
j The Republic of ATLANTIS~ i-gt considered the wealthiest i~on m the world Ii b a peace-loving country desire~ no ~randllcment of territory and up to the Jlre~ent time she ~ enjoyed a ~ecurity from invaion that ha~ been greatly
Imiddottrained
- sted br her geographical position She ha maintained a ittlOnal policy of al()ofne~) freedom from alliances and tical entanglement- ith other nations although she has erially assisted other Powers with men and materiel to _ guard their integrity and to preserve their democratic Is Her lofty aims and her invaluable assistance have
always been duly appreciated She maintains a strong Yand a small but highly efficient Active Army and
Territorial Guard It would take several for ATLANTIS to put a large army in the field and it
y to her national policy and (0 the will of the people in a large standing army to safeguard her illtcrcstr
ome and abroad The tactical doctrine of her army il middotd upon offen-tive action The unsteady world condition~ and the realization that no longcr pos~ible to conceive military operations which
lot r(gtquilc the u~e of armored vehicles have awakened ANTIS to the fact that she needs some kind of a mcchashy
nized force At present she has practically none she is therefor( ~talting from scratch r
Acconlingly the Chief Executive of ATLANTIS has sent the following directive to his Secretary of National Defense
THE EXECUTIVE MANSION OF ATLANTIS 10 August J[JJ8
TilE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEIENSE
My Dear Mr Secretary
Modern means qf transportation communications size of navies and especi~IIY the capacity potentialities speed and range of airplanes today and thoge planned for future use have tJken from AUallti~ the security that she has enjoyed from her birth due to her geographical position
Our National Defrl1sc is -plencUd in all its brancheH arms doctrines allli ladies Cxcept that it cumpletely laclHI mechanization We have partial motorization but no mechshyanization
It is requested 1hal the appropriate Rlatr section make without delay a study of the mechanization of England France Germany Italy and Russia considering for each
~~2~~~u country without mechamzatlOn poIicili doctrimmiddotq ~r country at lea~t the following fubjecis
5
1 )lidon of the illmetl forces ~ The terrain or probable theatre of operations 01 The organization of m(gtchal1izcd folcl- 4 The 1tmament of combat vehicle 5 The doetlillt of lJlCchanization fi Prolal)j 1ac1ical ~mJllornH1l1
d Submit tu me 01- -oun a- po-sjblcgt rccommclHlation-gt for HJI nnmlliatlffti (If a I1lv~ hal1iztgtltl Ullit or force which po~~
-popo t~ll bl paton 1)1 thlgt five WlIIl1S above mLlltirJJ)(d adtlling It In 0111 OIJ Wfrj alld -1Ilh additional iJlfolmashy
tllJIl a you may (II lIll tit
SlIlcenly
A (III f 111 riltI lltllIti
TlI (ltlJr ldf hi lllllg III mind that a Pnident (1IIJIiri)-l (Jllr ltlid fill h Jjll IHfflJ wty flf t1mlillg Ollt
v hd iJlJuJd Ill dlll 1hlJl lJ~ dltplmilllllg what has b((11
d(IlH rf~ned 111 tlw ]la)~( of hht()l) forl -tudy of the
()1Ij11l and demiddotjpmlllt (It flll(llullzeci Wtap()Il alld tilllf prdcl1(aJ appli(tI lOll 111 the lJ1I11t1itJd
FIl))I 1))111 11 IlIdl LIII]gt III ad Ion
~Jll tIll JWglllllH~ of drftll it ha- bttll 1(eoglIized
1I1cmiddot ~al III 11t1 ~Jnw Idnd of ohocllt 1 loop to pierce illt illinl t 101lt HannIbal lif of elephant- as a -pealhead 10 cr~h 111(gt Ilief of tlw lomall LlJdoll- b pcrha])s Uw
Illl Idmplt of 1hI-- 11 of fOI cp III that ca-gtc the expcnshyIlllllt ~- 1101 put IllJy lHfnJ iJelltluse the elephants beshyitIJlI rll ()lalllipd alld )llld HO II( cOlltrf)lled oli the InlUItshy
lIPId Thd Itla t)111 llJay have uelJl thl g-uidlllg
JJJIH pll lor 1111 l~l of imilar mdhod~ of tarfare during til lJrld ar homiddotpr )ll~t a- III the case of IIannibaltlw n-ut l a faitJn~ in tho-l ta-e when medliluical defects Ilthlfd II WhfIP irnplfllHr lacl]al ilS wa Ilw(kmiddot of tlll~p
v(afrlll-
fll 1 til TJrd Val hy lh ylll ]~lG mohility or lclWll
had blIll 101 aJld as a rcult of the machine gUll and the barbed wire eJltangltmcllt tagnation had taken placl all aloJl~~ ttl V(ctf~rll Front Ill( Allic theJl resorted to tlw lank whllh iI- tl]( oilly lYIH of mltcitanizalioll known at Ihal 11111lt fhi w(apoll Wli d(vised uy the British as an
anlidoe 10 the machine gUll that wa playing such with the lives of the infantry that it was sheer send men agaimt Rtrong-Iy defended positions
The British used 1anks for the f11-t time Battle of the -iommc in the summer and fall of 1 in lmiddotlauders and al CamLgtrai Their value uecame
(dUWtlld lJi1adiI FlIIH( lrIH~r1 fOI ollP of tIll IJdll (nd Hlilt hpl
from the outset in pitp of the fact that they moving mechallically imperfect machines and wcre poor taetical employment by lllCxplrienCtd hands
The French tl~ed tank in the Sois-ions oITen-li() for the purpoc of JldUllllg the Marne Salient at and in the Septemuer-OcloDer 1918 offensives ( and Guise)
Till ((nlllttlI~ lirsl employed tanks in the gre~tt otflllsi(gt near Sl Quenli1 21 March 1918 a1d thercafter in all major operations up to the (nd of with varying degree of suecess
6
lxhII No 70 M echQllization
LIGHT MpoundCHANIZED DIVISION (DL~
FlrURF 1 -French LIght lIIechanized DlvlslOn
c
ni
~
It may be aid that the followlllg priflciple~ goverlling tactical employment of tanIgt can be deducted from the
orld War
1 That terrain i-- d controlling- and vital fador in tank erations
2 That Kurprbe when po~ille is extremely valuable in ank attack
3 That tanks WWll u~ed ill rnagt properly SllcCJ1cd and pported by artillery have the opportunity to make a dcpp netratioll into a uefensivc zone 4 Ihat lmk- are Cxtremely vulnerable to artillery fin en not adequately -ltreenccl
5 That tilt abPllcc of an trtillery preparatioll or other dent means of dealing with the ~lIlmy antitank vcallon~ yes intact ho-iljp weapolls that may he ahle to intfl11l1 ectively agaiJ)-L a tank attaek and cauI heavy ioses
6 That altillery cOlillterhatltlY -upport i- of great sistancc jf lot a Il(((dty tn advancing tank throughout e attack
7 That the tallk dltack (leading tanks) -hould include rapid advance to prcdetermined obJcctIves the most (1ishynt of which is the rna of the ho-lile artillery llaralyring e enemy~ commullicatiolls and command system
We thus ee that the World War developed a new faelor the art of war that has opelled new horizons whose po~~ishy
Hties the workl is- beginning to realize and that the idea of eoffen-ivc- of 1018 in the Vetern Front and thosccontemshyated for 1Dl D wen L1lP origin of the operatiolls alld COIlshy
ption) oj the mechanized force of the present da~ Since the Vorld Var themiddot major POWCIS have ucen
perimenting with mechanized tWIts and t(~tillg- tlH()ric- ning mechanization It may he inferred therefore
t a nelmiddotd is anticipated for a mechanized force HlP ha-ic irement- of vhich are great mobility and striking power When the Unitfd States mfchanized force came into
ing in 1928 the Var Department directive said among her things
Tank are the principal attack elements of a mechanized force The tactics of the force as a whole shall be predicated upon supporting and assisting the attack of the tank elements and upon quickly consolishydating xeculing and exploiting the success gained by the tank atack Other arms are added as auxiliaries to furnish thc clement of holding (which tanks lack) security and maintenance of command fire support facility of movement and supply
The term mechanized unit as We understand it today include all units equipped with armored combat vehicles whether they be scout cars combat cars or tanks All major powen arc mechanizing or motorizing as far as their finanshycial and indutitrial resources permit and for this reason it j of llltlrlicular importance to cast a glance at what those natIons are accomplishing The information herein given lla- heen obtained from foreign press reports and due to the mallY change) and experimentation that is continually taking place It may contain slight errors in organization
FRANCE
The French military doctrine is based upon a national policy that does not seek territorial expansion but desires to maintain intact what she now possesses The French visualize only one enemy-Gcrmany-her big heavily armed neighbor defeated in the World War but now determined to get back the territory and power of which she was stripped by France England and the othcr Allies therefore all their plan~ and organization are designed to stop effectively any German aUack The French defense is based upon the Mnginot Lill( an immensely strong HericR of underground forts running from the Belgian frontier to a point along the Swiss bordel If they are atacked around either flank of this line they expect to blocl the advance with a mobile defcllRe until they are roinforced by allies
8(0 CampGSS Q1UI1~tmly June 1938 page 46
7
C amp GSS Quart
The terrain of operation of the French Army is 011 ito own soil or in adjacent territory on its northern fronticr where there is an excellent r(mu 1l~t
IVlcchanizatioll is NUll ill a state of flu She has ol1e complete mechanizpd dhi-ioll OIl( ill t hI pro(t~ of formashytiun a third tentatively planllvd and a fOllrt h -u~_~(kd Her light mechanized dimiddotj oll (I )ivi-inn kgiIP 1)1(lniqlil
rgt~1L) IS orgalllz(d Hit) t f) brigulp- -110 II III FWllll 1 rhe dragolJ- jll)rttmiddotc art tlplia]clll 10 motorized illfaJltr~ Ow alP mountfmiddotd ill light trull( aile an Jlrllyidpd With traniportatioll for all pepfJllwl and lapOJl-
M(chaniztcI enalry Ulllt havp ))1onlcI that I( COlllshy
pallY lilO-t rd tilllf ear ( a h[)Jdill~~ llhloll tnd lor lOlllshymunicat ion IHlrjJrhf- 111 pn11l1 1PIHlflllY III 1 hl~l ullit i to ill(laof nl)Jiit jI1 at hI 11)(11-( nJ IH) (I I )U( 11)
the (((lIllIl rold liP II Jrlllt thh --Ilm j (l1llt --alishy[acto)y
TJw Frellch mechallizld [IJll( j it J1owlrful IHIH)1l providfd for Ihl high commalld It i d(-igllld to (If(lI dishytant and rapid ncollllaiuHt ilivolvillK combat to Olcnpy and 1loJd-1 rahgic po-il iOl p(lldin~ alrial of PI IIlop to carry out cavalry missions With increased -peed and radius of acti()f and to InPpt th( al1aek If ialgl host ill l111halllyld f~rc(1
TIl( Fnnch btditvl thaI lIH(haJlizd fO](l will play an
after a tiuccc-sful aUach Howevcl they helieve tha order to break through a strongly organized llcfcl1siyc v tion the attacker mu~t still rely Oll the mperiority of arLillllY tu Uplll the way fol IllS llliantry
Mtlhanizld ullits are lo-otiy to clIak and to main
tllll for this lltKOIl mechanizalioll ha- bClll -olely confi to till cavail) Tiw FJIlllh AnllY t rend are iowards n)(
izatlOll ralht1 tlHlll o mechanization They Illlien l armils 111u-gt1 make greater use of fl-t moving ehich-- 1 --l t lH army of till future as the largL ll my u-ld during orld Vu 1101 mccha1lizcd Jut Ilwtori-ld They t11l1l1 Il1llillIlizaLioit as lttmliyjllg to a -opeda nlLChallized f(JI~~ Thele -~eIllS to be little -ympathy wil II I hc t hOIlg-ht 01 -r 1lllIip- ill futllre war This i- (~t1itt~ lIatural as the culo IC-OUllt- III manpower an~ too great all as d to he lidl
put aside III Irance the proponent of mechanizatIOn ht not IHPIl as actIve as thoe ill otiHr cOlllltril but 011 ~ other halJd plans for motorizatioll arc very tomJrchelJ~ The lHst French thought concpivl- Owl the army l11IJ-ttmotorized a- ~)Oll a~ po---iille alld that fa-t moving llladu are Heeded to IlJclea-e the moiJility of modern fOlll r
Ihp Frellch doct rillt ~1 ill is lrtillflY takps tilt JllIl
tht iJlfalltry oeeupie-gt cJl~olidatp- and hold it
(111lt1 BRITIgt
TIll British have tltditiollall~ relicd Oil -ct IH)lII I
reinforccd by air pOll for prollcti)l1 of th( lHllllllalllL the cololllal empire She 11l- lOllll to JPg-anl till Illl lmeaJl --ea as -lOI1llw]wt hpj cl1 pllljllrty lwclthl be~
(iblaitar at till wpstlln Plltralllp and cOlltrcll 1h( ~t
ClIla ill the eal plating J1lt1 ill a faurabk jllIition (If ((HI 1111 1oul to Illdia If lightillg lIlClilS it ill prok take plaCt 011 -otne otllll lIatioll- snil Tht isualize lise of the army 011 the continlnt or lhrollghllllt the Emr (~reat Hritalll ha~ no Olle paltill1lall~ lltIll~ tratiiliOlI her pulicy is ill oppusition tu the con lriptil military --er of Continental Europe
Brit i-h lllt husiaom fol tighting machineo began IImiddot t he men who fir-t sa tallk- ill ad inll alld t hi 11lthU~Imiddotmiddot inclPtsLld after the ml-hillg attalk or Hearly luur hUllt tallk-gtat (amIJlli By till lIHI or tilt rorld Yal the Iln ~
had Uw lJl-l tallks il1lbtlllll and tlw~ had ltlc(luired dll~l ldeas of how to U-l UIlIll lIll rl~lltlllnhl( Clil and mih~ leadll afe dlfilliteiy cOfllfllilttd to till Jlolicy of mol0rrJ aJlilatioll and at IHP-lllt alilllralltl~I)attaJioll at ilolll(tt~ iJCtlll lomplL1tLly JJl()tnMllltliJanild
The Ulitih Army j- organized and trained prima a an e]editiolltlY foret III Indilllw mnt likll~ -ecn (onllilt j- 011 the lIort h t front itI ill l Illountainous 1(1 ntillly IlJl-uit(tl to mtchilll arran lOIlStIl11Plltly
IndilIl Army dots llot nquin the full nHa--llll of llwchan lion that io d(inti rill hl)JlW llllil- (u-Ill- iJltllJlllmlmiddot and Je- in Palc-tine may attain l1ch ploportiolls t (IIal Britaill l1la~ iH lomp(lI(d ttl gtPIHI til lxpllliti(lr rOlC( to PJl-Pll Onill then nriJ I h fOleig1l policy Jl
aks 1UlOlH as a vcry jlossiulp tiwatpl of war there the rain i- gcnelally suiiallIl [or mcehllliztd warfan mol(1 if a nlitish Army Pl lights 011 European soil it will pr ably be along-side of the French Army Uuder such cOC
lions the expcditionary force might (ll he top 11llY
XVIJI No 70 Mechanization
12 expeditionary force mu~t be ready vthen the need adses for this reason the immediate organization of mechanshy
d forces if considered urgent On 7 March 1938 bull Mr Chamberlin ill a -gtJ)((Lh ill the
ue of Common) designated the OiJ)ltclIVl- of Cnat ltains policies as follows
1 i 1 The protection of Greal Dritain lt The preiclvation of the trade )oul(- upon wlll(h
t hi this country depend for it food and raw f i materials
Lf~ ~ The defen-e of Britih territorIes onr-ea from ~ attacl whether by -ea land or air j 1 Cooperation in t he defen~e of tht tlrrjtoril~ of
g I allY alIie we might have in ca-c of wltl1
[ j After the Prime IiJlitcr had indicated the military olJ t j~tnt- of Creat BritalJl~ IJolicy the Secretary of State for lWllr ~lr IIole-llelisha marie it clLar that a Dritbh (Jlcdishyti4narr force in the future auld not con-i-t of a few h-stercotypcd divimiddotdon- From no 011 he -aicl there arc to
Highlanders are iJeing converted in~o machine-gun batshytalIOn and are being equipped with armored machine-gun carriers In addition thc 3d Carabinicrs and the 1721st Lancers arc being cOllcrted to light I tank units This is part or the x~htme to l(~llace the fivlt Brilih hOl-)cd regishymentH plus the eight liglil tank compahics in India by four Dritbh cavalry light tanl( regiments
III regard to tactical doctrine the Britih remember the iL~-on of the Vorld War They foresee the future possishyhilil~ of again being called upon for a military effort in Europe They vigtuaiizc a rapid moving hard ~triking force Capahl 1)[ Ixccuting- wide encircling operation or quick deCp penclrltion- into rear area They would avoid above Ill the thfenxive action and stabilized warfare of the past
Ten of the 22 cavalry reg-iments will be mechanized or lllot ()Jlzed The two-hrigade (avalry divisions of the expedishytionary force will be converted into a mobile division COTIshy
-itillg of units Rhown in Figure 2 The importallt factor regarding mechanization in the
Briti-h Army that Hhould always be kept in mind it that
I
I JoIrORF 2_Hrltllh MechanIzed Cavalry Divisioni 1
I 11
Jj 1
ll tW() typc- of diviions and variations within the typc~ e type will be a motorized division based on the light
_ chlllc gun much the Sdme as exi-tlllg dii~ion- which arc ~ eatly more than 50 per cent mutorized The other type 11 b( a mechanized armored divl-ion based on the tank -~ lfgjJj lhp hell) nwehillc-gun hattalions a proportion
the-op will Ill retained to cOJP-l troops the remainder will (f)flprtul into light machll1 _~rLln hatlalion-l and will form nuctu- of the motorized div il lU 11 0 The strength of til(
clern army 111 IIore-Belishu continucd is based not - the indiVIdual hilt rather on fire units which combine
POer and mobility Thp Hnti h HCgulal Army ill Inclil is being mechanizpl
a~middot of fallinJ-( into lint with home plutiec four Blitigth talions the 1st Royal Fusiliers the lRt Devons the hit yal Scob Fusilier and the 2d Argyll and Sutherland
according to it mission the Army will probably be fighting in conjunction with one or more continental allies-and in that case it will fUlnifh as a matter of fact the mechanized force for the allies WIth whom it may be associated
GERMANY
The mission of lilt German Army is aggressive at presshyent -Ccking aggrandizement of national territory in the direct ion of Czechos]ovalda 01 Poland By )1(1 recent annexashytion of Austria an area approximately equal to that of the stale of Maine has b((n added to her territorial limits and 11lr population has increased from 66 millions to about 74 milli()Il Th Austrian Army of 70000 Regulars and the 1nOQOO reserves are being rapidly transformed into PanshyGerman forces Her next most pressing military problem is the elimination of Czechoslovakia Traditionally the enemy of I
9
n
11
(lItlIIl 11middot1middotllrdmiddot I() JIJIf1rh hI- Ib1lI lllllOJcd dlmiddotjshy
j()n hi(h tn Iwing (middotpandld into --l The divi--ion orshy~aflildil)ll i iwlu d tIl )( t hOrll ill thl (hart (It~iglrl
L)
The (trmall tat i(al d(l(1 rillf cOllI tmplatt t ~11OIlj
swift lttplk(gt ltlhtaillVcl by llltlll)(JPJ 10 maintaill lh( (lllshy
flict in hl)-tile territ()jY Tllt-l nllehanized divi iolls arC dl-iglllmiddotd to provide a 1)1)11[111 fa~t ~t riking Itpon for --urprif 11- ill 1111 illilid tal~I- of thp ltampaig-Il Thigt mfchallizld fore( rIll ~t rib hard Pllough alld far ellough Into hol II rril()rr 10 frll tral(middot Ill (llIIllY fllohilizalioll alld dbnljil OJ( Iltlll illitial ddlhlt dbpo iliolh ill ~l1ch a
way 1 ha1 1fw -llpJlorl iJlg (frnwlI forcti ill hI ahlp tn -~curf an larly vilfIY All amplp of the -pld with vhich ((rmany IXHCt to mo( hj rnc(haniz(d force Witgt
j~iv(~n h Ihf 11~hlllillg-1ik( rapidity with which that Jl()(lshy
ful forc ol COllt(ntrai(d ill VilIl1tl la-t Match rllttchllW finllIlfl [gt1- ~ hffoj I Ill -1IlIJIjtd Tt aiiangt fluId IIllil 1)p
seimJe f)f Ao)tria (erlllany attacills great importance to the early h()llr of the val tllli Ihlllfol( lwl sllatpJ~ i- ha~ed UPOIl a war of (illiek dlli-ioll WIH1l 1Hl war machill-l
on land and air wlll vij~qr()IH)Jy st rikp (hIring the firRt days or wcelu of Uw war and inflict defeat upon the enemy
thaI (oun1ry ao shc did four years later Many haLmiddot lJ(litvl thaI ~Iu--oIiJli lt1- pr))]]Y tllatcd lJy HiUCl hen~ m ilttUti tncJ Autlia [liiall who rrmcmlJc) Caportlt Ill) love for (ermany and despitr Hitlers as-uranCe pract flifIHhhip and the promise that Brelllll --halJ fori nlllaill Ill( illvinlatp frolltiPl IJP1llll the two (ounl 1hlfI) will alwa)- IH a jllt-1 lflll ill Ihl Italian mind ao tok -llH(rity of thl--p promit-- parlklilarl~ (on--idiIW thlle are l1early thJ(C-quaricl of a million ((1111lt111 J
North(Jn Italy IUtl b V(gtly ulJHraIgtJp 10 a tlllllg -(a )()lr bl
prestIII she i --t1Ollg ill Ihe ~Iediler]llltal1 due to tilt
nus -tllJlnarine alld air ha~l that hl hl~ prepared which thnatlll thlt lift-lilll-- of bolh (Ilat Dlitain VrlIHt Silt i--lIalizt Fralltl 1- In lllg prest igp
Jat in llat iOIl nnd t lOIl) dy d(~irC to auml that
f)nlillJ~ til( la-t ItW ytalS Italy has her11 ovnomiddotinlenill
wlth major l1uits of thrp( distinct tvJC~ the divi~middotd()lI t lIP molOiizld tli i-joll and tIlt mechanized
The IHlrpuse of the fa-1t division is to make rapid movements and to arrive on time t1WlI at nated place to deploY fire power sufllcicnt to
~ _ rshy1)1ech(mizul ion C amp GSS Quart
France -hc ha- huilt a -pcfldilt1 road lwl in Uw ~olltht t especially uitable fill tlw u( of mcchanizcd force~ It i-
reliahly rCllorlcd that Hitler is rapidly [Ilrtifing- the Rhine frontier to meet tFrcl1ch attack
r The terrain of ojgterltIOll- of tIl( (prnJall Army ill fJ(gt itlitiallx at hast on gtllJ1l ()IlP of thl Iirhl)olillg llat 1011 -nil ~ Germany form(gtrly tied hy t11( IH()middotIioll~ of IhE Tnal~ if Veriilh- WlllCh 11( 1lldJatpd ill 1~)-) ha llladl IWI--plf fnl to tlqllin the m)1 mlJltrll (fjUill1llnt IllJlquipllHlJt i~ new alld n1lJl)til- all lllElIfn improtl1wnt (1Jllla~-lll
thoC nat jOlb hich hayt IlI(1I wvilJ~ alrlll It II Iheir (lId matflili -OIlIi of vjlltll tiatl lllI 101111 01111 rar Sll( itlltitlpl kIt I Ilh all ldpr~al~ --1 roJW ill arlllOfEd vfgtllic1p Th( illf1111 ry dll-illll j lqllIPIHd Illl 11 aliI itanL VIlIl- which l1 lJf ill()-t II tIl 7~ an(lrclil~ to ]Cpnrt~
TIl FIIIHh di1 IllI hamiddot 1-
ol
ITALY rt
The mission of the Italian army il for the defensc 01 it homeland and the presPlvatioll and enlargement of is colonial mpirp upun which Italy is dcpelldlllt for her Ie matpriab Slw ]ool s fOlwani to power and (xlIarl through fulul( domination of the riLditlllanCan Sea til plaeing Cl(at Brilain ill t h(s Wulll-- All invasion r (If
tIll lloll 11 t hrouglJ BnllIltl Pa-s lIa alway __ l)(c11 the up mlhl COllctln of the Italialls fully nn1tml)(gtring that ~l
til( days of Hannibal all illva~ic)lls of her oil have c Ihrouldl this --tratgic Pa--i Italy Hnttl an inc1cl Au--tria as a buffpr state uectuic Germany a~ too hig trollg a IIcighhOl fOl comfort Oll~ July llt t ll1flbiliztu troops 011 the Au~lriall Lorder to protect Aust iJl(l(JltIllt1(IlCt~ When Austrian Nazi-- ldlled ChalllCllor nol
alld (elmaiIY Was then middotmpPoiecl to he planning the seizur
10
01 XVIII No 70
mission To this end the division is composed of two rts cavalry motorcYclits and fast car~ f01 speed i portee its and artillery for fire power It is a long range recortshyissance and combat force extremely mobile and little ex-
ground or air attacks The cavalry and the cycli-Ls tiaie diJIkult terrain and fngage and hreak combat
eae The fast diVl~ion is particularly i-gttIItahle fOJ tiom in the Northern frontier he jlUlllO-C of the motorized division is to dl(jop the occlsioll demand it d very high power fire It is
-uiJlttance an infantrr riiyi-ioll transported in mo1or- IS capable of ]ong- rapid movements but at the moment of
~L tion it ieav(s it motors and fights like an oldinary divishy - Jll reinforced by a -trong mechanized echelon Naturally middotdmiddotmiddot is tied to the roach and once commilted to action it beshyI mes 11Il ordinary foot ullit and lose it- value as a Ir - echal1lzcll force
d j These two unit- opposed each other in the Italian mashyT uer- la t Augut on the plain of Venice Thfir identity Lijf doctrine and equality of forces led to a -talematC The ~ motorized diviion cut off the fa~t diviion from its base and r ~e fast division fell upon the rear of the motorized divi-ion tisblating thi- unit from the main body of ib furce~
Mechanization
The purpose of this unit is to break the enemyR line to open a gap through which other troops may penetrate and break duwn the enemys further resistance The mechanized brigade is therefore the keen edge of the pellet ratillg wedge but it can reach ib objective only when plolcrly provided with ~uppolting arlillery a~ otherwise the pnemys guns can prevent the l)li~ade from r(aching the dcfeni-ive line or at lca~t inflicting heavy loss(gt~ As the gap i~ opened units from the r(lltlr- fast motorized 01 ~elf-propeJled-sbould be llu-hed into it to calise the enemy- general collap~c leading to what Napoleon called the denouement Many Italian military I(-uler~ helieve that the mechanized hrigade -hould he termed the mechani2cd divi-ion and that it ~hould have one battalion of tOO-mm and another battalion of 105-mm and be furthe reinforced hy army artillery as the ~ituation may require
The national policyof Italy calh for a war of -hort durashytion necessary hecau~e of shortage of es-ential raW matershyiab Accordingly her strategy is based upon a quick victory hich is essential uccause her industrie canllot he mainshytained nor her people fed if the gateway to the Meditershyrnnean flOm the east and we-1 arc clolcd to hey 1n accordance with Musolinis declarations Italy evidently
MECHANIZED DIVISION
General Pariani in his final report of these maneuvers ark- thai these two new types of unit- were used to
each other but this should be comddered aR excepshyfor these unitgt arc intended for use in collaboration
obalJly a~ embled in larger unit~ Thi~ would make it Ie to make a more logical di--tribuUon of duties for t po-scssing great peed and maneuvering power
ving a combination vhich volild have great combat ngth
The mechanizcIl )rigaue (hrigaia corazzata) I as tested the maneuvers held in Sicily la~tAugustt b hOW11 in
gure lt1
Sp( cctrss Qnartcrill March 1938 page 75 tSec CampGSS Quarterly March 1938 page 71
will usc her ail force more 01 less in accordancl with Douhets theory striking terror and dlstrllction into the hostile territory She has placticcn thb type of arfare during the Ethiopian War and more recentl- in Spain and appH~ntlY helievQ in the -oundnc-h of thii- doclrin~
RUSSIA
The mision of the Rusfian Army contemplates a war against Tapan in the Far East or againt Germany or Germany and ItaJy combined ill Europc or poltsibly a war ~n the two theater at the same time The organization plan of the Red Army call Jar a lwogram of defense all two fronts thousands of miles a]lart
11
C amp GSS Quart
According to n~ports thpound Ru-sgtian Army has five dhi~ ~iom~ and nine independent brigadeN f~llly motorized and a total of from 1000 to 1000 tank motly Chritie manumiddot factured in RUiia The mcchani7pc] force aceolding to the foreign pres-- cmprics t 00 motorized tllviiuns six armored car rcg-inwllh awl (i~~hten armoJ(d car gTOlP A numocr of lImb are (quipppd with amphibian armored alrS with a mt-jmum -plImiddotd of 10 rnilp- pel hOU1 on law]
anel -(VIU mih3 jlPl hOllr Oll wat) All tlw cavalrr rlivbioJl have IHeJl proidrmiddotd with a nwCilallizLd group of thre( --quadshyr()h of ljght tank alJd al mllnd caf- lgtUt to U1I lioak of cree maillttinld it b Ilracl]cally 11l1jHJ-lhlf III glV tlw organizal ion of t hi lll(haJlild 101 CI wit h ah agtlutf (l(llracy
but tillyL -llnl II) Ill litt douhl that HII--Il i thinkingshyalong- mlchalllzld Jill~- and that probahly lthin a fp ypar- Ill rnay avlJi(vf 11111 idlraldl rntlnpIIlPllt III rnlClalllJati()ll
TIH comhat flJlIWipk flf tlH Ilrl Army tre ha--rt Oil the employment of mVChallllal lqllJjlIlWlll Todern a-tuit eapolh e-I)lcjall~ lal1k arlllllJY 1 lat lOll and mechanized force lmpJoyc(1 011 1 11n~l (alp makp IHblhle the nrganizashytil)n of a -imultalHolh attuk of Ihe tlllmy on hi entuc hattie fronl so that w may iJp jola1ld (omplptrly stlr~ rounded and dttrytd (Pal 1]2 FSR l)~G) And again the mallllIVpl alld at lark tIl Jl1lchal11zlllllllih -houlcl bc SUJlshy
r)(lrtlcl hy tiatiotl (Pdl 7 FSR 101()
thQ mechanization of tho Army of Atlantis The Grand study is attached as an appendix
In arriving at the recommendations the factors YOll
preRsed wel~e kept constantly in mind and in addi1 ion following were con~idercd
1 The tactical doctrin(~ of the five major powers r ird 1( frequently influenced by riitinctivr factor of graphy and of national Ilolicies
2 A military contlict of the future j- inconcei Without the participation of air and armorccl forces questionahly the evolution towards the machine b accentuated daily
t The incontrovcrtiuly established importance of all tion requires a speedy aggresHive and strong power ontj 1~rollJH1 to supplement and retain th( results gained fft~
aerial reconnaiHslmce and combat r1 1 The dCiCIl-livc power of the older arms is not gr~
enough to repube the attack of trong hostile armored for nor is the penetrating power mobility and speed of the o arm~ Hufficient to drive the attack sO rapidly and deeply the hotile front a to deprive the defender of uflil] tIme to taic countermeasures shy
5 Improvisations of mobile unit- have provcn to k little value as it was uornf out hy the organizatioll Of
IMECHANIZED BRIGADE
AA SshyMotorshyTank Regr Reg
Anti Ton (Mor)
cycleBerSCig(U1 FA Unit Detsco
FHLfn 1 ~ItaJln Mechanizld Hllgwic
C(j(U middotS) German cavalry in U)]middot1 A Hwift armored divIsion 4holl) organized that will form the nucleuN of t he mechanized f
1 a f-ult of Hl ahf) tudy the ChIef of Staff ~lIbshy of Atlantis in case of war a force receiving apptopriatJmitt d hh llport 10 Iht Sfcrdary of National J)cf(nsc dircctly for its improvement and dp(Jopmcnt not as a Hal dOll th CfHHlu jfJlb till StIdary ()mmIHlkatrd to Ow of any hranch hut a force to which all hranche of the se(hif Efcntiv(L1 fnIlI-
lllu-1 (ontnhutc whoc tadi and training will break (nlircly from the method that wer t hotl(ht Ul(qlllle
lJImiddotIAIltTE~T OF NATIOKAI llEIEtltSE the cavalry 01 for the infantry awl think maUers Ollt f j(UIIBLIC OF ATLAtltTIS an (ntire1y freHh basis This should ill no way )Jll(JltIf f IJfl tllJl I lll)
eavlary and t)1(gt infalltrv C)()1ll acquiring slich mcchani71 TIn (11111 EXl-CllTIVI 10 the (xtpn1 IWeeHSalY to PlUlhl( th(gte armg to bctterc J(IIlBIIC OF klfANIJS out their pregcribed tactical functions The fact that
My dear Chief mlehallizld unit tight in support of the infantry or th~
Tn (ompJiamp vlth Ollr dllfctive of 10 Aug-uHt 1938 I carries out a role onCQ filled hy cavalry is an incident11 m
1IIbmit illJ(with 111l IvComnwllciatiol1) of mv de mrtmcnt for ter
-olXVIJl No 70 Mechanization
6 This mechanized force which we shall call the Swift obstacles and road blocks and can render important service rmored Division should be used for strategic missions and as a holding force Since the infantry regiment and the field r exploitation of a success and its principal mechanized artillery regiment canH-ist of three battalion~ each aIle batshy
are the scout car and the combat car These ele- talion may be attached to each mechanized regiment in case s will be organized into three echelons rcconnaisancc that circumHtances may make it desirable to do so
~ ort and assflult The division reconnaissance unit at the disposal of the ~~~ 7 The basic principles underlying the employment of division commander give a tool of reconnaissance makingr- e Swift Armored Division are movement Burprise and unnecessttry the detachment of similar vnits from the other l---e objective It will be employltd on defensive misisons elements of the division ~ Iy in case of necessity and Ib relief from such mis-ions The obRervation Hquadron furnishes observation of the
t - ould be effected at the earliest opportunity j terrain over which the division will advance and fight will T 8 The Swift Armored Division iR eHpccially valuable inmiddotr furnih battle reconnaissance and lay if necessary smoke ~ ruil and delaying action Its great mobility and tire ltcrCCIlS to blind or deceive the enemy The attack aviation ~ - wcr enables it to operate on a broad front to beat the which will always be avaBable for attachment can render ~1 - emy to defiles and other critical localities to carry out great altli~tance by aUacking thoRe objectives which cannot I dt~truction on the enemy route of advance or retreat to
strike the enemy in flank or rear or to deliver repeated g- attackgt against his flanks Jr 1 9_ The Swift Armored Divi-liull is especially adapted to C it In an envelopment or turning movement and in the exshy -~ llatlon of a breakthrough The most important factor to IL con~idered in this type of operations is the terrain and itL bull
wl be the mi-sion of the reconn~lt~ance echelon to rlconshy~1iter and ~eize faorablc terrain for the action of mrchall shyt iud chiclegt From this favorable terrain the $upport echcshy
lolt ahb the attack of the asault echelon and occupie- the ObJcctIHgt ~(curcd uy the laHer Thus the $upport echelon become the ~JlringiJ()arJ from which the u--ault echelon ntkc It Iucccssive bounds to gain the ultImate objective
lU Since there arc three echelon- the Swift Armored Dh jlOll -hould huyc three typc~ of mechanized vchicles fat -[out and or light armored cars medium combat vehishyde~ 1Ild lombat vchicle-- of a heavier type which will take carl of the three different phacs of battle reconnaissance de L]opment for comLat and attack The reconnaissance eiEnltnt of the mobile division -yill cover the uhision anti _~llctrate or outflallk the enemys -creen This echelon will tbti rClllfoned by the support echelon to develoll the cncmy~
fcnle dbpoitlOll- and gain a suitable terrain from whichf attac~ finally the assault ((helon comprising th( mast-
f the dVhlOllS mcchal1lzed force vIll be launched by sllr shyill I~e and in several waves ag~linst the enemys front 01 f nk 111 order to gain a deciive -llCC(-S ~ 11 ATLANTIS has a large seacoast to defend and a highlyr
bull bIle force like the Swift Armored Division viii be exshy1ely valuable as a mechanized general reerve capable of hing any threatened locality in a comparatively short
Thi strong reerve centrally located in rear of strashy~ections of our coa~t can meet the enemy at any point Wide World Photo
e a hostile landing is attempted_ Gelman eombat cars on the march in Austria_ It is believed that the propooed Swift Armored Divimiddot
n (Figure 5) is suitable to carry out all these missions and be fired upon by the artillery Its objectives will be thereshyparticularly adapted to the terrain of operation~ where it fore hostile antitank weapons hostile artillery and reserves II be employed_ It i~ a well balanced homogeneous unit beyond range of our own artillery 01 which may be unknown elements of which have the Rame rate of march to the artillery
13 Thc three mechanized regiments constitute the Attack aviation may be the only means available to the cleu of the fighting force which supported by motorized enemy against a Rurprise attack o( the mobile division howshyantrYt artillery and aviation posesses speed mobility and ever bombing must be used because the effect of aerial
ock action it i-l in short a modern weapon of llronounced machinc~gun tire against fast moving armored vehicles can iking puwer The Bupporting motorized infantry will be discarded It is important therefore that the Swift der valuable assistance in clearing defiles of hostile troops Armored Division be provided with antiaircraft defense
t 13
11 pI (IdJl1l tlv( iIdlllhltmiddot fOl alLHhnHl1t
j(um 5-S~lfl Armored Vivl1ior) of Atlanli
Ji~ch(riz(tion
Th S lft lIllo)ld i)lJ-jllll nlll-t hl lharaltlri7fd h~ high JIlflhdil trahieal lOd Htltai --Impii(itr and flexishybility 4IIJJJllJl nqlljr~ thal oldy ltmiddot llltial (jellllllt-gt be ill shy
cilllti(d It nqllllt a 1 iJtldHced -llf-ngt]iall1 nrg-aniza1io) which h withill it If lillllllan tOI)llomt oll1el( that will hi (ltOllnllJfd dlllllW tilt adVilllt E and ill tIll hlLtlltJltld Tid llqlllli til (IWIIHlj Hllit incI it i Itiltpd that
d dfmil II Iii l)d dJt((jmiddot or t1 kind IIIit ll (d ttl til 1(gtlll
It r J 1
l~ldl() I 11U1l11llcIlJlll J-- 1 -1111 ial to tlw COllllllOllld and hI I I till t t ~iJtld lill 1-- Illtlar
~illlldllll lllay Ill lllIlltl h~ limitailOll-- oj tlIcils to 1((-1 ll~-Jld( lPI~ (l1ll1Iat ear- -i1flllld hl ~qll1ppld 11111111t 1 II Iii llll 1hi I clllia11Ilg prolurtment 1rUJllllg
lltl (llllllll Ill]] uppl~middot
FI(11J1111 11 qUI] t Ill tllgtljt1I()ll lhal ill lHllllit Ill( t[ 11l1l1l1 lt111]( I dlll~ Il h d llwtori-ld Illfantl~middot airshy
r~(1 and 111J fur ~jllllal operatIOns til a addItional -IIP])Ii 1]H] 11 Jidlll 1)(1(1
Tlli qlIh t LdhI- 1hat nJtThallJlcd fOlLt- 1re nut OJlly
1111 Indo ) ] ~Illl lll nd J( (- ~aly lot he arlll~ of AI LA -11- Lll 111t 11wll I (d Jfll iii hI falilitai1d for the folJOing
c amp GSS Quart
1 The domestic facilities for the manufacture of mored vehicles in Atlantis is UllilUlpasscd oy aJlY lIat10 the world l11dwtrial material scientific and tillar leoUILI1S an mol( than ample to pruduce and rnaintan lHel~4aly lquipnwlll
2 It ha ht11 loaid that oil will domillate the H(xt q
a1 and that it is (veil more importallt than mUllitioll~il mell to mock Ill lig-ht illg lIl1it- Atlantis has an ovcrhelnj uivalltage 011 hpIside Napoleol1- armlPs moved on tJ
-omaeh- hut thl nlllliPlll motorizld and Il1lLhanizld anl JllOVl Oil gasolilll The (Clman highly motorized I nHchalliztl army had comdderahle dillkultie~ ill it- mr (Ill VipllIla alld it j said that a ian-e portion of tl1P mel) iZld and motorizpc lin it (rt I(ft 1ralldetl Oil the load~i IllVI1 saw Au-triHll -011 The Fnllch General Staff wri Arllo J)ogth-IIfIllol ha- iig-Ulld out that the oil neel motor alld Idnieatillg oil-of modern armie~ navies ane IllPt- i- -0 glcat that ill the event of war the tIlmali Europl fOI war purpo-(gt alone would be nearly th1l( t iuropl (llUre peacetime nced-- Germany is --UPpJIllg
pIf today from coal J1lo-11y low grade coal and Iiglll millioll tOll of fUlj a year But in till vent uf war til Ollly a Ira(t iOll of 1Jc oil lhal (prmallY will Jllld fOT
lannil- Shortagp of oil will paralmiddotzc tho-l nlOtorizedj Dllcilanizlcl force Thl la-t harrLl uf oil of a iJlilagu army will be as dramatic as Ow last eartridgr
~ Tlw (hmand for gltatlr S1Jlld alld mohillly h il anonl with Atlantis plan of llat jOllal defeJlsC a plan ~f 011 a -mall highly lliilitnt fOlll The citizens of Atlantl t hOlotlghly accllstomed to the li-e of mechanical devicl-t havp a larger Ilumb(r (If TIWChallllS t han allY otlw) Hatil
the world lIemiKls of Parliament apprlciatl the nll1 Jighting macilille- n~logllizl the lllcd- of a well (qUI) mmiern mechanized furle so that a~ an entirely iluh dent entity it wiJllJe ill a favoraLle position whell thel lome to grant the nCl(~~arr funds
4 Fighting nwdlinc-gt -uit the natIOnal eharader of thL dtizells of Atlallti~ They appeal ttl 11wir dL--irf (lllrgl1 ic and -ift dCd~i()ll
g SecretaIll XatioJal VI
SerVice Ur7lts and
TrClns~ ~pPorting AUXIII
-~
01 XVIII No 70 Mechanization
The authol~ have cnd((lVOled to prltClcJli in thi -ludy a alanced mechalli~crl force of -trong fire lower great mobilshy and heavy hock action inuepemlent in organilatioll a rce pertaining to no one blanch On tlch a cOlltlOvcl-ial bject it can hardly be cpccted thai thtlC will be unanimshy
o( atrcenwnt Thh gcnelltli lndy i IIllSlntcd a thl
ba-ih of dicllt)-)ion of a problem the sathiactory solution of which -)hould be under constant discussion The mission of thi publication will have been fulfilled if thi~ ~l-ticle serves to inspire vigorou~ thought on one of the most widely disshycU-ised subjects that is occupying the minds of the most brillianl mi1il~lry leader~ in the world today
)
fn ~(lmc c()untrie- of th( orIel man is held ~hlJap In
the lInited Hiate on the other hanel e have the utrongtt
re-ped for human lifl C()n~equcntl~middot in our national
tlefcn~l program of today e have placed great emphasis upon equipment ~upply and transportation We have de CiOPld an autoJ1loth e program which looks tnward an
alm~ Oil whcel hich ill Oplrate more -lileedily fight more eflicicntly and -mlTer le~~ ~cyelcly than our military forces of ~ c~terday
~middot1lt~isflllit Seci efury vf Irar Louis Johnsu
c S Ir COnI Photo TIlII d ~1i14 1 III AntilllCItft tI(4)]h
15
Military News Around the World By ~lJOI( E -1 BENJTJ~Z CAC
I TIl( gaolilw Ijt~l lllrdlJr alld til adaptatlHIl of arnw if ll machllll 1Ia t [Ot1 Imiddotd a wOlld-widt dllmiddotjI)Pllllllt of
nHlilaJJizati()fl anti l1l()iorill1iolJ Japalll~( lall]-gt rllllhlillj~
through Chilll arillond (II IUII11HriIW tllrolwh rtllllld tfJwn in SPltlill ((rllltlIlY PaIl1tr dimiddotj j()l and ((cl1oshyovakia IlVdltlllt d llllit lll[ll(I(Ilillj III llllmic wal IrancE dlplayi1Wmiddot It n1lLhlI11lld IIllit It t hl rtlTIlI mill aI rcyipv in hOllllr IJf the nril hh -Ilrlirll Italy Tl1otn-n1lch llliz(d fon J (middotill l ill) III 1lit J)(Ji()111111 p- JJd Sicily and melilallizld Cl al r IIn1- lei Ill I ron lqr-- pract iti Ill the -Iifl Jmpla(al~l a--anlt 11J(j Ill( world II) 111(( t hat war l1laChllll-gt 111 Il tl-d III Ill 1111111 011 bljIl -lt1t than h~lI hitlwllli jill kllll III 1(1 01 Plllllt a1-
Thee molhilli m()l III jcI()lllH alld tlwllforl tho-gtl (fllIlltli( whiih han Ill l1lllI01 til nrld 011 lPllur(p III ha( til ()PImiddot]nlllJg 1IlIl1lgP ffll thPll idt It -fpm apprnpnll 1lt1 lIHI liJ II1ld- nil production a- ginll iwio
Tht olln ill) WIl) from Illlvrllatlllllal 1troll1l1l1 f rlfl(middot 01 I 11 L hl IIlI Illltt1111lllJ pJncliHIl 01
) t rolltlm III Ih 111ld dll nllt I hi 11 1~I~~l 1~l~G alld 1~Jrl
0
IRON
0 COAL
B OIL
111l11 (ud
lugh )LSUl tu establish themjcs The dlcnmiddotfi IflpctiYl 1 Odober ID~8 and i- H111kr~toud to have Ii i drawn il(tltlu-( or Ilw L1at nnmiJ(l of Cllltlal ilIlOPf j dlilill)( to (111(1 Argentina ~
11 -1 111gt
I [1lt ((I (t (
II rJIrjIHI bullbull 1)1 111 lhflJ7hll
I 1 ~td IilII IFI iIIIIh7
- ( llll 1 2 11 III jih
11-lj 11 1 -dIlI f)
bullfr- -111 j)l 1iIJJ
t rldJ( ildl 17171
IIll~l)i h lrj-
1 lt0 1111 lIli
1j bullbull Jjjjnl
i JrIl 2111 1 7 1 I Ill
(11 J~I-l I I h7
[r li)I) 17iJ1i r)Iill J 1117 iJl jjtji
1Idr 7i I I)-
BiI bull ILl II))
middot1gt 11 )(r dtdl(
11 )7
(11
I Id
jllll IJ1n j1 11011
(gt10 li)l 102 h
lIn JUt I
~ I ~ h7111 I
i 7lt7-11
n If)7)
~ 1 1217(i
middot1()117
I 7 mWi
I(J fII
III 17 Hi7
(JIi ]n2W
III 2111
122
1
2) BELGIlDl p~
Bplgiulll i NUllOtllllled by lIeighhol~ po~sl~sillg- hug( anwtda- ald C()Il-lqt1llltl~ S1( fllrs ti1( ruin of cit ies If
I COll(- This explains wily the lklgilll gOYllnmenl lod working ipvprishly to protlct the ciilian populatioll ag~
III air attacks n) According to reports air raid shelters already havel
11K cOl1structfd ill many Belgian cities Some shaped like hivIo (til u(ommodatl ~o p l~()l1- A few call hold a~
III a 700 011w) shrlters have hlell built in unciergll ((liars Ail raid alarms are carritd out on Sunda) HllIstOnl tIll Illopl awl training lhl inhaliitant- fOlair l)fC(aulions
(f7111fra r
1l0llVIA
A n_f(middotntillil ha (kcll(d iIL barriers agaiIl~t r()reig-ner~ A century old dillille belween Bolivia and Para~ to 1-1)]( (lp(1 ivp innnirrat iOIl prpjprallly of farnllr with which has lttlSlU much hloodsl1Ld over a boundary in
Hi
the terms of the treaty of peace friendship and the 100000 square miles of Chaco jungle and
will be divided Paraguay which held the upper hen hostilities ended will get most of the wilderneg is assured a free port on the upper Paraguay River
her access to the sea
BRAZIL
All branches of the petroleum industry of Brazil were nationalized by decree-law a35 of 2a April1938 The supshy
N eW8 Around the Worid
The winners of six engineering scholarships annually granted by W R Grace and Company in collaboration with the General Electric Company to university students of Peru and Chile were announced last March The scholarshyships were fint awarded ill1937 to Chilean graduate stushydents ard the re~ults according to the donors have been mORt successful
CHINA
Anking captured 13 June was the ninth Chinese proshyvincial capital to fall to Japanese armies since the undeclared war on China started on 7 July last year There are still fifteen unconquered
I n the order of their capture the other conquered capishytals are Kalgan Chahar Province Paoting Mope j Kweisui~ Suiyan Taiyua11 Shansi Chinkiang Kiangsu Hangchow rhckiang Tsinan Shantung and Kaifeng Honan
Nanking the nationa1 capital was captured on 13 December
phing of petroleum is made a public utility which means tHat the production importation transportation and sale of
de petroleum and its derivatives and the refining of imshyrted petroleum are subject to regulation by the Federal vernment All refineries of national or imported petroshym must be owned and operated by native Brazilians and
t e percentage of foreig~ employees may not exceed that ablished by the general law on this subject
BULGARIA
Bulgarias old enemies the Allied powers of the World ar choru-ed approval of Balkan action freeing- Bulgaria
m postvar treatv restrIctions on armaments and armies At the same ti~e there appeared to be no bar to similar
lion by Hungary the only nation still nominally bound by re~triction-1 imposed by the victorious Allies Other of the wartime central powers-Germany alld
rkey-already have thrown off reannament bonds
Chinese Commumcatiom through French Indo-China
Now that the Japanese are making serious efforts to cut off the Canton-Hankow railway the Chinese are reshydoubling their efforts in Yunnan Province in order to have an emergency gate of communications with the outside world Plans have already been made for the improvement of all highways leading to Kunming the construction of a new highway to connect Kunming with one of the railways in Burma and the repair and extension of the highway to Sinkiang Yunnan will be therefore the new keypoint of Chinas communications with the outside world should the Japanese succeed in cutting off the Canton-Hankow railway which ha~ been the main supply line of the Chinese armies
I (Ncw York Timcs 7 August 1938)
COLOMBIA
One of the worst aviation disasters of modern times occurred at Bogota Colombia on Sunday 24 June 1938
17
Mili~hrll News Around the World c amp GBB Quart
when a stunting plane crlgthed into a rci(middot in~~ -taml killingshy35 peron- and injuring mo( than 100 Pnidcllt Alfollo Lopez and Preident-ellct Eduardo Hauto who wpre rcYicwshying the military c-llliJlt Htll WpJP Ilnhurt
(OST mc Th (hif( (-pnrh ill 117 pre hanana cacao and
turrCl The Clltci -tal (plt lriLtlll alld (PJlllall~ ill
the ordd Jlanwd li 1 hI Cillmiddotr IH1Jcha middotr flf ((jta Hilall prl)(twt whilt tIl l1l1t((j Stttl (lrmlll IuILtp11l Inlll lIppl~irlJ~ 1Il1prll t
nB
Thl~ (uhall IJ (rITllIIJ 1()]ItIT(d Ulqll la lIl Alldr
)ummpr Hnwlttn thl ()rd] f)f (middottrlo 1tI111I dE middotmiddotmiddot pldlmiddot
(uba~ hiJilelt)1J1llqrlat AUVIl- Thll- If) (tJ- afttr till fgtVPllt dill Cllbfl hf))lltlr 1hi iJPl1) who canlld till llHWl tJ (arcia It wa- all ())11 J1l(--agt from Pn-idlll rcIinll~shy
tf) (Illeral Callfq (tlrl]l IIadll nf tlw (l1lJall ill-ulg-(nt mquirillf- ahout tIlt --trltwth of tlw (l1)lll fnlTI that wln
I (ol1ahJrdl llh thll- -- rlll~ lllligiltlJl) tilt -pllliard-shyill (uiJa
CZICIOlo 11
Hld H rII [v
rimiddotmiddoth ] lkltn Utd) [) PdlII th cj)Ut of PIl~lt
Accordillg to n]lf)rt the (zlch deflll-c sy-tpm ]- iJalteci on a t ripif ring of fort fi(middotld (()()ed with barhed wire and mif1ld rouh alld iJridVI fhl Jirt lilH dinTh on the lordptmiddot 1- -tarltd -Oll) --1(1) (u- WIl Sill( t he anllexashy
tion f Athtria tlll Jillf ha IJff1l (-tpIHjpd -0 that J]OW It (()VPl- 1ill Illlgt h of fhl (Jrnall fJoll11f1
AlJotlt ~o mill-- iJlhiJld lhf fir--t lillP h a -PCOJlfJ lttriJlg of forf ifiratils Thi h t hI 1-gt1 rOllgl-j r t hI t 11111 alld j lw OIW the zfdb arp c1tclmilltd tf hold
rt aplwars to lw ttl( inknt if) or ttl army In dt~t 10 jill
Skoda munitiolls W01k- at Pilslll and tlalsft~ the emplomiddotycc- most ()f whom arc (t(c hi to ~hadow faciorir- which haVe been huill in Sinvalda
The army thin)ci II (all han IOOOO()() nalI tinder arms ilL the (IHI of a week all defellding the second line each
equipped with a subwmachinc gun for no Czech sol carries the ordinary rifle
The third line is around Prague about 15 miles f lh eill limih II will ) defended al all costs but go nWllf officials will moVe to Kaschau in Slovakia
This war-bolll republic which fears dismcmbcrmen Ihe hands of (crmanl has iucd eeral military det r((ntly t(gtIIlt1inv to strCllgthell hClnational defense C PlIj-Ol military training- wa- slPcified for all children 0
( wit h 1 hr (x((pt jon of tllO-C who norlllaJl~ woulc11w exe from phy-ical j raining Boys not attemling ~chool are quircd lIoW to devote 70 hour- annually to military trairJ ulltil tlHY arc 17 a1ld Lhcl(aflll no hour annually until 7
plltp] military selvicp (irl- must dplotc 10 hours annu~ io filt aid and air defense training nntil tll( ag-c of 21t thJaft(rW hours annually unfilthc age of 10
011 JUII ~ th (zlth()~l()vakian J-(I)vclnment deershythat all motion-pictun hou~egt mll~t be equipped with ll1a-I~ for pa11f)1l~ and (mploYfegt within a month lJ JloJicL will allot gagt rnagtk quotas on the basis of the -eati t[padtip- of the nation- theatres
TlEN~IARK ~ I
Thr 1hird of t h( nw submarille tIllder construction the Royal Dallish Navy has heen launched recently t~gt~ christellld th( Iavfreun It cli places about l~lO tons it~ an armament of five 18 torpedo tuhps nne ~-lIlch gUlH
t
two lG-illch antiaircraft Hapons 1
1))mXICAN REIIBLIC
Oll ~7 Fpbrllar ID~8 the IlldepclHlCl1c( Day of f l)oJ11iniran Rplublic Plgtmiddotddcllt Trujillo ple-tlltcd tOi 1 National Congress the account of hi~ admilllstratioll forf i Ptl 1f)~7 ( HLvtlIue- loJ 11~7 Illwd a tntal of ~11)61868l i~ IlllTLa-e of $7lOGOO ocr the pilllding- year The prini~ c()l1ullodilil- (xporltd Wlie stll(ar cacao cofTfl tohacco (orn 1
T
EctlAIlOIt
Fronti(r clashes between Ecuador and Peru OCCUlTto ~
Jlllll ~ in tIll Napo ngtgioll ()lr which hoth llatiolls cLr sovr(Jvn1v Delegates of the two llati(lll~ have Leen mN ill Va-hinglon since Sepilmhel W 1)~6 ill an eTort tO~i amicahly t hi old houllclalY qtlst 1011 1 hut their fl (onfplPllCf-l have so far ploduCld no ~Oll1tiOll to the la1ld division prohPJ11 It is hpiipv(fl htlI(l 1hat a f snilltio1l1o 1his (1I1Pstjoll illl)( fOUlHI
FINLAND
The 1T40 In(ernational Olympic Games will be held lI(~lsingfOlt- capital of Finland
8
PERU
FRAICE
The French allti Portugllc-c go(~rnments have reached liccord giving Fra1~CLl the right to u-e the AzorC Islands the Atlantic ocean a a iallllinJ IM-C for a French North
tlantic ~viation fcrvicc The United Staies Great Britain and Germany all have
ffceivrel permilsion from Portugal to llSC ihe Azores for ~OPo(d trans-Atlantic Iinc
j
On June 14 the French cahinet an110unced it had opted a decree increa~ing the number of oflicers and men e third large increase in France armed forces within
t
j
News Around the World
three month~ In additon to a reneval of recruiting of an unannounced number of Holdier~ for the Regular Army prepshyarations were made to take 4000 captain and lieutenants from the reserve forces
The French army now 800000 -)tron~ i-) expected to reach 900000 by the last of this year In l)1O it is to be 1000000 the figure at which it wiII be -tabilized unless the llle-cnt two-year term of CltJnllHlbury elvice i-) increased
A measure to consctipt the entire nation in war time Wa approved by Parliament 011 J1lIH 17 Thi bill was originally introduced in 1J23 and it wa- talen off the shelf thi) year owing- to the war scare created by the German annexation of Austria and the German threat to Czechoshyslovakia It was rushed through thc Senate and approved with some amendmpnts by the Chamber on thc same day This hill provides for mobilization of all the national forces in time of war as well as for coordination of war preparashytiolls in time of JHalC The enUre population men and womshyen alike ill he concripted fOl zome kind of work in the event of war and all profits arising from production of munitions and war materiab are to he nationalized
An oreIer was placed on July 6th for 1750000 gas mask to be distributed free to Paris resident The funds for the purchase of the masks were advanced iJy the city but it will be refunded by the national government elt some later date
The French Foreign otncc disclo-ed on July 1 the occushypatioll of the strategic Parace I-iand) in the South (hina
FrUlCC neeup Pm 1((gt1 hand
Sea h(1e French and Japanese interest cla~h and neal thE sea ]wes between Great Britains Far Eas1 olltpost~ HOllg~ kong and Singapore Allhough only a group of coral reefs their sLrltegic importallce is rated high as thty would serve as excellent seaplane bases in event of wtr They lie 150 miles southeast of lIainan and 250 miles east of Tourane
I
19
News Arollnd the World CampGSS
d
0111 of hI prillllpd port 01 1 hE l-I(Jn loa-1 of French Jndo-(hllll
IfilluJto titmiddot dlcpl hat )111l llllrlp~ although (IW-(middot tliwr1ll(1l bt nlted IhlJ1l fl)r glHPraioHs in -parch of turtil and Jird lllh lcconling to French rf)lf)ri j H~ir on Ilpatioll wa t akpf a- a llrtCltlutiul1 iII the eVCnt or Japancle eizurc of Haman
Lat TUll Fra1lce alJd Endalld toasted th(ll 1Hrff(f prlltHII a Pari (middotJllhlbla-ll1ally j~ll(itl King (lOn~p ami
(llllfll ElizaiHlh BritaIll and FraTl~e took this Qcca-ioJ1 to alll))lnc tf) tI orld-- CIHclally Home and Berlin-that thir allianCf wa l)1rml111rll and lllbnaJabJr As IiIlg
(Ofg1 (xpnl~(middotd It our n~Jal iJJh hav(gt IHVPI IKPIl mol( illlimat
FralJfp parndld I1Pr lTIllltary power for the Briti-h middotHPpivn King rrnrgp and OUfPll Elild)(th drovr hrshytWflllllJlI of modn FrPIHmiddoth lallk~ ill tlw ollleial pr()l(-~ioll
in Parilt on TlH~dat lI JlllW a1(1 on Thur-lday a military nvipmiddot Va -Itag(middotd ill fHir hOlor at Vrai11~ ill which 0000 men participated
AC(flniing- to Prflti rpport 1hr French Governmrni is (middottHhiriflring tll( 1Ill of I~f)und camouflage to deceive the
lllemy hy imitating the noise of gunfire troops in the march throug-h loud spCakels
HLe camouflage sonore may be adapted to tcl iUll in ordtl to lI(ctlngt the entmr and lttan I Joud spPlkers will carry t he Round of lnoying trains iIlg infant ry fumbinv f nlCks~all snl1-ltsting a troop movement Vhlt (lHmy troops art hpingshymCft this thJ(gttf it 1taJ afllck may ht JaUll1wd el4C
GERlIIANY
Now that German border fortifications are aI11Ht1 aJ)(lVP th( ~rOllll(I tlw Gtrman goP1nH1lmt prorlamation on W Jul~r dcelaring- the entire we-itern a eiosrd ana which noborl may (l1lr without oflkiaJ idpnt ilicatioll pallPI4
Ill ciosltd area (forlified area) is between 50 miles wide and incltlde~ the Netherlands Belgian hOI1 n6nn French and Swis~ rronti(ls
Germany haR adopted a flexible system of which taking advantage of natural stlonlOIOlltls several Unes of fortified points with strong rtoru~
20
M ilitar News Around the World
heavy gllllS tank troop- and bathed wire Eniangie-
The Germans beliee that the French Maginat Line is rigid already outdated alld aisert that it can be broken
The German flying boat Nordmeer was catapulted from the deck of her mother ship off the Azores 21 July and landed in New York in 17 hours and 42 minutes later after a nonstop flight of 2a97 mile~ The ship carried a crew of four men th( pilot the co-pilot radio operator and flight
GRItAT BRITAIN
ar Secretary Horc-Belisha announced recently lower retIrement ageH and higher retirement pay for the army 1110 than 2000 officers will be promoted 1 August The S(cretary abo promised speedy action on plans for evacuatshyillg Londoll and other cities in the event of war
The term British Empire is obsolete There is now a Brlti~h Commonwealth of N-ations Canada Australia New Zealand South Africa Newfoundland and Ireland are equal) in law with England India and Southern Rhodesia also have the statu~ of dominions fn foreign affairs
The Dominions of Canada and South Africa are full member states of the League of Nations If England were involved in a war the dominions through their elected parliashyments would decide whether to intervene or not They could in theory remain neutral
Beginning the 1938 seneb of survey flight acrOss th2 Atlantic the British pick-a-back plane Mercury took off from it mother hip off Foynes Ireland 20 July and landed in New York 25 hours later The ship carried only a twoshyman crew the pilot navigator and the radio operator
The Air Ministry has announced recently the formation of three Balloon Barrage Squadrons for the defense of Lonshydon and it environs Eventually there will be seven Each quadran will have between 40 and 50 balloons about 500 being required for LOl1don
The object of the barrage as is generally well known is to force enemy aircraft to a height at which they can be effectually dealt with by airelaft and antiaircraft guns Being moored to motor trucks the balloon barrage can be quickly towed to any threatened nrNl and constitutes a mobile barrier
The antiaircraft defeme of London according to a bleech made in May 1918 by MI HOle-BeliRha had a
21
~ ~ shy
lfilita11 Nelcs Around the WOOld C amp GSS Quart
-tllllgtll 011 -Iay 1 Et)6 (If )7S0 nHitcl- and nWJl On May 1 1~)t) it Wltl-- ~~)tlli and tlt PIP-Pllt is 0tr that llumber
II ~I 1- If ~ I I ~IJ )ly l~)U)
111 JUJle JlJ ill S(tjll Flo lilt T qf the (lrman lIojlllial jhlltimiddot llIj1 (rr)~- l KllrtUlt ()jllllld the va[l-
tJ~l Iltcl It 1 1J)l n Illlll than tW(llty (~rman hip llltllllld thl IJllljth IIlIlh o Ill arnll-t( whlth loyal HI) -Jn 1 Ill jdllllll rttbj thall (1 tIl(gt nt+~ J1l t1
th Alii For 11l11Ij1(Il al tllb hajjl(hl]ll~ III till mud It Ihl hottOl nl Ill ~I )111 11J (I(gtat Brlt-ull 1llIb -crap lIll jill ]11 r TIlWhllll~ tlld tilt I)IJ~ 1Ltlpilip h[- h(til
rt 111 IIII 1hi ~ljIll I
11]IJrHw11 IIill (r- Vdl old thrdlr l)lrallll tlw lir shylrl~lrlllll Ilj IrrLllld 1lll1ir tll 11( (ol~lilqljlll 111 a lInl 11lli (nm(lll~ al J )Illllll ( tl~ll( qll 2-) T111l1 In- I a P)n(-tshy
tlli f 110 apJldlttli I) JI~(-~l t hp (Il11tldlnC( III i)I) 11 Irt]alld
(lld flrlhllll 111middot111ld Dritl h ]1)111- ~latljllld at f()]llkd lrJ--h Jlllrt i111w
I ]dl(Id h r]l~h -lei]11 llld it h llIHi(middot]-lll1ld thaI IH
IrllJl~ Jll 111 IIl~ttlll d l- ~llll III tlH~I ftlrllllc1I1111b ll
fl 1 Id t ~ (lid
----I DAMASCUS
o
AI
Serious riots between A rabs and Jcw- the WOllt-lt ~r
1~)6 have recently occurred in Palc~tilw Iain trol1lJle~~ ise ClC IIaHa chicI porl of Palestine and terminu~ of theJ-i- rpE
oil pipe linc Jerusalem amI Jaffa Report- t(l1 of the tratilill into thtgt Jloly Land of Tlall-jorltlanian Arabs to~ an 1111il fdlow 1ralgts of PallitiJll ill the strug-g-Ic againstt Id 1 Tews tlld (]llt Britain
Ju-t a Y(tlr ago without prIOr publie dehate and win Igo Clllbulling- Hw vishcs oj itilll Alab~ or Jew~ the Bri iJ 11Iprnmtnt adopted it plan for a tnpartittmiddot partition Pa-tilw Tlw 1Ioly Land Wagt to be dividtgtd into a 1 j jpl-h -11 It all ilah tate ufJi1ld with Trltlnlt-jordaniac i 1 lrJtbh 1l1lluIldt 0(1 01(gt hoI pla(p-i with a lorrid)1 it~ j
J(ru~ai(m to tlw -)(a It ha- Jlot hell Jlo~sibk to putJhpa palllllto dfll tlw plan prOVIng- to he er~ ulJPopularitO)rm rtll fIWS alld Arahs due t
thrif (HEECE wcnk
gDme The torpedo boat (corgt I built uy Yarrow and (
]lallY wa~ laulldwd 011 ~ March 11 ha a -pccd of if) t
kW)j ii di pJatmiddotn1PJlt of ljO tUH- and il-- armament isl of rOIl 7-1I1th j(tln- G or 7 antiaircraft mach11lq ltllH1cighl 2J-in(11 tflll)do tuhe
(l _ r X(It IIlttltllC llI(UrlUlJf lui) ]Jfny lttient Mexi seate
i lesolutlOll of ~K JalHlalY InHl 1iXllt1 180 lW--Ogt I
of a qlwtzai) pCI da~ a- till minimum agl for lab0middot~ (hracelos) engag-td ill agricultural ork
hensi depri
HAITI roigh
TIll minimum wago of (mployeo aH1 tidY laborer ~~st public ~lrvices III Haiti (nut incl~lding paid ~lomr~tic ftd~p~ tnb) h to be 1[)O g-ourdl- Jlel day alHllt ~halllJ()t hell~Jj to atiaciInwnt J)yond Olll-ttllth of it~ total aecon1ingJ3G law ur to Al1gu~t 1~)~H not more than one-third of the~~ 0
salary of salaried ll1ployc(~ and clprl i~ liahle to a~~
[)lent llJdi (nllldw of the [all 1))I liJIIIliioll Tul~~~re
ITALY IIc ()n til( ollasioll of Hitlers hit to Ital lat 1lu ~ n
olli-lher lhoIJach1lt pnhlhwd a Inilf ~lle(Jllllt ~f ~j nt italIan A Irll
Allordillg to 1hat pllllhcal io]) Ilw Jl aJiln Army 1~ _f4 (quipped diseiplilHgtd and trailltd it lla- all rffretiv( fur 2O()()() llHlI it is all army cnnlpowd oC cadn-l willct hrought up til ~1nllgth dllrJllg (lrtaill periods of they~-It cornprisc~ middot1 Army (roups 15 arm~ corps ~4 infrl~
divhi [j 1llgt1I1l1aill diviioll 1 fast divisions 2 motD U divisions and ~tv(nd independent mechanized brignde~ lli
this should he added the armand corp- -qlCdal troop J
can raise all army of ~OOOOOO mrll IJ( li
22
Military News Around the World
The Colonial army in Lybia and Eastern Africa cornshyises 100000 men- hite and lolored of this number two rps are stationed in Lybia
The mission of the Italian Army i~ to protect the EuroshynJrontiers and safeguard the Italian intere-t- ill North
d East Africa ~ The Italian Air Force b a highly tlailleU unit COlhiishy
ibg of from 60000 to 70000 meni
JAPAN
La~t July thegt Tapane-e Cabinet recommended that jflpan lthdraw its 11lltatlOl1 to hold the 1910 International OlympIC Game in Tohyo The Cabinets move wa probably d1c to the co-tly tr ill rhina the Ilccl-middotdty for national thrJi and the helief thlt tIll Japane-e pit-it would be weahcncd hy the lIlternatiollai ~IJlrit of the Olympics The ~mei will be held at IIeblllgfor- the capital of FlIlland
~IEXICO
A lontleal firm the Canadian Car anti Foundry Comshy~11 hugt entered into contract with the Mexican governshyaient for the COlltructlOn of aircraft in the military shops of M(ICO CIty 10 tralllll1g machl1lcgt and 40 military tmiddotoshy3elter having been agreed to as an Initial order
(Unitul SI I tlCC~ He I II II)
-ETHERLANDS
Lipan military campaign in China has aroused appreshy~ell~Ion ll1 Netherland India If open warfare happened to ieprire the Japanese of the American supply of oil Japan mght pUh south toward the rich fitorc of fuel in the Dutch 8nt IndIcs ~ Xetherland is creating a big fleet of heavy bombers orpulo craft and mine layers The army ~trength laudgt at about 40000 (32000 in l~36) Two tlivisionfi thoroughly equipped could be put nto actlOn1 There are now about 7000 Japanese in Netherland iqdia There are 1200000 Chinee of whom around 700000 iVere born in China
The Dutch Army is to be increased by 7000 men and ~o~e who ere due for return to civtllife la~t March have ~n retained and ~ent to reinforce guards on the Dutch ktmt1er
NICAHAGlTA
The urveyeu route of the proposed Canal across Nica~ un ~tart1 from Greytowll on the Caribbean via the San n Hiver and Lake Nicalug-ua to Brlto on the Pacific It would take a ship 25 to middotW hours to pass through the
(i jected canal in contrast to 7 to 8 for the Panama Canal t
PlojUllu Nicaruguan Canal
NORWAY
The annexation of Austria has completely reversed Norwegian minds in regard to national defense In April 1037 the unusual amount of 21000000 crowns was approshypriated for national defense slightly against the wish of the caiJinet Thi3 same government has just proposed extrashyordinary appropriations totalling 52000000 crowns a sum abont equal 10 that of the national defenses ordinary budget
(La Yacht)
PA~A
Panama shipping tonnaVenow stands first among Latin American countries Foreign firms have found it very conshyvenient to register their ships with the Republic of Panama and at present her registered mElchant fleet consists of 120 seagoing vessels The increase on this years registry is 12 gthipgt of which 6 were an exchange from another flag
(U S Naval Institute Proceedings July 1938)
PERU The Peruvian exports in 1937 amounted to $151363000
an increase of 13 per cent over 1936 Imports from the United States in 1937 showed an increase of 30 per cent the next competitor is Germany
At its meeting of 1 June 1938 the Governing Board of the Pan American Union approved the final text of the proshygram which will serve as the basis of deliberations of the Eighth International Conference of American States to be held in Lima next December
POLAND
lIajor Vaclew Makow4ki and four other Polish fliers landed al Warsaw Oil 5 June eompletillg a I6500-mile flight by a roundabout route from California
~ 23
~Miit~my$iew8 Around the WOlld t amp liSS UDI
The five flying a twin~endnc Lockheed American ila11shy
port pianc left Los Allgeles ll lIlay They flew to South America and crossed the Suuth Atiantic from Natal Brazil to Dakar French Vc-t Africa
IORTlJ(AL d
A PorluguPl Air ~li-siun is to vj-it Eng-laud III the Illar
future to takl c1eiivpry of 15 (o-1ler (ladidof -ingt--lltcr pursuits onhr(middotd hy the Portugllese (Ollllment lal Janushyary
En~~lalld hv had a rniiltJ~ Ttl]-o) III Portu)al -11111
la-t February It j- njHlrldj that -h( hLlS dlricierl to -uppl~ P()rllll~al wilh hl-a and livht arfilliry and (middot pHd UiJtallshytwllolns or credit- to lIpI Idd ally alarm(d by til(gt appanl1t delermlllation of (3prmallY and Italy to 1- tlill 1 -1 rallldt hold on SlJain and to uomillate Port ugal
H i- -aid that the Roel of (ibraltar nJH (OlhHiflt d impregnable iII be modernized with somp of thp lat(-t artil~
Ifry and antiaircraft hatterjt~ for deftn~c againt reported Itd(l~(lrnJan ) Ill- at Ah(lll 11 and (Tlf a 110t t () IllllltlOll
b()mhinf~ plalH from Spltlm Spalli-h 1111lUll1l and tht Bill~ aric hIand
ItDIAIA
queen iI-anc of Rumania one of Europes mo t colorful pcr-ol1aiitie died 18 Tuly in tlw royal palace at Sinaia at 1he ag of ()2
IWSSL
The Sovilt io ha at present from 11 to 36 cavalry dh-i()ll~ 2a of hilh an ill Eulopt
III Europl h-Jf of th(l Clyalry is stationed in the thrce wl tern military di trich (l (llingrad Vhite Ru~sia and El)
Sn Ill If Hllllt d (llIlll wh~ln itUlWIl IUlIl lapHllllL lrOOIshy
rrhe cavalry tationed at the frontier is reinforCed three mota-mechanized diVisions and by strong air force
The cavalry division comprises two brigades un ar - lery regiment (horse) one chemical 1quudron one englr~ti lquadron 10 communication squadrons and a nlOlo-mampt~ anizt1Ilgroup of three squadron- with 51 tanlc t~
f (l~a 11a1CC Mllitairc 2G Febl uary l~
Diplomatic )rlatiolls bdween Japan and Soviet Ru~~~
J1(and tilt hlpaking point as clashes between armed fo~ of the twu llatioll5 occurred 29 July over a small hHfl ~ hal)v]mf t1~~ ~H1 tht Smiel 1I~n(hukllO1l1 hOcicl near ~~ Important SOVIPL xeaporl and al r base of Vladlvostock t ~
fort itipd hill which bolh Japan and Russia claim is indk]J~ by the arrow Hu-sia claims that Changkufeng heigh1-~ parL of Soviet territory unuer the terms of an 1886 tr~ ltabli~hillg the fronticr with China
For the fillh time in four years an edict from the K lin has removed its viceroy in the Far East The Far EJ-~ ern uiJLrict is Olle of the three or four 1110-t importl~ provincial posl- in Rusia It ilJ(lude~ SlV(l1 provinc-leJt largcr than the usual Soviet province grouped in onc adrr isilativ( unit becau~e of the fear uf Japanese attack
i
SA~l I ~iams Navy is being strengthened Two gunboalsw1middot
to he delivrlcd by Japan last July they hayc a displaccm~ of 1100 tOllS and speed of 17 knob
(U S Naval mifilufc P)oC(cdin[Js July 1
SWEDEN J The Foreign l1inisters of Finland Denmark No~
and Sweden met in Oslo on 5 April to discus their coml~ defensp ploblemK in the event of war The result wns aJ_~ e1al agreement to refrlin in the future as in the past fil joining tHY gTOtlps of nation and to maintain strcngthelltheir poiililul and ecollornic cooperation with -~ end in view f_
( US N(tIallllntllltll J 1 l11middotI(Iillfq AllUlttE~~
SWIZEHLAND
Oil 25 Junc Italy joined Germany ill a formal pror III Swil-tiand 10 JPiIHt1 1111 llflulralityt- long HH slw rn laills her traditional aloofness from international COl
Oil 11 May tlw Ltagnp of Natiolls apPlovpd S lands request freeiIl)~ her from any obligation to PH ill -oallctiolls such as tlw ccononllC and finallcial ) taken agaiIlHt Italy because of the Halo-Ethiopian Vhlll Rwitzrrlalld joilwd the Lcag-ue it was with a s ion that he should not be required to join any milit action under the League Covenant
24
-~
~1XV[I1 NiJ70 Military N eW8 Around the World
TURKEY
IOn 6 July 1938 Great Britain approved a loan to Turkey mounting to $80000000 to be devoted to the purchase of
~ rmnrnents made in Britain ~ Recent diRpatchcs show that Turkey is planning mcchshytrnization of her army and extensive purcha~es of airplanes ~nd submarineR
AIlt)(lHHlrltta outlet of SYria
On ~ July a Franco-Turkish pact wa signed which rovide- for Franco-Turkbh military cooperation in the lexandretta ditrict with France and Turkey providing rmcd cuntingents of equal strength
The Sanjak of Alexandretta is just a strip fifty miles wide and seventy miles long with only two towns of any size-Antioch and Alexandretta But Alexandretta though a small town is important because it is the only natural harbor on the eaRt COHRt of the Mediterranean except Haifa in Paleo tine and the maritime outlet for the trade of the City of Aleppo and the Syrian hinterland
Turkey i~ interested in Alexandretta because the port there is a potential naval base and affords easy access to Turkih territory With independence approaching Syria the Turks arc ~aid to he anxious to bring Alexandretta under their influence and prevent it from falling into hostile hands
URUGUAY
The Constitution of Uruguay approved 19 Aprif 1934 provides that just remuneration and length of working day arc to be fixed by law with special regulations fQr women and minors Several decrees have been promulgated at various dates putting into effect minimum wages for workerR in variouH industries
VENEZUELA
On 12 July Venezuela withdrew from the League of Nations
The republics of Latin America are gradually drifting away from Geneva Of the twenty American republics originally belonging to the League eight have resigned or are about to do so
For the first time in history the United States is linked with Venezuela in a one-day fiight
Intermediate points on the Pan-American airways route include Puerto Rico Haiti Cuba and the Dominican Republic
Around-the-World Flhrhls
25
c amp CSS Qummiddoti
d
Frontier clashea oocur beshytween Ecuador amp Peru 3 Jtmamp
1938
Eighth International Conference ot Amorioan States will be held in
Lima lleoerrber 1938
bull 11shy
~lxvillNo 70 Military News Around tlte World
27
IThe Spanish Civil War
f
It 11 1 1 f tl 11l SpUIl
VIH1l thl rllll htglll rumhling in -pal11 on lR July
m(Jnth ~et it 1-- t1l1lring- tilt tlllni ~lar and both id( are l111tornpromi ing lilil -(J ddelIllIllld to go to tbt iJithr lIHI thd th(r( ~(tmiddotm In he nnthillg ilIa vall --top 11H (()llflk
5pmi
F]fl)m Tht Il1ltgtUl)~ent Drive on Vllpneia
28
The Insurgent spring drive to the sea culminated J~ the capitllp of Villaroz Oil 11) Aplil thll~ ~plitting Govea mpllt territory illtwf) Heet iOlls Tlw In-unCnts tried in middot1 10 captule 10(0 Ilaquooy cily Oil Ih( (alern bank of the Ebl~ FralllO Ihcll (hcided upon a swift drive with Valcnciat3 llw oiJIeetiv( which would not only g-ivc him control of tk1 important city but would at the same time cut off ~Iadnc~~ lifflillP ami thll the old capital isolated and starved wo1~1 hl furCld to surrender 1
I Th IWiUII(Cnt plan fol the drive south from the Ten(
--iIJocacer lilll wa~ ba-ed upon the converging movernt of 1 WO army (OIPS to pinch out the -lalient On the left It Army Corp of Galicia ((cl1cral Aranda) moved downtJ lrditerranean coast toward Castellon and Sagunto Onu
l
rivht of the Teruel-Alhocacer line the Army (orps (stille (General Valera) moved alonl( the axis of the Te~) -~amlllto highway Itorming Iiaisoll )ptween the wing~ th( fnsurgent Arm werc various divisions among themt Firsl of Navarre under Garcia VaJino t
The terrain is very mountainous with fp roads a~t able a region uifIlcull to traverse (P11 in ppace timl TIl (overnmen1 force- prepared stllt)Jlg defeTlltic positio taldng advantage of the strong terrain
The drive to Valencia has l)((n bitterly contestedf~middot
lhe Insurgents wcrc r(wanlfd on 1~ TlIlH with the caPtur1e~shyCasfeIl6n a seaport of cOllt-oiderablc yaluc only 35 miles f ~~ Valencia The Government f()rce~ arc t-otilJ offering re5~] tance along thp Mijare- RiYcr ~~
I 1 j
In the north Francos lroop bombarded the L()st Division out of its P1l1rP1Whpd po-ition ItltllCh frontil1r and OVPl 1)000 omcer~ and men fled Frallce
Resuminl( a drive on a front long dormant in the WCl the Insurgent forces captured Blasquez and the region surrounding it (Figure 3) Then suddenly
News Around the World
Vhat effect will the Gandesa offensive have in future operashyHom is a matter of conjecture
~ ReNcH
o SPANI5H
Flum 4-Spamh Tlllitory occupied by the French in 1811
Franco has an immew-IO superiority in the air a far more ample supply of guns and munitions than his enemies Moreshyover in order to placate Italy France has officially closed the Pyreneean frontier across which large war supplies of all kinds had been passing to Government Spain That frontier
FIGUF(f 1---Glllllltnt Olftlll( Itll (aIHiL-1
i 90vernment forces who had been yielding the stubbornly lteld ground on the -outh ~aJient of the Insurgent Salient Hurled an unexpected thrust into the llorth flank of that $lient The Government advance swept forward a dozen Jiule and reached the strategic cit~ of Gande~a (Figure 3) ken by the Insurgents last spring after some of the bloodshy3t fighting of the war The Goernment forcci however cre shortly after thrown back from the gates of Gandesa e Government offensive has relieved Insurgent pressure in
e south temporarily at least and seems to indicate that the O(rnment fOlces arC -tlll (ltlpahlc of stubhorn and effective
anee that their morale is still high and that the gents are not likely to vin the war before next spring r in the war the push at Ilrullclc paralyzed the activity Insurgent Army of the North which had just taken The Government drive on Belchite forced a months
tion between the conqueltt of Santander and AsturiaB
ha yet to become watertight and Barcelona still receives some munitions from other sources notably Mexico the Balkan countries and [rom private ources in Europe but this b not sufficient to oVercome the handicap to which the Government forces are doomed for lack of equipment in comparison vith the Insurgents whose superiority in guns tank8 airplanes and munition-5 increases daily
Italy ha- already lost more men in this war than she did in the EthIOpian Conquest and in addition the conflict has proved to be a drain on Italian finances and war materials For this reason Mussolini would like to see Franco win as --oon as possible
A Franco victory has been repeatedly deferred but few would now question its inevitability in the end Whether it can be accompliRhed this year or next spring however is not for Ul to predict The future alone can reveal the durashytion of thi struggle where we find not only armed forces pitted against one another but the indomitable will and do-or-die spirit of two irreconcilable factions
The bravery of the Spanish soldier is the heritage of a race ready to die for the defense of itf- lrincill)cH Thl heroism of the Alcazar of Toledo and the epic of Madrid had its inspiration in the memories of a g-)OriOUR past
-JHihll1ru Commentator J(anWB Citl StHr
29
The Sino-Japanese War
Ill
I
)l I ~f 1 Ill Llp1l1middot( (apt lInlI Suchow ~trategic rall ~ IUl1l ]1111 of i hI Lurwhu an(1 1h( Ticntin-Pukow r1l1wa It tllf)) a j)) (middotrflll fquipptgtd army of O( 20DOOO 1lll1l -uj)lorlt tl b~ alrpLllll- and tank- -lvlral months to
Wide Harld r~
1aIHllj(middot1 ohbl)o in thl Yc-l1ow River overflow where th( Peipille--Hankow railroad crosses the Lungri-The fall of thi~ strategic jl1nctlOn seemed imminent T~
Chinese blasted the dykes between Kingshui just north Cheng-chow and Kaifeng 50 mile to the East The Yen River ~wirling over hundreds of square miles blocl_shyhlJl[mese [ruuls before Chcngchow and forced them bac~ far as Kaifeng- cll-tr)jm~ lllormouc Japanese war m~r riel and lauslllg many los-es in property and lives The -~ river rolled relentlessly leaving starvation and ruin inf wake but the ]05 Vas nut all Chinas for the Jap armies uogg-l(l (lon wholly bested by the high water T Chinas Sorrow as the Yellow River is nicknamed be~
lt1111 1111 ChlCl fortl-- to the Vest SaIWlllltry llatl(- 111111) the Lung-hai railway followeu
1hi tall oj lltiJow pnrt ICllally al Lanflllg 50 n1l1e~ to the 1 wlllJt I (hilll CnuntlrllfTel1gtic llccecltied in su1shyilllltu]lng 1tpIl- lIHk lilJ I)ji-inll commanilpd by (ellshy
(rd 1)fIIIlra til1 ]1 nllLl of JIallchuria Thi forte vas )Illr aYt d IIIll lit kr cJlmiddot Ilit I ion t hnnwh timely arrival of rgtll1f01(II ~
Ill JaJlal]~( tJ((l~ I in till Lunghai Corridor nuw ~I(rn(d to ()jH1l ulIJllill 111l1 of lilt 11 the capture oj IIanlf) ollic]d gtd Ilf till ChiIlPl National (onrnmrnt afttl thl fall of ankirw The Japallll expected io captur( Hdlh1) h~ it IWII-fold malltlr Hv hnd following- the Jgt1JPJllJ~llalkrJ rlttiha~ lIJrnbilHd v-ith all (xplditioll up IIi YllWlzl Hlt wilen tllP 1apaJlc-c Navy had concenshyt rt11d a jlfIgtrJll Ilpll All ll11fol(gtltePll faeLo] hO(v(1 1
11Ihld t 1](( lanfll pnpal td pJan-i It jt ran ytar for China not to itnQs~ a thmd either
qf Ihl- YllIfJW Ilr ttl( lll)tZ( Hiv(T Some of the f1oolti-i haVll lJrr-1l J)It1 cal it Iuph llotably that of 1 Rill) A Hel srviral YIar I)f orii lluhr 111( -llIJPlviioll flf ff)reil~1l P l1 fdnrpl- I Ill (hllll had 1)lill dybmiddot ~lld had -ll((PLtipd ill l((pillg the lov ItlY(r alolW it ~ Ilorrnall()lr(
Ojl lJ Jlllll tIll JapallC-e Army 1lt driving- furiously for the IHJ-c-iol of Chcnvchow important junction city
(hinas Savior and the friendly rier dragons fUllli~hlt the most effective natural defense in Chinas moment t great national peril Flood strategy succeeded where et fii and guns had failed ~
1_ FHam 2 YIlI) ltlVll I
TIll Yello RIver 2700
30
(
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Military News Around the Worid
ellow mud which it carries at times more than 40 per cent y weight Thi~ ricr ha~ a more I4pectacular history than
Itinr other in the world and has wanderedfrom its appointed middotay (Figure 2) man time- It- v3srtliei ill th( sumnier hich is the time of high water are unpredictable
mperor Wu in 2297 Dc attempled to tame it by ing it into several parallel channels At 011(gt time it
wed north to Tienblll and entered the ~ea at Taku and it aintaincd that cours(gt for a number of centuries After
AD and until 1194 it flowed northwest of Tsinan ptying into Laichow Day later the river changed its
urse and flowed south through Kiang~u prOVIllce to the eHow Sea At other timegt it has -hiftcd between the-e two ints occasionally emI)tying into the Yangtze ncar Nanking
r~e which it ic followin1=f at this time The pnHnl Iir)od may (xc(cd that of 1fI~5 when 3000
quare miles were inundated 8()000000 worth of property estroyed and ~OOOOOO made homeless
YAGTZE CA~IPAIGN
Jpan(c lIfHlltry near Kiukiang on the Yangtze Riv(r
ready making arrangements for supply of munitions through French Indo-China to offset the lo~ of the supply line Ihlough lIang-kong and Canton The warlike clashes with Soviet Ru--ia have already caused withdrawal of troops from Northern China to Manchukuo but sO far Japans drive down Lake Poyang has shown no signs of slackening
1 Having been stopped by the River of SorrowH in the North where the great flood forestalled the Hankow drive lhe Japane~e Geneal Slaff immediately decided to push the ~angtze campaign vigorou-iy Anking was quickly capshyturcd but the Japanese have encountered stiff resistance Jhereitftcr However they have Hucceeded in ~ecuring Kiushy- iang great pottery center which held them for a month find gunboals have been senl through the moulh of Lake royallg They continue to pres~ up the Yangtze but the
lnain drive seems directed along the easier roule down Lake Toyang v Nanchang greateHt Chine~e air baHc Nauchangs all and the cutting of the Canton-Hanlww railway would l oom Hankow The Chinese Foreign OfTice with its archives
~ llld mosl foreign embassies including the American have Iready moved to Chungking 500 miles up the Yangtze
~ ankoVl cannot hold out indefinitely The Chinese are al-
f
FWURF 1 ~Th( HonRkong~Cnnton Rmway which Japanese bombers havo failed to d(~troy
Japan continues its Hir raids against Canton in an effort to break up the railroad to Hankow In spite of these air raids the Kowlon-Canton Railroad which is the main supply line of the Chinese armies continues running and rendering effective service
July 7 1938 marked the first anniversary of this war which started as a clashmiddot between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge outside of Peiping and has now become the greatest armed conflict which Asia has witnessed in 32 yearH
More lives have been losi more property has been destroyed and more money has been spent to keep the embattled armieg going than was the case in the Russo~ Japanese War
31
h
~
Military NewampAroulld the World
FHIJfU f) Id) of (mton hleh fo) month hac J II ltllhJ ell rl to J arllll( L Hlr lu(h
This war h~Lq no swept 100O()() quare mllCs nillP provincial capitab out of twenty-four ha~ heell captured by the inaders the lo~ of Chil1fs( lil-gt according to Japanclt(c p-timat(s which probably art too high is aiJout l~WOOOO li(- It is actually imp0slhlp 10 pslimap llw dlctrllrtioll of proper- ~11](1 wealth in (hina Thre(-fourth- of the ships of Chinamiddot 1ltY have beCn c~q)tl1red or destroyed alld the (hinec $~()lrnnllllt 11a- 11lOrL refugees than It can aiel Till 11llt- ) (hinl- raila~ ~~I(m haE Ill(11 tagg(lshy
U de 11 nrld Jb
IapUHlt combat (hie 1Il Norlh ChllHl
Japan ha- mod(rn WfHIJOIlH China 1Of)O y()ar~ of hisshytory during which )w has hllJl (OI1(IUered hut nev( al1t-orhcd
-From (hinn Fiyhts fo ifr Ekins and Wright
ing Yct in spitc of these appalling ImibCl Japan hal) fa to brillg China to it knee~
In January of this year Cabinet members were ex inl the peoph to )llpale foJ a three or four-yeal ar no~ depressed by the setback which the Yellow River gave thc lJJVaderH army in Honan Var Minister S Ilagaici declares that in his opinion Japan must be pre to fight at least ten ycars Japall is maintaining an ar over 1000000 mell in China and the war is costing h proximatliy ~rOOOO()O a day The (hillKe game lIoW
to bc to make the J apanCbC pay an exhorbitani pri may cauc a collap-c and cvcry days delay in the J apal1ri~
invasion j SPlll as a measure of victorv for China by Jlt c
creasing the already staggeriJlg co-t of the war tJ A JlC complication has come up The armed claslt j
bdWel1l J apltlncsc amI Rusian troup may prove to be tl j
first batth of a major war It is possible that the trou 4 may he localized and cttletl by diplomatic Rteps but th)i-H arc oh-erver- who argue that the Soviet Union believe) t tens the moment hus arrived for the following reasons 1
~ien 1 Rusia bplievc-gt that Japall is near financial exha Com
1 ion and a 1l0W or nev(1 moment ha4 arrived to fight a V ~
alld fOle-gtlall attack oy Japan in the future ~~ 2 Rusia fear- that China may collapse Rho
Japanese capture Hanico and sever the Cantoll-1 railway which is the main ChillC-c munitions artery I_
L RUKsia may IJliievc that the Siherian situation cant on kept within the Lound of a minaturc war without seri)l danger to the Soviet Union jildh
~- res OUwr obKenerK believe that the border trouble pC
mLrlly a Rll~~iall effort to prevent troop movements frl~ th MallLhukuo to -trengthen the Yallgtze Yalley Campaign-J
II haK been predicted that Japan will make peace Otiirod turcs to China after capturing Halllww and that Hhe eXPf(-~ng to end the devastating war ill the very n~ar future
Fighting- almost with bare hand against a armed adverary there is no sign of surrender yet b Chinebe government and people Encouraged by th( R Hians Chinc-c rcsi-tancc may stiffell
In 1812 the HUKSians deliberately burned ill(bCOW
order to minimize the FrClwh capture of their capital aIld embarrass Ow illvadpr The sl1uwuent collapse of Icons emJlil(~ has brrll attriuutLd Ly hi-torians to that 1 act The d(otruct ion of the Yello Rivcr dykeo 111a prmI to be HllOilHr act of self-sacrifice that may ~llso the dreams of another great empire
t~ er J
in nk 1 n ns hel qui OUI
ith
TANK ATTACK AGAINST ANTITANK GUNS
Condensed flam the HUltqHl AIllnfluyC_ IUllkU Xlufwz 11 1ll7]
AKTITA~K Gu~s IN DEFENSE
The advent on the field of battle of a lIe offcl1(-ive arm Lthe tallk-ha~ called into being abo a Ill means of deshyfense a t-opccial type of antitank gUll At the pregtcnt time the armiegt of all cQuntripgt are gtufiishy(lently familiar both vith tank(- alld with the mean of combatting them 1 In the opinion of Eirnannsbclgcr to each ldlometcr of
Ollt there must be 8 gum or to tlw divbion 61 gUliS to hich arc added ]8 guns at the dislln-itioll of the division Jmmlllder a total of 82 guns for the 8-kilometel defense
front of the division that b 10 gun- to each kilometer of tront i Such a tatulatioIl of the dcfell-e with alltitank gUllS i~ fudlcative of the fact that the attacking tanks arc being presented with a new situation
j Durillg the last few years a change ha5 occulTed also ih the qualitative state of the antitank arm i The 50-mm antitank gun of the Rheinmetall factory ireel 1929 has a muzzle velocity of 2000 fs a maximum ~nge of 6500 yards a practical rate of fire of 15 to 20 shots ~er mll1ute a weight of projectile of 171 kilograms The ~jrojectllc is thus enabled to pierce armor plating of a thickshy~~S up to 30-mm or 40-mm at a (lilttance of 1000 yards t A 37-mm gUll with an initial vclocity of 800 yard~ maxishyum range of 7000 yards and projeclile weight of 066 Iogramgt has an armor-piercmg -gttrength at a (1i~tance of
~_ 000 yards up to 20-mm or 10-mm rC~s(niJlg- of the djshyi- nce by half inclca-gtcs the penetrative power of the projecshy Ie by about one-fourth According to the French Rrvuf dATtillfJic there has
r
ten introduced into the armament of the English infantry4n antitank rifle I All the accepted methods of tank allack upon antitank
nS_HPil1cers front flank-which once Were COllshy
~ Rted retain their importance in a favorable situation that t in ctgtc of low saturation of the defense front with anti shy~_ nk g-un- and in cafie the tank unit act in JcconnaiRsance _ a broad front The degree of ~aturation with antitank
ns however which prevail at the precni limp demands ~ her methods of combatting them a different tactic That - quire a new effort in the field of military and ~cientific
i~ ought
-~
Foreign Military Digests Digestlt of important articles from foreign militarlf periodicalgt til( remaiui1l1 articlegt 1m each
lIlajaziu (( ( listed i11 C((trd(u (If Scrret( d Jgt( riodic([ Artielfs
j ~
SmEKrTH OJ THE TANI AND OF TilE ANTITANK GUN
Let us compare the strength of the individual light tank ith that of the antitank gun Conceiving the situation to
be one In which the tank ix approaching nn antitank gun which has been sct up on a firing position there is the folshylowing to be Imid the antitank gun thanks to its stable Jlosition and to concealment on the locality is less con~picshyll0W than the tank moving in the open and readily observshyable Because of that fact the initiative will almost alvays remain un the ide of the antitank gun The antitank gun is the first to open fire from a diRtance of 500 to 1000 yards and has the possibility of making a few aimed shots before the opening of tire from the tank With tho hots the antitank gun may put the tank out of commission If it doc- not then the tank will begin firing
The tire from the tank is tire from a machine in motion upon a poorly observable target on an unstudied locality and for this rea~on its accuracy wHi be approximately half that of the fire of the antitank gun However since the tank has armor and in addition to the gun haR also a machine gun it is more correct to consider that the vulnerability of the tank is much ICHH than that of the untitank gUll and its fire power much greater But the initiative as before will remain on the ide of the antitank gun All that is indicative of a cershytain preponderance in the fire power of the antitank gun over that of individual tunks
THE STRENGTH OF ATTACKING TANKS
What is true of the attacking tank and of the defending antitank gun taken separately can not be extended to the massive and skillfully organized tank attack
The rifle battalion engaged in supporting the tank comshypany will conduct its offensive in a zone 600 to 800 meters wide Assuming that the adversary is satunited with anti shytank guns in accordance wjth Eimannsbergers calcuJationg the company wiII me~t at the forward area of such 7one 5 to 6 antitank gun At some depth it wil meet with entire batteries of regimental or battalion artillery Consequently against each 2 to 3 tanl(t~ there may appear one antitank gun We have already seen above that when 2 to 5 tanks go to meet one modern antitank gUll the final ()utcome of their collision can not be predicted
In that case the situation for the tank is not brilliant to attack is po~sible but the risl is very high and the losses will without doubt be great How call those losses be avoided and What is the best method for attacking the front of the antitank guns The best way out of the difficulty must be sought in establishing a definite ~mpeliority of forces in the decisive direction That can be attained by closing up the combat orders in the direction of the main blow
Ag-ainst such a solution the foJ1owing objections mny be raiecl There will take part in the battle not only those antitanl guns which wi1l appear in front of the tanls but also those which will be on the fianl of the attacking cOmshypanY so that the humber of antitank guns must still be inshy
33
middot roreirII MililwY Digestq C amp GSS Quart
creaHed bv lor S Thal Itgt tlU( a- l(gtld- tlw -ingie comshypany ltutng- separat(l~ _ But eVell for -uch a company if it operatc~ dth 1lthcl --mall tomlmt interval eeltain adshyvantages are created illee tht numher of antitank gUllgt actmiddot ing again-t it will IJl clhicillahly II p hl( to take into
consideration maJJlly till ma-h( tall attack cIllCe the - employrnellt of tanh- III t he offrll in~ mut Ill majL
(FR-~(i Art 7J (()Il-(Cjuentiy the Lllll( (ompII1Y will a a rule not attack -illgl~ 11w attack gt111 )( parlicipaltd III
al-o hy 11~Hr cf)mpallir acting- at ngilt and hmiddotft
Till 1clIltWr- rif tlH attacking tank (IIl tlw alltlshy
ltl1k glllh lPIJlll illjf tlHir atLlck arc (middotmblHImiddotd III tIll ac11shy
IW p gt of fill offI-- flj Ill( dflJ) Till adl--lry dlall
when t1(gt dp~11 ~ and Ltlllreate a gtujl(ril)rity (If fon ill Ih dtciiyp dinmiddot(titJll Ttw pl1ly OJ till d([11l t artl oIT tIll attack Ill)t v hr he dhlrt-- but WiHlt I hI adnmiddotr ary atshytackgt that 1-- hi- (t]fJJh will c]pplld ()Il hl dllfjoll of t11l
asailant Bpcau e (If that fact lll mil )p ](ady pr~shy
wher( to J(pubr the lt1lt1Irgtar That circumtallcP ha always hmiddotd awl will lpad til dijllrlllll (If forn flll Ill( part of thp dtffn lmiddot lnrI In adY(llta)~( Oil I Ill part Ill tht otYPll-l(
Alld thlht l(halltql- llllht bl pot to u p for proppr 01shy~~anizati()n Df tllt t101 attack ~hltpfr may Iw the -nturashylion of 11w (Itf~ll with antItank gUIl-- it i~ 11wl~ po~ibIr
to create in till dllilp dlrlctioll a prlJlolHiL-ranCI uf tanllt attaching It1 COlljHlatlnn jtll till ttrtllleIY If the cnrmy has 1-1ahll--hcil ollf lntitmh gUll for each IOU yards (that is a high -gtaturatlUll and to create it is not uch n simple matshy101 a- may apptar at firt glance) t the nttackcl may have ill 111 offensive 70ne of 100 yard 1 to 6 or more tanks In that (asc (111 Hot countl11l the po~ibility of creating the same prepunderancc in artillery the advantage of the fighting a clcarly 011 the ~id( of the taId And therein lies the ltuperiority of the- at tacking- tanks oYer the antitank gUllS That nquirl~ of t1w organizer of the offensive an excellent military mind and thl rapality to lmplny tatlk tactics in (onformity WIth Ow IwculJaritic of the -iluation
In tIll ()lf~UljZllioll of thp tallk aUack th(gt 11101( the advpr-Iry lltllltioll b dilracld from the tIinction of the main blow the fewPl will oe the meall- of antitank defcJlsP which 1( will have aIoll~~ t hat direction anti the mure sucshyce[ul will be the tank attalk For this reaoon the preparamiddot tion of the aUarl of tan] an~I infantry mnt alway~ he can-fully concraJpd ill Ow dfejjvp rIir(ctiDll by Ow lmployshymenl of camouflage and by fligned activities ill ~econdalY dinctioll- The -uddllllW of the attack alvays has a -tunninJ~ effect
In tomlitiolh of limit(d obltcrvaUoH (ill twilight in pre-dawn fog) tIl( firE of artillery and antitank gUllS is poundndclfd (gtxtr(~n1PJy difn(ult and it is 11Iwly tl(hP condishytion which turn out 10 he highly favorahlp tl) the aetiyities oj th attaekillf~ tallls That is provpd abo by Ilw pxpprifIHP of th( Vorld War Tn all ea-C- a Jh~ht -mokp cllrllin ill front of lhf af1a(kifl~ talll is lllpflJ
lhe directions selected for the tank attack must have no obstaclr~ whi(h Hw tank--t art ill(apllhl of oVllenming Thc-iC conlt-lideration place highly 1chponiblp mi~ions upon tank r((ollnaih~alHmiddot( Thi-l lPCOllllaisstlnce must (stablish the character and Htnngth of the antitank guns and obstacles
and al--() tlw plteulialitics of the tank movpment on the
[ ~
ous sectors
StllIIE~middotaON OF TIlE ANTITANK (~llN~ III tillt (tt of a eOl1tillllOlS frollt of lntitlnllt gllll ~
a cI011sity or JIll HUll to (arh lon ranIs the aet iOll- of ralt~shysmall lalll g-roUJl~ (or a to Ii tan ) not united hy a gCI(middot olnmand ale unfavorahl( alHi an llot likel to tnrn ()ntl middotf CtSflllJy (~onsellueIl1Iy it is Hot adisahie t () assign lJ~ taJlih hy platoo)ls to the infant l lo01ptnil It h mJ blltll again-t a continuoll~ front of antitanllt gUlls to 011lt_ atl with a HtrollgPl1 with a whole comhat order of tad middot1
lompallits amI battaiioll-gt Ill( (ombat order of a 1lt1 J tlltnpall~ or hal tali on j- lapahle of comhattillJ even a r i 1illllOllS front of antitank gUll-
Tank pIed oon~ rna properJ~ be a-signed to infm (ornpltLnh-I in ca-c in which thell arc vanguard tank cr lOllS con-iUng of medium or heavy tanks and whose t 1
-ioll It is to suppre llw antitallk gUll- Tn 1he cae of a (()JltillUOU~ front the antitank gun
~uppr(sfd hy the mn]p powerful fin of Uw attacking- ta j
alld -u]lporling- arlill(ry Tlw tallks attacl in 1h( adormiddot d lomiJal order tllldfl (OYII of tlw firf of tlwir artillpryJ~ conduct fire nol only upon th( antitank gUllS which htJ been dicerllcd hut al-o upon suspiciotH 11lac(~s uf every 1] where fmch gun--t might be cOllcaied That deprives thc~middot~ tanle gUB8 of the adnllltal~(s of the illitiatip and make-~ il more difficult for them to make lle of aimed fire The tamiddot 4 mal1(gttlVer with a view to (1(at in) a mOlp favorable I Hi
tion for the attack Tlms for examplc when they t suppressed the antitank guns along 01lC direction they lgt r rndcavor 10 dphollch into thlt flank of other guns hut tlga alwaygt act in full combat order t ~O
middot~uil The Ain
THE CIWSSI-iG OF THE DES IN 1~1j
I~o[DII nd(niiilPllanr EI Pa-n til L(gt Andes 1m Jahle 1817 By Gentlal Knaus Crgtndenccd from 1I1I1IdlllIltI()ltrll( ftli(lr HlilelIIIIIcn nlllmllll PlOD 1~o71 iini
t udBy CIIlK II ~ IIRTKE~S Infantl
In 1808 the Frellch orrupicl till grcallt1 part of Spanish penimnda Lut --t(arllly any mfml)fl of th( Sl eolonilt- (oIlsirlprCd thi--t O(CUlTelHC as an opport UIli
-(utth Spanish domillation ill t Ill Spalli~h American nics All important positioll~ in 1h(se dependencies occupied by nativ( horn Spaniards EYPll th(l Amen 00
horn Spaniards ele rllu)atld to pusitions of serond 81 imloriaIwP IIlllrs they had bCPl1 enucaten and trnil1~ lac ~pain It WH only ill t hr minds of a fe broad i~i[ ll1f1l thai t hp idltt-- (lr ill( FnIlCh levolut ion rOllnd nccptf nIl
On2G 11ay uno a Junta I)lglll it distllSsions in 13m lis
Ail thpl a lily or 700()() Illtllapilli or 11 lrown col lie Rio dpla Plata (AlgClltina) In spite of frequent persmr he Challgc- this Jullta exhibitCd a heroic activity and ficial quality g1patly instlul11Cntal in achieing and taining frl(dol1l for A rglIltina
The ~eal of Spain- main power lay in the crown co of Peru Only by destruction of Spanish maslcry in t land did it appear possible to achieve independence for
34
VolXVIIiNo70 Foreign Military Digests
_nltV-S _gtrl-9~I
1 lJOOOOOOr
YI1m- 1 San brtm- OperlltlOns III 181
J ~ther areas Therefore the Junta in Buenos Aires disshytiatched shortly after 25 May 1810 an expedition to Alto - Feru (today Boliyia) and other expeditions were ordered ~tainl the Spanish in Paraguay and Montevideo On 7
omiddotember 1810 the Argentinians defeated the Spanish ncar ~uipacha and freed the most part of Alto Peru (Bolivia) Theieuro operations were conducted beginning at Buenos Am and extending to Lal(~ Titicaca over a distance of
i 3hout 1500 miles the last 600 of which were at an elevationIOf approximately 13000 feet An armistice which had f heen signed was broken by the Spimiards and the Argenshy lmJan Army was defeated and scattered as a result of a
Sudden surprise attack In consequence Alto Peru (Bolivia) ~as lost and the remainder of the Argentine troops retreated
middotto Salta and Tueuman (about 800 miles) On 2~ SeptemberlrlSl2 at Tucuman and on-20 February 1813 at Salta the ~f rgentiniarlH under General Belgrano defeated the Spanshyto ards under General Tritan The Argentine Army again ~ dvanced into Alto Peru but in two battles east of Lago ~~ oopo vas deciRively defeated on 1 October and 14 November tf 813 Belg-rano withdrew again to Tucuman and was 1Cshy
~ laced by General San lITartin Don Jme San Martin was born 25 February 1778 in
apQju (today San 11mUn) in the province of Corriente~ i- parents were Spani~h He attended Reveral schools in
Aire and in 1788 entered a ~eminary in Madrid At of 11 he became a cadet in the Infantry Regiment and at the age of 15 was commissioned a sub-lieushy
With audacity and great hravery he took part in ~ ampaigns in Morocco Portugal Spain and in a sea-undershy
li king against England In 1811 at the age of 33 he became lieutenant colonel In order to be able to participate in the dependence of his home land he left Spain and traveling
by way of London reached Buenos Aires on 9 March 1812 Vhen he offered his services to the government they were acshycepted and he was commissioned to organize a cavalry unit according to European pattern Sun Martin fir~t formed the squadron uGranaderos a Caballo This Hquadroll proved to be an excellent Behool both for developing the highest love of country and in promulgating the bet military virtues (today the regiment Granaderos a Caballo h a distinshyguished unit which performs daily its guard service in uniformH Huch a-) it wore when first organized)
III the beginning of 1813 San Martin was able to dpmonshystrate his excellent leadership capabi1itie~ when he was entruited with the protection of the right bank of the Parana norlhweRt of Bueno- Aires A Spanbh flotilla ascended the Parana River San Marlin followed it vlith his mounted men Early on the morning of 3 Februar) 250 Spaniards with 2 cannon landed near the cloister of San ILorenzo and began to advance against this place San Martin struck this force from either side of the cloister with such surprbe and such strength that it was defeated in a short time and was forced to retreat and reembark under the protection of the guns of the flotilla Although of little importance in itself this batshytle gained for the Argentinians freedom of traffic and comshymerce on both the Param~ and Uruguay Riv~rs since the Royalists did not again dare to send expeditions up those streams
In February 1814) San Martin was named commander of all troops in northwest Argentina He rccognized immeshydiately that the troops located there wcre not suited for operations over the long ltlnd difficult routes by way of Alto Peru (Bolivia) to move against and destroy the center of Spanish might ill Lima In lIlay 18B San Martin reshynounced based on considerations of health a plan whereby these difficult routes would have to be used and recomshymended that the province of euyo (today the provinces of Mendoza San Juan and San Lui) be used as a baRis of operations over another route against the Spaniards in Peru
THE ROUTE OVER THE ANDES TO CHILE AND PERU
According to San Marlins point of view it was unnecesshysary to sacrifice man and money for an undertaking by way of Alto Peru in this area the defense should be entrusted to the blave Gauchos those rah and hnrd riders of the proshyvince of Salta and to several tried squadrons In the area around Mendoza he desired to form a small ell disciplined army which in cooperation with the Chileans should preshypare an end to the Spanish mastery in order later to break the center of Spanish authority in Peru
When San Martin was placed at the head of the governshyment of the province of Cuyo in September 1814 he found such a small force (D85 men with insnHicient equipment) that it was impossible to begin the intended operationR at once His first job was to create the necessary tool and the ncc(sary means In the encampment at Pllmerillo IP~ miles northeast of the city of Mendoza (Fig-lire 2) he began his difiicult tURk the formation of his army the instruction of itt) components and the development of its spirit and morale It is interesting to 110te that he laid a special fmphaltis on target practice on field firing on close combat md upon the flower of decision by the lower commanders
l
35
r [oreiiin Military Digcais C amp (88 Quart
______ 1 ___ _ knoll ~
shy 1~~~-- ~---- (1
=
~t
L
-
l((f rhmiddot nvutl 01(1 tlw Antlc
For 1tw ft-Ul1011 1)1 hl- plalJ- San l1artlll required 1DOO pll tll1wd s]itihl~ tfJIl1l]l((1 di ciplined soldiers ucu-11olllld til hard lipld ~1JIlp cOIHlItiolh AH t11P iJaiH of his force San fart1l1 had t Iw iil-t and -ccoud -quadnms of hi- Gran1frch a (ahalll) and Iht (hillttll troops of GellshyeraIOIIimlJl- To thl-l wpre addcrllater 1200 voluntpCr- the th12ltl and f01111 h -qutdrons of GranadQros a Caballo and ltorne arlillfry III pltc of 111 effort- ill SLptemlJ(r 1816 the army llumhlreu hut 2HJO elfpdive- lI1stpad of the necesshy-lilT -1000 Agt a Jf-ult of the freedom of slaves 710 ltulditr (iJlatk HlId mulattu) PIjgt PIIJoJJpd alld fnlDI rhi]p 1evcral immigrant dtachmlnt were forml with the result that at the hinnllW of lRl7 lh And Army had rmellOr a total of tlO~O men lllc1uuillg all tafT
As auxijiariclt there crc empJoy(d
(C ] 200 mtlHjl for tilt tralbJlorl of all dIp tlld t h( ~Iunty of Ow Jill( of -llpply
II 120 nJilHI1 froTH hlldoza 101 work till road c A detachment of mountain guidps r 11a~j(r4 for 1111 pacl animals
Tillt four infantry haftalion (No 17 H 11) each COl1shy
Hi~tcd of fOlll infantry cOJnpallic~ a grenadier company and
it reconnaiiSHnCe compaIlY The legiment Glunaderltr Caballo a- c)mpo~(gtd of four combat t-qu1uron and accompanying --qlladron for the staff Tlw artillery bat ion had 16 to lD (allllOll~ some I-inch ~()mc 6-inch T --(afT olllti-tecl Ill li7 BWll The ltlJ1lll1l111itioli allotment it~d II ~70 rounds JlPI man (aB tol(1 ~)(WOOO) md 1 rOllnds 1)(1 canl10n (all told 2[20)
VIH1l till two (ohIllHI l1urched fJlllll Melldoza pre all told lO7)] hl)]o(- and llluh- 1600 snddiLmiddot [or tillt nIT alld fht (tdrr 72GD uJdlt mullgt alld pack millegt III addition 1020 ridlll~ and pad anim (()tnpallid detachment north and ~outh of the main co For pteh mall 1helt W(tmiddot ai)(lllt 1 hOlp- Ol mllips l~p
During Uw 111a](11 111( clalry alJd tIw -tafr~ crc( ale lowld to ride nJlh the mules in ordl to -l( the norses en lW ill ()mlmL ~rhc infantry tlw artillery IJcrollnel th( 011111 1)(JollJlPI tgt)( mIJlllJpd nil nlul in ollhr to co tlwir trength and 10 Iwlp ill ~ln1iJlj off a pCculiar ffi(shy
lain sillness COmmo)] to the Allck ~y~ Thp tubes of the (JillIOn Yen carertlll~ lap]I(d w_ aD
wool alid slwed into a lOvcr of hOl (hidp On -tlp sl 0011
tlw-lp (J(~ hrought fOlvard bv meangt of la oe attachec~ ~ tJ( ptck laddl(- )1 f 0 mullgt ~()lll followillg t hr oj Wl J~- U 1
hundred militia --oldilr a~i1(d ill this nHtlls of nu f[fion
The food tak(11 along Va aq folInw- about pound of dried --alt meat 700 edti( Oil the hoof 70 round loaves of Corn nllai zwieback dry chC(-( n J-u ply of win(gt and brandy a w~l1 as a goodly supply of An advanced supply ba-oe of food and forag-c protect militia was -tablishcd 011 the route of thl Ilorth colu tween Plumeril10 and Los Jlanantiaie4
III nnicI to proide durabk t~llif()rm~ fnr the diffi( llIuiertaldng- a cloth manufactor~ Was built ~ The M( id Luis HcUJan pstablishcd an arm factory Provision imiddotlls t made fur the manufacture of Jlmnlcr 11
San 1ialLin wa~ untiring in his efforts to train h to raise to the utmost (heir morale to JlrOLllrL~ the ne equiprnent and a1m- tn Cstablish an effective com fions and pr ~~~t(m to -((UI( tholoHll krltin rce ance reports lIe had strong ~ttpport from the gO(lll
of BUentiK Alnmiddot and frnm till J1oJlulation of the ploilltt (U~(I Till (lHhll l onl rihnttmiddotd t hlil lll~JlY to the l
liw~l Iriti-h 1ll11hUlb 111 rlltllOS lill- to hl)~e ir pst it H~ In (t tJll O(lthO of ~palljh d)l11illaliolli
ili(1l iar~~p nlllnlllJt~ oj sllJlPIiI nn lTldit ~~ The Ioral ~1aIlih a]m~ in Chill llJlchJ the agrd PI
dlnt GCl1eral nO~l Flanti lo l11lCO del Pont num 7OO nl~ttI lntl ~O() olililil Tn (ll~ t1lJi1 (1 Spar th ltoldi4n- yet tIll llla~ ltlll-itld of Chilem
Notwithstanding the IlUnllrical superiority of thee all AI Cl~ )111 lartlll tilddtll tn (IIT~middot thltHI5h the CA lioll ltlgdfl~t (hIi( A a Il-Ult PI 111 (lllg years in
IIIHl()~a 1J(j[ 11( had a 1h()1Ol~h IdWhdgl of tlw teT ro]l illlll jljJfWl toJJdillOIL of ill( nrCH as wLi1 a the Ihilll~ or asltI~t~lllll to hb OlhratlOn by an uprising of nathc-- of (hi]r n I
rtgilllliIlJ~ If Stpl(llliJtl lX]G San llaltll1 under nit IllJotiatioI Jtll the ChH[ of Oil Pehuenlhc Indians in CarlON (60 miles outh of Mendoza) with the elsible re tention of ~(cu1ing IHrmission to advalHt through the
36
01
middot
~
--~ shyolxihIl No 70 Foreign Military Digests
f itory of thrse indll)(ndcnt nciian1- m order to gtrikc at the paniard~ J~ a~ (If the E Plammiddothm d paRS During the colutlOlI the 1hllVJld1l~ maintall1(fi a neutrality although
( Spalllard lHdun orNl by lt111 kind of precnts to secure -~ 1eir alliaIllC again-t tlw Aljllltil1lans and ChiJean~ Durshy
g the di-ell-~I(Jll- S-111 Marlin propo~cd that the Indian~ rodtlP -uPJlh(~ fJr hi army ior which he would pay well nel fll]uilWU lh( -tllt et -iCCnl from the Indian Chief f~ allOtllldll Olle tL(Jj(JU~hl~ familial with the Indian manshy
cr he 1dll tllv Jnddll- ould tranflTIlt all informttion at m to L1H SpiI1lilJ U I holt dually happclled
iJj Jlalo dll Pont thl ~ranhh((lmll1ander in (~lile SOOI1
vPlllhld -tnllg 11)](-- 110nl lantIago to thl Iclmty of ttlC(l Iii) ndl Dutil oj SantlHgn In order to furthel his
-futenllull- Ill delude thmiddot Spaniard- San iIartin sent a fOle QJ till 1lll bl)l jJl~ (Jld I all -Id nlll)())- t() be clnulated 1 hat rih mllll allll uuld -)Oll 11Idlth 011 the pas About the ~ld vi (kloln) 1i5lLi San ltirllll tolllpleted negotlation- ()l the lIpll-ng of till Chillan 1Il lhL provincl- of Colchashyaua and 1Iltlul~ Thi~ upri-ing detached omc 2000 Spani-h ijuop ~(ltlY i1()11l the nJalll operatwns and toward itself
-i FOl all OIH)atlun dgal1~t [Ink 12UO miles long and middot~O null WIde l)IJ iderlllg ~eog-rapillc tlimatic and ciVlli shy
~ tJtlun londitlm-o olll~ tile f(ltIie and aluable areas 111 and ~OLIl1d ~11tJ1l_-P ere to be lUllsidcled ts the theater of dpcratJ(lIIc- )orth ChIle contained many saltpeter Wast(~ middoti1d and Ill()untam- ludl uffered little llO-1-iiJility of supply ran 11111 thollgh Inall Thl -ullth purtion (Iatlgonia) ~lIlel -dt1ed a~ uut of the que~tlOn South of the plOVshytile of )Iaulc there lleu the Arancano Indians an indeshy(f=-Jtndcnt extl ltwrdlllallly warlIke race which were not l p1CllCd unt-Ii 1870 In Ionsequencc the operations zone t~d hmitcd t6 that area lying Letween the 27th and 37th ~Id lllh- III thi~ a na ~0l1le G73 mik~ wide the terram ~~ the follo lllg charnl telistIc
UdClll the 11011 of the PadlIc and the Desaguadcro t_ ncr ttluWlllg illll1l 110rth to ~outh and in the south called Ie Culorulo) il the Andes hllh r~alh theIr hIghest elemiddot l ~tlllll in the ilenuozl-Santiago area The mass Aconcashyj 11 llU hl- a hlght oj 23O()() ftet to the south the i- c-t Jjju T1lllUllgito 22UOU 1ed nurth of Aconcagua the1crlldal]) 21UO() JClt In t1111- alect the pa~~es average an - evltlUl or ljO()O ftL In the variuus charts and m~p~ 1 ( c1eatlllll Vumiddoty The -110 Ime averages an elevatIOn f Of 15000 to 1G000 feet From thb cel1tr~l mountain range - mIll oj rh e1 no l~t to the PacIfic anu flow east
th~ Dlaguudlro Detycen the main mountain range thl Utaguadelo lie the rami lieu le~cr ranges and caRl
the a iell gelllrall) a~te fairly level area Only It the watercourse were to be found fruitful and cultl shy
cd a rl-t Nul only du Vc lUlU lc-~er cast and west range- (ll tilt AJlde-o (Hl11I range) and the Pacilie but a
I dllgl g11111 ally pal t11cl to th( coast which rises to jl)() t(~t tut at Interal~ by the -treams flowing into utll Uetweln ilw coatal range and the Andes lay vltdll~ from G to 23 lllile~ lJ1 width and with nn elevashy
ot GOO to 2f)OO ieet lopiou-lj- atered ullromlllOnly tfut till granary of Chile
The rllOst important pa--l- ill Ihe area of upcratlOn~ ere the followmg
Come Caballos (14400 feet) from La Rioja to Copiapo
h Santa Rosa 14000 feet) from San Juan to Coshyquimbo
c Lo Patos (1l000 feet) frum San Juall or Mendoza north of Atoncagua to LOR Andes
d La Cumbre (12500 fect) from Mendoza by way of U~pallata south of Aconcagua to Los Andes
EI lurtillo (13800 feel) frum San Carlos to Santi shyago
I Elllalleholl (lAIlO rltct) from San Rafael to Talca (150 miles south of Santiago)
III addItion there arc nUlllerOUR other routes which how(jI al( often very narlo vcry steep very difficult to ( rno- and in glneral unusable for military operations
Of the -ix main routc- named above the two northern (1) and (h) and the southern (f) lose lomdderable imporshytance bpcause of their distance from the Mendoza-Santiago 1IS of opcrations
Unly on a few of the passe were small shelters acshyIommlldating a few persons to he found In the mountain a 11 ( - were pa-tule lands Vater was adequate in the Alldc- (main range) in super abundance on the west slopes and in Chile but found only in the valleys to the east An army cro-sing the Andes will fmd pasturage and water in cuffiLient quantities Jul all other supplieR must be guaranshyteed along a line uf communications
In audition to the diHiculties of the poor roads and steep tony ascents and descent a force must contend with the adverRities of tne weal her In fact a crossing can be con sidered only during thf summer months (December t March) Even during thi- 11crioci at a height of 12OO( feet sudden RI1Uwstorms and LliZlalds can create havoc and dc~truction
In many sedions of the Andes puna (mountain sickshy11(-iR) aITedlt many traveler- Not only is it very disagreeshyaLle Lut it often results in death Common indications are cllfllcult breatlung suffocation decreased heart action exshyces5iYe tiredness great deSIre for sleep loss of appetite vomIting no~e anu cur bleechng Many people familiar ith the Andes attribute t he particular Andes mountain ~icknes- to the tremendous amount of rich ores the numershyOtiS underground wat~l tOl1rseS and the magnetic attracshytions As an antidote ra onions and garlic are eaten the nu-trils of the alllmah are rubbeJ with these two vegetables in order to inclea~e the11 breathing rate and blood flow At a height of lOOO meters a persoll with a full stomach will probal) be a1fected
The maw (11 Cf advallced over two routs (Figure 3)
(a) fIll right (nortli) lllalll column advanccd from Plumerillo In a northwesterly dIrection across the eastern ranges theuce by way of Los Patos
(b) The left (south) (olumn moved by way of URpnlshylata and La Cumba on Los Andes
On 15 January horsts of thL -tafI and of the Grunlt shydero) a CaLallo were sent aillud on thl north column route to the 10-gt Manatiale~ (3172 meters) area (an area proshyteLled against hostile threatR) ~o that they could become accustomed to the steep rocky a~cents and the weather
37
~ r Farciyn JIilitarY Digests c amp GSS Quart
d
JJ
ildlllI (ll] I Jdlllli 1-~ (dltlv Lljan Ilwing- to TAl
jItntllld(~ d lIn lrd -lIpph 111 HIln ltJIIIl fur 111 dd iI ltIii illd JUIIllt 1 l-Illlldlfl
Iii lt1Iil ~ IIi d IIIHilr (lllld I)()Jl 11jlIp -ohr lldllljtd tl1I 1lIllIJjlla tollo
Ir Jf[dlIJI Ill Jllt~fll(dlfll(lfll(lI(ll((lcr(J-a
(middott1ldlll II 111 1 (llddHj OllPlIl~ Jlld ICOlllla-anVl
(llIlIl Il 1lt1I~l ilt11dll1l ()lt I lnd ~ that 1 n -n h 01 till ~I I llljllllJ til lldd four V()1ll11111H and OTll
1111(1]111 lj 11lkJ 1(11)] JJOll )l ( IiliaIl InO IdI( 1 11 d --qtlti)oll of Ill (nnadlros a
[tldll ljldil1 1[]1111 0 I and -)t) lrlltrymill with ) jIJIl til 1lJ r IH IIi (j 11111 [1(lll ludi-llldo Alyarado
III lib I) fh ltll](l (( llild J)()1l 1irJlarto ()Ihggins L I] d I 11
I)ll ~I Idl) j jlll]l middotnlllllry (11111)a11I(- of Infantry i 111 dlfllJ 0 -I ~ Ill 1111 ltllllOil
IJl 1111] J lOll JltillIlry (lJnjJ1ls of Battalwn 1 ~ jllflIlJlil()td Illlll cd 11)( lafr --quadrOll
Ill ~ll llll lilmiddotI lilt ~d --qlltdron-ofthl (nI1shyIdtll)-- 1 (lhdo
Oil ~ 111]111 1111 I( flldllJd( l of Ow utilllmiddot or th 1111111 ld1ltlI1l 11lt 1)1111 dId lIllY IHtdqnlltlIgt
I hi ((IlltlI (1lllllldlHkd jn fllOllEl I)oll (ItgOJI 11
111 flIId flqrlJ Pill Idlo 1gt folo-
IIJ 1-IIIII1middot 1IJdlll Ilttalion-oll (i(lHpltn p ) 1) (rIItd]u-l (Lildlll trO()plr 20 artllkryfnetl
) I dllllll 1 )11 llJmiddotmiddotmiddot IjdlJJ -jJaJ fllglilfI)gt Ilh lt10111 1
111 fl [Ilat hll
()I lIJallll(r~ I (lll[fIIJ-- alld hlJllI) 1Ill 1l11l1lia quadII]1 qj Sail LUh alld a dtachnllllt of Pllgllllpr
Ih] IldllllllJ 1 lldl()Id 1) ~Il ralthmiddot
The Illft column was givcltn the initial miHsion of rcachi the Ultpallata arca and blockillg the valley of the Me river It should halt then~ until the north columl IIHliHmiddotd ltIll fllIH lttpproxirllatplyto fll w(t (the route IlIlrth (()llilllll a~ IllUlil l()ngl1 and mor( dHlkult) 1Ill 011 Ii I (lIIlHill IWllld -tizl llw IHight~ ast of La eu drmiddotrpd ill Spalllsh [(lrt- Oil the t~t -Iopes of the (malll lall~) alld (~taiJlish (ontad with lhe right (0 ()n t IlP (middot 1 ~df)IH~ 01 tlH ndp- the lpfi column should till tPPIOadl or t he right toIUI1111 Vh(l1 right nl( hlli 1 (Ianila dl 1( hupalla the left xhould h~g adtIJ(( Oll --ianta Ho-1 lnil -hould not enkr thi ton
to X F(llll1tIy i
Th Ijglt (nort 11) 011l1t11l should atvlJlle a- rapidlyf 1 l)(I~-1il)ll III ()ldpi to rltch If)S Iato- at an early date fr 1 Vhlli It Voltld fH pO -lhie (I1lploymg native guides to po jr out route ithtl SHit of the AcolHagua to cstahIiRh cv ~er J1llmitatiol1 with th gtouth toJumn From LOB Patos l~a(i should PlI-h on fa~t atmiddot 1)-- the Andes and vain the exit fn ~r()
the valJl~ oj tlw PuLlellcio j~Jlr It -hould -eize the helV 1 lorl II 01 ChacaJIlco pd
Tht advHI(( f)f tlw l(ft (solth) (01111111 paI
I I
Thi (OiUnlil Va- to Ilcwh li-paliata 011 21 Ja1llHlylffil
ait thelv until t1~ ~Hrlh lf)iumn had advlttllll(l a )lOftltrh tlOnatldINtal1(middotp 1111rtll1l1l1liltlallll1l wcre at the r(latllt~)(
1ll11l11]lortHlit fortiflcd po-itioll al Jiliwuta Against th r~( tWll advanced via JlIIlcai (--ollth of ACOI1eaglla)-VarL l two Spani-h compallllS (ahout 200 men) under lIa 1 largnclli A night march by 30 Spamards over PlcsUt)tl(( Illy illlpa-gt-gtahl( ouk- l(slIltd III a surpri-c attack on f~$u (hluta Iarly 21 January Some of the milItia Were kll--i the otlll1r ltptulld ailil the raitilI1g party withdrew toV~)1 Potrerillos (uluIlel La~ lIela~ ordered the immediate f ann of tiw glllladH] lOI1lJlany of the 11th DaUalion and Ifr Granati(ro- a Caballo under ~IaJur Don Enrique ~Jr tint At 4 00 A~I 23 Janl1ar~ after a forced march olin milts ill 1) hotll- lajor ilallilwl rcadwd the trong hoJ~ po--ition at Los Potrerillo-- At -t 30 I without furf-a-a n~~onnai-s(~nle ht attacked till Spanidl position at ttJt-lIl 1I0111t~ Alttl a Ire lIght of ~12 hourRll1s ammunitlOll (xhw ted )( ord(rtd nAinmt111 to Vacls But the Spl ian] withdrew lir-t initially to the pa~s at La CumiJrl iatpl farlher to the west
At 7 00 PM 1 February till columll I tltllhld tht dt
(Uia-- tl(1 (IOGO() [cpt) Faoltd hy the moonlightmiddot troops IH~an their a-c~l1t to the La CumlJle pass ( ridge line) at 10 00 111 ThlY arried at the hci ~ Il) AiI 2 FtilrUHlV and dlllillg till day tonlin
Iuneallllu (U200 feet) Thilt march i pluibly the ignitilltlnL nig-ht march at -111 lllights I ccorclt~d ill h )i-talllt 11 mill a-rlllt ~WO 1(It dlS(lnt 1WO (hI a FllJruary ulone La Ihra- Onlllld 1lajtll In llh 170 Illollllttt 1I1iPnwIl and W CranlIlelos a (a to attacl tilt SplIl1-il po-gtiti()ll tuardw Vipja liasrd dpl lIitd III f() I llla I 1011 of Ioul p a provided hy a natie all the -mall fortp advanced However I)(cau~(
xtl (Ill dillkuitH- (til ()untplld along 11w routes rocky -iOPl- and uf the Ilclcsity for terrain ltlonnaignn about 15 milt Vere rcquir~d in Ittlhing Ilw Spanish p tion
38
1 06 men attaekcd the pmlishyAbout one-hnlf the fon (
and rear
iOn frontally hde the remainder D6 men advancing over Ifficu1t vcry Stt~lJ and rocky terrain struck the position in
After 11 ~ houlr- fighting 40 Spaniards fallen 49 had t-uncndered and the remainder under
L vcr of darknc- fled towtld4 Los Andes rh The main -outh column reached Guardia Vieja on 6 I~ JFebruary Shortly after nOJIl 8 Fehruary it rcachCd Santa ~ iRosa n~i)O llHjprlt) whIt 11 the Spamard- had eacuaiec till ll- duy Lefore The lOUlllll had HllOmpii-hed its initial mbshyr ~ t-I(n On 8 February l(gtI1lWdloH with the 1l00th column at Sw Felipe wa a-gtdJLd
Thl nWI( h of til Igllt (north) column
r 1 The mUlIl (right) column began its mallh from Plumshylnllo on 11 falllltlmiddotY alld nlarciHri III ltix groupgt one group J)er day leaviJg the camI) Oil 2) January after his troop~ )lad aU mOiIi (Jut GlIltlal San 1Iartin took hie departure
fr from Mendoza f The hrst tq glOUp llndel General Soier formed the
advance guard The mo-t important instructions given GenshyE ral Soler were (1) the to n of San Felipe as to be leached un 8 FebrualY (2) lOIlnnuniLatlOIl was to be estahlished ~long the rlCOlllagsl rle- with the -outh column (3)
) fhould the ituatio1 1lHi thl hostile dispo~itions and size permit it Santa Ro-a-Lo Andes was to ue attacked ( 1) it I of utmot importance that the heights of Chacashy
L )JUfO he tUIHd () lIry dTort ~hotlld he made to surmiddot llri-c and fJyelptn tl til( SpanI-h ou110ts in the Andes
rt (6) should th[ ataIHc guan be attacked by tonsiderably 1 lunerJOl 1011(- It wa-- to fall balk on Lhe following columns_ i The advalH t of tlll~ (uiumn Va executed according to
plan III Pltl or the difilcultw or terram and at the Leginning of water Hlpplr the objcdives set were reached
1 b ~~hedl1ll until the crl--t uf the Andes was reached the v yenre~lest part of the malch was made mounted on mules ) jncludIng ill( infantry1 I From Lo Paio-- San Iartin despatched a flank Jeshyt tachment of 200 Illell under Ialor Don Antonio Arcos via tj ~middotltlk lIlrmUi ClIlllga (when a Spanish po~t wa- known to IJL talIoncd) and Alto tit (usn to Lagt Alherpal1as ThiS
ftrca ~huuld be OLlllpied ltlnd defended to permit easy acces- Jpf the main body into the broad valley of Putaendo River t ~ The adaJlCl guard Itltlthld the camp eat of Cuesta (iLgt
el ~LllteJl on IltlmiddotlJruary On 1 Feuruary the detachmcllt t~ [(O- -lLulcd the dlltil at La Guardia de la- Achupalla~) n1middotpefeatin~ a force of 100 Spal1lanli defending theretk Tl1l adiun guarant(l(~d to the main force the exit from dhfhe difliLlilt mountain terrain General Soler IJushed forshyd ~ a d rapl1Jly with the aUIJmpdllying StlUaliloll and the ~d lt ntl th SquadrrlIl- Graladero- a (ahallu he speeded upjt he adanu of the inflntry awl ar1illery On 6 February t)~~ he trolll)gt of the adVallll guard tlC uilited in and north of ~Ji an Antunio de Putaelldo Captam ~e(ochea with 110 n~yen Granatlcros a Caballo wa ordered agaillst La) Coimas On l~ he morning of the 7th this force ellcountered a Spanish deshy~ t ltichment of 100 cavalry ~oo infantry and 2 cannon in a t()~ trolJg jJ(Jmiddotiltion a1 Las Cnima- General Soler immediately arm copatched reinforcemen1s-two sltiuadlon of til(gt Clanashyp~ crJ- a Caballu and two mfantry companic-l to Cq)tain
eCuchta 0icloehea howeyer dJd nol aWait the~e reinshy
Foreign Military Dige8t8
forccments lIe feigned a1douule envelopment of the Spallshyjqh position AH the envelopers approached closely he feigned failure and a wild retreat A- he contemplated the Spanish cavalry stationed on eith~l flank of the SpaniRh infantry jumped to Lhe attack and purtluit When the Granaderos a Clballo had drawn the Spanish cavalry sufficiently far from their infantlmiddot~r and artillery support they turned ~t JIIlk and demqra1izcd th( Spafli~h cavalry In the disshyorder and disruption the Spanish infantry also took to flight Th( SpaniRh force far Rupcnor in numbers fled to San Flipe There was no pur-uit by Necocheas force
The advanCegt rested on 7 February riwaiting the arshyriaJ of the main body As planned the right column reached San Felipe on 8 February the lpft column reaching Santa ROfm the -ame day After reconstruction of the bridg-c (destroyed by the Spani~h) over the Aconcagua River near San Felipe the Andes army was united on 9 February southwest of Los Andes A squadron under iIajor Melian waJ pmhed forward toard Chacabuco to observe the enemy middotand reconnoiter the terrain
By his viclorie of 4 Fehruary (Guardia Vieia) and of 7 February (Las Coirnas) General San Martin became master of Aconcagua provinc( and thereby was enabled to provide his army with supplies and additional horses On 8 February San Martin sent a message to the President in Buenos Aires in which he expressed his great regret in being unable to follow the Spanish at once but would require at least six days to secure replacements for his horses and mules incapacitated on the march from Mendoza to Los Andes Of the 1600 horses ~nd 9191 mules which began the march in spite of utmost care taken only about 500 horses and 4300 mules reached Los Andes in a usable condition
Between Los Andes and Santiago there lies but one major terrain obstacle the heights of Chacabuco These heights form a half-moon shaped ridge between 4500 to 7200 feet high extending from east to west and forming a connecting- link between thp AndeR and the coastal range The north (Jopes arc very steep the south slopes are much gentler dolted with small hill and receding gradually to Chacabuco
As they reLired from San Felipe to the south the Spanshyiards occupied the heights neal elevation 1820 with 2 comshypanies and 25 cavalrymen in order to block the route
When General del Pont learned on 9 February of the results of the engagements in the Aconcagua and Putaendo valleys he di reeLed that all forces Routh of Santiago asshyemble there to defend the cit) and he despatched Brigadier laloto with to half battions Lo Chacabuco Maroto arrived at Chacabuco the evening of 11 February he pershyqonally lodl to lhe 10 tomjJmlie~ on the norlh slopes (1820 elevation) and ordered them to defend to the utmost Only whenihalf their force VDS decimated were they authorized to withdrHw On 12 FebruaJT MaroLo intended to occupy the heights with hig entire force
Meanwhile San Mnrlin had sent two esp(cially well qualified guidc8 to Santiag-o who kept him informed of the Spanish movements On 10 and 1] February two engineer oHicers protected by v ~quadron of cavalry reconnoitered the heights and the hotllilc position The weRt slopes (1432
39
On
C amp (SS Quart
Ol-liggins Thi~ attack pushed through and into the artillery position~ Cannon Were cut down with the bel As the cavalry charge in proglC--s the leading clements (2 rifle companiCfI) tsoIPl~ loillllllJ whost advancp hH1 bllll accelerated tati(d lillwisl the hft liallk of the Spaniards many whom Cdl 10 the hayonet The stalT and llh Squa middot(iranadelo a Caballo U1Hll Major Necochea had In
farther w(gt1 almot sirnulLallcously with the other aU Ill HI ruck thl SplIlish left rear The-e three attacks aga t IH Spanihh Ipft and rpar ltlu-eo confusioll and disorder HTPat lo~-l on thi~ flaJlk -0 that OHiggins second at
af~ailll t 111 lil~ht fnUlld a much dbcOl1certed and u Plteruy-rl-1I11 -Iompiett ~lIlT~- The Spaniards attack~lt ril
middotkl1rei~ lIilitarg Digests
melp-) tPIHlll~d mon -uiLlhle fol tlll a ccnt than thu tllt-lt
(22n Jilt~lt)
Ull I FlIJrUl1 olt of the gmde-gt returned with inshyformatlfll fn l1i~lhd Ly an agtnt ill Santiago It wa) an cxtrad of ( lWl ~d rj 1 j1oHl~j f)dEl (lopiNI 111 hih own oOle-e) which dirtlltd till JIIIJt of ftillfonlmPllh to (haclshyUuco (()IlqUllltiy hiI aft(lllo(JIl (11 FdJluary) San lll~t II (tll t h- lJ Irdllltlt (oJlltlllaquondtI~ anci -ttltd thal I had j t 11 In flll)ti IldlIlI)H] 11) attal ] 1 Felnuary lllI 1]middot [)i(l IJtlld lllJt Ill lull nmiddotad- ulltil then hut llll Jll -iillln 11llrn SdlfldO dt111lIldld Iarli(1 action ThIll (1111 III hld (jltlll~1 d ili- pltl 1I1d vutild IWllth Ith d IUJ Jll p [d fill J ~ lttll llal ilj~aJlhl till (nelll) III
flrdr 10 did( k luJIl iH r Illt lIt (luld hap to f()nl~()
11Ilj II LIIIJ dll i 11( I)uld )it thv Imiddotllm no tillle to Initl Ill Jl I III Iltuld cilf(al lum ill udad
Till lldl IIJl tidlLd III tVII C(JII1l1111 The lI l qltllll ([U rd OIqiJlh wilJ 1~I()I lllt 11 (1 ~t2d tlld ~d
Squad rOil Ilf Llll (ldllltilnJ a (tullo Illiantry bllshytalj(lIh I 1]1t S (( h ith [our rllll COl11ptlllll- and tO
gllll) had til mi ioll )f tiXlll~ the (l1lm~ III [rullt The ( 1 OlHlll11 rWItl ~()ltr 1111 ~10() 1l111l (the ~tafr ami
Uh Sqtladloll If tll( dllultJn (abalJo lllLullly Igtatshylditlll I dlill 11 Idd 1gt1 IOllr rillE- lllPlllit- Oil gTlIlLdil1 tlld (111( 1( ldllld ~llllmiddot( I ltl)lllldll Ill gIllIldlel awl ret(Jllshy
1lImiddot-dHI (lllllIIlH of inLllltlY IJattali()ll~ 7 and 8 and t~1l Itllh) hld till 1ll1lnll of atlaeldllg tlw ho-tili ]pft (11) llll lllcl 1IHlllllg I Ill d(tl~]()ll
lt llI) ~l 12 February the UiYIIlCC IJlg lll IIlItially
III Illlt C(I1111111 Srdlr I fUlljgt ivldillg Ollig-gingt ~ent illshy
llllllY )llldllll ~ to till la~t ttl gll tIlt impnlull to the 1llllIl) 1 htl 1hI 11lt1 1dl rwht would 1)[ Pllvtloplf1 and lllcishydl Iljtlly to tll(l thp ho-tij( atttntlOl1 aay from the actual (middotInI11111t1ll1 -I()l Sldtormiddot Cldul11ll turned to the southwcst ()IIirl~IIl ll)lllillUed --I)ulh Oil the Chalaouco -lopes ) II ijlll Jllitl 1111 --jllll h 1-1 (lft) Iillk and 111 a
h1 p lJilllt I dilir droL il hack TIll Spltlllitrcl ithdllw 1) lILt ()tllh jllll-uld )- tIll hl Squadlon (ralladCro a (Iiltllo TllI reinftlrlvlllllh UlHlPr (rn(ral Malolc) had I Ill Ulltlll If) nmiddottl1l 1111 htighh of Chacauuco as the results II tIll lIl)W nt 111 hlltlll IHI1l )JI)oo ()J(knd the tlClUshy
II tlllIIjlcilllt 1( jHI-III111l nlllt2-)Jllilt IlOlthof(middothallshyLIIUJ (lll) Tlll~ plt1 1tlllj) aiHlllt t Ulllt III width IJiolktd ill J(-~ Ill ll 1tlJll arm lllll tiIp plains
San Iartw tlllh()fJId ()IIiggin to pur-lIe Ith illshyf~lllry hat1all)Jl x1hc SI)tlllard IIceing- from the Chacahuco hi hllI)11 unti( r IIIJ (JlHill lIn to hrillJ ol a 1~1lItrd llIgtg(shy
HWllt again t ht IW JlIJ illfJll until thl (tva]ry had passed th II tilc Iyillj~ 1)( 1laquo111 tlw height which had JU~t iHrn tlkl II ltd tll l)fh1tiIJIlIIIupifd l)y ilw forc( I)f 1lroto Bu1 () II WFlll 11 h a )lrlll1W din to ~wUle this thing himelf dJll1JlJt (Ji)t till f)rdlr~ II( advancld with hattaliolls 7 ami Illll lhf poilion and Ililn a wI11 plallllld nnc1e(lIkd
lin hnth inflIltry and arlill(ry His troop ufT1rillg gllat Ill I -11( ICJf(Imiddotd II) vilhdraw San Martill himplf apshyIWiln d 1)1] Ill 1i1leI wit h 1111 i~t awl 2d SquadrolJ ( ralla~ tilmiddotrO a fahallq alld l tl1l Spulih (tvalry awl illfalllry aclvtll(illg ill pur Ult 1)1 OHiggins furce lIe orclprcd Soler to attack h~ h iJ Ift lIank imm((lially hil h Jlrshy-I(lnally led thpound two quadr()ll~ III attack for the rclilf of
40
from Ibn sidt Jlghl to form a square bUl UJlsucccifull~-gt Vild flight to jhl -outh followul (enclal ~(Jlcr launcI~ u~ hi malJl forle ill Jur-uit TIll cavalry pursued 1) mil
T af
0
-Oll h of ChacalJllco Spalli-h lo~~es 600 dend over 6 r(aptnld J OO() rillr~ 2 canllon and all the traingt
And Army lJad 1~2 killed and 177 WOllIHkd ~RI
Thi IOllg prpparatiolls the well planllPd mea-urea irf I e (
the gTlat On-lnlZlr Irailler and cxccllCllt comrnClIH CI S~ C ar Marlin jt)HlId lill fruition in th( hattie of Chalabuco t~
II htory llconl (w hattie with far r middotching polf ~~ cal COII-tltLIlIHl- This baltllt ~ho()k the Spanlh mat~i-middot an at its root gltlVP 1lH maJor portion of Chile it frCcdom a~~ art gutlank(d -tit(I-- to till -tnwglps by Argelltina for in~ tar pcnd~ncc It paved thl way for further operations agairt f1 tl the Spanish ill PCIU f all
The CJoSlllg ords of Sail Martins mcsagc to the COU~fhE eil ill fhwllOS Air( wlittLll 22 Fcuruar- Vcre thcc tiJr ~hall be forevlr the glory of the Army of the Andes thatflaquoU81 21 days it lomplltld a campaign crossed the highest mo~l~ee bin chain (If thL earth closed accounts with the tyrant ar~ frc(d Chilcgt ijsel
After Chalahucll thc Spanianh con-idcl(d furthpl le toe lance profitless During the I1lght 12-13 February H~f t (vtcuatNI Santiago and 11((1 to Vaiparain (GO mill~s) Fl1ilJe here ome Were tlanported by ~hiJl to PQlu others to SOLt~a Chile (TalcaiJualla) The artillery p(rk at Cuola ll-tlll Prldo [Pll into tht hand~ of fan Ilartlll ~~e
Vlwll 0ltln lIla1 ill lealned during the Illght 13- _ c~ February or 1lw Jlight of all Spanish otlicbls r]())n Sant hL dLpatchLd Captain Aldan wit h 30 Granadcros a Cab ill puruit alld prompt Iy tarleti the remaillder uf his lHovilW Oil -altlit~() II elltered tht tity Oil lhl Iah g
by tnlllendou- delllollstration from the pOllulace Iflth San llallin wa ChOSlJl to Ul SllllCmc Direct() ltflhld tillt hOllol llll prnpnld (Plwrai OHiggins ho prornptly lielled Oll 1he 16th
C(n(ral dpi Pont a tely -ick mall and his immc (lItollnlJ~l Wll lapturld --oulh or Valparaiso the night of FtbltwlY and hrought hae] tn -antiago
III ~()lIlh Amlrica lrilits charge San Martin with roll()iIlJ~ llIilII- aftt) hi ictolY at Cl1acabuco
(1) Failure to 1lru rtlcnllcssly with all his forces
(2) [he advance Oil Santiago evacuated by the Sp on 1~ Fcbrwuy rather than directly on VaillllaiRo to off the Spanbh access to the sea at
(3) Failure to launch a campaign immediately against alCllhuano (south of Santiago) where-the Spmish had good esources strong positions and excellent harbors
4) Failure in these particulars resulted in the Spanish ning masters in parts of Chile for more than a year
Foreign Military Digests
Right column Plumerillo to San Antonio de Putaendo 223 miles executed in 17 marching days or an average of over 13 miles per day
Plumerillo to Santiago 301 miles in 27 days (elapsed time) 01 an average for the leading echelon of over 11 miles
Y1 ore dI ~) In answer the author writes 0~11 The crossing of the Andes demanded from both leaders ~Ct tnd men tremendous will power and physical endurance ~~~t ltAfter he united his army in the Lo Anum area San iIartin ~ lionsidercd a halt of six days nCCCRary to get up all his artil shy~ fery to procure animaf replacements and to provide his t~ i troops with proper food and mpplics Yet thi- Cxtraordinshyc~ 4rllyactive and capable commander after but two days rest ~ Ihunchcd his tired troop~ in attack at Chacabuco in pursuit ~ tk Santiago and dcspatched a moullted purmit force to the
coast t Based on the information he received 11 February Sail
1 Martin knew that hii opponent was a~scmbling his troops for the defense of Santiago He multt assume that such a
~~ defense would be made not that the Spalllsh forces would tharch off to Valparaiso the night of 12-11 February without living battle Had San nartin had timely information of
0_ this Spanish move it might perhaps have been posihle for t- Ban Martin with orne of his force to have fltgt(tched Valshyz ~arafs6 simultaneously with the Spaniards but it b an old r ar experience that the pursuer ~eldom marches as fast 11 ti the purllcd 11orpove1 the march of tl1P Aneles Army on
Valparaiso might well hwe been a blow in the 111 On the G other hand the occupation of Santiago guaranteed ~upplies for the tired army ~toppecl plundering by the mobs and
It guaranteed the early provision of a new government for the r treed country
The Spanish reaction in the area south of Santiago made iLelf felt under the capable leadership of Colonel Ordonez
c- To COlmteract thil1 San Martin de~patched Colonel Las Hera~ t~ at the head of ] DOD infantry cavalry and artillerymell to r ~e south with the mision of defeating and dispersing the oJ ~anish San Martlll himself had lt1 g-reater objective in ypmd The freeing of (hile was Jut a preliminary step in t~e emancipation of Peru where Spaill ma-icry had ib
3 i tpcal point But for an undertaking aglinst the Spaniards(if Peru the forces thCll ill (hill were wadclJuaic H(gtipi trom nch BUPllOS Airc~ wa~ Hccc--ary in order to provide at the ealiIt-t a Heet hl(h III turn would se(ure masitr of
rr ~e Pacific and thereb -eCllle the Chilean and Peru~ian e~ tlt Therefore a ~onth after Chlcabuco San Martin t elled to Buenos Airclt to lay hi- case b(fore the power
Overcoming many obstade he -ucceecied in hl~ misshyon and on 20 August 1820 the army under San Martin d the fleet under Admiral Lord Cochrane all told 8 warshyipl 17 tralJiports 4000 men iailed from Valparaiso
t ward~ Peru f t The campaign in Chile demoll-gttluted the great cap ashy
t~lilie of San Martin his far-seeing preparations his dttermination of purpose his indomitable leadership
8 L A brief Rtatement of the march accomplishments of the l oop~ would ~eem in order nl~ In the plans and ord(rs ilt-ued by General San Martin e marchc to be excculed daily and the reullH of lhe road
ater wood and pasturage reconnaissanccR are recorded
and for the 2d 3d 4th and 5th echelons 185 192 20 and 13 miles per day
Left column Plumerillo to La Villa de Santa Rosa Qxecutcd in 10 marching days or an average of 166 miles per day This column marched a total distance to Santiago of 217 miles
The question might be asked What would be the inshyfluence of modern organization and equipment on an operashylion ill the Andes today It must be remembered that these mountains rise to great elevations (12000 to 23000 feet) that the valleys are often narrow and steep That fliers gas or tanks would prove especially effective against a force marching in multiple columns and echeloned in depth is questionable Of course the picture changes once the force reaches Los Andes That the movements of the columns could and would be observed by observers in planes is probshyable and that the hostile high command using rail and motor transportation could concentrate his forces to strike the still gtcparated columns is possible and probable
Autogyr08 and wireless would faciHtate the communishycation~ and spy report service Parachute troops especially in defiles might be employed with surprise by both attacker and defender Modern engineers and engineer technique would certainly relieve many route difficulties
IS IT NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MOUNTED FORMATIONS IN THE CAVALRY
[dFautmiddotli consel vel des formations a cheval dans la cavulcrie By Lieut Colonel Dario Condensed fOm RevH de ClLvalcnc January-February 1938]
By MAJOR L K TRUCOTT JR Cavalry
A question disagreeable to cavalry ears Belgians reply in absolute negative England 50 mechanized tends to total mechanization Germany retains but a single large unit a brigade in east Prussia Considering the question may lead to useful reflections
The idea of substituting motor for horse came logically a result of the waf From its beginning the horse was forbidden the battlefield Haelen sounded the knell of the doctrine of mounted combat by large units The years 1917 and 1918 saw tanks cross fire-swept zones penetrate hostile di-position sow disorder and put enemy at the mercy of infantry-a role of cavalry masses for centuries Off the battlefield cavalry transported maneuver masses rapidly over great difltances the truck transported greater masses more rapidly over great distances The truck permitted the audacious wide and sustained play of reserves that characshyterized 1918 During the critieal days of 1918 when large cavalry units engaged dismounted llrmored cars in gaps contacted and surprised enemy columns informed oriented and rallied elements of withdrawing troops On the battleshyfield the molor was sucessfully substituted for the horse
However at the end of the war the horse had argushyments In March 1918 what but mounted formations could have regained contact as quickly with German rear guards
41
C amp GSS Quart
of HCrU-iS the area devH-tatrd by them In April 1)]8 what ehw could have moved lPinforc(ment to the north aeros the communications of Engli~h annie preparing for the new battlc ~lonths latef what eJ(middot could have clung to retreatshying- German-- acro-- ruins ami lilid~ of FlandPlmiddot Vhat else could haccfOS(middotd 1hf 1llkll1 nllllllldll lllrntll I1ulg-arialJshy
dGerman rcojtance fOlccd capitlilati()lh ill a few hour and reachrd the Danulw III a fn ((1 Vhat of innul11Clabh patrol- gliding aco wood and mar h -willlmillg river-- (Irarillg uJ-taclt- -Ilmiddot1Jlj~ tlw P1wmy ithout J)pinf~ won or heard di-cIJ--JIlV hi Ill) lnHlIh IHnding entin da~ JUlIll hb lim and rltnrllltW iJy dt-Vi()lh route with rich lllfo] shy
mlti(JJl
If it llm( d (Jgcd to ~UlJ-tJtllte Illllt(lr for ho re 11lt ub 1 it lit if1I (an 1)( finly parI wi and dl)( lnt l1JIorabl~
tonrifllIll til hqJ~ It Illlghl )( jllllnp If Ihp]( W1
actllally all all IflTtlll middotdll(middot Ej)(middotri(middotllcl ha- (alrnl(
Pllthultjam and pa- ~ lull 10dll ( h nO t ht t t Iwlt Ill)
mcchaniz-ed all hlT~llll that till 111 tt-rr(lll llllcle is likely to proglt off r()ad Il arJIlV dcgru I(onling to the modr of llopllllOll Jut aha~ lp-trirtrrl alld alway at great coj that th( all tprraill i lprtain tfmiddotrrmiddotain
By dlpllllll nrp pnwer at at ild -=prr(l rfady for inshytant actioll l11t motor 11Iin~ lll Illlhnprd onlutinn to thc problem of lili0(JII of In illld 1ll0tnwnl It spr( el proshyttdioll and an1allHllt hac changld COllClitlOn~ of reCOllshyllaiance llld cOlltar fxtlnding- the ladill~ of action ill width and dr-pth Tn 11anpo1t -qwrd and radiu l)clmit acshycclcratin~ mU-emcllt- to the front and incrcaillg di-tallceo tu thc rear TI1U~ the motor ha~ mudified preyiou concepshyt iOll of lxplqit ing (ontact ~(curity orgtllizat ion awl fUllctlOl1111g of erdce It has changcd combat and malllll shyycr iJy modifying nwthoci of ((cu1io11 lllcl rflldrring- posshy~ihlp what forn1lrly wa lut Certain ulclat ions ill South ~loror(() and cry JlTobahly till ~ampaig-n in Aby--dnia are not diflicult opprationlt madp etlsipr by tllt( of motor thl~
arl oJlpratioll lill1ll1wht haYI Ill(n imp()ssih1e without thlll1 But Ow motor hac rlgnrnuo limitntionlt
JUf rhlliifgtl lilll it(lf 1111 middot~I()tlll~ CoIl0IW]( a Iltioll of ga- cl(t(Jmilwrl ill Ilature and quantity mopovpr importfL The ration allows lwitw -Ilbotilution 1101 rpchHliol1 For maintenance tl1l molor rcquin~ at dcilllitp lpriod work llld
replacement which ~ufTer neither --ubstitution nor reducshytion Repair-today Htth more than lx(hallf~p of worl
part for lH-nCjuill 1Hcial parb ill -IlPcial quantity for pach model of vehicle At a particular time lacking tlw-p parts IPpbCNllfllt lt- hours of worl goa tilt motor -tops slrvicp Thpll alf 110 motors tapahlL of fllrthCr (1shy
vice 011 -hort allowance or orn out provided they lecciv(- (JJ1~id(rati()n and tolerance thpre are motor Jlfrf(ctl~
ltpn(d thai move or motor that do nol mo(-
)IojoJ formation mwt he emploYfd within a limitCd definitely kllO1l radith (JI tied to road on a system of cir shyCulat ill Ir10PIlWllt and ImpJoymPIJt of dT(( ini an hound to rcql1inmcntlt of maintel11I1Cl (omba1 engines arc vulshynerable antitank cannon and mille ravagf thpir nlllk After (om hat a -plciai sl1ice must immcdia1rly collpei and repair damaged matpripl and failure ri-lo~ losing costly mat~ricl that could have been restored to service
l(ITll1U limit((iols-DiHpiacement of automotive v cles dependsmiddot upon consistency of ~oil and aosence ~tacles Lacking bridges rivers are alnmlute obstac moulltaini marshy cOLlntries WtHlls or in had wea llOgtS-(otlllt lY vehich)K must middot(ck loul~ 1 hlre1or( mo dt-fPlui UpOI1 nature alld dllhitv of roadlt
Fllllc it)lIIl liltlf([tif)I-~ From chicles armored nary or moto]cyeit oh(lvatioli is poor while in moe 011 Ul( other hand (Iliclfs an eaiiy seen and marc iward Vphicl-s a1( cllmIHISOHl- (olumn- an dim aswmblf put ill march swlter conccal break up disaUvfllltagtS forbid u-e for short distances Vehicl column arc (gtxposed to ambuh and depending UpOIJ
of vlllltlaililily to all forms or --urprise (~ 01 r C
bull
rc Consequently While pos-iLiJitics of the motor renamp ~ W
Its lIiC as 11lCCSsary a~ powdcl thc motor has disadvantarj ( that limit and at timegt forbid Hi employment IIechann ~ j~
formations have takell IloSltCsioll of the battlefield forbidd-- Ol
to the horse Alotol formations arc taking over rapid f 1f( diitant trmlipOlt of nla(i Left to thcms(lv(s CV(-11 elI - nl billCd t1l(se formations lend thcmwiv(-s hadly to details itl actions their (ontacf g-ivc- only a ~Jl(cial definition tJ ~ calillot be dil(etly [xploitcmiddotd by 01 hel I roop they hi 1 diHkulty ill maintaining- contact once matlc For short ~ Oni placement of motor formatio1l (lltrmkillg security circihn latioll alld detlucking COl1sUnle ~Hlantag(gti of spre ~ Mechanized formation cannot operate within h(~avy COYt
Motorcycles while invaluable f() communication Hnd 1 for distant surfacE reconnaissancE are of questionah cill1(y fot sc(urity during approach and contact F mOllntains marsh~ reg-ion certain brollten and cover area like tllO-1e found ill the north an foruiddftl motonmiddot formati011s unle~R exits are as~urrd thev are forbid~ mechanized formatiolls cxcept in grllCral ~ alignment 0 ill progressing fron1 Demolition ompromi=c movem(llt5~ both unforesecn they cause massing that adation will n14
mortal Fog freeze snow can immobilizc entire f tions finally failure in circulation ~uppJy or maint exposes motor formatioJ)4 to (ompl(10 paralysis restrictions an ppccially leti( ill offplliv( manCu(gtfpound in defensive situations tlw dlfCndtl is usually master oft terrain his r(a1 and security
Thll(fon if then i Ilccd 1111((1 all eilc1l111stl11CCc force mOle rapid 1han infantry a Huhl ltllHll1lastic c III lll 1 to t IlP motor is ll(((ar~ 1hii cOlllplenWl1t (all the horse While Ihe field of battle i forbidden to the I the approach is less forbidden than to th~ truck units have not 111( illPrl ia of automobile units tlwy ltlimir vulilllability by formations and rapirl dislWlsions Til patrnl alone arc capahle of a~sl1ring- full l)(onllais~a
l(l1~dll fol tlllt illfa1l1JY Tlwitmiddot (ollj~l(t is Jilp thal fantlY and is immpdiaiply lltiliablc wit hout t lanspor TJ1Pil (OIlIJllllS sllppJp and fluid call crOSH womb and impfl1pt rahl(l foJ motors or terrain broken by demol JlflHtratl mountaill labyrinths Rwim rivers Final horse finds suhsistfll(p nrarly rlrywhclC Th( horse ltlllr~i fatif~l1e and fJriat ions hc S(-lVCS (-VCll wh perfectly HClved i a worn horse column drags l)elhaps but moves and a few days rest will reestablish it SU11plcn~
horse units their fluidity their simplicity of mainten3
particularly to circumstances and terrain forbidden r formations Motor and horse are therefore com pleshyone to the other portion between hor~e and mOLor involves all the of national defcn~e such a~ the nature of the ar
esecn the general orientation of operation~ density middot infantry possible nature of terrain and climate in theaters
Foreign Military Digests
In an organization born of the war on the West~rn Front of reinforcements individually justified we have reached the point where the division which by origin and definition should bn the smallest group of combined arms thai can be efficiently employed can move only by breaidng up and forming mixed groups WOlse-not special to the cavalryshyin desiring to put these unitA in position to fight new means
i f operations clcdits and pel~onll(l Clvailabl( for the ~ otor i~ costly in money and effective national resources
articulally breeding which imposei a millinmm of (ffcctives n time of peace finally on the degree in which conduct of arcan be left to mercy of ~uppIi~1 that depend on the molshy
lle of the real and good will of fOlcignrll COlllequently jlJ]utlOilS difler in different countries Belgian will differ trom British or German Olll- may diiTCl from othergt The iwo nations that have gone farther in favor of til( motal are VlOse faced with particular war cfmditioll Delgiurn (gtnshy11-agcs only a defensive action waiting intervention hy dlied forces Great Britain counts on air and -ca fleet fol insular protection maintdnc a colonial army for defellse and if it ~ngages in a continental war chooses its conditions In a +tuatlOn Ib defini~Et the German ~oltltioll j less dcgtcided
)lo1e in question iq how to ernploy our remaining horse unit for thcir role is not the 8ame a formerly Admitting that the missions of cavalry are unchanged the motor can ~ke over some of them thelefore tlH missiongt do not (xist 1()r hone formations alone From that we can (ollcei(~ the
tV role of hOI-e formations under to forme a normal - ole hich vill do what the motor call1lOt or which the horse n do more easily at less cost or at 1(-gt risk an eventual
~ole which will be to supply momentary defic~cncic- of autoshygtllOblie formations ~ This employment demand light and fluid unit able to ~lter through woods climb mountain slopes penetrate rohell and covered country where the motor cannot and
middot ihere ucres will be not to the strongct5t but to the first f annmiddote This u~c requjre~ supple and plastic units thai l n (stablieh and maintain contact without gap even on a I oing front so thai infantry can determine when to end s approach march and properly orient its deployment middot nit capable of cooperating with moto fOJmations llch a~ y con-titutillg a pivot of maneuver for a motorized maneushy
ering force unit- capable of making up for deficiencies of otorized and mechanized formationc of taking great idths I)f accompli5hing far from -UPPOll mi ~ion~ that may
ad to actions in force and for that capble of absorbing ~~_ overfu reinforcements Will not our cavalry division in which 16 squadrons of ~ ounted men are a minority in effectivES and volume be tmiddotmiddot ore adapted to the eventual role than to the 1100mal Theyt rc eq~ipp(d for independent action they havpound mean~ of peratmg far from support mean of force provisionF ~ helon services engineer mean They are powerful but eavy But large cavalry units that could execute a distant id during the war as that over more than 100 kilometers
om Macedonia to the Danuhc which cut an army from its ~~ il1e and captured cities wac a formation without baggage lt artillery and which aHllted and received no other ~Hlpp1ies
an horseshoe nails dropped by airplanes To fulfin such mission we should abandon the modern cavalry division
we havc not taken into account that they might and should fight with their support
The molor diminished needs but thcre was more to do Motorizing trainfgt by replacing wagons by truckR increases weight because the truck is heavier and more cumbersome than a wagon and require~ more to supply maintain and reshypair it What would have lightened immensely would have been to comdder that trucks in a few hOllrs over hundreds of kIlometers can deliver to units when required equipment that had to be carried at a11 times when trains were animal drawn Similarly if mechanization for horse regiments has no other purpose than to provide antitank means and greater armament it iR a drawback but if we consider_that enemy tanks arc a threat only where Ollr own can operate then mechanization can be for cavalry the ideal antitank mean- prCRent when needed absent when not In Ruch case to Rive horse unitR support of mechanization is to reinforce and protect and not to weight them Mechanized fractions operating with horse units can be used under circumstances terrain and conditions where employment of mechanized mas~es would be impossible There is difference in employshying a platoon of armoled vehicles on a long forest road vhere cavalrymen scout the flanks and employing- a long column incapable of observing its own flanks
Considering capabilities of the motor aerial as well as terrestrial horse formations should be reorganized The influence of employment of motors not only on distribution of cavalry missions but on the mission~ themselves should furnish a basis and orientation
We observe at once that the role of mobile fire reserves primordial at one time i~ no longer peculiar to the cavalry Ve note that missions of exploration no longer have place of first rank which was once theirs Rapidity and intensity with which situations change today have lessened interest in information obtained by exploration Further to hope to obtain information other than by ~udden contact with powershyful mechanized means risks being a dangerollR illusion The offensive can draw only the same advantag-c from rapid means of transport as the defense
On the other hand the primordial impurtance of securshyity misRions is always increasing security of the commander for there iR rhd of being caught and losing liberty of action nt great dhtance Recnrity of troopR for the approach march should begin at a distance with nttendant risk of lORing direction intermingling and fatigue
These obgervationR may lead to stopping nrguments with infantry where cavalry risks mobility without hope and to abandoning the costly mirage of uexploratlOll and pure cavalry mis~ion~ which by cruel irony fall more and more mto the domain of the motor Further these observation~ may puint out the very real necessity of distant security
Without going as far as the Germans who divided large cavalry units into reconnaissance groups the formula may
43
11shy
its~ e
4
Foreiiin Jlilifary Digests
be found in a modernized version of the old firt1t linc brigade rlhe character of distant ~(curity relative proximity of inshyfantry po-3ibility of rapid reinforcement oppose all tempshytation to weight llllit~ TIH llecessity of covering a corp front imposp till pffpPiin minimum The llCcesity of operating- in ~mall dpjachlllellb fiuin a nch suhaltern
(cadre vanld 1Om (Jf rl1l~si(JllS ohligation of maYleuver l1(c-ldty 01 ab~orhilJg reillforc(m1lllb fn(IIlPntly rt~qtlir(-
same nchllC-- ill ~uperi()r cadrL-- othing -hould hindtl groupillj 1)[ ullit tor mb ioll- of another Jlatlln and of reinforeilW tlllIll tmporaJily with splcially Il(te-~ary
meangt
Tilt IH ctalJ 111111--- hould lH tilt diiloll WIth two 1)1 three ilflre nyimellt a nlPchanLed n)J~imlllt 1lllCarily lfJmprbiJlJ~ a Jqwlrfnl lilt Itank annanHlIt a ~r(lllp of a1shytilhr~ nlflrl(r ratHr thlll gUllgt 1 --ignal detachment all
lttntilInlaft d( tadlJlfllt a II cqtllPPld -talT IIorLregishyl1Hllts proitif-d WIth l trolW platooll (Jf motorcycle megtshy~(llgers would he fltlwrYh IwIlI ill motor anri train- lomhat trlIlI- hould lw It~t()l(d tn tilt m()hilit~middot of unit~ hy
rdulning- to animal drawn m(an~ (cttain ~ubdlvl~lOn~ 11(h as tIl( ~pahi~ hI) ~ri D1ollntalllllfs should Il equipPld and traiwd t() mount arfan
In piact (If tItI Ij Cl airy livjiJlh a Tlattr Iluml)l flf 11Or~p f()rmtllolh pll III hmd mnhilp lIpple and light without 1lt11W tt1 ()tld lllrlllit fllrnhhlllg large units Pllgagillg ill d(Icafl IlWntIIClS with thL dbtant -ecurity rrrillired 1111-( -amp formatIOn- grouped or alone would bl able to 11lrfllrm Ill miloll- formerly deolving 011 the eaalry divll()lI~ Furtlwr tht~ would be able 10 cooprrate with mol)r f()nll~ti()Il ~llllplenllllt them or in (1lte of need to talt (IVlr l part ()f tlIP front In a implpound comhination would be found the rolf and place of the two clements that Join today in giving (lyalry it mohility and power thp motor and tIlt hor~(
Torn from th~ (Olltrlfllttllll that tries at Olllpound to make 1l1lllJll Id IJlI Jlt I tlld nllllllllIIlll( cmiddotalry hecome lig-ht waill hy illlluIJoll thl tlJr-l fOrillatioll- would again take the hahit of malleUHr a la legere They would find again for applll at ill 11 ill JJnd(ln ~IIITolll(ljnJ~ old qualities that dpldo ld li~ht tIO()lb ill the so-calpd war of advanced jlo-h Thb (Julcllw t)f J-Tlat advaJ1ta~~p to iJlfantry which would altJ I)(lon)( mUWl rahl The dcvplopmcnt of scienshyt Ijllt mean hould lalt rather than wcaken the orignal characteritic of tlw old arm fir~l l)((aup they arc aided ll a(j(Jl1 and nJipmiddottd of dutIl seco1ld olcausc to assure th pr(Liioll and illcd IIPcP-ary for employing meant) more lod nlOll varitri qnall unit and regiments mut be taken from a lomph~middotily alld f1n~anic instahility that accommushydal( n(gti1lwl intruclioll Jlor mailltenance
It i noi a qu(lion of 1(Ilrllilll~ to th( tlntiq11 -implishy(Ifmiddot of Hl( thrr f arm- 1111 11 i lHIls-aIY to OITPct an Illshy
vtllizd ion which by fortf of (ir(mn-taJlcP- was lealizNi h (dr)J11rl- lIld q(middotE~ EOIT(middot(tions New fOlmaiionH )11111 ~ajn in knowing llwir matprifl l)(tiP) and mort quilhlJ in acquirinr practice and in testing results As for old arm collahoration with nlO(icrn lllgil1(-l should be a rshyf urn Iq prllHiplC and to making he-t use of particular rnall~ III a flIOl( r(stricipd field indIvidual qualities will ltipjfrmiIlP tlm~clv(s
C amp GSS Quart
THB INBVITABlLlTY OF CONTINUOUS FRONlli
[La fntnlitc dt-s fronts continus By General RoullurroJ CondpJ1sPu from HClr Jl1litajlC SlIiEM Declmher 1D37]
By MAJOn T R PIIILLJlS Coa~t Al tllllry CorJl~
We shall not recommence trench warfare is a fa refrin to all who lived througPt it But what do they about it
It wa the effect of caUHes already old but none iJelli(erants had paid attention to them
The queHtion whether it will be in our power to p the formation of continuous frontgt and the trenches characterize them depends upon the survival of the cau~
An anonymous author in a gttudy on the evolutionf tadics wrote in 1891 We do not agree with those ill claim that the offensive hue lost nothing of its value defensive is not as has been said an attitude whose a 2
resides in purely defcmdve advantages It has virtues And further One of these lines (one oft t 18 opposing fronts) unable to xucceed in front will attemp ~
envelop the other this one in his turn will prolong rd front and it will he a race as to who can extend the Ir( t r within the limit permitted by hi effectives 01 at I~ 5- things would develop that vay if Ol1e could extend indt~ O-J nitely but nature imposes obstacles The line will stoP~ier point of support the -ea a mountain range or the front of a neutral nation t
Thece prevision- were unheard in the concert ofmiddot e ~ thoritativc voices proclaiming the headlong offensive tical instruction continued to spread the blind offensive the first combats of 19J1 The prophetic sense of a wa eonfticting- so violentlv with current ideas had motivat anonymity of the author He was revealed in 1914 as Lii Colonel Emile lIlayer to whose reputation as a miliu writer nothing neeuH be added now
On friendly terms with 1I1arshals Joffre and Focht Jng
had vainly sought to make them understand his ideas l~n ( This ancient history is not without interest at it m er
when certain spirits attempt to turll aside the 11fCOCClI t of a new war of trenches by hypotheses on the causes Htabiliation of 1914 Can one not see states one the r l of a series of accidental causes or of General Falkenh ft particular conception of the conduct of war ~I
In theHc two cases there is no reason for th( eff((~ a the (au~(s which have disappcareu lo occur anew ~7
No on would dare hold that the realiation foreseen more than twenty years in advance and foJ irreproachable logic was the result of fiimple coincide of chancC
As for the hypothesis of the personal influence l~ral von Falkcnhayn on stabilization it appears to be d hy his first acts a~ mprtmc command) of tlll Ge armies 12 September J 91-1
Aetually fter mid-September he orltllrcd the Gc Fifth Army lHt WPl1l the MCUHC and the Argonne to adv An analag-uliH order wa~ given at the same time to the de ment of General von Strantz to mo( from the region of toward the heights of the Meuse These movements m fesUy had as object the investment of Verdun The displayed by the troops charged with these missions sho that they were stopped after inconteHtable tactical succ
OlXVlI No 70 Foreign Military 7Jigests
ot by order of the Supreme Command but by the resistance ey encountered
~ We are thus led to recognize that the formation of conshy~nuous fronts in the Varld V~ar was the logical consequence a higher causes Lieut Colonel Mayer indicated them in
91 Are they still effective They arc (1) the power of rmmet particularly favorable to tile defensive and (2) ~ e increase of man power in modern armies Both have olved since the World War but uniquely in the sense of ~gmentation This first verification is decidedly of a $ture to lead to the belief that it~ consequences have fo1shy1bwed the same progres~Honi The essential characteristic8 of modern materiel appear ~confirm this iirst supposition Ve shall examine from this ~int of view the actual possibilities of artillery aviation ~echanjzation and motorization and finally of gas These are the branches of modern materiel whose perfection since the war might lead to serious modifications of the tactics of lin8 i When we took the field in 1914 ranges in exces of 7700 ~rds were considered exceptional for artillery The greatshy4t range of French cannon was about 11000 yards for the JfJ5mm long and 3000 or 4000 yards more for the German IlO-mm_ The range of the giant German and Austrian howshyItzers dId not exceed 13200 yardR i Artlllery observation posts ere always diRtant from the objectives and the uncertainty of unobserved fire genshyJaBy prevented its employment In the courxe of the war CI~tiation coming to the help of terrestrial observation pershy- ltted the use of observed fire from the extreme range of e guns Careful ballistic btudies supplied the methods of efficacious map fire especially by the me of concentrations of fil-e
under these conditions and thanks to present long 4nges batteries spread over 10000 or more yards of front ten execute concentrations of fire vmiddotithout direct observation_ 1
or the whole of their front Thee possibilities were evishy nt on many occasions during the course of the World Var t It IS evident that they have been augmented by the inshy
--clt eaF~ of the rangep of the gun and the superior instruction the artillery personnel This gives an advantage to the
atfense the organization of which can easily be Huperior to at of the attack because of its stabilization Among the examples of concentration of fireamp that the
World Var furnishes us two are recalled which can give an feuroa of the services to be expected of long range artillery in ~e future
1 In January 1915 the German XVI Army Corps held the ont of the Argonne from the Aisne to the height of Vaumiddot ois still famous for the bloody combats of which it was the cater This front included a wooded part the Argonne
Vi ere the German troops attempted to advance and a part s covered between the Argonne and Vauquois included
_ e latter part having received a defensive mission was nstituted aA a distinct sector from the forest under the
ders of the artillery commander of the army corpR He 8 particularly apt to get the maximum returns from his ament In fact although this German ector was held bull very small infantry strength for its extent it held
ainst all French attacks_
In the -egion of the height of the Meuse in November 1914 a concentration of fire of forty pieces opened in less than a half hour quickly ended the menace of a serious Ger~ man attack
It results from these conHidelations that modern prog~ re~~ in artillery gives new postiiuilities of extension and to forces on defensive fronts
Aviation gave birth Lo great hope for the attack Camshyouflage of terrestrial organizations and the custom of making important movement at night have reduced the effects of its activity singularly Its role in reconnai8sance at all distanshyces is considerable but it cannot hope to prevent all disshycovery of movements by the enemy_ It is thus logical to believe that all efforts at envelopment will collide with an exten~ion of the front attacked under the same conditions as m 1914 to the degree that reserves are available
At the present time it is difficult to form an accurate opinion of the cap-abilities of parachute infantry Without drawing definite conclusions from the experiments in France during the autumn maneuvermiddot one can say that they have not thrown much light on the utility of this novelty Until proof is given to the contrarythe actions of the parachutists do not seem to be able to exceed the limits of very rIsky episodes
Aerial superiority certamly will glve an advantage to the contender who has it but nothing authorizes the belief that it will be decisive It will not prevent the inferior conshytender from establishing defensive lines in front of which an attack may receive a bloody check
Motorization of the ground forces gives the same facilishytIes to the enveloping maneuver of the attack and the counshyter-action of the defense Like all technical surprises the tank at its outset gained the success due to surprise But on a modern battlefield this SUCless will be difticult to renew against a defense using artificial obstacles mines and antishytank cannon The Abyssinians who were nothing but savage warriors even found the means to trap a dozen Italian tanks
Isolated feats by mechanical engines can never be preshynmted But in mass they are not capable with their own means of carrying through an attack and their employment in mass requires an extensive artillery preparation
It is certain the motorization and mechanization will extend fronts inordinately At the same time it increases the difficulty of protection In the British maneuvers of last autumn one of the sideR was entirely mechanized the other was partially and included foot infantry and horse cavalry the reconnaissance elements of both sides were able to reach the command potjt of their adversary In the same maneushyvers the defender was skillful enough in the use of obstacles to canalize the attlck of the enemy tanks_ They were caught in a trap and fell under the fire of antitank guns A coufltelshyattack by tanks completed their defeat This episode was an affair of tanks and the infantry does not eem to have played a role
One flees in the modern tank the Ruccessor of the arshymored knight History shows the many successes of the latter Bllt firc um-l ~loVly pCliPrlfd IinaIIy chased him f)om the field of battle What will become of the tank as artillery becomes perfected to destroy it This is a secret of the future that exercises of peace have failed to unveiL
45
In an~ (il In the pnlnt Rtatc of armament tlll Ctll shy
ploynHn of tank dOl flt (eIn to fan) OllP ide more than the othll HI lJmlltt Thp oiJ-IlYcr of the last British mallvilI-- (dl (-1llt11 that fliPY gie the an~er advanshytagp to the dl1n-l
I (1 dta( k III I 11 dc vlth(llt doubt local ppi-odl- C~mJlal i-vll II tfW11 (Ifj tIll nUwk and dlfell--e can furlllh 110 oj hI) (nil lu jll)) Ihtll Jll( art IlII1 t hey will lH of ~reat 1-1 ldLlll~ 1f 1hI dt tll I
lhl--I (In-lrlltltllllh 1(n1 to C()ITOh))at( for tlw fushylun tlH l Idl 111111- Id- J]IIlI (IjOlll1 ~Llrlr whith () ]1111(1] lH l~] I TIlI lOnJillll tllt lIlUr--l of OpnllOI1
illl Il III III d I 1 I 11 JI)(j of t hI 1111lt1 Var pnt ril)ld tlll I )l1I 1l1 IJ] 11(1 -i( jlOltIIJll awl t1li fnllllatioll of
II ll)( llal Jt I (( 11 shy
FIJI (1() 111 pI dnlllillall tl)1I11)JTO on the Jlcld of 11111 iltft 11 dl ~Ill 1- lllt-Ill Ith atlTUeU YlUlenn lnd dvplh dnln tiltmiddotljIWn oj )()rnhaldmlnt tiatioJ1 and the llHlll-t-d 1 tlnge vi gUl Such 1- the -latement in til pII~rdl Id till FtI111 h JI)--tltl(tion~ for tIll employment of lalLT 11011 llf l~ Allglht l~jC In It l1w offcn~ivl and dc fl n ~I I lll I 11 ttl tl form ot al for hidl -olclicr- should
iJl lIIIh 1111IIllvn TIH lndn( it rctlldcd in GlrnlllI 111111111111 IP1111 II) --11) Yllaltl prlfCllIlCl foJ the ofshy
tn-lI
()JTLIl--J( - tgUll- a front or)-anized 111 ulpth en~n III-I il~ 11 I -) rllillllj III the II-t Ylal- of the orld Var that tllll (llt~ k IH1-tl1lltcd a lritablc yictory for the uPshy
fllHel fhi 1-- -ho11 II1 the e~ond hattie of Cham jldllll III 1litlriltl lfl1-) the lJatllp of the Ai-ne Il1 1~1l7
dId agalll III Frllltl and Flander~ in 1larch and April 1J18 fll I Ill LtLt 11 t (11 ht fIlIUl e of the Glrnlans to break the line- hul dl tlll lll()jd 1tHrt I---iOll of a grac deftat The 1il I)ln- 1)1 arlll(lltTlt llIl onJr tlcentuate thIS tendencr Jll
111 flltUft
11 d lillI lr thaI iClhlllLal -urpri~L nll contradIct 1 Pll 11))1 llldllltetl e do not think -0
(Jill I 1IIllln-]1111 Illlll Ill that de-pitc all the arguments IItI]1 nl (Ill -Idlllllt1IOll fir fronts JIl a gnat war
11)(1 III -ldl (1 Ill -[lJ Jlri-l of unknown devices war hLshy
111 II JI ill JIIlti Il Iltt JIIlJ III lvolve rapidly toward -tahshy1ItlIIIlI LIlt J-ur~
[LJI))lill ltl1I 01 front By LlluL CI)Io I 11 I f )jO]f II d f) ltl1ll i1 I ill lld)lfllI ( -i11(
1111111 IqIK J
ill th 1)( llmiddotlldH J 1--111 of UfIII( Jlilillllf 811( GC11elshy
d f j~JUtPl1 Id fliP III d (()jllll1l IaYLr- prediction luiJlI-hed In jK~JI IJ lilt fnlUlt llblliatIOTl of fronts of hattIe In Ifl II nlntHl Lt~l ()ljlSl his iueas un the -ubicct dld I plaJJb liHlr tIlI-l
Ill tit 1 HjJllHllt of jirIIHJ(1 of all types of w(apons
11 1i111d HI 11 aJJlltl 1Illolaldt rlont [o(VIl this dul uot Ill-Illy a I lIJOUIllerIlL Ilt of til( slluggle aml giving up of atttmIlt tn -(J1Yt~ tlw prohlltll 111l1s p()~wd It alt lH((ssary to fOil f II 111111 orle of tilt p)treI1lJtH~ of the line to iale till pOI]Oll III till ll11 A Oil as an lllvclopmcnt is noticed by llf fHIJl ((11 though It lIlay nul be Wide the threatened
46
c amp GSS Quart
wing wilh(iras almot instill(tivel~
mPllt it finds itltelJ hetwcll1 two IirCs converging on it unahle to ripn-te in two different directions it renOUll UlHlJual stn)le
IL i tpparllll that tlw dt~rlllder lan protpound~lt his agaifl~t a 1111 f1111g f)lO(Hllnt of mall amplitude hy foriiilt-ati()ll alld tlIP cla-sil procedures against flu J1I()I~lll(llt 1lIt d the ll1vllopment is malti at tO
aide dblan(( and with important forccs the (on seq al( IIlIl(h flInj( J(cllluhtHblc Lines of communiratio 1luat lOll will H endangL)p( RaiIlm~di and roads vill hloclpd
Thlh 110 III() J(Jf of -tahiiitation i-gt an impllgnal flail] r 11ldd( 1 hi dPliluk -td~mlJlt in the Rente JIilltwc I
SIIlt( ill la 11()2 I said thPll that to maintain the rigl i-altI~1 it~ of t hp I rUllt it 1l1U-t be sUllPorted ag-ainst the sea ~ff t k
If f I ec11l01Ult a III rUlgL or a Ilcutra ron tIer In urIe bull an 0 )S~f k 1hal tould lleither he turned or foncd These two conditio~1 ~ i ~s fire Po(J alid imprpjnable flallk~ are indispensable tot ]IlC tH
conlinuou front lhe 1)
FIn j)()Wll is a relatIve term In this c(U-)c If thc( 1lcc I I hi I t 4ePOSllW 101(es arc tljula en as a woe Cit 1er as 0 I lrh
mean- thev PO-IS or tht llumlHl of (f[rlLives the j t ll j hility i a~-I1I(d In pJintipll If the oppo~ing for ~ very llIHljunl if cquIiibllum doe~ not exist or if it is brol ovel a Z()JW suflidlntly extlJljn the front is in danger i(ing- fontd bu k alld pierccd in t hjlt region
Some ypars parli(J I had explained my ideas to toillradp Toutct thelI director at the Ecole SlIpcricure Gllern lIe ohiected that a division could not hold a Ir m()rt Ihan a ieagllt (tilnl rmlls) AClording to T jrc our twenty army torps would be a1gt1pound to furnish twenty-IT lh a adlYC divL~i(lll~ till others were not considered of valu ~ adiu
1tilU- the linc of rCSltante (auld not exceed twenty-I ~-ere
ICagllC~ apploximately th distallCeuro from Dlinkitk to r ~ 11 th fort iIy contradictor concluded that the establishment elf f a Imc of re~istal1ce on our northern frontier would ilb~ t the total of our aetl( trvolls and there would be nonef fur OUI other frontiers or for an llnportnnt re~erve
AfUl thp fOllllatJOJ1 of fronts in ll1t huLh sidc~ 1
~hort of ammunition If the inadEr~ at that time had well supplied and the FreTleh supplies exhausted a iJ through could hayc hecn made with a frontal attack pJtlonclPlIlHt tfluld hl( lgtlll1 ohtaincd by different m Early lISC of gas lI1ight hayc up~d it The continuolls f ttll Ill hI 01(11 if th(I1( ilt a ~llilkient disparity of force stabilized front h the result of approximately equal and Im)lCglwhle tlanks
If I tlilIilult to -oPt that aviation would lie abl( to lurll tillS HLatlmcnt but I lll~itate to malw a prophecy fad I did nut prophllY III Bn und 1902 I never atten 10 lilt IIkdp 1l1~ flilHh Jofrn and Folh with illY i(lla ~illlpl~ to 1gt1Oadpll theirs Both had a precise idea 0 fill 11 wlluld lit rOllght and I told tlWI1l tlwy ll~ WI npl(~Illt it to llilIllltllvl a priori and that thc future Jd tIll lip fo tlwir pJlvisioIlS Above all I though ~
deceived themselves in Ia(ing their confidence in the I 1JIlJ~ offlIldVt I 1011 in LOpini(m in May 1DO) iJ iilvl that llll-l theory IS false I believe it ~ven mol gerons than fabc (May I not ue permitted to say t thcRc two lines are those I am most proud to have wrillpoundlt rus
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Foreign Military Digests
THE GEmA-I ARlIY IN 1917
[LllltlllC allqnunde lil l)n By Colonel voni X~landll CUIHlllhld frum R( 111( lJdtrulc ~Olt~r
1 Fbruuy lJlR 1
1 By MUJ[t T n PUll J 110 (nat AllJilllY Corp
J Colonel von Xyland(gtl German Arm Retired i a well jno~n mil~tary ritCl Hnd i- I10 nne of the profes~ors of imilt1JI h~~toIT at the Krigakcde~lic in BeTm Thi 1artlc]e ltllltall1- 1 OIl-dll ahle InformatIOn about the German jlrmy that prevIOusly h- not heen available middot The gJIHi (Irmarl l1M 11 Cln er- of September 1n17 in lthL reg-IfIll ()l the Illti( Slltt ere an imp01lant event they lttradl d t (JIlidll al)k flllClgl1 at lention The maneucr- 1nftheglOtllld 11)1 ( t ok pl( ( in tern Pomerania and III
b[(lklenL1l1)r a hlTltlill or rnlllll1 hil- Clit vith llumerou ]he and -OjlH COle -t Til jll (-lIH c of three army COn)
Inriudll1g nllmlIll1 ~fltorj d and lrmolNI forcc- rendered the mamlI el lIlt)ll Important than any of tho-e that had prl-ltdetl1t in G(lmln~ and eell 111 forclgn lotlntric To ih(~e a- ~ddc(~ the lolIaLoration of the navy and aviation fIhL field oj actIon of the latliJ ww LOlHidcrably more exmiddot tcnJed than that oi the two ground armle The fleet mashy1fller Ino] plll l Oll tilt HaItH Spa IIlIl in It- large I ~IlW~ the tilCIlL of the manLUlr~ middot A UIl1YO 01 troop tlHl1-IOIL had heen sent from Ent l)lU~ Ja 11 a tnward SwiJwlllulHh--Stettin and had oe-t-n ttltllked hile en loute by till alt(lcalY This ollasioned omLat~ on the -ld aIllI 111 till all a- vel as the start of a
middot omncltialcontlll t Each pal t) had a large air force The bjtlthl a-illcd to the all fonp~ exceeded greatly later Jlly Jnd in depth the front etalJlishcd on land Vithin the LdlU uf allllli act tty eXElCI~es of passive aerial defense (re uJlldulteu dUllng the entIre week of the maneuvers ~~n tilh fahion the C1 il population as able to prepare it shyelf for modern 1 at uttainly rill not spare them
j 1 hl-l lOl1lblIled lilal1CUVel a~ecting th~ armies of the and ~l-t and all -upplitd a IlIlCIOUS occasIon to test the 0mmltind ()rgdllatioll 11111 Olhllld in Germany and which ~olllri ltUll thl lollllJnlatlOll oj the~e three armies with a IC to realization of thell common oUJedives The exelshy
bull lleS hllh utnnol be lxplained in detail aroused for thi~ Ca~l)ll (11 extl(Illel~ 11 (Iy fnleigll mtlrest and have prushy
joked many perllnent JI--cussiolJs on the development of the ew Gel man army
In dred the maneUver~ Wele the result of a year of inshy truLtion during whiLh in lonformlly WIth the laws of milishyar) concllption the re~toration of the army advanceu ethodlcally For the first time In the autumn of 1937 men
vho had tompleted two yeJr- traiElIlg henceforth normal ad )lt1l HllIster(u out Dy the u(cree of 24 Aug-ust 19~6 11 n1ln ho Ire lit for clvice lcccivcu this instruction
ther In the armies of the land -ea and air In addition ome iJluntl~l- could IJC engaged for longer duration and
~middoterc a-Jgn~d to [undwll rtlulring special knowledge Older men ho Junng the period of limitation of armashy
middot Jenb had nol lecived military lIitlu(tion and who (ould ot bL uilled for lwo yettl- trainlIlg took part as reservist nan eiJdll veLd (OUlS( of in-tudlOn In the autumn of 937 the da-s of 1915 as well as the 1912 class in East russia had been called normally to arms after having been
in labor camps The conception of obligatory military sershyvice effectively realized in Gelmany calls for an arrangeshyment between those who have been called for military 8ershyyicc and from this fact have submitted to a restriction on their ciyilian ltllCl aBel tholC for whom this is not the case To eITcd thi~ purpose a military tax hab been introduced effetive 1 September 1937 it affects for the present only thooe mcmbels of the cIoss of 1914 and 1916 who have not been lalled into service The tax is due until the end of the YLar in hilh the contlibuiol lealthes the age of 45 It is (dculalLd as follow~ during the first two years (which l onCS]lOlHl to normal service) at 50 ~~ of their income and after thal at G
The law on aerial defense published last year does not indilatf an extension of ohlig-atory service for it does not reqUIre 1I1l1 f (lJI Hervices It should be interpreted as follo~ All Glman~ are relluired to take part in aerial deshyfen E The service of alert Becurity first aid and of indishyVidual indutrial protection are constituted in groups harged with organizing aerial defense The Reichsluft shy~(hutzbund OlganlJlex and ir1Ftttmiddotult reams for self-protecshytion In other domainH it functions in the quality of (nttn4elol
During lf)n the regulations required by the introducshytIOn of two years -gtervice were put to test Military service is a service of honor for the German people It requires the 4oldiel to give him4elf to assure the existence of the nation even to the ~acrHice of his own life This fundamental a-ertion is destined to place in evidence the moral and psyshychic forces of the combatant as well as his physical and milmiddot tan training Veracity absolute obedienle punctuality exactitude and severity are indispensable qualities In turn they provolw will courage resistance the sentiment of honor and the modesty the soldier should pmsess Reciprocal confidence between the leader and his men on the one part and comradeship on the other should constitute a solid lien in the organi7ation Drill is ronsidered as an indispensable means for the formation of soldiel~ but not a~ an occasion to conduct formal exercises without purpose
Th( objective of the second year of training is the edushycation of the isolated combatant and instruction in special hranches In addition upon completion of the first year they Hhould be able lo function as leaders of groups and instructors During the second year special importance is lattached to the education of reserve officers
The formation of actIve officers who in their quality of instructor have heavy tasks is given special attention The numher of oflkers to be educated having been considerashybly augmented due to the introduction of two years of serw
yiee it ha~ heen neCe8Sar) tu reduce the period of instruction from four yltars to two and one-half yearf This has reshy-ulted in Illimllc regulation of time to gain the greatest benefit and it heavier effort 011 the vart of the students During tlH Hlst pal tIllt Falllwnlunker (aspirant officer) partilq)ates a~ a simple ~oldier he is nominated six months latLr If lIE prOlH to hae the nccessary qualities for adshyaneLmelll and lerImnntp4 the eyrIe of imlhuction ag a nonshy(ommi-~ione1 oiHcer B Ulb time he should already have demon~trated his qualities of leadership Next the future officer is ordered to th( war ~chool where he receives theoretshyical instruction A first examination must be paRsed before
47
C amp GSS Quarter
his nomination of Fahnrirh (aspirant) The final examinashytion decides whether he will become Oberfahnrich (first aspirant) The latter still goe two months to the school of arms vhere he acquire-gt ptciaI knowiedg( for the em- ployment of th( diverse armlt Aftf1 r1 new staRe of two m~nth-l of pract iral -gtrrvice th( selection of ameen takes pfc1ce In advancement to the urade of lieutenant the charshyact(l whkh a Ilail(l -hould have plays it dd()rminin~ rolr as compared to rlult~ obtaiJwd in prH ileal and theoretical ltervice
In 1937 the new army shows that it wiII follow i~ pIicity in the traces of its predecessor The traditions oft ancient RoldielR transmit them~elves to the present -~
neW units arC in intima1c relations with the aSRociations~~ former comhatants MpaSlllCS have been taken to aid Sl)l~1 diers ill civil empioymen1 after their service Particuhgtt-J attention i- -dV(l1 10 l1oIHommjs~ioncd officers of long s4 ~ vic to aid them in their future in civil life fmiddot
49
I
i bisto ~ighl build
[ book viIII
I~ho 1he f Becor[
few I~fthl
jng 0
the s pline with
troft work
middotmiddotn important arlantagc of the Ilie~cl engine is that Acad it i~ ~t affected hy wcath(r lOlHlitinns since it has no delishy Eri
guid
more the Diesel engine docs 110t hayc tn he shielded rate electrical apparalu~ to hecome out of order Furthershy
to P to permit the efficient U-e of radio (ommunication It is a fougl
prohIem to -hi(lrI t h( gaoline eng-ine when used in military Iandn~hi(I(~ to permit the operation of the now vital military radio communication sy-tem nUl to the greatly incr(as(()
Ie1110hility of mcehanizlC1 armies t he importance of radio C0111shymunication fne from all interflrence cannot he undershy modi l-timated
i PratAt the prccnt time great pr()~res~ with f)il~el cngines saryand trucls is heing made in Germany and FratHc-Germany contha ving- over HOllO Ililmiddot rl t ruclls and Francc ovcr 7000 Great j powBritain has over 100 To the United States belongs the Jlmpccredit for the first commercial ])iesel engille to he put into ~~obregular senicc Thi- eng-inc wa~ a (iO-hnrs(IH)V(r 2-cylinshy
=~hoder unit huilt at st Louis in lHIH fi -U(ftgtr ( Sunu rs Armu Ordnance
l~ lnan
en ate]
48
Book Reviews By LIEUTENANT J W RUDOLPH Infantrll
THE NAVY A HISTOHY
By FJETCIlCR PRATT
49amp pages bullbull Garden City NY Doubleday Doran amp Company
The stirring traditions of the American Navy its colorful history and the men who built it are vividly portrayed in this highly personalized account of the United States Navy The builders of American seapower are the supports upon which the book is built and they constitute a stirring roll call The work Iltil1 rank among the most popular histories of the Navy
Periods of naval history are reviewed in terms of the men who dominated them Assisting at the Revolutionary birth of the neet were Jones and Biddle with Barney and Barry in
secondary roles- these men created a tlaVY which bequeathed few victories but a wealth of courageous tradition The days
of the Barbary pirates and the War of 1812 witnessed the flowershying of a small but efficient fleet - a generation dominated by the stern and unflinching Preble whose uncompromising discishypline trained the outstanding ballie captains of the second war with England
Perry the sailor who opened Japan and the civilian Banshycroft stand out in the pre-Rebellion period Bancrofts greatest work as Secretary of the Navy being the creation of the Naval Academy The courage of Farragut the technical genius of Ericsson and the ordnance skill of Dahlgren were the naval guide posts of the Civil War Dahlgren built the great guns to put into Ericssons revolutionary ironclads while Farragut fought the battles
The great theoretician Ivlahan in the years between 1865 and 1898 propounded the strategy fulfilled victoriously by Dewey and Sampson at Manila and Santiago The World War Was a triumph for the teamwork training and ingenuity of oW
modern navy As a colorful swiftly moving story of our naval past Mr
Pratts history is one of the best although marred by unnecesshyi my minor errors of detail which rob it of much value It Ii contains little of naval policy administration and thought however and therefore fails to answer many pertinent and ~mportant questions In general the author has done a good -job presenting a brilliant panorama pf blue water and the men
rho have sailed our fighting ships I
THE LOST BATI]ALION
By THmfAS M bullbullJOHNSON ANDIFLETcmm PnATT
338 pages New York Dohbs-Merrill Company I
On 2 October 1918 790 men tif the 77th Division comshynanded by a New York lawyer Major Charles W Whittlesey vent over the top and into the Argonne Forest FIve days I ater 194 stumbled out In those five days the Lost Battalion
I
forged an immortal legend of eourage horror and sacrifice Twenty years after comes the complete story of that heroic incident of war
Five days in the battered tangle of the Argonne left indelible scars in the brains of the few who survived -~ scars that drove Whittlesey to suicidal death and sealed the lips of the men who came out Rarely is a survivor found who will even mention that he experienced the nightmare
Horror - not so much the horror of shattered minds and bodies but the frustration of helplessness -- stalks the pages of this book Men expect to be killed in battle but not by their own artillery When they die because the food and medicines intended to save them fall into the hands of their enemies before their very eyes death becomes truly tragic All these things happened to the Lost Battalion
Many myths which passing years have thrown up around the battalion are exploded by this book In the first place the battalion was never lost It was exactly where it was supposed to be and everybodY including GHQ knew it The charge of violating orders that supposedly hounded Whittlesey to his death is shown to be unfounded The gallant major obeyed instructions to the letter It was not his fault that having capshytured his objective with a body of new troops he was cut off and unable to withdraw
The Lost Battalion deserves its specia1 history - a story that is stark and true without robbing the battalion of an iota of glory The authors have recreated notably a vivid picture of five heroic days with a graphic account that is both simple and authentic
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAH
By CHARLES R FISH
Edited by William E Smith
531 pages bullbull New York Longmans Green amp Company
Critics acclaim this posthumous book of Professor Fish the greatest interpretive work ever written on the Civil War It is a book concerned with causes and results rather than narrashytive consequently the account of military operations is of minor importance to a thorough study of the background and effects of the sectional struggle
On many of the familiar aspects of the war Professor Fish takes sharp issue with traditional beliefs He does not accept the economic explanation of the outbreak of the conflict neither does he regard the war as inevitable The North did not have the edge from the start and did not actually clearly see victory until the fall of 1864 He even goes so far as to suggest that in the light of 1861 the South had the advantage since a successful defensive Will was the only necessity for victory III these views Mr Fish concurs with Major Sheppard (See review following)
Not Gettysburg Vicksburg nor even Atlanta were the decisive ~att1es of the struggle The real decision was reached
49
-
BIilk Ile-Liews
oehind lhp ~()rth(rn [rem in ovlrnlHJ ]-Gl Tilat (llci~ivp evellL was the nmiddot(lCtion of Linloln lhlllilfll a rf~ssured Fedshyeral gOVClnmlmiddotnt qpiitmiddotd t lk Iln-Utgt 1hat [Htdp lH outcome
inevitahle PrJl(Jn~(d n--ttllh tIl IIJrr(Jl[lldnl lld dlIPI])Il1) 1l11pllishy
gWHe and hrillia1lt iilfllfI gtl yit rnlki tIllgt anI~ of the 11
Ifetw(gtpn the ~taf(~ a Iil1111 nWll10rial tn Ihe author lroflor Smil h who (Il ihutuj 10 1 middotl1elll lhq)1 r on Wolf lintIltIshyand 10111 JrJjJlIlltW~li(jll hj- --1 prj l ylIulhll or] lhill llhout Illgt I dllllf- Hllld lll( htI IH 111 flllhh-Hmiddotd
It 11lIY III 1 J1IJI [I) (Ul(lltll(lal~rI LIW lhtl AllHrlCanshy
ought to qli1t r1tin al)[tlll 11H (vIl YII and klp it 101))1
Engli h (( rlJnh (lUI n 1 fll ml of Ill 11P lOIWPl nin Ill( Hfh(IJtgtl1 man of tIl 111111 Ollllnd1l1~ piI- hl 1lHl1e from
tIll jllll of lldbJ -f)ldltr- ll1111 1 ~l11jlptd ha addtd tlot hpj I(l - ~ tIl 1laquo Jj d of hi hrollll1 ~-lll-llnb it h a h(lnk jll(l I Illl] 11 ]11( tIll Iii)]] Ilf pcr l)llctl
OH Ian fil--iI ndll 111 jWrhqh--o lWlr thr -((11[ and tll1W
of til (lil 11 tILlI Ihl- Tli~ tIl( ()()d fnr tIl( tnC~ ~ot
-0 ~laJflr ~h( llldld 1111 ~II (ll halk 111 ltIll al111opllll(gt of unplliudlttd 1IlJ JJtltlH and ~l1(kh hi fat ono o11light dmvn tIHmiddlt [11 11 bliff plLPlw hl~ (ompn pd mo( truth hnUl IIUI (1 il lr than nlll 011 historjll1- h1( llCCtl I1hlC
1) injl1I mIll l1t11 bulky (lilligt
To 1J1ll ~hqITIJld 1])( I ntical pPlll)(l of lllll (in -ar 1 lilt (j ytmiddotll ~trplh of 1~)1-j)-gt nt unlil tlwil did tIll [-1111)11 plll illlo fgtltLUlon a ~rltlt~i( pbnalcubted to Il the 1 Ill plan t~ t ]1 t 1 Ill ( Ilnd Em (middotIOplllllll Iarried on 0 ( rll1 arCl (jf 1hflI~all(h fJf -lillll Inlh of -OllW of till 111o-t dl~Illl and dJ(]-I ItIlill nil (11111 hJp (llnt IwId LC( in 1iI( (-11 ~llllllLlll Lltll 1ill )H1 or thi (onfldll wyand t 11ln )llJWJWtl Ihl 11111111 I 1 111 (I) IiJill h hrilHin~ tlw horror Ir ar lllto 1111 lW1l1 of rhl -Illth III (llll~ Ihl- way wa-- it ii) Ihll 10 ill 11]( ( tl 11 lll 1 IIH lil--t truly nashy
tl()lld Jllljwj wh t11l tll11ll lI 01J] ((- 1110)11 -Itlllgth and
fJpuLt11f)J10f tll -1111 1111 l()llIld into tIll tJuEmiddot~~l( I)eftab of arrntp WI 11(11 11l0Utr]l t hf matlllaJ of war and t hI will tn
fiht had to Ill dCiJOImiddotd Ill hlok (()llilllh ~~(fllfl1t -llllltlJlI iIgt of 1111 lIlU(lgt of
tlw htlIi)llflll ll11dllll ~h~nlll not -uImiddoth a 01 llllrn -upv]1ority alt 1 Lad IHfn t auhl 1() 1Hlil~middot D(u---ioJ1- of campaig-ns tlld 1111 ([v a1( TIlIltllmiddotr]lilmiddot( f flf ICltIi-I 1I1~at Jla]~fd (tlit Y
Till IS FIVE IIO(fBS OF (STlr
At ~~ q]ock in thl afternoon of 11 larch l~I~X Etlr(m~
LfllnlHlff fdilof of Ihl 1111 11 (I(IfIlh WIS mlitillJ a 11-1shyminllu ~ttI(llWnl from 1hI Au rian gOlrnnllnt loJl(erning the Iwdllld pllhi1 ill 11 --10 1gt11 it (han(cllol KUIt von S(hwdl11i~~~ ollIHI(d j he dfat h knell of indellcndent Austria
c amp GSS Quart Vol
lIerr Lemlholf fled toward the Hungarian frontier Through the last five hours of Austria he had his finger on the pul~( events which were happening too fast even fol his t rained senE(p~ Ilb -tnry of those last hour-- while ha-tily writ ten is a -plen~t1 joh of rtI)(Hmiddottorial writing i-c~
Loyally Austrian and vio]pntly ~nti-Nali Lennhoff coJ-t not hl allyl hlllg hut partial lIe minec no words in hIS opinlt~tt3inc of t Iw IIit Ie) ~~ov(rnment yet he hold- hi own gOV(lIlrn~~~onJ largely p(JIihle for the d~harlc Had tile AListrian gov~Auni IlIPIit rnd it- prohlplll -quarely had it nol fumbled it opprJmiddotmiddotttua tunitie-- the (Iever and inevitahle Nazi llenetration wouldrl ~pap( have heen possible ~ On il
SIhuchniggs incapacity to meet the -itualion is the dOl ~o tI ~utlnant theme of lIerr LonnholTs book Tile bookish and patriK iIhelhalleeHor (ould not match Nazi ruthkmiddotsnc-- and miIitUlyprg
aralion with reason and love of country He trusted the Veuro Jtho khemPil who hetrayed him and was unahle Lo take the dcfJr
~tand that might have saved Aulria Yfars hefolr Ieee loo
L(nnlwlr tells tile tory of the death throc with alit drama of an inspired playwrighl an aUlhor who4c memorr I
pfouart too fre-h however to permit a (on~idlrerl dis(u~-ion T~ Iow hook d()(s have the value of trlling the -tor~ of Austria falll ll1i tIll fir~L iflll II is vivid authOritative iml)Ie and bitler t inc
r two W]S
badJAPAN IN CIIII
By T A BIssO real 17 l)ai~(lt -cv York Thf ~LltlTHlltn (urnpUlY Qf (
pro selfmiddot
T A Hion Far Eastern expert of the Foreign Pol onl) isoriatioll has ~ritt(ln the most penetrating and auther~ Chi l(onnt thaI has appeared to datc on the haCkground and ed ~tru
pha-cs of the war in China As a rc-umc of eyent and polirgt pHIlt
of the pn-t five year the book is a valuahle Contribution tot to]~ alal~tti(al study of the conflict Ir IEs-on has gather~1 O(f( wealth of facts and weldell tlwll1 mtn a sllic~ of eOl1yinc tonclusions 1hE
Japans drift toward Fasebm and China- 1loliLieal umb- 11hh lIOn idf l3is4on (on-iders the two most 111011wntolls phJS6 ~ket lontemporalY Far Ea~tern history Tins Chl11E5e nation]b ordi whi(h IH~llgtpd draw down upon (hina the wrath of Jap~lll foc 11(gt it~ root in lill ~tudcnt mOYlment gainrd monwntum with ~llrrender of the South China militarists to Chiang Kli~Sk and culminated at Sian in Ihe lnited Frollt
The author i~ obiously more at home in tiw study~ JapanesE affairs than upon the China ((11( His accounti-1 1l11tlllal JaplIH--p politicc i4 xlplllIlt and is till hl--is for)1 eOTlciusiol1 as to war guilt In his (onsidered opinion qJ Japanese militarists alone are n~ponsihl( Discredited in tti~ 1t tefllJlIl- to fa~tn Fls(ism 1I1HIll tlH people llw military e1iql~flI Jllunged Japan into a foreign War ill a dCppratp hid t ()-t Ilngthr~ llt t twir -Iipping l)()wel r~ 0
The a~t ual lory of t I~( ~yar iR of vital ill~pOllanCe ~~_ ~~l frolll a ltidulcd slttdy of the lI1eldent at Lukowchlao Tlr BIsy makes no prediet ions but gives the impression that he hold5~~
err ultilllal(~ vi(tory highly probable The calamilY of Japan~middot vietory is powerfully analysed in a chapte on the subj of Manehllria a damning verdict against NipPollesf impc ism
50
--~ Vol XVIII No 70 Book Reviews
Cn~A F~G2T Fun ia~n LIFE 11 Ii It 11 llJ TmON HGIIT
1 York hlttklt( JIOUSl McGnm-Hill
One of the firt booh pLlhi~hed 5JJ1Ce the outbreak of the Smo-Japanese War ueigned and wrilten in the light of that conflict is the work of two Far l1ltlern corrCspondcnb of the iGnited Pre~~ Frankly nolll1tClldeu to be a scholarly historical ~tudv the book is un (tremely 1l3dlhle piece written as n(gtwsshylpapermeJl would he expelted to Tite the ~t()ry of what IS going on in China The tory of the war helf i of minor importance to the jllcture of China- -trugg]e fol national unity which the author~ hae picked up b(g1nin~ with the Reolution of lBll 1hc greater part of the honh i devoted 0 the background of the pre-(gtJ1t ~itllal inn a bwlroulld through whilh Chiang Kaishybhek move a an e el-II1(Tet-II1g fh~Ull The attempt to explain rccent Chinlc hitory In tCrlll of DIll man is 110((1 a little too simple anJ a-- at hanilj ItTer pOlll ~ (Hll mi lcading
At least twice in his n~e to powCr Chiang Kai-shck ran afoul of Japanese intenbts Both timC~ he was forced to back down vith rCsultant 10s of f~ce hoI h at home and abroad lmtyin China Leing I he lat thing Japan desired a conflict was ineitabie sooner or lateI Eel1 Aia b not large enough for 10 strong llllpill- (hL1Jlg i)(lld to ~upCrior force but he only hiding his time until he wa strong enough to strike kiCk In a fe more I car he would hac been ready
TIl( Sian (Oup of De(tTllher In~(i shnc](d Japan into a
rClhlatioll thal time wa~ )et tin) shorl The uneApected display oi ChlllCsC solidarity indicated that Chinese national unity had prore~lteJ farther than the odd had Iealized while it was self-eident tb1t tlw KU()llintan-Communist settlement could onty hae an anti-Japanc-e foundat ion RCtHzinp that a strong China nlPant the end of her dream of Asiatic hegemony Japan ~tru(h while thcre wa yet lune TIl(gt war that folloed is as much a Japanec fight for life a5 It b Chinese A Japanese vicshytor means lcfluCtion of (hina 10 )ipponcsc 1assalage while def ill topple Japan frolll her -tatuf af a vmrld power
Both (l ent and pcr-onalltic- haC been vividly portrayed The lUthol- have a )idcd the pit [alb of rnYliad unpronounceshytble (hin~l nallllS I)) a -(rH ()f pi hy and killfuleharacter ~Jetcht~ 1 he result i iu~t hat the doctor ordered fol the ordmal) rcuhI who J molO than ctually inter(-ted in what l~ (gte 111 tlW he~dIll
CIlI-A FIGHTS ILCK
YCdr hef()re ~h(gt evpr -aw the (bine~e Reo Armies Agnes f)medley WltI nthu~iasti(allY r((ording lheir cXIlioils IIer very Fnthu~iasm long denied her the l)lIvilege of visiting the Chinese OVieb fly aLlraLling the attention and clo-e observation of the hince Central Government In 1136 however she entered
~he Communi-l di~tricts in the -orthwest where she has l emil-inerl moltt of the time ~in((gt At the oUlhreak of the Jlre~ent Sino-Japanese conflicti Ii~s Smedley in r~ite of an jniur~d ~pine ac(ompanicd lho
1 ~Ighth Route Army mto Sham1 Provlnce where she shared thef ardshipamp and adventurcamp of the ort guerrilla campaign against f
the Japanese Constantly on the move suffering from exhausshytion and her injury she wrote when and where she could posting her dispatches piece by piece Thus her RtOJy grew as it is here published with little more than neee-sary ~tructural editing
(ilina Piohls lIark is a vivid first-hand arrountof the early days of the North China War to the bepinninp of 1938 Of little military value the real worth of the book hes in its raphic picture of the relations between the peasants and the Eighth Route Army On thal relationship hingc much of the future development of the Chine~e nation
Miss Smedley is a personal friend of Chu Teh Mao Tseshytung Chou ~n-lai und all the other famous leaders of Chinese Communism Her book contains many true life portraits of these men But Miss Smedley unconsciouoly jJaints someone else as the mo~t interesting personality in the book herself Bitter atheistic and belligerent she is leaving her mark on the history of China the new China which she does not expect to live long enough to sec One may disabrree with her social anLl political philoltophy but never with her ~incerity A most unu~ual book
AND SO TO WAil By IIUBEltT HEIUtINl
17~ Imgp1- Npw JIavIL Yie (lrnvlTSlty Pr(gtllt
Professor Raymond J Sontag of Princeton reviewing this book for the Ialurduu Rcnt(U ()f 1Ierafure wrote that Dr Tanshysilltj book took ten year~ to write 1lr Herrings apparently as many days yet both reached the bame conclusion From 1914 to 1017 the rulers of America betrayed the interests and lhe wishes of the AmeJic3n people
Vheleas DI Tansill (on fines him~elr to the background of our entrance into the Great Yar IVlr Herring uses the Vorld Var merely as a stepping stone to present conditions His thesis obviously and frankly partIsan holds collectie security to he a dangerous futility and strict neutrality the only way to kecp out of quarrels which we can neither understand nor solve He fears that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull are about to repeat the mistake of Wilson and Lansing Neutrality as dislingubhed from isolation is more likely
to help the country and the world than participation in future wars Mr Herring wishes the lnited States to keep out of European and Asiatic wars in which essential interests are not involved and to steer clear of a11iances cooked up by nations intent upon prEselving the status quo against Hhave not counshytries
Since 191) the nation has resisted constantly increasing pressure to join ageneies whose ideals have been distorted into attempts to enforce the Versailles Treaty In spile of repeated refusals to become involved in foreign entaIlgiements the counshytry is still confronted with persistent pressure This hook is the CQfe for the other side briefly but convincingly presented Vhethel the reader agree with the luthol 01 not he will find these pages provocatlsc I
AMERICA GOES O WAR
By CHAm cs (AI LAN TANsl(1
no page Bololl Litlle 13rown amp Company
After ten years of exhaustive resbareh during which he had access to sources hardly touched br previous historians Dr
51
Tan~ill hae produred what h generally aedaimecl aR thc outshyblanding -1 udy of the hwkground of Amenca entry into the Vorld Var III~ ma(rid indude- the Bryan manuscripts the paper~ pf ilon [out ()lonf1 flowe Iaming and Knox as wpJl as tIl(gt Admiralty ar[hin- of ((middotrmany and the files of tilgtjl (ornmiUl( whih 1m v tiJatpci war p)litltrin~~
Dr Tanill di agITl ith t he popularly held opinion of Bryan 1lIlIl fOUl tnd olllPl -1 all n1l1l of I he war J)lrifJd Ill oft1l rid]( ukd liliam Jenning-- Bryan wilt) ni~lHd hj- portfolio - -I[rllary of Stalt 111 protl1 aglin t AlllPlict-shy(our h hl- 1111 HI [111 Ihl1 hld 11 011 taklll Bryan tlhi( flu I nitfmiddotd Stati ~otllcl hm( 1H11l parrd tl1( -tcrificp I)f 1II 7- 1 (1111 I I IJ llil 11 kti 11- of II( PII(I tr HOIl--f and Jtn-ilW 111) Imiddot d Ill flt~ld(nl mIn war
Hnli-( I~ trtwuarv Jllfifd wilile LanltlI1g j tarnl h a jdorillld 1 t )rl~I )1 1 twr higt JHhlt ( III alJt)( hb (middotoll-(lerWl
Yili 1)1 TIHll 11[ 1Jll-i fill ()l1w of Ian ll)middot l(tion h ~f[gt- n() ~()Ild in YiJr)l IlnllW arhlII 01 dll the foni~n dlplomat-- ill a_~hlll~iJll fall any tOf) l1l (ount BernltlnrJf appfal 111 tilt 1l1f faY(Jraht light of all
(haptel- lin nHrilan track ith tht Allic-- (oTl1pletl with ml- rmiddot~ of tlli-J( )ll a (()lllprthlllltingt yipw of thp ponomie pit tun lI1I1(II1h tlu auth()r tI(ltgt not CO]lt11r ith thl llfort-shyof 111f ~lt~f COllllllittll 11) ]llmt that Big Hu-lTlC-- drol tlIP nat 1011 IntIJ 11 11) protI It l1l0JJntlu ltl(--tll1ent- It IS
o---ildl Iw ldmu I hal 11011 npondcrl 111 part t 0 prp~-urcgt Lut Ilw]p 1- Ill Hjt Ilt of 11 Tlw jI)-pa)C Iork whilp it dops lll dll)(l~t IIf 111111- QU1 ~Wll i all indipPIlltahll guid( 10 till --Iudy of (lllr (nl]alWI inlf) war wh11h will hplnnw --tancialu
piI)P fill 111tllY -(Ir 1)1 jl11L It (llll 11] (If or tlf AIlHlIlln fItstory and Dran
rtf illt (~rddlilt ~(horl Ilf Jlllri(an (111 (I-ity a hington r )C hl I)(ll 1 1 (((lInif(rl authorit- on Ameri(an diplomatic i l~jOI for mII1 (lb For ttll ~lar- lw Va arivi-or tn tIll (li1rllltn of t IH -lllat( F()ri~n Itratiol1s Cmn111ittee for whom irmiddot Jlll Iht IfjIlrt 011 o11d ar npoJl---ihility fie la letshy~llf d III hi fivld 11 John Ifnplilh and ill ~eCral GCrman unishy 11-1111
(Tlo T ()liIL
1 I ~ - (I ~ York FUflf amp Hilllhlft InC
H(-np II(-n lir t nmC1 -in([gt hi monumental Anthonll 1flf( h In -rikinl~ (ontra1 to hie (arlir and Jnore ICnglhy vor hain~ lt)((r till -tlJll ba-icmiddot atlrilmle of eardul hbshylcJri( al nialth In I(ari of Ihe broad eer shifting arena of 1111(1 hiIl)I of I I) (in1 aris (onclntratldin both timl and pLI -llh (olJ)paratlf 1OIl()rny of chara(terizalioll all
f 1lIlltllrly happilY (tlldinld onl to quantity YOlllhful (ojOl1t] FlanLIIII (omrnandpr of a [ilion ctdry
rnlrnfn ()n ouJJ()-t duly ~~lIardlllg the pa--(- tiJ)(JUgh thtmiddot irshyjllllt Ulfllllltino tltill hi nlfllnt in ih heauliful and ]lPHpfIlJ
-t 11 illll InflllwJIlr pnwl t illal ing 0(1 all ulIpltttnt duty_ In a nrlrJI ltiddlll dlrmiddotv 1 10(ly -oul IIPI n I~(nt hwoman tp hratv Wit h Iwr flaughttJ vait ing for word fro III her husband a maj(~r In the (onfcrlr-ratp Irvi((
Franklin in 10(1 With IHl cannol hring himltClf to tile 1a-1 Ifon 11IlO Ihal of trmiddotliin) 1111 t hat her hushand is dead II is t hI frll~1 rt1 iOIl I hat paCP- the romm(e of the story against a
52
C amp GSS Quart Vo-background of impending conflict and the futility of war Me Rt while the young otTIcer does his best to lighten the burden the refugees f 1
Inlo the peaceful imlation war flnaly comes in the ear~ ~ win1ltT of IHGj when a Conferlelate force tries to break throu ~j 111(1 pas~(s In a vividly recreated battle sequence Frankllnl~ rpginwllt is wre(ked in a rather u-elcfs engajZement which enl 1 with a (onfcclcmtfgt c1efeat at loes hardly worth the pri~ -land ThlreaftCf the war move on leaving a badly wounded offiri 1stul IO(ked with hi reful~ee ill the owhound valley Through jPre long white winLer the tangled ~kein is straightened -iintE
The 1I0cl carefully and colorfully written is good readiu of t but not as profound a it i-- daimed to he An interesting faew In its 11)efJalttion is 1 be hi--Iori(al research hehind it Accordi~ ~und to Mr Allen mot of the Laic is true the story having bee Ctan pi((pd together at fir-t hand often from the lip~ of those wk poli participated in the events turt
Irol pos
TilE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON phe thrf
By MAH(l 111 sod
Ii pawgt with Ilnlf mdfx 8 hlb1o~raphy New York Bohh~Mcrr had life terr
The plf(t inn of Marquis Janll xcellent life of Old Hid des ory as the Pulilzer Prize winning biography for 1938 wasr -urprbe to those who havC read the- two volumes issued fo of t yean) apart The preent edilion combining both volumest par
one should he an imperative item in everV lihrary -1r Jam~( ha has amply earned his laurels with a truly ~onumental work - will life hitory that lanrls head and shoulders above the eonsid rna able ilia of exeellent writing that has already appeared abo pro
Andrew Jack--on
In The lionler ioploill published in 1933 11 James cam the story of jackson from the early pioneer days before t Rfvolution through his rise to prominencc in Tennessee to t laurels of New Orleans and the Florida controversy JackltI who has been too prominently portrayed as an uncouth front democrat Was here shown as he really was - a striking a impubive peronality but for all his nrc a gentleman and conserva1jve who knew the niceties of society and who stl)
~u(for order and moderation in goern1l1ellt to
Thelcccntly isltmiddotmcd sClond volume Portrait of a Presider -M(l has nol let thc earlier work down 711 James has not OIL ~iail uotained but has hci[htencltl the piteh as capturing the rn~ bar of Jacksons retirement from public life in 1821 he revie ~ t (alPpr in the llationallJolitical arena desrrihing and ana 00
til ad ions allli the forees with whieh Andrew Jackson e j an era in American history t~rJ
](Pll1arkable a a life story thp wOIk is equally strikingl~~hE a 1Jic(c of hi~tory Not content wit h revealing a mnn tlJiit lC
hi()glaphy l(~rral(lS an r)(wh coloringann emjrhingthat perioc ~j ~i l
With II t11( ltIftacl Ihal hils out t11( hare bones Winch perl13~U1 h not -U)prising sin(( AndrCw Jackson and his era are inSeuro) TU1 arable i rc
A magnifiepnt and pain--taldnp study of a greal man J
Ti Lfe 01 Andrew Jackson sets a new mark of biographical lence The publishers have recognizer its worth with an a tively constructed volume
IVOliVIiNO70
~f~OOSVELT ~ SllDY IN FORTUNE AND IOW~R By E~f1L LUDWIG
[Translated from the German by MauricE Samucll
350 pages New York The Viking Prp-~
Emil Ludwig renowned biographer of Napoleon Bismarck ) and Goethe has applied his psychological technique to the
study of a world figure at the height of his actIvity His life of President Roosevelt studded with typical Ludwi( hrilliance is interesting reading but will never rank as a definite life history of the present American Executive
In the first place Ludwig is cheerfully and frankly nowed under by the celebrated Rooevelt charm Vhat is more imporshytant he has a profound ignorance of American history and politics without vhl(h no wril cr can produce an adequate picshyture of our public life At the same time the author freedom from the prejudices of our lIfe and environment is in a lmiqup position to make some candid and revealing- comparisons
Arranged in three sections labelled Fortune lTctamorshyphosis and Power the book presents a theme of tramjUon through sutTering Young FrankEn D Rooseuroyclt was a clever ~ocially con~cious aristocrat so favored by fortune that he never had to develop his latent talents Struck down in the prime of life he fought a grim otruggle for health and cmcrjed with the temper and the de~ire to champion tilamp underprivileged He deserted his class to help those who did not have his advantages
Perhaps the be~t pa~-a~c 1I1 the book is Ludwigs de~(ription of the atmophere of the Executive oflices There is also a comshy-parison between the first fioYe months of Roosevelt and Hitler that is excellent The sugar-coated hero worAhip of this book inll handicap its popularity while many minor errors of fact~ mar Jts histoncal value Approach lhis biography with the proper suspicion and you may find it interesting if not authentic
TARNISHED WAIUUO)
Bi gt1JoH JACS R JACOHlt
Xcv York T)Hmiddot Mlltmll1an Company
Several years ago Gamaliel Bradford gaIned considerable succe~ltlnd c- ahli-hcd a hIOgraphical prccedent with hIS crusade fa cleanse some of the stain from historys accepted villall1- )Iajor Jacobs follows the trail hlazed by Danoyer Souls bul fails to achieve equal result~ in this hiography of ilajor General
~ames Wilkinson The fault however lies neither WIth thei ~uthor nor his effort Vhitewashing James Vilkinson 1- iiimply ~oo big a job
~ James Vilkinson commanding general of the United States r frmy and virtual ruler of the Mississippi frontier was one of )the 1featesl (harlatanl in American hblory For thirty ycar~
1C utilized his high posts in the interests of Spain whose highly f3id ~llyhe was Not ahove selling out either side whenever it fUited hIS pocketbook he covered his trackh so well thal a undred years paRSed before the full measure of his villainy was revealed
From the beginning of hi military and political career durshyl1~g the Hevolution he disIJayed the Tlpr~li~r talpnts whieh ~t0ught h~m to the top Charmmg and indispensable when ~ ork was lIght he always managed to he conveniently elsewhere
t Book Reviews
when d~nger thre~ten~d His sponsJrs and friends exe~PlifY the familiar axiom of birds of a feafher - Benediet Arnold Charles Gates St Clair sponsors whom he promptly betrayed when it behooved him I
Wilkin~on participated in every m ajOl conspiracy of early lAmellcan hIstory from the Conway Cabal to the Burr Conshy
spiracy In each one he escaped puni~hmenl by betrayal at the propel time It took the War of 1812 to show his true ability or Jack of it yet even then he talked his way out of his just deserts
lvJajor Jacobs has written a careful but unconvincing story nf Vilkinson Unable in Lhe interests of truth to justify his suhject he was apparently reluctant to throw him to the wolves The reultant middle-of-the-road study leaves Wilkinson a colorless as well as an unprepossessirtg rogue Iiajor Jacobs self-appointe(l lask was just too heavy The tarmsh on Wilkinshy~()nR name i too deep and too tough to be removed
JA~IES MAlliSON BIfILIJEJ
By ABBOTT E SUTH
Nfw York Wilson-Eriellton
In a new estimate of a memorable career to quote Its subtitle a highly significant impression is here created of the fourth President of the Pnited Slates James ~Tadison has sufshyfered from the one phase of his life for which Ihe was not fitted but his faults as a war lime Prebident arc herein belittled in the lIght of earlier and more enduring work As a master builder of the Constitution l1adhmn emerges ~tS a striking and colorful figure
Two men are largely responsible for the ratification of the Constitution James Madison and Alexander Hamilton teamed to build the compromise framework of our fundamental Jaw performed yeoman work in the ratification struggle through the pages of the classic Federalist then parted company on the interpretation of the new law An important phase of this book lS a clear analysis of that collaboration and split
Hamiltons attempt to make the Constitution do what he wanted was based upon a policy designed to oerthrow the power of the agricultural South lIadison was a southerner shya Virg-inia planter and landed proprietor and a representative of the threatened class He saw the issue and broke with Hamilshyton to join forces with Jefferson for states rights and ~grarianism
Ultimately he failed but his earlier work endured A scholal a man of infegl1ity and a statesman Madison WlS small only in physical stature The biograI1her has done a service to American hi~tory by retouching the picture of the fleeing Presishydent of 1814 to its true color as a character of real significance and life
GEOIWE MASO CONSTITUTIONALIST
By IImmiddot]N lIlI
100 pag(gts bull Cambridgp IIarvlrd University Press
Of ~t11 that -elellld group who wrangled their way through the tilling Philadelphia summer of 1787 to end up with the document known as lhe Constitution of the United States George Mason has been the most neglected In a century and
I
53
~
iook Revieus c amp GSS Quart~
a half only two hioJrraphirs of 1 ho ir~inian have beCll written of which thi- j- tlle --colld The iir-t lpppared fifty years ago
Ceorgl )IaltOIj wa all tlllu-ual man with a curious mixture of abilitiC- and limitation Onr of tIllt fio(-t mind~ of his gen~ eration )Ta--(Hl It a P()fllPOllf lIIlu-( who fiplejpd politirs and Jmb1i( lifl ~Tft ill IhI cOlllln of hh parohlal work he 1gt
capable of thinkin on a natIOnal -eall Ill( hurly-burly of Itlilaingt fJtll)(i [nad hun ill ~middot(t no (Jun(1 or (ornmitt(l h~Hl a ]HlH I l1ll1d
lI-()Il ]Hditi(middottl llllity WIgt ((lIdifltd to th in~illia
(()TlfntHJl (If 171~ and t 1)( lhllad(middotlphia (Oll PillIon of 1hj
yr 111- 0)1 III lrp Jflllhlic CUTlld LlImiddot IIp wa Olll of the fir to achIJlilr a (CJlltlllClltal (om~f( dthllUh he IIfucif
If) -it III If nrl II( rrJ( till illlllla 1111 of Highb which hflpfd infllllnl(Il(Jt Illll IJIlI Iklhrllilll1 (If Tlldf]lcllIlllllf hut ll1l rcoltll])lll tlflllht fJf iU1llpl The irginia Stal( (011shy
middottJutiOIl a rr1f~j1 of II Llld Wl Ill 1(Jrk a were th( fir-t ten anHllfirlllll I) ILl Fjd(rl (OIl-I1)l
rAftfr 1lllplflL flaml Ill (OIl tltuI1()11 ra~f)n oppo-nj il~
rat liital iO[l ld1tl- lIJ)(lll 1iIHll1l1-o that alpr (PCrlP1W( prnnd
rJlht bull a Il-uJl I)f lll~ nilj(Ilj()n~ l1H lil~t amlIHlmenh Wlle
1l1cgt()i))(I)lfll ]111r tll 1ll of ~blr uJtill1atpl~ boft oul hi- Hrl in tlH In 1111
J1~ lilil lIfl of bl)ll I lot tOI) lOll i l(luratC and 1I IOIl--tnwil 11 ~1H prcc1l1- a mall 110( contributions to (Ill lltllnnllI 11middot1 IItrll ln(llIl~
ThE lndll li) IlllII]W I)t(jlratioll of Hlght~ Dp(aration i j ndlplndl1l1 ] 1middot]middot Ilf (()Ilfrdpral ion and the COIllttitution fir -1 1gt a lll~rh plll t in IllCrwan hitory Yet ~uch are the i_rIIlI (If fIII1I 1111t IIJ~l -hlIJl1t1l I)f (OJ1Jw(tilul the only llltll III 1111 Ii ~IrlltI UII IIJPIJ all four fundamental dOluments Ilf 1JlI)Idll ltlIlJldi) hh h((11 WU lligh forgottrn Ir 1IJlrdllllll hlllllp]l (middotlil 111~middot n(ll(-o this influlntial and 1 11 l f()l1)lJ tlr Lt1 hi r from a (pnt ury of unlllPritpd ()h~(llril y
-hrl1lt1l ~ Iji ~ln111Jll~ CI( humhlpound (l1cl]gh 10 ~athJy any -lII~ I III 11)) n IIIl 1 colonial farm Ill earned hi parly li- 1Ilg alt a hnernaL(-r In an atC notoriou~ for its inlellectual lJ((rl y hc (middotdUf all d III 1l1-11f tnd J)(amp ill onlpr a ~ll((c-ful
tormiddotI(f)r -lll I~ Dr iuhlhiwr and lawyer Then he turned 10 Idlhli( dfail-- ITlI] --Iner fl)n~piLu)wly a~ a member of the (fllo[)jd 1ldmiddotlalIJn on 111f hidw- (our or (onnC(ticul and a- IntlItl of Yth (ollmiddotr
1 till onllmt1 of Ill I(olution 1oler Sherman went inl (j I hr (ollt inc1l1 al (onrl c [or Ill dural ion or I he war when Iw-tl ()fl thC (OtllITJltiPP- that drnflerl the Decmiddotlaration of Righh and o[ illdrp(IHl(IW( alld h Art iflls of (on[pderal ion Afl pr
I hi wn )1 rl 1I11l(r Iii (Ol1lH(II(llt ofli(middote- 10 whilh va addd I ill Ill) flf blll I)f W lfanll
1 h(1 Yltr 17x7 found the dour Puritan in the ConstItutional (nnwnfinn whprp hi-o ll1ocl(ralJOIl and (Oillmon -CI1(l -av(d mon~ than (1I11 ]Hatpd -l~ifln IIaving -igned the Constitution -)hfrrnan rOlllh for it latifialOn and then rcpresenctd his I all in th Ilou of l(epregt(ntatics and later in the Senate
II1r Boanlmans generally [ellent life of his iIIustriol ancestor may be forgiven a ecrtalJ1 awe in the presenleuro of th f1i
selfrighteous old statpgtrnan It is a reacbble contribution ~ fil
RevoluflCHlary history 11It11 11~lUtS a dp-op]ing but hither( m Tlpglp(cd figulP 10
tl
tto
LAlaJI ON TIlE lARCH
lhl ~Ii ~v
One of the most amazing pllPnonwna of (ontemporar ~1 Ameri(a h been I he rioe of II C I lL an I the nulting eh~ j~~ 111 the ranli~ of lahor 1uct wilen lahor lppeared to be comir 2 jI I I I I I can1I1to lb OWI1 1e llttllI1SS gfnclai(( J)Y t 1at-p It las co or ~h
the viewjloint of all ohvers he they C I 0 h~mpalhize fui A F of L adherent - or perplccd by1 andCr~ who catch 11 l full sound and fury of batLie folll boil ide
Mr Levin~)ll has kepI hi~ head in till full ~tnngtlJ ofl~ --torrn An open parll-an of tIl( C 1 0 Iw has written admirahly f(lItraiIlPd and (arfflll ~tory of lllllt lahor hi-o Anyone who rarr j n lrad will Ifarn Illlwh frum hi olrrant nr I balul(ed ddene of Ihe I l O t
First prcmh-e of the author IS that tIl( C I O i moJ sinned again~t than ~innin AI any rale it if hanllv the rer ~ lutionaly ogre its cnCllllf- ha( ]laill(ci it The mo~(n1(nth~~hu ~pommred some pntty rougil ~lllIT lmt Anwrican labor L~ht fought more destrwliPI in Ihl past with Ies results 1[
John L Lewis i- adequattgtIy dtfpl1tied against the ell of Communbm and 1~) It) l]pgtidlll ial a~piraljOlrs 1(lw iicvCs in capitalbm balanced h~- a strong labor front he knoT- hr there an leds in hi-o unions but H(- no more rCa~on to smct Co them out than to impo~e political qualincations for union me) to lwrship An(llast Jy J r I ej~ cln(~ not larpound to be PrC~ident i ~h not now anyway lH
Lnhor on flie l110rrll I~ a Rohel lHlll of Callable writing Ar i on( in1eCsted in the 111)01 Il1m(llllnt a fipld army oflkct~e1 arc plone to dis(~al(l wl1 plntit in tlw hoole So 111 Lbu C I 0 IJ~
+tUlTilE IOLlTl(() l~)middotl~ ~I
~( York llarlonrl HHP amp (I)
lJatthew Jo-ephson is nne of t 11( outstanding 8 writers in the Pniled Rlates lorla a fa(1 whhh should ()Vrooktd ill r(aclil1~ thi- nllllllt At thl ~atl1e time I earlful historian and a colorful fo(c-ful aut hoI with a linack 11 ~~ story telling Vbatpll his -olial thcorils and 11( us(s tl
hook Llt a vehicle for hi- philo npliy 01r 10(l1hon has IT i ten one of the brst i((Ollllt-o of our politieal hi~tory flnm~ Civil Val to the Bryan ](middotolt ~I
A few ymr a~ ~1r ]ocplon puhlihed The EM 1 Harol ~a -lory of the ri-l~ of I ~i~ JUSil(SS a~HI it~ masters ali ~ 1865 J hf SllfCC-Ss of thrs( lmlZll) imamwl pIrates was t J 011(gt Hide of a particularly ltonlid period in American histo~ lt-~ The Politicos completes the picture of the American social see and becomes a companion vork to The Robl1er HarOlls Do are excellent reading
Book Review8
The Politicos were the politicians - the professional key _ meo of American politics ho united with the unscrupulous
lt financiers io get a strangle holJ On the wealth and the governshy-ment of the reunited states They were a thoroughly unSltlYory lot and 111Joseph~oll ~pares nothing in painting them so At ~thesame time he has little u~c for the men who fought them for ~to him the reformers were small men who didnt really mean lV hat tlHY did ami -aid
All til( pr(~id(nts from Johnson through Garfield suITer at I middothllt hands Alhur he calls the most effective President since
1
I lLmcoin hut he ha- an unflattering opinion of Cleveland TIll l~tory of the ri~( of the Popuiibt movement occupies a large
portion of t Ill hook and b a notable study of (lass struggle Except for an Incon igttent habit of setting up irrevocable laws middotand then (1 ilicizing his subjects for reacting to those very laws hlS hook i~ an Ifedin addition to a ncglc(tcu period of our hIstory
THE BI( FOUR
By OSrAH LE IS
-cw York Alfred A Knopf
In the decade before the liil War young Theodore D JUd3h made such a nui~ancC of himself talkmg mcessantly about
-~ nmln(ontirltolal railroad that hiraliforrlia aS50elarh thought llIm s1ifhtly balmy lIis pcrsuasiv(1PSS was not lost ron fo~r
~a(ramento shopkeeper however WIth the result that Judah s ~~ lrfltlm became a renlity and the Sacramento quartet became I the most powerful financial and political figures on lh~ Pacific fOJL The slory of the rise of iIark Hopkins Charles Crocker [olis Huntington Lcbnl Stanford and the railroad empire _I l~ey built b the burden of one of the most absorbing books of
tLc ~umme sea~on Judah died hefore hi ision had come true and therefore
h o received any of hi~ deserved credit The four unemotlOnal - but eminently practieal merchants g-oL all of that Not that
~ f~(y didnt dc-erve a lionmiddots share for they did build the railroad brucomint inlreJible ob~tacles to do it The ~tory of that
hUllJing and the ~rreat monopoly into which it grew makes i1elilbtfuI lladillgI Four more different peronalities would be hard Lo find
lrhere vas Crocker j he florid man of action who drove hipgt jvork crew through the mountains and then promptly lost
IJnterest in the completed task Leland Stanford was the lstuffed lthirl of the team the front for the railroad and its
I
tl
I
~tlj01
manipulations as Governor of Cahfoll1ia President of ihe Censhytral Pacific and United States Senator
Quiet frugal Mark Hopkins had little use for wealth and never knew how to spend his money but as Tleasurer of the fenLral Puifk he nurRed it s lender funds into great fortunes for himself and hb a~sociates Brains of the four belonged to old Colh~ IIuntinglon tI~e shr(gtwd and cynical manipulator with no morc sOlll Ihan it shaNe
1r LCwis gild no lilies for hi~ ~ubject~ They were often di~hontsl and hl plainly saY1 ~O hUl he gives Lhe imprCssion of a blwahing- admira1 ion for the ofd fellows especially Huntington He ha~ w]ititn an interesting and colorful boole
READING COURSE FOR OFFICtRS
War Department Bulletin 1928
Lbt of S(kclpd lOoltlt relating to hictorieal llohtical (conomIC and mlhLlry gtubjetllt published for t11(gt informltion of tl-je ervice
This h1t lB divujpd into l(ction corrrlponding to thpoundgt several periods of an ompr lrVIIl RtmaillHl -P( liongt will appfar in future editions of the Quart(gtrly (For FlrlllNltHl e( tw Tune 1938 Quarterly page lt2_1
SECOND PERIOD (AVERAGE FIVE YEARSI
(f~T(rtVAI HETWETN COJANY mnnms oenSE ND ADVANCED laquo(jRSE)
~poIlWN4 MAIS OJ WAlt WrIJ NOTES IIY GENBHAL BUR~OJ) 1 vol ((i(gtorgfdAguilar)
BATTLE STUOJeS AN( IeT AND MOlImN BATTLE 1 vol (Charles T TJ Ardant du Pieq TranslatlOll by Col John M Greely and Mal RC Cotton)
llLtl(AN GOEtNMENT AND POIITICS 1 yol ((hark A Belrd PltTY HATTImiddotS OF Tim 1AnmoN ERA I vol (Claude G Bowcrsi A HISTORY OP TlIJ~ GR~AT WAIt 4 vols (John Buchan) HISTOltJ OF THE UNITED STATES 5 vols (Edward Channing) ALEXANDElt ~ vols (Theodorf A Dodg(j CSR 1 vol (Theodore A Dodge I GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 1 vol (TllPodore A Dodge) HNNIHAJ Z vol (Twodor(gt A Dod~() TilE CRITICAL Pmnou Or AMEHlCAN Hl~TOtY 1783-179 1 vol (John
Fiske)A (YILE or ADI LFTf1~t 18Gl-1 SO) l yolo (Worthington C Ford) )lOL80N TlIl FIRST 2 vol (August FOllrnipr Tramlated by Annie
KAdltlms) A SnORT JIJSTOl~Y or TliE ENGLISH PLOPLl~ 1 vol (fohn R Gr(en) TENTYFIVb YEARS lR1l2-WI6 ~ yollt5 ISir r~dward Grey) 1111 OPlmATIOKS OJ VAR 1 01 Sir Edward B Hamley THE VIltGINIA CAoIIAIGN QIo 61 and 65 1 vol (Andrew A HumphnYs) HISTOR) OF F1UNCE 3 vols (George V Kltchenl A GREATER THAN NAPOLgON 1 yol (Balil H LlddC1I Hart GI~OIWE WARHlNGTON 2 vols (Henry C Lodge) LH~ OF ANDREW JCKSON 3 vols (Jam(ls Parton) LIFE AND TlIES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 2 vols (James Parton) HISTORY OF THE A)nmICAN FRONTIER 1763-1R93_ 1 vol IFrederic L
Paxton) bull FINAl REPORT OF G[JN[~IlAJ 1 J PFUHIIN 1 voJ I Gen 1 r PerFllllng)
(War Dept) Fum PRIVATE TO FlEtI) MARSHAL (Sir WIlhlm Roh(rtson ~IEIOIRS OF GENERAl WILLIA1 T SIT1~TtMAN_ ~ vols (William T Sherman) TilE WAR WITH MFWo 2 vol lTuHn II Smithl THE MILITAln POLICY OF Til UNITj) STATES 1 01 IEmory Upton)
(War Dept) THE PIIILIPIINES PAST AND PHESENT 2 vblfl (Oflln C or((stltgtri FnrmCBlCK THE GTmAT t vol (Nonvood Yonng)
55
-VoLest We Forget TIlE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE WORLD WAll
On 11 ~l)ycmlJlr 1~j~~ Wf commemorate the 20th anllil-Ial~ of Uw Yolld ar Armi-1ice which ended tll( ffJ(at(-t war I hat tlll world ]wd (11 bullillH-(d llar-hal FOlh t(lpl_T~I11 lnl1()tlllllllg it nad a- [0110--
fIJ-llJtH will h( -topped on tIlt PlltlI frollt
1Hjlllllinpmiddot at 11 )O AilI Novlmlwl 11th (Fl(lllh linw) Iht dJ) d 11 IHJi) 111] )J go l)f ond tIl lIllI J (I J1d l
that hl)lll tlltha da1f until further order
VIIl oIr b dlllalvd tiHJP VIll only ~oon()() mpoundll III thp lIltl d Stallgt rrn~middot Two-thild- of 1Jw-p (1( nJ~ushy
ar and (1I1t-fillld dl(Jft (wtlthnltfl who had WllI (dled to FClll-ral --fI)II 1)) d1l1 tloliV til( I(middotiltll jHlnllr Illi nnr had ()j) hand IlIarly fj()fl()()() ~prl1wfi(ld nnec TlH lI P of maeillllp ~Ulh Illl a larg-l -caie i- a dpliopn1lllt of the o1ld V1L III the AnwrJcUI 1my thl diOtIll ill 1~112
wa only fOllr mlchilH gun llll rL)inlfllt 1rhrll War Wa- c1(ld)(d Ilerl Lc llll~ li)ht ~lrlilllr1 -l1flkifnt to eqUIp an arm of )t)fl()(IO nWll Tank t had llollt Vp had lG t I J JI 11 I I 1 PllIW () t hit h 1 tJ t I JId t oJojptl and tIll Il llll t V 11h dt Clllt
rllttl lhl tl f1llti11i Ill l(Iliar 1111 had IHPll illshy
I n to 1 1111 Illllt It-- ()llgillal -11 FOllr million nWll
(Itd In till rn1 l)f Inch 208L1H reached Fralltl To 11111 If tlllI nf 11li numJer saw activl criccgt at the irulll Ill t I tJlJf)JJ otliCtr Dr nnf pjJjllt for lach 20 lHtlL 1(l11~ -1) dii jnn- pfl -gt(nl 10 FranCP pllh divi ~lnn lll11j lll) q1 about 1000 UIliCllS and 27000 men Of 111 llllmiHr J (Inj jltl1t ill lclil comhat lrdll III St hhll alolll ~)~)o()nn AmLrictll W(1( llIgagrd the artillery llJ(d 0(1 J (lon(Hjn hl III four hOllr -t1H mn t ltCnw
(11 illlY (l)lllI111 I allOn I Lconitd ill hblulY The lllallufa~shy1111 01 Ij~ l~ lpCdlhd tlw Anwrictll Enfield rifle wa~
d(~WIImiddotd dIll pHI lIt 1l(lt1JtIOll -0 that the tolal plodllcshy11fll 01 hnllt 1 Jil ~ til 1I1h - hlti lllli1ld OPI ~JO()()n() hy thl tl1W t lw Alnll~l Jtl 1 -wllpd Tiw Brownillg automatIc Ill ld lill J~nl Ill))) IlJn Illl( Villi p)1 dtmiddotvIlopfd during tlw al lut lilt) jlltlltlt productioll and lh(d ill largl
Illlm)r in tIll t]1d iJatt] )Il Frallll Illi art illll ~h(Jlt We 1gt -ld 11 tl IfWlllll jlIn- fill trailllllg H1lpOP and I IJulJJlinJ llll fll1(1- 111 Fral1cL with artiller Innformin)Z to lll FJ (IHh IHI IJH J~h 1lndard (alillll- III I nund nllmshy
)II t had ill lrallll ~)(I) PI(l(S of ariill of wbich Jltll~ iOO ( lrlIt1 III An1trilltI
TIl PIOdIIlIJlIl III fIJI i~-(ylllld(J Irlilllr ttlgIII ll
lrHfllI chlj f)JltnlJ1JtHJIl In aviation T~w tf)ta l11shy
(JiIII1 111 I ht All ~I j(( Illtlca-pd from 1200 at tht outshy
hnak Ill tIll tr If I w nrlv 200000 a1 it (ondllioll
AmlmiddottlllI air -IJlIadrlJlh pJald important rl)ll~ at (hallallshyThl n -1 lilJi alld till TlusHAIVOIlIH 11111 hrl)tlJ~hl
dIIWl III fllll)d 7-)) lIHn1YmiddotpluII whill UtltIII1J~ a 10 of (In i ~J 7
At thf~ tnd of t hp war Amlricall productIoII of -mollteshy1( plfhl n 1 pll 1111 glfa (l han hI Fnllh and Bnl jh PllHilld illl1 rl)millmd While the plolt1ud 1011 Jf high 1p1o hI wa III 1)11 (Ill 1~1tdtl 1hall (Jlat Britain and )JPJriy dOlbll thlt of Franct
Anllnla lun h~ well proud of it~ Arrny The achielt ~ melll- of the AEF in France have been vcrS briefly state ~l iJy elltral PCl4hing- as folloW-i 1
Blwen Seplember 26th and November 11th tWenlj i t vo American awl -ix French divisions with an appronl
~~~~ ~~~ll~~II~~t1~t~l~(~~)~(~~~ ~~~~O~l ~~~~r~~X~~d~ 1 ~agld amI ltleehdvcly beaten forty-three different Gerrna i1l
diviion with an etimated fighting strength of 470O~ Of the twellty-two American divisions four had at difTere~ 1
times during this period been ill action on fronts other thi 4 ollr fHVJl j
The enemy uITered an estimated loss of over lOOOj ca ualtic- in thi-gt battle and the Fir-gtt Army about 117O(~1
Jhf lotll strength of thc Firt Army including 1350 j
French troops reehe(~ 101IOOO men It captured 26N1 HISoner- H71 canllon 000 machme gun- and large qww f tics of material
TIl( transportation and supply of divisions to mr1 from our front during this battle was a gigantic ta~k Thefq Were tweHtY~-1ix Amcliean amI seven French divisions ~rl side huntiredK of thousands of corps and army troops mm-_ ill and 0111 of t lit Amlrican ZOIlC A total of 173000 rn)_ Were evacuated to the real and more than 100000 re menl were recevi12d
It need hardly be related that Our cntry into t gave the Allie Ihe preponderance of force itally n to outweigh the tremendous increase in the strength Germans on the Western Front due to the collapse of RUi and the cOllsequent rclea~e of German divisions employ- against her From the military point of vicv we began aid the Allies parly in lUI8 when our divisions with iUll CiCllt training tu talc an active part in battle were senl 1 I h( inact ive front to relieve French divisions in order tf4i I hey might be ed where needed in the fighting line 1
The as1J1-tallce we gave the Allies in combat begall May with ilw tlcee~sful attack of one of our divisions t (anlignY Til wa followed early in June by the enlrs into battle of the two divisions that slopped the Germ advance 011 Paris ncar Chalrilu-Thierry and by thrcQ Otf)~ [hal were put in [he defensiw line In July two Amen clivIHiol1-) wit h OIl 1IUlllccan division formed the ~PCarh)i of the LIHII11)attaek against the Chateau-Thierry mlient which nine of our division~ participated There was a to of approximalely 300000 American troop engaged in I SlloIHl nat til of thl iIalllt whith involved vcr se fig-hi illg and was 1101 completed until the Germdns W
lrivel1 heyond [he Vesle in August In the middle of amp Imh)ln arllly of tllltlll Americans reduced the 81 Mil sdie))t The latter part of September our great battle of l1PIIH-AlgoIlJH was l)(~lll1 lasting through fOltY-8Pvendf
of intrllst Jig-ht il1)~ aIHI llhlillg brilliantly for our First S((olld Armie Oll NOLm1Jer I ]th after mure than 1200 Ampri(tln gtoldi(ls had participated
On the twentieth Anniversary of the Armistice it s proper to recall some of the Armys aecompliRhmenl that great emergency Lest We Forgct
56
Lest We Forget
DtTlu ltlIl VI~ILQL~I~CT I tYI 11 10 )~ ~ ~
I
Iltpound)Utqo~ frVtflG
- -----shy
~ cf I~M-~S~f Sshy
Dv-AulIJo+j
or J~Ulo1r~~
~oGtI5 copyl i
nmiddotwt J 1___
~L~ - _
57
I
Library Bulletin
j I
Thlt 10rrI ~trlocf 01 th Untd ltt t lt
Tr ~n()~t Itn de~ 10pOl nt n tt UnIt d Ot tmiddot I II I
Ih PQIlct 1H youth
( ~ d of d r
(~r t Itd If Ch I
11
rp O ~ COfllnl1j Imiddot I ~ I
I I_ K-- hlney n tho 01laquo 01 M bullbull rIHt HII McCrir I
gt Tr It1rl Ivlt Ilon of N pnhnn I I I I I~ - I I
MIIr~ clttlhllthtTHnt pproprltn fJlII for 1111 If I 11 I)
~ I
Tllr nor I hltrd I 11 III
0 r Ollrrhllrult It I 1111 I dlf iiII1
lrA chlrlt rI lUt 1 I - bull J ill
LmiddotgtlconmiddotdllGUtrrcdmiddotE~plln( I Ill I
JlUI h I It Tho Inv 510n of Chln~ b) tho Wlllttern worl Illgt 11 d
1 I ro J 111] Tho pO~l-wlr world middotIorl 1middot1 I I h 1[1 Ill 11 II I 111(I11j
1 L J I) I~ Gavltrnrnfnt gul1tlor1 of tr1nlportltttwn lUk tlxlll
J lop ~roo 11 I 1 X lraI I I Lr Tho Lo t Batttlton JII) 11 lin) I( r iI(ie)
I ph 1llh~ Tho polltleo~ 1865169( Ill I I I
hl) 11 lellltron~ mIHttlrcS til la Iucrro elvll (n [~pJn1 I) h 1)lIill lt frp ih 1 ar 1 1 1)11 11 liE ]
111 1 II -tIJnullr Irn Americlon relef 1I 111_1
I IIdI mj Lifo of Proldont Rooltltlvclt A ~tudl In fartur lnd pO f j Bl~ WI)j
1 I (f) II Tho philosophy of tho tct (1 111 11 If atd I tr J Im PM))
~~nlnnl I~r) (rnmII ror runlUt Twentymiddotthlrd nnuat report of Nltlonoll Adv1~ory Commlttlte for Aeronautics 1937 I(If7 11 rO Ij
Nltw lntrnltlonlll Yer Book um fIlllIm of ttl rid prlr ror tj ~nr E jp pnlj
l I)) t I)r f a) A ~tudy on th( opltrlltlon ofn Int(IIIlt n(o_offccl~ r ran 1111 frm II In nrll l i I elll e I lmldl1l 1 Ill 11 II I
I fall Ill 010 Wlthrwlrt~chaft do~ totln Krlcgts I rUd f hr I tllt ~ I I HI [01 1If)- ]
llflhr Tho Navy Ahl~tory I) nr rmiddot 1 )IP ]K f Ij
lr WI))n Children ortho RisIng Sun Ill Imiddotmiddotmiddot-)
1iI r lIuulluHI
Oltr DlenstUntorrlcht 1m Hecro 1J 11 f- ) gt H to r I til Ju ltI furl nrmj- Iu) fnr 11]0 raal_ymlt) 1 lH 11 ~(-t 1 q I
Ofr DIltn~tuntfrrlcht 1m H re 11 Jl) -101 11 11 t I rlllll1J1 IU fm 1)11 r] 1117 [1 ~l I 11-(]
1J11middot11I1i1 nf IntnwtI1d [f
International ~llnction5 fII( loy 11) f 111lt111 r 11 ttlllllltdut( In( 110) [LlT 1~)]~ [I~ ]
Tho Rcpubllc~ of South Amlricil npnrt h -1Ul jrltgt]1 [ mllrqn ItlllI 11)1)11111 of tllonltInI Afr q ) (j t1
-IIIflrth LI ( 11 1lt lrqr Der Untcrfuhrer der Flilkilrtlllcrie 11 hl U d ~It] u) r I t 1I1)IlIlrUllt nrtllry] l~n [1 07-12- 1 III
flhtl rool~ 1
Th( (clution of phylc Imiddot i 1
middot11 r
Ch (lilt for her Ioflt 11lt 11 I )
fd t 1 Hport r S (ond r(rl( 1 ~d 1 I 1 [0 I l~ t I I [I
is
~ I I 01
unt lllJH~
I P
1 11 Il lIh 11 11)
Intrutlon~ for tlH tlct1 rmploympnt of Irltf I bull 1 111 IlIt I l I I) 11
Trnport tlon on t W t rn Front I ] 1 I Igt lt
J JI h _ loj
Imiddottru~to for rllOHlHnt cont~Ql OVrol In WlT
111 J()lJrnyto r
~c
11 LI
fbull]
j
d I I 111 10) dI 11)lt_
II
I I I 11 I If I]]
I I I l J~ i 1 01 ) I - III
I) I Braxton Brago Gonertl af til Confcdlrlcy 11 III BIO]
Ofr SprlchBrockhmiddotH~ 11 nlllwlra f ld
-[1 r iI11um I[))) FolkwlYs tuh I Ih _ell 11 II1lPflr[ 1I111IH P rll10111 mtlt nlld mrnl~ IHI~ 111
ulhllt-ltlolhI1II tnll1J( r t ( Fighting pbnls of thl orld 12)
[ t ltII ~ loar ( allan Arncrlct UOl~ to 1r 1lt) l~ 11 llll-I l-f i q
Ifd ( Ctgt ut ~o11 d Iarmo ittllonn qull ] h 1 1))111 1 tI [1LlIUIl rnl 1Ilt ]101-( W1
IItnh Lad Thorouuhbrfd rdJ stock lnd it~ bullbull ncolitors rIn f pur 11( 1 1 fI1 1 1
hlt1lrllmlull Puerto Rico nd It plopl Illilt [17211
WhO5 who In Jalla 1936 th Ihuhuo nl lw) Pilll I~~ 1I1~1
011r HIltI 1 Ild rlhur 111 Tho Hoov politic 111
tr ii nr1 ( The Glrrnan Octopu Jillh r 11 f r rid 1 r 11111 11 Qi~
rI r - The Candlans Thl) story of II people 11J1i [171- 1
1111 I hWII TIll SlllomiddotJlprH~ confllct lnn til LNilUl of Ntlou lItIImiddot1
JII III~( Ill J looldnll bDhlnd tho tonsor~hlp 11 IX (1 ~Il 1 f]
ACADEMIC I
J1Uj)U GllLL ( 1 BliKDlL U S Army COllmandant n~n]lIE1t (ELL F II00Ji( U1T U S Army 4sgt(i1 (IIIIffdi
J 11 ITT iT COLOJEL F GILBREATII CayallY SrcJ(flry
DIRECTORS
l~qlllaJ I ~ ________ _lOLONEL K B Epl1u--ns (avall
~1IId Cia alHI Elell jllll CourbCS _______ COLONIL C I (IWeKCTT Infantr)
CHIEFS OF SECTIONS
I OJIllhJiL UPllltltiotl ______ _____ LUUT (OLUNELG It (UOl Illfalltr~-
II lilt Lll igCl1Cl Ihmiddot tory alld Slratcgy _____ LIEUT COLONEL F V g()LEr Fi(ld Artillltmiddot~middot I I I I)(fensivC Opcratiulls ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ LIEUT COLONEL G H MEYER Coa--t Artillery (nrp- 1- Suppl) EanntlOll and Logitic~ _ _ LIEUT COLONEL C F ILLIIS Cor]l~ or Enllllll
I_cclialll011_ _________________ LIEUT (OLONEL Il E ~ICqllLLN (11middot
l
ROSTER OF INSTRUCTORS
i ~Ld~ KllllH n (t
It I (tr) I Inf
1(gt h inPDltl 0 F Lt 111 (()L~~II~IIltIl) Thn B Cntrl t( 1q( n ( ( t~~lgl))rlH~)l~ 1 ( tlJm~ Charlln F r E l~drrhll1 L(i K t l
PCF tl~~di~lI~()1rnd k ~~~ Eri ilJlDl E FA ~atz Flod R Inf p~rd SJh~tlmiddotr I) r j
~~r Hlm( II H InC rlg Jln1()nl F inL
I 1 ~~rt ci~~I~llnL( I~ IWmCIDlt1gttIt L Inf ~d L IllMd H InL a(rHoml E InL IrFarlnd AndHw I illf
anlOrk An D Inf Hry Bl-ll 11 FA
c urn r Augu~tu M F 1 mlth AIIrt ( (~v
Qta -1ltmnan IJ Inl Idrlahnn William lt InC mWn Hompr C Inr uthm RlchJrdmiddotT FA
lIorlgltun laul A CE
N~~~i~~ ~~lll bn~ c Ttior Herhert W MC TOll1lt Dwight F C E
middoti~~PA~~h~~(P~ C~~middot fandpll ILlfold C Cav Brett S(fIIlU E Inf
(lmp1ill William A FA Ehrll Ir(gtl~r)l L InL HlIlwy Ullfu S Cav Brook Jdward II FA ugur Wayland H Cav 1lfllt Ward H bull FA Clmpiwll William F QMC Hultman Hfrbert FE CAe TnlltCott LUIlan Ie Jr Cav Pnrtlr Hay K Inr 111111 John K InL ililburn Rrltm L CAC Lflwr lLIll 1- lllL Hkd-o William P FA Karlstad Chups H Inr GriclllY CecIIJ In
Rook Lowell V InL (tdIe John U D lpndfrgrat Grady H Inf Hrt(gtI1P Rohfrt G C Irvil1l WilarJ V CAC Bl)I1()1(gt E~IoIrt F C S Phillip Thomas R C AC rlhE Sam LbullC 11011 John II C Ae HarkPr Jnhn Dc F AC
(middotlITIN Lorpncc Walter Eo CE IIartllflt Harlan ~ InL Jpnkm Reubn E InL Lanah1l1 Frtll(l~ 1l Jr SigC
ROSTER or RtGULAR CLASS 1938-1939
NAE 1lkPrrnan StlphpJI 0 Adamf1 Hugh P AIbrpcht Frank M Aldprman Crdg Andersoll KelllHth s Rack George 1 Balwr RussrU A Barher Edward Barl Ruwrl O Harndollar Marlin 1) II [llrlptt L(lUrIIHP V
B(gtldrrlinden William A Bplldpr Arthur I-I Ikqqlll~l Earl C Bplt)etLP Leo A BIfIdl WIlliam S 3d Binnl John J Bl(k Frldprilk IJ Blizzard John C oTr lIoaIlHr Haydoll L HuatrHr Marl M Jr Bohzien Edwin B Rohlpndpr John F
ItA~k llHANCli (lptall1 htfantry (LptUll FA (aplam CEo (Iptalll illfantry itljllr Infantry Captam Slg C Captam Infantry (Lptal1 C AC (IJlalll 1lSMC MaJOr lllfllltr~ Clptain CAC (aptull FA (apltin ( AC CtltUIl Infantry ~t1J()r Illfmtry raplam (avalrv
(tplam VA iLIJllr FA tllajor Infantry Captain Infantry Captain CE l1ajor Air Corps Captain Me
59
w _~~ AC(ldemic Notes c amp GSS QUUlmiddott~
IL It~h HILII NArlH RANI
UUWII Frud S Ir (aptain Infantry Hettinger John A Major Cavulr
BOWIH JaTllh C lr laptalll Infmtry Hill Tame P Captain lnfant~ HurjlIlit WlUfl) L (qtltlll1 InfllItr IIohlnthaJ William D MIJeH CA C
Bur((1 LI t ( (11[1111 F IIntmiddot Charp n Captain Clo S1 eg Sc
BU1IH1l ta1h bull r 1 ~d tjlt11Tl ( ( lIolllwr IiI) W Captain
Idh jtllph K ( algt lill lnfllltn Ilorn hlrl A Major Air Corl~ bull ~~ (mltl IiWlrl (tPLL]11 C I IlorrrH 1lt (iil11 I Captain ~1C
Sc (lIllltlll (Lf i) ( L)IUII IIILtllrJ Ilottllll Iohn I~ Clltam
(ttL II (I r (qtllll Il1fllllr HOIIl rh~lIl r Major
111 11 Id rd (111) Illftfr II()~JJ JLnl(l I Jr CLI)tain
llrJJIvrdj 1jr Jllf1I1r JIIW HobPrL L Jr (ljlLdn
(LLd ~()rml J ILl) 1 IIYlJllg Clyde L Malor
II Illld I I I ( II d ll JlI fl1l1r llJhn()Il I)OUgill V Captain
I Ir ~ il] 1fHtr JOhWJIl Elrlf A Major
J (In bull I~ (1j1Hl lr (q ohnull Howard It lpLIIII
(IIll HI) l Ii (till) 1 1Illi IlhOl WIllIlmiddotl1 n CapLlin
[d ffll I J (11lt]1 -11 I 111 (~harkl P CapLun
I rIl I i (tn Wllhlm B Captlln
rHoiL ( I trmiddot r I n (1) lfltUlj Franlc A Major
(IlIlIlJ1l) I lt I t)ll Ipm HamId I) Captain
ln 1r(sjIJT1 If ( q ~ K(bfr LaUtitHP B ~bJur
1)1d I Llm - I~ ljL Itf11L1r hlIHli Alvan C olljor
IIL I[O- Ir( nmiddot Kllt I au Jbullbull Cwllin J)llr1middot]middot(rrIH 11111 ul) K 11111 John A 11IJor
1)111 P lI l~ ( ljdl) (( Kohlgt Vlbiw n (apt a)
[)rlr( il I 11Jr (1 dry Jrwl (por)W K l1ljllr l )Ilgt 1 11] I If (IImiddott11I Irdilltr KrLltlhoJf -innw) CaplllI
Jl lllrt I I lr tIry LuHIvin Joltgtpph Captain
fnIrII Ii i (Ill1l IT Cliff LlIlham Charlp~ 1 Captain
111111 rtIL) I Ll]r lr ()fI LawrIl(I Charlp~ V Captnll
11 i ( rtd II ( H III llf I1dr ilwtoll VllIiLIn S Captain I II It ITmiddotl ITlt ( Lumhard StlpIH1l C ClpLllli
I-kill illl 1)1 dl r LUVIIl Juhn H Clptalll
1 -11) Inti II( I ( qLdll (I LYIllh Grorgf 1 Cljlltlll
Ir ]tJrlll (QI L1ll I Mahie RIl~(1l L C1)la1l1
lt f 1 I Id td 1 1lJl1r Idr Mtldonald John C ~Tajor
IlL r It doI (qgttllL lr rl~ Mlrhdl Iloyd illajor
rj TILllll [ ( t[tll ( ~ ~lartiJl 1Lrlin C ~LLj()r
1)f loll Ilt ( qgtt11l I Mathpwoll LptnllPI (Ipt-till 1- d n 1 l~ltl r1 I (lltlill ( ( iay Edwin T CaptLin
111r lnf JilIn Il(hr~4tal IItrhfrl 1 Cptain 1[oIlt1ll F ~1 (ClUff Mlr] Captain
LdlJI H IIIJr F 11p(ulough Samuel 11ajor ( I I~ f [tdl Ir (liII) JnLlll] tl1d((I Riehard G Cllltain r Ij ( 1)i J ( lIdUll (lt( Md~UtIIl John C Ca))ILlIl
Il Il l[ iIIIII IlIfI)ll1 Illlt(~nulth Wilbur R 11jor
(t rd H rl ( (qd llll I -llmiddotloy Guy S Jr Captain ( r]n T O) l IIJr IT ( rl~ 11nfTlt Htlbell C -I1Jor ~ l r IJ I 11 ~Ij ( -ll)r)rtmiddot Brywt I 1aJor (dI 11 d II (1]11111 [lIfl1tn Ilurphy John B lajllain
(1 H hJ lilli I 1Jr ITImiddot)fJ M~frlt Culby M Captaill
1 U dlll II I1 (1 ir (oq ~ NVIlll (pon 1) Cljltalll
(~Ii t 1 rII i~ L (IIllll JnflIltrv 1nhil Charil13 II (ptLin
(~dlJr jllldri shy (ljllltl 1 -llf~(III Rkhm K laptaill (lId L 11)jn I (II)lllll Ill ()middotJ)llllti Iohn W Major
(rI [ Ill ir ( ljllIll Sl~ ( Partndgpoundgt L1o~ d S lajor (r IIltmiddotr Ld) ( (IImiddot1i 111 (lvdr P(phw G()r~( B ()Itlin 0
(rdhl jl fl Il jf (1J1L11l Infantr Io~(lll WJlhun I) I1ajpr (r 111111 ljlllli -IT (orl 1ral hpr Hlthard ( ~aJltalll
II n II JlTIll II 1IJr illLllllr ltdl Slatlll Jo Captain i) ILr] llJlIT lnfIHtT ILIIllY TIOma~ II ~lajor
Ibl 11 ILId ~ Ir 11 Lt 11 (qfJh Hplc1 Widlr J Major
ILlllll johlJ H (qtll1l I ItplI- Andrew R Major IIrl It 11 11)llf up (ldwidrfpr Ilarr Major SIR ( j II nd J1fntl II (IItllll lr(TI itlnlll Alhrt (apllill (I- ~i Illrfl (IIYiJ o1]r (C ltwhanbol Willi11ll L (apt ll1
ILII11]1 (lplllI 1 itldlllo1lr (Iryll II Major ~i~~orI(1Iiard II ~ f d rll J (qLIIll C AC HqJrrts Thomas A Jr Captain FA J Heilllltl I hmh H Cljllal1l FA Itr)(lIlilponarcllI Captnin Air Cor~-middot
II I )~fI)]1 rg t 11 rt I o1ljor AU (orp HI)t1wllI JalI4 S Major (ava1) ~
Iff ILlr ILlrrl 11 II r) (apt1I1l (ldn Hnl~pl11 Gurdon D Captam Cavaln ~
Hln]lIJ) flrll olljor JnflIdry HohfoiCnherg(r Carl T Major Cavllr~
1fl11V Vdlfr H Jr (tpain FA Rothrrmich Albert Eo Captam lnfantl)
60
Infant) IllfIIltr
In(ntl) -
InfmID ~ Q ~C ~ Air corfi t A ~~
i
f2XVIII No 70 Academic Noles
NAME
Roycc Charles H _ Ran Cornehus E
gnlle Gordon P jiltchc1lller Frederick F schlattrr David M 1Schulgen G(gtorge F1Scott WilLlrd W lSilt~r-l RthmllOn ~rormdur Haymond L JSoane Charlp~ C bull Jr Sltlth 101m A I Jr (Snith fJgtIph l~rruthJ Holwrt MlK ~ltl dl-nw n
I ~ rJry )hrrow Imiddot i5~ldmg J)lJllad 1 15tafiurd Bpll ~3f1lr Th)Illll H llhfl~ AlhPrt K TT
Franlb H
-rt nrl Otto P lt Donald G tltIqJfD
Thr)ma~ D )1- fohn L
It Juhn F ljd-t PpLrnC (
j7 [-)1) CIIHlllf A ) i7 I rr~ fohn 1
l~~~~I~~rd T
jl_ hlm~ Lumn L 1IOln l1ltDJ] E ]Ilton Walter K Jr
i lilm~att RoJert Wefl jllrgLt Vlllard L l t ital Wp~lpy V
jYe2ger Hohart R ) -rmiddoton EHrett M
jiUlll Char)( W
) I
1 ri n ~)
HANK
Captam Major Captam Captlin Captalll Captam Major Captain Major Captain Clptain CapLlin (aptalll
Captul1 CapLun Major Major ClptlIn Captain Captam Captalll Captain Captam Captain Captum Major Captain Clptdn Captain Captam Ctptain ~IaJ()r
(aptalll Captain Major Ca]ltaln Captain Major Captain CaptJ1TI Captam Captain Captam MaJor Captam Mljor Captalll Captalll Captlin Major Captain IstLt CU11tam Captain Captain Major Major Major
UfANCI
Infantry Infantry AIr Corp CA C AIr Corp Air CorpshyrAC lt1-
-Infantry Infantn FA Alf et1 Dn F CK Infmtrr InrlIltn CE InfuntT) Infantr Alf CorpltshyInfantry CpLC Cc FA Air Cnrp FA CAC InflI1tr~
AIr Corp Atr Corp5 CA C Infantry Infantry CWS AIr Corp InfanttJ Air Corp Air Corp cr- C~lalry
Alr Corp Infmtr Air Corp Infantry Cavalry FA Cnalry FA Infantry QMC C E Alr CDrp ( A(
Cavalry Air Corps Infantry Infantry
TIlE C01~IANJ) AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Fort Leavenworth KalLltas
1937-1938
Map Problem No 25
15 Mar(h 193x
Tim map prllhlpm whi1 dilfprPllt from anything that has Iwpoundn ucltd m thl P-t at Ill Commmd and (jPlwral it lIT ihoo is nut eJ]tlrely new to mllhf lIl-trudiiltL ~L1Jor John H Burngt Infantry hl-gt writtrltll at ngth (O)Hrllll~ Ih]lt ypl of prohll11 In hN artide 111f11( Ihf lIo) ProJIlin jlllbhlt-llld lt 1h( SIPtmJPr-tktolPr lgtU of lIlP Injrtllir[()1rJwl
llv llfoblem I Oil I of Ilpejjon 0 rrawtl that It ((is mfnrmatlOn to llll lttIHjnt In ti(gt furm of fUmmMI(gt (very hlJf hour The soher is r(4U1red to llldt a rlllIlrt at th (1111 of pltlfh half hour on the actions taken an-I orders If my( tudly lilUIt hy til (ommanrlcr In thig tYfJ( of problpm the solver mu~t JUidl wli11 I)f Ita ufiICipnt informatIOn and WiWll till time j ripe for rnalrlg riprisj)lIs
Althnll)h thi b a corpg prohhm th( eJwmp lt lnu~trat(lt may be vljuIltI iIlIXIII-HI mvoh-mg ltmtlir unit
Prfmiddotllh~
Sl fTlll- I ArlVtIH SJClt t-2 II Sppud SltuHtinn ContintH d ~9
III Hnilltlfll to r IlIlU--iull 11 14
SEIltON I
ltiancc Sheet
General ltUat lOll spceJal situation
1 (l~NIHAL SITUATION - - (I 1110]18 Sperial iIap A herewith Scale J inch ~4 miles
lJ Boullclaries- The Pennsylvania lIaryland state line forms the boundary between two hostile states Blue (north) and Red (south)
c Opposing forces - It is known that Red war plans conshytemllbte the concentration of a reinforced corps of two or three diVlsion~ in the area helween South IVIountain and the Susqueshyhanna River
2 SPEfIAL SITUTION Q loncentralioll 11) I lorps rewforcer The I Corps reinforced Lieutenant General A comshymanding consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions organic corps troop~ and aUaehecl troops as indicated in paragraph 1 Table J page 7 TaIzes oj ()rganization CampGSS 1037 The I Corps concentrated with the 1st Division in the viCInity of Hanover (374-746) the 2d Division in the vicinity of Gettysburg (350shy750) and the corps artillery in the vicinity of Biglerville (349shy762) The corps service elements are to concentrate in the area Lemoyne (380-800) ~ Carhsle (355-79)middot ~It Holly Springs (355-785) - Bowmansville (~1l3-792)
(2) The 3d Division (detached from I Corps) with 903d Cavalry Squadron ultached and certain artillery tank and motor units concentrated in GHQ reserve in the area shown on Special Map A
(3) Other Blue forces concentrated in the area east of the Susquehanna River
b Misson oj the I Corls~The mission of the I Corps is to mvade Red territory and develop the hostile situation west of the Susquehanna River
c Krents prior to liouliaht 15 Morch - (1) The I Corps completed ib concentration late on 12 March The 1st Cavalry Brigade reinforced protecled the concentration Early on 13 March the I Corps preceded by its cavalry crossed the frontier and advanced to the south the 1st Division marched on Manshychester (384-729) the2d Division marched on Keymar (350-721)
61
0~ i~ YSRURG SHEET EDITION OF 1934
STIlt_ TEGIe ~LP GEiTYSm-Rc~RICHMOND ___ Tc
- 3middot
1 ( ~_I-ampJ---=
SPECIAL MAP A SITUATION AT DARK 14 MARCH
THE COMMAND AND GEN-ERAL STAFF SCHOOL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS
1937-1938 TO ACCOMPANySECTION I
MAP PROBLEM NO 25 (160) 25 MARCH 1938
or -
1cademic Noles
(2) The ht DiviicJI1 l1lluunl(gtt(d hootile infantry along the line Silnr I~lln fjf)S-j~~ I I inebun) (~tG-I~6) and attacked late 1 llarth
Il) The ~d ])1 on Jatl on tllf aft(rn()on of 1 lIarch lpadwcl tllC Ernmitltbl11~ ~11-7~) TaT1(gt~l()Wn ~)-72R)
fpad aflPJ bill ltldll ClJlJIfJ-ltion (4) Earl~middot 11 Illfh Ill hI and 2d Dimiddotbinlc und(r (owr
of f(j~r wlti h 11(d thnll~h)ut the day lauf(hprl a (()ordmatpd atlttk aralll lilt h)~1114 fonl al()n~r the IIIH SiIVl nun
IIJ(middotil()l() I i l~ J111 1 h~ld (onidfllbJ( W(middoth and hy dad 11 Ial (il L(d d11 II 1111 lu) till f)J l bw to fl1 lint Plea alll al(middot I ~Ii-i----) Ihl) d ~7x-7n ) (ul)p(wdp1 (~XX-I~ I)
I ~)J illl 1 i blll Ill 11 I11Llnl rv 1- 011( ht t illOfl Wl~
Jrl()fr1 to ) TtIrlh )fi-Il1) ITl (()lJh ItttnC l)r(pared for Illl)fll 111 1111)111 lrl1por I
(1) TIllIoll 11lri llldltl -upporld llHWtllJJ] of the 2d and hI I)J l-iIlJi~
II) J-ll1 till Ih IlllJjllllW of l~ )Iarcl 1IIf hogtlik (~1-alry pemratlmiddotd gtI lllw OUlltlj rtmiddotlOllnai- al(( ~(r(en in lil(gt middotjlmiddotinity ()fSl1trI C l()11 11l~1-~11 alld 1lll1Tilvd ()Il Yorh lij7~lf~raquo) By dark 11 ~I~n h t hf 1lt-1 (tya1ry nrwulpound ninfofCld had drivcn Ill 110 1ill la 11 1)11 1II Itt nm1 had onto a -trong pDf-ilion in 1111 willi 1 )- ~lll-hun 1)-(1~) S11IJhlown
~ Ill 1llfh J~J1Ldd( ()r () rll1fnr((d b pr(JIt(tllll~ tilt lint pf Oll1llll] 1tlI)11 f 1)1 (OJ p-
)11[ fIIIllf)fi il Hr(td llload- -hown in -ohd 1IH ()ll Ill ~r I I ( ~ill 11 P IfI ~111t ddpound for t 11-IY mot or t ltfTic
h) n (uti I I lit ( J lu r 111 hllll conl A Wlvy mit1
n~ (Ild 1111 lt 1)(11(11 ~(Ilth 7Iollnttln ~nrl the Sultqucshyhtll11t 11 11 Ill 11 IJl (h Imiddot()rc(a~t at Ii 110 Pl 1-1 I1JTh 111111111ltd I)F) iurlll11 Ihar III tIll Jatl 1f(rnnol1 of tii )Jar(h
(I ltIJlfl Tiltmiddot Su-qlHhllllll and Potomac Rivers are unfordtbll -II Pt1ljh () 1~1(r h unfordahlp -outIHlst of it i1llt()11 ~l-)j~ lth ))Ih 1ra11(11 l)atap~(o I1ierall other ]1(1111 II f f()r]ddl
InrHvrph
--llll 1 -11 t IIO (II 111 IP 1-l(lIh of Jfi Uarch Tbl plall~ for tlH ()fllLttlolh qf the (orp~ on IC) llareh
TJrovided for a ((ln~l1udtJII~ I)f the al1lIk hy the 1sl and 2d I)jvil)tb and II(middot J 1 (tYdn BrigHh
JHutlllallt (111(1 al 1 al hi~ (ommand post al IIano-el 111111 tlJ (lr p~lt ()f 11)( Tllorning of Ii) 1lareh ~tudying the Illllt)l 1TI1P llld tIll In flrllinv rIporli
J 11 ll() AI hi d lVlrpound of till foll()wing --ltuatlOn
(It tIl f1(1I1t (Jf IIII 1lt-1 (Iall) Briglclt the ho~tile eayalry had LfIll for(Imiddotd)ll VJl11drl to tlllaquo ~(Jlth and at 1000 A1 Ih( 1~1 (aalry Briradp had aun encounlpled hOllijp cavalry ni lalllIalorw rllf I1 Ialylal1d LitH (to1~7~f)) orli-villl ( f 1)-r~middotf J
On ill flllill f IIII 11 JlJj~iflll til 1100Idl force had allHlud ~l1nultalll)u-ly with thl attaek of the bt Division Thi rnlltt ha hnlJH1 pl1 Ilhtral ion and tlloveHwnl No gain~ hy (ilhe fOIl( ~(11ll to ha(lw(ll mlltll
On 1 Ill frollt or t 111 ~d Dn iol I he n(d~ launched a surshypn~( allwJ Ht dayh~~ht again t 1( right flank of the 2d Division
This attack was supported by tanks and caught the 2d Div~ in attack formation The tenor of the reports and m from the 2d Division indieates thal the Division is in sen difJi(ulty but in no imminent danger
Lieutcnant (jeneral A vbitcd the (ommand post of the Divimiddotion at Bandanna (mi-7lH) at 11 10 M where he fo the commander and staff gr~atly dhappointecl with the res of t he mornings hat 1 Ie The divi~i)n wa- reorganizin~ and paring to resume the attwk at about ~ 00 PIvl It expCte after reorganizal ion j hat two and po-ltihly 1hr(gt( hatt alions co be made available fol the new effort Lieutenant G viiled the command post of the 2d Dimiddotision at Galt (J
al ahout 121 PM The slarr of the 2c1 Division appeared ~()mewhat (hagrined uy the events of the morning vr tonflictIng and contradictory reports had been received [11 ~ the ~uh()rdinate uniL~ It wa~ almost impossihle to gain a co beer pie e or clear picture of aITairt- on that front pres ltertain fa(lS were cle~~ however The attack of the~ing
DIVISIOn had faIled the dlvJ-lOn had been thrown on the defrshy~ive and about noon had heen drinn back and appeared to~ -tuhhnrnly defending along the ~(gtnclal line Tane~tuwn i Pleaoant Valley (altualtie- ~llfT(rcd (ou1d not be dctcrmirw i with any dpgrpp of WlurlfY Iajor C(llpral ~d DivisionrjJ just fPturned from a viltit jo his hrig-ad(~ Iommanders whow 1 found reorganizing their fOI(e- and strcngllwning 1heir defenvl Two infantry battalions werc in diYi~i()n lCsCt( The divis cavalry ()ppo~ed l)y hOStllp (lvalry wa~ protc~ing the rightfl~~ along the c1cel about t wo Imle~ nort hwc-l of 1 aneylown 1la ~
General 2d Division in spite of the reerses of the day Ii calm and unworried ~
Vhilpon 111(se visits Li(utfI1ll1t General A studied thest at ton but did not i~ltuc any orders He rct urned to hb (ommalt~ post at Ilanover at 1 10 IM in time for the rouline daily rJ lonfercT1CC ~Imiddot
The Corps Reenc (1st Infantry less one battalion) at~ $ril hour was sLiIl at Two Taverns prepared for movement hy mo i t ranspClrL hndl
OTIS len Hp1U1n(- of llfornlltion f((IWei tt til( COfp Commallli Post i 1
l~u(d at half hour iHtervalsommfllClIlr at 1 15 P)l LnLi endmg at t15Pl~ 10 ~ In making fepofts ~tud(nh will nutp thp HIJuirpnHnt (ar(fllY~J
no impoftHlt OfiPf i HlloUIlImiddot((1 or 1ctl)1l tIIill tilt f(marc N()Il(il~ pntffd on till flport
L HI hriff Ill dfllJlllp
SE(JlO- 11 IConlinutt1)
Special Situatiun Continued
)rwiai ~ltUlt1UtJ (onllnt(d
1 -IEClALRItlAtlON (ONIIl111n lipon a1Tialat~ command post at 1 )0 11I Liputenant General A was met his Chief of Stair who prtsente(I him with 1he following me dal(d Cflq 1) Ilanh 10middot1) P~1
The fOI(p OPlHl-ld lo the 1 (orps is eslimatrrl to~ (orp- of not more t hall two divi-ions Your mi (hal1gtlti You will a(Imiddotll1lte wilhout delay and capt 1IMUtE The ad Division with surIkient GHQ motor pOIa1ion 10 move the essential (ornbat elements of on gadc reverts to your corps effective at once
The daily staff conference was called to order by the C of Starr at 1 45 PM Lieutenant General A the chiefs of
og ~
- ~
or
I
~olXlJl No 70 Academic Notes
general staff seclions and certain special stafl officers were presshyent The Chief of Staff briefly outlined tlu situation as already described above after which the following reports were made
Corps G-2 stated There is some doubt as to the strength of the hostile forces confronting us G-2 GHQ inclines to the belief that it is a corps of not more than two divisions We have
Jed two divisions Red deserters claim that four divisions were in the area Baltimore - Vashington about 12 lIarch Knowing Red Lieutenant General Js reputation for caution and prudence I cannot undertand his attacking us this morning unless he i~ quite certain that he IS superior to us It is quite possible that General J has been relieved However I han~ no mfonnation about thIS Of course the hostile commander Genshyeral J might be miinformed as to our strcngth I am striving
Ito gam morc definite information as to the hostile strength Unfortunately due to the continued fog the air service has
jbeen unable to Ioeate the ho-tile r(cIVcs 1 cstimate that at present they are west of Parrs Ridge favoring the Reds envelopshy
Iling attack i As to Red capabilities shy
ii 1 He can continue his attack today
He can renev his attack tomorrow enveloping our nght flank or with less ease our left flank
He may defend actiyely or passively northwest of or I on Pans Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
He may delay or withdraw
-1 Corps G-~ stated I1 SineC rny bA report to the Chief of Staff the following
Information has been received i I From the bt Cavalry Brigade dated 1100 AlIT -The t] hostile cavalry has been oriYen slowly south to the line bull ~Iaryland Line or1i5il1pound Am about to aUack
j Information has been slow in arriving from the 1st Cav~lry1 1 havc ~cnt a LiaIson Officer to that headquarters The 3d Division reports that its artillery is all truck-drawn I that plans have heen made to move the essential combat ricments of onc infantry brigade by GHQ motor transport on
two hours notlt~e 1 The 100 Pil weather forecast predicts rising temperature fJg ohouhi clear in a few hour~ continued dry I ~Iy section ha~ roughly prepared the following plans
To move I he 1d Divl~ion 10 either flank for an attack late this aflernoon or early tomorrow
To relieve the 2d Division by the 3d Division this afternoon or tonight and resume the attack -11
To withdraw to a defensive position southeast of etshytysburg in order to assume the counteroffensive with the
JI i 3d Division from the vicinity of Hanover
G-4 stated A check is being made by my section to detershyine how much motor transportation can be used for corps elical operations without disrupting supply I expect the
eport soon ~ The Corps Chief of Artillery reported that he was studying he Gmiddot3 plans to delermine the ose of the corps artillery and
location of ammunition The Corps Engineer reported that Red road demolitions as
uth as the Emmitsburg - Taneytown road on the west and the line Glenville (388-741) -- Shrewsbury -- Stewshy
town on the east flank were ninety percent repaired Road
signs were being put up throughout the rear areas The position southeast of Gettysburg was being reconnoitered
Requirement-Report the actions taken and orders as actuw
any issued by Lieutenant General A at his command post between 145 PM and 215 PM 15 March if any
Time allowed for solution 30 minutes
SECTION II (Continued)
Special Situation Continued Innwnlh
SpeCial ClltuatlOn continued 5
5 SpgCIAL SITUAFION CONTINUED---The following is a resume of messages received at the I Corps command post between 215 and 245 PM 15 March
From the Artillery Information Service
Mass of hostile artillery appears to be west of Parrs Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
From the 1st Cavalry Brigade (message delayed due to encoding and decoding)
Drove hostile cavalry to the south from the Maryland Line - Norrisville position at 11 45 AM Am following up My men and horses are greatly fatigued Casualties have been heavy Indications are that hostile cavalry will resist again in the vicinity Parkton (404-727) - Shawsville (418-725) Will attack
From the 2d Division
Am preparing to launch counteroffensive at about 430 PM Have three battalions southeast of Galt as maneuvering force
From the 1st Division
Will renew the attack at 3 30 PM in the direction Bandanna-Ebbvale-Carrollton Have three battalions available for the operation
From Liaison Officer with 1st Cavalry Brigade (Personal Report)
1st Cavalry Brigade is in dire need of rest but their morale is very high The commanders seem to be more weary than the troopers Hostile cavalry withdrew in disshyorder from Parkton - Shawsville position at 145 PM
Corps G-4 reported
Sumcient trucks of corps quartermaster train to move the essential combat elements of one brigade can be made available on two hours notice without disrupting the supply of the corps
From the Corps Air Service
Fog seems to be clearing expect to send out first misshysion at about 245 PM
From 1st Division
My division cavalry attacked the hostile cavalry on its front at 1 30 PM and drove it south of the Gunpowder River southeast of Gunpowder (388-734) Believe the hosshytile infantry on my front is preparing to resume the offenshysive
65
Ac~demic Notes
Ufljllifl]lfllf Jlporl tlH -a11Hh laln and orciN (1-
(lCtual1y i--ued hy LilUl (~n~1I1t CPIHrai A at hi mmnand lot hetween 21~) P~I and 21~ I~I 1 ~Ialltil if an
IllItgt a[[llltf flJ (dotu HI minu~
SI 1111 II ilolllillwmiddotd)
--1H(ial --ituilliolt (ontintHd
ii -IU Id SIll ]111 (f)lj1 I) TIltmiddot folloIIW 1
IP-lIIW of IIifl)llllalloll lllll IllIgtlI- ltlII(middotd 1 11ll I ((In
OlrlJIlllld 1)1) I hI (ll ~ 11 alld 1-) 11 l~ bnmiddoth FJ om ] -1 (l 11ry Hn- tdl loll] Jll--IIl~rtr J
Iffl iiI- (middottdl) vil1111t(middot ~Hllhi(~ II (llll]l)dl]
Vall lU(middotr 1 Plll)] jlaHd Illgt 111 of (~lI1P(Jd1 Fall- U( rd ~IJ PJ 1 Il(lIjJ~ IllUl 1tmiddot It1 and f()od 1I(1 hl1ild 1)1111 of 111 [nl I 111 (1_ 1 (ff PlIilllll
IIap lap~urld ~()(J l~(d 1ttlnllltIl dIll frl](ldll1) t1H)l)
to lorpgt ll~l
From bt lJi i-l[) 11
llllrLt~ld Ill-illt 1) )01111 jldtlI hIgt 1)(111
tlold I 1~1 Ill j) 111l( i (jlll 111 lit 1(1 11middot1 illl oil 111
pom1 -1ll1 1Ill [I 11 fl III 1hltl l~illorl flnnl llilIIII (ollll1ltldr~ Ind]ltJl (11 1( Ill 11 (If I~ld lflI1-
1-1 llll ~d 1)1 i ol
I~id (l1n tlld lllrllllJ~ 1111 I lit frllll (If 111 ~(12d
(ltlry ~qladroll 111 P mit itl pd all (Ih 1111 p Ill -pndlllg
t 1 (Inlllll)--lltt illl lhllHl1t to r(lllfOlTt 11l~ (1 airy 1XII(I1 jll1ll1I nmiddot Ullljll jOll of Ill olTllhl I liy Ipd qUill
-()I)IL HlqULgtt -UPIl hy 1(11) nllltIY hi 1()IHIntlalld on frnnt of1d I )1 I ion I fa t I hrlI h1I Ldlllh of infanlry at (~tl l~riitd(gt hl I)nl~ 11lilllllllllll llII(- 1IlHllllni~
lion -upph j UlPIIli1 IIaI 11( onnnilllld 1(tl pn-ltifll1
Iprlh of J1l jllII (It I) lWHun (I)J Ind [llHlll IJlb iiJ~7lOJ Fill k I I 1llllL tnd hn lll( lin i 11lIolllin llHIIil lll)[(I(f(illI
Fnllll lil --1 J ]1 I
Fil nlht of i 111 da~ or Ill p J iat ion will take ()If tt 2)0 11 III IIld( IImiddotIiJ (Ill i1 f) local hn lill jlITl and J(lnfflf( 1ItlIIlt
From Artilllry Illf1lrtlllljllll ~(l WI
IIotih 1~)-lTllll julgt b bl tll ltwalld lllli IJW(-t of
f-uni~l I(r apTJtrllll ty Ii)lut ~ 1)1j tdioll- I kty 111 tlin (1))1 Ill I t io I llllllJliIld falliJ~ Ol
qur litH in ilillil~ I)f I)lll-lIll alhmiddot at ~O jl)I 1) lllfonntI inn frUffl dn J-iull Lmiddotallr -illlp lgtf( )fHlgt nport
(((1111](11(11 l~llfl till 111)1111 ldf1l and (Jnhr t
all ually h Ifd by I Hlll 1lt1l1 (lIwrd A 11 111 (ullllllalld po t
ht t W(middot( 11 ~A) FT Ild ~ 1-) Pl 1) larel jf U]
Tfu 1I11111l tf 11f I)IlflI j() IniJlllt~
~J I iro 11 ((jlJlllld
~1H(j11 IIlIIJon (ontinlHd 1gt1 111011
7 SIlII SlImiddotIIO (OI0I1L1 Ill f()l1)win~~ h a Ifmn( uf illforl1llflllll alld IJlI-agflt Il((id 11 th( I (()IP-
((Hilmand po t plW(lll LlJ 11)1 and ~1i Pf L) jTanh
c amp CSS QUaImiddotten Yo shy
bullVrom (orp~ Aviat ion
o hoslile f(r(e~ of any ~ize dbloven~ll ea-t of It lim Parr Ridg Dug Hill Ridgc Ileay railroad ttl lllOVPIl1lnt- alol1)) Iinls tilroll)h a-hingloll BalLimo-
lIa dr (lltl (1)7-717) BulJ~ of truck movcmer [rom A-ht-lo- t~77~70l) toward Vl-tminsPr
From 2d I )iviiol l
llo tile attwk again-t Plea-anl alky ~trong-Iys~ port (lt1 by arlillry wt 1il1HlHrl Jt UH) PI Continumiddot hO lill Jll ~Url (gain-t tilt divi-IOll cavalry jJy reser
of Illl(l haltalion- till ~()llll1lat of (~dt
[rom 1-1 rJivi-ion
S I()ll~ igtfl attHk laulwiltd in itlmly of llmon M at ~ot) J)jVl Tili at tad ll(lllld by fiftlln~minute arli1t pllparation [fo-till l)~mJll gun fire ha heen receit from arlil -outHa t I)f PIlacant allpy Ha( reonr teted new po-ition for my righl approximalely foul m] w(~1 of Ehhvalp behind erpLk aIled DlPI Run (nOl Strategic Map)
From hI CavallV II igacip
[lav pat nj~- --tIJchill) t IH lllt 10 (1 ( of CUllI10) Fall ItilJ 111 hO lill f)]((- -Ill to haHgt ithdlawn t wv-L of (unpowdpl Falls niH Belil l main body ho~ 1 Ilalry b a--llllhI llg 111 till WilllY of Hereford (10i~71~~ct Jlavl halted bulk of Illy forc( ll t of PII-JtOIl for lE~tltbel fund Command po-t Parkton t
IIqlttiJ( demolitions on Clct IbnJ arp -Jighl villJmiddotlj IPpaired hy dark load marking detaJl have (omplel1 marking road- to ilinily (If [l1lmibLurg and lullCytOlITI ~
U(lliliflIj( RlIHlrl I Ill allions laken and Oder~~ act ually it-lslIed hy I l(utll~ant CClleral A at hi~ lommand Pl ~ hlllVcen u) 11 and U r~I Jr Iarlh if any ~
Tim (l1ollnlor solutwuW minute
SI(llO-J II (olltinuld)
Special Situatiun Contilluld lurishy
x SII~IIL ~11tT lIlli (1I~ 11- I Ell Till foll)wing i I IlJum( of lJ)ormlllon and 1l1l- aJ~ rCT1ld at tIl 1 Cmiddot Iolllllland po hllln ~gtl) )~l and 11) P1l 1) 1lt11111
From (~Ulp- All SelTicl r i nalloOll Oihll dlon b-tlll hIIlIHd hy grOllndhl1
IJlladullenl- of t1)lih trot)p hae been located at GI I dOll (~~S-IOti) loslyn I~IK-lin~) and Baltimore IL~ JlUIlIHl- (If jrtl(k~ Ill in Ihr vilmity of (Ivndon jf t rials of ariou kind art pli(ct along tlw 1ail1o)(1 trJI ~ ~(ltlH inllvlwhilW j in ]llojn-- in 1111 icinity of oot burg llh~7111) aud Aldlild lOX-iii )
Frolll l-t (avalry Brigade I1
I fa( IlabliIId IOntaltt with 101sl Cavalry Sq~lt ron at t ream (Iossing over Gunpowder Falls RivCl ail miles wcsluf Parkton ilolile (avahy still holds ~k Lon 14t11-72t1) and Glencoe 007-711i) Olherwse thea
66
Academic Notes
to northeast of GunpOvdel Fall River over wluch we have passed is dear of hostile fOI((~1
From 1st Division
Hostile (oreel- along lntilc front of 1st Division launcheu a vi~()rous attack al 100 PiYI It appcal- that the main effort is against right of bt Division Cnion 1Iills is in l-rrave danger as the attack there h supported by tanks and heavy cOl1centratiom of artIllery 10 definite information of condition at the front available at thi- time Defen-ive position along the line Silver Iun Bandanna ha been relonnollln~d Have committed none of my general rescrv( a ypl
From 2d Dij1011
Jly cavalry is making a 1irm -land along the Emmitsshyburg Taneyto1l Road a- [oncd to commit two batshytalions of the dn hlon rec(rn to fill a gap in the line we-t of Pleasant middotallc~middot -logttlp att~Hk i~ carried out with vigor ~trongly ~uppolmiddotted hy artill~ry and -iome tanks Pleasant alley is reported to be in hand~ of enemy Vill ~onfirm this later Hu e one battalion left in divbion reserve I3elice hostile attack will epntuully be directed against Taneytown Diiion air enile has reported mall troop concentration mm ing tovard that areL
) I HCIINreflenf Report the actions taken and orders as i lctually bued by Lieutenant Gelleral A at his command post
between L1fi 111 and 11) PI 1) i1arlh if an~- Till( altolf for s(Jlulion m mlllules
[t1 iI~1 i SJ(]IoX II lContinued)
Special Situation Cuntinuedrll
fl SPtLJ SI1P]TCl C()II--lTI~n The following is a he rcumgt of information and messages receied at the comshy
I3rd poct I CoIP~ bet (en middot115 P)1 and 4 45 P11 15 IVIarch
From bt (lyalry Brigade
After hartl fight ho~tile forces have withdrawn farther Et and ~outh of (unp()vrieJ Fall River Hostile infantry believed to hmiddot hLtwLen Ilereford (405-719) and Corbett bull4118-716)
From ht Divijon
Hostile forces have entered emon Mills severe handshyto-hand fighting guing on there 1t Division forced ba(k abou11 mile on front (nion 1ilb Ebbvale My reserve three battalions ahout ~ mile cat of Littlestown (364shy740) 0 large ho-tilp re-erve- loeated
From 2d Divj-jol1 ro 10middot IIotile fo]lt(gt han rpulhed Big Pipe Creek near
Cnion Milk IIo)tiie force hac captured Pleasant Valley and are iiiowly forcing our line to the north Strong attack developing around Taneytown Do not believe we can hold the town without committin~ remainder of division rbenpound Divihion re~erve j- or~anizing a poi-gtit ion )(11 W(el1
Harney (~l3-7~5) Galt -0 large hostile )c~ervef) loshycated yet
From Corps Aviation
No large hostile reserves located -0 Red reinforceshyments found in rear areas Railroad tram movement Vashshyington Baltimore Havre de CIUCl (ontinues heavy Appalcntly hostilp l)oRition heing- organized between Woodshyensburg and Ashland Convoy of about 60 tlucks moved from vicinity of Vestmimtel toward Hereford at 115 PIVI
R((JuirtIUlil Itepolt the actions taken and orders as uetually issued hy LIeuroutenant Ceneral A at hb eommand post )etveen 415 PM and 4113 PM 1) 1Ial(h if any
Tone (llloucd fnr wlution ao minutt--
SECllO III
A Solution lunwrnph
A -1)UllOll of rlIUlrem( III 10
10 A SOLUTION OF REQUIHIIn~N I Adions taken and orden as actually itsucd by Lieutenant neneral A If any
Between lf() and 215 PAl Upon completion of the report~ LlLutenan1 leneral A
directed that he be kept constantly informed of deyelopments He went to his altice having directed the chief of staff to accomshypany him He discussed briefly the ~ituati()n and future plans with the chief of otaff
Between 215 and 245 Pill Continued discussion of tituatioll and future plan~ He issued the following directive
The corps will attack early 16 lmiddotIarch ene]oping the hostile right flank from the vicinity of Whitehall (407-723) and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead (385-723)
The 1st Cavalry Brigade will continue its attack and seize the ridge west of Gunpowder Falls Hiver as far south as Glencoe and prevent hostile ground reLonnaissancc to the northeast thereof It wi1l protect the movement of the 3d Division and will on corps order assis~ the attaek of that dlyision early tomorrow
The 3d Division will- move by motor to the vicinity of Vhitehall under cove~ of darknes~ tonight It will attack early tomorrow mOll1ing on corps order and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead
The 1st and 2d Divisions will not resume the attack until daylight tomorrow Details will he annoullced later
The 3d Division will be strongly faorcd in the matler of artillery and other support
The corps reserve will consibt of the ht Infantry less one battalion and will assemble at Littlestown by daylight 16 1larch prepared for movement by motor transport
Bet1Neil 245 PllI and 415 Pili Lieutenant General A announceclto his Chief of Staff
J am going on a visit to the 1st and 2d Divbioll troops and command posts by motor Aide One will accompany me Aide Two will be at your dispoal Keep Illl informed as to deelop~ ments in the situation I will direct the 1st and 2d Divisions to conserve their reserves for the altack tomorrow Have a staff officer visit the 3d Division at once and go over our plans with their Chief of Staff I will visil the 3d Diviion later
67
UlI(CU ~lj PJl (lml 44i PJU RetUlning to tie I Corps command post at about 4 10 P~
Lieutenant General A familiarized himelf with the situation and plans Accompanied by Aide One he then departed by motor for tlw command po of t Ill ~d J)jvi~JOn Before leaving 11w (~JlP~ (olllllland PfJt lH approved tlw l)lan of allalk a IUtiillld to him hy the (hilf (~r lalL
~( 1to-- 1
I)j(middotu-gtioll
llIqfl I
Ttll()P Jt tdlll II l~
Tun I)f lltlfllll 11 lt1 Ttl (lin 111
i~lIJt 11 11
11 I I I~I()J I I( jlllljIOi--I of till probhlll j 1() illt] I alt the applicatton of thl tattwal principle of an inrippencilnl (()rp in all al1a(k and the tnlop 1llding- oy tile cor-p comrnander
12 TI~(J()l LI 01-( The (I)rp~ commander has a large and lll- I lIntd -tafT at hi-- dl-pn-al who-c function is 10 reji[( the iOJllmanikr ofa~ nlllh dr ad l~ l)()~ih( ill t 1( fUllcl inn of the -Ialf 0 lmiddotdtHl lTllat nw~l of information to In-itf ~UTUshy atl 1Pll()rt~ rhl~ df InUt ~rp that problcl1l~ rC(luinng (leciion trl lIP vllltd 11) tIl( (olnmandlr ill ~uffi(1fllt time to a[O for
w oldlll lIJtHtmiddotrllllt in Ill (Illtioll of hi~ dttbillll~ If the ((Illlllallrpr at I P1l111l- to fnl1nw the now of information into the illnlllland PII-1 lIP 1111 flOn bVIolllc ~o Illolycd that lw cannot ldtquately p111l ahead The con--pqUlll(C of thl~ -tatp of atTairs - u--udly a -vnc of fllfrgCllry dlri~ions illlol11p1tte inujpshyqutlv alld tOi) Itll to be truly elfeltiyco
TIll hnl ()f detul l~ul1lcd by the (olllrnanltitl will of ( (JUI-U delrnd upon jw (haraltcrbtic- of t h(-gt cOl11manuer and i W jl(r)llali it If hi-- vlmJ of st alT lllrl principal - air olilr] 0
U i~lrdlt- of 1 litO Ilit- for dlaii of tIll lomlnander he musl I lliru t J- ldf ~rllh OjojV po--ible duty ithin their capabilishy l-- HI dol ll()t -hifl hi- nH)lihilit it by -0 tIllingo If he jli lull )]()Jl1lh (lIljlO hh gtIalf 111 is llIilty of Walll1g his tOIH 11 and fLllln 10 mtke (Jlcli( i llt algtliiti(s and (nlrgirs of lht-- I1
III t ldf hllh ha lllll1 VOrioll Ingethtr for ~()nll time o~uh a- I he onl hll jOIlIIltidlred matH of t he detail- as 10 tactical fl1l hnd (If 111( (tITlllIltlllhol nll ill wlll known to the ~tajr Thi~ [)01 t ](lIlvt-- 1 he 10] 1 (()mmanltier of the nee~ity of always I-oin~ Into dpd III ill-gt illtlu((jon~ Only when Ii( wbes to rnak~ a hln~rl Il form] t1w hnd~ will it he IHl~~aIV for him to gn into any gnat amount of detail
In thi -jlUd lOll I hl ~d Divi~ion ha- ju~t revertpd to (untroI
of til( J (orp~ Jt j tlJlgt (lIiion ~(l(ded to make the main aUwk of 1 he corp and llwrffor( ih (Oondition and -tate of morap and 1rlInin~~ are of jreat inl(r~l to the torps commander 111( jqrfJ~ ~it uation at 21 Pl i~ -gt1ifh Iha1 no major lhang~ vhi(h 111 pr(tnl til( atlatk 011 IG )Iarrh (an he expcdeo Even a WII hdrawal Oil 1hp lo1 flank will not jeopardizl t 11( (orp- plan SufIWI111 djaik a 10 the conduct of operatlOll~ today and IOmll)) mv haf i W(oll JJ1JWIJIl(Opd by tlit corps (omlllalHi(ro I fowshyc er he ~hould per-onally check conditions in the ht and 2d Jgti-ioth Thel( lS danglr If h( remainf at his command po- thaI unl( hp 1- an unu-ually phlegmatic person he may he tPmpltd to difialp too IlHHh of the details of operation He can do much more for lw sll((e~ltgt of the corps in its attack 16 Ivlarch
68
If he goes on a visit to the commanders of the 1st and 2d Di sions and later visits the 3d Division
Upon his return to his command post at 410 PM the commander received the information that the Reds had res their attack This was not unexpected as G-2 had annou this a hostile capability The plans so far prepared ha been examined by the eorps commander and presumably rn J1l( his approval we next consider the best aclion for the CltJ
(ollmander to take He had already informed the 1st and I )iviion I hat thlY wpre to at tack tomorrow and that they m (on~lrve their rcs(rve~ today It is about time that totlllnanrier iHsued the necessary instructions for the Ihi ](t11 by the ht ant 2r1 Divisions It will be quite late night when the final resolls of the days fight will be known 111lt (oq command post It is helieved that the corps CltJr
man del (an rnalw the most effective use of the next few hOlt hy makmg a visit to the ad Division ~ea
While on thee visits to the divisions he not only getslir ne hand information of the tadial situation but also of the slll WI
of morale The visits of t he corps commander may be a POWcrfi VI
stimulant to the morale of the subordinate commanders ~ tta would probahly nol issue orders direct to the divisions bUll i1J he doeo do so his aide wjJJ immediately report them to the cor~1 chif of stalf
1 TIME OF ANNOIIN(]NG DlC1Sj()N - In the dev of (vcry opcla ion there arrive crrtain times when must lit made It is the duty of a f(eneral staff so to 1 t lllir rlporb as to rctcivc delbions early enough for the effective It is the responsibility of the commander that done It b never ea~y to relognize the exact point in the d nwnt of operation w11(n a derision must be announc~d tlliH -jluation the situation bas dee~oped to such a paint~ Ibnut 21 PM At this time the l1ank from which to atlacl~id WII hin the Iapabilities of the cavalry to secure There is litl ih the enemy (an do between 215 pr and dark to prevent to Corps from attaeking at daylight tomorrow Darkness is 71S Pl amI the 1d Diyision has made no reconnaissances] h1 not marked out its routes Therefore it is believed that dirldivC if Issued latcr than 315 PII may result in impro preparation confusion and ineffectiene~ Instructions IT he iI(gtd rlier than )1[ Pi( directinf( the ld Division pnpan to rnoc and the final decision mipht then be issushyialer in thl day As said before the situation is such al2 P1l as to permit a dlli--ion to he announ(ed To delay beyc 11G IM indicates indcciflion and vacillation due to the demiddot I fur ((lJ more information The moement of the 3d Diw~ is dillkult and will n1uire the determined efforts and con tration of everyone to make it a success It is wrong in prinel to kccp subordinate in doubt over long- periods of time ast1 what is wished A direetive should be is~ucd just as soon 3St~
situation has deveioped to the point where the decision canb 1 made We will never have all the information we would lik We must al lim tal( lakulatld risks as to the probableca~ hili ies and llos-ihle reactions of the hostile forces
1)ltbions rll(llld llarlv oftpn hav0 to be modified in SO~J
nf Ill(iJ det aib hy Ialll delopmcnts Therefore the directi i isued by t he commander must be sufliciently general Or brogt in its terms so as to allow the staff leeway for adjustmentc minor malleIS Only such changes in the situation as wow make a directive impossible of successful execution should allowed to dictate a change in the directive Frequent chan lead to a lack of faith in a eommander and the faith of
1
l
Academic Notes
dinates is a commanders most powerful ally There is in this situation developed after 215 PM which calls change in the cGmmanders directive THE DIRECTIVE- middotThe I Corps has bcen directed to Baltimore without delay The 3d Division is ready to dark tonight and the cavalry will have gained a suitable
y position for the 3d Division The fog is clearing and e can expect the hostile forces to gain a clearer idea of our
and dispositions and to readjust his line of action to r offensive He may be strong enough to continue the
ttack tomorrow but if he does he will find himself grpatJy
As long as the hostile force attacks our holding attack force the latter will best perform its mission by defending Therefore to insure reserves for an attack tomorrow when the hostile forces may be attempting a defense or withdrawal the corps comshymander should prevent these two divisions using up their availshyable strength today
The directive must be definite- about tilc movement of the ~d Division That division can ~ove by motor transport and gain some surprise by moving at night Since this transport must be oul of the way or concealed by daylight we do not haY(~ any loa much time even with a long night In view of the
andicapped by our attack against his exposed east flank (arly possible changes in thehostile situation during the night and in omorrow morning Offemive action is clearly demanded by he message from General Headquarters
J ~ i An attack of the hoctile we-l jeft) flank has some attractive
features If succeful illmmedlalely will be more eOotl- to the neroy It will mObt quickly halt his attack against our right ~I (west) flank It has very pronounced undesirable features Even if initially successful the hoStile forces will have to he 51 tttacked again in front of or on t~e line Parr Ridge Du~ i lIi11Ridge It also drives Red back on our objective t hm requirshy0- fug us to find him again and again The objective for thegt first ~aisaction is the high ground in vicinity of Hampstead The
tapture of this terrain feature will completely dislocate the hosshyJ llleforce The easiest avenue of approach to this feature i~ from ~ le vicinity of Vhitehall Either flank is equally accesqible ~ lthough the situation on the west flank is not so completely poundmiddotl~ wbilized as on the east flank The movement to the east flank J ~ the most direct route to the hostile line of communications ~ fhich seems to lead from Baltimore At 215 PlI the (orps commander is aWUie that the bt and
bull ~d Diyisions are about to resume the offcnshe He knows that 1 irose two divisions will constitute his holding attack tomorrow
order to allow our feints demonstrations and attacks by the 1st and 2d Divisions to have effect we direct the 3d Division to attack on corp order rather than at a definite time
The directive to the cavalry must be definite The whole plan o[ the collmander m~y be disrupted by the action o[ the rayulry if propel instructions are not issued It is therefore the duty of the corps commander to tell the cavalry commander what he wants done and when and where the mission is to be performed After being relieved by the 2d Division and its cavalry the best use [or the cavalry brigade will probably be 10 attaek in conjunction with that division vVe cannot be sure of the --ituation at daylight tomorrow therefore we direct the cavalry hrigade to await a corps order before ltlttarldng
In order to provide a strong weapon in the hands of the (orps commander in many situations we would like to hold a brigade of infantry in corps rcservc In this situation the hostile forces have so definitely committed themselves to an attack that a large reserve on our part is not so necessary as when the hostile force has committed only a portion of hiR force The Blue bitushyation has become so involved on the front of the 1st and 2d Divisions that it is diflicult to envisage holding out a large reerve even if the situation did indicate its desirability
DECISION-To the natural horn leader if there i -u(h ~ pctmiddott-on the power of decbiun is a ~(cond nature It 1 inherenl 111 the man The I(arier mllst he dfcisive He mu-t have confidenc( in himself and heri a~ain he must have Imowlcdge ltPHI he [lh irally and mentally fit A pour decision prom)l) rendei(d and lignrous1y followed is inshys finitely hetter than no dtci-ion at aiL Vacillation has no place in the make-uIJ of a real leader However wrong deshycbions if made too frelUentiy lead to loss of prestige and lack of tonfidence The real leader is never a straddler
-J11laquo 01 (Jfcrnl Ii I Brees U S AT1ny
69
I
d
Irghling Forl rourn~l uf till JOllrnai qf til i llmlmiddotdSlrjmiddotmiddot
rmy 1qart r
Directory of Periodicals
IO(hlfllllTl tlll dirpclory up only those periodicalR from which nrtich~ havpound h(gt(gtn HPelted -- altt) Llltlt of ltrJlHiwniq Indfxed and Kpy to AIJhrfvitltiollI
MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS
Joint Farcus
(rl~t J~ftaln 1 1~1) LlI mtd ~(r](1 111lt11tllUl1l CPt Hntallli 7) lt 1- r- II ( hi tltlll1qll of Inlha (rlt Bntun ItHhll if) Emiddot (rIHntIJIl HI
Gcncr1 Military
I il Hr1 tin) if) Hlllhtlll 11) Ii II bull 1111111[1 rillllll1nl 7f) CanaulJ7l rJI r Ii r flI Iri rl (lfldILI 71 La Fran(t ~llilt I r [1( 71 -11liLlrwi I (I hI 1 Itt 1111ll1fll (iult-tnl 7K
71~~~~~(I~(r (1 rll til I l2
Rpoundvu( ~11Iitalr (q Tmiddot I r111(p) xi) Rtvul -l1l1t llTC ~l~ --Ji7frbnri) x7l
Armgt ilnd Scrvlcc~
m An It(d IT r r ltJrtmiddot rl (rlt HnUill) H)
ltTILI In
(f)Ilt rtlill r Inrn 71 lIPid rtdl rmiddot 1 71 InIPjt flf Il (rllt I1ritlIl I if) fLtmiddot 111 t (ll ( d~ 1
( ALHY
(wnlrshy 71 (ldn (TI Hrl1lJl 71 HI 1)1 il ~I rH1C 2
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
TIll (lIon atdo) tIlt lr(]pound-- ~llect(gtd from LIbrary periodicals for the current quarter Periodicals in this Catalog lITIlgt(i allllalJmiddottically
ARMY ORDNANCE
Mly~Junc 1938
1 It ~C 1l1t (llll -(T1Nf OlijlltEINTS II1IT Tim 1 IBLlt (11 111 Lr If L II~Tgt -lajur General lJrtgham
Til ilL 1-1 q So rr IUd ~~II 1111 IHLrAREnNfS~ POLICnS OF A 111)(1 IS Jtll II Jllc()l Ctptdn LlldlJiILlrt
jlltlI I~ rI] 11 A -rtlyen W HWIrSTHIL MOlI]I7ATION 1 llj()r (Hid
July-August 193B
Tn Thl I --1middot1 1( [l Tlll r 1111 ro 1011 PAn ITH TJ~CH-11 bjflr(ImiddotIIrl Ilfr
TtJTI(d~ [I f lin I 1T1ltJAI~ Im1It HblATION Tn OtlR NA~ nltj 1 --1 I~II r I J Li III (q]n)1 Itfl~~r I
ARMY QUARTERLY I(Pt ilritlIll)
July 1938
Im (11JJ It lllL III TIll Hili No XVI APIILltR HJDGr 9TH or ~fAi 1911
Im 1 1 r--l ] 11 -1T1L 1gtIL1J1T10N IN CHINA (II) LNlrquin
70
ENGINlxns Military Engineer _ Pionicrc (Germany) Rall-lrrna di Ctlltum Mtlllarp (Italy I Hoyal Enginccrfl Journal (Great Brlbin)
INFANTRY
Infantry Journal
Uld~ntu~lC)MCdi~~~~~~ (Greut Brituin) Military Surgeon
Army Ordnanc( QUARTLlltSTCR
QuartrmafJUr Hevl(w Itoyal Army Service Corp-l Quartprly (Grplt Hntlill)
lNhgt
Kraftfahrkampflrupp( (Germany) Royal Tank Corpl Journll (Grtlt Bnlain)
Vlttrrinary Bulletin
Navy and Marines Manne Corps Gazctt( Naval In~titut( Proccpdinhl
i u
I]
____- I~
l 1
o J~ 1321
b ~if
TIlE MAJOR TCTI(S Ill- Tin INIlllnell B TTLg BrigadJ(lT gomery
ANTI-AIHCHAIT Hax
BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES Inlgul
By -1JOlt E11 BINITJZ COIII Artillpry (orp
Janulry 1938
lilSTOIW OF Tim INSlECTOltAn~ GCNEltA ltW TilE An Alll BELGIAN TRAINING (INTERS DURllOG TilE WORLD WAR
lHbtoir(gt d( lIlIflppdioll G6neralt d( lArm(gt( et d(gt CentTrH Hlrudinll BII~CH ptlldant la GUerrp Mondiah 1lH~191SII LilutGll1(ral de Selliers de Maranville
Ih( iHllhnr WI Inljwctnr Grl1eral of tlw
~(olli I~~l ~~ ~~~ ~~l~il (1~ I~~1 g ~~m
j
hv
I~~ He ~ nti
f n~ I
jar
h
I ~
~~II~h~g~~~~~~ldd1 ~~~t~i~~tr(i~l r~~p~~~~~ qlttlr l~l fr~11d~ ~~11lail~~11 t~lo~~~11cliiDcuit Cir(IlTllltal(Pl uIHhr whih 1111 HCgilIl forcP rpcnlitld and III1Jlpli(cl
At tiU time of til( retr(tt of til( nplf~ian army Ul author had undpr hi ()mmlllHI ROmf t ROOO recruits in France scattered in six diviqional depot~ of 3000 men continued their advance tl1P1f men wer( tallten to Fecnmp whill nfW depotfl were opPlled in various toWtll Normnndy with l1fadquarters at RoUln
01 XVIII No 70 Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A YFAlt OF AR IN SPAIN (JUIY 1936 JUlY 1937) rUne nnn6e de gucrre en Eltpagnp (Juillet 1936 - JUllleurot 193711
(II) Major Wanty Conclusion of Major Want~ g account of the first i-Ear of the Spanish
(11 War
~ilrh~I~~~I~~p~~~I h~dOhd(~~er ~(~~~~~t~~~rlal~~~IJO~I~~~rnI~~h~r~f pnrdofllcrrs The Jarge extenslOn of front and Ol(gt comparatively igtmull numlHr of
t~~~~~af7~~~i fl~l~~~a ld~i~f~( ~~~l~ of I~~t~~~~l~r~~n~~igtOt~I~~ ~~ t~t~(~q t ~hi~~ ~Oeuror1or to thmi( of tlw GoCrnmrnt fortP TI bavegt hpPIl ltoll1what nf lcsappomtmpnt hO((gtT thry ould probahly havp Jllaypdt marpound mflushyftalro1(gt hart tl)rr hrPIl mfantr- rpad to follow til(m llr GtnllJ1IIom) hedplttrofd mlny tlnt or put thpm (Jut of Utoll Ilotor17lrl (nlumn hea~o hpPIl Ifgt ff(ctlC and dlfIllUitlh at thp hpld of tilgt olumn h rrrOl11litrd thf (-l1tirp (oloy TI)e~ (olnmnlt haY )1rOPI1 to 1(1 fr~
_~~~r~~I~ldair alta(- Tlll~ remarkgt lrp prohah mldf vlth (Jua
1 Tnr lJoulwt thpOT ha ftllPd to ingtPlff natiollalllrrnT on tlw (ontrlnt $1 tacticgt havo c(lnltoildatfd puhllc -pnlin1middotnt and tifT nld tIl(middot ]1 to r-ltt to tllp a~t
DImiddot 1lI1TION OF UH C110-1 l IUfjOAL TIt 11 01 11lf nu (LN S()I OlI]
Une tXpoltjtion fip pI rf(gt(i(1nnrmrnt (ultllnmiddot1 fI prnfl-inllwl ain-i qUl dorganI~ltioll dllt 11~lr du lt)lu11 J
~ A regimental commanrpr (jpltrTlption of the pducational and 0(1shyt ~a tramlllg of t1l(gt Bflgian ltoJellPr mel the factiltw ofTfrprj tlw oowr to ~_-e traming hilp in the seTiN
February 1938
Tm f)LFbsC OF DI~lmiddot[lF 17 OTOBER TO]n I1l1middotIHLlt 1)J 1 Pagplt (lhlto(lirr dp lArml lltp all (Ollr~ d la GUerr(gt ]lJ1-1HIh
j I)lxmmlrgt 17 odoilTC-lllnoWmirp 19111 III) faJltlr Want Tr(l econd inlttalmpot of the dpfcmp of Dixmudf drgtlt(niling til(gt operashy
~3 from 20- Octoher 1911j~
ibull I Th~ tlt)wn v a a ltIrlt gl( rofi and rlliway ccntN of Bllgmm and for
rt1-00n tlw G(rmall- mul( grlgtlt pITnrh 10 ( lpIUff it TlH hndldHad
~ -~ tgc~ ~f~r~I~11~1~~( ~Zll1~l~t Ji~l~ ~l~~I111(i~1 F~~~~ t fI J~r~hf~~~111~ il~~ r artly in tIl( dppoundIlp of the cIty
[1 -- shyHISTORI OF TIll bltIICTORTr GrSJRAL OF TUB Alnn ~n THE
nEJil- TH JX1S(j (E1ERs 111IOS( TilE Vom IJ H ~ Hh1oire de lInltpectwn Gill(oral( de lArmC poundt dCs CCntrEs dInshy
struction TIplglt ppnd1l1t la GUNre 110ndiale 191j-lJIR 1 III) LipuLGrmprai de Spiller dp ~foranvlile
Ii _~ ~p(ond inlttaln1Pnt glVrc a detailed account of the ralsinJ and U-- r n mrn ior tw nfigian arm v during th(gt World War with iull dptail (1 gt-1ng t1Plr frdill) (Io hm~~ HId Hlmltllf-trat ion At alrpadv (Xp1LllWd ~ r CPrllllf IltU( fill( to the raplr C(fmall adI11(eurogt tralllln) (pntPrlt k1 to llt f~tlbhf-llfrl III XormalHllP vlth the tsltlstanee of the Frpneh G~rrLfnt Soml 40000 mpH ~ 150(1) rc(nllh or the ltiacl1899-Hnl u12jnro or the 1914 clalt - Hf( tTuJllrl in t11(ltp (pntNe
March 1938
THE DEFENSI OF DiIUDE 17 Onomm TO 10 NOIMIIEH~1914 ipar dlllgttOlrl rIp lArmp(gt 1plvp all (lure ltIf b GU(gtfrc 1)14-191R Dixmurlp 17 octolmgt-lO TJ(lvlmhrl 11l1J (Ill) Major Wanty
~ The third inlttalment (overing th oJ1(gttationlt from 22-~5 OctollPr m C Leh thr author dClt(flhes in ddail th(gt hIroic attemptlt to hold tlw position
trough tile hifTlJ command had deCld-d thlt Dixmllrr mllltt he lbamk)Jwri
~e f~~~f ~~t l~ill~~~~hr~~~~~~~~~~~ Ifli~tal~~i~alvN~n~~h~s~~71~1~~~~
l~Clme penlous Heavy lo~gtplt Vore inflicted on th( GPrmans who werl
astl ooung mpn of tlw new ReiNe Corplt ThCla( of rfltrrv(gt) thr(gtw _great ~train upon hoth French and TIplglal1lt particularly tl1P attfr who
uld not fpn or)imi7C tll(middot FutHh ltYltPlll or lt11ort rlllpfs The machinp ~nnrs In particular hul no r(st day or night Tl(SP operationgt arpound fcnbrd In grpat detail
1l)TOItY Of TilE JNSPE( TORTE GI~FltI ltH Tim AIWY AN]) TilL1 BrrGfAN THAININr CHIH~ DUilINf TIH~ WOHfn WAR rHl~toir( cir lInltppctOn G6nfralp dr JArmpe (gt1 drCl C(gtntrplt dIn-
Btruction B(gtll-C pendallt la Gl1(gtrrf Mondialp 1914-HI181 rIIl) ] Lifut GrnCral de Sflllfrs h1IIJratlvil1f f The thml ingttalmrnt (overing thp pCflod 5 January 1915 to Fehruary
19 bull
CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (ClIlada)
July 1938
CND~ ~(jIliiIN luLHY 13) the Hight IIollourahlp WL MallPllzl AI AR~IY THAT CAN ATTArK - A DIVIRION TJlAT rAN IlI~FrNJ) Captain
rJWBLl-~ljS OF DEFENCE ON THE PACI~IC Colonel Letson A SYSTEM OF ANTI-TANK Dl~FENCE Captain Kormann TANK OR ANTI-TANK Major Sieulrg
CAVALRY JOURNAL
May~Junc 1938
1)w TilL) KNOW Jlm) Major Schwi(gttl
July-August 1938
Tm ROU olt AVIATION WlIU ~mrHANI~~P AVAIItY CalJtam Sehlatter DLI EN~E MA1NST lIt ATTACK Captun Nohle Till lOlTNIIP ATTAf IN OPgN OIWtlt Colonel itrwart Late 15th
JallC( rs IIHhan Army rOlINIJ CONTHOL CmlMOlilCATiON A REGIMENTAL VIEW-
lUl~middotr Jwul (olun(1 Grim(s
CAVALRY JOURNAL IG-nat I3ritaml
July 1938
A (AUn OFFIllm~ EXIEltlENJSON TIlE INDIAN FltOSTIER DURING TIlE WAR LHutCololel BCaman
CnL1lY BAfTL~ HONOlJHS TUE r8NiNSULAR WAR - PART 3 TAshy1ntA ~7TJ[2KTH JIILY 1809 Major Edwards
~l(ItALt (I01l1IlER TO RIJOUiiHml Lleut-Culonp1 McCrp(ry
CHEMICAL WARFARE BULLETIN
July 1938
~I (TRIT OJ TilE IIWI(E m fliPLY nri(adlfr Genpral Tyn(r
COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
no~IDING OIEltATIONS IN TilE ZONE 01 Tlln INnHIOJ LJ(utColonel (olton
Am IOvBIt AND moO MOg1ENT Major Phillips ANTIAlRCILll COl~IUNHTIONS Captlin Bartlett
July-August 1938
DEi ENS OF TilE 13ELGLN COAST 1914-1918 Licut CulOlH1 Tilton BUIJlAlwomNT TACTlCS Brigadier General Pratt THUNDER IN TllJ EAST Lieutrllunt Rudolph Tng SPANISH WAIt A REVIEW OF TIfE BEamp1 FOHEIGl OPINION Captain
Johnson
FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
LBSUNS lItml SPAIN Colonel Lanza ARE PHlATE SOLDums Ni~CESSARY Upson Cml~IUNI(TiON WITJTlN THE LIGHT BATTALION Lieutenant Dishman
July-August 1938
MOlNG TARGET TiRIW NJrJ1T UVEIt (ftOSSING
FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain I
June 1938
AN(iO-FHENCIi CO-OPE1ATION Right Honoraillpound Winston Churchill PRIT Commmdcr Grellffll Am fOJUE KPANSION fly Our Air Jiorc Correspond(nt
August 1938
TIIB H()1BER WiLL r-OT ALWAYS GET THROUGH By Realist TilE HATTIE OF TIm WIlnEHNE~S Licut-Colonpi Burne
LA FRANCE MILITAIRE (France)
Il MJOR T R PlIlLLlPS Coast ArtIllery Corp
18 February 1938
INFANTRY TU~AINS TilE qurEN OF BATTIES ILinrantNip dpoundm(lrp a nl1P rips l1atalllpound1 J
Tl author T((all thal it il not today only that 0111 admits that battle hal loltt Its dl(iqiVl lmractPr This information was obtainable from the R11iill~Japallte War And it sppms that tllP only method or overcoming thilt4 inconvcnwnce is II IlfW mobility of operations mohihty which requires tactJ(ai continuity in til(gt prOI~rrgs or the attack
[n all armill thil truth has been recogniz(d ltnd all undeNtand equally that taniHI have not fulfilled all hopes placed in them It is not tanks that
71
C~tald(j of Selefteci Periodical Articles C amp GSS Quart ~~~~~~~~~==~--==-~==~--~~~==~~~~-~-~~~
wll be ahlmiddot to Tmg dppiltlOn m hattIe and it jq n(((ltIary nnew to tum tnwllrd the ptfrnai infantry It 1 mfalltry whirh Rhoulcl proVIre the solutJOn to
the )r~~~~ptt~~~~j~lli~i~~SL~t~i~(a~~~~~~~itty to gam continuitsect of moyprnfnt for the iJIIMltry uffmiddotnltIVf Equdl it j~ indlspenltahe to furshynith (lvidtnrl fnr rIo ~~llptrl flf thE infmtry lttalk aJulhlp information on thi NubjPft hal 11middotpl1 illlwil frlln Sptin Ind tlll O[wnt in till pl~t yar Al Captain gtIclmlra -11] III Tlw Onit(d Sr i(~middot HI-lW 1PrJ IVJltlOfl
i~~~ I~~t~~l~ll ~n~I Lr~li I~~ I~ f~~t J~l )Iiiirt ~~middott~i~~ ~~l)fd~l~~ i)if~ TJlI arlion f)f Jill] n VJll Lf call1ta In th( atta( 1llt mrantry rlnnot prnl~t( middot1 agailj~t rn lIhnp VllIlC 11 lilt C)gt n d h~ t1l11 rtllli ry (rtll~ Will I1WI) tr i lip tIl jllCll1nn hut lamiddot[( mel thrn l mLlilnll IUIl 11 nrnlll til plr) I lif 1(1lCl of tllP ltlfLury ullttl till 1 )nki rft tn work n fhl nL
It wlldd 11111 dllllnd wntl Ldnr ~)(Lln IhLId 1 middotInmiddotI of 1 fll7 II 1-0 ILt I ilL W Jim t hlt II d ltIqOn 1 If) Ill PHmiddot(middottl ltI llllt 11
Ihl ollIIIJI)) 1 Tltnrkdlp InLLTltn InfHlrmiddot I lr~ 1llV tlldlY 1IIfl vnlh IIJ( na~()n ti h lt-tlll l1l1
I qlld rillmiddot til 1111 If lIlh II will 1 )11 Ihd m1l(h Jllltn lIrr (If Uf tI n lrnj drl plapj dill It lmmPfiLtp PrlP 1 pry-ttIPI hnilld I d ITound 1ilf mfan1 r llld til i1 I v hy III Jl)~lnd 1 I ap 111 Illlli III mf111n dljcifill
Illl Il Ir L dd 11111 dflllpllllnt of dlIJo)~Ir lrllllilri t hI 1I1Ltlil r [ 11 T II frlll ttl hlh t himiddot Imprl rJli til trr)l t IIf (0)]lt11shytll iqn IJf llllJfl rn mfln r rj fWlrL1l11 III ill Iji muq Ip t hrgt founrllIl1lll f 1 bull 01 )r~ ( lit Irm
ljrrn Infilr I fin (fol)l1 Ill toolLv )llll 11IflItry 11 not llVrj rn hgt(I1 It J () ~ ltrmnrrd antlt1Il1 ~I lIOn- Ulri f~r(llarj( threli~shyr It Rill nd i mrjrn lJ1l it III Id t hi 11 Hll 11lrilmlllt in IH Of 41lfi Hl pflrt(( thl arm ITI)(II d I dll1I~ in Its f rlr and Jndoll Ih Ir (rror nr (oilgt rint tlu m- hl- 1l) 1111111 (llffl UI
5 M1rch 1938
Ill (iT -i THr1 TII Itll Till- lt01 Till ltT 11 It tl- ( nl1m r II Sud-I- I (olm]l HlHltl
n r Fr LllCO ~fdlLrtraquo o( I SIpkmlIr 1917 til liltlOr I n1 ntl ot nf till flur l~rollp-1 nf Ilrl~p Gprman mlhtlfmiddot unitlt
II 1 )llli]tif thlt O1kht td piL(I Olle r(lItllIIi- ronshy111 Ir 1 j lIl1ru IPImiddotIlrmiddot tn bf Ibout to Cd p1uP Thi IS I
) tI In r I) tll Trl j r 11l -llnnlk1 (( Il Ld middotr rfll1r lin HIICJllllI ~ 1m hLi c()mmmd( d hl II
rrn ()Tp 11 11I11Ilth ha b( nn (111 (1 In tlil command of tl1(gt ttl Groupshyf11 III of iLf[1 Ilnl~ It l ljll lwrl Ill rpphr -1 GPJlrrcll 011 lntlh l~ 1 III ( 11i1111 17lt11 In fTt -I Gf Iltrtl on HI HlWIlUI ejpml to hr dll lo
11111( Inj r 1 I- f)Ir)j I rilTlrllflll Ilf til mlr armv (nrp -fatlnIlP(1 011 tlt frotl f f CIgtfJlh)rn lUt md U1~tfil tJr- 11 Inrpi It -11J1lwh I Illfd f IllLtnlr- ItltIr nil Sthotrl thf Xill (UTlI II uremhuTf ~ nmiddotrll If CIll r middot 1111 llh tIl(gt 1middot COTll at Dndpn GpnfgtTal of
Infllllnmiddotnn S(lnldkr ill 111 (nrp at Hfl~11tll((llPrall)f Infantry foil] In adilltln hp ] t nIlrlan milUlllllIl lln~d(gt at Lmdlll tIlt d j)nlflll Igtf (jllnmiddot dt Brr-~lll llld thp 1ltt ~d mel ilh Armorrd l)jVlmiddot
11 II PlIlllr 11r7hlr)~ Inri nr(lt]all Th 011 HIlrl 11n11 (rn11]1 Ihu (llilstitUplt 11 Ixmiddot(l1ent nlPtll for
1111)1rl1ll1 prlllTP on Alllttri md Cz((holovlkl-l ThL l~fnllfJ em IH JrtlrI h I l1ornr r (If arm (orp c1f1arhpd from thp FJrct and Srconrl
ll HfrlJl and (tmiddot 1 vlfliuul (hturillnJ thp Lngp covCrinr fnrcfc I 11 dlll L lill I 10~ d1 tlJ rl j()Jh fflllll Poland or Franrp Faring
Inl Frlll I I- (middottHIIl lIll 1) 111 lin Ii 1 thf Y and XII Corplt al ~I1Ilrt In I] 1 Hl n TIl(gt r()prin~~ fllrcplt will 1( (ommlndtd hy CIIlril JI111I latlnlwil d K(IlrJultlrtl Fl(inl~ Pulanr1 j (lu Flrlt CnllP I 11llTl1llld d c III r d nll Hllll-IImiddotIIl ~hlfh ilhuril till 1 II III lid III (uI th hmiddotldlILLrfgtr ll J()JllgqlIrg Stlttin ttldin anrl Bn -1111 SInP t1 1 J I (oTl- 1(longH 1111 in thf ofTlllIV (roup of von Il Irll nUl if III II Tfr1L1middotd in Itlt cl)v(gtTin~~ mlcion tJwlrd PoTtnd hy I 1llh~fllr 1Il11~ JlroLlllly rrl)lllfd llndr tlH OrdfrH of nIIPral von KPlit
Tljl rl n m lltl- tlilll tl 11Igtl1rl tIll nfTInlvP 1111011 If till Hlldwlllu rnllP tIll T IX X XI lIlcl XImiddot COnl the ~ld and Hh Armorpd IJlvi-lOlll
dd Ihl ht (I1r 1)ll--lnn TJ1f (man Army cw thll- throw two cU(shyt hrmI-middot1 Vvlrd til(gt crplllHadmiddot III Ihl flTlt hi Ihl Fourth Group In(IlI1rrL~ md r tl1 Irdl r1 flf IlImiddotril VOIl HCilli(gtnau fOllr army (nrpl a Inmiddotllltolln hrJgult thrmiddotp armorl rliidnnl and a flvalry djill)l ill thl (JlrllllH IllP Tlmd (rup illl IlPadqllartprq at Dndpn mduding fi(gt
I)fr t- IrTlllrirl dIVllf1n9 an1 a livilon of cavalry Ar tIl 1 r III Ind (1 tht 11tklall armir lapaI11 of fl[ ini~ til llorpltltlntl of lTlllmiddotqrlulp Inri lldity
19 Mnrch 1938
Itl HLlIfTOC IlN THE GJltAN AltIY IUfI raquoiIJt r 1 1llr Jarm(p allpmnnrif I (orl1l1l Choumlo
j hI ~Ilr IJl7 hai paH(1 RlthoUI tlw war whlCh many (gtqwlpoundd and IJlk 10 ( Ih nnlr qW-Itj(Jn With ITIltfr allxidy Thiq qUlltllln dPJJInd~ )1 11IIm lrmmy liJr fI1l1 Olmtry wllfn pnJ)aratlOn fur war IS tIll fnnrJlrJ III a ImnllIlt of nal imal li(I Bllt IJIl Spfltt lind hll (il(III rt lml Iltllj 11]p I 0))1 of tlw orld Var witlId to prepow a rLpid WHr lJt Id alm1 hmiddotlv 01 lmiti An arm~ Wlll(h will)o allIIl all llllllY Hutldfnl~ Ind ly 1llrprl-f ~I intprt1t ihll( nwr in tIll HptNI of tiwir tanlq lhw in tllfir 1Tmor anrI armnmpnt Yon flppkt dppmrcl it )HCpqqary to rfinshy(re hll armlJrr II land (or(I hy a IhOllllllHl nirplanfl
011 Spfkl ~I th( nrt1 fnr()lIltrrpd conqidprahlp rtliHtanc( atnonK tlH rlf(tltativImiddot If thl old rNmlIl (ipnfril BtafT lmt 11HY C01HIUlrtd comshy
middotPllblbIJld yenIrior to tlJl GfltTman-Aufltrian union
72
plctely tht new gentml iOll wuch had )10 War eXj1(gtTlenc( and whose mllilt- lIlstrtlction wai Vpry hrJPf during tIllt perIOd of Glrman army limitation ~ 5C new academy heacitd by GClleral Libman nn intimat( advi~fr of til( Fuhn til ha~ only functionCc1 for two or three y(gtam and the firgtt officers who ht~ au grauuatfd are till doing thCir ~Crvice with troopg ar
Iwo t(gtIHlcllciP WIrf formpti in til GfIITal Staff Corps and lCpafll1 tb tlw old otlilfri who had )P(gt11 forlnd in tl1l war (ofCge in llerhn nnd~ (0
fOIlI~ht Ihl war and till yOlllll~ oHtlr wlthuut Wlr txlpritI1(( md graduall D( frorntllt ahlinvialld IHII wlr )tafT (our The olli(iai organ of thearrry tlP Mi1itar~WI)fIHnhlatt iI duplicated now hy the Deutsche We~ of organ of tll1 IIIW Glrrnan nnlitary thOIlIht j in oppocition to the idCM016 old (lIIITal StaIL 1hp OPI)()-itwil had tlndd (0 mov( the point of ~ of tIl nld(r ofjHtr toward till Frltllh taetitll idpas which con-ist of ga I IIllP to pprmil 1ll1)]ilLatlOn (oopnnv troop awtiting thpound ()(my Oil prc~ J))litionq WIth jlanlj wfl ltufil)orttli allfi Irqnl~ r(lt(gtrvpc fot ()untrratll 1ll middotIl of IlPld
Thl hwrn)(rl of (IL( olt G(Ilfra Staff wllh von Blomh(gt(R hrldtbt HIIa and haliwti1hlm up ith (xpIriel1ltl In Splin whllh was not avon~ to rapid tanl TIHI ltPI)lratpfl from thr inLmtry (VPO thotl~h victoriOCl w(r dl troYId lJ antitank 1~1J1l1 and Ivet) fifld artilhry aft Ixilauqt(ti t Iwir ammull1 Hill Tank JI tlH an(iPllt rullint harr World Wlf mlld 11 (olnwfd elmfly II till ilJfmtrv flut sin[(l 10 tlu printlpitl of Im ~ppld I nuy Iwulrl )1 falt It followed that try hl)uld Ill Iarripd In mrJJrlt ExplrilIH1 -Ith thi~ tlHory Wa~ obta at 1111 Hatth of (lIatItlapra H-~3 ~1tr(h 1937 when the aviatIOn tr fllrllwd Plll)rmOml (Ilitllllll of motrs mIll a ma~~ of iroll junk
Till r (XIINiIIHP1 lrml-frJ lif rpll(tiongt of the partlmll) or sudigt ~ttt(k Ithoul a detarallon of Wdr (i1Tman militan pub1icatIOIlH wL IVf1I rprPlllly hII fmpha-i7f11 till TfTlltrkahle fjualitll of UWlr laril I-pp(iatly tiwir fgtpIId which Icrmit tId (1t1-1Vf hioWH are now Pl1hi5r~ ](ttlr (())IlldtT(d artitlr notably tho by (j(lleri Elnlanbprger ll a AUlriJ1 lank autbonfimiddot_ III dlfan lt thit at lIat a yplr WJill)( requl tn manllfaelurp lIHlI~h tm to havf an fff liv Ilp(riorily uvert aclpmary Imdff tlw mo1 ftorabllt condition And til ~liht hJLtt Writll thaI rlpit jl1Ji whilh Iplrtlro ll](m~IIt from an a (ontrHlidion to tllf fundamlnLil Hlpl of tIll wpoundqmIl (I(onling to I Ill 1Ir of thp nldlr Cftnm (i(lpral Staff omngt there I)~ lonlT allY qllPtlOn of a Ilrldln at tack 1lId It wJ rquiT at (a~t a)i til miIlUfLctIlTl mattnd ~llfli(j(gtnt ill 1111Il1ity and flnllltr
At tIlt Ilml flltlfr (lmp inlo IHIWlr till HiPl of rapid war W
of (lfmaIl11tratlIY and thlt i ~ 11 till lill tltor could amrn~ III that 11 would aplHlr uddlnly hfon Ihgt PIlf01y hy urpnI hUll 1h( ~PIl(falf of Ihp oldlr (hoo n(uo(d to nloI tlf Fuhrr oert rolliltl md Fivld 111r11al HlnmllCn l1tholJg-h m anlnt National Socia5shywac not ahlfgt to rfIlOtln( phi Tllllitln (()Il IdlOll Hpoundlidplt fVPII I luperfi 1U (xmullllion of German millt[ likrtllrp ltho(lt1 that tllP ~t Hlomlwrg- d[vtrlld from th(gt politjd lImlt of 11)(gt Fllhrfr alld ~I rr from (oPrillj(lt1 lt(ra((~ htl lld -(1IIhl wr a JOIl tll1H to ud (orrflte(l J)oulwt qratil~Y It
Onl of fhf Ividlnt proofl tillt tIlt GfnPLll Staff hlIl rPllotlnCld 11 ~~~~d~i~~gt ~ltr~~~I~)fh~II~~c~rl~~I(I~~~i~ ~l~(lt~lt~))~ll~i~f tl~l(V~~~~~~~for~ -~( lTn1ond divi~ioll E(n til( orgmizlum of thf 11)) njvL~jf)l of I n already (lltup1ptply ready lIltl dctinpu to 0((111 tIll inclll-InII rrglr Q Flllfrffhl-TIarnwl1 hll bcCn topppd at prlltent n
Aftpr having rfgtdiz(gt(l that tank unite ~llon( could not l1nri(rtaheuro-~lpriOIIS op(rltion~ tl1pound I)r~ani7prlt of thl Il(W Irmy dtcid(d to pro(rd the r(irrinrrllllfllt of th 1notori7fd lIlLllItry lt0 th)t It woult not bL IJlhind til( tanl1 and III the fift hdf of 19n 11 reHlwnts of infantr~l hCfn motorizCd IItH C er tlw Rittle of GtucLtlaiarl l1pr( the motoshyinfintry had I](pn hpakn halt forced tilt Gprmall (~ IHrd Rtlff to am-ltL tlH fllrlhlr lnotorilltlllll of tIlt infalltry
1))1 (rfltors of til( np GprmlH dodrinp of ar Ire compIltCly TV Till IlPW aputtgt of tanls (i(lIfrd Eimltlllbl Tlr Iipllin thlt If I~ hIVP not U(((Ilti(rt tip in thl prtfnt it il bt(luP tlw havlt not becn proppriy anti JI(gt dp(Lm- thlt they ~hol1lclllP tlltainprl in ~he off(nsiwL~ ollk hy 11Ifltltry 11111 With pnlTflll 1r11i)T llpporl which ml~ hrlJ to f(lllow tht1ll TIp iillt al(llT(hl)l~ to -hwh tIl(gt lanks d~tiIlPd flltl repJa((gt tllC Irtilllry III onipr to tin lay it h Ihr Lrliry prlarlto)lwi qllllllll(] tll( lIILIIk bull hollid nnw lp gtupportftl hy thil lfllP lrtilllIY
~ H
~ ~
Lit lHIJl1(I a1 lll)tlty Ind intTI-ld molortlatioll If til arlllltryb rIHllllOIlll1lllHld lImHpr ill many f th( dIVJ~i(ll artlllpry T(gimentIil
thinl pclion fur the ~upport of tllll- art I ~ft unorganiild Tlw GPrmall~ ha(~ tlm r(llo11nlfd theirfith lt1 tIll rfation ofa
ml all( ulnHtil(1 tiH Frll1(h thlf It I 11l1 an witll tll ~trat~ lvlatlllll Tltl nIt (~Prtll1Il ((I(gtr11 StlfT hI tlWlY~ htmiddotjd (Jut the miinn of aviallon a to altl tilf ~roun(l troop and only tftpr qucll req~ nHntl had hPll Ilwt to u1drrtalI nnw indlptIHPIlI oppratiOIlllll theft I( rahlq on thp mo~t important CPJjtl[l from a lllJlitary point (l( vip h rp(Pllt arlitj( in tilt Militar-V()dl1nh)III Ct11ollt1 Braull tlll1011stn that 111 thotliand airpianpl and tilt -1uddl1l attHk arl qUlitions o~ lWlOTHI Melir and that II ilIHI(clry ahoy all to latify tll( lviationn i
of Ihf Iround armgt lnd al1) tilt rpquirllHlnq of III (111 and mo~timC tall ((ntlgtr4 of lip Itllllllr (or Lllfinirlfd( dt(I11( 11( 1tt(li(tted OmIt army (orPq -Iliuuld hayl nillt f1tOnnaLltltHt plaut thrll [or artillery]) vBlinll Hlllthrhl for iaiH)] lteh armY (ight((lr((onn31~sallc( pl~ c nilll Tmrquit and niJlP bomilarrim(ut Icll flank dlVIllOn a quadron of airplant lLf(l Hh mnllllp dliion Jplll(r tank or cavalry Itl nme
or tllf dffpwt p( impnrtnllt point it is 1l(gt((lCllry to (Otllit on 1t a flquadroll of niTll Illallpq flllh the frontiCr cannot hC l(ft without drJ and thf prohahle route of inva~ion of an (Iwmy raid mU1t be cnrrdl (on~(lu(gtntly aftPT hUYir fmtiqfiCd [Ill the IHfpoundis of tllf atm~ andof J I aircraft dlfensf tlwrf WIll not remam many Illnnr4 for ulnal raids II
c
L
~
the country_
thOUl3nd airplanes and if these needs ate not satisl1ed the army might he ampflously menaced and VIllagegt and important poinLI suhjected to destrucshy
~~ aTr~ili~~e tll~t ~h~~ner~de~r~ie~ta~ ~~~ed~ritadrt~~ ~~~r~~l t~~c~~ The day after the taking of supreme command or all
forces b) Hitler a decre(- annollnc(d the Unification of t][gt INial ~ i~iair armielt Calkd division nr group~ with centers at funich
~ ing had personally dircctpu an aerial maneuver the theme fawhICh was a war between Gc~many and Frpnc(gtbull and In WhiCh Rlrrultaneshy-1~ Dusly with a sudden attack agam~t the MagmQt hne a thommnd airplanegt ~ left the SlUltgardt Iirdromls and complplcly d(mtrol-ltd Pam The conclushy
sOIl3 wrrp bent by llltkr to Blomberg and the representatives of the Rtiehsshy wehr declared that the strategy of GOlrin~ might have heen rortunat but that it could aho 11lc led to complete disaster Bcsidgt eVtn in alte of t j ltucC(I~ therf Wltlgt no r(lton to admit that the will to rsist would b( hrolwn
i~d th~t the French vould r(gtnounce prolonging the war lgt As far a preparatiOn for var IS concertld the organization of the ~Irmy lt land Its penonnel should be conildered Thp Gprman army tralllformed In
~ l~f~d~~i~~ l~~duVl~gtn~~ l~h~~(II~)~fc~~l~~i~~l~I(1 ~~~~~~a~II~~ ~~~l~~~ ~ ~duatlOn from (houl are ghcn a su~wrflCJaI pxlmillatlUn if they wish to
~ i~~~~p~~~i ~la~~r~e~i~) tn~~~I~)~l ~t~~ll ~~~~~ ~l~~i(~~ (gt ~Il~Ii~ ~~I ~~~f~~~l~t~~~ l~~ 1e~nt~th~I~~1Till~(~r~~Sll~r~ijl~~ ~m~~~~O~r~ sO~i~I~~fnh 1~~~~i~~~I~~ I~nd the gpirlt of It~ offJceflt rtqiq II ow on a d()ubiful baltC dpprlvpd of th(
- lLadltlOnamp of the old army ~- 1 Furthermore while m the Fnmh rm)- all the olleers of the grade of ~ ft3jOr and above took part III the Great War In the German army fVfn a ~ ja part of tllp officers of the grade of colonel 01lt (gt11 as all tholtc under thiq
i ~~~~o~nf~Udg~~~IIPCre1na~t~ ~r~d~rmiddotca~~l~i~llfr~ld C~~~[l~~ il~ ~~~ - ~de of major The Frpnch Genertliqmo Gamehn was chipf of sttfI of a ~~ ~cup of armipi during the ar while the commandcr or the German forpgt
~i ~ Gfnel~l ~~a~g~~~~~~i~~l~~(t~iiil~r~~I~~Irl (~lr r~I~~lh~~~r~lgll~~~hfu~ni~h~dmiddotmiddotmiddot-i~ the ~oldier of the RNchltw(hr llld for til( reltt thre(gt school havp been I tltuted It Potsdam Bibrrich and Vetzlar IImveoer Berthod Jacob
- ~ates that there hai not yet I)(en a slll~le graduate from th(~e schools ~J For recruitment of ~cneral staff officerq the duration of the course at
~_J_ I-e WarColfg has he(ll rrduc(d from thrN tf) two yfars hut in consNllencf
~ i f~~~~km(~a~~f~~~t~a~r~f rS~~~~~~in~l~gt~p~~~ ~~~~~~~lt~~a~~ ITIf~G~~~~~ ann has (ven redlpd former general s~aff officprl t~ service from retlreshy cnt among others Colonel IIerke (Illd of the RUilway Bureau to Ow r ~ rmiddot~tfgtr and Colonel HfmarICh ehlPf of the topographical section 1 r The GlrnJan exam pip i (ol1yincm~ once more that to create an army gt~ t3 not ltuflicifnt to as~(mbJc men and arm them it is still 11(C(Slary and 1 ls IS more difficult to crrate the bkeleton the corps of officers and nonshyI lcc~mlSslOnPd officers _ Colonel Choumski tcrminlteg Ius study in saying With appreciation the
~~ ~~~t~~~~~i~~e~~~i2~je~~ti~~~t r~~dY~~~~I~~ d~ffi~~ltd~l~d 1~1~~J~~~~ai~ l2t rnmiddot tlut vould he gwen it by an European war The German army lack~ gtJ ~~l detlrmllwd military doetrme a compact and tested group of leadprl
vnor and inrtdor 101 well a th matfnel it nepds -c I_ J 19-20 April 1938
I IRON DISCIPLINE 1lt lOH1~ N1middot~CESSln THAN EVEH IN Tim SovmT ARM
IUne dl~ciplll1P mllItme de fer e~t plu~ (jUt jarnaio ngtce~aire dans larmcc IovietHjUP]
1- In the issue of 20 Mrch 19a~ lrOlsnaia ZVlPzda the organ of til( emiddotmiddot PHi army ati~lm th~ leLdN an~l poJt~al cummissar who do not maintain eI~ lDe-dIscrlme III thr orgamzatIOns rcl A mIlitary dilcipilne hke fan wnt(gts the author ll the foundatIOn of t tre aptItude for combat of the Red army and of the victory of the Soviet gt~ ~ope OV(f the (Ilemils of th( -ocilllltt ffvoluti(ln Th(gt Party I~ gOing to rI eestro the Trotkyist traitors who stru~gle a~ail1sF tlCorganlzatlOn of the ~l regular army and againt the strengthemng of Its dlsclphne
Our army is the mOlt homogClleous the helt or~all1zed and I)(~t dlCI
Itt f~~h~r i~n ~7~h~l~~i)H~~ ~lr~henn~d(~~~i~(I~a~~dv~~Wth~ ~~~ f~~c~~cid~~~ ~ of the comhatants of the Ipadors and the political ommissars and on their I devot10n to til( party of Lenin-Stalin and the socialit fatherland Our
~ III modern tcehniquf lnd the role of etlch fwldifr and rnch Irader
owed an
YHlCf(lIltld Ulldlf t1He (ondl~])ll flilcipin( ~ium(s an enormous C th ltJlight(ltt lark of rJclplme (xl(utlOn rhfTerent fran lllltruCshy
ruin modern merhanilm and lower the value of tllf umt~ of the
d((gtiRlve role in the lltru~gle to he carrlNl out to maintam 111 iron falls to tlw lrgtadrgtr9 and the politleal commlSlarH th(y arc rlpOll-
It Unfortunately there are in the Red army RomP leader and rll who hav( forgotten that WIthout iron dllClplme one cannot MY nor ffsolve the problemB of military and political prfparatioll
hI author thln cites 8)me concf(te eaRP it is in this cate~ory he riteJ that bclon~ for exam pIC ~he commandN of an aviatin formation III White RUR~ta in thiH organi7atlon th(rt I ll control nothlllJ hut held~ essnfgtS9 orders arf not obeyed neither rpgulatlOls nor llllltruct~ons r~ rolshy
order to lead the flights had been given to Captam NIkltJne ikltine did not execute the order hut transmittcd it to Lieutenant Polo vow
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
who in turn passed it on to a subordinate Consequence div(gtrse damages
wrec~afad~rc~~~d~~~t~~l ~~f~~~sioi~~~~~~~~~i~ ~~ll~C~~~~ice ceases to be a leader and should no longer have the conftdnee of the Party and the Government The fight to obtain Iron dlSClpIilO is in the firnt place the function of the political commissar he is tilt r(pr(~entative of the Party in the army he reprlsents Stalins central committe(l he ~hotlld bethe pershysOlllfieatiOIl o( the high BolHlwvlst discipiinpoundgt but unfortunately there are eommllsars in ill(gt H(d army who are not equal to their task for (xample in the organization to which Commissar Petrow is assigned the soldiers absent themselves fit will tlwy abandon themselv(s tomiddot drink and Commissar Ptrow dops not even think of remonstrating with them for this lack of dlgtcipllllP 1]( c(nsfS then to he a commiBSar
Th( leaders md the commiBsars who act thus are not true BolsheVist (hiefs let tiwm he relievd of their commands and thpoundir commiltsariats
TIl( InemiCH of the people the traitors to the fatherland the partisans of TroLltjky-Bukharin have attempted to destroy the iron dbcipline of th Rld army to weaken Its military abilitv they have not succeeded and will lot ltucceed Consequently it is neceary without delay to reillforce thiq iron discipline it is nccelSJry for the le~ders and (ommisars to occupy themshysplvps every day with their Hubordinates watching over the execution DC ordNS given until they aro accomplished not tolerating the least transgresshyHlnn of ord(l1 Those leaders and commissars who in their daily service fali to purllue the stru~gle to obtam iron diciphne are pitiful but it will only be ohtained where the efTorts of both are combined to understand the needs of thp men and to satisfy them
The truggle for iron discipline is the task of the Party men the organishyzatIOns of the Komsomoi in the army of all Bolshevists of men who are not even in the Party
The communists and the adher(lnts to the Young CommunIsts should dally impregnate the soldiers with the spirit of discipline and bolshevist or~amzation but the discipline of the ~()ldiers depend~ ahovfgt aU upon the dlampClpline of the leaders
It 1H hardly ntcel~ary to make any commcntantB on this article The nlder is left to draw the elementary deduction d(r1vlng from It
1 July 1938
CAN RUSSIA MAKE WAR jLa Russie peut-elle falre In guerrel
In Deutsche Wehr M Petenlcn under the title La Russie peatshyelie faire la guerre sur deux Ironts exposes the Scandmavian point of view
b~ic~iri~~r~e~rPt~~~g~~lli8~~~~i~ ~~~~)re lfhh~r~~~u~~degi~i~~d~dC~ Russia Make War
When in January 1936 RUSSIl announced the grand lmel of its fourshyyear plan with a view to development of its mIlitary forces many military specialists were skeptical it was knowIl that Russia had an immense human reservoir but it was demanded if thLI rpoundscrvolr that could be mobilized would
be w~I_k1~s~c~f~cl~~I~ltJkdd~~f~h~~egi the plan had modified the physlOgonomy of the Russian army in changing the proportIOns existing between the active army and the reserve If prevlOusly it was admitted that the active army should be one quarter and the reserve three quarters of the whole of the ground army Tuchachevsky considered that the reserve should not represent more than 250 of the Soviet army it was necessary besides to increase to a hardly imagined degree the material of war
O~e can estimate that in February 1938 the Russian ground army was ~~~~~~omae~~~i ~~~ill~~d~~he aviation and the navy the total would
For these two million men there is in general the necessary modern materiel aside from a few shortages but for an army of mobilization of eight miiiion men there was a total lack of equipment and the largest part of these elements could not be compared to the troops of the European powers the considerable masses oC arttllery and of machine guns which would Je necessary to equip the total did not exist the materiel and munishytions existing arc defective
Tanks are about 5000 in number and of these a large part llre no longer
~~tt~~~~~k~rp~~afoa~~~ ~~~~ro~~~ ~~i~hsihr~11~~e~bt~~~n6~O~g~~~I~kt~~~At the eighth congregI of the Soviets last year Stahn demanded that
the manufacture of airplanes be tripled so as to prOVIde 15000 machines by the middle of 1939 it waltJ desired to incorporate 500000 new specialist worlwrs but all this w~lUld not permit the achievement or th~ plan by the hour desired und even If they dId succeed Instructed and mo])hzahle efTpoundgt(shytIVIS for th machine were missing and even more iu( in Russia a large part of tllf aviation IS dpltille4 for the mission of independnt operati9ns which reqUIre personnel of the hlghcst cahbfr there call be no Just pretensIOn that the Russian aviation as contended in certam European circles is Huperior to the aviation of the great European powers
ltrat~i~ ~ll~l~~~la~i~~ ~~~0~~~~~idi~ld)~(~~t~I~r~~Ce9n ~N~~~~ ~eO~~~f~f which ten are III European RUSSia and fiv( m ASia the Iltrongest military potenti~ll i in the WPRt and the thr(C military rcpiolls of Lltmingrl~d und ~he North Sea include half the army and more thall half of the motorIZed Ufllt~ the FmniBh frontier has ulso bcen lnrgfiy reinforced recently if one adds to thlH account the military regions of Moscow and Kharkow Qne call say that two-thirds oC the Reel Army is concentrated on the western frontlet
Tins dIvision is comprehensible adds the author for European RUSSIa and the Extreme Orient constitute two theaters absolutely distinct and in spite of the development of aprial traffic it is impossible to displace great
73
C~1laloj of Sde(ted Peliotilu1 AImiddotticl(~ nlH-ltp oi ItJ middotpr two frolll~~ I woltr)rmiddot mounLlillt dl1~l it III ltJat( RU--ll d T)
Htllt~il (llIllt I il bull tlJ gt~ HlI d I ] II) t-
III diLI1 ( I Imiddotmiddotr ll tTIll J( J rlH 111
~I itlt~~~lT_ ft tl lItlshy urtlwrll d L )-fil fr dmiddot)) d i P bull I ltI I
1(lrII Jl vl11 (JLl J) I rl bull IlI ll) t T) 1 1111 lP tll- 01 I ~ d -
Illi l) 111 d l
dol fl
hll ~ I Imiddot 1101 OJ)) I hlr d )1 of f I I T d II
~I t ) 11 I Emiddot II )1 til I 1 gtjt t (1111 11111
t
( 1 d 11 r i bull i I til 11 1 ~ I 1 i I I III
l~lIr)lt~ tl d lt01middot fjr~f ~ 1) jlldI r 111 1 I Itt I bull Idol 11 I I 1101 r I llr I r I l I ~ l r 1 t I ~ f I j n 1
II HI I I q lIItIJ L 1 Ill f 01 1bull I IIf11
III f 1 III t
jr
111 i j j
1011
r1 ~ 11111 )j I
j Ill IIgt[t 11 11111 11 i
-ill llil d I
lId t d t rq 1 I It
Ij Ilr ) Itl 11111
1 11 Ip
j
lil lel oJmiddot t 1) 11 J I
] 11 rt]
1Ii r llll d I 1 ] T 1 I p Irt Pi tlll
11 1( 1 I Oll 11 ~llll1 l L 1 It r
t~ 11 t 11 d lt 1 I It j If l~ 1 d Ii 11 tr f I I Vlr j]) 1)rll]1I
11]1 1 bull 11(
In J r Ii I
il IlJljn 10111 II 111
r _111 II) f I~ ~ T 1
l I d 111shy 1- I r1III f1 shy - 1Ill L
+ ( n 1111 r f I
1))1 d I I Illlt I 11 I mor d of IIH II llgt]I 11101 I d lrq t Ii lq+lialllll dllhq prI(llnll
I n d IIItol Ir I j( IIH f Ir Itd S 1 rLllld IlI~~llnll p ll)shy
11I~ 11 1111111 hll(middot h l11 1111 Inti (Il itll Ilwgt fl v(rl lllin r llthlll T 1 ltlll of 11Ilh 1) or
fLO I d 11111 (1 Ilh 1111 fnrtnlr oint of I H tll ILl lIIlIlITl Imiddot tl] ]dmiddoth f l+rollIlnd 1 I
lfld roil11 prlllH d 111)1 tOl hlldrlll in 11l1 1 II ]ITt ]I 1Il1l1d 1( Wt llt ini~ dpllui1 d
C amp GSS Quate~ V
upon hut I1 1936 a 1leuroIid Ihonl for tIlt formatilJn euroIf mplrior P(middotNOnn 11
uld V~~lJJt~lrt~~ ~~~ll~(IItIZlt of tIl l(11prilllCI lnd tu PfOl(Pf In I~ tan anH flgthiofl I)u)fplvp 1
Tn I)rdpr not to t1i~(ard tli n~Ulizatlnn alnHI lIgttin~ it would1 IOl1t11 tn dlidl Ihl Inlllltry min ~wrial ddllgtl ndUl] corTl~pondin~t 1 mlilllLr rl1ltIJlH fld tl 1tltp in (t(h of tlHll1t ltlllllmlI)(ltr Uld an otg of 11Itrql 110111 -(1I1Zl t~ til pprulIIlll IIPlaquo(gtlry [ltJult 1)( rlit(Illd frv~ t~IhI 1I111l1 1r (fI(I whllllr t lip an rlltrod ullin r or dd plejprl cho3i jlf fur IP Id pt It Ildl All t hIgt pfrltollllll will( h 11OuhI hI olunher hit 10
) ~I 111lt IlId]]I))lhl llH in trudllll llld III IhlUI~h tlll)- lire n l of
1rfYI~1 ~)_~Jrl(itl~(r~i~~~alltI 1lntrulI1Y mlhtlr) auhorltip3V~ - of
To (-Hn 1111 dU(Lhlll of til populttlon Illd Ihl rltTIlllmlnt ()tk gr 1I1l11 111) f Ilul1Idld of olilllllr 1I(I-lry all inlfllp prnpagan~ ~ 1)lIlId lI ltlIPd 1111 IllP 0111 ql1d If I Ill t]lld dlllwr ~hlwUJg I
I~lln Ilr~~J 1 ~ ~)Il ~ 2 SItl~I~~11 ~h(O~I ~~~~I~~IIii ~uti~h~~~~~l~tIT~ ~I prltlJl1l~1I1ILL hnlild bf]It(d ~ ill (f(ruwll ll1d 1Il Ihl ()thpr (ountm3iJ( l 1111 Plllllq dln pd fir1 10 t 11Ildrt I III 111fmiddot -flin)] Ill 1 tallillJ~ to tiff 1 1111l14 dl1 III Ihpir 111T 111 II llriOllgt dullII II and nMly to reecho 0 11111lt1)11 111 Il lly 11)( Ir - irI lHlIlk 1Ollftrfl(p Ind till (mema 19i
10-11 July 1938 ~)
~ I(II~r~ ))~jJt~I I~~~I~ Jn Itf ~ jL 1 ~ TIll llr 11Iltlun rltlllin-gt antI [JuTt lln l(r III fltl pla(p am0j -l~
II)1i h llr It( I Iratl)lgt Ill j~Tiat matTlt (Horl lIrrmiddotfl rt 1117d ify p~ ~ tiLl of madlill frum Hnil h lilt AliI TlClll mlIIl1fH 11Irlr I ldlOWIl B -1
I t ~I1~~ ii)~ ~~~J~~ri~~ Ij~~~rtff~l~~l ~~1~~1~ Jl~~t~I~~~h~ js(
luwlpr of tT a1l11ll1l)I 1lIlHlrdll Illd flOIT)lll1 till unal ddtfegt in of I Ill IIrritllrv ~r
1]lt1 IIflllltlllh1H1H f tllll dlllrtll+l itlll I Ill ~nlt pxttlll oft It~ T flflll Ih 1111111111[1 1[1 lmpJII ]t]r1Il)~ Iut lll IH hI lntwu_l nlIn II il 1111 litII If (()lllllHlH ~Jh ill f tIIllll( hI dtllland -~u JlrlII~IOIl 11l JUllnt of dLlll Till pqlr 11 11ll I 11Irlry (volp ]Qj I
~I~~) ~ It1~~11 1Ij 1111 ~~ ~ ~l)I~ ~llii~~lb t1~ 1~lllf ~~~r~~~ll~II~~S 5ntl~~ I 1~ Ill II 11 It I 1+ 11111 111 Ifllfl ])I Illi Il lId rnl1t~ for i ] lIflampa~r h Ilf pl) Ill IllW rfTll1h 11
bull bull bull t b
1111 Illawt lrurd11 11l1Hfhljt lp tltlt of tlllt Hoal AIr Foret Tf~li lr)]IIll] 10 PWvllt fur till lit iltzalIIlll llld mllllt(IL1Hf of tIl( HW materr w11l1h h 1[111 hInti lIf[ rlf till LlnlrlltnP hH)1 l1lrll)rhHl1lcliL~lr III (middotlf~ If
Ill( holll htt 1111 pllIIIHci fo for appn-lllll four for fut-middot- I( 1lhIgt ll (rulthlltl (lI1L1Il 11)(middot iIIWll1lh Kinin tWlnty IHW airdroT (
~~ ~ I ~JI~~~I~~ hiSl~~ ~IIld~l~t~~~ ~~t ll~l~~~ n~ll ()fl~lxl~1l~~lli1Jllla~o~~~ i Ill 1)ltltltJn- ()f [11111 hII tinldy ]PPl plpfled mll~t of tlHm ill t IHHth uf Jollgiami 11ld SIlt1111d Without hlullt tu ILHl tPnl in lt(Cllr
I)~lln t uddlll ttt1I k l In lHrgto111lPl 1 large lITort ] dll11Ullh d ~OlO )11100 550 o)qno
~illtlO ltlrbr IlIl ri~J-(r aooo tuJfllt I lt1 Irangt tlw (pllll b- ()[t1lltlr~ VtljIIllwnl IIi fI HI nnw dd~ i I
Ill tltp tdullIgt 1~fP(ltlII)ll tIll pilot lfl (Hnl11blOllpd for short Ie bull-1 tlr eti( and ti llr n eTt + Inlt Ilh th( ltlPllortllnil V for pPTITIlr (I)llmiil)lI AI 17 I ~ ~ Imiddotar to ~fi ~ Htr It~ lIId tll) 1 11 (P 110 hIgt 1l1ll1d~
lip 1111H1 I alll)rh 1r 1lllllrdh 1( fl(lT d Hul I hI pr()llllflll~ hdlllr II 111lu tl flnt (Ill many l11lll
1l1]IIlHllh lrp lHIhd hUi ~Ir KlIlgl~ (Hld h(p[gt~ tu h1t IP11l1 II lOllgt whuh Will Pfl11l1 him tn (nllill thC irlTllt in Ih lIllifln I II H HIt~ llJ(d I~ HlIl)~ 111ulmiddot 11 Ihl j)11Hlinllln ( ftllrdlllJ~ lllt 1 IIdllHitf (II I( rlln1l1J f1 phYildl~ WIll I-II-( 1lld
Tid 1[Tllrt dll~ not pnlnl -lr llortmiddot-Hiltllt Oll hiidl fr)m allllum In tlllt lIP] g-oill) tl (llnl] thlgt IITmiddot( tiIgt of the antiainraft dtgtfpn-t fOT( In lltl II hJlhltkd -Ol)ll nWll and dlIlHi1d llpnll Ilw i1 rntoTl11 aTll) A( II1dly hi hl I flIIoI t ll tl1 l-H] 11ll1lI1 tIl tIl lI())O Ill n Till li~1Irf 10) IlP douhlld to llllll 100000 i
[1 tIl nrlH tlllll th1 (lmrnluri i lHn~ rt)rl-anizpoundd ~ot t)nlrI5~ gt~l
lrlll11~11 hlft~~~(f~~i111111~ l(l~lr IrI ~t~ Oi1 II ~ligt~) I~l( II~~ ~ I~~ f~Hl~ _ I fVIIlI1d dlld gnPII Il md 11111111 lIlt lI11portall(I J
Ih 11lt dl ]gtl 111 Iw Ulldlf II( Ilnlpr ()f a lllrp tl)mmaHle[lI 1 IhI 1r11 If li111 ll 11I1 rIIr II flIHlIl-lhb flr tHr lp dBI t hI offill 1 If 1Ill llr OIlJlllI1I11111V till (l1llImllt Hllll -I
In thl ~l111lry ltIf 11 a dIJall from th( (hid If tlH lll~r 1 ~~~ 1~~ 1 f)~ I~~~ i~~ ~~gifI~ll ~ ~t l~ ~I~tl ~l~ t~~i ~~t~ I(~I~~ III il~~1~ila 1 IIndr hi orlilT dlrlllltlr (Jf itlltntltllll llld of nrmiddotl~alH7Jllllln of antialrcr J dd1Ilp hainl till rull of hnltdlr )IIllrtl 1
TId r(()IIl1l1~lt InJl of t Itt Inllllland whkh rIalb hl~htly I hat w~gt j t1f1middotuly ((ht III lrl1l1I hac for ohJllt thpound (lmiddotntrahrtllI If 1(rythL ~ plrt alllln~ tn d(flllt t1~alJlltt air al tl~ ]
Ill( total Ilf t]1I( rlform ~hlw~ Iarly whal Illlllt)rl alll1 n11 BTl jl al ta(lll to air dTlir and till worry artJllImiddott b~ Ill1 dllqtr tlf ril Ila~l~ ~
~
74
iQlxlJU 0 70 Catalog of Sflected Periodicat Articles ~___m
They~re but the esampential steps of the general rearmament of our neighbors and Jr[ends a sure guarantee Q( the future_peace ormiddot Europe
-
FROM THE REICHSWl~lm 1933 TO THE REICfSHEER 1938 IDe In Reichswehr 1933 aU Reichsheer 19381 Colonel Baron
In 1933 when Adolf HitlCr was called hy President lIindenburg to agiumepower the Reichswehr included ten large units that isseven divisions ofinfantry nnd three divisions of cavulry
These divisions were broken down in twenty-one regiments of infantry offour battalions (o( which one was a recruit battalion l eighteen regiments of cavalry of five squadrons seven regiments of artillery of three or four
~ htrsc artillery of a cavalry division) Signal corps groups seven groups of
groups of automobilf trains and seven medical groups f large and small unhs sufficed for the professional army
or 4000 officers and 9bOOO men impos(d on the Reich by the Trpaty of re~mes It Wal insufficient as a nuchus for a modern army destined to rereive and in-ttruct one or two classes each ot 400000 young soldiers and to mobilize in thf future several million relervists
The first task whieh was imposed 011 tlw IWW Chanttllor desirous of ghing Germany a miitar force capahlf~ uf realizing its plans of GPrman expansion consisted tllUgt of augmenting the llumLfr of units of the Army
The Chancellor and his military coumrgtlofl Generals von B10mherg and von Frits(h had the clink illtwppn two pro((durefl one to Imse the
n the sIst(m of units of tradition (each regishynny (ing in gem~ral represented by a comshy
ter~middot in the Heilhw(hrJ the other heing to content ially with the tripling of existhtg units ns or which the most important was the lack of he second plan which was ldopted
licient to prepare the frame work of units of imtrucshyas necessary also to foresee the adm inistration of the as of the instruct(middotd mservcs It was also necessary
worganize the instruction at Ipat summarily of the fifteen classes (Gershymans born between 1900 and 19141 which had not received any military instruction
Parallel with the tripling of the activr tUlIts it was thus necessary tu create orgalls of recruitment and administration these were the inspections and districts of recruiting It was necessary to create at the same time rapid or~anization of instruction similar to the centers of instruction of the World War these were the ersatz units hattalions and batteries) commanded by ersatz oflkers retired ofilcers who had served in the Reichswehr or even m the old nrmyl
This period of prCparltltioll eXtlllded from January 1933 to October 1934 At the latter date each hattalion (except the recruit battalions) and
each artillery group of the Reiehswehr (except the horse artillery) transshyformed iLgtelf into a regiment of infantry of three hattalions and a regiment I)f arti1ery of three grouJl~ Each battalion of engineers gave birth to two
otters Each SibTIul medical and train group expanded into three groups Alone the cavalry rcginwllts ald the horse artillery were not touched by the
~ tripling However the 3d Cavalry Division (Weimar) became the 1st - Armoied Division
In this manner the Reichswehr expanded in the winter of 1934-35 to includl tWlnty-one divisions of infantry two divisions of cavalry and one armored division Side by side with this and in its service twenty-one ins~ctions of rptruiting and alollt ~OO tccfititing- districts were constituted
commanded and trained by eratz otncers (retiwd officers called to active duty
~ Compulsory military service was d(creed in May 1935
~ ~~ ~h~e~~~~ i~ ~~~~r~~gCl~~~I~i~I14o~dtll~edt~)~~~~le~~h~~~~~~~~i~~~~
of the German arm v had to ~urmotmt to recall certuin essential facts The number of oOleNs of all gradCs and all arms retired by the Reichsshy
wehr in itgt fourtefn rcargt of ltxistcncp could not hllve (xc(eded four or five thQusand of which not morf than three thousand at the most cOllld be used in 1934 Thes( Wfre for the most jlart required by the inspections of recruiting and the ersatz units
The active units of infantry engineers communications and traingt were able to draw new leaders from among til( officerl and noncommissioned offishycers actin and retired and from the state police ISchupo) This resource hardly existed f~r the artillery which only disposed to fulfil its triple obligations of its own cadres of 1933 It was not possible to obtain from the military schools of artilery instruction without a delay of at ien1t two years a triple production of lieutenants In spite of this in thC course of the wintpr of 1935-36 six divisions of mfantry and twoarmored divisions w(re creatd hy drawing on the twentyshyone divL~ions of infantry and the armored division whose existence only commenl(d with the preceding wintpr These new creations were not of a nature to um(gtlioratea prohlem already difficult It wafl thifl army of twenty-seven infantry divi1ions two cavalry divishy
~IOnl and three armored diviRions framed summarily enough and composed In the maiority of young soldiers of sev(n monthgt service that was available o the Reichsftihrer when he undortook the rcoccupation of the Rhineland In May 1936
rorm~~ ~iiiia~l~J9~~Iw~n~Ct i~~i~~r~lgrj~~rtheer~tl~~a~~s~~~nikr~~~ sur-lc-Main It was in 1936 also that the Challtcllor decided to extend military sershy
VIce to two yenrs and to increase the number of divisionf or infantry to
thirtr~~~ autumn of 1936 when ~he class of 1915 joined the class of 1914 in the active services the new Reichsheer included thirty divisions of infantry
~~~~l~dt~nret~r~~ieJ~Jl~i~~~ divisions and one ndepe~~dcnt brigade or
Beside it thirty-rour recruiting insJllctions fUnctioned disposing of 270 distric~ of numerous ersatz units
In 1937 the number of infantry divisions was inpreased to thirty-six of the ormal type and one mountain in Sljltomlier of the same year the class of 1914 passed to reserve and was replaced in Ll)(l ictive corps hy the class or 1916 bull
In FellTtmry 1918 wlWIl the murch on ll1HIIl took place the active German army inciud(gtd about MOOOOO soldiers about half having sixteen months of service and about haJJ four months but in whieh tho officer framework hud neither in (juantity or quality Cllleciully in the artillery a value corresponding to the Importance of thf eJTectives in soldiers
Since the Reichsheer has ahRorbed tlw Federal Austrian army whose illlmbers seem to have been reducnd to six divisions (three o( the normal type two mountain and one urmorpd)
The new army is articulated in sixt(en army (orps thirty-nine divisions of normal type three mountain division five armored divisions and five cavalry hrigades
It is an imposing total which to become equally IS powerful as imposing gt
must wait the slow and patient formation of leadem
INFANTRY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
Am POWER ANI) TltOOI MOVEMENT Major Phillips SOLDIElt LOOK AT THE SEA Major Dupuy TUE CASE FOIL ANTITANK Captain Greene A lRACTICAL GENERAL STAFF Major General Mosehy MIIITAltY MOTOTtcCII~S Captai~ Wheeling
July-August 1938
SOME HKFLE(TIONS ON INFANTRY MATrHmI AN) TACTICS rfajor Genshyeral Lynch
TUUNIJElt IN Tlfg 1A5T flmiddotm )IONTIS OF Tim WAit It-lt CIIINA Lieushytpllant Rudolph
TJII~ SPANISH WAIL A HEVlIoW OF TIIB HEH FOltEIGN OPINION Captain Johnson
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL AflMY MEDICAL CORPS (Great Britain)
May 1938
IMPROVISATION AND PltA(TICAI WOItK IN CA~IImiddot Major Bayley Tim PROBLEM OF MECHANIZATION S IT AFFI~crs Tim ~IEDICAI SEltVICE
LieutColonel Atkim
JOURNAL OFTHE ROYAL ARTILLERY Greit Britain)
July 1938
TRAINING RUMINATIONS 1937 Lieut-Colonel Lambert COUNTElt l3ATTFIW IN MOBILE WARFARE By Tweedledum
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUilON (Great Britain I
May 1938
TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LESSONS OF THE WAI~ IN ABYSSINIA Colonel Laderchi
THE BATTLE OF WAHSAV AUGUST 19Z0 AN EXA~IILE OF TilE COUNTEltshyQIoFENSIVE Major Mahony
MODEltN WAlt AND ITS MAZE OF ~IA(H1NES Brigadier Wilson AmCHMT AND ~tE(IIANISED LAND AIUItE rilE BTTLE OF GUlJAshy
LAJAltA 19n Captain Poulain French Army Reserve WAS GERMANY DEFEATED IN 1918
JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain ~ India
April 1938
ABYSSINIA TODAY Major Snelling PEACE Olt WAR Colonel Rich PItOPAGANDA LiclItColonel Dimmock THE INFLtmNcg OF Tim IltliS IN GliBAT BltlTAIN ND AMERICA Inglis
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMPFTRUPPE (Germany) By Clptldn UN Hartr)ss InflUltry
March 1938
NEW WAYS FOit MOtOR ANIgt HlDmt lNclte Wege Hlr Motortmd Reiterl rllijor General Eyb
Belore discussinlt the fmbject the author depicts some experiences from the Wllr in Ahyssinla He notes the rapid road eonstruction there was shyachieved primarily because motors were able to advance materIa across countr~and construction could he begun simultaneously at various points
75
~ ~ ~ Cllialof of Selected Periodical Articles
A nlW dlplrlUt( lt1 iJlrli~h tl in tllP trltlbportatlOJl hy motor of 1JfI lH of hurdIll to Lf(b lrnpa~aj til mllugt HllfJ from tiwn thr lllimals pn Ult( d to (arry llu tru(k InH1middot L1Tlhi r -tollJtd nCollllaif-ltanlI Wll of httl(middot (OIlIqHH It 1 TV tllI JIllgt 1 Vli unUH7fd ltpy and cout SPfVICP providtd (X(l 1l11It lllf()rrnattJH Smail i1t-moving- achanCrl or flank Ullltgt rOIIgtttmiddotd of LlIlIlt IIHI mltortl Ii Ilifantry In artll ry wlilch for tlw mnltt fart n lt1I1Ih d 1~ lIr
Bmiddottwlll -) An lld J -11 IIJ til ~IIdtd ~Llf(h (]f till IffJl
~~~ l~~1 ~~~gt Ii I ill~~l IH~I~ 1~~1~~ il~Ylllllt~~ 1~~iI(j ~~I~k lt1ll111middot l-lWlll1 lr~J 1tuh tmll 1 I nl In rlllruw IIFI rJtldill~ tIll rOM1 kl1 Ir Ullrh 1]o II I)))qlll~ ilv tIll Cnlllnlll Irl lillIIlltl llllIlllllllllnll 1111 11 fd 1)1111 ~ 11lt1 n1h 1111 ~ I i1ld Ill [lfr 1(01) tlnll I (lil k It II I XlI pll)]) I fl lfdmlr middotoIllnllmiddott Id Imiddoth Ii
1111 Illlt [f lIIt If 11drmiddotlinlll f qlltllllllI ItLvL Illi IIItr(1i r It Illi all1 r lrlt) t ~ 11111 hur Ill 11 -I lrl1111 n lld 111 It- Ullf dnTllll I ~lld 111]1 lt1 In llllthmiddot t l)rtlllflfIld (ldry 111 JIIl (III 1I1llr 1] tfmiddotIIIln 1Ilt)nIJlHh 11l1lWJt Hut Illlpltdlltontfl 1 llItl)tl1 lit lOf till nj111IIll of mllr Ill gtTllm HI ltq Ifnl
Ill ~Iod rlj r 1 i I ] II I l1lnd 11 Iii r If LI) 1)1)1 tl rt
If I thl I i) rllill h Jtlf-i )I lh mI()f lrI1 1 1 1 1) fllh r 1tlgt111 1t11r r1I1 4 1 H)
I d) IJlo rI 11 r Inil LIt h f Ii)( mwt III tUfn ut -1U)
I n n 1lt)1 rdln LIHl mIlr Il)tl r middot1[1 111111111 flld 1llhIlIl11dldullll111l
gttf 1(j11 til I till tIll Ir 111 Iltln JIlt IIgt Tw 1 L rrldh 101 1 UI lr1 of H tJJh )lnfl )middotr II h I 1 Ihnt nf P I ~ tll1 1 bullbull il 11HI Ojlltl InmiddottIn hi Hili r rl)llhrl nnr ~ bull Int 1nt ill ~ li d
In fd r t t I ~ Ill tltl tIlll mu-t rnri to fl I rrn1JII
t I t) dd111 t I I llI r L(IT~ 1 ~IId (f i nlaquomiddotr 1111 j 11111UIIJ(ld Irlltly L- 11(
d 1tl 11Imiddotlll~~ A IlflhllnhII~l- tllltfllflalllhrlmdlr j 01 r l]r jltr ~i ii 1111 nwtr tihlalw t)tIl1l dllChmiddot
)~gt1LlllI i f 11 ]1 1 r 11( r1~~~~~ ~td~~~~~fflrW~)~~~~~(middot~~~~~l )f( If ]11IIHImiddot1 ) 1Efll middothlCl ~ bull
f f 11 dhulvl1l qI In f lei )~rl t1lr I il t hlch lPJIl If llimiddotl)tIr1 oil and tlIP (oll~ III jllt 11111f mm illn thn that r(quITld fOf
I1r 11IHlIl III g-dIIlJl (In 1ltmbJI mot( Jrjlft1Ill (or pombal the arIlr nllll11 lit to
IIl( rl 1IIIr ll) I P rind of tlml Ihll a rI fnf l-gtImiddotmhl pll no Itrgp rolf
Ihl In I) I)() mIle Ipr dl g)Ili m lglllflcanCl 1hat 1lt lInportlnt i tlw
1l1ll~ lltlmiddotnutl Un1 r trlmiddotpllin~ 2(1 hdIJrltt dlgt B l1ch cticlllatioll and trl(llltl~
dlltLII1( ( of 1-0 ttl 1~O mt s thlt L~ 0
rt t1 till 1)1 lldllll 1IIl Iltlli7d Xp 11)( IJf ol))]1t and I I 0 II f Ii) rn r rI d~I lnnl 11 llrly hllt to or i 1 Ill) I n11 [d Ilunl whlt1I 11ll nhll)tl I full till ltUlt)lIIIshy
f 11 ldol mI I Imiddotl~ lfy ~r()torgt can tljllTlP 1 hour r d III I 1lllmupl I lndlll~ )nltly k lt(nb tIll ir h(
rIlImiddotr 111 n1 middotrdlvlIndludIYll1drgtmolllrIIPlh11 t 11111 r 1 lrn1llf Il nil 111 of I dl TIjllirl- all I rlqrdllllnl~
J 11 Ill Iii III II I ~t nt IlfY llln frolltlt wn ~(f(rgtly OY(f ii I II HI 111111 i I r 1)lldlnraquo Ill (11 l11nt ((lvtiry could mo aero
1lt1 middotn II h 1 rf 111 a 10111 lltllq~ ordinarily 1 thHI jorII1 1 jr hld Ill 1Ilhllt ltIlled and cro cIl11try
nllI till 1lttt frllt igt mmy mlll 11lI11 and thp I I Id 111gt11 IV mtlltt r((rlll WIth lIHmiddotrpalt(d
I d lId I frlf tIOna )Ilfl of tIll limp (on-
I film I Irl nI Id d~ llfTl n no III tIll ratlgt tlf mar(h of motur and Ir 1h Il II f trw lrtlll~ alllmallt lor (jon to 1)0 ]HHIlHh ill
I 1)111] )1llr (111111111 Slfh 1 Xfll ri11lfllt hll hpl ~ ~ l I tl r _
l ITlOJllt of fllll lwh hllt In vnt(middot1 ahout tlH trlmcndol~ jlIJf tl fr Ilr lllltltJtlbull ] OllllnlI11J 1gt a (Ollqlllnrf of Ilnh
1 bull 1 (JlJII)IInIlI1 [111 A hrilf (fmpln~TU mIY ill in onhr )1110 1 jlllJd 1( (III v I lrlll iOfl 11ll Itr two lillI of pay 111Hi or If) nIllt ttl I Ill frill 11ft II In III nltjUlr fllr fO-mi]1 march dayJ (IJ1lllnl 1 t dI il) fll[li rtlllll ~hTlh rllk0l1lr1 only at 7 l poundgt t l 11t JIIldfoj pl 1lt1 11 ~nll ~2~1 ]Iund or Ihoul fiV(lllllf tl
f I t to 1lIn d 11middot rrjmiddotr )1f1r1vlr fill Iloll dtyof rr I llId dL1 f JJ I 1hi IpJr I rl 1IIlT~ fllltj llfh]1lt III (lll III ]Ifl) ImiddotLIII d rrllll 1itf
I Jll 1111 IlJ rndlnllil afll fIJr hofl IlllIl Slr~II LlnfllodEralply I fl1 1111 tJmiddotIn I [11 IlInlltllll fllr ftllf tlrtl( wltl)ll fHI TIll 11middotIr 111 1gt1 ]rodld lIb 111 Irllt rdlo11
1 l IIIIJI tq ur lt1111 and lrlllllfY IIr A TTlotllf f11I1II1
rI 11I11 11 Ii III r1 I lt11 1)1 I 1 ht 11 il 1ljI~ III llr bullI Irl rllfr al t I J 1 I IltlId l IJr url witilh lan IllOVgt Lerw IIJulltry whplJ t III I dI1I~Ir~ tri Art llhry Ilnlll nil d m)tor nlllllnn will fin(l a mnvinK and r Tf mlrIT tH11 All llf ill 1 I Ur1N Ibl lIlIVIIII 11IUIllIl tJH TlJ JIf1ll1l If 1 lt (( I j low Ii t1I k h- plalll 111011(1 proll Vry cugt ly t d ur IJIll
[ III dldlllllllllllj IIt dh) 1 ltIII IIf IIII IlllltllriZld infantTY TfIIllTf only a (I~ Iolld tllur Ihw t1I dl rJlmiddotrltI)tl [)( 11l1rching infllltry qr cavalry
76
C amp GBB Qllarierq VI ~~ ~
MOTPl)V(lr grlatlT flhm(mml is nhtainllulr from mojoTR l)(cam~laquo th(gt (olUrJ olt li much longer tot
(5) Trall~ltion (rom march to combat and VIlt versa - The 10 toll nlem(n whu nde Oil the two Side seats in light truck can detruck frot (tII thrgt halted vhir plae(gt tIIPm1Clvcs lit 1 diltanc( of 10 to 12 yards f~ out 1111 tTllLk and Ill rlady to fir III 7 or 8lwconds
Jj(ltrllclcin and (Iltrll(ollg from 5 to 7-ton trucks rCquinll mot(l tillil wi t dllrulk al111llt IH ti((ond~ tu lntruck allout lO wc()ndl
III ((JIlPlflll111 til following tim(H hav bpI found neC(Bsary for cavriliJ i pal prlparltiOlIl From the halt to di~moulit takl a dbtHlle of IO to 12ya1amp vic Hul Ill pnptr(ci til fin rna
IU Whltl nd1l~ hy thr(gtps or HXlS the 1valryman nearest the hone- Vb hllldlr 11 nlIly IJ l ((ollch th otlHrs rtquirp 15 twcond ~ 01
~ ~ ~V~I~l~i~~i(I~I~Jl~~~rt~(~~i-Jti~)l~I~I(~~i~ i~rl~d~i~~~~~(~u~~~ ] pf( 1)101111 (leh 1IIIId hill f)WIl hopp alld lJl nady to fin in 10 second or I2l 1 rmall TIlIHHlIpl and he r(tdy to flrp III 9 -(condg 1 ah
OhVIOI1lt]Y tIll infantry In truckg IS at som( disadvantage agailllltl 1 Ilr)ln( Ittack Un till other hand til( digtJnc( hetwcpn trucks and tbt ) tin )111)11 lilli pfodlH1 1lc(gtWd IltltIVlIltlt1 to attaek from th Hank Tk i rllr If~ It lC~~~~~~~~f~ilI~llr~~~~f~~(~~~~~~l~r gtl~~~~ ~~1~1~~~~~Ptlllin~ J~ flvllrd)ltmiddot fxjl(rillltlI lJl to thl (ro)gt (UuntfY lpaJilities of motor vehlc1a ~ HUI Ih 11m of yar till typP uf ground and the ma~~ of motor vehice 1UBI
~llf~I~~~JI~~n~~gt~J~~I)~~))I~~~ ~I~I~~~ ~~()l~ll~t ~~~t~ri~nr~~Jljb~Ft~~ j ~ tn lltI~Iht~li~I~I~l~~ttl( I arev whrre TOlds or tralllre in abundane~ ~ ~ ~ll)1~111~I~JI~ ~i~~I~if~~)ln~ldl~~~I~i~J~J~~~h~~1o~~~)t~~i~~~il~~~l~l~tl~f~On~ tTl tn pn 1111 Evn In a thrnly lt(ttlfd but fairly nrln tNralll the light ~t (an lIrfurm ao wpH if nut b(ttpr than motlllt(gt(1 own tllP l1Ptlampltary rlconac 1111~ bull 1
Hut III wllotd 1rfIgti wlHTI road1 and traIl lrl klrCf til m()Un~ IIIHI 10 vtlullIlI in bet Illdlgtplllltah]l It 18 hI who (an (omh the aru ~ 1 thorull~hly gtllliy and IVlth fPlativ(iy little nOl~ It 1lt fwre that thcvtl~
11~~I~llI(I~vl~~~~lr~~~t~II~~I(~~~t ~t~~~I~~~~lll~t t[l~~ ~f nl~~J~~i(~~~l~~~~ t only a few mountud men Will gtIfJiCe lor thl purpo)C TIl(gt (omhat will It tlkfn ovpr hy tnotlJrltYltiJlttlt 1allk fInd lllotonwd IIlfantry
(7) Hoad tongflt10l1 An advmta~~p ac~ru(g to the motor c~lllmnfl I With ItH trll(cl tf1YI]hll~~ With (oI1 CI(prahl( dlgtancp bCtw(ell veillcles at 1 II (ollsel)u(l1t t1pxibility tjllg~lJon md hh)(king Will not occur so frequentiJ ~j o a with hnr~p~drawll vlmiddoth(lp Motor COhIllHl (an rfOgtgt one another It~ ~ ltlnly a qU(ltlOll of a (frtnn l()lt~ of tUnf It
lri) ~1otor noises atHI hghts - EXjlCripncl hag shown that spen
~1~~~ita~~l~~~~~lI~n 1(ll~(~Jlt[~~((~l~~I~middot~r l~~~~l~r~~~]e W~~nl~~d~t~~1 ~1 tl pruvidld In tttiucp fxhnugtt noises Other n1(gt1I1S of camounaging the mok IH1I-l of tanb IHarily arl Jlog~lhle such I tir actiVity and the usp of noil) Hlltnrl in otlJ(gtr lte3S and by artillefY fire
By (mplnyilll~ hhlP glass light) can be so dimmed that even at fall middot10lt1 rmglgt thp Ian not bp dl-tinguilthed from the front By proptshy(lllployil1)~ Iwh lightlt nil tlickpnng hem~ will diclosp the approach of t Vlhilk yet t11() will Jllrmit a rlo~f tudy of tilE adjacent tCrrain
(()llIl~I~~i~i~7s~rr~J~P~~~hf~1~~ ~)rr~~ti~~~(~ft~l~rt~~~~~I~~c~~~~~n~ll~~~ ~nal dItlllII hptwC11l I(hide to h(c)m( Cparat(d or to take the wrq foute To aVOid such errors the following means of correction and 3SSLStat~
~1~~I~~~~~~ll~(i~l~~Or~~I~~~i~~~~~~~~t(~~~1~~~f~~~l~c~l~~nr~~f (~r~~~chf~ difTlTltnt fi~lrp or lacll mut (ompIIIY hattdien etc blocking off TO nol to lIP 1I~ld lITIJ1lnYllli~ lll()torcy(hgtt~ as guidlS and rlir((torn
110) BrplkdOlll or forced stop of vchicles - The freate~t obstai~ I l tlf prnplnynllnt of till commcrtial type yphicl( in military opfgttat)[ In thlt thl( v(llIclt V1t tulmiddotk on lofl roadgt llfotiatp stepp gTldes I (xtrlml ditltlully nr not at all and Itl VNY ltplsith( to road and hridr d(~trll(tlOll hy tlH (IWllly It is tml that hOf~c~drawn vehicles and sma fourwhlll dJvl or 1-~hlll trulkf) WII Qv(rcomc these ditHcultics mn TladJlv HUI thl Ilfl of tht prohiltn lil in tlw utilization or the commNcl vehicle for TllIiitar) plrpU~ts How un the ma~ of tlwsC vehicles neOlshyplbh g1tiflHtllrliy t days march dunng which ~o to 50 small and 1aJi 011tIC]- dptru(tion pte ne cnCOlllltprpd We may ptesuppose tb
e
0 a
d a
l
tll hrll) I 11l1vPft1 ((1 arl dpltroy((i hut lhat ahw llf(lUPPoltes tb1 11111(11 lit 11111 ha1 IJt1 ltLvlllahlp to the tllpmy fOf Much dtlslructlOna 1 lltlt III ha~ IItl1l1(( fllll 11I1 opportunity Motor columns can ordinarl ~ dltotlr (nVlrla1HillllH or-two hld ~Jlot But a thorl)ugh test of capnhihOOj Iwuld hp mad t1JlIltally Hinc( III mot terrain d(truftiolls and obstaekl ~ 1
~~i~( ~~~(t(lh 1~~~~~~I~II ~~~H~t I~~~~f~~~~~t~lnd ~imilar flltUf] ~ A l(gtchniqlll tnll1 hI dlvllo]lld whwh Will O(f(OIl1( tl1ls(l handiCIIIl ~j
I-qII]lIIlt1II 1II11 III dvlinpld lnd 1111111 For iIlHlmHt t11( tIJl of rore lnd jlHII(Yl hoI h hI( and motor lllcrIId It hlluld not be difl1cult U pfolplt bllth flllllnr ml It)rigt hy proplr ((lvlring alld packing ngaw( wllfr n pill itt 10 what dlpth fordlll~ hy thll mlmH is possible we do~ Imow hut WI Jhould iparl1
A IlHlOr 1llIlInll middothoulrl J1PrhapH tratllport with it material to ns~ist~ middotroini~ ~(d ~IHlt til f(plIr hridgcs and (vento onstruct bridg(s
~~~~(~I~~lt~~~~~ 11)d ~~~ItCl(lt~1tll~(ll~~~g~V~~~1l~~~ve~r1~~a~~~~I~r in Illattrial at tl1l Ina of 1Ilgt and on tune will Ill thoroughly undt 1IlYOIP who has actually participated in ptwllIit Thpound actual pmpioy
I
bull
1 bull I
C alog of Selected Periodical Artlcles
1
1
I
I
( d~~h~n~~~~it~~1~~wt~~t~o~~r~~middotwefe of smull cnRequence
Tests should be made to determine the relative efficiency of animals (truck transported) and small tractors (truck transported) in gcttingtrucks
oat U~~ t~gea~~~i b~~~rec and rider ih this new rapid force what
will ~e~tb~elhe history of war in the past that the cavalry horse
=~3e~1~~r~~~~~~~~~~1ef~~r~ ~~dc~ot~~~~~~ ~~~~u~~cti~d~i~ mated the mounted Units as though a pest had struck in consequence of which the marching capacity of the cavalry waH d~creascd to or IlPlow that otinfantry
Therefore in time of pence the followiug mCaSllrCl mu~t h( bkcm 10 prepare the horse for the rigors of campaign ahle ~~~ fr~o~~7~smiddott~iJ and strong weighing not owr 700 poundH luilshy
(2) Cavse the animals to undergo fast or hunJfr ppriods at the Ham time doing full time work
(3) Accustom them to winter cold Have no stalls Provid( prottction a~t the wind and rain hut no morp than that afTord~d by the CanVH tDPof a truck
4 Protect the winter coat of the animal [nstead of the ~urry-comh ore the vacuum cleaner
Favorable results have been ohtained with the vacuum deaner hut it5 use has been forbidden hecause combing and bruRhing furtlHr discipline and improve the skin and digestion (hunger periods would improv( the digegttion
ProT~ployjng the vacuum cleaner would releusp more grooms for com hat
train~~rt_haired animals should be eliminated for military Jlurpose~ ~~ ~~ ~~e~~e~~oi~g~~ ~~i~~dfo~n~~~h~di~~o~~~ 3~a~~)~~~~ns~~(7) Competitions simulating whr conditioml using th~ following rulfs
(a) Time of competitions November to March in gnow and rain No stalls i
(b) Previous and continued hunger periods ic) Animal transport by truck Loading and unlouling tesLlt (d) Use of animals in pulling trucks on roads and out of bad
stretches
The author offers an example (in general) of tlw possihlp or~anization olan inrantry battalion (truck transportcd)
Attached to the battalion should be a number of motorcycles small tanks and tractors
Each rifle and machine-gun company to be provided with about 18 trucks which ill transport peroonnel equipment and upplics
To each company and fo the staff section an additional four trucks each transporting three horses together with riders
The animals are to serve the following purposes 9 n) Pull trucks out of holes around bad stretches etc
(2) When the battalion marches afoot to move thp combat trains Ismail perhaps trailer type vehicles)
(3) To provide reconnaissance during foot march (4) To mount the unit commanders (5) Where the opportunitv arises to group all the mounted men into
one organization (reconnaissance and security)It will be noted that these mounted men are not a cavalry unit rather
an all purpose unit AI told the battalion will have some amp0 trucks Thf lar~e number of
drivers (truck and motorcycle) can he tmined in infantry pon(gter duties
and icta~~~~~~~I~o~~~~i~~FeB~~lh~P~J~~ ~ d~~h
ARMORED MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZEU UNITS OJ FOJUm~N ARMIES 1937 IN RETROSPECT
JPanzer- mechanisierte und motoriqierte Verhandc fremder HeNt Ein RUckblick auf 1937J
(See digest middotCampGSS Q)larterly June 1938 page 97)
April 1938
TANKS - ARMORiD RECONNAtSSANCE VEHICLES AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST THESE
IPanzerkamptwagen - Panzersptihwagen und die Abwehr dagegenJ New French R~nault tank - De Militaire Spectator describes the
new Renault which shall serve as an infantry accompanying tank It weighs 12 tO~8 carries one 37-mm cannon and one machine gun has (l
speed of 14 miles per hour with armor of 25-mm to 30-mm (about one mch)Ita crew consiqts of two men
Rapid tanks in Poland -- Revue dArtillerie reports theRe tunkH which weigh 243 tons are 258 yards long 178 yards wide and 131 yards high A 40 horse pow~r motor provides a TOad speed of 27 miles per hour a cross country speed of 11 miles per hour They are capahle of c1imhin~ n 46~ slope of traversing water 20 inches deep and usc 7 gallons of gasoline per 60 miles Ea~h has n crew of two men is armed with one machine gun (with 2360 rounds of ammunition) and haq armor plat~ 3~mm to 8-mm thick
Russian hea~ tank HM l-Krassnaja Swjesda reports as follows on this tank type In the main turret are a cannon -nd a machine gun In
each of two s r forward turrets are a heavy and d light maehin~ gun Its weight is 18 tons crew 6 men With a 250 horse power motor it has a road speed of 27 miles per hour ~ngth 72 yards breadth 273 yards height 293 yards Climbing ability up to 43 degrees aple to knock over trees4 yard in diametermiddotcan cross water 12 yards deep-nhd ditches (deep)
~~erra~issi~~eis ~crm~~~i~ee~~~o~~ ci~~r~~~~~~and each is Sas pr~of The new Eng1ish mobile armored division - According to the United
Services Review the new mobile division will be organizeda~ follows
yen~~t~a~~~~a~~~h~t~~~hit~l~~~Sregiments ~ach One artillery brigade Motorized infantry Motorized engineers Motorized signal uniis Motorized supply elements
This division will be assembled for the first time during 1938 and will undergo tests llt Salisbury Plain
Other reports indicate that eachmiddot of the five home divisions will be
~iftb~~~la~fe~~rt~l~i ~~~t~~~~os~n~ ~1ray~~i~~~f~iirtebh~~~~hi home from India
Four light tank regiments are to be provided in India Employment oC tanks in the defense - La France MiIitaire deals
with this question According to the discussion tanks in the defense are employed
g~ ~rc~~~il~atti~~nk defense f It is contended that the 25-mm antitank weapon is neither numerous
~di~~b~rsR~~Ise~~f~~seOe~6nO~~~n~~~~h~~~ ~~~ou~eo~ftr~et~k~ mobility a rapid assembly of these vehicles at a threatened area should provide a massed defense But such employment must be planned and prepared
Tanks are equiPP(Jd with cannon so that they cancombat tanks they are not made mobile in order to move to a fixed deCense position Tanks employed in the defense must employ their mobility in order to strike (with fire) hostile tanks a~ a disadva~tage
French views on antitank defense ~ Utilization of terrain and tank mines When the defender places himself behind natural obstacles ordinarily the enemy haq the better observation The preparation of obstacles against tanks ie trenches mines felled trees (abattis) requires much work and time On a 1000 yard front a tank mine field can be laM by 30 men in 8 hours but infantry and cavalry are not especially Vained tor this work It is questionable whether an adequate number of mmes can be prOVided and laid in the time available
Consequently the most effective weapon against tanks is the antitank gun The equipping of French units with greater numbers of 25-mm antitank weapons is to the Fr(nch mind a most salutary measure This weapon employed in conjunction with obstacles forms the backbone of the antitank defense It should not however be employed in a linear defense nor as indidividual guns such employment invites penetration at the weak areas and consequent envelopment
To avoid dispersion it We d~fense there should be retam~d a reserve of antitank weapons held In readmess ongood routes along WhICh they can advance for emploYment in accordance ~ith the hos~ie tank situa~ion Only thus are retained the necessary mobJllty and elastiCity of the antitank
defeI~order to counterbattery effectively the artillery supp-orting the tank attack the defenders artillery should be reinforced
dAr~Il~~r~(lfo~~~~~el~g~)ShoJ~ ~~~~~~i~0~~rtt~~h~~~~r~~6f various supe~avy mac~_~~ _____ L __
- Range I Rat~ lVeight Caliber Muzzle (MeterilY of WeiahtOf
Kind in Velocily--middot -I--- Ftr Gun oj MM (Meters) Hori- Vefti- pc (Kilo- Bullel
ontal cal Minfte grams) (Gram~)
~J ~ ~~ Vkk---- -127 914900middot 5000 3i~50 -280--~ Browning l27- -middot800 8200 2~OOO 550middot60 -165-5~ Brownin~--132-800 9000 2000 ----(---165--~ ---- ------~-- ----------Hotchki~ _ ~~_~~Il _3~01l1~~~ _5_0_ Scotti 132 _~Il~==_~~===_5_2_ I3rdn 140 )000 5000 4000 20 100 60
NOTE one ounce =283495 grams I one kilogram = approximately 22i pounds
77 I
I
M y 193B
-IIJii~TI 1 Ill) (1lt ~ I II IITlo - 01 O](I TlII shyTl(~ 111111 1 ) 1lIIJiHf J- JIlIH_II HEgt
I HI url-efltll- fl ~ dr fl ~lH uilr lIh rUllR u~rll-1 IH- lJLd r~ lldnl III frnd] JII Itl n 1
-rlollnllrI I) 1111 ITt ddr TiJl Ir Iq illlll f tbf Srutli
S~~~ Ir(~~tlr ~ 1~1 I I 1~ ~ (1 I IJl I 1 ll~ II 111~11 111L~ 1~ aJ~l~I~~~1I1t110l1 1 q elFl 1) f ~ I ( llt 1 f fullf 111111 FImiddoth plltmn 1middot1 f 1 r )rgtdlfI 11 iIlol 1 rTlllIlr In) Ii 111 nl i I) 1111 lid nIl
1 I 111fllf d]l r ~I dill t r 01 I rlft pllll) III 1I 1111 1111 full 1( Irrj Ii 111 l [ - 11111111shy
I ) ~llrJ r I I I lIf gtlll)I
11 (IIIlt If j- 1rlIlIlIIlr I
11 j d II Irq I I rIrll II III If 11
ii rill]gt 1]1 If I jII n
d I rmiddot I I I 1 frld
rdll n to Kf1 nljt tl rH c 10 I ]lW~ rllll~
I) 11 111 tin) iltlll 1 Jr Lrl)lj 1 f
~II r 111 HLJijolfl1
i It
i ~ rmiddot
I
r dh Irl I j
11111 1) j TI
bull Ij L P
I d 1 r r ll-
1 1 111 loi1 - r 11] I 1middot
d r Illto i I L nl
J 01 l 01 d ]1 1~1)l1 ) tfl ]i) d 1 r I f I~ f ill ~
Ilr l ~ 11 1 lOllfr)ldh l1dl1l1~llp1llf d 1IIdl
pltlllltJ1l ~d I (pid )1 I lOll
11111middot111 llIj 111~ Illlnn d dl 1shy I H d
I J It
1 d I )
r I]
1 d II
-r rpt1
l j bull Id 1middot11[
1 d 111 - 1 d
( 11 rd 11 nlj t 1middot
1 Jd
nmiddot I
1 I Ir ~ I] d d
) I I flllqf1 oj lt11 J
li 11
II]
I I ~
nfgt Ii I ltof)
jtrl 1 j 11 (1] r I) Ill 11) Irmiddot Ind IIIi I rI) I 1111 IlI ~ll dl
It 1 I 1lIlH Il r l II h tin 1-111 (
Ld 111+ lrll ljt11 d 11 III Irtll] r
t1 1) llJlt 111 I rll11 (11)1 Ill )jl 011
il] I I I I II n[ tJ 1 llr tqllIHl1t~ bullbull1 Blr-I I tlln~ 1)(1 i ml hllll -llll (1lT1111l I)ll
1) d llid niH ltnr~ ltttdlllll 11 III) 1l111lll IlJllllrrrlfl
j 1
f I~q l[ lIn rlIHmiddottlt~ 11h of lwlt)
) d
ii I 1
I)
1111 11ll 1l1IlTl d uHIl 1ll111nflld l llqr I lid lIItr 1I1dmll I Lud 11 I Ilj)IH I t upply Hld ltwlld
I dILl 1)1111 11lt a Ir flJllghl by I )r gtllll a I Ir IlHJIllnrlli()J) and
]ltmiddot11 I (nl111 (IJIlIIjll lhtI 1111 Ir I dIILl1lrJ Till fqdd dililti1l WI fllllrId I I iI1 t11)1 ltof fin Itr tLIl1~ IlIllh I tlllrilr
rt d ]1 J 1t)1I rl Jlllr ltUPIlrt 1111 It h d ~h 11J))Id 11111d rl(1ll11II~ II
1111 1111 1llIrl mnill 1IIIIIdl Ilt1I k Iud 111 adlUII1jy proliel
]111 a tapul (orp v11I (otjtllnl
I~Jd lId 1I)If 01 I J Tln f)gadl 111 It dv AI ordill)1 ltI~ ll~I (li (Ir I f
j
1 111 nlfrlllIllllI irp rI and I J H II til ITI Lr ~)l LI 1ltQllHltld 11 In rn lrtrlllrlt1
Tf (1011 It ( 11 r I 1 d Illd t1l1 111111 II 111111 1r I) fllllr II dr I 11 rd III [111111 1)( fnllr 1UHlfOll Hltl a
m( 1111 -~H it) Till (rtnIJrl rl rr (fllllti~ aller- ~Ipwrlfon I a 1111 111 f 1111 101
jj I lnll dl PJ)) I 11ljU 1gt11 d 1 r )lllltilt1nC IJallalt()I Inri lrlddlltllItl IllllllllL 1111 lit bur r fl iI()lI
1 Iliflllnl d 111] Il I 0I11 d Lrl)ld ~t] II f Jr~anizd 11110 a talll Iri dl
c amp GSS QuCrt~
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
Jun~ 1938
STltImiddotAjLIlJ J (l11 rLI- Lifutfllmt Tuhnun WILL Till Hllm (()I1il1l TIL 10 Till AmI Lipul (ojuIll (jpI all
IVIILlTARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN IAll tna
H tlAloi Imiddot 1 IBmiddotgtIJ (01-1 rldllr~ Corp
Janunry 1938
Till Vll IN 11ft Ff ]--1 II) r K 1111 I IIt 111 II1It 1 (llIrd If iljllf
A fllltllllJJiIOIl of I pfl lOll nllll nil t I --11gt JpllU Ir AI trlllll) 10 t Ill lIlt III If 11 I II I L) 11 SI1II1)II11 tlrl~ in OHIT
1~)l7 tli ItIOtjr alt liJwd tlIht of thpl ]JI(tlt III gtorth Cillna 1111 fI-1 Ilr III aftlI 1gt dlvlltd II II fl]lIrtIIIIgt 1Il JIopPI prol
llld IIH III (llPllilJll ()f Tl1lllll
10) 1111111 Nil liU I iln J(I 11 phfPOltli(h I I r~( ht] r 1aJjr CPIIIrd Ialt(lw]
A fIII (f Ih ~Ilrlcl ltIffdr lllflllj tIll ltp(fJld hllf Ilf jir-
F~bruary 1938
Al I(tlnn- J I-I I-A IILD Hllrln ~I f)oi IFtlllfHIlCII1l11l1 rt1lrlt KrJI~~()1l11 I Fwld lt1lrlthd lOrI
IJrfwr
Tlu I)II Militlf Sl hll)l (11(ILdl lt11 (Ii~htfifth 1TInJvpr~ar I NovlmLtr J117 TII~ trlIl1lll lt()1 fr till l~uartfmllttrr Cfnm SIlff (If th fmlPrtt1 Arrn ~l 111middot111 ll11 It Ill lIr(lk If tIll Wr Var 11 rae- rIPIII d III 1n I
iorIJUIff) 11 LtI( lr()tOrtinl1ll~ lind 1111 rtrrpl I (llgttlin un Bin7lr
~
gas 1 sligh
born ~tPP nore
light
1 The fare e
~A (lii
mal
1n(H 11011
~8~~ beu
I
WfltI~lp~ )]~ )~ j~lnl~i il1 ~I(rI ~ ~1ljr~~ ~ In11) i~~l~llt f~t~~~~Vi~-l~I~~~I~~~ foj ~~elt
1111 dvpjopnllll f 1111 mHhlllf gl111 pnnjdri thf drfpl1lt( WJth I Jdli WPljJOll With whlh tltl olllkrl)IIII1(I HlvanlaRfC of tjw off(gtnsr T]H (tlllt of ffnnt Hul tl1( l1utnl)lf of llf1 pngaged mad nlltllank~ ~
~~~(~In~~~t~)~I~~)~~~lit II ~~ I1~ifI~~ ~ll)i~ ~~lJli~r1 1tll1 t~17~~f ~~i -I l dlrin) IIH olflIIIVI lIul frf~h n ~fnl hrlq~hl liP 1 tlip dpfpns(l (Pl1lm tJand hll11 up I hI at tar k 11111 111111 Ill tulk t hi 1 pOll Im (lf oilly off (ilsm~ I rlartll lt01IlL11)1l Ill If h)wlri tit11 ( n fnl m atl II] ylll r I hngl
trahzld In l)lrW furm of l(f1( In 1111 llIt hllr Op1l1Jnll ~talllll1(d warl at nl I a thll)~ Ilf Ihl Pt bull11111 tlw nft If thlnl In mnlnTlZatlOI1 Will [ rar 01 mllIlll(f
IOl[11l 1 -lt1 IlUTlt) HIIL jithrpohl iIJmiddot I Ir-II hI] I J LljOf (llgtft Pllhpk
Ill authof fPIPlt llit fulloltlg orld lfLlIf~ to itllluol 111 Jar inl
1) J11f Igllf If lIlon- I~ Allialllt if l~lIr()]lldll In1 r~ Ilt 111( Sino-faplllPltf Ir Ii) TIH nritlh En1jJrf 15J The Brll~tllt (lllIftrPIHI
fl Irldp allli nmnwr 71 Hplrmllnlnl
litlwrt1la clwk hllwI Ihl (rl11 BriLon 1 lllf 1111 nlnr(gttr gtitUttloll 110t 111 111 Ihl d( If --ijldoll ltIt durin) tilt Tllrhl
Till tnll~th of Ih lim 1lI~ lilt ur fnfl nf all mIJnt 110 llOwn In tahullfd form
Till (111 H 1 -IAI 11)[r HUfglrluli III SpanjPII I GtllPrd WwmgPf
TId lrtlll( i Ihf fifth inLllnwnl (If tlH mthnf JlOllllt of th( Sp (lv1l lr dptrihinl thl IlhHq~IHt n1r1lnll HI AtulJagt
In il~ uf Iott11 1 11 It tb aUlhr (lIl1tIltIl11gt III tpganl tu thrrt( of tllP ((lIrlHl1lnl olunltrnJrllh1t at Tptud 111 J)pcpmhlf arl frronlshy
March 1938
Alit HAII- SII 11lLln II LII~ ILuflm~rlff lind ihn- irlmnIlI I (nltlllll -)1hlul
Tlltrl If(gt II pr u I hIt 1 11 of Iml1) III 1 hi1h III ml d t rtwtl Ill ) IT I follo
(11 1I11~h (110-11 t wll Ii 1ltlntI(1 or iIlly-lllinn fUfgtl I~ I In(Illfhlrv lJ (a
In Ihl Ilaln-Ah-lIILUl r tlllrt 1- I fcaffity of targelgt ~plllih (jvil War FrItwo hflJI) a HpltlIlIlrd ha trill to ~a( thr ~ huildmgl of Madrid mil lur thi fI~on tlll- eity ha-1 ~uff(r(d (nmp fllight damag(-1 only Flr norf ltrionlt dlmlg(4 and many more ( must he (xpPltcd ill futun Wanl
mrr
Russ
and
78
i
i
ftXllriJ-O70 ~ bull Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
Both in China and Spain only high expo~iyeomh5 have heen ~5ed MILITAR-WdcHENBLATT (Germany)~~~~~~~ri~~~~~~t~h~iru~~~ ~a~116d~~~~Ji~~e~ ~~~~~e~h~aratJveJY By MAJOR EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
bom~it~~ltg~t~t~fr~~~~heI~~~e~~~~~n~Fni~iJ)J~o~~rhp~~f~~~ ~eps are taken~ It is very important to anticipafe events and take the
lecessary precautions ahead of time
1 -li
ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND THEIR E1I1ILOYlllENT LFlitgtgerthwchr-Waffen und Ihre Vervendung I l1-a]or KrzIHn_k
There arc four kinds of antiaircraft welljJons ~uns heav) machine gun ~ tight ma~l~jnc guml and searchlight
I 1 lntlUlrcraft guns may be classified 3lt follows
Light guns (up to- SO-mm cali her I Medium guns (up to IOO-mm caliber)
Heavy guns (over lOO-mm caliber)
eerr~m7~~i~~f ~~h~ni~~Jails whi1P til(gt light and m(gtdium tYJlP Heavy machine guns are oriinarily of from 25-mm to 40-mm calihtr
Adirect hit by the 37-mm or the 40-mm (an hrin~ down In airplan(J hilt malier llhells e~U1not be riepended upon to rio ~o I Light machine gum - caliiJ(nl from 125-mm to 20-mm are parshyiitkularly useful against low-flying aircraft ] middot1 ~1
EXPEpoundUENCES IN II1~ RAID PROTECTIONI lLuftschutzerfahrungen LifuLColonfi Trimm rery little is known today from practical experience of the efTed of
incendiary bombs and shells because the experienc( of the civil populashytion during the World War as regards air warfare was very limited The Gennans used incendiary bomhs against Rheims but the fires causpoundd hy ilem were (asHy extinguished The efTict of the inc(ndiary shell that will
be used in the future is yet to he determined - On the other hand much is known about poisonous gases and with
timel preparation and training effective protection against gas attacks can be obtained
CUIOUFLAGE ANn BLACKOUTS lTarnung - middot(rdunkflungj LicutColonel Schurgi
atural camoullage mEthods consist of planting trees to make roadR and buildings less conspicuous to air ohsprvers Artificial means consist in uing nets find shadow outlinegt Roads and roofs should b( of a dark color bright tints should hI uvoidpd Complete blackouts is lhe best prot((tion
at night
PnICAUTIONS AGApoundNST GAS ATTACJ~ iBrandchutz im LuftschutzJ Major Gcnpral Zar
1 Gas attacks may he (gtffectPd eithtgtr by mfans of bomhs or by Rpmy from ~airplane5 Atcfrding to tIl( author a gas attack will comp aft(r an air ~rald ~rhigh Ixploltj( bomb in ordlr to prevcnt or interfere with the salrage ~tork
) PHYSIOIOGJCAI l-nmiddotJ-CT 01- GASISmiddot Gift- und Gaslmmpfstoffc und ihn phYfliologil-cl( WirkungJ Liput
Colonel Mader A description of the effects of variaugt gases on the human system
~
~ IJ ~ Gasschutz cler Zivilbevolkerung im AuslandeJ Major Hirsch Most countries in Europe are taking precautionary meaflures against lair raids and have adopted gas masks for the protection of the population
Suttable types are the Swiss C mask the German VM 37 and the GT 6 as ~ell asthe Italian and Czech types
ANTI-Am Rlw nUILDING CONSTltUcTION UhfT Imutechnischen LuflflchutzJ Colonel Bodenstein
Roofs should he conHtructed of reinforced concrete or of a non-inflamshymaterial as a precaution against incendiary hombs Steel frame
are suitable types Well-huilt shpliern for the population are ecessary
AIR RAID smITEitS Der Schutzraumj Major General Palla
Air raid shelters should ofTer protection against high explosives gas nd incendiary shells
Shelters Rhould he huilt in hasements completely underground if posshyible and should not accommodate more than 50 persons l~ach pCfllOn hould have an air space or from 105 to 140 cuhic feet and a floor space or bout 7 square feet The author offers suggestions for design of a shelter nd (or its ventilatJon
1 April 1935
TilotWIlTS ON TilE DUitATION OF l-llTUitE WARS G(dallken fllwr die Dauer von Zukunftskriegen Major Mende
CCWlEltATION lIlTWI)BN INPANTltY ANO ARTILIERY l7wmmmlllwirkell von Infmt(trie und Artillerie1 LieutColonel
Lancell(gt fhi importHlt qu(sdon will always hegt the subject of discus1ion because
cOOpNatlOrl hetween the two arm neVN attained perfection during the World War
The artillery officer mut visualize the situation of the infantry officer Th( main difference hetWfen infantry and artillery is that in the infantry pwh man fireR 11 WfapOIl while in the artillery only one man directs the fire
- the hatllry eummander --- who in turn is Hubordinated to the hattalion commander All nUwr mcn perform suhordinate duties
Artillery should not ()(l subordinated to the infantry but both shouJd work in dmlC cOI)l8ration
The infantry regimental commander indicates to the artillery battalion commandN the assist~m(( required by the infantry leaving the artillerycommander freedom of execution
Th( maill value of an artillery battltlJion lies in the fact that the fire or all )atteries can be concentrated where the inIantry regimental commander de~If(s it most The performance of the artlllery mission - above aUt the Huddn concentration of all hlltteries on a particular sector - requires the pnergetic ~tIJfrvjsion of the battalion commander The effectiveness of artillery fire IS of such great importance that it justifies the granting of ibdeshypendent action to the artillery hattalion No special missions should be ugtsigned to hattmiel
Am ATTACKS ON GIWl1ND TROOPS jFliegerangriIT auf Truppen und seine AbwchrJ LieuLColonel
Greiner The author divides this subject into three parts (l) Attack on troops while entraining _ The object of this attack
may be the destruction of railway ihstalJatons so thllt they may not be tvailahle for loading troops Such an attack will also disrupt train schedshyules The troops must organize a system of aerial surveillance hut fire Iwuld only be opened when ordered by officers
(2) Attack] against troop trains in movement ~ While travelling in open cars evpr~ availahle machine gun should be in r(adineslI to repel the air attack
(3) Attacks against troops ~It the moment of detraining - The same precautions must he talt(ll as when entraining troops It must be rememshy
~~f~ ll~~~~~ trll~~t ~lt~k~Cpl~~e~I~~el~~ ~h~rroJ~dI~~t ~rgehiy~~~~= ahle that troops dpoundtrain at night but even so antiaireraft defense is impreshy~(indihh
rlll~ CYCLIST SQUADRON IN TilE RECONNAISSANCE 1NIT IDie Radfahrerschwadron in der AulkliirungsabteiJung1
The author compares the efficiency hetween the cyclist squadron and the cavalry platoon which form all organic part of the division recormaisshysance seetlOn
According to German Field Service Regulations and to German leading military thought the cyclist squadron has three missions to perform
(1) Security missions (2) Combat missions (3) Messenger service
Hegulations prescribe that cyclists may be attached to mounted recon~ naissance platoons
According to the author cyclists can travel from 25 to 30 miles per day while l mounted Jllato~n requires 10 hours to cover the same distance and at the end of the journey the cyclists are fresher than the horsemen While it is true that cyclists cannot be employed where roads are not availshyable yet enemy movements in such sections can hardly be expected
Does the cyelLl1 offer a better target than the cavalryman Neither (an obserVe woll while in movement However in a sudden encounger the
cyclist wiU have the advmtage Even at a few yards distance the cyclist cun throw himself 011 the ground take eover and commence firing The cavalryman always offers a target whether or )lot he gets off his horse or zigzags at a gallop In an encounter between a cyclist and a hOOScman the mounted man is lost
The cyclist also posseSses advantagC$ in reconnnicsance and surveillance as he can stop anywhere lay his bicyclpoundt on the ground and Qhservc At night he cln move faster thail the mounted trooper ilnd wjthout lights or nohw
THEN) OF THOUGHT ON INFANTRY qUESTIONS IN THt UNITED STATES
Jnrallleristill(~he Fragcn in ~meriknnischer Beleuchtung
79
Cdtaloof Selelted Periodic~l Articles
THE SP~IltHI WAll THE nECITlnu Of TEllUEI Tm lrmo R1VlR DIlIl
Iom spanid) n K rh~ Di icdrgtrPfoherung on Tfrue D(gtr Durrhhruch cudhch d(s Ehro J Coonfl v Xylander
An aecount of the Iwurgrnt opprations that led to thegt r(cptuffgt of TpTUP] and trw hr~~lIInlllK of thp ririVl to till q L tn ltHhuif tll( captuf of Ca1pp on If obrch 1 il
8 April 1938
TIIEgtt Hltl--r WAf I~ 1915 11)(( lil1t~lm( K d(~ ram~ Ilflj dmlrll Rlchmann
(rtnl~IJ IJH(IZATlOi r)F THE Am fOlHt lIton(TlO1- of JHshyIIln1 (IWI~ Tf) HlJS~IN 11-
II )1 lld flltJrlulllttOI dr LuftwlIT( J)fr Schut7 (hr lltl~~hlr II
rLI II ltInf nltl rUc TIlflJriPIl 1 Cnnnf agli
~tltrl ~h J~d Im rIll lilt tirrraft (llfl -uJllci(middotntly ahpld nf tim II Ioid Ihrl fUI) Tin dld m(1I1IlP-~lln bull dl()11 lllld (IIldlilll
Ijmiddot d flllP 111111
(anl()ufLw r1] t t(middot bull tltlily 1((1 dummy roId IlIIH ImJltd I pTftdllli hIT qr - llld Ihd plrtl(ltllr (ttrntlon lthlIzld 1( f11 n III I IfIl(HlLIIIIIf t j1 bullbull 1 I d PI ld Ial t hi l11nol ho I hi 101 II Inn of Ih 11nlrt All I IIgt IT lIlllllr rlft PIltIOI1 (1111 111111r ddltlI( mE Illlt
Vl11 ]1 1middot(01 ~ 11 I d d I hUTlIll llrJ rl ~dl 1 I-TO Jill d LI If (iI 11H I from Il( I Ttll 1111 t
Hill til1lr il-tdlltlll Lf)llI] I 1Il( ILllrd HIgtlp to I IHmv 1llt(lt-gt 111 orriN to atlr1(t Ittntlfln InrI dr(ph thrm
1111 Ptli(H I III m altw) C1Il I mlnlmlZerl ] fn idilll~ nul til( InmiddotlIIllI0I 111 infO (dtnlaquollflq d 111111 1)lhlr h1l1fll or In ~rOUH at thp middottnmltip of t1 filII 1th I dhIlUP of frolll IOO tn nn vardl IHtlll 1 h 1l1IInlj lHi mlllljOlll- ~f 1 ltholdd Ill Ld n to hIYP mplll1lt at hmr II) Tijlnr Itlllut dr Ll (ratfr-middot (111 f d IJ Plllll bomh
flJ1 r11middot of pltl1)ll I Xl-I cnne rIllnf und rr(lIlHI hI1Wlr Ihp rTf nciI 1lHl1 t h fll
15 April 1938
1111 1- TI I I 1lt1 ( L lt] H II I lltCl1 TIll IT1 iA J()I---T Of lEW It r Ill] n~) ~ lchrl(hUlldlpll I a(11 ltahcnlsclfn Amjebshy
t n
It 1 I 1 1 1111 lllfnrlllllllll lol11Inllllf~ olhrr nat 1011 l1l order lrpn m tJnll of ar Tlw mJJl uhj((tlt to ht (ollltj(lt rpd trl
( nm( Illd nlhLlr nutt(gtTgt Thll mfllrmatinl1 Will n1lk( It h 11] du TLIIll rlllllllqltlll~ that will ddill( thp attitudr that r1 III) II]H) ~I1J II Ilnri r 1( rIal elr(t1mftann
Tfw IH f Illll 1d Ill Int Ihhn)C lrVII hnuld POo-(4 -Ultah11 rlquirl shytt Ill Illlt I Jnli l tlll j 1I(h In tlnl(lt lbl1tt- tn ob1[ nWlltd
tI n~I1 1nd l hlghl- dllopld gt11)(gt of patriotl~m I~l lI1 1 Il( lllI)- nltaillfd llY 01(111 of Uhmlrlll1 Ilr1 shy
n r- f l1JfP71l111l
MILITARY ENGINEER
July-August 1938
llll1II n iT r- (ff~ RIJJt Lllutfnant Thomplton Till lilIH(TfO1I Till BIUTH 11(1 ~faj)r I1fllold Bnti~h
MILITARY SURGEON
April 1938
Til 11t1TIJ 11 1 TIlTL~ Or TilL -lEIJlCAL DEiAltnIEr-T 01 TH) Jt- TilL 1II)hT 1 I Or II Ill IN] IN NATIONAL lhl EN-E ~laJ(jr (lt III rd HI~ nold
TI IrA L 1u)f1 H ~I(f I III HI-I Till CIIAWN 11lt EnIIUII 1 IJIr 1IlJlrltl Fr( tlltl rm-
May 1938
Tm fI(I-IZTp ~j) rrgtTd)l-ltlt III nn MIIHfAL SrR(IS IN ltlI1111 (JjJnT11)~ II 11 ~ltII ~jA tlJlU E II) (aJlloIin gtLtlIl (1)(1 11 II C 1111 IIIlHI
June 1938
TlIL nfl(lIAT11) 11 f I r TI1INfgt IIf TilE ~lEnJ(AL SIln Wi ~ IN ~lmiddotI ltJImiddotUTI- f Nh 1~1) ltJ II n)HIu III Capllull faun lind L ll ()I HIII IJ
July 1938
C oltlHIHIIIIiIN OJ fW IIHLtI VIIIl ro j1I AiJYANl II tf ()j 11J)shy
f IL fh VhlelIrJl Jn1 ELlY JJ17) MIJor Frifll Illgt ]fAI IlLHAPY IS Till NLT WAlt (aptam Lowman
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
June 1938
TllI JJTlIWISI I)In 001 IN TIIi OlmNT Captalll Knox 1111 TIItI J flU J JllT OF TItHlTOIlTAI WArEItlt LiltlfCommandlr
ffIllgtl rt TilL JJoT 11NDIHLfl ~A)i 1-lt IlihTOIlY Smith
C amp G88 Quarterlj ~ - -~
July 1938 Li(
JAPANS IUSING SUN LiCut(gtnant Eller ~ TIllS NAVAL nAn LjCutCommander Hamilton ~ Im REBEL HAMS Pratt ~bullbull
August 1938
llWNI TSAO LipuLCommandlr JlOVC1l l Lei lIlt~~SSllN 11AItNtl AT SIIANlIiAI IN Ifl12 Li(gtIHCommttJ(]Cr Smt~
PIONIERE (GNmIIlY)
By M AJOH Ilt~f BENITEZ Coaft Arti1lCry Corp
February 1938
LNIJ IOHTlFJeATIONs 1(pfiltllwn zur lltuzlitlichell LandeslwfCstigungj Colonel Dittrr i
BI1f(lufJOn tll fxpNipncf gainCtl in tJ1C Vorld Var tIl( French ha~ ~ dlvllo]Hd 11)(gt ltm-ealllri fort ifwd rtl~iolJl Inginn fortifi[c1) rhmiddotfpn rmiddot By~t~ j
m whieh (OIWrttl and It(11 Irl tXIIIllIVfly lld lEalh ngion fortifi( IUll t fulfill the following conditions bull (1) Thl (XlllIt o[ the front multt loe such that all attachr cam i
ollll1anlgt tlH pfl~itiun nor can tlw (Twm 0 lrtlllfry prpvfnt moV(menta 1j brr IroOPH Within the furlln] 20111 in~ hold~~) Slrong lIank fith(T Tf1ting on tprram ffttufP or artllicial IItroq t~h~
(1) EeflIent eommunlation netwurk tnsurinr~ rapId movpmfntHwit1 i wil Ihf ZO)lf and al o rapid eommunieatlOn to the r(ar ~
(4) Illpound front mtlt he fldly protect(d and 1rIngtlJ(gtllrri by lililf-rnnlul j lP
or artlfiial oh1I1(Jlaquo1 lme (5) Comfort mU1t hp provided fur the garnon hy tllp on-trllctlOnc
living quartlrH and otlHr eOIlVfn1IIl(Pl Thi 111 altUf r(flt during (I j nat fi(htinl 1Ild at nll plTio(k j tle~
In formlf tinHfI fortnhW1 W(f( hflrI w a mafr If hOJ]or and~1
l~~j f ~ Ii ~~I~ifl M Tfllf~~ i~f~ 1~r~~I~~~(~~ ~ailr~ ~li~ t Ih~I ~~)t I~I~I~~tt ~ the ~pe tlip almntlonmPllt of H(gtiml and LJ ltlfl hy Juffre hdnfl tlp fint Jat t of tIl( MapH and th( ahandonmlnt h IIlIIdenJurg tnd LupoundilldorfT oft I
forI r~ii~I~)(IIIt~~hII(r~~ ~I]If~ I(YI~ ~~llfIW( fnrtlfieat ion ~Yfgttrm ~ ti II prrnt (rv IJ()lI Hul tll land forlllieIIIOil (If t)(la~ pnoopss rna ~Co arivantagflt ltlVlr thop of fnrnwr timl I Th
it(O
-- Im TlLININ(f OF JMINI~IR LJPElt- tP ~II- -i ~~ lS(hultl1~g 011 PllgtTi~rr(lhnrIl IlBd Trupp] LIIut CIOllPI Dlrmiddot -1m
lt~ (0101111 Oll i(hlPwell pre
ln~IIl((f8 III In lfhllllaquo( through dolt( (ountr An lCount Of 4~middot t( t 1lt l IM n N-l ~lrrtl d out hy tlip 2d lngtn lr BIIIlllOn in tJw reg- f r northll~t of Bn IllLll
Attllk of r1 ef IIllf A Imllar a((ount of 1 I 1ctlCJl pX(gtrcISl It vh
ul by t1~lnl~III~~~~ II~~I~I~~~~dglng ltllltpmPlt ti~ I(rgln von Fluzkiwln 1Il dC1l RIlC11l1 CapllIn Schroder en
dccrlptioll Illustrated hy photographs of til( work (arrl(d OU1dJO till 3d Motorized ComplIlY of the 5th Fngill(pr Battalion laying rlwrmiddot ()vCr til( Rhil)l )t COllftallC(gt
Thl work Wt~ dOll I h- congttrucHlg a ponton imdge laYlllg the c~ Jilt on til hridg( d((k lilt ltlJOtt~ thlm ~ra(hlllly by pa ing tbC1ll 01 drllm whIlt dirnLlltlJIIg til( hrll~( II gt((tiOIl from south to north
Nl -mTlIo[)S Imiddotnlt tlto~~lli( HIJltS It OTnRIZEIl tNIT~ INIIJ( VIg(gt 1111ll Fluzuhprglllg dtr mntori iprf1l Einilfltf1l1
Mtjor l1lrlullg
A (ontinuatlOn of m articlf publihpl in Novfmlwr lHHI ful TIlt authnr~ idp i~ to COllfltrud a bridgf COTliltillg of two strelbull - shy
(dJI l on which motor vphiC(s could ridp if I)TO idpd with a l1)cial rlrr~ J aHachld til (hI ()utllHh of Iadl whfPl ~
III tld1 iU1Llinlllll Major JIartllllg prop(l~elt tll( Up of two amphih j lanl each of vhich Inn~ a drum around whih cahlf jlt wound i JjtlrumR ITl rotIIt-1i II) 1111 tank lll~ilH H]11 tlw ahl m he paid oul orwo ~ _ 1IJ1 mechal1ldly Ill( tlIlkl talpound up thpir Il(Jltllioll on OPJlo-it( iri(s (lft II rir with tilt twn (dllj drftdwrillltt frnlll onl 10 th tillr 11)[ aTl ((urld to IiIi grouud hy Illltnl of 1111 pil14 drivlll thrllul~h nJWnl~l Fr In till loor and tllPY arl fllrlhpf IlPPllrltd hy I nIh 1
ThiH irpa hWI nol 11 IHPII 11111 111 IfllIic lInti lOIlW tl1ldlfiratl i(( lIlay hI 1(lIImry In 11Illlr middotllfHllIry nlull ~~_
~GT QUARTERMASTER REVIEW Fa
May-June 1938 JTh THE HOLE OJmiddot 11ll- NI~TllEnLANJ)fi IN THl- IOTtLpound) OF TonAY Dr a_
Akpoundon ~ PLANNIN(f BRANCH COr-~TRu(nON DiISION OFFIn~ O~ Tim Qp ~
TEIlMANSTEIt GENEHAL Captain Lamh
80
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A comIERCIAL VIEWPOINT ON THE ARMYS rIOTORIZATION 11WGRMl LieutColonel Rockwell _ ~
MASS PROCURE~lENT OF SUPPLIES FOlt WAH fohn Mille
JUly-August 1938
Am-FEP ARMIES OF TOMORROW THE SUPPLY OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN DEFI~NSE Lieut Colonel
Lederer RAsstGNA 01 CULTURA MILITARE (tly
(Formerly Rivistn di Artiglierl e Genio) By MAJO~ EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
January 1938 (Commencing with this i5ltue ttle iRivista eli Vanteria and the Rivistu di Artiglieria e Genio have been combined and wi apppar as one publication However the parts dealing with artillery engineer and infantry Hubj(cb arc Iwpt separate from the genffal mattff ~It(~ tion)
WMt AND ll-CtJ [La gucrrc c In pacej General Corsclli
For over more than 3400 years beginning with 149b BC to til( Dulshyhreak of the World War in 1914 many att(gtmpts have h((( made to srttll intemationltlJ affairs hy conciliation and mediation Ill( uague of Nltiolls and the Kellogg lact among others hwe resulted in failuTs HistoTY hov3 that war is inevitahle and human palt~ionl and natIOnal interpsts ~11 predominate over all the methods created to prpwnt war
War says ~lusso1ini is a piH(I01ll(IIJl whirh u(ompanit- thlgt deelopment of mankind 1t is a tragic destiny that will always wpigh uponmens shoulders Pacifism Oil til other hand is not a husing tmiddotitlwr shy
War is a social tonic which stimulates the enerpy of a rale and the national virtues it destroys all political social psvchical and moral impurishyties that accumulale in times o[ peaee
Modern war is totalitarian in characttr and rfquiregt tht pr(paratlon of the entire nation for wur
A BmDS~tn VIEW OF THIlt YEH 1937 IIanno 1937-XV in una rassppna panoramica]
A summary of the chid evcntgt of thp )last year in Itldy ano ahroad Considerable progr(lss has h(gt(gt1l made ll(ordin~ to tlw author in Italy The budgfmiddott ha~ hpPtl halatllp( and the army navy and air forer haY(I h((n reorganized
In regllrd to the army thl XX Corps was crpated and ~pnt to Lyhia oganWd to suit the ~pe(ial conditions thfrp ImproenHnt havp I)(cn made in the organization of the Cast division the motorized diyi-ion til moto-mechanized brigadp and til(gt cltalr-- rfginHllts Th( army hal )((Il
provided vith tilt r(relltly adopttd machine gun antiaircraft gUll ~O-mm -ii-mm antitank gun 81-mm mortar for the infantry ali(I the 75118 hatterils
for the division artilterr and for the artillery of til fast-division t The ar of quick decision h not an empty phrasC hut a dodrill( ~ hich depends upon a qui(k and dettTlllinCd preparation
~the 1t~~~i~a-~~~o ~cl ~l~~O~it~~i~~lte~h~Shi~l~~l~~lS j~l~~dcl~~fdthe c-uipoundErs Cavour Cesare Doria and Duilio The Italilll NlY when tll
present program is eompleted will hay a total of H20OOO tons (()nsi~ting of the [ollowing ships 6 battleships 7 heavy efuis(rs (10000 tOil 1lt1 light cruisers 10000-8000 tOil) 15 destroycrs 44 torpNlo chasfls 3lj torpt-do
boat5 98 luhmarines and auxilia~~~~~il~
1 Tile Nl~W TItJNIKG RFGUlATIONS l Illnuovo regolanHlnto di isttuziollPj ~ These regulations supersede ~~_~)Ii~hed in J9HJ
ij TilE I~~~E~~ ~t~ ~~~~~middot~~~I~~~~~~T AND Tim CHARACTEHshy
A (Lattuale eorsa agli armamentie Ie c~rat~erigLicllf delli flolt del ~ futuro Consul-General GmocclJ)cth A review of the comparative strength of the six principalllJ val p()vcrt asI follows _ _ _
i -- i I
Balle- I IDclfrOl1- SIIJ- I A ircrnft 1 1 hip (middotndlcr cr i 1IrtrilICH ((l(rhm 1oM1____ __ bull__ I_~__t ____I~__ 1--1---[ 1011WgC
_i~~--~--I~--~--i~--___ ~ _Imiddot I ~_ 2 1~_ i ~ i~~ ~ il~)(j I __~~ _ 610000
France 6 4 20 tmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot[ 851 I 8 ill 715000
G-T613 -~ 9r7lfiiiTI36 1--2 13ampLOOO
~ nrita~I~~ 2 111 ~ I~~II~~I- ~~ ~I~~lll ~1~-i71O271135~81r~~- 34 ~f--~~1600
middotObsolescent tModern under construction or projected
-
Accordingmiddot to the author navies Of the future will not differ fundashymentllly from those oC th~ last half century Battleshipswill continue tn form the backbone Qf the fleet there will be a large number of armored cruisers and destroyers and even a larger number of submaTines and a few aircraft carriers
TilE SINo-JAPANESE W An La gtH~rra cino~giapponesc1 (I) ColonelOxilia
The hiltory of the present war may be traced bllckto 1894 when the ~apanesl seized Korea In 1900 the powers sent OJ strong contingent to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion
Russia had its revolution in 1917 China had hers in 19U Japan johHd the Allies during Worl4 War cl1)tured Kino-Chiau
and obtained mandalpound ov c islands by the Treaty of Versailles IntlfIlal difwrders in opportunity for Communist peneshy
tratioll trom Hus~il In ai-Shek came to power and had to maneUvr between RUBsian pressure on one sid amiddotnd Japanese expansion on the other The prCSelt struggle is very similar to the situation in Spain
- a fight b(tweell th~sp two influences JapItl rommercial expansion requires a market for her goocia She is
~tricUy an agricultural country U1d lacks coal and iron mine oil and cotton whit-h arc (ssential to her industrie China offers Japan a solution to her Irohlms
TII~ SlNISII WAH lLa guerra di Spagna1 il) Captain Mele
fll( revoll hcgan in Morocco on 18 July 1936 The greater part of the army went over to the Insurgents while the navy with the exception of (JIll haltlfship tnd four cruiflcrs remained IOYlll to tllf government
ily 1 August the Insurgents had gainpu control of a large portion or Spain Tolosa fell in August lrun in September to be followed by San Sfb1stian 1m Toledo rhe Iiege of Madrid hfgtgan in October where desshyperate filhting continncd well into January On R February Malaga wa (allllred
J)ISTRlllVTlUN OF IIIE [middotN(JEEltS OF TIII~ ALPINE Dl]SION IN A )IOB1LJo~ WAR
II reparti del genio della divisi6ne alpina nella guerra di movishymentoJ (010n(1 CUJlJnis-ini
The Alpim Divisioll c()n~ists of two Alpipe regiments one artillery reginHnt om engineer COmT)(UlY and service LroQjIgtI TIl(gt engilleer company con~istgtl of five platoon4 with about ~OU ~peeialiHts ltlnd 150 drivers Their IfJuijJment consiltts of a light mountain hridge 30 kilometers of win 3 parchlilhts and 1~ rttdio slations In the Alpine Division the engineers eonstitutp only ppr cent of the whole strength a5 compared with 6 per C(nt in 1m ordinllry infantry division The author shows that the engineer stnngth is illsllflieient antI sUJgests an organization consisting of two engineer (ompanies specially trained Cor mining work a signal company providf(1 with tp1pgraph wire and radio crjllipment and a searchlight section of six scarehlight Ilw intirf engineer foree to 1)( commanded hyan engineer oiliecr
February 1938
A loHTLtUl~ECllON1CLE OF THE E-IHTION OF DON CHRISTOshyllllm Di-~ GAMA INmiddotABYSSUIA
I Vna cronaca Jlortoghese sulla spedlzione di don Cristofaro de Gama in Abilsinial 1) Prof Naldoni-Centenari
1he Portuguese expedition under Don Christopher de Gama consisting of 400 ~oldiers well trained and equipped with Over 600 rifles sailed on 9 fune 1541 Da Gamas hrotherwas Goernorof the Portuguese East Indies This Purtuguese force was sent to help tJlP Negus of Ahyssinia lgainst the King of 7(gtila
Im SINO-JAlANESpound WR ILa guerra cino-giappones(1 (U) Colonel OxiJia
In this instalment Colont Oxilia gives a brief description of China and then analyzes the strength of the armed forces of the two nations at the beginning of the war
The cause of the Mnflict may he attrihuted to the strong anti-Japanese feeling after the cstablishment of Manchukuo in 1931 which led to many local quarrels between Chinose and Japanese troops
The author believes that the origmal Japanese plan was to cut off all lontact hetween Russia and China cross the interior of Mongolia and the occupation of the live provinces in North China Hopei Chahal Sulyan Shansi llid Shantung At present it is hlrd to determine the Japunese plan
The Chinese plan is even more difficult to follow At first it -appeared that tilt Chil(se favored the operations at Shanghai in order to splitmiddot up the Japancie forces but these operations assumed far greater importance thall wa anticipatcd
ROADS AND rIOTOHS [Stmde c mutori mcntalitit dplla motoritltzione[ LieutColonel
DlmtC di Marco 1h( imjl(lftnnce oC roadH hus become very evident in the last few years
Committed liS WP are to a wal of short duration it becomes npCessary to have adequate roads to deriVe the benefits of speed offered by motor moveshyments
81
1101
Ca~al()i~f Selected Periodical Articles
111 rll ~ll1 L 10(1 1dl Hl--L I It (1lt1111 J 1( dLmiddot ll 1) 11 II
ld-ll)l ~ --1gt1111 t ill HIIII) If thmiddot Jill f th 11)11 f ~atlull TIll ) II u dl~ lL tLI lItJuj of till r II] 1 _ tuvlrdshythl Jnll-h lril1l1lhlrt1Jn ld dlUltlfl lj ~dnr 1( 11
Plrltlld nJ)l~ HI tl)11 nlI]
d 1111 ~nl H Ill ILl ~lrrl I ] 1)1t
I r II
tlldtlh r
11) 11l 11111gt11 1~ I
[ HI I I 11 I
~ I dmiddot d) )j l) f r bull
h 1111 111 J Imiddot [r1 d IlL )1 I r I II
) fl II I rl l f r gtI )01 t Ilrpl
ill I( 1)ljl I 11J
Ll II ~ r)i 1 bull I 1 11 I
~1 middotI)roIll Ir 1
1111111 II)
d )1 (1111 I i I ~
1middotrIi r 11 t III 1
RESERVE OfFICER
Junt 1938
(111 I
REVUE DE CAVALERIE 1111)
Jllury-Februny 1938 I 1
l r ITnillpll ill ] L~t I) 1 rllt n Ii (1111 II
JI1 1) J IJll 11 j
1 III T II I I iII J HI ( gt1111middot1 Il nJ11 I
Lt J
f l j Irlp r IT I I rmiddot lId 1
f l-fll 1)1 uLlt1 ] 1 r
11111- rLd 11a1 )IIt( I-
I )01- d ) PIIIII Ill
II (qlt 011 i1 1111lt111 nt I 1 I 1 r I oil
I lld - I II] I d t]r I I r I d I dlddI llf I ndljll 11
111--11111
-11 1111) 1111)) Jmiddotft
n dill lin rmUlI( II I dunn tlllh
f Illlt )ullr 1 IILd ll tholl
tJ I till ji
fL I I I] 1]1
bull middotr 1[i J (f I Jr IIT 11middotIf d 1) d
( It rl r(
I II j I f 1 1
Ild 1 1111)) Imiddot ll ltIII
( )1 PI itr )r f J I I f If 1 gtr f Ir
lId jf lit I]n 111 11101
JllJ HIlJd -II )(1 - )1 lflljmiddotInl 1l11llj111 111111
rio _ If lilli I )nlf) 1)0 (rl 11 f 1middotIIIId 1t11 IIrl I) 1ilJ fll ) III
jWj )1 hlllll l I il Id 1 t oj hl llli I I
dll) ltl II dl III I f ICd11 Hid 1)) 11 II 1 11l1)1r1
H II t HrJlllll I a H 1)1I of 1111
nilt Jlfln Thb H1IIII I lInllmiddot
C amp GSS Q1WIterii Vo -~ -
rapidly till rtmiddotlllrtUc])llH thaI th (1))1 llOUid i()J~1tally han and Whl IIHY han har Till yfgtl1 In I Ill nvdlIill~ of tltl )lottion dlarl(t(~ ~i I)y Illl(flIlal u lllkftgt inlln iv( r(annlilwnt gllwrl rcnr~IIIiali()n ~ Il1Hil)1l1111ion of I ill arm
1 FinIIHmiddotid and rflrnllIlWnl 11(riOnmiddot In Flruary 1f)3 Cu~ THOll ari()I1ccl I Inul dh lilt d 1) If li Ylr- o( 1()(1 million IOllIHI ~I(lrhr I IU)IIIlt 111 1 IIf Wal 11 and dr IU1111lt nmiddotL If Ii in llld~(tCii Icili 1HIIIIllII) Iwe
II 1t)n111ll 111lt)11 I~PIII lal IIlPI 11r - 1I11middotrnill~ tIll Ilwhiledi lilli Ih luLltllr dihi)l Ih 11I1h )ll1n1llHI arm
Illi mnllll dll lltlf h Ihl IlHJ t oritJ)tl wI dlrill~~ Irtltlnn 011 t~rr 1 II IlIIJTllt I IIJl~l(Iomiddot nf 1lIk If 1 1111110)) ~ nH~I)ilr hrigaa mpn JIllI d nf r Illll)lb of ill lank Ind IIdlll1 o(molurLd IIlrant~ 3 ca 1 n lflllllll of (ILlrv trlllri II 111- Illl ltlulIlmiddotd hllr- arlllilr 1ll(Jto~ f1an lIl)1 r mil llnd lllll- eml
B 1111 IlLllllrv 1111 in hh Ihl follOJllll lhrumiddotkrJ li~ IpllIll(mt~ prot 11 I 111 1 llr d IIIfcl IJ Cllll-lllllll I rlImiddotlllnll Il1( l~r)JI) 1111( mNr~ mitl 0)1 II ltdL111 rv of I Itl ii l f))1 i OIllIHJ-1 II IIf ~ lilttahtlllgt of muhuw gu hav 11101 3 lrlIllb- pf )IJI tdiOlh I Il h dli-illl 111 lbr Ill IrlJ mulofzd Tf Hlu I Jl d IIOlt I Xlll in Plll hut fInl (r II Ion of (orp -1111lt11 lJlIt~ a~ gral llI hill Vlll hll diltJn [nr 1--1 I v rd IIIIl (0r) al 1l(I~illllnl~ of war
( Illmiddot hll)) (()llIlllll)ll mjllomiddot( Ill til I nIlft -uIr10r If Count 1 ill I I t ()f IJlIH IlHllliJ( r- of whJlm fnllr lfl Il1lhtlry (lidlr lflilror h I II 1111 C d hy j O1I11r lli1 II Ill ]I )-t f I~-II 1IIl IhHf of 1tiT haq I Imiddotptdoli llId
III gt1 1(1 tIJIli111l rof 111 trlll Cl tllmiddotrd I ruel UTI of t )11 lrllJ I) Hnl III lllllltlllilild hut tlllllrlZltlll Illd 1l1(middotlilallllllllgtlJ
Jdl-IJd lnUI )~)lh IllJIltlnZltioJl 1 adlnld nnly in RU JJlllfllllnlrIIJlI 111 IIH Ldry llllIlHltr- mil infantry t w mrl
1illImiddotxI~I III TOflI lllllld IOJll1lmiddotl1ldj( m ]1Tl)rLI1t llOtOrtlllfJh ~ klli 111 lmiddotlJIJlII]d lnn and loLd motoriIIlI in llil Illi IrgtJIJltJht1ll lrIn In cull l Lin I lIllw r l~lInc nl lf nlOnnl d 111 II 1 III lOf IlHhlllll cl TIl( t~ SOl middotJJnmiddot III prltI Jf r(middotQntIlIll1Ioll ill Ilf Il)i hrl)uh f four I of1 Llhll II light lId fo1JT Illnld thn nf Irlll tlllk- infant 151
11]1111 11ht I (lmplIIH 1I1 ludl i ammiddot A FII h 1-1 tT hllltit 1lJard lalll-l orIl1ll]n I du IO) 1)1[
III) 1111 VI1I1 rlI I))OlIrLtll1111 i Ihll11 ln hl tJI 101 Ill ~ll)l Bntl h mtllLlry nc II 1)11 It huld 11lt1 d Illl tit )11- h of 1111l11fgt lld lcIl1l1ll11( ftI- ~ ltilJJ rtll HntlHl dUI
Tl~ ImltLlry rpl-nll rojl Flrl 1III1IId IIIlJj~ tl IIl-lILLr r ldiI-- 1 Inal ddt n ro to na ell
Ild ur TIIltIl1l111lti rOfll It hHllI IUI nl lllJll1l(middotd rdl lhltarmyfi~1 ~ Illn f 11 I t prlt)1 1 Ill 1rnl)r1 1)1111111 Ili In 1111 llwlropohs orl -HilIIll I)t (on ar mtinlilli Ii 10 I r11111 rIllltll~ llnblllllIlJ a urp I ~
~~~ ~lf ~~ r~l n~ ~~~ I~[~na 1(t~~j i~~ l~l J~l~ I~l~~llt~ ~~ ~I~i~~~i~ fi of [1111 r Thh ]lllIr 1 qJIIILLllI ly fln prnINli)l1 Illfl 1l10hL11tJ 11
[hII~~ t111I~I~)~~~11~)I1~~lI~I~middot1~)I1II)~II nl of 1 Plllpiw Ihl d~ pn I lilt 11 1lll lIl1lll]Id Iv Ill] 111 n __ ~lr for ~11111] (rpll Bnt1l11 i-Jwulda nN pn illOll ~Ir uf OIlJ dnrllllll 11kI Jl1 L ()nl mOlIOlrllltlOlI L11e mrrk I~t
It lOll 111 11lmil a 19nrUI- oTmiddotII i I rlllU el lltlll ~X Third llllUIOf)I(1 lrmy rpuirr llUlllrnll1 1)(middotI)I11--gt dllicult 10 recr h
111lt1 Ill rUel Htll thlllk II) Ih pr)ft ~Illd -oldippmiddot inat Brittin G
111 forlIl tILI lwcmiddotIt1i-t It hl III tldlt I(jint a 1l1lrlHd advanlagec- tQ lllllJal LCPI lrJl 1(1
1lw-p hndl~ Irt thl 1l1ditary rhln tlut qrm tilt hl i of at_ hf( il)II IIllIII) Hri(bh mLlltr~ nwn 11 ri IT th P(Olllll1)I rlltOll~ t~ II
n11LfotlP (hIlI for Flr-t Hrill~h rt-tHlrmiddot HI fnragt ar nmiddotdllllmiddotd r_)ure-- in gltl~OiW~1 act
11lI1taulttlbll ~ SPlt ltlnd 1ll~~lani I I -nILlll~ 11 uhlll~tntl Hltltr lllolorJzlllunr Il~
1111 folOf It 11IT 011111 1l1ll1 nl - dir Third IlWIhI11 d 11)111 uHi Irlurlut 111 hI mon 1-1 t
purd Ihm Irqr~I- lIld fILlgl 1
111 llonOlll( llIci nuILII [II-ll fJrci thp Britih lrm tllo~ 1 ~11 1ll01Ilnlllon lIIri 1llllllllitlIOlllmiddot illlprnIllWnl ill Iqllilllllnt md r i ~~ tltl( tltln of IIIW (nl~ll -- I Ii III J lhrl1 11 umpn-middot Llnt- af]l])ftfl - I I
ld Ir(or Ih hlhl jwl 11lr- (lrellll 11llll has l lrl (fl l bull h~ 11)11 n Y]CIpl tllIltJl1H llll 1lH mlltlnk 1111dllH I~un Thl mid 1fr~
11 l~~I~If~~t~~ ~I~I~middotIi~(~rt~l~~i ~II)I~~~~~~ 1IIi~df~(~_~~~~ illl
-Irnllg nnnr Hlr LI](l 110111)11 Ihlt houlti Iuhl it to lI~t un
~ iI~1 ~(I( II u~~ t 1~t~~lllI11~I~ ~ 11 ~r-lll ~I i r II~I~~ )i~f~~I~~~ I~ ~)1~11~1 ~ll]~t g
1 onmiddot ()IIlt f tL Illll- lll I Ihl to 1m lilnn~- mtJIllwnt j ~i lvtlr Irl I lIr I dl 11I11middotd tu tlan pl1fll umh1 qlld Tltl 1ltIn p(nlul- Ir ~ n I 1- lrmnllmiddotd mlll1ll1 for mlI hull 11111- 111lt11 rI( in hltlJc III I~ fIiI Illl lil~hl tlnk~ lwi II1lttrttl l)liltrtloll 1HIUPIl nh~ln lIn]lI lhlimiddot fill t Ill Finlh r ll1l1fllI- 11111 1111 tnr 11 lt t lldly Il n-l11 rll1m 11 III~ 11111111111111 md il JIllI 111 IXjllrlllllllllll lll~ 1l11] 11 11 I)f 1lli 1))111lt11) I Ill Yr lilrlflfl hayl Ill 1(IIl
r ~Ir) ~l in ~i t 1iI I~Ir 1 ~ l l~lllll~~~ ~ t~ r ~~I 11~1h~~ 111 I r~I)llIJ (a I 1 HII pIll] Ipm In hI1 gi (11 ~II i rt(t Illn C(l1lltu i
~I lll~l~t 1rt~ 1111(1 1)~~II~~~I( I ~I~I~)t~~itl~~~~hr t Yllf~~ I(~rll~il L~ll~ l~j~~ dlCltlt r mel plrtHu11rl ululrahit (In lIr lind arlJ11III tlwir I 1 thmiddotll1 tl Ilc ]Id ~111llIlrmiddot proId 1Jut I hI (lf(llj1 r1 -IlIri)r1ly 111IItlly ani Itank and lIllllalrNaft Lll u- ~uan JITImiddot(middotllqtllf jnrlglnltnt Itmiddot)rj)lllallll If tlw Hriti h lnny 1lt toll for mfurmat](lll til Ill llln lllpfjmiddotr dlfmitlmiddot it hnnltllw rltl1IfoPt 10 illfn IIOll of a middotlllllinlIlt1i vlr llot pl 111(11
illl 110
In 1)0
ll~ t~
0 sh ~ th
Catalog of Selected Periodical A~ticle8
March Aprii 193~
~~~a~~ ~jII)~i~middotSi~~O~~~i~l~it1(~~~~~~colon(gti Oario
~hdl~~~t~fht~~e~J~h~tl~~~se~~tsttlhrr~~~~~le~fthke~lf~~~ C~n~~l~~~ tiely recent comhats In Morocco
The firnt example illustrat(s t n(lInnulf1Rlmc( hy two platoons of armored cars (6 cars) and 1 half-seetion of tmks (2 tank~) to reeonnoiter terrain and dispositions in a locality TIl cfIJIHI pxample il]uRtrates employshyment of Il squadmn of armored ears (3 platoons of 5 carf and 1 platoon of 1 cars) to attnck the hostile flank and nllr to asht the main forlt wnos(gt Ranks ana i(ar were t11r(lt(tI(d hy the mmy TIll third example iJlustrah~s (gtmploy~)(nt of ollcylatl)cHl of three arrnofPd (ar UB a (nvcrin~ dptachment pr~tectll1g roudhlldltS Il (ach ca-( employment of cars in depth pcgtrshyTlItte~ Uco~phshlng th~ ry-tlsslon without los~ of cars lack of depth would ha~e Jeopardlz(d the mUISlOn and would hav( lost cars Each account h illustrated by a sketch showing lisposit iOlll and movemllts and hy photoshygroph~ showing gCneral tlaturP of the terrain
HgNNgN(A~JFS HAW I Tim 1( WITH CHlN IUn raid de Hpnnrnkampf dans la gUNr( dp ChilC1 By M 1(allfiavant
A hri(f narrativ( of a raid b) (illwral RellHlIkanwf distinguishedRusltian cavalry Ilucifr during tlw Huian lIwasion of Manchuria in 1900 ineident to tl1(gt Hoxir trnublls Jtelllwnkampf statitJ))pd at Tchita in Tral1sshybaikal was ordenmiddotd to bring rlinforcemn1 tn OIl qf th lIorthlm invading columns sprpe time afhr hotilitips IHgan Dptined to return to Tchita he sought 1)euro1mission to participatp in tlw ampaign and was giv(gtn commmdshyof an advaJHCd detachment Vith this impruviRed detachment 110 marched
~n~~r~~~U~lliii~~~ ~d~~lr~~i~s ~i~~l~~~d ~fipl~~lu~i~i~~~d oa~~~ three capitals of ~ranchuria ami deftated llUmrrOlls Chinese forces vastly superior to his own handful of Cossacks R(gtnnkampfs audacious conduct of this detachmcH was thf most important pjpmpnt in Hussian success during the camplIgn and hrought him mallv honors Against other Russian columns Chillpg fought wrll and wlh somp SUllCSS against HCllmmkampfs Cossacks and IllS skJifuU Ipadlrshlp tlwy were J(gtlpless The account is illustratpd with maps and a photograph of this great (tvalry leader
middot()[UT10N OF HIClTISIl CmiddotiLltY I~volutioll de la caval(rie hritanniquej LieutColonel Cuny
Change in organiZation usually slow are at times accentuated as at present for Rrilih cavalry Changil are imposd hy permanent factors of needs possiuilitirs and traditions of the arm whogtc peculiar characteristic is that it mURt h at the same time contitwntal and colonial Bffore studying HftltrimNlt~sincf til( war it i~ Illc-mry to c()n~ider dominant trafts witilOut which evolution would han 110 meaning
Equestrian resources of the United Kingdom - England is horse counshytry par excellencpound there the thoroughbred was developed the chase pershypetuated raees organized alld polo horn Horse sport is n need of national life and the claiRic figure of fohn Rull remains that of a portly cavalier clud in red coat and ridill~ boots rr~llln dvilizalion has not eliminatfd the taste for the horse hut it has chmged and commercialized it While horse actities remain It common hond hetwNn crowll 11ristocrlcy md the p(Ople iJreedlrs eOlH(lltrat(gt dTorls on produ(tion of de luxe horses and the less distinguiilhed horsE of army t) pe ha~ almost disappeared This slow dimunition in hor-f population IlPforC (ver illcwltlsing llumberll of automobiles to one of the principal (alls of nlelimnizatioll in BriUsh cavalry
The English cavalier As cverywhere else the mounted man feels a s~nsation ~f supclior force promptn(gt~gt and attraction that beinf mounted g1middotes TIll ~wntlm(nt dfvlopll rapid and hold methods of mind broad iskm j balancing (hsires and means ill a word seJf-eolltrol Master of his hoe the English gentleman hecomes mallter of himself it was not hazard that recruited the majority of gnat [ltnglhh leaders during the war trom the cavalry (Allenby Frrllch Haig) Ih( 1~llglish cavalier is more ~nterested in sport than in fine and learIPd pquitatiorl before everything he IS the rough and hold eavalier ready to ride at an obstacle without too much lculation and reflection The team spirit that characterizes the Anglo-Saxon IS manifested ill til( ta~te for rarCs hUlltll and game Excitation of til struggle team dhwiplin( sllit the (IId and slow tmperament This spirit or association is found throughout thp history of British cavalry where brilliant isolatd sections ire til exception comhined actiun the rule Finshyally the Englih flavr becomr ma~trR of brding caring for and training hOIllel With them horHcmastrrRhip is pla(cd ahowgt horsematlship
Thl Briti9h cavalry -- Thf traits are inherittmiddotd hy Britih cavalry III ilg higttory two currents can he diting1ishrrl the cavalier of gentlemen bold and undisciplined the puritan of 1c1 brilliant citizens who triumphed by energy and diseipline With the c01vaJiffs EngJiHh cavalry was bold and keen with t~(gt hourgeoilt it heetlmp methodicalllnd ordered and has so remained middotictorigts of Mnrlborough lnd Cromwell were due to powerful shock of rigid cavalry after preliminary fire preparation From the ueginshyni~g of the eventeenth ecnturv English ~avalry possessed a fire arm and tned c(mhination~ of fin and movem(gtnl ThrRe attempts developed during the eighteenth century by sp(cialization in mOllnted Hms of which truces are ound in divPrse organizations ronsidcred sincr the war
When the Empire waH ound(d and nlonial scrvi lldded to continental service platoons of preceding days were grouped under a colonel and given an organization suited to modestneeds of colonial war and garrison service
Th~ platoo~ system suiting ttllditiuns and ontingfnt ltituations persisted until the f11ddle of the nmete~nth c(ntury The larRc ravnlry unit L still
th pxceptJOn Ill England for- It doe not fit ne(d~ or colonial serice and reliels Of 20 line ~(giments Ii are ill I~ngl~nd 4 in ERJlt 5 in India Nea~ly hult ar-e st-tlOlled ~)frleas RQ are rlwied periodhaJly Colonial SETVlCe reqUlr~s tillS rehef and also a life eqmpmfllt rfffetiv(gtl and tactics
~~~~t i~~~~~l O~l~~~J~ of Jc~)li~i s~~~(~rt~~~nr~it~u~~~dnhrdi~~~~~l~ yCt illterc1mngeah)p this ItN(Hity explains the dela~ sand hCRitntion in reorJianization To nec)s of (oionial S(rvle(gt must hr add(d needs of a contmental war F~nlllsh (tvalry is thTgt ouly Oil( that fa((gts such a doubl ohhgatHlI pr~amza~loll mllst bHlupplp PllfJu~h h) nllpt nLd of II small
~h~rSil~kII~~ee~~~~t~~~l~ ~it~~Si~~~I~~~Io~V~a~I~i~~i~~~~~eit ~~i~ri~~forced in case of llcld ~ t
m(lnt~rmiddot~~~i(i~~a~~i~r~i~~~~l~t~~(gtc)~~~~~~~ ~~lt~I)( tI~r~~~o~~~~ e~l~t7~~ dplwntis (8scntmliy on perfe(twil III fire arms and means of transport As great as may he the esprit of corps and caste in the British cavalry it still reognizes the necclity of adapting it~(lf to the cxigellies of the tines by adoptilll newm(alls offerod byindustry frlwrfforf Ill mean are adoptedhut eSlmt pr~H~lpl(gts and miSSIOns rfIDalll thr unpoundgt tiS in tIll past
EVOLUTION SINCE TilE WAlt
Modifications sinee-thc war hay blen influenced bv battle experiencesSin(e 1870 lingJish uvulry has not w(n an arm ormollnt(d attackmiddothy Jarge units it has been the arm of recollnaisance and fire-powpr The South Afrkan War confirmed these views At the eve of til( war British cavalry was therefore farther advanced than continental cavalry Its fire weapons and fire instruction was Iluperinr to _that of infanlry This fire-power did not exlude the mounted attack hut favortd it it lwrmitted fixing the (memy mU1Huvering thenmiddottttac1dng with the armo blanche Cavatmiddoty was therefore trained to fight by shoek firp or (ombination uf both It was the arm of security and was utilized to hold ground and to constituteL mobile reS(gtfve British cavalry Rhowed the benefit of these conceptionR under differllt regions and conditiolls during th(middot war During tiltmiddot earlv days of the war llll thr(gte cavalry divhioll rllHlpred $plpndid sprvi(e badly used
~~~i1~~~r~~Jtol~lrf~i~~ti~e~e~I~~l~l~~r~si~~t~t~~~l~)~~~~~ti~~executed a march of 320 kiiompterH in 3 days and caused the dehacle of the Turkish armies From these different and contradictory operations some would have reduced cavalry to a IltIroly colonial roh others affirm that augmentation of fire-power and motorized materifgtl authorized a role in continental wars The Britlh high eommand without dpeiding between the radical opinions formulated the following conciu-ions to he drnwn from employment of cavalry in the last campaign
(1) Importallce of division eavulry and [(gt((gtit) of attachillg a regiment illstpad of a sqnadron to eaeh infalltry diviRion
(2) Distant rpconnaissallce i~ tll( fundioll of aviation and armored cars cavalry executes clostgt and dplailpd nconnahNlll1(
(I) Impossibility of llsing t large cavalry unit pXppt as mobile reserve to explOIt succ(ss
In resum(~ avalry ~hould endor to cOlcilialr two opposing factors mohility md fire-power and to this end it hns worked for eightcn years
TIJ[~ f~VOLUrION FIW~1 1119 TO 1937
Four stfPS in evolution can be distinguislwd dllring this period the overloadEd c~lvalry mixed cavalry or h011pound motorized pure cvalry mechashynized cavalry Changes howe been due to progress in means available Principlcs of employment and distribution in the Empire have remaillfd loll~tant to new weapons and vehicles tlmort (omlliete transformation of British cavalry call be attributed
(1) Overloaded cavalry 1919-1929-- Increas( in means of fire after the war reduced mohility of regiments I)(low that of 1914 The horse beClrne a beLlt of burden crushed under weight of materiel and was incapable of aRsuring fluidity and rapidity of movement indisl)ensable to cavalry missions Between 1919 and 1927 elvalry was reduced from31 regiments to 22 from a proportion of 77 ~ in 1914 to 5S f At the same time guard regiments werc reorganized us line regiments and lancers dragoons and hussar amalshygamated into a lingle orpll Bgttwe(gt11 1927 and 1929 fir(-Pnwer of rc~iments
~~~~S~std~~t~~~JI~~~t eO~p~~~~ ~r~~lm~~~If~~rt~~~~~l~~~o~~~~~il~e~ ihor~ drawn lhe hrigad(gt fntirely horfc contained thnf ngtgimlnts Imd disposed 66 automatic arms Only hi till division did motor~ app(gtar mid tilt division existed only 011 palwr it had 18 can nOli 227 automatic arms 9000 horses 434 wagons and only 361 automohiles
(2) The haIr mechanized cavalry --Progress in v(hicles permitted augshymenting mohility lIld fire-power and r(ducing rfT((tiPs without reduchlg number of units In 1927 tht Wllr Omce adopted the six-wheel tru(~k and the armored car The six-wheel truck permitted first light(lling by H3 kilos loads trallsported by horses extending radius of action 16 to 20 kiloshymetern second transport ill truclR of machine guns j munitions and rolling kitchens The motorized sig-nlli deta(hnwnt could he left far behind llnd still rejoin when npoundcded Cross-country carriers permitted doubling the number of automatie nrtn Thus transformed the regiment bacame a more powerful unit able to cover 36 to 48 miles at a rate of 5 or 6 miles an hour It waR comtmsed of a squadron of armored (ars cOIllltituting tho motorized
Woel~i~~n~~11~d t~~~~~~~1(~~~~lf~il~~r~r~ c~~~~~~~it~ i~19~~ Modifications indicated accomplished in 1929 occasioned a reduction of 1300 men and 1400 horses-for the cavalry During this period two types of cavalry were cre~ted entir~ely mechanized units (armot-ed car) Ind mixed
83
V lttlaloff of Selected Periodical Articles
Ullll U- d 1l1lr W 1111lt1(11 (tvdry or llHhptlldll1l hrlathl that (oll]d
form lvalr~ Ull lu]l fhl orgtnlzaliOll (hd not htand tIl-LltI III IPs- than tvo [armiddot anntht r t1r~anJ7tl(m lparatcd hO[I mri motor pfmrnts and rIlkd h~ht T i~ur( lib JJ Uklng nwtorJ1w tralll- (mplYlIlg light marhin( ~Ull III plan tf till dl1iurnltll nIl
11) PUfl dr) 1lItli (IVIIT and n1fChaniz(d fpoundguiatlOll Q In 199 rlmiddottonHl1lmd lInplu)-IIIl1l1 of nod rn nllanI fnJatJrIl 1lHIhalllZ(l v(JHclp armurlli (ar~ m( ~n of Jlillllll)watlOll) to pruvlcl mnlHbty and firf-pmnr ltl1iultlllify 1artllu11T qu till If or (Lvlir Till fullcmlll n1l111 (rt III
(( two (ari lt r It Ihlll blt HLHIIW glIH rfpiaing t))chuJl gUll tntl ~IJtJflltll
rtn~t LInd Ij]middot f IrIIrt oil addl II 111 111 d Ihlj 1 Blhy Jutm PjUlpraquolmiddotd l1h rlIllO fur
01 ndllJ II ilII1i 11l armor ri (ltdI1l Ild Ltl Ql1llr IlItI liu )101 HI r 1 I tllIljlV n I rUL pori phll h II lt Iimiddotj nddlll thtll I In 1laquo- ]11 II r ( ~
fJl LIT) dll r oWlhlt]Il lrlll] r I HIIJII III f Ir I( T rLIl~~Imiddot P Trnltllllf tllllhulH JH 111
IfJliI
JIl l)~ 11 r Irlll Til I l I I d of 1 uulrl)j )11 ~I Ing lllrht ml[ hIli IrlnIHr j r Ill dl 1 1111 l11 r lUlrirlm qf] p1ltn011 (Ih 1 I1ILI fl d 1lrl 110 Plllhlll 11111 plulrlln ju 11IPIlt1d
IIIHIlII r f 1II r I d frorn tltl a Ill nUl1l Ilt P0gt-I I rI 1 ll)hl III I 111 1111 (I) Tltll for dlmiddot-mnunllclrfHlIl TIlf Br(11
)flIl) 1 [lIlItltj 1 II) r fr Tr Ill Irl HlltlJH of frlt rnfhIIlIifd trlnl)rl I rll]It dill 11JIII) ill l]tl If IIll) dunl nl lTj rlt IT Thl10r)1111l shytlOJIl hlIl til fl (I rlun Iut nlllll t llluhJilt) illort qUdllltH II UJ IU IIJlII Illmiddot r 1111 Ill Ifl drmiddotH~rHd fnf dn 1l)1l rItlr- I)f for
Tlll1111 UTilI V ()-I rll) 1 di nlJlrl Ifl I hi n llilt 11I1) nl-l~d (Irl-~lIllltllll of thl Innlill 111hlllll mlnr7 1l1ll1 nt or a cflm)mltllln ()f thl
I TlIlfl )flllllt lIlll 11 11 Illdj rI Oil nl1gt111111 dll] m )1- ~I 11 t1J -1))1 1ll1 dIU) lllrd-J II Ill BnlJh Hilly
lllll-II I ( ~ 11)1) HI 11l 1lrI Ilf Ill( flnigt Callr eompmlllit I Itf)middot ~Ttllltllld 110 ljllth of thnl f()IflHnt I lr()Up of
r lId IT ~ I 111111 IJKd jOPI cIdry flltUfJtd hy rnotlfrn l I ill y lId r ro It ~()II In n 111111gt wllPrl mllhll)rl Llnnot
) fdl)1 lll~ d I 1 rrllll 1( Ii 11 hor (nd rnlChllluld llnltltl 11
I 1 llllll f lrnl I ri 11111 Thl 11 11Iil tlll- (hlll ((0 H I t rr (II lr Illn Illfl Ilvtln 111 hI[ IlO IllIlTp
I ( r I 1Ij~ t 11 h lillI d 1tlr 1111 jln ( dill qrgtlllllillIl lt1 not (oil
111 d I III middotf 1ll11 fI I fllr 1IrlTntmiddotnlmiddot WIth ni~ IWldl I lllllllil dl](jmiddotrl III 1~)11 til f(nrKIIlIZ Ih
rwl 111 Iry II) fllnn 10 Il1lthll1lpt hTlfldl- ll dn)IIIIl In 11 Iptntr Ijl) till IT ()jJUt
UI~ fr llmiddotrlI) hljl rl~1l1lllIh IIllu J f(flnlllIh IIf Jlurtpl ld f Itll tulk l11l0 luH rlglnlrnl IH 1Hn
d ld d L () n ilr lnd fl 11 dllnii~ I n till 111gt grlujltd I [lI(l~f
III Enrland 1 111 Eg pt 5 hnflt f(~lshyTld rllnlnI7ltlOn tIiTi11 tlw Ilorllld
lrjdllillQ tIll 1l1l)1l]middot dlIIIlJ dllt(Iod dunnl T11ull If (lalry (mhl~fd ofl rfglllwllt
Td IIf jJllrtt1 (lvdry jngIJl IIf Llnkl of 1 bull 1 llJldrJI1 )f pngllHtN ll1lhanizfd COIllshy
r~allllItll WI lot (onllllu(middott iftlr 11middotIc 11171111 WlrUIII( lIT crlllmiddotd 1111 rolloWlllj~
1 [lpht r 11l1 III f Ill jllllIlf rl 11 drj to lu (on(rt lilt]) h~hl d Illlll lb I bull flJllllllt Ill) d I)f It)ht tank lIul porl drl~()Ill frU nllill 1 til IP)P Irrl)~ jIlrll IIlllt
1111 n )111 Iii lull dVldld lHtwIIlI dn 11O1l (lvilry and I lid IJl rt)Hh I1(h lnnlr orgUl1ltOIl Th htLgtadll tl) Clltlillt
Jlfh~ Lmk r lm Illlt 1IId bull btttllll]1 IIf Ji)rl(1 lllflntry tgtI1(ally ontII shy j fr till III ~ ToJ lIld ( Ili-llt n ((JI)Jal~aJn and ahlJ( tlk llllult1 I ImlJJf tlth fIrgtlllzttllJll lll1r_ of till 11Ilc consisted uf ~ armored car r 111 llt~ hi LIdmiddot r )IIP nt lIld 10 jllrmiddot r4glm(llb of wllleh) Vprp in IIdl1 (Il Il IIf II l1Jdlll1 fOImiddotflInHmiddotnt 1111 1I(l4lry InfuTf till Il t 1(I Tl illlnt l[d jl Ilil 11111111 II alltI (ollfIPl1n n gtlltld ill de( Iioll to t r r-(lrt1l 1 n 11111 III 111 111lt111 illtl) h~ht tank n~~JnHllh lUi r(turn thl r III I JIlllld T)Irt fltJr III l~Jh l(vt1ry uf tIf 110(gt will (olllist of 2 r 111 11 If lfIJn d Ir~ 1 r mv III of hht Ilnk~ bullllltl ~ burH rqirrlllltl rlt 111 d rf tltllll nl r I II
Irvmiddotrlld Iqr of itLl cudmiddot rlt flJfl1 1 1I I far from detmite 1n Hl17 lllLlt1 tJf jJr drIVI n unltlmiddot1l mto platoolll and thlT1 Igt
lP fJlllIll1lji Iidqqr f li)ht tndl Lnrl plltoOnq of ]Jorligtf cavalry Jtrolt
Tl f bull lltlrf h (Ill rltllllmiddotd mohd rllviil)lI I 011 t1IlpJ1Ifti dllrl1l lIIH wai tf 111 1 IllllJdl of 1 )rtlIllf t1111 Ilf hattailllll (Of[(1l11Vt IPIlWllt J rld f i[vdry Ih IIImp)d IIf ~ tank fIfimpnh and 1LltlIion [ )r1l lllf (Ilry ITlIIIII lt111( 1)11 1( Uril) middottllHllt 11 1rllll If Itl IIllt Iltmiddot nJl 11 lInd) Ir arm Ind hlrVH FtJlOlillf~ mllHIlVpr or lln I II Ir ClUll III I HI d tlld(p 1hi IllnJlIi lIiv) i1~~htf mllTt hOlllI1~~tnOI lllr P(II dill alld I fi for 111I1 modlh(d till or~allllatLUIl 1hl port(( IIdlntrj WOIi Llklll rllm till hTl)ld fldu(fd hy half and organi(illlto a IhI-IHl orJLnIlltJ)IJ (har~1 rI WJth qf(ornim n~ll~laJJ( that tallkfl (allllnt ltf (llnl tl1 (J( jlfIII~ l1ld hlrldul Ilrrillll -I(h il loday th organization nil vliHh Brill Ii Idr h 1lt1 h(middot oqllHZftl and tranllu Entirely mcthashy1I11d II h(lr l h11 llllriv dhIPIIITNI for iJg-ht tanIH Lmd mechanizeu
b4
c amp GSS Quarter~ - ~ ~
(ONCItISIOtgt
Thll1 for f1ghtf1 y(ar~ HrHirh (valry ha- IWN ylLbtlt1 tl)rtalllzin~t contmuoUR attpmpt-q La 1)l)cJ1JlU two apparlllily lrr(gt(mHllahlf faew~ mohility and lirl-powpr Thi~ evolution ha- TIgtull(d from pfrfplti(m~ rnat6ri(I f1jlpoundcially erool Otlntrv ImllHjlOTt thi(l( ftrf(lltlll uf math haH elirninatNl t he duality IJ(lWPPIl (ontilHntnl anrlluionial (lvlirv Malo fi~ ~ ~ll111 1~lt ~~~l~I~ ~ ~llt~ ~ll~t11~~l1 ~1l~ I~~ 1~)(17 ~ i~~91~ r1l~eo1U
l ~n nlf r~iill(l1l~ WPrl nWlhalllztd tOlllY 111 pTIlllort IOn is eomple~~ rlv~rHltl ox ll1fyliatllZld fur ~ horop) l1ld IllPlropuhtm ((aIry j- aIm
(I1trrMI~(~~lnll~~I~ tllH qf thic rW cltlyalrj It Itgt ~t111 too ~non (014 ~ It paS~Il through a pltal of tfllformLlll1l with ILet of llhl1rkl men a trlill(gti (allrt It (allllot Ill Jlld~ttl lJlf()TlJ-1~ IXl-tlt and 1lt trUllld bull
Jlowvr tldn JrlPlhUlllld (Lvdry IHj)l ih 1lvt1rv cpiril It I 1t4 pur and II t radilll)gt alld pmiddotfu 1 to 111 clmfllundl d with lilt tall IHI AItiloUf(h cppnIc of tIlIir bur( It oIIHlrl pnlrVI the ~am( I the trlill tllIl1~lvl with tHlt care [or tlwir I1PW roll If ehangpound poi pamCui If ltllOultl hro nmiddotIo~Il1fgtr thai till (Ivdry 111gt -Ilfnltrod thl mllrmll alld lia adapttmiddotd 11lf wllh up)l() and prllIlId 1Ilgte to III tha IW(ti~qtl(l o[ tht tinH~1 1M
-oBH1 tinmtl that UI1Y hI1 10111 tOl Llr If1 till WLY of nlcchamzath 4oUI IIIIY a~llt If thl molJl1 dlII)IJ (middotlrnpl)gtmiddot(l (If Iliht IIlllt Jilhout l(rllltfl1 CUI pllwpr will hI (apIIlI of fUfmountmg HhLllH rllIforctt with 11 W~ anlitank ann JIIfY r(mlrle Oil tJf dlvlr~lty of unit 1111 Inp sa) Oland jPlIfth of (OlUTnIlI (Ilnrnwu Ilfrd for uppIy and maint In~ Othprl npiy to tfwp objet t11l11 that tJ( 11r)~I UTllt will not ~u 1 lJOlI lOl ttlllld Iwfort tlH middlmiddot f JaH It th bull1 It (1111( mHllIlIci ill the IXJlIThllI( TIll hi rony jJTlJjlflrtllJ1) of Ilf1d 11111 1111 io~lrj to hp liml unib in Egypt lndil mrl Jllfdmd (I111idf1ng till whlf of thl (aa~ an of thl Jmplrl blHh oc til Ix 11 Ill rq~1rlHnh ))1])1111111 tblrl lxlsi for natlVI hor(middot f(gmllllb III IndIa Hul )tgt hllr TIgmHIllt 11f 1 Ilnllllrl a hel Seoul 11 nil 1111~lilh tlrnllrJd army Atli(lligh till (lnll1Wln- 11IY (oll lt In
~I(~~~~gl~IJII~ f IS ~I~ ~11 I ~~~I~H~ I ~i~ ~ iN ~ 111 ~~t~ll ~t(itI r~ HIluJar (Ivdry tillt TI ff( (IltltUit 11J~ I (nnllfltn(I -1
of lhl IrnjJ(middotrial (lytlry It 11I11middotttlllmiddotgt tlJf 11111)(1 jllmi thmiddot enlt
lII~aJ lir41 on tlH halilp filld [t- Tj~lllllll)ll 1]111 tI or will lat 1laquo trallrnrnllll It h (llftl lilt ltt I fOII~ hilt 1 fllur J1)1I1l1 Ill ItllltfJert~ rtf fortigt lh
ltlthE
Ttl ~llPIIIl- 11 11 HII(~L lolUlltlt( N SH1A ~~~FtlOlli nl I fool ~it Ill Ion 11 I ~~IIlTl d (1 l)~ tin h tl 1rdllmiddotI11 flmiddotJ (apta hu
H1J()1
Thi tudy (1)111111lt thl ~Imiddotl))~rljlh f-j rlt Il~ III( Ardl I(IIlt ~l~lll
~~~t~ ~~ ~f 1~It~ll~I r~1 t11~~11~ [~ It ~~ f(l n ~~rLI I~ ~~I~~~~~ ~~ ~h cllIgt for lmprIlV(I1I1IlI Illlt HI 1(] 1 illu rtlld It h phIIl-taph of he IS
IYln 11 h
I 1HAl lION In I nn 1 ]1 nlll)j I ltll1 I nit ~T Iioxlrtilhlll tiP 1d1middotunlmiddotth iqu I plrlll du mh I (1111111 dl Br iJ
l11~ lrtill(middot dh(ll~i thl prlltiu linn If ih~ 111)111 fr0111 (nlll lld ullporLLllIp hv ria~Oll of gramiddot a1t of pllrnhlI111 III FrlIHl
REVUE DINFANTERIE FrlII Ih LIUH lUi TI()IJ Inflllln
January 193B
Till A B ( 01 Hl1L1EHY II]U IIA 11 ( du tlr dt 1lrtllkf1I I (ltltHh I 1Jmiddot-nngtIIIL
A Implltitd di-( U~-IH1 of artilh T 1111l prdhltHl
TANI- IN ( ItI Illl NI E rH [I[I Flit Altl 1ldl ~shy l~ lly lBlh
ILlgt dlln dlll 1 ddlll~I( A 111 1ft rnlt1 ILvril~1lI1I19H l~ Lilut(1l1I(middotj l1rn
An ICqtlllt by 0111 of til( Itatiing Frtl1 h Llllk mthoritw of tht trtl l~ ~~ tI~~~~v~~~~~1~ltl~I~I~Ir~~~I~)I~ltl ~~ I~i~ J~li))~~l~I~~l~I~fi~Imiddotll~t~lr~~I~~ ( tilnyX J1ay i)JX TId lrllll 11 (Uir( 1) t 1parlll tilfu ill QuHter A ~I No fD rUlll 1lX pag X4
tl TIm AllTOlOJllll Silo 01 191 ~1l11~ U1ITAI INTltLr f ILt ~l~l~og~~~tll()llohlh dl ) 917 ltmiddot J1lllllnlllllltttlrtmiddot 1 ClIjlU ~
Thl fori flf Frll(h alltoll1nblltmiddot 1111nllfllll lIT1r til Id rtlIl1h III Hlig i_1 l(jllIllllp lnl I)f fwmhlll IIIP ajljltarIlHI nf 111 I 1lIgllloc tnd uf llladllT~ ~I Ihlflf~ otlHmiddotr fUll tlt11I 111111 lri ttlJIgtlrlIIImiddotd (If fr(lt illtlnct g
February 1938
TANk~ IN Till (OUN ntt1 fIIC Till I otrNTI~ltATTACl or ~[at ~~ Hl1lOY II-I hllH IJih
[Lt (barR dlIJH la (Ilntn~altaqu( 1a ontrlmiddotlttIlUt de hUn Bdloy (11-13 juin JJ1X] LwutCoh))wl Pprr md Mw AUHCnac
Spp dig(~t in (~uartlr1y No 69 hlllP 1)IX IllL~i ~middotL
-
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articies
MARKSMANsmr TltA1NING FOR THE 60-~~M AND 8I-MM BRANDT
lMet~~~~tir fietH ~~ur martier Ba~~[d~ 81 ou de 601 Captain Loubiere
Method by which practice may be gained in correcting fire data as a result of actual observation at ranges of several hundred yards wi~hout the firing of liv( or training ammunition
March 1938
THE MODERN TANK ITS CAIAUILlTll-S AND EMPIonENT IN Tim ---_ATTACK )LI char moderne Sea pOHsihilitiilt mn emplai dllnH rattuque1
LicutColonel Pprre The tank is not a weapOIl which will win wars quickly lind painlessly
neither hafl it provpd a ailur(- in the Spanish War In an article which ill the reproduction of a conference hefore a large group or reserve officers he points out that if the tank has armor RutficiEntiy thick to protect it against the fire of antitank weapons striking it at 30 degree angles at ranges greater than those at whieh thf tank Irlw (an sec ancI return the hostile fire immedishy
~~~~h~~Cotr~~EC~j~~HI~~11~h~~erl~~t~~1s~i1~~ti~~frni~~)titl~~Il~~o~~~ cumbtd to antitank rifles He attributes this to the fa(t that these weapons ere unabl(middot to pemtratp the armor of tanks at other than short ranges and say the fact that tlw tanks Quid spot these weapons at such ranges and instantly return effctie fire was the reason He also points out that on the battlefield most of th targets which antitank guns get will he sitch that the bullet will not strike llCrpcndicularly hut at an angl(
In speaking 01 Amprican tanks tor some of which a sp(ed of 60 miles an hour are claimed he says that there is little advantage in sllch speedsshyfor one does not fight at 60 miles an hour He draws a great distinction between the maximum speed of a tank its average marching speed it speed in varied terrain and its comhat speed The latter he says no matter how
fra~~~~clitl~~mdilftce~t~ ~i~i~rn)iti~in~~~~il~~ ~ohl~t~r saee~Osu~~ search the terrain or to fire accurately This hrings out the essential differshyence hetwepn the French gtlchool of thotlght on tanks and the British The btter hag insisted that gpe(d is the hcst protection for the tank and takes precedence over armor The French school answered No since you are ohliged to ahandon tllis speed at the moment you fight effectively that is at tre time you run the grlatest dan~er
Colonel Perre says the expenence of the Spanish War confirmed the French reasoning and add~ that thf British and their followers arc now husi1y engaged in augmenting the armor of their tanks
He brings out that while modern tanks can make one days march of approximately equallpngth to that of truck columns the strategic mobility l~ much le~s A complet(gt overhaul is necesltary after 3000 kilometers and thererore every tank movemeurolIl must IW (awfully weighed to see whether it
nside(-l the most difficult type of tank attack that against in a defensive position an enemy who has had time to coordinate He first poinLc out that tanks are ablE to approach hostile resistshyfirp at colte range and hence obtain a maximum effect with the
expenditHrf of ammunition On the other hand tanks run great Itn ther llrc immohilized in combat and consfQuently cannot ound Their vision is ~mch that they cannot fire effectively nt
00 meiers and their presence in a zone only insures a temporary 11 whilh is likely to vanish when they move on Likewise the erent to varied terrain the necessity of locating the enemy and
tanks to provress with relative slowness from the moment fff(tiEJy~ Tlw autllOf thus concludell that when opposed
pable of strong Tlsistan(( tanks must act in close liaison IIlth the ot IN arms infantry artillerY and aviation This permits the infantrY to occupy terrain held hy the enemy and to mop it up The infantry
idly the (ffc(t of tml action which is essentially fleeting r(middot tllln rpmind(d thosl (If his auditors who had participated what til( infantry dreaded most when moving to the attack ouYd of ma(hine gun fire grazing machine gun fire coming
from a zon(l of temdn vhib)f from th( line of rlrparturp aurl at the most 1200 met(rg deer
If shortly after H hour this hand of terrain is invaded by tanks in depth protected and ~uppoIted IW other arms all or nearly all of these deadly automatic weapons will he silenced and thp infantry can advance Colonfl Perr~ spraks of this as the notion of tank employment in Ilretlg as opposed to thp linear emplovmltnt ff th() last war Th~ most powerrul tanks 3hould lorm the advanced ~middotchelons and since they have to coordinate their advance with lTtil(ry fires theuroy me under the orders of the commander of the arge unit tllf~(ommon (hier of the infantry and artillery
Not J($S Ir)gically he contends thf lightr-r tanks constituting ~e rear echelons n(fd not be fiO fust They IJPnefit from the protection of their Iurger hrC)tnera and or the fires of til infantry Sineeuro they are the IoseRt to the inrant~ ancl mUHt r(gtguJat(~ their advanceon that of the infantry they aro
bordmated to the infantry commanders olonel P(rrb points out thlt luch a systlm is cllpllble of powershythat with it attacks can he arranged much more qUlckfy than
Iistonmiddot d(middotcisive battles have occurred only when armllshyent pcrmittfi the (jomiJiiling I)r mallllVN with an action of frontnl rupture his combination was tIl(gt (RSPHl of Napoleonic- maneuver When fronts reinvioJahle flanking maneuvers mcrcJy throw huck the enemy He points ut that tlH- tank now giveR the high commllnd n hattering rllm capllble or ~ning a deep hreach and that this perhaps will give back to Victory those Ings which the pitiless automatic weapon had shot off
TaE AERIAL INFANTRY MISSION ILa mission aerienne daccompagnement de Iinfanterie aU combat1
Lieutenant Roy fhe author states that under modern conditions the infantry mission
(contact-liaison mission) haa become almost impoa3ible because of the deadlishyness of fire from the ground It therelore must be abolished No plnne
W~~1d eWaCrcrnt~rr tci~~~~a~YHu~t ~rdi~~g~ltitudes required during the
The befit that can be done is to combine this mission with dose reconshynaissance missions or rather to modify til( latter slightly When the ceiling is very high the plane occMionally can dive down to aRcertain one or two definite points A specific queRiionnaire should be given the observer belore the start or the mission Most of the information will hetransmitted hyradio
go od~th~~~I~ sc~~I~~~t~s~~nWUh~ 1~~i~ili~~~hol~~l~flla~~ ~e~ the lines at low altitude and have the benefit of surprise appearance and rapid disappearance However nothing much can be expected in the way oC informatIOn unless the observers are well trained in such work and unless only very simple things arc demanded of them for example Does the enemy occupy Iuch and such awood Have our leading elements reached the line x - Y Why does not such battalion progress rn such a case the speed of the plane will permit it after droPl1ing a message at the division command post to land at its airdrome and furnish by telephone information to the staff a few moments after obtaining it The use of radio in the latter case will be less important The author believes thut persevering in old methods would he fatal at the present time
THE TitANSFOItMATlON OF INFANT1W AND JUiVISION OF TERMINOLOGY [Les transformations de linfanterie et In refonte de la terminologieJ
Major Laporte
Changefl in terminology neccssitatcd by changes in French inCantry organization
~NGINEEILS AND MfCnANIZE~ UNITS lGenie et unites bhndees Captain M
THE LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR ACCORDING TO TWO RE(ENT AlltlCLES
[Les enseignements de In guerre dEspngne daprfs deux puhlicashytions reurocetesj Major CailiouX
A discussion of the accounts of Dr Herman Klotz a former German naval officer and of GeMral Temperley It is concluded that tanks and aviation are merely auxiliary arms of the infantry which remains the Queen of Battles Antitank defense and antiaircralt defense have been effective The tank no longer can count on technical surprise it is on an even basis with antitank defense and the morale of the eivil population ltan resiit bombardments by air forces Militia when engaged as interior units on a continuous front have been able to stop better trained troops and a situation not unlike that of 1914-18 has resulted
REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE (pmcc)
By MAJOR RG TINDALL Infantry
January 1938
NOTES ON THE HIGHER CONDU(T Q WAR FROM 1792 TO 1797 ANn FROM 1914 TO 1918
Notes sur In conduite Buperieure de Ia guerre de 179 i1 1797 et de 1914 it 19181 (I) Marshal Franchet dEsperey
tionalr~ ~~~~e~7t~lt~lyi~h~I~1t[~9~~ei~~~r~~r~h~~~~~r~I~~il~ effected through Carnot who middotat times even supervised the actions of the various fourteen army commanders
NATIONAL DEfENSE [La DCfense Nationale] LieutCoJonei Fabry
An article advocating a single chief [or the army navy and air forces of France Incidentally simultaneously with its pUblication the French government took such steps The actual reorganization effected ia covered in a Hueceeding article in the March issue of the Revue Militaire Generale
COMPOSITION AND POWER OF THE NAVY ITS ROLE IN NATJONAl~ DEFENSE
[Composition et puissance de In flottc Son role dnnA 11 DMense nationale1 Vice Admiral Darlan
The author brings out that France cannot fight n successful war unless materials can he imported from abroad and troopR transported from her colonies Thus the tllsk of the French navy is to keep the sea lanes open for French commerce and France must have n fleet at least equal to that of
d~~~~~f~afe~~t~h~t~amp~i~nnheei~~tl~t~~~t~tI~~g~~~~~~~~ed ~ao~hi~~~~~~~ ground-air~l]aval cooperation although he points out that thlS
85
- rl [ro 110 I r Vn-Ilth nr f)HP
-ltlldd I lt1 ltI I rl Ilmiddot in--i-h (1) orniudnv rr r I 111 (If tlw air forI IVI 11 1 111llIhl jill 11l IlllllllrIt pt did 1 i 11 I d In nrdl f I
f Ii Ii I Iii] rt) jltI III 1 1lt1 I I I 1111 1))11)1lrmiddot 1111
11lt d tllll If 11 lmiddott f I II h()~ 1h1 I I 111t itlljP 111 I I I r hll lldl ]l[ lId I L 111 ti I ]II
Irl 111 I~ r f 1 dr middotn n I Imiddotltl -1 I( I bullbull r I v n ttl oj 11 I jdlf III pI 1)1 I I old 11 I11TI) rlo fI dlt middot)dI]IT
J(rl~~Ir1 I~~I I r J
11 bull L II I( 1111 11111 I II
II I I I I 01 I I I Idl d
fflr I II Ii (
i t Till
I-UlImiddot1 I tr 11 bull I Id) I) Lt I
rlId1 I n oJ I I) It
)Jiid tf f r r I trtlJ
(1111 If II pli 1 H r H)d d i r d 1 1 d I) I lt I o
fr middotf 1 Iil Ir f bull II 1 I) I fr I
middot1 ft1 1 f 11
q I I bull -I d II Ir rt~ j j II
fr Ii
I ii fI j
11 1lt l I
11 1 (It]( T
rII I r I~ 1 t In 1lt1 h 1 I 1IlllJJIlll~ hu III d b I 111 rt
uljag huj ll rll
r qJfOIIl1llth In)) llgt~ II ul r nth
Ill 11l1 II fiTiIIIO 1
Ilhl 111JllmITJ11 1
ld r l~ll t lp mil ( jlgtI 11)1) 01 lIld 11~middotd tl 1 Inn 11 11nl1 1 f r qPH rj 1
f r 1 j nlil 111 fr
Till J 11 r II 111 11 J 1raquo -1 JJL) L r j ]j) r I (gt1 I)trd
[I imiddot II 1t d to( -Ilfllh )11 r -1 I 1 IlJLd L11 1 f lll)r
I tri jlj d cpU rtf t ll
11111 I L d)middot 1 HI (1)(1 jlilll 1 )1 I 1r1 I J I qr i Off 01 rltllJ t I 1lIlIlll llll I I~ II ~t I~ II f d TI I Id t fIr tl If ltgt1011111lt)1 d
l~ IIj ( r I I 1 rJ Illlldlllt dlHd inrH) lJllII II I d fl II II fld- f dl )Illo
Iilt In HIl 1llTiIlll Ir llj I I II I r)jfllll pll H Ll h I iOIl
I Ill II d [1111)11 f rl I llIld [Illt o I ( i r ( fl dl d liP tt 1 I nllt L11
101 II I dt r 1 f 1111 ltI [ r h f 1[1111
1 11 I 1 I I I I 1 III I] t tIl 11111 d (I rlr I gt
d d Ill r h IWI nIhlllqht nllt ill
Ii II d till pr J1ftflllll fnr Iltl r j] 1middot1 d 1111 Illltllil IlllllrIPI wa I)f nJIIIo
II 1J III I II 111lt1 r If I 10 r11 l III~ t hlll~1
8fi
c amp GSS Qummiddott~ Vo ~
KlLO)OO()() mdl lrmgt (if fid~( 1O()()OOO art HI(r) j-JtgtIL~ aIIOOOIJO hand J-r( nl]h nb~
1Irt of tllfP mppltl Irl olitwwd Jv Illtl1ill~ lllohiJillIliol1 lJlplt~ l whi(h Wfrt t IWII lta 111~ nlllllt 1 lImiddotIII illdll 1ry WI Illordinal(d L ~ orde 1llr 1 lahlid11ll1nl iJhe
TIll ralh) WI 11ll)1 1111lllIII alII I 11 flllil lrily Two hips ftn J rti middotlallllI l t lilT Ill (11 I l1I--1 (1111111) l1lltll1~ II Llt)middot inrfroz1 llHat lminl 11111Ipl 1 mItII1 rlldII 1Ial~ fill 1JlJlllf h I nirlltUII produ - Iro~ IllllWn I IIWr)Oll ItTII 11l1 IJllIIILUi ]l11f(hI~Igt of nat fl mad~t of jI
AWImiddotIItHII 1)1lt111 lId 1lI II or 1[1 Itllgti pn-mnlilly 1Itf)[lJll d t
111 1 ~iJII~l h~~ ~~i 0 r I r~ ~II ~ II~ ~ II~~I~~I- III Lilli Ividual ~lalu 1~on~ (111 11 r ilrl 1111111( 11 pll d ~Idl 1) -Ill ~ 11 111 plrtltloll hrlwf1 irlng Imiddot1t II II IInlY llId tIll nllIIrj r1l1 II II L Ill If I hI XllPdltlo1 i IInI r ~~~~~~II~~I t~lItlJfI~ 1( ~it( ~~ ~ ~ ~11 I~ II)~I~ nt~~~~(j~ag~l J~emi ~( Ij I~ 11 j I~I 1~~~IL~~1( I hHl I It IJ I II I hh IIt Il1 11111 t hI nH1 h 111 l(llJPt~ 1i1~f~1
llllfm dciJe
llIL OII1 Lit IN TIll lln thr ILollllipt dall 11 (111111 LIjltlf I)I Ildlrmiddot mati
111laquomiddot11 )011 of III rolt ltif Iflp Vr II] rhcPf Ill Jl-ltilJll il ffgardl OpUo~ 1111111 Ilid 1111 FfIIl] (hTlflr
0 1February 1938 ~ (middotrrot
-oll-Ot- 1111 1I1dllll 11-111 11 1t lltll1 17~2 111 17n ] [IJI 1l1 1 1 1111
nI llr la cnllil 1111 111flllIrlt dl ll J-IITr til 17l~L 17fr7r til 1~11 t I l~ll I I II llr-lttllrlIlftpI r11 IrY
Thl FOfll1lmiddotr I fHllllltld r f 1 llf SIIllIl-1 IflB 1111111gt ll~ -lrtfS IVlfl1lll 111 d oIHflll IIf H 1~ middot11 r 11 Ih Hill lor d If If ill 19il~ ( ([lIl t Imiddot FrlIHli ~OlrllJ1l( lIfprplr d fur 11 r]I lJ) d- of war F i~ond IVn it 1)1 [wrtlllalil y f ( IIIL )nITr -1)111] rI h I1l 1 Wa IH)lS1 ~Ytl llldlf IIII I If( 1Irr1Illl I d I Illlllllll IIllllllr din 11111 Thill lftlf 1 1deg of 11hIIl1lgt1011 I) I~ till 111 gt1 111~Irl I lnnlnl nllllll ha[pd ~J jMgt] Ill gJJfdl +11[1(111111 If I hr ll I hI 1 f 11 fnllTwnl InlhlarlldUIi
~(il~I~- ~I(~ ~~III1II~ I~~ ~ I~ l~ iI 1-111 I~ ~~rlll If ~lfJ l~~~ rlll~~~~~r ~~ lRd1 Imiddotr 1lllt ronlt t hltIfIIJImiddotI11 fq 11 1 IllI11 if (I)mrrll1ld hut ttl~ ~el WIS lirnltld In IIH --llfn 11)tpr f]OiT(I
I111I l~~~~lI~~t~II~~ 1)t i~ ~ l~ 11 r~)~1 I II 1 ~l~Th~~~~I~ji(~I~k hllll tIl h1 L ltJllllICmiddotrj Ill 111 ti fl II Id PIli Ill Ill Innh I hn III I- 1(middot d)[ 111111111 Ilt fo tiltgt ltl1I111 fllf
1[ ingthl- th ]1 IL lI--tti III lPll f 1I ri-Ill Ihl Ix(rllth p a r[~tlLtl IH1fgt 11 111111 [ If I 1111 II) IlIml ItrJll whi(h Ill[rshy1lmnll))1 ~lllllld n[llrllr
TAl 1I PI )LrLIUf) -]) pI TltltoH)tq llLl~ 111(1 (lip jhll f 11 dmiddot IkllllI11 I (11I d lpn
Thf Iuthof I in rpmiddot)hltlll 1lltl11l-t pf - nlplLt Ffillth tUmiddotlmiddot II) fshy1it-11lr tIlt 1lHplo-mfllt If LIgt1 Itllk 111 rIl11t tIll -tlry r II( I(3 of 111 1llt Ind l)Jj In gthw 1111 111 )p~r - 111lt1 lrJmiddott I(ht III 11111 m1)1IY of an wflll n Irl Illtf 11111 Inti (0l111jllff Ihpp nh It tu k of Cln)hrtl Sn~ltllh 1lJlI mlll- Iilt t hn 1)Hl1illl hi 01 id_
011 III ldnryt11~)~ti~~~I~ ~~~Il~~~~~~ -lIfprN Ill J III illltq~- ~t~ tit onl antltanl 1lii ~hllh 11111-1 ll 11 1111 Iwl TIll lIltll~lt ma ~llll (If today lrmiddot lfJI 1j-litl 1 Jr~~lrlh lrmrmiddotJ 1111 hilt II nr~6 X(( lIJ(TII IIH armor )[ IIii Illd 1)111 111 tnlltllll wljum IllIIt hr IT Iq~r 1IIe tlllnmiddotfllJI llJr i l1d~middot Ihl t llll~ 1lll Ilwll lo(L(gt Llrl ttlbull llrt tjlllll nlh middot11 (1 hn
If till 1middotIWIll hI 1111 111l m1l11 olllllh~( IJJlhl III dprltd Ld ar(llilr wh l)(lt ht th (lIl- dll Illt- tI nlI1111l al tl1 111)( nf rarp ~tain wllh II IlWl )-Ilt)gt III Ir~llgt 11111 Imlllr th 111ll lP(Iar~middot fortmiddot J
Mtdlt-Q Iq dll Iln1f I rlg 11[1 whlt 111 1tImiddot Ih lank Iodnl Ilon clogtp ral~1 Tit 1111Ir 111 dl) It Llr Ililtpr Ill qUWIlf ill1 (l1Hlu~i~~ iur
III dIJl- lilt j h t) til) thlllt Irtillf ll)ljlllrt Imt 1)( ltlPtl inf adql1ld Il IhL Igthl I)f liltgt LIllIgt Ir 1middotlIl1p] Ill wanl t far grelt ~ IJI of Intj)Il11 wI gtllJO IIltmiddot dll Il hIgt lillll 1lt1111 fltlr arlilil p ~b 11ft III all lltI1 1111 Ill Irtll t~ qtIP1 IJ1~ IIill dur1llg an tttar~middot rei t 1)1 IllrpO( of an lrll1 n dl t]llllll III Ilf fj ld]lhtl1ll1l of nlwf It(1n~ Ph( Itnmiddot ~JImiddoth hthlh hIIIIIIlJlI rtmiddottmiddot Illdl illt 111I Fnllch ltlrlll~ r~iE nmiddotdIIY Ihlgt~ an HUr l muhlllr1 11IIllt(d II 111l1lt tlI lllllCIII ~lld I f 1 f lrltll) II lt11111111 flllllllil Hp)lrl d 1111111laquo tH th~ ~)Ini Ill dimiddotappPlf llh tilt (Ill tll) (Imiddot tllllll gt1rth lw Link i d (I1111on~Jlln IH rIII)P ~
Sill 11 hmiddot If I ln I IhlL 111 It IT tin Irt t1ltry nhlnmiddot(r Ill fol~-I In i Ill pnl~~nllIn If Llllk l1l1l1t lormiddot It ih I hlll I hal of mfalltr IlII mn ttfl o r jllll 1111 ullllt (In rIr litll] lltlll1 anti qlUltlnn h fldio) ~Iw
[1 ~IIIr~I~~lil~ fIJt(~t II~l ~~Jiil~~~~I iJ~I~riJI~~)~In~~~1 ~~d~~~ hp 1111011 JIl ngarltl In dlp1lImiddotII1P llt- ~
Sl1r)))jmiddotp IllIIY1I IJllin ft11 tltll if It I 1I11lly IXpll)ltmiddot 1l)tllw adl i ary j not ~ion tinw to brin up fflIlfuflllIHIlIltt Tht Link is (mmrL shy~llltahl( to rtLiir( urpn ( hut nnly If fgtl1lphYlillll InIlt on a WHIp front amiddot ~ ltv(fll (1l1)11~ (lPIp Ill( llI1 Iwr m~It IIll p(middotlwlnllllWIlt ill dtlI h of tapt t-ltO a1 to mhmPrg(gt -itnuitanlnl1ly 1111 Illtif illLlJllry JlllsitHl) of tilt (ILPn - )[1
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles =shy
Behind the tanks the infantry mU~t push forward a3 rapidly as pos1ihle The author docs not wish to (mtircty eliminate ~alts on succ(gtslivc ohj(lelivLgtH althe following pUHlagc will show but he wiahc~ t~ rcdttcc these in time
Halts must not be prear~anged except wh(~re thp horizon changs in order to reconnOiter the terraIn herOiC movlngmlo 1t and because thNe the attacking troops find shelter behind the protecting crest against Olseishy11tion and lire But these stops must tJ( t(gtciuced to the minimum II [W minutes and not a few quarlNs of an hOUf ll~ long- ll1 the j)lfm is not broken as long as hill artillery has not helm reached Olnd r(main~ apthl( ofl toiler(nl rea(tion
~we~h~afil~tO~I~d~~tist ~~I1~~II~ll~~f~h~(tii~~~[ekt~~~~w~e l~s~~lli~l~ marguJ OfSUf)CrlOntgt httle by httle a the Infantry reaches the limit of t hf range of Its supportmg cannon
On the contrary in l tank attack the dehouching of thl infantry should he quite prudrnt IJ(cause since the automatic weapons of the enemy have remained sillnt for the m(J~t part the mopping tip (If the tanks jg stilt itllom~ prete The ap[learancl of the first infantry will cause the weapon of til( defense to open lIJl and permit the tanks to dCstroy them TllPreforp til Ulfantty should beware of (gtxpoing many men at first If HlP infantry dehouched in ms~ as it o(casionally did in tlw World War in orriN to avoid the hostile artillery harrage it risks falling an CaJY prey to thl hostile al)toshyrnatiwctpons But it can progressively become hold(r a thf tankskno(k out the hostile weapons Thus a tank attack will maintain its otiensiv( po~er and the infantry can g-o ra~ter and fastlr inlt(a(~ of Jlower and 5Iow(r
The author llllst-l that thp nr fones Will contribute most dT(~divflv 10 ctory by a close (~ollabomtion with ~round [orces ~tncl dp(rips any mai1
comhatants He concludefl that ofTpHiive tatlics anrI thf organiwtion of Jarg(f
unitsshoilid he bapd upon thcfmrJluyment of powerfully armed mel armor(d mechanized vehicles - He imistl on the impossibility at present of havingshyiarge unillt (qually apt at defcnltc of largp irontR and of atta(k and urgls tbespecialization of units This IIf iays if a nfcessity in modpfI1 limps
To wish to escape this in the domain of military organization is to ill~~mn ourop]middotmiddot to oly hwc mfdiocre units which ar jack of all
trades wher(gtas SlH(SS in war dfmaflds maximum quality and ffi(iPtHY 01 the instrumpnts mploypcl for each task
Prolongp(] staiJili7Jioll says tllp author was a (ollltequPH1 of thl 1~im(gtS Qf tl( offltsw tJ1IatI pmployed in til(gt last war ami will ](gt npro~ duced again if Ill(gt same conditions of lack of prpparaliol) ~llfJuld rp()ur But just as til situation in the last wlr (hallwcl rapidly in favor of that s[de which first crpated an instrunl(gtnt of a~tak 1ppropriatp to the neecis o(the hour 00 i1) the fulllrf that army wlill-h first obtains and learns 10 usc of(ensin mfntll -ititcci tn th (xigtlwj of tllf lge will rapidly pnd tillt war tII icor
TIIf EOIUTlON OF nm oHLITHY NII -IAHITtm H()[~ OF Tim FRENCH COONIAI EIlltJ
jLuvolution dll role militairc et maritihlP elP Iempir ()lonial frll1~ cais1 Major Rpgnaut
di~cusioll of til( defCIlSe of French colonits today and thpound ait tllfY ilght afford Frall(( in all Iuropfgtan war ~ ~
_jj- OllGNI7It( L[AISOl l-l 1 J~nJTlON OF m~IOLlTl()r-S l()rglni~aion dt liailtJIl- dan la Illigtpound (II oCuvre lt1( d(structiOlls1
Colonel Hot1SSfgtU
Thegt author disCllS(S tie 1Ilt(gt of dfgtmolitiIJllS under two glntrt1 CllS(gtgt first a ~ttat(gtgi( withdrawal planllrd well in-adyu( su(h as till ntir(mll1t
of the Gfrmans to tllt IlrndtniJurg Iinp in thl spring or 1917 and slcondly in delaying adion TIl( attr (lse bring Ollt stvlral ditricultit~ in tilpound actual
ion IJf dfmolitloI1S s Oil that smlll (gtnginePr partiltgt will he s(attfrec1 over til(
of tile infantry units preparing (hmoiitions This prltparatioll t it is till matt(r of ittuaily exploding till laid (harglH wllith t must not ht done too (hrly or too late llnd ahove all it t(gtr~ e dOIlI olition will Ilpoundgt IxplodNi in gfncrai on t J1)(ciai unI(r of eX(Ushy
hy th( authority whit-h has IJ(Jell dl1pgalpd to -ie this order ion may he made hy higJwr commanders down to and inlllding talion commandCrs battalion commanfiCr fighting a dpJaying action may find in
Ilumlwr of prepared demulitiuns whieh prohahly will have I)(en df1taehmentJ of (llgitw(lr bplollging to various difTerellt units
moment that is when battalion boundaries arp fi)((d
~~ d~~ii~i~r~fd~E~~7~~~t~lll~~~~~(~h~ ~~m~)~)~~~fg(~~~I~~c1~f~~IYnhljo~I~ nginrcr QIIi((r 1hll~ the tran~missi()n or ordpl1l for thp actual (lxgtculiou of emolitions will require cHreful liaison ~Irrallgments
Golanel HOUfseau points out that this situation whieh is ((flain to arhw n the Cafie of delaying action whcrf thing must he done rapidly docgt not
m to he cowr(i hy l)rescnt French rpgllati01l3 lIe imdsbl that unlNlH he JulStion il )wlved grave (ol1seqtrences might arise in war and IIrg(gts he study or SUdl problems on the ground hy units or all arms
March 1938
OllGANIZATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE [Organisation de la DC(cnsc nationaie (ilflfrai Azan
A hrief discull1iou of the effect of the decref signfd in lauuary hy tlw resIdent of France These charge a Miniltr of National Defense with
coordinating the Ministrs of War Air and the Navymiddot TOl15sist ntm hehas a permanent committe of Nltional D(fense Likew-ise he has at his dtiposhyIition the three Chiefs of Starr of the Army Navy and Air Force and he selects one of the( to act as Chief of Staff of National Defense Likewise a new commiittc has been crertted in order to intensHy the production of war materiel
The Chip of Staff of National Defengte (GcncrrJ Gamelin has been sfl(cted to fill thi~ f)()~t) if churgld in time of peace With the study of those qU(ltionfi (onfidcd to him by the Minister IIf (QordlnntcfI the Army and Air Fur((t plans of mobilization aAd opPflltion and the studies of combined Army Nuvy Air Forc( tlpcratiollR
The ffcdll of tillc measurcs will hring ahout a far more unified direc~ tion of olllratiollH in war than in th~ past
l1II~ WAit IN SIAIN TIIIH9~IIlJNATJC)N 01- Am FOlWEll wITn NAVAL Nt) mWUND FOWES
ILa ~ucrrc dI~sPJlg~l(gt La (ombinahon des forc(gts de Iair avec les furce nlvtics IL avcc larmee de terre] General Armengaud
((Iwral Armengaud of the Frltnch Air Force rccentlyentered Spain and
~~ ~ith)~J~~lg(J~~r~~~ent~~c~viltso~o~ll~f~i~~f ~~~~~J~~ J~~~~~t~~ ~ ill QU1r(riy No (i9 fUII(~ 192H pag1 121
INFANrltY AND CAVALlty Ilnfant(rie (~t Cavalerie Captain VNflicr
A lttudy of the dHfprPllles in Imiddotrench regulation hetween the action of dimlHmted cavalry and infantry
WE U]S1 I)] Till lwO-SI~S CMML 1II falll erltlI(r 1(1 Canul des DPllX Mers C~ptllin TOUTte
Ill(gt author sllgg(stH the digging of a ~lnal from Narvonrte on the ~outllCrn ]middotrPIIImiddoth Meciilfnuwan coast to Bordeaux thull giving France a -hnrt rout from till M(dit~rruwan tf) the CH~eaJl no wants tlii canal to lip wilipound ennllgh to hamill any vfHHt1 Hmaller than thp Normundie The rotltp suggpstPCj would parallel the Garonne river for approximately half itl way His artitl(l appear~ to hVe hfcn fltlggested hy the Spanish War situation
FnOM MAN TO U~[lJ~lt bull IDe lhomme au c1wpound] Captain Manie
A psychological study of leadership of more interfst to- French soldiers t111Il other
REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE (Switzfriltmd)
By MAJOR TR PnltllIs Coast Artillery Corps
Deccmbcr 1931
Tim INEITABIIIrY OF CONTINUOUS FItONTS ILa fatalit( des fronts continus] General Rouqu(rlll
(SI( dig(st page 44)
TACTICi[ NOTES FOR THE USE (jF FUTUItE CPTAINS INotes de tactiqtte il Iusage des futurs capitainls] (1) Colonel
L6derr(y
AlmONAUTl( IATIRIEL ILes materiels acronautiqles1 Captain Sch)
Dlgt(ription of tilt Belgian pursuit ship Renard It 361 and thc Fairey
HaWgt light bomhardment The former has a top speed of about 350 milltgts pltgtr hour at 6600 feet cruising speed of 250 milell ner hour at 13000 feet range of 660 miles aod a maximum altitude of ahout 39000 reet The Fairey Battle can he ucd either for distant reconnaissance or 115 light bombardment All light hombardment it can (arry 1100 IlOunds of bombs It r(gtachc~ a maximum altitude of about 25000 feet has a range of 1000 milCH at cruising speed Jnd has a top speed or 256 miles per hour at 15000 f(gtltt
January 1938
THE FIXATION Of FlWNTS IIimmohilisatioll des fronts LifuvCoJonel Mayer
(fiN digp-t pa Hi) I
hUmSSIONS ANllIiIlRn~N(lS 0 THE SINISH WAR IInljlrcssions et pXluriellCeS de lltl guerre dgspagne] (III) Capshy
tain Bauer Th(~e notCH are a continuation of C~tllain nauers observations ufter a
months tour in Insurgent Spain He notes the fxceltent discipline or the Insurgents (omparing it lo that of peace timp armies in their ohservance of military (ourtcRIPH Soldiers arc dvolld to their officers The officers earn
t~i~h~e~~~t ~~l~~ ~r~jmiddot~~eJir~~~e~i~3~ge~~~~J~~or officers is carried
r Jln~ ~l~~~~~it~~Ye~~~~~~~e t~~d~Pf~r~~d n~~~~i~~a~e~~~nh~~~~ 1)( rought without typewrjters and ink In the Insurgent forces paper work
87
K
r
1
I
1
I 11 d r f ii JI I I I
1 11 I 11111 I 11t1 1 I I ~ bull f I iJ i
I )1 fl doI r
I I
II
11 1
fl 1 jfji II
bullbull I 1 r J 1 oj I rmiddot middot
I d ill 110 I ( I r r d 11
q ) 1111 I I orj I 1fI
i 1 UlIr Itl J d If )) II
gt~ Caihlor~f Selected Periodical Articles
I fnl to hamiddot II hi II i(] I nllllllllHP jnt no amlHmt of It
Ill lllLultj - jlIrd I d Hi II 11LI
difficulty or lwrnlliitJ11Ti middotlllill Th irf liimU (middotll to) 11 dI1l71d- f )middotdlfI I mllt
rl lmiddotr I I r I~
1 ( 1
I nillr4 Pll(Htllltf d TIIl bull r II ( d Ill ~panh jJl1 r TI II PJllImiddot I
If) t h(middot frullI tlkH~ Hf 1
~ftf~I~ middot~~ll) dl~)l ~I ~[I jl LIiIIIl fl It gt1
(I) Lilli HI Ink tn SpI) 1 ttllH fnln 11
-1 Inlf I I
Ilq t I lr d111 fIIT I) rTlIitl) d I
II tH d I ()J d f J I r 1111-1 101) rI II IHld I
1 [ llr
Till ~1 I I - I T I ~
I [I ~ I
jl I III - -1101 -- rdd
I r J d r 1 1 I d 1
l11
11ll j117 L~j 11 1 11
I r II j I r
I 1middot1 d f 1 c
1 11
I I 1 fl 1
1
bull
t 1
d I
I II
I I ~
f I I 1Il I
lJ I d rllmiddot J II llft Ill 1laquo1 1 1]11] I d I I 11[11
I IltJI fr n t trd nIIfol f f I ( In(middot (IrI I d]Ij fr l1[( ) 01111] rmiddotITlttr](j 1111111 111 d~ )1 11
r I I t laquo pI p T 1 Ir -1 P 11 lJfllrn d rll 11 h Io 1 11 ~ I I
I j I t1
f I r I IIIHIII 1 oJ
I J rmiddotI Ir 11 rl I rn]
t 1 )r i I I 11 d1 j i
1 middotrmiddot 1 I fl
dr 1li frq bull rr1 r) T I fmiddotr II) 1 I f ] rl 1
11 111 1 1 I I f 11 I 11) I - ill ljr nd f r I t
] I) f f Iemiddotf Ir II d 1 r 111111
1
l
f 111 I
i
middott Itll f 1 I
1 oj
I f I
r
r
t II 1 1 lIP]) It I I) f 11 1
r 11 lOr Ii I f) III Ill 11II d 1111 TIll rI I nil 1)1
frIll 11d Itld J 11 1r 1 Jill t I 1 I u uf d fllI 1 It I llld
I 1I1ln d r 1ll1 111111111 1lift II~ III
1 r r 1 1 ~ JI 11 Illd II 11 11 togt ( 101 rlllll
11 11 j)~1
1 d f 111lt)1 d ]011 I rI tIl11 11
I 11 I Idl II 11 lll 11 r 11 I] )
] f I I I Ii (1 1 t1 d 1 1 1] 111gt I tmiddotr llq III d
lr ldr 11111 Ill 11j I
c amp (88 Quarterq Vol ~ ~
111 (JInIAN AHY 1- Hl7 t lLarm(middot1 allimlluil Ill 1~1i71 ((lloltl vX-lllIdlr re
Sf dil~Imiddott PI)tl 17 ) 1~fr hllHI j()NS -u 1HJJnc of Till ~ljlIl R ~ i~ IllfIpr~II P1 111 rIlIHImiddot tiP Lt gtllrn 1I]ltIlgl)(1 d Partamp ~ Ihf)
Jt ]1111)11 ~1111l )11 r( d a 1 tl tilll~ lruulld fOT IlIW fapllll11 d(11gt jlh
11IIIU l11P Illld ar 1hlTI b 1m 1I01lld IXImiddotppt)Il flt)wr In i Ojllll l- 111 il 1 111 1lt 111( It Ii 1 J hi In urgPIII Ul~dpr an~ clrCll - from
1111 r 11 1 lnmiddot lgII1 all (11111111 r 11111 lIy tlIlr IIHnlWCi to tIl guar iIIIOlII liP II] AI111OlrqldHTImiddotlrrmiddotL)Imaok OIlIIH)thlrhaD~ pr(~~ Ii IT r III 111 IPdmiddot n IIThd - and l1niill~Iollahly 11)(11 uh prlry i~~1 - lanSi 11IIOlfAI~I1 I~if IIii ~I (1)Imiddot1t iiI fOri of (bout lOn lirpllllf f(Hlm 1j~lIO (1 111111i L 111lt1 iI 1111 0111middot1 IIf till f l(j~t of thlmiddot Imiddot Wft ()hSIJI~ J ascl( 1 Iil 111 11111 (oldmiddotI]r had n(lIuPI tn fUflmiddoti~~n IMUon for h~lr j the~ IIlrdul) 1lt) II ITI Ikfl uri to whom (fI II]IP (an Ill gl In th~ Ins J 111 11111111)1 I] fllt1 IIlIlI mOllths of I Ill 1 11 11 broughl down lh enerr Pfs(c 1]111 ]1lrllll Illl 11)11 IIImiddotrtd Ill ([)filfTllld n(IIld thl 1IIlpngt-1ifmiddot11ISOI 11111111 I ltlr 111 middot1 f 111 wn Fnlul) t)I) HwltIm lIltl tiHflt E))gl~~ I P(C 1)11 h IlH r III IId (i I 11 111 lhL1) TIll Irh1lrjllIt rf(Plvfd an apprOl ~ (If ~h Iii 1 h 1lJd 1I11111Hr dUfll thh IIITlIH 1Illtl III Iddllon fLptUlaquod a numk I Itt f l1llt 1111 11111 Ill Ilil Tlli follllillg inlllh pl1- hrlt)ufht do~ illtcal I 1lld 111qnr~111 lilll ~ (I flIlin II Ind ufri ~1 LlJlfP-XIlUport 171 j lUn( 111 l)l~l Illd 1))10 lJ HrI~IIP1 XIX alld I~ Iol a total of 87 ljr1enl
I lrJ1111 f ))]IlnII111 III If Illagl thl Illllju[lttmaldy g()S~1 111 (Jll1lll1t fnrmiddot ()Il~f) lu If)HlltlIIOInlIPdTftuanwithtwen ~~~~It~ VII 11Jt)~ Ilf 111i11ll lIlli ~rl 111L11I1 Sm thn fIITI-(I hI( olItre] I I r Irl 11 ()lli III jU(g( 11 ~111 (PIdlll) PVIIlI h) futilp ltIh lHJtl1llugsa ~ 1)1111 III 11111111] InI Nil )~ltIInlmilt Tmiddott1I1l111~ Iohtlfal plllr vIli parr l )(1
t1 middotIf t) (ljll1ll1tll t fhlgt ptlli( of t IHlpUJttloll I()gml~ 11((1 at any pril fi Hnll 111- lta( hld thollll] of icllm fpml lIJlll) 1l)1 lttill tIl dfgtcL~ ~ J~~ f waf i~ hI InJ~ q1iLtlllld 011 Ill IItmiddotl of 1I111l1 md no 111fl IIw Onefl- rill
~r~~)I~ olfl llllI I1 111 t1 t I IlllhardllHl1t of Cit It illIL(P t hI law ((1 1I]t~O jLt 1lfJ It rl Itdo](Il mel prlllltlni~~ d thmiddot 1flrol1 of IwlYY artilkl) 1OIl
All tIl(gt grr at al1HI ill thp nOTth WI PffIIlTPd in thi~ ly Such ur I til t I f I ullon r luirimiddot ( In~p colla lIflIl(n wit 11 t Ijp l~rolJlil fOfct and t hi cann t Jll~ Imiddot illl]lr)-middot1 hI 1111 III (illil 111lt thl alllmnrnY of tIl( arm V of the LtJ hl- vir d [llil 1111111- 1)middoth If 1111 Ilnl]r~IHHI HI (middotPTtain tJUntrmiddotiflt llOtalr- l inffJ 1 rlllll 11 n I hi IUlll1))1 f 1 ILt HlI 1l1111r1 to ground llIulllrtion L ll(l~ 1dI1l1111lnlv ndulld f~llhl~~
11nl~lilHT 1111 lrlIld IT Jllollfilmiddot Ill 11HHllt 1111htlr) princlPlelI lilF
ll~llt~IIlf ~llIlrIIT(1 ~ri n~IIII)l~tll Itll~~alr~I~~~ lL~~)I~~ca~I~~J ~~~l~ d)lrl d1 Ilf 11111 angt IIIHI 11 fliT thl fTrnoI ~u Ld 1- IItt a1drr-mrn
1lal~ItlOlIlil--I af 1wl lrolllllln ~5 Tul 1937 tIll Nltltionahl 7jIll 01
1111))[1 ~~1n~~I11li ~~Iit ) f I hp Ifr- let im of purltuit s Jfr1
t lllllJl1q1 h l~ I n1l 11mllltt a TPtlt a t Ith tflOJl~ in thC fi~ nIl - I - I hi jrlllt l1l1llliIl1lTl~ in (Oil limnt and usuC
b llhn1 Ihi lItTlIllnn of lhe hjlwr mlllanthT Tro
~~I~I 1 ~ 1111li~~~~ lI~flll~lqi~~~111( 11( 1~1~~ ~S~ (llI~I~(I~~~ ~~~ ~ti~ 1~lln 1 mln~ fldlt If -Ill Itch 1- tJlI OIH of Ill PCllIllt prlr (nd
I~H~~~lIrI hll ~~f f(lii~~It~~ 1)11~nmiddot~1Iy~ riltlj~nt~1~t~~~~Ih i In 1 1111 (fm1I1 uni lll]illl lant ITt tlld ii~htb lrmuHd alill clnmiddot 1 j~~
JIll fllmiddotd in 101 ( I hI nth- 1 lih ~I( h Link ar u~lf1l1 111 fill f(0I11hlhl
~ 1 II~~I ~ II fIiI l~ I~ ~l ]~ 1~1r 1~I~1 ~~I~~~~ui~1l ~~t ~lf~lIl~O~I~ I ~Ir~~ 11-(1 Hut II 1 IIrlILh)1 1 nt1 Illl llllll1l lilt it- TubllPr lrat~cir- 1 1 ~I 11 hr II -upplu II Lltl1l1l 1l1I~ In 111f t11i It Brll1llll BllellltCL ici tl Jlrtlll Ilut I IIII 1 1h 1 [11 If UfPTi 1 h1gt pIlt td thv hlV( ~1I((lIm~J n~l~l 1]1 111111111 Ill 11 1IIIIlll 11Id 11111 hIII] l~rll)lIl 11llti inlttli 1 hI~llll 111 Ill lh1l1 11111 In middotd Jr IlrOtl] If hlllt lhl Thf(lITClr- 1 Link 1111 11 II) ]w I lo)mlr()nll~ wei -IH 1 liw I]ualilv 111111 (s IllfJll 11 I 11-] 1111 111 lh Illlf h 11111 rtl)pmiddot1 Imlo clIlnt sll11d ll~t 111( l1111n] Iq~ lll III IIIud Ihal It J Impllo lhh tn attachc~I jlrf ~~fll]h lit IlllrlI f tI prOlJIrh ITtllll l11d pnplfld l1HtIl llh ltntt 11011 I 1 IIf t Ill It ilL m )fIlt lll~ Ollt fl(d1 thp 1lInpll ltIf a (rrl~ to ( Hill r i III II ill Ihl [l1rl f IH rd ILI~ II tIll hltll of (lIllhTl1 W f~ h( Itrul Lt I I 1111d Il1lllOkr d 01111 11 11 Brit bh LillI wII It I 111))1 fr) Hlir I
I 1] LIlli til ftr1 h 11 Tnlll 111 ill 1t1 111 1l110~ hoth 111 lHlth Hul drp para
~~1 1 III~ t1111 I~ ~I~ 1 I r1] ~I~h ~ ~11 Il~ h7t II~~ It Irt i11fT) ~(~~ Th ItUmiddotiln mllllnk i~lll of 1~1-Il1l1 1lhlllT hal fIVt1l ~~ont a((ount I
II If 111middotll1ld 11l1JOl)1 I 1 )HLI middotlIhmiddotlltIj~Imiddot It 1l1Hlrfllhat j HIIIIlI 11I11 IhI1 If 111 1] 1-1 WIlli III (E lr~ 11l a nUJor ~ 11 1Lnph Ilf I~ ftll Illiull 111111 Oil Ih lJaI hpPIl wlll1(lt 1 llnllllllll) 1111111 1 dlI( dl11 hll Illr~1l11 ilILlion aruwl Ith~17lt - 111111lt11 hl 11Ild Hl(lI 1)(11 fl[ lltIOl tinllq II Iud
ljUUI 101- IHI IHIJ Imiddot Igt ItImiddot I
d1 HI111lli nt- 1Imiddotmiddotrimiddotll 11) [Tlt~ ~ I (ilIHral ~ilgt~f1 ~
TL 1]1] llliu] 1r1I1111 nf plf1I1111 Jl1111P11l1~ III Ituooja ha~h11 1h r illll of a I rl111 ] IrId Infant f I II 1hi army nlLll1U Irlt ~lf 1 1
IIIfn 111rlclIlrt Iollrquol lTIPntlr Lll1h frlIl()OJtllqlllnlf ~ pI)~liP mug Hal1dIIllPf Pari 19J7
88
f-middot ~- -gt~
VolXVIII No 70= ~
at Kiev and 1936 in While RU~ltlhl and at l~oSC()w lumiddotrgf scale d~hllrkatiol1 were executed partly by paralthut and partly ~ hy fHlccccding landingH of transport Jllanes These exercisel ure inloresting and ontgt calllot deny them some value Olle should howewr (xaminc th(m without prejudice tQaetermine to what extent they are actually practicalle and to whht extent they are artificial and of doubtful value
Individual training is conduded fint wry mplh(ldi(~t1ly in s(iwols whfrf tberuture fmrachuthts jump from high IOWlfl wilh tllP Pllrllimtfmiddot alrpadr opened to overcome tim initial (ar Tlwi Uwn PN(((ti to tetuul jtlmp~ frDm ditTerltnt altitudes gradually pftting lowN hut still high flwtl~h to guaranteltJ the certain operation or Ow paraciltllt Acturaey of Jandilll on a prescrihed Rl(ti~ ~ou~ht t~ fa~i1ital( II( ~rouJlig of a Iumbtr ormtn landin~ at Ollt tunCj with till ohJect th( (pltgtl1Ing of tlw paraehllC IS clelLHrl todimmilh the di-llenionTuITI)s af practicP(l with arms and mLlllitl()IlSI FoUowing this group d(seents are practicd and tlw ffort jl-l made to jWfP lS closely h)gftlwr as poltltilllf A soon as twy rIwh Ow ground tllIY nrilnt themselves march and fire bolh day and night
The dropping of iSl)iaf(] individuals for propaganda or fspiollagl purshyposes e~pcially at night is -implt In a sparsjy pOJHllalNi (()Unlry it is also relatively (as) to drop Hmali groHp (hargpd with fltst rltdions or ollwr pedal tasl5s 1I()Vf(r if tl~ jump la~I1 pJa(p at Iliglt ~h( rfgrO(lpnllntvi the parll(lpants ma be iJfJwult alHIf thpy an to IZP Important poiut it isimproiJabl( that tiWl WIll I)p tlllrlf[en((d If till ohjP[t itgt dttrudioll it can only h(middot sUjJNliliIl imp til jnwlitiol1 of Iar~( w(rk~ will rP1lllir( hundred of pound of exposin and it io diflieut to ltpp how a small dpLa(hshyment can tran]lort thc (xplOJ-ivPl on fooL aftlr landing from a parahult
In Rwsia they visualizf and f(alizmiddotd ill tlI mamIIrs dtfd th( landing Qr Reveral hUlldred mln to ~Il(p important ()hj(Ctivrc alld (middot(n o attack r(sPTPI or the rpJr of hostilp JHlitiolllt But OI( (an lJl lt(lI11Pwhat skeptical of till nsults to he lXI)(tIltd in war and lot ill mallfuvtr This j how they an Ix)(gtctrd to opPTatl
After dropping atest parachute to indicatp th( dir(ttion of tlH wind a first wae of5 or 30 pamchutists is launched Tlwltp I (J ol)lain tllf minimum dipersion do not ulwn their chutf- ttntil as late as polt-ihl( UtiHr wafS follow and ~r(jup t1wmpl(gts with tll(gt pr(((din~ ww(s or at past (oordinat( ith their Htion ~[achinf guns small fhld pil((s and ammunij ion are l1s) dropppri nut it it to hI qH~tif)lHd if till parathu (arrdlg w(apons and munitions will not Ill widely dispersed silwp t lwy eaHn~1 fl( oj)(llpd jU5t hefore they rftch tllf ground as can tholtl of tlw mPH dropped
It is eqwct(l that t1w fleharkmclIb will takp placf in the proximitmiddot of enemy landilg fiplds un(jN tIll llro(pdion of pursuit aviation as wpfl as homharilnwllt or attak aviation to attaek t11f ground dEf(ndlrlt Jt is a
~~~~~~~ltl (l~ ~~~71~Ie~~~l i i~~(kVi~~~~ ~li~~ ~~~I~~~(~ f~l~lmT~~~ t~il~~~(follolling this larglr fonI togltJwr with nM(hinl -gun ca~lllt)u ltlnd ammunition will be 1lnd((1 in plallfo tlwy (In talk of llyinlln Jutolll)hillS and tank Tlwy will thus 1)( ahl( tf dphark ltlIc(fosimiddot( gfl)UI (If l tholisand men (JtlI half an hour wi suUit to unload middotIOO() or 5Ollj nwn a forel aliI to obtain important rpsuts Obi()u~y this rl]uires tl( (mploynWIlL of a
bull talXf numhN of t ranport- Actually ahout 700 m(fj Wlre droPPfd hy paraelmt(gt ill t11P Ki(v manllshy
1 Hi in 1935 111 tlw ~lillk mallPUV(fS in 1lJfi about 1500 HlIll with 15 marhn(gt gUllS and g tnneil mortar__ WPrP dropped hy paralhutp and attaewd a-tandirrg ild 90 mil b(hind tll front In th(gt iloscow 1l1lIlPUprs OOO parachntist W(f( droPP(d in SlcCsshC WtVPS thlY fizlci ltIll airdrolt1f on vhich a compldl rlrimpnt of infantry wa __ d(gtharkri from transports
Oh iOllSI these operations wpre not (olldue(d undfr (fitahlP war mnditioll W(gt do lot know how th( tfrrdin was O((upifd anrlchflndlri In Iar it vmlld hav( IIP1l d(flndNI Till lranltlorl pianps (arryinJ the pJilchutbts f](V at ahout ~j()O ft( Tlwre was thus a good (hanel that thro Qe-ienhf I)lahine glllllt would hae (alJSlci 10i(1 to lw trilll~l0rts crews Jnd paradHlt ist at t 11 (inl of Imding lnd lafun 11HY loulrl rpJroup thrm~(ns and hI afmbkd in (oJHhlion to mallPllypf and fight
Admitlin~ that tllP ~llC(sit wanlt of para(huth(s wtrp ahlt to i-piz[l a landing- (wId alm(j~1 in~tantly altllOu~h it MiIlS hi~hly improilahli tlu defendfT- hpll drivp aWlY would COlltjllll lo t1~h usil1~ IOIlI ran~( machhw gUll lin against tht tranltlrts mlking the latN landings
RUsiiJ1l in~truct ion of paradmtits j tlrtainly priolls wtl is Hh(Ppt il( ofinterlsting rpsults It is IIPfitll(gtlpss plrmissilt to ngtrrl till SP(IuIlt dtScrib(gt(j as of slight (hanc[l of SIIlPo 111(gt1 (onltidPTatir)J]s should not pffient the trainin~ of military paraeilutists with a view to (rtain operashytions which may he posihh in sIJecial eases and which Wf gthould he preparfd to excrute FralHp hoW lt)mmellpd thi work and groups of parachutists have aJrraliy taken lart in sma olHrat ion~ It ilt wif though 1101 to ht our imaginations wltlndpr to (X(lt in tlw maUN It is not sullirient to havl parachutists tflaquohnieJll~ wpl instrueted it is equally important that thrjr instruction and ta(~kal fmploymlIt should be wiicly laquooncehed and conshyduetId
ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY (Glealllriluin)
July 1938
ASIIW)JIE ~1()P1mNliIJl) By th authors of Air Stratq~yl
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articlesmiddot
ROYAL ARMV SERVICE CORPS QUARTERLYmiddot(Hreat Drituitl)
May 1938
PhTItOJ SUIJY IN WAR ~ SO~fE lROBLE~IS Sm-IE TACTICI Ll-SSONS IN CONNECTION WITH MT E~lPLOYED IN
OlEltATION8 AGAIN~T AN IItRTGULAll FNEMY Till MAINTHNANc[] OF A MOIIII1l1middot()IUg HY Alit IHlItINlt ()Pf~IA[IH)NS IN
J)ER-l-~lT COUNTIlY
ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Gnlt nritain) June 1938
Tm USl- UF Im~()ITIONfi IN Tm~ (BIIAIGN IN SOUTH POLgtND DUIUNG O(TOIIEH Ill14 Captain Meltzer
SIt(AOltjl - Tm~ F()UNHlNfi (W Till- mw lJI-FImiddotNCImiddotH CoIOlw1 Malan
ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain I
July 1938
1111 ~lIL)nmNT OF A ImiddotANK IlHlGim AT1I1 IN ~H)j)~HN WAit
UNITED SERVICES REVIEW Grfat Britain)
28 April 1938
-(j~m ligtfII(TIONl of TIII~ ANSCIHllsS CoJOIwl B(adon
5 May1938
HY f-WAN IS IN CHINA Mljormiddot aenamara CAN Im ClIINISP ImSIST lNf)IFINln~ly A (tOHImiddot-- STUnI m Tm~ Pm
KST It Air Commodore Charlton
19 May 1938
J)I~lOCHCllS nmus IlICTATOnSlIIlS Tim nllOltTMCE OF 1~N1TEi) jmiddotW-l Air Commodore Charlton
1middotUDlN( TIII~ I~H~ OF Tim AIlligtfBN LEsSONS OF 11IP AlJlmSHOT IlOAIl ~lOYI~Il-oIr middot)Xlm(lfm KG Mandeville Roe
26 May 1938
nIOTAIN1 ltFiHigtMImiddotNT A 1)1IINSln IUfH Air Commodore Charl-Ion
2 June 1938
Aim w ItHFmNSII OF Am IlmmAIUnllNT Air Commodore Charlshyon
9 June 1938
AlT(ti ANII 1011NnR-ATTAtK IN SPAIN Major-Gelpral Fulpr Im NlIW FOH A j)J)IItTlIENT OF SUIIl Air Commodore Charlton
16 June 938
Fm-Nllt lJtlltW1 IIWDtlCTION Air Connnodort Charlton
23 June 1938
Im TltHTIi AIIOIIT Am WAltFAltl Ajr ComrylOrior( Charlton
30 June 1938
Till PI- iLol-mNl Ill (JI)IN( Air CommodorC Charlton
7 July 1938
1hmss InmHSAL Fun WAlt WBAT TIII~ llI(1TOIt tnliNTIU~S IIVE J[~H-l IN HpAIN Air Commodore Charlton
14 July 1938
Im tIlWROUS Mil PImiddot(tWP N1IONS WllIeH RllPPI) WAit 1IjTEshyHIS Air COlllm(J[jorcgt Charlton
21 July 1938
LJSS()NS OF TIm SIANI~H VI Air Commodorl Charlton
28 July 1938
h110lnANIp ojmiddot Tim Rsqu (OUNTln Air Commodorp Charlton
VETERINARY BULLETIN (~IPJll(nIllt to The Army MCdical Hullptin)
July 1938
~1 oUIIl1m 1I0HSE~IH)J~INt POIt tOAIl lIIAllCIIE~ Liputenan( JOIl(g
89
19
Readers Guide and Subject Index
A flll Vurrllflt Ir Arm AmmUnltlOm Io)lnlllil
I~~~~~~~ itl nllf ntltnnk llllt iI bull r I ~ rr ~ (rnamI Ann r ~r I
middotTlllllfU1 ~ f 1I01wl I ~ru7dln l I Tt
rmrod rlnflr - rllljlI+ Ij
I nnhd IlrlI1 j
Inbull j l~k
~
tilf J jn
If) 11-(gt[
jnrall) IIIIIInrrrSlr
IO
G
K L
I rt
1-nrl ~ f r 1
a
1 j 1-[_1-
I
v
LiST OF PERioDICALS INDEXED
AND
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
A Ord 1 (Irl A Quar r1n Irt linIn)
Bul Bdglt Mil HI) 11-r gtlIUUlrimiddotq 1111shyum)
Cln Dd QUilr c h II fmiddot (lT1i fly II uunda) Cay Jour (dr) rurnal C1V Jour 1GB] (-dr JltlIJrlm 1(pound1 at Ilntam)
Chrm Wlr () 11= d rlan illl111l CA Jour 1 r I rj I nllt fA Jour 111 r1 r 1 ur1 Ftp Forc 1 jh rr 11 Bnl]) L Fr ncc MIl J a lrIll hltaITP 11 rtI)
Jour RAMC ~Jlrnd f II HOIl Army 11lwll (middotrJ Cn 1 BTllulI
Jour R Art 1ur11 ( ltl HlI rllllf~ ((rnl UrllI Jour nusl f 1 bullbull r 11 [(~llOoI nil JI1IUI
ren I Bnta Jour USII Journi f II llld n JIIlltulllm of
101 (1 Brl IJI])
Kr~fl Kruflfahr)1IIprlTlIPI II) MeG 11 (fJ(Ilt
MIl Mltl flhlln~ Llhall 111111 t 11r)
MH~Wo(h )llttrmiddot~ 111111( rmatl1 Mil Eng ~llll1ar It lt r MIISuro Iljlln Nllv In~t Proc - 1
PIon II II rmn~)
QM R tur n r It ~ w
Rn~Orf_Hmiddotr (H1Imiddotr
Rv tift CY ll _II d I allt IIruu)
RY dlnf-ll Ill dlpln ril IIrlllll) Rv Mil Gcn H 11 Idllln (i(nlra[ (irallr)
Rv Mil Su[o itnu(gt 1I11111j[middot SUll~~ (SWIIwrjlllld) AAF Quar ltoynl Ar FUTr IJllarlltly (nnt Bntuln)
nASC aUlr JtuY1l1 nIl) - nH Iri~ (lllllf(rly Gil) Hrlhll
Boy Eng Jour ItnyullI)IHr Jurnulllnnl Ilrllaln) RTe Jour Itul lank (q~ Jourllul 1rlIt Irllln) U5 Rov llnllnl ~Irvln~ Itnl w (Ir at HfI~nln)
Vet Bul VrlNjnll~Y IIlIlh till
Jan Jllnu~rj Jul bull Tullo Fob middotFhruar Aug AJJII~t
MOl tlnrrh Sop Imhrr Apr Apr1 Oct_ Ilrluaf
May 111 Nov Nombir
Jun JUII Dec [Imlr
A
ABYSSINIA
AERIAL WARFARE
I 1 J f)I r ll t HI L) ( I I h rul~h 1 I) I- If UK Jji1)
II pngtj~IL Var n J v f It 1 Ir I UpI)II Jour Jul-UjJJIK)
Vi1 th h1h (ornmlfId 11 0 Ii r IMI (aoshylUI1)
lodrn wllraJd It Jl)7 f lila I dur IU)l HUR)
rrrll )Id (hal oJ Ilmd warmn IJollr I~IISI JUH)
~hmor(gt mod rnI1 d It 1 Quar Jul Ink) Ar 1 IlPIrfllll1~1~( of fl1T Jnmllnrdrnlt nl 11 Itfv
lIm) Th trill h hul aIr Hflln 11S It ~ I lull 1laH) 1 Ir c~ n h l fnr nr IllS n -7 Jul 1~lJ8) Thr hHarq f (I ~ It ~ -I j Jul IJ38) 1-11 of thl Spnlll~h l1r n~ Jt~ ZlJu 1IlH) TIH n r1l11 rlitlWI r - rrlucutOrl of tilt popltllnliull
111 -IJullJIK) rnt Drttummiddot9 Illr lrujm lLa rrnnr hill shy
1118) r rltII1Il1 Ihr lf[I~ (11 111 lllr 1Jl1)
i~~gt~~I~~1 n~f rt~ ~~ 11tI~~~lnt~~~1 n~rj~~d~ M~ll~~ - Ilnr 1l3H)
II-llr mi bUlilh~ rHlq1rlCIfl (11 Mill In19) or rlld Ilhrtr~ 111 l1U- ~l[r 11ltl) r atl-llkltJn IHud rop~ ll1middotmiddotoch-l Apr 1938) n pecunty lind Ill( Ir dTtnl IR 111 (( middotJlln I~~middot inlpr -~Ion~ 11111l P rH nrs of Ihr SplIlllqh Wtr (Ih ~
1lt - Jan l-ltIgt llll)Ih l~n7 hlllII~OrS 1Il II( I1llllrad Ilmiddottru1 Ill
SW_~l J 19)11) AIR ARM
Orglnlzlton and EquIpment
r furclt XllIn~lOn (lI~ I- rc - lUll 191fll bhmore mOIl rmz I H F Quar-Jul H138) Frrllfh rcratt rrllductlOlI ItS H -Iii JUlI (9311) ((f1I1 ilnll1H11 nr plthltm (I[limnmiddot MI J)I~~
I~118) rlalltllt 111111 rlO I I ~II SU1-or -- I)(c IV71
Trlnlng TactIcs
Til rIlt I ililI01l Oth InfChUnlZlrl caulr~ (n k Ju u 1)Hl)
11( IWIIII rntta IInvTour Julu~ 9~~1 Ill Iom r 011 t1 nln~ t throurh (FII-Ilt1fc Ac
11lfl) r J10WN 1I1l1 tngtnp ITH1 InllIt (Inf Jltlur Ml Jun I ll 11h h middot)I1Hl111illlll jllll1r l tll (i JunlQgt Twln1 awl 1dlnl~lrull 1~middot f Ii Vllrll hHmiddotltt~
IJur Iltl-l MI IV) r~rmiddotd IIrl1111lt or tomorrow (Ql HI - Julmiddot l~ 1l3QI
qllmorl llIolh rIIIZJ (ICF tlullr - Jul lillS) Tlw TtJaHltt 11111gt or 11 nwhmiddot fun hy Ilir durllj( 01 tat~I1~
1 10 rl -(nl IltA~( llllr 1IIuv 111)1 [11111111 1111 111[lh mrm (IS It 11 a 1gt~ r llgtT1IIltI1)furlgtnllllurdmIII1 IllS1 211
11lH) ilwlmlhnlHltll mrvnrlllr (l1-1 21J1In 11311)n dnlupln II of 11llnr IU- t~ ao Jln 1l3S1 Ir~~l rrlwnrnnl for Ir (IS It 7 llll JJI) I~ f l ~[I11h VHr (1 It v 1 luI lllH (rrat Ilnll11111 nlr prn]] nI 111 Fww 1111 11)middot11 JJ
l)]~)
Ir raldwd tl(rIltI 11Il1111tHI 1I1nr 1911raquo IXl rlo 1lt HI nT Wid pr(ull I rlll 1I11t ~lur I~~ jr lIIrl~ n lruJ Irop (0111 WllIh I Ir 11l3~1
lr)u1Hi WUtH7l1UOIl of II Hlr rOTl lrl (1 or orpll~J rnlv I 1tu~~inn )1 (1I1l1middotVIHh 8 Apr 19lRi
Thr nnlul hlflllllrj 1l1I~n (ltv dInf - Mllr 1~1ll T ucunty lIJ)d Ihl HT oT(J)I1 (ltv ]11 GlI Jlln IW
Imp~a~ IJ~~l ~I~jl~3~) of t111 fllll11lh WHf (ll M
S Tw
F
lion
Th~
Tho
otl Bom
M 1111 A~tll nll
M
Anll [)~fl
nU1l1
Irr Iu
Tan Th orr
Tar
~r
n
I Imiddot Th
(~II
T bull
Th
M
p
So Tt
n I I
TI
TI
tI
N
T
I
2
(LIIIri1~
10-111
fA Ord -Sl
lIlay-JUll 1918) middotIatlon oltgtufnational
Jour-1I1IIy-J1InI93S) - ~Iay-Jun 1938) ht- Jul 1918)
C]wm War - Jul 1938air 1gt1( Gal-Jun
~XlfljIN-o70~ Readers Guidea1d SubjeetIlidex0=-- shy
T~j-~~(lr9a8) in the IAoninvad IliltricL R~ M~i Or~1~~~il~3gl)n thil PlltCution of d molitlonll (ltv 1gt1H Itenmmkllmrtll raid in the WilT witn China (Rv de CavshyMar~Apr 1938)
troog landinge rrom alrpInnlll In Hu~a (Itv ~1i1 SusS( - ~ The J~l~e ~(J~938n the Leningmd ljHl~lct mv Mil lt~fanlry and cavulry (ltv Mil Gcn - Mar 1966)
Fe ANfMALS11l~8J of Rabat and KhemislCt (ltv
Arab hOT5( hrrtJlng in Syriu ( 19JB)
the aupp y 0 oraea n OUt middotllTm)middot (ltv Mil ~uir~(f - Jun
1938) ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
ntJmiddotairuaftbull (A QlIlT - Jul 1938) (C Jour-shyBo~~~u~~h~~~mln t~l tone of the Interior
A~tlalt~rll(~(omI1UlltntllgtnH leA Jur ~hl)-Jun 1)3K) Aahmore mo(hmiddotrnteltmiddotd (llF qullr _ Jul t1IH) nliir~Talt wellln lind thmiddotor middotmplymlnt (1111 MIlt
Mar 191l) ANTIAIRCRAFT OEFENSE
nli-airer I (AQullr -Jul 13f1) Dtlen~ lIJtainstlUr ~Ul~k ICa Juur - Jul-Au1 W18) BambinKIllrllllo111rl thzonflhltlntlmiddotnnr ICAJoUT
~lay-Jun 11ll8) ~ntltrtrillt fommUlliclltiurll IC Juur - ~ll1)-Jurl 1JIi) St-unty lur tlalIIrviI r ~u)plY ((wm War Jul 1~HI) AJhmore illdmiddotrnlzmiddotd (ItAf quaT Ju119l1l) Theaaial danl(r - Imiddotduclltion of thmiddotJopulatlon (La Franr ~1i-1 Ju11938)
lllurrnft weapon IIrlfl thr cltnfIgtmct (1gt11 -111 MIT 1JlII)
~lairrll1 uui(hfll (m~lrurtln (111 ~II Itr 1~)Pi)
~~~7g~~I~~~~ij~t ~~~i~~~ ~~n~~r~I~middotmiddott~~~~ rr~~rL~ ANTI GAS
Pn-ltoutlOfl tL~njnt Ia~ nttark~ (gt111 ~lItt gtlaT 1938) GLlprotcctlUa or lhe CIV pjoulatlot] ulwad 1-111 -htt
olul31) ANTITANK
R~~rit~~~~~n~~~~~~li~~t~IYHJt~~~~j8)IU 1lIH)
~~IOO nmiddotfle-rtwn lin Infntry mutt mmiddot1 ami tactlr~ Ilnl Juur Jul-u 19JH)
neSpom~h Vllr A reVJ( th hest )] 110 dnt Jour - Jul-AuK 1935
TILnD -Ilrmored rconnngts~anr vmiddothltI(middot~ and rh dfln~ Igamt the~e (Krull _pr I~Jax)
lhp Bnt~~h Army in 197 tl~v laquo( (L I-Fh 1311) jbgt rnooHn tank Its (IIpnl1)htmiddot~ und mgt1) mat m Ow
aacK (ItvdJf-- Mr IJJRJ TlCUe()fYflterday und 01 trmorrgtw (It~ gt111 FI
ICI=~SJ~~~l-~6~rJ3S)ell of the- SpluJ1h War (itvIlI
lak llttack agllinst antitank gun~ IS FnwJn lthtury Dta
ARMAMENT
Ppa---dn=~ in Endlln A sludy r mduHlr1 mohilzaln
B~~~~d ~~~~~~~ I~~~ Itcbull 26 IIlY EJ8)
ARMORED CARS
ART OF WAR STRATEGY
1betlnx in Smin TarII~i~tm fall1 I bullp [It folh tNmiddothmtgt fA Ord - Jul-Auf Hll8) bull
StratlrC and cnt(1l1 mafHinlmiddot Tlu IT rIllgt (1) nUT naljfml lCUnt~ (A Ord - JUI-lUf J~18)
Tle malor tactiClt of thl cncunt r baltIc (A Quar - Jul 19381
nttmy thai Clln llta~k - a l~illn llml 11 lt1middotfnf laquo(no DefQuar -- JullIIJ
A ~y~tcm of anti-tank dr n~middot (ClIlI D( r (lmT -- Jul 1l1II) ~crale (shouldr to IIhould(r) (Cw Jour [Gil) Ju 1935)
yenhS~sa~j~h~~i~ r~~t~r~h urri~~~lrll~~rllon (Inl Jour-Jul-Auo 1938)Counterbalv-ry In mohH warlaT( lJuur It rt ~- Julll38)
Will the hIgh commanlt lak If thgtgt aLr (Me filll -- Jun 1938)
Tldie2l and udministraHlt lessons of the VaT In Abys~mm aour nUSI ~ gttay 1138)
The battl fI War~aw AUlu~t 1920 IJur HU-- - May 1938)
Modern war and llq maze f maChLnl (Jour llVSI -tay 1938)
PCIor waT~ (Jour IJsn - pr 1~13i) Ashmor~ modfmiddotrnigtltmiddotd lJtAI~ QUilT lui 1l8) lltlme tllMka hIWlnR In cOllnfdlUfl wult 1gt11 fmiddotmplu-lt In
~r~ai~r) agllinst un irnKunr 4middotn my (llSC ltjmushy
r~~~kro~ri~no~~n~i~J~~lItmiddot~T ~_tj~i ~~8) - Jul H138)
t~tkrh~a~~tf~-~~t~ckAJSyent~~l_(~~l~rljH) Jun (llll) ~1llI of th Splfllsh War (US llv - 21 Ju 1l81
ftfR~~~ f~~ins the qurrn of haltls ILa FrnnC( Mil - If
Theaerial dangT - cducntion of ~hcppultion 111 Franc( Ml-lJul1918)
Thoullhtlion llll duration of futtlre war U1114 Voch -- 1 Apr1938) _
The rnod~m tank Ita capllbilitll~ lInd mploymlnl In thlt 1 It~ck (ltv dInr - Fh 1(38)
N(J(t On thl bllhr conduct or wnr (rom 1792 tu 17l7 lind rtom1911toJ)16 IlvMIIGcn-Jllnfeb1938
T~~~ Yllwrday and 01 tomCJrrow (nv ~1U Gen - Feh
Th~~~~v~ea~~(j~i~~~alv~ti~~i~~o~~~t~~ghl~sa(lr~Mil SuiIIIC-Fcb 1938)
Me hRlliwllltgtn [Sec Original Military Study) Tal~rK~~~lk against antitank guns IS loftiKn MIlitary
Thelnrvltabillty o(~onllnu()ul fron19 [SlcFJrlI(Jl MlItnry l)lIWlIAj
TIlt fixation or rr~ IS -onign Military IlhttlIs
ARTIllERY
Orgarilzatlon and Equlpmcnt
n )lnv~tlt ~oldl~r nltcUlry (1-A J()ur 11lly-Jun 1IJH) Cmmun1ltatin wlthm thCliht huUalm iImiddot- Juur _bull ~layshy
Jun 19~R)
~~~~l~~~~~ ~~jh~~~~m~~~~f~~middot~~~~[~rij~IU~~ilI Mny 1938)
(lur artlll~ in 1ll5 (Jtll~ (ljl -hl- Imiddotmiddoth 1118)
I Training Taetla
k~~~ ~~~~ltf~~~g (~[~J~~ - ~l~t~~~ l~i1~ Tralfllfll rurrrinntionll1937 (Jour It r - JullllI)
~~~~~t~~~II~t~~7l~~I~I~~a~~ltl ~r~lif~~~(~1Iw)~~a Apr 113B)
11w A II cmiddot I artdlry fir~middot IItv IIn - Jlln Inll)
ATTACK
Ikllt-n~ nIIin~t aor ntrlltk ~(av Jour - Jul-Au 1l8) The mounttmiddotd attnck In open rdgtr (Cav Juur-~ Jul-Aug
1918) _ EqUIpping for aHk r nVNlt (Mit Fn~ -- Jul-AuI In) TIll emplQymlnt of a tllnk IlfiJllldc (ftTC Jour -- Jul 1918) AHack In modern war ItTC Jour - Jul 1911I ttark Ilnd counter-attack in Spalll HJS ltull ~ iI Jun 1J11l) lr atlacks on ground trop$ (~liI4Wochmiddot--l AIr 1l38) Tlw traimngofcnglnpgtrlplldcrllnncl men (PIOn --[-1middot11913) Th mod~rn tllnk Ita cllpnhihllS and empymltnt in It
(Iaack ltv dInf-Mnr 1J38) Tllnk nttak I~hangt antItank guns I~ l-nll~lI Ilitury
Illlltlmiddotgb AUSTRIA ARMY Of)
n PUhly-lh~ar old mlilary schuu (1)liJ Milt 19111) fltJ
BELGIUM (ARMY OF)
I11slry vI the Inspcctorut GeMral [ the Army unll the HIIshylUln tmimng cent durinllthpoundgt World Vnr Hlul DIlI1 lgtJl-Jln-eh MUT 1938)
Ihmiddotsrijltim Qf educatlflnal and vQcational trnlninK 01 thlt Illll(nln SQ1lti1(t (nul Beige ~fi - Jlln 1938)
Aronalltir mat(middot (Rv Mil Suisse - Dec 1(37)
BUlGARIA (ARMY OF)
Motorlzalionothenrma N(wconccpliQngoforlnniznlion Iquipmcnt and emplnym~nt in fflr(iln armilt~ (Kraft- shy
May 1(38)
CAMOUFLAGpound
Air PW(T afld ro~)p 110VCmLnt (lnl Jour -- May-Jun 1938) Tnllllnr ruminatnR 1917 (Jour It An ~ Jul 1938) Cnmoulnlc nnd blackQut (Mi Mitt -- Mllr 1131) Ground orgullTatltm of t~e Ilir rjf~ Prutcction of airpoTL~
lI~rordmg to ItWltB18n Views MJImiddotWch -8 AN 1938 imlT(middotgHlonq Ilnd IXpctl(ncog of the Spanl~ War (itv ~1il
Suissc--Jun Feh HJ3S)
CANADA (ARMY OF)
(anlth~ tltgtrltlgn pohcy (Cup j)1f Quur-middot-JuI191S) lrQhlltms of defence on the PaCIfic (Can I)f Quar Iu
1J38) CAVAlRY
Organlzltlon and poundqulpmcnt
1918)
CHEMICAL SERVICpound
New wllr I(IUI(gtI [Qr uhl (A Ord - Mlly-Jun ll38) SNurly rr thl ReTVic f RuPIlly (Ch~m Wnr - Jut 1938) lrenutionsIiKuinKtluHlIlIlIkll (MllMltt-Mar1938) PhYRiuloKIlal ~fT(lcL nf j(HStfl (Mll Mitt ~ Mar ]9381 GUIII)roI~tlon of Ill( civil popullltIon nbruad (Mil MIlt-
MlI~ 1938) CHINA (ARMY OF)
~ fhl(91~JlIn~ luraquoitiVlt EXjledition in Chlnll (A QUII1-- Jul
fhumifr in tlw EuM 1 mth~ f til( wllr in Chinu (Jntbull JQl1r-- JUI~lUr 1131) Why Jupun i~ In (hina ((lR W -(j MIlY I9JB) (~an 1Ill Chin~~ rl~i~t illdJinitdy (US Itev - ~luy 13H)
COAST ARTIlLpoundRY
Bombinv plratiolll ill Illlt ~)Jl 01 the iukrior teA Jourshy1ny-Jun lJaS)
~~i~i~r~ft th~mDr[~~a~(~~i 1(~itr3~-(E~Yj~~i 9rel4 jullJ8)
IIm)lIrdmnltatiltgtI (f Jour --Jul-AuJ 193H)
COAST DEfENSE 11lt(ltU or the Bdg1Un rna~( HII44 918 (CA J9uf-Jul~
Aur19J8)
COMMAND STAFF AND LOGISTICS I((IJ[lr~dn(SIlt ioElIRlund IItudy of indo~lrjal m(Jbillzation
JllP flrgalliza1ltI1l and runmiddottion~ or the llltiwal Stfvi(g in cumbimmiddotd opmtouns IIf lund and ~tU frorl_ (Mil Sur shyMy Jun 1J38~
jllctltII IIml Idmml~trllliv(middot ll~ of tlimiddot Var in AUYl8lniu (Juur HOSJ - IIIY IJ38)
Air-hd armimiddotq r omormw (lI H Jul-Aul 1l38) 11lI J~e~~~(JiJ38nfulltTY dhmiddoti~irHl in dmiddotrltn~ (QM iev-shy
dw supply in war soml prohlmiddotml dlA~G QUilt - May 1938)
fill 11middot((1 for a d~partmnt nl SUJII) tU-l IlIv- 9 Jun I ~)3)
NftllH un Iimiddot hirtr cdud f wnr rrltgtm 1792 to 1797nnd frum 1914 I 1918 (ltv ~H1 Gell -- Jan (U 138)
National d(fn~ ltv lI1H (itll ~ Jnn 1938)Ihll l~thOrian Campairn 111 s~rice of supply (ltv Mil
(II-Jun 1938) OrgmTatinn Qf national ddnM (f~vom Gn - Mar 1938)Thu lIupply Qf hlgtrsClI in our urmy (ltv igt1J Smpoundgt - Jan
1938)Tlw mlhlCnce on our tn(tilt~ lllthelltroductionnrmllllof
motnmcd and nrmnnmiddotd (hi((H by our n~lghuors itv Mil SUIC - FllJ 1938)
Mprhlllliwtion [S~ OnginJl Hitary Study)
CONVOYS Air powrllnd lrQnp mOYnQnt (In Jour - ~by-Jun 1938)
COUNTERATTACK AUa~k and rou1l1r-al1u~k ~n Spain (Ult(middot J Jun 1938 1l11k~ In tIll d r11~1V Wlth th Fr Army Aril nud Muy
191H_ (ilvdInf-Jun Ul38)
COUNTERBATTERY Cuuut(gtr lJaUlry in mohile warflllltmiddot IJQUr It rt - - Jnl 1938)
COUNTEROFFENsIVE
Ihe hnUle or middotWIlnltlW AUI(Usl 1920 An fxample of tho rltlunter-n(f~nsl JUf ltV -Muy ll3B
)
r I DE~lLpoundS
Ill ImiddotTOlIlin of the An-l(lIin 1817 St Forlln Mllilflty])1gIHj
DElAYING ACTIONS Command -- Conlrol -- Cummun$tions A rtgim~1l1al
viewPQint (Cnv Jour-Jul-Aug 1938) envnlry tllk s to wheels (I~II orr - Jun InR)N(w ways fQr motor and ridr (Kraft - Milt 1938) HOff( hreding In the region of Rabal and Khemil~eL (Uv
dcCav-Jan-ub 1938) Evolution of British cavalry (ltv du env - 11ar-Arot 1938) ThesitulltionnndmodlofArnhhoTIIImiddotlmedlnglnHgtrill (ltv
de (IIV 4_ Mnr4Aflr lI3S)
hi i~~middot~~~rll~orlli rfK~~~1formalllHJ in 11middot ltuIllllryi
Training Tac1los
Did th(y knQw hoW (Cov Jour - May-Jun 1l38) The rol f iution with m~dlRnllmiddotd ravry ((IW Jm
Jul-Aug 1938) IJdcnAe aloinllt or nllnck (Cav Jour - Jul-AuK 1938) Th( mounted Ilttnltk In pen Qrder_ (Cuv JQur - Jul-Aug
1936)
Orgllflllmg hui~on in the ~I(utinn of demolitions (I~v Mil 01 FlJ 1911raquo
DEMOCRACY
)emocru~ middotr~us dlcta1L)llIhil~ (US R(gtv - 19 IllY 1938)
OJMOLITIONS
TInmiddot vtj fll hmlOliliuJlllin th~rllmJ1Li~n inSnulh 1lano during
()r~lfl~~r~ Ut~l~n j~t~h~~~cJu~i~l~t~~~~i1~lons (ltv Mil r4n--b1938)
DICTATORSHIP
1)~mj)rmriltlJ Vltlt~ dirl~tlt)l1Lhip~ (U~ IlIv - - 19 MIIY 1938)
DISCIPLINE
lrnn 1Ii~dplinc i~ mort nClt~SIlry thnn 4r Itt tlw ~ltllil Army (La Ifllnn Mil )-ZO pr 1118)
ECONOMICS
TIlt (middotvnluatiol1 (If lIw Imlire (ftna CuI MlI- Feb 1988)
91
lt1]) )1)
-i )IoIlt1umiddot JIf)
I
lrl It I)
F
rItHH C[ MllITAnv t rMVAll
I)
FOIlTIFICATIONS
)1 11
11
) fFlA-ICf ARMY OF
) lll
I ) t 101 1 JtI
f
I I 1 I )
) I 11 I -I
I l J]101 1 lt1 I 1 I I (~J
I ~
j I 111
111
Supply
1e
I dlII I 01
i I)
fr I 1 lt1 I I 11)
1 I T[
) JII
1 1
rflANC[ NAVY or
11 I 11 (I 1 J
01 r I 111 11
VUTUflE VJlprAPE
Jl I i~ 11
(i
G(OGnAPIlY MILITARY
It If 1 1-1 11
Cf)nmnd and St lit
1 )q~ J 1 I~I J ) I j gtq bull I II d) d I 1 r
OrlJ IJ Hon nd Equipment
Ii III 1t
I
) ))11I
I II I l[)1
IIrp111tHII
d)l It
I a Irall 111
Trdllinn
1111 1 r 11
[I)middot
1111 d l
II III I 101 h
1
GtRMANY NAVY Of I
11 I )f 01110 )1(I )tl In I~ c 1 1] 1 I IIlt I
Gn[AT nnlTfllN nFlMYOr)
I dr I ~ I 11 -
I )))]1
1 I 101)1 Id j
1 ~ I
Orrl1nr1tn 1nd flUlflnHlt
)1)11 I jn
l r 11)11lt) h qrgt 1111 1ul-IJI
1middot -1 rnll d
middotIlf I II
jl 1 I~ 11 11 r bullbull -1 bull ) nrlnp I r L ft ~ hIgt
1 ~ 111 1-lt1r- bull [eImiddot I 11pI+P 11 ) - I 01 ltd 11 III II 11
1 lIlt1 1)lt1(10 11lt)
ril L ~ lt I d1 I~ l
t bull I1
middotmiddot)r J t 10 I 1)1 r11l hr f ) r
fTl I 1-
Supply
p 1gt1111 It-( 11Ie 1
11 rr IrjllrllIrl Ic~ I - I lr 1) 1lt1111
TrlllJlnl
GRfAT ORITIIN NAVY or)
I j ]1 11lq1 gtI(q)middot11 lItO 1
lNrANl HY
Ornn)r Uon lllrl flUi[HPfllt
rllnlng Tlttlcshy
11tIIr
C amp GSS Qualterl Vol -- ~
h 111111 alld 11-1111 ilf1r1
jlnl middotlr]IIgtl1 Ilr lII~)
INTELLIGENCE middotMILITAHY AND NAVAL)
I 1 I ~ f
1 1
ft) I
1
JAPAN flnMY orl
Ip I ~I d1 1 11 II
1middot1 11 d I
JAPAN NAVY Of)
] j lulllli1 I I -I 1 I ~ Ir
Inolc1 lt111middot 11 11 1t1-lll11j Il)
JOINT OPERATIONS
Ifl r 111111lt11 ] 1 11 111 I
1 I 1- 1 rbull ~1 Il 11middot1
L
LflnGr UNIlS
ArlllY
11 middot1 +]11[1 1101 (h I] li-I
92
LAW (MILITARY AND INT~RNATIONAL)
ReadersGuide andSubject Index
MOBILE WARFARE NETHERLANDS
(uolN Imtry III mhil warfare (Jour It Art _ Jul 191fI) The Ie of the Nelherlandll in lhl wlt)rhl of lO(lay (QM Rov lJ malntrlam of ~I mohilmiddot lorc lJy nir durinl tll1NlItiona in - Mayhm 1l1H
dlt~(rt (ountry (ltMC ltlmr gtlal IJIH)t()I()~Illt101l and mllnuwr 111 ~ltl- 1 IWI) NIGHT OPERATIONS Ih~t~~UWt~~fd~rI~]~~l~~1 t~I~~IJgtinc illviniun in II mobile Nhht rill( crmiddot~liug (ImiddotA Juur- Jul-Aul IJHI)
MQBILITY
)nmmiddot rdtclion~ ltHI infantry materiel and t1ctjCgt (In Jour Jul-Auj 1938)
[nII~1IY III waf shy 80ml Ir()bllm~ (ltMC QUat shy MIIY
lw way~ fUf mutor and ridt (Kraft -~ ~lur 1l38) Tllnk~-armor(tl r(nnnal~~arHmiddot( vmiddothidr and the dcfcll~c
agaln~t th~ [Kraft shy pt 1938)
W~di~lh~~ln (n~~7C~i((~~1i~~IdJ lS)
jJl~~~~~~~~~~nt() j~~~~r~~U~ ~~i~~~~t~~~lj~ the cavalry ISlte Forliln Military DiJe8t~J
MOBILIZATION
Industrial MobilIzation
IrlpllrctlIlC5I in 1nllano1 A Iltudy of indu~trnl mohllizatlon (A Orrl- MnymiddotJun 1938)
o OBSTACLES
f1~uI~~ J)fet~IJI~~14~ iRt~~cE~~mJ~~ij~~l~~~)Poland Eludlul tl eytll uf thc airm)ll (US 1tev- W May 1938)
OIL Pelrol 9u1lgtly in war shy flomc prob[cm~ (RASe Quar shy May
1(38) ORGANIZATION
Sllfallliint-d fighting teallls (Me GIlZ-Jun 1938)
p
MACHINE GUNS
1-u-t ~hl~~~1(~~~~~~IA~~(i)~~jlidj and I h J(
MANEUVER IN WARFARE
S- Sani~h Vnr A rcvi(gtw of til(gt It fltgtrljrr 1ltill 1 JldJouf-Jul-u~Il38) (~blQ-z1llon nnd mmlfUcr (gt1ll htt _ F(h II))
4 MANEUVERS ~~t~~~E~Jl21i1~~l~it~~~~~rJ~~~~ ~middot1)illi~hi~ lDaR)
lc~~tJI1Dn of till arm1 -W cnnpptHgtnq f rl-am7~111n
~t~Jf~h~l~)I)~~~~ltI~f~~~ln J~~ (~~~1~1~1 ~u~-Jan 1lJ8)
~ ]3ndmg from arplan1 ill HUI (Itmiddot ~hl SUImiddot shyt r~lt~e~~~ Army In 1)li jStV F)rti)n ~l1lilr) 1)11131
MARCHES
h~i 3lIIl~t air at tap ICny Jour - Jillmiddot u l~laH)
~~~~r~~~~~~~~i~x~e~~ou[[ ~~r_~~J~~~f~)n ID1) YIamplti hltllgt~hudng Dr wad ruard~ ( t Bul -- Jill
il~Y1 (Of mtof Inl rilter (Krafl -- ~Tar lllii) middotmiddot~f1ttJd~ on ITOum trnolq (~111_Wmh -- 1 Al)r 1J3H) 1tJe-=rgo the ollIh in 1l17 ~( Forcir11 ~111tlry ~ [~~laquotal
MARKSMANSHIP
~lrb~~tlJn5hiP lrainillJ for tll )I)middotmrn mill HI_mill Brandl rOftat ltvjTnf Fth lllH
MARINE CORPS
~~~(tmhrlt-d flrhtinl~ tm1 DJ(middot (17 JUIgt 111lt1
~ MECHANIZATION
t~~ElfJ~fJ~ii~~~~~111 (jOlf HA~IC - ~by H)~Jll)
rtltllngrumtnations1937 (JourIlArt-JuI193l) ~lTlftand mechanised land warfare rh BaUle uf GUHlashy111m 1937 (Jour mJS[ - gtlay 1~J8)
JunlnB)unill(orelgnarmi 1918)
ill for~~~o~lf~rh~~~~f~~~ d rlll~h rmy in tn1 (ltv d Cav - Jan-IH nJtHj flMtld vlhir ejmIJll~ In Moroc(o Ill ltI ClV -- Marshy
11l~1~)f nriti~h mvalry ltv I (w -Iarpr ljIB) teutnmnhll Show of IJn amI irmiddotr rlllllary 1I)1rlt~t (WI
dnf-JanJrJ8) n(lnl am rnc hani7d unit~ (Iv dfnf - Ir ~j~8) elnHuenrnon OUT ta t1l~ or Ih 1ntrduIn r muw of IlIDI~riUllandarmrJ ~middotddImiddotIyournrI()rr lit Ij] Sutw-loh IJl8)
k=~~niu ~~~~ri~~h~1i~~1 yen~i~IIIP (aalry I~~oreirn Miltary lJiKtHj
MEDICAL sERVICE
provLoatlln and pradkul work 111 (ami (Jour It Me shylilY 1938) tPloblemofm(chanlzati()nllsilllrrtCtsllltm(djcII~(rvicl
l1otU nAMe _ May HJ3B)
MORALE
lorlllc I~houldcr to shoulder) (Cav Jour JGB) - Jul 191S)
MOnGAN Sir Hcnry (l615-H1HB)
Ih momiddotd ~Iand(rrd mlln in history (Nav InBt Iro( -- JUII lJall)
MOTORCYCLES
lHnary motorryde~ (In Jour- lIlal-Jun 11l3ll) lJc y(li~t quadran In th(gt rcconnlllgsallce unit (Mil-Woch
TI~ l~il~lr)J~~Lr() ([( (R de Cay - JIIII-I~~b 193R)
MOTORIZATION
Ar powIr anllroop mov(mtnL (In Jour - rfily-Jun 1laH) 11htary monrl)rh~ In JOUt- Iay-Jun IIR) omrdlrtlltm~()n mrntrymaterid and ladie (fnfJourshy
rulmiddotAul 1918)TllmiddottIC11 and atimiJ1IHlrntlv 1ltl~onS flf the Wllr III AblMlnla
(JourltllSI-gtlay llaS) ircraft ant m(halli~(middotd land warfare The Battle uf Guadl
A ~~J~r~~~~~~i~7~ihitl~J~ ~h~a~rsl ~lorJzation procrllm QIT Itv-May-Juo 1918)
SlIlH tatkallr-~~nq In rlnlrtion With M 1 fmpIHY(] )11 llrationq alin~t an irwgullr (filmy (RAsG qunrshyMay 1)IH)
Eludllll til( (Y~ f th mmln (US Rev -1J l1ay 1l1R) New wayq [or motor and rid(gtf Kraft - lInr 19J8) ArmorlI mmiddotclultlizmiddotJ ad mutorpd unit~ r foreill1 armLe8
TI~~~7~la~~~Irco~~~f~~a~~I~nl~I~) and the dcfctl~e alain~t thltsc (Kruft-Apr 1938)
Motorization of thenrm~ New conceptionsa1 orgrtnization bull lluJmcnt and cmplolmfnt in forClgn Urmlcg (Kruft shylIfay W18)
Ifntorizatlon and manltlIVtr (lliI [ltt-Feb1J38) tw inmiddottl]()dH fr rrosHlnl rivrrH h) motorized tinlt (1(011
1middotmiddothll)K) (oa and mlor~ (Ita Cui Mil- F(b 1918) Trllt tollitary molnnyd It dv Cav - Jan-Igteb 1938) Ijp Jrll~h rmy m 1~l7 llv d~ Cay -Jufi-Jd lilaH) Ih utnmIJmiddot Show of 1l17 od (~ m[iry IntllmiddotHt (ltv
lnl ~ Jan WaH) T)w mftulw On our ptir~ nr lh in1tnduIiltm of rn ~~ f
UWod aud armord middothid~ by nur ]( IlIhlJorq (ltv 1111 -l1i ~middotmiddot- FdJ 1111)
111~~~1~~~~~~~J ilr~~~ ~~~~~I Irmal I()t~ In tli callulry
N
NATfONAL DEFENSE
Ihc dd~ ( Switt rbnd The (1f(11arltdn~ gtolhieH of n llml In urnwd 1uro]Jmiddot ( Onl - Muyjun iJ18)
lrqrtlnl~ in 1ljtul11 1 fltuly f irlltlu~trilll ftIohih7l1till (A Unl gt1 Jun ll)aH)
StralJlcandrliilmiddotam1l1rml~ Tlwirrlntlnlt(]UUrnnt]oll
j~I(I~~r~tifpoundr~i~I~~~~~~f~~~rllUNlI~ t~lf 1(1~~(~ - Jul I~Q ~
Tinmiddot ur~atlI7an()1l nIH ntlVl1h~ uf tlamiddot Mdk11 illIHlflftlNlt of til Army 1he imIHlrlnm of mNidn~ in IIIHlollUI If~ (Iii SUrl - Aflr 1l18)
A~hmorl uJ-rni1ltd (ltH Quar- J111191H) )IIJ~~Il~~~futiI~(Ul1dlnl of Ih t1lW d(fmiddotl1lmiddotImiddot~ (Hoy jng
IHltai1 f(middotnrmllrnmiddotnl (UH RIv - 2( Mill HJ38) Nnliunnl dfr)IJw [tv 111 (jll - Jntll~Il1i)
C~I~~tJ1( It~I~liG~ ~ ~~ jJli It~j rIlI~ In national Organization of nnlional dlfensc (ltv 1111 Gcn - Mar 19111) l1echanrzation JSt~ ()ri~lnal Milllary StudyJ
PALESTINE
latcHtillC loteH (HUll Cui Mil- Feb 1938)
PERU (ARMY OF)
r1H (rllf~inK 01 the Andltl In 1811 Scc loreigll Military DilcstsJ
POLAND (ARMY OF)
TankR - armored fcconnaiMllncc vlhicJes and lim dcfenBc ngulnntthlc (Kraft-Apr 1938)
PORTUGAL (ARMY OF)
A PurtUlUllIC chronidu 01 the mrpcditlon f Don Chrilltopher (III Gamll ill (lhylinia (UI1Il Cui Mil - Feb 1938)
POSITION WARFARE
11 incvitlllJility ulcontinuoUlfronts IS(( ltorcign MillLary l)il(81f1J
The Ibntiou of fronl JSec Jltoreiln Military Digests
PRESS
Illlt inl1u(n(( of the prs~ in Great Britain and America (JuurUSlI-AprI918)
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda (Jour USlJ-Apr 193R)
Q
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE
Planning Branch Construction Division Offi(( or the Quar termasht General ~Qt Hev - May-Jun 1938)
A (olnmrdal Vl(gtwllOint on the army9molotitnllOn program ((~M ltlmiddotv-MllyJun W3R)
Air-fed Ilrmies of tomorrow (QM Hev -Jul-Au~ 1938) TIIC HUIlPly or an infantry dlmiddotjsion in deflmiddotnflC (Qrt Revshy
JulAug 138) Prt rol ~Ullily in war - somc llwblems (HliSe QUllr - May
]J38) Slme IneUeul [cgtlons in rOnncmiddottion with MT emplollil in
tJPernlinsn~ain~t In krlI~IRr enemy (ItASC QUllt shyMay 1938)
Tim maintenance orn mohile farec by air during opeflltlou9in dtHert Ctluntry (HASC QuaT - May 1938)
R
RAIOS
A~hmnre m(Jd~rnltlltf llo IA9~On~ lOr the SPlJlildl War AirmidHnnd theirffT(cta l~xl)rjenrlJ In GII~ pro(ction
MarHI3SAnt-nlr mid fgtll1ldlnj nrn~lruttlon (Mil Mitt - Mar 11138) Ilr raid shdt(rII (lliJ Mitt- Mar 1938)
RECONNAISSANCE
rile fol of (nllItion with mcrhlni~1d cnvlllry (Cav Jour-JIll-AUf( 111)8)11 yrll~t Rlulldron In Ih reconnaissance unit (Mil-Woeh -1 Apr 1935)
H~NN~NKAMPF Gtllurni Paul (1854-191B)
ltennenkllmpfs mid in th( waf witb Chinn (Rv de GavshyMnrmiddotAp(1938)middot
93
-- - --- --
I
r
Reltders-Guidc alld Subject Index c amp GSS Quarter~
ilvht n r (r r
LlIlppm~ fflr T1Nw 1IllljId [ (f
Fb lil~l
r ~ rmiddot I f
d ROUTES COMMUNICATIONS
1P)IJIWrflId 11 1 I ~ JI IfWIIIr I t II
middot1 ltI ~ 1 IIK
11
VI11ltrwymiddot
I
PUSSIA
1 )1
Ibullbull
1 1 1
11[ 1
11middot
[IWowrn J
SLCURITY
lid I
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
~IGAl SErtVIC(
i 1Jf 1_
SPAIN ARMY OF
middot1lt1
5unMARINfS
1 ]1
ljPPlY
1It
III) 1 11
11 110
1 I~ )1
) 1 I I~ 11 H
middot1 I I) I Un amiddot bull ~I
Pi J- I ~ I J Il n I I )
lr1I))
i (
Ilj I 1
I II 11 If
11middot I 1]1 1 I
SWITZERLAND ARMY or
tf lIf Irlo IhpllllrmlulhlllofmatIPIof ltI fl j -)1lt1 loy ur IvhlT Iltv
F 111gt
T
TACTICS OPpoundRATiON5
LI rlfr 1llllll(tlwr uIIWlHJ I f Jlnrhmiddot IJIIU I lay
j 1 tT-It JunlllIlJ I ll lid mHn jlbIgt Il
I i~ lt bull I I ILl 1 T 11 I 01111101 Ib ~ld
( ]11middot I I I I J n 11lt 1 lllf~
Ollrn~ Cot~It
IImiddot lhItll fluar Jul ) shy
([UHr I111-ullIIK) bull rd r II 1 ~ J ur Jul- 0 111
1 1 bull rmiddot - I fl1 nl 1111111 I~J RI I1gt-)IrJtl 1 lola
1 1
Spc1ilIWilrtilro
r r In JII) ~ joll Jul-AIW 1lllll r II Id~ n IRI7 [ ForI)n ~ftlIH
[ nltlllnUlrPldli 1~f(middotrI1 1lhtnrv
Troop Movoment~
lav-JunlfIR) lui fJH)
War In Abyl~IlI
1+ ~11lY 11ll1 lib til ~UI~
1gt1
TRAfnC CONTROL
1 wtmiddotj IrpJnrnnt 11IJ lw1un Inll 1ludIlmiddot h I II IlIrmrl (0-0 It v 11 III~ Jllkl
TRAN~PonTATION
rl-rdlrlllnlIl[ Ilfluf fUIII[I1ro r 1 n rlnlr~ nl t1 I Inigtlt 11II]t
bd nf 11 fj) 1 UIltll1 11 7 IJnlr It All JulllK) J I lr1 ltI nlmITnll~p 1lt0 of tl1l ur III AhI1rpn
r I ~11lt1 f flV 1l1k) fIJI vnr JI II n~ 0 11lt10111 (f HII Ill
1111 -10 til 11f1I l~ n )) rnn 11gt Wllh L1 Inplyp 1ll
Irolll wjrit n Irrltvla~ I my IltASt ~11-1I1I1yll3f1)
I IIlt mllllllHlllel f a rongtrgt furmiddotI hy nlr dUnnv OIlgtrnliOll~ In (fp~Ht rnunlry (ItAS QuaT- ~fllY IDJ8)
~~~~I~I~~I~() 1~~)(~rl~I~dn g~C~~ M~9t~J~r 19MI Itl~ llud molltgtr I HIl1 ( 111 tl1 - 1111 l~lH) imltltgttNiOll and ltXI rmiddot I thC Spnnlllh VIlT illv)1]
0U1~1 IlIn lph 1l3l)
(T
UNITED STATES IARMY OF)
Commilnd ilnd Stl
1tIIIIHTIlIllIlf IJIfJour Ifngt-Junl)]R)
Orlpnlxltlotl IInd Equipment
J ) f)alllaln Il IIrtlIIlt Ib I(dco1lhrutrttnrntol 1)1 fllI) TIllt mp)r[n~ or nHOrnp 11 1llOnal dpfenll 1 ~urmiddot Apr 1l1lt1
npf -11 nil nIW rnnrt71l1un program ~I Hmiddot~ 11 _1 1)lt)
Trlld flll1I11 11ITIr )1141111]lt lT lO t rfllah II-middotrh I Alr l~IIR)
UNITEO STATES INAVY OF)
Commnnd and Stltlff
I~~ w1 ru I 1 If~t Proc - Jul 1l3H)
Orgilnlxatlon and Equipment
t ()rnl (~avlnHtTr()r-Ju
Trllnlng
I) Hb1 mm I PrIOr lui ngt Ih)lll1 1 In Irr Il) 1111
VETERINARY SpoundRV1CE
gtIhld Jrmiddot~lJ)I Igtr r1 marrhl It Bu-J~l tl1lt)
w WAR PEACE
~tr3Ir nil fticmiddott m1lfnn~ TIl Ir UmiddotlllttOn t Hur nnllnnll rurlfy (AOri- JI-1Jf(EIlll
I~middotqnmiddot frH )Hllll IF JIlr [lI-JUfl 1flaKl irOHT or nr (Jour lSll - pr Ilf) 1~t 1fruHmn1 or 1IPII rnr VM 1(~M H la)
lUT lJJ~) I lip gtarhnrou a)middot lt It 11 Jul ]118) 1IIIra 0 mhtnn n~liw (gt1t1 1l1t~ JIII1 FJ 19J Wnr lIId l1(nclt Iltn4 (ul gt1 -llTI1l8)
WARS
FIUC
ITALY-ABYSS1NIA (1935-1936)
(nmpitlnHll1hwp
hrdt Mar 1~11~) ~-~ 1( i of uply I1h ~_
1
CHINA
BOXM RCbclllon 11(00)
Itllnampr rud 111 II Hr llh (llInll It rio (at shylr Ir 1)lt)
JIPAN-CHINA 1930~
11 1111111middot 111 11111111 (mil 1 IUH -1 Il
111 r ill Ih I~T T11 In 11Ih~ of Ihr wllr til (Inn Jr Imiddotur Iu umiddot)llil
1 dlUrl)ll 1111 ([1 (I (rlt nt (Nfl I~I lr~middotr - Jl lIR)
1( ~gtn~ klrm at ihIl11~h11 It In (Nav In~t lrur - ~cf 13H)
h Jo1lnn 1laquo 1 rhlnn IllS n - r If) lt)1)) (ui tillt (hUllt r l( nllil)lll 11- Itt ~IIV 19~ I)middot War I Ih Ir Ii~( (hl gt-Itl Inn 11l11) Illlt ~1lmiddotalllmiddot Witt 1tl4 (ul 11 -JlI1 Fb 1138)
1lllt()
P(NINSULAR WAR IIBOB-tBI41
(air) Inll lInoupmiddot rIO( 1 nlllmlnr ur middotmiddotIlllllIJ ithrllth Jllh IHill (a~ lollr (Inl-Jul 1)l~)
nUSSIA-POlAND (1920)
II 1111 I fltnI U)III 11~1l 11 Igtnmpl (ll It UIl rnrr nmiddot IJuT HII - Mnv 1~3R)
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 11936_19361
I 1(1~~~1 ill -r~li~~uni~~ltll fnll til krpp parI WI1h lIrhnigt
Tallk ur unt 1 lnl~ (tI1I I It r t~unr - Jul 191f~) J1~~()111 r~om Splln (1 Jour-~ Mny-Jun llJ8) lh S]gtmll~h Vur rllw of thp I)(~t ron ign Ojl1n101 (Jr
I~~rrl--1I~TX~~~~n~~~(1 nnd wnrfllfo flw bllltr 01 Gu~dl Injnfn1931 (Jour nUSI - Mny IU3l)
V~ ~
94
~d eollUlmiddotattaek ~ss~_(yen~uIfl938)9 JUll 1938)
-2IJui193S cmiddot S R(v-28 Jill 1938
1937) (BulBelgeMiI
Feb 1938)eli the Ebro River
Feb 1938) two recent artldlR
en-Mar 1938)
Imt=~J~~~FcetJ~8) of the Spanish War (Ry Mil
SOUTH AMEmCA ~=1K or the A~Tr8~A~ Ponign MililMy
CIVIL WAR (1861~1865)
iR ~~i ~~c 7J~~rI~ pct~J~I193i)1 193R)
WORD WAR (19141913)
C _ Soclo-Economlc History
WuGerm(lny dclcal~ 11l1918~ (Jollr RUSI - lay 1l38)
G - Arm and Selllce~
ARTILLERY
~ ~~l5Il of the Dlginn coast 1914_1918 (CA Jour - Julmiddot I Aug 1938)
OurutUery ill 1915 (HWI Cui ~m - Feb 1938)
CAVALRY
[)Id they know how (Cav Jour - MayJun 19311) A cavalry offieera experhmiddotneea on the Indian Frontier during
the Wat (Cav Jour [OBI - Jul 1938)
ENGINEER
The UIoe of demolitionllin thedmpaign in Soulh Polnnu duro Ing Oclo~r 1914 Roy Eng Jour - Jun 1938)
MFD1CAISEltVICamp
Contributions or the World Wat to the advancement or mfdimiddot cine (MiiSurg-JuI1938)
TANKti
TankB in the ddenaiYc With the Flrtlt Army 111 AJlril and Muy 1916 (Rvdlnf-Jnn 1938)
Mcchnniution [SiX Originnl MiliLnry Study)
H _ Military Candu t of tho Wnr In tho Flold
The other lidpound of thpound Hill No XVI Aubpoundrn Hidgc 9th of May 1915 (A Quar-Julll38)
Jh~ ~~~i~n~o ~fi~U~~nlv7Jamp~fobft~Yi~uNlt~e~~her 1H4
N~~lo~(t~ ~~~h-~~~d~rol~ (rom 1792 to 1797 nnll from 19141() 1918 (ltv Mil Gcn- Jan l~poundh 19311) bull
Organizing liaiwn in the (middotxNution of dmiddotmltllitlons (Rv Mil Gn - Feh 1938)
J _ Campaigns amp 9attlos
EUROIEAN AUF- - Ilul~IAN TIfFJITfm
The u~c of tlemotionll in th campaign in South Poland during October 1914 (Hoy Eng Jour - Jun 19311)
EURONAN Anp - WESTERN TJfAT~n
1914
Did they know how1 (Cav Jour- lnymiddotJun 19311) The defln9C of Dhmudc 17 October to 10 Nov(middotmhcr 1914
(nul Dolge MiI- Feb Mllr 1938)
ERRATA (To June 1938 Quarterly No 69)
Readers Guide and SubjectIndexgt
1915
Tho nthllt ~Ido of the Hill No XVI Aubcftl Ridge 9lb of MaytHU5 (A Quar - Ju(1938)
1917
orfl~~i~l~lbli9MfI the exe~tlon of demOlitions (RvMII
1918
fanks In th( d(teulliv( With thQ FIlI~ Army April and MllY 1918 (Rvdlnf-JanHl38)
L - Nava Hiltory
Thc lIulJrnlirinl war In 1915 (MnmiddotWoeh - g Apr 19111)
WEAPONS
A lIy~tem of antimiddottank delenn) (Can Der Qubr--Jul1938) Some rdl(lonll on Infantry mate~lel and tactics (Inf Jour
JulmiddotAug 1938) Strenmlined lightlng team (Me Gaz- Iun 1938)f and lhe defenllC
Feb 1938) nt (Mil Mitt-
Mar 1938) ImplCSlllons and erperiences of the Spani5h War (Rv Mil
Suifll(l-Jsn Feb 1938) ank atlack agaimlt antitank gunll Sec Foreign MlIilllry
Digestlll
WITHDRAWAL
(1) P(lgc 94 - Title should read MANGIN Counterattack or June
11 lrl)8page 112 Line 9 Muzzle velocity should read 831 mete~ per second (2725 fs) instead or 381 meters per second
I I
95
I
- 1]
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- Untitled
-
Books bull
Thc Navy A History-BIJ Fletcher Prall
The Lost Battalion-BII Tho11as Iohllsoll alld Fletchcr Prall
The American Civil War-BII Carl R Fish
Thc American Civil ar lSil-fii-lfl Major E W Sheppard OBEbull Me
The Last FiveIIour or Austria-BIJ Euyelle LelllllwlT
Japan in China-BII T A Bissoll
China FiRhts for lIer Life-UlJ fl R Ekills aml ThlOlI lIriyht
China FiRhis Back-BI JiJlIcs Smedley
And so to War-BIJ HulicrlHcrrillJ
America Gocs to War-By Charlc~ C TWlsill
Action at Aquila-BlllcrvclI Allell
A~drew Jackson-BII Marquis Tamcs
Roosnelt-BIJ Emil Ludwig
Tarnished Warrior-BI Major a11cs R Jacobs
Jamcs Madison Builder-BJ 4bott E Smith
(corg-e Mason Constitutionalist-BJ Harriet Hill
RORer Shermau Sig-ner and Statesman-Bn R S Boardmall
Labor on thc March-By Ertuard Levinsoll
The Politicos-BJ Matthew TosCTzSOll
The Big Four-BTl Oscar Lewis
Comments on the contents of the hooks listed here may be found on pagcmiddotW following-
Contents CD
Page lechanization _ _ __ 5
7tlilitary Ncv- Around the Vorld _
The Spanish Ciyil War _ -~--- 28
The Sino-J apanelt(gt Val __
Foreign Military Digests __
Digests of important articicc from foreign military periodicals the remaining articlet- for each magazine are lbted
Tallk AUack Agalllltt Antltank Guns __ _ _____ 3
Crossing of the Andes in 1817 ____ _ _______ 14 ____________________ 41
Is It Nc(cs~ary to PrpltCrvc Mounted Formations in the Cavnlry
The ImYltabJlty of Contmuous Fronts _ 44
The FIgt3tlOn of FrflntE _ 46
The German Army in HJl7 ________ _ ____________________ 47
Book Reviews and Reading Course for Officers ____________ _ 19
Let We Forget (The United States in the World War) _____________ _ _56
LIbrary Bulletin __ 58
Books recently acces-ionccl which arc of particular significance
Academic Noles CampGSS
Current School material which affcct~ instructional procedure or tacticHI doctrines
Rotcr of Instruct()rgt _______ 59
___________ 59 Rolttel of Regular CIalt 1938-1pound139 _
Map Problem No 25 (1938) ______ _ ___________61
Direclory of Periodicalgt ______ _
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles _ _70
A ltYHtematic reviev of the contents of selected military periodic~lIH Foreign-language peri shyodicalH are digclted to a degree to furnish an adequate idea of contents and significance
Reader Guide and Subject Index _
All subject-heading~ are arranged in alphabetic sequence and can be con~ultcd liIC a dicshytiollary Note abo List of Periodicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations
Errata ____ _ _________________________________ ___________________________________________ ~5
Mission TIll objtmiddotct o[ tid pullicatioll h a sytematic review of eUITflll military litpraturc thr()u~h catalogshy
JlIg artille~ oj lrnft~i()Ial vailh ill ~llttld military awlnaval plriodieals ill the domeKlic and foreign field
Artilltmiddot- from forciVIl IHriCitiit al an tnat ld b~ I rall-lal jotl- of 1itles and dig-csis of contents matershyial of partkular iIl1jll)rlanlt b toprlti more txten-hmiddotI~ in a middotwdifJll of Forcign lli1italY Djgcst
t Llhrary I~llllllll Ktll ion lit- boo]s 1LC(11t I aClc-siollcd which are of particular significance
Thi (JOlt f I I h Pllhljlpd a a ~uldl to lllOripoundrn llllillary tendencies amI to in4pire vigorou thoughts on t he ~1l1IJ(lt t nakd
Acknowledgment Till dllos of 1hi C)iIII I II dtmiddotill til lxprl- t heir thanks and appreciation to the mallY pllSOnS who
have aluahl~ a-btcd ill 111l plcparat ion of material for thi issue The work of cOlltributor~ has been dl)ll~ ip add it inn in their o he dutie awl on tIllir own time We arc very grateful to the following ofiiccrs 1m their ~(llerOt1- dOIld Ion
Captain 11 lartl1c~ nir KmfljahrkamftrllJlIJi (lIareh AprillIby 1~38)
11 al or T R Phillip (1 Frollcr Jilitnirr (18 Ftllluary 5 11 Malell 1J-20 April 1 10-11 July In~~) 11( 11iil(I SlIissr (lknmlllr l1n tJallual~r FlllIuary If1~8)
Li(uillltnt J Y Hutlolph Book Hcvicws
~liJtr IL lt Tllldall If 11 (rIIIllullrI (J anuary February March 11~8) RCI)U( Jlilitnirc ( II( (II (TaJ11lry Fdlluary ilarch 1138)
1a1(11 L 1 Trll--cottJr 1111( rll Crll)(l[rrir (Jmualy-Fplnuary March-Apri11938)
The Cover llliled Statgt Almy arrnond car M-l u-ocd fol n(middotollnai~~HI(
1qnippld wiih GO and W (alilH1 ma(hirJ( ~uns radio and armor plat(
Mechanization Ily LIEUT COLONEL P R DAVISON Cavalry
and ifAJOI~ E i1 BENITEZ lOW Artillery Corps
This article do(s lint nrcc8Wlily exprrss thr idc((s policics tcachings 01 beliefs of The Command ((ld (IIflal Stafr Scwol It slOlfld not he cn~trucd that the uutlws ([1C aftrmjltinll to introduce i( If olld stmlflr id((fS to 0111 (JIiee The sfudy is writtcn to l)1(srut mechanization in a general chflracter as it is fOllnd t~)dllJ hi jive fltrai llatirlrIs An hypothrtical -iflf(fiiol itgt used as a vehicle 1(]lOn which to load ([ sUnrtrst((Z mcchadzed force Should this study inphC a g1(at many differences of Opillioll it has thcll clcatCd thought on the subject and in so doi11U itR mission is accomplished
j The Republic of ATLANTIS~ i-gt considered the wealthiest i~on m the world Ii b a peace-loving country desire~ no ~randllcment of territory and up to the Jlre~ent time she ~ enjoyed a ~ecurity from invaion that ha~ been greatly
Imiddottrained
- sted br her geographical position She ha maintained a ittlOnal policy of al()ofne~) freedom from alliances and tical entanglement- ith other nations although she has erially assisted other Powers with men and materiel to _ guard their integrity and to preserve their democratic Is Her lofty aims and her invaluable assistance have
always been duly appreciated She maintains a strong Yand a small but highly efficient Active Army and
Territorial Guard It would take several for ATLANTIS to put a large army in the field and it
y to her national policy and (0 the will of the people in a large standing army to safeguard her illtcrcstr
ome and abroad The tactical doctrine of her army il middotd upon offen-tive action The unsteady world condition~ and the realization that no longcr pos~ible to conceive military operations which
lot r(gtquilc the u~e of armored vehicles have awakened ANTIS to the fact that she needs some kind of a mcchashy
nized force At present she has practically none she is therefor( ~talting from scratch r
Acconlingly the Chief Executive of ATLANTIS has sent the following directive to his Secretary of National Defense
THE EXECUTIVE MANSION OF ATLANTIS 10 August J[JJ8
TilE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEIENSE
My Dear Mr Secretary
Modern means qf transportation communications size of navies and especi~IIY the capacity potentialities speed and range of airplanes today and thoge planned for future use have tJken from AUallti~ the security that she has enjoyed from her birth due to her geographical position
Our National Defrl1sc is -plencUd in all its brancheH arms doctrines allli ladies Cxcept that it cumpletely laclHI mechanization We have partial motorization but no mechshyanization
It is requested 1hal the appropriate Rlatr section make without delay a study of the mechanization of England France Germany Italy and Russia considering for each
~~2~~~u country without mechamzatlOn poIicili doctrimmiddotq ~r country at lea~t the following fubjecis
5
1 )lidon of the illmetl forces ~ The terrain or probable theatre of operations 01 The organization of m(gtchal1izcd folcl- 4 The 1tmament of combat vehicle 5 The doetlillt of lJlCchanization fi Prolal)j 1ac1ical ~mJllornH1l1
d Submit tu me 01- -oun a- po-sjblcgt rccommclHlation-gt for HJI nnmlliatlffti (If a I1lv~ hal1iztgtltl Ullit or force which po~~
-popo t~ll bl paton 1)1 thlgt five WlIIl1S above mLlltirJJ)(d adtlling It In 0111 OIJ Wfrj alld -1Ilh additional iJlfolmashy
tllJIl a you may (II lIll tit
SlIlcenly
A (III f 111 riltI lltllIti
TlI (ltlJr ldf hi lllllg III mind that a Pnident (1IIJIiri)-l (Jllr ltlid fill h Jjll IHfflJ wty flf t1mlillg Ollt
v hd iJlJuJd Ill dlll 1hlJl lJ~ dltplmilllllg what has b((11
d(IlH rf~ned 111 tlw ]la)~( of hht()l) forl -tudy of the
()1Ij11l and demiddotjpmlllt (It flll(llullzeci Wtap()Il alld tilllf prdcl1(aJ appli(tI lOll 111 the lJ1I11t1itJd
FIl))I 1))111 11 IlIdl LIII]gt III ad Ion
~Jll tIll JWglllllH~ of drftll it ha- bttll 1(eoglIized
1I1cmiddot ~al III 11t1 ~Jnw Idnd of ohocllt 1 loop to pierce illt illinl t 101lt HannIbal lif of elephant- as a -pealhead 10 cr~h 111(gt Ilief of tlw lomall LlJdoll- b pcrha])s Uw
Illl Idmplt of 1hI-- 11 of fOI cp III that ca-gtc the expcnshyIlllllt ~- 1101 put IllJy lHfnJ iJelltluse the elephants beshyitIJlI rll ()lalllipd alld )llld HO II( cOlltrf)lled oli the InlUItshy
lIPId Thd Itla t)111 llJay have uelJl thl g-uidlllg
JJJIH pll lor 1111 l~l of imilar mdhod~ of tarfare during til lJrld ar homiddotpr )ll~t a- III the case of IIannibaltlw n-ut l a faitJn~ in tho-l ta-e when medliluical defects Ilthlfd II WhfIP irnplfllHr lacl]al ilS wa Ilw(kmiddot of tlll~p
v(afrlll-
fll 1 til TJrd Val hy lh ylll ]~lG mohility or lclWll
had blIll 101 aJld as a rcult of the machine gUll and the barbed wire eJltangltmcllt tagnation had taken placl all aloJl~~ ttl V(ctf~rll Front Ill( Allic theJl resorted to tlw lank whllh iI- tl]( oilly lYIH of mltcitanizalioll known at Ihal 11111lt fhi w(apoll Wli d(vised uy the British as an
anlidoe 10 the machine gUll that wa playing such with the lives of the infantry that it was sheer send men agaimt Rtrong-Iy defended positions
The British used 1anks for the f11-t time Battle of the -iommc in the summer and fall of 1 in lmiddotlauders and al CamLgtrai Their value uecame
(dUWtlld lJi1adiI FlIIH( lrIH~r1 fOI ollP of tIll IJdll (nd Hlilt hpl
from the outset in pitp of the fact that they moving mechallically imperfect machines and wcre poor taetical employment by lllCxplrienCtd hands
The French tl~ed tank in the Sois-ions oITen-li() for the purpoc of JldUllllg the Marne Salient at and in the Septemuer-OcloDer 1918 offensives ( and Guise)
Till ((nlllttlI~ lirsl employed tanks in the gre~tt otflllsi(gt near Sl Quenli1 21 March 1918 a1d thercafter in all major operations up to the (nd of with varying degree of suecess
6
lxhII No 70 M echQllization
LIGHT MpoundCHANIZED DIVISION (DL~
FlrURF 1 -French LIght lIIechanized DlvlslOn
c
ni
~
It may be aid that the followlllg priflciple~ goverlling tactical employment of tanIgt can be deducted from the
orld War
1 That terrain i-- d controlling- and vital fador in tank erations
2 That Kurprbe when po~ille is extremely valuable in ank attack
3 That tanks WWll u~ed ill rnagt properly SllcCJ1cd and pported by artillery have the opportunity to make a dcpp netratioll into a uefensivc zone 4 Ihat lmk- are Cxtremely vulnerable to artillery fin en not adequately -ltreenccl
5 That tilt abPllcc of an trtillery preparatioll or other dent means of dealing with the ~lIlmy antitank vcallon~ yes intact ho-iljp weapolls that may he ahle to intfl11l1 ectively agaiJ)-L a tank attaek and cauI heavy ioses
6 That altillery cOlillterhatltlY -upport i- of great sistancc jf lot a Il(((dty tn advancing tank throughout e attack
7 That the tallk dltack (leading tanks) -hould include rapid advance to prcdetermined obJcctIves the most (1ishynt of which is the rna of the ho-lile artillery llaralyring e enemy~ commullicatiolls and command system
We thus ee that the World War developed a new faelor the art of war that has opelled new horizons whose po~~ishy
Hties the workl is- beginning to realize and that the idea of eoffen-ivc- of 1018 in the Vetern Front and thosccontemshyated for 1Dl D wen L1lP origin of the operatiolls alld COIlshy
ption) oj the mechanized force of the present da~ Since the Vorld Var themiddot major POWCIS have ucen
perimenting with mechanized tWIts and t(~tillg- tlH()ric- ning mechanization It may he inferred therefore
t a nelmiddotd is anticipated for a mechanized force HlP ha-ic irement- of vhich are great mobility and striking power When the Unitfd States mfchanized force came into
ing in 1928 the Var Department directive said among her things
Tank are the principal attack elements of a mechanized force The tactics of the force as a whole shall be predicated upon supporting and assisting the attack of the tank elements and upon quickly consolishydating xeculing and exploiting the success gained by the tank atack Other arms are added as auxiliaries to furnish thc clement of holding (which tanks lack) security and maintenance of command fire support facility of movement and supply
The term mechanized unit as We understand it today include all units equipped with armored combat vehicles whether they be scout cars combat cars or tanks All major powen arc mechanizing or motorizing as far as their finanshycial and indutitrial resources permit and for this reason it j of llltlrlicular importance to cast a glance at what those natIons are accomplishing The information herein given lla- heen obtained from foreign press reports and due to the mallY change) and experimentation that is continually taking place It may contain slight errors in organization
FRANCE
The French military doctrine is based upon a national policy that does not seek territorial expansion but desires to maintain intact what she now possesses The French visualize only one enemy-Gcrmany-her big heavily armed neighbor defeated in the World War but now determined to get back the territory and power of which she was stripped by France England and the othcr Allies therefore all their plan~ and organization are designed to stop effectively any German aUack The French defense is based upon the Mnginot Lill( an immensely strong HericR of underground forts running from the Belgian frontier to a point along the Swiss bordel If they are atacked around either flank of this line they expect to blocl the advance with a mobile defcllRe until they are roinforced by allies
8(0 CampGSS Q1UI1~tmly June 1938 page 46
7
C amp GSS Quart
The terrain of operation of the French Army is 011 ito own soil or in adjacent territory on its northern fronticr where there is an excellent r(mu 1l~t
IVlcchanizatioll is NUll ill a state of flu She has ol1e complete mechanizpd dhi-ioll OIl( ill t hI pro(t~ of formashytiun a third tentatively planllvd and a fOllrt h -u~_~(kd Her light mechanized dimiddotj oll (I )ivi-inn kgiIP 1)1(lniqlil
rgt~1L) IS orgalllz(d Hit) t f) brigulp- -110 II III FWllll 1 rhe dragolJ- jll)rttmiddotc art tlplia]clll 10 motorized illfaJltr~ Ow alP mountfmiddotd ill light trull( aile an Jlrllyidpd With traniportatioll for all pepfJllwl and lapOJl-
M(chaniztcI enalry Ulllt havp ))1onlcI that I( COlllshy
pallY lilO-t rd tilllf ear ( a h[)Jdill~~ llhloll tnd lor lOlllshymunicat ion IHlrjJrhf- 111 pn11l1 1PIHlflllY III 1 hl~l ullit i to ill(laof nl)Jiit jI1 at hI 11)(11-( nJ IH) (I I )U( 11)
the (((lIllIl rold liP II Jrlllt thh --Ilm j (l1llt --alishy[acto)y
TJw Frellch mechallizld [IJll( j it J1owlrful IHIH)1l providfd for Ihl high commalld It i d(-igllld to (If(lI dishytant and rapid ncollllaiuHt ilivolvillK combat to Olcnpy and 1loJd-1 rahgic po-il iOl p(lldin~ alrial of PI IIlop to carry out cavalry missions With increased -peed and radius of acti()f and to InPpt th( al1aek If ialgl host ill l111halllyld f~rc(1
TIl( Fnnch btditvl thaI lIH(haJlizd fO](l will play an
after a tiuccc-sful aUach Howevcl they helieve tha order to break through a strongly organized llcfcl1siyc v tion the attacker mu~t still rely Oll the mperiority of arLillllY tu Uplll the way fol IllS llliantry
Mtlhanizld ullits are lo-otiy to clIak and to main
tllll for this lltKOIl mechanizalioll ha- bClll -olely confi to till cavail) Tiw FJIlllh AnllY t rend are iowards n)(
izatlOll ralht1 tlHlll o mechanization They Illlien l armils 111u-gt1 make greater use of fl-t moving ehich-- 1 --l t lH army of till future as the largL ll my u-ld during orld Vu 1101 mccha1lizcd Jut Ilwtori-ld They t11l1l1 Il1llillIlizaLioit as lttmliyjllg to a -opeda nlLChallized f(JI~~ Thele -~eIllS to be little -ympathy wil II I hc t hOIlg-ht 01 -r 1lllIip- ill futllre war This i- (~t1itt~ lIatural as the culo IC-OUllt- III manpower an~ too great all as d to he lidl
put aside III Irance the proponent of mechanizatIOn ht not IHPIl as actIve as thoe ill otiHr cOlllltril but 011 ~ other halJd plans for motorizatioll arc very tomJrchelJ~ The lHst French thought concpivl- Owl the army l11IJ-ttmotorized a- ~)Oll a~ po---iille alld that fa-t moving llladu are Heeded to IlJclea-e the moiJility of modern fOlll r
Ihp Frellch doct rillt ~1 ill is lrtillflY takps tilt JllIl
tht iJlfalltry oeeupie-gt cJl~olidatp- and hold it
(111lt1 BRITIgt
TIll British have tltditiollall~ relicd Oil -ct IH)lII I
reinforccd by air pOll for prollcti)l1 of th( lHllllllalllL the cololllal empire She 11l- lOllll to JPg-anl till Illl lmeaJl --ea as -lOI1llw]wt hpj cl1 pllljllrty lwclthl be~
(iblaitar at till wpstlln Plltralllp and cOlltrcll 1h( ~t
ClIla ill the eal plating J1lt1 ill a faurabk jllIition (If ((HI 1111 1oul to Illdia If lightillg lIlClilS it ill prok take plaCt 011 -otne otllll lIatioll- snil Tht isualize lise of the army 011 the continlnt or lhrollghllllt the Emr (~reat Hritalll ha~ no Olle paltill1lall~ lltIll~ tratiiliOlI her pulicy is ill oppusition tu the con lriptil military --er of Continental Europe
Brit i-h lllt husiaom fol tighting machineo began IImiddot t he men who fir-t sa tallk- ill ad inll alld t hi 11lthU~Imiddotmiddot inclPtsLld after the ml-hillg attalk or Hearly luur hUllt tallk-gtat (amIJlli By till lIHI or tilt rorld Yal the Iln ~
had Uw lJl-l tallks il1lbtlllll and tlw~ had ltlc(luired dll~l ldeas of how to U-l UIlIll lIll rl~lltlllnhl( Clil and mih~ leadll afe dlfilliteiy cOfllfllilttd to till Jlolicy of mol0rrJ aJlilatioll and at IHP-lllt alilllralltl~I)attaJioll at ilolll(tt~ iJCtlll lomplL1tLly JJl()tnMllltliJanild
The Ulitih Army j- organized and trained prima a an e]editiolltlY foret III Indilllw mnt likll~ -ecn (onllilt j- 011 the lIort h t front itI ill l Illountainous 1(1 ntillly IlJl-uit(tl to mtchilll arran lOIlStIl11Plltly
IndilIl Army dots llot nquin the full nHa--llll of llwchan lion that io d(inti rill hl)JlW llllil- (u-Ill- iJltllJlllmlmiddot and Je- in Palc-tine may attain l1ch ploportiolls t (IIal Britaill l1la~ iH lomp(lI(d ttl gtPIHI til lxpllliti(lr rOlC( to PJl-Pll Onill then nriJ I h fOleig1l policy Jl
aks 1UlOlH as a vcry jlossiulp tiwatpl of war there the rain i- gcnelally suiiallIl [or mcehllliztd warfan mol(1 if a nlitish Army Pl lights 011 European soil it will pr ably be along-side of the French Army Uuder such cOC
lions the expcditionary force might (ll he top 11llY
XVIJI No 70 Mechanization
12 expeditionary force mu~t be ready vthen the need adses for this reason the immediate organization of mechanshy
d forces if considered urgent On 7 March 1938 bull Mr Chamberlin ill a -gtJ)((Lh ill the
ue of Common) designated the OiJ)ltclIVl- of Cnat ltains policies as follows
1 i 1 The protection of Greal Dritain lt The preiclvation of the trade )oul(- upon wlll(h
t hi this country depend for it food and raw f i materials
Lf~ ~ The defen-e of Britih territorIes onr-ea from ~ attacl whether by -ea land or air j 1 Cooperation in t he defen~e of tht tlrrjtoril~ of
g I allY alIie we might have in ca-c of wltl1
[ j After the Prime IiJlitcr had indicated the military olJ t j~tnt- of Creat BritalJl~ IJolicy the Secretary of State for lWllr ~lr IIole-llelisha marie it clLar that a Dritbh (Jlcdishyti4narr force in the future auld not con-i-t of a few h-stercotypcd divimiddotdon- From no 011 he -aicl there arc to
Highlanders are iJeing converted in~o machine-gun batshytalIOn and are being equipped with armored machine-gun carriers In addition thc 3d Carabinicrs and the 1721st Lancers arc being cOllcrted to light I tank units This is part or the x~htme to l(~llace the fivlt Brilih hOl-)cd regishymentH plus the eight liglil tank compahics in India by four Dritbh cavalry light tanl( regiments
III regard to tactical doctrine the Britih remember the iL~-on of the Vorld War They foresee the future possishyhilil~ of again being called upon for a military effort in Europe They vigtuaiizc a rapid moving hard ~triking force Capahl 1)[ Ixccuting- wide encircling operation or quick deCp penclrltion- into rear area They would avoid above Ill the thfenxive action and stabilized warfare of the past
Ten of the 22 cavalry reg-iments will be mechanized or lllot ()Jlzed The two-hrigade (avalry divisions of the expedishytionary force will be converted into a mobile division COTIshy
-itillg of units Rhown in Figure 2 The importallt factor regarding mechanization in the
Briti-h Army that Hhould always be kept in mind it that
I
I JoIrORF 2_Hrltllh MechanIzed Cavalry Divisioni 1
I 11
Jj 1
ll tW() typc- of diviions and variations within the typc~ e type will be a motorized division based on the light
_ chlllc gun much the Sdme as exi-tlllg dii~ion- which arc ~ eatly more than 50 per cent mutorized The other type 11 b( a mechanized armored divl-ion based on the tank -~ lfgjJj lhp hell) nwehillc-gun hattalions a proportion
the-op will Ill retained to cOJP-l troops the remainder will (f)flprtul into light machll1 _~rLln hatlalion-l and will form nuctu- of the motorized div il lU 11 0 The strength of til(
clern army 111 IIore-Belishu continucd is based not - the indiVIdual hilt rather on fire units which combine
POer and mobility Thp Hnti h HCgulal Army ill Inclil is being mechanizpl
a~middot of fallinJ-( into lint with home plutiec four Blitigth talions the 1st Royal Fusiliers the lRt Devons the hit yal Scob Fusilier and the 2d Argyll and Sutherland
according to it mission the Army will probably be fighting in conjunction with one or more continental allies-and in that case it will fUlnifh as a matter of fact the mechanized force for the allies WIth whom it may be associated
GERMANY
The mission of lilt German Army is aggressive at presshyent -Ccking aggrandizement of national territory in the direct ion of Czechos]ovalda 01 Poland By )1(1 recent annexashytion of Austria an area approximately equal to that of the stale of Maine has b((n added to her territorial limits and 11lr population has increased from 66 millions to about 74 milli()Il Th Austrian Army of 70000 Regulars and the 1nOQOO reserves are being rapidly transformed into PanshyGerman forces Her next most pressing military problem is the elimination of Czechoslovakia Traditionally the enemy of I
9
n
11
(lItlIIl 11middot1middotllrdmiddot I() JIJIf1rh hI- Ib1lI lllllOJcd dlmiddotjshy
j()n hi(h tn Iwing (middotpandld into --l The divi--ion orshy~aflildil)ll i iwlu d tIl )( t hOrll ill thl (hart (It~iglrl
L)
The (trmall tat i(al d(l(1 rillf cOllI tmplatt t ~11OIlj
swift lttplk(gt ltlhtaillVcl by llltlll)(JPJ 10 maintaill lh( (lllshy
flict in hl)-tile territ()jY Tllt-l nllehanized divi iolls arC dl-iglllmiddotd to provide a 1)1)11[111 fa~t ~t riking Itpon for --urprif 11- ill 1111 illilid tal~I- of thp ltampaig-Il Thigt mfchallizld fore( rIll ~t rib hard Pllough alld far ellough Into hol II rril()rr 10 frll tral(middot Ill (llIIllY fllohilizalioll alld dbnljil OJ( Iltlll illitial ddlhlt dbpo iliolh ill ~l1ch a
way 1 ha1 1fw -llpJlorl iJlg (frnwlI forcti ill hI ahlp tn -~curf an larly vilfIY All amplp of the -pld with vhich ((rmany IXHCt to mo( hj rnc(haniz(d force Witgt
j~iv(~n h Ihf 11~hlllillg-1ik( rapidity with which that Jl()(lshy
ful forc ol COllt(ntrai(d ill VilIl1tl la-t Match rllttchllW finllIlfl [gt1- ~ hffoj I Ill -1IlIJIjtd Tt aiiangt fluId IIllil 1)p
seimJe f)f Ao)tria (erlllany attacills great importance to the early h()llr of the val tllli Ihlllfol( lwl sllatpJ~ i- ha~ed UPOIl a war of (illiek dlli-ioll WIH1l 1Hl war machill-l
on land and air wlll vij~qr()IH)Jy st rikp (hIring the firRt days or wcelu of Uw war and inflict defeat upon the enemy
thaI (oun1ry ao shc did four years later Many haLmiddot lJ(litvl thaI ~Iu--oIiJli lt1- pr))]]Y tllatcd lJy HiUCl hen~ m ilttUti tncJ Autlia [liiall who rrmcmlJc) Caportlt Ill) love for (ermany and despitr Hitlers as-uranCe pract flifIHhhip and the promise that Brelllll --halJ fori nlllaill Ill( illvinlatp frolltiPl IJP1llll the two (ounl 1hlfI) will alwa)- IH a jllt-1 lflll ill Ihl Italian mind ao tok -llH(rity of thl--p promit-- parlklilarl~ (on--idiIW thlle are l1early thJ(C-quaricl of a million ((1111lt111 J
North(Jn Italy IUtl b V(gtly ulJHraIgtJp 10 a tlllllg -(a )()lr bl
prestIII she i --t1Ollg ill Ihe ~Iediler]llltal1 due to tilt
nus -tllJlnarine alld air ha~l that hl hl~ prepared which thnatlll thlt lift-lilll-- of bolh (Ilat Dlitain VrlIHt Silt i--lIalizt Fralltl 1- In lllg prest igp
Jat in llat iOIl nnd t lOIl) dy d(~irC to auml that
f)nlillJ~ til( la-t ItW ytalS Italy has her11 ovnomiddotinlenill
wlth major l1uits of thrp( distinct tvJC~ the divi~middotd()lI t lIP molOiizld tli i-joll and tIlt mechanized
The IHlrpuse of the fa-1t division is to make rapid movements and to arrive on time t1WlI at nated place to deploY fire power sufllcicnt to
~ _ rshy1)1ech(mizul ion C amp GSS Quart
France -hc ha- huilt a -pcfldilt1 road lwl in Uw ~olltht t especially uitable fill tlw u( of mcchanizcd force~ It i-
reliahly rCllorlcd that Hitler is rapidly [Ilrtifing- the Rhine frontier to meet tFrcl1ch attack
r The terrain of ojgterltIOll- of tIl( (prnJall Army ill fJ(gt itlitiallx at hast on gtllJ1l ()IlP of thl Iirhl)olillg llat 1011 -nil ~ Germany form(gtrly tied hy t11( IH()middotIioll~ of IhE Tnal~ if Veriilh- WlllCh 11( 1lldJatpd ill 1~)-) ha llladl IWI--plf fnl to tlqllin the m)1 mlJltrll (fjUill1llnt IllJlquipllHlJt i~ new alld n1lJl)til- all lllElIfn improtl1wnt (1Jllla~-lll
thoC nat jOlb hich hayt IlI(1I wvilJ~ alrlll It II Iheir (lId matflili -OIlIi of vjlltll tiatl lllI 101111 01111 rar Sll( itlltitlpl kIt I Ilh all ldpr~al~ --1 roJW ill arlllOfEd vfgtllic1p Th( illf1111 ry dll-illll j lqllIPIHd Illl 11 aliI itanL VIlIl- which l1 lJf ill()-t II tIl 7~ an(lrclil~ to ]Cpnrt~
TIl FIIIHh di1 IllI hamiddot 1-
ol
ITALY rt
The mission of the Italian army il for the defensc 01 it homeland and the presPlvatioll and enlargement of is colonial mpirp upun which Italy is dcpelldlllt for her Ie matpriab Slw ]ool s fOlwani to power and (xlIarl through fulul( domination of the riLditlllanCan Sea til plaeing Cl(at Brilain ill t h(s Wulll-- All invasion r (If
tIll lloll 11 t hrouglJ BnllIltl Pa-s lIa alway __ l)(c11 the up mlhl COllctln of the Italialls fully nn1tml)(gtring that ~l
til( days of Hannibal all illva~ic)lls of her oil have c Ihrouldl this --tratgic Pa--i Italy Hnttl an inc1cl Au--tria as a buffpr state uectuic Germany a~ too hig trollg a IIcighhOl fOl comfort Oll~ July llt t ll1flbiliztu troops 011 the Au~lriall Lorder to protect Aust iJl(l(JltIllt1(IlCt~ When Austrian Nazi-- ldlled ChalllCllor nol
alld (elmaiIY Was then middotmpPoiecl to he planning the seizur
10
01 XVIII No 70
mission To this end the division is composed of two rts cavalry motorcYclits and fast car~ f01 speed i portee its and artillery for fire power It is a long range recortshyissance and combat force extremely mobile and little ex-
ground or air attacks The cavalry and the cycli-Ls tiaie diJIkult terrain and fngage and hreak combat
eae The fast diVl~ion is particularly i-gttIItahle fOJ tiom in the Northern frontier he jlUlllO-C of the motorized division is to dl(jop the occlsioll demand it d very high power fire It is
-uiJlttance an infantrr riiyi-ioll transported in mo1or- IS capable of ]ong- rapid movements but at the moment of
~L tion it ieav(s it motors and fights like an oldinary divishy - Jll reinforced by a -trong mechanized echelon Naturally middotdmiddotmiddot is tied to the roach and once commilted to action it beshyI mes 11Il ordinary foot ullit and lose it- value as a Ir - echal1lzcll force
d j These two unit- opposed each other in the Italian mashyT uer- la t Augut on the plain of Venice Thfir identity Lijf doctrine and equality of forces led to a -talematC The ~ motorized diviion cut off the fa~t diviion from its base and r ~e fast division fell upon the rear of the motorized divi-ion tisblating thi- unit from the main body of ib furce~
Mechanization
The purpose of this unit is to break the enemyR line to open a gap through which other troops may penetrate and break duwn the enemys further resistance The mechanized brigade is therefore the keen edge of the pellet ratillg wedge but it can reach ib objective only when plolcrly provided with ~uppolting arlillery a~ otherwise the pnemys guns can prevent the l)li~ade from r(aching the dcfeni-ive line or at lca~t inflicting heavy loss(gt~ As the gap i~ opened units from the r(lltlr- fast motorized 01 ~elf-propeJled-sbould be llu-hed into it to calise the enemy- general collap~c leading to what Napoleon called the denouement Many Italian military I(-uler~ helieve that the mechanized hrigade -hould he termed the mechani2cd divi-ion and that it ~hould have one battalion of tOO-mm and another battalion of 105-mm and be furthe reinforced hy army artillery as the ~ituation may require
The national policyof Italy calh for a war of -hort durashytion necessary hecau~e of shortage of es-ential raW matershyiab Accordingly her strategy is based upon a quick victory hich is essential uccause her industrie canllot he mainshytained nor her people fed if the gateway to the Meditershyrnnean flOm the east and we-1 arc clolcd to hey 1n accordance with Musolinis declarations Italy evidently
MECHANIZED DIVISION
General Pariani in his final report of these maneuvers ark- thai these two new types of unit- were used to
each other but this should be comddered aR excepshyfor these unitgt arc intended for use in collaboration
obalJly a~ embled in larger unit~ Thi~ would make it Ie to make a more logical di--tribuUon of duties for t po-scssing great peed and maneuvering power
ving a combination vhich volild have great combat ngth
The mechanizcIl )rigaue (hrigaia corazzata) I as tested the maneuvers held in Sicily la~tAugustt b hOW11 in
gure lt1
Sp( cctrss Qnartcrill March 1938 page 75 tSec CampGSS Quarterly March 1938 page 71
will usc her ail force more 01 less in accordancl with Douhets theory striking terror and dlstrllction into the hostile territory She has placticcn thb type of arfare during the Ethiopian War and more recentl- in Spain and appH~ntlY helievQ in the -oundnc-h of thii- doclrin~
RUSSIA
The mision of the Rusfian Army contemplates a war against Tapan in the Far East or againt Germany or Germany and ItaJy combined ill Europc or poltsibly a war ~n the two theater at the same time The organization plan of the Red Army call Jar a lwogram of defense all two fronts thousands of miles a]lart
11
C amp GSS Quart
According to n~ports thpound Ru-sgtian Army has five dhi~ ~iom~ and nine independent brigadeN f~llly motorized and a total of from 1000 to 1000 tank motly Chritie manumiddot factured in RUiia The mcchani7pc] force aceolding to the foreign pres-- cmprics t 00 motorized tllviiuns six armored car rcg-inwllh awl (i~~hten armoJ(d car gTOlP A numocr of lImb are (quipppd with amphibian armored alrS with a mt-jmum -plImiddotd of 10 rnilp- pel hOU1 on law]
anel -(VIU mih3 jlPl hOllr Oll wat) All tlw cavalrr rlivbioJl have IHeJl proidrmiddotd with a nwCilallizLd group of thre( --quadshyr()h of ljght tank alJd al mllnd caf- lgtUt to U1I lioak of cree maillttinld it b Ilracl]cally 11l1jHJ-lhlf III glV tlw organizal ion of t hi lll(haJlild 101 CI wit h ah agtlutf (l(llracy
but tillyL -llnl II) Ill litt douhl that HII--Il i thinkingshyalong- mlchalllzld Jill~- and that probahly lthin a fp ypar- Ill rnay avlJi(vf 11111 idlraldl rntlnpIIlPllt III rnlClalllJati()ll
TIH comhat flJlIWipk flf tlH Ilrl Army tre ha--rt Oil the employment of mVChallllal lqllJjlIlWlll Todern a-tuit eapolh e-I)lcjall~ lal1k arlllllJY 1 lat lOll and mechanized force lmpJoyc(1 011 1 11n~l (alp makp IHblhle the nrganizashytil)n of a -imultalHolh attuk of Ihe tlllmy on hi entuc hattie fronl so that w may iJp jola1ld (omplptrly stlr~ rounded and dttrytd (Pal 1]2 FSR l)~G) And again the mallllIVpl alld at lark tIl Jl1lchal11zlllllllih -houlcl bc SUJlshy
r)(lrtlcl hy tiatiotl (Pdl 7 FSR 101()
thQ mechanization of tho Army of Atlantis The Grand study is attached as an appendix
In arriving at the recommendations the factors YOll
preRsed wel~e kept constantly in mind and in addi1 ion following were con~idercd
1 The tactical doctrin(~ of the five major powers r ird 1( frequently influenced by riitinctivr factor of graphy and of national Ilolicies
2 A military contlict of the future j- inconcei Without the participation of air and armorccl forces questionahly the evolution towards the machine b accentuated daily
t The incontrovcrtiuly established importance of all tion requires a speedy aggresHive and strong power ontj 1~rollJH1 to supplement and retain th( results gained fft~
aerial reconnaiHslmce and combat r1 1 The dCiCIl-livc power of the older arms is not gr~
enough to repube the attack of trong hostile armored for nor is the penetrating power mobility and speed of the o arm~ Hufficient to drive the attack sO rapidly and deeply the hotile front a to deprive the defender of uflil] tIme to taic countermeasures shy
5 Improvisations of mobile unit- have provcn to k little value as it was uornf out hy the organizatioll Of
IMECHANIZED BRIGADE
AA SshyMotorshyTank Regr Reg
Anti Ton (Mor)
cycleBerSCig(U1 FA Unit Detsco
FHLfn 1 ~ItaJln Mechanizld Hllgwic
C(j(U middotS) German cavalry in U)]middot1 A Hwift armored divIsion 4holl) organized that will form the nucleuN of t he mechanized f
1 a f-ult of Hl ahf) tudy the ChIef of Staff ~lIbshy of Atlantis in case of war a force receiving apptopriatJmitt d hh llport 10 Iht Sfcrdary of National J)cf(nsc dircctly for its improvement and dp(Jopmcnt not as a Hal dOll th CfHHlu jfJlb till StIdary ()mmIHlkatrd to Ow of any hranch hut a force to which all hranche of the se(hif Efcntiv(L1 fnIlI-
lllu-1 (ontnhutc whoc tadi and training will break (nlircly from the method that wer t hotl(ht Ul(qlllle
lJImiddotIAIltTE~T OF NATIOKAI llEIEtltSE the cavalry 01 for the infantry awl think maUers Ollt f j(UIIBLIC OF ATLAtltTIS an (ntire1y freHh basis This should ill no way )Jll(JltIf f IJfl tllJl I lll)
eavlary and t)1(gt infalltrv C)()1ll acquiring slich mcchani71 TIn (11111 EXl-CllTIVI 10 the (xtpn1 IWeeHSalY to PlUlhl( th(gte armg to bctterc J(IIlBIIC OF klfANIJS out their pregcribed tactical functions The fact that
My dear Chief mlehallizld unit tight in support of the infantry or th~
Tn (ompJiamp vlth Ollr dllfctive of 10 Aug-uHt 1938 I carries out a role onCQ filled hy cavalry is an incident11 m
1IIbmit illJ(with 111l IvComnwllciatiol1) of mv de mrtmcnt for ter
-olXVIJl No 70 Mechanization
6 This mechanized force which we shall call the Swift obstacles and road blocks and can render important service rmored Division should be used for strategic missions and as a holding force Since the infantry regiment and the field r exploitation of a success and its principal mechanized artillery regiment canH-ist of three battalion~ each aIle batshy
are the scout car and the combat car These ele- talion may be attached to each mechanized regiment in case s will be organized into three echelons rcconnaisancc that circumHtances may make it desirable to do so
~ ort and assflult The division reconnaissance unit at the disposal of the ~~~ 7 The basic principles underlying the employment of division commander give a tool of reconnaissance makingr- e Swift Armored Division are movement Burprise and unnecessttry the detachment of similar vnits from the other l---e objective It will be employltd on defensive misisons elements of the division ~ Iy in case of necessity and Ib relief from such mis-ions The obRervation Hquadron furnishes observation of the
t - ould be effected at the earliest opportunity j terrain over which the division will advance and fight will T 8 The Swift Armored Division iR eHpccially valuable inmiddotr furnih battle reconnaissance and lay if necessary smoke ~ ruil and delaying action Its great mobility and tire ltcrCCIlS to blind or deceive the enemy The attack aviation ~ - wcr enables it to operate on a broad front to beat the which will always be avaBable for attachment can render ~1 - emy to defiles and other critical localities to carry out great altli~tance by aUacking thoRe objectives which cannot I dt~truction on the enemy route of advance or retreat to
strike the enemy in flank or rear or to deliver repeated g- attackgt against his flanks Jr 1 9_ The Swift Armored Divi-liull is especially adapted to C it In an envelopment or turning movement and in the exshy -~ llatlon of a breakthrough The most important factor to IL con~idered in this type of operations is the terrain and itL bull
wl be the mi-sion of the reconn~lt~ance echelon to rlconshy~1iter and ~eize faorablc terrain for the action of mrchall shyt iud chiclegt From this favorable terrain the $upport echcshy
lolt ahb the attack of the asault echelon and occupie- the ObJcctIHgt ~(curcd uy the laHer Thus the $upport echelon become the ~JlringiJ()arJ from which the u--ault echelon ntkc It Iucccssive bounds to gain the ultImate objective
lU Since there arc three echelon- the Swift Armored Dh jlOll -hould huyc three typc~ of mechanized vchicles fat -[out and or light armored cars medium combat vehishyde~ 1Ild lombat vchicle-- of a heavier type which will take carl of the three different phacs of battle reconnaissance de L]opment for comLat and attack The reconnaissance eiEnltnt of the mobile division -yill cover the uhision anti _~llctrate or outflallk the enemys -creen This echelon will tbti rClllfoned by the support echelon to develoll the cncmy~
fcnle dbpoitlOll- and gain a suitable terrain from whichf attac~ finally the assault ((helon comprising th( mast-
f the dVhlOllS mcchal1lzed force vIll be launched by sllr shyill I~e and in several waves ag~linst the enemys front 01 f nk 111 order to gain a deciive -llCC(-S ~ 11 ATLANTIS has a large seacoast to defend and a highlyr
bull bIle force like the Swift Armored Division viii be exshy1ely valuable as a mechanized general reerve capable of hing any threatened locality in a comparatively short
Thi strong reerve centrally located in rear of strashy~ections of our coa~t can meet the enemy at any point Wide World Photo
e a hostile landing is attempted_ Gelman eombat cars on the march in Austria_ It is believed that the propooed Swift Armored Divimiddot
n (Figure 5) is suitable to carry out all these missions and be fired upon by the artillery Its objectives will be thereshyparticularly adapted to the terrain of operation~ where it fore hostile antitank weapons hostile artillery and reserves II be employed_ It i~ a well balanced homogeneous unit beyond range of our own artillery 01 which may be unknown elements of which have the Rame rate of march to the artillery
13 Thc three mechanized regiments constitute the Attack aviation may be the only means available to the cleu of the fighting force which supported by motorized enemy against a Rurprise attack o( the mobile division howshyantrYt artillery and aviation posesses speed mobility and ever bombing must be used because the effect of aerial
ock action it i-l in short a modern weapon of llronounced machinc~gun tire against fast moving armored vehicles can iking puwer The Bupporting motorized infantry will be discarded It is important therefore that the Swift der valuable assistance in clearing defiles of hostile troops Armored Division be provided with antiaircraft defense
t 13
11 pI (IdJl1l tlv( iIdlllhltmiddot fOl alLHhnHl1t
j(um 5-S~lfl Armored Vivl1ior) of Atlanli
Ji~ch(riz(tion
Th S lft lIllo)ld i)lJ-jllll nlll-t hl lharaltlri7fd h~ high JIlflhdil trahieal lOd Htltai --Impii(itr and flexishybility 4IIJJJllJl nqlljr~ thal oldy ltmiddot llltial (jellllllt-gt be ill shy
cilllti(d It nqllllt a 1 iJtldHced -llf-ngt]iall1 nrg-aniza1io) which h withill it If lillllllan tOI)llomt oll1el( that will hi (ltOllnllJfd dlllllW tilt adVilllt E and ill tIll hlLtlltJltld Tid llqlllli til (IWIIHlj Hllit incI it i Itiltpd that
d dfmil II Iii l)d dJt((jmiddot or t1 kind IIIit ll (d ttl til 1(gtlll
It r J 1
l~ldl() I 11U1l11llcIlJlll J-- 1 -1111 ial to tlw COllllllOllld and hI I I till t t ~iJtld lill 1-- Illtlar
~illlldllll lllay Ill lllIlltl h~ limitailOll-- oj tlIcils to 1((-1 ll~-Jld( lPI~ (l1ll1Iat ear- -i1flllld hl ~qll1ppld 11111111t 1 II Iii llll 1hi I clllia11Ilg prolurtment 1rUJllllg
lltl (llllllll Ill]] uppl~middot
FI(11J1111 11 qUI] t Ill tllgtljt1I()ll lhal ill lHllllit Ill( t[ 11l1l1l1 lt111]( I dlll~ Il h d llwtori-ld Illfantl~middot airshy
r~(1 and 111J fur ~jllllal operatIOns til a addItional -IIP])Ii 1]H] 11 Jidlll 1)(1(1
Tlli qlIh t LdhI- 1hat nJtThallJlcd fOlLt- 1re nut OJlly
1111 Indo ) ] ~Illl lll nd J( (- ~aly lot he arlll~ of AI LA -11- Lll 111t 11wll I (d Jfll iii hI falilitai1d for the folJOing
c amp GSS Quart
1 The domestic facilities for the manufacture of mored vehicles in Atlantis is UllilUlpasscd oy aJlY lIat10 the world l11dwtrial material scientific and tillar leoUILI1S an mol( than ample to pruduce and rnaintan lHel~4aly lquipnwlll
2 It ha ht11 loaid that oil will domillate the H(xt q
a1 and that it is (veil more importallt than mUllitioll~il mell to mock Ill lig-ht illg lIl1it- Atlantis has an ovcrhelnj uivalltage 011 hpIside Napoleol1- armlPs moved on tJ
-omaeh- hut thl nlllliPlll motorizld and Il1lLhanizld anl JllOVl Oil gasolilll The (Clman highly motorized I nHchalliztl army had comdderahle dillkultie~ ill it- mr (Ill VipllIla alld it j said that a ian-e portion of tl1P mel) iZld and motorizpc lin it (rt I(ft 1ralldetl Oil the load~i IllVI1 saw Au-triHll -011 The Fnllch General Staff wri Arllo J)ogth-IIfIllol ha- iig-Ulld out that the oil neel motor alld Idnieatillg oil-of modern armie~ navies ane IllPt- i- -0 glcat that ill the event of war the tIlmali Europl fOI war purpo-(gt alone would be nearly th1l( t iuropl (llUre peacetime nced-- Germany is --UPpJIllg
pIf today from coal J1lo-11y low grade coal and Iiglll millioll tOll of fUlj a year But in till vent uf war til Ollly a Ira(t iOll of 1Jc oil lhal (prmallY will Jllld fOT
lannil- Shortagp of oil will paralmiddotzc tho-l nlOtorizedj Dllcilanizlcl force Thl la-t harrLl uf oil of a iJlilagu army will be as dramatic as Ow last eartridgr
~ Tlw (hmand for gltatlr S1Jlld alld mohillly h il anonl with Atlantis plan of llat jOllal defeJlsC a plan ~f 011 a -mall highly lliilitnt fOlll The citizens of Atlantl t hOlotlghly accllstomed to the li-e of mechanical devicl-t havp a larger Ilumb(r (If TIWChallllS t han allY otlw) Hatil
the world lIemiKls of Parliament apprlciatl the nll1 Jighting macilille- n~logllizl the lllcd- of a well (qUI) mmiern mechanized furle so that a~ an entirely iluh dent entity it wiJllJe ill a favoraLle position whell thel lome to grant the nCl(~~arr funds
4 Fighting nwdlinc-gt -uit the natIOnal eharader of thL dtizells of Atlallti~ They appeal ttl 11wir dL--irf (lllrgl1 ic and -ift dCd~i()ll
g SecretaIll XatioJal VI
SerVice Ur7lts and
TrClns~ ~pPorting AUXIII
-~
01 XVIII No 70 Mechanization
The authol~ have cnd((lVOled to prltClcJli in thi -ludy a alanced mechalli~crl force of -trong fire lower great mobilshy and heavy hock action inuepemlent in organilatioll a rce pertaining to no one blanch On tlch a cOlltlOvcl-ial bject it can hardly be cpccted thai thtlC will be unanimshy
o( atrcenwnt Thh gcnelltli lndy i IIllSlntcd a thl
ba-ih of dicllt)-)ion of a problem the sathiactory solution of which -)hould be under constant discussion The mission of thi publication will have been fulfilled if thi~ ~l-ticle serves to inspire vigorou~ thought on one of the most widely disshycU-ised subjects that is occupying the minds of the most brillianl mi1il~lry leader~ in the world today
)
fn ~(lmc c()untrie- of th( orIel man is held ~hlJap In
the lInited Hiate on the other hanel e have the utrongtt
re-ped for human lifl C()n~equcntl~middot in our national
tlefcn~l program of today e have placed great emphasis upon equipment ~upply and transportation We have de CiOPld an autoJ1loth e program which looks tnward an
alm~ Oil whcel hich ill Oplrate more -lileedily fight more eflicicntly and -mlTer le~~ ~cyelcly than our military forces of ~ c~terday
~middot1lt~isflllit Seci efury vf Irar Louis Johnsu
c S Ir COnI Photo TIlII d ~1i14 1 III AntilllCItft tI(4)]h
15
Military News Around the World By ~lJOI( E -1 BENJTJ~Z CAC
I TIl( gaolilw Ijt~l lllrdlJr alld til adaptatlHIl of arnw if ll machllll 1Ia t [Ot1 Imiddotd a wOlld-widt dllmiddotjI)Pllllllt of
nHlilaJJizati()fl anti l1l()iorill1iolJ Japalll~( lall]-gt rllllhlillj~
through Chilll arillond (II IUII11HriIW tllrolwh rtllllld tfJwn in SPltlill ((rllltlIlY PaIl1tr dimiddotj j()l and ((cl1oshyovakia IlVdltlllt d llllit lll[ll(I(Ilillj III llllmic wal IrancE dlplayi1Wmiddot It n1lLhlI11lld IIllit It t hl rtlTIlI mill aI rcyipv in hOllllr IJf the nril hh -Ilrlirll Italy Tl1otn-n1lch llliz(d fon J (middotill l ill) III 1lit J)(Ji()111111 p- JJd Sicily and melilallizld Cl al r IIn1- lei Ill I ron lqr-- pract iti Ill the -Iifl Jmpla(al~l a--anlt 11J(j Ill( world II) 111(( t hat war l1laChllll-gt 111 Il tl-d III Ill 1111111 011 bljIl -lt1t than h~lI hitlwllli jill kllll III 1(1 01 Plllllt a1-
Thee molhilli m()l III jcI()lllH alld tlwllforl tho-gtl (fllIlltli( whiih han Ill l1lllI01 til nrld 011 lPllur(p III ha( til ()PImiddot]nlllJg 1IlIl1lgP ffll thPll idt It -fpm apprnpnll 1lt1 lIHI liJ II1ld- nil production a- ginll iwio
Tht olln ill) WIl) from Illlvrllatlllllal 1troll1l1l1 f rlfl(middot 01 I 11 L hl IIlI Illltt1111lllJ pJncliHIl 01
) t rolltlm III Ih 111ld dll nllt I hi 11 1~I~~l 1~l~G alld 1~Jrl
0
IRON
0 COAL
B OIL
111l11 (ud
lugh )LSUl tu establish themjcs The dlcnmiddotfi IflpctiYl 1 Odober ID~8 and i- H111kr~toud to have Ii i drawn il(tltlu-( or Ilw L1at nnmiJ(l of Cllltlal ilIlOPf j dlilill)( to (111(1 Argentina ~
11 -1 111gt
I [1lt ((I (t (
II rJIrjIHI bullbull 1)1 111 lhflJ7hll
I 1 ~td IilII IFI iIIIIh7
- ( llll 1 2 11 III jih
11-lj 11 1 -dIlI f)
bullfr- -111 j)l 1iIJJ
t rldJ( ildl 17171
IIll~l)i h lrj-
1 lt0 1111 lIli
1j bullbull Jjjjnl
i JrIl 2111 1 7 1 I Ill
(11 J~I-l I I h7
[r li)I) 17iJ1i r)Iill J 1117 iJl jjtji
1Idr 7i I I)-
BiI bull ILl II))
middot1gt 11 )(r dtdl(
11 )7
(11
I Id
jllll IJ1n j1 11011
(gt10 li)l 102 h
lIn JUt I
~ I ~ h7111 I
i 7lt7-11
n If)7)
~ 1 1217(i
middot1()117
I 7 mWi
I(J fII
III 17 Hi7
(JIi ]n2W
III 2111
122
1
2) BELGIlDl p~
Bplgiulll i NUllOtllllled by lIeighhol~ po~sl~sillg- hug( anwtda- ald C()Il-lqt1llltl~ S1( fllrs ti1( ruin of cit ies If
I COll(- This explains wily the lklgilll gOYllnmenl lod working ipvprishly to protlct the ciilian populatioll ag~
III air attacks n) According to reports air raid shelters already havel
11K cOl1structfd ill many Belgian cities Some shaped like hivIo (til u(ommodatl ~o p l~()l1- A few call hold a~
III a 700 011w) shrlters have hlell built in unciergll ((liars Ail raid alarms are carritd out on Sunda) HllIstOnl tIll Illopl awl training lhl inhaliitant- fOlair l)fC(aulions
(f7111fra r
1l0llVIA
A n_f(middotntillil ha (kcll(d iIL barriers agaiIl~t r()reig-ner~ A century old dillille belween Bolivia and Para~ to 1-1)]( (lp(1 ivp innnirrat iOIl prpjprallly of farnllr with which has lttlSlU much hloodsl1Ld over a boundary in
Hi
the terms of the treaty of peace friendship and the 100000 square miles of Chaco jungle and
will be divided Paraguay which held the upper hen hostilities ended will get most of the wilderneg is assured a free port on the upper Paraguay River
her access to the sea
BRAZIL
All branches of the petroleum industry of Brazil were nationalized by decree-law a35 of 2a April1938 The supshy
N eW8 Around the Worid
The winners of six engineering scholarships annually granted by W R Grace and Company in collaboration with the General Electric Company to university students of Peru and Chile were announced last March The scholarshyships were fint awarded ill1937 to Chilean graduate stushydents ard the re~ults according to the donors have been mORt successful
CHINA
Anking captured 13 June was the ninth Chinese proshyvincial capital to fall to Japanese armies since the undeclared war on China started on 7 July last year There are still fifteen unconquered
I n the order of their capture the other conquered capishytals are Kalgan Chahar Province Paoting Mope j Kweisui~ Suiyan Taiyua11 Shansi Chinkiang Kiangsu Hangchow rhckiang Tsinan Shantung and Kaifeng Honan
Nanking the nationa1 capital was captured on 13 December
phing of petroleum is made a public utility which means tHat the production importation transportation and sale of
de petroleum and its derivatives and the refining of imshyrted petroleum are subject to regulation by the Federal vernment All refineries of national or imported petroshym must be owned and operated by native Brazilians and
t e percentage of foreig~ employees may not exceed that ablished by the general law on this subject
BULGARIA
Bulgarias old enemies the Allied powers of the World ar choru-ed approval of Balkan action freeing- Bulgaria
m postvar treatv restrIctions on armaments and armies At the same ti~e there appeared to be no bar to similar
lion by Hungary the only nation still nominally bound by re~triction-1 imposed by the victorious Allies Other of the wartime central powers-Germany alld
rkey-already have thrown off reannament bonds
Chinese Commumcatiom through French Indo-China
Now that the Japanese are making serious efforts to cut off the Canton-Hankow railway the Chinese are reshydoubling their efforts in Yunnan Province in order to have an emergency gate of communications with the outside world Plans have already been made for the improvement of all highways leading to Kunming the construction of a new highway to connect Kunming with one of the railways in Burma and the repair and extension of the highway to Sinkiang Yunnan will be therefore the new keypoint of Chinas communications with the outside world should the Japanese succeed in cutting off the Canton-Hankow railway which ha~ been the main supply line of the Chinese armies
I (Ncw York Timcs 7 August 1938)
COLOMBIA
One of the worst aviation disasters of modern times occurred at Bogota Colombia on Sunday 24 June 1938
17
Mili~hrll News Around the World c amp GBB Quart
when a stunting plane crlgthed into a rci(middot in~~ -taml killingshy35 peron- and injuring mo( than 100 Pnidcllt Alfollo Lopez and Preident-ellct Eduardo Hauto who wpre rcYicwshying the military c-llliJlt Htll WpJP Ilnhurt
(OST mc Th (hif( (-pnrh ill 117 pre hanana cacao and
turrCl The Clltci -tal (plt lriLtlll alld (PJlllall~ ill
the ordd Jlanwd li 1 hI Cillmiddotr IH1Jcha middotr flf ((jta Hilall prl)(twt whilt tIl l1l1t((j Stttl (lrmlll IuILtp11l Inlll lIppl~irlJ~ 1Il1prll t
nB
Thl~ (uhall IJ (rITllIIJ 1()]ItIT(d Ulqll la lIl Alldr
)ummpr Hnwlttn thl ()rd] f)f (middottrlo 1tI111I dE middotmiddotmiddot pldlmiddot
(uba~ hiJilelt)1J1llqrlat AUVIl- Thll- If) (tJ- afttr till fgtVPllt dill Cllbfl hf))lltlr 1hi iJPl1) who canlld till llHWl tJ (arcia It wa- all ())11 J1l(--agt from Pn-idlll rcIinll~shy
tf) (Illeral Callfq (tlrl]l IIadll nf tlw (l1lJall ill-ulg-(nt mquirillf- ahout tIlt --trltwth of tlw (l1)lll fnlTI that wln
I (ol1ahJrdl llh thll- -- rlll~ lllligiltlJl) tilt -pllliard-shyill (uiJa
CZICIOlo 11
Hld H rII [v
rimiddotmiddoth ] lkltn Utd) [) PdlII th cj)Ut of PIl~lt
Accordillg to n]lf)rt the (zlch deflll-c sy-tpm ]- iJalteci on a t ripif ring of fort fi(middotld (()()ed with barhed wire and mif1ld rouh alld iJridVI fhl Jirt lilH dinTh on the lordptmiddot 1- -tarltd -Oll) --1(1) (u- WIl Sill( t he anllexashy
tion f Athtria tlll Jillf ha IJff1l (-tpIHjpd -0 that J]OW It (()VPl- 1ill Illlgt h of fhl (Jrnall fJoll11f1
AlJotlt ~o mill-- iJlhiJld lhf fir--t lillP h a -PCOJlfJ lttriJlg of forf ifiratils Thi h t hI 1-gt1 rOllgl-j r t hI t 11111 alld j lw OIW the zfdb arp c1tclmilltd tf hold
rt aplwars to lw ttl( inknt if) or ttl army In dt~t 10 jill
Skoda munitiolls W01k- at Pilslll and tlalsft~ the emplomiddotycc- most ()f whom arc (t(c hi to ~hadow faciorir- which haVe been huill in Sinvalda
The army thin)ci II (all han IOOOO()() nalI tinder arms ilL the (IHI of a week all defellding the second line each
equipped with a subwmachinc gun for no Czech sol carries the ordinary rifle
The third line is around Prague about 15 miles f lh eill limih II will ) defended al all costs but go nWllf officials will moVe to Kaschau in Slovakia
This war-bolll republic which fears dismcmbcrmen Ihe hands of (crmanl has iucd eeral military det r((ntly t(gtIIlt1inv to strCllgthell hClnational defense C PlIj-Ol military training- wa- slPcified for all children 0
( wit h 1 hr (x((pt jon of tllO-C who norlllaJl~ woulc11w exe from phy-ical j raining Boys not attemling ~chool are quircd lIoW to devote 70 hour- annually to military trairJ ulltil tlHY arc 17 a1ld Lhcl(aflll no hour annually until 7
plltp] military selvicp (irl- must dplotc 10 hours annu~ io filt aid and air defense training nntil tll( ag-c of 21t thJaft(rW hours annually unfilthc age of 10
011 JUII ~ th (zlth()~l()vakian J-(I)vclnment deershythat all motion-pictun hou~egt mll~t be equipped with ll1a-I~ for pa11f)1l~ and (mploYfegt within a month lJ JloJicL will allot gagt rnagtk quotas on the basis of the -eati t[padtip- of the nation- theatres
TlEN~IARK ~ I
Thr 1hird of t h( nw submarille tIllder construction the Royal Dallish Navy has heen launched recently t~gt~ christellld th( Iavfreun It cli places about l~lO tons it~ an armament of five 18 torpedo tuhps nne ~-lIlch gUlH
t
two lG-illch antiaircraft Hapons 1
1))mXICAN REIIBLIC
Oll ~7 Fpbrllar ID~8 the IlldepclHlCl1c( Day of f l)oJ11iniran Rplublic Plgtmiddotddcllt Trujillo ple-tlltcd tOi 1 National Congress the account of hi~ admilllstratioll forf i Ptl 1f)~7 ( HLvtlIue- loJ 11~7 Illwd a tntal of ~11)61868l i~ IlllTLa-e of $7lOGOO ocr the pilllding- year The prini~ c()l1ullodilil- (xporltd Wlie stll(ar cacao cofTfl tohacco (orn 1
T
EctlAIlOIt
Fronti(r clashes between Ecuador and Peru OCCUlTto ~
Jlllll ~ in tIll Napo ngtgioll ()lr which hoth llatiolls cLr sovr(Jvn1v Delegates of the two llati(lll~ have Leen mN ill Va-hinglon since Sepilmhel W 1)~6 ill an eTort tO~i amicahly t hi old houllclalY qtlst 1011 1 hut their fl (onfplPllCf-l have so far ploduCld no ~Oll1tiOll to the la1ld division prohPJ11 It is hpiipv(fl htlI(l 1hat a f snilltio1l1o 1his (1I1Pstjoll illl)( fOUlHI
FINLAND
The 1T40 In(ernational Olympic Games will be held lI(~lsingfOlt- capital of Finland
8
PERU
FRAICE
The French allti Portugllc-c go(~rnments have reached liccord giving Fra1~CLl the right to u-e the AzorC Islands the Atlantic ocean a a iallllinJ IM-C for a French North
tlantic ~viation fcrvicc The United Staies Great Britain and Germany all have
ffceivrel permilsion from Portugal to llSC ihe Azores for ~OPo(d trans-Atlantic Iinc
j
On June 14 the French cahinet an110unced it had opted a decree increa~ing the number of oflicers and men e third large increase in France armed forces within
t
j
News Around the World
three month~ In additon to a reneval of recruiting of an unannounced number of Holdier~ for the Regular Army prepshyarations were made to take 4000 captain and lieutenants from the reserve forces
The French army now 800000 -)tron~ i-) expected to reach 900000 by the last of this year In l)1O it is to be 1000000 the figure at which it wiII be -tabilized unless the llle-cnt two-year term of CltJnllHlbury elvice i-) increased
A measure to consctipt the entire nation in war time Wa approved by Parliament 011 J1lIH 17 Thi bill was originally introduced in 1J23 and it wa- talen off the shelf thi) year owing- to the war scare created by the German annexation of Austria and the German threat to Czechoshyslovakia It was rushed through thc Senate and approved with some amendmpnts by the Chamber on thc same day This hill provides for mobilization of all the national forces in time of war as well as for coordination of war preparashytiolls in time of JHalC The enUre population men and womshyen alike ill he concripted fOl zome kind of work in the event of war and all profits arising from production of munitions and war materiab are to he nationalized
An oreIer was placed on July 6th for 1750000 gas mask to be distributed free to Paris resident The funds for the purchase of the masks were advanced iJy the city but it will be refunded by the national government elt some later date
The French Foreign otncc disclo-ed on July 1 the occushypatioll of the strategic Parace I-iand) in the South (hina
FrUlCC neeup Pm 1((gt1 hand
Sea h(1e French and Japanese interest cla~h and neal thE sea ]wes between Great Britains Far Eas1 olltpost~ HOllg~ kong and Singapore Allhough only a group of coral reefs their sLrltegic importallce is rated high as thty would serve as excellent seaplane bases in event of wtr They lie 150 miles southeast of lIainan and 250 miles east of Tourane
I
19
News Arollnd the World CampGSS
d
0111 of hI prillllpd port 01 1 hE l-I(Jn loa-1 of French Jndo-(hllll
IfilluJto titmiddot dlcpl hat )111l llllrlp~ although (IW-(middot tliwr1ll(1l bt nlted IhlJ1l fl)r glHPraioHs in -parch of turtil and Jird lllh lcconling to French rf)lf)ri j H~ir on Ilpatioll wa t akpf a- a llrtCltlutiul1 iII the eVCnt or Japancle eizurc of Haman
Lat TUll Fra1lce alJd Endalld toasted th(ll 1Hrff(f prlltHII a Pari (middotJllhlbla-ll1ally j~ll(itl King (lOn~p ami
(llllfll ElizaiHlh BritaIll and FraTl~e took this Qcca-ioJ1 to alll))lnc tf) tI orld-- CIHclally Home and Berlin-that thir allianCf wa l)1rml111rll and lllbnaJabJr As IiIlg
(Ofg1 (xpnl~(middotd It our n~Jal iJJh hav(gt IHVPI IKPIl mol( illlimat
FralJfp parndld I1Pr lTIllltary power for the Briti-h middotHPpivn King rrnrgp and OUfPll Elild)(th drovr hrshytWflllllJlI of modn FrPIHmiddoth lallk~ ill tlw ollleial pr()l(-~ioll
in Parilt on TlH~dat lI JlllW a1(1 on Thur-lday a military nvipmiddot Va -Itag(middotd ill fHir hOlor at Vrai11~ ill which 0000 men participated
AC(flniing- to Prflti rpport 1hr French Governmrni is (middottHhiriflring tll( 1Ill of I~f)und camouflage to deceive the
lllemy hy imitating the noise of gunfire troops in the march throug-h loud spCakels
HLe camouflage sonore may be adapted to tcl iUll in ordtl to lI(ctlngt the entmr and lttan I Joud spPlkers will carry t he Round of lnoying trains iIlg infant ry fumbinv f nlCks~all snl1-ltsting a troop movement Vhlt (lHmy troops art hpingshymCft this thJ(gttf it 1taJ afllck may ht JaUll1wd el4C
GERlIIANY
Now that German border fortifications are aI11Ht1 aJ)(lVP th( ~rOllll(I tlw Gtrman goP1nH1lmt prorlamation on W Jul~r dcelaring- the entire we-itern a eiosrd ana which noborl may (l1lr without oflkiaJ idpnt ilicatioll pallPI4
Ill ciosltd area (forlified area) is between 50 miles wide and incltlde~ the Netherlands Belgian hOI1 n6nn French and Swis~ rronti(ls
Germany haR adopted a flexible system of which taking advantage of natural stlonlOIOlltls several Unes of fortified points with strong rtoru~
20
M ilitar News Around the World
heavy gllllS tank troop- and bathed wire Eniangie-
The Germans beliee that the French Maginat Line is rigid already outdated alld aisert that it can be broken
The German flying boat Nordmeer was catapulted from the deck of her mother ship off the Azores 21 July and landed in New York in 17 hours and 42 minutes later after a nonstop flight of 2a97 mile~ The ship carried a crew of four men th( pilot the co-pilot radio operator and flight
GRItAT BRITAIN
ar Secretary Horc-Belisha announced recently lower retIrement ageH and higher retirement pay for the army 1110 than 2000 officers will be promoted 1 August The S(cretary abo promised speedy action on plans for evacuatshyillg Londoll and other cities in the event of war
The term British Empire is obsolete There is now a Brlti~h Commonwealth of N-ations Canada Australia New Zealand South Africa Newfoundland and Ireland are equal) in law with England India and Southern Rhodesia also have the statu~ of dominions fn foreign affairs
The Dominions of Canada and South Africa are full member states of the League of Nations If England were involved in a war the dominions through their elected parliashyments would decide whether to intervene or not They could in theory remain neutral
Beginning the 1938 seneb of survey flight acrOss th2 Atlantic the British pick-a-back plane Mercury took off from it mother hip off Foynes Ireland 20 July and landed in New York 25 hours later The ship carried only a twoshyman crew the pilot navigator and the radio operator
The Air Ministry has announced recently the formation of three Balloon Barrage Squadrons for the defense of Lonshydon and it environs Eventually there will be seven Each quadran will have between 40 and 50 balloons about 500 being required for LOl1don
The object of the barrage as is generally well known is to force enemy aircraft to a height at which they can be effectually dealt with by airelaft and antiaircraft guns Being moored to motor trucks the balloon barrage can be quickly towed to any threatened nrNl and constitutes a mobile barrier
The antiaircraft defeme of London according to a bleech made in May 1918 by MI HOle-BeliRha had a
21
~ ~ shy
lfilita11 Nelcs Around the WOOld C amp GSS Quart
-tllllgtll 011 -Iay 1 Et)6 (If )7S0 nHitcl- and nWJl On May 1 1~)t) it Wltl-- ~~)tlli and tlt PIP-Pllt is 0tr that llumber
II ~I 1- If ~ I I ~IJ )ly l~)U)
111 JUJle JlJ ill S(tjll Flo lilt T qf the (lrman lIojlllial jhlltimiddot llIj1 (rr)~- l KllrtUlt ()jllllld the va[l-
tJ~l Iltcl It 1 1J)l n Illlll than tW(llty (~rman hip llltllllld thl IJllljth IIlIlh o Ill arnll-t( whlth loyal HI) -Jn 1 Ill jdllllll rttbj thall (1 tIl(gt nt+~ J1l t1
th Alii For 11l11Ij1(Il al tllb hajjl(hl]ll~ III till mud It Ihl hottOl nl Ill ~I )111 11J (I(gtat Brlt-ull 1llIb -crap lIll jill ]11 r TIlWhllll~ tlld tilt I)IJ~ 1Ltlpilip h[- h(til
rt 111 IIII 1hi ~ljIll I
11]IJrHw11 IIill (r- Vdl old thrdlr l)lrallll tlw lir shylrl~lrlllll Ilj IrrLllld 1lll1ir tll 11( (ol~lilqljlll 111 a lInl 11lli (nm(lll~ al J )Illllll ( tl~ll( qll 2-) T111l1 In- I a P)n(-tshy
tlli f 110 apJldlttli I) JI~(-~l t hp (Il11tldlnC( III i)I) 11 Irt]alld
(lld flrlhllll 111middot111ld Dritl h ]1)111- ~latljllld at f()]llkd lrJ--h Jlllrt i111w
I ]dl(Id h r]l~h -lei]11 llld it h llIHi(middot]-lll1ld thaI IH
IrllJl~ Jll 111 IIl~ttlll d l- ~llll III tlH~I ftlrllllc1I1111b ll
fl 1 Id t ~ (lid
----I DAMASCUS
o
AI
Serious riots between A rabs and Jcw- the WOllt-lt ~r
1~)6 have recently occurred in Palc~tilw Iain trol1lJle~~ ise ClC IIaHa chicI porl of Palestine and terminu~ of theJ-i- rpE
oil pipe linc Jerusalem amI Jaffa Report- t(l1 of the tratilill into thtgt Jloly Land of Tlall-jorltlanian Arabs to~ an 1111il fdlow 1ralgts of PallitiJll ill the strug-g-Ic againstt Id 1 Tews tlld (]llt Britain
Ju-t a Y(tlr ago without prIOr publie dehate and win Igo Clllbulling- Hw vishcs oj itilll Alab~ or Jew~ the Bri iJ 11Iprnmtnt adopted it plan for a tnpartittmiddot partition Pa-tilw Tlw 1Ioly Land Wagt to be dividtgtd into a 1 j jpl-h -11 It all ilah tate ufJi1ld with Trltlnlt-jordaniac i 1 lrJtbh 1l1lluIldt 0(1 01(gt hoI pla(p-i with a lorrid)1 it~ j
J(ru~ai(m to tlw -)(a It ha- Jlot hell Jlo~sibk to putJhpa palllllto dfll tlw plan prOVIng- to he er~ ulJPopularitO)rm rtll fIWS alld Arahs due t
thrif (HEECE wcnk
gDme The torpedo boat (corgt I built uy Yarrow and (
]lallY wa~ laulldwd 011 ~ March 11 ha a -pccd of if) t
kW)j ii di pJatmiddotn1PJlt of ljO tUH- and il-- armament isl of rOIl 7-1I1th j(tln- G or 7 antiaircraft mach11lq ltllH1cighl 2J-in(11 tflll)do tuhe
(l _ r X(It IIlttltllC llI(UrlUlJf lui) ]Jfny lttient Mexi seate
i lesolutlOll of ~K JalHlalY InHl 1iXllt1 180 lW--Ogt I
of a qlwtzai) pCI da~ a- till minimum agl for lab0middot~ (hracelos) engag-td ill agricultural ork
hensi depri
HAITI roigh
TIll minimum wago of (mployeo aH1 tidY laborer ~~st public ~lrvices III Haiti (nut incl~lding paid ~lomr~tic ftd~p~ tnb) h to be 1[)O g-ourdl- Jlel day alHllt ~halllJ()t hell~Jj to atiaciInwnt J)yond Olll-ttllth of it~ total aecon1ingJ3G law ur to Al1gu~t 1~)~H not more than one-third of the~~ 0
salary of salaried ll1ployc(~ and clprl i~ liahle to a~~
[)lent llJdi (nllldw of the [all 1))I liJIIIliioll Tul~~~re
ITALY IIc ()n til( ollasioll of Hitlers hit to Ital lat 1lu ~ n
olli-lher lhoIJach1lt pnhlhwd a Inilf ~lle(Jllllt ~f ~j nt italIan A Irll
Allordillg to 1hat pllllhcal io]) Ilw Jl aJiln Army 1~ _f4 (quipped diseiplilHgtd and trailltd it lla- all rffretiv( fur 2O()()() llHlI it is all army cnnlpowd oC cadn-l willct hrought up til ~1nllgth dllrJllg (lrtaill periods of they~-It cornprisc~ middot1 Army (roups 15 arm~ corps ~4 infrl~
divhi [j 1llgt1I1l1aill diviioll 1 fast divisions 2 motD U divisions and ~tv(nd independent mechanized brignde~ lli
this should he added the armand corp- -qlCdal troop J
can raise all army of ~OOOOOO mrll IJ( li
22
Military News Around the World
The Colonial army in Lybia and Eastern Africa cornshyises 100000 men- hite and lolored of this number two rps are stationed in Lybia
The mission of the Italian Army i~ to protect the EuroshynJrontiers and safeguard the Italian intere-t- ill North
d East Africa ~ The Italian Air Force b a highly tlailleU unit COlhiishy
ibg of from 60000 to 70000 meni
JAPAN
La~t July thegt Tapane-e Cabinet recommended that jflpan lthdraw its 11lltatlOl1 to hold the 1910 International OlympIC Game in Tohyo The Cabinets move wa probably d1c to the co-tly tr ill rhina the Ilccl-middotdty for national thrJi and the helief thlt tIll Japane-e pit-it would be weahcncd hy the lIlternatiollai ~IJlrit of the Olympics The ~mei will be held at IIeblllgfor- the capital of FlIlland
~IEXICO
A lontleal firm the Canadian Car anti Foundry Comshy~11 hugt entered into contract with the Mexican governshyaient for the COlltructlOn of aircraft in the military shops of M(ICO CIty 10 tralllll1g machl1lcgt and 40 military tmiddotoshy3elter having been agreed to as an Initial order
(Unitul SI I tlCC~ He I II II)
-ETHERLANDS
Lipan military campaign in China has aroused appreshy~ell~Ion ll1 Netherland India If open warfare happened to ieprire the Japanese of the American supply of oil Japan mght pUh south toward the rich fitorc of fuel in the Dutch 8nt IndIcs ~ Xetherland is creating a big fleet of heavy bombers orpulo craft and mine layers The army ~trength laudgt at about 40000 (32000 in l~36) Two tlivisionfi thoroughly equipped could be put nto actlOn1 There are now about 7000 Japanese in Netherland iqdia There are 1200000 Chinee of whom around 700000 iVere born in China
The Dutch Army is to be increased by 7000 men and ~o~e who ere due for return to civtllife la~t March have ~n retained and ~ent to reinforce guards on the Dutch ktmt1er
NICAHAGlTA
The urveyeu route of the proposed Canal across Nica~ un ~tart1 from Greytowll on the Caribbean via the San n Hiver and Lake Nicalug-ua to Brlto on the Pacific It would take a ship 25 to middotW hours to pass through the
(i jected canal in contrast to 7 to 8 for the Panama Canal t
PlojUllu Nicaruguan Canal
NORWAY
The annexation of Austria has completely reversed Norwegian minds in regard to national defense In April 1037 the unusual amount of 21000000 crowns was approshypriated for national defense slightly against the wish of the caiJinet Thi3 same government has just proposed extrashyordinary appropriations totalling 52000000 crowns a sum abont equal 10 that of the national defenses ordinary budget
(La Yacht)
PA~A
Panama shipping tonnaVenow stands first among Latin American countries Foreign firms have found it very conshyvenient to register their ships with the Republic of Panama and at present her registered mElchant fleet consists of 120 seagoing vessels The increase on this years registry is 12 gthipgt of which 6 were an exchange from another flag
(U S Naval Institute Proceedings July 1938)
PERU The Peruvian exports in 1937 amounted to $151363000
an increase of 13 per cent over 1936 Imports from the United States in 1937 showed an increase of 30 per cent the next competitor is Germany
At its meeting of 1 June 1938 the Governing Board of the Pan American Union approved the final text of the proshygram which will serve as the basis of deliberations of the Eighth International Conference of American States to be held in Lima next December
POLAND
lIajor Vaclew Makow4ki and four other Polish fliers landed al Warsaw Oil 5 June eompletillg a I6500-mile flight by a roundabout route from California
~ 23
~Miit~my$iew8 Around the WOlld t amp liSS UDI
The five flying a twin~endnc Lockheed American ila11shy
port pianc left Los Allgeles ll lIlay They flew to South America and crossed the Suuth Atiantic from Natal Brazil to Dakar French Vc-t Africa
IORTlJ(AL d
A PorluguPl Air ~li-siun is to vj-it Eng-laud III the Illar
future to takl c1eiivpry of 15 (o-1ler (ladidof -ingt--lltcr pursuits onhr(middotd hy the Portugllese (Ollllment lal Janushyary
En~~lalld hv had a rniiltJ~ Ttl]-o) III Portu)al -11111
la-t February It j- njHlrldj that -h( hLlS dlricierl to -uppl~ P()rllll~al wilh hl-a and livht arfilliry and (middot pHd UiJtallshytwllolns or credit- to lIpI Idd ally alarm(d by til(gt appanl1t delermlllation of (3prmallY and Italy to 1- tlill 1 -1 rallldt hold on SlJain and to uomillate Port ugal
H i- -aid that the Roel of (ibraltar nJH (OlhHiflt d impregnable iII be modernized with somp of thp lat(-t artil~
Ifry and antiaircraft hatterjt~ for deftn~c againt reported Itd(l~(lrnJan ) Ill- at Ah(lll 11 and (Tlf a 110t t () IllllltlOll
b()mhinf~ plalH from Spltlm Spalli-h 1111lUll1l and tht Bill~ aric hIand
ItDIAIA
queen iI-anc of Rumania one of Europes mo t colorful pcr-ol1aiitie died 18 Tuly in tlw royal palace at Sinaia at 1he ag of ()2
IWSSL
The Sovilt io ha at present from 11 to 36 cavalry dh-i()ll~ 2a of hilh an ill Eulopt
III Europl h-Jf of th(l Clyalry is stationed in the thrce wl tern military di trich (l (llingrad Vhite Ru~sia and El)
Sn Ill If Hllllt d (llIlll wh~ln itUlWIl IUlIl lapHllllL lrOOIshy
rrhe cavalry tationed at the frontier is reinforCed three mota-mechanized diVisions and by strong air force
The cavalry division comprises two brigades un ar - lery regiment (horse) one chemical 1quudron one englr~ti lquadron 10 communication squadrons and a nlOlo-mampt~ anizt1Ilgroup of three squadron- with 51 tanlc t~
f (l~a 11a1CC Mllitairc 2G Febl uary l~
Diplomatic )rlatiolls bdween Japan and Soviet Ru~~~
J1(and tilt hlpaking point as clashes between armed fo~ of the twu llatioll5 occurred 29 July over a small hHfl ~ hal)v]mf t1~~ ~H1 tht Smiel 1I~n(hukllO1l1 hOcicl near ~~ Important SOVIPL xeaporl and al r base of Vladlvostock t ~
fort itipd hill which bolh Japan and Russia claim is indk]J~ by the arrow Hu-sia claims that Changkufeng heigh1-~ parL of Soviet territory unuer the terms of an 1886 tr~ ltabli~hillg the fronticr with China
For the fillh time in four years an edict from the K lin has removed its viceroy in the Far East The Far EJ-~ ern uiJLrict is Olle of the three or four 1110-t importl~ provincial posl- in Rusia It ilJ(lude~ SlV(l1 provinc-leJt largcr than the usual Soviet province grouped in onc adrr isilativ( unit becau~e of the fear uf Japanese attack
i
SA~l I ~iams Navy is being strengthened Two gunboalsw1middot
to he delivrlcd by Japan last July they hayc a displaccm~ of 1100 tOllS and speed of 17 knob
(U S Naval mifilufc P)oC(cdin[Js July 1
SWEDEN J The Foreign l1inisters of Finland Denmark No~
and Sweden met in Oslo on 5 April to discus their coml~ defensp ploblemK in the event of war The result wns aJ_~ e1al agreement to refrlin in the future as in the past fil joining tHY gTOtlps of nation and to maintain strcngthelltheir poiililul and ecollornic cooperation with -~ end in view f_
( US N(tIallllntllltll J 1 l11middotI(Iillfq AllUlttE~~
SWIZEHLAND
Oil 25 Junc Italy joined Germany ill a formal pror III Swil-tiand 10 JPiIHt1 1111 llflulralityt- long HH slw rn laills her traditional aloofness from international COl
Oil 11 May tlw Ltagnp of Natiolls apPlovpd S lands request freeiIl)~ her from any obligation to PH ill -oallctiolls such as tlw ccononllC and finallcial ) taken agaiIlHt Italy because of the Halo-Ethiopian Vhlll Rwitzrrlalld joilwd the Lcag-ue it was with a s ion that he should not be required to join any milit action under the League Covenant
24
-~
~1XV[I1 NiJ70 Military N eW8 Around the World
TURKEY
IOn 6 July 1938 Great Britain approved a loan to Turkey mounting to $80000000 to be devoted to the purchase of
~ rmnrnents made in Britain ~ Recent diRpatchcs show that Turkey is planning mcchshytrnization of her army and extensive purcha~es of airplanes ~nd submarineR
AIlt)(lHHlrltta outlet of SYria
On ~ July a Franco-Turkish pact wa signed which rovide- for Franco-Turkbh military cooperation in the lexandretta ditrict with France and Turkey providing rmcd cuntingents of equal strength
The Sanjak of Alexandretta is just a strip fifty miles wide and seventy miles long with only two towns of any size-Antioch and Alexandretta But Alexandretta though a small town is important because it is the only natural harbor on the eaRt COHRt of the Mediterranean except Haifa in Paleo tine and the maritime outlet for the trade of the City of Aleppo and the Syrian hinterland
Turkey i~ interested in Alexandretta because the port there is a potential naval base and affords easy access to Turkih territory With independence approaching Syria the Turks arc ~aid to he anxious to bring Alexandretta under their influence and prevent it from falling into hostile hands
URUGUAY
The Constitution of Uruguay approved 19 Aprif 1934 provides that just remuneration and length of working day arc to be fixed by law with special regulations fQr women and minors Several decrees have been promulgated at various dates putting into effect minimum wages for workerR in variouH industries
VENEZUELA
On 12 July Venezuela withdrew from the League of Nations
The republics of Latin America are gradually drifting away from Geneva Of the twenty American republics originally belonging to the League eight have resigned or are about to do so
For the first time in history the United States is linked with Venezuela in a one-day fiight
Intermediate points on the Pan-American airways route include Puerto Rico Haiti Cuba and the Dominican Republic
Around-the-World Flhrhls
25
c amp CSS Qummiddoti
d
Frontier clashea oocur beshytween Ecuador amp Peru 3 Jtmamp
1938
Eighth International Conference ot Amorioan States will be held in
Lima lleoerrber 1938
bull 11shy
~lxvillNo 70 Military News Around tlte World
27
IThe Spanish Civil War
f
It 11 1 1 f tl 11l SpUIl
VIH1l thl rllll htglll rumhling in -pal11 on lR July
m(Jnth ~et it 1-- t1l1lring- tilt tlllni ~lar and both id( are l111tornpromi ing lilil -(J ddelIllIllld to go to tbt iJithr lIHI thd th(r( ~(tmiddotm In he nnthillg ilIa vall --top 11H (()llflk
5pmi
F]fl)m Tht Il1ltgtUl)~ent Drive on Vllpneia
28
The Insurgent spring drive to the sea culminated J~ the capitllp of Villaroz Oil 11) Aplil thll~ ~plitting Govea mpllt territory illtwf) Heet iOlls Tlw In-unCnts tried in middot1 10 captule 10(0 Ilaquooy cily Oil Ih( (alern bank of the Ebl~ FralllO Ihcll (hcided upon a swift drive with Valcnciat3 llw oiJIeetiv( which would not only g-ivc him control of tk1 important city but would at the same time cut off ~Iadnc~~ lifflillP ami thll the old capital isolated and starved wo1~1 hl furCld to surrender 1
I Th IWiUII(Cnt plan fol the drive south from the Ten(
--iIJocacer lilll wa~ ba-ed upon the converging movernt of 1 WO army (OIPS to pinch out the -lalient On the left It Army Corp of Galicia ((cl1cral Aranda) moved downtJ lrditerranean coast toward Castellon and Sagunto Onu
l
rivht of the Teruel-Alhocacer line the Army (orps (stille (General Valera) moved alonl( the axis of the Te~) -~amlllto highway Itorming Iiaisoll )ptween the wing~ th( fnsurgent Arm werc various divisions among themt Firsl of Navarre under Garcia VaJino t
The terrain is very mountainous with fp roads a~t able a region uifIlcull to traverse (P11 in ppace timl TIl (overnmen1 force- prepared stllt)Jlg defeTlltic positio taldng advantage of the strong terrain
The drive to Valencia has l)((n bitterly contestedf~middot
lhe Insurgents wcrc r(wanlfd on 1~ TlIlH with the caPtur1e~shyCasfeIl6n a seaport of cOllt-oiderablc yaluc only 35 miles f ~~ Valencia The Government f()rce~ arc t-otilJ offering re5~] tance along thp Mijare- RiYcr ~~
I 1 j
In the north Francos lroop bombarded the L()st Division out of its P1l1rP1Whpd po-ition ItltllCh frontil1r and OVPl 1)000 omcer~ and men fled Frallce
Resuminl( a drive on a front long dormant in the WCl the Insurgent forces captured Blasquez and the region surrounding it (Figure 3) Then suddenly
News Around the World
Vhat effect will the Gandesa offensive have in future operashyHom is a matter of conjecture
~ ReNcH
o SPANI5H
Flum 4-Spamh Tlllitory occupied by the French in 1811
Franco has an immew-IO superiority in the air a far more ample supply of guns and munitions than his enemies Moreshyover in order to placate Italy France has officially closed the Pyreneean frontier across which large war supplies of all kinds had been passing to Government Spain That frontier
FIGUF(f 1---Glllllltnt Olftlll( Itll (aIHiL-1
i 90vernment forces who had been yielding the stubbornly lteld ground on the -outh ~aJient of the Insurgent Salient Hurled an unexpected thrust into the llorth flank of that $lient The Government advance swept forward a dozen Jiule and reached the strategic cit~ of Gande~a (Figure 3) ken by the Insurgents last spring after some of the bloodshy3t fighting of the war The Goernment forcci however cre shortly after thrown back from the gates of Gandesa e Government offensive has relieved Insurgent pressure in
e south temporarily at least and seems to indicate that the O(rnment fOlces arC -tlll (ltlpahlc of stubhorn and effective
anee that their morale is still high and that the gents are not likely to vin the war before next spring r in the war the push at Ilrullclc paralyzed the activity Insurgent Army of the North which had just taken The Government drive on Belchite forced a months
tion between the conqueltt of Santander and AsturiaB
ha yet to become watertight and Barcelona still receives some munitions from other sources notably Mexico the Balkan countries and [rom private ources in Europe but this b not sufficient to oVercome the handicap to which the Government forces are doomed for lack of equipment in comparison vith the Insurgents whose superiority in guns tank8 airplanes and munition-5 increases daily
Italy ha- already lost more men in this war than she did in the EthIOpian Conquest and in addition the conflict has proved to be a drain on Italian finances and war materials For this reason Mussolini would like to see Franco win as --oon as possible
A Franco victory has been repeatedly deferred but few would now question its inevitability in the end Whether it can be accompliRhed this year or next spring however is not for Ul to predict The future alone can reveal the durashytion of thi struggle where we find not only armed forces pitted against one another but the indomitable will and do-or-die spirit of two irreconcilable factions
The bravery of the Spanish soldier is the heritage of a race ready to die for the defense of itf- lrincill)cH Thl heroism of the Alcazar of Toledo and the epic of Madrid had its inspiration in the memories of a g-)OriOUR past
-JHihll1ru Commentator J(anWB Citl StHr
29
The Sino-Japanese War
Ill
I
)l I ~f 1 Ill Llp1l1middot( (apt lInlI Suchow ~trategic rall ~ IUl1l ]1111 of i hI Lurwhu an(1 1h( Ticntin-Pukow r1l1wa It tllf)) a j)) (middotrflll fquipptgtd army of O( 20DOOO 1lll1l -uj)lorlt tl b~ alrpLllll- and tank- -lvlral months to
Wide Harld r~
1aIHllj(middot1 ohbl)o in thl Yc-l1ow River overflow where th( Peipille--Hankow railroad crosses the Lungri-The fall of thi~ strategic jl1nctlOn seemed imminent T~
Chinese blasted the dykes between Kingshui just north Cheng-chow and Kaifeng 50 mile to the East The Yen River ~wirling over hundreds of square miles blocl_shyhlJl[mese [ruuls before Chcngchow and forced them bac~ far as Kaifeng- cll-tr)jm~ lllormouc Japanese war m~r riel and lauslllg many los-es in property and lives The -~ river rolled relentlessly leaving starvation and ruin inf wake but the ]05 Vas nut all Chinas for the Jap armies uogg-l(l (lon wholly bested by the high water T Chinas Sorrow as the Yellow River is nicknamed be~
lt1111 1111 ChlCl fortl-- to the Vest SaIWlllltry llatl(- 111111) the Lung-hai railway followeu
1hi tall oj lltiJow pnrt ICllally al Lanflllg 50 n1l1e~ to the 1 wlllJt I (hilll CnuntlrllfTel1gtic llccecltied in su1shyilllltu]lng 1tpIl- lIHk lilJ I)ji-inll commanilpd by (ellshy
(rd 1)fIIIlra til1 ]1 nllLl of JIallchuria Thi forte vas )Illr aYt d IIIll lit kr cJlmiddot Ilit I ion t hnnwh timely arrival of rgtll1f01(II ~
Ill JaJlal]~( tJ((l~ I in till Lunghai Corridor nuw ~I(rn(d to ()jH1l ulIJllill 111l1 of lilt 11 the capture oj IIanlf) ollic]d gtd Ilf till ChiIlPl National (onrnmrnt afttl thl fall of ankirw The Japallll expected io captur( Hdlh1) h~ it IWII-fold malltlr Hv hnd following- the Jgt1JPJllJ~llalkrJ rlttiha~ lIJrnbilHd v-ith all (xplditioll up IIi YllWlzl Hlt wilen tllP 1apaJlc-c Navy had concenshyt rt11d a jlfIgtrJll Ilpll All ll11fol(gtltePll faeLo] hO(v(1 1
11Ihld t 1](( lanfll pnpal td pJan-i It jt ran ytar for China not to itnQs~ a thmd either
qf Ihl- YllIfJW Ilr ttl( lll)tZ( Hiv(T Some of the f1oolti-i haVll lJrr-1l J)It1 cal it Iuph llotably that of 1 Rill) A Hel srviral YIar I)f orii lluhr 111( -llIJPlviioll flf ff)reil~1l P l1 fdnrpl- I Ill (hllll had 1)lill dybmiddot ~lld had -ll((PLtipd ill l((pillg the lov ItlY(r alolW it ~ Ilorrnall()lr(
Ojl lJ Jlllll tIll JapallC-e Army 1lt driving- furiously for the IHJ-c-iol of Chcnvchow important junction city
(hinas Savior and the friendly rier dragons fUllli~hlt the most effective natural defense in Chinas moment t great national peril Flood strategy succeeded where et fii and guns had failed ~
1_ FHam 2 YIlI) ltlVll I
TIll Yello RIver 2700
30
(
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Military News Around the Worid
ellow mud which it carries at times more than 40 per cent y weight Thi~ ricr ha~ a more I4pectacular history than
Itinr other in the world and has wanderedfrom its appointed middotay (Figure 2) man time- It- v3srtliei ill th( sumnier hich is the time of high water are unpredictable
mperor Wu in 2297 Dc attempled to tame it by ing it into several parallel channels At 011(gt time it
wed north to Tienblll and entered the ~ea at Taku and it aintaincd that cours(gt for a number of centuries After
AD and until 1194 it flowed northwest of Tsinan ptying into Laichow Day later the river changed its
urse and flowed south through Kiang~u prOVIllce to the eHow Sea At other timegt it has -hiftcd between the-e two ints occasionally emI)tying into the Yangtze ncar Nanking
r~e which it ic followin1=f at this time The pnHnl Iir)od may (xc(cd that of 1fI~5 when 3000
quare miles were inundated 8()000000 worth of property estroyed and ~OOOOOO made homeless
YAGTZE CA~IPAIGN
Jpan(c lIfHlltry near Kiukiang on the Yangtze Riv(r
ready making arrangements for supply of munitions through French Indo-China to offset the lo~ of the supply line Ihlough lIang-kong and Canton The warlike clashes with Soviet Ru--ia have already caused withdrawal of troops from Northern China to Manchukuo but sO far Japans drive down Lake Poyang has shown no signs of slackening
1 Having been stopped by the River of SorrowH in the North where the great flood forestalled the Hankow drive lhe Japane~e Geneal Slaff immediately decided to push the ~angtze campaign vigorou-iy Anking was quickly capshyturcd but the Japanese have encountered stiff resistance Jhereitftcr However they have Hucceeded in ~ecuring Kiushy- iang great pottery center which held them for a month find gunboals have been senl through the moulh of Lake royallg They continue to pres~ up the Yangtze but the
lnain drive seems directed along the easier roule down Lake Toyang v Nanchang greateHt Chine~e air baHc Nauchangs all and the cutting of the Canton-Hanlww railway would l oom Hankow The Chinese Foreign OfTice with its archives
~ llld mosl foreign embassies including the American have Iready moved to Chungking 500 miles up the Yangtze
~ ankoVl cannot hold out indefinitely The Chinese are al-
f
FWURF 1 ~Th( HonRkong~Cnnton Rmway which Japanese bombers havo failed to d(~troy
Japan continues its Hir raids against Canton in an effort to break up the railroad to Hankow In spite of these air raids the Kowlon-Canton Railroad which is the main supply line of the Chinese armies continues running and rendering effective service
July 7 1938 marked the first anniversary of this war which started as a clashmiddot between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge outside of Peiping and has now become the greatest armed conflict which Asia has witnessed in 32 yearH
More lives have been losi more property has been destroyed and more money has been spent to keep the embattled armieg going than was the case in the Russo~ Japanese War
31
h
~
Military NewampAroulld the World
FHIJfU f) Id) of (mton hleh fo) month hac J II ltllhJ ell rl to J arllll( L Hlr lu(h
This war h~Lq no swept 100O()() quare mllCs nillP provincial capitab out of twenty-four ha~ heell captured by the inaders the lo~ of Chil1fs( lil-gt according to Japanclt(c p-timat(s which probably art too high is aiJout l~WOOOO li(- It is actually imp0slhlp 10 pslimap llw dlctrllrtioll of proper- ~11](1 wealth in (hina Thre(-fourth- of the ships of Chinamiddot 1ltY have beCn c~q)tl1red or destroyed alld the (hinec $~()lrnnllllt 11a- 11lOrL refugees than It can aiel Till 11llt- ) (hinl- raila~ ~~I(m haE Ill(11 tagg(lshy
U de 11 nrld Jb
IapUHlt combat (hie 1Il Norlh ChllHl
Japan ha- mod(rn WfHIJOIlH China 1Of)O y()ar~ of hisshytory during which )w has hllJl (OI1(IUered hut nev( al1t-orhcd
-From (hinn Fiyhts fo ifr Ekins and Wright
ing Yct in spitc of these appalling ImibCl Japan hal) fa to brillg China to it knee~
In January of this year Cabinet members were ex inl the peoph to )llpale foJ a three or four-yeal ar no~ depressed by the setback which the Yellow River gave thc lJJVaderH army in Honan Var Minister S Ilagaici declares that in his opinion Japan must be pre to fight at least ten ycars Japall is maintaining an ar over 1000000 mell in China and the war is costing h proximatliy ~rOOOO()O a day The (hillKe game lIoW
to bc to make the J apanCbC pay an exhorbitani pri may cauc a collap-c and cvcry days delay in the J apal1ri~
invasion j SPlll as a measure of victorv for China by Jlt c
creasing the already staggeriJlg co-t of the war tJ A JlC complication has come up The armed claslt j
bdWel1l J apltlncsc amI Rusian troup may prove to be tl j
first batth of a major war It is possible that the trou 4 may he localized and cttletl by diplomatic Rteps but th)i-H arc oh-erver- who argue that the Soviet Union believe) t tens the moment hus arrived for the following reasons 1
~ien 1 Rusia bplievc-gt that Japall is near financial exha Com
1 ion and a 1l0W or nev(1 moment ha4 arrived to fight a V ~
alld fOle-gtlall attack oy Japan in the future ~~ 2 Rusia fear- that China may collapse Rho
Japanese capture Hanico and sever the Cantoll-1 railway which is the main ChillC-c munitions artery I_
L RUKsia may IJliievc that the Siherian situation cant on kept within the Lound of a minaturc war without seri)l danger to the Soviet Union jildh
~- res OUwr obKenerK believe that the border trouble pC
mLrlly a Rll~~iall effort to prevent troop movements frl~ th MallLhukuo to -trengthen the Yallgtze Yalley Campaign-J
II haK been predicted that Japan will make peace Otiirod turcs to China after capturing Halllww and that Hhe eXPf(-~ng to end the devastating war ill the very n~ar future
Fighting- almost with bare hand against a armed adverary there is no sign of surrender yet b Chinebe government and people Encouraged by th( R Hians Chinc-c rcsi-tancc may stiffell
In 1812 the HUKSians deliberately burned ill(bCOW
order to minimize the FrClwh capture of their capital aIld embarrass Ow illvadpr The sl1uwuent collapse of Icons emJlil(~ has brrll attriuutLd Ly hi-torians to that 1 act The d(otruct ion of the Yello Rivcr dykeo 111a prmI to be HllOilHr act of self-sacrifice that may ~llso the dreams of another great empire
t~ er J
in nk 1 n ns hel qui OUI
ith
TANK ATTACK AGAINST ANTITANK GUNS
Condensed flam the HUltqHl AIllnfluyC_ IUllkU Xlufwz 11 1ll7]
AKTITA~K Gu~s IN DEFENSE
The advent on the field of battle of a lIe offcl1(-ive arm Lthe tallk-ha~ called into being abo a Ill means of deshyfense a t-opccial type of antitank gUll At the pregtcnt time the armiegt of all cQuntripgt are gtufiishy(lently familiar both vith tank(- alld with the mean of combatting them 1 In the opinion of Eirnannsbclgcr to each ldlometcr of
Ollt there must be 8 gum or to tlw divbion 61 gUliS to hich arc added ]8 guns at the dislln-itioll of the division Jmmlllder a total of 82 guns for the 8-kilometel defense
front of the division that b 10 gun- to each kilometer of tront i Such a tatulatioIl of the dcfell-e with alltitank gUllS i~ fudlcative of the fact that the attacking tanks arc being presented with a new situation
j Durillg the last few years a change ha5 occulTed also ih the qualitative state of the antitank arm i The 50-mm antitank gun of the Rheinmetall factory ireel 1929 has a muzzle velocity of 2000 fs a maximum ~nge of 6500 yards a practical rate of fire of 15 to 20 shots ~er mll1ute a weight of projectile of 171 kilograms The ~jrojectllc is thus enabled to pierce armor plating of a thickshy~~S up to 30-mm or 40-mm at a (lilttance of 1000 yards t A 37-mm gUll with an initial vclocity of 800 yard~ maxishyum range of 7000 yards and projeclile weight of 066 Iogramgt has an armor-piercmg -gttrength at a (1i~tance of
~_ 000 yards up to 20-mm or 10-mm rC~s(niJlg- of the djshyi- nce by half inclca-gtcs the penetrative power of the projecshy Ie by about one-fourth According to the French Rrvuf dATtillfJic there has
r
ten introduced into the armament of the English infantry4n antitank rifle I All the accepted methods of tank allack upon antitank
nS_HPil1cers front flank-which once Were COllshy
~ Rted retain their importance in a favorable situation that t in ctgtc of low saturation of the defense front with anti shy~_ nk g-un- and in cafie the tank unit act in JcconnaiRsance _ a broad front The degree of ~aturation with antitank
ns however which prevail at the precni limp demands ~ her methods of combatting them a different tactic That - quire a new effort in the field of military and ~cientific
i~ ought
-~
Foreign Military Digests Digestlt of important articles from foreign militarlf periodicalgt til( remaiui1l1 articlegt 1m each
lIlajaziu (( ( listed i11 C((trd(u (If Scrret( d Jgt( riodic([ Artielfs
j ~
SmEKrTH OJ THE TANI AND OF TilE ANTITANK GUN
Let us compare the strength of the individual light tank ith that of the antitank gun Conceiving the situation to
be one In which the tank ix approaching nn antitank gun which has been sct up on a firing position there is the folshylowing to be Imid the antitank gun thanks to its stable Jlosition and to concealment on the locality is less con~picshyll0W than the tank moving in the open and readily observshyable Because of that fact the initiative will almost alvays remain un the ide of the antitank gun The antitank gun is the first to open fire from a diRtance of 500 to 1000 yards and has the possibility of making a few aimed shots before the opening of tire from the tank With tho hots the antitank gun may put the tank out of commission If it doc- not then the tank will begin firing
The tire from the tank is tire from a machine in motion upon a poorly observable target on an unstudied locality and for this rea~on its accuracy wHi be approximately half that of the fire of the antitank gun However since the tank has armor and in addition to the gun haR also a machine gun it is more correct to consider that the vulnerability of the tank is much ICHH than that of the untitank gUll and its fire power much greater But the initiative as before will remain on the ide of the antitank gun All that is indicative of a cershytain preponderance in the fire power of the antitank gun over that of individual tunks
THE STRENGTH OF ATTACKING TANKS
What is true of the attacking tank and of the defending antitank gun taken separately can not be extended to the massive and skillfully organized tank attack
The rifle battalion engaged in supporting the tank comshypany will conduct its offensive in a zone 600 to 800 meters wide Assuming that the adversary is satunited with anti shytank guns in accordance wjth Eimannsbergers calcuJationg the company wiII me~t at the forward area of such 7one 5 to 6 antitank gun At some depth it wil meet with entire batteries of regimental or battalion artillery Consequently against each 2 to 3 tanl(t~ there may appear one antitank gun We have already seen above that when 2 to 5 tanks go to meet one modern antitank gUll the final ()utcome of their collision can not be predicted
In that case the situation for the tank is not brilliant to attack is po~sible but the risl is very high and the losses will without doubt be great How call those losses be avoided and What is the best method for attacking the front of the antitank guns The best way out of the difficulty must be sought in establishing a definite ~mpeliority of forces in the decisive direction That can be attained by closing up the combat orders in the direction of the main blow
Ag-ainst such a solution the foJ1owing objections mny be raiecl There will take part in the battle not only those antitanl guns which wi1l appear in front of the tanls but also those which will be on the fianl of the attacking cOmshypanY so that the humber of antitank guns must still be inshy
33
middot roreirII MililwY Digestq C amp GSS Quart
creaHed bv lor S Thal Itgt tlU( a- l(gtld- tlw -ingie comshypany ltutng- separat(l~ _ But eVell for -uch a company if it operatc~ dth 1lthcl --mall tomlmt interval eeltain adshyvantages are created illee tht numher of antitank gUllgt actmiddot ing again-t it will IJl clhicillahly II p hl( to take into
consideration maJJlly till ma-h( tall attack cIllCe the - employrnellt of tanh- III t he offrll in~ mut Ill majL
(FR-~(i Art 7J (()Il-(Cjuentiy the Lllll( (ompII1Y will a a rule not attack -illgl~ 11w attack gt111 )( parlicipaltd III
al-o hy 11~Hr cf)mpallir acting- at ngilt and hmiddotft
Till 1clIltWr- rif tlH attacking tank (IIl tlw alltlshy
ltl1k glllh lPIJlll illjf tlHir atLlck arc (middotmblHImiddotd III tIll ac11shy
IW p gt of fill offI-- flj Ill( dflJ) Till adl--lry dlall
when t1(gt dp~11 ~ and Ltlllreate a gtujl(ril)rity (If fon ill Ih dtciiyp dinmiddot(titJll Ttw pl1ly OJ till d([11l t artl oIT tIll attack Ill)t v hr he dhlrt-- but WiHlt I hI adnmiddotr ary atshytackgt that 1-- hi- (t]fJJh will c]pplld ()Il hl dllfjoll of t11l
asailant Bpcau e (If that fact lll mil )p ](ady pr~shy
wher( to J(pubr the lt1lt1Irgtar That circumtallcP ha always hmiddotd awl will lpad til dijllrlllll (If forn flll Ill( part of thp dtffn lmiddot lnrI In adY(llta)~( Oil I Ill part Ill tht otYPll-l(
Alld thlht l(halltql- llllht bl pot to u p for proppr 01shy~~anizati()n Df tllt t101 attack ~hltpfr may Iw the -nturashylion of 11w (Itf~ll with antItank gUIl-- it i~ 11wl~ po~ibIr
to create in till dllilp dlrlctioll a prlJlolHiL-ranCI uf tanllt attaching It1 COlljHlatlnn jtll till ttrtllleIY If the cnrmy has 1-1ahll--hcil ollf lntitmh gUll for each IOU yards (that is a high -gtaturatlUll and to create it is not uch n simple matshy101 a- may apptar at firt glance) t the nttackcl may have ill 111 offensive 70ne of 100 yard 1 to 6 or more tanks In that (asc (111 Hot countl11l the po~ibility of creating the same prepunderancc in artillery the advantage of the fighting a clcarly 011 the ~id( of the taId And therein lies the ltuperiority of the- at tacking- tanks oYer the antitank gUllS That nquirl~ of t1w organizer of the offensive an excellent military mind and thl rapality to lmplny tatlk tactics in (onformity WIth Ow IwculJaritic of the -iluation
In tIll ()lf~UljZllioll of thp tallk aUack th(gt 11101( the advpr-Iry lltllltioll b dilracld from the tIinction of the main blow the fewPl will oe the meall- of antitank defcJlsP which 1( will have aIoll~~ t hat direction anti the mure sucshyce[ul will be the tank attalk For this reaoon the preparamiddot tion of the aUarl of tan] an~I infantry mnt alway~ he can-fully concraJpd ill Ow dfejjvp rIir(ctiDll by Ow lmployshymenl of camouflage and by fligned activities ill ~econdalY dinctioll- The -uddllllW of the attack alvays has a -tunninJ~ effect
In tomlitiolh of limit(d obltcrvaUoH (ill twilight in pre-dawn fog) tIl( firE of artillery and antitank gUllS is poundndclfd (gtxtr(~n1PJy difn(ult and it is 11Iwly tl(hP condishytion which turn out 10 he highly favorahlp tl) the aetiyities oj th attaekillf~ tallls That is provpd abo by Ilw pxpprifIHP of th( Vorld War Tn all ea-C- a Jh~ht -mokp cllrllin ill front of lhf af1a(kifl~ talll is lllpflJ
lhe directions selected for the tank attack must have no obstaclr~ whi(h Hw tank--t art ill(apllhl of oVllenming Thc-iC conlt-lideration place highly 1chponiblp mi~ions upon tank r((ollnaih~alHmiddot( Thi-l lPCOllllaisstlnce must (stablish the character and Htnngth of the antitank guns and obstacles
and al--() tlw plteulialitics of the tank movpment on the
[ ~
ous sectors
StllIIE~middotaON OF TIlE ANTITANK (~llN~ III tillt (tt of a eOl1tillllOlS frollt of lntitlnllt gllll ~
a cI011sity or JIll HUll to (arh lon ranIs the aet iOll- of ralt~shysmall lalll g-roUJl~ (or a to Ii tan ) not united hy a gCI(middot olnmand ale unfavorahl( alHi an llot likel to tnrn ()ntl middotf CtSflllJy (~onsellueIl1Iy it is Hot adisahie t () assign lJ~ taJlih hy platoo)ls to the infant l lo01ptnil It h mJ blltll again-t a continuoll~ front of antitanllt gUlls to 011lt_ atl with a HtrollgPl1 with a whole comhat order of tad middot1
lompallits amI battaiioll-gt Ill( (ombat order of a 1lt1 J tlltnpall~ or hal tali on j- lapahle of comhattillJ even a r i 1illllOllS front of antitank gUll-
Tank pIed oon~ rna properJ~ be a-signed to infm (ornpltLnh-I in ca-c in which thell arc vanguard tank cr lOllS con-iUng of medium or heavy tanks and whose t 1
-ioll It is to suppre llw antitallk gUll- Tn 1he cae of a (()JltillUOU~ front the antitank gun
~uppr(sfd hy the mn]p powerful fin of Uw attacking- ta j
alld -u]lporling- arlill(ry Tlw tallks attacl in 1h( adormiddot d lomiJal order tllldfl (OYII of tlw firf of tlwir artillpryJ~ conduct fire nol only upon th( antitank gUllS which htJ been dicerllcd hut al-o upon suspiciotH 11lac(~s uf every 1] where fmch gun--t might be cOllcaied That deprives thc~middot~ tanle gUB8 of the adnllltal~(s of the illitiatip and make-~ il more difficult for them to make lle of aimed fire The tamiddot 4 mal1(gttlVer with a view to (1(at in) a mOlp favorable I Hi
tion for the attack Tlms for examplc when they t suppressed the antitank guns along 01lC direction they lgt r rndcavor 10 dphollch into thlt flank of other guns hut tlga alwaygt act in full combat order t ~O
middot~uil The Ain
THE CIWSSI-iG OF THE DES IN 1~1j
I~o[DII nd(niiilPllanr EI Pa-n til L(gt Andes 1m Jahle 1817 By Gentlal Knaus Crgtndenccd from 1I1I1IdlllIltI()ltrll( ftli(lr HlilelIIIIIcn nlllmllll PlOD 1~o71 iini
t udBy CIIlK II ~ IIRTKE~S Infantl
In 1808 the Frellch orrupicl till grcallt1 part of Spanish penimnda Lut --t(arllly any mfml)fl of th( Sl eolonilt- (oIlsirlprCd thi--t O(CUlTelHC as an opport UIli
-(utth Spanish domillation ill t Ill Spalli~h American nics All important positioll~ in 1h(se dependencies occupied by nativ( horn Spaniards EYPll th(l Amen 00
horn Spaniards ele rllu)atld to pusitions of serond 81 imloriaIwP IIlllrs they had bCPl1 enucaten and trnil1~ lac ~pain It WH only ill t hr minds of a fe broad i~i[ ll1f1l thai t hp idltt-- (lr ill( FnIlCh levolut ion rOllnd nccptf nIl
On2G 11ay uno a Junta I)lglll it distllSsions in 13m lis
Ail thpl a lily or 700()() Illtllapilli or 11 lrown col lie Rio dpla Plata (AlgClltina) In spite of frequent persmr he Challgc- this Jullta exhibitCd a heroic activity and ficial quality g1patly instlul11Cntal in achieing and taining frl(dol1l for A rglIltina
The ~eal of Spain- main power lay in the crown co of Peru Only by destruction of Spanish maslcry in t land did it appear possible to achieve independence for
34
VolXVIIiNo70 Foreign Military Digests
_nltV-S _gtrl-9~I
1 lJOOOOOOr
YI1m- 1 San brtm- OperlltlOns III 181
J ~ther areas Therefore the Junta in Buenos Aires disshytiatched shortly after 25 May 1810 an expedition to Alto - Feru (today Boliyia) and other expeditions were ordered ~tainl the Spanish in Paraguay and Montevideo On 7
omiddotember 1810 the Argentinians defeated the Spanish ncar ~uipacha and freed the most part of Alto Peru (Bolivia) Theieuro operations were conducted beginning at Buenos Am and extending to Lal(~ Titicaca over a distance of
i 3hout 1500 miles the last 600 of which were at an elevationIOf approximately 13000 feet An armistice which had f heen signed was broken by the Spimiards and the Argenshy lmJan Army was defeated and scattered as a result of a
Sudden surprise attack In consequence Alto Peru (Bolivia) ~as lost and the remainder of the Argentine troops retreated
middotto Salta and Tueuman (about 800 miles) On 2~ SeptemberlrlSl2 at Tucuman and on-20 February 1813 at Salta the ~f rgentiniarlH under General Belgrano defeated the Spanshyto ards under General Tritan The Argentine Army again ~ dvanced into Alto Peru but in two battles east of Lago ~~ oopo vas deciRively defeated on 1 October and 14 November tf 813 Belg-rano withdrew again to Tucuman and was 1Cshy
~ laced by General San lITartin Don Jme San Martin was born 25 February 1778 in
apQju (today San 11mUn) in the province of Corriente~ i- parents were Spani~h He attended Reveral schools in
Aire and in 1788 entered a ~eminary in Madrid At of 11 he became a cadet in the Infantry Regiment and at the age of 15 was commissioned a sub-lieushy
With audacity and great hravery he took part in ~ ampaigns in Morocco Portugal Spain and in a sea-undershy
li king against England In 1811 at the age of 33 he became lieutenant colonel In order to be able to participate in the dependence of his home land he left Spain and traveling
by way of London reached Buenos Aires on 9 March 1812 Vhen he offered his services to the government they were acshycepted and he was commissioned to organize a cavalry unit according to European pattern Sun Martin fir~t formed the squadron uGranaderos a Caballo This Hquadroll proved to be an excellent Behool both for developing the highest love of country and in promulgating the bet military virtues (today the regiment Granaderos a Caballo h a distinshyguished unit which performs daily its guard service in uniformH Huch a-) it wore when first organized)
III the beginning of 1813 San Martin was able to dpmonshystrate his excellent leadership capabi1itie~ when he was entruited with the protection of the right bank of the Parana norlhweRt of Bueno- Aires A Spanbh flotilla ascended the Parana River San Marlin followed it vlith his mounted men Early on the morning of 3 Februar) 250 Spaniards with 2 cannon landed near the cloister of San ILorenzo and began to advance against this place San Martin struck this force from either side of the cloister with such surprbe and such strength that it was defeated in a short time and was forced to retreat and reembark under the protection of the guns of the flotilla Although of little importance in itself this batshytle gained for the Argentinians freedom of traffic and comshymerce on both the Param~ and Uruguay Riv~rs since the Royalists did not again dare to send expeditions up those streams
In February 1814) San Martin was named commander of all troops in northwest Argentina He rccognized immeshydiately that the troops located there wcre not suited for operations over the long ltlnd difficult routes by way of Alto Peru (Bolivia) to move against and destroy the center of Spanish might ill Lima In lIlay 18B San Martin reshynounced based on considerations of health a plan whereby these difficult routes would have to be used and recomshymended that the province of euyo (today the provinces of Mendoza San Juan and San Lui) be used as a baRis of operations over another route against the Spaniards in Peru
THE ROUTE OVER THE ANDES TO CHILE AND PERU
According to San Marlins point of view it was unnecesshysary to sacrifice man and money for an undertaking by way of Alto Peru in this area the defense should be entrusted to the blave Gauchos those rah and hnrd riders of the proshyvince of Salta and to several tried squadrons In the area around Mendoza he desired to form a small ell disciplined army which in cooperation with the Chileans should preshypare an end to the Spanish mastery in order later to break the center of Spanish authority in Peru
When San Martin was placed at the head of the governshyment of the province of Cuyo in September 1814 he found such a small force (D85 men with insnHicient equipment) that it was impossible to begin the intended operationR at once His first job was to create the necessary tool and the ncc(sary means In the encampment at Pllmerillo IP~ miles northeast of the city of Mendoza (Fig-lire 2) he began his difiicult tURk the formation of his army the instruction of itt) components and the development of its spirit and morale It is interesting to 110te that he laid a special fmphaltis on target practice on field firing on close combat md upon the flower of decision by the lower commanders
l
35
r [oreiiin Military Digcais C amp (88 Quart
______ 1 ___ _ knoll ~
shy 1~~~-- ~---- (1
=
~t
L
-
l((f rhmiddot nvutl 01(1 tlw Antlc
For 1tw ft-Ul1011 1)1 hl- plalJ- San l1artlll required 1DOO pll tll1wd s]itihl~ tfJIl1l]l((1 di ciplined soldiers ucu-11olllld til hard lipld ~1JIlp cOIHlItiolh AH t11P iJaiH of his force San fart1l1 had t Iw iil-t and -ccoud -quadnms of hi- Gran1frch a (ahalll) and Iht (hillttll troops of GellshyeraIOIIimlJl- To thl-l wpre addcrllater 1200 voluntpCr- the th12ltl and f01111 h -qutdrons of GranadQros a Caballo and ltorne arlillfry III pltc of 111 effort- ill SLptemlJ(r 1816 the army llumhlreu hut 2HJO elfpdive- lI1stpad of the necesshy-lilT -1000 Agt a Jf-ult of the freedom of slaves 710 ltulditr (iJlatk HlId mulattu) PIjgt PIIJoJJpd alld fnlDI rhi]p 1evcral immigrant dtachmlnt were forml with the result that at the hinnllW of lRl7 lh And Army had rmellOr a total of tlO~O men lllc1uuillg all tafT
As auxijiariclt there crc empJoy(d
(C ] 200 mtlHjl for tilt tralbJlorl of all dIp tlld t h( ~Iunty of Ow Jill( of -llpply
II 120 nJilHI1 froTH hlldoza 101 work till road c A detachment of mountain guidps r 11a~j(r4 for 1111 pacl animals
Tillt four infantry haftalion (No 17 H 11) each COl1shy
Hi~tcd of fOlll infantry cOJnpallic~ a grenadier company and
it reconnaiiSHnCe compaIlY The legiment Glunaderltr Caballo a- c)mpo~(gtd of four combat t-qu1uron and accompanying --qlladron for the staff Tlw artillery bat ion had 16 to lD (allllOll~ some I-inch ~()mc 6-inch T --(afT olllti-tecl Ill li7 BWll The ltlJ1lll1l111itioli allotment it~d II ~70 rounds JlPI man (aB tol(1 ~)(WOOO) md 1 rOllnds 1)(1 canl10n (all told 2[20)
VIH1l till two (ohIllHI l1urched fJlllll Melldoza pre all told lO7)] hl)]o(- and llluh- 1600 snddiLmiddot [or tillt nIT alld fht (tdrr 72GD uJdlt mullgt alld pack millegt III addition 1020 ridlll~ and pad anim (()tnpallid detachment north and ~outh of the main co For pteh mall 1helt W(tmiddot ai)(lllt 1 hOlp- Ol mllips l~p
During Uw 111a](11 111( clalry alJd tIw -tafr~ crc( ale lowld to ride nJlh the mules in ordl to -l( the norses en lW ill ()mlmL ~rhc infantry tlw artillery IJcrollnel th( 011111 1)(JollJlPI tgt)( mIJlllJpd nil nlul in ollhr to co tlwir trength and 10 Iwlp ill ~ln1iJlj off a pCculiar ffi(shy
lain sillness COmmo)] to the Allck ~y~ Thp tubes of the (JillIOn Yen carertlll~ lap]I(d w_ aD
wool alid slwed into a lOvcr of hOl (hidp On -tlp sl 0011
tlw-lp (J(~ hrought fOlvard bv meangt of la oe attachec~ ~ tJ( ptck laddl(- )1 f 0 mullgt ~()lll followillg t hr oj Wl J~- U 1
hundred militia --oldilr a~i1(d ill this nHtlls of nu f[fion
The food tak(11 along Va aq folInw- about pound of dried --alt meat 700 edti( Oil the hoof 70 round loaves of Corn nllai zwieback dry chC(-( n J-u ply of win(gt and brandy a w~l1 as a goodly supply of An advanced supply ba-oe of food and forag-c protect militia was -tablishcd 011 the route of thl Ilorth colu tween Plumeril10 and Los Jlanantiaie4
III nnicI to proide durabk t~llif()rm~ fnr the diffi( llIuiertaldng- a cloth manufactor~ Was built ~ The M( id Luis HcUJan pstablishcd an arm factory Provision imiddotlls t made fur the manufacture of Jlmnlcr 11
San 1ialLin wa~ untiring in his efforts to train h to raise to the utmost (heir morale to JlrOLllrL~ the ne equiprnent and a1m- tn Cstablish an effective com fions and pr ~~~t(m to -((UI( tholoHll krltin rce ance reports lIe had strong ~ttpport from the gO(lll
of BUentiK Alnmiddot and frnm till J1oJlulation of the ploilltt (U~(I Till (lHhll l onl rihnttmiddotd t hlil lll~JlY to the l
liw~l Iriti-h 1ll11hUlb 111 rlltllOS lill- to hl)~e ir pst it H~ In (t tJll O(lthO of ~palljh d)l11illaliolli
ili(1l iar~~p nlllnlllJt~ oj sllJlPIiI nn lTldit ~~ The Ioral ~1aIlih a]m~ in Chill llJlchJ the agrd PI
dlnt GCl1eral nO~l Flanti lo l11lCO del Pont num 7OO nl~ttI lntl ~O() olililil Tn (ll~ t1lJi1 (1 Spar th ltoldi4n- yet tIll llla~ ltlll-itld of Chilem
Notwithstanding the IlUnllrical superiority of thee all AI Cl~ )111 lartlll tilddtll tn (IIT~middot thltHI5h the CA lioll ltlgdfl~t (hIi( A a Il-Ult PI 111 (lllg years in
IIIHl()~a 1J(j[ 11( had a 1h()1Ol~h IdWhdgl of tlw teT ro]l illlll jljJfWl toJJdillOIL of ill( nrCH as wLi1 a the Ihilll~ or asltI~t~lllll to hb OlhratlOn by an uprising of nathc-- of (hi]r n I
rtgilllliIlJ~ If Stpl(llliJtl lX]G San llaltll1 under nit IllJotiatioI Jtll the ChH[ of Oil Pehuenlhc Indians in CarlON (60 miles outh of Mendoza) with the elsible re tention of ~(cu1ing IHrmission to advalHt through the
36
01
middot
~
--~ shyolxihIl No 70 Foreign Military Digests
f itory of thrse indll)(ndcnt nciian1- m order to gtrikc at the paniard~ J~ a~ (If the E Plammiddothm d paRS During the colutlOlI the 1hllVJld1l~ maintall1(fi a neutrality although
( Spalllard lHdun orNl by lt111 kind of precnts to secure -~ 1eir alliaIllC again-t tlw Aljllltil1lans and ChiJean~ Durshy
g the di-ell-~I(Jll- S-111 Marlin propo~cd that the Indian~ rodtlP -uPJlh(~ fJr hi army ior which he would pay well nel fll]uilWU lh( -tllt et -iCCnl from the Indian Chief f~ allOtllldll Olle tL(Jj(JU~hl~ familial with the Indian manshy
cr he 1dll tllv Jnddll- ould tranflTIlt all informttion at m to L1H SpiI1lilJ U I holt dually happclled
iJj Jlalo dll Pont thl ~ranhh((lmll1ander in (~lile SOOI1
vPlllhld -tnllg 11)](-- 110nl lantIago to thl Iclmty of ttlC(l Iii) ndl Dutil oj SantlHgn In order to furthel his
-futenllull- Ill delude thmiddot Spaniard- San iIartin sent a fOle QJ till 1lll bl)l jJl~ (Jld I all -Id nlll)())- t() be clnulated 1 hat rih mllll allll uuld -)Oll 11Idlth 011 the pas About the ~ld vi (kloln) 1i5lLi San ltirllll tolllpleted negotlation- ()l the lIpll-ng of till Chillan 1Il lhL provincl- of Colchashyaua and 1Iltlul~ Thi~ upri-ing detached omc 2000 Spani-h ijuop ~(ltlY i1()11l the nJalll operatwns and toward itself
-i FOl all OIH)atlun dgal1~t [Ink 12UO miles long and middot~O null WIde l)IJ iderlllg ~eog-rapillc tlimatic and ciVlli shy
~ tJtlun londitlm-o olll~ tile f(ltIie and aluable areas 111 and ~OLIl1d ~11tJ1l_-P ere to be lUllsidcled ts the theater of dpcratJ(lIIc- )orth ChIle contained many saltpeter Wast(~ middoti1d and Ill()untam- ludl uffered little llO-1-iiJility of supply ran 11111 thollgh Inall Thl -ullth purtion (Iatlgonia) ~lIlel -dt1ed a~ uut of the que~tlOn South of the plOVshytile of )Iaulc there lleu the Arancano Indians an indeshy(f=-Jtndcnt extl ltwrdlllallly warlIke race which were not l p1CllCd unt-Ii 1870 In Ionsequencc the operations zone t~d hmitcd t6 that area lying Letween the 27th and 37th ~Id lllh- III thi~ a na ~0l1le G73 mik~ wide the terram ~~ the follo lllg charnl telistIc
UdClll the 11011 of the PadlIc and the Desaguadcro t_ ncr ttluWlllg illll1l 110rth to ~outh and in the south called Ie Culorulo) il the Andes hllh r~alh theIr hIghest elemiddot l ~tlllll in the ilenuozl-Santiago area The mass Aconcashyj 11 llU hl- a hlght oj 23O()() ftet to the south the i- c-t Jjju T1lllUllgito 22UOU 1ed nurth of Aconcagua the1crlldal]) 21UO() JClt In t1111- alect the pa~~es average an - evltlUl or ljO()O ftL In the variuus charts and m~p~ 1 ( c1eatlllll Vumiddoty The -110 Ime averages an elevatIOn f Of 15000 to 1G000 feet From thb cel1tr~l mountain range - mIll oj rh e1 no l~t to the PacIfic anu flow east
th~ Dlaguudlro Detycen the main mountain range thl Utaguadelo lie the rami lieu le~cr ranges and caRl
the a iell gelllrall) a~te fairly level area Only It the watercourse were to be found fruitful and cultl shy
cd a rl-t Nul only du Vc lUlU lc-~er cast and west range- (ll tilt AJlde-o (Hl11I range) and the Pacilie but a
I dllgl g11111 ally pal t11cl to th( coast which rises to jl)() t(~t tut at Interal~ by the -treams flowing into utll Uetweln ilw coatal range and the Andes lay vltdll~ from G to 23 lllile~ lJ1 width and with nn elevashy
ot GOO to 2f)OO ieet lopiou-lj- atered ullromlllOnly tfut till granary of Chile
The rllOst important pa--l- ill Ihe area of upcratlOn~ ere the followmg
Come Caballos (14400 feet) from La Rioja to Copiapo
h Santa Rosa 14000 feet) from San Juan to Coshyquimbo
c Lo Patos (1l000 feet) frum San Juall or Mendoza north of Atoncagua to LOR Andes
d La Cumbre (12500 fect) from Mendoza by way of U~pallata south of Aconcagua to Los Andes
EI lurtillo (13800 feel) frum San Carlos to Santi shyago
I Elllalleholl (lAIlO rltct) from San Rafael to Talca (150 miles south of Santiago)
III addItion there arc nUlllerOUR other routes which how(jI al( often very narlo vcry steep very difficult to ( rno- and in glneral unusable for military operations
Of the -ix main routc- named above the two northern (1) and (h) and the southern (f) lose lomdderable imporshytance bpcause of their distance from the Mendoza-Santiago 1IS of opcrations
Unly on a few of the passe were small shelters acshyIommlldating a few persons to he found In the mountain a 11 ( - were pa-tule lands Vater was adequate in the Alldc- (main range) in super abundance on the west slopes and in Chile but found only in the valleys to the east An army cro-sing the Andes will fmd pasturage and water in cuffiLient quantities Jul all other supplieR must be guaranshyteed along a line uf communications
In audition to the diHiculties of the poor roads and steep tony ascents and descent a force must contend with the adverRities of tne weal her In fact a crossing can be con sidered only during thf summer months (December t March) Even during thi- 11crioci at a height of 12OO( feet sudden RI1Uwstorms and LliZlalds can create havoc and dc~truction
In many sedions of the Andes puna (mountain sickshy11(-iR) aITedlt many traveler- Not only is it very disagreeshyaLle Lut it often results in death Common indications are cllfllcult breatlung suffocation decreased heart action exshyces5iYe tiredness great deSIre for sleep loss of appetite vomIting no~e anu cur bleechng Many people familiar ith the Andes attribute t he particular Andes mountain ~icknes- to the tremendous amount of rich ores the numershyOtiS underground wat~l tOl1rseS and the magnetic attracshytions As an antidote ra onions and garlic are eaten the nu-trils of the alllmah are rubbeJ with these two vegetables in order to inclea~e the11 breathing rate and blood flow At a height of lOOO meters a persoll with a full stomach will probal) be a1fected
The maw (11 Cf advallced over two routs (Figure 3)
(a) fIll right (nortli) lllalll column advanccd from Plumerillo In a northwesterly dIrection across the eastern ranges theuce by way of Los Patos
(b) The left (south) (olumn moved by way of URpnlshylata and La Cumba on Los Andes
On 15 January horsts of thL -tafI and of the Grunlt shydero) a CaLallo were sent aillud on thl north column route to the 10-gt Manatiale~ (3172 meters) area (an area proshyteLled against hostile threatR) ~o that they could become accustomed to the steep rocky a~cents and the weather
37
~ r Farciyn JIilitarY Digests c amp GSS Quart
d
JJ
ildlllI (ll] I Jdlllli 1-~ (dltlv Lljan Ilwing- to TAl
jItntllld(~ d lIn lrd -lIpph 111 HIln ltJIIIl fur 111 dd iI ltIii illd JUIIllt 1 l-Illlldlfl
Iii lt1Iil ~ IIi d IIIHilr (lllld I)()Jl 11jlIp -ohr lldllljtd tl1I 1lIllIJjlla tollo
Ir Jf[dlIJI Ill Jllt~fll(dlfll(lfll(lI(ll((lcr(J-a
(middott1ldlll II 111 1 (llddHj OllPlIl~ Jlld ICOlllla-anVl
(llIlIl Il 1lt1I~l ilt11dll1l ()lt I lnd ~ that 1 n -n h 01 till ~I I llljllllJ til lldd four V()1ll11111H and OTll
1111(1]111 lj 11lkJ 1(11)] JJOll )l ( IiliaIl InO IdI( 1 11 d --qtlti)oll of Ill (nnadlros a
[tldll ljldil1 1[]1111 0 I and -)t) lrlltrymill with ) jIJIl til 1lJ r IH IIi (j 11111 [1(lll ludi-llldo Alyarado
III lib I) fh ltll](l (( llild J)()1l 1irJlarto ()Ihggins L I] d I 11
I)ll ~I Idl) j jlll]l middotnlllllry (11111)a11I(- of Infantry i 111 dlfllJ 0 -I ~ Ill 1111 ltllllOil
IJl 1111] J lOll JltillIlry (lJnjJ1ls of Battalwn 1 ~ jllflIlJlil()td Illlll cd 11)( lafr --quadrOll
Ill ~ll llll lilmiddotI lilt ~d --qlltdron-ofthl (nI1shyIdtll)-- 1 (lhdo
Oil ~ 111]111 1111 I( flldllJd( l of Ow utilllmiddot or th 1111111 ld1ltlI1l 11lt 1)1111 dId lIllY IHtdqnlltlIgt
I hi ((IlltlI (1lllllldlHkd jn fllOllEl I)oll (ItgOJI 11
111 flIId flqrlJ Pill Idlo 1gt folo-
IIJ 1-IIIII1middot 1IJdlll Ilttalion-oll (i(lHpltn p ) 1) (rIItd]u-l (Lildlll trO()plr 20 artllkryfnetl
) I dllllll 1 )11 llJmiddotmiddotmiddot IjdlJJ -jJaJ fllglilfI)gt Ilh lt10111 1
111 fl [Ilat hll
()I lIJallll(r~ I (lll[fIIJ-- alld hlJllI) 1Ill 1l11l1lia quadII]1 qj Sail LUh alld a dtachnllllt of Pllgllllpr
Ih] IldllllllJ 1 lldl()Id 1) ~Il ralthmiddot
The Illft column was givcltn the initial miHsion of rcachi the Ultpallata arca and blockillg the valley of the Me river It should halt then~ until the north columl IIHliHmiddotd ltIll fllIH lttpproxirllatplyto fll w(t (the route IlIlrth (()llilllll a~ IllUlil l()ngl1 and mor( dHlkult) 1Ill 011 Ii I (lIIlHill IWllld -tizl llw IHight~ ast of La eu drmiddotrpd ill Spalllsh [(lrt- Oil the t~t -Iopes of the (malll lall~) alld (~taiJlish (ontad with lhe right (0 ()n t IlP (middot 1 ~df)IH~ 01 tlH ndp- the lpfi column should till tPPIOadl or t he right toIUI1111 Vh(l1 right nl( hlli 1 (Ianila dl 1( hupalla the left xhould h~g adtIJ(( Oll --ianta Ho-1 lnil -hould not enkr thi ton
to X F(llll1tIy i
Th Ijglt (nort 11) 011l1t11l should atvlJlle a- rapidlyf 1 l)(I~-1il)ll III ()ldpi to rltch If)S Iato- at an early date fr 1 Vhlli It Voltld fH pO -lhie (I1lploymg native guides to po jr out route ithtl SHit of the AcolHagua to cstahIiRh cv ~er J1llmitatiol1 with th gtouth toJumn From LOB Patos l~a(i should PlI-h on fa~t atmiddot 1)-- the Andes and vain the exit fn ~r()
the valJl~ oj tlw PuLlellcio j~Jlr It -hould -eize the helV 1 lorl II 01 ChacaJIlco pd
Tht advHI(( f)f tlw l(ft (solth) (01111111 paI
I I
Thi (OiUnlil Va- to Ilcwh li-paliata 011 21 Ja1llHlylffil
ait thelv until t1~ ~Hrlh lf)iumn had advlttllll(l a )lOftltrh tlOnatldINtal1(middotp 1111rtll1l1l1liltlallll1l wcre at the r(latllt~)(
1ll11l11]lortHlit fortiflcd po-itioll al Jiliwuta Against th r~( tWll advanced via JlIIlcai (--ollth of ACOI1eaglla)-VarL l two Spani-h compallllS (ahout 200 men) under lIa 1 largnclli A night march by 30 Spamards over PlcsUt)tl(( Illy illlpa-gt-gtahl( ouk- l(slIltd III a surpri-c attack on f~$u (hluta Iarly 21 January Some of the milItia Were kll--i the otlll1r ltptulld ailil the raitilI1g party withdrew toV~)1 Potrerillos (uluIlel La~ lIela~ ordered the immediate f ann of tiw glllladH] lOI1lJlany of the 11th DaUalion and Ifr Granati(ro- a Caballo under ~IaJur Don Enrique ~Jr tint At 4 00 A~I 23 Janl1ar~ after a forced march olin milts ill 1) hotll- lajor ilallilwl rcadwd the trong hoJ~ po--ition at Los Potrerillo-- At -t 30 I without furf-a-a n~~onnai-s(~nle ht attacked till Spanidl position at ttJt-lIl 1I0111t~ Alttl a Ire lIght of ~12 hourRll1s ammunitlOll (xhw ted )( ord(rtd nAinmt111 to Vacls But the Spl ian] withdrew lir-t initially to the pa~s at La CumiJrl iatpl farlher to the west
At 7 00 PM 1 February till columll I tltllhld tht dt
(Uia-- tl(1 (IOGO() [cpt) Faoltd hy the moonlightmiddot troops IH~an their a-c~l1t to the La CumlJle pass ( ridge line) at 10 00 111 ThlY arried at the hci ~ Il) AiI 2 FtilrUHlV and dlllillg till day tonlin
Iuneallllu (U200 feet) Thilt march i pluibly the ignitilltlnL nig-ht march at -111 lllights I ccorclt~d ill h )i-talllt 11 mill a-rlllt ~WO 1(It dlS(lnt 1WO (hI a FllJruary ulone La Ihra- Onlllld 1lajtll In llh 170 Illollllttt 1I1iPnwIl and W CranlIlelos a (a to attacl tilt SplIl1-il po-gtiti()ll tuardw Vipja liasrd dpl lIitd III f() I llla I 1011 of Ioul p a provided hy a natie all the -mall fortp advanced However I)(cau~(
xtl (Ill dillkuitH- (til ()untplld along 11w routes rocky -iOPl- and uf the Ilclcsity for terrain ltlonnaignn about 15 milt Vere rcquir~d in Ittlhing Ilw Spanish p tion
38
1 06 men attaekcd the pmlishyAbout one-hnlf the fon (
and rear
iOn frontally hde the remainder D6 men advancing over Ifficu1t vcry Stt~lJ and rocky terrain struck the position in
After 11 ~ houlr- fighting 40 Spaniards fallen 49 had t-uncndered and the remainder under
L vcr of darknc- fled towtld4 Los Andes rh The main -outh column reached Guardia Vieja on 6 I~ JFebruary Shortly after nOJIl 8 Fehruary it rcachCd Santa ~ iRosa n~i)O llHjprlt) whIt 11 the Spamard- had eacuaiec till ll- duy Lefore The lOUlllll had HllOmpii-hed its initial mbshyr ~ t-I(n On 8 February l(gtI1lWdloH with the 1l00th column at Sw Felipe wa a-gtdJLd
Thl nWI( h of til Igllt (north) column
r 1 The mUlIl (right) column began its mallh from Plumshylnllo on 11 falllltlmiddotY alld nlarciHri III ltix groupgt one group J)er day leaviJg the camI) Oil 2) January after his troop~ )lad aU mOiIi (Jut GlIltlal San 1Iartin took hie departure
fr from Mendoza f The hrst tq glOUp llndel General Soier formed the
advance guard The mo-t important instructions given GenshyE ral Soler were (1) the to n of San Felipe as to be leached un 8 FebrualY (2) lOIlnnuniLatlOIl was to be estahlished ~long the rlCOlllagsl rle- with the -outh column (3)
) fhould the ituatio1 1lHi thl hostile dispo~itions and size permit it Santa Ro-a-Lo Andes was to ue attacked ( 1) it I of utmot importance that the heights of Chacashy
L )JUfO he tUIHd () lIry dTort ~hotlld he made to surmiddot llri-c and fJyelptn tl til( SpanI-h ou110ts in the Andes
rt (6) should th[ ataIHc guan be attacked by tonsiderably 1 lunerJOl 1011(- It wa-- to fall balk on Lhe following columns_ i The advalH t of tlll~ (uiumn Va executed according to
plan III Pltl or the difilcultw or terram and at the Leginning of water Hlpplr the objcdives set were reached
1 b ~~hedl1ll until the crl--t uf the Andes was reached the v yenre~lest part of the malch was made mounted on mules ) jncludIng ill( infantry1 I From Lo Paio-- San Iartin despatched a flank Jeshyt tachment of 200 Illell under Ialor Don Antonio Arcos via tj ~middotltlk lIlrmUi ClIlllga (when a Spanish po~t wa- known to IJL talIoncd) and Alto tit (usn to Lagt Alherpal1as ThiS
ftrca ~huuld be OLlllpied ltlnd defended to permit easy acces- Jpf the main body into the broad valley of Putaendo River t ~ The adaJlCl guard Itltlthld the camp eat of Cuesta (iLgt
el ~LllteJl on IltlmiddotlJruary On 1 Feuruary the detachmcllt t~ [(O- -lLulcd the dlltil at La Guardia de la- Achupalla~) n1middotpefeatin~ a force of 100 Spal1lanli defending theretk Tl1l adiun guarant(l(~d to the main force the exit from dhfhe difliLlilt mountain terrain General Soler IJushed forshyd ~ a d rapl1Jly with the aUIJmpdllying StlUaliloll and the ~d lt ntl th SquadrrlIl- Graladero- a (ahallu he speeded upjt he adanu of the inflntry awl ar1illery On 6 February t)~~ he trolll)gt of the adVallll guard tlC uilited in and north of ~Ji an Antunio de Putaelldo Captam ~e(ochea with 110 n~yen Granatlcros a Caballo wa ordered agaillst La) Coimas On l~ he morning of the 7th this force ellcountered a Spanish deshy~ t ltichment of 100 cavalry ~oo infantry and 2 cannon in a t()~ trolJg jJ(Jmiddotiltion a1 Las Cnima- General Soler immediately arm copatched reinforcemen1s-two sltiuadlon of til(gt Clanashyp~ crJ- a Caballu and two mfantry companic-l to Cq)tain
eCuchta 0icloehea howeyer dJd nol aWait the~e reinshy
Foreign Military Dige8t8
forccments lIe feigned a1douule envelopment of the Spallshyjqh position AH the envelopers approached closely he feigned failure and a wild retreat A- he contemplated the Spanish cavalry stationed on eith~l flank of the SpaniRh infantry jumped to Lhe attack and purtluit When the Granaderos a Clballo had drawn the Spanish cavalry sufficiently far from their infantlmiddot~r and artillery support they turned ~t JIIlk and demqra1izcd th( Spafli~h cavalry In the disshyorder and disruption the Spanish infantry also took to flight Th( SpaniRh force far Rupcnor in numbers fled to San Flipe There was no pur-uit by Necocheas force
The advanCegt rested on 7 February riwaiting the arshyriaJ of the main body As planned the right column reached San Felipe on 8 February the lpft column reaching Santa ROfm the -ame day After reconstruction of the bridg-c (destroyed by the Spani~h) over the Aconcagua River near San Felipe the Andes army was united on 9 February southwest of Los Andes A squadron under iIajor Melian waJ pmhed forward toard Chacabuco to observe the enemy middotand reconnoiter the terrain
By his viclorie of 4 Fehruary (Guardia Vieia) and of 7 February (Las Coirnas) General San Martin became master of Aconcagua provinc( and thereby was enabled to provide his army with supplies and additional horses On 8 February San Martin sent a message to the President in Buenos Aires in which he expressed his great regret in being unable to follow the Spanish at once but would require at least six days to secure replacements for his horses and mules incapacitated on the march from Mendoza to Los Andes Of the 1600 horses ~nd 9191 mules which began the march in spite of utmost care taken only about 500 horses and 4300 mules reached Los Andes in a usable condition
Between Los Andes and Santiago there lies but one major terrain obstacle the heights of Chacabuco These heights form a half-moon shaped ridge between 4500 to 7200 feet high extending from east to west and forming a connecting- link between thp AndeR and the coastal range The north (Jopes arc very steep the south slopes are much gentler dolted with small hill and receding gradually to Chacabuco
As they reLired from San Felipe to the south the Spanshyiards occupied the heights neal elevation 1820 with 2 comshypanies and 25 cavalrymen in order to block the route
When General del Pont learned on 9 February of the results of the engagements in the Aconcagua and Putaendo valleys he di reeLed that all forces Routh of Santiago asshyemble there to defend the cit) and he despatched Brigadier laloto with to half battions Lo Chacabuco Maroto arrived at Chacabuco the evening of 11 February he pershyqonally lodl to lhe 10 tomjJmlie~ on the norlh slopes (1820 elevation) and ordered them to defend to the utmost Only whenihalf their force VDS decimated were they authorized to withdrHw On 12 FebruaJT MaroLo intended to occupy the heights with hig entire force
Meanwhile San Mnrlin had sent two esp(cially well qualified guidc8 to Santiag-o who kept him informed of the Spanish movements On 10 and 1] February two engineer oHicers protected by v ~quadron of cavalry reconnoitered the heights and the hotllilc position The weRt slopes (1432
39
On
C amp (SS Quart
Ol-liggins Thi~ attack pushed through and into the artillery position~ Cannon Were cut down with the bel As the cavalry charge in proglC--s the leading clements (2 rifle companiCfI) tsoIPl~ loillllllJ whost advancp hH1 bllll accelerated tati(d lillwisl the hft liallk of the Spaniards many whom Cdl 10 the hayonet The stalT and llh Squa middot(iranadelo a Caballo U1Hll Major Necochea had In
farther w(gt1 almot sirnulLallcously with the other aU Ill HI ruck thl SplIlish left rear The-e three attacks aga t IH Spanihh Ipft and rpar ltlu-eo confusioll and disorder HTPat lo~-l on thi~ flaJlk -0 that OHiggins second at
af~ailll t 111 lil~ht fnUlld a much dbcOl1certed and u Plteruy-rl-1I11 -Iompiett ~lIlT~- The Spaniards attack~lt ril
middotkl1rei~ lIilitarg Digests
melp-) tPIHlll~d mon -uiLlhle fol tlll a ccnt than thu tllt-lt
(22n Jilt~lt)
Ull I FlIJrUl1 olt of the gmde-gt returned with inshyformatlfll fn l1i~lhd Ly an agtnt ill Santiago It wa) an cxtrad of ( lWl ~d rj 1 j1oHl~j f)dEl (lopiNI 111 hih own oOle-e) which dirtlltd till JIIIJt of ftillfonlmPllh to (haclshyUuco (()IlqUllltiy hiI aft(lllo(JIl (11 FdJluary) San lll~t II (tll t h- lJ Irdllltlt (oJlltlllaquondtI~ anci -ttltd thal I had j t 11 In flll)ti IldlIlI)H] 11) attal ] 1 Felnuary lllI 1]middot [)i(l IJtlld lllJt Ill lull nmiddotad- ulltil then hut llll Jll -iillln 11llrn SdlfldO dt111lIldld Iarli(1 action ThIll (1111 III hld (jltlll~1 d ili- pltl 1I1d vutild IWllth Ith d IUJ Jll p [d fill J ~ lttll llal ilj~aJlhl till (nelll) III
flrdr 10 did( k luJIl iH r Illt lIt (luld hap to f()nl~()
11Ilj II LIIIJ dll i 11( I)uld )it thv Imiddotllm no tillle to Initl Ill Jl I III Iltuld cilf(al lum ill udad
Till lldl IIJl tidlLd III tVII C(JII1l1111 The lI l qltllll ([U rd OIqiJlh wilJ 1~I()I lllt 11 (1 ~t2d tlld ~d
Squad rOil Ilf Llll (ldllltilnJ a (tullo Illiantry bllshytalj(lIh I 1]1t S (( h ith [our rllll COl11ptlllll- and tO
gllll) had til mi ioll )f tiXlll~ the (l1lm~ III [rullt The ( 1 OlHlll11 rWItl ~()ltr 1111 ~10() 1l111l (the ~tafr ami
Uh Sqtladloll If tll( dllultJn (abalJo lllLullly Igtatshylditlll I dlill 11 Idd 1gt1 IOllr rillE- lllPlllit- Oil gTlIlLdil1 tlld (111( 1( ldllld ~llllmiddot( I ltl)lllldll Ill gIllIldlel awl ret(Jllshy
1lImiddot-dHI (lllllIIlH of inLllltlY IJattali()ll~ 7 and 8 and t~1l Itllh) hld till 1ll1lnll of atlaeldllg tlw ho-tili ]pft (11) llll lllcl 1IHlllllg I Ill d(tl~]()ll
lt llI) ~l 12 February the UiYIIlCC IJlg lll IIlItially
III Illlt C(I1111111 Srdlr I fUlljgt ivldillg Ollig-gingt ~ent illshy
llllllY )llldllll ~ to till la~t ttl gll tIlt impnlull to the 1llllIl) 1 htl 1hI 11lt1 1dl rwht would 1)[ Pllvtloplf1 and lllcishydl Iljtlly to tll(l thp ho-tij( atttntlOl1 aay from the actual (middotInI11111t1ll1 -I()l Sldtormiddot Cldul11ll turned to the southwcst ()IIirl~IIl ll)lllillUed --I)ulh Oil the Chalaouco -lopes ) II ijlll Jllitl 1111 --jllll h 1-1 (lft) Iillk and 111 a
h1 p lJilllt I dilir droL il hack TIll Spltlllitrcl ithdllw 1) lILt ()tllh jllll-uld )- tIll hl Squadlon (ralladCro a (Iiltllo TllI reinftlrlvlllllh UlHlPr (rn(ral Malolc) had I Ill Ulltlll If) nmiddottl1l 1111 htighh of Chacauuco as the results II tIll lIl)W nt 111 hlltlll IHI1l )JI)oo ()J(knd the tlClUshy
II tlllIIjlcilllt 1( jHI-III111l nlllt2-)Jllilt IlOlthof(middothallshyLIIUJ (lll) Tlll~ plt1 1tlllj) aiHlllt t Ulllt III width IJiolktd ill J(-~ Ill ll 1tlJll arm lllll tiIp plains
San Iartw tlllh()fJId ()IIiggin to pur-lIe Ith illshyf~lllry hat1all)Jl x1hc SI)tlllard IIceing- from the Chacahuco hi hllI)11 unti( r IIIJ (JlHill lIn to hrillJ ol a 1~1lItrd llIgtg(shy
HWllt again t ht IW JlIJ illfJll until thl (tva]ry had passed th II tilc Iyillj~ 1)( 1laquo111 tlw height which had JU~t iHrn tlkl II ltd tll l)fh1tiIJIlIIIupifd l)y ilw forc( I)f 1lroto Bu1 () II WFlll 11 h a )lrlll1W din to ~wUle this thing himelf dJll1JlJt (Ji)t till f)rdlr~ II( advancld with hattaliolls 7 ami Illll lhf poilion and Ililn a wI11 plallllld nnc1e(lIkd
lin hnth inflIltry and arlill(ry His troop ufT1rillg gllat Ill I -11( ICJf(Imiddotd II) vilhdraw San Martill himplf apshyIWiln d 1)1] Ill 1i1leI wit h 1111 i~t awl 2d SquadrolJ ( ralla~ tilmiddotrO a fahallq alld l tl1l Spulih (tvalry awl illfalllry aclvtll(illg ill pur Ult 1)1 OHiggins furce lIe orclprcd Soler to attack h~ h iJ Ift lIank imm((lially hil h Jlrshy-I(lnally led thpound two quadr()ll~ III attack for the rclilf of
40
from Ibn sidt Jlghl to form a square bUl UJlsucccifull~-gt Vild flight to jhl -outh followul (enclal ~(Jlcr launcI~ u~ hi malJl forle ill Jur-uit TIll cavalry pursued 1) mil
T af
0
-Oll h of ChacalJllco Spalli-h lo~~es 600 dend over 6 r(aptnld J OO() rillr~ 2 canllon and all the traingt
And Army lJad 1~2 killed and 177 WOllIHkd ~RI
Thi IOllg prpparatiolls the well planllPd mea-urea irf I e (
the gTlat On-lnlZlr Irailler and cxccllCllt comrnClIH CI S~ C ar Marlin jt)HlId lill fruition in th( hattie of Chalabuco t~
II htory llconl (w hattie with far r middotching polf ~~ cal COII-tltLIlIHl- This baltllt ~ho()k the Spanlh mat~i-middot an at its root gltlVP 1lH maJor portion of Chile it frCcdom a~~ art gutlank(d -tit(I-- to till -tnwglps by Argelltina for in~ tar pcnd~ncc It paved thl way for further operations agairt f1 tl the Spanish ill PCIU f all
The CJoSlllg ords of Sail Martins mcsagc to the COU~fhE eil ill fhwllOS Air( wlittLll 22 Fcuruar- Vcre thcc tiJr ~hall be forevlr the glory of the Army of the Andes thatflaquoU81 21 days it lomplltld a campaign crossed the highest mo~l~ee bin chain (If thL earth closed accounts with the tyrant ar~ frc(d Chilcgt ijsel
After Chalahucll thc Spanianh con-idcl(d furthpl le toe lance profitless During the I1lght 12-13 February H~f t (vtcuatNI Santiago and 11((1 to Vaiparain (GO mill~s) Fl1ilJe here ome Were tlanported by ~hiJl to PQlu others to SOLt~a Chile (TalcaiJualla) The artillery p(rk at Cuola ll-tlll Prldo [Pll into tht hand~ of fan Ilartlll ~~e
Vlwll 0ltln lIla1 ill lealned during the Illght 13- _ c~ February or 1lw Jlight of all Spanish otlicbls r]())n Sant hL dLpatchLd Captain Aldan wit h 30 Granadcros a Cab ill puruit alld prompt Iy tarleti the remaillder uf his lHovilW Oil -altlit~() II elltered tht tity Oil lhl Iah g
by tnlllendou- delllollstration from the pOllulace Iflth San llallin wa ChOSlJl to Ul SllllCmc Direct() ltflhld tillt hOllol llll prnpnld (Plwrai OHiggins ho prornptly lielled Oll 1he 16th
C(n(ral dpi Pont a tely -ick mall and his immc (lItollnlJ~l Wll lapturld --oulh or Valparaiso the night of FtbltwlY and hrought hae] tn -antiago
III ~()lIlh Amlrica lrilits charge San Martin with roll()iIlJ~ llIilII- aftt) hi ictolY at Cl1acabuco
(1) Failure to 1lru rtlcnllcssly with all his forces
(2) [he advance Oil Santiago evacuated by the Sp on 1~ Fcbrwuy rather than directly on VaillllaiRo to off the Spanbh access to the sea at
(3) Failure to launch a campaign immediately against alCllhuano (south of Santiago) where-the Spmish had good esources strong positions and excellent harbors
4) Failure in these particulars resulted in the Spanish ning masters in parts of Chile for more than a year
Foreign Military Digests
Right column Plumerillo to San Antonio de Putaendo 223 miles executed in 17 marching days or an average of over 13 miles per day
Plumerillo to Santiago 301 miles in 27 days (elapsed time) 01 an average for the leading echelon of over 11 miles
Y1 ore dI ~) In answer the author writes 0~11 The crossing of the Andes demanded from both leaders ~Ct tnd men tremendous will power and physical endurance ~~~t ltAfter he united his army in the Lo Anum area San iIartin ~ lionsidercd a halt of six days nCCCRary to get up all his artil shy~ fery to procure animaf replacements and to provide his t~ i troops with proper food and mpplics Yet thi- Cxtraordinshyc~ 4rllyactive and capable commander after but two days rest ~ Ihunchcd his tired troop~ in attack at Chacabuco in pursuit ~ tk Santiago and dcspatched a moullted purmit force to the
coast t Based on the information he received 11 February Sail
1 Martin knew that hii opponent was a~scmbling his troops for the defense of Santiago He multt assume that such a
~~ defense would be made not that the Spalllsh forces would tharch off to Valparaiso the night of 12-11 February without living battle Had San nartin had timely information of
0_ this Spanish move it might perhaps have been posihle for t- Ban Martin with orne of his force to have fltgt(tched Valshyz ~arafs6 simultaneously with the Spaniards but it b an old r ar experience that the pursuer ~eldom marches as fast 11 ti the purllcd 11orpove1 the march of tl1P Aneles Army on
Valparaiso might well hwe been a blow in the 111 On the G other hand the occupation of Santiago guaranteed ~upplies for the tired army ~toppecl plundering by the mobs and
It guaranteed the early provision of a new government for the r treed country
The Spanish reaction in the area south of Santiago made iLelf felt under the capable leadership of Colonel Ordonez
c- To COlmteract thil1 San Martin de~patched Colonel Las Hera~ t~ at the head of ] DOD infantry cavalry and artillerymell to r ~e south with the mision of defeating and dispersing the oJ ~anish San Martlll himself had lt1 g-reater objective in ypmd The freeing of (hile was Jut a preliminary step in t~e emancipation of Peru where Spaill ma-icry had ib
3 i tpcal point But for an undertaking aglinst the Spaniards(if Peru the forces thCll ill (hill were wadclJuaic H(gtipi trom nch BUPllOS Airc~ wa~ Hccc--ary in order to provide at the ealiIt-t a Heet hl(h III turn would se(ure masitr of
rr ~e Pacific and thereb -eCllle the Chilean and Peru~ian e~ tlt Therefore a ~onth after Chlcabuco San Martin t elled to Buenos Airclt to lay hi- case b(fore the power
Overcoming many obstade he -ucceecied in hl~ misshyon and on 20 August 1820 the army under San Martin d the fleet under Admiral Lord Cochrane all told 8 warshyipl 17 tralJiports 4000 men iailed from Valparaiso
t ward~ Peru f t The campaign in Chile demoll-gttluted the great cap ashy
t~lilie of San Martin his far-seeing preparations his dttermination of purpose his indomitable leadership
8 L A brief Rtatement of the march accomplishments of the l oop~ would ~eem in order nl~ In the plans and ord(rs ilt-ued by General San Martin e marchc to be excculed daily and the reullH of lhe road
ater wood and pasturage reconnaissanccR are recorded
and for the 2d 3d 4th and 5th echelons 185 192 20 and 13 miles per day
Left column Plumerillo to La Villa de Santa Rosa Qxecutcd in 10 marching days or an average of 166 miles per day This column marched a total distance to Santiago of 217 miles
The question might be asked What would be the inshyfluence of modern organization and equipment on an operashylion ill the Andes today It must be remembered that these mountains rise to great elevations (12000 to 23000 feet) that the valleys are often narrow and steep That fliers gas or tanks would prove especially effective against a force marching in multiple columns and echeloned in depth is questionable Of course the picture changes once the force reaches Los Andes That the movements of the columns could and would be observed by observers in planes is probshyable and that the hostile high command using rail and motor transportation could concentrate his forces to strike the still gtcparated columns is possible and probable
Autogyr08 and wireless would faciHtate the communishycation~ and spy report service Parachute troops especially in defiles might be employed with surprise by both attacker and defender Modern engineers and engineer technique would certainly relieve many route difficulties
IS IT NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MOUNTED FORMATIONS IN THE CAVALRY
[dFautmiddotli consel vel des formations a cheval dans la cavulcrie By Lieut Colonel Dario Condensed fOm RevH de ClLvalcnc January-February 1938]
By MAJOR L K TRUCOTT JR Cavalry
A question disagreeable to cavalry ears Belgians reply in absolute negative England 50 mechanized tends to total mechanization Germany retains but a single large unit a brigade in east Prussia Considering the question may lead to useful reflections
The idea of substituting motor for horse came logically a result of the waf From its beginning the horse was forbidden the battlefield Haelen sounded the knell of the doctrine of mounted combat by large units The years 1917 and 1918 saw tanks cross fire-swept zones penetrate hostile di-position sow disorder and put enemy at the mercy of infantry-a role of cavalry masses for centuries Off the battlefield cavalry transported maneuver masses rapidly over great difltances the truck transported greater masses more rapidly over great distances The truck permitted the audacious wide and sustained play of reserves that characshyterized 1918 During the critieal days of 1918 when large cavalry units engaged dismounted llrmored cars in gaps contacted and surprised enemy columns informed oriented and rallied elements of withdrawing troops On the battleshyfield the molor was sucessfully substituted for the horse
However at the end of the war the horse had argushyments In March 1918 what but mounted formations could have regained contact as quickly with German rear guards
41
C amp GSS Quart
of HCrU-iS the area devH-tatrd by them In April 1)]8 what ehw could have moved lPinforc(ment to the north aeros the communications of Engli~h annie preparing for the new battlc ~lonths latef what eJ(middot could have clung to retreatshying- German-- acro-- ruins ami lilid~ of FlandPlmiddot Vhat else could haccfOS(middotd 1hf 1llkll1 nllllllldll lllrntll I1ulg-arialJshy
dGerman rcojtance fOlccd capitlilati()lh ill a few hour and reachrd the Danulw III a fn ((1 Vhat of innul11Clabh patrol- gliding aco wood and mar h -willlmillg river-- (Irarillg uJ-taclt- -Ilmiddot1Jlj~ tlw P1wmy ithout J)pinf~ won or heard di-cIJ--JIlV hi Ill) lnHlIh IHnding entin da~ JUlIll hb lim and rltnrllltW iJy dt-Vi()lh route with rich lllfo] shy
mlti(JJl
If it llm( d (Jgcd to ~UlJ-tJtllte Illllt(lr for ho re 11lt ub 1 it lit if1I (an 1)( finly parI wi and dl)( lnt l1JIorabl~
tonrifllIll til hqJ~ It Illlghl )( jllllnp If Ihp]( W1
actllally all all IflTtlll middotdll(middot Ej)(middotri(middotllcl ha- (alrnl(
Pllthultjam and pa- ~ lull 10dll ( h nO t ht t t Iwlt Ill)
mcchaniz-ed all hlT~llll that till 111 tt-rr(lll llllcle is likely to proglt off r()ad Il arJIlV dcgru I(onling to the modr of llopllllOll Jut aha~ lp-trirtrrl alld alway at great coj that th( all tprraill i lprtain tfmiddotrrmiddotain
By dlpllllll nrp pnwer at at ild -=prr(l rfady for inshytant actioll l11t motor 11Iin~ lll Illlhnprd onlutinn to thc problem of lili0(JII of In illld 1ll0tnwnl It spr( el proshyttdioll and an1allHllt hac changld COllClitlOn~ of reCOllshyllaiance llld cOlltar fxtlnding- the ladill~ of action ill width and dr-pth Tn 11anpo1t -qwrd and radiu l)clmit acshycclcratin~ mU-emcllt- to the front and incrcaillg di-tallceo tu thc rear TI1U~ the motor ha~ mudified preyiou concepshyt iOll of lxplqit ing (ontact ~(curity orgtllizat ion awl fUllctlOl1111g of erdce It has changcd combat and malllll shyycr iJy modifying nwthoci of ((cu1io11 lllcl rflldrring- posshy~ihlp what forn1lrly wa lut Certain ulclat ions ill South ~loror(() and cry JlTobahly till ~ampaig-n in Aby--dnia are not diflicult opprationlt madp etlsipr by tllt( of motor thl~
arl oJlpratioll lill1ll1wht haYI Ill(n imp()ssih1e without thlll1 But Ow motor hac rlgnrnuo limitntionlt
JUf rhlliifgtl lilll it(lf 1111 middot~I()tlll~ CoIl0IW]( a Iltioll of ga- cl(t(Jmilwrl ill Ilature and quantity mopovpr importfL The ration allows lwitw -Ilbotilution 1101 rpchHliol1 For maintenance tl1l molor rcquin~ at dcilllitp lpriod work llld
replacement which ~ufTer neither --ubstitution nor reducshytion Repair-today Htth more than lx(hallf~p of worl
part for lH-nCjuill 1Hcial parb ill -IlPcial quantity for pach model of vehicle At a particular time lacking tlw-p parts IPpbCNllfllt lt- hours of worl goa tilt motor -tops slrvicp Thpll alf 110 motors tapahlL of fllrthCr (1shy
vice 011 -hort allowance or orn out provided they lecciv(- (JJ1~id(rati()n and tolerance thpre are motor Jlfrf(ctl~
ltpn(d thai move or motor that do nol mo(-
)IojoJ formation mwt he emploYfd within a limitCd definitely kllO1l radith (JI tied to road on a system of cir shyCulat ill Ir10PIlWllt and ImpJoymPIJt of dT(( ini an hound to rcql1inmcntlt of maintel11I1Cl (omba1 engines arc vulshynerable antitank cannon and mille ravagf thpir nlllk After (om hat a -plciai sl1ice must immcdia1rly collpei and repair damaged matpripl and failure ri-lo~ losing costly mat~ricl that could have been restored to service
l(ITll1U limit((iols-DiHpiacement of automotive v cles dependsmiddot upon consistency of ~oil and aosence ~tacles Lacking bridges rivers are alnmlute obstac moulltaini marshy cOLlntries WtHlls or in had wea llOgtS-(otlllt lY vehich)K must middot(ck loul~ 1 hlre1or( mo dt-fPlui UpOI1 nature alld dllhitv of roadlt
Fllllc it)lIIl liltlf([tif)I-~ From chicles armored nary or moto]cyeit oh(lvatioli is poor while in moe 011 Ul( other hand (Iliclfs an eaiiy seen and marc iward Vphicl-s a1( cllmIHISOHl- (olumn- an dim aswmblf put ill march swlter conccal break up disaUvfllltagtS forbid u-e for short distances Vehicl column arc (gtxposed to ambuh and depending UpOIJ
of vlllltlaililily to all forms or --urprise (~ 01 r C
bull
rc Consequently While pos-iLiJitics of the motor renamp ~ W
Its lIiC as 11lCCSsary a~ powdcl thc motor has disadvantarj ( that limit and at timegt forbid Hi employment IIechann ~ j~
formations have takell IloSltCsioll of the battlefield forbidd-- Ol
to the horse Alotol formations arc taking over rapid f 1f( diitant trmlipOlt of nla(i Left to thcms(lv(s CV(-11 elI - nl billCd t1l(se formations lend thcmwiv(-s hadly to details itl actions their (ontacf g-ivc- only a ~Jl(cial definition tJ ~ calillot be dil(etly [xploitcmiddotd by 01 hel I roop they hi 1 diHkulty ill maintaining- contact once matlc For short ~ Oni placement of motor formatio1l (lltrmkillg security circihn latioll alld detlucking COl1sUnle ~Hlantag(gti of spre ~ Mechanized formation cannot operate within h(~avy COYt
Motorcycles while invaluable f() communication Hnd 1 for distant surfacE reconnaissancE are of questionah cill1(y fot sc(urity during approach and contact F mOllntains marsh~ reg-ion certain brollten and cover area like tllO-1e found ill the north an foruiddftl motonmiddot formati011s unle~R exits are as~urrd thev are forbid~ mechanized formatiolls cxcept in grllCral ~ alignment 0 ill progressing fron1 Demolition ompromi=c movem(llt5~ both unforesecn they cause massing that adation will n14
mortal Fog freeze snow can immobilizc entire f tions finally failure in circulation ~uppJy or maint exposes motor formatioJ)4 to (ompl(10 paralysis restrictions an ppccially leti( ill offplliv( manCu(gtfpound in defensive situations tlw dlfCndtl is usually master oft terrain his r(a1 and security
Thll(fon if then i Ilccd 1111((1 all eilc1l111stl11CCc force mOle rapid 1han infantry a Huhl ltllHll1lastic c III lll 1 to t IlP motor is ll(((ar~ 1hii cOlllplenWl1t (all the horse While Ihe field of battle i forbidden to the I the approach is less forbidden than to th~ truck units have not 111( illPrl ia of automobile units tlwy ltlimir vulilllability by formations and rapirl dislWlsions Til patrnl alone arc capahle of a~sl1ring- full l)(onllais~a
l(l1~dll fol tlllt illfa1l1JY Tlwitmiddot (ollj~l(t is Jilp thal fantlY and is immpdiaiply lltiliablc wit hout t lanspor TJ1Pil (OIlIJllllS sllppJp and fluid call crOSH womb and impfl1pt rahl(l foJ motors or terrain broken by demol JlflHtratl mountaill labyrinths Rwim rivers Final horse finds suhsistfll(p nrarly rlrywhclC Th( horse ltlllr~i fatif~l1e and fJriat ions hc S(-lVCS (-VCll wh perfectly HClved i a worn horse column drags l)elhaps but moves and a few days rest will reestablish it SU11plcn~
horse units their fluidity their simplicity of mainten3
particularly to circumstances and terrain forbidden r formations Motor and horse are therefore com pleshyone to the other portion between hor~e and mOLor involves all the of national defcn~e such a~ the nature of the ar
esecn the general orientation of operation~ density middot infantry possible nature of terrain and climate in theaters
Foreign Military Digests
In an organization born of the war on the West~rn Front of reinforcements individually justified we have reached the point where the division which by origin and definition should bn the smallest group of combined arms thai can be efficiently employed can move only by breaidng up and forming mixed groups WOlse-not special to the cavalryshyin desiring to put these unitA in position to fight new means
i f operations clcdits and pel~onll(l Clvailabl( for the ~ otor i~ costly in money and effective national resources
articulally breeding which imposei a millinmm of (ffcctives n time of peace finally on the degree in which conduct of arcan be left to mercy of ~uppIi~1 that depend on the molshy
lle of the real and good will of fOlcignrll COlllequently jlJ]utlOilS difler in different countries Belgian will differ trom British or German Olll- may diiTCl from othergt The iwo nations that have gone farther in favor of til( motal are VlOse faced with particular war cfmditioll Delgiurn (gtnshy11-agcs only a defensive action waiting intervention hy dlied forces Great Britain counts on air and -ca fleet fol insular protection maintdnc a colonial army for defellse and if it ~ngages in a continental war chooses its conditions In a +tuatlOn Ib defini~Et the German ~oltltioll j less dcgtcided
)lo1e in question iq how to ernploy our remaining horse unit for thcir role is not the 8ame a formerly Admitting that the missions of cavalry are unchanged the motor can ~ke over some of them thelefore tlH missiongt do not (xist 1()r hone formations alone From that we can (ollcei(~ the
tV role of hOI-e formations under to forme a normal - ole hich vill do what the motor call1lOt or which the horse n do more easily at less cost or at 1(-gt risk an eventual
~ole which will be to supply momentary defic~cncic- of autoshygtllOblie formations ~ This employment demand light and fluid unit able to ~lter through woods climb mountain slopes penetrate rohell and covered country where the motor cannot and
middot ihere ucres will be not to the strongct5t but to the first f annmiddote This u~c requjre~ supple and plastic units thai l n (stablieh and maintain contact without gap even on a I oing front so thai infantry can determine when to end s approach march and properly orient its deployment middot nit capable of cooperating with moto fOJmations llch a~ y con-titutillg a pivot of maneuver for a motorized maneushy
ering force unit- capable of making up for deficiencies of otorized and mechanized formationc of taking great idths I)f accompli5hing far from -UPPOll mi ~ion~ that may
ad to actions in force and for that capble of absorbing ~~_ overfu reinforcements Will not our cavalry division in which 16 squadrons of ~ ounted men are a minority in effectivES and volume be tmiddotmiddot ore adapted to the eventual role than to the 1100mal Theyt rc eq~ipp(d for independent action they havpound mean~ of peratmg far from support mean of force provisionF ~ helon services engineer mean They are powerful but eavy But large cavalry units that could execute a distant id during the war as that over more than 100 kilometers
om Macedonia to the Danuhc which cut an army from its ~~ il1e and captured cities wac a formation without baggage lt artillery and which aHllted and received no other ~Hlpp1ies
an horseshoe nails dropped by airplanes To fulfin such mission we should abandon the modern cavalry division
we havc not taken into account that they might and should fight with their support
The molor diminished needs but thcre was more to do Motorizing trainfgt by replacing wagons by truckR increases weight because the truck is heavier and more cumbersome than a wagon and require~ more to supply maintain and reshypair it What would have lightened immensely would have been to comdder that trucks in a few hOllrs over hundreds of kIlometers can deliver to units when required equipment that had to be carried at a11 times when trains were animal drawn Similarly if mechanization for horse regiments has no other purpose than to provide antitank means and greater armament it iR a drawback but if we consider_that enemy tanks arc a threat only where Ollr own can operate then mechanization can be for cavalry the ideal antitank mean- prCRent when needed absent when not In Ruch case to Rive horse unitR support of mechanization is to reinforce and protect and not to weight them Mechanized fractions operating with horse units can be used under circumstances terrain and conditions where employment of mechanized mas~es would be impossible There is difference in employshying a platoon of armoled vehicles on a long forest road vhere cavalrymen scout the flanks and employing- a long column incapable of observing its own flanks
Considering capabilities of the motor aerial as well as terrestrial horse formations should be reorganized The influence of employment of motors not only on distribution of cavalry missions but on the mission~ themselves should furnish a basis and orientation
We observe at once that the role of mobile fire reserves primordial at one time i~ no longer peculiar to the cavalry Ve note that missions of exploration no longer have place of first rank which was once theirs Rapidity and intensity with which situations change today have lessened interest in information obtained by exploration Further to hope to obtain information other than by ~udden contact with powershyful mechanized means risks being a dangerollR illusion The offensive can draw only the same advantag-c from rapid means of transport as the defense
On the other hand the primordial impurtance of securshyity misRions is always increasing security of the commander for there iR rhd of being caught and losing liberty of action nt great dhtance Recnrity of troopR for the approach march should begin at a distance with nttendant risk of lORing direction intermingling and fatigue
These obgervationR may lead to stopping nrguments with infantry where cavalry risks mobility without hope and to abandoning the costly mirage of uexploratlOll and pure cavalry mis~ion~ which by cruel irony fall more and more mto the domain of the motor Further these observation~ may puint out the very real necessity of distant security
Without going as far as the Germans who divided large cavalry units into reconnaissance groups the formula may
43
11shy
its~ e
4
Foreiiin Jlilifary Digests
be found in a modernized version of the old firt1t linc brigade rlhe character of distant ~(curity relative proximity of inshyfantry po-3ibility of rapid reinforcement oppose all tempshytation to weight llllit~ TIH llecessity of covering a corp front imposp till pffpPiin minimum The llCcesity of operating- in ~mall dpjachlllellb fiuin a nch suhaltern
(cadre vanld 1Om (Jf rl1l~si(JllS ohligation of maYleuver l1(c-ldty 01 ab~orhilJg reillforc(m1lllb fn(IIlPntly rt~qtlir(-
same nchllC-- ill ~uperi()r cadrL-- othing -hould hindtl groupillj 1)[ ullit tor mb ioll- of another Jlatlln and of reinforeilW tlllIll tmporaJily with splcially Il(te-~ary
meangt
Tilt IH ctalJ 111111--- hould lH tilt diiloll WIth two 1)1 three ilflre nyimellt a nlPchanLed n)J~imlllt 1lllCarily lfJmprbiJlJ~ a Jqwlrfnl lilt Itank annanHlIt a ~r(lllp of a1shytilhr~ nlflrl(r ratHr thlll gUllgt 1 --ignal detachment all
lttntilInlaft d( tadlJlfllt a II cqtllPPld -talT IIorLregishyl1Hllts proitif-d WIth l trolW platooll (Jf motorcycle megtshy~(llgers would he fltlwrYh IwIlI ill motor anri train- lomhat trlIlI- hould lw It~t()l(d tn tilt m()hilit~middot of unit~ hy
rdulning- to animal drawn m(an~ (cttain ~ubdlvl~lOn~ 11(h as tIl( ~pahi~ hI) ~ri D1ollntalllllfs should Il equipPld and traiwd t() mount arfan
In piact (If tItI Ij Cl airy livjiJlh a Tlattr Iluml)l flf 11Or~p f()rmtllolh pll III hmd mnhilp lIpple and light without 1lt11W tt1 ()tld lllrlllit fllrnhhlllg large units Pllgagillg ill d(Icafl IlWntIIClS with thL dbtant -ecurity rrrillired 1111-( -amp formatIOn- grouped or alone would bl able to 11lrfllrm Ill miloll- formerly deolving 011 the eaalry divll()lI~ Furtlwr tht~ would be able 10 cooprrate with mol)r f()nll~ti()Il ~llllplenllllt them or in (1lte of need to talt (IVlr l part ()f tlIP front In a implpound comhination would be found the rolf and place of the two clements that Join today in giving (lyalry it mohility and power thp motor and tIlt hor~(
Torn from th~ (Olltrlfllttllll that tries at Olllpound to make 1l1lllJll Id IJlI Jlt I tlld nllllllllIIlll( cmiddotalry hecome lig-ht waill hy illlluIJoll thl tlJr-l fOrillatioll- would again take the hahit of malleUHr a la legere They would find again for applll at ill 11 ill JJnd(ln ~IIITolll(ljnJ~ old qualities that dpldo ld li~ht tIO()lb ill the so-calpd war of advanced jlo-h Thb (Julcllw t)f J-Tlat advaJ1ta~~p to iJlfantry which would altJ I)(lon)( mUWl rahl The dcvplopmcnt of scienshyt Ijllt mean hould lalt rather than wcaken the orignal characteritic of tlw old arm fir~l l)((aup they arc aided ll a(j(Jl1 and nJipmiddottd of dutIl seco1ld olcausc to assure th pr(Liioll and illcd IIPcP-ary for employing meant) more lod nlOll varitri qnall unit and regiments mut be taken from a lomph~middotily alld f1n~anic instahility that accommushydal( n(gti1lwl intruclioll Jlor mailltenance
It i noi a qu(lion of 1(Ilrllilll~ to th( tlntiq11 -implishy(Ifmiddot of Hl( thrr f arm- 1111 11 i lHIls-aIY to OITPct an Illshy
vtllizd ion which by fortf of (ir(mn-taJlcP- was lealizNi h (dr)J11rl- lIld q(middotE~ EOIT(middot(tions New fOlmaiionH )11111 ~ajn in knowing llwir matprifl l)(tiP) and mort quilhlJ in acquirinr practice and in testing results As for old arm collahoration with nlO(icrn lllgil1(-l should be a rshyf urn Iq prllHiplC and to making he-t use of particular rnall~ III a flIOl( r(stricipd field indIvidual qualities will ltipjfrmiIlP tlm~clv(s
C amp GSS Quart
THB INBVITABlLlTY OF CONTINUOUS FRONlli
[La fntnlitc dt-s fronts continus By General RoullurroJ CondpJ1sPu from HClr Jl1litajlC SlIiEM Declmher 1D37]
By MAJOn T R PIIILLJlS Coa~t Al tllllry CorJl~
We shall not recommence trench warfare is a fa refrin to all who lived througPt it But what do they about it
It wa the effect of caUHes already old but none iJelli(erants had paid attention to them
The queHtion whether it will be in our power to p the formation of continuous frontgt and the trenches characterize them depends upon the survival of the cau~
An anonymous author in a gttudy on the evolutionf tadics wrote in 1891 We do not agree with those ill claim that the offensive hue lost nothing of its value defensive is not as has been said an attitude whose a 2
resides in purely defcmdve advantages It has virtues And further One of these lines (one oft t 18 opposing fronts) unable to xucceed in front will attemp ~
envelop the other this one in his turn will prolong rd front and it will he a race as to who can extend the Ir( t r within the limit permitted by hi effectives 01 at I~ 5- things would develop that vay if Ol1e could extend indt~ O-J nitely but nature imposes obstacles The line will stoP~ier point of support the -ea a mountain range or the front of a neutral nation t
Thece prevision- were unheard in the concert ofmiddot e ~ thoritativc voices proclaiming the headlong offensive tical instruction continued to spread the blind offensive the first combats of 19J1 The prophetic sense of a wa eonfticting- so violentlv with current ideas had motivat anonymity of the author He was revealed in 1914 as Lii Colonel Emile lIlayer to whose reputation as a miliu writer nothing neeuH be added now
On friendly terms with 1I1arshals Joffre and Focht Jng
had vainly sought to make them understand his ideas l~n ( This ancient history is not without interest at it m er
when certain spirits attempt to turll aside the 11fCOCClI t of a new war of trenches by hypotheses on the causes Htabiliation of 1914 Can one not see states one the r l of a series of accidental causes or of General Falkenh ft particular conception of the conduct of war ~I
In theHc two cases there is no reason for th( eff((~ a the (au~(s which have disappcareu lo occur anew ~7
No on would dare hold that the realiation foreseen more than twenty years in advance and foJ irreproachable logic was the result of fiimple coincide of chancC
As for the hypothesis of the personal influence l~ral von Falkcnhayn on stabilization it appears to be d hy his first acts a~ mprtmc command) of tlll Ge armies 12 September J 91-1
Aetually fter mid-September he orltllrcd the Gc Fifth Army lHt WPl1l the MCUHC and the Argonne to adv An analag-uliH order wa~ given at the same time to the de ment of General von Strantz to mo( from the region of toward the heights of the Meuse These movements m fesUy had as object the investment of Verdun The displayed by the troops charged with these missions sho that they were stopped after inconteHtable tactical succ
OlXVlI No 70 Foreign Military 7Jigests
ot by order of the Supreme Command but by the resistance ey encountered
~ We are thus led to recognize that the formation of conshy~nuous fronts in the Varld V~ar was the logical consequence a higher causes Lieut Colonel Mayer indicated them in
91 Are they still effective They arc (1) the power of rmmet particularly favorable to tile defensive and (2) ~ e increase of man power in modern armies Both have olved since the World War but uniquely in the sense of ~gmentation This first verification is decidedly of a $ture to lead to the belief that it~ consequences have fo1shy1bwed the same progres~Honi The essential characteristic8 of modern materiel appear ~confirm this iirst supposition Ve shall examine from this ~int of view the actual possibilities of artillery aviation ~echanjzation and motorization and finally of gas These are the branches of modern materiel whose perfection since the war might lead to serious modifications of the tactics of lin8 i When we took the field in 1914 ranges in exces of 7700 ~rds were considered exceptional for artillery The greatshy4t range of French cannon was about 11000 yards for the JfJ5mm long and 3000 or 4000 yards more for the German IlO-mm_ The range of the giant German and Austrian howshyItzers dId not exceed 13200 yardR i Artlllery observation posts ere always diRtant from the objectives and the uncertainty of unobserved fire genshyJaBy prevented its employment In the courxe of the war CI~tiation coming to the help of terrestrial observation pershy- ltted the use of observed fire from the extreme range of e guns Careful ballistic btudies supplied the methods of efficacious map fire especially by the me of concentrations of fil-e
under these conditions and thanks to present long 4nges batteries spread over 10000 or more yards of front ten execute concentrations of fire vmiddotithout direct observation_ 1
or the whole of their front Thee possibilities were evishy nt on many occasions during the course of the World Var t It IS evident that they have been augmented by the inshy
--clt eaF~ of the rangep of the gun and the superior instruction the artillery personnel This gives an advantage to the
atfense the organization of which can easily be Huperior to at of the attack because of its stabilization Among the examples of concentration of fireamp that the
World Var furnishes us two are recalled which can give an feuroa of the services to be expected of long range artillery in ~e future
1 In January 1915 the German XVI Army Corps held the ont of the Argonne from the Aisne to the height of Vaumiddot ois still famous for the bloody combats of which it was the cater This front included a wooded part the Argonne
Vi ere the German troops attempted to advance and a part s covered between the Argonne and Vauquois included
_ e latter part having received a defensive mission was nstituted aA a distinct sector from the forest under the
ders of the artillery commander of the army corpR He 8 particularly apt to get the maximum returns from his ament In fact although this German ector was held bull very small infantry strength for its extent it held
ainst all French attacks_
In the -egion of the height of the Meuse in November 1914 a concentration of fire of forty pieces opened in less than a half hour quickly ended the menace of a serious Ger~ man attack
It results from these conHidelations that modern prog~ re~~ in artillery gives new postiiuilities of extension and to forces on defensive fronts
Aviation gave birth Lo great hope for the attack Camshyouflage of terrestrial organizations and the custom of making important movement at night have reduced the effects of its activity singularly Its role in reconnai8sance at all distanshyces is considerable but it cannot hope to prevent all disshycovery of movements by the enemy_ It is thus logical to believe that all efforts at envelopment will collide with an exten~ion of the front attacked under the same conditions as m 1914 to the degree that reserves are available
At the present time it is difficult to form an accurate opinion of the cap-abilities of parachute infantry Without drawing definite conclusions from the experiments in France during the autumn maneuvermiddot one can say that they have not thrown much light on the utility of this novelty Until proof is given to the contrarythe actions of the parachutists do not seem to be able to exceed the limits of very rIsky episodes
Aerial superiority certamly will glve an advantage to the contender who has it but nothing authorizes the belief that it will be decisive It will not prevent the inferior conshytender from establishing defensive lines in front of which an attack may receive a bloody check
Motorization of the ground forces gives the same facilishytIes to the enveloping maneuver of the attack and the counshyter-action of the defense Like all technical surprises the tank at its outset gained the success due to surprise But on a modern battlefield this SUCless will be difticult to renew against a defense using artificial obstacles mines and antishytank cannon The Abyssinians who were nothing but savage warriors even found the means to trap a dozen Italian tanks
Isolated feats by mechanical engines can never be preshynmted But in mass they are not capable with their own means of carrying through an attack and their employment in mass requires an extensive artillery preparation
It is certain the motorization and mechanization will extend fronts inordinately At the same time it increases the difficulty of protection In the British maneuvers of last autumn one of the sideR was entirely mechanized the other was partially and included foot infantry and horse cavalry the reconnaissance elements of both sides were able to reach the command potjt of their adversary In the same maneushyvers the defender was skillful enough in the use of obstacles to canalize the attlck of the enemy tanks_ They were caught in a trap and fell under the fire of antitank guns A coufltelshyattack by tanks completed their defeat This episode was an affair of tanks and the infantry does not eem to have played a role
One flees in the modern tank the Ruccessor of the arshymored knight History shows the many successes of the latter Bllt firc um-l ~loVly pCliPrlfd IinaIIy chased him f)om the field of battle What will become of the tank as artillery becomes perfected to destroy it This is a secret of the future that exercises of peace have failed to unveiL
45
In an~ (il In the pnlnt Rtatc of armament tlll Ctll shy
ploynHn of tank dOl flt (eIn to fan) OllP ide more than the othll HI lJmlltt Thp oiJ-IlYcr of the last British mallvilI-- (dl (-1llt11 that fliPY gie the an~er advanshytagp to the dl1n-l
I (1 dta( k III I 11 dc vlth(llt doubt local ppi-odl- C~mJlal i-vll II tfW11 (Ifj tIll nUwk and dlfell--e can furlllh 110 oj hI) (nil lu jll)) Ihtll Jll( art IlII1 t hey will lH of ~reat 1-1 ldLlll~ 1f 1hI dt tll I
lhl--I (In-lrlltltllllh 1(n1 to C()ITOh))at( for tlw fushylun tlH l Idl 111111- Id- J]IIlI (IjOlll1 ~Llrlr whith () ]1111(1] lH l~] I TIlI lOnJillll tllt lIlUr--l of OpnllOI1
illl Il III III d I 1 I 11 JI)(j of t hI 1111lt1 Var pnt ril)ld tlll I )l1I 1l1 IJ] 11(1 -i( jlOltIIJll awl t1li fnllllatioll of
II ll)( llal Jt I (( 11 shy
FIJI (1() 111 pI dnlllillall tl)1I11)JTO on the Jlcld of 11111 iltft 11 dl ~Ill 1- lllt-Ill Ith atlTUeU YlUlenn lnd dvplh dnln tiltmiddotljIWn oj )()rnhaldmlnt tiatioJ1 and the llHlll-t-d 1 tlnge vi gUl Such 1- the -latement in til pII~rdl Id till FtI111 h JI)--tltl(tion~ for tIll employment of lalLT 11011 llf l~ Allglht l~jC In It l1w offcn~ivl and dc fl n ~I I lll I 11 ttl tl form ot al for hidl -olclicr- should
iJl lIIIh 1111IIllvn TIH lndn( it rctlldcd in GlrnlllI 111111111111 IP1111 II) --11) Yllaltl prlfCllIlCl foJ the ofshy
tn-lI
()JTLIl--J( - tgUll- a front or)-anized 111 ulpth en~n III-I il~ 11 I -) rllillllj III the II-t Ylal- of the orld Var that tllll (llt~ k IH1-tl1lltcd a lritablc yictory for the uPshy
fllHel fhi 1-- -ho11 II1 the e~ond hattie of Cham jldllll III 1litlriltl lfl1-) the lJatllp of the Ai-ne Il1 1~1l7
dId agalll III Frllltl and Flander~ in 1larch and April 1J18 fll I Ill LtLt 11 t (11 ht fIlIUl e of the Glrnlans to break the line- hul dl tlll lll()jd 1tHrt I---iOll of a grac deftat The 1il I)ln- 1)1 arlll(lltTlt llIl onJr tlcentuate thIS tendencr Jll
111 flltUft
11 d lillI lr thaI iClhlllLal -urpri~L nll contradIct 1 Pll 11))1 llldllltetl e do not think -0
(Jill I 1IIllln-]1111 Illlll Ill that de-pitc all the arguments IItI]1 nl (Ill -Idlllllt1IOll fir fronts JIl a gnat war
11)(1 III -ldl (1 Ill -[lJ Jlri-l of unknown devices war hLshy
111 II JI ill JIIlti Il Iltt JIIlJ III lvolve rapidly toward -tahshy1ItlIIIlI LIlt J-ur~
[LJI))lill ltl1I 01 front By LlluL CI)Io I 11 I f )jO]f II d f) ltl1ll i1 I ill lld)lfllI ( -i11(
1111111 IqIK J
ill th 1)( llmiddotlldH J 1--111 of UfIII( Jlilillllf 811( GC11elshy
d f j~JUtPl1 Id fliP III d (()jllll1l IaYLr- prediction luiJlI-hed In jK~JI IJ lilt fnlUlt llblliatIOTl of fronts of hattIe In Ifl II nlntHl Lt~l ()ljlSl his iueas un the -ubicct dld I plaJJb liHlr tIlI-l
Ill tit 1 HjJllHllt of jirIIHJ(1 of all types of w(apons
11 1i111d HI 11 aJJlltl 1Illolaldt rlont [o(VIl this dul uot Ill-Illy a I lIJOUIllerIlL Ilt of til( slluggle aml giving up of atttmIlt tn -(J1Yt~ tlw prohlltll 111l1s p()~wd It alt lH((ssary to fOil f II 111111 orle of tilt p)treI1lJtH~ of the line to iale till pOI]Oll III till ll11 A Oil as an lllvclopmcnt is noticed by llf fHIJl ((11 though It lIlay nul be Wide the threatened
46
c amp GSS Quart
wing wilh(iras almot instill(tivel~
mPllt it finds itltelJ hetwcll1 two IirCs converging on it unahle to ripn-te in two different directions it renOUll UlHlJual stn)le
IL i tpparllll that tlw dt~rlllder lan protpound~lt his agaifl~t a 1111 f1111g f)lO(Hllnt of mall amplitude hy foriiilt-ati()ll alld tlIP cla-sil procedures against flu J1I()I~lll(llt 1lIt d the ll1vllopment is malti at tO
aide dblan(( and with important forccs the (on seq al( IIlIl(h flInj( J(cllluhtHblc Lines of communiratio 1luat lOll will H endangL)p( RaiIlm~di and roads vill hloclpd
Thlh 110 III() J(Jf of -tahiiitation i-gt an impllgnal flail] r 11ldd( 1 hi dPliluk -td~mlJlt in the Rente JIilltwc I
SIIlt( ill la 11()2 I said thPll that to maintain the rigl i-altI~1 it~ of t hp I rUllt it 1l1U-t be sUllPorted ag-ainst the sea ~ff t k
If f I ec11l01Ult a III rUlgL or a Ilcutra ron tIer In urIe bull an 0 )S~f k 1hal tould lleither he turned or foncd These two conditio~1 ~ i ~s fire Po(J alid imprpjnable flallk~ are indispensable tot ]IlC tH
conlinuou front lhe 1)
FIn j)()Wll is a relatIve term In this c(U-)c If thc( 1lcc I I hi I t 4ePOSllW 101(es arc tljula en as a woe Cit 1er as 0 I lrh
mean- thev PO-IS or tht llumlHl of (f[rlLives the j t ll j hility i a~-I1I(d In pJintipll If the oppo~ing for ~ very llIHljunl if cquIiibllum doe~ not exist or if it is brol ovel a Z()JW suflidlntly extlJljn the front is in danger i(ing- fontd bu k alld pierccd in t hjlt region
Some ypars parli(J I had explained my ideas to toillradp Toutct thelI director at the Ecole SlIpcricure Gllern lIe ohiected that a division could not hold a Ir m()rt Ihan a ieagllt (tilnl rmlls) AClording to T jrc our twenty army torps would be a1gt1pound to furnish twenty-IT lh a adlYC divL~i(lll~ till others were not considered of valu ~ adiu
1tilU- the linc of rCSltante (auld not exceed twenty-I ~-ere
ICagllC~ apploximately th distallCeuro from Dlinkitk to r ~ 11 th fort iIy contradictor concluded that the establishment elf f a Imc of re~istal1ce on our northern frontier would ilb~ t the total of our aetl( trvolls and there would be nonef fur OUI other frontiers or for an llnportnnt re~erve
AfUl thp fOllllatJOJ1 of fronts in ll1t huLh sidc~ 1
~hort of ammunition If the inadEr~ at that time had well supplied and the FreTleh supplies exhausted a iJ through could hayc hecn made with a frontal attack pJtlonclPlIlHt tfluld hl( lgtlll1 ohtaincd by different m Early lISC of gas lI1ight hayc up~d it The continuolls f ttll Ill hI 01(11 if th(I1( ilt a ~llilkient disparity of force stabilized front h the result of approximately equal and Im)lCglwhle tlanks
If I tlilIilult to -oPt that aviation would lie abl( to lurll tillS HLatlmcnt but I lll~itate to malw a prophecy fad I did nut prophllY III Bn und 1902 I never atten 10 lilt IIkdp 1l1~ flilHh Jofrn and Folh with illY i(lla ~illlpl~ to 1gt1Oadpll theirs Both had a precise idea 0 fill 11 wlluld lit rOllght and I told tlWI1l tlwy ll~ WI npl(~Illt it to llilIllltllvl a priori and that thc future Jd tIll lip fo tlwir pJlvisioIlS Above all I though ~
deceived themselves in Ia(ing their confidence in the I 1JIlJ~ offlIldVt I 1011 in LOpini(m in May 1DO) iJ iilvl that llll-l theory IS false I believe it ~ven mol gerons than fabc (May I not ue permitted to say t thcRc two lines are those I am most proud to have wrillpoundlt rus
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Foreign Military Digests
THE GEmA-I ARlIY IN 1917
[LllltlllC allqnunde lil l)n By Colonel voni X~landll CUIHlllhld frum R( 111( lJdtrulc ~Olt~r
1 Fbruuy lJlR 1
1 By MUJ[t T n PUll J 110 (nat AllJilllY Corp
J Colonel von Xyland(gtl German Arm Retired i a well jno~n mil~tary ritCl Hnd i- I10 nne of the profes~ors of imilt1JI h~~toIT at the Krigakcde~lic in BeTm Thi 1artlc]e ltllltall1- 1 OIl-dll ahle InformatIOn about the German jlrmy that prevIOusly h- not heen available middot The gJIHi (Irmarl l1M 11 Cln er- of September 1n17 in lthL reg-IfIll ()l the Illti( Slltt ere an imp01lant event they lttradl d t (JIlidll al)k flllClgl1 at lention The maneucr- 1nftheglOtllld 11)1 ( t ok pl( ( in tern Pomerania and III
b[(lklenL1l1)r a hlTltlill or rnlllll1 hil- Clit vith llumerou ]he and -OjlH COle -t Til jll (-lIH c of three army COn)
Inriudll1g nllmlIll1 ~fltorj d and lrmolNI forcc- rendered the mamlI el lIlt)ll Important than any of tho-e that had prl-ltdetl1t in G(lmln~ and eell 111 forclgn lotlntric To ih(~e a- ~ddc(~ the lolIaLoration of the navy and aviation fIhL field oj actIon of the latliJ ww LOlHidcrably more exmiddot tcnJed than that oi the two ground armle The fleet mashy1fller Ino] plll l Oll tilt HaItH Spa IIlIl in It- large I ~IlW~ the tilCIlL of the manLUlr~ middot A UIl1YO 01 troop tlHl1-IOIL had heen sent from Ent l)lU~ Ja 11 a tnward SwiJwlllulHh--Stettin and had oe-t-n ttltllked hile en loute by till alt(lcalY This ollasioned omLat~ on the -ld aIllI 111 till all a- vel as the start of a
middot omncltialcontlll t Each pal t) had a large air force The bjtlthl a-illcd to the all fonp~ exceeded greatly later Jlly Jnd in depth the front etalJlishcd on land Vithin the LdlU uf allllli act tty eXElCI~es of passive aerial defense (re uJlldulteu dUllng the entIre week of the maneuvers ~~n tilh fahion the C1 il population as able to prepare it shyelf for modern 1 at uttainly rill not spare them
j 1 hl-l lOl1lblIled lilal1CUVel a~ecting th~ armies of the and ~l-t and all -upplitd a IlIlCIOUS occasIon to test the 0mmltind ()rgdllatioll 11111 Olhllld in Germany and which ~olllri ltUll thl lollllJnlatlOll oj the~e three armies with a IC to realization of thell common oUJedives The exelshy
bull lleS hllh utnnol be lxplained in detail aroused for thi~ Ca~l)ll (11 extl(Illel~ 11 (Iy fnleigll mtlrest and have prushy
joked many perllnent JI--cussiolJs on the development of the ew Gel man army
In dred the maneUver~ Wele the result of a year of inshy truLtion during whiLh in lonformlly WIth the laws of milishyar) concllption the re~toration of the army advanceu ethodlcally For the first time In the autumn of 1937 men
vho had tompleted two yeJr- traiElIlg henceforth normal ad )lt1l HllIster(u out Dy the u(cree of 24 Aug-ust 19~6 11 n1ln ho Ire lit for clvice lcccivcu this instruction
ther In the armies of the land -ea and air In addition ome iJluntl~l- could IJC engaged for longer duration and
~middoterc a-Jgn~d to [undwll rtlulring special knowledge Older men ho Junng the period of limitation of armashy
middot Jenb had nol lecived military lIitlu(tion and who (ould ot bL uilled for lwo yettl- trainlIlg took part as reservist nan eiJdll veLd (OUlS( of in-tudlOn In the autumn of 937 the da-s of 1915 as well as the 1912 class in East russia had been called normally to arms after having been
in labor camps The conception of obligatory military sershyvice effectively realized in Gelmany calls for an arrangeshyment between those who have been called for military 8ershyyicc and from this fact have submitted to a restriction on their ciyilian ltllCl aBel tholC for whom this is not the case To eITcd thi~ purpose a military tax hab been introduced effetive 1 September 1937 it affects for the present only thooe mcmbels of the cIoss of 1914 and 1916 who have not been lalled into service The tax is due until the end of the YLar in hilh the contlibuiol lealthes the age of 45 It is (dculalLd as follow~ during the first two years (which l onCS]lOlHl to normal service) at 50 ~~ of their income and after thal at G
The law on aerial defense published last year does not indilatf an extension of ohlig-atory service for it does not reqUIre 1I1l1 f (lJI Hervices It should be interpreted as follo~ All Glman~ are relluired to take part in aerial deshyfen E The service of alert Becurity first aid and of indishyVidual indutrial protection are constituted in groups harged with organizing aerial defense The Reichsluft shy~(hutzbund OlganlJlex and ir1Ftttmiddotult reams for self-protecshytion In other domainH it functions in the quality of (nttn4elol
During lf)n the regulations required by the introducshytIOn of two years -gtervice were put to test Military service is a service of honor for the German people It requires the 4oldiel to give him4elf to assure the existence of the nation even to the ~acrHice of his own life This fundamental a-ertion is destined to place in evidence the moral and psyshychic forces of the combatant as well as his physical and milmiddot tan training Veracity absolute obedienle punctuality exactitude and severity are indispensable qualities In turn they provolw will courage resistance the sentiment of honor and the modesty the soldier should pmsess Reciprocal confidence between the leader and his men on the one part and comradeship on the other should constitute a solid lien in the organi7ation Drill is ronsidered as an indispensable means for the formation of soldiel~ but not a~ an occasion to conduct formal exercises without purpose
Th( objective of the second year of training is the edushycation of the isolated combatant and instruction in special hranches In addition upon completion of the first year they Hhould be able lo function as leaders of groups and instructors During the second year special importance is lattached to the education of reserve officers
The formation of actIve officers who in their quality of instructor have heavy tasks is given special attention The numher of oflkers to be educated having been considerashybly augmented due to the introduction of two years of serw
yiee it ha~ heen neCe8Sar) tu reduce the period of instruction from four yltars to two and one-half yearf This has reshy-ulted in Illimllc regulation of time to gain the greatest benefit and it heavier effort 011 the vart of the students During tlH Hlst pal tIllt Falllwnlunker (aspirant officer) partilq)ates a~ a simple ~oldier he is nominated six months latLr If lIE prOlH to hae the nccessary qualities for adshyaneLmelll and lerImnntp4 the eyrIe of imlhuction ag a nonshy(ommi-~ione1 oiHcer B Ulb time he should already have demon~trated his qualities of leadership Next the future officer is ordered to th( war ~chool where he receives theoretshyical instruction A first examination must be paRsed before
47
C amp GSS Quarter
his nomination of Fahnrirh (aspirant) The final examinashytion decides whether he will become Oberfahnrich (first aspirant) The latter still goe two months to the school of arms vhere he acquire-gt ptciaI knowiedg( for the em- ployment of th( diverse armlt Aftf1 r1 new staRe of two m~nth-l of pract iral -gtrrvice th( selection of ameen takes pfc1ce In advancement to the urade of lieutenant the charshyact(l whkh a Ilail(l -hould have plays it dd()rminin~ rolr as compared to rlult~ obtaiJwd in prH ileal and theoretical ltervice
In 1937 the new army shows that it wiII follow i~ pIicity in the traces of its predecessor The traditions oft ancient RoldielR transmit them~elves to the present -~
neW units arC in intima1c relations with the aSRociations~~ former comhatants MpaSlllCS have been taken to aid Sl)l~1 diers ill civil empioymen1 after their service Particuhgtt-J attention i- -dV(l1 10 l1oIHommjs~ioncd officers of long s4 ~ vic to aid them in their future in civil life fmiddot
49
I
i bisto ~ighl build
[ book viIII
I~ho 1he f Becor[
few I~fthl
jng 0
the s pline with
troft work
middotmiddotn important arlantagc of the Ilie~cl engine is that Acad it i~ ~t affected hy wcath(r lOlHlitinns since it has no delishy Eri
guid
more the Diesel engine docs 110t hayc tn he shielded rate electrical apparalu~ to hecome out of order Furthershy
to P to permit the efficient U-e of radio (ommunication It is a fougl
prohIem to -hi(lrI t h( gaoline eng-ine when used in military Iandn~hi(I(~ to permit the operation of the now vital military radio communication sy-tem nUl to the greatly incr(as(()
Ie1110hility of mcehanizlC1 armies t he importance of radio C0111shymunication fne from all interflrence cannot he undershy modi l-timated
i PratAt the prccnt time great pr()~res~ with f)il~el cngines saryand trucls is heing made in Germany and FratHc-Germany contha ving- over HOllO Ililmiddot rl t ruclls and Francc ovcr 7000 Great j powBritain has over 100 To the United States belongs the Jlmpccredit for the first commercial ])iesel engille to he put into ~~obregular senicc Thi- eng-inc wa~ a (iO-hnrs(IH)V(r 2-cylinshy
=~hoder unit huilt at st Louis in lHIH fi -U(ftgtr ( Sunu rs Armu Ordnance
l~ lnan
en ate]
48
Book Reviews By LIEUTENANT J W RUDOLPH Infantrll
THE NAVY A HISTOHY
By FJETCIlCR PRATT
49amp pages bullbull Garden City NY Doubleday Doran amp Company
The stirring traditions of the American Navy its colorful history and the men who built it are vividly portrayed in this highly personalized account of the United States Navy The builders of American seapower are the supports upon which the book is built and they constitute a stirring roll call The work Iltil1 rank among the most popular histories of the Navy
Periods of naval history are reviewed in terms of the men who dominated them Assisting at the Revolutionary birth of the neet were Jones and Biddle with Barney and Barry in
secondary roles- these men created a tlaVY which bequeathed few victories but a wealth of courageous tradition The days
of the Barbary pirates and the War of 1812 witnessed the flowershying of a small but efficient fleet - a generation dominated by the stern and unflinching Preble whose uncompromising discishypline trained the outstanding ballie captains of the second war with England
Perry the sailor who opened Japan and the civilian Banshycroft stand out in the pre-Rebellion period Bancrofts greatest work as Secretary of the Navy being the creation of the Naval Academy The courage of Farragut the technical genius of Ericsson and the ordnance skill of Dahlgren were the naval guide posts of the Civil War Dahlgren built the great guns to put into Ericssons revolutionary ironclads while Farragut fought the battles
The great theoretician Ivlahan in the years between 1865 and 1898 propounded the strategy fulfilled victoriously by Dewey and Sampson at Manila and Santiago The World War Was a triumph for the teamwork training and ingenuity of oW
modern navy As a colorful swiftly moving story of our naval past Mr
Pratts history is one of the best although marred by unnecesshyi my minor errors of detail which rob it of much value It Ii contains little of naval policy administration and thought however and therefore fails to answer many pertinent and ~mportant questions In general the author has done a good -job presenting a brilliant panorama pf blue water and the men
rho have sailed our fighting ships I
THE LOST BATI]ALION
By THmfAS M bullbullJOHNSON ANDIFLETcmm PnATT
338 pages New York Dohbs-Merrill Company I
On 2 October 1918 790 men tif the 77th Division comshynanded by a New York lawyer Major Charles W Whittlesey vent over the top and into the Argonne Forest FIve days I ater 194 stumbled out In those five days the Lost Battalion
I
forged an immortal legend of eourage horror and sacrifice Twenty years after comes the complete story of that heroic incident of war
Five days in the battered tangle of the Argonne left indelible scars in the brains of the few who survived -~ scars that drove Whittlesey to suicidal death and sealed the lips of the men who came out Rarely is a survivor found who will even mention that he experienced the nightmare
Horror - not so much the horror of shattered minds and bodies but the frustration of helplessness -- stalks the pages of this book Men expect to be killed in battle but not by their own artillery When they die because the food and medicines intended to save them fall into the hands of their enemies before their very eyes death becomes truly tragic All these things happened to the Lost Battalion
Many myths which passing years have thrown up around the battalion are exploded by this book In the first place the battalion was never lost It was exactly where it was supposed to be and everybodY including GHQ knew it The charge of violating orders that supposedly hounded Whittlesey to his death is shown to be unfounded The gallant major obeyed instructions to the letter It was not his fault that having capshytured his objective with a body of new troops he was cut off and unable to withdraw
The Lost Battalion deserves its specia1 history - a story that is stark and true without robbing the battalion of an iota of glory The authors have recreated notably a vivid picture of five heroic days with a graphic account that is both simple and authentic
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAH
By CHARLES R FISH
Edited by William E Smith
531 pages bullbull New York Longmans Green amp Company
Critics acclaim this posthumous book of Professor Fish the greatest interpretive work ever written on the Civil War It is a book concerned with causes and results rather than narrashytive consequently the account of military operations is of minor importance to a thorough study of the background and effects of the sectional struggle
On many of the familiar aspects of the war Professor Fish takes sharp issue with traditional beliefs He does not accept the economic explanation of the outbreak of the conflict neither does he regard the war as inevitable The North did not have the edge from the start and did not actually clearly see victory until the fall of 1864 He even goes so far as to suggest that in the light of 1861 the South had the advantage since a successful defensive Will was the only necessity for victory III these views Mr Fish concurs with Major Sheppard (See review following)
Not Gettysburg Vicksburg nor even Atlanta were the decisive ~att1es of the struggle The real decision was reached
49
-
BIilk Ile-Liews
oehind lhp ~()rth(rn [rem in ovlrnlHJ ]-Gl Tilat (llci~ivp evellL was the nmiddot(lCtion of Linloln lhlllilfll a rf~ssured Fedshyeral gOVClnmlmiddotnt qpiitmiddotd t lk Iln-Utgt 1hat [Htdp lH outcome
inevitahle PrJl(Jn~(d n--ttllh tIl IIJrr(Jl[lldnl lld dlIPI])Il1) 1l11pllishy
gWHe and hrillia1lt iilfllfI gtl yit rnlki tIllgt anI~ of the 11
Ifetw(gtpn the ~taf(~ a Iil1111 nWll10rial tn Ihe author lroflor Smil h who (Il ihutuj 10 1 middotl1elll lhq)1 r on Wolf lintIltIshyand 10111 JrJjJlIlltW~li(jll hj- --1 prj l ylIulhll or] lhill llhout Illgt I dllllf- Hllld lll( htI IH 111 flllhh-Hmiddotd
It 11lIY III 1 J1IJI [I) (Ul(lltll(lal~rI LIW lhtl AllHrlCanshy
ought to qli1t r1tin al)[tlll 11H (vIl YII and klp it 101))1
Engli h (( rlJnh (lUI n 1 fll ml of Ill 11P lOIWPl nin Ill( Hfh(IJtgtl1 man of tIl 111111 Ollllnd1l1~ piI- hl 1lHl1e from
tIll jllll of lldbJ -f)ldltr- ll1111 1 ~l11jlptd ha addtd tlot hpj I(l - ~ tIl 1laquo Jj d of hi hrollll1 ~-lll-llnb it h a h(lnk jll(l I Illl] 11 ]11( tIll Iii)]] Ilf pcr l)llctl
OH Ian fil--iI ndll 111 jWrhqh--o lWlr thr -((11[ and tll1W
of til (lil 11 tILlI Ihl- Tli~ tIl( ()()d fnr tIl( tnC~ ~ot
-0 ~laJflr ~h( llldld 1111 ~II (ll halk 111 ltIll al111opllll(gt of unplliudlttd 1IlJ JJtltlH and ~l1(kh hi fat ono o11light dmvn tIHmiddlt [11 11 bliff plLPlw hl~ (ompn pd mo( truth hnUl IIUI (1 il lr than nlll 011 historjll1- h1( llCCtl I1hlC
1) injl1I mIll l1t11 bulky (lilligt
To 1J1ll ~hqITIJld 1])( I ntical pPlll)(l of lllll (in -ar 1 lilt (j ytmiddotll ~trplh of 1~)1-j)-gt nt unlil tlwil did tIll [-1111)11 plll illlo fgtltLUlon a ~rltlt~i( pbnalcubted to Il the 1 Ill plan t~ t ]1 t 1 Ill ( Ilnd Em (middotIOplllllll Iarried on 0 ( rll1 arCl (jf 1hflI~all(h fJf -lillll Inlh of -OllW of till 111o-t dl~Illl and dJ(]-I ItIlill nil (11111 hJp (llnt IwId LC( in 1iI( (-11 ~llllllLlll Lltll 1ill )H1 or thi (onfldll wyand t 11ln )llJWJWtl Ihl 11111111 I 1 111 (I) IiJill h hrilHin~ tlw horror Ir ar lllto 1111 lW1l1 of rhl -Illth III (llll~ Ihl- way wa-- it ii) Ihll 10 ill 11]( ( tl 11 lll 1 IIH lil--t truly nashy
tl()lld Jllljwj wh t11l tll11ll lI 01J] ((- 1110)11 -Itlllgth and
fJpuLt11f)J10f tll -1111 1111 l()llIld into tIll tJuEmiddot~~l( I)eftab of arrntp WI 11(11 11l0Utr]l t hf matlllaJ of war and t hI will tn
fiht had to Ill dCiJOImiddotd Ill hlok (()llilllh ~~(fllfl1t -llllltlJlI iIgt of 1111 lIlU(lgt of
tlw htlIi)llflll ll11dllll ~h~nlll not -uImiddoth a 01 llllrn -upv]1ority alt 1 Lad IHfn t auhl 1() 1Hlil~middot D(u---ioJ1- of campaig-ns tlld 1111 ([v a1( TIlIltllmiddotr]lilmiddot( f flf ICltIi-I 1I1~at Jla]~fd (tlit Y
Till IS FIVE IIO(fBS OF (STlr
At ~~ q]ock in thl afternoon of 11 larch l~I~X Etlr(m~
LfllnlHlff fdilof of Ihl 1111 11 (I(IfIlh WIS mlitillJ a 11-1shyminllu ~ttI(llWnl from 1hI Au rian gOlrnnllnt loJl(erning the Iwdllld pllhi1 ill 11 --10 1gt11 it (han(cllol KUIt von S(hwdl11i~~~ ollIHI(d j he dfat h knell of indellcndent Austria
c amp GSS Quart Vol
lIerr Lemlholf fled toward the Hungarian frontier Through the last five hours of Austria he had his finger on the pul~( events which were happening too fast even fol his t rained senE(p~ Ilb -tnry of those last hour-- while ha-tily writ ten is a -plen~t1 joh of rtI)(Hmiddottorial writing i-c~
Loyally Austrian and vio]pntly ~nti-Nali Lennhoff coJ-t not hl allyl hlllg hut partial lIe minec no words in hIS opinlt~tt3inc of t Iw IIit Ie) ~~ov(rnment yet he hold- hi own gOV(lIlrn~~~onJ largely p(JIihle for the d~harlc Had tile AListrian gov~Auni IlIPIit rnd it- prohlplll -quarely had it nol fumbled it opprJmiddotmiddotttua tunitie-- the (Iever and inevitahle Nazi llenetration wouldrl ~pap( have heen possible ~ On il
SIhuchniggs incapacity to meet the -itualion is the dOl ~o tI ~utlnant theme of lIerr LonnholTs book Tile bookish and patriK iIhelhalleeHor (ould not match Nazi ruthkmiddotsnc-- and miIitUlyprg
aralion with reason and love of country He trusted the Veuro Jtho khemPil who hetrayed him and was unahle Lo take the dcfJr
~tand that might have saved Aulria Yfars hefolr Ieee loo
L(nnlwlr tells tile tory of the death throc with alit drama of an inspired playwrighl an aUlhor who4c memorr I
pfouart too fre-h however to permit a (on~idlrerl dis(u~-ion T~ Iow hook d()(s have the value of trlling the -tor~ of Austria falll ll1i tIll fir~L iflll II is vivid authOritative iml)Ie and bitler t inc
r two W]S
badJAPAN IN CIIII
By T A BIssO real 17 l)ai~(lt -cv York Thf ~LltlTHlltn (urnpUlY Qf (
pro selfmiddot
T A Hion Far Eastern expert of the Foreign Pol onl) isoriatioll has ~ritt(ln the most penetrating and auther~ Chi l(onnt thaI has appeared to datc on the haCkground and ed ~tru
pha-cs of the war in China As a rc-umc of eyent and polirgt pHIlt
of the pn-t five year the book is a valuahle Contribution tot to]~ alal~tti(al study of the conflict Ir IEs-on has gather~1 O(f( wealth of facts and weldell tlwll1 mtn a sllic~ of eOl1yinc tonclusions 1hE
Japans drift toward Fasebm and China- 1loliLieal umb- 11hh lIOn idf l3is4on (on-iders the two most 111011wntolls phJS6 ~ket lontemporalY Far Ea~tern history Tins Chl11E5e nation]b ordi whi(h IH~llgtpd draw down upon (hina the wrath of Jap~lll foc 11(gt it~ root in lill ~tudcnt mOYlment gainrd monwntum with ~llrrender of the South China militarists to Chiang Kli~Sk and culminated at Sian in Ihe lnited Frollt
The author i~ obiously more at home in tiw study~ JapanesE affairs than upon the China ((11( His accounti-1 1l11tlllal JaplIH--p politicc i4 xlplllIlt and is till hl--is for)1 eOTlciusiol1 as to war guilt In his (onsidered opinion qJ Japanese militarists alone are n~ponsihl( Discredited in tti~ 1t tefllJlIl- to fa~tn Fls(ism 1I1HIll tlH people llw military e1iql~flI Jllunged Japan into a foreign War ill a dCppratp hid t ()-t Ilngthr~ llt t twir -Iipping l)()wel r~ 0
The a~t ual lory of t I~( ~yar iR of vital ill~pOllanCe ~~_ ~~l frolll a ltidulcd slttdy of the lI1eldent at Lukowchlao Tlr BIsy makes no prediet ions but gives the impression that he hold5~~
err ultilllal(~ vi(tory highly probable The calamilY of Japan~middot vietory is powerfully analysed in a chapte on the subj of Manehllria a damning verdict against NipPollesf impc ism
50
--~ Vol XVIII No 70 Book Reviews
Cn~A F~G2T Fun ia~n LIFE 11 Ii It 11 llJ TmON HGIIT
1 York hlttklt( JIOUSl McGnm-Hill
One of the firt booh pLlhi~hed 5JJ1Ce the outbreak of the Smo-Japanese War ueigned and wrilten in the light of that conflict is the work of two Far l1ltlern corrCspondcnb of the iGnited Pre~~ Frankly nolll1tClldeu to be a scholarly historical ~tudv the book is un (tremely 1l3dlhle piece written as n(gtwsshylpapermeJl would he expelted to Tite the ~t()ry of what IS going on in China The tory of the war helf i of minor importance to the jllcture of China- -trugg]e fol national unity which the author~ hae picked up b(g1nin~ with the Reolution of lBll 1hc greater part of the honh i devoted 0 the background of the pre-(gtJ1t ~itllal inn a bwlroulld through whilh Chiang Kaishybhek move a an e el-II1(Tet-II1g fh~Ull The attempt to explain rccent Chinlc hitory In tCrlll of DIll man is 110((1 a little too simple anJ a-- at hanilj ItTer pOlll ~ (Hll mi lcading
At least twice in his n~e to powCr Chiang Kai-shck ran afoul of Japanese intenbts Both timC~ he was forced to back down vith rCsultant 10s of f~ce hoI h at home and abroad lmtyin China Leing I he lat thing Japan desired a conflict was ineitabie sooner or lateI Eel1 Aia b not large enough for 10 strong llllpill- (hL1Jlg i)(lld to ~upCrior force but he only hiding his time until he wa strong enough to strike kiCk In a fe more I car he would hac been ready
TIl( Sian (Oup of De(tTllher In~(i shnc](d Japan into a
rClhlatioll thal time wa~ )et tin) shorl The uneApected display oi ChlllCsC solidarity indicated that Chinese national unity had prore~lteJ farther than the odd had Iealized while it was self-eident tb1t tlw KU()llintan-Communist settlement could onty hae an anti-Japanc-e foundat ion RCtHzinp that a strong China nlPant the end of her dream of Asiatic hegemony Japan ~tru(h while thcre wa yet lune TIl(gt war that folloed is as much a Japanec fight for life a5 It b Chinese A Japanese vicshytor means lcfluCtion of (hina 10 )ipponcsc 1assalage while def ill topple Japan frolll her -tatuf af a vmrld power
Both (l ent and pcr-onalltic- haC been vividly portrayed The lUthol- have a )idcd the pit [alb of rnYliad unpronounceshytble (hin~l nallllS I)) a -(rH ()f pi hy and killfuleharacter ~Jetcht~ 1 he result i iu~t hat the doctor ordered fol the ordmal) rcuhI who J molO than ctually inter(-ted in what l~ (gte 111 tlW he~dIll
CIlI-A FIGHTS ILCK
YCdr hef()re ~h(gt evpr -aw the (bine~e Reo Armies Agnes f)medley WltI nthu~iasti(allY r((ording lheir cXIlioils IIer very Fnthu~iasm long denied her the l)lIvilege of visiting the Chinese OVieb fly aLlraLling the attention and clo-e observation of the hince Central Government In 1136 however she entered
~he Communi-l di~tricts in the -orthwest where she has l emil-inerl moltt of the time ~in((gt At the oUlhreak of the Jlre~ent Sino-Japanese conflicti Ii~s Smedley in r~ite of an jniur~d ~pine ac(ompanicd lho
1 ~Ighth Route Army mto Sham1 Provlnce where she shared thef ardshipamp and adventurcamp of the ort guerrilla campaign against f
the Japanese Constantly on the move suffering from exhausshytion and her injury she wrote when and where she could posting her dispatches piece by piece Thus her RtOJy grew as it is here published with little more than neee-sary ~tructural editing
(ilina Piohls lIark is a vivid first-hand arrountof the early days of the North China War to the bepinninp of 1938 Of little military value the real worth of the book hes in its raphic picture of the relations between the peasants and the Eighth Route Army On thal relationship hingc much of the future development of the Chine~e nation
Miss Smedley is a personal friend of Chu Teh Mao Tseshytung Chou ~n-lai und all the other famous leaders of Chinese Communism Her book contains many true life portraits of these men But Miss Smedley unconsciouoly jJaints someone else as the mo~t interesting personality in the book herself Bitter atheistic and belligerent she is leaving her mark on the history of China the new China which she does not expect to live long enough to sec One may disabrree with her social anLl political philoltophy but never with her ~incerity A most unu~ual book
AND SO TO WAil By IIUBEltT HEIUtINl
17~ Imgp1- Npw JIavIL Yie (lrnvlTSlty Pr(gtllt
Professor Raymond J Sontag of Princeton reviewing this book for the Ialurduu Rcnt(U ()f 1Ierafure wrote that Dr Tanshysilltj book took ten year~ to write 1lr Herrings apparently as many days yet both reached the bame conclusion From 1914 to 1017 the rulers of America betrayed the interests and lhe wishes of the AmeJic3n people
Vheleas DI Tansill (on fines him~elr to the background of our entrance into the Great Yar IVlr Herring uses the Vorld Var merely as a stepping stone to present conditions His thesis obviously and frankly partIsan holds collectie security to he a dangerous futility and strict neutrality the only way to kecp out of quarrels which we can neither understand nor solve He fears that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull are about to repeat the mistake of Wilson and Lansing Neutrality as dislingubhed from isolation is more likely
to help the country and the world than participation in future wars Mr Herring wishes the lnited States to keep out of European and Asiatic wars in which essential interests are not involved and to steer clear of a11iances cooked up by nations intent upon prEselving the status quo against Hhave not counshytries
Since 191) the nation has resisted constantly increasing pressure to join ageneies whose ideals have been distorted into attempts to enforce the Versailles Treaty In spile of repeated refusals to become involved in foreign entaIlgiements the counshytry is still confronted with persistent pressure This hook is the CQfe for the other side briefly but convincingly presented Vhethel the reader agree with the luthol 01 not he will find these pages provocatlsc I
AMERICA GOES O WAR
By CHAm cs (AI LAN TANsl(1
no page Bololl Litlle 13rown amp Company
After ten years of exhaustive resbareh during which he had access to sources hardly touched br previous historians Dr
51
Tan~ill hae produred what h generally aedaimecl aR thc outshyblanding -1 udy of the hwkground of Amenca entry into the Vorld Var III~ ma(rid indude- the Bryan manuscripts the paper~ pf ilon [out ()lonf1 flowe Iaming and Knox as wpJl as tIl(gt Admiralty ar[hin- of ((middotrmany and the files of tilgtjl (ornmiUl( whih 1m v tiJatpci war p)litltrin~~
Dr Tanill di agITl ith t he popularly held opinion of Bryan 1lIlIl fOUl tnd olllPl -1 all n1l1l of I he war J)lrifJd Ill oft1l rid]( ukd liliam Jenning-- Bryan wilt) ni~lHd hj- portfolio - -I[rllary of Stalt 111 protl1 aglin t AlllPlict-shy(our h hl- 1111 HI [111 Ihl1 hld 11 011 taklll Bryan tlhi( flu I nitfmiddotd Stati ~otllcl hm( 1H11l parrd tl1( -tcrificp I)f 1II 7- 1 (1111 I I IJ llil 11 kti 11- of II( PII(I tr HOIl--f and Jtn-ilW 111) Imiddot d Ill flt~ld(nl mIn war
Hnli-( I~ trtwuarv Jllfifd wilile LanltlI1g j tarnl h a jdorillld 1 t )rl~I )1 1 twr higt JHhlt ( III alJt)( hb (middotoll-(lerWl
Yili 1)1 TIHll 11[ 1Jll-i fill ()l1w of Ian ll)middot l(tion h ~f[gt- n() ~()Ild in YiJr)l IlnllW arhlII 01 dll the foni~n dlplomat-- ill a_~hlll~iJll fall any tOf) l1l (ount BernltlnrJf appfal 111 tilt 1l1f faY(Jraht light of all
(haptel- lin nHrilan track ith tht Allic-- (oTl1pletl with ml- rmiddot~ of tlli-J( )ll a (()lllprthlllltingt yipw of thp ponomie pit tun lI1I1(II1h tlu auth()r tI(ltgt not CO]lt11r ith thl llfort-shyof 111f ~lt~f COllllllittll 11) ]llmt that Big Hu-lTlC-- drol tlIP nat 1011 IntIJ 11 11) protI It l1l0JJntlu ltl(--tll1ent- It IS
o---ildl Iw ldmu I hal 11011 npondcrl 111 part t 0 prp~-urcgt Lut Ilw]p 1- Ill Hjt Ilt of 11 Tlw jI)-pa)C Iork whilp it dops lll dll)(l~t IIf 111111- QU1 ~Wll i all indipPIlltahll guid( 10 till --Iudy of (lllr (nl]alWI inlf) war wh11h will hplnnw --tancialu
piI)P fill 111tllY -(Ir 1)1 jl11L It (llll 11] (If or tlf AIlHlIlln fItstory and Dran
rtf illt (~rddlilt ~(horl Ilf Jlllri(an (111 (I-ity a hington r )C hl I)(ll 1 1 (((lInif(rl authorit- on Ameri(an diplomatic i l~jOI for mII1 (lb For ttll ~lar- lw Va arivi-or tn tIll (li1rllltn of t IH -lllat( F()ri~n Itratiol1s Cmn111ittee for whom irmiddot Jlll Iht IfjIlrt 011 o11d ar npoJl---ihility fie la letshy~llf d III hi fivld 11 John Ifnplilh and ill ~eCral GCrman unishy 11-1111
(Tlo T ()liIL
1 I ~ - (I ~ York FUflf amp Hilllhlft InC
H(-np II(-n lir t nmC1 -in([gt hi monumental Anthonll 1flf( h In -rikinl~ (ontra1 to hie (arlir and Jnore ICnglhy vor hain~ lt)((r till -tlJll ba-icmiddot atlrilmle of eardul hbshylcJri( al nialth In I(ari of Ihe broad eer shifting arena of 1111(1 hiIl)I of I I) (in1 aris (onclntratldin both timl and pLI -llh (olJ)paratlf 1OIl()rny of chara(terizalioll all
f 1lIlltllrly happilY (tlldinld onl to quantity YOlllhful (ojOl1t] FlanLIIII (omrnandpr of a [ilion ctdry
rnlrnfn ()n ouJJ()-t duly ~~lIardlllg the pa--(- tiJ)(JUgh thtmiddot irshyjllllt Ulfllllltino tltill hi nlfllnt in ih heauliful and ]lPHpfIlJ
-t 11 illll InflllwJIlr pnwl t illal ing 0(1 all ulIpltttnt duty_ In a nrlrJI ltiddlll dlrmiddotv 1 10(ly -oul IIPI n I~(nt hwoman tp hratv Wit h Iwr flaughttJ vait ing for word fro III her husband a maj(~r In the (onfcrlr-ratp Irvi((
Franklin in 10(1 With IHl cannol hring himltClf to tile 1a-1 Ifon 11IlO Ihal of trmiddotliin) 1111 t hat her hushand is dead II is t hI frll~1 rt1 iOIl I hat paCP- the romm(e of the story against a
52
C amp GSS Quart Vo-background of impending conflict and the futility of war Me Rt while the young otTIcer does his best to lighten the burden the refugees f 1
Inlo the peaceful imlation war flnaly comes in the ear~ ~ win1ltT of IHGj when a Conferlelate force tries to break throu ~j 111(1 pas~(s In a vividly recreated battle sequence Frankllnl~ rpginwllt is wre(ked in a rather u-elcfs engajZement which enl 1 with a (onfcclcmtfgt c1efeat at loes hardly worth the pri~ -land ThlreaftCf the war move on leaving a badly wounded offiri 1stul IO(ked with hi reful~ee ill the owhound valley Through jPre long white winLer the tangled ~kein is straightened -iintE
The 1I0cl carefully and colorfully written is good readiu of t but not as profound a it i-- daimed to he An interesting faew In its 11)efJalttion is 1 be hi--Iori(al research hehind it Accordi~ ~und to Mr Allen mot of the Laic is true the story having bee Ctan pi((pd together at fir-t hand often from the lip~ of those wk poli participated in the events turt
Irol pos
TilE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON phe thrf
By MAH(l 111 sod
Ii pawgt with Ilnlf mdfx 8 hlb1o~raphy New York Bohh~Mcrr had life terr
The plf(t inn of Marquis Janll xcellent life of Old Hid des ory as the Pulilzer Prize winning biography for 1938 wasr -urprbe to those who havC read the- two volumes issued fo of t yean) apart The preent edilion combining both volumest par
one should he an imperative item in everV lihrary -1r Jam~( ha has amply earned his laurels with a truly ~onumental work - will life hitory that lanrls head and shoulders above the eonsid rna able ilia of exeellent writing that has already appeared abo pro
Andrew Jack--on
In The lionler ioploill published in 1933 11 James cam the story of jackson from the early pioneer days before t Rfvolution through his rise to prominencc in Tennessee to t laurels of New Orleans and the Florida controversy JackltI who has been too prominently portrayed as an uncouth front democrat Was here shown as he really was - a striking a impubive peronality but for all his nrc a gentleman and conserva1jve who knew the niceties of society and who stl)
~u(for order and moderation in goern1l1ellt to
Thelcccntly isltmiddotmcd sClond volume Portrait of a Presider -M(l has nol let thc earlier work down 711 James has not OIL ~iail uotained but has hci[htencltl the piteh as capturing the rn~ bar of Jacksons retirement from public life in 1821 he revie ~ t (alPpr in the llationallJolitical arena desrrihing and ana 00
til ad ions allli the forees with whieh Andrew Jackson e j an era in American history t~rJ
](Pll1arkable a a life story thp wOIk is equally strikingl~~hE a 1Jic(c of hi~tory Not content wit h revealing a mnn tlJiit lC
hi()glaphy l(~rral(lS an r)(wh coloringann emjrhingthat perioc ~j ~i l
With II t11( ltIftacl Ihal hils out t11( hare bones Winch perl13~U1 h not -U)prising sin(( AndrCw Jackson and his era are inSeuro) TU1 arable i rc
A magnifiepnt and pain--taldnp study of a greal man J
Ti Lfe 01 Andrew Jackson sets a new mark of biographical lence The publishers have recognizer its worth with an a tively constructed volume
IVOliVIiNO70
~f~OOSVELT ~ SllDY IN FORTUNE AND IOW~R By E~f1L LUDWIG
[Translated from the German by MauricE Samucll
350 pages New York The Viking Prp-~
Emil Ludwig renowned biographer of Napoleon Bismarck ) and Goethe has applied his psychological technique to the
study of a world figure at the height of his actIvity His life of President Roosevelt studded with typical Ludwi( hrilliance is interesting reading but will never rank as a definite life history of the present American Executive
In the first place Ludwig is cheerfully and frankly nowed under by the celebrated Rooevelt charm Vhat is more imporshytant he has a profound ignorance of American history and politics without vhl(h no wril cr can produce an adequate picshyture of our public life At the same time the author freedom from the prejudices of our lIfe and environment is in a lmiqup position to make some candid and revealing- comparisons
Arranged in three sections labelled Fortune lTctamorshyphosis and Power the book presents a theme of tramjUon through sutTering Young FrankEn D Rooseuroyclt was a clever ~ocially con~cious aristocrat so favored by fortune that he never had to develop his latent talents Struck down in the prime of life he fought a grim otruggle for health and cmcrjed with the temper and the de~ire to champion tilamp underprivileged He deserted his class to help those who did not have his advantages
Perhaps the be~t pa~-a~c 1I1 the book is Ludwigs de~(ription of the atmophere of the Executive oflices There is also a comshy-parison between the first fioYe months of Roosevelt and Hitler that is excellent The sugar-coated hero worAhip of this book inll handicap its popularity while many minor errors of fact~ mar Jts histoncal value Approach lhis biography with the proper suspicion and you may find it interesting if not authentic
TARNISHED WAIUUO)
Bi gt1JoH JACS R JACOHlt
Xcv York T)Hmiddot Mlltmll1an Company
Several years ago Gamaliel Bradford gaIned considerable succe~ltlnd c- ahli-hcd a hIOgraphical prccedent with hIS crusade fa cleanse some of the stain from historys accepted villall1- )Iajor Jacobs follows the trail hlazed by Danoyer Souls bul fails to achieve equal result~ in this hiography of ilajor General
~ames Wilkinson The fault however lies neither WIth thei ~uthor nor his effort Vhitewashing James Vilkinson 1- iiimply ~oo big a job
~ James Vilkinson commanding general of the United States r frmy and virtual ruler of the Mississippi frontier was one of )the 1featesl (harlatanl in American hblory For thirty ycar~
1C utilized his high posts in the interests of Spain whose highly f3id ~llyhe was Not ahove selling out either side whenever it fUited hIS pocketbook he covered his trackh so well thal a undred years paRSed before the full measure of his villainy was revealed
From the beginning of hi military and political career durshyl1~g the Hevolution he disIJayed the Tlpr~li~r talpnts whieh ~t0ught h~m to the top Charmmg and indispensable when ~ ork was lIght he always managed to he conveniently elsewhere
t Book Reviews
when d~nger thre~ten~d His sponsJrs and friends exe~PlifY the familiar axiom of birds of a feafher - Benediet Arnold Charles Gates St Clair sponsors whom he promptly betrayed when it behooved him I
Wilkin~on participated in every m ajOl conspiracy of early lAmellcan hIstory from the Conway Cabal to the Burr Conshy
spiracy In each one he escaped puni~hmenl by betrayal at the propel time It took the War of 1812 to show his true ability or Jack of it yet even then he talked his way out of his just deserts
lvJajor Jacobs has written a careful but unconvincing story nf Vilkinson Unable in Lhe interests of truth to justify his suhject he was apparently reluctant to throw him to the wolves The reultant middle-of-the-road study leaves Wilkinson a colorless as well as an unprepossessirtg rogue Iiajor Jacobs self-appointe(l lask was just too heavy The tarmsh on Wilkinshy~()nR name i too deep and too tough to be removed
JA~IES MAlliSON BIfILIJEJ
By ABBOTT E SUTH
Nfw York Wilson-Eriellton
In a new estimate of a memorable career to quote Its subtitle a highly significant impression is here created of the fourth President of the Pnited Slates James ~Tadison has sufshyfered from the one phase of his life for which Ihe was not fitted but his faults as a war lime Prebident arc herein belittled in the lIght of earlier and more enduring work As a master builder of the Constitution l1adhmn emerges ~tS a striking and colorful figure
Two men are largely responsible for the ratification of the Constitution James Madison and Alexander Hamilton teamed to build the compromise framework of our fundamental Jaw performed yeoman work in the ratification struggle through the pages of the classic Federalist then parted company on the interpretation of the new law An important phase of this book lS a clear analysis of that collaboration and split
Hamiltons attempt to make the Constitution do what he wanted was based upon a policy designed to oerthrow the power of the agricultural South lIadison was a southerner shya Virg-inia planter and landed proprietor and a representative of the threatened class He saw the issue and broke with Hamilshyton to join forces with Jefferson for states rights and ~grarianism
Ultimately he failed but his earlier work endured A scholal a man of infegl1ity and a statesman Madison WlS small only in physical stature The biograI1her has done a service to American hi~tory by retouching the picture of the fleeing Presishydent of 1814 to its true color as a character of real significance and life
GEOIWE MASO CONSTITUTIONALIST
By IImmiddot]N lIlI
100 pag(gts bull Cambridgp IIarvlrd University Press
Of ~t11 that -elellld group who wrangled their way through the tilling Philadelphia summer of 1787 to end up with the document known as lhe Constitution of the United States George Mason has been the most neglected In a century and
I
53
~
iook Revieus c amp GSS Quart~
a half only two hioJrraphirs of 1 ho ir~inian have beCll written of which thi- j- tlle --colld The iir-t lpppared fifty years ago
Ceorgl )IaltOIj wa all tlllu-ual man with a curious mixture of abilitiC- and limitation Onr of tIllt fio(-t mind~ of his gen~ eration )Ta--(Hl It a P()fllPOllf lIIlu-( who fiplejpd politirs and Jmb1i( lifl ~Tft ill IhI cOlllln of hh parohlal work he 1gt
capable of thinkin on a natIOnal -eall Ill( hurly-burly of Itlilaingt fJtll)(i [nad hun ill ~middot(t no (Jun(1 or (ornmitt(l h~Hl a ]HlH I l1ll1d
lI-()Il ]Hditi(middottl llllity WIgt ((lIdifltd to th in~illia
(()TlfntHJl (If 171~ and t 1)( lhllad(middotlphia (Oll PillIon of 1hj
yr 111- 0)1 III lrp Jflllhlic CUTlld LlImiddot IIp wa Olll of the fir to achIJlilr a (CJlltlllClltal (om~f( dthllUh he IIfucif
If) -it III If nrl II( rrJ( till illlllla 1111 of Highb which hflpfd infllllnl(Il(Jt Illll IJIlI Iklhrllilll1 (If Tlldf]lcllIlllllf hut ll1l rcoltll])lll tlflllht fJf iU1llpl The irginia Stal( (011shy
middottJutiOIl a rr1f~j1 of II Llld Wl Ill 1(Jrk a were th( fir-t ten anHllfirlllll I) ILl Fjd(rl (OIl-I1)l
rAftfr 1lllplflL flaml Ill (OIl tltuI1()11 ra~f)n oppo-nj il~
rat liital iO[l ld1tl- lIJ)(lll 1iIHll1l1-o that alpr (PCrlP1W( prnnd
rJlht bull a Il-uJl I)f lll~ nilj(Ilj()n~ l1H lil~t amlIHlmenh Wlle
1l1cgt()i))(I)lfll ]111r tll 1ll of ~blr uJtill1atpl~ boft oul hi- Hrl in tlH In 1111
J1~ lilil lIfl of bl)ll I lot tOI) lOll i l(luratC and 1I IOIl--tnwil 11 ~1H prcc1l1- a mall 110( contributions to (Ill lltllnnllI 11middot1 IItrll ln(llIl~
ThE lndll li) IlllII]W I)t(jlratioll of Hlght~ Dp(aration i j ndlplndl1l1 ] 1middot]middot Ilf (()Ilfrdpral ion and the COIllttitution fir -1 1gt a lll~rh plll t in IllCrwan hitory Yet ~uch are the i_rIIlI (If fIII1I 1111t IIJ~l -hlIJl1t1l I)f (OJ1Jw(tilul the only llltll III 1111 Ii ~IrlltI UII IIJPIJ all four fundamental dOluments Ilf 1JlI)Idll ltlIlJldi) hh h((11 WU lligh forgottrn Ir 1IJlrdllllll hlllllp]l (middotlil 111~middot n(ll(-o this influlntial and 1 11 l f()l1)lJ tlr Lt1 hi r from a (pnt ury of unlllPritpd ()h~(llril y
-hrl1lt1l ~ Iji ~ln111Jll~ CI( humhlpound (l1cl]gh 10 ~athJy any -lII~ I III 11)) n IIIl 1 colonial farm Ill earned hi parly li- 1Ilg alt a hnernaL(-r In an atC notoriou~ for its inlellectual lJ((rl y hc (middotdUf all d III 1l1-11f tnd J)(amp ill onlpr a ~ll((c-ful
tormiddotI(f)r -lll I~ Dr iuhlhiwr and lawyer Then he turned 10 Idlhli( dfail-- ITlI] --Iner fl)n~piLu)wly a~ a member of the (fllo[)jd 1ldmiddotlalIJn on 111f hidw- (our or (onnC(ticul and a- IntlItl of Yth (ollmiddotr
1 till onllmt1 of Ill I(olution 1oler Sherman went inl (j I hr (ollt inc1l1 al (onrl c [or Ill dural ion or I he war when Iw-tl ()fl thC (OtllITJltiPP- that drnflerl the Decmiddotlaration of Righh and o[ illdrp(IHl(IW( alld h Art iflls of (on[pderal ion Afl pr
I hi wn )1 rl 1I11l(r Iii (Ol1lH(II(llt ofli(middote- 10 whilh va addd I ill Ill) flf blll I)f W lfanll
1 h(1 Yltr 17x7 found the dour Puritan in the ConstItutional (nnwnfinn whprp hi-o ll1ocl(ralJOIl and (Oillmon -CI1(l -av(d mon~ than (1I11 ]Hatpd -l~ifln IIaving -igned the Constitution -)hfrrnan rOlllh for it latifialOn and then rcpresenctd his I all in th Ilou of l(epregt(ntatics and later in the Senate
II1r Boanlmans generally [ellent life of his iIIustriol ancestor may be forgiven a ecrtalJ1 awe in the presenleuro of th f1i
selfrighteous old statpgtrnan It is a reacbble contribution ~ fil
RevoluflCHlary history 11It11 11~lUtS a dp-op]ing but hither( m Tlpglp(cd figulP 10
tl
tto
LAlaJI ON TIlE lARCH
lhl ~Ii ~v
One of the most amazing pllPnonwna of (ontemporar ~1 Ameri(a h been I he rioe of II C I lL an I the nulting eh~ j~~ 111 the ranli~ of lahor 1uct wilen lahor lppeared to be comir 2 jI I I I I I can1I1to lb OWI1 1e llttllI1SS gfnclai(( J)Y t 1at-p It las co or ~h
the viewjloint of all ohvers he they C I 0 h~mpalhize fui A F of L adherent - or perplccd by1 andCr~ who catch 11 l full sound and fury of batLie folll boil ide
Mr Levin~)ll has kepI hi~ head in till full ~tnngtlJ ofl~ --torrn An open parll-an of tIl( C 1 0 Iw has written admirahly f(lItraiIlPd and (arfflll ~tory of lllllt lahor hi-o Anyone who rarr j n lrad will Ifarn Illlwh frum hi olrrant nr I balul(ed ddene of Ihe I l O t
First prcmh-e of the author IS that tIl( C I O i moJ sinned again~t than ~innin AI any rale it if hanllv the rer ~ lutionaly ogre its cnCllllf- ha( ]laill(ci it The mo~(n1(nth~~hu ~pommred some pntty rougil ~lllIT lmt Anwrican labor L~ht fought more destrwliPI in Ihl past with Ies results 1[
John L Lewis i- adequattgtIy dtfpl1tied against the ell of Communbm and 1~) It) l]pgtidlll ial a~piraljOlrs 1(lw iicvCs in capitalbm balanced h~- a strong labor front he knoT- hr there an leds in hi-o unions but H(- no more rCa~on to smct Co them out than to impo~e political qualincations for union me) to lwrship An(llast Jy J r I ej~ cln(~ not larpound to be PrC~ident i ~h not now anyway lH
Lnhor on flie l110rrll I~ a Rohel lHlll of Callable writing Ar i on( in1eCsted in the 111)01 Il1m(llllnt a fipld army oflkct~e1 arc plone to dis(~al(l wl1 plntit in tlw hoole So 111 Lbu C I 0 IJ~
+tUlTilE IOLlTl(() l~)middotl~ ~I
~( York llarlonrl HHP amp (I)
lJatthew Jo-ephson is nne of t 11( outstanding 8 writers in the Pniled Rlates lorla a fa(1 whhh should ()Vrooktd ill r(aclil1~ thi- nllllllt At thl ~atl1e time I earlful historian and a colorful fo(c-ful aut hoI with a linack 11 ~~ story telling Vbatpll his -olial thcorils and 11( us(s tl
hook Llt a vehicle for hi- philo npliy 01r 10(l1hon has IT i ten one of the brst i((Ollllt-o of our politieal hi~tory flnm~ Civil Val to the Bryan ](middotolt ~I
A few ymr a~ ~1r ]ocplon puhlihed The EM 1 Harol ~a -lory of the ri-l~ of I ~i~ JUSil(SS a~HI it~ masters ali ~ 1865 J hf SllfCC-Ss of thrs( lmlZll) imamwl pIrates was t J 011(gt Hide of a particularly ltonlid period in American histo~ lt-~ The Politicos completes the picture of the American social see and becomes a companion vork to The Robl1er HarOlls Do are excellent reading
Book Review8
The Politicos were the politicians - the professional key _ meo of American politics ho united with the unscrupulous
lt financiers io get a strangle holJ On the wealth and the governshy-ment of the reunited states They were a thoroughly unSltlYory lot and 111Joseph~oll ~pares nothing in painting them so At ~thesame time he has little u~c for the men who fought them for ~to him the reformers were small men who didnt really mean lV hat tlHY did ami -aid
All til( pr(~id(nts from Johnson through Garfield suITer at I middothllt hands Alhur he calls the most effective President since
1
I lLmcoin hut he ha- an unflattering opinion of Cleveland TIll l~tory of the ri~( of the Popuiibt movement occupies a large
portion of t Ill hook and b a notable study of (lass struggle Except for an Incon igttent habit of setting up irrevocable laws middotand then (1 ilicizing his subjects for reacting to those very laws hlS hook i~ an Ifedin addition to a ncglc(tcu period of our hIstory
THE BI( FOUR
By OSrAH LE IS
-cw York Alfred A Knopf
In the decade before the liil War young Theodore D JUd3h made such a nui~ancC of himself talkmg mcessantly about
-~ nmln(ontirltolal railroad that hiraliforrlia aS50elarh thought llIm s1ifhtly balmy lIis pcrsuasiv(1PSS was not lost ron fo~r
~a(ramento shopkeeper however WIth the result that Judah s ~~ lrfltlm became a renlity and the Sacramento quartet became I the most powerful financial and political figures on lh~ Pacific fOJL The slory of the rise of iIark Hopkins Charles Crocker [olis Huntington Lcbnl Stanford and the railroad empire _I l~ey built b the burden of one of the most absorbing books of
tLc ~umme sea~on Judah died hefore hi ision had come true and therefore
h o received any of hi~ deserved credit The four unemotlOnal - but eminently practieal merchants g-oL all of that Not that
~ f~(y didnt dc-erve a lionmiddots share for they did build the railroad brucomint inlreJible ob~tacles to do it The ~tory of that
hUllJing and the ~rreat monopoly into which it grew makes i1elilbtfuI lladillgI Four more different peronalities would be hard Lo find
lrhere vas Crocker j he florid man of action who drove hipgt jvork crew through the mountains and then promptly lost
IJnterest in the completed task Leland Stanford was the lstuffed lthirl of the team the front for the railroad and its
I
tl
I
~tlj01
manipulations as Governor of Cahfoll1ia President of ihe Censhytral Pacific and United States Senator
Quiet frugal Mark Hopkins had little use for wealth and never knew how to spend his money but as Tleasurer of the fenLral Puifk he nurRed it s lender funds into great fortunes for himself and hb a~sociates Brains of the four belonged to old Colh~ IIuntinglon tI~e shr(gtwd and cynical manipulator with no morc sOlll Ihan it shaNe
1r LCwis gild no lilies for hi~ ~ubject~ They were often di~hontsl and hl plainly saY1 ~O hUl he gives Lhe imprCssion of a blwahing- admira1 ion for the ofd fellows especially Huntington He ha~ w]ititn an interesting and colorful boole
READING COURSE FOR OFFICtRS
War Department Bulletin 1928
Lbt of S(kclpd lOoltlt relating to hictorieal llohtical (conomIC and mlhLlry gtubjetllt published for t11(gt informltion of tl-je ervice
This h1t lB divujpd into l(ction corrrlponding to thpoundgt several periods of an ompr lrVIIl RtmaillHl -P( liongt will appfar in future editions of the Quart(gtrly (For FlrlllNltHl e( tw Tune 1938 Quarterly page lt2_1
SECOND PERIOD (AVERAGE FIVE YEARSI
(f~T(rtVAI HETWETN COJANY mnnms oenSE ND ADVANCED laquo(jRSE)
~poIlWN4 MAIS OJ WAlt WrIJ NOTES IIY GENBHAL BUR~OJ) 1 vol ((i(gtorgfdAguilar)
BATTLE STUOJeS AN( IeT AND MOlImN BATTLE 1 vol (Charles T TJ Ardant du Pieq TranslatlOll by Col John M Greely and Mal RC Cotton)
llLtl(AN GOEtNMENT AND POIITICS 1 yol ((hark A Belrd PltTY HATTImiddotS OF Tim 1AnmoN ERA I vol (Claude G Bowcrsi A HISTORY OP TlIJ~ GR~AT WAIt 4 vols (John Buchan) HISTOltJ OF THE UNITED STATES 5 vols (Edward Channing) ALEXANDElt ~ vols (Theodorf A Dodg(j CSR 1 vol (Theodore A Dodge I GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 1 vol (TllPodore A Dodge) HNNIHAJ Z vol (Twodor(gt A Dod~() TilE CRITICAL Pmnou Or AMEHlCAN Hl~TOtY 1783-179 1 vol (John
Fiske)A (YILE or ADI LFTf1~t 18Gl-1 SO) l yolo (Worthington C Ford) )lOL80N TlIl FIRST 2 vol (August FOllrnipr Tramlated by Annie
KAdltlms) A SnORT JIJSTOl~Y or TliE ENGLISH PLOPLl~ 1 vol (fohn R Gr(en) TENTYFIVb YEARS lR1l2-WI6 ~ yollt5 ISir r~dward Grey) 1111 OPlmATIOKS OJ VAR 1 01 Sir Edward B Hamley THE VIltGINIA CAoIIAIGN QIo 61 and 65 1 vol (Andrew A HumphnYs) HISTOR) OF F1UNCE 3 vols (George V Kltchenl A GREATER THAN NAPOLgON 1 yol (Balil H LlddC1I Hart GI~OIWE WARHlNGTON 2 vols (Henry C Lodge) LH~ OF ANDREW JCKSON 3 vols (Jam(ls Parton) LIFE AND TlIES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 2 vols (James Parton) HISTORY OF THE A)nmICAN FRONTIER 1763-1R93_ 1 vol IFrederic L
Paxton) bull FINAl REPORT OF G[JN[~IlAJ 1 J PFUHIIN 1 voJ I Gen 1 r PerFllllng)
(War Dept) Fum PRIVATE TO FlEtI) MARSHAL (Sir WIlhlm Roh(rtson ~IEIOIRS OF GENERAl WILLIA1 T SIT1~TtMAN_ ~ vols (William T Sherman) TilE WAR WITH MFWo 2 vol lTuHn II Smithl THE MILITAln POLICY OF Til UNITj) STATES 1 01 IEmory Upton)
(War Dept) THE PIIILIPIINES PAST AND PHESENT 2 vblfl (Oflln C or((stltgtri FnrmCBlCK THE GTmAT t vol (Nonvood Yonng)
55
-VoLest We Forget TIlE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE WORLD WAll
On 11 ~l)ycmlJlr 1~j~~ Wf commemorate the 20th anllil-Ial~ of Uw Yolld ar Armi-1ice which ended tll( ffJ(at(-t war I hat tlll world ]wd (11 bullillH-(d llar-hal FOlh t(lpl_T~I11 lnl1()tlllllllg it nad a- [0110--
fIJ-llJtH will h( -topped on tIlt PlltlI frollt
1Hjlllllinpmiddot at 11 )O AilI Novlmlwl 11th (Fl(lllh linw) Iht dJ) d 11 IHJi) 111] )J go l)f ond tIl lIllI J (I J1d l
that hl)lll tlltha da1f until further order
VIIl oIr b dlllalvd tiHJP VIll only ~oon()() mpoundll III thp lIltl d Stallgt rrn~middot Two-thild- of 1Jw-p (1( nJ~ushy
ar and (1I1t-fillld dl(Jft (wtlthnltfl who had WllI (dled to FClll-ral --fI)II 1)) d1l1 tloliV til( I(middotiltll jHlnllr Illi nnr had ()j) hand IlIarly fj()fl()()() ~prl1wfi(ld nnec TlH lI P of maeillllp ~Ulh Illl a larg-l -caie i- a dpliopn1lllt of the o1ld V1L III the AnwrJcUI 1my thl diOtIll ill 1~112
wa only fOllr mlchilH gun llll rL)inlfllt 1rhrll War Wa- c1(ld)(d Ilerl Lc llll~ li)ht ~lrlilllr1 -l1flkifnt to eqUIp an arm of )t)fl()(IO nWll Tank t had llollt Vp had lG t I J JI 11 I I 1 PllIW () t hit h 1 tJ t I JId t oJojptl and tIll Il llll t V 11h dt Clllt
rllttl lhl tl f1llti11i Ill l(Iliar 1111 had IHPll illshy
I n to 1 1111 Illllt It-- ()llgillal -11 FOllr million nWll
(Itd In till rn1 l)f Inch 208L1H reached Fralltl To 11111 If tlllI nf 11li numJer saw activl criccgt at the irulll Ill t I tJlJf)JJ otliCtr Dr nnf pjJjllt for lach 20 lHtlL 1(l11~ -1) dii jnn- pfl -gt(nl 10 FranCP pllh divi ~lnn lll11j lll) q1 about 1000 UIliCllS and 27000 men Of 111 llllmiHr J (Inj jltl1t ill lclil comhat lrdll III St hhll alolll ~)~)o()nn AmLrictll W(1( llIgagrd the artillery llJ(d 0(1 J (lon(Hjn hl III four hOllr -t1H mn t ltCnw
(11 illlY (l)lllI111 I allOn I Lconitd ill hblulY The lllallufa~shy1111 01 Ij~ l~ lpCdlhd tlw Anwrictll Enfield rifle wa~
d(~WIImiddotd dIll pHI lIt 1l(lt1JtIOll -0 that the tolal plodllcshy11fll 01 hnllt 1 Jil ~ til 1I1h - hlti lllli1ld OPI ~JO()()n() hy thl tl1W t lw Alnll~l Jtl 1 -wllpd Tiw Brownillg automatIc Ill ld lill J~nl Ill))) IlJn Illl( Villi p)1 dtmiddotvIlopfd during tlw al lut lilt) jlltlltlt productioll and lh(d ill largl
Illlm)r in tIll t]1d iJatt] )Il Frallll Illi art illll ~h(Jlt We 1gt -ld 11 tl IfWlllll jlIn- fill trailllllg H1lpOP and I IJulJJlinJ llll fll1(1- 111 Fral1cL with artiller Innformin)Z to lll FJ (IHh IHI IJH J~h 1lndard (alillll- III I nund nllmshy
)II t had ill lrallll ~)(I) PI(l(S of ariill of wbich Jltll~ iOO ( lrlIt1 III An1trilltI
TIl PIOdIIlIJlIl III fIJI i~-(ylllld(J Irlilllr ttlgIII ll
lrHfllI chlj f)JltnlJ1JtHJIl In aviation T~w tf)ta l11shy
(JiIII1 111 I ht All ~I j(( Illtlca-pd from 1200 at tht outshy
hnak Ill tIll tr If I w nrlv 200000 a1 it (ondllioll
AmlmiddottlllI air -IJlIadrlJlh pJald important rl)ll~ at (hallallshyThl n -1 lilJi alld till TlusHAIVOIlIH 11111 hrl)tlJ~hl
dIIWl III fllll)d 7-)) lIHn1YmiddotpluII whill UtltIII1J~ a 10 of (In i ~J 7
At thf~ tnd of t hp war Amlricall productIoII of -mollteshy1( plfhl n 1 pll 1111 glfa (l han hI Fnllh and Bnl jh PllHilld illl1 rl)millmd While the plolt1ud 1011 Jf high 1p1o hI wa III 1)11 (Ill 1~1tdtl 1hall (Jlat Britain and )JPJriy dOlbll thlt of Franct
Anllnla lun h~ well proud of it~ Arrny The achielt ~ melll- of the AEF in France have been vcrS briefly state ~l iJy elltral PCl4hing- as folloW-i 1
Blwen Seplember 26th and November 11th tWenlj i t vo American awl -ix French divisions with an appronl
~~~~ ~~~ll~~II~~t1~t~l~(~~)~(~~~ ~~~~O~l ~~~~r~~X~~d~ 1 ~agld amI ltleehdvcly beaten forty-three different Gerrna i1l
diviion with an etimated fighting strength of 470O~ Of the twellty-two American divisions four had at difTere~ 1
times during this period been ill action on fronts other thi 4 ollr fHVJl j
The enemy uITered an estimated loss of over lOOOj ca ualtic- in thi-gt battle and the Fir-gtt Army about 117O(~1
Jhf lotll strength of thc Firt Army including 1350 j
French troops reehe(~ 101IOOO men It captured 26N1 HISoner- H71 canllon 000 machme gun- and large qww f tics of material
TIl( transportation and supply of divisions to mr1 from our front during this battle was a gigantic ta~k Thefq Were tweHtY~-1ix Amcliean amI seven French divisions ~rl side huntiredK of thousands of corps and army troops mm-_ ill and 0111 of t lit Amlrican ZOIlC A total of 173000 rn)_ Were evacuated to the real and more than 100000 re menl were recevi12d
It need hardly be related that Our cntry into t gave the Allie Ihe preponderance of force itally n to outweigh the tremendous increase in the strength Germans on the Western Front due to the collapse of RUi and the cOllsequent rclea~e of German divisions employ- against her From the military point of vicv we began aid the Allies parly in lUI8 when our divisions with iUll CiCllt training tu talc an active part in battle were senl 1 I h( inact ive front to relieve French divisions in order tf4i I hey might be ed where needed in the fighting line 1
The as1J1-tallce we gave the Allies in combat begall May with ilw tlcee~sful attack of one of our divisions t (anlignY Til wa followed early in June by the enlrs into battle of the two divisions that slopped the Germ advance 011 Paris ncar Chalrilu-Thierry and by thrcQ Otf)~ [hal were put in [he defensiw line In July two Amen clivIHiol1-) wit h OIl 1IUlllccan division formed the ~PCarh)i of the LIHII11)attaek against the Chateau-Thierry mlient which nine of our division~ participated There was a to of approximalely 300000 American troop engaged in I SlloIHl nat til of thl iIalllt whith involved vcr se fig-hi illg and was 1101 completed until the Germdns W
lrivel1 heyond [he Vesle in August In the middle of amp Imh)ln arllly of tllltlll Americans reduced the 81 Mil sdie))t The latter part of September our great battle of l1PIIH-AlgoIlJH was l)(~lll1 lasting through fOltY-8Pvendf
of intrllst Jig-ht il1)~ aIHI llhlillg brilliantly for our First S((olld Armie Oll NOLm1Jer I ]th after mure than 1200 Ampri(tln gtoldi(ls had participated
On the twentieth Anniversary of the Armistice it s proper to recall some of the Armys aecompliRhmenl that great emergency Lest We Forgct
56
Lest We Forget
DtTlu ltlIl VI~ILQL~I~CT I tYI 11 10 )~ ~ ~
I
Iltpound)Utqo~ frVtflG
- -----shy
~ cf I~M-~S~f Sshy
Dv-AulIJo+j
or J~Ulo1r~~
~oGtI5 copyl i
nmiddotwt J 1___
~L~ - _
57
I
Library Bulletin
j I
Thlt 10rrI ~trlocf 01 th Untd ltt t lt
Tr ~n()~t Itn de~ 10pOl nt n tt UnIt d Ot tmiddot I II I
Ih PQIlct 1H youth
( ~ d of d r
(~r t Itd If Ch I
11
rp O ~ COfllnl1j Imiddot I ~ I
I I_ K-- hlney n tho 01laquo 01 M bullbull rIHt HII McCrir I
gt Tr It1rl Ivlt Ilon of N pnhnn I I I I I~ - I I
MIIr~ clttlhllthtTHnt pproprltn fJlII for 1111 If I 11 I)
~ I
Tllr nor I hltrd I 11 III
0 r Ollrrhllrult It I 1111 I dlf iiII1
lrA chlrlt rI lUt 1 I - bull J ill
LmiddotgtlconmiddotdllGUtrrcdmiddotE~plln( I Ill I
JlUI h I It Tho Inv 510n of Chln~ b) tho Wlllttern worl Illgt 11 d
1 I ro J 111] Tho pO~l-wlr world middotIorl 1middot1 I I h 1[1 Ill 11 II I 111(I11j
1 L J I) I~ Gavltrnrnfnt gul1tlor1 of tr1nlportltttwn lUk tlxlll
J lop ~roo 11 I 1 X lraI I I Lr Tho Lo t Batttlton JII) 11 lin) I( r iI(ie)
I ph 1llh~ Tho polltleo~ 1865169( Ill I I I
hl) 11 lellltron~ mIHttlrcS til la Iucrro elvll (n [~pJn1 I) h 1)lIill lt frp ih 1 ar 1 1 1)11 11 liE ]
111 1 II -tIJnullr Irn Americlon relef 1I 111_1
I IIdI mj Lifo of Proldont Rooltltlvclt A ~tudl In fartur lnd pO f j Bl~ WI)j
1 I (f) II Tho philosophy of tho tct (1 111 11 If atd I tr J Im PM))
~~nlnnl I~r) (rnmII ror runlUt Twentymiddotthlrd nnuat report of Nltlonoll Adv1~ory Commlttlte for Aeronautics 1937 I(If7 11 rO Ij
Nltw lntrnltlonlll Yer Book um fIlllIm of ttl rid prlr ror tj ~nr E jp pnlj
l I)) t I)r f a) A ~tudy on th( opltrlltlon ofn Int(IIIlt n(o_offccl~ r ran 1111 frm II In nrll l i I elll e I lmldl1l 1 Ill 11 II I
I fall Ill 010 Wlthrwlrt~chaft do~ totln Krlcgts I rUd f hr I tllt ~ I I HI [01 1If)- ]
llflhr Tho Navy Ahl~tory I) nr rmiddot 1 )IP ]K f Ij
lr WI))n Children ortho RisIng Sun Ill Imiddotmiddotmiddot-)
1iI r lIuulluHI
Oltr DlenstUntorrlcht 1m Hecro 1J 11 f- ) gt H to r I til Ju ltI furl nrmj- Iu) fnr 11]0 raal_ymlt) 1 lH 11 ~(-t 1 q I
Ofr DIltn~tuntfrrlcht 1m H re 11 Jl) -101 11 11 t I rlllll1J1 IU fm 1)11 r] 1117 [1 ~l I 11-(]
1J11middot11I1i1 nf IntnwtI1d [f
International ~llnction5 fII( loy 11) f 111lt111 r 11 ttlllllltdut( In( 110) [LlT 1~)]~ [I~ ]
Tho Rcpubllc~ of South Amlricil npnrt h -1Ul jrltgt]1 [ mllrqn ItlllI 11)1)11111 of tllonltInI Afr q ) (j t1
-IIIflrth LI ( 11 1lt lrqr Der Untcrfuhrer der Flilkilrtlllcrie 11 hl U d ~It] u) r I t 1I1)IlIlrUllt nrtllry] l~n [1 07-12- 1 III
flhtl rool~ 1
Th( (clution of phylc Imiddot i 1
middot11 r
Ch (lilt for her Ioflt 11lt 11 I )
fd t 1 Hport r S (ond r(rl( 1 ~d 1 I 1 [0 I l~ t I I [I
is
~ I I 01
unt lllJH~
I P
1 11 Il lIh 11 11)
Intrutlon~ for tlH tlct1 rmploympnt of Irltf I bull 1 111 IlIt I l I I) 11
Trnport tlon on t W t rn Front I ] 1 I Igt lt
J JI h _ loj
Imiddottru~to for rllOHlHnt cont~Ql OVrol In WlT
111 J()lJrnyto r
~c
11 LI
fbull]
j
d I I 111 10) dI 11)lt_
II
I I I 11 I If I]]
I I I l J~ i 1 01 ) I - III
I) I Braxton Brago Gonertl af til Confcdlrlcy 11 III BIO]
Ofr SprlchBrockhmiddotH~ 11 nlllwlra f ld
-[1 r iI11um I[))) FolkwlYs tuh I Ih _ell 11 II1lPflr[ 1I111IH P rll10111 mtlt nlld mrnl~ IHI~ 111
ulhllt-ltlolhI1II tnll1J( r t ( Fighting pbnls of thl orld 12)
[ t ltII ~ loar ( allan Arncrlct UOl~ to 1r 1lt) l~ 11 llll-I l-f i q
Ifd ( Ctgt ut ~o11 d Iarmo ittllonn qull ] h 1 1))111 1 tI [1LlIUIl rnl 1Ilt ]101-( W1
IItnh Lad Thorouuhbrfd rdJ stock lnd it~ bullbull ncolitors rIn f pur 11( 1 1 fI1 1 1
hlt1lrllmlull Puerto Rico nd It plopl Illilt [17211
WhO5 who In Jalla 1936 th Ihuhuo nl lw) Pilll I~~ 1I1~1
011r HIltI 1 Ild rlhur 111 Tho Hoov politic 111
tr ii nr1 ( The Glrrnan Octopu Jillh r 11 f r rid 1 r 11111 11 Qi~
rI r - The Candlans Thl) story of II people 11J1i [171- 1
1111 I hWII TIll SlllomiddotJlprH~ confllct lnn til LNilUl of Ntlou lItIImiddot1
JII III~( Ill J looldnll bDhlnd tho tonsor~hlp 11 IX (1 ~Il 1 f]
ACADEMIC I
J1Uj)U GllLL ( 1 BliKDlL U S Army COllmandant n~n]lIE1t (ELL F II00Ji( U1T U S Army 4sgt(i1 (IIIIffdi
J 11 ITT iT COLOJEL F GILBREATII CayallY SrcJ(flry
DIRECTORS
l~qlllaJ I ~ ________ _lOLONEL K B Epl1u--ns (avall
~1IId Cia alHI Elell jllll CourbCS _______ COLONIL C I (IWeKCTT Infantr)
CHIEFS OF SECTIONS
I OJIllhJiL UPllltltiotl ______ _____ LUUT (OLUNELG It (UOl Illfalltr~-
II lilt Lll igCl1Cl Ihmiddot tory alld Slratcgy _____ LIEUT COLONEL F V g()LEr Fi(ld Artillltmiddot~middot I I I I)(fensivC Opcratiulls ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ LIEUT COLONEL G H MEYER Coa--t Artillery (nrp- 1- Suppl) EanntlOll and Logitic~ _ _ LIEUT COLONEL C F ILLIIS Cor]l~ or Enllllll
I_cclialll011_ _________________ LIEUT (OLONEL Il E ~ICqllLLN (11middot
l
ROSTER OF INSTRUCTORS
i ~Ld~ KllllH n (t
It I (tr) I Inf
1(gt h inPDltl 0 F Lt 111 (()L~~II~IIltIl) Thn B Cntrl t( 1q( n ( ( t~~lgl))rlH~)l~ 1 ( tlJm~ Charlln F r E l~drrhll1 L(i K t l
PCF tl~~di~lI~()1rnd k ~~~ Eri ilJlDl E FA ~atz Flod R Inf p~rd SJh~tlmiddotr I) r j
~~r Hlm( II H InC rlg Jln1()nl F inL
I 1 ~~rt ci~~I~llnL( I~ IWmCIDlt1gttIt L Inf ~d L IllMd H InL a(rHoml E InL IrFarlnd AndHw I illf
anlOrk An D Inf Hry Bl-ll 11 FA
c urn r Augu~tu M F 1 mlth AIIrt ( (~v
Qta -1ltmnan IJ Inl Idrlahnn William lt InC mWn Hompr C Inr uthm RlchJrdmiddotT FA
lIorlgltun laul A CE
N~~~i~~ ~~lll bn~ c Ttior Herhert W MC TOll1lt Dwight F C E
middoti~~PA~~h~~(P~ C~~middot fandpll ILlfold C Cav Brett S(fIIlU E Inf
(lmp1ill William A FA Ehrll Ir(gtl~r)l L InL HlIlwy Ullfu S Cav Brook Jdward II FA ugur Wayland H Cav 1lfllt Ward H bull FA Clmpiwll William F QMC Hultman Hfrbert FE CAe TnlltCott LUIlan Ie Jr Cav Pnrtlr Hay K Inr 111111 John K InL ililburn Rrltm L CAC Lflwr lLIll 1- lllL Hkd-o William P FA Karlstad Chups H Inr GriclllY CecIIJ In
Rook Lowell V InL (tdIe John U D lpndfrgrat Grady H Inf Hrt(gtI1P Rohfrt G C Irvil1l WilarJ V CAC Bl)I1()1(gt E~IoIrt F C S Phillip Thomas R C AC rlhE Sam LbullC 11011 John II C Ae HarkPr Jnhn Dc F AC
(middotlITIN Lorpncc Walter Eo CE IIartllflt Harlan ~ InL Jpnkm Reubn E InL Lanah1l1 Frtll(l~ 1l Jr SigC
ROSTER or RtGULAR CLASS 1938-1939
NAE 1lkPrrnan StlphpJI 0 Adamf1 Hugh P AIbrpcht Frank M Aldprman Crdg Andersoll KelllHth s Rack George 1 Balwr RussrU A Barher Edward Barl Ruwrl O Harndollar Marlin 1) II [llrlptt L(lUrIIHP V
B(gtldrrlinden William A Bplldpr Arthur I-I Ikqqlll~l Earl C Bplt)etLP Leo A BIfIdl WIlliam S 3d Binnl John J Bl(k Frldprilk IJ Blizzard John C oTr lIoaIlHr Haydoll L HuatrHr Marl M Jr Bohzien Edwin B Rohlpndpr John F
ItA~k llHANCli (lptall1 htfantry (LptUll FA (aplam CEo (Iptalll illfantry itljllr Infantry Captam Slg C Captam Infantry (Lptal1 C AC (IJlalll 1lSMC MaJOr lllfllltr~ Clptain CAC (aptull FA (apltin ( AC CtltUIl Infantry ~t1J()r Illfmtry raplam (avalrv
(tplam VA iLIJllr FA tllajor Infantry Captain Infantry Captain CE l1ajor Air Corps Captain Me
59
w _~~ AC(ldemic Notes c amp GSS QUUlmiddott~
IL It~h HILII NArlH RANI
UUWII Frud S Ir (aptain Infantry Hettinger John A Major Cavulr
BOWIH JaTllh C lr laptalll Infmtry Hill Tame P Captain lnfant~ HurjlIlit WlUfl) L (qtltlll1 InfllItr IIohlnthaJ William D MIJeH CA C
Bur((1 LI t ( (11[1111 F IIntmiddot Charp n Captain Clo S1 eg Sc
BU1IH1l ta1h bull r 1 ~d tjlt11Tl ( ( lIolllwr IiI) W Captain
Idh jtllph K ( algt lill lnfllltn Ilorn hlrl A Major Air Corl~ bull ~~ (mltl IiWlrl (tPLL]11 C I IlorrrH 1lt (iil11 I Captain ~1C
Sc (lIllltlll (Lf i) ( L)IUII IIILtllrJ Ilottllll Iohn I~ Clltam
(ttL II (I r (qtllll Il1fllllr HOIIl rh~lIl r Major
111 11 Id rd (111) Illftfr II()~JJ JLnl(l I Jr CLI)tain
llrJJIvrdj 1jr Jllf1I1r JIIW HobPrL L Jr (ljlLdn
(LLd ~()rml J ILl) 1 IIYlJllg Clyde L Malor
II Illld I I I ( II d ll JlI fl1l1r llJhn()Il I)OUgill V Captain
I Ir ~ il] 1fHtr JOhWJIl Elrlf A Major
J (In bull I~ (1j1Hl lr (q ohnull Howard It lpLIIII
(IIll HI) l Ii (till) 1 1Illi IlhOl WIllIlmiddotl1 n CapLlin
[d ffll I J (11lt]1 -11 I 111 (~harkl P CapLun
I rIl I i (tn Wllhlm B Captlln
rHoiL ( I trmiddot r I n (1) lfltUlj Franlc A Major
(IlIlIlJ1l) I lt I t)ll Ipm HamId I) Captain
ln 1r(sjIJT1 If ( q ~ K(bfr LaUtitHP B ~bJur
1)1d I Llm - I~ ljL Itf11L1r hlIHli Alvan C olljor
IIL I[O- Ir( nmiddot Kllt I au Jbullbull Cwllin J)llr1middot]middot(rrIH 11111 ul) K 11111 John A 11IJor
1)111 P lI l~ ( ljdl) (( Kohlgt Vlbiw n (apt a)
[)rlr( il I 11Jr (1 dry Jrwl (por)W K l1ljllr l )Ilgt 1 11] I If (IImiddott11I Irdilltr KrLltlhoJf -innw) CaplllI
Jl lllrt I I lr tIry LuHIvin Joltgtpph Captain
fnIrII Ii i (Ill1l IT Cliff LlIlham Charlp~ 1 Captain
111111 rtIL) I Ll]r lr ()fI LawrIl(I Charlp~ V Captnll
11 i ( rtd II ( H III llf I1dr ilwtoll VllIiLIn S Captain I II It ITmiddotl ITlt ( Lumhard StlpIH1l C ClpLllli
I-kill illl 1)1 dl r LUVIIl Juhn H Clptalll
1 -11) Inti II( I ( qLdll (I LYIllh Grorgf 1 Cljlltlll
Ir ]tJrlll (QI L1ll I Mahie RIl~(1l L C1)la1l1
lt f 1 I Id td 1 1lJl1r Idr Mtldonald John C ~Tajor
IlL r It doI (qgttllL lr rl~ Mlrhdl Iloyd illajor
rj TILllll [ ( t[tll ( ~ ~lartiJl 1Lrlin C ~LLj()r
1)f loll Ilt ( qgtt11l I Mathpwoll LptnllPI (Ipt-till 1- d n 1 l~ltl r1 I (lltlill ( ( iay Edwin T CaptLin
111r lnf JilIn Il(hr~4tal IItrhfrl 1 Cptain 1[oIlt1ll F ~1 (ClUff Mlr] Captain
LdlJI H IIIJr F 11p(ulough Samuel 11ajor ( I I~ f [tdl Ir (liII) JnLlll] tl1d((I Riehard G Cllltain r Ij ( 1)i J ( lIdUll (lt( Md~UtIIl John C Ca))ILlIl
Il Il l[ iIIIII IlIfI)ll1 Illlt(~nulth Wilbur R 11jor
(t rd H rl ( (qd llll I -llmiddotloy Guy S Jr Captain ( r]n T O) l IIJr IT ( rl~ 11nfTlt Htlbell C -I1Jor ~ l r IJ I 11 ~Ij ( -ll)r)rtmiddot Brywt I 1aJor (dI 11 d II (1]11111 [lIfl1tn Ilurphy John B lajllain
(1 H hJ lilli I 1Jr ITImiddot)fJ M~frlt Culby M Captaill
1 U dlll II I1 (1 ir (oq ~ NVIlll (pon 1) Cljltalll
(~Ii t 1 rII i~ L (IIllll JnflIltrv 1nhil Charil13 II (ptLin
(~dlJr jllldri shy (ljllltl 1 -llf~(III Rkhm K laptaill (lId L 11)jn I (II)lllll Ill ()middotJ)llllti Iohn W Major
(rI [ Ill ir ( ljllIll Sl~ ( Partndgpoundgt L1o~ d S lajor (r IIltmiddotr Ld) ( (IImiddot1i 111 (lvdr P(phw G()r~( B ()Itlin 0
(rdhl jl fl Il jf (1J1L11l Infantr Io~(lll WJlhun I) I1ajpr (r 111111 ljlllli -IT (orl 1ral hpr Hlthard ( ~aJltalll
II n II JlTIll II 1IJr illLllllr ltdl Slatlll Jo Captain i) ILr] llJlIT lnfIHtT ILIIllY TIOma~ II ~lajor
Ibl 11 ILId ~ Ir 11 Lt 11 (qfJh Hplc1 Widlr J Major
ILlllll johlJ H (qtll1l I ItplI- Andrew R Major IIrl It 11 11)llf up (ldwidrfpr Ilarr Major SIR ( j II nd J1fntl II (IItllll lr(TI itlnlll Alhrt (apllill (I- ~i Illrfl (IIYiJ o1]r (C ltwhanbol Willi11ll L (apt ll1
ILII11]1 (lplllI 1 itldlllo1lr (Iryll II Major ~i~~orI(1Iiard II ~ f d rll J (qLIIll C AC HqJrrts Thomas A Jr Captain FA J Heilllltl I hmh H Cljllal1l FA Itr)(lIlilponarcllI Captnin Air Cor~-middot
II I )~fI)]1 rg t 11 rt I o1ljor AU (orp HI)t1wllI JalI4 S Major (ava1) ~
Iff ILlr ILlrrl 11 II r) (apt1I1l (ldn Hnl~pl11 Gurdon D Captam Cavaln ~
Hln]lIJ) flrll olljor JnflIdry HohfoiCnherg(r Carl T Major Cavllr~
1fl11V Vdlfr H Jr (tpain FA Rothrrmich Albert Eo Captam lnfantl)
60
Infant) IllfIIltr
In(ntl) -
InfmID ~ Q ~C ~ Air corfi t A ~~
i
f2XVIII No 70 Academic Noles
NAME
Roycc Charles H _ Ran Cornehus E
gnlle Gordon P jiltchc1lller Frederick F schlattrr David M 1Schulgen G(gtorge F1Scott WilLlrd W lSilt~r-l RthmllOn ~rormdur Haymond L JSoane Charlp~ C bull Jr Sltlth 101m A I Jr (Snith fJgtIph l~rruthJ Holwrt MlK ~ltl dl-nw n
I ~ rJry )hrrow Imiddot i5~ldmg J)lJllad 1 15tafiurd Bpll ~3f1lr Th)Illll H llhfl~ AlhPrt K TT
Franlb H
-rt nrl Otto P lt Donald G tltIqJfD
Thr)ma~ D )1- fohn L
It Juhn F ljd-t PpLrnC (
j7 [-)1) CIIHlllf A ) i7 I rr~ fohn 1
l~~~~I~~rd T
jl_ hlm~ Lumn L 1IOln l1ltDJ] E ]Ilton Walter K Jr
i lilm~att RoJert Wefl jllrgLt Vlllard L l t ital Wp~lpy V
jYe2ger Hohart R ) -rmiddoton EHrett M
jiUlll Char)( W
) I
1 ri n ~)
HANK
Captam Major Captam Captlin Captalll Captam Major Captain Major Captain Clptain CapLlin (aptalll
Captul1 CapLun Major Major ClptlIn Captain Captam Captalll Captain Captam Captain Captum Major Captain Clptdn Captain Captam Ctptain ~IaJ()r
(aptalll Captain Major Ca]ltaln Captain Major Captain CaptJ1TI Captam Captain Captam MaJor Captam Mljor Captalll Captalll Captlin Major Captain IstLt CU11tam Captain Captain Major Major Major
UfANCI
Infantry Infantry AIr Corp CA C AIr Corp Air CorpshyrAC lt1-
-Infantry Infantn FA Alf et1 Dn F CK Infmtrr InrlIltn CE InfuntT) Infantr Alf CorpltshyInfantry CpLC Cc FA Air Cnrp FA CAC InflI1tr~
AIr Corp Atr Corp5 CA C Infantry Infantry CWS AIr Corp InfanttJ Air Corp Air Corp cr- C~lalry
Alr Corp Infmtr Air Corp Infantry Cavalry FA Cnalry FA Infantry QMC C E Alr CDrp ( A(
Cavalry Air Corps Infantry Infantry
TIlE C01~IANJ) AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Fort Leavenworth KalLltas
1937-1938
Map Problem No 25
15 Mar(h 193x
Tim map prllhlpm whi1 dilfprPllt from anything that has Iwpoundn ucltd m thl P-t at Ill Commmd and (jPlwral it lIT ihoo is nut eJ]tlrely new to mllhf lIl-trudiiltL ~L1Jor John H Burngt Infantry hl-gt writtrltll at ngth (O)Hrllll~ Ih]lt ypl of prohll11 In hN artide 111f11( Ihf lIo) ProJIlin jlllbhlt-llld lt 1h( SIPtmJPr-tktolPr lgtU of lIlP Injrtllir[()1rJwl
llv llfoblem I Oil I of Ilpejjon 0 rrawtl that It ((is mfnrmatlOn to llll lttIHjnt In ti(gt furm of fUmmMI(gt (very hlJf hour The soher is r(4U1red to llldt a rlllIlrt at th (1111 of pltlfh half hour on the actions taken an-I orders If my( tudly lilUIt hy til (ommanrlcr In thig tYfJ( of problpm the solver mu~t JUidl wli11 I)f Ita ufiICipnt informatIOn and WiWll till time j ripe for rnalrlg riprisj)lIs
Althnll)h thi b a corpg prohhm th( eJwmp lt lnu~trat(lt may be vljuIltI iIlIXIII-HI mvoh-mg ltmtlir unit
Prfmiddotllh~
Sl fTlll- I ArlVtIH SJClt t-2 II Sppud SltuHtinn ContintH d ~9
III Hnilltlfll to r IlIlU--iull 11 14
SEIltON I
ltiancc Sheet
General ltUat lOll spceJal situation
1 (l~NIHAL SITUATION - - (I 1110]18 Sperial iIap A herewith Scale J inch ~4 miles
lJ Boullclaries- The Pennsylvania lIaryland state line forms the boundary between two hostile states Blue (north) and Red (south)
c Opposing forces - It is known that Red war plans conshytemllbte the concentration of a reinforced corps of two or three diVlsion~ in the area helween South IVIountain and the Susqueshyhanna River
2 SPEfIAL SITUTION Q loncentralioll 11) I lorps rewforcer The I Corps reinforced Lieutenant General A comshymanding consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions organic corps troop~ and aUaehecl troops as indicated in paragraph 1 Table J page 7 TaIzes oj ()rganization CampGSS 1037 The I Corps concentrated with the 1st Division in the viCInity of Hanover (374-746) the 2d Division in the vicinity of Gettysburg (350shy750) and the corps artillery in the vicinity of Biglerville (349shy762) The corps service elements are to concentrate in the area Lemoyne (380-800) ~ Carhsle (355-79)middot ~It Holly Springs (355-785) - Bowmansville (~1l3-792)
(2) The 3d Division (detached from I Corps) with 903d Cavalry Squadron ultached and certain artillery tank and motor units concentrated in GHQ reserve in the area shown on Special Map A
(3) Other Blue forces concentrated in the area east of the Susquehanna River
b Misson oj the I Corls~The mission of the I Corps is to mvade Red territory and develop the hostile situation west of the Susquehanna River
c Krents prior to liouliaht 15 Morch - (1) The I Corps completed ib concentration late on 12 March The 1st Cavalry Brigade reinforced protecled the concentration Early on 13 March the I Corps preceded by its cavalry crossed the frontier and advanced to the south the 1st Division marched on Manshychester (384-729) the2d Division marched on Keymar (350-721)
61
0~ i~ YSRURG SHEET EDITION OF 1934
STIlt_ TEGIe ~LP GEiTYSm-Rc~RICHMOND ___ Tc
- 3middot
1 ( ~_I-ampJ---=
SPECIAL MAP A SITUATION AT DARK 14 MARCH
THE COMMAND AND GEN-ERAL STAFF SCHOOL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS
1937-1938 TO ACCOMPANySECTION I
MAP PROBLEM NO 25 (160) 25 MARCH 1938
or -
1cademic Noles
(2) The ht DiviicJI1 l1lluunl(gtt(d hootile infantry along the line Silnr I~lln fjf)S-j~~ I I inebun) (~tG-I~6) and attacked late 1 llarth
Il) The ~d ])1 on Jatl on tllf aft(rn()on of 1 lIarch lpadwcl tllC Ernmitltbl11~ ~11-7~) TaT1(gt~l()Wn ~)-72R)
fpad aflPJ bill ltldll ClJlJIfJ-ltion (4) Earl~middot 11 Illfh Ill hI and 2d Dimiddotbinlc und(r (owr
of f(j~r wlti h 11(d thnll~h)ut the day lauf(hprl a (()ordmatpd atlttk aralll lilt h)~1114 fonl al()n~r the IIIH SiIVl nun
IIJ(middotil()l() I i l~ J111 1 h~ld (onidfllbJ( W(middoth and hy dad 11 Ial (il L(d d11 II 1111 lu) till f)J l bw to fl1 lint Plea alll al(middot I ~Ii-i----) Ihl) d ~7x-7n ) (ul)p(wdp1 (~XX-I~ I)
I ~)J illl 1 i blll Ill 11 I11Llnl rv 1- 011( ht t illOfl Wl~
Jrl()fr1 to ) TtIrlh )fi-Il1) ITl (()lJh ItttnC l)r(pared for Illl)fll 111 1111)111 lrl1por I
(1) TIllIoll 11lri llldltl -upporld llHWtllJJ] of the 2d and hI I)J l-iIlJi~
II) J-ll1 till Ih IlllJjllllW of l~ )Iarcl 1IIf hogtlik (~1-alry pemratlmiddotd gtI lllw OUlltlj rtmiddotlOllnai- al(( ~(r(en in lil(gt middotjlmiddotinity ()fSl1trI C l()11 11l~1-~11 alld 1lll1Tilvd ()Il Yorh lij7~lf~raquo) By dark 11 ~I~n h t hf 1lt-1 (tya1ry nrwulpound ninfofCld had drivcn Ill 110 1ill la 11 1)11 1II Itt nm1 had onto a -trong pDf-ilion in 1111 willi 1 )- ~lll-hun 1)-(1~) S11IJhlown
~ Ill 1llfh J~J1Ldd( ()r () rll1fnr((d b pr(JIt(tllll~ tilt lint pf Oll1llll] 1tlI)11 f 1)1 (OJ p-
)11[ fIIIllf)fi il Hr(td llload- -hown in -ohd 1IH ()ll Ill ~r I I ( ~ill 11 P IfI ~111t ddpound for t 11-IY mot or t ltfTic
h) n (uti I I lit ( J lu r 111 hllll conl A Wlvy mit1
n~ (Ild 1111 lt 1)(11(11 ~(Ilth 7Iollnttln ~nrl the Sultqucshyhtll11t 11 11 Ill 11 IJl (h Imiddot()rc(a~t at Ii 110 Pl 1-1 I1JTh 111111111ltd I)F) iurlll11 Ihar III tIll Jatl 1f(rnnol1 of tii )Jar(h
(I ltIJlfl Tiltmiddot Su-qlHhllllll and Potomac Rivers are unfordtbll -II Pt1ljh () 1~1(r h unfordahlp -outIHlst of it i1llt()11 ~l-)j~ lth ))Ih 1ra11(11 l)atap~(o I1ierall other ]1(1111 II f f()r]ddl
InrHvrph
--llll 1 -11 t IIO (II 111 IP 1-l(lIh of Jfi Uarch Tbl plall~ for tlH ()fllLttlolh qf the (orp~ on IC) llareh
TJrovided for a ((ln~l1udtJII~ I)f the al1lIk hy the 1sl and 2d I)jvil)tb and II(middot J 1 (tYdn BrigHh
JHutlllallt (111(1 al 1 al hi~ (ommand post al IIano-el 111111 tlJ (lr p~lt ()f 11)( Tllorning of Ii) 1lareh ~tudying the Illllt)l 1TI1P llld tIll In flrllinv rIporli
J 11 ll() AI hi d lVlrpound of till foll()wing --ltuatlOn
(It tIl f1(1I1t (Jf IIII 1lt-1 (Iall) Briglclt the ho~tile eayalry had LfIll for(Imiddotd)ll VJl11drl to tlllaquo ~(Jlth and at 1000 A1 Ih( 1~1 (aalry Briradp had aun encounlpled hOllijp cavalry ni lalllIalorw rllf I1 Ialylal1d LitH (to1~7~f)) orli-villl ( f 1)-r~middotf J
On ill flllill f IIII 11 JlJj~iflll til 1100Idl force had allHlud ~l1nultalll)u-ly with thl attaek of the bt Division Thi rnlltt ha hnlJH1 pl1 Ilhtral ion and tlloveHwnl No gain~ hy (ilhe fOIl( ~(11ll to ha(lw(ll mlltll
On 1 Ill frollt or t 111 ~d Dn iol I he n(d~ launched a surshypn~( allwJ Ht dayh~~ht again t 1( right flank of the 2d Division
This attack was supported by tanks and caught the 2d Div~ in attack formation The tenor of the reports and m from the 2d Division indieates thal the Division is in sen difJi(ulty but in no imminent danger
Lieutcnant (jeneral A vbitcd the (ommand post of the Divimiddotion at Bandanna (mi-7lH) at 11 10 M where he fo the commander and staff gr~atly dhappointecl with the res of t he mornings hat 1 Ie The divi~i)n wa- reorganizin~ and paring to resume the attwk at about ~ 00 PIvl It expCte after reorganizal ion j hat two and po-ltihly 1hr(gt( hatt alions co be made available fol the new effort Lieutenant G viiled the command post of the 2d Dimiddotision at Galt (J
al ahout 121 PM The slarr of the 2c1 Division appeared ~()mewhat (hagrined uy the events of the morning vr tonflictIng and contradictory reports had been received [11 ~ the ~uh()rdinate uniL~ It wa~ almost impossihle to gain a co beer pie e or clear picture of aITairt- on that front pres ltertain fa(lS were cle~~ however The attack of the~ing
DIVISIOn had faIled the dlvJ-lOn had been thrown on the defrshy~ive and about noon had heen drinn back and appeared to~ -tuhhnrnly defending along the ~(gtnclal line Tane~tuwn i Pleaoant Valley (altualtie- ~llfT(rcd (ou1d not be dctcrmirw i with any dpgrpp of WlurlfY Iajor C(llpral ~d DivisionrjJ just fPturned from a viltit jo his hrig-ad(~ Iommanders whow 1 found reorganizing their fOI(e- and strcngllwning 1heir defenvl Two infantry battalions werc in diYi~i()n lCsCt( The divis cavalry ()ppo~ed l)y hOStllp (lvalry wa~ protc~ing the rightfl~~ along the c1cel about t wo Imle~ nort hwc-l of 1 aneylown 1la ~
General 2d Division in spite of the reerses of the day Ii calm and unworried ~
Vhilpon 111(se visits Li(utfI1ll1t General A studied thest at ton but did not i~ltuc any orders He rct urned to hb (ommalt~ post at Ilanover at 1 10 IM in time for the rouline daily rJ lonfercT1CC ~Imiddot
The Corps Reenc (1st Infantry less one battalion) at~ $ril hour was sLiIl at Two Taverns prepared for movement hy mo i t ranspClrL hndl
OTIS len Hp1U1n(- of llfornlltion f((IWei tt til( COfp Commallli Post i 1
l~u(d at half hour iHtervalsommfllClIlr at 1 15 P)l LnLi endmg at t15Pl~ 10 ~ In making fepofts ~tud(nh will nutp thp HIJuirpnHnt (ar(fllY~J
no impoftHlt OfiPf i HlloUIlImiddot((1 or 1ctl)1l tIIill tilt f(marc N()Il(il~ pntffd on till flport
L HI hriff Ill dfllJlllp
SE(JlO- 11 IConlinutt1)
Special Situatiun Continued
)rwiai ~ltUlt1UtJ (onllnt(d
1 -IEClALRItlAtlON (ONIIl111n lipon a1Tialat~ command post at 1 )0 11I Liputenant General A was met his Chief of Stair who prtsente(I him with 1he following me dal(d Cflq 1) Ilanh 10middot1) P~1
The fOI(p OPlHl-ld lo the 1 (orps is eslimatrrl to~ (orp- of not more t hall two divi-ions Your mi (hal1gtlti You will a(Imiddotll1lte wilhout delay and capt 1IMUtE The ad Division with surIkient GHQ motor pOIa1ion 10 move the essential (ornbat elements of on gadc reverts to your corps effective at once
The daily staff conference was called to order by the C of Starr at 1 45 PM Lieutenant General A the chiefs of
og ~
- ~
or
I
~olXlJl No 70 Academic Notes
general staff seclions and certain special stafl officers were presshyent The Chief of Staff briefly outlined tlu situation as already described above after which the following reports were made
Corps G-2 stated There is some doubt as to the strength of the hostile forces confronting us G-2 GHQ inclines to the belief that it is a corps of not more than two divisions We have
Jed two divisions Red deserters claim that four divisions were in the area Baltimore - Vashington about 12 lIarch Knowing Red Lieutenant General Js reputation for caution and prudence I cannot undertand his attacking us this morning unless he i~ quite certain that he IS superior to us It is quite possible that General J has been relieved However I han~ no mfonnation about thIS Of course the hostile commander Genshyeral J might be miinformed as to our strcngth I am striving
Ito gam morc definite information as to the hostile strength Unfortunately due to the continued fog the air service has
jbeen unable to Ioeate the ho-tile r(cIVcs 1 cstimate that at present they are west of Parrs Ridge favoring the Reds envelopshy
Iling attack i As to Red capabilities shy
ii 1 He can continue his attack today
He can renev his attack tomorrow enveloping our nght flank or with less ease our left flank
He may defend actiyely or passively northwest of or I on Pans Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
He may delay or withdraw
-1 Corps G-~ stated I1 SineC rny bA report to the Chief of Staff the following
Information has been received i I From the bt Cavalry Brigade dated 1100 AlIT -The t] hostile cavalry has been oriYen slowly south to the line bull ~Iaryland Line or1i5il1pound Am about to aUack
j Information has been slow in arriving from the 1st Cav~lry1 1 havc ~cnt a LiaIson Officer to that headquarters The 3d Division reports that its artillery is all truck-drawn I that plans have heen made to move the essential combat ricments of onc infantry brigade by GHQ motor transport on
two hours notlt~e 1 The 100 Pil weather forecast predicts rising temperature fJg ohouhi clear in a few hour~ continued dry I ~Iy section ha~ roughly prepared the following plans
To move I he 1d Divl~ion 10 either flank for an attack late this aflernoon or early tomorrow
To relieve the 2d Division by the 3d Division this afternoon or tonight and resume the attack -11
To withdraw to a defensive position southeast of etshytysburg in order to assume the counteroffensive with the
JI i 3d Division from the vicinity of Hanover
G-4 stated A check is being made by my section to detershyine how much motor transportation can be used for corps elical operations without disrupting supply I expect the
eport soon ~ The Corps Chief of Artillery reported that he was studying he Gmiddot3 plans to delermine the ose of the corps artillery and
location of ammunition The Corps Engineer reported that Red road demolitions as
uth as the Emmitsburg - Taneytown road on the west and the line Glenville (388-741) -- Shrewsbury -- Stewshy
town on the east flank were ninety percent repaired Road
signs were being put up throughout the rear areas The position southeast of Gettysburg was being reconnoitered
Requirement-Report the actions taken and orders as actuw
any issued by Lieutenant General A at his command post between 145 PM and 215 PM 15 March if any
Time allowed for solution 30 minutes
SECTION II (Continued)
Special Situation Continued Innwnlh
SpeCial ClltuatlOn continued 5
5 SpgCIAL SITUAFION CONTINUED---The following is a resume of messages received at the I Corps command post between 215 and 245 PM 15 March
From the Artillery Information Service
Mass of hostile artillery appears to be west of Parrs Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
From the 1st Cavalry Brigade (message delayed due to encoding and decoding)
Drove hostile cavalry to the south from the Maryland Line - Norrisville position at 11 45 AM Am following up My men and horses are greatly fatigued Casualties have been heavy Indications are that hostile cavalry will resist again in the vicinity Parkton (404-727) - Shawsville (418-725) Will attack
From the 2d Division
Am preparing to launch counteroffensive at about 430 PM Have three battalions southeast of Galt as maneuvering force
From the 1st Division
Will renew the attack at 3 30 PM in the direction Bandanna-Ebbvale-Carrollton Have three battalions available for the operation
From Liaison Officer with 1st Cavalry Brigade (Personal Report)
1st Cavalry Brigade is in dire need of rest but their morale is very high The commanders seem to be more weary than the troopers Hostile cavalry withdrew in disshyorder from Parkton - Shawsville position at 145 PM
Corps G-4 reported
Sumcient trucks of corps quartermaster train to move the essential combat elements of one brigade can be made available on two hours notice without disrupting the supply of the corps
From the Corps Air Service
Fog seems to be clearing expect to send out first misshysion at about 245 PM
From 1st Division
My division cavalry attacked the hostile cavalry on its front at 1 30 PM and drove it south of the Gunpowder River southeast of Gunpowder (388-734) Believe the hosshytile infantry on my front is preparing to resume the offenshysive
65
Ac~demic Notes
Ufljllifl]lfllf Jlporl tlH -a11Hh laln and orciN (1-
(lCtual1y i--ued hy LilUl (~n~1I1t CPIHrai A at hi mmnand lot hetween 21~) P~I and 21~ I~I 1 ~Ialltil if an
IllItgt a[[llltf flJ (dotu HI minu~
SI 1111 II ilolllillwmiddotd)
--1H(ial --ituilliolt (ontintHd
ii -IU Id SIll ]111 (f)lj1 I) TIltmiddot folloIIW 1
IP-lIIW of IIifl)llllalloll lllll IllIgtlI- ltlII(middotd 1 11ll I ((In
OlrlJIlllld 1)1) I hI (ll ~ 11 alld 1-) 11 l~ bnmiddoth FJ om ] -1 (l 11ry Hn- tdl loll] Jll--IIl~rtr J
Iffl iiI- (middottdl) vil1111t(middot ~Hllhi(~ II (llll]l)dl]
Vall lU(middotr 1 Plll)] jlaHd Illgt 111 of (~lI1P(Jd1 Fall- U( rd ~IJ PJ 1 Il(lIjJ~ IllUl 1tmiddot It1 and f()od 1I(1 hl1ild 1)1111 of 111 [nl I 111 (1_ 1 (ff PlIilllll
IIap lap~urld ~()(J l~(d 1ttlnllltIl dIll frl](ldll1) t1H)l)
to lorpgt ll~l
From bt lJi i-l[) 11
llllrLt~ld Ill-illt 1) )01111 jldtlI hIgt 1)(111
tlold I 1~1 Ill j) 111l( i (jlll 111 lit 1(1 11middot1 illl oil 111
pom1 -1ll1 1Ill [I 11 fl III 1hltl l~illorl flnnl llilIIII (ollll1ltldr~ Ind]ltJl (11 1( Ill 11 (If I~ld lflI1-
1-1 llll ~d 1)1 i ol
I~id (l1n tlld lllrllllJ~ 1111 I lit frllll (If 111 ~(12d
(ltlry ~qladroll 111 P mit itl pd all (Ih 1111 p Ill -pndlllg
t 1 (Inlllll)--lltt illl lhllHl1t to r(lllfOlTt 11l~ (1 airy 1XII(I1 jll1ll1I nmiddot Ullljll jOll of Ill olTllhl I liy Ipd qUill
-()I)IL HlqULgtt -UPIl hy 1(11) nllltIY hi 1()IHIntlalld on frnnt of1d I )1 I ion I fa t I hrlI h1I Ldlllh of infanlry at (~tl l~riitd(gt hl I)nl~ 11lilllllllllll llII(- 1IlHllllni~
lion -upph j UlPIIli1 IIaI 11( onnnilllld 1(tl pn-ltifll1
Iprlh of J1l jllII (It I) lWHun (I)J Ind [llHlll IJlb iiJ~7lOJ Fill k I I 1llllL tnd hn lll( lin i 11lIolllin llHIIil lll)[(I(f(illI
Fnllll lil --1 J ]1 I
Fil nlht of i 111 da~ or Ill p J iat ion will take ()If tt 2)0 11 III IIld( IImiddotIiJ (Ill i1 f) local hn lill jlITl and J(lnfflf( 1ItlIIlt
From Artilllry Illf1lrtlllljllll ~(l WI
IIotih 1~)-lTllll julgt b bl tll ltwalld lllli IJW(-t of
f-uni~l I(r apTJtrllll ty Ii)lut ~ 1)1j tdioll- I kty 111 tlin (1))1 Ill I t io I llllllJliIld falliJ~ Ol
qur litH in ilillil~ I)f I)lll-lIll alhmiddot at ~O jl)I 1) lllfonntI inn frUffl dn J-iull Lmiddotallr -illlp lgtf( )fHlgt nport
(((1111](11(11 l~llfl till 111)1111 ldf1l and (Jnhr t
all ually h Ifd by I Hlll 1lt1l1 (lIwrd A 11 111 (ullllllalld po t
ht t W(middot( 11 ~A) FT Ild ~ 1-) Pl 1) larel jf U]
Tfu 1I11111l tf 11f I)IlflI j() IniJlllt~
~J I iro 11 ((jlJlllld
~1H(j11 IIlIIJon (ontinlHd 1gt1 111011
7 SIlII SlImiddotIIO (OI0I1L1 Ill f()l1)win~~ h a Ifmn( uf illforl1llflllll alld IJlI-agflt Il((id 11 th( I (()IP-
((Hilmand po t plW(lll LlJ 11)1 and ~1i Pf L) jTanh
c amp CSS QUaImiddotten Yo shy
bullVrom (orp~ Aviat ion
o hoslile f(r(e~ of any ~ize dbloven~ll ea-t of It lim Parr Ridg Dug Hill Ridgc Ileay railroad ttl lllOVPIl1lnt- alol1)) Iinls tilroll)h a-hingloll BalLimo-
lIa dr (lltl (1)7-717) BulJ~ of truck movcmer [rom A-ht-lo- t~77~70l) toward Vl-tminsPr
From 2d I )iviiol l
llo tile attwk again-t Plea-anl alky ~trong-Iys~ port (lt1 by arlillry wt 1il1HlHrl Jt UH) PI Continumiddot hO lill Jll ~Url (gain-t tilt divi-IOll cavalry jJy reser
of Illl(l haltalion- till ~()llll1lat of (~dt
[rom 1-1 rJivi-ion
S I()ll~ igtfl attHk laulwiltd in itlmly of llmon M at ~ot) J)jVl Tili at tad ll(lllld by fiftlln~minute arli1t pllparation [fo-till l)~mJll gun fire ha heen receit from arlil -outHa t I)f PIlacant allpy Ha( reonr teted new po-ition for my righl approximalely foul m] w(~1 of Ehhvalp behind erpLk aIled DlPI Run (nOl Strategic Map)
From hI CavallV II igacip
[lav pat nj~- --tIJchill) t IH lllt 10 (1 ( of CUllI10) Fall ItilJ 111 hO lill f)]((- -Ill to haHgt ithdlawn t wv-L of (unpowdpl Falls niH Belil l main body ho~ 1 Ilalry b a--llllhI llg 111 till WilllY of Hereford (10i~71~~ct Jlavl halted bulk of Illy forc( ll t of PII-JtOIl for lE~tltbel fund Command po-t Parkton t
IIqlttiJ( demolitions on Clct IbnJ arp -Jighl villJmiddotlj IPpaired hy dark load marking detaJl have (omplel1 marking road- to ilinily (If [l1lmibLurg and lullCytOlITI ~
U(lliliflIj( RlIHlrl I Ill allions laken and Oder~~ act ually it-lslIed hy I l(utll~ant CClleral A at hi~ lommand Pl ~ hlllVcen u) 11 and U r~I Jr Iarlh if any ~
Tim (l1ollnlor solutwuW minute
SI(llO-J II (olltinuld)
Special Situatiun Contilluld lurishy
x SII~IIL ~11tT lIlli (1I~ 11- I Ell Till foll)wing i I IlJum( of lJ)ormlllon and 1l1l- aJ~ rCT1ld at tIl 1 Cmiddot Iolllllland po hllln ~gtl) )~l and 11) P1l 1) 1lt11111
From (~Ulp- All SelTicl r i nalloOll Oihll dlon b-tlll hIIlIHd hy grOllndhl1
IJlladullenl- of t1)lih trot)p hae been located at GI I dOll (~~S-IOti) loslyn I~IK-lin~) and Baltimore IL~ JlUIlIHl- (If jrtl(k~ Ill in Ihr vilmity of (Ivndon jf t rials of ariou kind art pli(ct along tlw 1ail1o)(1 trJI ~ ~(ltlH inllvlwhilW j in ]llojn-- in 1111 icinity of oot burg llh~7111) aud Aldlild lOX-iii )
Frolll l-t (avalry Brigade I1
I fa( IlabliIId IOntaltt with 101sl Cavalry Sq~lt ron at t ream (Iossing over Gunpowder Falls RivCl ail miles wcsluf Parkton ilolile (avahy still holds ~k Lon 14t11-72t1) and Glencoe 007-711i) Olherwse thea
66
Academic Notes
to northeast of GunpOvdel Fall River over wluch we have passed is dear of hostile fOI((~1
From 1st Division
Hostile (oreel- along lntilc front of 1st Division launcheu a vi~()rous attack al 100 PiYI It appcal- that the main effort is against right of bt Division Cnion 1Iills is in l-rrave danger as the attack there h supported by tanks and heavy cOl1centratiom of artIllery 10 definite information of condition at the front available at thi- time Defen-ive position along the line Silver Iun Bandanna ha been relonnollln~d Have committed none of my general rescrv( a ypl
From 2d Dij1011
Jly cavalry is making a 1irm -land along the Emmitsshyburg Taneyto1l Road a- [oncd to commit two batshytalions of the dn hlon rec(rn to fill a gap in the line we-t of Pleasant middotallc~middot -logttlp att~Hk i~ carried out with vigor ~trongly ~uppolmiddotted hy artill~ry and -iome tanks Pleasant alley is reported to be in hand~ of enemy Vill ~onfirm this later Hu e one battalion left in divbion reserve I3elice hostile attack will epntuully be directed against Taneytown Diiion air enile has reported mall troop concentration mm ing tovard that areL
) I HCIINreflenf Report the actions taken and orders as i lctually bued by Lieutenant Gelleral A at his command post
between L1fi 111 and 11) PI 1) i1arlh if an~- Till( altolf for s(Jlulion m mlllules
[t1 iI~1 i SJ(]IoX II lContinued)
Special Situation Cuntinuedrll
fl SPtLJ SI1P]TCl C()II--lTI~n The following is a he rcumgt of information and messages receied at the comshy
I3rd poct I CoIP~ bet (en middot115 P)1 and 4 45 P11 15 IVIarch
From bt (lyalry Brigade
After hartl fight ho~tile forces have withdrawn farther Et and ~outh of (unp()vrieJ Fall River Hostile infantry believed to hmiddot hLtwLen Ilereford (405-719) and Corbett bull4118-716)
From ht Divijon
Hostile forces have entered emon Mills severe handshyto-hand fighting guing on there 1t Division forced ba(k abou11 mile on front (nion 1ilb Ebbvale My reserve three battalions ahout ~ mile cat of Littlestown (364shy740) 0 large ho-tilp re-erve- loeated
From 2d Divj-jol1 ro 10middot IIotile fo]lt(gt han rpulhed Big Pipe Creek near
Cnion Milk IIo)tiie force hac captured Pleasant Valley and are iiiowly forcing our line to the north Strong attack developing around Taneytown Do not believe we can hold the town without committin~ remainder of division rbenpound Divihion re~erve j- or~anizing a poi-gtit ion )(11 W(el1
Harney (~l3-7~5) Galt -0 large hostile )c~ervef) loshycated yet
From Corps Aviation
No large hostile reserves located -0 Red reinforceshyments found in rear areas Railroad tram movement Vashshyington Baltimore Havre de CIUCl (ontinues heavy Appalcntly hostilp l)oRition heing- organized between Woodshyensburg and Ashland Convoy of about 60 tlucks moved from vicinity of Vestmimtel toward Hereford at 115 PIVI
R((JuirtIUlil Itepolt the actions taken and orders as uetually issued hy LIeuroutenant Ceneral A at hb eommand post )etveen 415 PM and 4113 PM 1) 1Ial(h if any
Tone (llloucd fnr wlution ao minutt--
SECllO III
A Solution lunwrnph
A -1)UllOll of rlIUlrem( III 10
10 A SOLUTION OF REQUIHIIn~N I Adions taken and orden as actually itsucd by Lieutenant neneral A If any
Between lf() and 215 PAl Upon completion of the report~ LlLutenan1 leneral A
directed that he be kept constantly informed of deyelopments He went to his altice having directed the chief of staff to accomshypany him He discussed briefly the ~ituati()n and future plans with the chief of otaff
Between 215 and 245 Pill Continued discussion of tituatioll and future plan~ He issued the following directive
The corps will attack early 16 lmiddotIarch ene]oping the hostile right flank from the vicinity of Whitehall (407-723) and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead (385-723)
The 1st Cavalry Brigade will continue its attack and seize the ridge west of Gunpowder Falls Hiver as far south as Glencoe and prevent hostile ground reLonnaissancc to the northeast thereof It wi1l protect the movement of the 3d Division and will on corps order assis~ the attaek of that dlyision early tomorrow
The 3d Division will- move by motor to the vicinity of Vhitehall under cove~ of darknes~ tonight It will attack early tomorrow mOll1ing on corps order and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead
The 1st and 2d Divisions will not resume the attack until daylight tomorrow Details will he annoullced later
The 3d Division will be strongly faorcd in the matler of artillery and other support
The corps reserve will consibt of the ht Infantry less one battalion and will assemble at Littlestown by daylight 16 1larch prepared for movement by motor transport
Bet1Neil 245 PllI and 415 Pili Lieutenant General A announceclto his Chief of Staff
J am going on a visit to the 1st and 2d Divbioll troops and command posts by motor Aide One will accompany me Aide Two will be at your dispoal Keep Illl informed as to deelop~ ments in the situation I will direct the 1st and 2d Divisions to conserve their reserves for the altack tomorrow Have a staff officer visit the 3d Division at once and go over our plans with their Chief of Staff I will visil the 3d Diviion later
67
UlI(CU ~lj PJl (lml 44i PJU RetUlning to tie I Corps command post at about 4 10 P~
Lieutenant General A familiarized himelf with the situation and plans Accompanied by Aide One he then departed by motor for tlw command po of t Ill ~d J)jvi~JOn Before leaving 11w (~JlP~ (olllllland PfJt lH approved tlw l)lan of allalk a IUtiillld to him hy the (hilf (~r lalL
~( 1to-- 1
I)j(middotu-gtioll
llIqfl I
Ttll()P Jt tdlll II l~
Tun I)f lltlfllll 11 lt1 Ttl (lin 111
i~lIJt 11 11
11 I I I~I()J I I( jlllljIOi--I of till probhlll j 1() illt] I alt the applicatton of thl tattwal principle of an inrippencilnl (()rp in all al1a(k and the tnlop 1llding- oy tile cor-p comrnander
12 TI~(J()l LI 01-( The (I)rp~ commander has a large and lll- I lIntd -tafT at hi-- dl-pn-al who-c function is 10 reji[( the iOJllmanikr ofa~ nlllh dr ad l~ l)()~ih( ill t 1( fUllcl inn of the -Ialf 0 lmiddotdtHl lTllat nw~l of information to In-itf ~UTUshy atl 1Pll()rt~ rhl~ df InUt ~rp that problcl1l~ rC(luinng (leciion trl lIP vllltd 11) tIl( (olnmandlr ill ~uffi(1fllt time to a[O for
w oldlll lIJtHtmiddotrllllt in Ill (Illtioll of hi~ dttbillll~ If the ((Illlllallrpr at I P1l111l- to fnl1nw the now of information into the illnlllland PII-1 lIP 1111 flOn bVIolllc ~o Illolycd that lw cannot ldtquately p111l ahead The con--pqUlll(C of thl~ -tatp of atTairs - u--udly a -vnc of fllfrgCllry dlri~ions illlol11p1tte inujpshyqutlv alld tOi) Itll to be truly elfeltiyco
TIll hnl ()f detul l~ul1lcd by the (olllrnanltitl will of ( (JUI-U delrnd upon jw (haraltcrbtic- of t h(-gt cOl11manuer and i W jl(r)llali it If hi-- vlmJ of st alT lllrl principal - air olilr] 0
U i~lrdlt- of 1 litO Ilit- for dlaii of tIll lomlnander he musl I lliru t J- ldf ~rllh OjojV po--ible duty ithin their capabilishy l-- HI dol ll()t -hifl hi- nH)lihilit it by -0 tIllingo If he jli lull )]()Jl1lh (lIljlO hh gtIalf 111 is llIilty of Walll1g his tOIH 11 and fLllln 10 mtke (Jlcli( i llt algtliiti(s and (nlrgirs of lht-- I1
III t ldf hllh ha lllll1 VOrioll Ingethtr for ~()nll time o~uh a- I he onl hll jOIlIIltidlred matH of t he detail- as 10 tactical fl1l hnd (If 111( (tITlllIltlllhol nll ill wlll known to the ~tajr Thi~ [)01 t ](lIlvt-- 1 he 10] 1 (()mmanltier of the nee~ity of always I-oin~ Into dpd III ill-gt illtlu((jon~ Only when Ii( wbes to rnak~ a hln~rl Il form] t1w hnd~ will it he IHl~~aIV for him to gn into any gnat amount of detail
In thi -jlUd lOll I hl ~d Divi~ion ha- ju~t revertpd to (untroI
of til( J (orp~ Jt j tlJlgt (lIiion ~(l(ded to make the main aUwk of 1 he corp and llwrffor( ih (Oondition and -tate of morap and 1rlInin~~ are of jreat inl(r~l to the torps commander 111( jqrfJ~ ~it uation at 21 Pl i~ -gt1ifh Iha1 no major lhang~ vhi(h 111 pr(tnl til( atlatk 011 IG )Iarrh (an he expcdeo Even a WII hdrawal Oil 1hp lo1 flank will not jeopardizl t 11( (orp- plan SufIWI111 djaik a 10 the conduct of operatlOll~ today and IOmll)) mv haf i W(oll JJ1JWIJIl(Opd by tlit corps (omlllalHi(ro I fowshyc er he ~hould per-onally check conditions in the ht and 2d Jgti-ioth Thel( lS danglr If h( remainf at his command po- thaI unl( hp 1- an unu-ually phlegmatic person he may he tPmpltd to difialp too IlHHh of the details of operation He can do much more for lw sll((e~ltgt of the corps in its attack 16 Ivlarch
68
If he goes on a visit to the commanders of the 1st and 2d Di sions and later visits the 3d Division
Upon his return to his command post at 410 PM the commander received the information that the Reds had res their attack This was not unexpected as G-2 had annou this a hostile capability The plans so far prepared ha been examined by the eorps commander and presumably rn J1l( his approval we next consider the best aclion for the CltJ
(ollmander to take He had already informed the 1st and I )iviion I hat thlY wpre to at tack tomorrow and that they m (on~lrve their rcs(rve~ today It is about time that totlllnanrier iHsued the necessary instructions for the Ihi ](t11 by the ht ant 2r1 Divisions It will be quite late night when the final resolls of the days fight will be known 111lt (oq command post It is helieved that the corps CltJr
man del (an rnalw the most effective use of the next few hOlt hy makmg a visit to the ad Division ~ea
While on thee visits to the divisions he not only getslir ne hand information of the tadial situation but also of the slll WI
of morale The visits of t he corps commander may be a POWcrfi VI
stimulant to the morale of the subordinate commanders ~ tta would probahly nol issue orders direct to the divisions bUll i1J he doeo do so his aide wjJJ immediately report them to the cor~1 chif of stalf
1 TIME OF ANNOIIN(]NG DlC1Sj()N - In the dev of (vcry opcla ion there arrive crrtain times when must lit made It is the duty of a f(eneral staff so to 1 t lllir rlporb as to rctcivc delbions early enough for the effective It is the responsibility of the commander that done It b never ea~y to relognize the exact point in the d nwnt of operation w11(n a derision must be announc~d tlliH -jluation the situation bas dee~oped to such a paint~ Ibnut 21 PM At this time the l1ank from which to atlacl~id WII hin the Iapabilities of the cavalry to secure There is litl ih the enemy (an do between 215 pr and dark to prevent to Corps from attaeking at daylight tomorrow Darkness is 71S Pl amI the 1d Diyision has made no reconnaissances] h1 not marked out its routes Therefore it is believed that dirldivC if Issued latcr than 315 PII may result in impro preparation confusion and ineffectiene~ Instructions IT he iI(gtd rlier than )1[ Pi( directinf( the ld Division pnpan to rnoc and the final decision mipht then be issushyialer in thl day As said before the situation is such al2 P1l as to permit a dlli--ion to he announ(ed To delay beyc 11G IM indicates indcciflion and vacillation due to the demiddot I fur ((lJ more information The moement of the 3d Diw~ is dillkult and will n1uire the determined efforts and con tration of everyone to make it a success It is wrong in prinel to kccp subordinate in doubt over long- periods of time ast1 what is wished A direetive should be is~ucd just as soon 3St~
situation has deveioped to the point where the decision canb 1 made We will never have all the information we would lik We must al lim tal( lakulatld risks as to the probableca~ hili ies and llos-ihle reactions of the hostile forces
1)ltbions rll(llld llarlv oftpn hav0 to be modified in SO~J
nf Ill(iJ det aib hy Ialll delopmcnts Therefore the directi i isued by t he commander must be sufliciently general Or brogt in its terms so as to allow the staff leeway for adjustmentc minor malleIS Only such changes in the situation as wow make a directive impossible of successful execution should allowed to dictate a change in the directive Frequent chan lead to a lack of faith in a eommander and the faith of
1
l
Academic Notes
dinates is a commanders most powerful ally There is in this situation developed after 215 PM which calls change in the cGmmanders directive THE DIRECTIVE- middotThe I Corps has bcen directed to Baltimore without delay The 3d Division is ready to dark tonight and the cavalry will have gained a suitable
y position for the 3d Division The fog is clearing and e can expect the hostile forces to gain a clearer idea of our
and dispositions and to readjust his line of action to r offensive He may be strong enough to continue the
ttack tomorrow but if he does he will find himself grpatJy
As long as the hostile force attacks our holding attack force the latter will best perform its mission by defending Therefore to insure reserves for an attack tomorrow when the hostile forces may be attempting a defense or withdrawal the corps comshymander should prevent these two divisions using up their availshyable strength today
The directive must be definite- about tilc movement of the ~d Division That division can ~ove by motor transport and gain some surprise by moving at night Since this transport must be oul of the way or concealed by daylight we do not haY(~ any loa much time even with a long night In view of the
andicapped by our attack against his exposed east flank (arly possible changes in thehostile situation during the night and in omorrow morning Offemive action is clearly demanded by he message from General Headquarters
J ~ i An attack of the hoctile we-l jeft) flank has some attractive
features If succeful illmmedlalely will be more eOotl- to the neroy It will mObt quickly halt his attack against our right ~I (west) flank It has very pronounced undesirable features Even if initially successful the hoStile forces will have to he 51 tttacked again in front of or on t~e line Parr Ridge Du~ i lIi11Ridge It also drives Red back on our objective t hm requirshy0- fug us to find him again and again The objective for thegt first ~aisaction is the high ground in vicinity of Hampstead The
tapture of this terrain feature will completely dislocate the hosshyJ llleforce The easiest avenue of approach to this feature i~ from ~ le vicinity of Vhitehall Either flank is equally accesqible ~ lthough the situation on the west flank is not so completely poundmiddotl~ wbilized as on the east flank The movement to the east flank J ~ the most direct route to the hostile line of communications ~ fhich seems to lead from Baltimore At 215 PlI the (orps commander is aWUie that the bt and
bull ~d Diyisions are about to resume the offcnshe He knows that 1 irose two divisions will constitute his holding attack tomorrow
order to allow our feints demonstrations and attacks by the 1st and 2d Divisions to have effect we direct the 3d Division to attack on corp order rather than at a definite time
The directive to the cavalry must be definite The whole plan o[ the collmander m~y be disrupted by the action o[ the rayulry if propel instructions are not issued It is therefore the duty of the corps commander to tell the cavalry commander what he wants done and when and where the mission is to be performed After being relieved by the 2d Division and its cavalry the best use [or the cavalry brigade will probably be 10 attaek in conjunction with that division vVe cannot be sure of the --ituation at daylight tomorrow therefore we direct the cavalry hrigade to await a corps order before ltlttarldng
In order to provide a strong weapon in the hands of the (orps commander in many situations we would like to hold a brigade of infantry in corps rcservc In this situation the hostile forces have so definitely committed themselves to an attack that a large reserve on our part is not so necessary as when the hostile force has committed only a portion of hiR force The Blue bitushyation has become so involved on the front of the 1st and 2d Divisions that it is diflicult to envisage holding out a large reerve even if the situation did indicate its desirability
DECISION-To the natural horn leader if there i -u(h ~ pctmiddott-on the power of decbiun is a ~(cond nature It 1 inherenl 111 the man The I(arier mllst he dfcisive He mu-t have confidenc( in himself and heri a~ain he must have Imowlcdge ltPHI he [lh irally and mentally fit A pour decision prom)l) rendei(d and lignrous1y followed is inshys finitely hetter than no dtci-ion at aiL Vacillation has no place in the make-uIJ of a real leader However wrong deshycbions if made too frelUentiy lead to loss of prestige and lack of tonfidence The real leader is never a straddler
-J11laquo 01 (Jfcrnl Ii I Brees U S AT1ny
69
I
d
Irghling Forl rourn~l uf till JOllrnai qf til i llmlmiddotdSlrjmiddotmiddot
rmy 1qart r
Directory of Periodicals
IO(hlfllllTl tlll dirpclory up only those periodicalR from which nrtich~ havpound h(gt(gtn HPelted -- altt) Llltlt of ltrJlHiwniq Indfxed and Kpy to AIJhrfvitltiollI
MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS
Joint Farcus
(rl~t J~ftaln 1 1~1) LlI mtd ~(r](1 111lt11tllUl1l CPt Hntallli 7) lt 1- r- II ( hi tltlll1qll of Inlha (rlt Bntun ItHhll if) Emiddot (rIHntIJIl HI
Gcncr1 Military
I il Hr1 tin) if) Hlllhtlll 11) Ii II bull 1111111[1 rillllll1nl 7f) CanaulJ7l rJI r Ii r flI Iri rl (lfldILI 71 La Fran(t ~llilt I r [1( 71 -11liLlrwi I (I hI 1 Itt 1111ll1fll (iult-tnl 7K
71~~~~~(I~(r (1 rll til I l2
Rpoundvu( ~11Iitalr (q Tmiddot I r111(p) xi) Rtvul -l1l1t llTC ~l~ --Ji7frbnri) x7l
Armgt ilnd Scrvlcc~
m An It(d IT r r ltJrtmiddot rl (rlt HnUill) H)
ltTILI In
(f)Ilt rtlill r Inrn 71 lIPid rtdl rmiddot 1 71 InIPjt flf Il (rllt I1ritlIl I if) fLtmiddot 111 t (ll ( d~ 1
( ALHY
(wnlrshy 71 (ldn (TI Hrl1lJl 71 HI 1)1 il ~I rH1C 2
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
TIll (lIon atdo) tIlt lr(]pound-- ~llect(gtd from LIbrary periodicals for the current quarter Periodicals in this Catalog lITIlgt(i allllalJmiddottically
ARMY ORDNANCE
Mly~Junc 1938
1 It ~C 1l1t (llll -(T1Nf OlijlltEINTS II1IT Tim 1 IBLlt (11 111 Lr If L II~Tgt -lajur General lJrtgham
Til ilL 1-1 q So rr IUd ~~II 1111 IHLrAREnNfS~ POLICnS OF A 111)(1 IS Jtll II Jllc()l Ctptdn LlldlJiILlrt
jlltlI I~ rI] 11 A -rtlyen W HWIrSTHIL MOlI]I7ATION 1 llj()r (Hid
July-August 193B
Tn Thl I --1middot1 1( [l Tlll r 1111 ro 1011 PAn ITH TJ~CH-11 bjflr(ImiddotIIrl Ilfr
TtJTI(d~ [I f lin I 1T1ltJAI~ Im1It HblATION Tn OtlR NA~ nltj 1 --1 I~II r I J Li III (q]n)1 Itfl~~r I
ARMY QUARTERLY I(Pt ilritlIll)
July 1938
Im (11JJ It lllL III TIll Hili No XVI APIILltR HJDGr 9TH or ~fAi 1911
Im 1 1 r--l ] 11 -1T1L 1gtIL1J1T10N IN CHINA (II) LNlrquin
70
ENGINlxns Military Engineer _ Pionicrc (Germany) Rall-lrrna di Ctlltum Mtlllarp (Italy I Hoyal Enginccrfl Journal (Great Brlbin)
INFANTRY
Infantry Journal
Uld~ntu~lC)MCdi~~~~~~ (Greut Brituin) Military Surgeon
Army Ordnanc( QUARTLlltSTCR
QuartrmafJUr Hevl(w Itoyal Army Service Corp-l Quartprly (Grplt Hntlill)
lNhgt
Kraftfahrkampflrupp( (Germany) Royal Tank Corpl Journll (Grtlt Bnlain)
Vlttrrinary Bulletin
Navy and Marines Manne Corps Gazctt( Naval In~titut( Proccpdinhl
i u
I]
____- I~
l 1
o J~ 1321
b ~if
TIlE MAJOR TCTI(S Ill- Tin INIlllnell B TTLg BrigadJ(lT gomery
ANTI-AIHCHAIT Hax
BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES Inlgul
By -1JOlt E11 BINITJZ COIII Artillpry (orp
Janulry 1938
lilSTOIW OF Tim INSlECTOltAn~ GCNEltA ltW TilE An Alll BELGIAN TRAINING (INTERS DURllOG TilE WORLD WAR
lHbtoir(gt d( lIlIflppdioll G6neralt d( lArm(gt( et d(gt CentTrH Hlrudinll BII~CH ptlldant la GUerrp Mondiah 1lH~191SII LilutGll1(ral de Selliers de Maranville
Ih( iHllhnr WI Inljwctnr Grl1eral of tlw
~(olli I~~l ~~ ~~~ ~~l~il (1~ I~~1 g ~~m
j
hv
I~~ He ~ nti
f n~ I
jar
h
I ~
~~II~h~g~~~~~~ldd1 ~~~t~i~~tr(i~l r~~p~~~~~ qlttlr l~l fr~11d~ ~~11lail~~11 t~lo~~~11cliiDcuit Cir(IlTllltal(Pl uIHhr whih 1111 HCgilIl forcP rpcnlitld and III1Jlpli(cl
At tiU time of til( retr(tt of til( nplf~ian army Ul author had undpr hi ()mmlllHI ROmf t ROOO recruits in France scattered in six diviqional depot~ of 3000 men continued their advance tl1P1f men wer( tallten to Fecnmp whill nfW depotfl were opPlled in various toWtll Normnndy with l1fadquarters at RoUln
01 XVIII No 70 Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A YFAlt OF AR IN SPAIN (JUIY 1936 JUlY 1937) rUne nnn6e de gucrre en Eltpagnp (Juillet 1936 - JUllleurot 193711
(II) Major Wanty Conclusion of Major Want~ g account of the first i-Ear of the Spanish
(11 War
~ilrh~I~~~I~~p~~~I h~dOhd(~~er ~(~~~~~t~~~rlal~~~IJO~I~~~rnI~~h~r~f pnrdofllcrrs The Jarge extenslOn of front and Ol(gt comparatively igtmull numlHr of
t~~~~~af7~~~i fl~l~~~a ld~i~f~( ~~~l~ of I~~t~~~~l~r~~n~~igtOt~I~~ ~~ t~t~(~q t ~hi~~ ~Oeuror1or to thmi( of tlw GoCrnmrnt fortP TI bavegt hpPIl ltoll1what nf lcsappomtmpnt hO((gtT thry ould probahly havp Jllaypdt marpound mflushyftalro1(gt hart tl)rr hrPIl mfantr- rpad to follow til(m llr GtnllJ1IIom) hedplttrofd mlny tlnt or put thpm (Jut of Utoll Ilotor17lrl (nlumn hea~o hpPIl Ifgt ff(ctlC and dlfIllUitlh at thp hpld of tilgt olumn h rrrOl11litrd thf (-l1tirp (oloy TI)e~ (olnmnlt haY )1rOPI1 to 1(1 fr~
_~~~r~~I~ldair alta(- Tlll~ remarkgt lrp prohah mldf vlth (Jua
1 Tnr lJoulwt thpOT ha ftllPd to ingtPlff natiollalllrrnT on tlw (ontrlnt $1 tacticgt havo c(lnltoildatfd puhllc -pnlin1middotnt and tifT nld tIl(middot ]1 to r-ltt to tllp a~t
DImiddot 1lI1TION OF UH C110-1 l IUfjOAL TIt 11 01 11lf nu (LN S()I OlI]
Une tXpoltjtion fip pI rf(gt(i(1nnrmrnt (ultllnmiddot1 fI prnfl-inllwl ain-i qUl dorganI~ltioll dllt 11~lr du lt)lu11 J
~ A regimental commanrpr (jpltrTlption of the pducational and 0(1shyt ~a tramlllg of t1l(gt Bflgian ltoJellPr mel the factiltw ofTfrprj tlw oowr to ~_-e traming hilp in the seTiN
February 1938
Tm f)LFbsC OF DI~lmiddot[lF 17 OTOBER TO]n I1l1middotIHLlt 1)J 1 Pagplt (lhlto(lirr dp lArml lltp all (Ollr~ d la GUerr(gt ]lJ1-1HIh
j I)lxmmlrgt 17 odoilTC-lllnoWmirp 19111 III) faJltlr Want Tr(l econd inlttalmpot of the dpfcmp of Dixmudf drgtlt(niling til(gt operashy
~3 from 20- Octoher 1911j~
ibull I Th~ tlt)wn v a a ltIrlt gl( rofi and rlliway ccntN of Bllgmm and for
rt1-00n tlw G(rmall- mul( grlgtlt pITnrh 10 ( lpIUff it TlH hndldHad
~ -~ tgc~ ~f~r~I~11~1~~( ~Zll1~l~t Ji~l~ ~l~~I111(i~1 F~~~~ t fI J~r~hf~~~111~ il~~ r artly in tIl( dppoundIlp of the cIty
[1 -- shyHISTORI OF TIll bltIICTORTr GrSJRAL OF TUB Alnn ~n THE
nEJil- TH JX1S(j (E1ERs 111IOS( TilE Vom IJ H ~ Hh1oire de lInltpectwn Gill(oral( de lArmC poundt dCs CCntrEs dInshy
struction TIplglt ppnd1l1t la GUNre 110ndiale 191j-lJIR 1 III) LipuLGrmprai de Spiller dp ~foranvlile
Ii _~ ~p(ond inlttaln1Pnt glVrc a detailed account of the ralsinJ and U-- r n mrn ior tw nfigian arm v during th(gt World War with iull dptail (1 gt-1ng t1Plr frdill) (Io hm~~ HId Hlmltllf-trat ion At alrpadv (Xp1LllWd ~ r CPrllllf IltU( fill( to the raplr C(fmall adI11(eurogt tralllln) (pntPrlt k1 to llt f~tlbhf-llfrl III XormalHllP vlth the tsltlstanee of the Frpneh G~rrLfnt Soml 40000 mpH ~ 150(1) rc(nllh or the ltiacl1899-Hnl u12jnro or the 1914 clalt - Hf( tTuJllrl in t11(ltp (pntNe
March 1938
THE DEFENSI OF DiIUDE 17 Onomm TO 10 NOIMIIEH~1914 ipar dlllgttOlrl rIp lArmp(gt 1plvp all (lure ltIf b GU(gtfrc 1)14-191R Dixmurlp 17 octolmgt-lO TJ(lvlmhrl 11l1J (Ill) Major Wanty
~ The third inlttalment (overing th oJ1(gttationlt from 22-~5 OctollPr m C Leh thr author dClt(flhes in ddail th(gt hIroic attemptlt to hold tlw position
trough tile hifTlJ command had deCld-d thlt Dixmllrr mllltt he lbamk)Jwri
~e f~~~f ~~t l~ill~~~~hr~~~~~~~~~~~ Ifli~tal~~i~alvN~n~~h~s~~71~1~~~~
l~Clme penlous Heavy lo~gtplt Vore inflicted on th( GPrmans who werl
astl ooung mpn of tlw new ReiNe Corplt ThCla( of rfltrrv(gt) thr(gtw _great ~train upon hoth French and TIplglal1lt particularly tl1P attfr who
uld not fpn or)imi7C tll(middot FutHh ltYltPlll or lt11ort rlllpfs The machinp ~nnrs In particular hul no r(st day or night Tl(SP operationgt arpound fcnbrd In grpat detail
1l)TOItY Of TilE JNSPE( TORTE GI~FltI ltH Tim AIWY AN]) TilL1 BrrGfAN THAININr CHIH~ DUilINf TIH~ WOHfn WAR rHl~toir( cir lInltppctOn G6nfralp dr JArmpe (gt1 drCl C(gtntrplt dIn-
Btruction B(gtll-C pendallt la Gl1(gtrrf Mondialp 1914-HI181 rIIl) ] Lifut GrnCral de Sflllfrs h1IIJratlvil1f f The thml ingttalmrnt (overing thp pCflod 5 January 1915 to Fehruary
19 bull
CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (ClIlada)
July 1938
CND~ ~(jIliiIN luLHY 13) the Hight IIollourahlp WL MallPllzl AI AR~IY THAT CAN ATTArK - A DIVIRION TJlAT rAN IlI~FrNJ) Captain
rJWBLl-~ljS OF DEFENCE ON THE PACI~IC Colonel Letson A SYSTEM OF ANTI-TANK Dl~FENCE Captain Kormann TANK OR ANTI-TANK Major Sieulrg
CAVALRY JOURNAL
May~Junc 1938
1)w TilL) KNOW Jlm) Major Schwi(gttl
July-August 1938
Tm ROU olt AVIATION WlIU ~mrHANI~~P AVAIItY CalJtam Sehlatter DLI EN~E MA1NST lIt ATTACK Captun Nohle Till lOlTNIIP ATTAf IN OPgN OIWtlt Colonel itrwart Late 15th
JallC( rs IIHhan Army rOlINIJ CONTHOL CmlMOlilCATiON A REGIMENTAL VIEW-
lUl~middotr Jwul (olun(1 Grim(s
CAVALRY JOURNAL IG-nat I3ritaml
July 1938
A (AUn OFFIllm~ EXIEltlENJSON TIlE INDIAN FltOSTIER DURING TIlE WAR LHutCololel BCaman
CnL1lY BAfTL~ HONOlJHS TUE r8NiNSULAR WAR - PART 3 TAshy1ntA ~7TJ[2KTH JIILY 1809 Major Edwards
~l(ItALt (I01l1IlER TO RIJOUiiHml Lleut-Culonp1 McCrp(ry
CHEMICAL WARFARE BULLETIN
July 1938
~I (TRIT OJ TilE IIWI(E m fliPLY nri(adlfr Genpral Tyn(r
COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
no~IDING OIEltATIONS IN TilE ZONE 01 Tlln INnHIOJ LJ(utColonel (olton
Am IOvBIt AND moO MOg1ENT Major Phillips ANTIAlRCILll COl~IUNHTIONS Captlin Bartlett
July-August 1938
DEi ENS OF TilE 13ELGLN COAST 1914-1918 Licut CulOlH1 Tilton BUIJlAlwomNT TACTlCS Brigadier General Pratt THUNDER IN TllJ EAST Lieutrllunt Rudolph Tng SPANISH WAIt A REVIEW OF TIfE BEamp1 FOHEIGl OPINION Captain
Johnson
FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
LBSUNS lItml SPAIN Colonel Lanza ARE PHlATE SOLDums Ni~CESSARY Upson Cml~IUNI(TiON WITJTlN THE LIGHT BATTALION Lieutenant Dishman
July-August 1938
MOlNG TARGET TiRIW NJrJ1T UVEIt (ftOSSING
FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain I
June 1938
AN(iO-FHENCIi CO-OPE1ATION Right Honoraillpound Winston Churchill PRIT Commmdcr Grellffll Am fOJUE KPANSION fly Our Air Jiorc Correspond(nt
August 1938
TIIB H()1BER WiLL r-OT ALWAYS GET THROUGH By Realist TilE HATTIE OF TIm WIlnEHNE~S Licut-Colonpi Burne
LA FRANCE MILITAIRE (France)
Il MJOR T R PlIlLLlPS Coast ArtIllery Corp
18 February 1938
INFANTRY TU~AINS TilE qurEN OF BATTIES ILinrantNip dpoundm(lrp a nl1P rips l1atalllpound1 J
Tl author T((all thal it il not today only that 0111 admits that battle hal loltt Its dl(iqiVl lmractPr This information was obtainable from the R11iill~Japallte War And it sppms that tllP only method or overcoming thilt4 inconvcnwnce is II IlfW mobility of operations mohihty which requires tactJ(ai continuity in til(gt prOI~rrgs or the attack
[n all armill thil truth has been recogniz(d ltnd all undeNtand equally that taniHI have not fulfilled all hopes placed in them It is not tanks that
71
C~tald(j of Selefteci Periodical Articles C amp GSS Quart ~~~~~~~~~==~--==-~==~--~~~==~~~~-~-~~~
wll be ahlmiddot to Tmg dppiltlOn m hattIe and it jq n(((ltIary nnew to tum tnwllrd the ptfrnai infantry It 1 mfalltry whirh Rhoulcl proVIre the solutJOn to
the )r~~~~ptt~~~~j~lli~i~~SL~t~i~(a~~~~~~~itty to gam continuitsect of moyprnfnt for the iJIIMltry uffmiddotnltIVf Equdl it j~ indlspenltahe to furshynith (lvidtnrl fnr rIo ~~llptrl flf thE infmtry lttalk aJulhlp information on thi NubjPft hal 11middotpl1 illlwil frlln Sptin Ind tlll O[wnt in till pl~t yar Al Captain gtIclmlra -11] III Tlw Onit(d Sr i(~middot HI-lW 1PrJ IVJltlOfl
i~~~ I~~t~~l~ll ~n~I Lr~li I~~ I~ f~~t J~l )Iiiirt ~~middott~i~~ ~~l)fd~l~~ i)if~ TJlI arlion f)f Jill] n VJll Lf call1ta In th( atta( 1llt mrantry rlnnot prnl~t( middot1 agailj~t rn lIhnp VllIlC 11 lilt C)gt n d h~ t1l11 rtllli ry (rtll~ Will I1WI) tr i lip tIl jllCll1nn hut lamiddot[( mel thrn l mLlilnll IUIl 11 nrnlll til plr) I lif 1(1lCl of tllP ltlfLury ullttl till 1 )nki rft tn work n fhl nL
It wlldd 11111 dllllnd wntl Ldnr ~)(Lln IhLId 1 middotInmiddotI of 1 fll7 II 1-0 ILt I ilL W Jim t hlt II d ltIqOn 1 If) Ill PHmiddot(middottl ltI llllt 11
Ihl ollIIIJI)) 1 Tltnrkdlp InLLTltn InfHlrmiddot I lr~ 1llV tlldlY 1IIfl vnlh IIJ( na~()n ti h lt-tlll l1l1
I qlld rillmiddot til 1111 If lIlh II will 1 )11 Ihd m1l(h Jllltn lIrr (If Uf tI n lrnj drl plapj dill It lmmPfiLtp PrlP 1 pry-ttIPI hnilld I d ITound 1ilf mfan1 r llld til i1 I v hy III Jl)~lnd 1 I ap 111 Illlli III mf111n dljcifill
Illl Il Ir L dd 11111 dflllpllllnt of dlIJo)~Ir lrllllilri t hI 1I1Ltlil r [ 11 T II frlll ttl hlh t himiddot Imprl rJli til trr)l t IIf (0)]lt11shytll iqn IJf llllJfl rn mfln r rj fWlrL1l11 III ill Iji muq Ip t hrgt founrllIl1lll f 1 bull 01 )r~ ( lit Irm
ljrrn Infilr I fin (fol)l1 Ill toolLv )llll 11IflItry 11 not llVrj rn hgt(I1 It J () ~ ltrmnrrd antlt1Il1 ~I lIOn- Ulri f~r(llarj( threli~shyr It Rill nd i mrjrn lJ1l it III Id t hi 11 Hll 11lrilmlllt in IH Of 41lfi Hl pflrt(( thl arm ITI)(II d I dll1I~ in Its f rlr and Jndoll Ih Ir (rror nr (oilgt rint tlu m- hl- 1l) 1111111 (llffl UI
5 M1rch 1938
Ill (iT -i THr1 TII Itll Till- lt01 Till ltT 11 It tl- ( nl1m r II Sud-I- I (olm]l HlHltl
n r Fr LllCO ~fdlLrtraquo o( I SIpkmlIr 1917 til liltlOr I n1 ntl ot nf till flur l~rollp-1 nf Ilrl~p Gprman mlhtlfmiddot unitlt
II 1 )llli]tif thlt O1kht td piL(I Olle r(lItllIIi- ronshy111 Ir 1 j lIl1ru IPImiddotIlrmiddot tn bf Ibout to Cd p1uP Thi IS I
) tI In r I) tll Trl j r 11l -llnnlk1 (( Il Ld middotr rfll1r lin HIICJllllI ~ 1m hLi c()mmmd( d hl II
rrn ()Tp 11 11I11Ilth ha b( nn (111 (1 In tlil command of tl1(gt ttl Groupshyf11 III of iLf[1 Ilnl~ It l ljll lwrl Ill rpphr -1 GPJlrrcll 011 lntlh l~ 1 III ( 11i1111 17lt11 In fTt -I Gf Iltrtl on HI HlWIlUI ejpml to hr dll lo
11111( Inj r 1 I- f)Ir)j I rilTlrllflll Ilf til mlr armv (nrp -fatlnIlP(1 011 tlt frotl f f CIgtfJlh)rn lUt md U1~tfil tJr- 11 Inrpi It -11J1lwh I Illfd f IllLtnlr- ItltIr nil Sthotrl thf Xill (UTlI II uremhuTf ~ nmiddotrll If CIll r middot 1111 llh tIl(gt 1middot COTll at Dndpn GpnfgtTal of
Infllllnmiddotnn S(lnldkr ill 111 (nrp at Hfl~11tll((llPrall)f Infantry foil] In adilltln hp ] t nIlrlan milUlllllIl lln~d(gt at Lmdlll tIlt d j)nlflll Igtf (jllnmiddot dt Brr-~lll llld thp 1ltt ~d mel ilh Armorrd l)jVlmiddot
11 II PlIlllr 11r7hlr)~ Inri nr(lt]all Th 011 HIlrl 11n11 (rn11]1 Ihu (llilstitUplt 11 Ixmiddot(l1ent nlPtll for
1111)1rl1ll1 prlllTP on Alllttri md Cz((holovlkl-l ThL l~fnllfJ em IH JrtlrI h I l1ornr r (If arm (orp c1f1arhpd from thp FJrct and Srconrl
ll HfrlJl and (tmiddot 1 vlfliuul (hturillnJ thp Lngp covCrinr fnrcfc I 11 dlll L lill I 10~ d1 tlJ rl j()Jh fflllll Poland or Franrp Faring
Inl Frlll I I- (middottHIIl lIll 1) 111 lin Ii 1 thf Y and XII Corplt al ~I1Ilrt In I] 1 Hl n TIl(gt r()prin~~ fllrcplt will 1( (ommlndtd hy CIIlril JI111I latlnlwil d K(IlrJultlrtl Fl(inl~ Pulanr1 j (lu Flrlt CnllP I 11llTl1llld d c III r d nll Hllll-IImiddotIIl ~hlfh ilhuril till 1 II III lid III (uI th hmiddotldlILLrfgtr ll J()JllgqlIrg Stlttin ttldin anrl Bn -1111 SInP t1 1 J I (oTl- 1(longH 1111 in thf ofTlllIV (roup of von Il Irll nUl if III II Tfr1L1middotd in Itlt cl)v(gtTin~~ mlcion tJwlrd PoTtnd hy I 1llh~fllr 1Il11~ JlroLlllly rrl)lllfd llndr tlH OrdfrH of nIIPral von KPlit
Tljl rl n m lltl- tlilll tl 11Igtl1rl tIll nfTInlvP 1111011 If till Hlldwlllu rnllP tIll T IX X XI lIlcl XImiddot COnl the ~ld and Hh Armorpd IJlvi-lOlll
dd Ihl ht (I1r 1)ll--lnn TJ1f (man Army cw thll- throw two cU(shyt hrmI-middot1 Vvlrd til(gt crplllHadmiddot III Ihl flTlt hi Ihl Fourth Group In(IlI1rrL~ md r tl1 Irdl r1 flf IlImiddotril VOIl HCilli(gtnau fOllr army (nrpl a Inmiddotllltolln hrJgult thrmiddotp armorl rliidnnl and a flvalry djill)l ill thl (JlrllllH IllP Tlmd (rup illl IlPadqllartprq at Dndpn mduding fi(gt
I)fr t- IrTlllrirl dIVllf1n9 an1 a livilon of cavalry Ar tIl 1 r III Ind (1 tht 11tklall armir lapaI11 of fl[ ini~ til llorpltltlntl of lTlllmiddotqrlulp Inri lldity
19 Mnrch 1938
Itl HLlIfTOC IlN THE GJltAN AltIY IUfI raquoiIJt r 1 1llr Jarm(p allpmnnrif I (orl1l1l Choumlo
j hI ~Ilr IJl7 hai paH(1 RlthoUI tlw war whlCh many (gtqwlpoundd and IJlk 10 ( Ih nnlr qW-Itj(Jn With ITIltfr allxidy Thiq qUlltllln dPJJInd~ )1 11IIm lrmmy liJr fI1l1 Olmtry wllfn pnJ)aratlOn fur war IS tIll fnnrJlrJ III a ImnllIlt of nal imal li(I Bllt IJIl Spfltt lind hll (il(III rt lml Iltllj 11]p I 0))1 of tlw orld Var witlId to prepow a rLpid WHr lJt Id alm1 hmiddotlv 01 lmiti An arm~ Wlll(h will)o allIIl all llllllY Hutldfnl~ Ind ly 1llrprl-f ~I intprt1t ihll( nwr in tIll HptNI of tiwir tanlq lhw in tllfir 1Tmor anrI armnmpnt Yon flppkt dppmrcl it )HCpqqary to rfinshy(re hll armlJrr II land (or(I hy a IhOllllllHl nirplanfl
011 Spfkl ~I th( nrt1 fnr()lIltrrpd conqidprahlp rtliHtanc( atnonK tlH rlf(tltativImiddot If thl old rNmlIl (ipnfril BtafT lmt 11HY C01HIUlrtd comshy
middotPllblbIJld yenIrior to tlJl GfltTman-Aufltrian union
72
plctely tht new gentml iOll wuch had )10 War eXj1(gtTlenc( and whose mllilt- lIlstrtlction wai Vpry hrJPf during tIllt perIOd of Glrman army limitation ~ 5C new academy heacitd by GClleral Libman nn intimat( advi~fr of til( Fuhn til ha~ only functionCc1 for two or three y(gtam and the firgtt officers who ht~ au grauuatfd are till doing thCir ~Crvice with troopg ar
Iwo t(gtIHlcllciP WIrf formpti in til GfIITal Staff Corps and lCpafll1 tb tlw old otlilfri who had )P(gt11 forlnd in tl1l war (ofCge in llerhn nnd~ (0
fOIlI~ht Ihl war and till yOlllll~ oHtlr wlthuut Wlr txlpritI1(( md graduall D( frorntllt ahlinvialld IHII wlr )tafT (our The olli(iai organ of thearrry tlP Mi1itar~WI)fIHnhlatt iI duplicated now hy the Deutsche We~ of organ of tll1 IIIW Glrrnan nnlitary thOIlIht j in oppocition to the idCM016 old (lIIITal StaIL 1hp OPI)()-itwil had tlndd (0 mov( the point of ~ of tIl nld(r ofjHtr toward till Frltllh taetitll idpas which con-ist of ga I IIllP to pprmil 1ll1)]ilLatlOn (oopnnv troop awtiting thpound ()(my Oil prc~ J))litionq WIth jlanlj wfl ltufil)orttli allfi Irqnl~ r(lt(gtrvpc fot ()untrratll 1ll middotIl of IlPld
Thl hwrn)(rl of (IL( olt G(Ilfra Staff wllh von Blomh(gt(R hrldtbt HIIa and haliwti1hlm up ith (xpIriel1ltl In Splin whllh was not avon~ to rapid tanl TIHI ltPI)lratpfl from thr inLmtry (VPO thotl~h victoriOCl w(r dl troYId lJ antitank 1~1J1l1 and Ivet) fifld artilhry aft Ixilauqt(ti t Iwir ammull1 Hill Tank JI tlH an(iPllt rullint harr World Wlf mlld 11 (olnwfd elmfly II till ilJfmtrv flut sin[(l 10 tlu printlpitl of Im ~ppld I nuy Iwulrl )1 falt It followed that try hl)uld Ill Iarripd In mrJJrlt ExplrilIH1 -Ith thi~ tlHory Wa~ obta at 1111 Hatth of (lIatItlapra H-~3 ~1tr(h 1937 when the aviatIOn tr fllrllwd Plll)rmOml (Ilitllllll of motrs mIll a ma~~ of iroll junk
Till r (XIINiIIHP1 lrml-frJ lif rpll(tiongt of the partlmll) or sudigt ~ttt(k Ithoul a detarallon of Wdr (i1Tman militan pub1icatIOIlH wL IVf1I rprPlllly hII fmpha-i7f11 till TfTlltrkahle fjualitll of UWlr laril I-pp(iatly tiwir fgtpIId which Icrmit tId (1t1-1Vf hioWH are now Pl1hi5r~ ](ttlr (())IlldtT(d artitlr notably tho by (j(lleri Elnlanbprger ll a AUlriJ1 lank autbonfimiddot_ III dlfan lt thit at lIat a yplr WJill)( requl tn manllfaelurp lIHlI~h tm to havf an fff liv Ilp(riorily uvert aclpmary Imdff tlw mo1 ftorabllt condition And til ~liht hJLtt Writll thaI rlpit jl1Ji whilh Iplrtlro ll](m~IIt from an a (ontrHlidion to tllf fundamlnLil Hlpl of tIll wpoundqmIl (I(onling to I Ill 1Ir of thp nldlr Cftnm (i(lpral Staff omngt there I)~ lonlT allY qllPtlOn of a Ilrldln at tack 1lId It wJ rquiT at (a~t a)i til miIlUfLctIlTl mattnd ~llfli(j(gtnt ill 1111Il1ity and flnllltr
At tIlt Ilml flltlfr (lmp inlo IHIWlr till HiPl of rapid war W
of (lfmaIl11tratlIY and thlt i ~ 11 till lill tltor could amrn~ III that 11 would aplHlr uddlnly hfon Ihgt PIlf01y hy urpnI hUll 1h( ~PIl(falf of Ihp oldlr (hoo n(uo(d to nloI tlf Fuhrr oert rolliltl md Fivld 111r11al HlnmllCn l1tholJg-h m anlnt National Socia5shywac not ahlfgt to rfIlOtln( phi Tllllitln (()Il IdlOll Hpoundlidplt fVPII I luperfi 1U (xmullllion of German millt[ likrtllrp ltho(lt1 that tllP ~t Hlomlwrg- d[vtrlld from th(gt politjd lImlt of 11)(gt Fllhrfr alld ~I rr from (oPrillj(lt1 lt(ra((~ htl lld -(1IIhl wr a JOIl tll1H to ud (orrflte(l J)oulwt qratil~Y It
Onl of fhf Ividlnt proofl tillt tIlt GfnPLll Staff hlIl rPllotlnCld 11 ~~~~d~i~~gt ~ltr~~~I~)fh~II~~c~rl~~I(I~~~i~ ~l~(lt~lt~))~ll~i~f tl~l(V~~~~~~~for~ -~( lTn1ond divi~ioll E(n til( orgmizlum of thf 11)) njvL~jf)l of I n already (lltup1ptply ready lIltl dctinpu to 0((111 tIll inclll-InII rrglr Q Flllfrffhl-TIarnwl1 hll bcCn topppd at prlltent n
Aftpr having rfgtdiz(gt(l that tank unite ~llon( could not l1nri(rtaheuro-~lpriOIIS op(rltion~ tl1pound I)r~ani7prlt of thl Il(W Irmy dtcid(d to pro(rd the r(irrinrrllllfllt of th 1notori7fd lIlLllItry lt0 th)t It woult not bL IJlhind til( tanl1 and III the fift hdf of 19n 11 reHlwnts of infantr~l hCfn motorizCd IItH C er tlw Rittle of GtucLtlaiarl l1pr( the motoshyinfintry had I](pn hpakn halt forced tilt Gprmall (~ IHrd Rtlff to am-ltL tlH fllrlhlr lnotorilltlllll of tIlt infalltry
1))1 (rfltors of til( np GprmlH dodrinp of ar Ire compIltCly TV Till IlPW aputtgt of tanls (i(lIfrd Eimltlllbl Tlr Iipllin thlt If I~ hIVP not U(((Ilti(rt tip in thl prtfnt it il bt(luP tlw havlt not becn proppriy anti JI(gt dp(Lm- thlt they ~hol1lclllP tlltainprl in ~he off(nsiwL~ ollk hy 11Ifltltry 11111 With pnlTflll 1r11i)T llpporl which ml~ hrlJ to f(lllow tht1ll TIp iillt al(llT(hl)l~ to -hwh tIl(gt lanks d~tiIlPd flltl repJa((gt tllC Irtilllry III onipr to tin lay it h Ihr Lrliry prlarlto)lwi qllllllll(] tll( lIILIIk bull hollid nnw lp gtupportftl hy thil lfllP lrtilllIY
~ H
~ ~
Lit lHIJl1(I a1 lll)tlty Ind intTI-ld molortlatioll If til arlllltryb rIHllllOIlll1lllHld lImHpr ill many f th( dIVJ~i(ll artlllpry T(gimentIil
thinl pclion fur the ~upport of tllll- art I ~ft unorganiild Tlw GPrmall~ ha(~ tlm r(llo11nlfd theirfith lt1 tIll rfation ofa
ml all( ulnHtil(1 tiH Frll1(h thlf It I 11l1 an witll tll ~trat~ lvlatlllll Tltl nIt (~Prtll1Il ((I(gtr11 StlfT hI tlWlY~ htmiddotjd (Jut the miinn of aviallon a to altl tilf ~roun(l troop and only tftpr qucll req~ nHntl had hPll Ilwt to u1drrtalI nnw indlptIHPIlI oppratiOIlllll theft I( rahlq on thp mo~t important CPJjtl[l from a lllJlitary point (l( vip h rp(Pllt arlitj( in tilt Militar-V()dl1nh)III Ct11ollt1 Braull tlll1011stn that 111 thotliand airpianpl and tilt -1uddl1l attHk arl qUlitions o~ lWlOTHI Melir and that II ilIHI(clry ahoy all to latify tll( lviationn i
of Ihf Iround armgt lnd al1) tilt rpquirllHlnq of III (111 and mo~timC tall ((ntlgtr4 of lip Itllllllr (or Lllfinirlfd( dt(I11( 11( 1tt(li(tted OmIt army (orPq -Iliuuld hayl nillt f1tOnnaLltltHt plaut thrll [or artillery]) vBlinll Hlllthrhl for iaiH)] lteh armY (ight((lr((onn31~sallc( pl~ c nilll Tmrquit and niJlP bomilarrim(ut Icll flank dlVIllOn a quadron of airplant lLf(l Hh mnllllp dliion Jplll(r tank or cavalry Itl nme
or tllf dffpwt p( impnrtnllt point it is 1l(gt((lCllry to (Otllit on 1t a flquadroll of niTll Illallpq flllh the frontiCr cannot hC l(ft without drJ and thf prohahle route of inva~ion of an (Iwmy raid mU1t be cnrrdl (on~(lu(gtntly aftPT hUYir fmtiqfiCd [Ill the IHfpoundis of tllf atm~ andof J I aircraft dlfensf tlwrf WIll not remam many Illnnr4 for ulnal raids II
c
L
~
the country_
thOUl3nd airplanes and if these needs ate not satisl1ed the army might he ampflously menaced and VIllagegt and important poinLI suhjected to destrucshy
~~ aTr~ili~~e tll~t ~h~~ner~de~r~ie~ta~ ~~~ed~ritadrt~~ ~~~r~~l t~~c~~ The day after the taking of supreme command or all
forces b) Hitler a decre(- annollnc(d the Unification of t][gt INial ~ i~iair armielt Calkd division nr group~ with centers at funich
~ ing had personally dircctpu an aerial maneuver the theme fawhICh was a war between Gc~many and Frpnc(gtbull and In WhiCh Rlrrultaneshy-1~ Dusly with a sudden attack agam~t the MagmQt hne a thommnd airplanegt ~ left the SlUltgardt Iirdromls and complplcly d(mtrol-ltd Pam The conclushy
sOIl3 wrrp bent by llltkr to Blomberg and the representatives of the Rtiehsshy wehr declared that the strategy of GOlrin~ might have heen rortunat but that it could aho 11lc led to complete disaster Bcsidgt eVtn in alte of t j ltucC(I~ therf Wltlgt no r(lton to admit that the will to rsist would b( hrolwn
i~d th~t the French vould r(gtnounce prolonging the war lgt As far a preparatiOn for var IS concertld the organization of the ~Irmy lt land Its penonnel should be conildered Thp Gprman army tralllformed In
~ l~f~d~~i~~ l~~duVl~gtn~~ l~h~~(II~)~fc~~l~~i~~l~I(1 ~~~~~~a~II~~ ~~~l~~~ ~ ~duatlOn from (houl are ghcn a su~wrflCJaI pxlmillatlUn if they wish to
~ i~~~~p~~~i ~la~~r~e~i~) tn~~~I~)~l ~t~~ll ~~~~~ ~l~~i(~~ (gt ~Il~Ii~ ~~I ~~~f~~~l~t~~~ l~~ 1e~nt~th~I~~1Till~(~r~~Sll~r~ijl~~ ~m~~~~O~r~ sO~i~I~~fnh 1~~~~i~~~I~~ I~nd the gpirlt of It~ offJceflt rtqiq II ow on a d()ubiful baltC dpprlvpd of th(
- lLadltlOnamp of the old army ~- 1 Furthermore while m the Fnmh rm)- all the olleers of the grade of ~ ft3jOr and above took part III the Great War In the German army fVfn a ~ ja part of tllp officers of the grade of colonel 01lt (gt11 as all tholtc under thiq
i ~~~~o~nf~Udg~~~IIPCre1na~t~ ~r~d~rmiddotca~~l~i~llfr~ld C~~~[l~~ il~ ~~~ - ~de of major The Frpnch Genertliqmo Gamehn was chipf of sttfI of a ~~ ~cup of armipi during the ar while the commandcr or the German forpgt
~i ~ Gfnel~l ~~a~g~~~~~~i~~l~~(t~iiil~r~~I~~Irl (~lr r~I~~lh~~~r~lgll~~~hfu~ni~h~dmiddotmiddotmiddot-i~ the ~oldier of the RNchltw(hr llld for til( reltt thre(gt school havp been I tltuted It Potsdam Bibrrich and Vetzlar IImveoer Berthod Jacob
- ~ates that there hai not yet I)(en a slll~le graduate from th(~e schools ~J For recruitment of ~cneral staff officerq the duration of the course at
~_J_ I-e WarColfg has he(ll rrduc(d from thrN tf) two yfars hut in consNllencf
~ i f~~~~km(~a~~f~~~t~a~r~f rS~~~~~~in~l~gt~p~~~ ~~~~~~~lt~~a~~ ITIf~G~~~~~ ann has (ven redlpd former general s~aff officprl t~ service from retlreshy cnt among others Colonel IIerke (Illd of the RUilway Bureau to Ow r ~ rmiddot~tfgtr and Colonel HfmarICh ehlPf of the topographical section 1 r The GlrnJan exam pip i (ol1yincm~ once more that to create an army gt~ t3 not ltuflicifnt to as~(mbJc men and arm them it is still 11(C(Slary and 1 ls IS more difficult to crrate the bkeleton the corps of officers and nonshyI lcc~mlSslOnPd officers _ Colonel Choumski tcrminlteg Ius study in saying With appreciation the
~~ ~~~t~~~~~i~~e~~~i2~je~~ti~~~t r~~dY~~~~I~~ d~ffi~~ltd~l~d 1~1~~J~~~~ai~ l2t rnmiddot tlut vould he gwen it by an European war The German army lack~ gtJ ~~l detlrmllwd military doetrme a compact and tested group of leadprl
vnor and inrtdor 101 well a th matfnel it nepds -c I_ J 19-20 April 1938
I IRON DISCIPLINE 1lt lOH1~ N1middot~CESSln THAN EVEH IN Tim SovmT ARM
IUne dl~ciplll1P mllItme de fer e~t plu~ (jUt jarnaio ngtce~aire dans larmcc IovietHjUP]
1- In the issue of 20 Mrch 19a~ lrOlsnaia ZVlPzda the organ of til( emiddotmiddot PHi army ati~lm th~ leLdN an~l poJt~al cummissar who do not maintain eI~ lDe-dIscrlme III thr orgamzatIOns rcl A mIlitary dilcipilne hke fan wnt(gts the author ll the foundatIOn of t tre aptItude for combat of the Red army and of the victory of the Soviet gt~ ~ope OV(f the (Ilemils of th( -ocilllltt ffvoluti(ln Th(gt Party I~ gOing to rI eestro the Trotkyist traitors who stru~gle a~ail1sF tlCorganlzatlOn of the ~l regular army and againt the strengthemng of Its dlsclphne
Our army is the mOlt homogClleous the helt or~all1zed and I)(~t dlCI
Itt f~~h~r i~n ~7~h~l~~i)H~~ ~lr~henn~d(~~~i~(I~a~~dv~~Wth~ ~~~ f~~c~~cid~~~ ~ of the comhatants of the Ipadors and the political ommissars and on their I devot10n to til( party of Lenin-Stalin and the socialit fatherland Our
~ III modern tcehniquf lnd the role of etlch fwldifr and rnch Irader
owed an
YHlCf(lIltld Ulldlf t1He (ondl~])ll flilcipin( ~ium(s an enormous C th ltJlight(ltt lark of rJclplme (xl(utlOn rhfTerent fran lllltruCshy
ruin modern merhanilm and lower the value of tllf umt~ of the
d((gtiRlve role in the lltru~gle to he carrlNl out to maintam 111 iron falls to tlw lrgtadrgtr9 and the politleal commlSlarH th(y arc rlpOll-
It Unfortunately there are in the Red army RomP leader and rll who hav( forgotten that WIthout iron dllClplme one cannot MY nor ffsolve the problemB of military and political prfparatioll
hI author thln cites 8)me concf(te eaRP it is in this cate~ory he riteJ that bclon~ for exam pIC ~he commandN of an aviatin formation III White RUR~ta in thiH organi7atlon th(rt I ll control nothlllJ hut held~ essnfgtS9 orders arf not obeyed neither rpgulatlOls nor llllltruct~ons r~ rolshy
order to lead the flights had been given to Captam NIkltJne ikltine did not execute the order hut transmittcd it to Lieutenant Polo vow
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
who in turn passed it on to a subordinate Consequence div(gtrse damages
wrec~afad~rc~~~d~~~t~~l ~~f~~~sioi~~~~~~~~~i~ ~~ll~C~~~~ice ceases to be a leader and should no longer have the conftdnee of the Party and the Government The fight to obtain Iron dlSClpIilO is in the firnt place the function of the political commissar he is tilt r(pr(~entative of the Party in the army he reprlsents Stalins central committe(l he ~hotlld bethe pershysOlllfieatiOIl o( the high BolHlwvlst discipiinpoundgt but unfortunately there are eommllsars in ill(gt H(d army who are not equal to their task for (xample in the organization to which Commissar Petrow is assigned the soldiers absent themselves fit will tlwy abandon themselv(s tomiddot drink and Commissar Ptrow dops not even think of remonstrating with them for this lack of dlgtcipllllP 1]( c(nsfS then to he a commiBSar
Th( leaders md the commiBsars who act thus are not true BolsheVist (hiefs let tiwm he relievd of their commands and thpoundir commiltsariats
TIl( InemiCH of the people the traitors to the fatherland the partisans of TroLltjky-Bukharin have attempted to destroy the iron dbcipline of th Rld army to weaken Its military abilitv they have not succeeded and will lot ltucceed Consequently it is neceary without delay to reillforce thiq iron discipline it is nccelSJry for the le~ders and (ommisars to occupy themshysplvps every day with their Hubordinates watching over the execution DC ordNS given until they aro accomplished not tolerating the least transgresshyHlnn of ord(l1 Those leaders and commissars who in their daily service fali to purllue the stru~gle to obtam iron diciphne are pitiful but it will only be ohtained where the efTorts of both are combined to understand the needs of thp men and to satisfy them
The truggle for iron discipline is the task of the Party men the organishyzatIOns of the Komsomoi in the army of all Bolshevists of men who are not even in the Party
The communists and the adher(lnts to the Young CommunIsts should dally impregnate the soldiers with the spirit of discipline and bolshevist or~amzation but the discipline of the ~()ldiers depend~ ahovfgt aU upon the dlampClpline of the leaders
It 1H hardly ntcel~ary to make any commcntantB on this article The nlder is left to draw the elementary deduction d(r1vlng from It
1 July 1938
CAN RUSSIA MAKE WAR jLa Russie peut-elle falre In guerrel
In Deutsche Wehr M Petenlcn under the title La Russie peatshyelie faire la guerre sur deux Ironts exposes the Scandmavian point of view
b~ic~iri~~r~e~rPt~~~g~~lli8~~~~i~ ~~~~)re lfhh~r~~~u~~degi~i~~d~dC~ Russia Make War
When in January 1936 RUSSIl announced the grand lmel of its fourshyyear plan with a view to development of its mIlitary forces many military specialists were skeptical it was knowIl that Russia had an immense human reservoir but it was demanded if thLI rpoundscrvolr that could be mobilized would
be w~I_k1~s~c~f~cl~~I~ltJkdd~~f~h~~egi the plan had modified the physlOgonomy of the Russian army in changing the proportIOns existing between the active army and the reserve If prevlOusly it was admitted that the active army should be one quarter and the reserve three quarters of the whole of the ground army Tuchachevsky considered that the reserve should not represent more than 250 of the Soviet army it was necessary besides to increase to a hardly imagined degree the material of war
O~e can estimate that in February 1938 the Russian ground army was ~~~~~~omae~~~i ~~~ill~~d~~he aviation and the navy the total would
For these two million men there is in general the necessary modern materiel aside from a few shortages but for an army of mobilization of eight miiiion men there was a total lack of equipment and the largest part of these elements could not be compared to the troops of the European powers the considerable masses oC arttllery and of machine guns which would Je necessary to equip the total did not exist the materiel and munishytions existing arc defective
Tanks are about 5000 in number and of these a large part llre no longer
~~tt~~~~~k~rp~~afoa~~~ ~~~~ro~~~ ~~i~hsihr~11~~e~bt~~~n6~O~g~~~I~kt~~~At the eighth congregI of the Soviets last year Stahn demanded that
the manufacture of airplanes be tripled so as to prOVIde 15000 machines by the middle of 1939 it waltJ desired to incorporate 500000 new specialist worlwrs but all this w~lUld not permit the achievement or th~ plan by the hour desired und even If they dId succeed Instructed and mo])hzahle efTpoundgt(shytIVIS for th machine were missing and even more iu( in Russia a large part of tllf aviation IS dpltille4 for the mission of independnt operati9ns which reqUIre personnel of the hlghcst cahbfr there call be no Just pretensIOn that the Russian aviation as contended in certam European circles is Huperior to the aviation of the great European powers
ltrat~i~ ~ll~l~~~la~i~~ ~~~0~~~~~idi~ld)~(~~t~I~r~~Ce9n ~N~~~~ ~eO~~~f~f which ten are III European RUSSia and fiv( m ASia the Iltrongest military potenti~ll i in the WPRt and the thr(C military rcpiolls of Lltmingrl~d und ~he North Sea include half the army and more thall half of the motorIZed Ufllt~ the FmniBh frontier has ulso bcen lnrgfiy reinforced recently if one adds to thlH account the military regions of Moscow and Kharkow Qne call say that two-thirds oC the Reel Army is concentrated on the western frontlet
Tins dIvision is comprehensible adds the author for European RUSSIa and the Extreme Orient constitute two theaters absolutely distinct and in spite of the development of aprial traffic it is impossible to displace great
73
C~1laloj of Sde(ted Peliotilu1 AImiddotticl(~ nlH-ltp oi ItJ middotpr two frolll~~ I woltr)rmiddot mounLlillt dl1~l it III ltJat( RU--ll d T)
Htllt~il (llIllt I il bull tlJ gt~ HlI d I ] II) t-
III diLI1 ( I Imiddotmiddotr ll tTIll J( J rlH 111
~I itlt~~~lT_ ft tl lItlshy urtlwrll d L )-fil fr dmiddot)) d i P bull I ltI I
1(lrII Jl vl11 (JLl J) I rl bull IlI ll) t T) 1 1111 lP tll- 01 I ~ d -
Illi l) 111 d l
dol fl
hll ~ I Imiddot 1101 OJ)) I hlr d )1 of f I I T d II
~I t ) 11 I Emiddot II )1 til I 1 gtjt t (1111 11111
t
( 1 d 11 r i bull i I til 11 1 ~ I 1 i I I III
l~lIr)lt~ tl d lt01middot fjr~f ~ 1) jlldI r 111 1 I Itt I bull Idol 11 I I 1101 r I llr I r I l I ~ l r 1 t I ~ f I j n 1
II HI I I q lIItIJ L 1 Ill f 01 1bull I IIf11
III f 1 III t
jr
111 i j j
1011
r1 ~ 11111 )j I
j Ill IIgt[t 11 11111 11 i
-ill llil d I
lId t d t rq 1 I It
Ij Ilr ) Itl 11111
1 11 Ip
j
lil lel oJmiddot t 1) 11 J I
] 11 rt]
1Ii r llll d I 1 ] T 1 I p Irt Pi tlll
11 1( 1 I Oll 11 ~llll1 l L 1 It r
t~ 11 t 11 d lt 1 I It j If l~ 1 d Ii 11 tr f I I Vlr j]) 1)rll]1I
11]1 1 bull 11(
In J r Ii I
il IlJljn 10111 II 111
r _111 II) f I~ ~ T 1
l I d 111shy 1- I r1III f1 shy - 1Ill L
+ ( n 1111 r f I
1))1 d I I Illlt I 11 I mor d of IIH II llgt]I 11101 I d lrq t Ii lq+lialllll dllhq prI(llnll
I n d IIItol Ir I j( IIH f Ir Itd S 1 rLllld IlI~~llnll p ll)shy
11I~ 11 1111111 hll(middot h l11 1111 Inti (Il itll Ilwgt fl v(rl lllin r llthlll T 1 ltlll of 11Ilh 1) or
fLO I d 11111 (1 Ilh 1111 fnrtnlr oint of I H tll ILl lIIlIlITl Imiddot tl] ]dmiddoth f l+rollIlnd 1 I
lfld roil11 prlllH d 111)1 tOl hlldrlll in 11l1 1 II ]ITt ]I 1Il1l1d 1( Wt llt ini~ dpllui1 d
C amp GSS Quate~ V
upon hut I1 1936 a 1leuroIid Ihonl for tIlt formatilJn euroIf mplrior P(middotNOnn 11
uld V~~lJJt~lrt~~ ~~~ll~(IItIZlt of tIl l(11prilllCI lnd tu PfOl(Pf In I~ tan anH flgthiofl I)u)fplvp 1
Tn I)rdpr not to t1i~(ard tli n~Ulizatlnn alnHI lIgttin~ it would1 IOl1t11 tn dlidl Ihl Inlllltry min ~wrial ddllgtl ndUl] corTl~pondin~t 1 mlilllLr rl1ltIJlH fld tl 1tltp in (t(h of tlHll1t ltlllllmlI)(ltr Uld an otg of 11Itrql 110111 -(1I1Zl t~ til pprulIIlll IIPlaquo(gtlry [ltJult 1)( rlit(Illd frv~ t~IhI 1I111l1 1r (fI(I whllllr t lip an rlltrod ullin r or dd plejprl cho3i jlf fur IP Id pt It Ildl All t hIgt pfrltollllll will( h 11OuhI hI olunher hit 10
) ~I 111lt IlId]]I))lhl llH in trudllll llld III IhlUI~h tlll)- lire n l of
1rfYI~1 ~)_~Jrl(itl~(r~i~~~alltI 1lntrulI1Y mlhtlr) auhorltip3V~ - of
To (-Hn 1111 dU(Lhlll of til populttlon Illd Ihl rltTIlllmlnt ()tk gr 1I1l11 111) f Ilul1Idld of olilllllr 1I(I-lry all inlfllp prnpagan~ ~ 1)lIlId lI ltlIPd 1111 IllP 0111 ql1d If I Ill t]lld dlllwr ~hlwUJg I
I~lln Ilr~~J 1 ~ ~)Il ~ 2 SItl~I~~11 ~h(O~I ~~~~I~~IIii ~uti~h~~~~~l~tIT~ ~I prltlJl1l~1I1ILL hnlild bf]It(d ~ ill (f(ruwll ll1d 1Il Ihl ()thpr (ountm3iJ( l 1111 Plllllq dln pd fir1 10 t 11Ildrt I III 111fmiddot -flin)] Ill 1 tallillJ~ to tiff 1 1111l14 dl1 III Ihpir 111T 111 II llriOllgt dullII II and nMly to reecho 0 11111lt1)11 111 Il lly 11)( Ir - irI lHlIlk 1Ollftrfl(p Ind till (mema 19i
10-11 July 1938 ~)
~ I(II~r~ ))~jJt~I I~~~I~ Jn Itf ~ jL 1 ~ TIll llr 11Iltlun rltlllin-gt antI [JuTt lln l(r III fltl pla(p am0j -l~
II)1i h llr It( I Iratl)lgt Ill j~Tiat matTlt (Horl lIrrmiddotfl rt 1117d ify p~ ~ tiLl of madlill frum Hnil h lilt AliI TlClll mlIIl1fH 11Irlr I ldlOWIl B -1
I t ~I1~~ ii)~ ~~~J~~ri~~ Ij~~~rtff~l~~l ~~1~~1~ Jl~~t~I~~~h~ js(
luwlpr of tT a1l11ll1l)I 1lIlHlrdll Illd flOIT)lll1 till unal ddtfegt in of I Ill IIrritllrv ~r
1]lt1 IIflllltlllh1H1H f tllll dlllrtll+l itlll I Ill ~nlt pxttlll oft It~ T flflll Ih 1111111111[1 1[1 lmpJII ]t]r1Il)~ Iut lll IH hI lntwu_l nlIn II il 1111 litII If (()lllllHlH ~Jh ill f tIIllll( hI dtllland -~u JlrlII~IOIl 11l JUllnt of dLlll Till pqlr 11 11ll I 11Irlry (volp ]Qj I
~I~~) ~ It1~~11 1Ij 1111 ~~ ~ ~l)I~ ~llii~~lb t1~ 1~lllf ~~~r~~~ll~II~~S 5ntl~~ I 1~ Ill II 11 It I 1+ 11111 111 Ifllfl ])I Illi Il lId rnl1t~ for i ] lIflampa~r h Ilf pl) Ill IllW rfTll1h 11
bull bull bull t b
1111 Illawt lrurd11 11l1Hfhljt lp tltlt of tlllt Hoal AIr Foret Tf~li lr)]IIll] 10 PWvllt fur till lit iltzalIIlll llld mllllt(IL1Hf of tIl( HW materr w11l1h h 1[111 hInti lIf[ rlf till LlnlrlltnP hH)1 l1lrll)rhHl1lcliL~lr III (middotlf~ If
Ill( holll htt 1111 pllIIIHci fo for appn-lllll four for fut-middot- I( 1lhIgt ll (rulthlltl (lI1L1Il 11)(middot iIIWll1lh Kinin tWlnty IHW airdroT (
~~ ~ I ~JI~~~I~~ hiSl~~ ~IIld~l~t~~~ ~~t ll~l~~~ n~ll ()fl~lxl~1l~~lli1Jllla~o~~~ i Ill 1)ltltltJn- ()f [11111 hII tinldy ]PPl plpfled mll~t of tlHm ill t IHHth uf Jollgiami 11ld SIlt1111d Without hlullt tu ILHl tPnl in lt(Cllr
I)~lln t uddlll ttt1I k l In lHrgto111lPl 1 large lITort ] dll11Ullh d ~OlO )11100 550 o)qno
~illtlO ltlrbr IlIl ri~J-(r aooo tuJfllt I lt1 Irangt tlw (pllll b- ()[t1lltlr~ VtljIIllwnl IIi fI HI nnw dd~ i I
Ill tltp tdullIgt 1~fP(ltlII)ll tIll pilot lfl (Hnl11blOllpd for short Ie bull-1 tlr eti( and ti llr n eTt + Inlt Ilh th( ltlPllortllnil V for pPTITIlr (I)llmiil)lI AI 17 I ~ ~ Imiddotar to ~fi ~ Htr It~ lIId tll) 1 11 (P 110 hIgt 1l1ll1d~
lip 1111H1 I alll)rh 1r 1lllllrdh 1( fl(lT d Hul I hI pr()llllflll~ hdlllr II 111lu tl flnt (Ill many l11lll
1l1]IIlHllh lrp lHIhd hUi ~Ir KlIlgl~ (Hld h(p[gt~ tu h1t IP11l1 II lOllgt whuh Will Pfl11l1 him tn (nllill thC irlTllt in Ih lIllifln I II H HIt~ llJ(d I~ HlIl)~ 111ulmiddot 11 Ihl j)11Hlinllln ( ftllrdlllJ~ lllt 1 IIdllHitf (II I( rlln1l1J f1 phYildl~ WIll I-II-( 1lld
Tid 1[Tllrt dll~ not pnlnl -lr llortmiddot-Hiltllt Oll hiidl fr)m allllum In tlllt lIP] g-oill) tl (llnl] thlgt IITmiddot( tiIgt of the antiainraft dtgtfpn-t fOT( In lltl II hJlhltkd -Ol)ll nWll and dlIlHi1d llpnll Ilw i1 rntoTl11 aTll) A( II1dly hi hl I flIIoI t ll tl1 l-H] 11ll1lI1 tIl tIl lI())O Ill n Till li~1Irf 10) IlP douhlld to llllll 100000 i
[1 tIl nrlH tlllll th1 (lmrnluri i lHn~ rt)rl-anizpoundd ~ot t)nlrI5~ gt~l
lrlll11~11 hlft~~~(f~~i111111~ l(l~lr IrI ~t~ Oi1 II ~ligt~) I~l( II~~ ~ I~~ f~Hl~ _ I fVIIlI1d dlld gnPII Il md 11111111 lIlt lI11portall(I J
Ih 11lt dl ]gtl 111 Iw Ulldlf II( Ilnlpr ()f a lllrp tl)mmaHle[lI 1 IhI 1r11 If li111 ll 11I1 rIIr II flIHlIl-lhb flr tHr lp dBI t hI offill 1 If 1Ill llr OIlJlllI1I11111V till (l1llImllt Hllll -I
In thl ~l111lry ltIf 11 a dIJall from th( (hid If tlH lll~r 1 ~~~ 1~~ 1 f)~ I~~~ i~~ ~~gifI~ll ~ ~t l~ ~I~tl ~l~ t~~i ~~t~ I(~I~~ III il~~1~ila 1 IIndr hi orlilT dlrlllltlr (Jf itlltntltllll llld of nrmiddotl~alH7Jllllln of antialrcr J dd1Ilp hainl till rull of hnltdlr )IIllrtl 1
TId r(()IIl1l1~lt InJl of t Itt Inllllland whkh rIalb hl~htly I hat w~gt j t1f1middotuly ((ht III lrl1l1I hac for ohJllt thpound (lmiddotntrahrtllI If 1(rythL ~ plrt alllln~ tn d(flllt t1~alJlltt air al tl~ ]
Ill( total Ilf t]1I( rlform ~hlw~ Iarly whal Illlllt)rl alll1 n11 BTl jl al ta(lll to air dTlir and till worry artJllImiddott b~ Ill1 dllqtr tlf ril Ila~l~ ~
~
74
iQlxlJU 0 70 Catalog of Sflected Periodicat Articles ~___m
They~re but the esampential steps of the general rearmament of our neighbors and Jr[ends a sure guarantee Q( the future_peace ormiddot Europe
-
FROM THE REICHSWl~lm 1933 TO THE REICfSHEER 1938 IDe In Reichswehr 1933 aU Reichsheer 19381 Colonel Baron
In 1933 when Adolf HitlCr was called hy President lIindenburg to agiumepower the Reichswehr included ten large units that isseven divisions ofinfantry nnd three divisions of cavulry
These divisions were broken down in twenty-one regiments of infantry offour battalions (o( which one was a recruit battalion l eighteen regiments of cavalry of five squadrons seven regiments of artillery of three or four
~ htrsc artillery of a cavalry division) Signal corps groups seven groups of
groups of automobilf trains and seven medical groups f large and small unhs sufficed for the professional army
or 4000 officers and 9bOOO men impos(d on the Reich by the Trpaty of re~mes It Wal insufficient as a nuchus for a modern army destined to rereive and in-ttruct one or two classes each ot 400000 young soldiers and to mobilize in thf future several million relervists
The first task whieh was imposed 011 tlw IWW Chanttllor desirous of ghing Germany a miitar force capahlf~ uf realizing its plans of GPrman expansion consisted tllUgt of augmenting the llumLfr of units of the Army
The Chancellor and his military coumrgtlofl Generals von B10mherg and von Frits(h had the clink illtwppn two pro((durefl one to Imse the
n the sIst(m of units of tradition (each regishynny (ing in gem~ral represented by a comshy
ter~middot in the Heilhw(hrJ the other heing to content ially with the tripling of existhtg units ns or which the most important was the lack of he second plan which was ldopted
licient to prepare the frame work of units of imtrucshyas necessary also to foresee the adm inistration of the as of the instruct(middotd mservcs It was also necessary
worganize the instruction at Ipat summarily of the fifteen classes (Gershymans born between 1900 and 19141 which had not received any military instruction
Parallel with the tripling of the activr tUlIts it was thus necessary tu create orgalls of recruitment and administration these were the inspections and districts of recruiting It was necessary to create at the same time rapid or~anization of instruction similar to the centers of instruction of the World War these were the ersatz units hattalions and batteries) commanded by ersatz oflkers retired ofilcers who had served in the Reichswehr or even m the old nrmyl
This period of prCparltltioll eXtlllded from January 1933 to October 1934 At the latter date each hattalion (except the recruit battalions) and
each artillery group of the Reiehswehr (except the horse artillery) transshyformed iLgtelf into a regiment of infantry of three hattalions and a regiment I)f arti1ery of three grouJl~ Each battalion of engineers gave birth to two
otters Each SibTIul medical and train group expanded into three groups Alone the cavalry rcginwllts ald the horse artillery were not touched by the
~ tripling However the 3d Cavalry Division (Weimar) became the 1st - Armoied Division
In this manner the Reichswehr expanded in the winter of 1934-35 to includl tWlnty-one divisions of infantry two divisions of cavalry and one armored division Side by side with this and in its service twenty-one ins~ctions of rptruiting and alollt ~OO tccfititing- districts were constituted
commanded and trained by eratz otncers (retiwd officers called to active duty
~ Compulsory military service was d(creed in May 1935
~ ~~ ~h~e~~~~ i~ ~~~~r~~gCl~~~I~i~I14o~dtll~edt~)~~~~le~~h~~~~~~~~i~~~~
of the German arm v had to ~urmotmt to recall certuin essential facts The number of oOleNs of all gradCs and all arms retired by the Reichsshy
wehr in itgt fourtefn rcargt of ltxistcncp could not hllve (xc(eded four or five thQusand of which not morf than three thousand at the most cOllld be used in 1934 Thes( Wfre for the most jlart required by the inspections of recruiting and the ersatz units
The active units of infantry engineers communications and traingt were able to draw new leaders from among til( officerl and noncommissioned offishycers actin and retired and from the state police ISchupo) This resource hardly existed f~r the artillery which only disposed to fulfil its triple obligations of its own cadres of 1933 It was not possible to obtain from the military schools of artilery instruction without a delay of at ien1t two years a triple production of lieutenants In spite of this in thC course of the wintpr of 1935-36 six divisions of mfantry and twoarmored divisions w(re creatd hy drawing on the twentyshyone divL~ions of infantry and the armored division whose existence only commenl(d with the preceding wintpr These new creations were not of a nature to um(gtlioratea prohlem already difficult It wafl thifl army of twenty-seven infantry divi1ions two cavalry divishy
~IOnl and three armored diviRions framed summarily enough and composed In the maiority of young soldiers of sev(n monthgt service that was available o the Reichsftihrer when he undortook the rcoccupation of the Rhineland In May 1936
rorm~~ ~iiiia~l~J9~~Iw~n~Ct i~~i~~r~lgrj~~rtheer~tl~~a~~s~~~nikr~~~ sur-lc-Main It was in 1936 also that the Challtcllor decided to extend military sershy
VIce to two yenrs and to increase the number of divisionf or infantry to
thirtr~~~ autumn of 1936 when ~he class of 1915 joined the class of 1914 in the active services the new Reichsheer included thirty divisions of infantry
~~~~l~dt~nret~r~~ieJ~Jl~i~~~ divisions and one ndepe~~dcnt brigade or
Beside it thirty-rour recruiting insJllctions fUnctioned disposing of 270 distric~ of numerous ersatz units
In 1937 the number of infantry divisions was inpreased to thirty-six of the ormal type and one mountain in Sljltomlier of the same year the class of 1914 passed to reserve and was replaced in Ll)(l ictive corps hy the class or 1916 bull
In FellTtmry 1918 wlWIl the murch on ll1HIIl took place the active German army inciud(gtd about MOOOOO soldiers about half having sixteen months of service and about haJJ four months but in whieh tho officer framework hud neither in (juantity or quality Cllleciully in the artillery a value corresponding to the Importance of thf eJTectives in soldiers
Since the Reichsheer has ahRorbed tlw Federal Austrian army whose illlmbers seem to have been reducnd to six divisions (three o( the normal type two mountain and one urmorpd)
The new army is articulated in sixt(en army (orps thirty-nine divisions of normal type three mountain division five armored divisions and five cavalry hrigades
It is an imposing total which to become equally IS powerful as imposing gt
must wait the slow and patient formation of leadem
INFANTRY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
Am POWER ANI) TltOOI MOVEMENT Major Phillips SOLDIElt LOOK AT THE SEA Major Dupuy TUE CASE FOIL ANTITANK Captain Greene A lRACTICAL GENERAL STAFF Major General Mosehy MIIITAltY MOTOTtcCII~S Captai~ Wheeling
July-August 1938
SOME HKFLE(TIONS ON INFANTRY MATrHmI AN) TACTICS rfajor Genshyeral Lynch
TUUNIJElt IN Tlfg 1A5T flmiddotm )IONTIS OF Tim WAit It-lt CIIINA Lieushytpllant Rudolph
TJII~ SPANISH WAIL A HEVlIoW OF TIIB HEH FOltEIGN OPINION Captain Johnson
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL AflMY MEDICAL CORPS (Great Britain)
May 1938
IMPROVISATION AND PltA(TICAI WOItK IN CA~IImiddot Major Bayley Tim PROBLEM OF MECHANIZATION S IT AFFI~crs Tim ~IEDICAI SEltVICE
LieutColonel Atkim
JOURNAL OFTHE ROYAL ARTILLERY Greit Britain)
July 1938
TRAINING RUMINATIONS 1937 Lieut-Colonel Lambert COUNTElt l3ATTFIW IN MOBILE WARFARE By Tweedledum
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUilON (Great Britain I
May 1938
TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LESSONS OF THE WAI~ IN ABYSSINIA Colonel Laderchi
THE BATTLE OF WAHSAV AUGUST 19Z0 AN EXA~IILE OF TilE COUNTEltshyQIoFENSIVE Major Mahony
MODEltN WAlt AND ITS MAZE OF ~IA(H1NES Brigadier Wilson AmCHMT AND ~tE(IIANISED LAND AIUItE rilE BTTLE OF GUlJAshy
LAJAltA 19n Captain Poulain French Army Reserve WAS GERMANY DEFEATED IN 1918
JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain ~ India
April 1938
ABYSSINIA TODAY Major Snelling PEACE Olt WAR Colonel Rich PItOPAGANDA LiclItColonel Dimmock THE INFLtmNcg OF Tim IltliS IN GliBAT BltlTAIN ND AMERICA Inglis
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMPFTRUPPE (Germany) By Clptldn UN Hartr)ss InflUltry
March 1938
NEW WAYS FOit MOtOR ANIgt HlDmt lNclte Wege Hlr Motortmd Reiterl rllijor General Eyb
Belore discussinlt the fmbject the author depicts some experiences from the Wllr in Ahyssinla He notes the rapid road eonstruction there was shyachieved primarily because motors were able to advance materIa across countr~and construction could he begun simultaneously at various points
75
~ ~ ~ Cllialof of Selected Periodical Articles
A nlW dlplrlUt( lt1 iJlrli~h tl in tllP trltlbportatlOJl hy motor of 1JfI lH of hurdIll to Lf(b lrnpa~aj til mllugt HllfJ from tiwn thr lllimals pn Ult( d to (arry llu tru(k InH1middot L1Tlhi r -tollJtd nCollllaif-ltanlI Wll of httl(middot (OIlIqHH It 1 TV tllI JIllgt 1 Vli unUH7fd ltpy and cout SPfVICP providtd (X(l 1l11It lllf()rrnattJH Smail i1t-moving- achanCrl or flank Ullltgt rOIIgtttmiddotd of LlIlIlt IIHI mltortl Ii Ilifantry In artll ry wlilch for tlw mnltt fart n lt1I1Ih d 1~ lIr
Bmiddottwlll -) An lld J -11 IIJ til ~IIdtd ~Llf(h (]f till IffJl
~~~ l~~1 ~~~gt Ii I ill~~l IH~I~ 1~~1~~ il~Ylllllt~~ 1~~iI(j ~~I~k lt1ll111middot l-lWlll1 lr~J 1tuh tmll 1 I nl In rlllruw IIFI rJtldill~ tIll rOM1 kl1 Ir Ullrh 1]o II I)))qlll~ ilv tIll Cnlllnlll Irl lillIIlltl llllIlllllllllnll 1111 11 fd 1)1111 ~ 11lt1 n1h 1111 ~ I i1ld Ill [lfr 1(01) tlnll I (lil k It II I XlI pll)]) I fl lfdmlr middotoIllnllmiddott Id Imiddoth Ii
1111 Illlt [f lIIt If 11drmiddotlinlll f qlltllllllI ItLvL Illi IIItr(1i r It Illi all1 r lrlt) t ~ 11111 hur Ill 11 -I lrl1111 n lld 111 It- Ullf dnTllll I ~lld 111]1 lt1 In llllthmiddot t l)rtlllflfIld (ldry 111 JIIl (III 1I1llr 1] tfmiddotIIIln 1Ilt)nIJlHh 11l1lWJt Hut Illlpltdlltontfl 1 llItl)tl1 lit lOf till nj111IIll of mllr Ill gtTllm HI ltq Ifnl
Ill ~Iod rlj r 1 i I ] II I l1lnd 11 Iii r If LI) 1)1)1 tl rt
If I thl I i) rllill h Jtlf-i )I lh mI()f lrI1 1 1 1 1) fllh r 1tlgt111 1t11r r1I1 4 1 H)
I d) IJlo rI 11 r Inil LIt h f Ii)( mwt III tUfn ut -1U)
I n n 1lt)1 rdln LIHl mIlr Il)tl r middot1[1 111111111 flld 1llhIlIl11dldullll111l
gttf 1(j11 til I till tIll Ir 111 Iltln JIlt IIgt Tw 1 L rrldh 101 1 UI lr1 of H tJJh )lnfl )middotr II h I 1 Ihnt nf P I ~ tll1 1 bullbull il 11HI Ojlltl InmiddottIn hi Hili r rl)llhrl nnr ~ bull Int 1nt ill ~ li d
In fd r t t I ~ Ill tltl tIlll mu-t rnri to fl I rrn1JII
t I t) dd111 t I I llI r L(IT~ 1 ~IId (f i nlaquomiddotr 1111 j 11111UIIJ(ld Irlltly L- 11(
d 1tl 11Imiddotlll~~ A IlflhllnhII~l- tllltfllflalllhrlmdlr j 01 r l]r jltr ~i ii 1111 nwtr tihlalw t)tIl1l dllChmiddot
)~gt1LlllI i f 11 ]1 1 r 11( r1~~~~~ ~td~~~~~fflrW~)~~~~~(middot~~~~~l )f( If ]11IIHImiddot1 ) 1Efll middothlCl ~ bull
f f 11 dhulvl1l qI In f lei )~rl t1lr I il t hlch lPJIl If llimiddotl)tIr1 oil and tlIP (oll~ III jllt 11111f mm illn thn that r(quITld fOf
I1r 11IHlIl III g-dIIlJl (In 1ltmbJI mot( Jrjlft1Ill (or pombal the arIlr nllll11 lit to
IIl( rl 1IIIr ll) I P rind of tlml Ihll a rI fnf l-gtImiddotmhl pll no Itrgp rolf
Ihl In I) I)() mIle Ipr dl g)Ili m lglllflcanCl 1hat 1lt lInportlnt i tlw
1l1ll~ lltlmiddotnutl Un1 r trlmiddotpllin~ 2(1 hdIJrltt dlgt B l1ch cticlllatioll and trl(llltl~
dlltLII1( ( of 1-0 ttl 1~O mt s thlt L~ 0
rt t1 till 1)1 lldllll 1IIl Iltlli7d Xp 11)( IJf ol))]1t and I I 0 II f Ii) rn r rI d~I lnnl 11 llrly hllt to or i 1 Ill) I n11 [d Ilunl whlt1I 11ll nhll)tl I full till ltUlt)lIIIshy
f 11 ldol mI I Imiddotl~ lfy ~r()torgt can tljllTlP 1 hour r d III I 1lllmupl I lndlll~ )nltly k lt(nb tIll ir h(
rIlImiddotr 111 n1 middotrdlvlIndludIYll1drgtmolllrIIPlh11 t 11111 r 1 lrn1llf Il nil 111 of I dl TIjllirl- all I rlqrdllllnl~
J 11 Ill Iii III II I ~t nt IlfY llln frolltlt wn ~(f(rgtly OY(f ii I II HI 111111 i I r 1)lldlnraquo Ill (11 l11nt ((lvtiry could mo aero
1lt1 middotn II h 1 rf 111 a 10111 lltllq~ ordinarily 1 thHI jorII1 1 jr hld Ill 1Ilhllt ltIlled and cro cIl11try
nllI till 1lttt frllt igt mmy mlll 11lI11 and thp I I Id 111gt11 IV mtlltt r((rlll WIth lIHmiddotrpalt(d
I d lId I frlf tIOna )Ilfl of tIll limp (on-
I film I Irl nI Id d~ llfTl n no III tIll ratlgt tlf mar(h of motur and Ir 1h Il II f trw lrtlll~ alllmallt lor (jon to 1)0 ]HHIlHh ill
I 1)111] )1llr (111111111 Slfh 1 Xfll ri11lfllt hll hpl ~ ~ l I tl r _
l ITlOJllt of fllll lwh hllt In vnt(middot1 ahout tlH trlmcndol~ jlIJf tl fr Ilr lllltltJtlbull ] OllllnlI11J 1gt a (Ollqlllnrf of Ilnh
1 bull 1 (JlJII)IInIlI1 [111 A hrilf (fmpln~TU mIY ill in onhr )1110 1 jlllJd 1( (III v I lrlll iOfl 11ll Itr two lillI of pay 111Hi or If) nIllt ttl I Ill frill 11ft II In III nltjUlr fllr fO-mi]1 march dayJ (IJ1lllnl 1 t dI il) fll[li rtlllll ~hTlh rllk0l1lr1 only at 7 l poundgt t l 11t JIIldfoj pl 1lt1 11 ~nll ~2~1 ]Iund or Ihoul fiV(lllllf tl
f I t to 1lIn d 11middot rrjmiddotr )1f1r1vlr fill Iloll dtyof rr I llId dL1 f JJ I 1hi IpJr I rl 1IIlT~ fllltj llfh]1lt III (lll III ]Ifl) ImiddotLIII d rrllll 1itf
I Jll 1111 IlJ rndlnllil afll fIJr hofl IlllIl Slr~II LlnfllodEralply I fl1 1111 tJmiddotIn I [11 IlInlltllll fllr ftllf tlrtl( wltl)ll fHI TIll 11middotIr 111 1gt1 ]rodld lIb 111 Irllt rdlo11
1 l IIIIJI tq ur lt1111 and lrlllllfY IIr A TTlotllf f11I1II1
rI 11I11 11 Ii III r1 I lt11 1)1 I 1 ht 11 il 1ljI~ III llr bullI Irl rllfr al t I J 1 I IltlId l IJr url witilh lan IllOVgt Lerw IIJulltry whplJ t III I dI1I~Ir~ tri Art llhry Ilnlll nil d m)tor nlllllnn will fin(l a mnvinK and r Tf mlrIT tH11 All llf ill 1 I Ur1N Ibl lIlIVIIII 11IUIllIl tJH TlJ JIf1ll1l If 1 lt (( I j low Ii t1I k h- plalll 111011(1 proll Vry cugt ly t d ur IJIll
[ III dldlllllllllllj IIt dh) 1 ltIII IIf IIII IlllltllriZld infantTY TfIIllTf only a (I~ Iolld tllur Ihw t1I dl rJlmiddotrltI)tl [)( 11l1rching infllltry qr cavalry
76
C amp GBB Qllarierq VI ~~ ~
MOTPl)V(lr grlatlT flhm(mml is nhtainllulr from mojoTR l)(cam~laquo th(gt (olUrJ olt li much longer tot
(5) Trall~ltion (rom march to combat and VIlt versa - The 10 toll nlem(n whu nde Oil the two Side seats in light truck can detruck frot (tII thrgt halted vhir plae(gt tIIPm1Clvcs lit 1 diltanc( of 10 to 12 yards f~ out 1111 tTllLk and Ill rlady to fir III 7 or 8lwconds
Jj(ltrllclcin and (Iltrll(ollg from 5 to 7-ton trucks rCquinll mot(l tillil wi t dllrulk al111llt IH ti((ond~ tu lntruck allout lO wc()ndl
III ((JIlPlflll111 til following tim(H hav bpI found neC(Bsary for cavriliJ i pal prlparltiOlIl From the halt to di~moulit takl a dbtHlle of IO to 12ya1amp vic Hul Ill pnptr(ci til fin rna
IU Whltl nd1l~ hy thr(gtps or HXlS the 1valryman nearest the hone- Vb hllldlr 11 nlIly IJ l ((ollch th otlHrs rtquirp 15 twcond ~ 01
~ ~ ~V~I~l~i~~i(I~I~Jl~~~rt~(~~i-Jti~)l~I~I(~~i~ i~rl~d~i~~~~~(~u~~~ ] pf( 1)101111 (leh 1IIIId hill f)WIl hopp alld lJl nady to fin in 10 second or I2l 1 rmall TIlIHHlIpl and he r(tdy to flrp III 9 -(condg 1 ah
OhVIOI1lt]Y tIll infantry In truckg IS at som( disadvantage agailllltl 1 Ilr)ln( Ittack Un till other hand til( digtJnc( hetwcpn trucks and tbt ) tin )111)11 lilli pfodlH1 1lc(gtWd IltltIVlIltlt1 to attaek from th Hank Tk i rllr If~ It lC~~~~~~~~f~ilI~llr~~~~f~~(~~~~~~l~r gtl~~~~ ~~1~1~~~~~Ptlllin~ J~ flvllrd)ltmiddot fxjl(rillltlI lJl to thl (ro)gt (UuntfY lpaJilities of motor vehlc1a ~ HUI Ih 11m of yar till typP uf ground and the ma~~ of motor vehice 1UBI
~llf~I~~~JI~~n~~gt~J~~I)~~))I~~~ ~I~I~~~ ~~()l~ll~t ~~~t~ri~nr~~Jljb~Ft~~ j ~ tn lltI~Iht~li~I~I~l~~ttl( I arev whrre TOlds or tralllre in abundane~ ~ ~ ~ll)1~111~I~JI~ ~i~~I~if~~)ln~ldl~~~I~i~J~J~~~h~~1o~~~)t~~i~~~il~~~l~l~tl~f~On~ tTl tn pn 1111 Evn In a thrnly lt(ttlfd but fairly nrln tNralll the light ~t (an lIrfurm ao wpH if nut b(ttpr than motlllt(gt(1 own tllP l1Ptlampltary rlconac 1111~ bull 1
Hut III wllotd 1rfIgti wlHTI road1 and traIl lrl klrCf til m()Un~ IIIHI 10 vtlullIlI in bet Illdlgtplllltah]l It 18 hI who (an (omh the aru ~ 1 thorull~hly gtllliy and IVlth fPlativ(iy little nOl~ It 1lt fwre that thcvtl~
11~~I~llI(I~vl~~~~lr~~~t~II~~I(~~~t ~t~~~I~~~~lll~t t[l~~ ~f nl~~J~~i(~~~l~~~~ t only a few mountud men Will gtIfJiCe lor thl purpo)C TIl(gt (omhat will It tlkfn ovpr hy tnotlJrltYltiJlttlt 1allk fInd lllotonwd IIlfantry
(7) Hoad tongflt10l1 An advmta~~p ac~ru(g to the motor c~lllmnfl I With ItH trll(cl tf1YI]hll~~ With (oI1 CI(prahl( dlgtancp bCtw(ell veillcles at 1 II (ollsel)u(l1t t1pxibility tjllg~lJon md hh)(king Will not occur so frequentiJ ~j o a with hnr~p~drawll vlmiddoth(lp Motor COhIllHl (an rfOgtgt one another It~ ~ ltlnly a qU(ltlOll of a (frtnn l()lt~ of tUnf It
lri) ~1otor noises atHI hghts - EXjlCripncl hag shown that spen
~1~~~ita~~l~~~~~lI~n 1(ll~(~Jlt[~~((~l~~I~middot~r l~~~~l~r~~~]e W~~nl~~d~t~~1 ~1 tl pruvidld In tttiucp fxhnugtt noises Other n1(gt1I1S of camounaging the mok IH1I-l of tanb IHarily arl Jlog~lhle such I tir actiVity and the usp of noil) Hlltnrl in otlJ(gtr lte3S and by artillefY fire
By (mplnyilll~ hhlP glass light) can be so dimmed that even at fall middot10lt1 rmglgt thp Ian not bp dl-tinguilthed from the front By proptshy(lllployil1)~ Iwh lightlt nil tlickpnng hem~ will diclosp the approach of t Vlhilk yet t11() will Jllrmit a rlo~f tudy of tilE adjacent tCrrain
(()llIl~I~~i~i~7s~rr~J~P~~~hf~1~~ ~)rr~~ti~~~(~ft~l~rt~~~~~I~~c~~~~~n~ll~~~ ~nal dItlllII hptwC11l I(hide to h(c)m( Cparat(d or to take the wrq foute To aVOid such errors the following means of correction and 3SSLStat~
~1~~I~~~~~~ll~(i~l~~Or~~I~~~i~~~~~~~~t(~~~1~~~f~~~l~c~l~~nr~~f (~r~~~chf~ difTlTltnt fi~lrp or lacll mut (ompIIIY hattdien etc blocking off TO nol to lIP 1I~ld lITIJ1lnYllli~ lll()torcy(hgtt~ as guidlS and rlir((torn
110) BrplkdOlll or forced stop of vchicles - The freate~t obstai~ I l tlf prnplnynllnt of till commcrtial type yphicl( in military opfgttat)[ In thlt thl( v(llIclt V1t tulmiddotk on lofl roadgt llfotiatp stepp gTldes I (xtrlml ditltlully nr not at all and Itl VNY ltplsith( to road and hridr d(~trll(tlOll hy tlH (IWllly It is tml that hOf~c~drawn vehicles and sma fourwhlll dJvl or 1-~hlll trulkf) WII Qv(rcomc these ditHcultics mn TladJlv HUI thl Ilfl of tht prohiltn lil in tlw utilization or the commNcl vehicle for TllIiitar) plrpU~ts How un the ma~ of tlwsC vehicles neOlshyplbh g1tiflHtllrliy t days march dunng which ~o to 50 small and 1aJi 011tIC]- dptru(tion pte ne cnCOlllltprpd We may ptesuppose tb
e
0 a
d a
l
tll hrll) I 11l1vPft1 ((1 arl dpltroy((i hut lhat ahw llf(lUPPoltes tb1 11111(11 lit 11111 ha1 IJt1 ltLvlllahlp to the tllpmy fOf Much dtlslructlOna 1 lltlt III ha~ IItl1l1(( fllll 11I1 opportunity Motor columns can ordinarl ~ dltotlr (nVlrla1HillllH or-two hld ~Jlot But a thorl)ugh test of capnhihOOj Iwuld hp mad t1JlIltally Hinc( III mot terrain d(truftiolls and obstaekl ~ 1
~~i~( ~~~(t(lh 1~~~~~~I~II ~~~H~t I~~~~f~~~~~t~lnd ~imilar flltUf] ~ A l(gtchniqlll tnll1 hI dlvllo]lld whwh Will O(f(OIl1( tl1ls(l handiCIIIl ~j
I-qII]lIIlt1II 1II11 III dvlinpld lnd 1111111 For iIlHlmHt t11( tIJl of rore lnd jlHII(Yl hoI h hI( and motor lllcrIId It hlluld not be difl1cult U pfolplt bllth flllllnr ml It)rigt hy proplr ((lvlring alld packing ngaw( wllfr n pill itt 10 what dlpth fordlll~ hy thll mlmH is possible we do~ Imow hut WI Jhould iparl1
A IlHlOr 1llIlInll middothoulrl J1PrhapH tratllport with it material to ns~ist~ middotroini~ ~(d ~IHlt til f(plIr hridgcs and (vento onstruct bridg(s
~~~~(~I~~lt~~~~~ 11)d ~~~ItCl(lt~1tll~(ll~~~g~V~~~1l~~~ve~r1~~a~~~~I~r in Illattrial at tl1l Ina of 1Ilgt and on tune will Ill thoroughly undt 1IlYOIP who has actually participated in ptwllIit Thpound actual pmpioy
I
bull
1 bull I
C alog of Selected Periodical Artlcles
1
1
I
I
( d~~h~n~~~~it~~1~~wt~~t~o~~r~~middotwefe of smull cnRequence
Tests should be made to determine the relative efficiency of animals (truck transported) and small tractors (truck transported) in gcttingtrucks
oat U~~ t~gea~~~i b~~~rec and rider ih this new rapid force what
will ~e~tb~elhe history of war in the past that the cavalry horse
=~3e~1~~r~~~~~~~~~~1ef~~r~ ~~dc~ot~~~~~~ ~~~~u~~cti~d~i~ mated the mounted Units as though a pest had struck in consequence of which the marching capacity of the cavalry waH d~creascd to or IlPlow that otinfantry
Therefore in time of pence the followiug mCaSllrCl mu~t h( bkcm 10 prepare the horse for the rigors of campaign ahle ~~~ fr~o~~7~smiddott~iJ and strong weighing not owr 700 poundH luilshy
(2) Cavse the animals to undergo fast or hunJfr ppriods at the Ham time doing full time work
(3) Accustom them to winter cold Have no stalls Provid( prottction a~t the wind and rain hut no morp than that afTord~d by the CanVH tDPof a truck
4 Protect the winter coat of the animal [nstead of the ~urry-comh ore the vacuum cleaner
Favorable results have been ohtained with the vacuum deaner hut it5 use has been forbidden hecause combing and bruRhing furtlHr discipline and improve the skin and digestion (hunger periods would improv( the digegttion
ProT~ployjng the vacuum cleaner would releusp more grooms for com hat
train~~rt_haired animals should be eliminated for military Jlurpose~ ~~ ~~ ~~e~~e~~oi~g~~ ~~i~~dfo~n~~~h~di~~o~~~ 3~a~~)~~~~ns~~(7) Competitions simulating whr conditioml using th~ following rulfs
(a) Time of competitions November to March in gnow and rain No stalls i
(b) Previous and continued hunger periods ic) Animal transport by truck Loading and unlouling tesLlt (d) Use of animals in pulling trucks on roads and out of bad
stretches
The author offers an example (in general) of tlw possihlp or~anization olan inrantry battalion (truck transportcd)
Attached to the battalion should be a number of motorcycles small tanks and tractors
Each rifle and machine-gun company to be provided with about 18 trucks which ill transport peroonnel equipment and upplics
To each company and fo the staff section an additional four trucks each transporting three horses together with riders
The animals are to serve the following purposes 9 n) Pull trucks out of holes around bad stretches etc
(2) When the battalion marches afoot to move thp combat trains Ismail perhaps trailer type vehicles)
(3) To provide reconnaissance during foot march (4) To mount the unit commanders (5) Where the opportunitv arises to group all the mounted men into
one organization (reconnaissance and security)It will be noted that these mounted men are not a cavalry unit rather
an all purpose unit AI told the battalion will have some amp0 trucks Thf lar~e number of
drivers (truck and motorcycle) can he tmined in infantry pon(gter duties
and icta~~~~~~~I~o~~~~i~~FeB~~lh~P~J~~ ~ d~~h
ARMORED MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZEU UNITS OJ FOJUm~N ARMIES 1937 IN RETROSPECT
JPanzer- mechanisierte und motoriqierte Verhandc fremder HeNt Ein RUckblick auf 1937J
(See digest middotCampGSS Q)larterly June 1938 page 97)
April 1938
TANKS - ARMORiD RECONNAtSSANCE VEHICLES AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST THESE
IPanzerkamptwagen - Panzersptihwagen und die Abwehr dagegenJ New French R~nault tank - De Militaire Spectator describes the
new Renault which shall serve as an infantry accompanying tank It weighs 12 tO~8 carries one 37-mm cannon and one machine gun has (l
speed of 14 miles per hour with armor of 25-mm to 30-mm (about one mch)Ita crew consiqts of two men
Rapid tanks in Poland -- Revue dArtillerie reports theRe tunkH which weigh 243 tons are 258 yards long 178 yards wide and 131 yards high A 40 horse pow~r motor provides a TOad speed of 27 miles per hour a cross country speed of 11 miles per hour They are capahle of c1imhin~ n 46~ slope of traversing water 20 inches deep and usc 7 gallons of gasoline per 60 miles Ea~h has n crew of two men is armed with one machine gun (with 2360 rounds of ammunition) and haq armor plat~ 3~mm to 8-mm thick
Russian hea~ tank HM l-Krassnaja Swjesda reports as follows on this tank type In the main turret are a cannon -nd a machine gun In
each of two s r forward turrets are a heavy and d light maehin~ gun Its weight is 18 tons crew 6 men With a 250 horse power motor it has a road speed of 27 miles per hour ~ngth 72 yards breadth 273 yards height 293 yards Climbing ability up to 43 degrees aple to knock over trees4 yard in diametermiddotcan cross water 12 yards deep-nhd ditches (deep)
~~erra~issi~~eis ~crm~~~i~ee~~~o~~ ci~~r~~~~~~and each is Sas pr~of The new Eng1ish mobile armored division - According to the United
Services Review the new mobile division will be organizeda~ follows
yen~~t~a~~~~a~~~h~t~~~hit~l~~~Sregiments ~ach One artillery brigade Motorized infantry Motorized engineers Motorized signal uniis Motorized supply elements
This division will be assembled for the first time during 1938 and will undergo tests llt Salisbury Plain
Other reports indicate that eachmiddot of the five home divisions will be
~iftb~~~la~fe~~rt~l~i ~~~t~~~~os~n~ ~1ray~~i~~~f~iirtebh~~~~hi home from India
Four light tank regiments are to be provided in India Employment oC tanks in the defense - La France MiIitaire deals
with this question According to the discussion tanks in the defense are employed
g~ ~rc~~~il~atti~~nk defense f It is contended that the 25-mm antitank weapon is neither numerous
~di~~b~rsR~~Ise~~f~~seOe~6nO~~~n~~~~h~~~ ~~~ou~eo~ftr~et~k~ mobility a rapid assembly of these vehicles at a threatened area should provide a massed defense But such employment must be planned and prepared
Tanks are equiPP(Jd with cannon so that they cancombat tanks they are not made mobile in order to move to a fixed deCense position Tanks employed in the defense must employ their mobility in order to strike (with fire) hostile tanks a~ a disadva~tage
French views on antitank defense ~ Utilization of terrain and tank mines When the defender places himself behind natural obstacles ordinarily the enemy haq the better observation The preparation of obstacles against tanks ie trenches mines felled trees (abattis) requires much work and time On a 1000 yard front a tank mine field can be laM by 30 men in 8 hours but infantry and cavalry are not especially Vained tor this work It is questionable whether an adequate number of mmes can be prOVided and laid in the time available
Consequently the most effective weapon against tanks is the antitank gun The equipping of French units with greater numbers of 25-mm antitank weapons is to the Fr(nch mind a most salutary measure This weapon employed in conjunction with obstacles forms the backbone of the antitank defense It should not however be employed in a linear defense nor as indidividual guns such employment invites penetration at the weak areas and consequent envelopment
To avoid dispersion it We d~fense there should be retam~d a reserve of antitank weapons held In readmess ongood routes along WhICh they can advance for emploYment in accordance ~ith the hos~ie tank situa~ion Only thus are retained the necessary mobJllty and elastiCity of the antitank
defeI~order to counterbattery effectively the artillery supp-orting the tank attack the defenders artillery should be reinforced
dAr~Il~~r~(lfo~~~~~el~g~)ShoJ~ ~~~~~~i~0~~rtt~~h~~~~r~~6f various supe~avy mac~_~~ _____ L __
- Range I Rat~ lVeight Caliber Muzzle (MeterilY of WeiahtOf
Kind in Velocily--middot -I--- Ftr Gun oj MM (Meters) Hori- Vefti- pc (Kilo- Bullel
ontal cal Minfte grams) (Gram~)
~J ~ ~~ Vkk---- -127 914900middot 5000 3i~50 -280--~ Browning l27- -middot800 8200 2~OOO 550middot60 -165-5~ Brownin~--132-800 9000 2000 ----(---165--~ ---- ------~-- ----------Hotchki~ _ ~~_~~Il _3~01l1~~~ _5_0_ Scotti 132 _~Il~==_~~===_5_2_ I3rdn 140 )000 5000 4000 20 100 60
NOTE one ounce =283495 grams I one kilogram = approximately 22i pounds
77 I
I
M y 193B
-IIJii~TI 1 Ill) (1lt ~ I II IITlo - 01 O](I TlII shyTl(~ 111111 1 ) 1lIIJiHf J- JIlIH_II HEgt
I HI url-efltll- fl ~ dr fl ~lH uilr lIh rUllR u~rll-1 IH- lJLd r~ lldnl III frnd] JII Itl n 1
-rlollnllrI I) 1111 ITt ddr TiJl Ir Iq illlll f tbf Srutli
S~~~ Ir(~~tlr ~ 1~1 I I 1~ ~ (1 I IJl I 1 ll~ II 111~11 111L~ 1~ aJ~l~I~~~1I1t110l1 1 q elFl 1) f ~ I ( llt 1 f fullf 111111 FImiddoth plltmn 1middot1 f 1 r )rgtdlfI 11 iIlol 1 rTlllIlr In) Ii 111 nl i I) 1111 lid nIl
1 I 111fllf d]l r ~I dill t r 01 I rlft pllll) III 1I 1111 1111 full 1( Irrj Ii 111 l [ - 11111111shy
I ) ~llrJ r I I I lIf gtlll)I
11 (IIIlt If j- 1rlIlIlIIlr I
11 j d II Irq I I rIrll II III If 11
ii rill]gt 1]1 If I jII n
d I rmiddot I I I 1 frld
rdll n to Kf1 nljt tl rH c 10 I ]lW~ rllll~
I) 11 111 tin) iltlll 1 Jr Lrl)lj 1 f
~II r 111 HLJijolfl1
i It
i ~ rmiddot
I
r dh Irl I j
11111 1) j TI
bull Ij L P
I d 1 r r ll-
1 1 111 loi1 - r 11] I 1middot
d r Illto i I L nl
J 01 l 01 d ]1 1~1)l1 ) tfl ]i) d 1 r I f I~ f ill ~
Ilr l ~ 11 1 lOllfr)ldh l1dl1l1~llp1llf d 1IIdl
pltlllltJ1l ~d I (pid )1 I lOll
11111middot111 llIj 111~ Illlnn d dl 1shy I H d
I J It
1 d I )
r I]
1 d II
-r rpt1
l j bull Id 1middot11[
1 d 111 - 1 d
( 11 rd 11 nlj t 1middot
1 Jd
nmiddot I
1 I Ir ~ I] d d
) I I flllqf1 oj lt11 J
li 11
II]
I I ~
nfgt Ii I ltof)
jtrl 1 j 11 (1] r I) Ill 11) Irmiddot Ind IIIi I rI) I 1111 IlI ~ll dl
It 1 I 1lIlH Il r l II h tin 1-111 (
Ld 111+ lrll ljt11 d 11 III Irtll] r
t1 1) llJlt 111 I rll11 (11)1 Ill )jl 011
il] I I I I II n[ tJ 1 llr tqllIHl1t~ bullbull1 Blr-I I tlln~ 1)(1 i ml hllll -llll (1lT1111l I)ll
1) d llid niH ltnr~ ltttdlllll 11 III) 1l111lll IlJllllrrrlfl
j 1
f I~q l[ lIn rlIHmiddottlt~ 11h of lwlt)
) d
ii I 1
I)
1111 11ll 1l1IlTl d uHIl 1ll111nflld l llqr I lid lIItr 1I1dmll I Lud 11 I Ilj)IH I t upply Hld ltwlld
I dILl 1)1111 11lt a Ir flJllghl by I )r gtllll a I Ir IlHJIllnrlli()J) and
]ltmiddot11 I (nl111 (IJIlIIjll lhtI 1111 Ir I dIILl1lrJ Till fqdd dililti1l WI fllllrId I I iI1 t11)1 ltof fin Itr tLIl1~ IlIllh I tlllrilr
rt d ]1 J 1t)1I rl Jlllr ltUPIlrt 1111 It h d ~h 11J))Id 11111d rl(1ll11II~ II
1111 1111 1llIrl mnill 1IIIIIdl Ilt1I k Iud 111 adlUII1jy proliel
]111 a tapul (orp v11I (otjtllnl
I~Jd lId 1I)If 01 I J Tln f)gadl 111 It dv AI ordill)1 ltI~ ll~I (li (Ir I f
j
1 111 nlfrlllIllllI irp rI and I J H II til ITI Lr ~)l LI 1ltQllHltld 11 In rn lrtrlllrlt1
Tf (1011 It ( 11 r I 1 d Illd t1l1 111111 II 111111 1r I) fllllr II dr I 11 rd III [111111 1)( fnllr 1UHlfOll Hltl a
m( 1111 -~H it) Till (rtnIJrl rl rr (fllllti~ aller- ~Ipwrlfon I a 1111 111 f 1111 101
jj I lnll dl PJ)) I 11ljU 1gt11 d 1 r )lllltilt1nC IJallalt()I Inri lrlddlltllItl IllllllllL 1111 lit bur r fl iI()lI
1 Iliflllnl d 111] Il I 0I11 d Lrl)ld ~t] II f Jr~anizd 11110 a talll Iri dl
c amp GSS QuCrt~
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
Jun~ 1938
STltImiddotAjLIlJ J (l11 rLI- Lifutfllmt Tuhnun WILL Till Hllm (()I1il1l TIL 10 Till AmI Lipul (ojuIll (jpI all
IVIILlTARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN IAll tna
H tlAloi Imiddot 1 IBmiddotgtIJ (01-1 rldllr~ Corp
Janunry 1938
Till Vll IN 11ft Ff ]--1 II) r K 1111 I IIt 111 II1It 1 (llIrd If iljllf
A fllltllllJJiIOIl of I pfl lOll nllll nil t I --11gt JpllU Ir AI trlllll) 10 t Ill lIlt III If 11 I II I L) 11 SI1II1)II11 tlrl~ in OHIT
1~)l7 tli ItIOtjr alt liJwd tlIht of thpl ]JI(tlt III gtorth Cillna 1111 fI-1 Ilr III aftlI 1gt dlvlltd II II fl]lIrtIIIIgt 1Il JIopPI prol
llld IIH III (llPllilJll ()f Tl1lllll
10) 1111111 Nil liU I iln J(I 11 phfPOltli(h I I r~( ht] r 1aJjr CPIIIrd Ialt(lw]
A fIII (f Ih ~Ilrlcl ltIffdr lllflllj tIll ltp(fJld hllf Ilf jir-
F~bruary 1938
Al I(tlnn- J I-I I-A IILD Hllrln ~I f)oi IFtlllfHIlCII1l11l1 rt1lrlt KrJI~~()1l11 I Fwld lt1lrlthd lOrI
IJrfwr
Tlu I)II Militlf Sl hll)l (11(ILdl lt11 (Ii~htfifth 1TInJvpr~ar I NovlmLtr J117 TII~ trlIl1lll lt()1 fr till l~uartfmllttrr Cfnm SIlff (If th fmlPrtt1 Arrn ~l 111middot111 ll11 It Ill lIr(lk If tIll Wr Var 11 rae- rIPIII d III 1n I
iorIJUIff) 11 LtI( lr()tOrtinl1ll~ lind 1111 rtrrpl I (llgttlin un Bin7lr
~
gas 1 sligh
born ~tPP nore
light
1 The fare e
~A (lii
mal
1n(H 11011
~8~~ beu
I
WfltI~lp~ )]~ )~ j~lnl~i il1 ~I(rI ~ ~1ljr~~ ~ In11) i~~l~llt f~t~~~~Vi~-l~I~~~I~~~ foj ~~elt
1111 dvpjopnllll f 1111 mHhlllf gl111 pnnjdri thf drfpl1lt( WJth I Jdli WPljJOll With whlh tltl olllkrl)IIII1(I HlvanlaRfC of tjw off(gtnsr T]H (tlllt of ffnnt Hul tl1( l1utnl)lf of llf1 pngaged mad nlltllank~ ~
~~~(~In~~~t~)~I~~)~~~lit II ~~ I1~ifI~~ ~ll)i~ ~~lJli~r1 1tll1 t~17~~f ~~i -I l dlrin) IIH olflIIIVI lIul frf~h n ~fnl hrlq~hl liP 1 tlip dpfpns(l (Pl1lm tJand hll11 up I hI at tar k 11111 111111 Ill tulk t hi 1 pOll Im (lf oilly off (ilsm~ I rlartll lt01IlL11)1l Ill If h)wlri tit11 ( n fnl m atl II] ylll r I hngl
trahzld In l)lrW furm of l(f1( In 1111 llIt hllr Op1l1Jnll ~talllll1(d warl at nl I a thll)~ Ilf Ihl Pt bull11111 tlw nft If thlnl In mnlnTlZatlOI1 Will [ rar 01 mllIlll(f
IOl[11l 1 -lt1 IlUTlt) HIIL jithrpohl iIJmiddot I Ir-II hI] I J LljOf (llgtft Pllhpk
Ill authof fPIPlt llit fulloltlg orld lfLlIf~ to itllluol 111 Jar inl
1) J11f Igllf If lIlon- I~ Allialllt if l~lIr()]lldll In1 r~ Ilt 111( Sino-faplllPltf Ir Ii) TIH nritlh En1jJrf 15J The Brll~tllt (lllIftrPIHI
fl Irldp allli nmnwr 71 Hplrmllnlnl
litlwrt1la clwk hllwI Ihl (rl11 BriLon 1 lllf 1111 nlnr(gttr gtitUttloll 110t 111 111 Ihl d( If --ijldoll ltIt durin) tilt Tllrhl
Till tnll~th of Ih lim 1lI~ lilt ur fnfl nf all mIJnt 110 llOwn In tahullfd form
Till (111 H 1 -IAI 11)[r HUfglrluli III SpanjPII I GtllPrd WwmgPf
TId lrtlll( i Ihf fifth inLllnwnl (If tlH mthnf JlOllllt of th( Sp (lv1l lr dptrihinl thl IlhHq~IHt n1r1lnll HI AtulJagt
In il~ uf Iott11 1 11 It tb aUlhr (lIl1tIltIl11gt III tpganl tu thrrt( of tllP ((lIrlHl1lnl olunltrnJrllh1t at Tptud 111 J)pcpmhlf arl frronlshy
March 1938
Alit HAII- SII 11lLln II LII~ ILuflm~rlff lind ihn- irlmnIlI I (nltlllll -)1hlul
Tlltrl If(gt II pr u I hIt 1 11 of Iml1) III 1 hi1h III ml d t rtwtl Ill ) IT I follo
(11 1I11~h (110-11 t wll Ii 1ltlntI(1 or iIlly-lllinn fUfgtl I~ I In(Illfhlrv lJ (a
In Ihl Ilaln-Ah-lIILUl r tlllrt 1- I fcaffity of targelgt ~plllih (jvil War FrItwo hflJI) a HpltlIlIlrd ha trill to ~a( thr ~ huildmgl of Madrid mil lur thi fI~on tlll- eity ha-1 ~uff(r(d (nmp fllight damag(-1 only Flr norf ltrionlt dlmlg(4 and many more ( must he (xpPltcd ill futun Wanl
mrr
Russ
and
78
i
i
ftXllriJ-O70 ~ bull Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
Both in China and Spain only high expo~iyeomh5 have heen ~5ed MILITAR-WdcHENBLATT (Germany)~~~~~~~ri~~~~~~t~h~iru~~~ ~a~116d~~~~Ji~~e~ ~~~~~e~h~aratJveJY By MAJOR EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
bom~it~~ltg~t~t~fr~~~~heI~~~e~~~~~n~Fni~iJ)J~o~~rhp~~f~~~ ~eps are taken~ It is very important to anticipafe events and take the
lecessary precautions ahead of time
1 -li
ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND THEIR E1I1ILOYlllENT LFlitgtgerthwchr-Waffen und Ihre Vervendung I l1-a]or KrzIHn_k
There arc four kinds of antiaircraft welljJons ~uns heav) machine gun ~ tight ma~l~jnc guml and searchlight
I 1 lntlUlrcraft guns may be classified 3lt follows
Light guns (up to- SO-mm cali her I Medium guns (up to IOO-mm caliber)
Heavy guns (over lOO-mm caliber)
eerr~m7~~i~~f ~~h~ni~~Jails whi1P til(gt light and m(gtdium tYJlP Heavy machine guns are oriinarily of from 25-mm to 40-mm calihtr
Adirect hit by the 37-mm or the 40-mm (an hrin~ down In airplan(J hilt malier llhells e~U1not be riepended upon to rio ~o I Light machine gum - caliiJ(nl from 125-mm to 20-mm are parshyiitkularly useful against low-flying aircraft ] middot1 ~1
EXPEpoundUENCES IN II1~ RAID PROTECTIONI lLuftschutzerfahrungen LifuLColonfi Trimm rery little is known today from practical experience of the efTed of
incendiary bombs and shells because the experienc( of the civil populashytion during the World War as regards air warfare was very limited The Gennans used incendiary bomhs against Rheims but the fires causpoundd hy ilem were (asHy extinguished The efTict of the inc(ndiary shell that will
be used in the future is yet to he determined - On the other hand much is known about poisonous gases and with
timel preparation and training effective protection against gas attacks can be obtained
CUIOUFLAGE ANn BLACKOUTS lTarnung - middot(rdunkflungj LicutColonel Schurgi
atural camoullage mEthods consist of planting trees to make roadR and buildings less conspicuous to air ohsprvers Artificial means consist in uing nets find shadow outlinegt Roads and roofs should b( of a dark color bright tints should hI uvoidpd Complete blackouts is lhe best prot((tion
at night
PnICAUTIONS AGApoundNST GAS ATTACJ~ iBrandchutz im LuftschutzJ Major Gcnpral Zar
1 Gas attacks may he (gtffectPd eithtgtr by mfans of bomhs or by Rpmy from ~airplane5 Atcfrding to tIl( author a gas attack will comp aft(r an air ~rald ~rhigh Ixploltj( bomb in ordlr to prevcnt or interfere with the salrage ~tork
) PHYSIOIOGJCAI l-nmiddotJ-CT 01- GASISmiddot Gift- und Gaslmmpfstoffc und ihn phYfliologil-cl( WirkungJ Liput
Colonel Mader A description of the effects of variaugt gases on the human system
~
~ IJ ~ Gasschutz cler Zivilbevolkerung im AuslandeJ Major Hirsch Most countries in Europe are taking precautionary meaflures against lair raids and have adopted gas masks for the protection of the population
Suttable types are the Swiss C mask the German VM 37 and the GT 6 as ~ell asthe Italian and Czech types
ANTI-Am Rlw nUILDING CONSTltUcTION UhfT Imutechnischen LuflflchutzJ Colonel Bodenstein
Roofs should he conHtructed of reinforced concrete or of a non-inflamshymaterial as a precaution against incendiary hombs Steel frame
are suitable types Well-huilt shpliern for the population are ecessary
AIR RAID smITEitS Der Schutzraumj Major General Palla
Air raid shelters should ofTer protection against high explosives gas nd incendiary shells
Shelters Rhould he huilt in hasements completely underground if posshyible and should not accommodate more than 50 persons l~ach pCfllOn hould have an air space or from 105 to 140 cuhic feet and a floor space or bout 7 square feet The author offers suggestions for design of a shelter nd (or its ventilatJon
1 April 1935
TilotWIlTS ON TilE DUitATION OF l-llTUitE WARS G(dallken fllwr die Dauer von Zukunftskriegen Major Mende
CCWlEltATION lIlTWI)BN INPANTltY ANO ARTILIERY l7wmmmlllwirkell von Infmt(trie und Artillerie1 LieutColonel
Lancell(gt fhi importHlt qu(sdon will always hegt the subject of discus1ion because
cOOpNatlOrl hetween the two arm neVN attained perfection during the World War
The artillery officer mut visualize the situation of the infantry officer Th( main difference hetWfen infantry and artillery is that in the infantry pwh man fireR 11 WfapOIl while in the artillery only one man directs the fire
- the hatllry eummander --- who in turn is Hubordinated to the hattalion commander All nUwr mcn perform suhordinate duties
Artillery should not ()(l subordinated to the infantry but both shouJd work in dmlC cOI)l8ration
The infantry regimental commander indicates to the artillery battalion commandN the assist~m(( required by the infantry leaving the artillerycommander freedom of execution
Th( maill value of an artillery battltlJion lies in the fact that the fire or all )atteries can be concentrated where the inIantry regimental commander de~If(s it most The performance of the artlllery mission - above aUt the Huddn concentration of all hlltteries on a particular sector - requires the pnergetic ~tIJfrvjsion of the battalion commander The effectiveness of artillery fire IS of such great importance that it justifies the granting of ibdeshypendent action to the artillery hattalion No special missions should be ugtsigned to hattmiel
Am ATTACKS ON GIWl1ND TROOPS jFliegerangriIT auf Truppen und seine AbwchrJ LieuLColonel
Greiner The author divides this subject into three parts (l) Attack on troops while entraining _ The object of this attack
may be the destruction of railway ihstalJatons so thllt they may not be tvailahle for loading troops Such an attack will also disrupt train schedshyules The troops must organize a system of aerial surveillance hut fire Iwuld only be opened when ordered by officers
(2) Attack] against troop trains in movement ~ While travelling in open cars evpr~ availahle machine gun should be in r(adineslI to repel the air attack
(3) Attacks against troops ~It the moment of detraining - The same precautions must he talt(ll as when entraining troops It must be rememshy
~~f~ ll~~~~~ trll~~t ~lt~k~Cpl~~e~I~~el~~ ~h~rroJ~dI~~t ~rgehiy~~~~= ahle that troops dpoundtrain at night but even so antiaireraft defense is impreshy~(indihh
rlll~ CYCLIST SQUADRON IN TilE RECONNAISSANCE 1NIT IDie Radfahrerschwadron in der AulkliirungsabteiJung1
The author compares the efficiency hetween the cyclist squadron and the cavalry platoon which form all organic part of the division recormaisshysance seetlOn
According to German Field Service Regulations and to German leading military thought the cyclist squadron has three missions to perform
(1) Security missions (2) Combat missions (3) Messenger service
Hegulations prescribe that cyclists may be attached to mounted recon~ naissance platoons
According to the author cyclists can travel from 25 to 30 miles per day while l mounted Jllato~n requires 10 hours to cover the same distance and at the end of the journey the cyclists are fresher than the horsemen While it is true that cyclists cannot be employed where roads are not availshyable yet enemy movements in such sections can hardly be expected
Does the cyelLl1 offer a better target than the cavalryman Neither (an obserVe woll while in movement However in a sudden encounger the
cyclist wiU have the advmtage Even at a few yards distance the cyclist cun throw himself 011 the ground take eover and commence firing The cavalryman always offers a target whether or )lot he gets off his horse or zigzags at a gallop In an encounter between a cyclist and a hOOScman the mounted man is lost
The cyclist also posseSses advantagC$ in reconnnicsance and surveillance as he can stop anywhere lay his bicyclpoundt on the ground and Qhservc At night he cln move faster thail the mounted trooper ilnd wjthout lights or nohw
THEN) OF THOUGHT ON INFANTRY qUESTIONS IN THt UNITED STATES
Jnrallleristill(~he Fragcn in ~meriknnischer Beleuchtung
79
Cdtaloof Selelted Periodic~l Articles
THE SP~IltHI WAll THE nECITlnu Of TEllUEI Tm lrmo R1VlR DIlIl
Iom spanid) n K rh~ Di icdrgtrPfoherung on Tfrue D(gtr Durrhhruch cudhch d(s Ehro J Coonfl v Xylander
An aecount of the Iwurgrnt opprations that led to thegt r(cptuffgt of TpTUP] and trw hr~~lIInlllK of thp ririVl to till q L tn ltHhuif tll( captuf of Ca1pp on If obrch 1 il
8 April 1938
TIIEgtt Hltl--r WAf I~ 1915 11)(( lil1t~lm( K d(~ ram~ Ilflj dmlrll Rlchmann
(rtnl~IJ IJH(IZATlOi r)F THE Am fOlHt lIton(TlO1- of JHshyIIln1 (IWI~ Tf) HlJS~IN 11-
II )1 lld flltJrlulllttOI dr LuftwlIT( J)fr Schut7 (hr lltl~~hlr II
rLI II ltInf nltl rUc TIlflJriPIl 1 Cnnnf agli
~tltrl ~h J~d Im rIll lilt tirrraft (llfl -uJllci(middotntly ahpld nf tim II Ioid Ihrl fUI) Tin dld m(1I1IlP-~lln bull dl()11 lllld (IIldlilll
Ijmiddot d flllP 111111
(anl()ufLw r1] t t(middot bull tltlily 1((1 dummy roId IlIIH ImJltd I pTftdllli hIT qr - llld Ihd plrtl(ltllr (ttrntlon lthlIzld 1( f11 n III I IfIl(HlLIIIIIf t j1 bullbull 1 I d PI ld Ial t hi l11nol ho I hi 101 II Inn of Ih 11nlrt All I IIgt IT lIlllllr rlft PIltIOI1 (1111 111111r ddltlI( mE Illlt
Vl11 ]1 1middot(01 ~ 11 I d d I hUTlIll llrJ rl ~dl 1 I-TO Jill d LI If (iI 11H I from Il( I Ttll 1111 t
Hill til1lr il-tdlltlll Lf)llI] I 1Il( ILllrd HIgtlp to I IHmv 1llt(lt-gt 111 orriN to atlr1(t Ittntlfln InrI dr(ph thrm
1111 Ptli(H I III m altw) C1Il I mlnlmlZerl ] fn idilll~ nul til( InmiddotlIIllI0I 111 infO (dtnlaquollflq d 111111 1)lhlr h1l1fll or In ~rOUH at thp middottnmltip of t1 filII 1th I dhIlUP of frolll IOO tn nn vardl IHtlll 1 h 1l1IInlj lHi mlllljOlll- ~f 1 ltholdd Ill Ld n to hIYP mplll1lt at hmr II) Tijlnr Itlllut dr Ll (ratfr-middot (111 f d IJ Plllll bomh
flJ1 r11middot of pltl1)ll I Xl-I cnne rIllnf und rr(lIlHI hI1Wlr Ihp rTf nciI 1lHl1 t h fll
15 April 1938
1111 1- TI I I 1lt1 ( L lt] H II I lltCl1 TIll IT1 iA J()I---T Of lEW It r Ill] n~) ~ lchrl(hUlldlpll I a(11 ltahcnlsclfn Amjebshy
t n
It 1 I 1 1 1111 lllfnrlllllllll lol11Inllllf~ olhrr nat 1011 l1l order lrpn m tJnll of ar Tlw mJJl uhj((tlt to ht (ollltj(lt rpd trl
( nm( Illd nlhLlr nutt(gtTgt Thll mfllrmatinl1 Will n1lk( It h 11] du TLIIll rlllllllqltlll~ that will ddill( thp attitudr that r1 III) II]H) ~I1J II Ilnri r 1( rIal elr(t1mftann
Tfw IH f Illll 1d Ill Int Ihhn)C lrVII hnuld POo-(4 -Ultah11 rlquirl shytt Ill Illlt I Jnli l tlll j 1I(h In tlnl(lt lbl1tt- tn ob1[ nWlltd
tI n~I1 1nd l hlghl- dllopld gt11)(gt of patriotl~m I~l lI1 1 Il( lllI)- nltaillfd llY 01(111 of Uhmlrlll1 Ilr1 shy
n r- f l1JfP71l111l
MILITARY ENGINEER
July-August 1938
llll1II n iT r- (ff~ RIJJt Lllutfnant Thomplton Till lilIH(TfO1I Till BIUTH 11(1 ~faj)r I1fllold Bnti~h
MILITARY SURGEON
April 1938
Til 11t1TIJ 11 1 TIlTL~ Or TilL -lEIJlCAL DEiAltnIEr-T 01 TH) Jt- TilL 1II)hT 1 I Or II Ill IN] IN NATIONAL lhl EN-E ~laJ(jr (lt III rd HI~ nold
TI IrA L 1u)f1 H ~I(f I III HI-I Till CIIAWN 11lt EnIIUII 1 IJIr 1IlJlrltl Fr( tlltl rm-
May 1938
Tm fI(I-IZTp ~j) rrgtTd)l-ltlt III nn MIIHfAL SrR(IS IN ltlI1111 (JjJnT11)~ II 11 ~ltII ~jA tlJlU E II) (aJlloIin gtLtlIl (1)(1 11 II C 1111 IIIlHI
June 1938
TlIL nfl(lIAT11) 11 f I r TI1INfgt IIf TilE ~lEnJ(AL SIln Wi ~ IN ~lmiddotI ltJImiddotUTI- f Nh 1~1) ltJ II n)HIu III Capllull faun lind L ll ()I HIII IJ
July 1938
C oltlHIHIIIIiIN OJ fW IIHLtI VIIIl ro j1I AiJYANl II tf ()j 11J)shy
f IL fh VhlelIrJl Jn1 ELlY JJ17) MIJor Frifll Illgt ]fAI IlLHAPY IS Till NLT WAlt (aptam Lowman
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
June 1938
TllI JJTlIWISI I)In 001 IN TIIi OlmNT Captalll Knox 1111 TIItI J flU J JllT OF TItHlTOIlTAI WArEItlt LiltlfCommandlr
ffIllgtl rt TilL JJoT 11NDIHLfl ~A)i 1-lt IlihTOIlY Smith
C amp G88 Quarterlj ~ - -~
July 1938 Li(
JAPANS IUSING SUN LiCut(gtnant Eller ~ TIllS NAVAL nAn LjCutCommander Hamilton ~ Im REBEL HAMS Pratt ~bullbull
August 1938
llWNI TSAO LipuLCommandlr JlOVC1l l Lei lIlt~~SSllN 11AItNtl AT SIIANlIiAI IN Ifl12 Li(gtIHCommttJ(]Cr Smt~
PIONIERE (GNmIIlY)
By M AJOH Ilt~f BENITEZ Coaft Arti1lCry Corp
February 1938
LNIJ IOHTlFJeATIONs 1(pfiltllwn zur lltuzlitlichell LandeslwfCstigungj Colonel Dittrr i
BI1f(lufJOn tll fxpNipncf gainCtl in tJ1C Vorld Var tIl( French ha~ ~ dlvllo]Hd 11)(gt ltm-ealllri fort ifwd rtl~iolJl Inginn fortifi[c1) rhmiddotfpn rmiddot By~t~ j
m whieh (OIWrttl and It(11 Irl tXIIIllIVfly lld lEalh ngion fortifi( IUll t fulfill the following conditions bull (1) Thl (XlllIt o[ the front multt loe such that all attachr cam i
ollll1anlgt tlH pfl~itiun nor can tlw (Twm 0 lrtlllfry prpvfnt moV(menta 1j brr IroOPH Within the furlln] 20111 in~ hold~~) Slrong lIank fith(T Tf1ting on tprram ffttufP or artllicial IItroq t~h~
(1) EeflIent eommunlation netwurk tnsurinr~ rapId movpmfntHwit1 i wil Ihf ZO)lf and al o rapid eommunieatlOn to the r(ar ~
(4) Illpound front mtlt he fldly protect(d and 1rIngtlJ(gtllrri by lililf-rnnlul j lP
or artlfiial oh1I1(Jlaquo1 lme (5) Comfort mU1t hp provided fur the garnon hy tllp on-trllctlOnc
living quartlrH and otlHr eOIlVfn1IIl(Pl Thi 111 altUf r(flt during (I j nat fi(htinl 1Ild at nll plTio(k j tle~
In formlf tinHfI fortnhW1 W(f( hflrI w a mafr If hOJ]or and~1
l~~j f ~ Ii ~~I~ifl M Tfllf~~ i~f~ 1~r~~I~~~(~~ ~ailr~ ~li~ t Ih~I ~~)t I~I~I~~tt ~ the ~pe tlip almntlonmPllt of H(gtiml and LJ ltlfl hy Juffre hdnfl tlp fint Jat t of tIl( MapH and th( ahandonmlnt h IIlIIdenJurg tnd LupoundilldorfT oft I
forI r~ii~I~)(IIIt~~hII(r~~ ~I]If~ I(YI~ ~~llfIW( fnrtlfieat ion ~Yfgttrm ~ ti II prrnt (rv IJ()lI Hul tll land forlllieIIIOil (If t)(la~ pnoopss rna ~Co arivantagflt ltlVlr thop of fnrnwr timl I Th
it(O
-- Im TlLININ(f OF JMINI~IR LJPElt- tP ~II- -i ~~ lS(hultl1~g 011 PllgtTi~rr(lhnrIl IlBd Trupp] LIIut CIOllPI Dlrmiddot -1m
lt~ (0101111 Oll i(hlPwell pre
ln~IIl((f8 III In lfhllllaquo( through dolt( (ountr An lCount Of 4~middot t( t 1lt l IM n N-l ~lrrtl d out hy tlip 2d lngtn lr BIIIlllOn in tJw reg- f r northll~t of Bn IllLll
Attllk of r1 ef IIllf A Imllar a((ount of 1 I 1ctlCJl pX(gtrcISl It vh
ul by t1~lnl~III~~~~ II~~I~I~~~~dglng ltllltpmPlt ti~ I(rgln von Fluzkiwln 1Il dC1l RIlC11l1 CapllIn Schroder en
dccrlptioll Illustrated hy photographs of til( work (arrl(d OU1dJO till 3d Motorized ComplIlY of the 5th Fngill(pr Battalion laying rlwrmiddot ()vCr til( Rhil)l )t COllftallC(gt
Thl work Wt~ dOll I h- congttrucHlg a ponton imdge laYlllg the c~ Jilt on til hridg( d((k lilt ltlJOtt~ thlm ~ra(hlllly by pa ing tbC1ll 01 drllm whIlt dirnLlltlJIIg til( hrll~( II gt((tiOIl from south to north
Nl -mTlIo[)S Imiddotnlt tlto~~lli( HIJltS It OTnRIZEIl tNIT~ INIIJ( VIg(gt 1111ll Fluzuhprglllg dtr mntori iprf1l Einilfltf1l1
Mtjor l1lrlullg
A (ontinuatlOn of m articlf publihpl in Novfmlwr lHHI ful TIlt authnr~ idp i~ to COllfltrud a bridgf COTliltillg of two strelbull - shy
(dJI l on which motor vphiC(s could ridp if I)TO idpd with a l1)cial rlrr~ J aHachld til (hI ()utllHh of Iadl whfPl ~
III tld1 iU1Llinlllll Major JIartllllg prop(l~elt tll( Up of two amphih j lanl each of vhich Inn~ a drum around whih cahlf jlt wound i JjtlrumR ITl rotIIt-1i II) 1111 tank lll~ilH H]11 tlw ahl m he paid oul orwo ~ _ 1IJ1 mechal1ldly Ill( tlIlkl talpound up thpir Il(Jltllioll on OPJlo-it( iri(s (lft II rir with tilt twn (dllj drftdwrillltt frnlll onl 10 th tillr 11)[ aTl ((urld to IiIi grouud hy Illltnl of 1111 pil14 drivlll thrllul~h nJWnl~l Fr In till loor and tllPY arl fllrlhpf IlPPllrltd hy I nIh 1
ThiH irpa hWI nol 11 IHPII 11111 111 IfllIic lInti lOIlW tl1ldlfiratl i(( lIlay hI 1(lIImry In 11Illlr middotllfHllIry nlull ~~_
~GT QUARTERMASTER REVIEW Fa
May-June 1938 JTh THE HOLE OJmiddot 11ll- NI~TllEnLANJ)fi IN THl- IOTtLpound) OF TonAY Dr a_
Akpoundon ~ PLANNIN(f BRANCH COr-~TRu(nON DiISION OFFIn~ O~ Tim Qp ~
TEIlMANSTEIt GENEHAL Captain Lamh
80
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A comIERCIAL VIEWPOINT ON THE ARMYS rIOTORIZATION 11WGRMl LieutColonel Rockwell _ ~
MASS PROCURE~lENT OF SUPPLIES FOlt WAH fohn Mille
JUly-August 1938
Am-FEP ARMIES OF TOMORROW THE SUPPLY OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN DEFI~NSE Lieut Colonel
Lederer RAsstGNA 01 CULTURA MILITARE (tly
(Formerly Rivistn di Artiglierl e Genio) By MAJO~ EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
January 1938 (Commencing with this i5ltue ttle iRivista eli Vanteria and the Rivistu di Artiglieria e Genio have been combined and wi apppar as one publication However the parts dealing with artillery engineer and infantry Hubj(cb arc Iwpt separate from the genffal mattff ~It(~ tion)
WMt AND ll-CtJ [La gucrrc c In pacej General Corsclli
For over more than 3400 years beginning with 149b BC to til( Dulshyhreak of the World War in 1914 many att(gtmpts have h((( made to srttll intemationltlJ affairs hy conciliation and mediation Ill( uague of Nltiolls and the Kellogg lact among others hwe resulted in failuTs HistoTY hov3 that war is inevitahle and human palt~ionl and natIOnal interpsts ~11 predominate over all the methods created to prpwnt war
War says ~lusso1ini is a piH(I01ll(IIJl whirh u(ompanit- thlgt deelopment of mankind 1t is a tragic destiny that will always wpigh uponmens shoulders Pacifism Oil til other hand is not a husing tmiddotitlwr shy
War is a social tonic which stimulates the enerpy of a rale and the national virtues it destroys all political social psvchical and moral impurishyties that accumulale in times o[ peaee
Modern war is totalitarian in characttr and rfquiregt tht pr(paratlon of the entire nation for wur
A BmDS~tn VIEW OF THIlt YEH 1937 IIanno 1937-XV in una rassppna panoramica]
A summary of the chid evcntgt of thp )last year in Itldy ano ahroad Considerable progr(lss has h(gt(gt1l made ll(ordin~ to tlw author in Italy The budgfmiddott ha~ hpPtl halatllp( and the army navy and air forer haY(I h((n reorganized
In regllrd to the army thl XX Corps was crpated and ~pnt to Lyhia oganWd to suit the ~pe(ial conditions thfrp ImproenHnt havp I)(cn made in the organization of the Cast division the motorized diyi-ion til moto-mechanized brigadp and til(gt cltalr-- rfginHllts Th( army hal )((Il
provided vith tilt r(relltly adopttd machine gun antiaircraft gUll ~O-mm -ii-mm antitank gun 81-mm mortar for the infantry ali(I the 75118 hatterils
for the division artilterr and for the artillery of til fast-division t The ar of quick decision h not an empty phrasC hut a dodrill( ~ hich depends upon a qui(k and dettTlllinCd preparation
~the 1t~~~i~a-~~~o ~cl ~l~~O~it~~i~~lte~h~Shi~l~~l~~lS j~l~~dcl~~fdthe c-uipoundErs Cavour Cesare Doria and Duilio The Italilll NlY when tll
present program is eompleted will hay a total of H20OOO tons (()nsi~ting of the [ollowing ships 6 battleships 7 heavy efuis(rs (10000 tOil 1lt1 light cruisers 10000-8000 tOil) 15 destroycrs 44 torpNlo chasfls 3lj torpt-do
boat5 98 luhmarines and auxilia~~~~~il~
1 Tile Nl~W TItJNIKG RFGUlATIONS l Illnuovo regolanHlnto di isttuziollPj ~ These regulations supersede ~~_~)Ii~hed in J9HJ
ij TilE I~~~E~~ ~t~ ~~~~~middot~~~I~~~~~~T AND Tim CHARACTEHshy
A (Lattuale eorsa agli armamentie Ie c~rat~erigLicllf delli flolt del ~ futuro Consul-General GmocclJ)cth A review of the comparative strength of the six principalllJ val p()vcrt asI follows _ _ _
i -- i I
Balle- I IDclfrOl1- SIIJ- I A ircrnft 1 1 hip (middotndlcr cr i 1IrtrilICH ((l(rhm 1oM1____ __ bull__ I_~__t ____I~__ 1--1---[ 1011WgC
_i~~--~--I~--~--i~--___ ~ _Imiddot I ~_ 2 1~_ i ~ i~~ ~ il~)(j I __~~ _ 610000
France 6 4 20 tmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot[ 851 I 8 ill 715000
G-T613 -~ 9r7lfiiiTI36 1--2 13ampLOOO
~ nrita~I~~ 2 111 ~ I~~II~~I- ~~ ~I~~lll ~1~-i71O271135~81r~~- 34 ~f--~~1600
middotObsolescent tModern under construction or projected
-
Accordingmiddot to the author navies Of the future will not differ fundashymentllly from those oC th~ last half century Battleshipswill continue tn form the backbone Qf the fleet there will be a large number of armored cruisers and destroyers and even a larger number of submaTines and a few aircraft carriers
TilE SINo-JAPANESE W An La gtH~rra cino~giapponesc1 (I) ColonelOxilia
The hiltory of the present war may be traced bllckto 1894 when the ~apanesl seized Korea In 1900 the powers sent OJ strong contingent to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion
Russia had its revolution in 1917 China had hers in 19U Japan johHd the Allies during Worl4 War cl1)tured Kino-Chiau
and obtained mandalpound ov c islands by the Treaty of Versailles IntlfIlal difwrders in opportunity for Communist peneshy
tratioll trom Hus~il In ai-Shek came to power and had to maneUvr between RUBsian pressure on one sid amiddotnd Japanese expansion on the other The prCSelt struggle is very similar to the situation in Spain
- a fight b(tweell th~sp two influences JapItl rommercial expansion requires a market for her goocia She is
~tricUy an agricultural country U1d lacks coal and iron mine oil and cotton whit-h arc (ssential to her industrie China offers Japan a solution to her Irohlms
TII~ SlNISII WAH lLa guerra di Spagna1 il) Captain Mele
fll( revoll hcgan in Morocco on 18 July 1936 The greater part of the army went over to the Insurgents while the navy with the exception of (JIll haltlfship tnd four cruiflcrs remained IOYlll to tllf government
ily 1 August the Insurgents had gainpu control of a large portion or Spain Tolosa fell in August lrun in September to be followed by San Sfb1stian 1m Toledo rhe Iiege of Madrid hfgtgan in October where desshyperate filhting continncd well into January On R February Malaga wa (allllred
J)ISTRlllVTlUN OF IIIE [middotN(JEEltS OF TIII~ ALPINE Dl]SION IN A )IOB1LJo~ WAR
II reparti del genio della divisi6ne alpina nella guerra di movishymentoJ (010n(1 CUJlJnis-ini
The Alpim Divisioll c()n~ists of two Alpipe regiments one artillery reginHnt om engineer COmT)(UlY and service LroQjIgtI TIl(gt engilleer company con~istgtl of five platoon4 with about ~OU ~peeialiHts ltlnd 150 drivers Their IfJuijJment consiltts of a light mountain hridge 30 kilometers of win 3 parchlilhts and 1~ rttdio slations In the Alpine Division the engineers eonstitutp only ppr cent of the whole strength a5 compared with 6 per C(nt in 1m ordinllry infantry division The author shows that the engineer stnngth is illsllflieient antI sUJgests an organization consisting of two engineer (ompanies specially trained Cor mining work a signal company providf(1 with tp1pgraph wire and radio crjllipment and a searchlight section of six scarehlight Ilw intirf engineer foree to 1)( commanded hyan engineer oiliecr
February 1938
A loHTLtUl~ECllON1CLE OF THE E-IHTION OF DON CHRISTOshyllllm Di-~ GAMA INmiddotABYSSUIA
I Vna cronaca Jlortoghese sulla spedlzione di don Cristofaro de Gama in Abilsinial 1) Prof Naldoni-Centenari
1he Portuguese expedition under Don Christopher de Gama consisting of 400 ~oldiers well trained and equipped with Over 600 rifles sailed on 9 fune 1541 Da Gamas hrotherwas Goernorof the Portuguese East Indies This Purtuguese force was sent to help tJlP Negus of Ahyssinia lgainst the King of 7(gtila
Im SINO-JAlANESpound WR ILa guerra cino-giappones(1 (U) Colonel OxiJia
In this instalment Colont Oxilia gives a brief description of China and then analyzes the strength of the armed forces of the two nations at the beginning of the war
The cause of the Mnflict may he attrihuted to the strong anti-Japanese feeling after the cstablishment of Manchukuo in 1931 which led to many local quarrels between Chinose and Japanese troops
The author believes that the origmal Japanese plan was to cut off all lontact hetween Russia and China cross the interior of Mongolia and the occupation of the live provinces in North China Hopei Chahal Sulyan Shansi llid Shantung At present it is hlrd to determine the Japunese plan
The Chinese plan is even more difficult to follow At first it -appeared that tilt Chil(se favored the operations at Shanghai in order to splitmiddot up the Japancie forces but these operations assumed far greater importance thall wa anticipatcd
ROADS AND rIOTOHS [Stmde c mutori mcntalitit dplla motoritltzione[ LieutColonel
DlmtC di Marco 1h( imjl(lftnnce oC roadH hus become very evident in the last few years
Committed liS WP are to a wal of short duration it becomes npCessary to have adequate roads to deriVe the benefits of speed offered by motor moveshyments
81
1101
Ca~al()i~f Selected Periodical Articles
111 rll ~ll1 L 10(1 1dl Hl--L I It (1lt1111 J 1( dLmiddot ll 1) 11 II
ld-ll)l ~ --1gt1111 t ill HIIII) If thmiddot Jill f th 11)11 f ~atlull TIll ) II u dl~ lL tLI lItJuj of till r II] 1 _ tuvlrdshythl Jnll-h lril1l1lhlrt1Jn ld dlUltlfl lj ~dnr 1( 11
Plrltlld nJ)l~ HI tl)11 nlI]
d 1111 ~nl H Ill ILl ~lrrl I ] 1)1t
I r II
tlldtlh r
11) 11l 11111gt11 1~ I
[ HI I I 11 I
~ I dmiddot d) )j l) f r bull
h 1111 111 J Imiddot [r1 d IlL )1 I r I II
) fl II I rl l f r gtI )01 t Ilrpl
ill I( 1)ljl I 11J
Ll II ~ r)i 1 bull I 1 11 I
~1 middotI)roIll Ir 1
1111111 II)
d )1 (1111 I i I ~
1middotrIi r 11 t III 1
RESERVE OfFICER
Junt 1938
(111 I
REVUE DE CAVALERIE 1111)
Jllury-Februny 1938 I 1
l r ITnillpll ill ] L~t I) 1 rllt n Ii (1111 II
JI1 1) J IJll 11 j
1 III T II I I iII J HI ( gt1111middot1 Il nJ11 I
Lt J
f l j Irlp r IT I I rmiddot lId 1
f l-fll 1)1 uLlt1 ] 1 r
11111- rLd 11a1 )IIt( I-
I )01- d ) PIIIII Ill
II (qlt 011 i1 1111lt111 nt I 1 I 1 r I oil
I lld - I II] I d t]r I I r I d I dlddI llf I ndljll 11
111--11111
-11 1111) 1111)) Jmiddotft
n dill lin rmUlI( II I dunn tlllh
f Illlt )ullr 1 IILd ll tholl
tJ I till ji
fL I I I] 1]1
bull middotr 1[i J (f I Jr IIT 11middotIf d 1) d
( It rl r(
I II j I f 1 1
Ild 1 1111)) Imiddot ll ltIII
( )1 PI itr )r f J I I f If 1 gtr f Ir
lId jf lit I]n 111 11101
JllJ HIlJd -II )(1 - )1 lflljmiddotInl 1l11llj111 111111
rio _ If lilli I )nlf) 1)0 (rl 11 f 1middotIIIId 1t11 IIrl I) 1ilJ fll ) III
jWj )1 hlllll l I il Id 1 t oj hl llli I I
dll) ltl II dl III I f ICd11 Hid 1)) 11 II 1 11l1)1r1
H II t HrJlllll I a H 1)1I of 1111
nilt Jlfln Thb H1IIII I lInllmiddot
C amp GSS Q1WIterii Vo -~ -
rapidly till rtmiddotlllrtUc])llH thaI th (1))1 llOUid i()J~1tally han and Whl IIHY han har Till yfgtl1 In I Ill nvdlIill~ of tltl )lottion dlarl(t(~ ~i I)y Illl(flIlal u lllkftgt inlln iv( r(annlilwnt gllwrl rcnr~IIIiali()n ~ Il1Hil)1l1111ion of I ill arm
1 FinIIHmiddotid and rflrnllIlWnl 11(riOnmiddot In Flruary 1f)3 Cu~ THOll ari()I1ccl I Inul dh lilt d 1) If li Ylr- o( 1()(1 million IOllIHI ~I(lrhr I IU)IIIlt 111 1 IIf Wal 11 and dr IU1111lt nmiddotL If Ii in llld~(tCii Icili 1HIIIIllII) Iwe
II 1t)n111ll 111lt)11 I~PIII lal IIlPI 11r - 1I11middotrnill~ tIll Ilwhiledi lilli Ih luLltllr dihi)l Ih 11I1h )ll1n1llHI arm
Illi mnllll dll lltlf h Ihl IlHJ t oritJ)tl wI dlrill~~ Irtltlnn 011 t~rr 1 II IlIIJTllt I IIJl~l(Iomiddot nf 1lIk If 1 1111110)) ~ nH~I)ilr hrigaa mpn JIllI d nf r Illll)lb of ill lank Ind IIdlll1 o(molurLd IIlrant~ 3 ca 1 n lflllllll of (ILlrv trlllri II 111- Illl ltlulIlmiddotd hllr- arlllilr 1ll(Jto~ f1an lIl)1 r mil llnd lllll- eml
B 1111 IlLllllrv 1111 in hh Ihl follOJllll lhrumiddotkrJ li~ IpllIll(mt~ prot 11 I 111 1 llr d IIIfcl IJ Cllll-lllllll I rlImiddotlllnll Il1( l~r)JI) 1111( mNr~ mitl 0)1 II ltdL111 rv of I Itl ii l f))1 i OIllIHJ-1 II IIf ~ lilttahtlllgt of muhuw gu hav 11101 3 lrlIllb- pf )IJI tdiOlh I Il h dli-illl 111 lbr Ill IrlJ mulofzd Tf Hlu I Jl d IIOlt I Xlll in Plll hut fInl (r II Ion of (orp -1111lt11 lJlIt~ a~ gral llI hill Vlll hll diltJn [nr 1--1 I v rd IIIIl (0r) al 1l(I~illllnl~ of war
( Illmiddot hll)) (()llIlllll)ll mjllomiddot( Ill til I nIlft -uIr10r If Count 1 ill I I t ()f IJlIH IlHllliJ( r- of whJlm fnllr lfl Il1lhtlry (lidlr lflilror h I II 1111 C d hy j O1I11r lli1 II Ill ]I )-t f I~-II 1IIl IhHf of 1tiT haq I Imiddotptdoli llId
III gt1 1(1 tIJIli111l rof 111 trlll Cl tllmiddotrd I ruel UTI of t )11 lrllJ I) Hnl III lllllltlllilild hut tlllllrlZltlll Illd 1l1(middotlilallllllllgtlJ
Jdl-IJd lnUI )~)lh IllJIltlnZltioJl 1 adlnld nnly in RU JJlllfllllnlrIIJlI 111 IIH Ldry llllIlHltr- mil infantry t w mrl
1illImiddotxI~I III TOflI lllllld IOJll1lmiddotl1ldj( m ]1Tl)rLI1t llOtOrtlllfJh ~ klli 111 lmiddotlJIJlII]d lnn and loLd motoriIIlI in llil Illi IrgtJIJltJht1ll lrIn In cull l Lin I lIllw r l~lInc nl lf nlOnnl d 111 II 1 III lOf IlHhlllll cl TIl( t~ SOl middotJJnmiddot III prltI Jf r(middotQntIlIll1Ioll ill Ilf Il)i hrl)uh f four I of1 Llhll II light lId fo1JT Illnld thn nf Irlll tlllk- infant 151
11]1111 11ht I (lmplIIH 1I1 ludl i ammiddot A FII h 1-1 tT hllltit 1lJard lalll-l orIl1ll]n I du IO) 1)1[
III) 1111 VI1I1 rlI I))OlIrLtll1111 i Ihll11 ln hl tJI 101 Ill ~ll)l Bntl h mtllLlry nc II 1)11 It huld 11lt1 d Illl tit )11- h of 1111l11fgt lld lcIl1l1ll11( ftI- ~ ltilJJ rtll HntlHl dUI
Tl~ ImltLlry rpl-nll rojl Flrl 1III1IId IIIlJj~ tl IIl-lILLr r ldiI-- 1 Inal ddt n ro to na ell
Ild ur TIIltIl1l111lti rOfll It hHllI IUI nl lllJll1l(middotd rdl lhltarmyfi~1 ~ Illn f 11 I t prlt)1 1 Ill 1rnl)r1 1)1111111 Ili In 1111 llwlropohs orl -HilIIll I)t (on ar mtinlilli Ii 10 I r11111 rIllltll~ llnblllllIlJ a urp I ~
~~~ ~lf ~~ r~l n~ ~~~ I~[~na 1(t~~j i~~ l~l J~l~ I~l~~llt~ ~~ ~I~i~~~i~ fi of [1111 r Thh ]lllIr 1 qJIIILLllI ly fln prnINli)l1 Illfl 1l10hL11tJ 11
[hII~~ t111I~I~)~~~11~)I1~~lI~I~middot1~)I1II)~II nl of 1 Plllpiw Ihl d~ pn I lilt 11 1lll lIl1lll]Id Iv Ill] 111 n __ ~lr for ~11111] (rpll Bnt1l11 i-Jwulda nN pn illOll ~Ir uf OIlJ dnrllllll 11kI Jl1 L ()nl mOlIOlrllltlOlI L11e mrrk I~t
It lOll 111 11lmil a 19nrUI- oTmiddotII i I rlllU el lltlll ~X Third llllUIOf)I(1 lrmy rpuirr llUlllrnll1 1)(middotI)I11--gt dllicult 10 recr h
111lt1 Ill rUel Htll thlllk II) Ih pr)ft ~Illd -oldippmiddot inat Brittin G
111 forlIl tILI lwcmiddotIt1i-t It hl III tldlt I(jint a 1l1lrlHd advanlagec- tQ lllllJal LCPI lrJl 1(1
1lw-p hndl~ Irt thl 1l1ditary rhln tlut qrm tilt hl i of at_ hf( il)II IIllIII) Hri(bh mLlltr~ nwn 11 ri IT th P(Olllll1)I rlltOll~ t~ II
n11LfotlP (hIlI for Flr-t Hrill~h rt-tHlrmiddot HI fnragt ar nmiddotdllllmiddotd r_)ure-- in gltl~OiW~1 act
11lI1taulttlbll ~ SPlt ltlnd 1ll~~lani I I -nILlll~ 11 uhlll~tntl Hltltr lllolorJzlllunr Il~
1111 folOf It 11IT 011111 1l1ll1 nl - dir Third IlWIhI11 d 11)111 uHi Irlurlut 111 hI mon 1-1 t
purd Ihm Irqr~I- lIld fILlgl 1
111 llonOlll( llIci nuILII [II-ll fJrci thp Britih lrm tllo~ 1 ~11 1ll01Ilnlllon lIIri 1llllllllitlIOlllmiddot illlprnIllWnl ill Iqllilllllnt md r i ~~ tltl( tltln of IIIW (nl~ll -- I Ii III J lhrl1 11 umpn-middot Llnt- af]l])ftfl - I I
ld Ir(or Ih hlhl jwl 11lr- (lrellll 11llll has l lrl (fl l bull h~ 11)11 n Y]CIpl tllIltJl1H llll 1lH mlltlnk 1111dllH I~un Thl mid 1fr~
11 l~~I~If~~t~~ ~I~I~middotIi~(~rt~l~~i ~II)I~~~~~~ 1IIi~df~(~_~~~~ illl
-Irnllg nnnr Hlr LI](l 110111)11 Ihlt houlti Iuhl it to lI~t un
~ iI~1 ~(I( II u~~ t 1~t~~lllI11~I~ ~ 11 ~r-lll ~I i r II~I~~ )i~f~~I~~~ I~ ~)1~11~1 ~ll]~t g
1 onmiddot ()IIlt f tL Illll- lll I Ihl to 1m lilnn~- mtJIllwnt j ~i lvtlr Irl I lIr I dl 11I11middotd tu tlan pl1fll umh1 qlld Tltl 1ltIn p(nlul- Ir ~ n I 1- lrmnllmiddotd mlll1ll1 for mlI hull 11111- 111lt11 rI( in hltlJc III I~ fIiI Illl lil~hl tlnk~ lwi II1lttrttl l)liltrtloll 1HIUPIl nh~ln lIn]lI lhlimiddot fill t Ill Finlh r ll1l1fllI- 11111 1111 tnr 11 lt t lldly Il n-l11 rll1m 11 III~ 11111111111111 md il JIllI 111 IXjllrlllllllllll lll~ 1l11] 11 11 I)f 1lli 1))111lt11) I Ill Yr lilrlflfl hayl Ill 1(IIl
r ~Ir) ~l in ~i t 1iI I~Ir 1 ~ l l~lllll~~~ ~ t~ r ~~I 11~1h~~ 111 I r~I)llIJ (a I 1 HII pIll] Ipm In hI1 gi (11 ~II i rt(t Illn C(l1lltu i
~I lll~l~t 1rt~ 1111(1 1)~~II~~~I( I ~I~I~)t~~itl~~~~hr t Yllf~~ I(~rll~il L~ll~ l~j~~ dlCltlt r mel plrtHu11rl ululrahit (In lIr lind arlJ11III tlwir I 1 thmiddotll1 tl Ilc ]Id ~111llIlrmiddot proId 1Jut I hI (lf(llj1 r1 -IlIri)r1ly 111IItlly ani Itank and lIllllalrNaft Lll u- ~uan JITImiddot(middotllqtllf jnrlglnltnt Itmiddot)rj)lllallll If tlw Hriti h lnny 1lt toll for mfurmat](lll til Ill llln lllpfjmiddotr dlfmitlmiddot it hnnltllw rltl1IfoPt 10 illfn IIOll of a middotlllllinlIlt1i vlr llot pl 111(11
illl 110
In 1)0
ll~ t~
0 sh ~ th
Catalog of Selected Periodical A~ticle8
March Aprii 193~
~~~a~~ ~jII)~i~middotSi~~O~~~i~l~it1(~~~~~~colon(gti Oario
~hdl~~~t~fht~~e~J~h~tl~~~se~~tsttlhrr~~~~~le~fthke~lf~~~ C~n~~l~~~ tiely recent comhats In Morocco
The firnt example illustrat(s t n(lInnulf1Rlmc( hy two platoons of armored cars (6 cars) and 1 half-seetion of tmks (2 tank~) to reeonnoiter terrain and dispositions in a locality TIl cfIJIHI pxample il]uRtrates employshyment of Il squadmn of armored ears (3 platoons of 5 carf and 1 platoon of 1 cars) to attnck the hostile flank and nllr to asht the main forlt wnos(gt Ranks ana i(ar were t11r(lt(tI(d hy the mmy TIll third example iJlustrah~s (gtmploy~)(nt of ollcylatl)cHl of three arrnofPd (ar UB a (nvcrin~ dptachment pr~tectll1g roudhlldltS Il (ach ca-( employment of cars in depth pcgtrshyTlItte~ Uco~phshlng th~ ry-tlsslon without los~ of cars lack of depth would ha~e Jeopardlz(d the mUISlOn and would hav( lost cars Each account h illustrated by a sketch showing lisposit iOlll and movemllts and hy photoshygroph~ showing gCneral tlaturP of the terrain
HgNNgN(A~JFS HAW I Tim 1( WITH CHlN IUn raid de Hpnnrnkampf dans la gUNr( dp ChilC1 By M 1(allfiavant
A hri(f narrativ( of a raid b) (illwral RellHlIkanwf distinguishedRusltian cavalry Ilucifr during tlw Huian lIwasion of Manchuria in 1900 ineident to tl1(gt Hoxir trnublls Jtelllwnkampf statitJ))pd at Tchita in Tral1sshybaikal was ordenmiddotd to bring rlinforcemn1 tn OIl qf th lIorthlm invading columns sprpe time afhr hotilitips IHgan Dptined to return to Tchita he sought 1)euro1mission to participatp in tlw ampaign and was giv(gtn commmdshyof an advaJHCd detachment Vith this impruviRed detachment 110 marched
~n~~r~~~U~lliii~~~ ~d~~lr~~i~s ~i~~l~~~d ~fipl~~lu~i~i~~~d oa~~~ three capitals of ~ranchuria ami deftated llUmrrOlls Chinese forces vastly superior to his own handful of Cossacks R(gtnnkampfs audacious conduct of this detachmcH was thf most important pjpmpnt in Hussian success during the camplIgn and hrought him mallv honors Against other Russian columns Chillpg fought wrll and wlh somp SUllCSS against HCllmmkampfs Cossacks and IllS skJifuU Ipadlrshlp tlwy were J(gtlpless The account is illustratpd with maps and a photograph of this great (tvalry leader
middot()[UT10N OF HIClTISIl CmiddotiLltY I~volutioll de la caval(rie hritanniquej LieutColonel Cuny
Change in organiZation usually slow are at times accentuated as at present for Rrilih cavalry Changil are imposd hy permanent factors of needs possiuilitirs and traditions of the arm whogtc peculiar characteristic is that it mURt h at the same time contitwntal and colonial Bffore studying HftltrimNlt~sincf til( war it i~ Illc-mry to c()n~ider dominant trafts witilOut which evolution would han 110 meaning
Equestrian resources of the United Kingdom - England is horse counshytry par excellencpound there the thoroughbred was developed the chase pershypetuated raees organized alld polo horn Horse sport is n need of national life and the claiRic figure of fohn Rull remains that of a portly cavalier clud in red coat and ridill~ boots rr~llln dvilizalion has not eliminatfd the taste for the horse hut it has chmged and commercialized it While horse actities remain It common hond hetwNn crowll 11ristocrlcy md the p(Ople iJreedlrs eOlH(lltrat(gt dTorls on produ(tion of de luxe horses and the less distinguiilhed horsE of army t) pe ha~ almost disappeared This slow dimunition in hor-f population IlPforC (ver illcwltlsing llumberll of automobiles to one of the principal (alls of nlelimnizatioll in BriUsh cavalry
The English cavalier As cverywhere else the mounted man feels a s~nsation ~f supclior force promptn(gt~gt and attraction that beinf mounted g1middotes TIll ~wntlm(nt dfvlopll rapid and hold methods of mind broad iskm j balancing (hsires and means ill a word seJf-eolltrol Master of his hoe the English gentleman hecomes mallter of himself it was not hazard that recruited the majority of gnat [ltnglhh leaders during the war trom the cavalry (Allenby Frrllch Haig) Ih( 1~llglish cavalier is more ~nterested in sport than in fine and learIPd pquitatiorl before everything he IS the rough and hold eavalier ready to ride at an obstacle without too much lculation and reflection The team spirit that characterizes the Anglo-Saxon IS manifested ill til( ta~te for rarCs hUlltll and game Excitation of til struggle team dhwiplin( sllit the (IId and slow tmperament This spirit or association is found throughout thp history of British cavalry where brilliant isolatd sections ire til exception comhined actiun the rule Finshyally the Englih flavr becomr ma~trR of brding caring for and training hOIllel With them horHcmastrrRhip is pla(cd ahowgt horsematlship
Thl Briti9h cavalry -- Thf traits are inherittmiddotd hy Britih cavalry III ilg higttory two currents can he diting1ishrrl the cavalier of gentlemen bold and undisciplined the puritan of 1c1 brilliant citizens who triumphed by energy and diseipline With the c01vaJiffs EngJiHh cavalry was bold and keen with t~(gt hourgeoilt it heetlmp methodicalllnd ordered and has so remained middotictorigts of Mnrlborough lnd Cromwell were due to powerful shock of rigid cavalry after preliminary fire preparation From the ueginshyni~g of the eventeenth ecnturv English ~avalry possessed a fire arm and tned c(mhination~ of fin and movem(gtnl ThrRe attempts developed during the eighteenth century by sp(cialization in mOllnted Hms of which truces are ound in divPrse organizations ronsidcred sincr the war
When the Empire waH ound(d and nlonial scrvi lldded to continental service platoons of preceding days were grouped under a colonel and given an organization suited to modestneeds of colonial war and garrison service
Th~ platoo~ system suiting ttllditiuns and ontingfnt ltituations persisted until the f11ddle of the nmete~nth c(ntury The larRc ravnlry unit L still
th pxceptJOn Ill England for- It doe not fit ne(d~ or colonial serice and reliels Of 20 line ~(giments Ii are ill I~ngl~nd 4 in ERJlt 5 in India Nea~ly hult ar-e st-tlOlled ~)frleas RQ are rlwied periodhaJly Colonial SETVlCe reqUlr~s tillS rehef and also a life eqmpmfllt rfffetiv(gtl and tactics
~~~~t i~~~~~l O~l~~~J~ of Jc~)li~i s~~~(~rt~~~nr~it~u~~~dnhrdi~~~~~l~ yCt illterc1mngeah)p this ItN(Hity explains the dela~ sand hCRitntion in reorJianization To nec)s of (oionial S(rvle(gt must hr add(d needs of a contmental war F~nlllsh (tvalry is thTgt ouly Oil( that fa((gts such a doubl ohhgatHlI pr~amza~loll mllst bHlupplp PllfJu~h h) nllpt nLd of II small
~h~rSil~kII~~ee~~~~t~~~l~ ~it~~Si~~~I~~~Io~V~a~I~i~~i~~~~~eit ~~i~ri~~forced in case of llcld ~ t
m(lnt~rmiddot~~~i(i~~a~~i~r~i~~~~l~t~~(gtc)~~~~~~~ ~~lt~I)( tI~r~~~o~~~~ e~l~t7~~ dplwntis (8scntmliy on perfe(twil III fire arms and means of transport As great as may he the esprit of corps and caste in the British cavalry it still reognizes the necclity of adapting it~(lf to the cxigellies of the tines by adoptilll newm(alls offerod byindustry frlwrfforf Ill mean are adoptedhut eSlmt pr~H~lpl(gts and miSSIOns rfIDalll thr unpoundgt tiS in tIll past
EVOLUTION SINCE TilE WAlt
Modifications sinee-thc war hay blen influenced bv battle experiencesSin(e 1870 lingJish uvulry has not w(n an arm ormollnt(d attackmiddothy Jarge units it has been the arm of recollnaisance and fire-powpr The South Afrkan War confirmed these views At the eve of til( war British cavalry was therefore farther advanced than continental cavalry Its fire weapons and fire instruction was Iluperinr to _that of infanlry This fire-power did not exlude the mounted attack hut favortd it it lwrmitted fixing the (memy mU1Huvering thenmiddottttac1dng with the armo blanche Cavatmiddoty was therefore trained to fight by shoek firp or (ombination uf both It was the arm of security and was utilized to hold ground and to constituteL mobile reS(gtfve British cavalry Rhowed the benefit of these conceptionR under differllt regions and conditiolls during th(middot war During tiltmiddot earlv days of the war llll thr(gte cavalry divhioll rllHlpred $plpndid sprvi(e badly used
~~~i1~~~r~~Jtol~lrf~i~~ti~e~e~I~~l~l~~r~si~~t~t~~~l~)~~~~~ti~~executed a march of 320 kiiompterH in 3 days and caused the dehacle of the Turkish armies From these different and contradictory operations some would have reduced cavalry to a IltIroly colonial roh others affirm that augmentation of fire-power and motorized materifgtl authorized a role in continental wars The Britlh high eommand without dpeiding between the radical opinions formulated the following conciu-ions to he drnwn from employment of cavalry in the last campaign
(1) Importallce of division eavulry and [(gt((gtit) of attachillg a regiment illstpad of a sqnadron to eaeh infalltry diviRion
(2) Distant rpconnaissallce i~ tll( fundioll of aviation and armored cars cavalry executes clostgt and dplailpd nconnahNlll1(
(I) Impossibility of llsing t large cavalry unit pXppt as mobile reserve to explOIt succ(ss
In resum(~ avalry ~hould endor to cOlcilialr two opposing factors mohility md fire-power and to this end it hns worked for eightcn years
TIJ[~ f~VOLUrION FIW~1 1119 TO 1937
Four stfPS in evolution can be distinguislwd dllring this period the overloadEd c~lvalry mixed cavalry or h011pound motorized pure cvalry mechashynized cavalry Changes howe been due to progress in means available Principlcs of employment and distribution in the Empire have remaillfd loll~tant to new weapons and vehicles tlmort (omlliete transformation of British cavalry call be attributed
(1) Overloaded cavalry 1919-1929-- Increas( in means of fire after the war reduced mohility of regiments I)(low that of 1914 The horse beClrne a beLlt of burden crushed under weight of materiel and was incapable of aRsuring fluidity and rapidity of movement indisl)ensable to cavalry missions Between 1919 and 1927 elvalry was reduced from31 regiments to 22 from a proportion of 77 ~ in 1914 to 5S f At the same time guard regiments werc reorganized us line regiments and lancers dragoons and hussar amalshygamated into a lingle orpll Bgttwe(gt11 1927 and 1929 fir(-Pnwer of rc~iments
~~~~S~std~~t~~~JI~~~t eO~p~~~~ ~r~~lm~~~If~~rt~~~~~l~~~o~~~~~il~e~ ihor~ drawn lhe hrigad(gt fntirely horfc contained thnf ngtgimlnts Imd disposed 66 automatic arms Only hi till division did motor~ app(gtar mid tilt division existed only 011 palwr it had 18 can nOli 227 automatic arms 9000 horses 434 wagons and only 361 automohiles
(2) The haIr mechanized cavalry --Progress in v(hicles permitted augshymenting mohility lIld fire-power and r(ducing rfT((tiPs without reduchlg number of units In 1927 tht Wllr Omce adopted the six-wheel tru(~k and the armored car The six-wheel truck permitted first light(lling by H3 kilos loads trallsported by horses extending radius of action 16 to 20 kiloshymetern second transport ill truclR of machine guns j munitions and rolling kitchens The motorized sig-nlli deta(hnwnt could he left far behind llnd still rejoin when npoundcded Cross-country carriers permitted doubling the number of automatie nrtn Thus transformed the regiment bacame a more powerful unit able to cover 36 to 48 miles at a rate of 5 or 6 miles an hour It waR comtmsed of a squadron of armored (ars cOIllltituting tho motorized
Woel~i~~n~~11~d t~~~~~~~1(~~~~lf~il~~r~r~ c~~~~~~~it~ i~19~~ Modifications indicated accomplished in 1929 occasioned a reduction of 1300 men and 1400 horses-for the cavalry During this period two types of cavalry were cre~ted entir~ely mechanized units (armot-ed car) Ind mixed
83
V lttlaloff of Selected Periodical Articles
Ullll U- d 1l1lr W 1111lt1(11 (tvdry or llHhptlldll1l hrlathl that (oll]d
form lvalr~ Ull lu]l fhl orgtnlzaliOll (hd not htand tIl-LltI III IPs- than tvo [armiddot anntht r t1r~anJ7tl(m lparatcd hO[I mri motor pfmrnts and rIlkd h~ht T i~ur( lib JJ Uklng nwtorJ1w tralll- (mplYlIlg light marhin( ~Ull III plan tf till dl1iurnltll nIl
11) PUfl dr) 1lItli (IVIIT and n1fChaniz(d fpoundguiatlOll Q In 199 rlmiddottonHl1lmd lInplu)-IIIl1l1 of nod rn nllanI fnJatJrIl 1lHIhalllZ(l v(JHclp armurlli (ar~ m( ~n of Jlillllll)watlOll) to pruvlcl mnlHbty and firf-pmnr ltl1iultlllify 1artllu11T qu till If or (Lvlir Till fullcmlll n1l111 (rt III
(( two (ari lt r It Ihlll blt HLHIIW glIH rfpiaing t))chuJl gUll tntl ~IJtJflltll
rtn~t LInd Ij]middot f IrIIrt oil addl II 111 111 d Ihlj 1 Blhy Jutm PjUlpraquolmiddotd l1h rlIllO fur
01 ndllJ II ilII1i 11l armor ri (ltdI1l Ild Ltl Ql1llr IlItI liu )101 HI r 1 I tllIljlV n I rUL pori phll h II lt Iimiddotj nddlll thtll I In 1laquo- ]11 II r ( ~
fJl LIT) dll r oWlhlt]Il lrlll] r I HIIJII III f Ir I( T rLIl~~Imiddot P Trnltllllf tllllhulH JH 111
IfJliI
JIl l)~ 11 r Irlll Til I l I I d of 1 uulrl)j )11 ~I Ing lllrht ml[ hIli IrlnIHr j r Ill dl 1 1111 l11 r lUlrirlm qf] p1ltn011 (Ih 1 I1ILI fl d 1lrl 110 Plllhlll 11111 plulrlln ju 11IPIlt1d
IIIHIlII r f 1II r I d frorn tltl a Ill nUl1l Ilt P0gt-I I rI 1 ll)hl III I 111 1111 (I) Tltll for dlmiddot-mnunllclrfHlIl TIlf Br(11
)flIl) 1 [lIlItltj 1 II) r fr Tr Ill Irl HlltlJH of frlt rnfhIIlIifd trlnl)rl I rll]It dill 11JIII) ill l]tl If IIll) dunl nl lTj rlt IT Thl10r)1111l shytlOJIl hlIl til fl (I rlun Iut nlllll t llluhJilt) illort qUdllltH II UJ IU IIJlII Illmiddot r 1111 Ill Ifl drmiddotH~rHd fnf dn 1l)1l rItlr- I)f for
Tlll1111 UTilI V ()-I rll) 1 di nlJlrl Ifl I hi n llilt 11I1) nl-l~d (Irl-~lIllltllll of thl Innlill 111hlllll mlnr7 1l1ll1 nt or a cflm)mltllln ()f thl
I TlIlfl )flllllt lIlll 11 11 Illdj rI Oil nl1gt111111 dll] m )1- ~I 11 t1J -1))1 1ll1 dIU) lllrd-J II Ill BnlJh Hilly
lllll-II I ( ~ 11)1) HI 11l 1lrI Ilf Ill( flnigt Callr eompmlllit I Itf)middot ~Ttllltllld 110 ljllth of thnl f()IflHnt I lr()Up of
r lId IT ~ I 111111 IJKd jOPI cIdry flltUfJtd hy rnotlfrn l I ill y lId r ro It ~()II In n 111111gt wllPrl mllhll)rl Llnnot
) fdl)1 lll~ d I 1 rrllll 1( Ii 11 hor (nd rnlChllluld llnltltl 11
I 1 llllll f lrnl I ri 11111 Thl 11 11Iil tlll- (hlll ((0 H I t rr (II lr Illn Illfl Ilvtln 111 hI[ IlO IllIlTp
I ( r I 1Ij~ t 11 h lillI d 1tlr 1111 jln ( dill qrgtlllllillIl lt1 not (oil
111 d I III middotf 1ll11 fI I fllr 1IrlTntmiddotnlmiddot WIth ni~ IWldl I lllllllil dl](jmiddotrl III 1~)11 til f(nrKIIlIZ Ih
rwl 111 Iry II) fllnn 10 Il1lthll1lpt hTlfldl- ll dn)IIIIl In 11 Iptntr Ijl) till IT ()jJUt
UI~ fr llmiddotrlI) hljl rl~1l1lllIh IIllu J f(flnlllIh IIf Jlurtpl ld f Itll tulk l11l0 luH rlglnlrnl IH 1Hn
d ld d L () n ilr lnd fl 11 dllnii~ I n till 111gt grlujltd I [lI(l~f
III Enrland 1 111 Eg pt 5 hnflt f(~lshyTld rllnlnI7ltlOn tIiTi11 tlw Ilorllld
lrjdllillQ tIll 1l1l)1l]middot dlIIIlJ dllt(Iod dunnl T11ull If (lalry (mhl~fd ofl rfglllwllt
Td IIf jJllrtt1 (lvdry jngIJl IIf Llnkl of 1 bull 1 llJldrJI1 )f pngllHtN ll1lhanizfd COIllshy
r~allllItll WI lot (onllllu(middott iftlr 11middotIc 11171111 WlrUIII( lIT crlllmiddotd 1111 rolloWlllj~
1 [lpht r 11l1 III f Ill jllllIlf rl 11 drj to lu (on(rt lilt]) h~hl d Illlll lb I bull flJllllllt Ill) d I)f It)ht tank lIul porl drl~()Ill frU nllill 1 til IP)P Irrl)~ jIlrll IIlllt
1111 n )111 Iii lull dVldld lHtwIIlI dn 11O1l (lvilry and I lid IJl rt)Hh I1(h lnnlr orgUl1ltOIl Th htLgtadll tl) Clltlillt
Jlfh~ Lmk r lm Illlt 1IId bull btttllll]1 IIf Ji)rl(1 lllflntry tgtI1(ally ontII shy j fr till III ~ ToJ lIld ( Ili-llt n ((JI)Jal~aJn and ahlJ( tlk llllult1 I ImlJJf tlth fIrgtlllzttllJll lll1r_ of till 11Ilc consisted uf ~ armored car r 111 llt~ hi LIdmiddot r )IIP nt lIld 10 jllrmiddot r4glm(llb of wllleh) Vprp in IIdl1 (Il Il IIf II l1Jdlll1 fOImiddotflInHmiddotnt 1111 1I(l4lry InfuTf till Il t 1(I Tl illlnt l[d jl Ilil 11111111 II alltI (ollfIPl1n n gtlltld ill de( Iioll to t r r-(lrt1l 1 n 11111 III 111 111lt111 illtl) h~ht tank n~~JnHllh lUi r(turn thl r III I JIlllld T)Irt fltJr III l~Jh l(vt1ry uf tIf 110(gt will (olllist of 2 r 111 11 If lfIJn d Ir~ 1 r mv III of hht Ilnk~ bullllltl ~ burH rqirrlllltl rlt 111 d rf tltllll nl r I II
Irvmiddotrlld Iqr of itLl cudmiddot rlt flJfl1 1 1I I far from detmite 1n Hl17 lllLlt1 tJf jJr drIVI n unltlmiddot1l mto platoolll and thlT1 Igt
lP fJlllIll1lji Iidqqr f li)ht tndl Lnrl plltoOnq of ]Jorligtf cavalry Jtrolt
Tl f bull lltlrf h (Ill rltllllmiddotd mohd rllviil)lI I 011 t1IlpJ1Ifti dllrl1l lIIH wai tf 111 1 IllllJdl of 1 )rtlIllf t1111 Ilf hattailllll (Of[(1l11Vt IPIlWllt J rld f i[vdry Ih IIImp)d IIf ~ tank fIfimpnh and 1LltlIion [ )r1l lllf (Ilry ITlIIIII lt111( 1)11 1( Uril) middottllHllt 11 1rllll If Itl IIllt Iltmiddot nJl 11 lInd) Ir arm Ind hlrVH FtJlOlillf~ mllHIlVpr or lln I II Ir ClUll III I HI d tlld(p 1hi IllnJlIi lIiv) i1~~htf mllTt hOlllI1~~tnOI lllr P(II dill alld I fi for 111I1 modlh(d till or~allllatLUIl 1hl port(( IIdlntrj WOIi Llklll rllm till hTl)ld fldu(fd hy half and organi(illlto a IhI-IHl orJLnIlltJ)IJ (har~1 rI WJth qf(ornim n~ll~laJJ( that tallkfl (allllnt ltf (llnl tl1 (J( jlfIII~ l1ld hlrldul Ilrrillll -I(h il loday th organization nil vliHh Brill Ii Idr h 1lt1 h(middot oqllHZftl and tranllu Entirely mcthashy1I11d II h(lr l h11 llllriv dhIPIIITNI for iJg-ht tanIH Lmd mechanizeu
b4
c amp GSS Quarter~ - ~ ~
(ONCItISIOtgt
Thll1 for f1ghtf1 y(ar~ HrHirh (valry ha- IWN ylLbtlt1 tl)rtalllzin~t contmuoUR attpmpt-q La 1)l)cJ1JlU two apparlllily lrr(gt(mHllahlf faew~ mohility and lirl-powpr Thi~ evolution ha- TIgtull(d from pfrfplti(m~ rnat6ri(I f1jlpoundcially erool Otlntrv ImllHjlOTt thi(l( ftrf(lltlll uf math haH elirninatNl t he duality IJ(lWPPIl (ontilHntnl anrlluionial (lvlirv Malo fi~ ~ ~ll111 1~lt ~~~l~I~ ~ ~llt~ ~ll~t11~~l1 ~1l~ I~~ 1~)(17 ~ i~~91~ r1l~eo1U
l ~n nlf r~iill(l1l~ WPrl nWlhalllztd tOlllY 111 pTIlllort IOn is eomple~~ rlv~rHltl ox ll1fyliatllZld fur ~ horop) l1ld IllPlropuhtm ((aIry j- aIm
(I1trrMI~(~~lnll~~I~ tllH qf thic rW cltlyalrj It Itgt ~t111 too ~non (014 ~ It paS~Il through a pltal of tfllformLlll1l with ILet of llhl1rkl men a trlill(gti (allrt It (allllot Ill Jlld~ttl lJlf()TlJ-1~ IXl-tlt and 1lt trUllld bull
Jlowvr tldn JrlPlhUlllld (Lvdry IHj)l ih 1lvt1rv cpiril It I 1t4 pur and II t radilll)gt alld pmiddotfu 1 to 111 clmfllundl d with lilt tall IHI AItiloUf(h cppnIc of tIlIir bur( It oIIHlrl pnlrVI the ~am( I the trlill tllIl1~lvl with tHlt care [or tlwir I1PW roll If ehangpound poi pamCui If ltllOultl hro nmiddotIo~Il1fgtr thai till (Ivdry 111gt -Ilfnltrod thl mllrmll alld lia adapttmiddotd 11lf wllh up)l() and prllIlId 1Ilgte to III tha IW(ti~qtl(l o[ tht tinH~1 1M
-oBH1 tinmtl that UI1Y hI1 10111 tOl Llr If1 till WLY of nlcchamzath 4oUI IIIIY a~llt If thl molJl1 dlII)IJ (middotlrnpl)gtmiddot(l (If Iliht IIlllt Jilhout l(rllltfl1 CUI pllwpr will hI (apIIlI of fUfmountmg HhLllH rllIforctt with 11 W~ anlitank ann JIIfY r(mlrle Oil tJf dlvlr~lty of unit 1111 Inp sa) Oland jPlIfth of (OlUTnIlI (Ilnrnwu Ilfrd for uppIy and maint In~ Othprl npiy to tfwp objet t11l11 that tJ( 11r)~I UTllt will not ~u 1 lJOlI lOl ttlllld Iwfort tlH middlmiddot f JaH It th bull1 It (1111( mHllIlIci ill the IXJlIThllI( TIll hi rony jJTlJjlflrtllJ1) of Ilf1d 11111 1111 io~lrj to hp liml unib in Egypt lndil mrl Jllfdmd (I111idf1ng till whlf of thl (aa~ an of thl Jmplrl blHh oc til Ix 11 Ill rq~1rlHnh ))1])1111111 tblrl lxlsi for natlVI hor(middot f(gmllllb III IndIa Hul )tgt hllr TIgmHIllt 11f 1 Ilnllllrl a hel Seoul 11 nil 1111~lilh tlrnllrJd army Atli(lligh till (lnll1Wln- 11IY (oll lt In
~I(~~~~gl~IJII~ f IS ~I~ ~11 I ~~~I~H~ I ~i~ ~ iN ~ 111 ~~t~ll ~t(itI r~ HIluJar (Ivdry tillt TI ff( (IltltUit 11J~ I (nnllfltn(I -1
of lhl IrnjJ(middotrial (lytlry It 11I11middotttlllmiddotgt tlJf 11111)(1 jllmi thmiddot enlt
lII~aJ lir41 on tlH halilp filld [t- Tj~lllllll)ll 1]111 tI or will lat 1laquo trallrnrnllll It h (llftl lilt ltt I fOII~ hilt 1 fllur J1)1I1l1 Ill ItllltfJert~ rtf fortigt lh
ltlthE
Ttl ~llPIIIl- 11 11 HII(~L lolUlltlt( N SH1A ~~~FtlOlli nl I fool ~it Ill Ion 11 I ~~IIlTl d (1 l)~ tin h tl 1rdllmiddotI11 flmiddotJ (apta hu
H1J()1
Thi tudy (1)111111lt thl ~Imiddotl))~rljlh f-j rlt Il~ III( Ardl I(IIlt ~l~lll
~~~t~ ~~ ~f 1~It~ll~I r~1 t11~~11~ [~ It ~~ f(l n ~~rLI I~ ~~I~~~~~ ~~ ~h cllIgt for lmprIlV(I1I1IlI Illlt HI 1(] 1 illu rtlld It h phIIl-taph of he IS
IYln 11 h
I 1HAl lION In I nn 1 ]1 nlll)j I ltll1 I nit ~T Iioxlrtilhlll tiP 1d1middotunlmiddotth iqu I plrlll du mh I (1111111 dl Br iJ
l11~ lrtill(middot dh(ll~i thl prlltiu linn If ih~ 111)111 fr0111 (nlll lld ullporLLllIp hv ria~Oll of gramiddot a1t of pllrnhlI111 III FrlIHl
REVUE DINFANTERIE FrlII Ih LIUH lUi TI()IJ Inflllln
January 193B
Till A B ( 01 Hl1L1EHY II]U IIA 11 ( du tlr dt 1lrtllkf1I I (ltltHh I 1Jmiddot-nngtIIIL
A Implltitd di-( U~-IH1 of artilh T 1111l prdhltHl
TANI- IN ( ItI Illl NI E rH [I[I Flit Altl 1ldl ~shy l~ lly lBlh
ILlgt dlln dlll 1 ddlll~I( A 111 1ft rnlt1 ILvril~1lI1I19H l~ Lilut(1l1I(middotj l1rn
An ICqtlllt by 0111 of til( Itatiing Frtl1 h Llllk mthoritw of tht trtl l~ ~~ tI~~~~v~~~~~1~ltl~I~I~Ir~~~I~)I~ltl ~~ I~i~ J~li))~~l~I~~l~I~fi~Imiddotll~t~lr~~I~~ ( tilnyX J1ay i)JX TId lrllll 11 (Uir( 1) t 1parlll tilfu ill QuHter A ~I No fD rUlll 1lX pag X4
tl TIm AllTOlOJllll Silo 01 191 ~1l11~ U1ITAI INTltLr f ILt ~l~l~og~~~tll()llohlh dl ) 917 ltmiddot J1lllllnlllllltttlrtmiddot 1 ClIjlU ~
Thl fori flf Frll(h alltoll1nblltmiddot 1111nllfllll lIT1r til Id rtlIl1h III Hlig i_1 l(jllIllllp lnl I)f fwmhlll IIIP ajljltarIlHI nf 111 I 1lIgllloc tnd uf llladllT~ ~I Ihlflf~ otlHmiddotr fUll tlt11I 111111 lri ttlJIgtlrlIIImiddotd (If fr(lt illtlnct g
February 1938
TANk~ IN Till (OUN ntt1 fIIC Till I otrNTI~ltATTACl or ~[at ~~ Hl1lOY II-I hllH IJih
[Lt (barR dlIJH la (Ilntn~altaqu( 1a ontrlmiddotlttIlUt de hUn Bdloy (11-13 juin JJ1X] LwutCoh))wl Pprr md Mw AUHCnac
Spp dig(~t in (~uartlr1y No 69 hlllP 1)IX IllL~i ~middotL
-
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articies
MARKSMANsmr TltA1NING FOR THE 60-~~M AND 8I-MM BRANDT
lMet~~~~tir fietH ~~ur martier Ba~~[d~ 81 ou de 601 Captain Loubiere
Method by which practice may be gained in correcting fire data as a result of actual observation at ranges of several hundred yards wi~hout the firing of liv( or training ammunition
March 1938
THE MODERN TANK ITS CAIAUILlTll-S AND EMPIonENT IN Tim ---_ATTACK )LI char moderne Sea pOHsihilitiilt mn emplai dllnH rattuque1
LicutColonel Pprre The tank is not a weapOIl which will win wars quickly lind painlessly
neither hafl it provpd a ailur(- in the Spanish War In an article which ill the reproduction of a conference hefore a large group or reserve officers he points out that if the tank has armor RutficiEntiy thick to protect it against the fire of antitank weapons striking it at 30 degree angles at ranges greater than those at whieh thf tank Irlw (an sec ancI return the hostile fire immedishy
~~~~h~~Cotr~~EC~j~~HI~~11~h~~erl~~t~~1s~i1~~ti~~frni~~)titl~~Il~~o~~~ cumbtd to antitank rifles He attributes this to the fa(t that these weapons ere unabl(middot to pemtratp the armor of tanks at other than short ranges and say the fact that tlw tanks Quid spot these weapons at such ranges and instantly return effctie fire was the reason He also points out that on the battlefield most of th targets which antitank guns get will he sitch that the bullet will not strike llCrpcndicularly hut at an angl(
In speaking 01 Amprican tanks tor some of which a sp(ed of 60 miles an hour are claimed he says that there is little advantage in sllch speedsshyfor one does not fight at 60 miles an hour He draws a great distinction between the maximum speed of a tank its average marching speed it speed in varied terrain and its comhat speed The latter he says no matter how
fra~~~~clitl~~mdilftce~t~ ~i~i~rn)iti~in~~~~il~~ ~ohl~t~r saee~Osu~~ search the terrain or to fire accurately This hrings out the essential differshyence hetwepn the French gtlchool of thotlght on tanks and the British The btter hag insisted that gpe(d is the hcst protection for the tank and takes precedence over armor The French school answered No since you are ohliged to ahandon tllis speed at the moment you fight effectively that is at tre time you run the grlatest dan~er
Colonel Perre says the expenence of the Spanish War confirmed the French reasoning and add~ that thf British and their followers arc now husi1y engaged in augmenting the armor of their tanks
He brings out that while modern tanks can make one days march of approximately equallpngth to that of truck columns the strategic mobility l~ much le~s A complet(gt overhaul is necesltary after 3000 kilometers and thererore every tank movemeurolIl must IW (awfully weighed to see whether it
nside(-l the most difficult type of tank attack that against in a defensive position an enemy who has had time to coordinate He first poinLc out that tanks are ablE to approach hostile resistshyfirp at colte range and hence obtain a maximum effect with the
expenditHrf of ammunition On the other hand tanks run great Itn ther llrc immohilized in combat and consfQuently cannot ound Their vision is ~mch that they cannot fire effectively nt
00 meiers and their presence in a zone only insures a temporary 11 whilh is likely to vanish when they move on Likewise the erent to varied terrain the necessity of locating the enemy and
tanks to provress with relative slowness from the moment fff(tiEJy~ Tlw autllOf thus concludell that when opposed
pable of strong Tlsistan(( tanks must act in close liaison IIlth the ot IN arms infantry artillerY and aviation This permits the infantrY to occupy terrain held hy the enemy and to mop it up The infantry
idly the (ffc(t of tml action which is essentially fleeting r(middot tllln rpmind(d thosl (If his auditors who had participated what til( infantry dreaded most when moving to the attack ouYd of ma(hine gun fire grazing machine gun fire coming
from a zon(l of temdn vhib)f from th( line of rlrparturp aurl at the most 1200 met(rg deer
If shortly after H hour this hand of terrain is invaded by tanks in depth protected and ~uppoIted IW other arms all or nearly all of these deadly automatic weapons will he silenced and thp infantry can advance Colonfl Perr~ spraks of this as the notion of tank employment in Ilretlg as opposed to thp linear emplovmltnt ff th() last war Th~ most powerrul tanks 3hould lorm the advanced ~middotchelons and since they have to coordinate their advance with lTtil(ry fires theuroy me under the orders of the commander of the arge unit tllf~(ommon (hier of the infantry and artillery
Not J($S Ir)gically he contends thf lightr-r tanks constituting ~e rear echelons n(fd not be fiO fust They IJPnefit from the protection of their Iurger hrC)tnera and or the fires of til infantry Sineeuro they are the IoseRt to the inrant~ ancl mUHt r(gtguJat(~ their advanceon that of the infantry they aro
bordmated to the infantry commanders olonel P(rrb points out thlt luch a systlm is cllpllble of powershythat with it attacks can he arranged much more qUlckfy than
Iistonmiddot d(middotcisive battles have occurred only when armllshyent pcrmittfi the (jomiJiiling I)r mallllVN with an action of frontnl rupture his combination was tIl(gt (RSPHl of Napoleonic- maneuver When fronts reinvioJahle flanking maneuvers mcrcJy throw huck the enemy He points ut that tlH- tank now giveR the high commllnd n hattering rllm capllble or ~ning a deep hreach and that this perhaps will give back to Victory those Ings which the pitiless automatic weapon had shot off
TaE AERIAL INFANTRY MISSION ILa mission aerienne daccompagnement de Iinfanterie aU combat1
Lieutenant Roy fhe author states that under modern conditions the infantry mission
(contact-liaison mission) haa become almost impoa3ible because of the deadlishyness of fire from the ground It therelore must be abolished No plnne
W~~1d eWaCrcrnt~rr tci~~~~a~YHu~t ~rdi~~g~ltitudes required during the
The befit that can be done is to combine this mission with dose reconshynaissance missions or rather to modify til( latter slightly When the ceiling is very high the plane occMionally can dive down to aRcertain one or two definite points A specific queRiionnaire should be given the observer belore the start or the mission Most of the information will hetransmitted hyradio
go od~th~~~I~ sc~~I~~~t~s~~nWUh~ 1~~i~ili~~~hol~~l~flla~~ ~e~ the lines at low altitude and have the benefit of surprise appearance and rapid disappearance However nothing much can be expected in the way oC informatIOn unless the observers are well trained in such work and unless only very simple things arc demanded of them for example Does the enemy occupy Iuch and such awood Have our leading elements reached the line x - Y Why does not such battalion progress rn such a case the speed of the plane will permit it after droPl1ing a message at the division command post to land at its airdrome and furnish by telephone information to the staff a few moments after obtaining it The use of radio in the latter case will be less important The author believes thut persevering in old methods would he fatal at the present time
THE TitANSFOItMATlON OF INFANT1W AND JUiVISION OF TERMINOLOGY [Les transformations de linfanterie et In refonte de la terminologieJ
Major Laporte
Changefl in terminology neccssitatcd by changes in French inCantry organization
~NGINEEILS AND MfCnANIZE~ UNITS lGenie et unites bhndees Captain M
THE LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR ACCORDING TO TWO RE(ENT AlltlCLES
[Les enseignements de In guerre dEspngne daprfs deux puhlicashytions reurocetesj Major CailiouX
A discussion of the accounts of Dr Herman Klotz a former German naval officer and of GeMral Temperley It is concluded that tanks and aviation are merely auxiliary arms of the infantry which remains the Queen of Battles Antitank defense and antiaircralt defense have been effective The tank no longer can count on technical surprise it is on an even basis with antitank defense and the morale of the eivil population ltan resiit bombardments by air forces Militia when engaged as interior units on a continuous front have been able to stop better trained troops and a situation not unlike that of 1914-18 has resulted
REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE (pmcc)
By MAJOR RG TINDALL Infantry
January 1938
NOTES ON THE HIGHER CONDU(T Q WAR FROM 1792 TO 1797 ANn FROM 1914 TO 1918
Notes sur In conduite Buperieure de Ia guerre de 179 i1 1797 et de 1914 it 19181 (I) Marshal Franchet dEsperey
tionalr~ ~~~~e~7t~lt~lyi~h~I~1t[~9~~ei~~~r~~r~h~~~~~r~I~~il~ effected through Carnot who middotat times even supervised the actions of the various fourteen army commanders
NATIONAL DEfENSE [La DCfense Nationale] LieutCoJonei Fabry
An article advocating a single chief [or the army navy and air forces of France Incidentally simultaneously with its pUblication the French government took such steps The actual reorganization effected ia covered in a Hueceeding article in the March issue of the Revue Militaire Generale
COMPOSITION AND POWER OF THE NAVY ITS ROLE IN NATJONAl~ DEFENSE
[Composition et puissance de In flottc Son role dnnA 11 DMense nationale1 Vice Admiral Darlan
The author brings out that France cannot fight n successful war unless materials can he imported from abroad and troopR transported from her colonies Thus the tllsk of the French navy is to keep the sea lanes open for French commerce and France must have n fleet at least equal to that of
d~~~~~f~afe~~t~h~t~amp~i~nnheei~~tl~t~~~t~tI~~g~~~~~~~~ed ~ao~hi~~~~~~~ ground-air~l]aval cooperation although he points out that thlS
85
- rl [ro 110 I r Vn-Ilth nr f)HP
-ltlldd I lt1 ltI I rl Ilmiddot in--i-h (1) orniudnv rr r I 111 (If tlw air forI IVI 11 1 111llIhl jill 11l IlllllllrIt pt did 1 i 11 I d In nrdl f I
f Ii Ii I Iii] rt) jltI III 1 1lt1 I I I 1111 1))11)1lrmiddot 1111
11lt d tllll If 11 lmiddott f I II h()~ 1h1 I I 111t itlljP 111 I I I r hll lldl ]l[ lId I L 111 ti I ]II
Irl 111 I~ r f 1 dr middotn n I Imiddotltl -1 I( I bullbull r I v n ttl oj 11 I jdlf III pI 1)1 I I old 11 I11TI) rlo fI dlt middot)dI]IT
J(rl~~Ir1 I~~I I r J
11 bull L II I( 1111 11111 I II
II I I I I 01 I I I Idl d
fflr I II Ii (
i t Till
I-UlImiddot1 I tr 11 bull I Id) I) Lt I
rlId1 I n oJ I I) It
)Jiid tf f r r I trtlJ
(1111 If II pli 1 H r H)d d i r d 1 1 d I) I lt I o
fr middotf 1 Iil Ir f bull II 1 I) I fr I
middot1 ft1 1 f 11
q I I bull -I d II Ir rt~ j j II
fr Ii
I ii fI j
11 1lt l I
11 1 (It]( T
rII I r I~ 1 t In 1lt1 h 1 I 1IlllJJIlll~ hu III d b I 111 rt
uljag huj ll rll
r qJfOIIl1llth In)) llgt~ II ul r nth
Ill 11l1 II fiTiIIIO 1
Ilhl 111JllmITJ11 1
ld r l~ll t lp mil ( jlgtI 11)1) 01 lIld 11~middotd tl 1 Inn 11 11nl1 1 f r qPH rj 1
f r 1 j nlil 111 fr
Till J 11 r II 111 11 J 1raquo -1 JJL) L r j ]j) r I (gt1 I)trd
[I imiddot II 1t d to( -Ilfllh )11 r -1 I 1 IlJLd L11 1 f lll)r
I tri jlj d cpU rtf t ll
11111 I L d)middot 1 HI (1)(1 jlilll 1 )1 I 1r1 I J I qr i Off 01 rltllJ t I 1lIlIlll llll I I~ II ~t I~ II f d TI I Id t fIr tl If ltgt1011111lt)1 d
l~ IIj ( r I I 1 rJ Illlldlllt dlHd inrH) lJllII II I d fl II II fld- f dl )Illo
Iilt In HIl 1llTiIlll Ir llj I I II I r)jfllll pll H Ll h I iOIl
I Ill II d [1111)11 f rl I llIld [Illt o I ( i r ( fl dl d liP tt 1 I nllt L11
101 II I dt r 1 f 1111 ltI [ r h f 1[1111
1 11 I 1 I I I I 1 III I] t tIl 11111 d (I rlr I gt
d d Ill r h IWI nIhlllqht nllt ill
Ii II d till pr J1ftflllll fnr Iltl r j] 1middot1 d 1111 Illltllil IlllllrIPI wa I)f nJIIIo
II 1J III I II 111lt1 r If I 10 r11 l III~ t hlll~1
8fi
c amp GSS Qummiddott~ Vo ~
KlLO)OO()() mdl lrmgt (if fid~( 1O()()OOO art HI(r) j-JtgtIL~ aIIOOOIJO hand J-r( nl]h nb~
1Irt of tllfP mppltl Irl olitwwd Jv Illtl1ill~ lllohiJillIliol1 lJlplt~ l whi(h Wfrt t IWII lta 111~ nlllllt 1 lImiddotIII illdll 1ry WI Illordinal(d L ~ orde 1llr 1 lahlid11ll1nl iJhe
TIll ralh) WI 11ll)1 1111lllIII alII I 11 flllil lrily Two hips ftn J rti middotlallllI l t lilT Ill (11 I l1I--1 (1111111) l1lltll1~ II Llt)middot inrfroz1 llHat lminl 11111Ipl 1 mItII1 rlldII 1Ial~ fill 1JlJlllf h I nirlltUII produ - Iro~ IllllWn I IIWr)Oll ItTII 11l1 IJllIIILUi ]l11f(hI~Igt of nat fl mad~t of jI
AWImiddotIItHII 1)1lt111 lId 1lI II or 1[1 Itllgti pn-mnlilly 1Itf)[lJll d t
111 1 ~iJII~l h~~ ~~i 0 r I r~ ~II ~ II~ ~ II~~I~~I- III Lilli Ividual ~lalu 1~on~ (111 11 r ilrl 1111111( 11 pll d ~Idl 1) -Ill ~ 11 111 plrtltloll hrlwf1 irlng Imiddot1t II II IInlY llId tIll nllIIrj r1l1 II II L Ill If I hI XllPdltlo1 i IInI r ~~~~~~II~~I t~lItlJfI~ 1( ~it( ~~ ~ ~ ~11 I~ II)~I~ nt~~~~(j~ag~l J~emi ~( Ij I~ 11 j I~I 1~~~IL~~1( I hHl I It IJ I II I hh IIt Il1 11111 t hI nH1 h 111 l(llJPt~ 1i1~f~1
llllfm dciJe
llIL OII1 Lit IN TIll lln thr ILollllipt dall 11 (111111 LIjltlf I)I Ildlrmiddot mati
111laquomiddot11 )011 of III rolt ltif Iflp Vr II] rhcPf Ill Jl-ltilJll il ffgardl OpUo~ 1111111 Ilid 1111 FfIIl] (hTlflr
0 1February 1938 ~ (middotrrot
-oll-Ot- 1111 1I1dllll 11-111 11 1t lltll1 17~2 111 17n ] [IJI 1l1 1 1 1111
nI llr la cnllil 1111 111flllIrlt dl ll J-IITr til 17l~L 17fr7r til 1~11 t I l~ll I I II llr-lttllrlIlftpI r11 IrY
Thl FOfll1lmiddotr I fHllllltld r f 1 llf SIIllIl-1 IflB 1111111gt ll~ -lrtfS IVlfl1lll 111 d oIHflll IIf H 1~ middot11 r 11 Ih Hill lor d If If ill 19il~ ( ([lIl t Imiddot FrlIHli ~OlrllJ1l( lIfprplr d fur 11 r]I lJ) d- of war F i~ond IVn it 1)1 [wrtlllalil y f ( IIIL )nITr -1)111] rI h I1l 1 Wa IH)lS1 ~Ytl llldlf IIII I If( 1Irr1Illl I d I Illlllllll IIllllllr din 11111 Thill lftlf 1 1deg of 11hIIl1lgt1011 I) I~ till 111 gt1 111~Irl I lnnlnl nllllll ha[pd ~J jMgt] Ill gJJfdl +11[1(111111 If I hr ll I hI 1 f 11 fnllTwnl InlhlarlldUIi
~(il~I~- ~I(~ ~~III1II~ I~~ ~ I~ l~ iI 1-111 I~ ~~rlll If ~lfJ l~~~ rlll~~~~~r ~~ lRd1 Imiddotr 1lllt ronlt t hltIfIIJImiddotI11 fq 11 1 IllI11 if (I)mrrll1ld hut ttl~ ~el WIS lirnltld In IIH --llfn 11)tpr f]OiT(I
I111I l~~~~lI~~t~II~~ 1)t i~ ~ l~ 11 r~)~1 I II 1 ~l~Th~~~~I~ji(~I~k hllll tIl h1 L ltJllllICmiddotrj Ill 111 ti fl II Id PIli Ill Ill Innh I hn III I- 1(middot d)[ 111111111 Ilt fo tiltgt ltl1I111 fllf
1[ ingthl- th ]1 IL lI--tti III lPll f 1I ri-Ill Ihl Ix(rllth p a r[~tlLtl IH1fgt 11 111111 [ If I 1111 II) IlIml ItrJll whi(h Ill[rshy1lmnll))1 ~lllllld n[llrllr
TAl 1I PI )LrLIUf) -]) pI TltltoH)tq llLl~ 111(1 (lip jhll f 11 dmiddot IkllllI11 I (11I d lpn
Thf Iuthof I in rpmiddot)hltlll 1lltl11l-t pf - nlplLt Ffillth tUmiddotlmiddot II) fshy1it-11lr tIlt 1lHplo-mfllt If LIgt1 Itllk 111 rIl11t tIll -tlry r II( I(3 of 111 1llt Ind l)Jj In gthw 1111 111 )p~r - 111lt1 lrJmiddott I(ht III 11111 m1)1IY of an wflll n Irl Illtf 11111 Inti (0l111jllff Ihpp nh It tu k of Cln)hrtl Sn~ltllh 1lJlI mlll- Iilt t hn 1)Hl1illl hi 01 id_
011 III ldnryt11~)~ti~~~I~ ~~~Il~~~~~~ -lIfprN Ill J III illltq~- ~t~ tit onl antltanl 1lii ~hllh 11111-1 ll 11 1111 Iwl TIll lIltll~lt ma ~llll (If today lrmiddot lfJI 1j-litl 1 Jr~~lrlh lrmrmiddotJ 1111 hilt II nr~6 X(( lIJ(TII IIH armor )[ IIii Illd 1)111 111 tnlltllll wljum IllIIt hr IT Iq~r 1IIe tlllnmiddotfllJI llJr i l1d~middot Ihl t llll~ 1lll Ilwll lo(L(gt Llrl ttlbull llrt tjlllll nlh middot11 (1 hn
If till 1middotIWIll hI 1111 111l m1l11 olllllh~( IJJlhl III dprltd Ld ar(llilr wh l)(lt ht th (lIl- dll Illt- tI nlI1111l al tl1 111)( nf rarp ~tain wllh II IlWl )-Ilt)gt III Ir~llgt 11111 Imlllr th 111ll lP(Iar~middot fortmiddot J
Mtdlt-Q Iq dll Iln1f I rlg 11[1 whlt 111 1tImiddot Ih lank Iodnl Ilon clogtp ral~1 Tit 1111Ir 111 dl) It Llr Ililtpr Ill qUWIlf ill1 (l1Hlu~i~~ iur
III dIJl- lilt j h t) til) thlllt Irtillf ll)ljlllrt Imt 1)( ltlPtl inf adql1ld Il IhL Igthl I)f liltgt LIllIgt Ir 1middotlIl1p] Ill wanl t far grelt ~ IJI of Intj)Il11 wI gtllJO IIltmiddot dll Il hIgt lillll 1lt1111 fltlr arlilil p ~b 11ft III all lltI1 1111 Ill Irtll t~ qtIP1 IJ1~ IIill dur1llg an tttar~middot rei t 1)1 IllrpO( of an lrll1 n dl t]llllll III Ilf fj ld]lhtl1ll1l of nlwf It(1n~ Ph( Itnmiddot ~JImiddoth hthlh hIIIIIIlJlI rtmiddottmiddot Illdl illt 111I Fnllch ltlrlll~ r~iE nmiddotdIIY Ihlgt~ an HUr l muhlllr1 11IIllt(d II 111l1lt tlI lllllCIII ~lld I f 1 f lrltll) II lt11111111 flllllllil Hp)lrl d 1111111laquo tH th~ ~)Ini Ill dimiddotappPlf llh tilt (Ill tll) (Imiddot tllllll gt1rth lw Link i d (I1111on~Jlln IH rIII)P ~
Sill 11 hmiddot If I ln I IhlL 111 It IT tin Irt t1ltry nhlnmiddot(r Ill fol~-I In i Ill pnl~~nllIn If Llllk l1l1l1t lormiddot It ih I hlll I hal of mfalltr IlII mn ttfl o r jllll 1111 ullllt (In rIr litll] lltlll1 anti qlUltlnn h fldio) ~Iw
[1 ~IIIr~I~~lil~ fIJt(~t II~l ~~Jiil~~~~I iJ~I~riJI~~)~In~~~1 ~~d~~~ hp 1111011 JIl ngarltl In dlp1lImiddotII1P llt- ~
Sl1r)))jmiddotp IllIIY1I IJllin ft11 tltll if It I 1I11lly IXpll)ltmiddot 1l)tllw adl i ary j not ~ion tinw to brin up fflIlfuflllIHIlIltt Tht Link is (mmrL shy~llltahl( to rtLiir( urpn ( hut nnly If fgtl1lphYlillll InIlt on a WHIp front amiddot ~ ltv(fll (1l1)11~ (lPIp Ill( llI1 Iwr m~It IIll p(middotlwlnllllWIlt ill dtlI h of tapt t-ltO a1 to mhmPrg(gt -itnuitanlnl1ly 1111 Illtif illLlJllry JlllsitHl) of tilt (ILPn - )[1
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles =shy
Behind the tanks the infantry mU~t push forward a3 rapidly as pos1ihle The author docs not wish to (mtircty eliminate ~alts on succ(gtslivc ohj(lelivLgtH althe following pUHlagc will show but he wiahc~ t~ rcdttcc these in time
Halts must not be prear~anged except wh(~re thp horizon changs in order to reconnOiter the terraIn herOiC movlngmlo 1t and because thNe the attacking troops find shelter behind the protecting crest against Olseishy11tion and lire But these stops must tJ( t(gtciuced to the minimum II [W minutes and not a few quarlNs of an hOUf ll~ long- ll1 the j)lfm is not broken as long as hill artillery has not helm reached Olnd r(main~ apthl( ofl toiler(nl rea(tion
~we~h~afil~tO~I~d~~tist ~~I1~~II~ll~~f~h~(tii~~~[ekt~~~~w~e l~s~~lli~l~ marguJ OfSUf)CrlOntgt httle by httle a the Infantry reaches the limit of t hf range of Its supportmg cannon
On the contrary in l tank attack the dehouching of thl infantry should he quite prudrnt IJ(cause since the automatic weapons of the enemy have remained sillnt for the m(J~t part the mopping tip (If the tanks jg stilt itllom~ prete The ap[learancl of the first infantry will cause the weapon of til( defense to open lIJl and permit the tanks to dCstroy them TllPreforp til Ulfantty should beware of (gtxpoing many men at first If HlP infantry dehouched in ms~ as it o(casionally did in tlw World War in orriN to avoid the hostile artillery harrage it risks falling an CaJY prey to thl hostile al)toshyrnatiwctpons But it can progressively become hold(r a thf tankskno(k out the hostile weapons Thus a tank attack will maintain its otiensiv( po~er and the infantry can g-o ra~ter and fastlr inlt(a(~ of Jlower and 5Iow(r
The author llllst-l that thp nr fones Will contribute most dT(~divflv 10 ctory by a close (~ollabomtion with ~round [orces ~tncl dp(rips any mai1
comhatants He concludefl that ofTpHiive tatlics anrI thf organiwtion of Jarg(f
unitsshoilid he bapd upon thcfmrJluyment of powerfully armed mel armor(d mechanized vehicles - He imistl on the impossibility at present of havingshyiarge unillt (qually apt at defcnltc of largp irontR and of atta(k and urgls tbespecialization of units This IIf iays if a nfcessity in modpfI1 limps
To wish to escape this in the domain of military organization is to ill~~mn ourop]middotmiddot to oly hwc mfdiocre units which ar jack of all
trades wher(gtas SlH(SS in war dfmaflds maximum quality and ffi(iPtHY 01 the instrumpnts mploypcl for each task
Prolongp(] staiJili7Jioll says tllp author was a (ollltequPH1 of thl 1~im(gtS Qf tl( offltsw tJ1IatI pmployed in til(gt last war ami will ](gt npro~ duced again if Ill(gt same conditions of lack of prpparaliol) ~llfJuld rp()ur But just as til situation in the last wlr (hallwcl rapidly in favor of that s[de which first crpated an instrunl(gtnt of a~tak 1ppropriatp to the neecis o(the hour 00 i1) the fulllrf that army wlill-h first obtains and learns 10 usc of(ensin mfntll -ititcci tn th (xigtlwj of tllf lge will rapidly pnd tillt war tII icor
TIIf EOIUTlON OF nm oHLITHY NII -IAHITtm H()[~ OF Tim FRENCH COONIAI EIlltJ
jLuvolution dll role militairc et maritihlP elP Iempir ()lonial frll1~ cais1 Major Rpgnaut
di~cusioll of til( defCIlSe of French colonits today and thpound ait tllfY ilght afford Frall(( in all Iuropfgtan war ~ ~
_jj- OllGNI7It( L[AISOl l-l 1 J~nJTlON OF m~IOLlTl()r-S l()rglni~aion dt liailtJIl- dan la Illigtpound (II oCuvre lt1( d(structiOlls1
Colonel Hot1SSfgtU
Thegt author disCllS(S tie 1Ilt(gt of dfgtmolitiIJllS under two glntrt1 CllS(gtgt first a ~ttat(gtgi( withdrawal planllrd well in-adyu( su(h as till ntir(mll1t
of the Gfrmans to tllt IlrndtniJurg Iinp in thl spring or 1917 and slcondly in delaying adion TIl( attr (lse bring Ollt stvlral ditricultit~ in tilpound actual
ion IJf dfmolitloI1S s Oil that smlll (gtnginePr partiltgt will he s(attfrec1 over til(
of tile infantry units preparing (hmoiitions This prltparatioll t it is till matt(r of ittuaily exploding till laid (harglH wllith t must not ht done too (hrly or too late llnd ahove all it t(gtr~ e dOIlI olition will Ilpoundgt IxplodNi in gfncrai on t J1)(ciai unI(r of eX(Ushy
hy th( authority whit-h has IJ(Jell dl1pgalpd to -ie this order ion may he made hy higJwr commanders down to and inlllding talion commandCrs battalion commanfiCr fighting a dpJaying action may find in
Ilumlwr of prepared demulitiuns whieh prohahly will have I)(en df1taehmentJ of (llgitw(lr bplollging to various difTerellt units
moment that is when battalion boundaries arp fi)((d
~~ d~~ii~i~r~fd~E~~7~~~t~lll~~~~~(~h~ ~~m~)~)~~~fg(~~~I~~c1~f~~IYnhljo~I~ nginrcr QIIi((r 1hll~ the tran~missi()n or ordpl1l for thp actual (lxgtculiou of emolitions will require cHreful liaison ~Irrallgments
Golanel HOUfseau points out that this situation whieh is ((flain to arhw n the Cafie of delaying action whcrf thing must he done rapidly docgt not
m to he cowr(i hy l)rescnt French rpgllati01l3 lIe imdsbl that unlNlH he JulStion il )wlved grave (ol1seqtrences might arise in war and IIrg(gts he study or SUdl problems on the ground hy units or all arms
March 1938
OllGANIZATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE [Organisation de la DC(cnsc nationaie (ilflfrai Azan
A hrief discull1iou of the effect of the decref signfd in lauuary hy tlw resIdent of France These charge a Miniltr of National Defense with
coordinating the Ministrs of War Air and the Navymiddot TOl15sist ntm hehas a permanent committe of Nltional D(fense Likew-ise he has at his dtiposhyIition the three Chiefs of Starr of the Army Navy and Air Force and he selects one of the( to act as Chief of Staff of National Defense Likewise a new commiittc has been crertted in order to intensHy the production of war materiel
The Chip of Staff of National Defengte (GcncrrJ Gamelin has been sfl(cted to fill thi~ f)()~t) if churgld in time of peace With the study of those qU(ltionfi (onfidcd to him by the Minister IIf (QordlnntcfI the Army and Air Fur((t plans of mobilization aAd opPflltion and the studies of combined Army Nuvy Air Forc( tlpcratiollR
The ffcdll of tillc measurcs will hring ahout a far more unified direc~ tion of olllratiollH in war than in th~ past
l1II~ WAit IN SIAIN TIIIH9~IIlJNATJC)N 01- Am FOlWEll wITn NAVAL Nt) mWUND FOWES
ILa ~ucrrc dI~sPJlg~l(gt La (ombinahon des forc(gts de Iair avec les furce nlvtics IL avcc larmee de terre] General Armengaud
((Iwral Armengaud of the Frltnch Air Force rccentlyentered Spain and
~~ ~ith)~J~~lg(J~~r~~~ent~~c~viltso~o~ll~f~i~~f ~~~~~J~~ J~~~~~t~~ ~ ill QU1r(riy No (i9 fUII(~ 192H pag1 121
INFANrltY AND CAVALlty Ilnfant(rie (~t Cavalerie Captain VNflicr
A lttudy of the dHfprPllles in Imiddotrench regulation hetween the action of dimlHmted cavalry and infantry
WE U]S1 I)] Till lwO-SI~S CMML 1II falll erltlI(r 1(1 Canul des DPllX Mers C~ptllin TOUTte
Ill(gt author sllgg(stH the digging of a ~lnal from Narvonrte on the ~outllCrn ]middotrPIIImiddoth Meciilfnuwan coast to Bordeaux thull giving France a -hnrt rout from till M(dit~rruwan tf) the CH~eaJl no wants tlii canal to lip wilipound ennllgh to hamill any vfHHt1 Hmaller than thp Normundie The rotltp suggpstPCj would parallel the Garonne river for approximately half itl way His artitl(l appear~ to hVe hfcn fltlggested hy the Spanish War situation
FnOM MAN TO U~[lJ~lt bull IDe lhomme au c1wpound] Captain Manie
A psychological study of leadership of more interfst to- French soldiers t111Il other
REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE (Switzfriltmd)
By MAJOR TR PnltllIs Coast Artillery Corps
Deccmbcr 1931
Tim INEITABIIIrY OF CONTINUOUS FItONTS ILa fatalit( des fronts continus] General Rouqu(rlll
(SI( dig(st page 44)
TACTICi[ NOTES FOR THE USE (jF FUTUItE CPTAINS INotes de tactiqtte il Iusage des futurs capitainls] (1) Colonel
L6derr(y
AlmONAUTl( IATIRIEL ILes materiels acronautiqles1 Captain Sch)
Dlgt(ription of tilt Belgian pursuit ship Renard It 361 and thc Fairey
HaWgt light bomhardment The former has a top speed of about 350 milltgts pltgtr hour at 6600 feet cruising speed of 250 milell ner hour at 13000 feet range of 660 miles aod a maximum altitude of ahout 39000 reet The Fairey Battle can he ucd either for distant reconnaissance or 115 light bombardment All light hombardment it can (arry 1100 IlOunds of bombs It r(gtachc~ a maximum altitude of about 25000 feet has a range of 1000 milCH at cruising speed Jnd has a top speed or 256 miles per hour at 15000 f(gtltt
January 1938
THE FIXATION Of FlWNTS IIimmohilisatioll des fronts LifuvCoJonel Mayer
(fiN digp-t pa Hi) I
hUmSSIONS ANllIiIlRn~N(lS 0 THE SINISH WAR IInljlrcssions et pXluriellCeS de lltl guerre dgspagne] (III) Capshy
tain Bauer Th(~e notCH are a continuation of C~tllain nauers observations ufter a
months tour in Insurgent Spain He notes the fxceltent discipline or the Insurgents (omparing it lo that of peace timp armies in their ohservance of military (ourtcRIPH Soldiers arc dvolld to their officers The officers earn
t~i~h~e~~~t ~~l~~ ~r~jmiddot~~eJir~~~e~i~3~ge~~~~J~~or officers is carried
r Jln~ ~l~~~~~it~~Ye~~~~~~~e t~~d~Pf~r~~d n~~~~i~~a~e~~~nh~~~~ 1)( rought without typewrjters and ink In the Insurgent forces paper work
87
K
r
1
I
1
I 11 d r f ii JI I I I
1 11 I 11111 I 11t1 1 I I ~ bull f I iJ i
I )1 fl doI r
I I
II
11 1
fl 1 jfji II
bullbull I 1 r J 1 oj I rmiddot middot
I d ill 110 I ( I r r d 11
q ) 1111 I I orj I 1fI
i 1 UlIr Itl J d If )) II
gt~ Caihlor~f Selected Periodical Articles
I fnl to hamiddot II hi II i(] I nllllllllHP jnt no amlHmt of It
Ill lllLultj - jlIrd I d Hi II 11LI
difficulty or lwrnlliitJ11Ti middotlllill Th irf liimU (middotll to) 11 dI1l71d- f )middotdlfI I mllt
rl lmiddotr I I r I~
1 ( 1
I nillr4 Pll(Htllltf d TIIl bull r II ( d Ill ~panh jJl1 r TI II PJllImiddot I
If) t h(middot frullI tlkH~ Hf 1
~ftf~I~ middot~~ll) dl~)l ~I ~[I jl LIiIIIl fl It gt1
(I) Lilli HI Ink tn SpI) 1 ttllH fnln 11
-1 Inlf I I
Ilq t I lr d111 fIIT I) rTlIitl) d I
II tH d I ()J d f J I r 1111-1 101) rI II IHld I
1 [ llr
Till ~1 I I - I T I ~
I [I ~ I
jl I III - -1101 -- rdd
I r J d r 1 1 I d 1
l11
11ll j117 L~j 11 1 11
I r II j I r
I 1middot1 d f 1 c
1 11
I I 1 fl 1
1
bull
t 1
d I
I II
I I ~
f I I 1Il I
lJ I d rllmiddot J II llft Ill 1laquo1 1 1]11] I d I I 11[11
I IltJI fr n t trd nIIfol f f I ( In(middot (IrI I d]Ij fr l1[( ) 01111] rmiddotITlttr](j 1111111 111 d~ )1 11
r I I t laquo pI p T 1 Ir -1 P 11 lJfllrn d rll 11 h Io 1 11 ~ I I
I j I t1
f I r I IIIHIII 1 oJ
I J rmiddotI Ir 11 rl I rn]
t 1 )r i I I 11 d1 j i
1 middotrmiddot 1 I fl
dr 1li frq bull rr1 r) T I fmiddotr II) 1 I f ] rl 1
11 111 1 1 I I f 11 I 11) I - ill ljr nd f r I t
] I) f f Iemiddotf Ir II d 1 r 111111
1
l
f 111 I
i
middott Itll f 1 I
1 oj
I f I
r
r
t II 1 1 lIP]) It I I) f 11 1
r 11 lOr Ii I f) III Ill 11II d 1111 TIll rI I nil 1)1
frIll 11d Itld J 11 1r 1 Jill t I 1 I u uf d fllI 1 It I llld
I 1I1ln d r 1ll1 111111111 1lift II~ III
1 r r 1 1 ~ JI 11 Illd II 11 11 togt ( 101 rlllll
11 11 j)~1
1 d f 111lt)1 d ]011 I rI tIl11 11
I 11 I Idl II 11 lll 11 r 11 I] )
] f I I I Ii (1 1 t1 d 1 1 1] 111gt I tmiddotr llq III d
lr ldr 11111 Ill 11j I
c amp (88 Quarterq Vol ~ ~
111 (JInIAN AHY 1- Hl7 t lLarm(middot1 allimlluil Ill 1~1i71 ((lloltl vX-lllIdlr re
Sf dil~Imiddott PI)tl 17 ) 1~fr hllHI j()NS -u 1HJJnc of Till ~ljlIl R ~ i~ IllfIpr~II P1 111 rIlIHImiddot tiP Lt gtllrn 1I]ltIlgl)(1 d Partamp ~ Ihf)
Jt ]1111)11 ~1111l )11 r( d a 1 tl tilll~ lruulld fOT IlIW fapllll11 d(11gt jlh
11IIIU l11P Illld ar 1hlTI b 1m 1I01lld IXImiddotppt)Il flt)wr In i Ojllll l- 111 il 1 111 1lt 111( It Ii 1 J hi In urgPIII Ul~dpr an~ clrCll - from
1111 r 11 1 lnmiddot lgII1 all (11111111 r 11111 lIy tlIlr IIHnlWCi to tIl guar iIIIOlII liP II] AI111OlrqldHTImiddotlrrmiddotL)Imaok OIlIIH)thlrhaD~ pr(~~ Ii IT r III 111 IPdmiddot n IIThd - and l1niill~Iollahly 11)(11 uh prlry i~~1 - lanSi 11IIOlfAI~I1 I~if IIii ~I (1)Imiddot1t iiI fOri of (bout lOn lirpllllf f(Hlm 1j~lIO (1 111111i L 111lt1 iI 1111 0111middot1 IIf till f l(j~t of thlmiddot Imiddot Wft ()hSIJI~ J ascl( 1 Iil 111 11111 (oldmiddotI]r had n(lIuPI tn fUflmiddoti~~n IMUon for h~lr j the~ IIlrdul) 1lt) II ITI Ikfl uri to whom (fI II]IP (an Ill gl In th~ Ins J 111 11111111)1 I] fllt1 IIlIlI mOllths of I Ill 1 11 11 broughl down lh enerr Pfs(c 1]111 ]1lrllll Illl 11)11 IIImiddotrtd Ill ([)filfTllld n(IIld thl 1IIlpngt-1ifmiddot11ISOI 11111111 I ltlr 111 middot1 f 111 wn Fnlul) t)I) HwltIm lIltl tiHflt E))gl~~ I P(C 1)11 h IlH r III IId (i I 11 111 lhL1) TIll Irh1lrjllIt rf(Plvfd an apprOl ~ (If ~h Iii 1 h 1lJd 1I11111Hr dUfll thh IIITlIH 1Illtl III Iddllon fLptUlaquod a numk I Itt f l1llt 1111 11111 Ill Ilil Tlli follllillg inlllh pl1- hrlt)ufht do~ illtcal I 1lld 111qnr~111 lilll ~ (I flIlin II Ind ufri ~1 LlJlfP-XIlUport 171 j lUn( 111 l)l~l Illd 1))10 lJ HrI~IIP1 XIX alld I~ Iol a total of 87 ljr1enl
I lrJ1111 f ))]IlnII111 III If Illagl thl Illllju[lttmaldy g()S~1 111 (Jll1lll1t fnrmiddot ()Il~f) lu If)HlltlIIOInlIPdTftuanwithtwen ~~~~It~ VII 11Jt)~ Ilf 111i11ll lIlli ~rl 111L11I1 Sm thn fIITI-(I hI( olItre] I I r Irl 11 ()lli III jU(g( 11 ~111 (PIdlll) PVIIlI h) futilp ltIh lHJtl1llugsa ~ 1)1111 III 11111111] InI Nil )~ltIInlmilt Tmiddott1I1l111~ Iohtlfal plllr vIli parr l )(1
t1 middotIf t) (ljll1ll1tll t fhlgt ptlli( of t IHlpUJttloll I()gml~ 11((1 at any pril fi Hnll 111- lta( hld thollll] of icllm fpml lIJlll) 1l)1 lttill tIl dfgtcL~ ~ J~~ f waf i~ hI InJ~ q1iLtlllld 011 Ill IItmiddotl of 1I111l1 md no 111fl IIw Onefl- rill
~r~~)I~ olfl llllI I1 111 t1 t I IlllhardllHl1t of Cit It illIL(P t hI law ((1 1I]t~O jLt 1lfJ It rl Itdo](Il mel prlllltlni~~ d thmiddot 1flrol1 of IwlYY artilkl) 1OIl
All tIl(gt grr at al1HI ill thp nOTth WI PffIIlTPd in thi~ ly Such ur I til t I f I ullon r luirimiddot ( In~p colla lIflIl(n wit 11 t Ijp l~rolJlil fOfct and t hi cann t Jll~ Imiddot illl]lr)-middot1 hI 1111 III (illil 111lt thl alllmnrnY of tIl( arm V of the LtJ hl- vir d [llil 1111111- 1)middoth If 1111 Ilnl]r~IHHI HI (middotPTtain tJUntrmiddotiflt llOtalr- l inffJ 1 rlllll 11 n I hi IUlll1))1 f 1 ILt HlI 1l1111r1 to ground llIulllrtion L ll(l~ 1dI1l1111lnlv ndulld f~llhl~~
11nl~lilHT 1111 lrlIld IT Jllollfilmiddot Ill 11HHllt 1111htlr) princlPlelI lilF
ll~llt~IIlf ~llIlrIIT(1 ~ri n~IIII)l~tll Itll~~alr~I~~~ lL~~)I~~ca~I~~J ~~~l~ d)lrl d1 Ilf 11111 angt IIIHI 11 fliT thl fTrnoI ~u Ld 1- IItt a1drr-mrn
1lal~ItlOlIlil--I af 1wl lrolllllln ~5 Tul 1937 tIll Nltltionahl 7jIll 01
1111))[1 ~~1n~~I11li ~~Iit ) f I hp Ifr- let im of purltuit s Jfr1
t lllllJl1q1 h l~ I n1l 11mllltt a TPtlt a t Ith tflOJl~ in thC fi~ nIl - I - I hi jrlllt l1l1llliIl1lTl~ in (Oil limnt and usuC
b llhn1 Ihi lItTlIllnn of lhe hjlwr mlllanthT Tro
~~I~I 1 ~ 1111li~~~~ lI~flll~lqi~~~111( 11( 1~1~~ ~S~ (llI~I~(I~~~ ~~~ ~ti~ 1~lln 1 mln~ fldlt If -Ill Itch 1- tJlI OIH of Ill PCllIllt prlr (nd
I~H~~~lIrI hll ~~f f(lii~~It~~ 1)11~nmiddot~1Iy~ riltlj~nt~1~t~~~~Ih i In 1 1111 (fm1I1 uni lll]illl lant ITt tlld ii~htb lrmuHd alill clnmiddot 1 j~~
JIll fllmiddotd in 101 ( I hI nth- 1 lih ~I( h Link ar u~lf1l1 111 fill f(0I11hlhl
~ 1 II~~I ~ II fIiI l~ I~ ~l ]~ 1~1r 1~I~1 ~~I~~~~ui~1l ~~t ~lf~lIl~O~I~ I ~Ir~~ 11-(1 Hut II 1 IIrlILh)1 1 nt1 Illl llllll1l lilt it- TubllPr lrat~cir- 1 1 ~I 11 hr II -upplu II Lltl1l1l 1l1I~ In 111f t11i It Brll1llll BllellltCL ici tl Jlrtlll Ilut I IIII 1 1h 1 [11 If UfPTi 1 h1gt pIlt td thv hlV( ~1I((lIm~J n~l~l 1]1 111111111 Ill 11 1IIIIlll 11Id 11111 hIII] l~rll)lIl 11llti inlttli 1 hI~llll 111 Ill lh1l1 11111 In middotd Jr IlrOtl] If hlllt lhl Thf(lITClr- 1 Link 1111 11 II) ]w I lo)mlr()nll~ wei -IH 1 liw I]ualilv 111111 (s IllfJll 11 I 11-] 1111 111 lh Illlf h 11111 rtl)pmiddot1 Imlo clIlnt sll11d ll~t 111( l1111n] Iq~ lll III IIIud Ihal It J Impllo lhh tn attachc~I jlrf ~~fll]h lit IlllrlI f tI prOlJIrh ITtllll l11d pnplfld l1HtIl llh ltntt 11011 I 1 IIf t Ill It ilL m )fIlt lll~ Ollt fl(d1 thp 1lInpll ltIf a (rrl~ to ( Hill r i III II ill Ihl [l1rl f IH rd ILI~ II tIll hltll of (lIllhTl1 W f~ h( Itrul Lt I I 1111d Il1lllOkr d 01111 11 11 Brit bh LillI wII It I 111))1 fr) Hlir I
I 1] LIlli til ftr1 h 11 Tnlll 111 ill 1t1 111 1l110~ hoth 111 lHlth Hul drp para
~~1 1 III~ t1111 I~ ~I~ 1 I r1] ~I~h ~ ~11 Il~ h7t II~~ It Irt i11fT) ~(~~ Th ItUmiddotiln mllllnk i~lll of 1~1-Il1l1 1lhlllT hal fIVt1l ~~ont a((ount I
II If 111middotll1ld 11l1JOl)1 I 1 )HLI middotlIhmiddotlltIj~Imiddot It 1l1Hlrfllhat j HIIIIlI 11I11 IhI1 If 111 1] 1-1 WIlli III (E lr~ 11l a nUJor ~ 11 1Lnph Ilf I~ ftll Illiull 111111 Oil Ih lJaI hpPIl wlll1(lt 1 llnllllllll) 1111111 1 dlI( dl11 hll Illr~1l11 ilILlion aruwl Ith~17lt - 111111lt11 hl 11Ild Hl(lI 1)(11 fl[ lltIOl tinllq II Iud
ljUUI 101- IHI IHIJ Imiddot Igt ItImiddot I
d1 HI111lli nt- 1Imiddotmiddotrimiddotll 11) [Tlt~ ~ I (ilIHral ~ilgt~f1 ~
TL 1]1] llliu] 1r1I1111 nf plf1I1111 Jl1111P11l1~ III Ituooja ha~h11 1h r illll of a I rl111 ] IrId Infant f I II 1hi army nlLll1U Irlt ~lf 1 1
IIIfn 111rlclIlrt Iollrquol lTIPntlr Lll1h frlIl()OJtllqlllnlf ~ pI)~liP mug Hal1dIIllPf Pari 19J7
88
f-middot ~- -gt~
VolXVIII No 70= ~
at Kiev and 1936 in While RU~ltlhl and at l~oSC()w lumiddotrgf scale d~hllrkatiol1 were executed partly by paralthut and partly ~ hy fHlccccding landingH of transport Jllanes These exercisel ure inloresting and ontgt calllot deny them some value Olle should howewr (xaminc th(m without prejudice tQaetermine to what extent they are actually practicalle and to whht extent they are artificial and of doubtful value
Individual training is conduded fint wry mplh(ldi(~t1ly in s(iwols whfrf tberuture fmrachuthts jump from high IOWlfl wilh tllP Pllrllimtfmiddot alrpadr opened to overcome tim initial (ar Tlwi Uwn PN(((ti to tetuul jtlmp~ frDm ditTerltnt altitudes gradually pftting lowN hut still high flwtl~h to guaranteltJ the certain operation or Ow paraciltllt Acturaey of Jandilll on a prescrihed Rl(ti~ ~ou~ht t~ fa~i1ital( II( ~rouJlig of a Iumbtr ormtn landin~ at Ollt tunCj with till ohJect th( (pltgtl1Ing of tlw paraehllC IS clelLHrl todimmilh the di-llenionTuITI)s af practicP(l with arms and mLlllitl()IlSI FoUowing this group d(seents are practicd and tlw ffort jl-l made to jWfP lS closely h)gftlwr as poltltilllf A soon as twy rIwh Ow ground tllIY nrilnt themselves march and fire bolh day and night
The dropping of iSl)iaf(] individuals for propaganda or fspiollagl purshyposes e~pcially at night is -implt In a sparsjy pOJHllalNi (()Unlry it is also relatively (as) to drop Hmali groHp (hargpd with fltst rltdions or ollwr pedal tasl5s 1I()Vf(r if tl~ jump la~I1 pJa(p at Iliglt ~h( rfgrO(lpnllntvi the parll(lpants ma be iJfJwult alHIf thpy an to IZP Important poiut it isimproiJabl( that tiWl WIll I)p tlllrlf[en((d If till ohjP[t itgt dttrudioll it can only h(middot sUjJNliliIl imp til jnwlitiol1 of Iar~( w(rk~ will rP1lllir( hundred of pound of exposin and it io diflieut to ltpp how a small dpLa(hshyment can tran]lort thc (xplOJ-ivPl on fooL aftlr landing from a parahult
In Rwsia they visualizf and f(alizmiddotd ill tlI mamIIrs dtfd th( landing Qr Reveral hUlldred mln to ~Il(p important ()hj(Ctivrc alld (middot(n o attack r(sPTPI or the rpJr of hostilp JHlitiolllt But OI( (an lJl lt(lI11Pwhat skeptical of till nsults to he lXI)(tIltd in war and lot ill mallfuvtr This j how they an Ix)(gtctrd to opPTatl
After dropping atest parachute to indicatp th( dir(ttion of tlH wind a first wae of5 or 30 pamchutists is launched Tlwltp I (J ol)lain tllf minimum dipersion do not ulwn their chutf- ttntil as late as polt-ihl( UtiHr wafS follow and ~r(jup t1wmpl(gts with tll(gt pr(((din~ ww(s or at past (oordinat( ith their Htion ~[achinf guns small fhld pil((s and ammunij ion are l1s) dropppri nut it it to hI qH~tif)lHd if till parathu (arrdlg w(apons and munitions will not Ill widely dispersed silwp t lwy eaHn~1 fl( oj)(llpd jU5t hefore they rftch tllf ground as can tholtl of tlw mPH dropped
It is eqwct(l that t1w fleharkmclIb will takp placf in the proximitmiddot of enemy landilg fiplds un(jN tIll llro(pdion of pursuit aviation as wpfl as homharilnwllt or attak aviation to attaek t11f ground dEf(ndlrlt Jt is a
~~~~~~~ltl (l~ ~~~71~Ie~~~l i i~~(kVi~~~~ ~li~~ ~~~I~~~(~ f~l~lmT~~~ t~il~~~(follolling this larglr fonI togltJwr with nM(hinl -gun ca~lllt)u ltlnd ammunition will be 1lnd((1 in plallfo tlwy (In talk of llyinlln Jutolll)hillS and tank Tlwy will thus 1)( ahl( tf dphark ltlIc(fosimiddot( gfl)UI (If l tholisand men (JtlI half an hour wi suUit to unload middotIOO() or 5Ollj nwn a forel aliI to obtain important rpsuts Obi()u~y this rl]uires tl( (mploynWIlL of a
bull talXf numhN of t ranport- Actually ahout 700 m(fj Wlre droPPfd hy paraelmt(gt ill t11P Ki(v manllshy
1 Hi in 1935 111 tlw ~lillk mallPUV(fS in 1lJfi about 1500 HlIll with 15 marhn(gt gUllS and g tnneil mortar__ WPrP dropped hy paralhutp and attaewd a-tandirrg ild 90 mil b(hind tll front In th(gt iloscow 1l1lIlPUprs OOO parachntist W(f( droPP(d in SlcCsshC WtVPS thlY fizlci ltIll airdrolt1f on vhich a compldl rlrimpnt of infantry wa __ d(gtharkri from transports
Oh iOllSI these operations wpre not (olldue(d undfr (fitahlP war mnditioll W(gt do lot know how th( tfrrdin was O((upifd anrlchflndlri In Iar it vmlld hav( IIP1l d(flndNI Till lranltlorl pianps (arryinJ the pJilchutbts f](V at ahout ~j()O ft( Tlwre was thus a good (hanel that thro Qe-ienhf I)lahine glllllt would hae (alJSlci 10i(1 to lw trilll~l0rts crews Jnd paradHlt ist at t 11 (inl of Imding lnd lafun 11HY loulrl rpJroup thrm~(ns and hI afmbkd in (oJHhlion to mallPllypf and fight
Admitlin~ that tllP ~llC(sit wanlt of para(huth(s wtrp ahlt to i-piz[l a landing- (wId alm(j~1 in~tantly altllOu~h it MiIlS hi~hly improilahli tlu defendfT- hpll drivp aWlY would COlltjllll lo t1~h usil1~ IOIlI ran~( machhw gUll lin against tht tranltlrts mlking the latN landings
RUsiiJ1l in~truct ion of paradmtits j tlrtainly priolls wtl is Hh(Ppt il( ofinterlsting rpsults It is IIPfitll(gtlpss plrmissilt to ngtrrl till SP(IuIlt dtScrib(gt(j as of slight (hanc[l of SIIlPo 111(gt1 (onltidPTatir)J]s should not pffient the trainin~ of military paraeilutists with a view to (rtain operashytions which may he posihh in sIJecial eases and which Wf gthould he preparfd to excrute FralHp hoW lt)mmellpd thi work and groups of parachutists have aJrraliy taken lart in sma olHrat ion~ It ilt wif though 1101 to ht our imaginations wltlndpr to (X(lt in tlw maUN It is not sullirient to havl parachutists tflaquohnieJll~ wpl instrueted it is equally important that thrjr instruction and ta(~kal fmploymlIt should be wiicly laquooncehed and conshyduetId
ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY (Glealllriluin)
July 1938
ASIIW)JIE ~1()P1mNliIJl) By th authors of Air Stratq~yl
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articlesmiddot
ROYAL ARMV SERVICE CORPS QUARTERLYmiddot(Hreat Drituitl)
May 1938
PhTItOJ SUIJY IN WAR ~ SO~fE lROBLE~IS Sm-IE TACTICI Ll-SSONS IN CONNECTION WITH MT E~lPLOYED IN
OlEltATION8 AGAIN~T AN IItRTGULAll FNEMY Till MAINTHNANc[] OF A MOIIII1l1middot()IUg HY Alit IHlItINlt ()Pf~IA[IH)NS IN
J)ER-l-~lT COUNTIlY
ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Gnlt nritain) June 1938
Tm USl- UF Im~()ITIONfi IN Tm~ (BIIAIGN IN SOUTH POLgtND DUIUNG O(TOIIEH Ill14 Captain Meltzer
SIt(AOltjl - Tm~ F()UNHlNfi (W Till- mw lJI-FImiddotNCImiddotH CoIOlw1 Malan
ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain I
July 1938
1111 ~lIL)nmNT OF A ImiddotANK IlHlGim AT1I1 IN ~H)j)~HN WAit
UNITED SERVICES REVIEW Grfat Britain)
28 April 1938
-(j~m ligtfII(TIONl of TIII~ ANSCIHllsS CoJOIwl B(adon
5 May1938
HY f-WAN IS IN CHINA Mljormiddot aenamara CAN Im ClIINISP ImSIST lNf)IFINln~ly A (tOHImiddot-- STUnI m Tm~ Pm
KST It Air Commodore Charlton
19 May 1938
J)I~lOCHCllS nmus IlICTATOnSlIIlS Tim nllOltTMCE OF 1~N1TEi) jmiddotW-l Air Commodore Charlton
1middotUDlN( TIII~ I~H~ OF Tim AIlligtfBN LEsSONS OF 11IP AlJlmSHOT IlOAIl ~lOYI~Il-oIr middot)Xlm(lfm KG Mandeville Roe
26 May 1938
nIOTAIN1 ltFiHigtMImiddotNT A 1)1IINSln IUfH Air Commodore Charl-Ion
2 June 1938
Aim w ItHFmNSII OF Am IlmmAIUnllNT Air Commodore Charlshyon
9 June 1938
AlT(ti ANII 1011NnR-ATTAtK IN SPAIN Major-Gelpral Fulpr Im NlIW FOH A j)J)IItTlIENT OF SUIIl Air Commodore Charlton
16 June 938
Fm-Nllt lJtlltW1 IIWDtlCTION Air Connnodort Charlton
23 June 1938
Im TltHTIi AIIOIIT Am WAltFAltl Ajr ComrylOrior( Charlton
30 June 1938
Till PI- iLol-mNl Ill (JI)IN( Air CommodorC Charlton
7 July 1938
1hmss InmHSAL Fun WAlt WBAT TIII~ llI(1TOIt tnliNTIU~S IIVE J[~H-l IN HpAIN Air Commodore Charlton
14 July 1938
Im tIlWROUS Mil PImiddot(tWP N1IONS WllIeH RllPPI) WAit 1IjTEshyHIS Air COlllm(J[jorcgt Charlton
21 July 1938
LJSS()NS OF TIm SIANI~H VI Air Commodorl Charlton
28 July 1938
h110lnANIp ojmiddot Tim Rsqu (OUNTln Air Commodorp Charlton
VETERINARY BULLETIN (~IPJll(nIllt to The Army MCdical Hullptin)
July 1938
~1 oUIIl1m 1I0HSE~IH)J~INt POIt tOAIl lIIAllCIIE~ Liputenan( JOIl(g
89
19
Readers Guide and Subject Index
A flll Vurrllflt Ir Arm AmmUnltlOm Io)lnlllil
I~~~~~~~ itl nllf ntltnnk llllt iI bull r I ~ rr ~ (rnamI Ann r ~r I
middotTlllllfU1 ~ f 1I01wl I ~ru7dln l I Tt
rmrod rlnflr - rllljlI+ Ij
I nnhd IlrlI1 j
Inbull j l~k
~
tilf J jn
If) 11-(gt[
jnrall) IIIIIInrrrSlr
IO
G
K L
I rt
1-nrl ~ f r 1
a
1 j 1-[_1-
I
v
LiST OF PERioDICALS INDEXED
AND
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
A Ord 1 (Irl A Quar r1n Irt linIn)
Bul Bdglt Mil HI) 11-r gtlIUUlrimiddotq 1111shyum)
Cln Dd QUilr c h II fmiddot (lT1i fly II uunda) Cay Jour (dr) rurnal C1V Jour 1GB] (-dr JltlIJrlm 1(pound1 at Ilntam)
Chrm Wlr () 11= d rlan illl111l CA Jour 1 r I rj I nllt fA Jour 111 r1 r 1 ur1 Ftp Forc 1 jh rr 11 Bnl]) L Fr ncc MIl J a lrIll hltaITP 11 rtI)
Jour RAMC ~Jlrnd f II HOIl Army 11lwll (middotrJ Cn 1 BTllulI
Jour R Art 1ur11 ( ltl HlI rllllf~ ((rnl UrllI Jour nusl f 1 bullbull r 11 [(~llOoI nil JI1IUI
ren I Bnta Jour USII Journi f II llld n JIIlltulllm of
101 (1 Brl IJI])
Kr~fl Kruflfahr)1IIprlTlIPI II) MeG 11 (fJ(Ilt
MIl Mltl flhlln~ Llhall 111111 t 11r)
MH~Wo(h )llttrmiddot~ 111111( rmatl1 Mil Eng ~llll1ar It lt r MIISuro Iljlln Nllv In~t Proc - 1
PIon II II rmn~)
QM R tur n r It ~ w
Rn~Orf_Hmiddotr (H1Imiddotr
Rv tift CY ll _II d I allt IIruu)
RY dlnf-ll Ill dlpln ril IIrlllll) Rv Mil Gcn H 11 Idllln (i(nlra[ (irallr)
Rv Mil Su[o itnu(gt 1I11111j[middot SUll~~ (SWIIwrjlllld) AAF Quar ltoynl Ar FUTr IJllarlltly (nnt Bntuln)
nASC aUlr JtuY1l1 nIl) - nH Iri~ (lllllf(rly Gil) Hrlhll
Boy Eng Jour ItnyullI)IHr Jurnulllnnl Ilrllaln) RTe Jour Itul lank (q~ Jourllul 1rlIt Irllln) U5 Rov llnllnl ~Irvln~ Itnl w (Ir at HfI~nln)
Vet Bul VrlNjnll~Y IIlIlh till
Jan Jllnu~rj Jul bull Tullo Fob middotFhruar Aug AJJII~t
MOl tlnrrh Sop Imhrr Apr Apr1 Oct_ Ilrluaf
May 111 Nov Nombir
Jun JUII Dec [Imlr
A
ABYSSINIA
AERIAL WARFARE
I 1 J f)I r ll t HI L) ( I I h rul~h 1 I) I- If UK Jji1)
II pngtj~IL Var n J v f It 1 Ir I UpI)II Jour Jul-UjJJIK)
Vi1 th h1h (ornmlfId 11 0 Ii r IMI (aoshylUI1)
lodrn wllraJd It Jl)7 f lila I dur IU)l HUR)
rrrll )Id (hal oJ Ilmd warmn IJollr I~IISI JUH)
~hmor(gt mod rnI1 d It 1 Quar Jul Ink) Ar 1 IlPIrfllll1~1~( of fl1T Jnmllnrdrnlt nl 11 Itfv
lIm) Th trill h hul aIr Hflln 11S It ~ I lull 1laH) 1 Ir c~ n h l fnr nr IllS n -7 Jul 1~lJ8) Thr hHarq f (I ~ It ~ -I j Jul IJ38) 1-11 of thl Spnlll~h l1r n~ Jt~ ZlJu 1IlH) TIH n r1l11 rlitlWI r - rrlucutOrl of tilt popltllnliull
111 -IJullJIK) rnt Drttummiddot9 Illr lrujm lLa rrnnr hill shy
1118) r rltII1Il1 Ihr lf[I~ (11 111 lllr 1Jl1)
i~~gt~~I~~1 n~f rt~ ~~ 11tI~~~lnt~~~1 n~rj~~d~ M~ll~~ - Ilnr 1l3H)
II-llr mi bUlilh~ rHlq1rlCIfl (11 Mill In19) or rlld Ilhrtr~ 111 l1U- ~l[r 11ltl) r atl-llkltJn IHud rop~ ll1middotmiddotoch-l Apr 1938) n pecunty lind Ill( Ir dTtnl IR 111 (( middotJlln I~~middot inlpr -~Ion~ 11111l P rH nrs of Ihr SplIlllqh Wtr (Ih ~
1lt - Jan l-ltIgt llll)Ih l~n7 hlllII~OrS 1Il II( I1llllrad Ilmiddottru1 Ill
SW_~l J 19)11) AIR ARM
Orglnlzlton and EquIpment
r furclt XllIn~lOn (lI~ I- rc - lUll 191fll bhmore mOIl rmz I H F Quar-Jul H138) Frrllfh rcratt rrllductlOlI ItS H -Iii JUlI (9311) ((f1I1 ilnll1H11 nr plthltm (I[limnmiddot MI J)I~~
I~118) rlalltllt 111111 rlO I I ~II SU1-or -- I)(c IV71
Trlnlng TactIcs
Til rIlt I ililI01l Oth InfChUnlZlrl caulr~ (n k Ju u 1)Hl)
11( IWIIII rntta IInvTour Julu~ 9~~1 Ill Iom r 011 t1 nln~ t throurh (FII-Ilt1fc Ac
11lfl) r J10WN 1I1l1 tngtnp ITH1 InllIt (Inf Jltlur Ml Jun I ll 11h h middot)I1Hl111illlll jllll1r l tll (i JunlQgt Twln1 awl 1dlnl~lrull 1~middot f Ii Vllrll hHmiddotltt~
IJur Iltl-l MI IV) r~rmiddotd IIrl1111lt or tomorrow (Ql HI - Julmiddot l~ 1l3QI
qllmorl llIolh rIIIZJ (ICF tlullr - Jul lillS) Tlw TtJaHltt 11111gt or 11 nwhmiddot fun hy Ilir durllj( 01 tat~I1~
1 10 rl -(nl IltA~( llllr 1IIuv 111)1 [11111111 1111 111[lh mrm (IS It 11 a 1gt~ r llgtT1IIltI1)furlgtnllllurdmIII1 IllS1 211
11lH) ilwlmlhnlHltll mrvnrlllr (l1-1 21J1In 11311)n dnlupln II of 11llnr IU- t~ ao Jln 1l3S1 Ir~~l rrlwnrnnl for Ir (IS It 7 llll JJI) I~ f l ~[I11h VHr (1 It v 1 luI lllH (rrat Ilnll11111 nlr prn]] nI 111 Fww 1111 11)middot11 JJ
l)]~)
Ir raldwd tl(rIltI 11Il1111tHI 1I1nr 1911raquo IXl rlo 1lt HI nT Wid pr(ull I rlll 1I11t ~lur I~~ jr lIIrl~ n lruJ Irop (0111 WllIh I Ir 11l3~1
lr)u1Hi WUtH7l1UOIl of II Hlr rOTl lrl (1 or orpll~J rnlv I 1tu~~inn )1 (1I1l1middotVIHh 8 Apr 19lRi
Thr nnlul hlflllllrj 1l1I~n (ltv dInf - Mllr 1~1ll T ucunty lIJ)d Ihl HT oT(J)I1 (ltv ]11 GlI Jlln IW
Imp~a~ IJ~~l ~I~jl~3~) of t111 fllll11lh WHf (ll M
S Tw
F
lion
Th~
Tho
otl Bom
M 1111 A~tll nll
M
Anll [)~fl
nU1l1
Irr Iu
Tan Th orr
Tar
~r
n
I Imiddot Th
(~II
T bull
Th
M
p
So Tt
n I I
TI
TI
tI
N
T
I
2
(LIIIri1~
10-111
fA Ord -Sl
lIlay-JUll 1918) middotIatlon oltgtufnational
Jour-1I1IIy-J1InI93S) - ~Iay-Jun 1938) ht- Jul 1918)
C]wm War - Jul 1938air 1gt1( Gal-Jun
~XlfljIN-o70~ Readers Guidea1d SubjeetIlidex0=-- shy
T~j-~~(lr9a8) in the IAoninvad IliltricL R~ M~i Or~1~~~il~3gl)n thil PlltCution of d molitlonll (ltv 1gt1H Itenmmkllmrtll raid in the WilT witn China (Rv de CavshyMar~Apr 1938)
troog landinge rrom alrpInnlll In Hu~a (Itv ~1i1 SusS( - ~ The J~l~e ~(J~938n the Leningmd ljHl~lct mv Mil lt~fanlry and cavulry (ltv Mil Gcn - Mar 1966)
Fe ANfMALS11l~8J of Rabat and KhemislCt (ltv
Arab hOT5( hrrtJlng in Syriu ( 19JB)
the aupp y 0 oraea n OUt middotllTm)middot (ltv Mil ~uir~(f - Jun
1938) ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
ntJmiddotairuaftbull (A QlIlT - Jul 1938) (C Jour-shyBo~~~u~~h~~~mln t~l tone of the Interior
A~tlalt~rll(~(omI1UlltntllgtnH leA Jur ~hl)-Jun 1)3K) Aahmore mo(hmiddotrnteltmiddotd (llF qullr _ Jul t1IH) nliir~Talt wellln lind thmiddotor middotmplymlnt (1111 MIlt
Mar 191l) ANTIAIRCRAFT OEFENSE
nli-airer I (AQullr -Jul 13f1) Dtlen~ lIJtainstlUr ~Ul~k ICa Juur - Jul-Au1 W18) BambinKIllrllllo111rl thzonflhltlntlmiddotnnr ICAJoUT
~lay-Jun 11ll8) ~ntltrtrillt fommUlliclltiurll IC Juur - ~ll1)-Jurl 1JIi) St-unty lur tlalIIrviI r ~u)plY ((wm War Jul 1~HI) AJhmore illdmiddotrnlzmiddotd (ItAf quaT Ju119l1l) Theaaial danl(r - Imiddotduclltion of thmiddotJopulatlon (La Franr ~1i-1 Ju11938)
lllurrnft weapon IIrlfl thr cltnfIgtmct (1gt11 -111 MIT 1JlII)
~lairrll1 uui(hfll (m~lrurtln (111 ~II Itr 1~)Pi)
~~~7g~~I~~~~ij~t ~~~i~~~ ~~n~~r~I~middotmiddott~~~~ rr~~rL~ ANTI GAS
Pn-ltoutlOfl tL~njnt Ia~ nttark~ (gt111 ~lItt gtlaT 1938) GLlprotcctlUa or lhe CIV pjoulatlot] ulwad 1-111 -htt
olul31) ANTITANK
R~~rit~~~~~n~~~~~~li~~t~IYHJt~~~~j8)IU 1lIH)
~~IOO nmiddotfle-rtwn lin Infntry mutt mmiddot1 ami tactlr~ Ilnl Juur Jul-u 19JH)
neSpom~h Vllr A reVJ( th hest )] 110 dnt Jour - Jul-AuK 1935
TILnD -Ilrmored rconnngts~anr vmiddothltI(middot~ and rh dfln~ Igamt the~e (Krull _pr I~Jax)
lhp Bnt~~h Army in 197 tl~v laquo( (L I-Fh 1311) jbgt rnooHn tank Its (IIpnl1)htmiddot~ und mgt1) mat m Ow
aacK (ItvdJf-- Mr IJJRJ TlCUe()fYflterday und 01 trmorrgtw (It~ gt111 FI
ICI=~SJ~~~l-~6~rJ3S)ell of the- SpluJ1h War (itvIlI
lak llttack agllinst antitank gun~ IS FnwJn lthtury Dta
ARMAMENT
Ppa---dn=~ in Endlln A sludy r mduHlr1 mohilzaln
B~~~~d ~~~~~~~ I~~~ Itcbull 26 IIlY EJ8)
ARMORED CARS
ART OF WAR STRATEGY
1betlnx in Smin TarII~i~tm fall1 I bullp [It folh tNmiddothmtgt fA Ord - Jul-Auf Hll8) bull
StratlrC and cnt(1l1 mafHinlmiddot Tlu IT rIllgt (1) nUT naljfml lCUnt~ (A Ord - JUI-lUf J~18)
Tle malor tactiClt of thl cncunt r baltIc (A Quar - Jul 19381
nttmy thai Clln llta~k - a l~illn llml 11 lt1middotfnf laquo(no DefQuar -- JullIIJ
A ~y~tcm of anti-tank dr n~middot (ClIlI D( r (lmT -- Jul 1l1II) ~crale (shouldr to IIhould(r) (Cw Jour [Gil) Ju 1935)
yenhS~sa~j~h~~i~ r~~t~r~h urri~~~lrll~~rllon (Inl Jour-Jul-Auo 1938)Counterbalv-ry In mohH warlaT( lJuur It rt ~- Julll38)
Will the hIgh commanlt lak If thgtgt aLr (Me filll -- Jun 1938)
Tldie2l and udministraHlt lessons of the VaT In Abys~mm aour nUSI ~ gttay 1138)
The battl fI War~aw AUlu~t 1920 IJur HU-- - May 1938)
Modern war and llq maze f maChLnl (Jour llVSI -tay 1938)
PCIor waT~ (Jour IJsn - pr 1~13i) Ashmor~ modfmiddotrnigtltmiddotd lJtAI~ QUilT lui 1l8) lltlme tllMka hIWlnR In cOllnfdlUfl wult 1gt11 fmiddotmplu-lt In
~r~ai~r) agllinst un irnKunr 4middotn my (llSC ltjmushy
r~~~kro~ri~no~~n~i~J~~lItmiddot~T ~_tj~i ~~8) - Jul H138)
t~tkrh~a~~tf~-~~t~ckAJSyent~~l_(~~l~rljH) Jun (llll) ~1llI of th Splfllsh War (US llv - 21 Ju 1l81
ftfR~~~ f~~ins the qurrn of haltls ILa FrnnC( Mil - If
Theaerial dangT - cducntion of ~hcppultion 111 Franc( Ml-lJul1918)
Thoullhtlion llll duration of futtlre war U1114 Voch -- 1 Apr1938) _
The rnod~m tank Ita capllbilitll~ lInd mploymlnl In thlt 1 It~ck (ltv dInr - Fh 1(38)
N(J(t On thl bllhr conduct or wnr (rom 1792 tu 17l7 lind rtom1911toJ)16 IlvMIIGcn-Jllnfeb1938
T~~~ Yllwrday and 01 tomCJrrow (nv ~1U Gen - Feh
Th~~~~v~ea~~(j~i~~~alv~ti~~i~~o~~~t~~ghl~sa(lr~Mil SuiIIIC-Fcb 1938)
Me hRlliwllltgtn [Sec Original Military Study) Tal~rK~~~lk against antitank guns IS loftiKn MIlitary
Thelnrvltabillty o(~onllnu()ul fron19 [SlcFJrlI(Jl MlItnry l)lIWlIAj
TIlt fixation or rr~ IS -onign Military IlhttlIs
ARTIllERY
Orgarilzatlon and Equlpmcnt
n )lnv~tlt ~oldl~r nltcUlry (1-A J()ur 11lly-Jun 1IJH) Cmmun1ltatin wlthm thCliht huUalm iImiddot- Juur _bull ~layshy
Jun 19~R)
~~~~l~~~~~ ~~jh~~~~m~~~~f~~middot~~~~[~rij~IU~~ilI Mny 1938)
(lur artlll~ in 1ll5 (Jtll~ (ljl -hl- Imiddotmiddoth 1118)
I Training Taetla
k~~~ ~~~~ltf~~~g (~[~J~~ - ~l~t~~~ l~i1~ Tralfllfll rurrrinntionll1937 (Jour It r - JullllI)
~~~~~t~~~II~t~~7l~~I~I~~a~~ltl ~r~lif~~~(~1Iw)~~a Apr 113B)
11w A II cmiddot I artdlry fir~middot IItv IIn - Jlln Inll)
ATTACK
Ikllt-n~ nIIin~t aor ntrlltk ~(av Jour - Jul-Au 1l8) The mounttmiddotd attnck In open rdgtr (Cav Juur-~ Jul-Aug
1918) _ EqUIpping for aHk r nVNlt (Mit Fn~ -- Jul-AuI In) TIll emplQymlnt of a tllnk IlfiJllldc (ftTC Jour -- Jul 1918) AHack In modern war ItTC Jour - Jul 1911I ttark Ilnd counter-attack in Spalll HJS ltull ~ iI Jun 1J11l) lr atlacks on ground trop$ (~liI4Wochmiddot--l AIr 1l38) Tlw traimngofcnglnpgtrlplldcrllnncl men (PIOn --[-1middot11913) Th mod~rn tllnk Ita cllpnhihllS and empymltnt in It
(Iaack ltv dInf-Mnr 1J38) Tllnk nttak I~hangt antItank guns I~ l-nll~lI Ilitury
Illlltlmiddotgb AUSTRIA ARMY Of)
n PUhly-lh~ar old mlilary schuu (1)liJ Milt 19111) fltJ
BELGIUM (ARMY OF)
I11slry vI the Inspcctorut GeMral [ the Army unll the HIIshylUln tmimng cent durinllthpoundgt World Vnr Hlul DIlI1 lgtJl-Jln-eh MUT 1938)
Ihmiddotsrijltim Qf educatlflnal and vQcational trnlninK 01 thlt Illll(nln SQ1lti1(t (nul Beige ~fi - Jlln 1938)
Aronalltir mat(middot (Rv Mil Suisse - Dec 1(37)
BUlGARIA (ARMY OF)
Motorlzalionothenrma N(wconccpliQngoforlnniznlion Iquipmcnt and emplnym~nt in fflr(iln armilt~ (Kraft- shy
May 1(38)
CAMOUFLAGpound
Air PW(T afld ro~)p 110VCmLnt (lnl Jour -- May-Jun 1938) Tnllllnr ruminatnR 1917 (Jour It An ~ Jul 1938) Cnmoulnlc nnd blackQut (Mi Mitt -- Mllr 1131) Ground orgullTatltm of t~e Ilir rjf~ Prutcction of airpoTL~
lI~rordmg to ItWltB18n Views MJImiddotWch -8 AN 1938 imlT(middotgHlonq Ilnd IXpctl(ncog of the Spanl~ War (itv ~1il
Suissc--Jun Feh HJ3S)
CANADA (ARMY OF)
(anlth~ tltgtrltlgn pohcy (Cup j)1f Quur-middot-JuI191S) lrQhlltms of defence on the PaCIfic (Can I)f Quar Iu
1J38) CAVAlRY
Organlzltlon and poundqulpmcnt
1918)
CHEMICAL SERVICpound
New wllr I(IUI(gtI [Qr uhl (A Ord - Mlly-Jun ll38) SNurly rr thl ReTVic f RuPIlly (Ch~m Wnr - Jut 1938) lrenutionsIiKuinKtluHlIlIlIkll (MllMltt-Mar1938) PhYRiuloKIlal ~fT(lcL nf j(HStfl (Mll Mitt ~ Mar ]9381 GUIII)roI~tlon of Ill( civil popullltIon nbruad (Mil MIlt-
MlI~ 1938) CHINA (ARMY OF)
~ fhl(91~JlIn~ luraquoitiVlt EXjledition in Chlnll (A QUII1-- Jul
fhumifr in tlw EuM 1 mth~ f til( wllr in Chinu (Jntbull JQl1r-- JUI~lUr 1131) Why Jupun i~ In (hina ((lR W -(j MIlY I9JB) (~an 1Ill Chin~~ rl~i~t illdJinitdy (US Itev - ~luy 13H)
COAST ARTIlLpoundRY
Bombinv plratiolll ill Illlt ~)Jl 01 the iukrior teA Jourshy1ny-Jun lJaS)
~~i~i~r~ft th~mDr[~~a~(~~i 1(~itr3~-(E~Yj~~i 9rel4 jullJ8)
IIm)lIrdmnltatiltgtI (f Jour --Jul-AuJ 193H)
COAST DEfENSE 11lt(ltU or the Bdg1Un rna~( HII44 918 (CA J9uf-Jul~
Aur19J8)
COMMAND STAFF AND LOGISTICS I((IJ[lr~dn(SIlt ioElIRlund IItudy of indo~lrjal m(Jbillzation
JllP flrgalliza1ltI1l and runmiddottion~ or the llltiwal Stfvi(g in cumbimmiddotd opmtouns IIf lund and ~tU frorl_ (Mil Sur shyMy Jun 1J38~
jllctltII IIml Idmml~trllliv(middot ll~ of tlimiddot Var in AUYl8lniu (Juur HOSJ - IIIY IJ38)
Air-hd armimiddotq r omormw (lI H Jul-Aul 1l38) 11lI J~e~~~(JiJ38nfulltTY dhmiddoti~irHl in dmiddotrltn~ (QM iev-shy
dw supply in war soml prohlmiddotml dlA~G QUilt - May 1938)
fill 11middot((1 for a d~partmnt nl SUJII) tU-l IlIv- 9 Jun I ~)3)
NftllH un Iimiddot hirtr cdud f wnr rrltgtm 1792 to 1797nnd frum 1914 I 1918 (ltv ~H1 Gell -- Jan (U 138)
National d(fn~ ltv lI1H (itll ~ Jnn 1938)Ihll l~thOrian Campairn 111 s~rice of supply (ltv Mil
(II-Jun 1938) OrgmTatinn Qf national ddnM (f~vom Gn - Mar 1938)Thu lIupply Qf hlgtrsClI in our urmy (ltv igt1J Smpoundgt - Jan
1938)Tlw mlhlCnce on our tn(tilt~ lllthelltroductionnrmllllof
motnmcd and nrmnnmiddotd (hi((H by our n~lghuors itv Mil SUIC - FllJ 1938)
Mprhlllliwtion [S~ OnginJl Hitary Study)
CONVOYS Air powrllnd lrQnp mOYnQnt (In Jour - ~by-Jun 1938)
COUNTERATTACK AUa~k and rou1l1r-al1u~k ~n Spain (Ult(middot J Jun 1938 1l11k~ In tIll d r11~1V Wlth th Fr Army Aril nud Muy
191H_ (ilvdInf-Jun Ul38)
COUNTERBATTERY Cuuut(gtr lJaUlry in mohile warflllltmiddot IJQUr It rt - - Jnl 1938)
COUNTEROFFENsIVE
Ihe hnUle or middotWIlnltlW AUI(Usl 1920 An fxample of tho rltlunter-n(f~nsl JUf ltV -Muy ll3B
)
r I DE~lLpoundS
Ill ImiddotTOlIlin of the An-l(lIin 1817 St Forlln Mllilflty])1gIHj
DElAYING ACTIONS Command -- Conlrol -- Cummun$tions A rtgim~1l1al
viewPQint (Cnv Jour-Jul-Aug 1938) envnlry tllk s to wheels (I~II orr - Jun InR)N(w ways fQr motor and ridr (Kraft - Milt 1938) HOff( hreding In the region of Rabal and Khemil~eL (Uv
dcCav-Jan-ub 1938) Evolution of British cavalry (ltv du env - 11ar-Arot 1938) ThesitulltionnndmodlofArnhhoTIIImiddotlmedlnglnHgtrill (ltv
de (IIV 4_ Mnr4Aflr lI3S)
hi i~~middot~~~rll~orlli rfK~~~1formalllHJ in 11middot ltuIllllryi
Training Tac1los
Did th(y knQw hoW (Cov Jour - May-Jun 1l38) The rol f iution with m~dlRnllmiddotd ravry ((IW Jm
Jul-Aug 1938) IJdcnAe aloinllt or nllnck (Cav Jour - Jul-AuK 1938) Th( mounted Ilttnltk In pen Qrder_ (Cuv JQur - Jul-Aug
1936)
Orgllflllmg hui~on in the ~I(utinn of demolitions (I~v Mil 01 FlJ 1911raquo
DEMOCRACY
)emocru~ middotr~us dlcta1L)llIhil~ (US R(gtv - 19 IllY 1938)
OJMOLITIONS
TInmiddot vtj fll hmlOliliuJlllin th~rllmJ1Li~n inSnulh 1lano during
()r~lfl~~r~ Ut~l~n j~t~h~~~cJu~i~l~t~~~~i1~lons (ltv Mil r4n--b1938)
DICTATORSHIP
1)~mj)rmriltlJ Vltlt~ dirl~tlt)l1Lhip~ (U~ IlIv - - 19 MIIY 1938)
DISCIPLINE
lrnn 1Ii~dplinc i~ mort nClt~SIlry thnn 4r Itt tlw ~ltllil Army (La Ifllnn Mil )-ZO pr 1118)
ECONOMICS
TIlt (middotvnluatiol1 (If lIw Imlire (ftna CuI MlI- Feb 1988)
91
lt1]) )1)
-i )IoIlt1umiddot JIf)
I
lrl It I)
F
rItHH C[ MllITAnv t rMVAll
I)
FOIlTIFICATIONS
)1 11
11
) fFlA-ICf ARMY OF
) lll
I ) t 101 1 JtI
f
I I 1 I )
) I 11 I -I
I l J]101 1 lt1 I 1 I I (~J
I ~
j I 111
111
Supply
1e
I dlII I 01
i I)
fr I 1 lt1 I I 11)
1 I T[
) JII
1 1
rflANC[ NAVY or
11 I 11 (I 1 J
01 r I 111 11
VUTUflE VJlprAPE
Jl I i~ 11
(i
G(OGnAPIlY MILITARY
It If 1 1-1 11
Cf)nmnd and St lit
1 )q~ J 1 I~I J ) I j gtq bull I II d) d I 1 r
OrlJ IJ Hon nd Equipment
Ii III 1t
I
) ))11I
I II I l[)1
IIrp111tHII
d)l It
I a Irall 111
Trdllinn
1111 1 r 11
[I)middot
1111 d l
II III I 101 h
1
GtRMANY NAVY Of I
11 I )f 01110 )1(I )tl In I~ c 1 1] 1 I IIlt I
Gn[AT nnlTfllN nFlMYOr)
I dr I ~ I 11 -
I )))]1
1 I 101)1 Id j
1 ~ I
Orrl1nr1tn 1nd flUlflnHlt
)1)11 I jn
l r 11)11lt) h qrgt 1111 1ul-IJI
1middot -1 rnll d
middotIlf I II
jl 1 I~ 11 11 r bullbull -1 bull ) nrlnp I r L ft ~ hIgt
1 ~ 111 1-lt1r- bull [eImiddot I 11pI+P 11 ) - I 01 ltd 11 III II 11
1 lIlt1 1)lt1(10 11lt)
ril L ~ lt I d1 I~ l
t bull I1
middotmiddot)r J t 10 I 1)1 r11l hr f ) r
fTl I 1-
Supply
p 1gt1111 It-( 11Ie 1
11 rr IrjllrllIrl Ic~ I - I lr 1) 1lt1111
TrlllJlnl
GRfAT ORITIIN NAVY or)
I j ]1 11lq1 gtI(q)middot11 lItO 1
lNrANl HY
Ornn)r Uon lllrl flUi[HPfllt
rllnlng Tlttlcshy
11tIIr
C amp GSS Qualterl Vol -- ~
h 111111 alld 11-1111 ilf1r1
jlnl middotlr]IIgtl1 Ilr lII~)
INTELLIGENCE middotMILITAHY AND NAVAL)
I 1 I ~ f
1 1
ft) I
1
JAPAN flnMY orl
Ip I ~I d1 1 11 II
1middot1 11 d I
JAPAN NAVY Of)
] j lulllli1 I I -I 1 I ~ Ir
Inolc1 lt111middot 11 11 1t1-lll11j Il)
JOINT OPERATIONS
Ifl r 111111lt11 ] 1 11 111 I
1 I 1- 1 rbull ~1 Il 11middot1
L
LflnGr UNIlS
ArlllY
11 middot1 +]11[1 1101 (h I] li-I
92
LAW (MILITARY AND INT~RNATIONAL)
ReadersGuide andSubject Index
MOBILE WARFARE NETHERLANDS
(uolN Imtry III mhil warfare (Jour It Art _ Jul 191fI) The Ie of the Nelherlandll in lhl wlt)rhl of lO(lay (QM Rov lJ malntrlam of ~I mohilmiddot lorc lJy nir durinl tll1NlItiona in - Mayhm 1l1H
dlt~(rt (ountry (ltMC ltlmr gtlal IJIH)t()I()~Illt101l and mllnuwr 111 ~ltl- 1 IWI) NIGHT OPERATIONS Ih~t~~UWt~~fd~rI~]~~l~~1 t~I~~IJgtinc illviniun in II mobile Nhht rill( crmiddot~liug (ImiddotA Juur- Jul-Aul IJHI)
MQBILITY
)nmmiddot rdtclion~ ltHI infantry materiel and t1ctjCgt (In Jour Jul-Auj 1938)
[nII~1IY III waf shy 80ml Ir()bllm~ (ltMC QUat shy MIIY
lw way~ fUf mutor and ridt (Kraft -~ ~lur 1l38) Tllnk~-armor(tl r(nnnal~~arHmiddot( vmiddothidr and the dcfcll~c
agaln~t th~ [Kraft shy pt 1938)
W~di~lh~~ln (n~~7C~i((~~1i~~IdJ lS)
jJl~~~~~~~~~~nt() j~~~~r~~U~ ~~i~~~~t~~~lj~ the cavalry ISlte Forliln Military DiJe8t~J
MOBILIZATION
Industrial MobilIzation
IrlpllrctlIlC5I in 1nllano1 A Iltudy of indu~trnl mohllizatlon (A Orrl- MnymiddotJun 1938)
o OBSTACLES
f1~uI~~ J)fet~IJI~~14~ iRt~~cE~~mJ~~ij~~l~~~)Poland Eludlul tl eytll uf thc airm)ll (US 1tev- W May 1938)
OIL Pelrol 9u1lgtly in war shy flomc prob[cm~ (RASe Quar shy May
1(38) ORGANIZATION
Sllfallliint-d fighting teallls (Me GIlZ-Jun 1938)
p
MACHINE GUNS
1-u-t ~hl~~~1(~~~~~~IA~~(i)~~jlidj and I h J(
MANEUVER IN WARFARE
S- Sani~h Vnr A rcvi(gtw of til(gt It fltgtrljrr 1ltill 1 JldJouf-Jul-u~Il38) (~blQ-z1llon nnd mmlfUcr (gt1ll htt _ F(h II))
4 MANEUVERS ~~t~~~E~Jl21i1~~l~it~~~~~rJ~~~~ ~middot1)illi~hi~ lDaR)
lc~~tJI1Dn of till arm1 -W cnnpptHgtnq f rl-am7~111n
~t~Jf~h~l~)I)~~~~ltI~f~~~ln J~~ (~~~1~1~1 ~u~-Jan 1lJ8)
~ ]3ndmg from arplan1 ill HUI (Itmiddot ~hl SUImiddot shyt r~lt~e~~~ Army In 1)li jStV F)rti)n ~l1lilr) 1)11131
MARCHES
h~i 3lIIl~t air at tap ICny Jour - Jillmiddot u l~laH)
~~~~r~~~~~~~~i~x~e~~ou[[ ~~r_~~J~~~f~)n ID1) YIamplti hltllgt~hudng Dr wad ruard~ ( t Bul -- Jill
il~Y1 (Of mtof Inl rilter (Krafl -- ~Tar lllii) middotmiddot~f1ttJd~ on ITOum trnolq (~111_Wmh -- 1 Al)r 1J3H) 1tJe-=rgo the ollIh in 1l17 ~( Forcir11 ~111tlry ~ [~~laquotal
MARKSMANSHIP
~lrb~~tlJn5hiP lrainillJ for tll )I)middotmrn mill HI_mill Brandl rOftat ltvjTnf Fth lllH
MARINE CORPS
~~~(tmhrlt-d flrhtinl~ tm1 DJ(middot (17 JUIgt 111lt1
~ MECHANIZATION
t~~ElfJ~fJ~ii~~~~~111 (jOlf HA~IC - ~by H)~Jll)
rtltllngrumtnations1937 (JourIlArt-JuI193l) ~lTlftand mechanised land warfare rh BaUle uf GUHlashy111m 1937 (Jour mJS[ - gtlay 1~J8)
JunlnB)unill(orelgnarmi 1918)
ill for~~~o~lf~rh~~~~f~~~ d rlll~h rmy in tn1 (ltv d Cav - Jan-IH nJtHj flMtld vlhir ejmIJll~ In Moroc(o Ill ltI ClV -- Marshy
11l~1~)f nriti~h mvalry ltv I (w -Iarpr ljIB) teutnmnhll Show of IJn amI irmiddotr rlllllary 1I)1rlt~t (WI
dnf-JanJrJ8) n(lnl am rnc hani7d unit~ (Iv dfnf - Ir ~j~8) elnHuenrnon OUT ta t1l~ or Ih 1ntrduIn r muw of IlIDI~riUllandarmrJ ~middotddImiddotIyournrI()rr lit Ij] Sutw-loh IJl8)
k=~~niu ~~~~ri~~h~1i~~1 yen~i~IIIP (aalry I~~oreirn Miltary lJiKtHj
MEDICAL sERVICE
provLoatlln and pradkul work 111 (ami (Jour It Me shylilY 1938) tPloblemofm(chanlzati()nllsilllrrtCtsllltm(djcII~(rvicl
l1otU nAMe _ May HJ3B)
MORALE
lorlllc I~houldcr to shoulder) (Cav Jour JGB) - Jul 191S)
MOnGAN Sir Hcnry (l615-H1HB)
Ih momiddotd ~Iand(rrd mlln in history (Nav InBt Iro( -- JUII lJall)
MOTORCYCLES
lHnary motorryde~ (In Jour- lIlal-Jun 11l3ll) lJc y(li~t quadran In th(gt rcconnlllgsallce unit (Mil-Woch
TI~ l~il~lr)J~~Lr() ([( (R de Cay - JIIII-I~~b 193R)
MOTORIZATION
Ar powIr anllroop mov(mtnL (In Jour - rfily-Jun 1laH) 11htary monrl)rh~ In JOUt- Iay-Jun IIR) omrdlrtlltm~()n mrntrymaterid and ladie (fnfJourshy
rulmiddotAul 1918)TllmiddottIC11 and atimiJ1IHlrntlv 1ltl~onS flf the Wllr III AblMlnla
(JourltllSI-gtlay llaS) ircraft ant m(halli~(middotd land warfare The Battle uf Guadl
A ~~J~r~~~~~~i~7~ihitl~J~ ~h~a~rsl ~lorJzation procrllm QIT Itv-May-Juo 1918)
SlIlH tatkallr-~~nq In rlnlrtion With M 1 fmpIHY(] )11 llrationq alin~t an irwgullr (filmy (RAsG qunrshyMay 1)IH)
Eludllll til( (Y~ f th mmln (US Rev -1J l1ay 1l1R) New wayq [or motor and rid(gtf Kraft - lInr 19J8) ArmorlI mmiddotclultlizmiddotJ ad mutorpd unit~ r foreill1 armLe8
TI~~~7~la~~~Irco~~~f~~a~~I~nl~I~) and the dcfctl~e alain~t thltsc (Kruft-Apr 1938)
Motorization of thenrm~ New conceptionsa1 orgrtnization bull lluJmcnt and cmplolmfnt in forClgn Urmlcg (Kruft shylIfay W18)
Ifntorizatlon and manltlIVtr (lliI [ltt-Feb1J38) tw inmiddottl]()dH fr rrosHlnl rivrrH h) motorized tinlt (1(011
1middotmiddothll)K) (oa and mlor~ (Ita Cui Mil- F(b 1918) Trllt tollitary molnnyd It dv Cav - Jan-Igteb 1938) Ijp Jrll~h rmy m 1~l7 llv d~ Cay -Jufi-Jd lilaH) Ih utnmIJmiddot Show of 1l17 od (~ m[iry IntllmiddotHt (ltv
lnl ~ Jan WaH) T)w mftulw On our ptir~ nr lh in1tnduIiltm of rn ~~ f
UWod aud armord middothid~ by nur ]( IlIhlJorq (ltv 1111 -l1i ~middotmiddot- FdJ 1111)
111~~~1~~~~~~~J ilr~~~ ~~~~~I Irmal I()t~ In tli callulry
N
NATfONAL DEFENSE
Ihc dd~ ( Switt rbnd The (1f(11arltdn~ gtolhieH of n llml In urnwd 1uro]Jmiddot ( Onl - Muyjun iJ18)
lrqrtlnl~ in 1ljtul11 1 fltuly f irlltlu~trilll ftIohih7l1till (A Unl gt1 Jun ll)aH)
StralJlcandrliilmiddotam1l1rml~ Tlwirrlntlnlt(]UUrnnt]oll
j~I(I~~r~tifpoundr~i~I~~~~~~f~~~rllUNlI~ t~lf 1(1~~(~ - Jul I~Q ~
Tinmiddot ur~atlI7an()1l nIH ntlVl1h~ uf tlamiddot Mdk11 illIHlflftlNlt of til Army 1he imIHlrlnm of mNidn~ in IIIHlollUI If~ (Iii SUrl - Aflr 1l18)
A~hmorl uJ-rni1ltd (ltH Quar- J111191H) )IIJ~~Il~~~futiI~(Ul1dlnl of Ih t1lW d(fmiddotl1lmiddotImiddot~ (Hoy jng
IHltai1 f(middotnrmllrnmiddotnl (UH RIv - 2( Mill HJ38) Nnliunnl dfr)IJw [tv 111 (jll - Jntll~Il1i)
C~I~~tJ1( It~I~liG~ ~ ~~ jJli It~j rIlI~ In national Organization of nnlional dlfensc (ltv 1111 Gcn - Mar 19111) l1echanrzation JSt~ ()ri~lnal Milllary StudyJ
PALESTINE
latcHtillC loteH (HUll Cui Mil- Feb 1938)
PERU (ARMY OF)
r1H (rllf~inK 01 the Andltl In 1811 Scc loreigll Military DilcstsJ
POLAND (ARMY OF)
TankR - armored fcconnaiMllncc vlhicJes and lim dcfenBc ngulnntthlc (Kraft-Apr 1938)
PORTUGAL (ARMY OF)
A PurtUlUllIC chronidu 01 the mrpcditlon f Don Chrilltopher (III Gamll ill (lhylinia (UI1Il Cui Mil - Feb 1938)
POSITION WARFARE
11 incvitlllJility ulcontinuoUlfronts IS(( ltorcign MillLary l)il(81f1J
The Ibntiou of fronl JSec Jltoreiln Military Digests
PRESS
Illlt inl1u(n(( of the prs~ in Great Britain and America (JuurUSlI-AprI918)
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda (Jour USlJ-Apr 193R)
Q
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE
Planning Branch Construction Division Offi(( or the Quar termasht General ~Qt Hev - May-Jun 1938)
A (olnmrdal Vl(gtwllOint on the army9molotitnllOn program ((~M ltlmiddotv-MllyJun W3R)
Air-fed Ilrmies of tomorrow (QM Hev -Jul-Au~ 1938) TIIC HUIlPly or an infantry dlmiddotjsion in deflmiddotnflC (Qrt Revshy
JulAug 138) Prt rol ~Ullily in war - somc llwblems (HliSe QUllr - May
]J38) Slme IneUeul [cgtlons in rOnncmiddottion with MT emplollil in
tJPernlinsn~ain~t In krlI~IRr enemy (ItASC QUllt shyMay 1938)
Tim maintenance orn mohile farec by air during opeflltlou9in dtHert Ctluntry (HASC QuaT - May 1938)
R
RAIOS
A~hmnre m(Jd~rnltlltf llo IA9~On~ lOr the SPlJlildl War AirmidHnnd theirffT(cta l~xl)rjenrlJ In GII~ pro(ction
MarHI3SAnt-nlr mid fgtll1ldlnj nrn~lruttlon (Mil Mitt - Mar 11138) Ilr raid shdt(rII (lliJ Mitt- Mar 1938)
RECONNAISSANCE
rile fol of (nllItion with mcrhlni~1d cnvlllry (Cav Jour-JIll-AUf( 111)8)11 yrll~t Rlulldron In Ih reconnaissance unit (Mil-Woeh -1 Apr 1935)
H~NN~NKAMPF Gtllurni Paul (1854-191B)
ltennenkllmpfs mid in th( waf witb Chinn (Rv de GavshyMnrmiddotAp(1938)middot
93
-- - --- --
I
r
Reltders-Guidc alld Subject Index c amp GSS Quarter~
ilvht n r (r r
LlIlppm~ fflr T1Nw 1IllljId [ (f
Fb lil~l
r ~ rmiddot I f
d ROUTES COMMUNICATIONS
1P)IJIWrflId 11 1 I ~ JI IfWIIIr I t II
middot1 ltI ~ 1 IIK
11
VI11ltrwymiddot
I
PUSSIA
1 )1
Ibullbull
1 1 1
11[ 1
11middot
[IWowrn J
SLCURITY
lid I
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
~IGAl SErtVIC(
i 1Jf 1_
SPAIN ARMY OF
middot1lt1
5unMARINfS
1 ]1
ljPPlY
1It
III) 1 11
11 110
1 I~ )1
) 1 I I~ 11 H
middot1 I I) I Un amiddot bull ~I
Pi J- I ~ I J Il n I I )
lr1I))
i (
Ilj I 1
I II 11 If
11middot I 1]1 1 I
SWITZERLAND ARMY or
tf lIf Irlo IhpllllrmlulhlllofmatIPIof ltI fl j -)1lt1 loy ur IvhlT Iltv
F 111gt
T
TACTICS OPpoundRATiON5
LI rlfr 1llllll(tlwr uIIWlHJ I f Jlnrhmiddot IJIIU I lay
j 1 tT-It JunlllIlJ I ll lid mHn jlbIgt Il
I i~ lt bull I I ILl 1 T 11 I 01111101 Ib ~ld
( ]11middot I I I I J n 11lt 1 lllf~
Ollrn~ Cot~It
IImiddot lhItll fluar Jul ) shy
([UHr I111-ullIIK) bull rd r II 1 ~ J ur Jul- 0 111
1 1 bull rmiddot - I fl1 nl 1111111 I~J RI I1gt-)IrJtl 1 lola
1 1
Spc1ilIWilrtilro
r r In JII) ~ joll Jul-AIW 1lllll r II Id~ n IRI7 [ ForI)n ~ftlIH
[ nltlllnUlrPldli 1~f(middotrI1 1lhtnrv
Troop Movoment~
lav-JunlfIR) lui fJH)
War In Abyl~IlI
1+ ~11lY 11ll1 lib til ~UI~
1gt1
TRAfnC CONTROL
1 wtmiddotj IrpJnrnnt 11IJ lw1un Inll 1ludIlmiddot h I II IlIrmrl (0-0 It v 11 III~ Jllkl
TRAN~PonTATION
rl-rdlrlllnlIl[ Ilfluf fUIII[I1ro r 1 n rlnlr~ nl t1 I Inigtlt 11II]t
bd nf 11 fj) 1 UIltll1 11 7 IJnlr It All JulllK) J I lr1 ltI nlmITnll~p 1lt0 of tl1l ur III AhI1rpn
r I ~11lt1 f flV 1l1k) fIJI vnr JI II n~ 0 11lt10111 (f HII Ill
1111 -10 til 11f1I l~ n )) rnn 11gt Wllh L1 Inplyp 1ll
Irolll wjrit n Irrltvla~ I my IltASt ~11-1I1I1yll3f1)
I IIlt mllllllHlllel f a rongtrgt furmiddotI hy nlr dUnnv OIlgtrnliOll~ In (fp~Ht rnunlry (ItAS QuaT- ~fllY IDJ8)
~~~~I~I~~I~() 1~~)(~rl~I~dn g~C~~ M~9t~J~r 19MI Itl~ llud molltgtr I HIl1 ( 111 tl1 - 1111 l~lH) imltltgttNiOll and ltXI rmiddot I thC Spnnlllh VIlT illv)1]
0U1~1 IlIn lph 1l3l)
(T
UNITED STATES IARMY OF)
Commilnd ilnd Stl
1tIIIIHTIlIllIlf IJIfJour Ifngt-Junl)]R)
Orlpnlxltlotl IInd Equipment
J ) f)alllaln Il IIrtlIIlt Ib I(dco1lhrutrttnrntol 1)1 fllI) TIllt mp)r[n~ or nHOrnp 11 1llOnal dpfenll 1 ~urmiddot Apr 1l1lt1
npf -11 nil nIW rnnrt71l1un program ~I Hmiddot~ 11 _1 1)lt)
Trlld flll1I11 11ITIr )1141111]lt lT lO t rfllah II-middotrh I Alr l~IIR)
UNITEO STATES INAVY OF)
Commnnd and Stltlff
I~~ w1 ru I 1 If~t Proc - Jul 1l3H)
Orgilnlxatlon and Equipment
t ()rnl (~avlnHtTr()r-Ju
Trllnlng
I) Hb1 mm I PrIOr lui ngt Ih)lll1 1 In Irr Il) 1111
VETERINARY SpoundRV1CE
gtIhld Jrmiddot~lJ)I Igtr r1 marrhl It Bu-J~l tl1lt)
w WAR PEACE
~tr3Ir nil fticmiddott m1lfnn~ TIl Ir UmiddotlllttOn t Hur nnllnnll rurlfy (AOri- JI-1Jf(EIlll
I~middotqnmiddot frH )Hllll IF JIlr [lI-JUfl 1flaKl irOHT or nr (Jour lSll - pr Ilf) 1~t 1fruHmn1 or 1IPII rnr VM 1(~M H la)
lUT lJJ~) I lip gtarhnrou a)middot lt It 11 Jul ]118) 1IIIra 0 mhtnn n~liw (gt1t1 1l1t~ JIII1 FJ 19J Wnr lIId l1(nclt Iltn4 (ul gt1 -llTI1l8)
WARS
FIUC
ITALY-ABYSS1NIA (1935-1936)
(nmpitlnHll1hwp
hrdt Mar 1~11~) ~-~ 1( i of uply I1h ~_
1
CHINA
BOXM RCbclllon 11(00)
Itllnampr rud 111 II Hr llh (llInll It rio (at shylr Ir 1)lt)
JIPAN-CHINA 1930~
11 1111111middot 111 11111111 (mil 1 IUH -1 Il
111 r ill Ih I~T T11 In 11Ih~ of Ihr wllr til (Inn Jr Imiddotur Iu umiddot)llil
1 dlUrl)ll 1111 ([1 (I (rlt nt (Nfl I~I lr~middotr - Jl lIR)
1( ~gtn~ klrm at ihIl11~h11 It In (Nav In~t lrur - ~cf 13H)
h Jo1lnn 1laquo 1 rhlnn IllS n - r If) lt)1)) (ui tillt (hUllt r l( nllil)lll 11- Itt ~IIV 19~ I)middot War I Ih Ir Ii~( (hl gt-Itl Inn 11l11) Illlt ~1lmiddotalllmiddot Witt 1tl4 (ul 11 -JlI1 Fb 1138)
1lllt()
P(NINSULAR WAR IIBOB-tBI41
(air) Inll lInoupmiddot rIO( 1 nlllmlnr ur middotmiddotIlllllIJ ithrllth Jllh IHill (a~ lollr (Inl-Jul 1)l~)
nUSSIA-POlAND (1920)
II 1111 I fltnI U)III 11~1l 11 Igtnmpl (ll It UIl rnrr nmiddot IJuT HII - Mnv 1~3R)
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 11936_19361
I 1(1~~~1 ill -r~li~~uni~~ltll fnll til krpp parI WI1h lIrhnigt
Tallk ur unt 1 lnl~ (tI1I I It r t~unr - Jul 191f~) J1~~()111 r~om Splln (1 Jour-~ Mny-Jun llJ8) lh S]gtmll~h Vur rllw of thp I)(~t ron ign Ojl1n101 (Jr
I~~rrl--1I~TX~~~~n~~~(1 nnd wnrfllfo flw bllltr 01 Gu~dl Injnfn1931 (Jour nUSI - Mny IU3l)
V~ ~
94
~d eollUlmiddotattaek ~ss~_(yen~uIfl938)9 JUll 1938)
-2IJui193S cmiddot S R(v-28 Jill 1938
1937) (BulBelgeMiI
Feb 1938)eli the Ebro River
Feb 1938) two recent artldlR
en-Mar 1938)
Imt=~J~~~FcetJ~8) of the Spanish War (Ry Mil
SOUTH AMEmCA ~=1K or the A~Tr8~A~ Ponign MililMy
CIVIL WAR (1861~1865)
iR ~~i ~~c 7J~~rI~ pct~J~I193i)1 193R)
WORD WAR (19141913)
C _ Soclo-Economlc History
WuGerm(lny dclcal~ 11l1918~ (Jollr RUSI - lay 1l38)
G - Arm and Selllce~
ARTILLERY
~ ~~l5Il of the Dlginn coast 1914_1918 (CA Jour - Julmiddot I Aug 1938)
OurutUery ill 1915 (HWI Cui ~m - Feb 1938)
CAVALRY
[)Id they know how (Cav Jour - MayJun 19311) A cavalry offieera experhmiddotneea on the Indian Frontier during
the Wat (Cav Jour [OBI - Jul 1938)
ENGINEER
The UIoe of demolitionllin thedmpaign in Soulh Polnnu duro Ing Oclo~r 1914 Roy Eng Jour - Jun 1938)
MFD1CAISEltVICamp
Contributions or the World Wat to the advancement or mfdimiddot cine (MiiSurg-JuI1938)
TANKti
TankB in the ddenaiYc With the Flrtlt Army 111 AJlril and Muy 1916 (Rvdlnf-Jnn 1938)
Mcchnniution [SiX Originnl MiliLnry Study)
H _ Military Candu t of tho Wnr In tho Flold
The other lidpound of thpound Hill No XVI Aubpoundrn Hidgc 9th of May 1915 (A Quar-Julll38)
Jh~ ~~~i~n~o ~fi~U~~nlv7Jamp~fobft~Yi~uNlt~e~~her 1H4
N~~lo~(t~ ~~~h-~~~d~rol~ (rom 1792 to 1797 nnll from 19141() 1918 (ltv Mil Gcn- Jan l~poundh 19311) bull
Organizing liaiwn in the (middotxNution of dmiddotmltllitlons (Rv Mil Gn - Feh 1938)
J _ Campaigns amp 9attlos
EUROIEAN AUF- - Ilul~IAN TIfFJITfm
The u~c of tlemotionll in th campaign in South Poland during October 1914 (Hoy Eng Jour - Jun 19311)
EURONAN Anp - WESTERN TJfAT~n
1914
Did they know how1 (Cav Jour- lnymiddotJun 19311) The defln9C of Dhmudc 17 October to 10 Nov(middotmhcr 1914
(nul Dolge MiI- Feb Mllr 1938)
ERRATA (To June 1938 Quarterly No 69)
Readers Guide and SubjectIndexgt
1915
Tho nthllt ~Ido of the Hill No XVI Aubcftl Ridge 9lb of MaytHU5 (A Quar - Ju(1938)
1917
orfl~~i~l~lbli9MfI the exe~tlon of demOlitions (RvMII
1918
fanks In th( d(teulliv( With thQ FIlI~ Army April and MllY 1918 (Rvdlnf-JanHl38)
L - Nava Hiltory
Thc lIulJrnlirinl war In 1915 (MnmiddotWoeh - g Apr 19111)
WEAPONS
A lIy~tem of antimiddottank delenn) (Can Der Qubr--Jul1938) Some rdl(lonll on Infantry mate~lel and tactics (Inf Jour
JulmiddotAug 1938) Strenmlined lightlng team (Me Gaz- Iun 1938)f and lhe defenllC
Feb 1938) nt (Mil Mitt-
Mar 1938) ImplCSlllons and erperiences of the Spani5h War (Rv Mil
Suifll(l-Jsn Feb 1938) ank atlack agaimlt antitank gunll Sec Foreign MlIilllry
Digestlll
WITHDRAWAL
(1) P(lgc 94 - Title should read MANGIN Counterattack or June
11 lrl)8page 112 Line 9 Muzzle velocity should read 831 mete~ per second (2725 fs) instead or 381 meters per second
I I
95
I
- 1]
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- Untitled
-
Contents CD
Page lechanization _ _ __ 5
7tlilitary Ncv- Around the Vorld _
The Spanish Ciyil War _ -~--- 28
The Sino-J apanelt(gt Val __
Foreign Military Digests __
Digests of important articicc from foreign military periodicals the remaining articlet- for each magazine are lbted
Tallk AUack Agalllltt Antltank Guns __ _ _____ 3
Crossing of the Andes in 1817 ____ _ _______ 14 ____________________ 41
Is It Nc(cs~ary to PrpltCrvc Mounted Formations in the Cavnlry
The ImYltabJlty of Contmuous Fronts _ 44
The FIgt3tlOn of FrflntE _ 46
The German Army in HJl7 ________ _ ____________________ 47
Book Reviews and Reading Course for Officers ____________ _ 19
Let We Forget (The United States in the World War) _____________ _ _56
LIbrary Bulletin __ 58
Books recently acces-ionccl which arc of particular significance
Academic Noles CampGSS
Current School material which affcct~ instructional procedure or tacticHI doctrines
Rotcr of Instruct()rgt _______ 59
___________ 59 Rolttel of Regular CIalt 1938-1pound139 _
Map Problem No 25 (1938) ______ _ ___________61
Direclory of Periodicalgt ______ _
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles _ _70
A ltYHtematic reviev of the contents of selected military periodic~lIH Foreign-language peri shyodicalH are digclted to a degree to furnish an adequate idea of contents and significance
Reader Guide and Subject Index _
All subject-heading~ are arranged in alphabetic sequence and can be con~ultcd liIC a dicshytiollary Note abo List of Periodicals Indexed and Key to Abbreviations
Errata ____ _ _________________________________ ___________________________________________ ~5
Mission TIll objtmiddotct o[ tid pullicatioll h a sytematic review of eUITflll military litpraturc thr()u~h catalogshy
JlIg artille~ oj lrnft~i()Ial vailh ill ~llttld military awlnaval plriodieals ill the domeKlic and foreign field
Artilltmiddot- from forciVIl IHriCitiit al an tnat ld b~ I rall-lal jotl- of 1itles and dig-csis of contents matershyial of partkular iIl1jll)rlanlt b toprlti more txten-hmiddotI~ in a middotwdifJll of Forcign lli1italY Djgcst
t Llhrary I~llllllll Ktll ion lit- boo]s 1LC(11t I aClc-siollcd which are of particular significance
Thi (JOlt f I I h Pllhljlpd a a ~uldl to lllOripoundrn llllillary tendencies amI to in4pire vigorou thoughts on t he ~1l1IJ(lt t nakd
Acknowledgment Till dllos of 1hi C)iIII I II dtmiddotill til lxprl- t heir thanks and appreciation to the mallY pllSOnS who
have aluahl~ a-btcd ill 111l plcparat ion of material for thi issue The work of cOlltributor~ has been dl)ll~ ip add it inn in their o he dutie awl on tIllir own time We arc very grateful to the following ofiiccrs 1m their ~(llerOt1- dOIld Ion
Captain 11 lartl1c~ nir KmfljahrkamftrllJlIJi (lIareh AprillIby 1~38)
11 al or T R Phillip (1 Frollcr Jilitnirr (18 Ftllluary 5 11 Malell 1J-20 April 1 10-11 July In~~) 11( 11iil(I SlIissr (lknmlllr l1n tJallual~r FlllIuary If1~8)
Li(uillltnt J Y Hutlolph Book Hcvicws
~liJtr IL lt Tllldall If 11 (rIIIllullrI (J anuary February March 11~8) RCI)U( Jlilitnirc ( II( (II (TaJ11lry Fdlluary ilarch 1138)
1a1(11 L 1 Trll--cottJr 1111( rll Crll)(l[rrir (Jmualy-Fplnuary March-Apri11938)
The Cover llliled Statgt Almy arrnond car M-l u-ocd fol n(middotollnai~~HI(
1qnippld wiih GO and W (alilH1 ma(hirJ( ~uns radio and armor plat(
Mechanization Ily LIEUT COLONEL P R DAVISON Cavalry
and ifAJOI~ E i1 BENITEZ lOW Artillery Corps
This article do(s lint nrcc8Wlily exprrss thr idc((s policics tcachings 01 beliefs of The Command ((ld (IIflal Stafr Scwol It slOlfld not he cn~trucd that the uutlws ([1C aftrmjltinll to introduce i( If olld stmlflr id((fS to 0111 (JIiee The sfudy is writtcn to l)1(srut mechanization in a general chflracter as it is fOllnd t~)dllJ hi jive fltrai llatirlrIs An hypothrtical -iflf(fiiol itgt used as a vehicle 1(]lOn which to load ([ sUnrtrst((Z mcchadzed force Should this study inphC a g1(at many differences of Opillioll it has thcll clcatCd thought on the subject and in so doi11U itR mission is accomplished
j The Republic of ATLANTIS~ i-gt considered the wealthiest i~on m the world Ii b a peace-loving country desire~ no ~randllcment of territory and up to the Jlre~ent time she ~ enjoyed a ~ecurity from invaion that ha~ been greatly
Imiddottrained
- sted br her geographical position She ha maintained a ittlOnal policy of al()ofne~) freedom from alliances and tical entanglement- ith other nations although she has erially assisted other Powers with men and materiel to _ guard their integrity and to preserve their democratic Is Her lofty aims and her invaluable assistance have
always been duly appreciated She maintains a strong Yand a small but highly efficient Active Army and
Territorial Guard It would take several for ATLANTIS to put a large army in the field and it
y to her national policy and (0 the will of the people in a large standing army to safeguard her illtcrcstr
ome and abroad The tactical doctrine of her army il middotd upon offen-tive action The unsteady world condition~ and the realization that no longcr pos~ible to conceive military operations which
lot r(gtquilc the u~e of armored vehicles have awakened ANTIS to the fact that she needs some kind of a mcchashy
nized force At present she has practically none she is therefor( ~talting from scratch r
Acconlingly the Chief Executive of ATLANTIS has sent the following directive to his Secretary of National Defense
THE EXECUTIVE MANSION OF ATLANTIS 10 August J[JJ8
TilE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEIENSE
My Dear Mr Secretary
Modern means qf transportation communications size of navies and especi~IIY the capacity potentialities speed and range of airplanes today and thoge planned for future use have tJken from AUallti~ the security that she has enjoyed from her birth due to her geographical position
Our National Defrl1sc is -plencUd in all its brancheH arms doctrines allli ladies Cxcept that it cumpletely laclHI mechanization We have partial motorization but no mechshyanization
It is requested 1hal the appropriate Rlatr section make without delay a study of the mechanization of England France Germany Italy and Russia considering for each
~~2~~~u country without mechamzatlOn poIicili doctrimmiddotq ~r country at lea~t the following fubjecis
5
1 )lidon of the illmetl forces ~ The terrain or probable theatre of operations 01 The organization of m(gtchal1izcd folcl- 4 The 1tmament of combat vehicle 5 The doetlillt of lJlCchanization fi Prolal)j 1ac1ical ~mJllornH1l1
d Submit tu me 01- -oun a- po-sjblcgt rccommclHlation-gt for HJI nnmlliatlffti (If a I1lv~ hal1iztgtltl Ullit or force which po~~
-popo t~ll bl paton 1)1 thlgt five WlIIl1S above mLlltirJJ)(d adtlling It In 0111 OIJ Wfrj alld -1Ilh additional iJlfolmashy
tllJIl a you may (II lIll tit
SlIlcenly
A (III f 111 riltI lltllIti
TlI (ltlJr ldf hi lllllg III mind that a Pnident (1IIJIiri)-l (Jllr ltlid fill h Jjll IHfflJ wty flf t1mlillg Ollt
v hd iJlJuJd Ill dlll 1hlJl lJ~ dltplmilllllg what has b((11
d(IlH rf~ned 111 tlw ]la)~( of hht()l) forl -tudy of the
()1Ij11l and demiddotjpmlllt (It flll(llullzeci Wtap()Il alld tilllf prdcl1(aJ appli(tI lOll 111 the lJ1I11t1itJd
FIl))I 1))111 11 IlIdl LIII]gt III ad Ion
~Jll tIll JWglllllH~ of drftll it ha- bttll 1(eoglIized
1I1cmiddot ~al III 11t1 ~Jnw Idnd of ohocllt 1 loop to pierce illt illinl t 101lt HannIbal lif of elephant- as a -pealhead 10 cr~h 111(gt Ilief of tlw lomall LlJdoll- b pcrha])s Uw
Illl Idmplt of 1hI-- 11 of fOI cp III that ca-gtc the expcnshyIlllllt ~- 1101 put IllJy lHfnJ iJelltluse the elephants beshyitIJlI rll ()lalllipd alld )llld HO II( cOlltrf)lled oli the InlUItshy
lIPId Thd Itla t)111 llJay have uelJl thl g-uidlllg
JJJIH pll lor 1111 l~l of imilar mdhod~ of tarfare during til lJrld ar homiddotpr )ll~t a- III the case of IIannibaltlw n-ut l a faitJn~ in tho-l ta-e when medliluical defects Ilthlfd II WhfIP irnplfllHr lacl]al ilS wa Ilw(kmiddot of tlll~p
v(afrlll-
fll 1 til TJrd Val hy lh ylll ]~lG mohility or lclWll
had blIll 101 aJld as a rcult of the machine gUll and the barbed wire eJltangltmcllt tagnation had taken placl all aloJl~~ ttl V(ctf~rll Front Ill( Allic theJl resorted to tlw lank whllh iI- tl]( oilly lYIH of mltcitanizalioll known at Ihal 11111lt fhi w(apoll Wli d(vised uy the British as an
anlidoe 10 the machine gUll that wa playing such with the lives of the infantry that it was sheer send men agaimt Rtrong-Iy defended positions
The British used 1anks for the f11-t time Battle of the -iommc in the summer and fall of 1 in lmiddotlauders and al CamLgtrai Their value uecame
(dUWtlld lJi1adiI FlIIH( lrIH~r1 fOI ollP of tIll IJdll (nd Hlilt hpl
from the outset in pitp of the fact that they moving mechallically imperfect machines and wcre poor taetical employment by lllCxplrienCtd hands
The French tl~ed tank in the Sois-ions oITen-li() for the purpoc of JldUllllg the Marne Salient at and in the Septemuer-OcloDer 1918 offensives ( and Guise)
Till ((nlllttlI~ lirsl employed tanks in the gre~tt otflllsi(gt near Sl Quenli1 21 March 1918 a1d thercafter in all major operations up to the (nd of with varying degree of suecess
6
lxhII No 70 M echQllization
LIGHT MpoundCHANIZED DIVISION (DL~
FlrURF 1 -French LIght lIIechanized DlvlslOn
c
ni
~
It may be aid that the followlllg priflciple~ goverlling tactical employment of tanIgt can be deducted from the
orld War
1 That terrain i-- d controlling- and vital fador in tank erations
2 That Kurprbe when po~ille is extremely valuable in ank attack
3 That tanks WWll u~ed ill rnagt properly SllcCJ1cd and pported by artillery have the opportunity to make a dcpp netratioll into a uefensivc zone 4 Ihat lmk- are Cxtremely vulnerable to artillery fin en not adequately -ltreenccl
5 That tilt abPllcc of an trtillery preparatioll or other dent means of dealing with the ~lIlmy antitank vcallon~ yes intact ho-iljp weapolls that may he ahle to intfl11l1 ectively agaiJ)-L a tank attaek and cauI heavy ioses
6 That altillery cOlillterhatltlY -upport i- of great sistancc jf lot a Il(((dty tn advancing tank throughout e attack
7 That the tallk dltack (leading tanks) -hould include rapid advance to prcdetermined obJcctIves the most (1ishynt of which is the rna of the ho-lile artillery llaralyring e enemy~ commullicatiolls and command system
We thus ee that the World War developed a new faelor the art of war that has opelled new horizons whose po~~ishy
Hties the workl is- beginning to realize and that the idea of eoffen-ivc- of 1018 in the Vetern Front and thosccontemshyated for 1Dl D wen L1lP origin of the operatiolls alld COIlshy
ption) oj the mechanized force of the present da~ Since the Vorld Var themiddot major POWCIS have ucen
perimenting with mechanized tWIts and t(~tillg- tlH()ric- ning mechanization It may he inferred therefore
t a nelmiddotd is anticipated for a mechanized force HlP ha-ic irement- of vhich are great mobility and striking power When the Unitfd States mfchanized force came into
ing in 1928 the Var Department directive said among her things
Tank are the principal attack elements of a mechanized force The tactics of the force as a whole shall be predicated upon supporting and assisting the attack of the tank elements and upon quickly consolishydating xeculing and exploiting the success gained by the tank atack Other arms are added as auxiliaries to furnish thc clement of holding (which tanks lack) security and maintenance of command fire support facility of movement and supply
The term mechanized unit as We understand it today include all units equipped with armored combat vehicles whether they be scout cars combat cars or tanks All major powen arc mechanizing or motorizing as far as their finanshycial and indutitrial resources permit and for this reason it j of llltlrlicular importance to cast a glance at what those natIons are accomplishing The information herein given lla- heen obtained from foreign press reports and due to the mallY change) and experimentation that is continually taking place It may contain slight errors in organization
FRANCE
The French military doctrine is based upon a national policy that does not seek territorial expansion but desires to maintain intact what she now possesses The French visualize only one enemy-Gcrmany-her big heavily armed neighbor defeated in the World War but now determined to get back the territory and power of which she was stripped by France England and the othcr Allies therefore all their plan~ and organization are designed to stop effectively any German aUack The French defense is based upon the Mnginot Lill( an immensely strong HericR of underground forts running from the Belgian frontier to a point along the Swiss bordel If they are atacked around either flank of this line they expect to blocl the advance with a mobile defcllRe until they are roinforced by allies
8(0 CampGSS Q1UI1~tmly June 1938 page 46
7
C amp GSS Quart
The terrain of operation of the French Army is 011 ito own soil or in adjacent territory on its northern fronticr where there is an excellent r(mu 1l~t
IVlcchanizatioll is NUll ill a state of flu She has ol1e complete mechanizpd dhi-ioll OIl( ill t hI pro(t~ of formashytiun a third tentatively planllvd and a fOllrt h -u~_~(kd Her light mechanized dimiddotj oll (I )ivi-inn kgiIP 1)1(lniqlil
rgt~1L) IS orgalllz(d Hit) t f) brigulp- -110 II III FWllll 1 rhe dragolJ- jll)rttmiddotc art tlplia]clll 10 motorized illfaJltr~ Ow alP mountfmiddotd ill light trull( aile an Jlrllyidpd With traniportatioll for all pepfJllwl and lapOJl-
M(chaniztcI enalry Ulllt havp ))1onlcI that I( COlllshy
pallY lilO-t rd tilllf ear ( a h[)Jdill~~ llhloll tnd lor lOlllshymunicat ion IHlrjJrhf- 111 pn11l1 1PIHlflllY III 1 hl~l ullit i to ill(laof nl)Jiit jI1 at hI 11)(11-( nJ IH) (I I )U( 11)
the (((lIllIl rold liP II Jrlllt thh --Ilm j (l1llt --alishy[acto)y
TJw Frellch mechallizld [IJll( j it J1owlrful IHIH)1l providfd for Ihl high commalld It i d(-igllld to (If(lI dishytant and rapid ncollllaiuHt ilivolvillK combat to Olcnpy and 1loJd-1 rahgic po-il iOl p(lldin~ alrial of PI IIlop to carry out cavalry missions With increased -peed and radius of acti()f and to InPpt th( al1aek If ialgl host ill l111halllyld f~rc(1
TIl( Fnnch btditvl thaI lIH(haJlizd fO](l will play an
after a tiuccc-sful aUach Howevcl they helieve tha order to break through a strongly organized llcfcl1siyc v tion the attacker mu~t still rely Oll the mperiority of arLillllY tu Uplll the way fol IllS llliantry
Mtlhanizld ullits are lo-otiy to clIak and to main
tllll for this lltKOIl mechanizalioll ha- bClll -olely confi to till cavail) Tiw FJIlllh AnllY t rend are iowards n)(
izatlOll ralht1 tlHlll o mechanization They Illlien l armils 111u-gt1 make greater use of fl-t moving ehich-- 1 --l t lH army of till future as the largL ll my u-ld during orld Vu 1101 mccha1lizcd Jut Ilwtori-ld They t11l1l1 Il1llillIlizaLioit as lttmliyjllg to a -opeda nlLChallized f(JI~~ Thele -~eIllS to be little -ympathy wil II I hc t hOIlg-ht 01 -r 1lllIip- ill futllre war This i- (~t1itt~ lIatural as the culo IC-OUllt- III manpower an~ too great all as d to he lidl
put aside III Irance the proponent of mechanizatIOn ht not IHPIl as actIve as thoe ill otiHr cOlllltril but 011 ~ other halJd plans for motorizatioll arc very tomJrchelJ~ The lHst French thought concpivl- Owl the army l11IJ-ttmotorized a- ~)Oll a~ po---iille alld that fa-t moving llladu are Heeded to IlJclea-e the moiJility of modern fOlll r
Ihp Frellch doct rillt ~1 ill is lrtillflY takps tilt JllIl
tht iJlfalltry oeeupie-gt cJl~olidatp- and hold it
(111lt1 BRITIgt
TIll British have tltditiollall~ relicd Oil -ct IH)lII I
reinforccd by air pOll for prollcti)l1 of th( lHllllllalllL the cololllal empire She 11l- lOllll to JPg-anl till Illl lmeaJl --ea as -lOI1llw]wt hpj cl1 pllljllrty lwclthl be~
(iblaitar at till wpstlln Plltralllp and cOlltrcll 1h( ~t
ClIla ill the eal plating J1lt1 ill a faurabk jllIition (If ((HI 1111 1oul to Illdia If lightillg lIlClilS it ill prok take plaCt 011 -otne otllll lIatioll- snil Tht isualize lise of the army 011 the continlnt or lhrollghllllt the Emr (~reat Hritalll ha~ no Olle paltill1lall~ lltIll~ tratiiliOlI her pulicy is ill oppusition tu the con lriptil military --er of Continental Europe
Brit i-h lllt husiaom fol tighting machineo began IImiddot t he men who fir-t sa tallk- ill ad inll alld t hi 11lthU~Imiddotmiddot inclPtsLld after the ml-hillg attalk or Hearly luur hUllt tallk-gtat (amIJlli By till lIHI or tilt rorld Yal the Iln ~
had Uw lJl-l tallks il1lbtlllll and tlw~ had ltlc(luired dll~l ldeas of how to U-l UIlIll lIll rl~lltlllnhl( Clil and mih~ leadll afe dlfilliteiy cOfllfllilttd to till Jlolicy of mol0rrJ aJlilatioll and at IHP-lllt alilllralltl~I)attaJioll at ilolll(tt~ iJCtlll lomplL1tLly JJl()tnMllltliJanild
The Ulitih Army j- organized and trained prima a an e]editiolltlY foret III Indilllw mnt likll~ -ecn (onllilt j- 011 the lIort h t front itI ill l Illountainous 1(1 ntillly IlJl-uit(tl to mtchilll arran lOIlStIl11Plltly
IndilIl Army dots llot nquin the full nHa--llll of llwchan lion that io d(inti rill hl)JlW llllil- (u-Ill- iJltllJlllmlmiddot and Je- in Palc-tine may attain l1ch ploportiolls t (IIal Britaill l1la~ iH lomp(lI(d ttl gtPIHI til lxpllliti(lr rOlC( to PJl-Pll Onill then nriJ I h fOleig1l policy Jl
aks 1UlOlH as a vcry jlossiulp tiwatpl of war there the rain i- gcnelally suiiallIl [or mcehllliztd warfan mol(1 if a nlitish Army Pl lights 011 European soil it will pr ably be along-side of the French Army Uuder such cOC
lions the expcditionary force might (ll he top 11llY
XVIJI No 70 Mechanization
12 expeditionary force mu~t be ready vthen the need adses for this reason the immediate organization of mechanshy
d forces if considered urgent On 7 March 1938 bull Mr Chamberlin ill a -gtJ)((Lh ill the
ue of Common) designated the OiJ)ltclIVl- of Cnat ltains policies as follows
1 i 1 The protection of Greal Dritain lt The preiclvation of the trade )oul(- upon wlll(h
t hi this country depend for it food and raw f i materials
Lf~ ~ The defen-e of Britih territorIes onr-ea from ~ attacl whether by -ea land or air j 1 Cooperation in t he defen~e of tht tlrrjtoril~ of
g I allY alIie we might have in ca-c of wltl1
[ j After the Prime IiJlitcr had indicated the military olJ t j~tnt- of Creat BritalJl~ IJolicy the Secretary of State for lWllr ~lr IIole-llelisha marie it clLar that a Dritbh (Jlcdishyti4narr force in the future auld not con-i-t of a few h-stercotypcd divimiddotdon- From no 011 he -aicl there arc to
Highlanders are iJeing converted in~o machine-gun batshytalIOn and are being equipped with armored machine-gun carriers In addition thc 3d Carabinicrs and the 1721st Lancers arc being cOllcrted to light I tank units This is part or the x~htme to l(~llace the fivlt Brilih hOl-)cd regishymentH plus the eight liglil tank compahics in India by four Dritbh cavalry light tanl( regiments
III regard to tactical doctrine the Britih remember the iL~-on of the Vorld War They foresee the future possishyhilil~ of again being called upon for a military effort in Europe They vigtuaiizc a rapid moving hard ~triking force Capahl 1)[ Ixccuting- wide encircling operation or quick deCp penclrltion- into rear area They would avoid above Ill the thfenxive action and stabilized warfare of the past
Ten of the 22 cavalry reg-iments will be mechanized or lllot ()Jlzed The two-hrigade (avalry divisions of the expedishytionary force will be converted into a mobile division COTIshy
-itillg of units Rhown in Figure 2 The importallt factor regarding mechanization in the
Briti-h Army that Hhould always be kept in mind it that
I
I JoIrORF 2_Hrltllh MechanIzed Cavalry Divisioni 1
I 11
Jj 1
ll tW() typc- of diviions and variations within the typc~ e type will be a motorized division based on the light
_ chlllc gun much the Sdme as exi-tlllg dii~ion- which arc ~ eatly more than 50 per cent mutorized The other type 11 b( a mechanized armored divl-ion based on the tank -~ lfgjJj lhp hell) nwehillc-gun hattalions a proportion
the-op will Ill retained to cOJP-l troops the remainder will (f)flprtul into light machll1 _~rLln hatlalion-l and will form nuctu- of the motorized div il lU 11 0 The strength of til(
clern army 111 IIore-Belishu continucd is based not - the indiVIdual hilt rather on fire units which combine
POer and mobility Thp Hnti h HCgulal Army ill Inclil is being mechanizpl
a~middot of fallinJ-( into lint with home plutiec four Blitigth talions the 1st Royal Fusiliers the lRt Devons the hit yal Scob Fusilier and the 2d Argyll and Sutherland
according to it mission the Army will probably be fighting in conjunction with one or more continental allies-and in that case it will fUlnifh as a matter of fact the mechanized force for the allies WIth whom it may be associated
GERMANY
The mission of lilt German Army is aggressive at presshyent -Ccking aggrandizement of national territory in the direct ion of Czechos]ovalda 01 Poland By )1(1 recent annexashytion of Austria an area approximately equal to that of the stale of Maine has b((n added to her territorial limits and 11lr population has increased from 66 millions to about 74 milli()Il Th Austrian Army of 70000 Regulars and the 1nOQOO reserves are being rapidly transformed into PanshyGerman forces Her next most pressing military problem is the elimination of Czechoslovakia Traditionally the enemy of I
9
n
11
(lItlIIl 11middot1middotllrdmiddot I() JIJIf1rh hI- Ib1lI lllllOJcd dlmiddotjshy
j()n hi(h tn Iwing (middotpandld into --l The divi--ion orshy~aflildil)ll i iwlu d tIl )( t hOrll ill thl (hart (It~iglrl
L)
The (trmall tat i(al d(l(1 rillf cOllI tmplatt t ~11OIlj
swift lttplk(gt ltlhtaillVcl by llltlll)(JPJ 10 maintaill lh( (lllshy
flict in hl)-tile territ()jY Tllt-l nllehanized divi iolls arC dl-iglllmiddotd to provide a 1)1)11[111 fa~t ~t riking Itpon for --urprif 11- ill 1111 illilid tal~I- of thp ltampaig-Il Thigt mfchallizld fore( rIll ~t rib hard Pllough alld far ellough Into hol II rril()rr 10 frll tral(middot Ill (llIIllY fllohilizalioll alld dbnljil OJ( Iltlll illitial ddlhlt dbpo iliolh ill ~l1ch a
way 1 ha1 1fw -llpJlorl iJlg (frnwlI forcti ill hI ahlp tn -~curf an larly vilfIY All amplp of the -pld with vhich ((rmany IXHCt to mo( hj rnc(haniz(d force Witgt
j~iv(~n h Ihf 11~hlllillg-1ik( rapidity with which that Jl()(lshy
ful forc ol COllt(ntrai(d ill VilIl1tl la-t Match rllttchllW finllIlfl [gt1- ~ hffoj I Ill -1IlIJIjtd Tt aiiangt fluId IIllil 1)p
seimJe f)f Ao)tria (erlllany attacills great importance to the early h()llr of the val tllli Ihlllfol( lwl sllatpJ~ i- ha~ed UPOIl a war of (illiek dlli-ioll WIH1l 1Hl war machill-l
on land and air wlll vij~qr()IH)Jy st rikp (hIring the firRt days or wcelu of Uw war and inflict defeat upon the enemy
thaI (oun1ry ao shc did four years later Many haLmiddot lJ(litvl thaI ~Iu--oIiJli lt1- pr))]]Y tllatcd lJy HiUCl hen~ m ilttUti tncJ Autlia [liiall who rrmcmlJc) Caportlt Ill) love for (ermany and despitr Hitlers as-uranCe pract flifIHhhip and the promise that Brelllll --halJ fori nlllaill Ill( illvinlatp frolltiPl IJP1llll the two (ounl 1hlfI) will alwa)- IH a jllt-1 lflll ill Ihl Italian mind ao tok -llH(rity of thl--p promit-- parlklilarl~ (on--idiIW thlle are l1early thJ(C-quaricl of a million ((1111lt111 J
North(Jn Italy IUtl b V(gtly ulJHraIgtJp 10 a tlllllg -(a )()lr bl
prestIII she i --t1Ollg ill Ihe ~Iediler]llltal1 due to tilt
nus -tllJlnarine alld air ha~l that hl hl~ prepared which thnatlll thlt lift-lilll-- of bolh (Ilat Dlitain VrlIHt Silt i--lIalizt Fralltl 1- In lllg prest igp
Jat in llat iOIl nnd t lOIl) dy d(~irC to auml that
f)nlillJ~ til( la-t ItW ytalS Italy has her11 ovnomiddotinlenill
wlth major l1uits of thrp( distinct tvJC~ the divi~middotd()lI t lIP molOiizld tli i-joll and tIlt mechanized
The IHlrpuse of the fa-1t division is to make rapid movements and to arrive on time t1WlI at nated place to deploY fire power sufllcicnt to
~ _ rshy1)1ech(mizul ion C amp GSS Quart
France -hc ha- huilt a -pcfldilt1 road lwl in Uw ~olltht t especially uitable fill tlw u( of mcchanizcd force~ It i-
reliahly rCllorlcd that Hitler is rapidly [Ilrtifing- the Rhine frontier to meet tFrcl1ch attack
r The terrain of ojgterltIOll- of tIl( (prnJall Army ill fJ(gt itlitiallx at hast on gtllJ1l ()IlP of thl Iirhl)olillg llat 1011 -nil ~ Germany form(gtrly tied hy t11( IH()middotIioll~ of IhE Tnal~ if Veriilh- WlllCh 11( 1lldJatpd ill 1~)-) ha llladl IWI--plf fnl to tlqllin the m)1 mlJltrll (fjUill1llnt IllJlquipllHlJt i~ new alld n1lJl)til- all lllElIfn improtl1wnt (1Jllla~-lll
thoC nat jOlb hich hayt IlI(1I wvilJ~ alrlll It II Iheir (lId matflili -OIlIi of vjlltll tiatl lllI 101111 01111 rar Sll( itlltitlpl kIt I Ilh all ldpr~al~ --1 roJW ill arlllOfEd vfgtllic1p Th( illf1111 ry dll-illll j lqllIPIHd Illl 11 aliI itanL VIlIl- which l1 lJf ill()-t II tIl 7~ an(lrclil~ to ]Cpnrt~
TIl FIIIHh di1 IllI hamiddot 1-
ol
ITALY rt
The mission of the Italian army il for the defensc 01 it homeland and the presPlvatioll and enlargement of is colonial mpirp upun which Italy is dcpelldlllt for her Ie matpriab Slw ]ool s fOlwani to power and (xlIarl through fulul( domination of the riLditlllanCan Sea til plaeing Cl(at Brilain ill t h(s Wulll-- All invasion r (If
tIll lloll 11 t hrouglJ BnllIltl Pa-s lIa alway __ l)(c11 the up mlhl COllctln of the Italialls fully nn1tml)(gtring that ~l
til( days of Hannibal all illva~ic)lls of her oil have c Ihrouldl this --tratgic Pa--i Italy Hnttl an inc1cl Au--tria as a buffpr state uectuic Germany a~ too hig trollg a IIcighhOl fOl comfort Oll~ July llt t ll1flbiliztu troops 011 the Au~lriall Lorder to protect Aust iJl(l(JltIllt1(IlCt~ When Austrian Nazi-- ldlled ChalllCllor nol
alld (elmaiIY Was then middotmpPoiecl to he planning the seizur
10
01 XVIII No 70
mission To this end the division is composed of two rts cavalry motorcYclits and fast car~ f01 speed i portee its and artillery for fire power It is a long range recortshyissance and combat force extremely mobile and little ex-
ground or air attacks The cavalry and the cycli-Ls tiaie diJIkult terrain and fngage and hreak combat
eae The fast diVl~ion is particularly i-gttIItahle fOJ tiom in the Northern frontier he jlUlllO-C of the motorized division is to dl(jop the occlsioll demand it d very high power fire It is
-uiJlttance an infantrr riiyi-ioll transported in mo1or- IS capable of ]ong- rapid movements but at the moment of
~L tion it ieav(s it motors and fights like an oldinary divishy - Jll reinforced by a -trong mechanized echelon Naturally middotdmiddotmiddot is tied to the roach and once commilted to action it beshyI mes 11Il ordinary foot ullit and lose it- value as a Ir - echal1lzcll force
d j These two unit- opposed each other in the Italian mashyT uer- la t Augut on the plain of Venice Thfir identity Lijf doctrine and equality of forces led to a -talematC The ~ motorized diviion cut off the fa~t diviion from its base and r ~e fast division fell upon the rear of the motorized divi-ion tisblating thi- unit from the main body of ib furce~
Mechanization
The purpose of this unit is to break the enemyR line to open a gap through which other troops may penetrate and break duwn the enemys further resistance The mechanized brigade is therefore the keen edge of the pellet ratillg wedge but it can reach ib objective only when plolcrly provided with ~uppolting arlillery a~ otherwise the pnemys guns can prevent the l)li~ade from r(aching the dcfeni-ive line or at lca~t inflicting heavy loss(gt~ As the gap i~ opened units from the r(lltlr- fast motorized 01 ~elf-propeJled-sbould be llu-hed into it to calise the enemy- general collap~c leading to what Napoleon called the denouement Many Italian military I(-uler~ helieve that the mechanized hrigade -hould he termed the mechani2cd divi-ion and that it ~hould have one battalion of tOO-mm and another battalion of 105-mm and be furthe reinforced hy army artillery as the ~ituation may require
The national policyof Italy calh for a war of -hort durashytion necessary hecau~e of shortage of es-ential raW matershyiab Accordingly her strategy is based upon a quick victory hich is essential uccause her industrie canllot he mainshytained nor her people fed if the gateway to the Meditershyrnnean flOm the east and we-1 arc clolcd to hey 1n accordance with Musolinis declarations Italy evidently
MECHANIZED DIVISION
General Pariani in his final report of these maneuvers ark- thai these two new types of unit- were used to
each other but this should be comddered aR excepshyfor these unitgt arc intended for use in collaboration
obalJly a~ embled in larger unit~ Thi~ would make it Ie to make a more logical di--tribuUon of duties for t po-scssing great peed and maneuvering power
ving a combination vhich volild have great combat ngth
The mechanizcIl )rigaue (hrigaia corazzata) I as tested the maneuvers held in Sicily la~tAugustt b hOW11 in
gure lt1
Sp( cctrss Qnartcrill March 1938 page 75 tSec CampGSS Quarterly March 1938 page 71
will usc her ail force more 01 less in accordancl with Douhets theory striking terror and dlstrllction into the hostile territory She has placticcn thb type of arfare during the Ethiopian War and more recentl- in Spain and appH~ntlY helievQ in the -oundnc-h of thii- doclrin~
RUSSIA
The mision of the Rusfian Army contemplates a war against Tapan in the Far East or againt Germany or Germany and ItaJy combined ill Europc or poltsibly a war ~n the two theater at the same time The organization plan of the Red Army call Jar a lwogram of defense all two fronts thousands of miles a]lart
11
C amp GSS Quart
According to n~ports thpound Ru-sgtian Army has five dhi~ ~iom~ and nine independent brigadeN f~llly motorized and a total of from 1000 to 1000 tank motly Chritie manumiddot factured in RUiia The mcchani7pc] force aceolding to the foreign pres-- cmprics t 00 motorized tllviiuns six armored car rcg-inwllh awl (i~~hten armoJ(d car gTOlP A numocr of lImb are (quipppd with amphibian armored alrS with a mt-jmum -plImiddotd of 10 rnilp- pel hOU1 on law]
anel -(VIU mih3 jlPl hOllr Oll wat) All tlw cavalrr rlivbioJl have IHeJl proidrmiddotd with a nwCilallizLd group of thre( --quadshyr()h of ljght tank alJd al mllnd caf- lgtUt to U1I lioak of cree maillttinld it b Ilracl]cally 11l1jHJ-lhlf III glV tlw organizal ion of t hi lll(haJlild 101 CI wit h ah agtlutf (l(llracy
but tillyL -llnl II) Ill litt douhl that HII--Il i thinkingshyalong- mlchalllzld Jill~- and that probahly lthin a fp ypar- Ill rnay avlJi(vf 11111 idlraldl rntlnpIIlPllt III rnlClalllJati()ll
TIH comhat flJlIWipk flf tlH Ilrl Army tre ha--rt Oil the employment of mVChallllal lqllJjlIlWlll Todern a-tuit eapolh e-I)lcjall~ lal1k arlllllJY 1 lat lOll and mechanized force lmpJoyc(1 011 1 11n~l (alp makp IHblhle the nrganizashytil)n of a -imultalHolh attuk of Ihe tlllmy on hi entuc hattie fronl so that w may iJp jola1ld (omplptrly stlr~ rounded and dttrytd (Pal 1]2 FSR l)~G) And again the mallllIVpl alld at lark tIl Jl1lchal11zlllllllih -houlcl bc SUJlshy
r)(lrtlcl hy tiatiotl (Pdl 7 FSR 101()
thQ mechanization of tho Army of Atlantis The Grand study is attached as an appendix
In arriving at the recommendations the factors YOll
preRsed wel~e kept constantly in mind and in addi1 ion following were con~idercd
1 The tactical doctrin(~ of the five major powers r ird 1( frequently influenced by riitinctivr factor of graphy and of national Ilolicies
2 A military contlict of the future j- inconcei Without the participation of air and armorccl forces questionahly the evolution towards the machine b accentuated daily
t The incontrovcrtiuly established importance of all tion requires a speedy aggresHive and strong power ontj 1~rollJH1 to supplement and retain th( results gained fft~
aerial reconnaiHslmce and combat r1 1 The dCiCIl-livc power of the older arms is not gr~
enough to repube the attack of trong hostile armored for nor is the penetrating power mobility and speed of the o arm~ Hufficient to drive the attack sO rapidly and deeply the hotile front a to deprive the defender of uflil] tIme to taic countermeasures shy
5 Improvisations of mobile unit- have provcn to k little value as it was uornf out hy the organizatioll Of
IMECHANIZED BRIGADE
AA SshyMotorshyTank Regr Reg
Anti Ton (Mor)
cycleBerSCig(U1 FA Unit Detsco
FHLfn 1 ~ItaJln Mechanizld Hllgwic
C(j(U middotS) German cavalry in U)]middot1 A Hwift armored divIsion 4holl) organized that will form the nucleuN of t he mechanized f
1 a f-ult of Hl ahf) tudy the ChIef of Staff ~lIbshy of Atlantis in case of war a force receiving apptopriatJmitt d hh llport 10 Iht Sfcrdary of National J)cf(nsc dircctly for its improvement and dp(Jopmcnt not as a Hal dOll th CfHHlu jfJlb till StIdary ()mmIHlkatrd to Ow of any hranch hut a force to which all hranche of the se(hif Efcntiv(L1 fnIlI-
lllu-1 (ontnhutc whoc tadi and training will break (nlircly from the method that wer t hotl(ht Ul(qlllle
lJImiddotIAIltTE~T OF NATIOKAI llEIEtltSE the cavalry 01 for the infantry awl think maUers Ollt f j(UIIBLIC OF ATLAtltTIS an (ntire1y freHh basis This should ill no way )Jll(JltIf f IJfl tllJl I lll)
eavlary and t)1(gt infalltrv C)()1ll acquiring slich mcchani71 TIn (11111 EXl-CllTIVI 10 the (xtpn1 IWeeHSalY to PlUlhl( th(gte armg to bctterc J(IIlBIIC OF klfANIJS out their pregcribed tactical functions The fact that
My dear Chief mlehallizld unit tight in support of the infantry or th~
Tn (ompJiamp vlth Ollr dllfctive of 10 Aug-uHt 1938 I carries out a role onCQ filled hy cavalry is an incident11 m
1IIbmit illJ(with 111l IvComnwllciatiol1) of mv de mrtmcnt for ter
-olXVIJl No 70 Mechanization
6 This mechanized force which we shall call the Swift obstacles and road blocks and can render important service rmored Division should be used for strategic missions and as a holding force Since the infantry regiment and the field r exploitation of a success and its principal mechanized artillery regiment canH-ist of three battalion~ each aIle batshy
are the scout car and the combat car These ele- talion may be attached to each mechanized regiment in case s will be organized into three echelons rcconnaisancc that circumHtances may make it desirable to do so
~ ort and assflult The division reconnaissance unit at the disposal of the ~~~ 7 The basic principles underlying the employment of division commander give a tool of reconnaissance makingr- e Swift Armored Division are movement Burprise and unnecessttry the detachment of similar vnits from the other l---e objective It will be employltd on defensive misisons elements of the division ~ Iy in case of necessity and Ib relief from such mis-ions The obRervation Hquadron furnishes observation of the
t - ould be effected at the earliest opportunity j terrain over which the division will advance and fight will T 8 The Swift Armored Division iR eHpccially valuable inmiddotr furnih battle reconnaissance and lay if necessary smoke ~ ruil and delaying action Its great mobility and tire ltcrCCIlS to blind or deceive the enemy The attack aviation ~ - wcr enables it to operate on a broad front to beat the which will always be avaBable for attachment can render ~1 - emy to defiles and other critical localities to carry out great altli~tance by aUacking thoRe objectives which cannot I dt~truction on the enemy route of advance or retreat to
strike the enemy in flank or rear or to deliver repeated g- attackgt against his flanks Jr 1 9_ The Swift Armored Divi-liull is especially adapted to C it In an envelopment or turning movement and in the exshy -~ llatlon of a breakthrough The most important factor to IL con~idered in this type of operations is the terrain and itL bull
wl be the mi-sion of the reconn~lt~ance echelon to rlconshy~1iter and ~eize faorablc terrain for the action of mrchall shyt iud chiclegt From this favorable terrain the $upport echcshy
lolt ahb the attack of the asault echelon and occupie- the ObJcctIHgt ~(curcd uy the laHer Thus the $upport echelon become the ~JlringiJ()arJ from which the u--ault echelon ntkc It Iucccssive bounds to gain the ultImate objective
lU Since there arc three echelon- the Swift Armored Dh jlOll -hould huyc three typc~ of mechanized vchicles fat -[out and or light armored cars medium combat vehishyde~ 1Ild lombat vchicle-- of a heavier type which will take carl of the three different phacs of battle reconnaissance de L]opment for comLat and attack The reconnaissance eiEnltnt of the mobile division -yill cover the uhision anti _~llctrate or outflallk the enemys -creen This echelon will tbti rClllfoned by the support echelon to develoll the cncmy~
fcnle dbpoitlOll- and gain a suitable terrain from whichf attac~ finally the assault ((helon comprising th( mast-
f the dVhlOllS mcchal1lzed force vIll be launched by sllr shyill I~e and in several waves ag~linst the enemys front 01 f nk 111 order to gain a deciive -llCC(-S ~ 11 ATLANTIS has a large seacoast to defend and a highlyr
bull bIle force like the Swift Armored Division viii be exshy1ely valuable as a mechanized general reerve capable of hing any threatened locality in a comparatively short
Thi strong reerve centrally located in rear of strashy~ections of our coa~t can meet the enemy at any point Wide World Photo
e a hostile landing is attempted_ Gelman eombat cars on the march in Austria_ It is believed that the propooed Swift Armored Divimiddot
n (Figure 5) is suitable to carry out all these missions and be fired upon by the artillery Its objectives will be thereshyparticularly adapted to the terrain of operation~ where it fore hostile antitank weapons hostile artillery and reserves II be employed_ It i~ a well balanced homogeneous unit beyond range of our own artillery 01 which may be unknown elements of which have the Rame rate of march to the artillery
13 Thc three mechanized regiments constitute the Attack aviation may be the only means available to the cleu of the fighting force which supported by motorized enemy against a Rurprise attack o( the mobile division howshyantrYt artillery and aviation posesses speed mobility and ever bombing must be used because the effect of aerial
ock action it i-l in short a modern weapon of llronounced machinc~gun tire against fast moving armored vehicles can iking puwer The Bupporting motorized infantry will be discarded It is important therefore that the Swift der valuable assistance in clearing defiles of hostile troops Armored Division be provided with antiaircraft defense
t 13
11 pI (IdJl1l tlv( iIdlllhltmiddot fOl alLHhnHl1t
j(um 5-S~lfl Armored Vivl1ior) of Atlanli
Ji~ch(riz(tion
Th S lft lIllo)ld i)lJ-jllll nlll-t hl lharaltlri7fd h~ high JIlflhdil trahieal lOd Htltai --Impii(itr and flexishybility 4IIJJJllJl nqlljr~ thal oldy ltmiddot llltial (jellllllt-gt be ill shy
cilllti(d It nqllllt a 1 iJtldHced -llf-ngt]iall1 nrg-aniza1io) which h withill it If lillllllan tOI)llomt oll1el( that will hi (ltOllnllJfd dlllllW tilt adVilllt E and ill tIll hlLtlltJltld Tid llqlllli til (IWIIHlj Hllit incI it i Itiltpd that
d dfmil II Iii l)d dJt((jmiddot or t1 kind IIIit ll (d ttl til 1(gtlll
It r J 1
l~ldl() I 11U1l11llcIlJlll J-- 1 -1111 ial to tlw COllllllOllld and hI I I till t t ~iJtld lill 1-- Illtlar
~illlldllll lllay Ill lllIlltl h~ limitailOll-- oj tlIcils to 1((-1 ll~-Jld( lPI~ (l1ll1Iat ear- -i1flllld hl ~qll1ppld 11111111t 1 II Iii llll 1hi I clllia11Ilg prolurtment 1rUJllllg
lltl (llllllll Ill]] uppl~middot
FI(11J1111 11 qUI] t Ill tllgtljt1I()ll lhal ill lHllllit Ill( t[ 11l1l1l1 lt111]( I dlll~ Il h d llwtori-ld Illfantl~middot airshy
r~(1 and 111J fur ~jllllal operatIOns til a addItional -IIP])Ii 1]H] 11 Jidlll 1)(1(1
Tlli qlIh t LdhI- 1hat nJtThallJlcd fOlLt- 1re nut OJlly
1111 Indo ) ] ~Illl lll nd J( (- ~aly lot he arlll~ of AI LA -11- Lll 111t 11wll I (d Jfll iii hI falilitai1d for the folJOing
c amp GSS Quart
1 The domestic facilities for the manufacture of mored vehicles in Atlantis is UllilUlpasscd oy aJlY lIat10 the world l11dwtrial material scientific and tillar leoUILI1S an mol( than ample to pruduce and rnaintan lHel~4aly lquipnwlll
2 It ha ht11 loaid that oil will domillate the H(xt q
a1 and that it is (veil more importallt than mUllitioll~il mell to mock Ill lig-ht illg lIl1it- Atlantis has an ovcrhelnj uivalltage 011 hpIside Napoleol1- armlPs moved on tJ
-omaeh- hut thl nlllliPlll motorizld and Il1lLhanizld anl JllOVl Oil gasolilll The (Clman highly motorized I nHchalliztl army had comdderahle dillkultie~ ill it- mr (Ill VipllIla alld it j said that a ian-e portion of tl1P mel) iZld and motorizpc lin it (rt I(ft 1ralldetl Oil the load~i IllVI1 saw Au-triHll -011 The Fnllch General Staff wri Arllo J)ogth-IIfIllol ha- iig-Ulld out that the oil neel motor alld Idnieatillg oil-of modern armie~ navies ane IllPt- i- -0 glcat that ill the event of war the tIlmali Europl fOI war purpo-(gt alone would be nearly th1l( t iuropl (llUre peacetime nced-- Germany is --UPpJIllg
pIf today from coal J1lo-11y low grade coal and Iiglll millioll tOll of fUlj a year But in till vent uf war til Ollly a Ira(t iOll of 1Jc oil lhal (prmallY will Jllld fOT
lannil- Shortagp of oil will paralmiddotzc tho-l nlOtorizedj Dllcilanizlcl force Thl la-t harrLl uf oil of a iJlilagu army will be as dramatic as Ow last eartridgr
~ Tlw (hmand for gltatlr S1Jlld alld mohillly h il anonl with Atlantis plan of llat jOllal defeJlsC a plan ~f 011 a -mall highly lliilitnt fOlll The citizens of Atlantl t hOlotlghly accllstomed to the li-e of mechanical devicl-t havp a larger Ilumb(r (If TIWChallllS t han allY otlw) Hatil
the world lIemiKls of Parliament apprlciatl the nll1 Jighting macilille- n~logllizl the lllcd- of a well (qUI) mmiern mechanized furle so that a~ an entirely iluh dent entity it wiJllJe ill a favoraLle position whell thel lome to grant the nCl(~~arr funds
4 Fighting nwdlinc-gt -uit the natIOnal eharader of thL dtizells of Atlallti~ They appeal ttl 11wir dL--irf (lllrgl1 ic and -ift dCd~i()ll
g SecretaIll XatioJal VI
SerVice Ur7lts and
TrClns~ ~pPorting AUXIII
-~
01 XVIII No 70 Mechanization
The authol~ have cnd((lVOled to prltClcJli in thi -ludy a alanced mechalli~crl force of -trong fire lower great mobilshy and heavy hock action inuepemlent in organilatioll a rce pertaining to no one blanch On tlch a cOlltlOvcl-ial bject it can hardly be cpccted thai thtlC will be unanimshy
o( atrcenwnt Thh gcnelltli lndy i IIllSlntcd a thl
ba-ih of dicllt)-)ion of a problem the sathiactory solution of which -)hould be under constant discussion The mission of thi publication will have been fulfilled if thi~ ~l-ticle serves to inspire vigorou~ thought on one of the most widely disshycU-ised subjects that is occupying the minds of the most brillianl mi1il~lry leader~ in the world today
)
fn ~(lmc c()untrie- of th( orIel man is held ~hlJap In
the lInited Hiate on the other hanel e have the utrongtt
re-ped for human lifl C()n~equcntl~middot in our national
tlefcn~l program of today e have placed great emphasis upon equipment ~upply and transportation We have de CiOPld an autoJ1loth e program which looks tnward an
alm~ Oil whcel hich ill Oplrate more -lileedily fight more eflicicntly and -mlTer le~~ ~cyelcly than our military forces of ~ c~terday
~middot1lt~isflllit Seci efury vf Irar Louis Johnsu
c S Ir COnI Photo TIlII d ~1i14 1 III AntilllCItft tI(4)]h
15
Military News Around the World By ~lJOI( E -1 BENJTJ~Z CAC
I TIl( gaolilw Ijt~l lllrdlJr alld til adaptatlHIl of arnw if ll machllll 1Ia t [Ot1 Imiddotd a wOlld-widt dllmiddotjI)Pllllllt of
nHlilaJJizati()fl anti l1l()iorill1iolJ Japalll~( lall]-gt rllllhlillj~
through Chilll arillond (II IUII11HriIW tllrolwh rtllllld tfJwn in SPltlill ((rllltlIlY PaIl1tr dimiddotj j()l and ((cl1oshyovakia IlVdltlllt d llllit lll[ll(I(Ilillj III llllmic wal IrancE dlplayi1Wmiddot It n1lLhlI11lld IIllit It t hl rtlTIlI mill aI rcyipv in hOllllr IJf the nril hh -Ilrlirll Italy Tl1otn-n1lch llliz(d fon J (middotill l ill) III 1lit J)(Ji()111111 p- JJd Sicily and melilallizld Cl al r IIn1- lei Ill I ron lqr-- pract iti Ill the -Iifl Jmpla(al~l a--anlt 11J(j Ill( world II) 111(( t hat war l1laChllll-gt 111 Il tl-d III Ill 1111111 011 bljIl -lt1t than h~lI hitlwllli jill kllll III 1(1 01 Plllllt a1-
Thee molhilli m()l III jcI()lllH alld tlwllforl tho-gtl (fllIlltli( whiih han Ill l1lllI01 til nrld 011 lPllur(p III ha( til ()PImiddot]nlllJg 1IlIl1lgP ffll thPll idt It -fpm apprnpnll 1lt1 lIHI liJ II1ld- nil production a- ginll iwio
Tht olln ill) WIl) from Illlvrllatlllllal 1troll1l1l1 f rlfl(middot 01 I 11 L hl IIlI Illltt1111lllJ pJncliHIl 01
) t rolltlm III Ih 111ld dll nllt I hi 11 1~I~~l 1~l~G alld 1~Jrl
0
IRON
0 COAL
B OIL
111l11 (ud
lugh )LSUl tu establish themjcs The dlcnmiddotfi IflpctiYl 1 Odober ID~8 and i- H111kr~toud to have Ii i drawn il(tltlu-( or Ilw L1at nnmiJ(l of Cllltlal ilIlOPf j dlilill)( to (111(1 Argentina ~
11 -1 111gt
I [1lt ((I (t (
II rJIrjIHI bullbull 1)1 111 lhflJ7hll
I 1 ~td IilII IFI iIIIIh7
- ( llll 1 2 11 III jih
11-lj 11 1 -dIlI f)
bullfr- -111 j)l 1iIJJ
t rldJ( ildl 17171
IIll~l)i h lrj-
1 lt0 1111 lIli
1j bullbull Jjjjnl
i JrIl 2111 1 7 1 I Ill
(11 J~I-l I I h7
[r li)I) 17iJ1i r)Iill J 1117 iJl jjtji
1Idr 7i I I)-
BiI bull ILl II))
middot1gt 11 )(r dtdl(
11 )7
(11
I Id
jllll IJ1n j1 11011
(gt10 li)l 102 h
lIn JUt I
~ I ~ h7111 I
i 7lt7-11
n If)7)
~ 1 1217(i
middot1()117
I 7 mWi
I(J fII
III 17 Hi7
(JIi ]n2W
III 2111
122
1
2) BELGIlDl p~
Bplgiulll i NUllOtllllled by lIeighhol~ po~sl~sillg- hug( anwtda- ald C()Il-lqt1llltl~ S1( fllrs ti1( ruin of cit ies If
I COll(- This explains wily the lklgilll gOYllnmenl lod working ipvprishly to protlct the ciilian populatioll ag~
III air attacks n) According to reports air raid shelters already havel
11K cOl1structfd ill many Belgian cities Some shaped like hivIo (til u(ommodatl ~o p l~()l1- A few call hold a~
III a 700 011w) shrlters have hlell built in unciergll ((liars Ail raid alarms are carritd out on Sunda) HllIstOnl tIll Illopl awl training lhl inhaliitant- fOlair l)fC(aulions
(f7111fra r
1l0llVIA
A n_f(middotntillil ha (kcll(d iIL barriers agaiIl~t r()reig-ner~ A century old dillille belween Bolivia and Para~ to 1-1)]( (lp(1 ivp innnirrat iOIl prpjprallly of farnllr with which has lttlSlU much hloodsl1Ld over a boundary in
Hi
the terms of the treaty of peace friendship and the 100000 square miles of Chaco jungle and
will be divided Paraguay which held the upper hen hostilities ended will get most of the wilderneg is assured a free port on the upper Paraguay River
her access to the sea
BRAZIL
All branches of the petroleum industry of Brazil were nationalized by decree-law a35 of 2a April1938 The supshy
N eW8 Around the Worid
The winners of six engineering scholarships annually granted by W R Grace and Company in collaboration with the General Electric Company to university students of Peru and Chile were announced last March The scholarshyships were fint awarded ill1937 to Chilean graduate stushydents ard the re~ults according to the donors have been mORt successful
CHINA
Anking captured 13 June was the ninth Chinese proshyvincial capital to fall to Japanese armies since the undeclared war on China started on 7 July last year There are still fifteen unconquered
I n the order of their capture the other conquered capishytals are Kalgan Chahar Province Paoting Mope j Kweisui~ Suiyan Taiyua11 Shansi Chinkiang Kiangsu Hangchow rhckiang Tsinan Shantung and Kaifeng Honan
Nanking the nationa1 capital was captured on 13 December
phing of petroleum is made a public utility which means tHat the production importation transportation and sale of
de petroleum and its derivatives and the refining of imshyrted petroleum are subject to regulation by the Federal vernment All refineries of national or imported petroshym must be owned and operated by native Brazilians and
t e percentage of foreig~ employees may not exceed that ablished by the general law on this subject
BULGARIA
Bulgarias old enemies the Allied powers of the World ar choru-ed approval of Balkan action freeing- Bulgaria
m postvar treatv restrIctions on armaments and armies At the same ti~e there appeared to be no bar to similar
lion by Hungary the only nation still nominally bound by re~triction-1 imposed by the victorious Allies Other of the wartime central powers-Germany alld
rkey-already have thrown off reannament bonds
Chinese Commumcatiom through French Indo-China
Now that the Japanese are making serious efforts to cut off the Canton-Hankow railway the Chinese are reshydoubling their efforts in Yunnan Province in order to have an emergency gate of communications with the outside world Plans have already been made for the improvement of all highways leading to Kunming the construction of a new highway to connect Kunming with one of the railways in Burma and the repair and extension of the highway to Sinkiang Yunnan will be therefore the new keypoint of Chinas communications with the outside world should the Japanese succeed in cutting off the Canton-Hankow railway which ha~ been the main supply line of the Chinese armies
I (Ncw York Timcs 7 August 1938)
COLOMBIA
One of the worst aviation disasters of modern times occurred at Bogota Colombia on Sunday 24 June 1938
17
Mili~hrll News Around the World c amp GBB Quart
when a stunting plane crlgthed into a rci(middot in~~ -taml killingshy35 peron- and injuring mo( than 100 Pnidcllt Alfollo Lopez and Preident-ellct Eduardo Hauto who wpre rcYicwshying the military c-llliJlt Htll WpJP Ilnhurt
(OST mc Th (hif( (-pnrh ill 117 pre hanana cacao and
turrCl The Clltci -tal (plt lriLtlll alld (PJlllall~ ill
the ordd Jlanwd li 1 hI Cillmiddotr IH1Jcha middotr flf ((jta Hilall prl)(twt whilt tIl l1l1t((j Stttl (lrmlll IuILtp11l Inlll lIppl~irlJ~ 1Il1prll t
nB
Thl~ (uhall IJ (rITllIIJ 1()]ItIT(d Ulqll la lIl Alldr
)ummpr Hnwlttn thl ()rd] f)f (middottrlo 1tI111I dE middotmiddotmiddot pldlmiddot
(uba~ hiJilelt)1J1llqrlat AUVIl- Thll- If) (tJ- afttr till fgtVPllt dill Cllbfl hf))lltlr 1hi iJPl1) who canlld till llHWl tJ (arcia It wa- all ())11 J1l(--agt from Pn-idlll rcIinll~shy
tf) (Illeral Callfq (tlrl]l IIadll nf tlw (l1lJall ill-ulg-(nt mquirillf- ahout tIlt --trltwth of tlw (l1)lll fnlTI that wln
I (ol1ahJrdl llh thll- -- rlll~ lllligiltlJl) tilt -pllliard-shyill (uiJa
CZICIOlo 11
Hld H rII [v
rimiddotmiddoth ] lkltn Utd) [) PdlII th cj)Ut of PIl~lt
Accordillg to n]lf)rt the (zlch deflll-c sy-tpm ]- iJalteci on a t ripif ring of fort fi(middotld (()()ed with barhed wire and mif1ld rouh alld iJridVI fhl Jirt lilH dinTh on the lordptmiddot 1- -tarltd -Oll) --1(1) (u- WIl Sill( t he anllexashy
tion f Athtria tlll Jillf ha IJff1l (-tpIHjpd -0 that J]OW It (()VPl- 1ill Illlgt h of fhl (Jrnall fJoll11f1
AlJotlt ~o mill-- iJlhiJld lhf fir--t lillP h a -PCOJlfJ lttriJlg of forf ifiratils Thi h t hI 1-gt1 rOllgl-j r t hI t 11111 alld j lw OIW the zfdb arp c1tclmilltd tf hold
rt aplwars to lw ttl( inknt if) or ttl army In dt~t 10 jill
Skoda munitiolls W01k- at Pilslll and tlalsft~ the emplomiddotycc- most ()f whom arc (t(c hi to ~hadow faciorir- which haVe been huill in Sinvalda
The army thin)ci II (all han IOOOO()() nalI tinder arms ilL the (IHI of a week all defellding the second line each
equipped with a subwmachinc gun for no Czech sol carries the ordinary rifle
The third line is around Prague about 15 miles f lh eill limih II will ) defended al all costs but go nWllf officials will moVe to Kaschau in Slovakia
This war-bolll republic which fears dismcmbcrmen Ihe hands of (crmanl has iucd eeral military det r((ntly t(gtIIlt1inv to strCllgthell hClnational defense C PlIj-Ol military training- wa- slPcified for all children 0
( wit h 1 hr (x((pt jon of tllO-C who norlllaJl~ woulc11w exe from phy-ical j raining Boys not attemling ~chool are quircd lIoW to devote 70 hour- annually to military trairJ ulltil tlHY arc 17 a1ld Lhcl(aflll no hour annually until 7
plltp] military selvicp (irl- must dplotc 10 hours annu~ io filt aid and air defense training nntil tll( ag-c of 21t thJaft(rW hours annually unfilthc age of 10
011 JUII ~ th (zlth()~l()vakian J-(I)vclnment deershythat all motion-pictun hou~egt mll~t be equipped with ll1a-I~ for pa11f)1l~ and (mploYfegt within a month lJ JloJicL will allot gagt rnagtk quotas on the basis of the -eati t[padtip- of the nation- theatres
TlEN~IARK ~ I
Thr 1hird of t h( nw submarille tIllder construction the Royal Dallish Navy has heen launched recently t~gt~ christellld th( Iavfreun It cli places about l~lO tons it~ an armament of five 18 torpedo tuhps nne ~-lIlch gUlH
t
two lG-illch antiaircraft Hapons 1
1))mXICAN REIIBLIC
Oll ~7 Fpbrllar ID~8 the IlldepclHlCl1c( Day of f l)oJ11iniran Rplublic Plgtmiddotddcllt Trujillo ple-tlltcd tOi 1 National Congress the account of hi~ admilllstratioll forf i Ptl 1f)~7 ( HLvtlIue- loJ 11~7 Illwd a tntal of ~11)61868l i~ IlllTLa-e of $7lOGOO ocr the pilllding- year The prini~ c()l1ullodilil- (xporltd Wlie stll(ar cacao cofTfl tohacco (orn 1
T
EctlAIlOIt
Fronti(r clashes between Ecuador and Peru OCCUlTto ~
Jlllll ~ in tIll Napo ngtgioll ()lr which hoth llatiolls cLr sovr(Jvn1v Delegates of the two llati(lll~ have Leen mN ill Va-hinglon since Sepilmhel W 1)~6 ill an eTort tO~i amicahly t hi old houllclalY qtlst 1011 1 hut their fl (onfplPllCf-l have so far ploduCld no ~Oll1tiOll to the la1ld division prohPJ11 It is hpiipv(fl htlI(l 1hat a f snilltio1l1o 1his (1I1Pstjoll illl)( fOUlHI
FINLAND
The 1T40 In(ernational Olympic Games will be held lI(~lsingfOlt- capital of Finland
8
PERU
FRAICE
The French allti Portugllc-c go(~rnments have reached liccord giving Fra1~CLl the right to u-e the AzorC Islands the Atlantic ocean a a iallllinJ IM-C for a French North
tlantic ~viation fcrvicc The United Staies Great Britain and Germany all have
ffceivrel permilsion from Portugal to llSC ihe Azores for ~OPo(d trans-Atlantic Iinc
j
On June 14 the French cahinet an110unced it had opted a decree increa~ing the number of oflicers and men e third large increase in France armed forces within
t
j
News Around the World
three month~ In additon to a reneval of recruiting of an unannounced number of Holdier~ for the Regular Army prepshyarations were made to take 4000 captain and lieutenants from the reserve forces
The French army now 800000 -)tron~ i-) expected to reach 900000 by the last of this year In l)1O it is to be 1000000 the figure at which it wiII be -tabilized unless the llle-cnt two-year term of CltJnllHlbury elvice i-) increased
A measure to consctipt the entire nation in war time Wa approved by Parliament 011 J1lIH 17 Thi bill was originally introduced in 1J23 and it wa- talen off the shelf thi) year owing- to the war scare created by the German annexation of Austria and the German threat to Czechoshyslovakia It was rushed through thc Senate and approved with some amendmpnts by the Chamber on thc same day This hill provides for mobilization of all the national forces in time of war as well as for coordination of war preparashytiolls in time of JHalC The enUre population men and womshyen alike ill he concripted fOl zome kind of work in the event of war and all profits arising from production of munitions and war materiab are to he nationalized
An oreIer was placed on July 6th for 1750000 gas mask to be distributed free to Paris resident The funds for the purchase of the masks were advanced iJy the city but it will be refunded by the national government elt some later date
The French Foreign otncc disclo-ed on July 1 the occushypatioll of the strategic Parace I-iand) in the South (hina
FrUlCC neeup Pm 1((gt1 hand
Sea h(1e French and Japanese interest cla~h and neal thE sea ]wes between Great Britains Far Eas1 olltpost~ HOllg~ kong and Singapore Allhough only a group of coral reefs their sLrltegic importallce is rated high as thty would serve as excellent seaplane bases in event of wtr They lie 150 miles southeast of lIainan and 250 miles east of Tourane
I
19
News Arollnd the World CampGSS
d
0111 of hI prillllpd port 01 1 hE l-I(Jn loa-1 of French Jndo-(hllll
IfilluJto titmiddot dlcpl hat )111l llllrlp~ although (IW-(middot tliwr1ll(1l bt nlted IhlJ1l fl)r glHPraioHs in -parch of turtil and Jird lllh lcconling to French rf)lf)ri j H~ir on Ilpatioll wa t akpf a- a llrtCltlutiul1 iII the eVCnt or Japancle eizurc of Haman
Lat TUll Fra1lce alJd Endalld toasted th(ll 1Hrff(f prlltHII a Pari (middotJllhlbla-ll1ally j~ll(itl King (lOn~p ami
(llllfll ElizaiHlh BritaIll and FraTl~e took this Qcca-ioJ1 to alll))lnc tf) tI orld-- CIHclally Home and Berlin-that thir allianCf wa l)1rml111rll and lllbnaJabJr As IiIlg
(Ofg1 (xpnl~(middotd It our n~Jal iJJh hav(gt IHVPI IKPIl mol( illlimat
FralJfp parndld I1Pr lTIllltary power for the Briti-h middotHPpivn King rrnrgp and OUfPll Elild)(th drovr hrshytWflllllJlI of modn FrPIHmiddoth lallk~ ill tlw ollleial pr()l(-~ioll
in Parilt on TlH~dat lI JlllW a1(1 on Thur-lday a military nvipmiddot Va -Itag(middotd ill fHir hOlor at Vrai11~ ill which 0000 men participated
AC(flniing- to Prflti rpport 1hr French Governmrni is (middottHhiriflring tll( 1Ill of I~f)und camouflage to deceive the
lllemy hy imitating the noise of gunfire troops in the march throug-h loud spCakels
HLe camouflage sonore may be adapted to tcl iUll in ordtl to lI(ctlngt the entmr and lttan I Joud spPlkers will carry t he Round of lnoying trains iIlg infant ry fumbinv f nlCks~all snl1-ltsting a troop movement Vhlt (lHmy troops art hpingshymCft this thJ(gttf it 1taJ afllck may ht JaUll1wd el4C
GERlIIANY
Now that German border fortifications are aI11Ht1 aJ)(lVP th( ~rOllll(I tlw Gtrman goP1nH1lmt prorlamation on W Jul~r dcelaring- the entire we-itern a eiosrd ana which noborl may (l1lr without oflkiaJ idpnt ilicatioll pallPI4
Ill ciosltd area (forlified area) is between 50 miles wide and incltlde~ the Netherlands Belgian hOI1 n6nn French and Swis~ rronti(ls
Germany haR adopted a flexible system of which taking advantage of natural stlonlOIOlltls several Unes of fortified points with strong rtoru~
20
M ilitar News Around the World
heavy gllllS tank troop- and bathed wire Eniangie-
The Germans beliee that the French Maginat Line is rigid already outdated alld aisert that it can be broken
The German flying boat Nordmeer was catapulted from the deck of her mother ship off the Azores 21 July and landed in New York in 17 hours and 42 minutes later after a nonstop flight of 2a97 mile~ The ship carried a crew of four men th( pilot the co-pilot radio operator and flight
GRItAT BRITAIN
ar Secretary Horc-Belisha announced recently lower retIrement ageH and higher retirement pay for the army 1110 than 2000 officers will be promoted 1 August The S(cretary abo promised speedy action on plans for evacuatshyillg Londoll and other cities in the event of war
The term British Empire is obsolete There is now a Brlti~h Commonwealth of N-ations Canada Australia New Zealand South Africa Newfoundland and Ireland are equal) in law with England India and Southern Rhodesia also have the statu~ of dominions fn foreign affairs
The Dominions of Canada and South Africa are full member states of the League of Nations If England were involved in a war the dominions through their elected parliashyments would decide whether to intervene or not They could in theory remain neutral
Beginning the 1938 seneb of survey flight acrOss th2 Atlantic the British pick-a-back plane Mercury took off from it mother hip off Foynes Ireland 20 July and landed in New York 25 hours later The ship carried only a twoshyman crew the pilot navigator and the radio operator
The Air Ministry has announced recently the formation of three Balloon Barrage Squadrons for the defense of Lonshydon and it environs Eventually there will be seven Each quadran will have between 40 and 50 balloons about 500 being required for LOl1don
The object of the barrage as is generally well known is to force enemy aircraft to a height at which they can be effectually dealt with by airelaft and antiaircraft guns Being moored to motor trucks the balloon barrage can be quickly towed to any threatened nrNl and constitutes a mobile barrier
The antiaircraft defeme of London according to a bleech made in May 1918 by MI HOle-BeliRha had a
21
~ ~ shy
lfilita11 Nelcs Around the WOOld C amp GSS Quart
-tllllgtll 011 -Iay 1 Et)6 (If )7S0 nHitcl- and nWJl On May 1 1~)t) it Wltl-- ~~)tlli and tlt PIP-Pllt is 0tr that llumber
II ~I 1- If ~ I I ~IJ )ly l~)U)
111 JUJle JlJ ill S(tjll Flo lilt T qf the (lrman lIojlllial jhlltimiddot llIj1 (rr)~- l KllrtUlt ()jllllld the va[l-
tJ~l Iltcl It 1 1J)l n Illlll than tW(llty (~rman hip llltllllld thl IJllljth IIlIlh o Ill arnll-t( whlth loyal HI) -Jn 1 Ill jdllllll rttbj thall (1 tIl(gt nt+~ J1l t1
th Alii For 11l11Ij1(Il al tllb hajjl(hl]ll~ III till mud It Ihl hottOl nl Ill ~I )111 11J (I(gtat Brlt-ull 1llIb -crap lIll jill ]11 r TIlWhllll~ tlld tilt I)IJ~ 1Ltlpilip h[- h(til
rt 111 IIII 1hi ~ljIll I
11]IJrHw11 IIill (r- Vdl old thrdlr l)lrallll tlw lir shylrl~lrlllll Ilj IrrLllld 1lll1ir tll 11( (ol~lilqljlll 111 a lInl 11lli (nm(lll~ al J )Illllll ( tl~ll( qll 2-) T111l1 In- I a P)n(-tshy
tlli f 110 apJldlttli I) JI~(-~l t hp (Il11tldlnC( III i)I) 11 Irt]alld
(lld flrlhllll 111middot111ld Dritl h ]1)111- ~latljllld at f()]llkd lrJ--h Jlllrt i111w
I ]dl(Id h r]l~h -lei]11 llld it h llIHi(middot]-lll1ld thaI IH
IrllJl~ Jll 111 IIl~ttlll d l- ~llll III tlH~I ftlrllllc1I1111b ll
fl 1 Id t ~ (lid
----I DAMASCUS
o
AI
Serious riots between A rabs and Jcw- the WOllt-lt ~r
1~)6 have recently occurred in Palc~tilw Iain trol1lJle~~ ise ClC IIaHa chicI porl of Palestine and terminu~ of theJ-i- rpE
oil pipe linc Jerusalem amI Jaffa Report- t(l1 of the tratilill into thtgt Jloly Land of Tlall-jorltlanian Arabs to~ an 1111il fdlow 1ralgts of PallitiJll ill the strug-g-Ic againstt Id 1 Tews tlld (]llt Britain
Ju-t a Y(tlr ago without prIOr publie dehate and win Igo Clllbulling- Hw vishcs oj itilll Alab~ or Jew~ the Bri iJ 11Iprnmtnt adopted it plan for a tnpartittmiddot partition Pa-tilw Tlw 1Ioly Land Wagt to be dividtgtd into a 1 j jpl-h -11 It all ilah tate ufJi1ld with Trltlnlt-jordaniac i 1 lrJtbh 1l1lluIldt 0(1 01(gt hoI pla(p-i with a lorrid)1 it~ j
J(ru~ai(m to tlw -)(a It ha- Jlot hell Jlo~sibk to putJhpa palllllto dfll tlw plan prOVIng- to he er~ ulJPopularitO)rm rtll fIWS alld Arahs due t
thrif (HEECE wcnk
gDme The torpedo boat (corgt I built uy Yarrow and (
]lallY wa~ laulldwd 011 ~ March 11 ha a -pccd of if) t
kW)j ii di pJatmiddotn1PJlt of ljO tUH- and il-- armament isl of rOIl 7-1I1th j(tln- G or 7 antiaircraft mach11lq ltllH1cighl 2J-in(11 tflll)do tuhe
(l _ r X(It IIlttltllC llI(UrlUlJf lui) ]Jfny lttient Mexi seate
i lesolutlOll of ~K JalHlalY InHl 1iXllt1 180 lW--Ogt I
of a qlwtzai) pCI da~ a- till minimum agl for lab0middot~ (hracelos) engag-td ill agricultural ork
hensi depri
HAITI roigh
TIll minimum wago of (mployeo aH1 tidY laborer ~~st public ~lrvices III Haiti (nut incl~lding paid ~lomr~tic ftd~p~ tnb) h to be 1[)O g-ourdl- Jlel day alHllt ~halllJ()t hell~Jj to atiaciInwnt J)yond Olll-ttllth of it~ total aecon1ingJ3G law ur to Al1gu~t 1~)~H not more than one-third of the~~ 0
salary of salaried ll1ployc(~ and clprl i~ liahle to a~~
[)lent llJdi (nllldw of the [all 1))I liJIIIliioll Tul~~~re
ITALY IIc ()n til( ollasioll of Hitlers hit to Ital lat 1lu ~ n
olli-lher lhoIJach1lt pnhlhwd a Inilf ~lle(Jllllt ~f ~j nt italIan A Irll
Allordillg to 1hat pllllhcal io]) Ilw Jl aJiln Army 1~ _f4 (quipped diseiplilHgtd and trailltd it lla- all rffretiv( fur 2O()()() llHlI it is all army cnnlpowd oC cadn-l willct hrought up til ~1nllgth dllrJllg (lrtaill periods of they~-It cornprisc~ middot1 Army (roups 15 arm~ corps ~4 infrl~
divhi [j 1llgt1I1l1aill diviioll 1 fast divisions 2 motD U divisions and ~tv(nd independent mechanized brignde~ lli
this should he added the armand corp- -qlCdal troop J
can raise all army of ~OOOOOO mrll IJ( li
22
Military News Around the World
The Colonial army in Lybia and Eastern Africa cornshyises 100000 men- hite and lolored of this number two rps are stationed in Lybia
The mission of the Italian Army i~ to protect the EuroshynJrontiers and safeguard the Italian intere-t- ill North
d East Africa ~ The Italian Air Force b a highly tlailleU unit COlhiishy
ibg of from 60000 to 70000 meni
JAPAN
La~t July thegt Tapane-e Cabinet recommended that jflpan lthdraw its 11lltatlOl1 to hold the 1910 International OlympIC Game in Tohyo The Cabinets move wa probably d1c to the co-tly tr ill rhina the Ilccl-middotdty for national thrJi and the helief thlt tIll Japane-e pit-it would be weahcncd hy the lIlternatiollai ~IJlrit of the Olympics The ~mei will be held at IIeblllgfor- the capital of FlIlland
~IEXICO
A lontleal firm the Canadian Car anti Foundry Comshy~11 hugt entered into contract with the Mexican governshyaient for the COlltructlOn of aircraft in the military shops of M(ICO CIty 10 tralllll1g machl1lcgt and 40 military tmiddotoshy3elter having been agreed to as an Initial order
(Unitul SI I tlCC~ He I II II)
-ETHERLANDS
Lipan military campaign in China has aroused appreshy~ell~Ion ll1 Netherland India If open warfare happened to ieprire the Japanese of the American supply of oil Japan mght pUh south toward the rich fitorc of fuel in the Dutch 8nt IndIcs ~ Xetherland is creating a big fleet of heavy bombers orpulo craft and mine layers The army ~trength laudgt at about 40000 (32000 in l~36) Two tlivisionfi thoroughly equipped could be put nto actlOn1 There are now about 7000 Japanese in Netherland iqdia There are 1200000 Chinee of whom around 700000 iVere born in China
The Dutch Army is to be increased by 7000 men and ~o~e who ere due for return to civtllife la~t March have ~n retained and ~ent to reinforce guards on the Dutch ktmt1er
NICAHAGlTA
The urveyeu route of the proposed Canal across Nica~ un ~tart1 from Greytowll on the Caribbean via the San n Hiver and Lake Nicalug-ua to Brlto on the Pacific It would take a ship 25 to middotW hours to pass through the
(i jected canal in contrast to 7 to 8 for the Panama Canal t
PlojUllu Nicaruguan Canal
NORWAY
The annexation of Austria has completely reversed Norwegian minds in regard to national defense In April 1037 the unusual amount of 21000000 crowns was approshypriated for national defense slightly against the wish of the caiJinet Thi3 same government has just proposed extrashyordinary appropriations totalling 52000000 crowns a sum abont equal 10 that of the national defenses ordinary budget
(La Yacht)
PA~A
Panama shipping tonnaVenow stands first among Latin American countries Foreign firms have found it very conshyvenient to register their ships with the Republic of Panama and at present her registered mElchant fleet consists of 120 seagoing vessels The increase on this years registry is 12 gthipgt of which 6 were an exchange from another flag
(U S Naval Institute Proceedings July 1938)
PERU The Peruvian exports in 1937 amounted to $151363000
an increase of 13 per cent over 1936 Imports from the United States in 1937 showed an increase of 30 per cent the next competitor is Germany
At its meeting of 1 June 1938 the Governing Board of the Pan American Union approved the final text of the proshygram which will serve as the basis of deliberations of the Eighth International Conference of American States to be held in Lima next December
POLAND
lIajor Vaclew Makow4ki and four other Polish fliers landed al Warsaw Oil 5 June eompletillg a I6500-mile flight by a roundabout route from California
~ 23
~Miit~my$iew8 Around the WOlld t amp liSS UDI
The five flying a twin~endnc Lockheed American ila11shy
port pianc left Los Allgeles ll lIlay They flew to South America and crossed the Suuth Atiantic from Natal Brazil to Dakar French Vc-t Africa
IORTlJ(AL d
A PorluguPl Air ~li-siun is to vj-it Eng-laud III the Illar
future to takl c1eiivpry of 15 (o-1ler (ladidof -ingt--lltcr pursuits onhr(middotd hy the Portugllese (Ollllment lal Janushyary
En~~lalld hv had a rniiltJ~ Ttl]-o) III Portu)al -11111
la-t February It j- njHlrldj that -h( hLlS dlricierl to -uppl~ P()rllll~al wilh hl-a and livht arfilliry and (middot pHd UiJtallshytwllolns or credit- to lIpI Idd ally alarm(d by til(gt appanl1t delermlllation of (3prmallY and Italy to 1- tlill 1 -1 rallldt hold on SlJain and to uomillate Port ugal
H i- -aid that the Roel of (ibraltar nJH (OlhHiflt d impregnable iII be modernized with somp of thp lat(-t artil~
Ifry and antiaircraft hatterjt~ for deftn~c againt reported Itd(l~(lrnJan ) Ill- at Ah(lll 11 and (Tlf a 110t t () IllllltlOll
b()mhinf~ plalH from Spltlm Spalli-h 1111lUll1l and tht Bill~ aric hIand
ItDIAIA
queen iI-anc of Rumania one of Europes mo t colorful pcr-ol1aiitie died 18 Tuly in tlw royal palace at Sinaia at 1he ag of ()2
IWSSL
The Sovilt io ha at present from 11 to 36 cavalry dh-i()ll~ 2a of hilh an ill Eulopt
III Europl h-Jf of th(l Clyalry is stationed in the thrce wl tern military di trich (l (llingrad Vhite Ru~sia and El)
Sn Ill If Hllllt d (llIlll wh~ln itUlWIl IUlIl lapHllllL lrOOIshy
rrhe cavalry tationed at the frontier is reinforCed three mota-mechanized diVisions and by strong air force
The cavalry division comprises two brigades un ar - lery regiment (horse) one chemical 1quudron one englr~ti lquadron 10 communication squadrons and a nlOlo-mampt~ anizt1Ilgroup of three squadron- with 51 tanlc t~
f (l~a 11a1CC Mllitairc 2G Febl uary l~
Diplomatic )rlatiolls bdween Japan and Soviet Ru~~~
J1(and tilt hlpaking point as clashes between armed fo~ of the twu llatioll5 occurred 29 July over a small hHfl ~ hal)v]mf t1~~ ~H1 tht Smiel 1I~n(hukllO1l1 hOcicl near ~~ Important SOVIPL xeaporl and al r base of Vladlvostock t ~
fort itipd hill which bolh Japan and Russia claim is indk]J~ by the arrow Hu-sia claims that Changkufeng heigh1-~ parL of Soviet territory unuer the terms of an 1886 tr~ ltabli~hillg the fronticr with China
For the fillh time in four years an edict from the K lin has removed its viceroy in the Far East The Far EJ-~ ern uiJLrict is Olle of the three or four 1110-t importl~ provincial posl- in Rusia It ilJ(lude~ SlV(l1 provinc-leJt largcr than the usual Soviet province grouped in onc adrr isilativ( unit becau~e of the fear uf Japanese attack
i
SA~l I ~iams Navy is being strengthened Two gunboalsw1middot
to he delivrlcd by Japan last July they hayc a displaccm~ of 1100 tOllS and speed of 17 knob
(U S Naval mifilufc P)oC(cdin[Js July 1
SWEDEN J The Foreign l1inisters of Finland Denmark No~
and Sweden met in Oslo on 5 April to discus their coml~ defensp ploblemK in the event of war The result wns aJ_~ e1al agreement to refrlin in the future as in the past fil joining tHY gTOtlps of nation and to maintain strcngthelltheir poiililul and ecollornic cooperation with -~ end in view f_
( US N(tIallllntllltll J 1 l11middotI(Iillfq AllUlttE~~
SWIZEHLAND
Oil 25 Junc Italy joined Germany ill a formal pror III Swil-tiand 10 JPiIHt1 1111 llflulralityt- long HH slw rn laills her traditional aloofness from international COl
Oil 11 May tlw Ltagnp of Natiolls apPlovpd S lands request freeiIl)~ her from any obligation to PH ill -oallctiolls such as tlw ccononllC and finallcial ) taken agaiIlHt Italy because of the Halo-Ethiopian Vhlll Rwitzrrlalld joilwd the Lcag-ue it was with a s ion that he should not be required to join any milit action under the League Covenant
24
-~
~1XV[I1 NiJ70 Military N eW8 Around the World
TURKEY
IOn 6 July 1938 Great Britain approved a loan to Turkey mounting to $80000000 to be devoted to the purchase of
~ rmnrnents made in Britain ~ Recent diRpatchcs show that Turkey is planning mcchshytrnization of her army and extensive purcha~es of airplanes ~nd submarineR
AIlt)(lHHlrltta outlet of SYria
On ~ July a Franco-Turkish pact wa signed which rovide- for Franco-Turkbh military cooperation in the lexandretta ditrict with France and Turkey providing rmcd cuntingents of equal strength
The Sanjak of Alexandretta is just a strip fifty miles wide and seventy miles long with only two towns of any size-Antioch and Alexandretta But Alexandretta though a small town is important because it is the only natural harbor on the eaRt COHRt of the Mediterranean except Haifa in Paleo tine and the maritime outlet for the trade of the City of Aleppo and the Syrian hinterland
Turkey i~ interested in Alexandretta because the port there is a potential naval base and affords easy access to Turkih territory With independence approaching Syria the Turks arc ~aid to he anxious to bring Alexandretta under their influence and prevent it from falling into hostile hands
URUGUAY
The Constitution of Uruguay approved 19 Aprif 1934 provides that just remuneration and length of working day arc to be fixed by law with special regulations fQr women and minors Several decrees have been promulgated at various dates putting into effect minimum wages for workerR in variouH industries
VENEZUELA
On 12 July Venezuela withdrew from the League of Nations
The republics of Latin America are gradually drifting away from Geneva Of the twenty American republics originally belonging to the League eight have resigned or are about to do so
For the first time in history the United States is linked with Venezuela in a one-day fiight
Intermediate points on the Pan-American airways route include Puerto Rico Haiti Cuba and the Dominican Republic
Around-the-World Flhrhls
25
c amp CSS Qummiddoti
d
Frontier clashea oocur beshytween Ecuador amp Peru 3 Jtmamp
1938
Eighth International Conference ot Amorioan States will be held in
Lima lleoerrber 1938
bull 11shy
~lxvillNo 70 Military News Around tlte World
27
IThe Spanish Civil War
f
It 11 1 1 f tl 11l SpUIl
VIH1l thl rllll htglll rumhling in -pal11 on lR July
m(Jnth ~et it 1-- t1l1lring- tilt tlllni ~lar and both id( are l111tornpromi ing lilil -(J ddelIllIllld to go to tbt iJithr lIHI thd th(r( ~(tmiddotm In he nnthillg ilIa vall --top 11H (()llflk
5pmi
F]fl)m Tht Il1ltgtUl)~ent Drive on Vllpneia
28
The Insurgent spring drive to the sea culminated J~ the capitllp of Villaroz Oil 11) Aplil thll~ ~plitting Govea mpllt territory illtwf) Heet iOlls Tlw In-unCnts tried in middot1 10 captule 10(0 Ilaquooy cily Oil Ih( (alern bank of the Ebl~ FralllO Ihcll (hcided upon a swift drive with Valcnciat3 llw oiJIeetiv( which would not only g-ivc him control of tk1 important city but would at the same time cut off ~Iadnc~~ lifflillP ami thll the old capital isolated and starved wo1~1 hl furCld to surrender 1
I Th IWiUII(Cnt plan fol the drive south from the Ten(
--iIJocacer lilll wa~ ba-ed upon the converging movernt of 1 WO army (OIPS to pinch out the -lalient On the left It Army Corp of Galicia ((cl1cral Aranda) moved downtJ lrditerranean coast toward Castellon and Sagunto Onu
l
rivht of the Teruel-Alhocacer line the Army (orps (stille (General Valera) moved alonl( the axis of the Te~) -~amlllto highway Itorming Iiaisoll )ptween the wing~ th( fnsurgent Arm werc various divisions among themt Firsl of Navarre under Garcia VaJino t
The terrain is very mountainous with fp roads a~t able a region uifIlcull to traverse (P11 in ppace timl TIl (overnmen1 force- prepared stllt)Jlg defeTlltic positio taldng advantage of the strong terrain
The drive to Valencia has l)((n bitterly contestedf~middot
lhe Insurgents wcrc r(wanlfd on 1~ TlIlH with the caPtur1e~shyCasfeIl6n a seaport of cOllt-oiderablc yaluc only 35 miles f ~~ Valencia The Government f()rce~ arc t-otilJ offering re5~] tance along thp Mijare- RiYcr ~~
I 1 j
In the north Francos lroop bombarded the L()st Division out of its P1l1rP1Whpd po-ition ItltllCh frontil1r and OVPl 1)000 omcer~ and men fled Frallce
Resuminl( a drive on a front long dormant in the WCl the Insurgent forces captured Blasquez and the region surrounding it (Figure 3) Then suddenly
News Around the World
Vhat effect will the Gandesa offensive have in future operashyHom is a matter of conjecture
~ ReNcH
o SPANI5H
Flum 4-Spamh Tlllitory occupied by the French in 1811
Franco has an immew-IO superiority in the air a far more ample supply of guns and munitions than his enemies Moreshyover in order to placate Italy France has officially closed the Pyreneean frontier across which large war supplies of all kinds had been passing to Government Spain That frontier
FIGUF(f 1---Glllllltnt Olftlll( Itll (aIHiL-1
i 90vernment forces who had been yielding the stubbornly lteld ground on the -outh ~aJient of the Insurgent Salient Hurled an unexpected thrust into the llorth flank of that $lient The Government advance swept forward a dozen Jiule and reached the strategic cit~ of Gande~a (Figure 3) ken by the Insurgents last spring after some of the bloodshy3t fighting of the war The Goernment forcci however cre shortly after thrown back from the gates of Gandesa e Government offensive has relieved Insurgent pressure in
e south temporarily at least and seems to indicate that the O(rnment fOlces arC -tlll (ltlpahlc of stubhorn and effective
anee that their morale is still high and that the gents are not likely to vin the war before next spring r in the war the push at Ilrullclc paralyzed the activity Insurgent Army of the North which had just taken The Government drive on Belchite forced a months
tion between the conqueltt of Santander and AsturiaB
ha yet to become watertight and Barcelona still receives some munitions from other sources notably Mexico the Balkan countries and [rom private ources in Europe but this b not sufficient to oVercome the handicap to which the Government forces are doomed for lack of equipment in comparison vith the Insurgents whose superiority in guns tank8 airplanes and munition-5 increases daily
Italy ha- already lost more men in this war than she did in the EthIOpian Conquest and in addition the conflict has proved to be a drain on Italian finances and war materials For this reason Mussolini would like to see Franco win as --oon as possible
A Franco victory has been repeatedly deferred but few would now question its inevitability in the end Whether it can be accompliRhed this year or next spring however is not for Ul to predict The future alone can reveal the durashytion of thi struggle where we find not only armed forces pitted against one another but the indomitable will and do-or-die spirit of two irreconcilable factions
The bravery of the Spanish soldier is the heritage of a race ready to die for the defense of itf- lrincill)cH Thl heroism of the Alcazar of Toledo and the epic of Madrid had its inspiration in the memories of a g-)OriOUR past
-JHihll1ru Commentator J(anWB Citl StHr
29
The Sino-Japanese War
Ill
I
)l I ~f 1 Ill Llp1l1middot( (apt lInlI Suchow ~trategic rall ~ IUl1l ]1111 of i hI Lurwhu an(1 1h( Ticntin-Pukow r1l1wa It tllf)) a j)) (middotrflll fquipptgtd army of O( 20DOOO 1lll1l -uj)lorlt tl b~ alrpLllll- and tank- -lvlral months to
Wide Harld r~
1aIHllj(middot1 ohbl)o in thl Yc-l1ow River overflow where th( Peipille--Hankow railroad crosses the Lungri-The fall of thi~ strategic jl1nctlOn seemed imminent T~
Chinese blasted the dykes between Kingshui just north Cheng-chow and Kaifeng 50 mile to the East The Yen River ~wirling over hundreds of square miles blocl_shyhlJl[mese [ruuls before Chcngchow and forced them bac~ far as Kaifeng- cll-tr)jm~ lllormouc Japanese war m~r riel and lauslllg many los-es in property and lives The -~ river rolled relentlessly leaving starvation and ruin inf wake but the ]05 Vas nut all Chinas for the Jap armies uogg-l(l (lon wholly bested by the high water T Chinas Sorrow as the Yellow River is nicknamed be~
lt1111 1111 ChlCl fortl-- to the Vest SaIWlllltry llatl(- 111111) the Lung-hai railway followeu
1hi tall oj lltiJow pnrt ICllally al Lanflllg 50 n1l1e~ to the 1 wlllJt I (hilll CnuntlrllfTel1gtic llccecltied in su1shyilllltu]lng 1tpIl- lIHk lilJ I)ji-inll commanilpd by (ellshy
(rd 1)fIIIlra til1 ]1 nllLl of JIallchuria Thi forte vas )Illr aYt d IIIll lit kr cJlmiddot Ilit I ion t hnnwh timely arrival of rgtll1f01(II ~
Ill JaJlal]~( tJ((l~ I in till Lunghai Corridor nuw ~I(rn(d to ()jH1l ulIJllill 111l1 of lilt 11 the capture oj IIanlf) ollic]d gtd Ilf till ChiIlPl National (onrnmrnt afttl thl fall of ankirw The Japallll expected io captur( Hdlh1) h~ it IWII-fold malltlr Hv hnd following- the Jgt1JPJllJ~llalkrJ rlttiha~ lIJrnbilHd v-ith all (xplditioll up IIi YllWlzl Hlt wilen tllP 1apaJlc-c Navy had concenshyt rt11d a jlfIgtrJll Ilpll All ll11fol(gtltePll faeLo] hO(v(1 1
11Ihld t 1](( lanfll pnpal td pJan-i It jt ran ytar for China not to itnQs~ a thmd either
qf Ihl- YllIfJW Ilr ttl( lll)tZ( Hiv(T Some of the f1oolti-i haVll lJrr-1l J)It1 cal it Iuph llotably that of 1 Rill) A Hel srviral YIar I)f orii lluhr 111( -llIJPlviioll flf ff)reil~1l P l1 fdnrpl- I Ill (hllll had 1)lill dybmiddot ~lld had -ll((PLtipd ill l((pillg the lov ItlY(r alolW it ~ Ilorrnall()lr(
Ojl lJ Jlllll tIll JapallC-e Army 1lt driving- furiously for the IHJ-c-iol of Chcnvchow important junction city
(hinas Savior and the friendly rier dragons fUllli~hlt the most effective natural defense in Chinas moment t great national peril Flood strategy succeeded where et fii and guns had failed ~
1_ FHam 2 YIlI) ltlVll I
TIll Yello RIver 2700
30
(
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Military News Around the Worid
ellow mud which it carries at times more than 40 per cent y weight Thi~ ricr ha~ a more I4pectacular history than
Itinr other in the world and has wanderedfrom its appointed middotay (Figure 2) man time- It- v3srtliei ill th( sumnier hich is the time of high water are unpredictable
mperor Wu in 2297 Dc attempled to tame it by ing it into several parallel channels At 011(gt time it
wed north to Tienblll and entered the ~ea at Taku and it aintaincd that cours(gt for a number of centuries After
AD and until 1194 it flowed northwest of Tsinan ptying into Laichow Day later the river changed its
urse and flowed south through Kiang~u prOVIllce to the eHow Sea At other timegt it has -hiftcd between the-e two ints occasionally emI)tying into the Yangtze ncar Nanking
r~e which it ic followin1=f at this time The pnHnl Iir)od may (xc(cd that of 1fI~5 when 3000
quare miles were inundated 8()000000 worth of property estroyed and ~OOOOOO made homeless
YAGTZE CA~IPAIGN
Jpan(c lIfHlltry near Kiukiang on the Yangtze Riv(r
ready making arrangements for supply of munitions through French Indo-China to offset the lo~ of the supply line Ihlough lIang-kong and Canton The warlike clashes with Soviet Ru--ia have already caused withdrawal of troops from Northern China to Manchukuo but sO far Japans drive down Lake Poyang has shown no signs of slackening
1 Having been stopped by the River of SorrowH in the North where the great flood forestalled the Hankow drive lhe Japane~e Geneal Slaff immediately decided to push the ~angtze campaign vigorou-iy Anking was quickly capshyturcd but the Japanese have encountered stiff resistance Jhereitftcr However they have Hucceeded in ~ecuring Kiushy- iang great pottery center which held them for a month find gunboals have been senl through the moulh of Lake royallg They continue to pres~ up the Yangtze but the
lnain drive seems directed along the easier roule down Lake Toyang v Nanchang greateHt Chine~e air baHc Nauchangs all and the cutting of the Canton-Hanlww railway would l oom Hankow The Chinese Foreign OfTice with its archives
~ llld mosl foreign embassies including the American have Iready moved to Chungking 500 miles up the Yangtze
~ ankoVl cannot hold out indefinitely The Chinese are al-
f
FWURF 1 ~Th( HonRkong~Cnnton Rmway which Japanese bombers havo failed to d(~troy
Japan continues its Hir raids against Canton in an effort to break up the railroad to Hankow In spite of these air raids the Kowlon-Canton Railroad which is the main supply line of the Chinese armies continues running and rendering effective service
July 7 1938 marked the first anniversary of this war which started as a clashmiddot between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge outside of Peiping and has now become the greatest armed conflict which Asia has witnessed in 32 yearH
More lives have been losi more property has been destroyed and more money has been spent to keep the embattled armieg going than was the case in the Russo~ Japanese War
31
h
~
Military NewampAroulld the World
FHIJfU f) Id) of (mton hleh fo) month hac J II ltllhJ ell rl to J arllll( L Hlr lu(h
This war h~Lq no swept 100O()() quare mllCs nillP provincial capitab out of twenty-four ha~ heell captured by the inaders the lo~ of Chil1fs( lil-gt according to Japanclt(c p-timat(s which probably art too high is aiJout l~WOOOO li(- It is actually imp0slhlp 10 pslimap llw dlctrllrtioll of proper- ~11](1 wealth in (hina Thre(-fourth- of the ships of Chinamiddot 1ltY have beCn c~q)tl1red or destroyed alld the (hinec $~()lrnnllllt 11a- 11lOrL refugees than It can aiel Till 11llt- ) (hinl- raila~ ~~I(m haE Ill(11 tagg(lshy
U de 11 nrld Jb
IapUHlt combat (hie 1Il Norlh ChllHl
Japan ha- mod(rn WfHIJOIlH China 1Of)O y()ar~ of hisshytory during which )w has hllJl (OI1(IUered hut nev( al1t-orhcd
-From (hinn Fiyhts fo ifr Ekins and Wright
ing Yct in spitc of these appalling ImibCl Japan hal) fa to brillg China to it knee~
In January of this year Cabinet members were ex inl the peoph to )llpale foJ a three or four-yeal ar no~ depressed by the setback which the Yellow River gave thc lJJVaderH army in Honan Var Minister S Ilagaici declares that in his opinion Japan must be pre to fight at least ten ycars Japall is maintaining an ar over 1000000 mell in China and the war is costing h proximatliy ~rOOOO()O a day The (hillKe game lIoW
to bc to make the J apanCbC pay an exhorbitani pri may cauc a collap-c and cvcry days delay in the J apal1ri~
invasion j SPlll as a measure of victorv for China by Jlt c
creasing the already staggeriJlg co-t of the war tJ A JlC complication has come up The armed claslt j
bdWel1l J apltlncsc amI Rusian troup may prove to be tl j
first batth of a major war It is possible that the trou 4 may he localized and cttletl by diplomatic Rteps but th)i-H arc oh-erver- who argue that the Soviet Union believe) t tens the moment hus arrived for the following reasons 1
~ien 1 Rusia bplievc-gt that Japall is near financial exha Com
1 ion and a 1l0W or nev(1 moment ha4 arrived to fight a V ~
alld fOle-gtlall attack oy Japan in the future ~~ 2 Rusia fear- that China may collapse Rho
Japanese capture Hanico and sever the Cantoll-1 railway which is the main ChillC-c munitions artery I_
L RUKsia may IJliievc that the Siherian situation cant on kept within the Lound of a minaturc war without seri)l danger to the Soviet Union jildh
~- res OUwr obKenerK believe that the border trouble pC
mLrlly a Rll~~iall effort to prevent troop movements frl~ th MallLhukuo to -trengthen the Yallgtze Yalley Campaign-J
II haK been predicted that Japan will make peace Otiirod turcs to China after capturing Halllww and that Hhe eXPf(-~ng to end the devastating war ill the very n~ar future
Fighting- almost with bare hand against a armed adverary there is no sign of surrender yet b Chinebe government and people Encouraged by th( R Hians Chinc-c rcsi-tancc may stiffell
In 1812 the HUKSians deliberately burned ill(bCOW
order to minimize the FrClwh capture of their capital aIld embarrass Ow illvadpr The sl1uwuent collapse of Icons emJlil(~ has brrll attriuutLd Ly hi-torians to that 1 act The d(otruct ion of the Yello Rivcr dykeo 111a prmI to be HllOilHr act of self-sacrifice that may ~llso the dreams of another great empire
t~ er J
in nk 1 n ns hel qui OUI
ith
TANK ATTACK AGAINST ANTITANK GUNS
Condensed flam the HUltqHl AIllnfluyC_ IUllkU Xlufwz 11 1ll7]
AKTITA~K Gu~s IN DEFENSE
The advent on the field of battle of a lIe offcl1(-ive arm Lthe tallk-ha~ called into being abo a Ill means of deshyfense a t-opccial type of antitank gUll At the pregtcnt time the armiegt of all cQuntripgt are gtufiishy(lently familiar both vith tank(- alld with the mean of combatting them 1 In the opinion of Eirnannsbclgcr to each ldlometcr of
Ollt there must be 8 gum or to tlw divbion 61 gUliS to hich arc added ]8 guns at the dislln-itioll of the division Jmmlllder a total of 82 guns for the 8-kilometel defense
front of the division that b 10 gun- to each kilometer of tront i Such a tatulatioIl of the dcfell-e with alltitank gUllS i~ fudlcative of the fact that the attacking tanks arc being presented with a new situation
j Durillg the last few years a change ha5 occulTed also ih the qualitative state of the antitank arm i The 50-mm antitank gun of the Rheinmetall factory ireel 1929 has a muzzle velocity of 2000 fs a maximum ~nge of 6500 yards a practical rate of fire of 15 to 20 shots ~er mll1ute a weight of projectile of 171 kilograms The ~jrojectllc is thus enabled to pierce armor plating of a thickshy~~S up to 30-mm or 40-mm at a (lilttance of 1000 yards t A 37-mm gUll with an initial vclocity of 800 yard~ maxishyum range of 7000 yards and projeclile weight of 066 Iogramgt has an armor-piercmg -gttrength at a (1i~tance of
~_ 000 yards up to 20-mm or 10-mm rC~s(niJlg- of the djshyi- nce by half inclca-gtcs the penetrative power of the projecshy Ie by about one-fourth According to the French Rrvuf dATtillfJic there has
r
ten introduced into the armament of the English infantry4n antitank rifle I All the accepted methods of tank allack upon antitank
nS_HPil1cers front flank-which once Were COllshy
~ Rted retain their importance in a favorable situation that t in ctgtc of low saturation of the defense front with anti shy~_ nk g-un- and in cafie the tank unit act in JcconnaiRsance _ a broad front The degree of ~aturation with antitank
ns however which prevail at the precni limp demands ~ her methods of combatting them a different tactic That - quire a new effort in the field of military and ~cientific
i~ ought
-~
Foreign Military Digests Digestlt of important articles from foreign militarlf periodicalgt til( remaiui1l1 articlegt 1m each
lIlajaziu (( ( listed i11 C((trd(u (If Scrret( d Jgt( riodic([ Artielfs
j ~
SmEKrTH OJ THE TANI AND OF TilE ANTITANK GUN
Let us compare the strength of the individual light tank ith that of the antitank gun Conceiving the situation to
be one In which the tank ix approaching nn antitank gun which has been sct up on a firing position there is the folshylowing to be Imid the antitank gun thanks to its stable Jlosition and to concealment on the locality is less con~picshyll0W than the tank moving in the open and readily observshyable Because of that fact the initiative will almost alvays remain un the ide of the antitank gun The antitank gun is the first to open fire from a diRtance of 500 to 1000 yards and has the possibility of making a few aimed shots before the opening of tire from the tank With tho hots the antitank gun may put the tank out of commission If it doc- not then the tank will begin firing
The tire from the tank is tire from a machine in motion upon a poorly observable target on an unstudied locality and for this rea~on its accuracy wHi be approximately half that of the fire of the antitank gun However since the tank has armor and in addition to the gun haR also a machine gun it is more correct to consider that the vulnerability of the tank is much ICHH than that of the untitank gUll and its fire power much greater But the initiative as before will remain on the ide of the antitank gun All that is indicative of a cershytain preponderance in the fire power of the antitank gun over that of individual tunks
THE STRENGTH OF ATTACKING TANKS
What is true of the attacking tank and of the defending antitank gun taken separately can not be extended to the massive and skillfully organized tank attack
The rifle battalion engaged in supporting the tank comshypany will conduct its offensive in a zone 600 to 800 meters wide Assuming that the adversary is satunited with anti shytank guns in accordance wjth Eimannsbergers calcuJationg the company wiII me~t at the forward area of such 7one 5 to 6 antitank gun At some depth it wil meet with entire batteries of regimental or battalion artillery Consequently against each 2 to 3 tanl(t~ there may appear one antitank gun We have already seen above that when 2 to 5 tanks go to meet one modern antitank gUll the final ()utcome of their collision can not be predicted
In that case the situation for the tank is not brilliant to attack is po~sible but the risl is very high and the losses will without doubt be great How call those losses be avoided and What is the best method for attacking the front of the antitank guns The best way out of the difficulty must be sought in establishing a definite ~mpeliority of forces in the decisive direction That can be attained by closing up the combat orders in the direction of the main blow
Ag-ainst such a solution the foJ1owing objections mny be raiecl There will take part in the battle not only those antitanl guns which wi1l appear in front of the tanls but also those which will be on the fianl of the attacking cOmshypanY so that the humber of antitank guns must still be inshy
33
middot roreirII MililwY Digestq C amp GSS Quart
creaHed bv lor S Thal Itgt tlU( a- l(gtld- tlw -ingie comshypany ltutng- separat(l~ _ But eVell for -uch a company if it operatc~ dth 1lthcl --mall tomlmt interval eeltain adshyvantages are created illee tht numher of antitank gUllgt actmiddot ing again-t it will IJl clhicillahly II p hl( to take into
consideration maJJlly till ma-h( tall attack cIllCe the - employrnellt of tanh- III t he offrll in~ mut Ill majL
(FR-~(i Art 7J (()Il-(Cjuentiy the Lllll( (ompII1Y will a a rule not attack -illgl~ 11w attack gt111 )( parlicipaltd III
al-o hy 11~Hr cf)mpallir acting- at ngilt and hmiddotft
Till 1clIltWr- rif tlH attacking tank (IIl tlw alltlshy
ltl1k glllh lPIJlll illjf tlHir atLlck arc (middotmblHImiddotd III tIll ac11shy
IW p gt of fill offI-- flj Ill( dflJ) Till adl--lry dlall
when t1(gt dp~11 ~ and Ltlllreate a gtujl(ril)rity (If fon ill Ih dtciiyp dinmiddot(titJll Ttw pl1ly OJ till d([11l t artl oIT tIll attack Ill)t v hr he dhlrt-- but WiHlt I hI adnmiddotr ary atshytackgt that 1-- hi- (t]fJJh will c]pplld ()Il hl dllfjoll of t11l
asailant Bpcau e (If that fact lll mil )p ](ady pr~shy
wher( to J(pubr the lt1lt1Irgtar That circumtallcP ha always hmiddotd awl will lpad til dijllrlllll (If forn flll Ill( part of thp dtffn lmiddot lnrI In adY(llta)~( Oil I Ill part Ill tht otYPll-l(
Alld thlht l(halltql- llllht bl pot to u p for proppr 01shy~~anizati()n Df tllt t101 attack ~hltpfr may Iw the -nturashylion of 11w (Itf~ll with antItank gUIl-- it i~ 11wl~ po~ibIr
to create in till dllilp dlrlctioll a prlJlolHiL-ranCI uf tanllt attaching It1 COlljHlatlnn jtll till ttrtllleIY If the cnrmy has 1-1ahll--hcil ollf lntitmh gUll for each IOU yards (that is a high -gtaturatlUll and to create it is not uch n simple matshy101 a- may apptar at firt glance) t the nttackcl may have ill 111 offensive 70ne of 100 yard 1 to 6 or more tanks In that (asc (111 Hot countl11l the po~ibility of creating the same prepunderancc in artillery the advantage of the fighting a clcarly 011 the ~id( of the taId And therein lies the ltuperiority of the- at tacking- tanks oYer the antitank gUllS That nquirl~ of t1w organizer of the offensive an excellent military mind and thl rapality to lmplny tatlk tactics in (onformity WIth Ow IwculJaritic of the -iluation
In tIll ()lf~UljZllioll of thp tallk aUack th(gt 11101( the advpr-Iry lltllltioll b dilracld from the tIinction of the main blow the fewPl will oe the meall- of antitank defcJlsP which 1( will have aIoll~~ t hat direction anti the mure sucshyce[ul will be the tank attalk For this reaoon the preparamiddot tion of the aUarl of tan] an~I infantry mnt alway~ he can-fully concraJpd ill Ow dfejjvp rIir(ctiDll by Ow lmployshymenl of camouflage and by fligned activities ill ~econdalY dinctioll- The -uddllllW of the attack alvays has a -tunninJ~ effect
In tomlitiolh of limit(d obltcrvaUoH (ill twilight in pre-dawn fog) tIl( firE of artillery and antitank gUllS is poundndclfd (gtxtr(~n1PJy difn(ult and it is 11Iwly tl(hP condishytion which turn out 10 he highly favorahlp tl) the aetiyities oj th attaekillf~ tallls That is provpd abo by Ilw pxpprifIHP of th( Vorld War Tn all ea-C- a Jh~ht -mokp cllrllin ill front of lhf af1a(kifl~ talll is lllpflJ
lhe directions selected for the tank attack must have no obstaclr~ whi(h Hw tank--t art ill(apllhl of oVllenming Thc-iC conlt-lideration place highly 1chponiblp mi~ions upon tank r((ollnaih~alHmiddot( Thi-l lPCOllllaisstlnce must (stablish the character and Htnngth of the antitank guns and obstacles
and al--() tlw plteulialitics of the tank movpment on the
[ ~
ous sectors
StllIIE~middotaON OF TIlE ANTITANK (~llN~ III tillt (tt of a eOl1tillllOlS frollt of lntitlnllt gllll ~
a cI011sity or JIll HUll to (arh lon ranIs the aet iOll- of ralt~shysmall lalll g-roUJl~ (or a to Ii tan ) not united hy a gCI(middot olnmand ale unfavorahl( alHi an llot likel to tnrn ()ntl middotf CtSflllJy (~onsellueIl1Iy it is Hot adisahie t () assign lJ~ taJlih hy platoo)ls to the infant l lo01ptnil It h mJ blltll again-t a continuoll~ front of antitanllt gUlls to 011lt_ atl with a HtrollgPl1 with a whole comhat order of tad middot1
lompallits amI battaiioll-gt Ill( (ombat order of a 1lt1 J tlltnpall~ or hal tali on j- lapahle of comhattillJ even a r i 1illllOllS front of antitank gUll-
Tank pIed oon~ rna properJ~ be a-signed to infm (ornpltLnh-I in ca-c in which thell arc vanguard tank cr lOllS con-iUng of medium or heavy tanks and whose t 1
-ioll It is to suppre llw antitallk gUll- Tn 1he cae of a (()JltillUOU~ front the antitank gun
~uppr(sfd hy the mn]p powerful fin of Uw attacking- ta j
alld -u]lporling- arlill(ry Tlw tallks attacl in 1h( adormiddot d lomiJal order tllldfl (OYII of tlw firf of tlwir artillpryJ~ conduct fire nol only upon th( antitank gUllS which htJ been dicerllcd hut al-o upon suspiciotH 11lac(~s uf every 1] where fmch gun--t might be cOllcaied That deprives thc~middot~ tanle gUB8 of the adnllltal~(s of the illitiatip and make-~ il more difficult for them to make lle of aimed fire The tamiddot 4 mal1(gttlVer with a view to (1(at in) a mOlp favorable I Hi
tion for the attack Tlms for examplc when they t suppressed the antitank guns along 01lC direction they lgt r rndcavor 10 dphollch into thlt flank of other guns hut tlga alwaygt act in full combat order t ~O
middot~uil The Ain
THE CIWSSI-iG OF THE DES IN 1~1j
I~o[DII nd(niiilPllanr EI Pa-n til L(gt Andes 1m Jahle 1817 By Gentlal Knaus Crgtndenccd from 1I1I1IdlllIltI()ltrll( ftli(lr HlilelIIIIIcn nlllmllll PlOD 1~o71 iini
t udBy CIIlK II ~ IIRTKE~S Infantl
In 1808 the Frellch orrupicl till grcallt1 part of Spanish penimnda Lut --t(arllly any mfml)fl of th( Sl eolonilt- (oIlsirlprCd thi--t O(CUlTelHC as an opport UIli
-(utth Spanish domillation ill t Ill Spalli~h American nics All important positioll~ in 1h(se dependencies occupied by nativ( horn Spaniards EYPll th(l Amen 00
horn Spaniards ele rllu)atld to pusitions of serond 81 imloriaIwP IIlllrs they had bCPl1 enucaten and trnil1~ lac ~pain It WH only ill t hr minds of a fe broad i~i[ ll1f1l thai t hp idltt-- (lr ill( FnIlCh levolut ion rOllnd nccptf nIl
On2G 11ay uno a Junta I)lglll it distllSsions in 13m lis
Ail thpl a lily or 700()() Illtllapilli or 11 lrown col lie Rio dpla Plata (AlgClltina) In spite of frequent persmr he Challgc- this Jullta exhibitCd a heroic activity and ficial quality g1patly instlul11Cntal in achieing and taining frl(dol1l for A rglIltina
The ~eal of Spain- main power lay in the crown co of Peru Only by destruction of Spanish maslcry in t land did it appear possible to achieve independence for
34
VolXVIIiNo70 Foreign Military Digests
_nltV-S _gtrl-9~I
1 lJOOOOOOr
YI1m- 1 San brtm- OperlltlOns III 181
J ~ther areas Therefore the Junta in Buenos Aires disshytiatched shortly after 25 May 1810 an expedition to Alto - Feru (today Boliyia) and other expeditions were ordered ~tainl the Spanish in Paraguay and Montevideo On 7
omiddotember 1810 the Argentinians defeated the Spanish ncar ~uipacha and freed the most part of Alto Peru (Bolivia) Theieuro operations were conducted beginning at Buenos Am and extending to Lal(~ Titicaca over a distance of
i 3hout 1500 miles the last 600 of which were at an elevationIOf approximately 13000 feet An armistice which had f heen signed was broken by the Spimiards and the Argenshy lmJan Army was defeated and scattered as a result of a
Sudden surprise attack In consequence Alto Peru (Bolivia) ~as lost and the remainder of the Argentine troops retreated
middotto Salta and Tueuman (about 800 miles) On 2~ SeptemberlrlSl2 at Tucuman and on-20 February 1813 at Salta the ~f rgentiniarlH under General Belgrano defeated the Spanshyto ards under General Tritan The Argentine Army again ~ dvanced into Alto Peru but in two battles east of Lago ~~ oopo vas deciRively defeated on 1 October and 14 November tf 813 Belg-rano withdrew again to Tucuman and was 1Cshy
~ laced by General San lITartin Don Jme San Martin was born 25 February 1778 in
apQju (today San 11mUn) in the province of Corriente~ i- parents were Spani~h He attended Reveral schools in
Aire and in 1788 entered a ~eminary in Madrid At of 11 he became a cadet in the Infantry Regiment and at the age of 15 was commissioned a sub-lieushy
With audacity and great hravery he took part in ~ ampaigns in Morocco Portugal Spain and in a sea-undershy
li king against England In 1811 at the age of 33 he became lieutenant colonel In order to be able to participate in the dependence of his home land he left Spain and traveling
by way of London reached Buenos Aires on 9 March 1812 Vhen he offered his services to the government they were acshycepted and he was commissioned to organize a cavalry unit according to European pattern Sun Martin fir~t formed the squadron uGranaderos a Caballo This Hquadroll proved to be an excellent Behool both for developing the highest love of country and in promulgating the bet military virtues (today the regiment Granaderos a Caballo h a distinshyguished unit which performs daily its guard service in uniformH Huch a-) it wore when first organized)
III the beginning of 1813 San Martin was able to dpmonshystrate his excellent leadership capabi1itie~ when he was entruited with the protection of the right bank of the Parana norlhweRt of Bueno- Aires A Spanbh flotilla ascended the Parana River San Marlin followed it vlith his mounted men Early on the morning of 3 Februar) 250 Spaniards with 2 cannon landed near the cloister of San ILorenzo and began to advance against this place San Martin struck this force from either side of the cloister with such surprbe and such strength that it was defeated in a short time and was forced to retreat and reembark under the protection of the guns of the flotilla Although of little importance in itself this batshytle gained for the Argentinians freedom of traffic and comshymerce on both the Param~ and Uruguay Riv~rs since the Royalists did not again dare to send expeditions up those streams
In February 1814) San Martin was named commander of all troops in northwest Argentina He rccognized immeshydiately that the troops located there wcre not suited for operations over the long ltlnd difficult routes by way of Alto Peru (Bolivia) to move against and destroy the center of Spanish might ill Lima In lIlay 18B San Martin reshynounced based on considerations of health a plan whereby these difficult routes would have to be used and recomshymended that the province of euyo (today the provinces of Mendoza San Juan and San Lui) be used as a baRis of operations over another route against the Spaniards in Peru
THE ROUTE OVER THE ANDES TO CHILE AND PERU
According to San Marlins point of view it was unnecesshysary to sacrifice man and money for an undertaking by way of Alto Peru in this area the defense should be entrusted to the blave Gauchos those rah and hnrd riders of the proshyvince of Salta and to several tried squadrons In the area around Mendoza he desired to form a small ell disciplined army which in cooperation with the Chileans should preshypare an end to the Spanish mastery in order later to break the center of Spanish authority in Peru
When San Martin was placed at the head of the governshyment of the province of Cuyo in September 1814 he found such a small force (D85 men with insnHicient equipment) that it was impossible to begin the intended operationR at once His first job was to create the necessary tool and the ncc(sary means In the encampment at Pllmerillo IP~ miles northeast of the city of Mendoza (Fig-lire 2) he began his difiicult tURk the formation of his army the instruction of itt) components and the development of its spirit and morale It is interesting to 110te that he laid a special fmphaltis on target practice on field firing on close combat md upon the flower of decision by the lower commanders
l
35
r [oreiiin Military Digcais C amp (88 Quart
______ 1 ___ _ knoll ~
shy 1~~~-- ~---- (1
=
~t
L
-
l((f rhmiddot nvutl 01(1 tlw Antlc
For 1tw ft-Ul1011 1)1 hl- plalJ- San l1artlll required 1DOO pll tll1wd s]itihl~ tfJIl1l]l((1 di ciplined soldiers ucu-11olllld til hard lipld ~1JIlp cOIHlItiolh AH t11P iJaiH of his force San fart1l1 had t Iw iil-t and -ccoud -quadnms of hi- Gran1frch a (ahalll) and Iht (hillttll troops of GellshyeraIOIIimlJl- To thl-l wpre addcrllater 1200 voluntpCr- the th12ltl and f01111 h -qutdrons of GranadQros a Caballo and ltorne arlillfry III pltc of 111 effort- ill SLptemlJ(r 1816 the army llumhlreu hut 2HJO elfpdive- lI1stpad of the necesshy-lilT -1000 Agt a Jf-ult of the freedom of slaves 710 ltulditr (iJlatk HlId mulattu) PIjgt PIIJoJJpd alld fnlDI rhi]p 1evcral immigrant dtachmlnt were forml with the result that at the hinnllW of lRl7 lh And Army had rmellOr a total of tlO~O men lllc1uuillg all tafT
As auxijiariclt there crc empJoy(d
(C ] 200 mtlHjl for tilt tralbJlorl of all dIp tlld t h( ~Iunty of Ow Jill( of -llpply
II 120 nJilHI1 froTH hlldoza 101 work till road c A detachment of mountain guidps r 11a~j(r4 for 1111 pacl animals
Tillt four infantry haftalion (No 17 H 11) each COl1shy
Hi~tcd of fOlll infantry cOJnpallic~ a grenadier company and
it reconnaiiSHnCe compaIlY The legiment Glunaderltr Caballo a- c)mpo~(gtd of four combat t-qu1uron and accompanying --qlladron for the staff Tlw artillery bat ion had 16 to lD (allllOll~ some I-inch ~()mc 6-inch T --(afT olllti-tecl Ill li7 BWll The ltlJ1lll1l111itioli allotment it~d II ~70 rounds JlPI man (aB tol(1 ~)(WOOO) md 1 rOllnds 1)(1 canl10n (all told 2[20)
VIH1l till two (ohIllHI l1urched fJlllll Melldoza pre all told lO7)] hl)]o(- and llluh- 1600 snddiLmiddot [or tillt nIT alld fht (tdrr 72GD uJdlt mullgt alld pack millegt III addition 1020 ridlll~ and pad anim (()tnpallid detachment north and ~outh of the main co For pteh mall 1helt W(tmiddot ai)(lllt 1 hOlp- Ol mllips l~p
During Uw 111a](11 111( clalry alJd tIw -tafr~ crc( ale lowld to ride nJlh the mules in ordl to -l( the norses en lW ill ()mlmL ~rhc infantry tlw artillery IJcrollnel th( 011111 1)(JollJlPI tgt)( mIJlllJpd nil nlul in ollhr to co tlwir trength and 10 Iwlp ill ~ln1iJlj off a pCculiar ffi(shy
lain sillness COmmo)] to the Allck ~y~ Thp tubes of the (JillIOn Yen carertlll~ lap]I(d w_ aD
wool alid slwed into a lOvcr of hOl (hidp On -tlp sl 0011
tlw-lp (J(~ hrought fOlvard bv meangt of la oe attachec~ ~ tJ( ptck laddl(- )1 f 0 mullgt ~()lll followillg t hr oj Wl J~- U 1
hundred militia --oldilr a~i1(d ill this nHtlls of nu f[fion
The food tak(11 along Va aq folInw- about pound of dried --alt meat 700 edti( Oil the hoof 70 round loaves of Corn nllai zwieback dry chC(-( n J-u ply of win(gt and brandy a w~l1 as a goodly supply of An advanced supply ba-oe of food and forag-c protect militia was -tablishcd 011 the route of thl Ilorth colu tween Plumeril10 and Los Jlanantiaie4
III nnicI to proide durabk t~llif()rm~ fnr the diffi( llIuiertaldng- a cloth manufactor~ Was built ~ The M( id Luis HcUJan pstablishcd an arm factory Provision imiddotlls t made fur the manufacture of Jlmnlcr 11
San 1ialLin wa~ untiring in his efforts to train h to raise to the utmost (heir morale to JlrOLllrL~ the ne equiprnent and a1m- tn Cstablish an effective com fions and pr ~~~t(m to -((UI( tholoHll krltin rce ance reports lIe had strong ~ttpport from the gO(lll
of BUentiK Alnmiddot and frnm till J1oJlulation of the ploilltt (U~(I Till (lHhll l onl rihnttmiddotd t hlil lll~JlY to the l
liw~l Iriti-h 1ll11hUlb 111 rlltllOS lill- to hl)~e ir pst it H~ In (t tJll O(lthO of ~palljh d)l11illaliolli
ili(1l iar~~p nlllnlllJt~ oj sllJlPIiI nn lTldit ~~ The Ioral ~1aIlih a]m~ in Chill llJlchJ the agrd PI
dlnt GCl1eral nO~l Flanti lo l11lCO del Pont num 7OO nl~ttI lntl ~O() olililil Tn (ll~ t1lJi1 (1 Spar th ltoldi4n- yet tIll llla~ ltlll-itld of Chilem
Notwithstanding the IlUnllrical superiority of thee all AI Cl~ )111 lartlll tilddtll tn (IIT~middot thltHI5h the CA lioll ltlgdfl~t (hIi( A a Il-Ult PI 111 (lllg years in
IIIHl()~a 1J(j[ 11( had a 1h()1Ol~h IdWhdgl of tlw teT ro]l illlll jljJfWl toJJdillOIL of ill( nrCH as wLi1 a the Ihilll~ or asltI~t~lllll to hb OlhratlOn by an uprising of nathc-- of (hi]r n I
rtgilllliIlJ~ If Stpl(llliJtl lX]G San llaltll1 under nit IllJotiatioI Jtll the ChH[ of Oil Pehuenlhc Indians in CarlON (60 miles outh of Mendoza) with the elsible re tention of ~(cu1ing IHrmission to advalHt through the
36
01
middot
~
--~ shyolxihIl No 70 Foreign Military Digests
f itory of thrse indll)(ndcnt nciian1- m order to gtrikc at the paniard~ J~ a~ (If the E Plammiddothm d paRS During the colutlOlI the 1hllVJld1l~ maintall1(fi a neutrality although
( Spalllard lHdun orNl by lt111 kind of precnts to secure -~ 1eir alliaIllC again-t tlw Aljllltil1lans and ChiJean~ Durshy
g the di-ell-~I(Jll- S-111 Marlin propo~cd that the Indian~ rodtlP -uPJlh(~ fJr hi army ior which he would pay well nel fll]uilWU lh( -tllt et -iCCnl from the Indian Chief f~ allOtllldll Olle tL(Jj(JU~hl~ familial with the Indian manshy
cr he 1dll tllv Jnddll- ould tranflTIlt all informttion at m to L1H SpiI1lilJ U I holt dually happclled
iJj Jlalo dll Pont thl ~ranhh((lmll1ander in (~lile SOOI1
vPlllhld -tnllg 11)](-- 110nl lantIago to thl Iclmty of ttlC(l Iii) ndl Dutil oj SantlHgn In order to furthel his
-futenllull- Ill delude thmiddot Spaniard- San iIartin sent a fOle QJ till 1lll bl)l jJl~ (Jld I all -Id nlll)())- t() be clnulated 1 hat rih mllll allll uuld -)Oll 11Idlth 011 the pas About the ~ld vi (kloln) 1i5lLi San ltirllll tolllpleted negotlation- ()l the lIpll-ng of till Chillan 1Il lhL provincl- of Colchashyaua and 1Iltlul~ Thi~ upri-ing detached omc 2000 Spani-h ijuop ~(ltlY i1()11l the nJalll operatwns and toward itself
-i FOl all OIH)atlun dgal1~t [Ink 12UO miles long and middot~O null WIde l)IJ iderlllg ~eog-rapillc tlimatic and ciVlli shy
~ tJtlun londitlm-o olll~ tile f(ltIie and aluable areas 111 and ~OLIl1d ~11tJ1l_-P ere to be lUllsidcled ts the theater of dpcratJ(lIIc- )orth ChIle contained many saltpeter Wast(~ middoti1d and Ill()untam- ludl uffered little llO-1-iiJility of supply ran 11111 thollgh Inall Thl -ullth purtion (Iatlgonia) ~lIlel -dt1ed a~ uut of the que~tlOn South of the plOVshytile of )Iaulc there lleu the Arancano Indians an indeshy(f=-Jtndcnt extl ltwrdlllallly warlIke race which were not l p1CllCd unt-Ii 1870 In Ionsequencc the operations zone t~d hmitcd t6 that area lying Letween the 27th and 37th ~Id lllh- III thi~ a na ~0l1le G73 mik~ wide the terram ~~ the follo lllg charnl telistIc
UdClll the 11011 of the PadlIc and the Desaguadcro t_ ncr ttluWlllg illll1l 110rth to ~outh and in the south called Ie Culorulo) il the Andes hllh r~alh theIr hIghest elemiddot l ~tlllll in the ilenuozl-Santiago area The mass Aconcashyj 11 llU hl- a hlght oj 23O()() ftet to the south the i- c-t Jjju T1lllUllgito 22UOU 1ed nurth of Aconcagua the1crlldal]) 21UO() JClt In t1111- alect the pa~~es average an - evltlUl or ljO()O ftL In the variuus charts and m~p~ 1 ( c1eatlllll Vumiddoty The -110 Ime averages an elevatIOn f Of 15000 to 1G000 feet From thb cel1tr~l mountain range - mIll oj rh e1 no l~t to the PacIfic anu flow east
th~ Dlaguudlro Detycen the main mountain range thl Utaguadelo lie the rami lieu le~cr ranges and caRl
the a iell gelllrall) a~te fairly level area Only It the watercourse were to be found fruitful and cultl shy
cd a rl-t Nul only du Vc lUlU lc-~er cast and west range- (ll tilt AJlde-o (Hl11I range) and the Pacilie but a
I dllgl g11111 ally pal t11cl to th( coast which rises to jl)() t(~t tut at Interal~ by the -treams flowing into utll Uetweln ilw coatal range and the Andes lay vltdll~ from G to 23 lllile~ lJ1 width and with nn elevashy
ot GOO to 2f)OO ieet lopiou-lj- atered ullromlllOnly tfut till granary of Chile
The rllOst important pa--l- ill Ihe area of upcratlOn~ ere the followmg
Come Caballos (14400 feet) from La Rioja to Copiapo
h Santa Rosa 14000 feet) from San Juan to Coshyquimbo
c Lo Patos (1l000 feet) frum San Juall or Mendoza north of Atoncagua to LOR Andes
d La Cumbre (12500 fect) from Mendoza by way of U~pallata south of Aconcagua to Los Andes
EI lurtillo (13800 feel) frum San Carlos to Santi shyago
I Elllalleholl (lAIlO rltct) from San Rafael to Talca (150 miles south of Santiago)
III addItion there arc nUlllerOUR other routes which how(jI al( often very narlo vcry steep very difficult to ( rno- and in glneral unusable for military operations
Of the -ix main routc- named above the two northern (1) and (h) and the southern (f) lose lomdderable imporshytance bpcause of their distance from the Mendoza-Santiago 1IS of opcrations
Unly on a few of the passe were small shelters acshyIommlldating a few persons to he found In the mountain a 11 ( - were pa-tule lands Vater was adequate in the Alldc- (main range) in super abundance on the west slopes and in Chile but found only in the valleys to the east An army cro-sing the Andes will fmd pasturage and water in cuffiLient quantities Jul all other supplieR must be guaranshyteed along a line uf communications
In audition to the diHiculties of the poor roads and steep tony ascents and descent a force must contend with the adverRities of tne weal her In fact a crossing can be con sidered only during thf summer months (December t March) Even during thi- 11crioci at a height of 12OO( feet sudden RI1Uwstorms and LliZlalds can create havoc and dc~truction
In many sedions of the Andes puna (mountain sickshy11(-iR) aITedlt many traveler- Not only is it very disagreeshyaLle Lut it often results in death Common indications are cllfllcult breatlung suffocation decreased heart action exshyces5iYe tiredness great deSIre for sleep loss of appetite vomIting no~e anu cur bleechng Many people familiar ith the Andes attribute t he particular Andes mountain ~icknes- to the tremendous amount of rich ores the numershyOtiS underground wat~l tOl1rseS and the magnetic attracshytions As an antidote ra onions and garlic are eaten the nu-trils of the alllmah are rubbeJ with these two vegetables in order to inclea~e the11 breathing rate and blood flow At a height of lOOO meters a persoll with a full stomach will probal) be a1fected
The maw (11 Cf advallced over two routs (Figure 3)
(a) fIll right (nortli) lllalll column advanccd from Plumerillo In a northwesterly dIrection across the eastern ranges theuce by way of Los Patos
(b) The left (south) (olumn moved by way of URpnlshylata and La Cumba on Los Andes
On 15 January horsts of thL -tafI and of the Grunlt shydero) a CaLallo were sent aillud on thl north column route to the 10-gt Manatiale~ (3172 meters) area (an area proshyteLled against hostile threatR) ~o that they could become accustomed to the steep rocky a~cents and the weather
37
~ r Farciyn JIilitarY Digests c amp GSS Quart
d
JJ
ildlllI (ll] I Jdlllli 1-~ (dltlv Lljan Ilwing- to TAl
jItntllld(~ d lIn lrd -lIpph 111 HIln ltJIIIl fur 111 dd iI ltIii illd JUIIllt 1 l-Illlldlfl
Iii lt1Iil ~ IIi d IIIHilr (lllld I)()Jl 11jlIp -ohr lldllljtd tl1I 1lIllIJjlla tollo
Ir Jf[dlIJI Ill Jllt~fll(dlfll(lfll(lI(ll((lcr(J-a
(middott1ldlll II 111 1 (llddHj OllPlIl~ Jlld ICOlllla-anVl
(llIlIl Il 1lt1I~l ilt11dll1l ()lt I lnd ~ that 1 n -n h 01 till ~I I llljllllJ til lldd four V()1ll11111H and OTll
1111(1]111 lj 11lkJ 1(11)] JJOll )l ( IiliaIl InO IdI( 1 11 d --qtlti)oll of Ill (nnadlros a
[tldll ljldil1 1[]1111 0 I and -)t) lrlltrymill with ) jIJIl til 1lJ r IH IIi (j 11111 [1(lll ludi-llldo Alyarado
III lib I) fh ltll](l (( llild J)()1l 1irJlarto ()Ihggins L I] d I 11
I)ll ~I Idl) j jlll]l middotnlllllry (11111)a11I(- of Infantry i 111 dlfllJ 0 -I ~ Ill 1111 ltllllOil
IJl 1111] J lOll JltillIlry (lJnjJ1ls of Battalwn 1 ~ jllflIlJlil()td Illlll cd 11)( lafr --quadrOll
Ill ~ll llll lilmiddotI lilt ~d --qlltdron-ofthl (nI1shyIdtll)-- 1 (lhdo
Oil ~ 111]111 1111 I( flldllJd( l of Ow utilllmiddot or th 1111111 ld1ltlI1l 11lt 1)1111 dId lIllY IHtdqnlltlIgt
I hi ((IlltlI (1lllllldlHkd jn fllOllEl I)oll (ItgOJI 11
111 flIId flqrlJ Pill Idlo 1gt folo-
IIJ 1-IIIII1middot 1IJdlll Ilttalion-oll (i(lHpltn p ) 1) (rIItd]u-l (Lildlll trO()plr 20 artllkryfnetl
) I dllllll 1 )11 llJmiddotmiddotmiddot IjdlJJ -jJaJ fllglilfI)gt Ilh lt10111 1
111 fl [Ilat hll
()I lIJallll(r~ I (lll[fIIJ-- alld hlJllI) 1Ill 1l11l1lia quadII]1 qj Sail LUh alld a dtachnllllt of Pllgllllpr
Ih] IldllllllJ 1 lldl()Id 1) ~Il ralthmiddot
The Illft column was givcltn the initial miHsion of rcachi the Ultpallata arca and blockillg the valley of the Me river It should halt then~ until the north columl IIHliHmiddotd ltIll fllIH lttpproxirllatplyto fll w(t (the route IlIlrth (()llilllll a~ IllUlil l()ngl1 and mor( dHlkult) 1Ill 011 Ii I (lIIlHill IWllld -tizl llw IHight~ ast of La eu drmiddotrpd ill Spalllsh [(lrt- Oil the t~t -Iopes of the (malll lall~) alld (~taiJlish (ontad with lhe right (0 ()n t IlP (middot 1 ~df)IH~ 01 tlH ndp- the lpfi column should till tPPIOadl or t he right toIUI1111 Vh(l1 right nl( hlli 1 (Ianila dl 1( hupalla the left xhould h~g adtIJ(( Oll --ianta Ho-1 lnil -hould not enkr thi ton
to X F(llll1tIy i
Th Ijglt (nort 11) 011l1t11l should atvlJlle a- rapidlyf 1 l)(I~-1il)ll III ()ldpi to rltch If)S Iato- at an early date fr 1 Vhlli It Voltld fH pO -lhie (I1lploymg native guides to po jr out route ithtl SHit of the AcolHagua to cstahIiRh cv ~er J1llmitatiol1 with th gtouth toJumn From LOB Patos l~a(i should PlI-h on fa~t atmiddot 1)-- the Andes and vain the exit fn ~r()
the valJl~ oj tlw PuLlellcio j~Jlr It -hould -eize the helV 1 lorl II 01 ChacaJIlco pd
Tht advHI(( f)f tlw l(ft (solth) (01111111 paI
I I
Thi (OiUnlil Va- to Ilcwh li-paliata 011 21 Ja1llHlylffil
ait thelv until t1~ ~Hrlh lf)iumn had advlttllll(l a )lOftltrh tlOnatldINtal1(middotp 1111rtll1l1l1liltlallll1l wcre at the r(latllt~)(
1ll11l11]lortHlit fortiflcd po-itioll al Jiliwuta Against th r~( tWll advanced via JlIIlcai (--ollth of ACOI1eaglla)-VarL l two Spani-h compallllS (ahout 200 men) under lIa 1 largnclli A night march by 30 Spamards over PlcsUt)tl(( Illy illlpa-gt-gtahl( ouk- l(slIltd III a surpri-c attack on f~$u (hluta Iarly 21 January Some of the milItia Were kll--i the otlll1r ltptulld ailil the raitilI1g party withdrew toV~)1 Potrerillos (uluIlel La~ lIela~ ordered the immediate f ann of tiw glllladH] lOI1lJlany of the 11th DaUalion and Ifr Granati(ro- a Caballo under ~IaJur Don Enrique ~Jr tint At 4 00 A~I 23 Janl1ar~ after a forced march olin milts ill 1) hotll- lajor ilallilwl rcadwd the trong hoJ~ po--ition at Los Potrerillo-- At -t 30 I without furf-a-a n~~onnai-s(~nle ht attacked till Spanidl position at ttJt-lIl 1I0111t~ Alttl a Ire lIght of ~12 hourRll1s ammunitlOll (xhw ted )( ord(rtd nAinmt111 to Vacls But the Spl ian] withdrew lir-t initially to the pa~s at La CumiJrl iatpl farlher to the west
At 7 00 PM 1 February till columll I tltllhld tht dt
(Uia-- tl(1 (IOGO() [cpt) Faoltd hy the moonlightmiddot troops IH~an their a-c~l1t to the La CumlJle pass ( ridge line) at 10 00 111 ThlY arried at the hci ~ Il) AiI 2 FtilrUHlV and dlllillg till day tonlin
Iuneallllu (U200 feet) Thilt march i pluibly the ignitilltlnL nig-ht march at -111 lllights I ccorclt~d ill h )i-talllt 11 mill a-rlllt ~WO 1(It dlS(lnt 1WO (hI a FllJruary ulone La Ihra- Onlllld 1lajtll In llh 170 Illollllttt 1I1iPnwIl and W CranlIlelos a (a to attacl tilt SplIl1-il po-gtiti()ll tuardw Vipja liasrd dpl lIitd III f() I llla I 1011 of Ioul p a provided hy a natie all the -mall fortp advanced However I)(cau~(
xtl (Ill dillkuitH- (til ()untplld along 11w routes rocky -iOPl- and uf the Ilclcsity for terrain ltlonnaignn about 15 milt Vere rcquir~d in Ittlhing Ilw Spanish p tion
38
1 06 men attaekcd the pmlishyAbout one-hnlf the fon (
and rear
iOn frontally hde the remainder D6 men advancing over Ifficu1t vcry Stt~lJ and rocky terrain struck the position in
After 11 ~ houlr- fighting 40 Spaniards fallen 49 had t-uncndered and the remainder under
L vcr of darknc- fled towtld4 Los Andes rh The main -outh column reached Guardia Vieja on 6 I~ JFebruary Shortly after nOJIl 8 Fehruary it rcachCd Santa ~ iRosa n~i)O llHjprlt) whIt 11 the Spamard- had eacuaiec till ll- duy Lefore The lOUlllll had HllOmpii-hed its initial mbshyr ~ t-I(n On 8 February l(gtI1lWdloH with the 1l00th column at Sw Felipe wa a-gtdJLd
Thl nWI( h of til Igllt (north) column
r 1 The mUlIl (right) column began its mallh from Plumshylnllo on 11 falllltlmiddotY alld nlarciHri III ltix groupgt one group J)er day leaviJg the camI) Oil 2) January after his troop~ )lad aU mOiIi (Jut GlIltlal San 1Iartin took hie departure
fr from Mendoza f The hrst tq glOUp llndel General Soier formed the
advance guard The mo-t important instructions given GenshyE ral Soler were (1) the to n of San Felipe as to be leached un 8 FebrualY (2) lOIlnnuniLatlOIl was to be estahlished ~long the rlCOlllagsl rle- with the -outh column (3)
) fhould the ituatio1 1lHi thl hostile dispo~itions and size permit it Santa Ro-a-Lo Andes was to ue attacked ( 1) it I of utmot importance that the heights of Chacashy
L )JUfO he tUIHd () lIry dTort ~hotlld he made to surmiddot llri-c and fJyelptn tl til( SpanI-h ou110ts in the Andes
rt (6) should th[ ataIHc guan be attacked by tonsiderably 1 lunerJOl 1011(- It wa-- to fall balk on Lhe following columns_ i The advalH t of tlll~ (uiumn Va executed according to
plan III Pltl or the difilcultw or terram and at the Leginning of water Hlpplr the objcdives set were reached
1 b ~~hedl1ll until the crl--t uf the Andes was reached the v yenre~lest part of the malch was made mounted on mules ) jncludIng ill( infantry1 I From Lo Paio-- San Iartin despatched a flank Jeshyt tachment of 200 Illell under Ialor Don Antonio Arcos via tj ~middotltlk lIlrmUi ClIlllga (when a Spanish po~t wa- known to IJL talIoncd) and Alto tit (usn to Lagt Alherpal1as ThiS
ftrca ~huuld be OLlllpied ltlnd defended to permit easy acces- Jpf the main body into the broad valley of Putaendo River t ~ The adaJlCl guard Itltlthld the camp eat of Cuesta (iLgt
el ~LllteJl on IltlmiddotlJruary On 1 Feuruary the detachmcllt t~ [(O- -lLulcd the dlltil at La Guardia de la- Achupalla~) n1middotpefeatin~ a force of 100 Spal1lanli defending theretk Tl1l adiun guarant(l(~d to the main force the exit from dhfhe difliLlilt mountain terrain General Soler IJushed forshyd ~ a d rapl1Jly with the aUIJmpdllying StlUaliloll and the ~d lt ntl th SquadrrlIl- Graladero- a (ahallu he speeded upjt he adanu of the inflntry awl ar1illery On 6 February t)~~ he trolll)gt of the adVallll guard tlC uilited in and north of ~Ji an Antunio de Putaelldo Captam ~e(ochea with 110 n~yen Granatlcros a Caballo wa ordered agaillst La) Coimas On l~ he morning of the 7th this force ellcountered a Spanish deshy~ t ltichment of 100 cavalry ~oo infantry and 2 cannon in a t()~ trolJg jJ(Jmiddotiltion a1 Las Cnima- General Soler immediately arm copatched reinforcemen1s-two sltiuadlon of til(gt Clanashyp~ crJ- a Caballu and two mfantry companic-l to Cq)tain
eCuchta 0icloehea howeyer dJd nol aWait the~e reinshy
Foreign Military Dige8t8
forccments lIe feigned a1douule envelopment of the Spallshyjqh position AH the envelopers approached closely he feigned failure and a wild retreat A- he contemplated the Spanish cavalry stationed on eith~l flank of the SpaniRh infantry jumped to Lhe attack and purtluit When the Granaderos a Clballo had drawn the Spanish cavalry sufficiently far from their infantlmiddot~r and artillery support they turned ~t JIIlk and demqra1izcd th( Spafli~h cavalry In the disshyorder and disruption the Spanish infantry also took to flight Th( SpaniRh force far Rupcnor in numbers fled to San Flipe There was no pur-uit by Necocheas force
The advanCegt rested on 7 February riwaiting the arshyriaJ of the main body As planned the right column reached San Felipe on 8 February the lpft column reaching Santa ROfm the -ame day After reconstruction of the bridg-c (destroyed by the Spani~h) over the Aconcagua River near San Felipe the Andes army was united on 9 February southwest of Los Andes A squadron under iIajor Melian waJ pmhed forward toard Chacabuco to observe the enemy middotand reconnoiter the terrain
By his viclorie of 4 Fehruary (Guardia Vieia) and of 7 February (Las Coirnas) General San Martin became master of Aconcagua provinc( and thereby was enabled to provide his army with supplies and additional horses On 8 February San Martin sent a message to the President in Buenos Aires in which he expressed his great regret in being unable to follow the Spanish at once but would require at least six days to secure replacements for his horses and mules incapacitated on the march from Mendoza to Los Andes Of the 1600 horses ~nd 9191 mules which began the march in spite of utmost care taken only about 500 horses and 4300 mules reached Los Andes in a usable condition
Between Los Andes and Santiago there lies but one major terrain obstacle the heights of Chacabuco These heights form a half-moon shaped ridge between 4500 to 7200 feet high extending from east to west and forming a connecting- link between thp AndeR and the coastal range The north (Jopes arc very steep the south slopes are much gentler dolted with small hill and receding gradually to Chacabuco
As they reLired from San Felipe to the south the Spanshyiards occupied the heights neal elevation 1820 with 2 comshypanies and 25 cavalrymen in order to block the route
When General del Pont learned on 9 February of the results of the engagements in the Aconcagua and Putaendo valleys he di reeLed that all forces Routh of Santiago asshyemble there to defend the cit) and he despatched Brigadier laloto with to half battions Lo Chacabuco Maroto arrived at Chacabuco the evening of 11 February he pershyqonally lodl to lhe 10 tomjJmlie~ on the norlh slopes (1820 elevation) and ordered them to defend to the utmost Only whenihalf their force VDS decimated were they authorized to withdrHw On 12 FebruaJT MaroLo intended to occupy the heights with hig entire force
Meanwhile San Mnrlin had sent two esp(cially well qualified guidc8 to Santiag-o who kept him informed of the Spanish movements On 10 and 1] February two engineer oHicers protected by v ~quadron of cavalry reconnoitered the heights and the hotllilc position The weRt slopes (1432
39
On
C amp (SS Quart
Ol-liggins Thi~ attack pushed through and into the artillery position~ Cannon Were cut down with the bel As the cavalry charge in proglC--s the leading clements (2 rifle companiCfI) tsoIPl~ loillllllJ whost advancp hH1 bllll accelerated tati(d lillwisl the hft liallk of the Spaniards many whom Cdl 10 the hayonet The stalT and llh Squa middot(iranadelo a Caballo U1Hll Major Necochea had In
farther w(gt1 almot sirnulLallcously with the other aU Ill HI ruck thl SplIlish left rear The-e three attacks aga t IH Spanihh Ipft and rpar ltlu-eo confusioll and disorder HTPat lo~-l on thi~ flaJlk -0 that OHiggins second at
af~ailll t 111 lil~ht fnUlld a much dbcOl1certed and u Plteruy-rl-1I11 -Iompiett ~lIlT~- The Spaniards attack~lt ril
middotkl1rei~ lIilitarg Digests
melp-) tPIHlll~d mon -uiLlhle fol tlll a ccnt than thu tllt-lt
(22n Jilt~lt)
Ull I FlIJrUl1 olt of the gmde-gt returned with inshyformatlfll fn l1i~lhd Ly an agtnt ill Santiago It wa) an cxtrad of ( lWl ~d rj 1 j1oHl~j f)dEl (lopiNI 111 hih own oOle-e) which dirtlltd till JIIIJt of ftillfonlmPllh to (haclshyUuco (()IlqUllltiy hiI aft(lllo(JIl (11 FdJluary) San lll~t II (tll t h- lJ Irdllltlt (oJlltlllaquondtI~ anci -ttltd thal I had j t 11 In flll)ti IldlIlI)H] 11) attal ] 1 Felnuary lllI 1]middot [)i(l IJtlld lllJt Ill lull nmiddotad- ulltil then hut llll Jll -iillln 11llrn SdlfldO dt111lIldld Iarli(1 action ThIll (1111 III hld (jltlll~1 d ili- pltl 1I1d vutild IWllth Ith d IUJ Jll p [d fill J ~ lttll llal ilj~aJlhl till (nelll) III
flrdr 10 did( k luJIl iH r Illt lIt (luld hap to f()nl~()
11Ilj II LIIIJ dll i 11( I)uld )it thv Imiddotllm no tillle to Initl Ill Jl I III Iltuld cilf(al lum ill udad
Till lldl IIJl tidlLd III tVII C(JII1l1111 The lI l qltllll ([U rd OIqiJlh wilJ 1~I()I lllt 11 (1 ~t2d tlld ~d
Squad rOil Ilf Llll (ldllltilnJ a (tullo Illiantry bllshytalj(lIh I 1]1t S (( h ith [our rllll COl11ptlllll- and tO
gllll) had til mi ioll )f tiXlll~ the (l1lm~ III [rullt The ( 1 OlHlll11 rWItl ~()ltr 1111 ~10() 1l111l (the ~tafr ami
Uh Sqtladloll If tll( dllultJn (abalJo lllLullly Igtatshylditlll I dlill 11 Idd 1gt1 IOllr rillE- lllPlllit- Oil gTlIlLdil1 tlld (111( 1( ldllld ~llllmiddot( I ltl)lllldll Ill gIllIldlel awl ret(Jllshy
1lImiddot-dHI (lllllIIlH of inLllltlY IJattali()ll~ 7 and 8 and t~1l Itllh) hld till 1ll1lnll of atlaeldllg tlw ho-tili ]pft (11) llll lllcl 1IHlllllg I Ill d(tl~]()ll
lt llI) ~l 12 February the UiYIIlCC IJlg lll IIlItially
III Illlt C(I1111111 Srdlr I fUlljgt ivldillg Ollig-gingt ~ent illshy
llllllY )llldllll ~ to till la~t ttl gll tIlt impnlull to the 1llllIl) 1 htl 1hI 11lt1 1dl rwht would 1)[ Pllvtloplf1 and lllcishydl Iljtlly to tll(l thp ho-tij( atttntlOl1 aay from the actual (middotInI11111t1ll1 -I()l Sldtormiddot Cldul11ll turned to the southwcst ()IIirl~IIl ll)lllillUed --I)ulh Oil the Chalaouco -lopes ) II ijlll Jllitl 1111 --jllll h 1-1 (lft) Iillk and 111 a
h1 p lJilllt I dilir droL il hack TIll Spltlllitrcl ithdllw 1) lILt ()tllh jllll-uld )- tIll hl Squadlon (ralladCro a (Iiltllo TllI reinftlrlvlllllh UlHlPr (rn(ral Malolc) had I Ill Ulltlll If) nmiddottl1l 1111 htighh of Chacauuco as the results II tIll lIl)W nt 111 hlltlll IHI1l )JI)oo ()J(knd the tlClUshy
II tlllIIjlcilllt 1( jHI-III111l nlllt2-)Jllilt IlOlthof(middothallshyLIIUJ (lll) Tlll~ plt1 1tlllj) aiHlllt t Ulllt III width IJiolktd ill J(-~ Ill ll 1tlJll arm lllll tiIp plains
San Iartw tlllh()fJId ()IIiggin to pur-lIe Ith illshyf~lllry hat1all)Jl x1hc SI)tlllard IIceing- from the Chacahuco hi hllI)11 unti( r IIIJ (JlHill lIn to hrillJ ol a 1~1lItrd llIgtg(shy
HWllt again t ht IW JlIJ illfJll until thl (tva]ry had passed th II tilc Iyillj~ 1)( 1laquo111 tlw height which had JU~t iHrn tlkl II ltd tll l)fh1tiIJIlIIIupifd l)y ilw forc( I)f 1lroto Bu1 () II WFlll 11 h a )lrlll1W din to ~wUle this thing himelf dJll1JlJt (Ji)t till f)rdlr~ II( advancld with hattaliolls 7 ami Illll lhf poilion and Ililn a wI11 plallllld nnc1e(lIkd
lin hnth inflIltry and arlill(ry His troop ufT1rillg gllat Ill I -11( ICJf(Imiddotd II) vilhdraw San Martill himplf apshyIWiln d 1)1] Ill 1i1leI wit h 1111 i~t awl 2d SquadrolJ ( ralla~ tilmiddotrO a fahallq alld l tl1l Spulih (tvalry awl illfalllry aclvtll(illg ill pur Ult 1)1 OHiggins furce lIe orclprcd Soler to attack h~ h iJ Ift lIank imm((lially hil h Jlrshy-I(lnally led thpound two quadr()ll~ III attack for the rclilf of
40
from Ibn sidt Jlghl to form a square bUl UJlsucccifull~-gt Vild flight to jhl -outh followul (enclal ~(Jlcr launcI~ u~ hi malJl forle ill Jur-uit TIll cavalry pursued 1) mil
T af
0
-Oll h of ChacalJllco Spalli-h lo~~es 600 dend over 6 r(aptnld J OO() rillr~ 2 canllon and all the traingt
And Army lJad 1~2 killed and 177 WOllIHkd ~RI
Thi IOllg prpparatiolls the well planllPd mea-urea irf I e (
the gTlat On-lnlZlr Irailler and cxccllCllt comrnClIH CI S~ C ar Marlin jt)HlId lill fruition in th( hattie of Chalabuco t~
II htory llconl (w hattie with far r middotching polf ~~ cal COII-tltLIlIHl- This baltllt ~ho()k the Spanlh mat~i-middot an at its root gltlVP 1lH maJor portion of Chile it frCcdom a~~ art gutlank(d -tit(I-- to till -tnwglps by Argelltina for in~ tar pcnd~ncc It paved thl way for further operations agairt f1 tl the Spanish ill PCIU f all
The CJoSlllg ords of Sail Martins mcsagc to the COU~fhE eil ill fhwllOS Air( wlittLll 22 Fcuruar- Vcre thcc tiJr ~hall be forevlr the glory of the Army of the Andes thatflaquoU81 21 days it lomplltld a campaign crossed the highest mo~l~ee bin chain (If thL earth closed accounts with the tyrant ar~ frc(d Chilcgt ijsel
After Chalahucll thc Spanianh con-idcl(d furthpl le toe lance profitless During the I1lght 12-13 February H~f t (vtcuatNI Santiago and 11((1 to Vaiparain (GO mill~s) Fl1ilJe here ome Were tlanported by ~hiJl to PQlu others to SOLt~a Chile (TalcaiJualla) The artillery p(rk at Cuola ll-tlll Prldo [Pll into tht hand~ of fan Ilartlll ~~e
Vlwll 0ltln lIla1 ill lealned during the Illght 13- _ c~ February or 1lw Jlight of all Spanish otlicbls r]())n Sant hL dLpatchLd Captain Aldan wit h 30 Granadcros a Cab ill puruit alld prompt Iy tarleti the remaillder uf his lHovilW Oil -altlit~() II elltered tht tity Oil lhl Iah g
by tnlllendou- delllollstration from the pOllulace Iflth San llallin wa ChOSlJl to Ul SllllCmc Direct() ltflhld tillt hOllol llll prnpnld (Plwrai OHiggins ho prornptly lielled Oll 1he 16th
C(n(ral dpi Pont a tely -ick mall and his immc (lItollnlJ~l Wll lapturld --oulh or Valparaiso the night of FtbltwlY and hrought hae] tn -antiago
III ~()lIlh Amlrica lrilits charge San Martin with roll()iIlJ~ llIilII- aftt) hi ictolY at Cl1acabuco
(1) Failure to 1lru rtlcnllcssly with all his forces
(2) [he advance Oil Santiago evacuated by the Sp on 1~ Fcbrwuy rather than directly on VaillllaiRo to off the Spanbh access to the sea at
(3) Failure to launch a campaign immediately against alCllhuano (south of Santiago) where-the Spmish had good esources strong positions and excellent harbors
4) Failure in these particulars resulted in the Spanish ning masters in parts of Chile for more than a year
Foreign Military Digests
Right column Plumerillo to San Antonio de Putaendo 223 miles executed in 17 marching days or an average of over 13 miles per day
Plumerillo to Santiago 301 miles in 27 days (elapsed time) 01 an average for the leading echelon of over 11 miles
Y1 ore dI ~) In answer the author writes 0~11 The crossing of the Andes demanded from both leaders ~Ct tnd men tremendous will power and physical endurance ~~~t ltAfter he united his army in the Lo Anum area San iIartin ~ lionsidercd a halt of six days nCCCRary to get up all his artil shy~ fery to procure animaf replacements and to provide his t~ i troops with proper food and mpplics Yet thi- Cxtraordinshyc~ 4rllyactive and capable commander after but two days rest ~ Ihunchcd his tired troop~ in attack at Chacabuco in pursuit ~ tk Santiago and dcspatched a moullted purmit force to the
coast t Based on the information he received 11 February Sail
1 Martin knew that hii opponent was a~scmbling his troops for the defense of Santiago He multt assume that such a
~~ defense would be made not that the Spalllsh forces would tharch off to Valparaiso the night of 12-11 February without living battle Had San nartin had timely information of
0_ this Spanish move it might perhaps have been posihle for t- Ban Martin with orne of his force to have fltgt(tched Valshyz ~arafs6 simultaneously with the Spaniards but it b an old r ar experience that the pursuer ~eldom marches as fast 11 ti the purllcd 11orpove1 the march of tl1P Aneles Army on
Valparaiso might well hwe been a blow in the 111 On the G other hand the occupation of Santiago guaranteed ~upplies for the tired army ~toppecl plundering by the mobs and
It guaranteed the early provision of a new government for the r treed country
The Spanish reaction in the area south of Santiago made iLelf felt under the capable leadership of Colonel Ordonez
c- To COlmteract thil1 San Martin de~patched Colonel Las Hera~ t~ at the head of ] DOD infantry cavalry and artillerymell to r ~e south with the mision of defeating and dispersing the oJ ~anish San Martlll himself had lt1 g-reater objective in ypmd The freeing of (hile was Jut a preliminary step in t~e emancipation of Peru where Spaill ma-icry had ib
3 i tpcal point But for an undertaking aglinst the Spaniards(if Peru the forces thCll ill (hill were wadclJuaic H(gtipi trom nch BUPllOS Airc~ wa~ Hccc--ary in order to provide at the ealiIt-t a Heet hl(h III turn would se(ure masitr of
rr ~e Pacific and thereb -eCllle the Chilean and Peru~ian e~ tlt Therefore a ~onth after Chlcabuco San Martin t elled to Buenos Airclt to lay hi- case b(fore the power
Overcoming many obstade he -ucceecied in hl~ misshyon and on 20 August 1820 the army under San Martin d the fleet under Admiral Lord Cochrane all told 8 warshyipl 17 tralJiports 4000 men iailed from Valparaiso
t ward~ Peru f t The campaign in Chile demoll-gttluted the great cap ashy
t~lilie of San Martin his far-seeing preparations his dttermination of purpose his indomitable leadership
8 L A brief Rtatement of the march accomplishments of the l oop~ would ~eem in order nl~ In the plans and ord(rs ilt-ued by General San Martin e marchc to be excculed daily and the reullH of lhe road
ater wood and pasturage reconnaissanccR are recorded
and for the 2d 3d 4th and 5th echelons 185 192 20 and 13 miles per day
Left column Plumerillo to La Villa de Santa Rosa Qxecutcd in 10 marching days or an average of 166 miles per day This column marched a total distance to Santiago of 217 miles
The question might be asked What would be the inshyfluence of modern organization and equipment on an operashylion ill the Andes today It must be remembered that these mountains rise to great elevations (12000 to 23000 feet) that the valleys are often narrow and steep That fliers gas or tanks would prove especially effective against a force marching in multiple columns and echeloned in depth is questionable Of course the picture changes once the force reaches Los Andes That the movements of the columns could and would be observed by observers in planes is probshyable and that the hostile high command using rail and motor transportation could concentrate his forces to strike the still gtcparated columns is possible and probable
Autogyr08 and wireless would faciHtate the communishycation~ and spy report service Parachute troops especially in defiles might be employed with surprise by both attacker and defender Modern engineers and engineer technique would certainly relieve many route difficulties
IS IT NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MOUNTED FORMATIONS IN THE CAVALRY
[dFautmiddotli consel vel des formations a cheval dans la cavulcrie By Lieut Colonel Dario Condensed fOm RevH de ClLvalcnc January-February 1938]
By MAJOR L K TRUCOTT JR Cavalry
A question disagreeable to cavalry ears Belgians reply in absolute negative England 50 mechanized tends to total mechanization Germany retains but a single large unit a brigade in east Prussia Considering the question may lead to useful reflections
The idea of substituting motor for horse came logically a result of the waf From its beginning the horse was forbidden the battlefield Haelen sounded the knell of the doctrine of mounted combat by large units The years 1917 and 1918 saw tanks cross fire-swept zones penetrate hostile di-position sow disorder and put enemy at the mercy of infantry-a role of cavalry masses for centuries Off the battlefield cavalry transported maneuver masses rapidly over great difltances the truck transported greater masses more rapidly over great distances The truck permitted the audacious wide and sustained play of reserves that characshyterized 1918 During the critieal days of 1918 when large cavalry units engaged dismounted llrmored cars in gaps contacted and surprised enemy columns informed oriented and rallied elements of withdrawing troops On the battleshyfield the molor was sucessfully substituted for the horse
However at the end of the war the horse had argushyments In March 1918 what but mounted formations could have regained contact as quickly with German rear guards
41
C amp GSS Quart
of HCrU-iS the area devH-tatrd by them In April 1)]8 what ehw could have moved lPinforc(ment to the north aeros the communications of Engli~h annie preparing for the new battlc ~lonths latef what eJ(middot could have clung to retreatshying- German-- acro-- ruins ami lilid~ of FlandPlmiddot Vhat else could haccfOS(middotd 1hf 1llkll1 nllllllldll lllrntll I1ulg-arialJshy
dGerman rcojtance fOlccd capitlilati()lh ill a few hour and reachrd the Danulw III a fn ((1 Vhat of innul11Clabh patrol- gliding aco wood and mar h -willlmillg river-- (Irarillg uJ-taclt- -Ilmiddot1Jlj~ tlw P1wmy ithout J)pinf~ won or heard di-cIJ--JIlV hi Ill) lnHlIh IHnding entin da~ JUlIll hb lim and rltnrllltW iJy dt-Vi()lh route with rich lllfo] shy
mlti(JJl
If it llm( d (Jgcd to ~UlJ-tJtllte Illllt(lr for ho re 11lt ub 1 it lit if1I (an 1)( finly parI wi and dl)( lnt l1JIorabl~
tonrifllIll til hqJ~ It Illlghl )( jllllnp If Ihp]( W1
actllally all all IflTtlll middotdll(middot Ej)(middotri(middotllcl ha- (alrnl(
Pllthultjam and pa- ~ lull 10dll ( h nO t ht t t Iwlt Ill)
mcchaniz-ed all hlT~llll that till 111 tt-rr(lll llllcle is likely to proglt off r()ad Il arJIlV dcgru I(onling to the modr of llopllllOll Jut aha~ lp-trirtrrl alld alway at great coj that th( all tprraill i lprtain tfmiddotrrmiddotain
By dlpllllll nrp pnwer at at ild -=prr(l rfady for inshytant actioll l11t motor 11Iin~ lll Illlhnprd onlutinn to thc problem of lili0(JII of In illld 1ll0tnwnl It spr( el proshyttdioll and an1allHllt hac changld COllClitlOn~ of reCOllshyllaiance llld cOlltar fxtlnding- the ladill~ of action ill width and dr-pth Tn 11anpo1t -qwrd and radiu l)clmit acshycclcratin~ mU-emcllt- to the front and incrcaillg di-tallceo tu thc rear TI1U~ the motor ha~ mudified preyiou concepshyt iOll of lxplqit ing (ontact ~(curity orgtllizat ion awl fUllctlOl1111g of erdce It has changcd combat and malllll shyycr iJy modifying nwthoci of ((cu1io11 lllcl rflldrring- posshy~ihlp what forn1lrly wa lut Certain ulclat ions ill South ~loror(() and cry JlTobahly till ~ampaig-n in Aby--dnia are not diflicult opprationlt madp etlsipr by tllt( of motor thl~
arl oJlpratioll lill1ll1wht haYI Ill(n imp()ssih1e without thlll1 But Ow motor hac rlgnrnuo limitntionlt
JUf rhlliifgtl lilll it(lf 1111 middot~I()tlll~ CoIl0IW]( a Iltioll of ga- cl(t(Jmilwrl ill Ilature and quantity mopovpr importfL The ration allows lwitw -Ilbotilution 1101 rpchHliol1 For maintenance tl1l molor rcquin~ at dcilllitp lpriod work llld
replacement which ~ufTer neither --ubstitution nor reducshytion Repair-today Htth more than lx(hallf~p of worl
part for lH-nCjuill 1Hcial parb ill -IlPcial quantity for pach model of vehicle At a particular time lacking tlw-p parts IPpbCNllfllt lt- hours of worl goa tilt motor -tops slrvicp Thpll alf 110 motors tapahlL of fllrthCr (1shy
vice 011 -hort allowance or orn out provided they lecciv(- (JJ1~id(rati()n and tolerance thpre are motor Jlfrf(ctl~
ltpn(d thai move or motor that do nol mo(-
)IojoJ formation mwt he emploYfd within a limitCd definitely kllO1l radith (JI tied to road on a system of cir shyCulat ill Ir10PIlWllt and ImpJoymPIJt of dT(( ini an hound to rcql1inmcntlt of maintel11I1Cl (omba1 engines arc vulshynerable antitank cannon and mille ravagf thpir nlllk After (om hat a -plciai sl1ice must immcdia1rly collpei and repair damaged matpripl and failure ri-lo~ losing costly mat~ricl that could have been restored to service
l(ITll1U limit((iols-DiHpiacement of automotive v cles dependsmiddot upon consistency of ~oil and aosence ~tacles Lacking bridges rivers are alnmlute obstac moulltaini marshy cOLlntries WtHlls or in had wea llOgtS-(otlllt lY vehich)K must middot(ck loul~ 1 hlre1or( mo dt-fPlui UpOI1 nature alld dllhitv of roadlt
Fllllc it)lIIl liltlf([tif)I-~ From chicles armored nary or moto]cyeit oh(lvatioli is poor while in moe 011 Ul( other hand (Iliclfs an eaiiy seen and marc iward Vphicl-s a1( cllmIHISOHl- (olumn- an dim aswmblf put ill march swlter conccal break up disaUvfllltagtS forbid u-e for short distances Vehicl column arc (gtxposed to ambuh and depending UpOIJ
of vlllltlaililily to all forms or --urprise (~ 01 r C
bull
rc Consequently While pos-iLiJitics of the motor renamp ~ W
Its lIiC as 11lCCSsary a~ powdcl thc motor has disadvantarj ( that limit and at timegt forbid Hi employment IIechann ~ j~
formations have takell IloSltCsioll of the battlefield forbidd-- Ol
to the horse Alotol formations arc taking over rapid f 1f( diitant trmlipOlt of nla(i Left to thcms(lv(s CV(-11 elI - nl billCd t1l(se formations lend thcmwiv(-s hadly to details itl actions their (ontacf g-ivc- only a ~Jl(cial definition tJ ~ calillot be dil(etly [xploitcmiddotd by 01 hel I roop they hi 1 diHkulty ill maintaining- contact once matlc For short ~ Oni placement of motor formatio1l (lltrmkillg security circihn latioll alld detlucking COl1sUnle ~Hlantag(gti of spre ~ Mechanized formation cannot operate within h(~avy COYt
Motorcycles while invaluable f() communication Hnd 1 for distant surfacE reconnaissancE are of questionah cill1(y fot sc(urity during approach and contact F mOllntains marsh~ reg-ion certain brollten and cover area like tllO-1e found ill the north an foruiddftl motonmiddot formati011s unle~R exits are as~urrd thev are forbid~ mechanized formatiolls cxcept in grllCral ~ alignment 0 ill progressing fron1 Demolition ompromi=c movem(llt5~ both unforesecn they cause massing that adation will n14
mortal Fog freeze snow can immobilizc entire f tions finally failure in circulation ~uppJy or maint exposes motor formatioJ)4 to (ompl(10 paralysis restrictions an ppccially leti( ill offplliv( manCu(gtfpound in defensive situations tlw dlfCndtl is usually master oft terrain his r(a1 and security
Thll(fon if then i Ilccd 1111((1 all eilc1l111stl11CCc force mOle rapid 1han infantry a Huhl ltllHll1lastic c III lll 1 to t IlP motor is ll(((ar~ 1hii cOlllplenWl1t (all the horse While Ihe field of battle i forbidden to the I the approach is less forbidden than to th~ truck units have not 111( illPrl ia of automobile units tlwy ltlimir vulilllability by formations and rapirl dislWlsions Til patrnl alone arc capahle of a~sl1ring- full l)(onllais~a
l(l1~dll fol tlllt illfa1l1JY Tlwitmiddot (ollj~l(t is Jilp thal fantlY and is immpdiaiply lltiliablc wit hout t lanspor TJ1Pil (OIlIJllllS sllppJp and fluid call crOSH womb and impfl1pt rahl(l foJ motors or terrain broken by demol JlflHtratl mountaill labyrinths Rwim rivers Final horse finds suhsistfll(p nrarly rlrywhclC Th( horse ltlllr~i fatif~l1e and fJriat ions hc S(-lVCS (-VCll wh perfectly HClved i a worn horse column drags l)elhaps but moves and a few days rest will reestablish it SU11plcn~
horse units their fluidity their simplicity of mainten3
particularly to circumstances and terrain forbidden r formations Motor and horse are therefore com pleshyone to the other portion between hor~e and mOLor involves all the of national defcn~e such a~ the nature of the ar
esecn the general orientation of operation~ density middot infantry possible nature of terrain and climate in theaters
Foreign Military Digests
In an organization born of the war on the West~rn Front of reinforcements individually justified we have reached the point where the division which by origin and definition should bn the smallest group of combined arms thai can be efficiently employed can move only by breaidng up and forming mixed groups WOlse-not special to the cavalryshyin desiring to put these unitA in position to fight new means
i f operations clcdits and pel~onll(l Clvailabl( for the ~ otor i~ costly in money and effective national resources
articulally breeding which imposei a millinmm of (ffcctives n time of peace finally on the degree in which conduct of arcan be left to mercy of ~uppIi~1 that depend on the molshy
lle of the real and good will of fOlcignrll COlllequently jlJ]utlOilS difler in different countries Belgian will differ trom British or German Olll- may diiTCl from othergt The iwo nations that have gone farther in favor of til( motal are VlOse faced with particular war cfmditioll Delgiurn (gtnshy11-agcs only a defensive action waiting intervention hy dlied forces Great Britain counts on air and -ca fleet fol insular protection maintdnc a colonial army for defellse and if it ~ngages in a continental war chooses its conditions In a +tuatlOn Ib defini~Et the German ~oltltioll j less dcgtcided
)lo1e in question iq how to ernploy our remaining horse unit for thcir role is not the 8ame a formerly Admitting that the missions of cavalry are unchanged the motor can ~ke over some of them thelefore tlH missiongt do not (xist 1()r hone formations alone From that we can (ollcei(~ the
tV role of hOI-e formations under to forme a normal - ole hich vill do what the motor call1lOt or which the horse n do more easily at less cost or at 1(-gt risk an eventual
~ole which will be to supply momentary defic~cncic- of autoshygtllOblie formations ~ This employment demand light and fluid unit able to ~lter through woods climb mountain slopes penetrate rohell and covered country where the motor cannot and
middot ihere ucres will be not to the strongct5t but to the first f annmiddote This u~c requjre~ supple and plastic units thai l n (stablieh and maintain contact without gap even on a I oing front so thai infantry can determine when to end s approach march and properly orient its deployment middot nit capable of cooperating with moto fOJmations llch a~ y con-titutillg a pivot of maneuver for a motorized maneushy
ering force unit- capable of making up for deficiencies of otorized and mechanized formationc of taking great idths I)f accompli5hing far from -UPPOll mi ~ion~ that may
ad to actions in force and for that capble of absorbing ~~_ overfu reinforcements Will not our cavalry division in which 16 squadrons of ~ ounted men are a minority in effectivES and volume be tmiddotmiddot ore adapted to the eventual role than to the 1100mal Theyt rc eq~ipp(d for independent action they havpound mean~ of peratmg far from support mean of force provisionF ~ helon services engineer mean They are powerful but eavy But large cavalry units that could execute a distant id during the war as that over more than 100 kilometers
om Macedonia to the Danuhc which cut an army from its ~~ il1e and captured cities wac a formation without baggage lt artillery and which aHllted and received no other ~Hlpp1ies
an horseshoe nails dropped by airplanes To fulfin such mission we should abandon the modern cavalry division
we havc not taken into account that they might and should fight with their support
The molor diminished needs but thcre was more to do Motorizing trainfgt by replacing wagons by truckR increases weight because the truck is heavier and more cumbersome than a wagon and require~ more to supply maintain and reshypair it What would have lightened immensely would have been to comdder that trucks in a few hOllrs over hundreds of kIlometers can deliver to units when required equipment that had to be carried at a11 times when trains were animal drawn Similarly if mechanization for horse regiments has no other purpose than to provide antitank means and greater armament it iR a drawback but if we consider_that enemy tanks arc a threat only where Ollr own can operate then mechanization can be for cavalry the ideal antitank mean- prCRent when needed absent when not In Ruch case to Rive horse unitR support of mechanization is to reinforce and protect and not to weight them Mechanized fractions operating with horse units can be used under circumstances terrain and conditions where employment of mechanized mas~es would be impossible There is difference in employshying a platoon of armoled vehicles on a long forest road vhere cavalrymen scout the flanks and employing- a long column incapable of observing its own flanks
Considering capabilities of the motor aerial as well as terrestrial horse formations should be reorganized The influence of employment of motors not only on distribution of cavalry missions but on the mission~ themselves should furnish a basis and orientation
We observe at once that the role of mobile fire reserves primordial at one time i~ no longer peculiar to the cavalry Ve note that missions of exploration no longer have place of first rank which was once theirs Rapidity and intensity with which situations change today have lessened interest in information obtained by exploration Further to hope to obtain information other than by ~udden contact with powershyful mechanized means risks being a dangerollR illusion The offensive can draw only the same advantag-c from rapid means of transport as the defense
On the other hand the primordial impurtance of securshyity misRions is always increasing security of the commander for there iR rhd of being caught and losing liberty of action nt great dhtance Recnrity of troopR for the approach march should begin at a distance with nttendant risk of lORing direction intermingling and fatigue
These obgervationR may lead to stopping nrguments with infantry where cavalry risks mobility without hope and to abandoning the costly mirage of uexploratlOll and pure cavalry mis~ion~ which by cruel irony fall more and more mto the domain of the motor Further these observation~ may puint out the very real necessity of distant security
Without going as far as the Germans who divided large cavalry units into reconnaissance groups the formula may
43
11shy
its~ e
4
Foreiiin Jlilifary Digests
be found in a modernized version of the old firt1t linc brigade rlhe character of distant ~(curity relative proximity of inshyfantry po-3ibility of rapid reinforcement oppose all tempshytation to weight llllit~ TIH llecessity of covering a corp front imposp till pffpPiin minimum The llCcesity of operating- in ~mall dpjachlllellb fiuin a nch suhaltern
(cadre vanld 1Om (Jf rl1l~si(JllS ohligation of maYleuver l1(c-ldty 01 ab~orhilJg reillforc(m1lllb fn(IIlPntly rt~qtlir(-
same nchllC-- ill ~uperi()r cadrL-- othing -hould hindtl groupillj 1)[ ullit tor mb ioll- of another Jlatlln and of reinforeilW tlllIll tmporaJily with splcially Il(te-~ary
meangt
Tilt IH ctalJ 111111--- hould lH tilt diiloll WIth two 1)1 three ilflre nyimellt a nlPchanLed n)J~imlllt 1lllCarily lfJmprbiJlJ~ a Jqwlrfnl lilt Itank annanHlIt a ~r(lllp of a1shytilhr~ nlflrl(r ratHr thlll gUllgt 1 --ignal detachment all
lttntilInlaft d( tadlJlfllt a II cqtllPPld -talT IIorLregishyl1Hllts proitif-d WIth l trolW platooll (Jf motorcycle megtshy~(llgers would he fltlwrYh IwIlI ill motor anri train- lomhat trlIlI- hould lw It~t()l(d tn tilt m()hilit~middot of unit~ hy
rdulning- to animal drawn m(an~ (cttain ~ubdlvl~lOn~ 11(h as tIl( ~pahi~ hI) ~ri D1ollntalllllfs should Il equipPld and traiwd t() mount arfan
In piact (If tItI Ij Cl airy livjiJlh a Tlattr Iluml)l flf 11Or~p f()rmtllolh pll III hmd mnhilp lIpple and light without 1lt11W tt1 ()tld lllrlllit fllrnhhlllg large units Pllgagillg ill d(Icafl IlWntIIClS with thL dbtant -ecurity rrrillired 1111-( -amp formatIOn- grouped or alone would bl able to 11lrfllrm Ill miloll- formerly deolving 011 the eaalry divll()lI~ Furtlwr tht~ would be able 10 cooprrate with mol)r f()nll~ti()Il ~llllplenllllt them or in (1lte of need to talt (IVlr l part ()f tlIP front In a implpound comhination would be found the rolf and place of the two clements that Join today in giving (lyalry it mohility and power thp motor and tIlt hor~(
Torn from th~ (Olltrlfllttllll that tries at Olllpound to make 1l1lllJll Id IJlI Jlt I tlld nllllllllIIlll( cmiddotalry hecome lig-ht waill hy illlluIJoll thl tlJr-l fOrillatioll- would again take the hahit of malleUHr a la legere They would find again for applll at ill 11 ill JJnd(ln ~IIITolll(ljnJ~ old qualities that dpldo ld li~ht tIO()lb ill the so-calpd war of advanced jlo-h Thb (Julcllw t)f J-Tlat advaJ1ta~~p to iJlfantry which would altJ I)(lon)( mUWl rahl The dcvplopmcnt of scienshyt Ijllt mean hould lalt rather than wcaken the orignal characteritic of tlw old arm fir~l l)((aup they arc aided ll a(j(Jl1 and nJipmiddottd of dutIl seco1ld olcausc to assure th pr(Liioll and illcd IIPcP-ary for employing meant) more lod nlOll varitri qnall unit and regiments mut be taken from a lomph~middotily alld f1n~anic instahility that accommushydal( n(gti1lwl intruclioll Jlor mailltenance
It i noi a qu(lion of 1(Ilrllilll~ to th( tlntiq11 -implishy(Ifmiddot of Hl( thrr f arm- 1111 11 i lHIls-aIY to OITPct an Illshy
vtllizd ion which by fortf of (ir(mn-taJlcP- was lealizNi h (dr)J11rl- lIld q(middotE~ EOIT(middot(tions New fOlmaiionH )11111 ~ajn in knowing llwir matprifl l)(tiP) and mort quilhlJ in acquirinr practice and in testing results As for old arm collahoration with nlO(icrn lllgil1(-l should be a rshyf urn Iq prllHiplC and to making he-t use of particular rnall~ III a flIOl( r(stricipd field indIvidual qualities will ltipjfrmiIlP tlm~clv(s
C amp GSS Quart
THB INBVITABlLlTY OF CONTINUOUS FRONlli
[La fntnlitc dt-s fronts continus By General RoullurroJ CondpJ1sPu from HClr Jl1litajlC SlIiEM Declmher 1D37]
By MAJOn T R PIIILLJlS Coa~t Al tllllry CorJl~
We shall not recommence trench warfare is a fa refrin to all who lived througPt it But what do they about it
It wa the effect of caUHes already old but none iJelli(erants had paid attention to them
The queHtion whether it will be in our power to p the formation of continuous frontgt and the trenches characterize them depends upon the survival of the cau~
An anonymous author in a gttudy on the evolutionf tadics wrote in 1891 We do not agree with those ill claim that the offensive hue lost nothing of its value defensive is not as has been said an attitude whose a 2
resides in purely defcmdve advantages It has virtues And further One of these lines (one oft t 18 opposing fronts) unable to xucceed in front will attemp ~
envelop the other this one in his turn will prolong rd front and it will he a race as to who can extend the Ir( t r within the limit permitted by hi effectives 01 at I~ 5- things would develop that vay if Ol1e could extend indt~ O-J nitely but nature imposes obstacles The line will stoP~ier point of support the -ea a mountain range or the front of a neutral nation t
Thece prevision- were unheard in the concert ofmiddot e ~ thoritativc voices proclaiming the headlong offensive tical instruction continued to spread the blind offensive the first combats of 19J1 The prophetic sense of a wa eonfticting- so violentlv with current ideas had motivat anonymity of the author He was revealed in 1914 as Lii Colonel Emile lIlayer to whose reputation as a miliu writer nothing neeuH be added now
On friendly terms with 1I1arshals Joffre and Focht Jng
had vainly sought to make them understand his ideas l~n ( This ancient history is not without interest at it m er
when certain spirits attempt to turll aside the 11fCOCClI t of a new war of trenches by hypotheses on the causes Htabiliation of 1914 Can one not see states one the r l of a series of accidental causes or of General Falkenh ft particular conception of the conduct of war ~I
In theHc two cases there is no reason for th( eff((~ a the (au~(s which have disappcareu lo occur anew ~7
No on would dare hold that the realiation foreseen more than twenty years in advance and foJ irreproachable logic was the result of fiimple coincide of chancC
As for the hypothesis of the personal influence l~ral von Falkcnhayn on stabilization it appears to be d hy his first acts a~ mprtmc command) of tlll Ge armies 12 September J 91-1
Aetually fter mid-September he orltllrcd the Gc Fifth Army lHt WPl1l the MCUHC and the Argonne to adv An analag-uliH order wa~ given at the same time to the de ment of General von Strantz to mo( from the region of toward the heights of the Meuse These movements m fesUy had as object the investment of Verdun The displayed by the troops charged with these missions sho that they were stopped after inconteHtable tactical succ
OlXVlI No 70 Foreign Military 7Jigests
ot by order of the Supreme Command but by the resistance ey encountered
~ We are thus led to recognize that the formation of conshy~nuous fronts in the Varld V~ar was the logical consequence a higher causes Lieut Colonel Mayer indicated them in
91 Are they still effective They arc (1) the power of rmmet particularly favorable to tile defensive and (2) ~ e increase of man power in modern armies Both have olved since the World War but uniquely in the sense of ~gmentation This first verification is decidedly of a $ture to lead to the belief that it~ consequences have fo1shy1bwed the same progres~Honi The essential characteristic8 of modern materiel appear ~confirm this iirst supposition Ve shall examine from this ~int of view the actual possibilities of artillery aviation ~echanjzation and motorization and finally of gas These are the branches of modern materiel whose perfection since the war might lead to serious modifications of the tactics of lin8 i When we took the field in 1914 ranges in exces of 7700 ~rds were considered exceptional for artillery The greatshy4t range of French cannon was about 11000 yards for the JfJ5mm long and 3000 or 4000 yards more for the German IlO-mm_ The range of the giant German and Austrian howshyItzers dId not exceed 13200 yardR i Artlllery observation posts ere always diRtant from the objectives and the uncertainty of unobserved fire genshyJaBy prevented its employment In the courxe of the war CI~tiation coming to the help of terrestrial observation pershy- ltted the use of observed fire from the extreme range of e guns Careful ballistic btudies supplied the methods of efficacious map fire especially by the me of concentrations of fil-e
under these conditions and thanks to present long 4nges batteries spread over 10000 or more yards of front ten execute concentrations of fire vmiddotithout direct observation_ 1
or the whole of their front Thee possibilities were evishy nt on many occasions during the course of the World Var t It IS evident that they have been augmented by the inshy
--clt eaF~ of the rangep of the gun and the superior instruction the artillery personnel This gives an advantage to the
atfense the organization of which can easily be Huperior to at of the attack because of its stabilization Among the examples of concentration of fireamp that the
World Var furnishes us two are recalled which can give an feuroa of the services to be expected of long range artillery in ~e future
1 In January 1915 the German XVI Army Corps held the ont of the Argonne from the Aisne to the height of Vaumiddot ois still famous for the bloody combats of which it was the cater This front included a wooded part the Argonne
Vi ere the German troops attempted to advance and a part s covered between the Argonne and Vauquois included
_ e latter part having received a defensive mission was nstituted aA a distinct sector from the forest under the
ders of the artillery commander of the army corpR He 8 particularly apt to get the maximum returns from his ament In fact although this German ector was held bull very small infantry strength for its extent it held
ainst all French attacks_
In the -egion of the height of the Meuse in November 1914 a concentration of fire of forty pieces opened in less than a half hour quickly ended the menace of a serious Ger~ man attack
It results from these conHidelations that modern prog~ re~~ in artillery gives new postiiuilities of extension and to forces on defensive fronts
Aviation gave birth Lo great hope for the attack Camshyouflage of terrestrial organizations and the custom of making important movement at night have reduced the effects of its activity singularly Its role in reconnai8sance at all distanshyces is considerable but it cannot hope to prevent all disshycovery of movements by the enemy_ It is thus logical to believe that all efforts at envelopment will collide with an exten~ion of the front attacked under the same conditions as m 1914 to the degree that reserves are available
At the present time it is difficult to form an accurate opinion of the cap-abilities of parachute infantry Without drawing definite conclusions from the experiments in France during the autumn maneuvermiddot one can say that they have not thrown much light on the utility of this novelty Until proof is given to the contrarythe actions of the parachutists do not seem to be able to exceed the limits of very rIsky episodes
Aerial superiority certamly will glve an advantage to the contender who has it but nothing authorizes the belief that it will be decisive It will not prevent the inferior conshytender from establishing defensive lines in front of which an attack may receive a bloody check
Motorization of the ground forces gives the same facilishytIes to the enveloping maneuver of the attack and the counshyter-action of the defense Like all technical surprises the tank at its outset gained the success due to surprise But on a modern battlefield this SUCless will be difticult to renew against a defense using artificial obstacles mines and antishytank cannon The Abyssinians who were nothing but savage warriors even found the means to trap a dozen Italian tanks
Isolated feats by mechanical engines can never be preshynmted But in mass they are not capable with their own means of carrying through an attack and their employment in mass requires an extensive artillery preparation
It is certain the motorization and mechanization will extend fronts inordinately At the same time it increases the difficulty of protection In the British maneuvers of last autumn one of the sideR was entirely mechanized the other was partially and included foot infantry and horse cavalry the reconnaissance elements of both sides were able to reach the command potjt of their adversary In the same maneushyvers the defender was skillful enough in the use of obstacles to canalize the attlck of the enemy tanks_ They were caught in a trap and fell under the fire of antitank guns A coufltelshyattack by tanks completed their defeat This episode was an affair of tanks and the infantry does not eem to have played a role
One flees in the modern tank the Ruccessor of the arshymored knight History shows the many successes of the latter Bllt firc um-l ~loVly pCliPrlfd IinaIIy chased him f)om the field of battle What will become of the tank as artillery becomes perfected to destroy it This is a secret of the future that exercises of peace have failed to unveiL
45
In an~ (il In the pnlnt Rtatc of armament tlll Ctll shy
ploynHn of tank dOl flt (eIn to fan) OllP ide more than the othll HI lJmlltt Thp oiJ-IlYcr of the last British mallvilI-- (dl (-1llt11 that fliPY gie the an~er advanshytagp to the dl1n-l
I (1 dta( k III I 11 dc vlth(llt doubt local ppi-odl- C~mJlal i-vll II tfW11 (Ifj tIll nUwk and dlfell--e can furlllh 110 oj hI) (nil lu jll)) Ihtll Jll( art IlII1 t hey will lH of ~reat 1-1 ldLlll~ 1f 1hI dt tll I
lhl--I (In-lrlltltllllh 1(n1 to C()ITOh))at( for tlw fushylun tlH l Idl 111111- Id- J]IIlI (IjOlll1 ~Llrlr whith () ]1111(1] lH l~] I TIlI lOnJillll tllt lIlUr--l of OpnllOI1
illl Il III III d I 1 I 11 JI)(j of t hI 1111lt1 Var pnt ril)ld tlll I )l1I 1l1 IJ] 11(1 -i( jlOltIIJll awl t1li fnllllatioll of
II ll)( llal Jt I (( 11 shy
FIJI (1() 111 pI dnlllillall tl)1I11)JTO on the Jlcld of 11111 iltft 11 dl ~Ill 1- lllt-Ill Ith atlTUeU YlUlenn lnd dvplh dnln tiltmiddotljIWn oj )()rnhaldmlnt tiatioJ1 and the llHlll-t-d 1 tlnge vi gUl Such 1- the -latement in til pII~rdl Id till FtI111 h JI)--tltl(tion~ for tIll employment of lalLT 11011 llf l~ Allglht l~jC In It l1w offcn~ivl and dc fl n ~I I lll I 11 ttl tl form ot al for hidl -olclicr- should
iJl lIIIh 1111IIllvn TIH lndn( it rctlldcd in GlrnlllI 111111111111 IP1111 II) --11) Yllaltl prlfCllIlCl foJ the ofshy
tn-lI
()JTLIl--J( - tgUll- a front or)-anized 111 ulpth en~n III-I il~ 11 I -) rllillllj III the II-t Ylal- of the orld Var that tllll (llt~ k IH1-tl1lltcd a lritablc yictory for the uPshy
fllHel fhi 1-- -ho11 II1 the e~ond hattie of Cham jldllll III 1litlriltl lfl1-) the lJatllp of the Ai-ne Il1 1~1l7
dId agalll III Frllltl and Flander~ in 1larch and April 1J18 fll I Ill LtLt 11 t (11 ht fIlIUl e of the Glrnlans to break the line- hul dl tlll lll()jd 1tHrt I---iOll of a grac deftat The 1il I)ln- 1)1 arlll(lltTlt llIl onJr tlcentuate thIS tendencr Jll
111 flltUft
11 d lillI lr thaI iClhlllLal -urpri~L nll contradIct 1 Pll 11))1 llldllltetl e do not think -0
(Jill I 1IIllln-]1111 Illlll Ill that de-pitc all the arguments IItI]1 nl (Ill -Idlllllt1IOll fir fronts JIl a gnat war
11)(1 III -ldl (1 Ill -[lJ Jlri-l of unknown devices war hLshy
111 II JI ill JIIlti Il Iltt JIIlJ III lvolve rapidly toward -tahshy1ItlIIIlI LIlt J-ur~
[LJI))lill ltl1I 01 front By LlluL CI)Io I 11 I f )jO]f II d f) ltl1ll i1 I ill lld)lfllI ( -i11(
1111111 IqIK J
ill th 1)( llmiddotlldH J 1--111 of UfIII( Jlilillllf 811( GC11elshy
d f j~JUtPl1 Id fliP III d (()jllll1l IaYLr- prediction luiJlI-hed In jK~JI IJ lilt fnlUlt llblliatIOTl of fronts of hattIe In Ifl II nlntHl Lt~l ()ljlSl his iueas un the -ubicct dld I plaJJb liHlr tIlI-l
Ill tit 1 HjJllHllt of jirIIHJ(1 of all types of w(apons
11 1i111d HI 11 aJJlltl 1Illolaldt rlont [o(VIl this dul uot Ill-Illy a I lIJOUIllerIlL Ilt of til( slluggle aml giving up of atttmIlt tn -(J1Yt~ tlw prohlltll 111l1s p()~wd It alt lH((ssary to fOil f II 111111 orle of tilt p)treI1lJtH~ of the line to iale till pOI]Oll III till ll11 A Oil as an lllvclopmcnt is noticed by llf fHIJl ((11 though It lIlay nul be Wide the threatened
46
c amp GSS Quart
wing wilh(iras almot instill(tivel~
mPllt it finds itltelJ hetwcll1 two IirCs converging on it unahle to ripn-te in two different directions it renOUll UlHlJual stn)le
IL i tpparllll that tlw dt~rlllder lan protpound~lt his agaifl~t a 1111 f1111g f)lO(Hllnt of mall amplitude hy foriiilt-ati()ll alld tlIP cla-sil procedures against flu J1I()I~lll(llt 1lIt d the ll1vllopment is malti at tO
aide dblan(( and with important forccs the (on seq al( IIlIl(h flInj( J(cllluhtHblc Lines of communiratio 1luat lOll will H endangL)p( RaiIlm~di and roads vill hloclpd
Thlh 110 III() J(Jf of -tahiiitation i-gt an impllgnal flail] r 11ldd( 1 hi dPliluk -td~mlJlt in the Rente JIilltwc I
SIIlt( ill la 11()2 I said thPll that to maintain the rigl i-altI~1 it~ of t hp I rUllt it 1l1U-t be sUllPorted ag-ainst the sea ~ff t k
If f I ec11l01Ult a III rUlgL or a Ilcutra ron tIer In urIe bull an 0 )S~f k 1hal tould lleither he turned or foncd These two conditio~1 ~ i ~s fire Po(J alid imprpjnable flallk~ are indispensable tot ]IlC tH
conlinuou front lhe 1)
FIn j)()Wll is a relatIve term In this c(U-)c If thc( 1lcc I I hi I t 4ePOSllW 101(es arc tljula en as a woe Cit 1er as 0 I lrh
mean- thev PO-IS or tht llumlHl of (f[rlLives the j t ll j hility i a~-I1I(d In pJintipll If the oppo~ing for ~ very llIHljunl if cquIiibllum doe~ not exist or if it is brol ovel a Z()JW suflidlntly extlJljn the front is in danger i(ing- fontd bu k alld pierccd in t hjlt region
Some ypars parli(J I had explained my ideas to toillradp Toutct thelI director at the Ecole SlIpcricure Gllern lIe ohiected that a division could not hold a Ir m()rt Ihan a ieagllt (tilnl rmlls) AClording to T jrc our twenty army torps would be a1gt1pound to furnish twenty-IT lh a adlYC divL~i(lll~ till others were not considered of valu ~ adiu
1tilU- the linc of rCSltante (auld not exceed twenty-I ~-ere
ICagllC~ apploximately th distallCeuro from Dlinkitk to r ~ 11 th fort iIy contradictor concluded that the establishment elf f a Imc of re~istal1ce on our northern frontier would ilb~ t the total of our aetl( trvolls and there would be nonef fur OUI other frontiers or for an llnportnnt re~erve
AfUl thp fOllllatJOJ1 of fronts in ll1t huLh sidc~ 1
~hort of ammunition If the inadEr~ at that time had well supplied and the FreTleh supplies exhausted a iJ through could hayc hecn made with a frontal attack pJtlonclPlIlHt tfluld hl( lgtlll1 ohtaincd by different m Early lISC of gas lI1ight hayc up~d it The continuolls f ttll Ill hI 01(11 if th(I1( ilt a ~llilkient disparity of force stabilized front h the result of approximately equal and Im)lCglwhle tlanks
If I tlilIilult to -oPt that aviation would lie abl( to lurll tillS HLatlmcnt but I lll~itate to malw a prophecy fad I did nut prophllY III Bn und 1902 I never atten 10 lilt IIkdp 1l1~ flilHh Jofrn and Folh with illY i(lla ~illlpl~ to 1gt1Oadpll theirs Both had a precise idea 0 fill 11 wlluld lit rOllght and I told tlWI1l tlwy ll~ WI npl(~Illt it to llilIllltllvl a priori and that thc future Jd tIll lip fo tlwir pJlvisioIlS Above all I though ~
deceived themselves in Ia(ing their confidence in the I 1JIlJ~ offlIldVt I 1011 in LOpini(m in May 1DO) iJ iilvl that llll-l theory IS false I believe it ~ven mol gerons than fabc (May I not ue permitted to say t thcRc two lines are those I am most proud to have wrillpoundlt rus
~
Vol XVIII No 70 Foreign Military Digests
THE GEmA-I ARlIY IN 1917
[LllltlllC allqnunde lil l)n By Colonel voni X~landll CUIHlllhld frum R( 111( lJdtrulc ~Olt~r
1 Fbruuy lJlR 1
1 By MUJ[t T n PUll J 110 (nat AllJilllY Corp
J Colonel von Xyland(gtl German Arm Retired i a well jno~n mil~tary ritCl Hnd i- I10 nne of the profes~ors of imilt1JI h~~toIT at the Krigakcde~lic in BeTm Thi 1artlc]e ltllltall1- 1 OIl-dll ahle InformatIOn about the German jlrmy that prevIOusly h- not heen available middot The gJIHi (Irmarl l1M 11 Cln er- of September 1n17 in lthL reg-IfIll ()l the Illti( Slltt ere an imp01lant event they lttradl d t (JIlidll al)k flllClgl1 at lention The maneucr- 1nftheglOtllld 11)1 ( t ok pl( ( in tern Pomerania and III
b[(lklenL1l1)r a hlTltlill or rnlllll1 hil- Clit vith llumerou ]he and -OjlH COle -t Til jll (-lIH c of three army COn)
Inriudll1g nllmlIll1 ~fltorj d and lrmolNI forcc- rendered the mamlI el lIlt)ll Important than any of tho-e that had prl-ltdetl1t in G(lmln~ and eell 111 forclgn lotlntric To ih(~e a- ~ddc(~ the lolIaLoration of the navy and aviation fIhL field oj actIon of the latliJ ww LOlHidcrably more exmiddot tcnJed than that oi the two ground armle The fleet mashy1fller Ino] plll l Oll tilt HaItH Spa IIlIl in It- large I ~IlW~ the tilCIlL of the manLUlr~ middot A UIl1YO 01 troop tlHl1-IOIL had heen sent from Ent l)lU~ Ja 11 a tnward SwiJwlllulHh--Stettin and had oe-t-n ttltllked hile en loute by till alt(lcalY This ollasioned omLat~ on the -ld aIllI 111 till all a- vel as the start of a
middot omncltialcontlll t Each pal t) had a large air force The bjtlthl a-illcd to the all fonp~ exceeded greatly later Jlly Jnd in depth the front etalJlishcd on land Vithin the LdlU uf allllli act tty eXElCI~es of passive aerial defense (re uJlldulteu dUllng the entIre week of the maneuvers ~~n tilh fahion the C1 il population as able to prepare it shyelf for modern 1 at uttainly rill not spare them
j 1 hl-l lOl1lblIled lilal1CUVel a~ecting th~ armies of the and ~l-t and all -upplitd a IlIlCIOUS occasIon to test the 0mmltind ()rgdllatioll 11111 Olhllld in Germany and which ~olllri ltUll thl lollllJnlatlOll oj the~e three armies with a IC to realization of thell common oUJedives The exelshy
bull lleS hllh utnnol be lxplained in detail aroused for thi~ Ca~l)ll (11 extl(Illel~ 11 (Iy fnleigll mtlrest and have prushy
joked many perllnent JI--cussiolJs on the development of the ew Gel man army
In dred the maneUver~ Wele the result of a year of inshy truLtion during whiLh in lonformlly WIth the laws of milishyar) concllption the re~toration of the army advanceu ethodlcally For the first time In the autumn of 1937 men
vho had tompleted two yeJr- traiElIlg henceforth normal ad )lt1l HllIster(u out Dy the u(cree of 24 Aug-ust 19~6 11 n1ln ho Ire lit for clvice lcccivcu this instruction
ther In the armies of the land -ea and air In addition ome iJluntl~l- could IJC engaged for longer duration and
~middoterc a-Jgn~d to [undwll rtlulring special knowledge Older men ho Junng the period of limitation of armashy
middot Jenb had nol lecived military lIitlu(tion and who (ould ot bL uilled for lwo yettl- trainlIlg took part as reservist nan eiJdll veLd (OUlS( of in-tudlOn In the autumn of 937 the da-s of 1915 as well as the 1912 class in East russia had been called normally to arms after having been
in labor camps The conception of obligatory military sershyvice effectively realized in Gelmany calls for an arrangeshyment between those who have been called for military 8ershyyicc and from this fact have submitted to a restriction on their ciyilian ltllCl aBel tholC for whom this is not the case To eITcd thi~ purpose a military tax hab been introduced effetive 1 September 1937 it affects for the present only thooe mcmbels of the cIoss of 1914 and 1916 who have not been lalled into service The tax is due until the end of the YLar in hilh the contlibuiol lealthes the age of 45 It is (dculalLd as follow~ during the first two years (which l onCS]lOlHl to normal service) at 50 ~~ of their income and after thal at G
The law on aerial defense published last year does not indilatf an extension of ohlig-atory service for it does not reqUIre 1I1l1 f (lJI Hervices It should be interpreted as follo~ All Glman~ are relluired to take part in aerial deshyfen E The service of alert Becurity first aid and of indishyVidual indutrial protection are constituted in groups harged with organizing aerial defense The Reichsluft shy~(hutzbund OlganlJlex and ir1Ftttmiddotult reams for self-protecshytion In other domainH it functions in the quality of (nttn4elol
During lf)n the regulations required by the introducshytIOn of two years -gtervice were put to test Military service is a service of honor for the German people It requires the 4oldiel to give him4elf to assure the existence of the nation even to the ~acrHice of his own life This fundamental a-ertion is destined to place in evidence the moral and psyshychic forces of the combatant as well as his physical and milmiddot tan training Veracity absolute obedienle punctuality exactitude and severity are indispensable qualities In turn they provolw will courage resistance the sentiment of honor and the modesty the soldier should pmsess Reciprocal confidence between the leader and his men on the one part and comradeship on the other should constitute a solid lien in the organi7ation Drill is ronsidered as an indispensable means for the formation of soldiel~ but not a~ an occasion to conduct formal exercises without purpose
Th( objective of the second year of training is the edushycation of the isolated combatant and instruction in special hranches In addition upon completion of the first year they Hhould be able lo function as leaders of groups and instructors During the second year special importance is lattached to the education of reserve officers
The formation of actIve officers who in their quality of instructor have heavy tasks is given special attention The numher of oflkers to be educated having been considerashybly augmented due to the introduction of two years of serw
yiee it ha~ heen neCe8Sar) tu reduce the period of instruction from four yltars to two and one-half yearf This has reshy-ulted in Illimllc regulation of time to gain the greatest benefit and it heavier effort 011 the vart of the students During tlH Hlst pal tIllt Falllwnlunker (aspirant officer) partilq)ates a~ a simple ~oldier he is nominated six months latLr If lIE prOlH to hae the nccessary qualities for adshyaneLmelll and lerImnntp4 the eyrIe of imlhuction ag a nonshy(ommi-~ione1 oiHcer B Ulb time he should already have demon~trated his qualities of leadership Next the future officer is ordered to th( war ~chool where he receives theoretshyical instruction A first examination must be paRsed before
47
C amp GSS Quarter
his nomination of Fahnrirh (aspirant) The final examinashytion decides whether he will become Oberfahnrich (first aspirant) The latter still goe two months to the school of arms vhere he acquire-gt ptciaI knowiedg( for the em- ployment of th( diverse armlt Aftf1 r1 new staRe of two m~nth-l of pract iral -gtrrvice th( selection of ameen takes pfc1ce In advancement to the urade of lieutenant the charshyact(l whkh a Ilail(l -hould have plays it dd()rminin~ rolr as compared to rlult~ obtaiJwd in prH ileal and theoretical ltervice
In 1937 the new army shows that it wiII follow i~ pIicity in the traces of its predecessor The traditions oft ancient RoldielR transmit them~elves to the present -~
neW units arC in intima1c relations with the aSRociations~~ former comhatants MpaSlllCS have been taken to aid Sl)l~1 diers ill civil empioymen1 after their service Particuhgtt-J attention i- -dV(l1 10 l1oIHommjs~ioncd officers of long s4 ~ vic to aid them in their future in civil life fmiddot
49
I
i bisto ~ighl build
[ book viIII
I~ho 1he f Becor[
few I~fthl
jng 0
the s pline with
troft work
middotmiddotn important arlantagc of the Ilie~cl engine is that Acad it i~ ~t affected hy wcath(r lOlHlitinns since it has no delishy Eri
guid
more the Diesel engine docs 110t hayc tn he shielded rate electrical apparalu~ to hecome out of order Furthershy
to P to permit the efficient U-e of radio (ommunication It is a fougl
prohIem to -hi(lrI t h( gaoline eng-ine when used in military Iandn~hi(I(~ to permit the operation of the now vital military radio communication sy-tem nUl to the greatly incr(as(()
Ie1110hility of mcehanizlC1 armies t he importance of radio C0111shymunication fne from all interflrence cannot he undershy modi l-timated
i PratAt the prccnt time great pr()~res~ with f)il~el cngines saryand trucls is heing made in Germany and FratHc-Germany contha ving- over HOllO Ililmiddot rl t ruclls and Francc ovcr 7000 Great j powBritain has over 100 To the United States belongs the Jlmpccredit for the first commercial ])iesel engille to he put into ~~obregular senicc Thi- eng-inc wa~ a (iO-hnrs(IH)V(r 2-cylinshy
=~hoder unit huilt at st Louis in lHIH fi -U(ftgtr ( Sunu rs Armu Ordnance
l~ lnan
en ate]
48
Book Reviews By LIEUTENANT J W RUDOLPH Infantrll
THE NAVY A HISTOHY
By FJETCIlCR PRATT
49amp pages bullbull Garden City NY Doubleday Doran amp Company
The stirring traditions of the American Navy its colorful history and the men who built it are vividly portrayed in this highly personalized account of the United States Navy The builders of American seapower are the supports upon which the book is built and they constitute a stirring roll call The work Iltil1 rank among the most popular histories of the Navy
Periods of naval history are reviewed in terms of the men who dominated them Assisting at the Revolutionary birth of the neet were Jones and Biddle with Barney and Barry in
secondary roles- these men created a tlaVY which bequeathed few victories but a wealth of courageous tradition The days
of the Barbary pirates and the War of 1812 witnessed the flowershying of a small but efficient fleet - a generation dominated by the stern and unflinching Preble whose uncompromising discishypline trained the outstanding ballie captains of the second war with England
Perry the sailor who opened Japan and the civilian Banshycroft stand out in the pre-Rebellion period Bancrofts greatest work as Secretary of the Navy being the creation of the Naval Academy The courage of Farragut the technical genius of Ericsson and the ordnance skill of Dahlgren were the naval guide posts of the Civil War Dahlgren built the great guns to put into Ericssons revolutionary ironclads while Farragut fought the battles
The great theoretician Ivlahan in the years between 1865 and 1898 propounded the strategy fulfilled victoriously by Dewey and Sampson at Manila and Santiago The World War Was a triumph for the teamwork training and ingenuity of oW
modern navy As a colorful swiftly moving story of our naval past Mr
Pratts history is one of the best although marred by unnecesshyi my minor errors of detail which rob it of much value It Ii contains little of naval policy administration and thought however and therefore fails to answer many pertinent and ~mportant questions In general the author has done a good -job presenting a brilliant panorama pf blue water and the men
rho have sailed our fighting ships I
THE LOST BATI]ALION
By THmfAS M bullbullJOHNSON ANDIFLETcmm PnATT
338 pages New York Dohbs-Merrill Company I
On 2 October 1918 790 men tif the 77th Division comshynanded by a New York lawyer Major Charles W Whittlesey vent over the top and into the Argonne Forest FIve days I ater 194 stumbled out In those five days the Lost Battalion
I
forged an immortal legend of eourage horror and sacrifice Twenty years after comes the complete story of that heroic incident of war
Five days in the battered tangle of the Argonne left indelible scars in the brains of the few who survived -~ scars that drove Whittlesey to suicidal death and sealed the lips of the men who came out Rarely is a survivor found who will even mention that he experienced the nightmare
Horror - not so much the horror of shattered minds and bodies but the frustration of helplessness -- stalks the pages of this book Men expect to be killed in battle but not by their own artillery When they die because the food and medicines intended to save them fall into the hands of their enemies before their very eyes death becomes truly tragic All these things happened to the Lost Battalion
Many myths which passing years have thrown up around the battalion are exploded by this book In the first place the battalion was never lost It was exactly where it was supposed to be and everybodY including GHQ knew it The charge of violating orders that supposedly hounded Whittlesey to his death is shown to be unfounded The gallant major obeyed instructions to the letter It was not his fault that having capshytured his objective with a body of new troops he was cut off and unable to withdraw
The Lost Battalion deserves its specia1 history - a story that is stark and true without robbing the battalion of an iota of glory The authors have recreated notably a vivid picture of five heroic days with a graphic account that is both simple and authentic
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAH
By CHARLES R FISH
Edited by William E Smith
531 pages bullbull New York Longmans Green amp Company
Critics acclaim this posthumous book of Professor Fish the greatest interpretive work ever written on the Civil War It is a book concerned with causes and results rather than narrashytive consequently the account of military operations is of minor importance to a thorough study of the background and effects of the sectional struggle
On many of the familiar aspects of the war Professor Fish takes sharp issue with traditional beliefs He does not accept the economic explanation of the outbreak of the conflict neither does he regard the war as inevitable The North did not have the edge from the start and did not actually clearly see victory until the fall of 1864 He even goes so far as to suggest that in the light of 1861 the South had the advantage since a successful defensive Will was the only necessity for victory III these views Mr Fish concurs with Major Sheppard (See review following)
Not Gettysburg Vicksburg nor even Atlanta were the decisive ~att1es of the struggle The real decision was reached
49
-
BIilk Ile-Liews
oehind lhp ~()rth(rn [rem in ovlrnlHJ ]-Gl Tilat (llci~ivp evellL was the nmiddot(lCtion of Linloln lhlllilfll a rf~ssured Fedshyeral gOVClnmlmiddotnt qpiitmiddotd t lk Iln-Utgt 1hat [Htdp lH outcome
inevitahle PrJl(Jn~(d n--ttllh tIl IIJrr(Jl[lldnl lld dlIPI])Il1) 1l11pllishy
gWHe and hrillia1lt iilfllfI gtl yit rnlki tIllgt anI~ of the 11
Ifetw(gtpn the ~taf(~ a Iil1111 nWll10rial tn Ihe author lroflor Smil h who (Il ihutuj 10 1 middotl1elll lhq)1 r on Wolf lintIltIshyand 10111 JrJjJlIlltW~li(jll hj- --1 prj l ylIulhll or] lhill llhout Illgt I dllllf- Hllld lll( htI IH 111 flllhh-Hmiddotd
It 11lIY III 1 J1IJI [I) (Ul(lltll(lal~rI LIW lhtl AllHrlCanshy
ought to qli1t r1tin al)[tlll 11H (vIl YII and klp it 101))1
Engli h (( rlJnh (lUI n 1 fll ml of Ill 11P lOIWPl nin Ill( Hfh(IJtgtl1 man of tIl 111111 Ollllnd1l1~ piI- hl 1lHl1e from
tIll jllll of lldbJ -f)ldltr- ll1111 1 ~l11jlptd ha addtd tlot hpj I(l - ~ tIl 1laquo Jj d of hi hrollll1 ~-lll-llnb it h a h(lnk jll(l I Illl] 11 ]11( tIll Iii)]] Ilf pcr l)llctl
OH Ian fil--iI ndll 111 jWrhqh--o lWlr thr -((11[ and tll1W
of til (lil 11 tILlI Ihl- Tli~ tIl( ()()d fnr tIl( tnC~ ~ot
-0 ~laJflr ~h( llldld 1111 ~II (ll halk 111 ltIll al111opllll(gt of unplliudlttd 1IlJ JJtltlH and ~l1(kh hi fat ono o11light dmvn tIHmiddlt [11 11 bliff plLPlw hl~ (ompn pd mo( truth hnUl IIUI (1 il lr than nlll 011 historjll1- h1( llCCtl I1hlC
1) injl1I mIll l1t11 bulky (lilligt
To 1J1ll ~hqITIJld 1])( I ntical pPlll)(l of lllll (in -ar 1 lilt (j ytmiddotll ~trplh of 1~)1-j)-gt nt unlil tlwil did tIll [-1111)11 plll illlo fgtltLUlon a ~rltlt~i( pbnalcubted to Il the 1 Ill plan t~ t ]1 t 1 Ill ( Ilnd Em (middotIOplllllll Iarried on 0 ( rll1 arCl (jf 1hflI~all(h fJf -lillll Inlh of -OllW of till 111o-t dl~Illl and dJ(]-I ItIlill nil (11111 hJp (llnt IwId LC( in 1iI( (-11 ~llllllLlll Lltll 1ill )H1 or thi (onfldll wyand t 11ln )llJWJWtl Ihl 11111111 I 1 111 (I) IiJill h hrilHin~ tlw horror Ir ar lllto 1111 lW1l1 of rhl -Illth III (llll~ Ihl- way wa-- it ii) Ihll 10 ill 11]( ( tl 11 lll 1 IIH lil--t truly nashy
tl()lld Jllljwj wh t11l tll11ll lI 01J] ((- 1110)11 -Itlllgth and
fJpuLt11f)J10f tll -1111 1111 l()llIld into tIll tJuEmiddot~~l( I)eftab of arrntp WI 11(11 11l0Utr]l t hf matlllaJ of war and t hI will tn
fiht had to Ill dCiJOImiddotd Ill hlok (()llilllh ~~(fllfl1t -llllltlJlI iIgt of 1111 lIlU(lgt of
tlw htlIi)llflll ll11dllll ~h~nlll not -uImiddoth a 01 llllrn -upv]1ority alt 1 Lad IHfn t auhl 1() 1Hlil~middot D(u---ioJ1- of campaig-ns tlld 1111 ([v a1( TIlIltllmiddotr]lilmiddot( f flf ICltIi-I 1I1~at Jla]~fd (tlit Y
Till IS FIVE IIO(fBS OF (STlr
At ~~ q]ock in thl afternoon of 11 larch l~I~X Etlr(m~
LfllnlHlff fdilof of Ihl 1111 11 (I(IfIlh WIS mlitillJ a 11-1shyminllu ~ttI(llWnl from 1hI Au rian gOlrnnllnt loJl(erning the Iwdllld pllhi1 ill 11 --10 1gt11 it (han(cllol KUIt von S(hwdl11i~~~ ollIHI(d j he dfat h knell of indellcndent Austria
c amp GSS Quart Vol
lIerr Lemlholf fled toward the Hungarian frontier Through the last five hours of Austria he had his finger on the pul~( events which were happening too fast even fol his t rained senE(p~ Ilb -tnry of those last hour-- while ha-tily writ ten is a -plen~t1 joh of rtI)(Hmiddottorial writing i-c~
Loyally Austrian and vio]pntly ~nti-Nali Lennhoff coJ-t not hl allyl hlllg hut partial lIe minec no words in hIS opinlt~tt3inc of t Iw IIit Ie) ~~ov(rnment yet he hold- hi own gOV(lIlrn~~~onJ largely p(JIihle for the d~harlc Had tile AListrian gov~Auni IlIPIit rnd it- prohlplll -quarely had it nol fumbled it opprJmiddotmiddotttua tunitie-- the (Iever and inevitahle Nazi llenetration wouldrl ~pap( have heen possible ~ On il
SIhuchniggs incapacity to meet the -itualion is the dOl ~o tI ~utlnant theme of lIerr LonnholTs book Tile bookish and patriK iIhelhalleeHor (ould not match Nazi ruthkmiddotsnc-- and miIitUlyprg
aralion with reason and love of country He trusted the Veuro Jtho khemPil who hetrayed him and was unahle Lo take the dcfJr
~tand that might have saved Aulria Yfars hefolr Ieee loo
L(nnlwlr tells tile tory of the death throc with alit drama of an inspired playwrighl an aUlhor who4c memorr I
pfouart too fre-h however to permit a (on~idlrerl dis(u~-ion T~ Iow hook d()(s have the value of trlling the -tor~ of Austria falll ll1i tIll fir~L iflll II is vivid authOritative iml)Ie and bitler t inc
r two W]S
badJAPAN IN CIIII
By T A BIssO real 17 l)ai~(lt -cv York Thf ~LltlTHlltn (urnpUlY Qf (
pro selfmiddot
T A Hion Far Eastern expert of the Foreign Pol onl) isoriatioll has ~ritt(ln the most penetrating and auther~ Chi l(onnt thaI has appeared to datc on the haCkground and ed ~tru
pha-cs of the war in China As a rc-umc of eyent and polirgt pHIlt
of the pn-t five year the book is a valuahle Contribution tot to]~ alal~tti(al study of the conflict Ir IEs-on has gather~1 O(f( wealth of facts and weldell tlwll1 mtn a sllic~ of eOl1yinc tonclusions 1hE
Japans drift toward Fasebm and China- 1loliLieal umb- 11hh lIOn idf l3is4on (on-iders the two most 111011wntolls phJS6 ~ket lontemporalY Far Ea~tern history Tins Chl11E5e nation]b ordi whi(h IH~llgtpd draw down upon (hina the wrath of Jap~lll foc 11(gt it~ root in lill ~tudcnt mOYlment gainrd monwntum with ~llrrender of the South China militarists to Chiang Kli~Sk and culminated at Sian in Ihe lnited Frollt
The author i~ obiously more at home in tiw study~ JapanesE affairs than upon the China ((11( His accounti-1 1l11tlllal JaplIH--p politicc i4 xlplllIlt and is till hl--is for)1 eOTlciusiol1 as to war guilt In his (onsidered opinion qJ Japanese militarists alone are n~ponsihl( Discredited in tti~ 1t tefllJlIl- to fa~tn Fls(ism 1I1HIll tlH people llw military e1iql~flI Jllunged Japan into a foreign War ill a dCppratp hid t ()-t Ilngthr~ llt t twir -Iipping l)()wel r~ 0
The a~t ual lory of t I~( ~yar iR of vital ill~pOllanCe ~~_ ~~l frolll a ltidulcd slttdy of the lI1eldent at Lukowchlao Tlr BIsy makes no prediet ions but gives the impression that he hold5~~
err ultilllal(~ vi(tory highly probable The calamilY of Japan~middot vietory is powerfully analysed in a chapte on the subj of Manehllria a damning verdict against NipPollesf impc ism
50
--~ Vol XVIII No 70 Book Reviews
Cn~A F~G2T Fun ia~n LIFE 11 Ii It 11 llJ TmON HGIIT
1 York hlttklt( JIOUSl McGnm-Hill
One of the firt booh pLlhi~hed 5JJ1Ce the outbreak of the Smo-Japanese War ueigned and wrilten in the light of that conflict is the work of two Far l1ltlern corrCspondcnb of the iGnited Pre~~ Frankly nolll1tClldeu to be a scholarly historical ~tudv the book is un (tremely 1l3dlhle piece written as n(gtwsshylpapermeJl would he expelted to Tite the ~t()ry of what IS going on in China The tory of the war helf i of minor importance to the jllcture of China- -trugg]e fol national unity which the author~ hae picked up b(g1nin~ with the Reolution of lBll 1hc greater part of the honh i devoted 0 the background of the pre-(gtJ1t ~itllal inn a bwlroulld through whilh Chiang Kaishybhek move a an e el-II1(Tet-II1g fh~Ull The attempt to explain rccent Chinlc hitory In tCrlll of DIll man is 110((1 a little too simple anJ a-- at hanilj ItTer pOlll ~ (Hll mi lcading
At least twice in his n~e to powCr Chiang Kai-shck ran afoul of Japanese intenbts Both timC~ he was forced to back down vith rCsultant 10s of f~ce hoI h at home and abroad lmtyin China Leing I he lat thing Japan desired a conflict was ineitabie sooner or lateI Eel1 Aia b not large enough for 10 strong llllpill- (hL1Jlg i)(lld to ~upCrior force but he only hiding his time until he wa strong enough to strike kiCk In a fe more I car he would hac been ready
TIl( Sian (Oup of De(tTllher In~(i shnc](d Japan into a
rClhlatioll thal time wa~ )et tin) shorl The uneApected display oi ChlllCsC solidarity indicated that Chinese national unity had prore~lteJ farther than the odd had Iealized while it was self-eident tb1t tlw KU()llintan-Communist settlement could onty hae an anti-Japanc-e foundat ion RCtHzinp that a strong China nlPant the end of her dream of Asiatic hegemony Japan ~tru(h while thcre wa yet lune TIl(gt war that folloed is as much a Japanec fight for life a5 It b Chinese A Japanese vicshytor means lcfluCtion of (hina 10 )ipponcsc 1assalage while def ill topple Japan frolll her -tatuf af a vmrld power
Both (l ent and pcr-onalltic- haC been vividly portrayed The lUthol- have a )idcd the pit [alb of rnYliad unpronounceshytble (hin~l nallllS I)) a -(rH ()f pi hy and killfuleharacter ~Jetcht~ 1 he result i iu~t hat the doctor ordered fol the ordmal) rcuhI who J molO than ctually inter(-ted in what l~ (gte 111 tlW he~dIll
CIlI-A FIGHTS ILCK
YCdr hef()re ~h(gt evpr -aw the (bine~e Reo Armies Agnes f)medley WltI nthu~iasti(allY r((ording lheir cXIlioils IIer very Fnthu~iasm long denied her the l)lIvilege of visiting the Chinese OVieb fly aLlraLling the attention and clo-e observation of the hince Central Government In 1136 however she entered
~he Communi-l di~tricts in the -orthwest where she has l emil-inerl moltt of the time ~in((gt At the oUlhreak of the Jlre~ent Sino-Japanese conflicti Ii~s Smedley in r~ite of an jniur~d ~pine ac(ompanicd lho
1 ~Ighth Route Army mto Sham1 Provlnce where she shared thef ardshipamp and adventurcamp of the ort guerrilla campaign against f
the Japanese Constantly on the move suffering from exhausshytion and her injury she wrote when and where she could posting her dispatches piece by piece Thus her RtOJy grew as it is here published with little more than neee-sary ~tructural editing
(ilina Piohls lIark is a vivid first-hand arrountof the early days of the North China War to the bepinninp of 1938 Of little military value the real worth of the book hes in its raphic picture of the relations between the peasants and the Eighth Route Army On thal relationship hingc much of the future development of the Chine~e nation
Miss Smedley is a personal friend of Chu Teh Mao Tseshytung Chou ~n-lai und all the other famous leaders of Chinese Communism Her book contains many true life portraits of these men But Miss Smedley unconsciouoly jJaints someone else as the mo~t interesting personality in the book herself Bitter atheistic and belligerent she is leaving her mark on the history of China the new China which she does not expect to live long enough to sec One may disabrree with her social anLl political philoltophy but never with her ~incerity A most unu~ual book
AND SO TO WAil By IIUBEltT HEIUtINl
17~ Imgp1- Npw JIavIL Yie (lrnvlTSlty Pr(gtllt
Professor Raymond J Sontag of Princeton reviewing this book for the Ialurduu Rcnt(U ()f 1Ierafure wrote that Dr Tanshysilltj book took ten year~ to write 1lr Herrings apparently as many days yet both reached the bame conclusion From 1914 to 1017 the rulers of America betrayed the interests and lhe wishes of the AmeJic3n people
Vheleas DI Tansill (on fines him~elr to the background of our entrance into the Great Yar IVlr Herring uses the Vorld Var merely as a stepping stone to present conditions His thesis obviously and frankly partIsan holds collectie security to he a dangerous futility and strict neutrality the only way to kecp out of quarrels which we can neither understand nor solve He fears that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull are about to repeat the mistake of Wilson and Lansing Neutrality as dislingubhed from isolation is more likely
to help the country and the world than participation in future wars Mr Herring wishes the lnited States to keep out of European and Asiatic wars in which essential interests are not involved and to steer clear of a11iances cooked up by nations intent upon prEselving the status quo against Hhave not counshytries
Since 191) the nation has resisted constantly increasing pressure to join ageneies whose ideals have been distorted into attempts to enforce the Versailles Treaty In spile of repeated refusals to become involved in foreign entaIlgiements the counshytry is still confronted with persistent pressure This hook is the CQfe for the other side briefly but convincingly presented Vhethel the reader agree with the luthol 01 not he will find these pages provocatlsc I
AMERICA GOES O WAR
By CHAm cs (AI LAN TANsl(1
no page Bololl Litlle 13rown amp Company
After ten years of exhaustive resbareh during which he had access to sources hardly touched br previous historians Dr
51
Tan~ill hae produred what h generally aedaimecl aR thc outshyblanding -1 udy of the hwkground of Amenca entry into the Vorld Var III~ ma(rid indude- the Bryan manuscripts the paper~ pf ilon [out ()lonf1 flowe Iaming and Knox as wpJl as tIl(gt Admiralty ar[hin- of ((middotrmany and the files of tilgtjl (ornmiUl( whih 1m v tiJatpci war p)litltrin~~
Dr Tanill di agITl ith t he popularly held opinion of Bryan 1lIlIl fOUl tnd olllPl -1 all n1l1l of I he war J)lrifJd Ill oft1l rid]( ukd liliam Jenning-- Bryan wilt) ni~lHd hj- portfolio - -I[rllary of Stalt 111 protl1 aglin t AlllPlict-shy(our h hl- 1111 HI [111 Ihl1 hld 11 011 taklll Bryan tlhi( flu I nitfmiddotd Stati ~otllcl hm( 1H11l parrd tl1( -tcrificp I)f 1II 7- 1 (1111 I I IJ llil 11 kti 11- of II( PII(I tr HOIl--f and Jtn-ilW 111) Imiddot d Ill flt~ld(nl mIn war
Hnli-( I~ trtwuarv Jllfifd wilile LanltlI1g j tarnl h a jdorillld 1 t )rl~I )1 1 twr higt JHhlt ( III alJt)( hb (middotoll-(lerWl
Yili 1)1 TIHll 11[ 1Jll-i fill ()l1w of Ian ll)middot l(tion h ~f[gt- n() ~()Ild in YiJr)l IlnllW arhlII 01 dll the foni~n dlplomat-- ill a_~hlll~iJll fall any tOf) l1l (ount BernltlnrJf appfal 111 tilt 1l1f faY(Jraht light of all
(haptel- lin nHrilan track ith tht Allic-- (oTl1pletl with ml- rmiddot~ of tlli-J( )ll a (()lllprthlllltingt yipw of thp ponomie pit tun lI1I1(II1h tlu auth()r tI(ltgt not CO]lt11r ith thl llfort-shyof 111f ~lt~f COllllllittll 11) ]llmt that Big Hu-lTlC-- drol tlIP nat 1011 IntIJ 11 11) protI It l1l0JJntlu ltl(--tll1ent- It IS
o---ildl Iw ldmu I hal 11011 npondcrl 111 part t 0 prp~-urcgt Lut Ilw]p 1- Ill Hjt Ilt of 11 Tlw jI)-pa)C Iork whilp it dops lll dll)(l~t IIf 111111- QU1 ~Wll i all indipPIlltahll guid( 10 till --Iudy of (lllr (nl]alWI inlf) war wh11h will hplnnw --tancialu
piI)P fill 111tllY -(Ir 1)1 jl11L It (llll 11] (If or tlf AIlHlIlln fItstory and Dran
rtf illt (~rddlilt ~(horl Ilf Jlllri(an (111 (I-ity a hington r )C hl I)(ll 1 1 (((lInif(rl authorit- on Ameri(an diplomatic i l~jOI for mII1 (lb For ttll ~lar- lw Va arivi-or tn tIll (li1rllltn of t IH -lllat( F()ri~n Itratiol1s Cmn111ittee for whom irmiddot Jlll Iht IfjIlrt 011 o11d ar npoJl---ihility fie la letshy~llf d III hi fivld 11 John Ifnplilh and ill ~eCral GCrman unishy 11-1111
(Tlo T ()liIL
1 I ~ - (I ~ York FUflf amp Hilllhlft InC
H(-np II(-n lir t nmC1 -in([gt hi monumental Anthonll 1flf( h In -rikinl~ (ontra1 to hie (arlir and Jnore ICnglhy vor hain~ lt)((r till -tlJll ba-icmiddot atlrilmle of eardul hbshylcJri( al nialth In I(ari of Ihe broad eer shifting arena of 1111(1 hiIl)I of I I) (in1 aris (onclntratldin both timl and pLI -llh (olJ)paratlf 1OIl()rny of chara(terizalioll all
f 1lIlltllrly happilY (tlldinld onl to quantity YOlllhful (ojOl1t] FlanLIIII (omrnandpr of a [ilion ctdry
rnlrnfn ()n ouJJ()-t duly ~~lIardlllg the pa--(- tiJ)(JUgh thtmiddot irshyjllllt Ulfllllltino tltill hi nlfllnt in ih heauliful and ]lPHpfIlJ
-t 11 illll InflllwJIlr pnwl t illal ing 0(1 all ulIpltttnt duty_ In a nrlrJI ltiddlll dlrmiddotv 1 10(ly -oul IIPI n I~(nt hwoman tp hratv Wit h Iwr flaughttJ vait ing for word fro III her husband a maj(~r In the (onfcrlr-ratp Irvi((
Franklin in 10(1 With IHl cannol hring himltClf to tile 1a-1 Ifon 11IlO Ihal of trmiddotliin) 1111 t hat her hushand is dead II is t hI frll~1 rt1 iOIl I hat paCP- the romm(e of the story against a
52
C amp GSS Quart Vo-background of impending conflict and the futility of war Me Rt while the young otTIcer does his best to lighten the burden the refugees f 1
Inlo the peaceful imlation war flnaly comes in the ear~ ~ win1ltT of IHGj when a Conferlelate force tries to break throu ~j 111(1 pas~(s In a vividly recreated battle sequence Frankllnl~ rpginwllt is wre(ked in a rather u-elcfs engajZement which enl 1 with a (onfcclcmtfgt c1efeat at loes hardly worth the pri~ -land ThlreaftCf the war move on leaving a badly wounded offiri 1stul IO(ked with hi reful~ee ill the owhound valley Through jPre long white winLer the tangled ~kein is straightened -iintE
The 1I0cl carefully and colorfully written is good readiu of t but not as profound a it i-- daimed to he An interesting faew In its 11)efJalttion is 1 be hi--Iori(al research hehind it Accordi~ ~und to Mr Allen mot of the Laic is true the story having bee Ctan pi((pd together at fir-t hand often from the lip~ of those wk poli participated in the events turt
Irol pos
TilE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON phe thrf
By MAH(l 111 sod
Ii pawgt with Ilnlf mdfx 8 hlb1o~raphy New York Bohh~Mcrr had life terr
The plf(t inn of Marquis Janll xcellent life of Old Hid des ory as the Pulilzer Prize winning biography for 1938 wasr -urprbe to those who havC read the- two volumes issued fo of t yean) apart The preent edilion combining both volumest par
one should he an imperative item in everV lihrary -1r Jam~( ha has amply earned his laurels with a truly ~onumental work - will life hitory that lanrls head and shoulders above the eonsid rna able ilia of exeellent writing that has already appeared abo pro
Andrew Jack--on
In The lionler ioploill published in 1933 11 James cam the story of jackson from the early pioneer days before t Rfvolution through his rise to prominencc in Tennessee to t laurels of New Orleans and the Florida controversy JackltI who has been too prominently portrayed as an uncouth front democrat Was here shown as he really was - a striking a impubive peronality but for all his nrc a gentleman and conserva1jve who knew the niceties of society and who stl)
~u(for order and moderation in goern1l1ellt to
Thelcccntly isltmiddotmcd sClond volume Portrait of a Presider -M(l has nol let thc earlier work down 711 James has not OIL ~iail uotained but has hci[htencltl the piteh as capturing the rn~ bar of Jacksons retirement from public life in 1821 he revie ~ t (alPpr in the llationallJolitical arena desrrihing and ana 00
til ad ions allli the forees with whieh Andrew Jackson e j an era in American history t~rJ
](Pll1arkable a a life story thp wOIk is equally strikingl~~hE a 1Jic(c of hi~tory Not content wit h revealing a mnn tlJiit lC
hi()glaphy l(~rral(lS an r)(wh coloringann emjrhingthat perioc ~j ~i l
With II t11( ltIftacl Ihal hils out t11( hare bones Winch perl13~U1 h not -U)prising sin(( AndrCw Jackson and his era are inSeuro) TU1 arable i rc
A magnifiepnt and pain--taldnp study of a greal man J
Ti Lfe 01 Andrew Jackson sets a new mark of biographical lence The publishers have recognizer its worth with an a tively constructed volume
IVOliVIiNO70
~f~OOSVELT ~ SllDY IN FORTUNE AND IOW~R By E~f1L LUDWIG
[Translated from the German by MauricE Samucll
350 pages New York The Viking Prp-~
Emil Ludwig renowned biographer of Napoleon Bismarck ) and Goethe has applied his psychological technique to the
study of a world figure at the height of his actIvity His life of President Roosevelt studded with typical Ludwi( hrilliance is interesting reading but will never rank as a definite life history of the present American Executive
In the first place Ludwig is cheerfully and frankly nowed under by the celebrated Rooevelt charm Vhat is more imporshytant he has a profound ignorance of American history and politics without vhl(h no wril cr can produce an adequate picshyture of our public life At the same time the author freedom from the prejudices of our lIfe and environment is in a lmiqup position to make some candid and revealing- comparisons
Arranged in three sections labelled Fortune lTctamorshyphosis and Power the book presents a theme of tramjUon through sutTering Young FrankEn D Rooseuroyclt was a clever ~ocially con~cious aristocrat so favored by fortune that he never had to develop his latent talents Struck down in the prime of life he fought a grim otruggle for health and cmcrjed with the temper and the de~ire to champion tilamp underprivileged He deserted his class to help those who did not have his advantages
Perhaps the be~t pa~-a~c 1I1 the book is Ludwigs de~(ription of the atmophere of the Executive oflices There is also a comshy-parison between the first fioYe months of Roosevelt and Hitler that is excellent The sugar-coated hero worAhip of this book inll handicap its popularity while many minor errors of fact~ mar Jts histoncal value Approach lhis biography with the proper suspicion and you may find it interesting if not authentic
TARNISHED WAIUUO)
Bi gt1JoH JACS R JACOHlt
Xcv York T)Hmiddot Mlltmll1an Company
Several years ago Gamaliel Bradford gaIned considerable succe~ltlnd c- ahli-hcd a hIOgraphical prccedent with hIS crusade fa cleanse some of the stain from historys accepted villall1- )Iajor Jacobs follows the trail hlazed by Danoyer Souls bul fails to achieve equal result~ in this hiography of ilajor General
~ames Wilkinson The fault however lies neither WIth thei ~uthor nor his effort Vhitewashing James Vilkinson 1- iiimply ~oo big a job
~ James Vilkinson commanding general of the United States r frmy and virtual ruler of the Mississippi frontier was one of )the 1featesl (harlatanl in American hblory For thirty ycar~
1C utilized his high posts in the interests of Spain whose highly f3id ~llyhe was Not ahove selling out either side whenever it fUited hIS pocketbook he covered his trackh so well thal a undred years paRSed before the full measure of his villainy was revealed
From the beginning of hi military and political career durshyl1~g the Hevolution he disIJayed the Tlpr~li~r talpnts whieh ~t0ught h~m to the top Charmmg and indispensable when ~ ork was lIght he always managed to he conveniently elsewhere
t Book Reviews
when d~nger thre~ten~d His sponsJrs and friends exe~PlifY the familiar axiom of birds of a feafher - Benediet Arnold Charles Gates St Clair sponsors whom he promptly betrayed when it behooved him I
Wilkin~on participated in every m ajOl conspiracy of early lAmellcan hIstory from the Conway Cabal to the Burr Conshy
spiracy In each one he escaped puni~hmenl by betrayal at the propel time It took the War of 1812 to show his true ability or Jack of it yet even then he talked his way out of his just deserts
lvJajor Jacobs has written a careful but unconvincing story nf Vilkinson Unable in Lhe interests of truth to justify his suhject he was apparently reluctant to throw him to the wolves The reultant middle-of-the-road study leaves Wilkinson a colorless as well as an unprepossessirtg rogue Iiajor Jacobs self-appointe(l lask was just too heavy The tarmsh on Wilkinshy~()nR name i too deep and too tough to be removed
JA~IES MAlliSON BIfILIJEJ
By ABBOTT E SUTH
Nfw York Wilson-Eriellton
In a new estimate of a memorable career to quote Its subtitle a highly significant impression is here created of the fourth President of the Pnited Slates James ~Tadison has sufshyfered from the one phase of his life for which Ihe was not fitted but his faults as a war lime Prebident arc herein belittled in the lIght of earlier and more enduring work As a master builder of the Constitution l1adhmn emerges ~tS a striking and colorful figure
Two men are largely responsible for the ratification of the Constitution James Madison and Alexander Hamilton teamed to build the compromise framework of our fundamental Jaw performed yeoman work in the ratification struggle through the pages of the classic Federalist then parted company on the interpretation of the new law An important phase of this book lS a clear analysis of that collaboration and split
Hamiltons attempt to make the Constitution do what he wanted was based upon a policy designed to oerthrow the power of the agricultural South lIadison was a southerner shya Virg-inia planter and landed proprietor and a representative of the threatened class He saw the issue and broke with Hamilshyton to join forces with Jefferson for states rights and ~grarianism
Ultimately he failed but his earlier work endured A scholal a man of infegl1ity and a statesman Madison WlS small only in physical stature The biograI1her has done a service to American hi~tory by retouching the picture of the fleeing Presishydent of 1814 to its true color as a character of real significance and life
GEOIWE MASO CONSTITUTIONALIST
By IImmiddot]N lIlI
100 pag(gts bull Cambridgp IIarvlrd University Press
Of ~t11 that -elellld group who wrangled their way through the tilling Philadelphia summer of 1787 to end up with the document known as lhe Constitution of the United States George Mason has been the most neglected In a century and
I
53
~
iook Revieus c amp GSS Quart~
a half only two hioJrraphirs of 1 ho ir~inian have beCll written of which thi- j- tlle --colld The iir-t lpppared fifty years ago
Ceorgl )IaltOIj wa all tlllu-ual man with a curious mixture of abilitiC- and limitation Onr of tIllt fio(-t mind~ of his gen~ eration )Ta--(Hl It a P()fllPOllf lIIlu-( who fiplejpd politirs and Jmb1i( lifl ~Tft ill IhI cOlllln of hh parohlal work he 1gt
capable of thinkin on a natIOnal -eall Ill( hurly-burly of Itlilaingt fJtll)(i [nad hun ill ~middot(t no (Jun(1 or (ornmitt(l h~Hl a ]HlH I l1ll1d
lI-()Il ]Hditi(middottl llllity WIgt ((lIdifltd to th in~illia
(()TlfntHJl (If 171~ and t 1)( lhllad(middotlphia (Oll PillIon of 1hj
yr 111- 0)1 III lrp Jflllhlic CUTlld LlImiddot IIp wa Olll of the fir to achIJlilr a (CJlltlllClltal (om~f( dthllUh he IIfucif
If) -it III If nrl II( rrJ( till illlllla 1111 of Highb which hflpfd infllllnl(Il(Jt Illll IJIlI Iklhrllilll1 (If Tlldf]lcllIlllllf hut ll1l rcoltll])lll tlflllht fJf iU1llpl The irginia Stal( (011shy
middottJutiOIl a rr1f~j1 of II Llld Wl Ill 1(Jrk a were th( fir-t ten anHllfirlllll I) ILl Fjd(rl (OIl-I1)l
rAftfr 1lllplflL flaml Ill (OIl tltuI1()11 ra~f)n oppo-nj il~
rat liital iO[l ld1tl- lIJ)(lll 1iIHll1l1-o that alpr (PCrlP1W( prnnd
rJlht bull a Il-uJl I)f lll~ nilj(Ilj()n~ l1H lil~t amlIHlmenh Wlle
1l1cgt()i))(I)lfll ]111r tll 1ll of ~blr uJtill1atpl~ boft oul hi- Hrl in tlH In 1111
J1~ lilil lIfl of bl)ll I lot tOI) lOll i l(luratC and 1I IOIl--tnwil 11 ~1H prcc1l1- a mall 110( contributions to (Ill lltllnnllI 11middot1 IItrll ln(llIl~
ThE lndll li) IlllII]W I)t(jlratioll of Hlght~ Dp(aration i j ndlplndl1l1 ] 1middot]middot Ilf (()Ilfrdpral ion and the COIllttitution fir -1 1gt a lll~rh plll t in IllCrwan hitory Yet ~uch are the i_rIIlI (If fIII1I 1111t IIJ~l -hlIJl1t1l I)f (OJ1Jw(tilul the only llltll III 1111 Ii ~IrlltI UII IIJPIJ all four fundamental dOluments Ilf 1JlI)Idll ltlIlJldi) hh h((11 WU lligh forgottrn Ir 1IJlrdllllll hlllllp]l (middotlil 111~middot n(ll(-o this influlntial and 1 11 l f()l1)lJ tlr Lt1 hi r from a (pnt ury of unlllPritpd ()h~(llril y
-hrl1lt1l ~ Iji ~ln111Jll~ CI( humhlpound (l1cl]gh 10 ~athJy any -lII~ I III 11)) n IIIl 1 colonial farm Ill earned hi parly li- 1Ilg alt a hnernaL(-r In an atC notoriou~ for its inlellectual lJ((rl y hc (middotdUf all d III 1l1-11f tnd J)(amp ill onlpr a ~ll((c-ful
tormiddotI(f)r -lll I~ Dr iuhlhiwr and lawyer Then he turned 10 Idlhli( dfail-- ITlI] --Iner fl)n~piLu)wly a~ a member of the (fllo[)jd 1ldmiddotlalIJn on 111f hidw- (our or (onnC(ticul and a- IntlItl of Yth (ollmiddotr
1 till onllmt1 of Ill I(olution 1oler Sherman went inl (j I hr (ollt inc1l1 al (onrl c [or Ill dural ion or I he war when Iw-tl ()fl thC (OtllITJltiPP- that drnflerl the Decmiddotlaration of Righh and o[ illdrp(IHl(IW( alld h Art iflls of (on[pderal ion Afl pr
I hi wn )1 rl 1I11l(r Iii (Ol1lH(II(llt ofli(middote- 10 whilh va addd I ill Ill) flf blll I)f W lfanll
1 h(1 Yltr 17x7 found the dour Puritan in the ConstItutional (nnwnfinn whprp hi-o ll1ocl(ralJOIl and (Oillmon -CI1(l -av(d mon~ than (1I11 ]Hatpd -l~ifln IIaving -igned the Constitution -)hfrrnan rOlllh for it latifialOn and then rcpresenctd his I all in th Ilou of l(epregt(ntatics and later in the Senate
II1r Boanlmans generally [ellent life of his iIIustriol ancestor may be forgiven a ecrtalJ1 awe in the presenleuro of th f1i
selfrighteous old statpgtrnan It is a reacbble contribution ~ fil
RevoluflCHlary history 11It11 11~lUtS a dp-op]ing but hither( m Tlpglp(cd figulP 10
tl
tto
LAlaJI ON TIlE lARCH
lhl ~Ii ~v
One of the most amazing pllPnonwna of (ontemporar ~1 Ameri(a h been I he rioe of II C I lL an I the nulting eh~ j~~ 111 the ranli~ of lahor 1uct wilen lahor lppeared to be comir 2 jI I I I I I can1I1to lb OWI1 1e llttllI1SS gfnclai(( J)Y t 1at-p It las co or ~h
the viewjloint of all ohvers he they C I 0 h~mpalhize fui A F of L adherent - or perplccd by1 andCr~ who catch 11 l full sound and fury of batLie folll boil ide
Mr Levin~)ll has kepI hi~ head in till full ~tnngtlJ ofl~ --torrn An open parll-an of tIl( C 1 0 Iw has written admirahly f(lItraiIlPd and (arfflll ~tory of lllllt lahor hi-o Anyone who rarr j n lrad will Ifarn Illlwh frum hi olrrant nr I balul(ed ddene of Ihe I l O t
First prcmh-e of the author IS that tIl( C I O i moJ sinned again~t than ~innin AI any rale it if hanllv the rer ~ lutionaly ogre its cnCllllf- ha( ]laill(ci it The mo~(n1(nth~~hu ~pommred some pntty rougil ~lllIT lmt Anwrican labor L~ht fought more destrwliPI in Ihl past with Ies results 1[
John L Lewis i- adequattgtIy dtfpl1tied against the ell of Communbm and 1~) It) l]pgtidlll ial a~piraljOlrs 1(lw iicvCs in capitalbm balanced h~- a strong labor front he knoT- hr there an leds in hi-o unions but H(- no more rCa~on to smct Co them out than to impo~e political qualincations for union me) to lwrship An(llast Jy J r I ej~ cln(~ not larpound to be PrC~ident i ~h not now anyway lH
Lnhor on flie l110rrll I~ a Rohel lHlll of Callable writing Ar i on( in1eCsted in the 111)01 Il1m(llllnt a fipld army oflkct~e1 arc plone to dis(~al(l wl1 plntit in tlw hoole So 111 Lbu C I 0 IJ~
+tUlTilE IOLlTl(() l~)middotl~ ~I
~( York llarlonrl HHP amp (I)
lJatthew Jo-ephson is nne of t 11( outstanding 8 writers in the Pniled Rlates lorla a fa(1 whhh should ()Vrooktd ill r(aclil1~ thi- nllllllt At thl ~atl1e time I earlful historian and a colorful fo(c-ful aut hoI with a linack 11 ~~ story telling Vbatpll his -olial thcorils and 11( us(s tl
hook Llt a vehicle for hi- philo npliy 01r 10(l1hon has IT i ten one of the brst i((Ollllt-o of our politieal hi~tory flnm~ Civil Val to the Bryan ](middotolt ~I
A few ymr a~ ~1r ]ocplon puhlihed The EM 1 Harol ~a -lory of the ri-l~ of I ~i~ JUSil(SS a~HI it~ masters ali ~ 1865 J hf SllfCC-Ss of thrs( lmlZll) imamwl pIrates was t J 011(gt Hide of a particularly ltonlid period in American histo~ lt-~ The Politicos completes the picture of the American social see and becomes a companion vork to The Robl1er HarOlls Do are excellent reading
Book Review8
The Politicos were the politicians - the professional key _ meo of American politics ho united with the unscrupulous
lt financiers io get a strangle holJ On the wealth and the governshy-ment of the reunited states They were a thoroughly unSltlYory lot and 111Joseph~oll ~pares nothing in painting them so At ~thesame time he has little u~c for the men who fought them for ~to him the reformers were small men who didnt really mean lV hat tlHY did ami -aid
All til( pr(~id(nts from Johnson through Garfield suITer at I middothllt hands Alhur he calls the most effective President since
1
I lLmcoin hut he ha- an unflattering opinion of Cleveland TIll l~tory of the ri~( of the Popuiibt movement occupies a large
portion of t Ill hook and b a notable study of (lass struggle Except for an Incon igttent habit of setting up irrevocable laws middotand then (1 ilicizing his subjects for reacting to those very laws hlS hook i~ an Ifedin addition to a ncglc(tcu period of our hIstory
THE BI( FOUR
By OSrAH LE IS
-cw York Alfred A Knopf
In the decade before the liil War young Theodore D JUd3h made such a nui~ancC of himself talkmg mcessantly about
-~ nmln(ontirltolal railroad that hiraliforrlia aS50elarh thought llIm s1ifhtly balmy lIis pcrsuasiv(1PSS was not lost ron fo~r
~a(ramento shopkeeper however WIth the result that Judah s ~~ lrfltlm became a renlity and the Sacramento quartet became I the most powerful financial and political figures on lh~ Pacific fOJL The slory of the rise of iIark Hopkins Charles Crocker [olis Huntington Lcbnl Stanford and the railroad empire _I l~ey built b the burden of one of the most absorbing books of
tLc ~umme sea~on Judah died hefore hi ision had come true and therefore
h o received any of hi~ deserved credit The four unemotlOnal - but eminently practieal merchants g-oL all of that Not that
~ f~(y didnt dc-erve a lionmiddots share for they did build the railroad brucomint inlreJible ob~tacles to do it The ~tory of that
hUllJing and the ~rreat monopoly into which it grew makes i1elilbtfuI lladillgI Four more different peronalities would be hard Lo find
lrhere vas Crocker j he florid man of action who drove hipgt jvork crew through the mountains and then promptly lost
IJnterest in the completed task Leland Stanford was the lstuffed lthirl of the team the front for the railroad and its
I
tl
I
~tlj01
manipulations as Governor of Cahfoll1ia President of ihe Censhytral Pacific and United States Senator
Quiet frugal Mark Hopkins had little use for wealth and never knew how to spend his money but as Tleasurer of the fenLral Puifk he nurRed it s lender funds into great fortunes for himself and hb a~sociates Brains of the four belonged to old Colh~ IIuntinglon tI~e shr(gtwd and cynical manipulator with no morc sOlll Ihan it shaNe
1r LCwis gild no lilies for hi~ ~ubject~ They were often di~hontsl and hl plainly saY1 ~O hUl he gives Lhe imprCssion of a blwahing- admira1 ion for the ofd fellows especially Huntington He ha~ w]ititn an interesting and colorful boole
READING COURSE FOR OFFICtRS
War Department Bulletin 1928
Lbt of S(kclpd lOoltlt relating to hictorieal llohtical (conomIC and mlhLlry gtubjetllt published for t11(gt informltion of tl-je ervice
This h1t lB divujpd into l(ction corrrlponding to thpoundgt several periods of an ompr lrVIIl RtmaillHl -P( liongt will appfar in future editions of the Quart(gtrly (For FlrlllNltHl e( tw Tune 1938 Quarterly page lt2_1
SECOND PERIOD (AVERAGE FIVE YEARSI
(f~T(rtVAI HETWETN COJANY mnnms oenSE ND ADVANCED laquo(jRSE)
~poIlWN4 MAIS OJ WAlt WrIJ NOTES IIY GENBHAL BUR~OJ) 1 vol ((i(gtorgfdAguilar)
BATTLE STUOJeS AN( IeT AND MOlImN BATTLE 1 vol (Charles T TJ Ardant du Pieq TranslatlOll by Col John M Greely and Mal RC Cotton)
llLtl(AN GOEtNMENT AND POIITICS 1 yol ((hark A Belrd PltTY HATTImiddotS OF Tim 1AnmoN ERA I vol (Claude G Bowcrsi A HISTORY OP TlIJ~ GR~AT WAIt 4 vols (John Buchan) HISTOltJ OF THE UNITED STATES 5 vols (Edward Channing) ALEXANDElt ~ vols (Theodorf A Dodg(j CSR 1 vol (Theodore A Dodge I GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 1 vol (TllPodore A Dodge) HNNIHAJ Z vol (Twodor(gt A Dod~() TilE CRITICAL Pmnou Or AMEHlCAN Hl~TOtY 1783-179 1 vol (John
Fiske)A (YILE or ADI LFTf1~t 18Gl-1 SO) l yolo (Worthington C Ford) )lOL80N TlIl FIRST 2 vol (August FOllrnipr Tramlated by Annie
KAdltlms) A SnORT JIJSTOl~Y or TliE ENGLISH PLOPLl~ 1 vol (fohn R Gr(en) TENTYFIVb YEARS lR1l2-WI6 ~ yollt5 ISir r~dward Grey) 1111 OPlmATIOKS OJ VAR 1 01 Sir Edward B Hamley THE VIltGINIA CAoIIAIGN QIo 61 and 65 1 vol (Andrew A HumphnYs) HISTOR) OF F1UNCE 3 vols (George V Kltchenl A GREATER THAN NAPOLgON 1 yol (Balil H LlddC1I Hart GI~OIWE WARHlNGTON 2 vols (Henry C Lodge) LH~ OF ANDREW JCKSON 3 vols (Jam(ls Parton) LIFE AND TlIES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 2 vols (James Parton) HISTORY OF THE A)nmICAN FRONTIER 1763-1R93_ 1 vol IFrederic L
Paxton) bull FINAl REPORT OF G[JN[~IlAJ 1 J PFUHIIN 1 voJ I Gen 1 r PerFllllng)
(War Dept) Fum PRIVATE TO FlEtI) MARSHAL (Sir WIlhlm Roh(rtson ~IEIOIRS OF GENERAl WILLIA1 T SIT1~TtMAN_ ~ vols (William T Sherman) TilE WAR WITH MFWo 2 vol lTuHn II Smithl THE MILITAln POLICY OF Til UNITj) STATES 1 01 IEmory Upton)
(War Dept) THE PIIILIPIINES PAST AND PHESENT 2 vblfl (Oflln C or((stltgtri FnrmCBlCK THE GTmAT t vol (Nonvood Yonng)
55
-VoLest We Forget TIlE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE WORLD WAll
On 11 ~l)ycmlJlr 1~j~~ Wf commemorate the 20th anllil-Ial~ of Uw Yolld ar Armi-1ice which ended tll( ffJ(at(-t war I hat tlll world ]wd (11 bullillH-(d llar-hal FOlh t(lpl_T~I11 lnl1()tlllllllg it nad a- [0110--
fIJ-llJtH will h( -topped on tIlt PlltlI frollt
1Hjlllllinpmiddot at 11 )O AilI Novlmlwl 11th (Fl(lllh linw) Iht dJ) d 11 IHJi) 111] )J go l)f ond tIl lIllI J (I J1d l
that hl)lll tlltha da1f until further order
VIIl oIr b dlllalvd tiHJP VIll only ~oon()() mpoundll III thp lIltl d Stallgt rrn~middot Two-thild- of 1Jw-p (1( nJ~ushy
ar and (1I1t-fillld dl(Jft (wtlthnltfl who had WllI (dled to FClll-ral --fI)II 1)) d1l1 tloliV til( I(middotiltll jHlnllr Illi nnr had ()j) hand IlIarly fj()fl()()() ~prl1wfi(ld nnec TlH lI P of maeillllp ~Ulh Illl a larg-l -caie i- a dpliopn1lllt of the o1ld V1L III the AnwrJcUI 1my thl diOtIll ill 1~112
wa only fOllr mlchilH gun llll rL)inlfllt 1rhrll War Wa- c1(ld)(d Ilerl Lc llll~ li)ht ~lrlilllr1 -l1flkifnt to eqUIp an arm of )t)fl()(IO nWll Tank t had llollt Vp had lG t I J JI 11 I I 1 PllIW () t hit h 1 tJ t I JId t oJojptl and tIll Il llll t V 11h dt Clllt
rllttl lhl tl f1llti11i Ill l(Iliar 1111 had IHPll illshy
I n to 1 1111 Illllt It-- ()llgillal -11 FOllr million nWll
(Itd In till rn1 l)f Inch 208L1H reached Fralltl To 11111 If tlllI nf 11li numJer saw activl criccgt at the irulll Ill t I tJlJf)JJ otliCtr Dr nnf pjJjllt for lach 20 lHtlL 1(l11~ -1) dii jnn- pfl -gt(nl 10 FranCP pllh divi ~lnn lll11j lll) q1 about 1000 UIliCllS and 27000 men Of 111 llllmiHr J (Inj jltl1t ill lclil comhat lrdll III St hhll alolll ~)~)o()nn AmLrictll W(1( llIgagrd the artillery llJ(d 0(1 J (lon(Hjn hl III four hOllr -t1H mn t ltCnw
(11 illlY (l)lllI111 I allOn I Lconitd ill hblulY The lllallufa~shy1111 01 Ij~ l~ lpCdlhd tlw Anwrictll Enfield rifle wa~
d(~WIImiddotd dIll pHI lIt 1l(lt1JtIOll -0 that the tolal plodllcshy11fll 01 hnllt 1 Jil ~ til 1I1h - hlti lllli1ld OPI ~JO()()n() hy thl tl1W t lw Alnll~l Jtl 1 -wllpd Tiw Brownillg automatIc Ill ld lill J~nl Ill))) IlJn Illl( Villi p)1 dtmiddotvIlopfd during tlw al lut lilt) jlltlltlt productioll and lh(d ill largl
Illlm)r in tIll t]1d iJatt] )Il Frallll Illi art illll ~h(Jlt We 1gt -ld 11 tl IfWlllll jlIn- fill trailllllg H1lpOP and I IJulJJlinJ llll fll1(1- 111 Fral1cL with artiller Innformin)Z to lll FJ (IHh IHI IJH J~h 1lndard (alillll- III I nund nllmshy
)II t had ill lrallll ~)(I) PI(l(S of ariill of wbich Jltll~ iOO ( lrlIt1 III An1trilltI
TIl PIOdIIlIJlIl III fIJI i~-(ylllld(J Irlilllr ttlgIII ll
lrHfllI chlj f)JltnlJ1JtHJIl In aviation T~w tf)ta l11shy
(JiIII1 111 I ht All ~I j(( Illtlca-pd from 1200 at tht outshy
hnak Ill tIll tr If I w nrlv 200000 a1 it (ondllioll
AmlmiddottlllI air -IJlIadrlJlh pJald important rl)ll~ at (hallallshyThl n -1 lilJi alld till TlusHAIVOIlIH 11111 hrl)tlJ~hl
dIIWl III fllll)d 7-)) lIHn1YmiddotpluII whill UtltIII1J~ a 10 of (In i ~J 7
At thf~ tnd of t hp war Amlricall productIoII of -mollteshy1( plfhl n 1 pll 1111 glfa (l han hI Fnllh and Bnl jh PllHilld illl1 rl)millmd While the plolt1ud 1011 Jf high 1p1o hI wa III 1)11 (Ill 1~1tdtl 1hall (Jlat Britain and )JPJriy dOlbll thlt of Franct
Anllnla lun h~ well proud of it~ Arrny The achielt ~ melll- of the AEF in France have been vcrS briefly state ~l iJy elltral PCl4hing- as folloW-i 1
Blwen Seplember 26th and November 11th tWenlj i t vo American awl -ix French divisions with an appronl
~~~~ ~~~ll~~II~~t1~t~l~(~~)~(~~~ ~~~~O~l ~~~~r~~X~~d~ 1 ~agld amI ltleehdvcly beaten forty-three different Gerrna i1l
diviion with an etimated fighting strength of 470O~ Of the twellty-two American divisions four had at difTere~ 1
times during this period been ill action on fronts other thi 4 ollr fHVJl j
The enemy uITered an estimated loss of over lOOOj ca ualtic- in thi-gt battle and the Fir-gtt Army about 117O(~1
Jhf lotll strength of thc Firt Army including 1350 j
French troops reehe(~ 101IOOO men It captured 26N1 HISoner- H71 canllon 000 machme gun- and large qww f tics of material
TIl( transportation and supply of divisions to mr1 from our front during this battle was a gigantic ta~k Thefq Were tweHtY~-1ix Amcliean amI seven French divisions ~rl side huntiredK of thousands of corps and army troops mm-_ ill and 0111 of t lit Amlrican ZOIlC A total of 173000 rn)_ Were evacuated to the real and more than 100000 re menl were recevi12d
It need hardly be related that Our cntry into t gave the Allie Ihe preponderance of force itally n to outweigh the tremendous increase in the strength Germans on the Western Front due to the collapse of RUi and the cOllsequent rclea~e of German divisions employ- against her From the military point of vicv we began aid the Allies parly in lUI8 when our divisions with iUll CiCllt training tu talc an active part in battle were senl 1 I h( inact ive front to relieve French divisions in order tf4i I hey might be ed where needed in the fighting line 1
The as1J1-tallce we gave the Allies in combat begall May with ilw tlcee~sful attack of one of our divisions t (anlignY Til wa followed early in June by the enlrs into battle of the two divisions that slopped the Germ advance 011 Paris ncar Chalrilu-Thierry and by thrcQ Otf)~ [hal were put in [he defensiw line In July two Amen clivIHiol1-) wit h OIl 1IUlllccan division formed the ~PCarh)i of the LIHII11)attaek against the Chateau-Thierry mlient which nine of our division~ participated There was a to of approximalely 300000 American troop engaged in I SlloIHl nat til of thl iIalllt whith involved vcr se fig-hi illg and was 1101 completed until the Germdns W
lrivel1 heyond [he Vesle in August In the middle of amp Imh)ln arllly of tllltlll Americans reduced the 81 Mil sdie))t The latter part of September our great battle of l1PIIH-AlgoIlJH was l)(~lll1 lasting through fOltY-8Pvendf
of intrllst Jig-ht il1)~ aIHI llhlillg brilliantly for our First S((olld Armie Oll NOLm1Jer I ]th after mure than 1200 Ampri(tln gtoldi(ls had participated
On the twentieth Anniversary of the Armistice it s proper to recall some of the Armys aecompliRhmenl that great emergency Lest We Forgct
56
Lest We Forget
DtTlu ltlIl VI~ILQL~I~CT I tYI 11 10 )~ ~ ~
I
Iltpound)Utqo~ frVtflG
- -----shy
~ cf I~M-~S~f Sshy
Dv-AulIJo+j
or J~Ulo1r~~
~oGtI5 copyl i
nmiddotwt J 1___
~L~ - _
57
I
Library Bulletin
j I
Thlt 10rrI ~trlocf 01 th Untd ltt t lt
Tr ~n()~t Itn de~ 10pOl nt n tt UnIt d Ot tmiddot I II I
Ih PQIlct 1H youth
( ~ d of d r
(~r t Itd If Ch I
11
rp O ~ COfllnl1j Imiddot I ~ I
I I_ K-- hlney n tho 01laquo 01 M bullbull rIHt HII McCrir I
gt Tr It1rl Ivlt Ilon of N pnhnn I I I I I~ - I I
MIIr~ clttlhllthtTHnt pproprltn fJlII for 1111 If I 11 I)
~ I
Tllr nor I hltrd I 11 III
0 r Ollrrhllrult It I 1111 I dlf iiII1
lrA chlrlt rI lUt 1 I - bull J ill
LmiddotgtlconmiddotdllGUtrrcdmiddotE~plln( I Ill I
JlUI h I It Tho Inv 510n of Chln~ b) tho Wlllttern worl Illgt 11 d
1 I ro J 111] Tho pO~l-wlr world middotIorl 1middot1 I I h 1[1 Ill 11 II I 111(I11j
1 L J I) I~ Gavltrnrnfnt gul1tlor1 of tr1nlportltttwn lUk tlxlll
J lop ~roo 11 I 1 X lraI I I Lr Tho Lo t Batttlton JII) 11 lin) I( r iI(ie)
I ph 1llh~ Tho polltleo~ 1865169( Ill I I I
hl) 11 lellltron~ mIHttlrcS til la Iucrro elvll (n [~pJn1 I) h 1)lIill lt frp ih 1 ar 1 1 1)11 11 liE ]
111 1 II -tIJnullr Irn Americlon relef 1I 111_1
I IIdI mj Lifo of Proldont Rooltltlvclt A ~tudl In fartur lnd pO f j Bl~ WI)j
1 I (f) II Tho philosophy of tho tct (1 111 11 If atd I tr J Im PM))
~~nlnnl I~r) (rnmII ror runlUt Twentymiddotthlrd nnuat report of Nltlonoll Adv1~ory Commlttlte for Aeronautics 1937 I(If7 11 rO Ij
Nltw lntrnltlonlll Yer Book um fIlllIm of ttl rid prlr ror tj ~nr E jp pnlj
l I)) t I)r f a) A ~tudy on th( opltrlltlon ofn Int(IIIlt n(o_offccl~ r ran 1111 frm II In nrll l i I elll e I lmldl1l 1 Ill 11 II I
I fall Ill 010 Wlthrwlrt~chaft do~ totln Krlcgts I rUd f hr I tllt ~ I I HI [01 1If)- ]
llflhr Tho Navy Ahl~tory I) nr rmiddot 1 )IP ]K f Ij
lr WI))n Children ortho RisIng Sun Ill Imiddotmiddotmiddot-)
1iI r lIuulluHI
Oltr DlenstUntorrlcht 1m Hecro 1J 11 f- ) gt H to r I til Ju ltI furl nrmj- Iu) fnr 11]0 raal_ymlt) 1 lH 11 ~(-t 1 q I
Ofr DIltn~tuntfrrlcht 1m H re 11 Jl) -101 11 11 t I rlllll1J1 IU fm 1)11 r] 1117 [1 ~l I 11-(]
1J11middot11I1i1 nf IntnwtI1d [f
International ~llnction5 fII( loy 11) f 111lt111 r 11 ttlllllltdut( In( 110) [LlT 1~)]~ [I~ ]
Tho Rcpubllc~ of South Amlricil npnrt h -1Ul jrltgt]1 [ mllrqn ItlllI 11)1)11111 of tllonltInI Afr q ) (j t1
-IIIflrth LI ( 11 1lt lrqr Der Untcrfuhrer der Flilkilrtlllcrie 11 hl U d ~It] u) r I t 1I1)IlIlrUllt nrtllry] l~n [1 07-12- 1 III
flhtl rool~ 1
Th( (clution of phylc Imiddot i 1
middot11 r
Ch (lilt for her Ioflt 11lt 11 I )
fd t 1 Hport r S (ond r(rl( 1 ~d 1 I 1 [0 I l~ t I I [I
is
~ I I 01
unt lllJH~
I P
1 11 Il lIh 11 11)
Intrutlon~ for tlH tlct1 rmploympnt of Irltf I bull 1 111 IlIt I l I I) 11
Trnport tlon on t W t rn Front I ] 1 I Igt lt
J JI h _ loj
Imiddottru~to for rllOHlHnt cont~Ql OVrol In WlT
111 J()lJrnyto r
~c
11 LI
fbull]
j
d I I 111 10) dI 11)lt_
II
I I I 11 I If I]]
I I I l J~ i 1 01 ) I - III
I) I Braxton Brago Gonertl af til Confcdlrlcy 11 III BIO]
Ofr SprlchBrockhmiddotH~ 11 nlllwlra f ld
-[1 r iI11um I[))) FolkwlYs tuh I Ih _ell 11 II1lPflr[ 1I111IH P rll10111 mtlt nlld mrnl~ IHI~ 111
ulhllt-ltlolhI1II tnll1J( r t ( Fighting pbnls of thl orld 12)
[ t ltII ~ loar ( allan Arncrlct UOl~ to 1r 1lt) l~ 11 llll-I l-f i q
Ifd ( Ctgt ut ~o11 d Iarmo ittllonn qull ] h 1 1))111 1 tI [1LlIUIl rnl 1Ilt ]101-( W1
IItnh Lad Thorouuhbrfd rdJ stock lnd it~ bullbull ncolitors rIn f pur 11( 1 1 fI1 1 1
hlt1lrllmlull Puerto Rico nd It plopl Illilt [17211
WhO5 who In Jalla 1936 th Ihuhuo nl lw) Pilll I~~ 1I1~1
011r HIltI 1 Ild rlhur 111 Tho Hoov politic 111
tr ii nr1 ( The Glrrnan Octopu Jillh r 11 f r rid 1 r 11111 11 Qi~
rI r - The Candlans Thl) story of II people 11J1i [171- 1
1111 I hWII TIll SlllomiddotJlprH~ confllct lnn til LNilUl of Ntlou lItIImiddot1
JII III~( Ill J looldnll bDhlnd tho tonsor~hlp 11 IX (1 ~Il 1 f]
ACADEMIC I
J1Uj)U GllLL ( 1 BliKDlL U S Army COllmandant n~n]lIE1t (ELL F II00Ji( U1T U S Army 4sgt(i1 (IIIIffdi
J 11 ITT iT COLOJEL F GILBREATII CayallY SrcJ(flry
DIRECTORS
l~qlllaJ I ~ ________ _lOLONEL K B Epl1u--ns (avall
~1IId Cia alHI Elell jllll CourbCS _______ COLONIL C I (IWeKCTT Infantr)
CHIEFS OF SECTIONS
I OJIllhJiL UPllltltiotl ______ _____ LUUT (OLUNELG It (UOl Illfalltr~-
II lilt Lll igCl1Cl Ihmiddot tory alld Slratcgy _____ LIEUT COLONEL F V g()LEr Fi(ld Artillltmiddot~middot I I I I)(fensivC Opcratiulls ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ LIEUT COLONEL G H MEYER Coa--t Artillery (nrp- 1- Suppl) EanntlOll and Logitic~ _ _ LIEUT COLONEL C F ILLIIS Cor]l~ or Enllllll
I_cclialll011_ _________________ LIEUT (OLONEL Il E ~ICqllLLN (11middot
l
ROSTER OF INSTRUCTORS
i ~Ld~ KllllH n (t
It I (tr) I Inf
1(gt h inPDltl 0 F Lt 111 (()L~~II~IIltIl) Thn B Cntrl t( 1q( n ( ( t~~lgl))rlH~)l~ 1 ( tlJm~ Charlln F r E l~drrhll1 L(i K t l
PCF tl~~di~lI~()1rnd k ~~~ Eri ilJlDl E FA ~atz Flod R Inf p~rd SJh~tlmiddotr I) r j
~~r Hlm( II H InC rlg Jln1()nl F inL
I 1 ~~rt ci~~I~llnL( I~ IWmCIDlt1gttIt L Inf ~d L IllMd H InL a(rHoml E InL IrFarlnd AndHw I illf
anlOrk An D Inf Hry Bl-ll 11 FA
c urn r Augu~tu M F 1 mlth AIIrt ( (~v
Qta -1ltmnan IJ Inl Idrlahnn William lt InC mWn Hompr C Inr uthm RlchJrdmiddotT FA
lIorlgltun laul A CE
N~~~i~~ ~~lll bn~ c Ttior Herhert W MC TOll1lt Dwight F C E
middoti~~PA~~h~~(P~ C~~middot fandpll ILlfold C Cav Brett S(fIIlU E Inf
(lmp1ill William A FA Ehrll Ir(gtl~r)l L InL HlIlwy Ullfu S Cav Brook Jdward II FA ugur Wayland H Cav 1lfllt Ward H bull FA Clmpiwll William F QMC Hultman Hfrbert FE CAe TnlltCott LUIlan Ie Jr Cav Pnrtlr Hay K Inr 111111 John K InL ililburn Rrltm L CAC Lflwr lLIll 1- lllL Hkd-o William P FA Karlstad Chups H Inr GriclllY CecIIJ In
Rook Lowell V InL (tdIe John U D lpndfrgrat Grady H Inf Hrt(gtI1P Rohfrt G C Irvil1l WilarJ V CAC Bl)I1()1(gt E~IoIrt F C S Phillip Thomas R C AC rlhE Sam LbullC 11011 John II C Ae HarkPr Jnhn Dc F AC
(middotlITIN Lorpncc Walter Eo CE IIartllflt Harlan ~ InL Jpnkm Reubn E InL Lanah1l1 Frtll(l~ 1l Jr SigC
ROSTER or RtGULAR CLASS 1938-1939
NAE 1lkPrrnan StlphpJI 0 Adamf1 Hugh P AIbrpcht Frank M Aldprman Crdg Andersoll KelllHth s Rack George 1 Balwr RussrU A Barher Edward Barl Ruwrl O Harndollar Marlin 1) II [llrlptt L(lUrIIHP V
B(gtldrrlinden William A Bplldpr Arthur I-I Ikqqlll~l Earl C Bplt)etLP Leo A BIfIdl WIlliam S 3d Binnl John J Bl(k Frldprilk IJ Blizzard John C oTr lIoaIlHr Haydoll L HuatrHr Marl M Jr Bohzien Edwin B Rohlpndpr John F
ItA~k llHANCli (lptall1 htfantry (LptUll FA (aplam CEo (Iptalll illfantry itljllr Infantry Captam Slg C Captam Infantry (Lptal1 C AC (IJlalll 1lSMC MaJOr lllfllltr~ Clptain CAC (aptull FA (apltin ( AC CtltUIl Infantry ~t1J()r Illfmtry raplam (avalrv
(tplam VA iLIJllr FA tllajor Infantry Captain Infantry Captain CE l1ajor Air Corps Captain Me
59
w _~~ AC(ldemic Notes c amp GSS QUUlmiddott~
IL It~h HILII NArlH RANI
UUWII Frud S Ir (aptain Infantry Hettinger John A Major Cavulr
BOWIH JaTllh C lr laptalll Infmtry Hill Tame P Captain lnfant~ HurjlIlit WlUfl) L (qtltlll1 InfllItr IIohlnthaJ William D MIJeH CA C
Bur((1 LI t ( (11[1111 F IIntmiddot Charp n Captain Clo S1 eg Sc
BU1IH1l ta1h bull r 1 ~d tjlt11Tl ( ( lIolllwr IiI) W Captain
Idh jtllph K ( algt lill lnfllltn Ilorn hlrl A Major Air Corl~ bull ~~ (mltl IiWlrl (tPLL]11 C I IlorrrH 1lt (iil11 I Captain ~1C
Sc (lIllltlll (Lf i) ( L)IUII IIILtllrJ Ilottllll Iohn I~ Clltam
(ttL II (I r (qtllll Il1fllllr HOIIl rh~lIl r Major
111 11 Id rd (111) Illftfr II()~JJ JLnl(l I Jr CLI)tain
llrJJIvrdj 1jr Jllf1I1r JIIW HobPrL L Jr (ljlLdn
(LLd ~()rml J ILl) 1 IIYlJllg Clyde L Malor
II Illld I I I ( II d ll JlI fl1l1r llJhn()Il I)OUgill V Captain
I Ir ~ il] 1fHtr JOhWJIl Elrlf A Major
J (In bull I~ (1j1Hl lr (q ohnull Howard It lpLIIII
(IIll HI) l Ii (till) 1 1Illi IlhOl WIllIlmiddotl1 n CapLlin
[d ffll I J (11lt]1 -11 I 111 (~harkl P CapLun
I rIl I i (tn Wllhlm B Captlln
rHoiL ( I trmiddot r I n (1) lfltUlj Franlc A Major
(IlIlIlJ1l) I lt I t)ll Ipm HamId I) Captain
ln 1r(sjIJT1 If ( q ~ K(bfr LaUtitHP B ~bJur
1)1d I Llm - I~ ljL Itf11L1r hlIHli Alvan C olljor
IIL I[O- Ir( nmiddot Kllt I au Jbullbull Cwllin J)llr1middot]middot(rrIH 11111 ul) K 11111 John A 11IJor
1)111 P lI l~ ( ljdl) (( Kohlgt Vlbiw n (apt a)
[)rlr( il I 11Jr (1 dry Jrwl (por)W K l1ljllr l )Ilgt 1 11] I If (IImiddott11I Irdilltr KrLltlhoJf -innw) CaplllI
Jl lllrt I I lr tIry LuHIvin Joltgtpph Captain
fnIrII Ii i (Ill1l IT Cliff LlIlham Charlp~ 1 Captain
111111 rtIL) I Ll]r lr ()fI LawrIl(I Charlp~ V Captnll
11 i ( rtd II ( H III llf I1dr ilwtoll VllIiLIn S Captain I II It ITmiddotl ITlt ( Lumhard StlpIH1l C ClpLllli
I-kill illl 1)1 dl r LUVIIl Juhn H Clptalll
1 -11) Inti II( I ( qLdll (I LYIllh Grorgf 1 Cljlltlll
Ir ]tJrlll (QI L1ll I Mahie RIl~(1l L C1)la1l1
lt f 1 I Id td 1 1lJl1r Idr Mtldonald John C ~Tajor
IlL r It doI (qgttllL lr rl~ Mlrhdl Iloyd illajor
rj TILllll [ ( t[tll ( ~ ~lartiJl 1Lrlin C ~LLj()r
1)f loll Ilt ( qgtt11l I Mathpwoll LptnllPI (Ipt-till 1- d n 1 l~ltl r1 I (lltlill ( ( iay Edwin T CaptLin
111r lnf JilIn Il(hr~4tal IItrhfrl 1 Cptain 1[oIlt1ll F ~1 (ClUff Mlr] Captain
LdlJI H IIIJr F 11p(ulough Samuel 11ajor ( I I~ f [tdl Ir (liII) JnLlll] tl1d((I Riehard G Cllltain r Ij ( 1)i J ( lIdUll (lt( Md~UtIIl John C Ca))ILlIl
Il Il l[ iIIIII IlIfI)ll1 Illlt(~nulth Wilbur R 11jor
(t rd H rl ( (qd llll I -llmiddotloy Guy S Jr Captain ( r]n T O) l IIJr IT ( rl~ 11nfTlt Htlbell C -I1Jor ~ l r IJ I 11 ~Ij ( -ll)r)rtmiddot Brywt I 1aJor (dI 11 d II (1]11111 [lIfl1tn Ilurphy John B lajllain
(1 H hJ lilli I 1Jr ITImiddot)fJ M~frlt Culby M Captaill
1 U dlll II I1 (1 ir (oq ~ NVIlll (pon 1) Cljltalll
(~Ii t 1 rII i~ L (IIllll JnflIltrv 1nhil Charil13 II (ptLin
(~dlJr jllldri shy (ljllltl 1 -llf~(III Rkhm K laptaill (lId L 11)jn I (II)lllll Ill ()middotJ)llllti Iohn W Major
(rI [ Ill ir ( ljllIll Sl~ ( Partndgpoundgt L1o~ d S lajor (r IIltmiddotr Ld) ( (IImiddot1i 111 (lvdr P(phw G()r~( B ()Itlin 0
(rdhl jl fl Il jf (1J1L11l Infantr Io~(lll WJlhun I) I1ajpr (r 111111 ljlllli -IT (orl 1ral hpr Hlthard ( ~aJltalll
II n II JlTIll II 1IJr illLllllr ltdl Slatlll Jo Captain i) ILr] llJlIT lnfIHtT ILIIllY TIOma~ II ~lajor
Ibl 11 ILId ~ Ir 11 Lt 11 (qfJh Hplc1 Widlr J Major
ILlllll johlJ H (qtll1l I ItplI- Andrew R Major IIrl It 11 11)llf up (ldwidrfpr Ilarr Major SIR ( j II nd J1fntl II (IItllll lr(TI itlnlll Alhrt (apllill (I- ~i Illrfl (IIYiJ o1]r (C ltwhanbol Willi11ll L (apt ll1
ILII11]1 (lplllI 1 itldlllo1lr (Iryll II Major ~i~~orI(1Iiard II ~ f d rll J (qLIIll C AC HqJrrts Thomas A Jr Captain FA J Heilllltl I hmh H Cljllal1l FA Itr)(lIlilponarcllI Captnin Air Cor~-middot
II I )~fI)]1 rg t 11 rt I o1ljor AU (orp HI)t1wllI JalI4 S Major (ava1) ~
Iff ILlr ILlrrl 11 II r) (apt1I1l (ldn Hnl~pl11 Gurdon D Captam Cavaln ~
Hln]lIJ) flrll olljor JnflIdry HohfoiCnherg(r Carl T Major Cavllr~
1fl11V Vdlfr H Jr (tpain FA Rothrrmich Albert Eo Captam lnfantl)
60
Infant) IllfIIltr
In(ntl) -
InfmID ~ Q ~C ~ Air corfi t A ~~
i
f2XVIII No 70 Academic Noles
NAME
Roycc Charles H _ Ran Cornehus E
gnlle Gordon P jiltchc1lller Frederick F schlattrr David M 1Schulgen G(gtorge F1Scott WilLlrd W lSilt~r-l RthmllOn ~rormdur Haymond L JSoane Charlp~ C bull Jr Sltlth 101m A I Jr (Snith fJgtIph l~rruthJ Holwrt MlK ~ltl dl-nw n
I ~ rJry )hrrow Imiddot i5~ldmg J)lJllad 1 15tafiurd Bpll ~3f1lr Th)Illll H llhfl~ AlhPrt K TT
Franlb H
-rt nrl Otto P lt Donald G tltIqJfD
Thr)ma~ D )1- fohn L
It Juhn F ljd-t PpLrnC (
j7 [-)1) CIIHlllf A ) i7 I rr~ fohn 1
l~~~~I~~rd T
jl_ hlm~ Lumn L 1IOln l1ltDJ] E ]Ilton Walter K Jr
i lilm~att RoJert Wefl jllrgLt Vlllard L l t ital Wp~lpy V
jYe2ger Hohart R ) -rmiddoton EHrett M
jiUlll Char)( W
) I
1 ri n ~)
HANK
Captam Major Captam Captlin Captalll Captam Major Captain Major Captain Clptain CapLlin (aptalll
Captul1 CapLun Major Major ClptlIn Captain Captam Captalll Captain Captam Captain Captum Major Captain Clptdn Captain Captam Ctptain ~IaJ()r
(aptalll Captain Major Ca]ltaln Captain Major Captain CaptJ1TI Captam Captain Captam MaJor Captam Mljor Captalll Captalll Captlin Major Captain IstLt CU11tam Captain Captain Major Major Major
UfANCI
Infantry Infantry AIr Corp CA C AIr Corp Air CorpshyrAC lt1-
-Infantry Infantn FA Alf et1 Dn F CK Infmtrr InrlIltn CE InfuntT) Infantr Alf CorpltshyInfantry CpLC Cc FA Air Cnrp FA CAC InflI1tr~
AIr Corp Atr Corp5 CA C Infantry Infantry CWS AIr Corp InfanttJ Air Corp Air Corp cr- C~lalry
Alr Corp Infmtr Air Corp Infantry Cavalry FA Cnalry FA Infantry QMC C E Alr CDrp ( A(
Cavalry Air Corps Infantry Infantry
TIlE C01~IANJ) AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Fort Leavenworth KalLltas
1937-1938
Map Problem No 25
15 Mar(h 193x
Tim map prllhlpm whi1 dilfprPllt from anything that has Iwpoundn ucltd m thl P-t at Ill Commmd and (jPlwral it lIT ihoo is nut eJ]tlrely new to mllhf lIl-trudiiltL ~L1Jor John H Burngt Infantry hl-gt writtrltll at ngth (O)Hrllll~ Ih]lt ypl of prohll11 In hN artide 111f11( Ihf lIo) ProJIlin jlllbhlt-llld lt 1h( SIPtmJPr-tktolPr lgtU of lIlP Injrtllir[()1rJwl
llv llfoblem I Oil I of Ilpejjon 0 rrawtl that It ((is mfnrmatlOn to llll lttIHjnt In ti(gt furm of fUmmMI(gt (very hlJf hour The soher is r(4U1red to llldt a rlllIlrt at th (1111 of pltlfh half hour on the actions taken an-I orders If my( tudly lilUIt hy til (ommanrlcr In thig tYfJ( of problpm the solver mu~t JUidl wli11 I)f Ita ufiICipnt informatIOn and WiWll till time j ripe for rnalrlg riprisj)lIs
Althnll)h thi b a corpg prohhm th( eJwmp lt lnu~trat(lt may be vljuIltI iIlIXIII-HI mvoh-mg ltmtlir unit
Prfmiddotllh~
Sl fTlll- I ArlVtIH SJClt t-2 II Sppud SltuHtinn ContintH d ~9
III Hnilltlfll to r IlIlU--iull 11 14
SEIltON I
ltiancc Sheet
General ltUat lOll spceJal situation
1 (l~NIHAL SITUATION - - (I 1110]18 Sperial iIap A herewith Scale J inch ~4 miles
lJ Boullclaries- The Pennsylvania lIaryland state line forms the boundary between two hostile states Blue (north) and Red (south)
c Opposing forces - It is known that Red war plans conshytemllbte the concentration of a reinforced corps of two or three diVlsion~ in the area helween South IVIountain and the Susqueshyhanna River
2 SPEfIAL SITUTION Q loncentralioll 11) I lorps rewforcer The I Corps reinforced Lieutenant General A comshymanding consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions organic corps troop~ and aUaehecl troops as indicated in paragraph 1 Table J page 7 TaIzes oj ()rganization CampGSS 1037 The I Corps concentrated with the 1st Division in the viCInity of Hanover (374-746) the 2d Division in the vicinity of Gettysburg (350shy750) and the corps artillery in the vicinity of Biglerville (349shy762) The corps service elements are to concentrate in the area Lemoyne (380-800) ~ Carhsle (355-79)middot ~It Holly Springs (355-785) - Bowmansville (~1l3-792)
(2) The 3d Division (detached from I Corps) with 903d Cavalry Squadron ultached and certain artillery tank and motor units concentrated in GHQ reserve in the area shown on Special Map A
(3) Other Blue forces concentrated in the area east of the Susquehanna River
b Misson oj the I Corls~The mission of the I Corps is to mvade Red territory and develop the hostile situation west of the Susquehanna River
c Krents prior to liouliaht 15 Morch - (1) The I Corps completed ib concentration late on 12 March The 1st Cavalry Brigade reinforced protecled the concentration Early on 13 March the I Corps preceded by its cavalry crossed the frontier and advanced to the south the 1st Division marched on Manshychester (384-729) the2d Division marched on Keymar (350-721)
61
0~ i~ YSRURG SHEET EDITION OF 1934
STIlt_ TEGIe ~LP GEiTYSm-Rc~RICHMOND ___ Tc
- 3middot
1 ( ~_I-ampJ---=
SPECIAL MAP A SITUATION AT DARK 14 MARCH
THE COMMAND AND GEN-ERAL STAFF SCHOOL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS
1937-1938 TO ACCOMPANySECTION I
MAP PROBLEM NO 25 (160) 25 MARCH 1938
or -
1cademic Noles
(2) The ht DiviicJI1 l1lluunl(gtt(d hootile infantry along the line Silnr I~lln fjf)S-j~~ I I inebun) (~tG-I~6) and attacked late 1 llarth
Il) The ~d ])1 on Jatl on tllf aft(rn()on of 1 lIarch lpadwcl tllC Ernmitltbl11~ ~11-7~) TaT1(gt~l()Wn ~)-72R)
fpad aflPJ bill ltldll ClJlJIfJ-ltion (4) Earl~middot 11 Illfh Ill hI and 2d Dimiddotbinlc und(r (owr
of f(j~r wlti h 11(d thnll~h)ut the day lauf(hprl a (()ordmatpd atlttk aralll lilt h)~1114 fonl al()n~r the IIIH SiIVl nun
IIJ(middotil()l() I i l~ J111 1 h~ld (onidfllbJ( W(middoth and hy dad 11 Ial (il L(d d11 II 1111 lu) till f)J l bw to fl1 lint Plea alll al(middot I ~Ii-i----) Ihl) d ~7x-7n ) (ul)p(wdp1 (~XX-I~ I)
I ~)J illl 1 i blll Ill 11 I11Llnl rv 1- 011( ht t illOfl Wl~
Jrl()fr1 to ) TtIrlh )fi-Il1) ITl (()lJh ItttnC l)r(pared for Illl)fll 111 1111)111 lrl1por I
(1) TIllIoll 11lri llldltl -upporld llHWtllJJ] of the 2d and hI I)J l-iIlJi~
II) J-ll1 till Ih IlllJjllllW of l~ )Iarcl 1IIf hogtlik (~1-alry pemratlmiddotd gtI lllw OUlltlj rtmiddotlOllnai- al(( ~(r(en in lil(gt middotjlmiddotinity ()fSl1trI C l()11 11l~1-~11 alld 1lll1Tilvd ()Il Yorh lij7~lf~raquo) By dark 11 ~I~n h t hf 1lt-1 (tya1ry nrwulpound ninfofCld had drivcn Ill 110 1ill la 11 1)11 1II Itt nm1 had onto a -trong pDf-ilion in 1111 willi 1 )- ~lll-hun 1)-(1~) S11IJhlown
~ Ill 1llfh J~J1Ldd( ()r () rll1fnr((d b pr(JIt(tllll~ tilt lint pf Oll1llll] 1tlI)11 f 1)1 (OJ p-
)11[ fIIIllf)fi il Hr(td llload- -hown in -ohd 1IH ()ll Ill ~r I I ( ~ill 11 P IfI ~111t ddpound for t 11-IY mot or t ltfTic
h) n (uti I I lit ( J lu r 111 hllll conl A Wlvy mit1
n~ (Ild 1111 lt 1)(11(11 ~(Ilth 7Iollnttln ~nrl the Sultqucshyhtll11t 11 11 Ill 11 IJl (h Imiddot()rc(a~t at Ii 110 Pl 1-1 I1JTh 111111111ltd I)F) iurlll11 Ihar III tIll Jatl 1f(rnnol1 of tii )Jar(h
(I ltIJlfl Tiltmiddot Su-qlHhllllll and Potomac Rivers are unfordtbll -II Pt1ljh () 1~1(r h unfordahlp -outIHlst of it i1llt()11 ~l-)j~ lth ))Ih 1ra11(11 l)atap~(o I1ierall other ]1(1111 II f f()r]ddl
InrHvrph
--llll 1 -11 t IIO (II 111 IP 1-l(lIh of Jfi Uarch Tbl plall~ for tlH ()fllLttlolh qf the (orp~ on IC) llareh
TJrovided for a ((ln~l1udtJII~ I)f the al1lIk hy the 1sl and 2d I)jvil)tb and II(middot J 1 (tYdn BrigHh
JHutlllallt (111(1 al 1 al hi~ (ommand post al IIano-el 111111 tlJ (lr p~lt ()f 11)( Tllorning of Ii) 1lareh ~tudying the Illllt)l 1TI1P llld tIll In flrllinv rIporli
J 11 ll() AI hi d lVlrpound of till foll()wing --ltuatlOn
(It tIl f1(1I1t (Jf IIII 1lt-1 (Iall) Briglclt the ho~tile eayalry had LfIll for(Imiddotd)ll VJl11drl to tlllaquo ~(Jlth and at 1000 A1 Ih( 1~1 (aalry Briradp had aun encounlpled hOllijp cavalry ni lalllIalorw rllf I1 Ialylal1d LitH (to1~7~f)) orli-villl ( f 1)-r~middotf J
On ill flllill f IIII 11 JlJj~iflll til 1100Idl force had allHlud ~l1nultalll)u-ly with thl attaek of the bt Division Thi rnlltt ha hnlJH1 pl1 Ilhtral ion and tlloveHwnl No gain~ hy (ilhe fOIl( ~(11ll to ha(lw(ll mlltll
On 1 Ill frollt or t 111 ~d Dn iol I he n(d~ launched a surshypn~( allwJ Ht dayh~~ht again t 1( right flank of the 2d Division
This attack was supported by tanks and caught the 2d Div~ in attack formation The tenor of the reports and m from the 2d Division indieates thal the Division is in sen difJi(ulty but in no imminent danger
Lieutcnant (jeneral A vbitcd the (ommand post of the Divimiddotion at Bandanna (mi-7lH) at 11 10 M where he fo the commander and staff gr~atly dhappointecl with the res of t he mornings hat 1 Ie The divi~i)n wa- reorganizin~ and paring to resume the attwk at about ~ 00 PIvl It expCte after reorganizal ion j hat two and po-ltihly 1hr(gt( hatt alions co be made available fol the new effort Lieutenant G viiled the command post of the 2d Dimiddotision at Galt (J
al ahout 121 PM The slarr of the 2c1 Division appeared ~()mewhat (hagrined uy the events of the morning vr tonflictIng and contradictory reports had been received [11 ~ the ~uh()rdinate uniL~ It wa~ almost impossihle to gain a co beer pie e or clear picture of aITairt- on that front pres ltertain fa(lS were cle~~ however The attack of the~ing
DIVISIOn had faIled the dlvJ-lOn had been thrown on the defrshy~ive and about noon had heen drinn back and appeared to~ -tuhhnrnly defending along the ~(gtnclal line Tane~tuwn i Pleaoant Valley (altualtie- ~llfT(rcd (ou1d not be dctcrmirw i with any dpgrpp of WlurlfY Iajor C(llpral ~d DivisionrjJ just fPturned from a viltit jo his hrig-ad(~ Iommanders whow 1 found reorganizing their fOI(e- and strcngllwning 1heir defenvl Two infantry battalions werc in diYi~i()n lCsCt( The divis cavalry ()ppo~ed l)y hOStllp (lvalry wa~ protc~ing the rightfl~~ along the c1cel about t wo Imle~ nort hwc-l of 1 aneylown 1la ~
General 2d Division in spite of the reerses of the day Ii calm and unworried ~
Vhilpon 111(se visits Li(utfI1ll1t General A studied thest at ton but did not i~ltuc any orders He rct urned to hb (ommalt~ post at Ilanover at 1 10 IM in time for the rouline daily rJ lonfercT1CC ~Imiddot
The Corps Reenc (1st Infantry less one battalion) at~ $ril hour was sLiIl at Two Taverns prepared for movement hy mo i t ranspClrL hndl
OTIS len Hp1U1n(- of llfornlltion f((IWei tt til( COfp Commallli Post i 1
l~u(d at half hour iHtervalsommfllClIlr at 1 15 P)l LnLi endmg at t15Pl~ 10 ~ In making fepofts ~tud(nh will nutp thp HIJuirpnHnt (ar(fllY~J
no impoftHlt OfiPf i HlloUIlImiddot((1 or 1ctl)1l tIIill tilt f(marc N()Il(il~ pntffd on till flport
L HI hriff Ill dfllJlllp
SE(JlO- 11 IConlinutt1)
Special Situatiun Continued
)rwiai ~ltUlt1UtJ (onllnt(d
1 -IEClALRItlAtlON (ONIIl111n lipon a1Tialat~ command post at 1 )0 11I Liputenant General A was met his Chief of Stair who prtsente(I him with 1he following me dal(d Cflq 1) Ilanh 10middot1) P~1
The fOI(p OPlHl-ld lo the 1 (orps is eslimatrrl to~ (orp- of not more t hall two divi-ions Your mi (hal1gtlti You will a(Imiddotll1lte wilhout delay and capt 1IMUtE The ad Division with surIkient GHQ motor pOIa1ion 10 move the essential (ornbat elements of on gadc reverts to your corps effective at once
The daily staff conference was called to order by the C of Starr at 1 45 PM Lieutenant General A the chiefs of
og ~
- ~
or
I
~olXlJl No 70 Academic Notes
general staff seclions and certain special stafl officers were presshyent The Chief of Staff briefly outlined tlu situation as already described above after which the following reports were made
Corps G-2 stated There is some doubt as to the strength of the hostile forces confronting us G-2 GHQ inclines to the belief that it is a corps of not more than two divisions We have
Jed two divisions Red deserters claim that four divisions were in the area Baltimore - Vashington about 12 lIarch Knowing Red Lieutenant General Js reputation for caution and prudence I cannot undertand his attacking us this morning unless he i~ quite certain that he IS superior to us It is quite possible that General J has been relieved However I han~ no mfonnation about thIS Of course the hostile commander Genshyeral J might be miinformed as to our strcngth I am striving
Ito gam morc definite information as to the hostile strength Unfortunately due to the continued fog the air service has
jbeen unable to Ioeate the ho-tile r(cIVcs 1 cstimate that at present they are west of Parrs Ridge favoring the Reds envelopshy
Iling attack i As to Red capabilities shy
ii 1 He can continue his attack today
He can renev his attack tomorrow enveloping our nght flank or with less ease our left flank
He may defend actiyely or passively northwest of or I on Pans Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
He may delay or withdraw
-1 Corps G-~ stated I1 SineC rny bA report to the Chief of Staff the following
Information has been received i I From the bt Cavalry Brigade dated 1100 AlIT -The t] hostile cavalry has been oriYen slowly south to the line bull ~Iaryland Line or1i5il1pound Am about to aUack
j Information has been slow in arriving from the 1st Cav~lry1 1 havc ~cnt a LiaIson Officer to that headquarters The 3d Division reports that its artillery is all truck-drawn I that plans have heen made to move the essential combat ricments of onc infantry brigade by GHQ motor transport on
two hours notlt~e 1 The 100 Pil weather forecast predicts rising temperature fJg ohouhi clear in a few hour~ continued dry I ~Iy section ha~ roughly prepared the following plans
To move I he 1d Divl~ion 10 either flank for an attack late this aflernoon or early tomorrow
To relieve the 2d Division by the 3d Division this afternoon or tonight and resume the attack -11
To withdraw to a defensive position southeast of etshytysburg in order to assume the counteroffensive with the
JI i 3d Division from the vicinity of Hanover
G-4 stated A check is being made by my section to detershyine how much motor transportation can be used for corps elical operations without disrupting supply I expect the
eport soon ~ The Corps Chief of Artillery reported that he was studying he Gmiddot3 plans to delermine the ose of the corps artillery and
location of ammunition The Corps Engineer reported that Red road demolitions as
uth as the Emmitsburg - Taneytown road on the west and the line Glenville (388-741) -- Shrewsbury -- Stewshy
town on the east flank were ninety percent repaired Road
signs were being put up throughout the rear areas The position southeast of Gettysburg was being reconnoitered
Requirement-Report the actions taken and orders as actuw
any issued by Lieutenant General A at his command post between 145 PM and 215 PM 15 March if any
Time allowed for solution 30 minutes
SECTION II (Continued)
Special Situation Continued Innwnlh
SpeCial ClltuatlOn continued 5
5 SpgCIAL SITUAFION CONTINUED---The following is a resume of messages received at the I Corps command post between 215 and 245 PM 15 March
From the Artillery Information Service
Mass of hostile artillery appears to be west of Parrs Ridge - Dug Hill Ridge
From the 1st Cavalry Brigade (message delayed due to encoding and decoding)
Drove hostile cavalry to the south from the Maryland Line - Norrisville position at 11 45 AM Am following up My men and horses are greatly fatigued Casualties have been heavy Indications are that hostile cavalry will resist again in the vicinity Parkton (404-727) - Shawsville (418-725) Will attack
From the 2d Division
Am preparing to launch counteroffensive at about 430 PM Have three battalions southeast of Galt as maneuvering force
From the 1st Division
Will renew the attack at 3 30 PM in the direction Bandanna-Ebbvale-Carrollton Have three battalions available for the operation
From Liaison Officer with 1st Cavalry Brigade (Personal Report)
1st Cavalry Brigade is in dire need of rest but their morale is very high The commanders seem to be more weary than the troopers Hostile cavalry withdrew in disshyorder from Parkton - Shawsville position at 145 PM
Corps G-4 reported
Sumcient trucks of corps quartermaster train to move the essential combat elements of one brigade can be made available on two hours notice without disrupting the supply of the corps
From the Corps Air Service
Fog seems to be clearing expect to send out first misshysion at about 245 PM
From 1st Division
My division cavalry attacked the hostile cavalry on its front at 1 30 PM and drove it south of the Gunpowder River southeast of Gunpowder (388-734) Believe the hosshytile infantry on my front is preparing to resume the offenshysive
65
Ac~demic Notes
Ufljllifl]lfllf Jlporl tlH -a11Hh laln and orciN (1-
(lCtual1y i--ued hy LilUl (~n~1I1t CPIHrai A at hi mmnand lot hetween 21~) P~I and 21~ I~I 1 ~Ialltil if an
IllItgt a[[llltf flJ (dotu HI minu~
SI 1111 II ilolllillwmiddotd)
--1H(ial --ituilliolt (ontintHd
ii -IU Id SIll ]111 (f)lj1 I) TIltmiddot folloIIW 1
IP-lIIW of IIifl)llllalloll lllll IllIgtlI- ltlII(middotd 1 11ll I ((In
OlrlJIlllld 1)1) I hI (ll ~ 11 alld 1-) 11 l~ bnmiddoth FJ om ] -1 (l 11ry Hn- tdl loll] Jll--IIl~rtr J
Iffl iiI- (middottdl) vil1111t(middot ~Hllhi(~ II (llll]l)dl]
Vall lU(middotr 1 Plll)] jlaHd Illgt 111 of (~lI1P(Jd1 Fall- U( rd ~IJ PJ 1 Il(lIjJ~ IllUl 1tmiddot It1 and f()od 1I(1 hl1ild 1)1111 of 111 [nl I 111 (1_ 1 (ff PlIilllll
IIap lap~urld ~()(J l~(d 1ttlnllltIl dIll frl](ldll1) t1H)l)
to lorpgt ll~l
From bt lJi i-l[) 11
llllrLt~ld Ill-illt 1) )01111 jldtlI hIgt 1)(111
tlold I 1~1 Ill j) 111l( i (jlll 111 lit 1(1 11middot1 illl oil 111
pom1 -1ll1 1Ill [I 11 fl III 1hltl l~illorl flnnl llilIIII (ollll1ltldr~ Ind]ltJl (11 1( Ill 11 (If I~ld lflI1-
1-1 llll ~d 1)1 i ol
I~id (l1n tlld lllrllllJ~ 1111 I lit frllll (If 111 ~(12d
(ltlry ~qladroll 111 P mit itl pd all (Ih 1111 p Ill -pndlllg
t 1 (Inlllll)--lltt illl lhllHl1t to r(lllfOlTt 11l~ (1 airy 1XII(I1 jll1ll1I nmiddot Ullljll jOll of Ill olTllhl I liy Ipd qUill
-()I)IL HlqULgtt -UPIl hy 1(11) nllltIY hi 1()IHIntlalld on frnnt of1d I )1 I ion I fa t I hrlI h1I Ldlllh of infanlry at (~tl l~riitd(gt hl I)nl~ 11lilllllllllll llII(- 1IlHllllni~
lion -upph j UlPIIli1 IIaI 11( onnnilllld 1(tl pn-ltifll1
Iprlh of J1l jllII (It I) lWHun (I)J Ind [llHlll IJlb iiJ~7lOJ Fill k I I 1llllL tnd hn lll( lin i 11lIolllin llHIIil lll)[(I(f(illI
Fnllll lil --1 J ]1 I
Fil nlht of i 111 da~ or Ill p J iat ion will take ()If tt 2)0 11 III IIld( IImiddotIiJ (Ill i1 f) local hn lill jlITl and J(lnfflf( 1ItlIIlt
From Artilllry Illf1lrtlllljllll ~(l WI
IIotih 1~)-lTllll julgt b bl tll ltwalld lllli IJW(-t of
f-uni~l I(r apTJtrllll ty Ii)lut ~ 1)1j tdioll- I kty 111 tlin (1))1 Ill I t io I llllllJliIld falliJ~ Ol
qur litH in ilillil~ I)f I)lll-lIll alhmiddot at ~O jl)I 1) lllfonntI inn frUffl dn J-iull Lmiddotallr -illlp lgtf( )fHlgt nport
(((1111](11(11 l~llfl till 111)1111 ldf1l and (Jnhr t
all ually h Ifd by I Hlll 1lt1l1 (lIwrd A 11 111 (ullllllalld po t
ht t W(middot( 11 ~A) FT Ild ~ 1-) Pl 1) larel jf U]
Tfu 1I11111l tf 11f I)IlflI j() IniJlllt~
~J I iro 11 ((jlJlllld
~1H(j11 IIlIIJon (ontinlHd 1gt1 111011
7 SIlII SlImiddotIIO (OI0I1L1 Ill f()l1)win~~ h a Ifmn( uf illforl1llflllll alld IJlI-agflt Il((id 11 th( I (()IP-
((Hilmand po t plW(lll LlJ 11)1 and ~1i Pf L) jTanh
c amp CSS QUaImiddotten Yo shy
bullVrom (orp~ Aviat ion
o hoslile f(r(e~ of any ~ize dbloven~ll ea-t of It lim Parr Ridg Dug Hill Ridgc Ileay railroad ttl lllOVPIl1lnt- alol1)) Iinls tilroll)h a-hingloll BalLimo-
lIa dr (lltl (1)7-717) BulJ~ of truck movcmer [rom A-ht-lo- t~77~70l) toward Vl-tminsPr
From 2d I )iviiol l
llo tile attwk again-t Plea-anl alky ~trong-Iys~ port (lt1 by arlillry wt 1il1HlHrl Jt UH) PI Continumiddot hO lill Jll ~Url (gain-t tilt divi-IOll cavalry jJy reser
of Illl(l haltalion- till ~()llll1lat of (~dt
[rom 1-1 rJivi-ion
S I()ll~ igtfl attHk laulwiltd in itlmly of llmon M at ~ot) J)jVl Tili at tad ll(lllld by fiftlln~minute arli1t pllparation [fo-till l)~mJll gun fire ha heen receit from arlil -outHa t I)f PIlacant allpy Ha( reonr teted new po-ition for my righl approximalely foul m] w(~1 of Ehhvalp behind erpLk aIled DlPI Run (nOl Strategic Map)
From hI CavallV II igacip
[lav pat nj~- --tIJchill) t IH lllt 10 (1 ( of CUllI10) Fall ItilJ 111 hO lill f)]((- -Ill to haHgt ithdlawn t wv-L of (unpowdpl Falls niH Belil l main body ho~ 1 Ilalry b a--llllhI llg 111 till WilllY of Hereford (10i~71~~ct Jlavl halted bulk of Illy forc( ll t of PII-JtOIl for lE~tltbel fund Command po-t Parkton t
IIqlttiJ( demolitions on Clct IbnJ arp -Jighl villJmiddotlj IPpaired hy dark load marking detaJl have (omplel1 marking road- to ilinily (If [l1lmibLurg and lullCytOlITI ~
U(lliliflIj( RlIHlrl I Ill allions laken and Oder~~ act ually it-lslIed hy I l(utll~ant CClleral A at hi~ lommand Pl ~ hlllVcen u) 11 and U r~I Jr Iarlh if any ~
Tim (l1ollnlor solutwuW minute
SI(llO-J II (olltinuld)
Special Situatiun Contilluld lurishy
x SII~IIL ~11tT lIlli (1I~ 11- I Ell Till foll)wing i I IlJum( of lJ)ormlllon and 1l1l- aJ~ rCT1ld at tIl 1 Cmiddot Iolllllland po hllln ~gtl) )~l and 11) P1l 1) 1lt11111
From (~Ulp- All SelTicl r i nalloOll Oihll dlon b-tlll hIIlIHd hy grOllndhl1
IJlladullenl- of t1)lih trot)p hae been located at GI I dOll (~~S-IOti) loslyn I~IK-lin~) and Baltimore IL~ JlUIlIHl- (If jrtl(k~ Ill in Ihr vilmity of (Ivndon jf t rials of ariou kind art pli(ct along tlw 1ail1o)(1 trJI ~ ~(ltlH inllvlwhilW j in ]llojn-- in 1111 icinity of oot burg llh~7111) aud Aldlild lOX-iii )
Frolll l-t (avalry Brigade I1
I fa( IlabliIId IOntaltt with 101sl Cavalry Sq~lt ron at t ream (Iossing over Gunpowder Falls RivCl ail miles wcsluf Parkton ilolile (avahy still holds ~k Lon 14t11-72t1) and Glencoe 007-711i) Olherwse thea
66
Academic Notes
to northeast of GunpOvdel Fall River over wluch we have passed is dear of hostile fOI((~1
From 1st Division
Hostile (oreel- along lntilc front of 1st Division launcheu a vi~()rous attack al 100 PiYI It appcal- that the main effort is against right of bt Division Cnion 1Iills is in l-rrave danger as the attack there h supported by tanks and heavy cOl1centratiom of artIllery 10 definite information of condition at the front available at thi- time Defen-ive position along the line Silver Iun Bandanna ha been relonnollln~d Have committed none of my general rescrv( a ypl
From 2d Dij1011
Jly cavalry is making a 1irm -land along the Emmitsshyburg Taneyto1l Road a- [oncd to commit two batshytalions of the dn hlon rec(rn to fill a gap in the line we-t of Pleasant middotallc~middot -logttlp att~Hk i~ carried out with vigor ~trongly ~uppolmiddotted hy artill~ry and -iome tanks Pleasant alley is reported to be in hand~ of enemy Vill ~onfirm this later Hu e one battalion left in divbion reserve I3elice hostile attack will epntuully be directed against Taneytown Diiion air enile has reported mall troop concentration mm ing tovard that areL
) I HCIINreflenf Report the actions taken and orders as i lctually bued by Lieutenant Gelleral A at his command post
between L1fi 111 and 11) PI 1) i1arlh if an~- Till( altolf for s(Jlulion m mlllules
[t1 iI~1 i SJ(]IoX II lContinued)
Special Situation Cuntinuedrll
fl SPtLJ SI1P]TCl C()II--lTI~n The following is a he rcumgt of information and messages receied at the comshy
I3rd poct I CoIP~ bet (en middot115 P)1 and 4 45 P11 15 IVIarch
From bt (lyalry Brigade
After hartl fight ho~tile forces have withdrawn farther Et and ~outh of (unp()vrieJ Fall River Hostile infantry believed to hmiddot hLtwLen Ilereford (405-719) and Corbett bull4118-716)
From ht Divijon
Hostile forces have entered emon Mills severe handshyto-hand fighting guing on there 1t Division forced ba(k abou11 mile on front (nion 1ilb Ebbvale My reserve three battalions ahout ~ mile cat of Littlestown (364shy740) 0 large ho-tilp re-erve- loeated
From 2d Divj-jol1 ro 10middot IIotile fo]lt(gt han rpulhed Big Pipe Creek near
Cnion Milk IIo)tiie force hac captured Pleasant Valley and are iiiowly forcing our line to the north Strong attack developing around Taneytown Do not believe we can hold the town without committin~ remainder of division rbenpound Divihion re~erve j- or~anizing a poi-gtit ion )(11 W(el1
Harney (~l3-7~5) Galt -0 large hostile )c~ervef) loshycated yet
From Corps Aviation
No large hostile reserves located -0 Red reinforceshyments found in rear areas Railroad tram movement Vashshyington Baltimore Havre de CIUCl (ontinues heavy Appalcntly hostilp l)oRition heing- organized between Woodshyensburg and Ashland Convoy of about 60 tlucks moved from vicinity of Vestmimtel toward Hereford at 115 PIVI
R((JuirtIUlil Itepolt the actions taken and orders as uetually issued hy LIeuroutenant Ceneral A at hb eommand post )etveen 415 PM and 4113 PM 1) 1Ial(h if any
Tone (llloucd fnr wlution ao minutt--
SECllO III
A Solution lunwrnph
A -1)UllOll of rlIUlrem( III 10
10 A SOLUTION OF REQUIHIIn~N I Adions taken and orden as actually itsucd by Lieutenant neneral A If any
Between lf() and 215 PAl Upon completion of the report~ LlLutenan1 leneral A
directed that he be kept constantly informed of deyelopments He went to his altice having directed the chief of staff to accomshypany him He discussed briefly the ~ituati()n and future plans with the chief of otaff
Between 215 and 245 Pill Continued discussion of tituatioll and future plan~ He issued the following directive
The corps will attack early 16 lmiddotIarch ene]oping the hostile right flank from the vicinity of Whitehall (407-723) and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead (385-723)
The 1st Cavalry Brigade will continue its attack and seize the ridge west of Gunpowder Falls Hiver as far south as Glencoe and prevent hostile ground reLonnaissancc to the northeast thereof It wi1l protect the movement of the 3d Division and will on corps order assis~ the attaek of that dlyision early tomorrow
The 3d Division will- move by motor to the vicinity of Vhitehall under cove~ of darknes~ tonight It will attack early tomorrow mOll1ing on corps order and capture the high ground vicinity of Hampstead
The 1st and 2d Divisions will not resume the attack until daylight tomorrow Details will he annoullced later
The 3d Division will be strongly faorcd in the matler of artillery and other support
The corps reserve will consibt of the ht Infantry less one battalion and will assemble at Littlestown by daylight 16 1larch prepared for movement by motor transport
Bet1Neil 245 PllI and 415 Pili Lieutenant General A announceclto his Chief of Staff
J am going on a visit to the 1st and 2d Divbioll troops and command posts by motor Aide One will accompany me Aide Two will be at your dispoal Keep Illl informed as to deelop~ ments in the situation I will direct the 1st and 2d Divisions to conserve their reserves for the altack tomorrow Have a staff officer visit the 3d Division at once and go over our plans with their Chief of Staff I will visil the 3d Diviion later
67
UlI(CU ~lj PJl (lml 44i PJU RetUlning to tie I Corps command post at about 4 10 P~
Lieutenant General A familiarized himelf with the situation and plans Accompanied by Aide One he then departed by motor for tlw command po of t Ill ~d J)jvi~JOn Before leaving 11w (~JlP~ (olllllland PfJt lH approved tlw l)lan of allalk a IUtiillld to him hy the (hilf (~r lalL
~( 1to-- 1
I)j(middotu-gtioll
llIqfl I
Ttll()P Jt tdlll II l~
Tun I)f lltlfllll 11 lt1 Ttl (lin 111
i~lIJt 11 11
11 I I I~I()J I I( jlllljIOi--I of till probhlll j 1() illt] I alt the applicatton of thl tattwal principle of an inrippencilnl (()rp in all al1a(k and the tnlop 1llding- oy tile cor-p comrnander
12 TI~(J()l LI 01-( The (I)rp~ commander has a large and lll- I lIntd -tafT at hi-- dl-pn-al who-c function is 10 reji[( the iOJllmanikr ofa~ nlllh dr ad l~ l)()~ih( ill t 1( fUllcl inn of the -Ialf 0 lmiddotdtHl lTllat nw~l of information to In-itf ~UTUshy atl 1Pll()rt~ rhl~ df InUt ~rp that problcl1l~ rC(luinng (leciion trl lIP vllltd 11) tIl( (olnmandlr ill ~uffi(1fllt time to a[O for
w oldlll lIJtHtmiddotrllllt in Ill (Illtioll of hi~ dttbillll~ If the ((Illlllallrpr at I P1l111l- to fnl1nw the now of information into the illnlllland PII-1 lIP 1111 flOn bVIolllc ~o Illolycd that lw cannot ldtquately p111l ahead The con--pqUlll(C of thl~ -tatp of atTairs - u--udly a -vnc of fllfrgCllry dlri~ions illlol11p1tte inujpshyqutlv alld tOi) Itll to be truly elfeltiyco
TIll hnl ()f detul l~ul1lcd by the (olllrnanltitl will of ( (JUI-U delrnd upon jw (haraltcrbtic- of t h(-gt cOl11manuer and i W jl(r)llali it If hi-- vlmJ of st alT lllrl principal - air olilr] 0
U i~lrdlt- of 1 litO Ilit- for dlaii of tIll lomlnander he musl I lliru t J- ldf ~rllh OjojV po--ible duty ithin their capabilishy l-- HI dol ll()t -hifl hi- nH)lihilit it by -0 tIllingo If he jli lull )]()Jl1lh (lIljlO hh gtIalf 111 is llIilty of Walll1g his tOIH 11 and fLllln 10 mtke (Jlcli( i llt algtliiti(s and (nlrgirs of lht-- I1
III t ldf hllh ha lllll1 VOrioll Ingethtr for ~()nll time o~uh a- I he onl hll jOIlIIltidlred matH of t he detail- as 10 tactical fl1l hnd (If 111( (tITlllIltlllhol nll ill wlll known to the ~tajr Thi~ [)01 t ](lIlvt-- 1 he 10] 1 (()mmanltier of the nee~ity of always I-oin~ Into dpd III ill-gt illtlu((jon~ Only when Ii( wbes to rnak~ a hln~rl Il form] t1w hnd~ will it he IHl~~aIV for him to gn into any gnat amount of detail
In thi -jlUd lOll I hl ~d Divi~ion ha- ju~t revertpd to (untroI
of til( J (orp~ Jt j tlJlgt (lIiion ~(l(ded to make the main aUwk of 1 he corp and llwrffor( ih (Oondition and -tate of morap and 1rlInin~~ are of jreat inl(r~l to the torps commander 111( jqrfJ~ ~it uation at 21 Pl i~ -gt1ifh Iha1 no major lhang~ vhi(h 111 pr(tnl til( atlatk 011 IG )Iarrh (an he expcdeo Even a WII hdrawal Oil 1hp lo1 flank will not jeopardizl t 11( (orp- plan SufIWI111 djaik a 10 the conduct of operatlOll~ today and IOmll)) mv haf i W(oll JJ1JWIJIl(Opd by tlit corps (omlllalHi(ro I fowshyc er he ~hould per-onally check conditions in the ht and 2d Jgti-ioth Thel( lS danglr If h( remainf at his command po- thaI unl( hp 1- an unu-ually phlegmatic person he may he tPmpltd to difialp too IlHHh of the details of operation He can do much more for lw sll((e~ltgt of the corps in its attack 16 Ivlarch
68
If he goes on a visit to the commanders of the 1st and 2d Di sions and later visits the 3d Division
Upon his return to his command post at 410 PM the commander received the information that the Reds had res their attack This was not unexpected as G-2 had annou this a hostile capability The plans so far prepared ha been examined by the eorps commander and presumably rn J1l( his approval we next consider the best aclion for the CltJ
(ollmander to take He had already informed the 1st and I )iviion I hat thlY wpre to at tack tomorrow and that they m (on~lrve their rcs(rve~ today It is about time that totlllnanrier iHsued the necessary instructions for the Ihi ](t11 by the ht ant 2r1 Divisions It will be quite late night when the final resolls of the days fight will be known 111lt (oq command post It is helieved that the corps CltJr
man del (an rnalw the most effective use of the next few hOlt hy makmg a visit to the ad Division ~ea
While on thee visits to the divisions he not only getslir ne hand information of the tadial situation but also of the slll WI
of morale The visits of t he corps commander may be a POWcrfi VI
stimulant to the morale of the subordinate commanders ~ tta would probahly nol issue orders direct to the divisions bUll i1J he doeo do so his aide wjJJ immediately report them to the cor~1 chif of stalf
1 TIME OF ANNOIIN(]NG DlC1Sj()N - In the dev of (vcry opcla ion there arrive crrtain times when must lit made It is the duty of a f(eneral staff so to 1 t lllir rlporb as to rctcivc delbions early enough for the effective It is the responsibility of the commander that done It b never ea~y to relognize the exact point in the d nwnt of operation w11(n a derision must be announc~d tlliH -jluation the situation bas dee~oped to such a paint~ Ibnut 21 PM At this time the l1ank from which to atlacl~id WII hin the Iapabilities of the cavalry to secure There is litl ih the enemy (an do between 215 pr and dark to prevent to Corps from attaeking at daylight tomorrow Darkness is 71S Pl amI the 1d Diyision has made no reconnaissances] h1 not marked out its routes Therefore it is believed that dirldivC if Issued latcr than 315 PII may result in impro preparation confusion and ineffectiene~ Instructions IT he iI(gtd rlier than )1[ Pi( directinf( the ld Division pnpan to rnoc and the final decision mipht then be issushyialer in thl day As said before the situation is such al2 P1l as to permit a dlli--ion to he announ(ed To delay beyc 11G IM indicates indcciflion and vacillation due to the demiddot I fur ((lJ more information The moement of the 3d Diw~ is dillkult and will n1uire the determined efforts and con tration of everyone to make it a success It is wrong in prinel to kccp subordinate in doubt over long- periods of time ast1 what is wished A direetive should be is~ucd just as soon 3St~
situation has deveioped to the point where the decision canb 1 made We will never have all the information we would lik We must al lim tal( lakulatld risks as to the probableca~ hili ies and llos-ihle reactions of the hostile forces
1)ltbions rll(llld llarlv oftpn hav0 to be modified in SO~J
nf Ill(iJ det aib hy Ialll delopmcnts Therefore the directi i isued by t he commander must be sufliciently general Or brogt in its terms so as to allow the staff leeway for adjustmentc minor malleIS Only such changes in the situation as wow make a directive impossible of successful execution should allowed to dictate a change in the directive Frequent chan lead to a lack of faith in a eommander and the faith of
1
l
Academic Notes
dinates is a commanders most powerful ally There is in this situation developed after 215 PM which calls change in the cGmmanders directive THE DIRECTIVE- middotThe I Corps has bcen directed to Baltimore without delay The 3d Division is ready to dark tonight and the cavalry will have gained a suitable
y position for the 3d Division The fog is clearing and e can expect the hostile forces to gain a clearer idea of our
and dispositions and to readjust his line of action to r offensive He may be strong enough to continue the
ttack tomorrow but if he does he will find himself grpatJy
As long as the hostile force attacks our holding attack force the latter will best perform its mission by defending Therefore to insure reserves for an attack tomorrow when the hostile forces may be attempting a defense or withdrawal the corps comshymander should prevent these two divisions using up their availshyable strength today
The directive must be definite- about tilc movement of the ~d Division That division can ~ove by motor transport and gain some surprise by moving at night Since this transport must be oul of the way or concealed by daylight we do not haY(~ any loa much time even with a long night In view of the
andicapped by our attack against his exposed east flank (arly possible changes in thehostile situation during the night and in omorrow morning Offemive action is clearly demanded by he message from General Headquarters
J ~ i An attack of the hoctile we-l jeft) flank has some attractive
features If succeful illmmedlalely will be more eOotl- to the neroy It will mObt quickly halt his attack against our right ~I (west) flank It has very pronounced undesirable features Even if initially successful the hoStile forces will have to he 51 tttacked again in front of or on t~e line Parr Ridge Du~ i lIi11Ridge It also drives Red back on our objective t hm requirshy0- fug us to find him again and again The objective for thegt first ~aisaction is the high ground in vicinity of Hampstead The
tapture of this terrain feature will completely dislocate the hosshyJ llleforce The easiest avenue of approach to this feature i~ from ~ le vicinity of Vhitehall Either flank is equally accesqible ~ lthough the situation on the west flank is not so completely poundmiddotl~ wbilized as on the east flank The movement to the east flank J ~ the most direct route to the hostile line of communications ~ fhich seems to lead from Baltimore At 215 PlI the (orps commander is aWUie that the bt and
bull ~d Diyisions are about to resume the offcnshe He knows that 1 irose two divisions will constitute his holding attack tomorrow
order to allow our feints demonstrations and attacks by the 1st and 2d Divisions to have effect we direct the 3d Division to attack on corp order rather than at a definite time
The directive to the cavalry must be definite The whole plan o[ the collmander m~y be disrupted by the action o[ the rayulry if propel instructions are not issued It is therefore the duty of the corps commander to tell the cavalry commander what he wants done and when and where the mission is to be performed After being relieved by the 2d Division and its cavalry the best use [or the cavalry brigade will probably be 10 attaek in conjunction with that division vVe cannot be sure of the --ituation at daylight tomorrow therefore we direct the cavalry hrigade to await a corps order before ltlttarldng
In order to provide a strong weapon in the hands of the (orps commander in many situations we would like to hold a brigade of infantry in corps rcservc In this situation the hostile forces have so definitely committed themselves to an attack that a large reserve on our part is not so necessary as when the hostile force has committed only a portion of hiR force The Blue bitushyation has become so involved on the front of the 1st and 2d Divisions that it is diflicult to envisage holding out a large reerve even if the situation did indicate its desirability
DECISION-To the natural horn leader if there i -u(h ~ pctmiddott-on the power of decbiun is a ~(cond nature It 1 inherenl 111 the man The I(arier mllst he dfcisive He mu-t have confidenc( in himself and heri a~ain he must have Imowlcdge ltPHI he [lh irally and mentally fit A pour decision prom)l) rendei(d and lignrous1y followed is inshys finitely hetter than no dtci-ion at aiL Vacillation has no place in the make-uIJ of a real leader However wrong deshycbions if made too frelUentiy lead to loss of prestige and lack of tonfidence The real leader is never a straddler
-J11laquo 01 (Jfcrnl Ii I Brees U S AT1ny
69
I
d
Irghling Forl rourn~l uf till JOllrnai qf til i llmlmiddotdSlrjmiddotmiddot
rmy 1qart r
Directory of Periodicals
IO(hlfllllTl tlll dirpclory up only those periodicalR from which nrtich~ havpound h(gt(gtn HPelted -- altt) Llltlt of ltrJlHiwniq Indfxed and Kpy to AIJhrfvitltiollI
MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS
Joint Farcus
(rl~t J~ftaln 1 1~1) LlI mtd ~(r](1 111lt11tllUl1l CPt Hntallli 7) lt 1- r- II ( hi tltlll1qll of Inlha (rlt Bntun ItHhll if) Emiddot (rIHntIJIl HI
Gcncr1 Military
I il Hr1 tin) if) Hlllhtlll 11) Ii II bull 1111111[1 rillllll1nl 7f) CanaulJ7l rJI r Ii r flI Iri rl (lfldILI 71 La Fran(t ~llilt I r [1( 71 -11liLlrwi I (I hI 1 Itt 1111ll1fll (iult-tnl 7K
71~~~~~(I~(r (1 rll til I l2
Rpoundvu( ~11Iitalr (q Tmiddot I r111(p) xi) Rtvul -l1l1t llTC ~l~ --Ji7frbnri) x7l
Armgt ilnd Scrvlcc~
m An It(d IT r r ltJrtmiddot rl (rlt HnUill) H)
ltTILI In
(f)Ilt rtlill r Inrn 71 lIPid rtdl rmiddot 1 71 InIPjt flf Il (rllt I1ritlIl I if) fLtmiddot 111 t (ll ( d~ 1
( ALHY
(wnlrshy 71 (ldn (TI Hrl1lJl 71 HI 1)1 il ~I rH1C 2
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
TIll (lIon atdo) tIlt lr(]pound-- ~llect(gtd from LIbrary periodicals for the current quarter Periodicals in this Catalog lITIlgt(i allllalJmiddottically
ARMY ORDNANCE
Mly~Junc 1938
1 It ~C 1l1t (llll -(T1Nf OlijlltEINTS II1IT Tim 1 IBLlt (11 111 Lr If L II~Tgt -lajur General lJrtgham
Til ilL 1-1 q So rr IUd ~~II 1111 IHLrAREnNfS~ POLICnS OF A 111)(1 IS Jtll II Jllc()l Ctptdn LlldlJiILlrt
jlltlI I~ rI] 11 A -rtlyen W HWIrSTHIL MOlI]I7ATION 1 llj()r (Hid
July-August 193B
Tn Thl I --1middot1 1( [l Tlll r 1111 ro 1011 PAn ITH TJ~CH-11 bjflr(ImiddotIIrl Ilfr
TtJTI(d~ [I f lin I 1T1ltJAI~ Im1It HblATION Tn OtlR NA~ nltj 1 --1 I~II r I J Li III (q]n)1 Itfl~~r I
ARMY QUARTERLY I(Pt ilritlIll)
July 1938
Im (11JJ It lllL III TIll Hili No XVI APIILltR HJDGr 9TH or ~fAi 1911
Im 1 1 r--l ] 11 -1T1L 1gtIL1J1T10N IN CHINA (II) LNlrquin
70
ENGINlxns Military Engineer _ Pionicrc (Germany) Rall-lrrna di Ctlltum Mtlllarp (Italy I Hoyal Enginccrfl Journal (Great Brlbin)
INFANTRY
Infantry Journal
Uld~ntu~lC)MCdi~~~~~~ (Greut Brituin) Military Surgeon
Army Ordnanc( QUARTLlltSTCR
QuartrmafJUr Hevl(w Itoyal Army Service Corp-l Quartprly (Grplt Hntlill)
lNhgt
Kraftfahrkampflrupp( (Germany) Royal Tank Corpl Journll (Grtlt Bnlain)
Vlttrrinary Bulletin
Navy and Marines Manne Corps Gazctt( Naval In~titut( Proccpdinhl
i u
I]
____- I~
l 1
o J~ 1321
b ~if
TIlE MAJOR TCTI(S Ill- Tin INIlllnell B TTLg BrigadJ(lT gomery
ANTI-AIHCHAIT Hax
BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES Inlgul
By -1JOlt E11 BINITJZ COIII Artillpry (orp
Janulry 1938
lilSTOIW OF Tim INSlECTOltAn~ GCNEltA ltW TilE An Alll BELGIAN TRAINING (INTERS DURllOG TilE WORLD WAR
lHbtoir(gt d( lIlIflppdioll G6neralt d( lArm(gt( et d(gt CentTrH Hlrudinll BII~CH ptlldant la GUerrp Mondiah 1lH~191SII LilutGll1(ral de Selliers de Maranville
Ih( iHllhnr WI Inljwctnr Grl1eral of tlw
~(olli I~~l ~~ ~~~ ~~l~il (1~ I~~1 g ~~m
j
hv
I~~ He ~ nti
f n~ I
jar
h
I ~
~~II~h~g~~~~~~ldd1 ~~~t~i~~tr(i~l r~~p~~~~~ qlttlr l~l fr~11d~ ~~11lail~~11 t~lo~~~11cliiDcuit Cir(IlTllltal(Pl uIHhr whih 1111 HCgilIl forcP rpcnlitld and III1Jlpli(cl
At tiU time of til( retr(tt of til( nplf~ian army Ul author had undpr hi ()mmlllHI ROmf t ROOO recruits in France scattered in six diviqional depot~ of 3000 men continued their advance tl1P1f men wer( tallten to Fecnmp whill nfW depotfl were opPlled in various toWtll Normnndy with l1fadquarters at RoUln
01 XVIII No 70 Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A YFAlt OF AR IN SPAIN (JUIY 1936 JUlY 1937) rUne nnn6e de gucrre en Eltpagnp (Juillet 1936 - JUllleurot 193711
(II) Major Wanty Conclusion of Major Want~ g account of the first i-Ear of the Spanish
(11 War
~ilrh~I~~~I~~p~~~I h~dOhd(~~er ~(~~~~~t~~~rlal~~~IJO~I~~~rnI~~h~r~f pnrdofllcrrs The Jarge extenslOn of front and Ol(gt comparatively igtmull numlHr of
t~~~~~af7~~~i fl~l~~~a ld~i~f~( ~~~l~ of I~~t~~~~l~r~~n~~igtOt~I~~ ~~ t~t~(~q t ~hi~~ ~Oeuror1or to thmi( of tlw GoCrnmrnt fortP TI bavegt hpPIl ltoll1what nf lcsappomtmpnt hO((gtT thry ould probahly havp Jllaypdt marpound mflushyftalro1(gt hart tl)rr hrPIl mfantr- rpad to follow til(m llr GtnllJ1IIom) hedplttrofd mlny tlnt or put thpm (Jut of Utoll Ilotor17lrl (nlumn hea~o hpPIl Ifgt ff(ctlC and dlfIllUitlh at thp hpld of tilgt olumn h rrrOl11litrd thf (-l1tirp (oloy TI)e~ (olnmnlt haY )1rOPI1 to 1(1 fr~
_~~~r~~I~ldair alta(- Tlll~ remarkgt lrp prohah mldf vlth (Jua
1 Tnr lJoulwt thpOT ha ftllPd to ingtPlff natiollalllrrnT on tlw (ontrlnt $1 tacticgt havo c(lnltoildatfd puhllc -pnlin1middotnt and tifT nld tIl(middot ]1 to r-ltt to tllp a~t
DImiddot 1lI1TION OF UH C110-1 l IUfjOAL TIt 11 01 11lf nu (LN S()I OlI]
Une tXpoltjtion fip pI rf(gt(i(1nnrmrnt (ultllnmiddot1 fI prnfl-inllwl ain-i qUl dorganI~ltioll dllt 11~lr du lt)lu11 J
~ A regimental commanrpr (jpltrTlption of the pducational and 0(1shyt ~a tramlllg of t1l(gt Bflgian ltoJellPr mel the factiltw ofTfrprj tlw oowr to ~_-e traming hilp in the seTiN
February 1938
Tm f)LFbsC OF DI~lmiddot[lF 17 OTOBER TO]n I1l1middotIHLlt 1)J 1 Pagplt (lhlto(lirr dp lArml lltp all (Ollr~ d la GUerr(gt ]lJ1-1HIh
j I)lxmmlrgt 17 odoilTC-lllnoWmirp 19111 III) faJltlr Want Tr(l econd inlttalmpot of the dpfcmp of Dixmudf drgtlt(niling til(gt operashy
~3 from 20- Octoher 1911j~
ibull I Th~ tlt)wn v a a ltIrlt gl( rofi and rlliway ccntN of Bllgmm and for
rt1-00n tlw G(rmall- mul( grlgtlt pITnrh 10 ( lpIUff it TlH hndldHad
~ -~ tgc~ ~f~r~I~11~1~~( ~Zll1~l~t Ji~l~ ~l~~I111(i~1 F~~~~ t fI J~r~hf~~~111~ il~~ r artly in tIl( dppoundIlp of the cIty
[1 -- shyHISTORI OF TIll bltIICTORTr GrSJRAL OF TUB Alnn ~n THE
nEJil- TH JX1S(j (E1ERs 111IOS( TilE Vom IJ H ~ Hh1oire de lInltpectwn Gill(oral( de lArmC poundt dCs CCntrEs dInshy
struction TIplglt ppnd1l1t la GUNre 110ndiale 191j-lJIR 1 III) LipuLGrmprai de Spiller dp ~foranvlile
Ii _~ ~p(ond inlttaln1Pnt glVrc a detailed account of the ralsinJ and U-- r n mrn ior tw nfigian arm v during th(gt World War with iull dptail (1 gt-1ng t1Plr frdill) (Io hm~~ HId Hlmltllf-trat ion At alrpadv (Xp1LllWd ~ r CPrllllf IltU( fill( to the raplr C(fmall adI11(eurogt tralllln) (pntPrlt k1 to llt f~tlbhf-llfrl III XormalHllP vlth the tsltlstanee of the Frpneh G~rrLfnt Soml 40000 mpH ~ 150(1) rc(nllh or the ltiacl1899-Hnl u12jnro or the 1914 clalt - Hf( tTuJllrl in t11(ltp (pntNe
March 1938
THE DEFENSI OF DiIUDE 17 Onomm TO 10 NOIMIIEH~1914 ipar dlllgttOlrl rIp lArmp(gt 1plvp all (lure ltIf b GU(gtfrc 1)14-191R Dixmurlp 17 octolmgt-lO TJ(lvlmhrl 11l1J (Ill) Major Wanty
~ The third inlttalment (overing th oJ1(gttationlt from 22-~5 OctollPr m C Leh thr author dClt(flhes in ddail th(gt hIroic attemptlt to hold tlw position
trough tile hifTlJ command had deCld-d thlt Dixmllrr mllltt he lbamk)Jwri
~e f~~~f ~~t l~ill~~~~hr~~~~~~~~~~~ Ifli~tal~~i~alvN~n~~h~s~~71~1~~~~
l~Clme penlous Heavy lo~gtplt Vore inflicted on th( GPrmans who werl
astl ooung mpn of tlw new ReiNe Corplt ThCla( of rfltrrv(gt) thr(gtw _great ~train upon hoth French and TIplglal1lt particularly tl1P attfr who
uld not fpn or)imi7C tll(middot FutHh ltYltPlll or lt11ort rlllpfs The machinp ~nnrs In particular hul no r(st day or night Tl(SP operationgt arpound fcnbrd In grpat detail
1l)TOItY Of TilE JNSPE( TORTE GI~FltI ltH Tim AIWY AN]) TilL1 BrrGfAN THAININr CHIH~ DUilINf TIH~ WOHfn WAR rHl~toir( cir lInltppctOn G6nfralp dr JArmpe (gt1 drCl C(gtntrplt dIn-
Btruction B(gtll-C pendallt la Gl1(gtrrf Mondialp 1914-HI181 rIIl) ] Lifut GrnCral de Sflllfrs h1IIJratlvil1f f The thml ingttalmrnt (overing thp pCflod 5 January 1915 to Fehruary
19 bull
CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (ClIlada)
July 1938
CND~ ~(jIliiIN luLHY 13) the Hight IIollourahlp WL MallPllzl AI AR~IY THAT CAN ATTArK - A DIVIRION TJlAT rAN IlI~FrNJ) Captain
rJWBLl-~ljS OF DEFENCE ON THE PACI~IC Colonel Letson A SYSTEM OF ANTI-TANK Dl~FENCE Captain Kormann TANK OR ANTI-TANK Major Sieulrg
CAVALRY JOURNAL
May~Junc 1938
1)w TilL) KNOW Jlm) Major Schwi(gttl
July-August 1938
Tm ROU olt AVIATION WlIU ~mrHANI~~P AVAIItY CalJtam Sehlatter DLI EN~E MA1NST lIt ATTACK Captun Nohle Till lOlTNIIP ATTAf IN OPgN OIWtlt Colonel itrwart Late 15th
JallC( rs IIHhan Army rOlINIJ CONTHOL CmlMOlilCATiON A REGIMENTAL VIEW-
lUl~middotr Jwul (olun(1 Grim(s
CAVALRY JOURNAL IG-nat I3ritaml
July 1938
A (AUn OFFIllm~ EXIEltlENJSON TIlE INDIAN FltOSTIER DURING TIlE WAR LHutCololel BCaman
CnL1lY BAfTL~ HONOlJHS TUE r8NiNSULAR WAR - PART 3 TAshy1ntA ~7TJ[2KTH JIILY 1809 Major Edwards
~l(ItALt (I01l1IlER TO RIJOUiiHml Lleut-Culonp1 McCrp(ry
CHEMICAL WARFARE BULLETIN
July 1938
~I (TRIT OJ TilE IIWI(E m fliPLY nri(adlfr Genpral Tyn(r
COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
no~IDING OIEltATIONS IN TilE ZONE 01 Tlln INnHIOJ LJ(utColonel (olton
Am IOvBIt AND moO MOg1ENT Major Phillips ANTIAlRCILll COl~IUNHTIONS Captlin Bartlett
July-August 1938
DEi ENS OF TilE 13ELGLN COAST 1914-1918 Licut CulOlH1 Tilton BUIJlAlwomNT TACTlCS Brigadier General Pratt THUNDER IN TllJ EAST Lieutrllunt Rudolph Tng SPANISH WAIt A REVIEW OF TIfE BEamp1 FOHEIGl OPINION Captain
Johnson
FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
LBSUNS lItml SPAIN Colonel Lanza ARE PHlATE SOLDums Ni~CESSARY Upson Cml~IUNI(TiON WITJTlN THE LIGHT BATTALION Lieutenant Dishman
July-August 1938
MOlNG TARGET TiRIW NJrJ1T UVEIt (ftOSSING
FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain I
June 1938
AN(iO-FHENCIi CO-OPE1ATION Right Honoraillpound Winston Churchill PRIT Commmdcr Grellffll Am fOJUE KPANSION fly Our Air Jiorc Correspond(nt
August 1938
TIIB H()1BER WiLL r-OT ALWAYS GET THROUGH By Realist TilE HATTIE OF TIm WIlnEHNE~S Licut-Colonpi Burne
LA FRANCE MILITAIRE (France)
Il MJOR T R PlIlLLlPS Coast ArtIllery Corp
18 February 1938
INFANTRY TU~AINS TilE qurEN OF BATTIES ILinrantNip dpoundm(lrp a nl1P rips l1atalllpound1 J
Tl author T((all thal it il not today only that 0111 admits that battle hal loltt Its dl(iqiVl lmractPr This information was obtainable from the R11iill~Japallte War And it sppms that tllP only method or overcoming thilt4 inconvcnwnce is II IlfW mobility of operations mohihty which requires tactJ(ai continuity in til(gt prOI~rrgs or the attack
[n all armill thil truth has been recogniz(d ltnd all undeNtand equally that taniHI have not fulfilled all hopes placed in them It is not tanks that
71
C~tald(j of Selefteci Periodical Articles C amp GSS Quart ~~~~~~~~~==~--==-~==~--~~~==~~~~-~-~~~
wll be ahlmiddot to Tmg dppiltlOn m hattIe and it jq n(((ltIary nnew to tum tnwllrd the ptfrnai infantry It 1 mfalltry whirh Rhoulcl proVIre the solutJOn to
the )r~~~~ptt~~~~j~lli~i~~SL~t~i~(a~~~~~~~itty to gam continuitsect of moyprnfnt for the iJIIMltry uffmiddotnltIVf Equdl it j~ indlspenltahe to furshynith (lvidtnrl fnr rIo ~~llptrl flf thE infmtry lttalk aJulhlp information on thi NubjPft hal 11middotpl1 illlwil frlln Sptin Ind tlll O[wnt in till pl~t yar Al Captain gtIclmlra -11] III Tlw Onit(d Sr i(~middot HI-lW 1PrJ IVJltlOfl
i~~~ I~~t~~l~ll ~n~I Lr~li I~~ I~ f~~t J~l )Iiiirt ~~middott~i~~ ~~l)fd~l~~ i)if~ TJlI arlion f)f Jill] n VJll Lf call1ta In th( atta( 1llt mrantry rlnnot prnl~t( middot1 agailj~t rn lIhnp VllIlC 11 lilt C)gt n d h~ t1l11 rtllli ry (rtll~ Will I1WI) tr i lip tIl jllCll1nn hut lamiddot[( mel thrn l mLlilnll IUIl 11 nrnlll til plr) I lif 1(1lCl of tllP ltlfLury ullttl till 1 )nki rft tn work n fhl nL
It wlldd 11111 dllllnd wntl Ldnr ~)(Lln IhLId 1 middotInmiddotI of 1 fll7 II 1-0 ILt I ilL W Jim t hlt II d ltIqOn 1 If) Ill PHmiddot(middottl ltI llllt 11
Ihl ollIIIJI)) 1 Tltnrkdlp InLLTltn InfHlrmiddot I lr~ 1llV tlldlY 1IIfl vnlh IIJ( na~()n ti h lt-tlll l1l1
I qlld rillmiddot til 1111 If lIlh II will 1 )11 Ihd m1l(h Jllltn lIrr (If Uf tI n lrnj drl plapj dill It lmmPfiLtp PrlP 1 pry-ttIPI hnilld I d ITound 1ilf mfan1 r llld til i1 I v hy III Jl)~lnd 1 I ap 111 Illlli III mf111n dljcifill
Illl Il Ir L dd 11111 dflllpllllnt of dlIJo)~Ir lrllllilri t hI 1I1Ltlil r [ 11 T II frlll ttl hlh t himiddot Imprl rJli til trr)l t IIf (0)]lt11shytll iqn IJf llllJfl rn mfln r rj fWlrL1l11 III ill Iji muq Ip t hrgt founrllIl1lll f 1 bull 01 )r~ ( lit Irm
ljrrn Infilr I fin (fol)l1 Ill toolLv )llll 11IflItry 11 not llVrj rn hgt(I1 It J () ~ ltrmnrrd antlt1Il1 ~I lIOn- Ulri f~r(llarj( threli~shyr It Rill nd i mrjrn lJ1l it III Id t hi 11 Hll 11lrilmlllt in IH Of 41lfi Hl pflrt(( thl arm ITI)(II d I dll1I~ in Its f rlr and Jndoll Ih Ir (rror nr (oilgt rint tlu m- hl- 1l) 1111111 (llffl UI
5 M1rch 1938
Ill (iT -i THr1 TII Itll Till- lt01 Till ltT 11 It tl- ( nl1m r II Sud-I- I (olm]l HlHltl
n r Fr LllCO ~fdlLrtraquo o( I SIpkmlIr 1917 til liltlOr I n1 ntl ot nf till flur l~rollp-1 nf Ilrl~p Gprman mlhtlfmiddot unitlt
II 1 )llli]tif thlt O1kht td piL(I Olle r(lItllIIi- ronshy111 Ir 1 j lIl1ru IPImiddotIlrmiddot tn bf Ibout to Cd p1uP Thi IS I
) tI In r I) tll Trl j r 11l -llnnlk1 (( Il Ld middotr rfll1r lin HIICJllllI ~ 1m hLi c()mmmd( d hl II
rrn ()Tp 11 11I11Ilth ha b( nn (111 (1 In tlil command of tl1(gt ttl Groupshyf11 III of iLf[1 Ilnl~ It l ljll lwrl Ill rpphr -1 GPJlrrcll 011 lntlh l~ 1 III ( 11i1111 17lt11 In fTt -I Gf Iltrtl on HI HlWIlUI ejpml to hr dll lo
11111( Inj r 1 I- f)Ir)j I rilTlrllflll Ilf til mlr armv (nrp -fatlnIlP(1 011 tlt frotl f f CIgtfJlh)rn lUt md U1~tfil tJr- 11 Inrpi It -11J1lwh I Illfd f IllLtnlr- ItltIr nil Sthotrl thf Xill (UTlI II uremhuTf ~ nmiddotrll If CIll r middot 1111 llh tIl(gt 1middot COTll at Dndpn GpnfgtTal of
Infllllnmiddotnn S(lnldkr ill 111 (nrp at Hfl~11tll((llPrall)f Infantry foil] In adilltln hp ] t nIlrlan milUlllllIl lln~d(gt at Lmdlll tIlt d j)nlflll Igtf (jllnmiddot dt Brr-~lll llld thp 1ltt ~d mel ilh Armorrd l)jVlmiddot
11 II PlIlllr 11r7hlr)~ Inri nr(lt]all Th 011 HIlrl 11n11 (rn11]1 Ihu (llilstitUplt 11 Ixmiddot(l1ent nlPtll for
1111)1rl1ll1 prlllTP on Alllttri md Cz((holovlkl-l ThL l~fnllfJ em IH JrtlrI h I l1ornr r (If arm (orp c1f1arhpd from thp FJrct and Srconrl
ll HfrlJl and (tmiddot 1 vlfliuul (hturillnJ thp Lngp covCrinr fnrcfc I 11 dlll L lill I 10~ d1 tlJ rl j()Jh fflllll Poland or Franrp Faring
Inl Frlll I I- (middottHIIl lIll 1) 111 lin Ii 1 thf Y and XII Corplt al ~I1Ilrt In I] 1 Hl n TIl(gt r()prin~~ fllrcplt will 1( (ommlndtd hy CIIlril JI111I latlnlwil d K(IlrJultlrtl Fl(inl~ Pulanr1 j (lu Flrlt CnllP I 11llTl1llld d c III r d nll Hllll-IImiddotIIl ~hlfh ilhuril till 1 II III lid III (uI th hmiddotldlILLrfgtr ll J()JllgqlIrg Stlttin ttldin anrl Bn -1111 SInP t1 1 J I (oTl- 1(longH 1111 in thf ofTlllIV (roup of von Il Irll nUl if III II Tfr1L1middotd in Itlt cl)v(gtTin~~ mlcion tJwlrd PoTtnd hy I 1llh~fllr 1Il11~ JlroLlllly rrl)lllfd llndr tlH OrdfrH of nIIPral von KPlit
Tljl rl n m lltl- tlilll tl 11Igtl1rl tIll nfTInlvP 1111011 If till Hlldwlllu rnllP tIll T IX X XI lIlcl XImiddot COnl the ~ld and Hh Armorpd IJlvi-lOlll
dd Ihl ht (I1r 1)ll--lnn TJ1f (man Army cw thll- throw two cU(shyt hrmI-middot1 Vvlrd til(gt crplllHadmiddot III Ihl flTlt hi Ihl Fourth Group In(IlI1rrL~ md r tl1 Irdl r1 flf IlImiddotril VOIl HCilli(gtnau fOllr army (nrpl a Inmiddotllltolln hrJgult thrmiddotp armorl rliidnnl and a flvalry djill)l ill thl (JlrllllH IllP Tlmd (rup illl IlPadqllartprq at Dndpn mduding fi(gt
I)fr t- IrTlllrirl dIVllf1n9 an1 a livilon of cavalry Ar tIl 1 r III Ind (1 tht 11tklall armir lapaI11 of fl[ ini~ til llorpltltlntl of lTlllmiddotqrlulp Inri lldity
19 Mnrch 1938
Itl HLlIfTOC IlN THE GJltAN AltIY IUfI raquoiIJt r 1 1llr Jarm(p allpmnnrif I (orl1l1l Choumlo
j hI ~Ilr IJl7 hai paH(1 RlthoUI tlw war whlCh many (gtqwlpoundd and IJlk 10 ( Ih nnlr qW-Itj(Jn With ITIltfr allxidy Thiq qUlltllln dPJJInd~ )1 11IIm lrmmy liJr fI1l1 Olmtry wllfn pnJ)aratlOn fur war IS tIll fnnrJlrJ III a ImnllIlt of nal imal li(I Bllt IJIl Spfltt lind hll (il(III rt lml Iltllj 11]p I 0))1 of tlw orld Var witlId to prepow a rLpid WHr lJt Id alm1 hmiddotlv 01 lmiti An arm~ Wlll(h will)o allIIl all llllllY Hutldfnl~ Ind ly 1llrprl-f ~I intprt1t ihll( nwr in tIll HptNI of tiwir tanlq lhw in tllfir 1Tmor anrI armnmpnt Yon flppkt dppmrcl it )HCpqqary to rfinshy(re hll armlJrr II land (or(I hy a IhOllllllHl nirplanfl
011 Spfkl ~I th( nrt1 fnr()lIltrrpd conqidprahlp rtliHtanc( atnonK tlH rlf(tltativImiddot If thl old rNmlIl (ipnfril BtafT lmt 11HY C01HIUlrtd comshy
middotPllblbIJld yenIrior to tlJl GfltTman-Aufltrian union
72
plctely tht new gentml iOll wuch had )10 War eXj1(gtTlenc( and whose mllilt- lIlstrtlction wai Vpry hrJPf during tIllt perIOd of Glrman army limitation ~ 5C new academy heacitd by GClleral Libman nn intimat( advi~fr of til( Fuhn til ha~ only functionCc1 for two or three y(gtam and the firgtt officers who ht~ au grauuatfd are till doing thCir ~Crvice with troopg ar
Iwo t(gtIHlcllciP WIrf formpti in til GfIITal Staff Corps and lCpafll1 tb tlw old otlilfri who had )P(gt11 forlnd in tl1l war (ofCge in llerhn nnd~ (0
fOIlI~ht Ihl war and till yOlllll~ oHtlr wlthuut Wlr txlpritI1(( md graduall D( frorntllt ahlinvialld IHII wlr )tafT (our The olli(iai organ of thearrry tlP Mi1itar~WI)fIHnhlatt iI duplicated now hy the Deutsche We~ of organ of tll1 IIIW Glrrnan nnlitary thOIlIht j in oppocition to the idCM016 old (lIIITal StaIL 1hp OPI)()-itwil had tlndd (0 mov( the point of ~ of tIl nld(r ofjHtr toward till Frltllh taetitll idpas which con-ist of ga I IIllP to pprmil 1ll1)]ilLatlOn (oopnnv troop awtiting thpound ()(my Oil prc~ J))litionq WIth jlanlj wfl ltufil)orttli allfi Irqnl~ r(lt(gtrvpc fot ()untrratll 1ll middotIl of IlPld
Thl hwrn)(rl of (IL( olt G(Ilfra Staff wllh von Blomh(gt(R hrldtbt HIIa and haliwti1hlm up ith (xpIriel1ltl In Splin whllh was not avon~ to rapid tanl TIHI ltPI)lratpfl from thr inLmtry (VPO thotl~h victoriOCl w(r dl troYId lJ antitank 1~1J1l1 and Ivet) fifld artilhry aft Ixilauqt(ti t Iwir ammull1 Hill Tank JI tlH an(iPllt rullint harr World Wlf mlld 11 (olnwfd elmfly II till ilJfmtrv flut sin[(l 10 tlu printlpitl of Im ~ppld I nuy Iwulrl )1 falt It followed that try hl)uld Ill Iarripd In mrJJrlt ExplrilIH1 -Ith thi~ tlHory Wa~ obta at 1111 Hatth of (lIatItlapra H-~3 ~1tr(h 1937 when the aviatIOn tr fllrllwd Plll)rmOml (Ilitllllll of motrs mIll a ma~~ of iroll junk
Till r (XIINiIIHP1 lrml-frJ lif rpll(tiongt of the partlmll) or sudigt ~ttt(k Ithoul a detarallon of Wdr (i1Tman militan pub1icatIOIlH wL IVf1I rprPlllly hII fmpha-i7f11 till TfTlltrkahle fjualitll of UWlr laril I-pp(iatly tiwir fgtpIId which Icrmit tId (1t1-1Vf hioWH are now Pl1hi5r~ ](ttlr (())IlldtT(d artitlr notably tho by (j(lleri Elnlanbprger ll a AUlriJ1 lank autbonfimiddot_ III dlfan lt thit at lIat a yplr WJill)( requl tn manllfaelurp lIHlI~h tm to havf an fff liv Ilp(riorily uvert aclpmary Imdff tlw mo1 ftorabllt condition And til ~liht hJLtt Writll thaI rlpit jl1Ji whilh Iplrtlro ll](m~IIt from an a (ontrHlidion to tllf fundamlnLil Hlpl of tIll wpoundqmIl (I(onling to I Ill 1Ir of thp nldlr Cftnm (i(lpral Staff omngt there I)~ lonlT allY qllPtlOn of a Ilrldln at tack 1lId It wJ rquiT at (a~t a)i til miIlUfLctIlTl mattnd ~llfli(j(gtnt ill 1111Il1ity and flnllltr
At tIlt Ilml flltlfr (lmp inlo IHIWlr till HiPl of rapid war W
of (lfmaIl11tratlIY and thlt i ~ 11 till lill tltor could amrn~ III that 11 would aplHlr uddlnly hfon Ihgt PIlf01y hy urpnI hUll 1h( ~PIl(falf of Ihp oldlr (hoo n(uo(d to nloI tlf Fuhrr oert rolliltl md Fivld 111r11al HlnmllCn l1tholJg-h m anlnt National Socia5shywac not ahlfgt to rfIlOtln( phi Tllllitln (()Il IdlOll Hpoundlidplt fVPII I luperfi 1U (xmullllion of German millt[ likrtllrp ltho(lt1 that tllP ~t Hlomlwrg- d[vtrlld from th(gt politjd lImlt of 11)(gt Fllhrfr alld ~I rr from (oPrillj(lt1 lt(ra((~ htl lld -(1IIhl wr a JOIl tll1H to ud (orrflte(l J)oulwt qratil~Y It
Onl of fhf Ividlnt proofl tillt tIlt GfnPLll Staff hlIl rPllotlnCld 11 ~~~~d~i~~gt ~ltr~~~I~)fh~II~~c~rl~~I(I~~~i~ ~l~(lt~lt~))~ll~i~f tl~l(V~~~~~~~for~ -~( lTn1ond divi~ioll E(n til( orgmizlum of thf 11)) njvL~jf)l of I n already (lltup1ptply ready lIltl dctinpu to 0((111 tIll inclll-InII rrglr Q Flllfrffhl-TIarnwl1 hll bcCn topppd at prlltent n
Aftpr having rfgtdiz(gt(l that tank unite ~llon( could not l1nri(rtaheuro-~lpriOIIS op(rltion~ tl1pound I)r~ani7prlt of thl Il(W Irmy dtcid(d to pro(rd the r(irrinrrllllfllt of th 1notori7fd lIlLllItry lt0 th)t It woult not bL IJlhind til( tanl1 and III the fift hdf of 19n 11 reHlwnts of infantr~l hCfn motorizCd IItH C er tlw Rittle of GtucLtlaiarl l1pr( the motoshyinfintry had I](pn hpakn halt forced tilt Gprmall (~ IHrd Rtlff to am-ltL tlH fllrlhlr lnotorilltlllll of tIlt infalltry
1))1 (rfltors of til( np GprmlH dodrinp of ar Ire compIltCly TV Till IlPW aputtgt of tanls (i(lIfrd Eimltlllbl Tlr Iipllin thlt If I~ hIVP not U(((Ilti(rt tip in thl prtfnt it il bt(luP tlw havlt not becn proppriy anti JI(gt dp(Lm- thlt they ~hol1lclllP tlltainprl in ~he off(nsiwL~ ollk hy 11Ifltltry 11111 With pnlTflll 1r11i)T llpporl which ml~ hrlJ to f(lllow tht1ll TIp iillt al(llT(hl)l~ to -hwh tIl(gt lanks d~tiIlPd flltl repJa((gt tllC Irtilllry III onipr to tin lay it h Ihr Lrliry prlarlto)lwi qllllllll(] tll( lIILIIk bull hollid nnw lp gtupportftl hy thil lfllP lrtilllIY
~ H
~ ~
Lit lHIJl1(I a1 lll)tlty Ind intTI-ld molortlatioll If til arlllltryb rIHllllOIlll1lllHld lImHpr ill many f th( dIVJ~i(ll artlllpry T(gimentIil
thinl pclion fur the ~upport of tllll- art I ~ft unorganiild Tlw GPrmall~ ha(~ tlm r(llo11nlfd theirfith lt1 tIll rfation ofa
ml all( ulnHtil(1 tiH Frll1(h thlf It I 11l1 an witll tll ~trat~ lvlatlllll Tltl nIt (~Prtll1Il ((I(gtr11 StlfT hI tlWlY~ htmiddotjd (Jut the miinn of aviallon a to altl tilf ~roun(l troop and only tftpr qucll req~ nHntl had hPll Ilwt to u1drrtalI nnw indlptIHPIlI oppratiOIlllll theft I( rahlq on thp mo~t important CPJjtl[l from a lllJlitary point (l( vip h rp(Pllt arlitj( in tilt Militar-V()dl1nh)III Ct11ollt1 Braull tlll1011stn that 111 thotliand airpianpl and tilt -1uddl1l attHk arl qUlitions o~ lWlOTHI Melir and that II ilIHI(clry ahoy all to latify tll( lviationn i
of Ihf Iround armgt lnd al1) tilt rpquirllHlnq of III (111 and mo~timC tall ((ntlgtr4 of lip Itllllllr (or Lllfinirlfd( dt(I11( 11( 1tt(li(tted OmIt army (orPq -Iliuuld hayl nillt f1tOnnaLltltHt plaut thrll [or artillery]) vBlinll Hlllthrhl for iaiH)] lteh armY (ight((lr((onn31~sallc( pl~ c nilll Tmrquit and niJlP bomilarrim(ut Icll flank dlVIllOn a quadron of airplant lLf(l Hh mnllllp dliion Jplll(r tank or cavalry Itl nme
or tllf dffpwt p( impnrtnllt point it is 1l(gt((lCllry to (Otllit on 1t a flquadroll of niTll Illallpq flllh the frontiCr cannot hC l(ft without drJ and thf prohahle route of inva~ion of an (Iwmy raid mU1t be cnrrdl (on~(lu(gtntly aftPT hUYir fmtiqfiCd [Ill the IHfpoundis of tllf atm~ andof J I aircraft dlfensf tlwrf WIll not remam many Illnnr4 for ulnal raids II
c
L
~
the country_
thOUl3nd airplanes and if these needs ate not satisl1ed the army might he ampflously menaced and VIllagegt and important poinLI suhjected to destrucshy
~~ aTr~ili~~e tll~t ~h~~ner~de~r~ie~ta~ ~~~ed~ritadrt~~ ~~~r~~l t~~c~~ The day after the taking of supreme command or all
forces b) Hitler a decre(- annollnc(d the Unification of t][gt INial ~ i~iair armielt Calkd division nr group~ with centers at funich
~ ing had personally dircctpu an aerial maneuver the theme fawhICh was a war between Gc~many and Frpnc(gtbull and In WhiCh Rlrrultaneshy-1~ Dusly with a sudden attack agam~t the MagmQt hne a thommnd airplanegt ~ left the SlUltgardt Iirdromls and complplcly d(mtrol-ltd Pam The conclushy
sOIl3 wrrp bent by llltkr to Blomberg and the representatives of the Rtiehsshy wehr declared that the strategy of GOlrin~ might have heen rortunat but that it could aho 11lc led to complete disaster Bcsidgt eVtn in alte of t j ltucC(I~ therf Wltlgt no r(lton to admit that the will to rsist would b( hrolwn
i~d th~t the French vould r(gtnounce prolonging the war lgt As far a preparatiOn for var IS concertld the organization of the ~Irmy lt land Its penonnel should be conildered Thp Gprman army tralllformed In
~ l~f~d~~i~~ l~~duVl~gtn~~ l~h~~(II~)~fc~~l~~i~~l~I(1 ~~~~~~a~II~~ ~~~l~~~ ~ ~duatlOn from (houl are ghcn a su~wrflCJaI pxlmillatlUn if they wish to
~ i~~~~p~~~i ~la~~r~e~i~) tn~~~I~)~l ~t~~ll ~~~~~ ~l~~i(~~ (gt ~Il~Ii~ ~~I ~~~f~~~l~t~~~ l~~ 1e~nt~th~I~~1Till~(~r~~Sll~r~ijl~~ ~m~~~~O~r~ sO~i~I~~fnh 1~~~~i~~~I~~ I~nd the gpirlt of It~ offJceflt rtqiq II ow on a d()ubiful baltC dpprlvpd of th(
- lLadltlOnamp of the old army ~- 1 Furthermore while m the Fnmh rm)- all the olleers of the grade of ~ ft3jOr and above took part III the Great War In the German army fVfn a ~ ja part of tllp officers of the grade of colonel 01lt (gt11 as all tholtc under thiq
i ~~~~o~nf~Udg~~~IIPCre1na~t~ ~r~d~rmiddotca~~l~i~llfr~ld C~~~[l~~ il~ ~~~ - ~de of major The Frpnch Genertliqmo Gamehn was chipf of sttfI of a ~~ ~cup of armipi during the ar while the commandcr or the German forpgt
~i ~ Gfnel~l ~~a~g~~~~~~i~~l~~(t~iiil~r~~I~~Irl (~lr r~I~~lh~~~r~lgll~~~hfu~ni~h~dmiddotmiddotmiddot-i~ the ~oldier of the RNchltw(hr llld for til( reltt thre(gt school havp been I tltuted It Potsdam Bibrrich and Vetzlar IImveoer Berthod Jacob
- ~ates that there hai not yet I)(en a slll~le graduate from th(~e schools ~J For recruitment of ~cneral staff officerq the duration of the course at
~_J_ I-e WarColfg has he(ll rrduc(d from thrN tf) two yfars hut in consNllencf
~ i f~~~~km(~a~~f~~~t~a~r~f rS~~~~~~in~l~gt~p~~~ ~~~~~~~lt~~a~~ ITIf~G~~~~~ ann has (ven redlpd former general s~aff officprl t~ service from retlreshy cnt among others Colonel IIerke (Illd of the RUilway Bureau to Ow r ~ rmiddot~tfgtr and Colonel HfmarICh ehlPf of the topographical section 1 r The GlrnJan exam pip i (ol1yincm~ once more that to create an army gt~ t3 not ltuflicifnt to as~(mbJc men and arm them it is still 11(C(Slary and 1 ls IS more difficult to crrate the bkeleton the corps of officers and nonshyI lcc~mlSslOnPd officers _ Colonel Choumski tcrminlteg Ius study in saying With appreciation the
~~ ~~~t~~~~~i~~e~~~i2~je~~ti~~~t r~~dY~~~~I~~ d~ffi~~ltd~l~d 1~1~~J~~~~ai~ l2t rnmiddot tlut vould he gwen it by an European war The German army lack~ gtJ ~~l detlrmllwd military doetrme a compact and tested group of leadprl
vnor and inrtdor 101 well a th matfnel it nepds -c I_ J 19-20 April 1938
I IRON DISCIPLINE 1lt lOH1~ N1middot~CESSln THAN EVEH IN Tim SovmT ARM
IUne dl~ciplll1P mllItme de fer e~t plu~ (jUt jarnaio ngtce~aire dans larmcc IovietHjUP]
1- In the issue of 20 Mrch 19a~ lrOlsnaia ZVlPzda the organ of til( emiddotmiddot PHi army ati~lm th~ leLdN an~l poJt~al cummissar who do not maintain eI~ lDe-dIscrlme III thr orgamzatIOns rcl A mIlitary dilcipilne hke fan wnt(gts the author ll the foundatIOn of t tre aptItude for combat of the Red army and of the victory of the Soviet gt~ ~ope OV(f the (Ilemils of th( -ocilllltt ffvoluti(ln Th(gt Party I~ gOing to rI eestro the Trotkyist traitors who stru~gle a~ail1sF tlCorganlzatlOn of the ~l regular army and againt the strengthemng of Its dlsclphne
Our army is the mOlt homogClleous the helt or~all1zed and I)(~t dlCI
Itt f~~h~r i~n ~7~h~l~~i)H~~ ~lr~henn~d(~~~i~(I~a~~dv~~Wth~ ~~~ f~~c~~cid~~~ ~ of the comhatants of the Ipadors and the political ommissars and on their I devot10n to til( party of Lenin-Stalin and the socialit fatherland Our
~ III modern tcehniquf lnd the role of etlch fwldifr and rnch Irader
owed an
YHlCf(lIltld Ulldlf t1He (ondl~])ll flilcipin( ~ium(s an enormous C th ltJlight(ltt lark of rJclplme (xl(utlOn rhfTerent fran lllltruCshy
ruin modern merhanilm and lower the value of tllf umt~ of the
d((gtiRlve role in the lltru~gle to he carrlNl out to maintam 111 iron falls to tlw lrgtadrgtr9 and the politleal commlSlarH th(y arc rlpOll-
It Unfortunately there are in the Red army RomP leader and rll who hav( forgotten that WIthout iron dllClplme one cannot MY nor ffsolve the problemB of military and political prfparatioll
hI author thln cites 8)me concf(te eaRP it is in this cate~ory he riteJ that bclon~ for exam pIC ~he commandN of an aviatin formation III White RUR~ta in thiH organi7atlon th(rt I ll control nothlllJ hut held~ essnfgtS9 orders arf not obeyed neither rpgulatlOls nor llllltruct~ons r~ rolshy
order to lead the flights had been given to Captam NIkltJne ikltine did not execute the order hut transmittcd it to Lieutenant Polo vow
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
who in turn passed it on to a subordinate Consequence div(gtrse damages
wrec~afad~rc~~~d~~~t~~l ~~f~~~sioi~~~~~~~~~i~ ~~ll~C~~~~ice ceases to be a leader and should no longer have the conftdnee of the Party and the Government The fight to obtain Iron dlSClpIilO is in the firnt place the function of the political commissar he is tilt r(pr(~entative of the Party in the army he reprlsents Stalins central committe(l he ~hotlld bethe pershysOlllfieatiOIl o( the high BolHlwvlst discipiinpoundgt but unfortunately there are eommllsars in ill(gt H(d army who are not equal to their task for (xample in the organization to which Commissar Petrow is assigned the soldiers absent themselves fit will tlwy abandon themselv(s tomiddot drink and Commissar Ptrow dops not even think of remonstrating with them for this lack of dlgtcipllllP 1]( c(nsfS then to he a commiBSar
Th( leaders md the commiBsars who act thus are not true BolsheVist (hiefs let tiwm he relievd of their commands and thpoundir commiltsariats
TIl( InemiCH of the people the traitors to the fatherland the partisans of TroLltjky-Bukharin have attempted to destroy the iron dbcipline of th Rld army to weaken Its military abilitv they have not succeeded and will lot ltucceed Consequently it is neceary without delay to reillforce thiq iron discipline it is nccelSJry for the le~ders and (ommisars to occupy themshysplvps every day with their Hubordinates watching over the execution DC ordNS given until they aro accomplished not tolerating the least transgresshyHlnn of ord(l1 Those leaders and commissars who in their daily service fali to purllue the stru~gle to obtam iron diciphne are pitiful but it will only be ohtained where the efTorts of both are combined to understand the needs of thp men and to satisfy them
The truggle for iron discipline is the task of the Party men the organishyzatIOns of the Komsomoi in the army of all Bolshevists of men who are not even in the Party
The communists and the adher(lnts to the Young CommunIsts should dally impregnate the soldiers with the spirit of discipline and bolshevist or~amzation but the discipline of the ~()ldiers depend~ ahovfgt aU upon the dlampClpline of the leaders
It 1H hardly ntcel~ary to make any commcntantB on this article The nlder is left to draw the elementary deduction d(r1vlng from It
1 July 1938
CAN RUSSIA MAKE WAR jLa Russie peut-elle falre In guerrel
In Deutsche Wehr M Petenlcn under the title La Russie peatshyelie faire la guerre sur deux Ironts exposes the Scandmavian point of view
b~ic~iri~~r~e~rPt~~~g~~lli8~~~~i~ ~~~~)re lfhh~r~~~u~~degi~i~~d~dC~ Russia Make War
When in January 1936 RUSSIl announced the grand lmel of its fourshyyear plan with a view to development of its mIlitary forces many military specialists were skeptical it was knowIl that Russia had an immense human reservoir but it was demanded if thLI rpoundscrvolr that could be mobilized would
be w~I_k1~s~c~f~cl~~I~ltJkdd~~f~h~~egi the plan had modified the physlOgonomy of the Russian army in changing the proportIOns existing between the active army and the reserve If prevlOusly it was admitted that the active army should be one quarter and the reserve three quarters of the whole of the ground army Tuchachevsky considered that the reserve should not represent more than 250 of the Soviet army it was necessary besides to increase to a hardly imagined degree the material of war
O~e can estimate that in February 1938 the Russian ground army was ~~~~~~omae~~~i ~~~ill~~d~~he aviation and the navy the total would
For these two million men there is in general the necessary modern materiel aside from a few shortages but for an army of mobilization of eight miiiion men there was a total lack of equipment and the largest part of these elements could not be compared to the troops of the European powers the considerable masses oC arttllery and of machine guns which would Je necessary to equip the total did not exist the materiel and munishytions existing arc defective
Tanks are about 5000 in number and of these a large part llre no longer
~~tt~~~~~k~rp~~afoa~~~ ~~~~ro~~~ ~~i~hsihr~11~~e~bt~~~n6~O~g~~~I~kt~~~At the eighth congregI of the Soviets last year Stahn demanded that
the manufacture of airplanes be tripled so as to prOVIde 15000 machines by the middle of 1939 it waltJ desired to incorporate 500000 new specialist worlwrs but all this w~lUld not permit the achievement or th~ plan by the hour desired und even If they dId succeed Instructed and mo])hzahle efTpoundgt(shytIVIS for th machine were missing and even more iu( in Russia a large part of tllf aviation IS dpltille4 for the mission of independnt operati9ns which reqUIre personnel of the hlghcst cahbfr there call be no Just pretensIOn that the Russian aviation as contended in certam European circles is Huperior to the aviation of the great European powers
ltrat~i~ ~ll~l~~~la~i~~ ~~~0~~~~~idi~ld)~(~~t~I~r~~Ce9n ~N~~~~ ~eO~~~f~f which ten are III European RUSSia and fiv( m ASia the Iltrongest military potenti~ll i in the WPRt and the thr(C military rcpiolls of Lltmingrl~d und ~he North Sea include half the army and more thall half of the motorIZed Ufllt~ the FmniBh frontier has ulso bcen lnrgfiy reinforced recently if one adds to thlH account the military regions of Moscow and Kharkow Qne call say that two-thirds oC the Reel Army is concentrated on the western frontlet
Tins dIvision is comprehensible adds the author for European RUSSIa and the Extreme Orient constitute two theaters absolutely distinct and in spite of the development of aprial traffic it is impossible to displace great
73
C~1laloj of Sde(ted Peliotilu1 AImiddotticl(~ nlH-ltp oi ItJ middotpr two frolll~~ I woltr)rmiddot mounLlillt dl1~l it III ltJat( RU--ll d T)
Htllt~il (llIllt I il bull tlJ gt~ HlI d I ] II) t-
III diLI1 ( I Imiddotmiddotr ll tTIll J( J rlH 111
~I itlt~~~lT_ ft tl lItlshy urtlwrll d L )-fil fr dmiddot)) d i P bull I ltI I
1(lrII Jl vl11 (JLl J) I rl bull IlI ll) t T) 1 1111 lP tll- 01 I ~ d -
Illi l) 111 d l
dol fl
hll ~ I Imiddot 1101 OJ)) I hlr d )1 of f I I T d II
~I t ) 11 I Emiddot II )1 til I 1 gtjt t (1111 11111
t
( 1 d 11 r i bull i I til 11 1 ~ I 1 i I I III
l~lIr)lt~ tl d lt01middot fjr~f ~ 1) jlldI r 111 1 I Itt I bull Idol 11 I I 1101 r I llr I r I l I ~ l r 1 t I ~ f I j n 1
II HI I I q lIItIJ L 1 Ill f 01 1bull I IIf11
III f 1 III t
jr
111 i j j
1011
r1 ~ 11111 )j I
j Ill IIgt[t 11 11111 11 i
-ill llil d I
lId t d t rq 1 I It
Ij Ilr ) Itl 11111
1 11 Ip
j
lil lel oJmiddot t 1) 11 J I
] 11 rt]
1Ii r llll d I 1 ] T 1 I p Irt Pi tlll
11 1( 1 I Oll 11 ~llll1 l L 1 It r
t~ 11 t 11 d lt 1 I It j If l~ 1 d Ii 11 tr f I I Vlr j]) 1)rll]1I
11]1 1 bull 11(
In J r Ii I
il IlJljn 10111 II 111
r _111 II) f I~ ~ T 1
l I d 111shy 1- I r1III f1 shy - 1Ill L
+ ( n 1111 r f I
1))1 d I I Illlt I 11 I mor d of IIH II llgt]I 11101 I d lrq t Ii lq+lialllll dllhq prI(llnll
I n d IIItol Ir I j( IIH f Ir Itd S 1 rLllld IlI~~llnll p ll)shy
11I~ 11 1111111 hll(middot h l11 1111 Inti (Il itll Ilwgt fl v(rl lllin r llthlll T 1 ltlll of 11Ilh 1) or
fLO I d 11111 (1 Ilh 1111 fnrtnlr oint of I H tll ILl lIIlIlITl Imiddot tl] ]dmiddoth f l+rollIlnd 1 I
lfld roil11 prlllH d 111)1 tOl hlldrlll in 11l1 1 II ]ITt ]I 1Il1l1d 1( Wt llt ini~ dpllui1 d
C amp GSS Quate~ V
upon hut I1 1936 a 1leuroIid Ihonl for tIlt formatilJn euroIf mplrior P(middotNOnn 11
uld V~~lJJt~lrt~~ ~~~ll~(IItIZlt of tIl l(11prilllCI lnd tu PfOl(Pf In I~ tan anH flgthiofl I)u)fplvp 1
Tn I)rdpr not to t1i~(ard tli n~Ulizatlnn alnHI lIgttin~ it would1 IOl1t11 tn dlidl Ihl Inlllltry min ~wrial ddllgtl ndUl] corTl~pondin~t 1 mlilllLr rl1ltIJlH fld tl 1tltp in (t(h of tlHll1t ltlllllmlI)(ltr Uld an otg of 11Itrql 110111 -(1I1Zl t~ til pprulIIlll IIPlaquo(gtlry [ltJult 1)( rlit(Illd frv~ t~IhI 1I111l1 1r (fI(I whllllr t lip an rlltrod ullin r or dd plejprl cho3i jlf fur IP Id pt It Ildl All t hIgt pfrltollllll will( h 11OuhI hI olunher hit 10
) ~I 111lt IlId]]I))lhl llH in trudllll llld III IhlUI~h tlll)- lire n l of
1rfYI~1 ~)_~Jrl(itl~(r~i~~~alltI 1lntrulI1Y mlhtlr) auhorltip3V~ - of
To (-Hn 1111 dU(Lhlll of til populttlon Illd Ihl rltTIlllmlnt ()tk gr 1I1l11 111) f Ilul1Idld of olilllllr 1I(I-lry all inlfllp prnpagan~ ~ 1)lIlId lI ltlIPd 1111 IllP 0111 ql1d If I Ill t]lld dlllwr ~hlwUJg I
I~lln Ilr~~J 1 ~ ~)Il ~ 2 SItl~I~~11 ~h(O~I ~~~~I~~IIii ~uti~h~~~~~l~tIT~ ~I prltlJl1l~1I1ILL hnlild bf]It(d ~ ill (f(ruwll ll1d 1Il Ihl ()thpr (ountm3iJ( l 1111 Plllllq dln pd fir1 10 t 11Ildrt I III 111fmiddot -flin)] Ill 1 tallillJ~ to tiff 1 1111l14 dl1 III Ihpir 111T 111 II llriOllgt dullII II and nMly to reecho 0 11111lt1)11 111 Il lly 11)( Ir - irI lHlIlk 1Ollftrfl(p Ind till (mema 19i
10-11 July 1938 ~)
~ I(II~r~ ))~jJt~I I~~~I~ Jn Itf ~ jL 1 ~ TIll llr 11Iltlun rltlllin-gt antI [JuTt lln l(r III fltl pla(p am0j -l~
II)1i h llr It( I Iratl)lgt Ill j~Tiat matTlt (Horl lIrrmiddotfl rt 1117d ify p~ ~ tiLl of madlill frum Hnil h lilt AliI TlClll mlIIl1fH 11Irlr I ldlOWIl B -1
I t ~I1~~ ii)~ ~~~J~~ri~~ Ij~~~rtff~l~~l ~~1~~1~ Jl~~t~I~~~h~ js(
luwlpr of tT a1l11ll1l)I 1lIlHlrdll Illd flOIT)lll1 till unal ddtfegt in of I Ill IIrritllrv ~r
1]lt1 IIflllltlllh1H1H f tllll dlllrtll+l itlll I Ill ~nlt pxttlll oft It~ T flflll Ih 1111111111[1 1[1 lmpJII ]t]r1Il)~ Iut lll IH hI lntwu_l nlIn II il 1111 litII If (()lllllHlH ~Jh ill f tIIllll( hI dtllland -~u JlrlII~IOIl 11l JUllnt of dLlll Till pqlr 11 11ll I 11Irlry (volp ]Qj I
~I~~) ~ It1~~11 1Ij 1111 ~~ ~ ~l)I~ ~llii~~lb t1~ 1~lllf ~~~r~~~ll~II~~S 5ntl~~ I 1~ Ill II 11 It I 1+ 11111 111 Ifllfl ])I Illi Il lId rnl1t~ for i ] lIflampa~r h Ilf pl) Ill IllW rfTll1h 11
bull bull bull t b
1111 Illawt lrurd11 11l1Hfhljt lp tltlt of tlllt Hoal AIr Foret Tf~li lr)]IIll] 10 PWvllt fur till lit iltzalIIlll llld mllllt(IL1Hf of tIl( HW materr w11l1h h 1[111 hInti lIf[ rlf till LlnlrlltnP hH)1 l1lrll)rhHl1lcliL~lr III (middotlf~ If
Ill( holll htt 1111 pllIIIHci fo for appn-lllll four for fut-middot- I( 1lhIgt ll (rulthlltl (lI1L1Il 11)(middot iIIWll1lh Kinin tWlnty IHW airdroT (
~~ ~ I ~JI~~~I~~ hiSl~~ ~IIld~l~t~~~ ~~t ll~l~~~ n~ll ()fl~lxl~1l~~lli1Jllla~o~~~ i Ill 1)ltltltJn- ()f [11111 hII tinldy ]PPl plpfled mll~t of tlHm ill t IHHth uf Jollgiami 11ld SIlt1111d Without hlullt tu ILHl tPnl in lt(Cllr
I)~lln t uddlll ttt1I k l In lHrgto111lPl 1 large lITort ] dll11Ullh d ~OlO )11100 550 o)qno
~illtlO ltlrbr IlIl ri~J-(r aooo tuJfllt I lt1 Irangt tlw (pllll b- ()[t1lltlr~ VtljIIllwnl IIi fI HI nnw dd~ i I
Ill tltp tdullIgt 1~fP(ltlII)ll tIll pilot lfl (Hnl11blOllpd for short Ie bull-1 tlr eti( and ti llr n eTt + Inlt Ilh th( ltlPllortllnil V for pPTITIlr (I)llmiil)lI AI 17 I ~ ~ Imiddotar to ~fi ~ Htr It~ lIId tll) 1 11 (P 110 hIgt 1l1ll1d~
lip 1111H1 I alll)rh 1r 1lllllrdh 1( fl(lT d Hul I hI pr()llllflll~ hdlllr II 111lu tl flnt (Ill many l11lll
1l1]IIlHllh lrp lHIhd hUi ~Ir KlIlgl~ (Hld h(p[gt~ tu h1t IP11l1 II lOllgt whuh Will Pfl11l1 him tn (nllill thC irlTllt in Ih lIllifln I II H HIt~ llJ(d I~ HlIl)~ 111ulmiddot 11 Ihl j)11Hlinllln ( ftllrdlllJ~ lllt 1 IIdllHitf (II I( rlln1l1J f1 phYildl~ WIll I-II-( 1lld
Tid 1[Tllrt dll~ not pnlnl -lr llortmiddot-Hiltllt Oll hiidl fr)m allllum In tlllt lIP] g-oill) tl (llnl] thlgt IITmiddot( tiIgt of the antiainraft dtgtfpn-t fOT( In lltl II hJlhltkd -Ol)ll nWll and dlIlHi1d llpnll Ilw i1 rntoTl11 aTll) A( II1dly hi hl I flIIoI t ll tl1 l-H] 11ll1lI1 tIl tIl lI())O Ill n Till li~1Irf 10) IlP douhlld to llllll 100000 i
[1 tIl nrlH tlllll th1 (lmrnluri i lHn~ rt)rl-anizpoundd ~ot t)nlrI5~ gt~l
lrlll11~11 hlft~~~(f~~i111111~ l(l~lr IrI ~t~ Oi1 II ~ligt~) I~l( II~~ ~ I~~ f~Hl~ _ I fVIIlI1d dlld gnPII Il md 11111111 lIlt lI11portall(I J
Ih 11lt dl ]gtl 111 Iw Ulldlf II( Ilnlpr ()f a lllrp tl)mmaHle[lI 1 IhI 1r11 If li111 ll 11I1 rIIr II flIHlIl-lhb flr tHr lp dBI t hI offill 1 If 1Ill llr OIlJlllI1I11111V till (l1llImllt Hllll -I
In thl ~l111lry ltIf 11 a dIJall from th( (hid If tlH lll~r 1 ~~~ 1~~ 1 f)~ I~~~ i~~ ~~gifI~ll ~ ~t l~ ~I~tl ~l~ t~~i ~~t~ I(~I~~ III il~~1~ila 1 IIndr hi orlilT dlrlllltlr (Jf itlltntltllll llld of nrmiddotl~alH7Jllllln of antialrcr J dd1Ilp hainl till rull of hnltdlr )IIllrtl 1
TId r(()IIl1l1~lt InJl of t Itt Inllllland whkh rIalb hl~htly I hat w~gt j t1f1middotuly ((ht III lrl1l1I hac for ohJllt thpound (lmiddotntrahrtllI If 1(rythL ~ plrt alllln~ tn d(flllt t1~alJlltt air al tl~ ]
Ill( total Ilf t]1I( rlform ~hlw~ Iarly whal Illlllt)rl alll1 n11 BTl jl al ta(lll to air dTlir and till worry artJllImiddott b~ Ill1 dllqtr tlf ril Ila~l~ ~
~
74
iQlxlJU 0 70 Catalog of Sflected Periodicat Articles ~___m
They~re but the esampential steps of the general rearmament of our neighbors and Jr[ends a sure guarantee Q( the future_peace ormiddot Europe
-
FROM THE REICHSWl~lm 1933 TO THE REICfSHEER 1938 IDe In Reichswehr 1933 aU Reichsheer 19381 Colonel Baron
In 1933 when Adolf HitlCr was called hy President lIindenburg to agiumepower the Reichswehr included ten large units that isseven divisions ofinfantry nnd three divisions of cavulry
These divisions were broken down in twenty-one regiments of infantry offour battalions (o( which one was a recruit battalion l eighteen regiments of cavalry of five squadrons seven regiments of artillery of three or four
~ htrsc artillery of a cavalry division) Signal corps groups seven groups of
groups of automobilf trains and seven medical groups f large and small unhs sufficed for the professional army
or 4000 officers and 9bOOO men impos(d on the Reich by the Trpaty of re~mes It Wal insufficient as a nuchus for a modern army destined to rereive and in-ttruct one or two classes each ot 400000 young soldiers and to mobilize in thf future several million relervists
The first task whieh was imposed 011 tlw IWW Chanttllor desirous of ghing Germany a miitar force capahlf~ uf realizing its plans of GPrman expansion consisted tllUgt of augmenting the llumLfr of units of the Army
The Chancellor and his military coumrgtlofl Generals von B10mherg and von Frits(h had the clink illtwppn two pro((durefl one to Imse the
n the sIst(m of units of tradition (each regishynny (ing in gem~ral represented by a comshy
ter~middot in the Heilhw(hrJ the other heing to content ially with the tripling of existhtg units ns or which the most important was the lack of he second plan which was ldopted
licient to prepare the frame work of units of imtrucshyas necessary also to foresee the adm inistration of the as of the instruct(middotd mservcs It was also necessary
worganize the instruction at Ipat summarily of the fifteen classes (Gershymans born between 1900 and 19141 which had not received any military instruction
Parallel with the tripling of the activr tUlIts it was thus necessary tu create orgalls of recruitment and administration these were the inspections and districts of recruiting It was necessary to create at the same time rapid or~anization of instruction similar to the centers of instruction of the World War these were the ersatz units hattalions and batteries) commanded by ersatz oflkers retired ofilcers who had served in the Reichswehr or even m the old nrmyl
This period of prCparltltioll eXtlllded from January 1933 to October 1934 At the latter date each hattalion (except the recruit battalions) and
each artillery group of the Reiehswehr (except the horse artillery) transshyformed iLgtelf into a regiment of infantry of three hattalions and a regiment I)f arti1ery of three grouJl~ Each battalion of engineers gave birth to two
otters Each SibTIul medical and train group expanded into three groups Alone the cavalry rcginwllts ald the horse artillery were not touched by the
~ tripling However the 3d Cavalry Division (Weimar) became the 1st - Armoied Division
In this manner the Reichswehr expanded in the winter of 1934-35 to includl tWlnty-one divisions of infantry two divisions of cavalry and one armored division Side by side with this and in its service twenty-one ins~ctions of rptruiting and alollt ~OO tccfititing- districts were constituted
commanded and trained by eratz otncers (retiwd officers called to active duty
~ Compulsory military service was d(creed in May 1935
~ ~~ ~h~e~~~~ i~ ~~~~r~~gCl~~~I~i~I14o~dtll~edt~)~~~~le~~h~~~~~~~~i~~~~
of the German arm v had to ~urmotmt to recall certuin essential facts The number of oOleNs of all gradCs and all arms retired by the Reichsshy
wehr in itgt fourtefn rcargt of ltxistcncp could not hllve (xc(eded four or five thQusand of which not morf than three thousand at the most cOllld be used in 1934 Thes( Wfre for the most jlart required by the inspections of recruiting and the ersatz units
The active units of infantry engineers communications and traingt were able to draw new leaders from among til( officerl and noncommissioned offishycers actin and retired and from the state police ISchupo) This resource hardly existed f~r the artillery which only disposed to fulfil its triple obligations of its own cadres of 1933 It was not possible to obtain from the military schools of artilery instruction without a delay of at ien1t two years a triple production of lieutenants In spite of this in thC course of the wintpr of 1935-36 six divisions of mfantry and twoarmored divisions w(re creatd hy drawing on the twentyshyone divL~ions of infantry and the armored division whose existence only commenl(d with the preceding wintpr These new creations were not of a nature to um(gtlioratea prohlem already difficult It wafl thifl army of twenty-seven infantry divi1ions two cavalry divishy
~IOnl and three armored diviRions framed summarily enough and composed In the maiority of young soldiers of sev(n monthgt service that was available o the Reichsftihrer when he undortook the rcoccupation of the Rhineland In May 1936
rorm~~ ~iiiia~l~J9~~Iw~n~Ct i~~i~~r~lgrj~~rtheer~tl~~a~~s~~~nikr~~~ sur-lc-Main It was in 1936 also that the Challtcllor decided to extend military sershy
VIce to two yenrs and to increase the number of divisionf or infantry to
thirtr~~~ autumn of 1936 when ~he class of 1915 joined the class of 1914 in the active services the new Reichsheer included thirty divisions of infantry
~~~~l~dt~nret~r~~ieJ~Jl~i~~~ divisions and one ndepe~~dcnt brigade or
Beside it thirty-rour recruiting insJllctions fUnctioned disposing of 270 distric~ of numerous ersatz units
In 1937 the number of infantry divisions was inpreased to thirty-six of the ormal type and one mountain in Sljltomlier of the same year the class of 1914 passed to reserve and was replaced in Ll)(l ictive corps hy the class or 1916 bull
In FellTtmry 1918 wlWIl the murch on ll1HIIl took place the active German army inciud(gtd about MOOOOO soldiers about half having sixteen months of service and about haJJ four months but in whieh tho officer framework hud neither in (juantity or quality Cllleciully in the artillery a value corresponding to the Importance of thf eJTectives in soldiers
Since the Reichsheer has ahRorbed tlw Federal Austrian army whose illlmbers seem to have been reducnd to six divisions (three o( the normal type two mountain and one urmorpd)
The new army is articulated in sixt(en army (orps thirty-nine divisions of normal type three mountain division five armored divisions and five cavalry hrigades
It is an imposing total which to become equally IS powerful as imposing gt
must wait the slow and patient formation of leadem
INFANTRY JOURNAL
May-June 1938
Am POWER ANI) TltOOI MOVEMENT Major Phillips SOLDIElt LOOK AT THE SEA Major Dupuy TUE CASE FOIL ANTITANK Captain Greene A lRACTICAL GENERAL STAFF Major General Mosehy MIIITAltY MOTOTtcCII~S Captai~ Wheeling
July-August 1938
SOME HKFLE(TIONS ON INFANTRY MATrHmI AN) TACTICS rfajor Genshyeral Lynch
TUUNIJElt IN Tlfg 1A5T flmiddotm )IONTIS OF Tim WAit It-lt CIIINA Lieushytpllant Rudolph
TJII~ SPANISH WAIL A HEVlIoW OF TIIB HEH FOltEIGN OPINION Captain Johnson
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL AflMY MEDICAL CORPS (Great Britain)
May 1938
IMPROVISATION AND PltA(TICAI WOItK IN CA~IImiddot Major Bayley Tim PROBLEM OF MECHANIZATION S IT AFFI~crs Tim ~IEDICAI SEltVICE
LieutColonel Atkim
JOURNAL OFTHE ROYAL ARTILLERY Greit Britain)
July 1938
TRAINING RUMINATIONS 1937 Lieut-Colonel Lambert COUNTElt l3ATTFIW IN MOBILE WARFARE By Tweedledum
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUilON (Great Britain I
May 1938
TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LESSONS OF THE WAI~ IN ABYSSINIA Colonel Laderchi
THE BATTLE OF WAHSAV AUGUST 19Z0 AN EXA~IILE OF TilE COUNTEltshyQIoFENSIVE Major Mahony
MODEltN WAlt AND ITS MAZE OF ~IA(H1NES Brigadier Wilson AmCHMT AND ~tE(IIANISED LAND AIUItE rilE BTTLE OF GUlJAshy
LAJAltA 19n Captain Poulain French Army Reserve WAS GERMANY DEFEATED IN 1918
JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain ~ India
April 1938
ABYSSINIA TODAY Major Snelling PEACE Olt WAR Colonel Rich PItOPAGANDA LiclItColonel Dimmock THE INFLtmNcg OF Tim IltliS IN GliBAT BltlTAIN ND AMERICA Inglis
DIE KRAFTFAHRKAMPFTRUPPE (Germany) By Clptldn UN Hartr)ss InflUltry
March 1938
NEW WAYS FOit MOtOR ANIgt HlDmt lNclte Wege Hlr Motortmd Reiterl rllijor General Eyb
Belore discussinlt the fmbject the author depicts some experiences from the Wllr in Ahyssinla He notes the rapid road eonstruction there was shyachieved primarily because motors were able to advance materIa across countr~and construction could he begun simultaneously at various points
75
~ ~ ~ Cllialof of Selected Periodical Articles
A nlW dlplrlUt( lt1 iJlrli~h tl in tllP trltlbportatlOJl hy motor of 1JfI lH of hurdIll to Lf(b lrnpa~aj til mllugt HllfJ from tiwn thr lllimals pn Ult( d to (arry llu tru(k InH1middot L1Tlhi r -tollJtd nCollllaif-ltanlI Wll of httl(middot (OIlIqHH It 1 TV tllI JIllgt 1 Vli unUH7fd ltpy and cout SPfVICP providtd (X(l 1l11It lllf()rrnattJH Smail i1t-moving- achanCrl or flank Ullltgt rOIIgtttmiddotd of LlIlIlt IIHI mltortl Ii Ilifantry In artll ry wlilch for tlw mnltt fart n lt1I1Ih d 1~ lIr
Bmiddottwlll -) An lld J -11 IIJ til ~IIdtd ~Llf(h (]f till IffJl
~~~ l~~1 ~~~gt Ii I ill~~l IH~I~ 1~~1~~ il~Ylllllt~~ 1~~iI(j ~~I~k lt1ll111middot l-lWlll1 lr~J 1tuh tmll 1 I nl In rlllruw IIFI rJtldill~ tIll rOM1 kl1 Ir Ullrh 1]o II I)))qlll~ ilv tIll Cnlllnlll Irl lillIIlltl llllIlllllllllnll 1111 11 fd 1)1111 ~ 11lt1 n1h 1111 ~ I i1ld Ill [lfr 1(01) tlnll I (lil k It II I XlI pll)]) I fl lfdmlr middotoIllnllmiddott Id Imiddoth Ii
1111 Illlt [f lIIt If 11drmiddotlinlll f qlltllllllI ItLvL Illi IIItr(1i r It Illi all1 r lrlt) t ~ 11111 hur Ill 11 -I lrl1111 n lld 111 It- Ullf dnTllll I ~lld 111]1 lt1 In llllthmiddot t l)rtlllflfIld (ldry 111 JIIl (III 1I1llr 1] tfmiddotIIIln 1Ilt)nIJlHh 11l1lWJt Hut Illlpltdlltontfl 1 llItl)tl1 lit lOf till nj111IIll of mllr Ill gtTllm HI ltq Ifnl
Ill ~Iod rlj r 1 i I ] II I l1lnd 11 Iii r If LI) 1)1)1 tl rt
If I thl I i) rllill h Jtlf-i )I lh mI()f lrI1 1 1 1 1) fllh r 1tlgt111 1t11r r1I1 4 1 H)
I d) IJlo rI 11 r Inil LIt h f Ii)( mwt III tUfn ut -1U)
I n n 1lt)1 rdln LIHl mIlr Il)tl r middot1[1 111111111 flld 1llhIlIl11dldullll111l
gttf 1(j11 til I till tIll Ir 111 Iltln JIlt IIgt Tw 1 L rrldh 101 1 UI lr1 of H tJJh )lnfl )middotr II h I 1 Ihnt nf P I ~ tll1 1 bullbull il 11HI Ojlltl InmiddottIn hi Hili r rl)llhrl nnr ~ bull Int 1nt ill ~ li d
In fd r t t I ~ Ill tltl tIlll mu-t rnri to fl I rrn1JII
t I t) dd111 t I I llI r L(IT~ 1 ~IId (f i nlaquomiddotr 1111 j 11111UIIJ(ld Irlltly L- 11(
d 1tl 11Imiddotlll~~ A IlflhllnhII~l- tllltfllflalllhrlmdlr j 01 r l]r jltr ~i ii 1111 nwtr tihlalw t)tIl1l dllChmiddot
)~gt1LlllI i f 11 ]1 1 r 11( r1~~~~~ ~td~~~~~fflrW~)~~~~~(middot~~~~~l )f( If ]11IIHImiddot1 ) 1Efll middothlCl ~ bull
f f 11 dhulvl1l qI In f lei )~rl t1lr I il t hlch lPJIl If llimiddotl)tIr1 oil and tlIP (oll~ III jllt 11111f mm illn thn that r(quITld fOf
I1r 11IHlIl III g-dIIlJl (In 1ltmbJI mot( Jrjlft1Ill (or pombal the arIlr nllll11 lit to
IIl( rl 1IIIr ll) I P rind of tlml Ihll a rI fnf l-gtImiddotmhl pll no Itrgp rolf
Ihl In I) I)() mIle Ipr dl g)Ili m lglllflcanCl 1hat 1lt lInportlnt i tlw
1l1ll~ lltlmiddotnutl Un1 r trlmiddotpllin~ 2(1 hdIJrltt dlgt B l1ch cticlllatioll and trl(llltl~
dlltLII1( ( of 1-0 ttl 1~O mt s thlt L~ 0
rt t1 till 1)1 lldllll 1IIl Iltlli7d Xp 11)( IJf ol))]1t and I I 0 II f Ii) rn r rI d~I lnnl 11 llrly hllt to or i 1 Ill) I n11 [d Ilunl whlt1I 11ll nhll)tl I full till ltUlt)lIIIshy
f 11 ldol mI I Imiddotl~ lfy ~r()torgt can tljllTlP 1 hour r d III I 1lllmupl I lndlll~ )nltly k lt(nb tIll ir h(
rIlImiddotr 111 n1 middotrdlvlIndludIYll1drgtmolllrIIPlh11 t 11111 r 1 lrn1llf Il nil 111 of I dl TIjllirl- all I rlqrdllllnl~
J 11 Ill Iii III II I ~t nt IlfY llln frolltlt wn ~(f(rgtly OY(f ii I II HI 111111 i I r 1)lldlnraquo Ill (11 l11nt ((lvtiry could mo aero
1lt1 middotn II h 1 rf 111 a 10111 lltllq~ ordinarily 1 thHI jorII1 1 jr hld Ill 1Ilhllt ltIlled and cro cIl11try
nllI till 1lttt frllt igt mmy mlll 11lI11 and thp I I Id 111gt11 IV mtlltt r((rlll WIth lIHmiddotrpalt(d
I d lId I frlf tIOna )Ilfl of tIll limp (on-
I film I Irl nI Id d~ llfTl n no III tIll ratlgt tlf mar(h of motur and Ir 1h Il II f trw lrtlll~ alllmallt lor (jon to 1)0 ]HHIlHh ill
I 1)111] )1llr (111111111 Slfh 1 Xfll ri11lfllt hll hpl ~ ~ l I tl r _
l ITlOJllt of fllll lwh hllt In vnt(middot1 ahout tlH trlmcndol~ jlIJf tl fr Ilr lllltltJtlbull ] OllllnlI11J 1gt a (Ollqlllnrf of Ilnh
1 bull 1 (JlJII)IInIlI1 [111 A hrilf (fmpln~TU mIY ill in onhr )1110 1 jlllJd 1( (III v I lrlll iOfl 11ll Itr two lillI of pay 111Hi or If) nIllt ttl I Ill frill 11ft II In III nltjUlr fllr fO-mi]1 march dayJ (IJ1lllnl 1 t dI il) fll[li rtlllll ~hTlh rllk0l1lr1 only at 7 l poundgt t l 11t JIIldfoj pl 1lt1 11 ~nll ~2~1 ]Iund or Ihoul fiV(lllllf tl
f I t to 1lIn d 11middot rrjmiddotr )1f1r1vlr fill Iloll dtyof rr I llId dL1 f JJ I 1hi IpJr I rl 1IIlT~ fllltj llfh]1lt III (lll III ]Ifl) ImiddotLIII d rrllll 1itf
I Jll 1111 IlJ rndlnllil afll fIJr hofl IlllIl Slr~II LlnfllodEralply I fl1 1111 tJmiddotIn I [11 IlInlltllll fllr ftllf tlrtl( wltl)ll fHI TIll 11middotIr 111 1gt1 ]rodld lIb 111 Irllt rdlo11
1 l IIIIJI tq ur lt1111 and lrlllllfY IIr A TTlotllf f11I1II1
rI 11I11 11 Ii III r1 I lt11 1)1 I 1 ht 11 il 1ljI~ III llr bullI Irl rllfr al t I J 1 I IltlId l IJr url witilh lan IllOVgt Lerw IIJulltry whplJ t III I dI1I~Ir~ tri Art llhry Ilnlll nil d m)tor nlllllnn will fin(l a mnvinK and r Tf mlrIT tH11 All llf ill 1 I Ur1N Ibl lIlIVIIII 11IUIllIl tJH TlJ JIf1ll1l If 1 lt (( I j low Ii t1I k h- plalll 111011(1 proll Vry cugt ly t d ur IJIll
[ III dldlllllllllllj IIt dh) 1 ltIII IIf IIII IlllltllriZld infantTY TfIIllTf only a (I~ Iolld tllur Ihw t1I dl rJlmiddotrltI)tl [)( 11l1rching infllltry qr cavalry
76
C amp GBB Qllarierq VI ~~ ~
MOTPl)V(lr grlatlT flhm(mml is nhtainllulr from mojoTR l)(cam~laquo th(gt (olUrJ olt li much longer tot
(5) Trall~ltion (rom march to combat and VIlt versa - The 10 toll nlem(n whu nde Oil the two Side seats in light truck can detruck frot (tII thrgt halted vhir plae(gt tIIPm1Clvcs lit 1 diltanc( of 10 to 12 yards f~ out 1111 tTllLk and Ill rlady to fir III 7 or 8lwconds
Jj(ltrllclcin and (Iltrll(ollg from 5 to 7-ton trucks rCquinll mot(l tillil wi t dllrulk al111llt IH ti((ond~ tu lntruck allout lO wc()ndl
III ((JIlPlflll111 til following tim(H hav bpI found neC(Bsary for cavriliJ i pal prlparltiOlIl From the halt to di~moulit takl a dbtHlle of IO to 12ya1amp vic Hul Ill pnptr(ci til fin rna
IU Whltl nd1l~ hy thr(gtps or HXlS the 1valryman nearest the hone- Vb hllldlr 11 nlIly IJ l ((ollch th otlHrs rtquirp 15 twcond ~ 01
~ ~ ~V~I~l~i~~i(I~I~Jl~~~rt~(~~i-Jti~)l~I~I(~~i~ i~rl~d~i~~~~~(~u~~~ ] pf( 1)101111 (leh 1IIIId hill f)WIl hopp alld lJl nady to fin in 10 second or I2l 1 rmall TIlIHHlIpl and he r(tdy to flrp III 9 -(condg 1 ah
OhVIOI1lt]Y tIll infantry In truckg IS at som( disadvantage agailllltl 1 Ilr)ln( Ittack Un till other hand til( digtJnc( hetwcpn trucks and tbt ) tin )111)11 lilli pfodlH1 1lc(gtWd IltltIVlIltlt1 to attaek from th Hank Tk i rllr If~ It lC~~~~~~~~f~ilI~llr~~~~f~~(~~~~~~l~r gtl~~~~ ~~1~1~~~~~Ptlllin~ J~ flvllrd)ltmiddot fxjl(rillltlI lJl to thl (ro)gt (UuntfY lpaJilities of motor vehlc1a ~ HUI Ih 11m of yar till typP uf ground and the ma~~ of motor vehice 1UBI
~llf~I~~~JI~~n~~gt~J~~I)~~))I~~~ ~I~I~~~ ~~()l~ll~t ~~~t~ri~nr~~Jljb~Ft~~ j ~ tn lltI~Iht~li~I~I~l~~ttl( I arev whrre TOlds or tralllre in abundane~ ~ ~ ~ll)1~111~I~JI~ ~i~~I~if~~)ln~ldl~~~I~i~J~J~~~h~~1o~~~)t~~i~~~il~~~l~l~tl~f~On~ tTl tn pn 1111 Evn In a thrnly lt(ttlfd but fairly nrln tNralll the light ~t (an lIrfurm ao wpH if nut b(ttpr than motlllt(gt(1 own tllP l1Ptlampltary rlconac 1111~ bull 1
Hut III wllotd 1rfIgti wlHTI road1 and traIl lrl klrCf til m()Un~ IIIHI 10 vtlullIlI in bet Illdlgtplllltah]l It 18 hI who (an (omh the aru ~ 1 thorull~hly gtllliy and IVlth fPlativ(iy little nOl~ It 1lt fwre that thcvtl~
11~~I~llI(I~vl~~~~lr~~~t~II~~I(~~~t ~t~~~I~~~~lll~t t[l~~ ~f nl~~J~~i(~~~l~~~~ t only a few mountud men Will gtIfJiCe lor thl purpo)C TIl(gt (omhat will It tlkfn ovpr hy tnotlJrltYltiJlttlt 1allk fInd lllotonwd IIlfantry
(7) Hoad tongflt10l1 An advmta~~p ac~ru(g to the motor c~lllmnfl I With ItH trll(cl tf1YI]hll~~ With (oI1 CI(prahl( dlgtancp bCtw(ell veillcles at 1 II (ollsel)u(l1t t1pxibility tjllg~lJon md hh)(king Will not occur so frequentiJ ~j o a with hnr~p~drawll vlmiddoth(lp Motor COhIllHl (an rfOgtgt one another It~ ~ ltlnly a qU(ltlOll of a (frtnn l()lt~ of tUnf It
lri) ~1otor noises atHI hghts - EXjlCripncl hag shown that spen
~1~~~ita~~l~~~~~lI~n 1(ll~(~Jlt[~~((~l~~I~middot~r l~~~~l~r~~~]e W~~nl~~d~t~~1 ~1 tl pruvidld In tttiucp fxhnugtt noises Other n1(gt1I1S of camounaging the mok IH1I-l of tanb IHarily arl Jlog~lhle such I tir actiVity and the usp of noil) Hlltnrl in otlJ(gtr lte3S and by artillefY fire
By (mplnyilll~ hhlP glass light) can be so dimmed that even at fall middot10lt1 rmglgt thp Ian not bp dl-tinguilthed from the front By proptshy(lllployil1)~ Iwh lightlt nil tlickpnng hem~ will diclosp the approach of t Vlhilk yet t11() will Jllrmit a rlo~f tudy of tilE adjacent tCrrain
(()llIl~I~~i~i~7s~rr~J~P~~~hf~1~~ ~)rr~~ti~~~(~ft~l~rt~~~~~I~~c~~~~~n~ll~~~ ~nal dItlllII hptwC11l I(hide to h(c)m( Cparat(d or to take the wrq foute To aVOid such errors the following means of correction and 3SSLStat~
~1~~I~~~~~~ll~(i~l~~Or~~I~~~i~~~~~~~~t(~~~1~~~f~~~l~c~l~~nr~~f (~r~~~chf~ difTlTltnt fi~lrp or lacll mut (ompIIIY hattdien etc blocking off TO nol to lIP 1I~ld lITIJ1lnYllli~ lll()torcy(hgtt~ as guidlS and rlir((torn
110) BrplkdOlll or forced stop of vchicles - The freate~t obstai~ I l tlf prnplnynllnt of till commcrtial type yphicl( in military opfgttat)[ In thlt thl( v(llIclt V1t tulmiddotk on lofl roadgt llfotiatp stepp gTldes I (xtrlml ditltlully nr not at all and Itl VNY ltplsith( to road and hridr d(~trll(tlOll hy tlH (IWllly It is tml that hOf~c~drawn vehicles and sma fourwhlll dJvl or 1-~hlll trulkf) WII Qv(rcomc these ditHcultics mn TladJlv HUI thl Ilfl of tht prohiltn lil in tlw utilization or the commNcl vehicle for TllIiitar) plrpU~ts How un the ma~ of tlwsC vehicles neOlshyplbh g1tiflHtllrliy t days march dunng which ~o to 50 small and 1aJi 011tIC]- dptru(tion pte ne cnCOlllltprpd We may ptesuppose tb
e
0 a
d a
l
tll hrll) I 11l1vPft1 ((1 arl dpltroy((i hut lhat ahw llf(lUPPoltes tb1 11111(11 lit 11111 ha1 IJt1 ltLvlllahlp to the tllpmy fOf Much dtlslructlOna 1 lltlt III ha~ IItl1l1(( fllll 11I1 opportunity Motor columns can ordinarl ~ dltotlr (nVlrla1HillllH or-two hld ~Jlot But a thorl)ugh test of capnhihOOj Iwuld hp mad t1JlIltally Hinc( III mot terrain d(truftiolls and obstaekl ~ 1
~~i~( ~~~(t(lh 1~~~~~~I~II ~~~H~t I~~~~f~~~~~t~lnd ~imilar flltUf] ~ A l(gtchniqlll tnll1 hI dlvllo]lld whwh Will O(f(OIl1( tl1ls(l handiCIIIl ~j
I-qII]lIIlt1II 1II11 III dvlinpld lnd 1111111 For iIlHlmHt t11( tIJl of rore lnd jlHII(Yl hoI h hI( and motor lllcrIId It hlluld not be difl1cult U pfolplt bllth flllllnr ml It)rigt hy proplr ((lvlring alld packing ngaw( wllfr n pill itt 10 what dlpth fordlll~ hy thll mlmH is possible we do~ Imow hut WI Jhould iparl1
A IlHlOr 1llIlInll middothoulrl J1PrhapH tratllport with it material to ns~ist~ middotroini~ ~(d ~IHlt til f(plIr hridgcs and (vento onstruct bridg(s
~~~~(~I~~lt~~~~~ 11)d ~~~ItCl(lt~1tll~(ll~~~g~V~~~1l~~~ve~r1~~a~~~~I~r in Illattrial at tl1l Ina of 1Ilgt and on tune will Ill thoroughly undt 1IlYOIP who has actually participated in ptwllIit Thpound actual pmpioy
I
bull
1 bull I
C alog of Selected Periodical Artlcles
1
1
I
I
( d~~h~n~~~~it~~1~~wt~~t~o~~r~~middotwefe of smull cnRequence
Tests should be made to determine the relative efficiency of animals (truck transported) and small tractors (truck transported) in gcttingtrucks
oat U~~ t~gea~~~i b~~~rec and rider ih this new rapid force what
will ~e~tb~elhe history of war in the past that the cavalry horse
=~3e~1~~r~~~~~~~~~~1ef~~r~ ~~dc~ot~~~~~~ ~~~~u~~cti~d~i~ mated the mounted Units as though a pest had struck in consequence of which the marching capacity of the cavalry waH d~creascd to or IlPlow that otinfantry
Therefore in time of pence the followiug mCaSllrCl mu~t h( bkcm 10 prepare the horse for the rigors of campaign ahle ~~~ fr~o~~7~smiddott~iJ and strong weighing not owr 700 poundH luilshy
(2) Cavse the animals to undergo fast or hunJfr ppriods at the Ham time doing full time work
(3) Accustom them to winter cold Have no stalls Provid( prottction a~t the wind and rain hut no morp than that afTord~d by the CanVH tDPof a truck
4 Protect the winter coat of the animal [nstead of the ~urry-comh ore the vacuum cleaner
Favorable results have been ohtained with the vacuum deaner hut it5 use has been forbidden hecause combing and bruRhing furtlHr discipline and improve the skin and digestion (hunger periods would improv( the digegttion
ProT~ployjng the vacuum cleaner would releusp more grooms for com hat
train~~rt_haired animals should be eliminated for military Jlurpose~ ~~ ~~ ~~e~~e~~oi~g~~ ~~i~~dfo~n~~~h~di~~o~~~ 3~a~~)~~~~ns~~(7) Competitions simulating whr conditioml using th~ following rulfs
(a) Time of competitions November to March in gnow and rain No stalls i
(b) Previous and continued hunger periods ic) Animal transport by truck Loading and unlouling tesLlt (d) Use of animals in pulling trucks on roads and out of bad
stretches
The author offers an example (in general) of tlw possihlp or~anization olan inrantry battalion (truck transportcd)
Attached to the battalion should be a number of motorcycles small tanks and tractors
Each rifle and machine-gun company to be provided with about 18 trucks which ill transport peroonnel equipment and upplics
To each company and fo the staff section an additional four trucks each transporting three horses together with riders
The animals are to serve the following purposes 9 n) Pull trucks out of holes around bad stretches etc
(2) When the battalion marches afoot to move thp combat trains Ismail perhaps trailer type vehicles)
(3) To provide reconnaissance during foot march (4) To mount the unit commanders (5) Where the opportunitv arises to group all the mounted men into
one organization (reconnaissance and security)It will be noted that these mounted men are not a cavalry unit rather
an all purpose unit AI told the battalion will have some amp0 trucks Thf lar~e number of
drivers (truck and motorcycle) can he tmined in infantry pon(gter duties
and icta~~~~~~~I~o~~~~i~~FeB~~lh~P~J~~ ~ d~~h
ARMORED MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZEU UNITS OJ FOJUm~N ARMIES 1937 IN RETROSPECT
JPanzer- mechanisierte und motoriqierte Verhandc fremder HeNt Ein RUckblick auf 1937J
(See digest middotCampGSS Q)larterly June 1938 page 97)
April 1938
TANKS - ARMORiD RECONNAtSSANCE VEHICLES AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST THESE
IPanzerkamptwagen - Panzersptihwagen und die Abwehr dagegenJ New French R~nault tank - De Militaire Spectator describes the
new Renault which shall serve as an infantry accompanying tank It weighs 12 tO~8 carries one 37-mm cannon and one machine gun has (l
speed of 14 miles per hour with armor of 25-mm to 30-mm (about one mch)Ita crew consiqts of two men
Rapid tanks in Poland -- Revue dArtillerie reports theRe tunkH which weigh 243 tons are 258 yards long 178 yards wide and 131 yards high A 40 horse pow~r motor provides a TOad speed of 27 miles per hour a cross country speed of 11 miles per hour They are capahle of c1imhin~ n 46~ slope of traversing water 20 inches deep and usc 7 gallons of gasoline per 60 miles Ea~h has n crew of two men is armed with one machine gun (with 2360 rounds of ammunition) and haq armor plat~ 3~mm to 8-mm thick
Russian hea~ tank HM l-Krassnaja Swjesda reports as follows on this tank type In the main turret are a cannon -nd a machine gun In
each of two s r forward turrets are a heavy and d light maehin~ gun Its weight is 18 tons crew 6 men With a 250 horse power motor it has a road speed of 27 miles per hour ~ngth 72 yards breadth 273 yards height 293 yards Climbing ability up to 43 degrees aple to knock over trees4 yard in diametermiddotcan cross water 12 yards deep-nhd ditches (deep)
~~erra~issi~~eis ~crm~~~i~ee~~~o~~ ci~~r~~~~~~and each is Sas pr~of The new Eng1ish mobile armored division - According to the United
Services Review the new mobile division will be organizeda~ follows
yen~~t~a~~~~a~~~h~t~~~hit~l~~~Sregiments ~ach One artillery brigade Motorized infantry Motorized engineers Motorized signal uniis Motorized supply elements
This division will be assembled for the first time during 1938 and will undergo tests llt Salisbury Plain
Other reports indicate that eachmiddot of the five home divisions will be
~iftb~~~la~fe~~rt~l~i ~~~t~~~~os~n~ ~1ray~~i~~~f~iirtebh~~~~hi home from India
Four light tank regiments are to be provided in India Employment oC tanks in the defense - La France MiIitaire deals
with this question According to the discussion tanks in the defense are employed
g~ ~rc~~~il~atti~~nk defense f It is contended that the 25-mm antitank weapon is neither numerous
~di~~b~rsR~~Ise~~f~~seOe~6nO~~~n~~~~h~~~ ~~~ou~eo~ftr~et~k~ mobility a rapid assembly of these vehicles at a threatened area should provide a massed defense But such employment must be planned and prepared
Tanks are equiPP(Jd with cannon so that they cancombat tanks they are not made mobile in order to move to a fixed deCense position Tanks employed in the defense must employ their mobility in order to strike (with fire) hostile tanks a~ a disadva~tage
French views on antitank defense ~ Utilization of terrain and tank mines When the defender places himself behind natural obstacles ordinarily the enemy haq the better observation The preparation of obstacles against tanks ie trenches mines felled trees (abattis) requires much work and time On a 1000 yard front a tank mine field can be laM by 30 men in 8 hours but infantry and cavalry are not especially Vained tor this work It is questionable whether an adequate number of mmes can be prOVided and laid in the time available
Consequently the most effective weapon against tanks is the antitank gun The equipping of French units with greater numbers of 25-mm antitank weapons is to the Fr(nch mind a most salutary measure This weapon employed in conjunction with obstacles forms the backbone of the antitank defense It should not however be employed in a linear defense nor as indidividual guns such employment invites penetration at the weak areas and consequent envelopment
To avoid dispersion it We d~fense there should be retam~d a reserve of antitank weapons held In readmess ongood routes along WhICh they can advance for emploYment in accordance ~ith the hos~ie tank situa~ion Only thus are retained the necessary mobJllty and elastiCity of the antitank
defeI~order to counterbattery effectively the artillery supp-orting the tank attack the defenders artillery should be reinforced
dAr~Il~~r~(lfo~~~~~el~g~)ShoJ~ ~~~~~~i~0~~rtt~~h~~~~r~~6f various supe~avy mac~_~~ _____ L __
- Range I Rat~ lVeight Caliber Muzzle (MeterilY of WeiahtOf
Kind in Velocily--middot -I--- Ftr Gun oj MM (Meters) Hori- Vefti- pc (Kilo- Bullel
ontal cal Minfte grams) (Gram~)
~J ~ ~~ Vkk---- -127 914900middot 5000 3i~50 -280--~ Browning l27- -middot800 8200 2~OOO 550middot60 -165-5~ Brownin~--132-800 9000 2000 ----(---165--~ ---- ------~-- ----------Hotchki~ _ ~~_~~Il _3~01l1~~~ _5_0_ Scotti 132 _~Il~==_~~===_5_2_ I3rdn 140 )000 5000 4000 20 100 60
NOTE one ounce =283495 grams I one kilogram = approximately 22i pounds
77 I
I
M y 193B
-IIJii~TI 1 Ill) (1lt ~ I II IITlo - 01 O](I TlII shyTl(~ 111111 1 ) 1lIIJiHf J- JIlIH_II HEgt
I HI url-efltll- fl ~ dr fl ~lH uilr lIh rUllR u~rll-1 IH- lJLd r~ lldnl III frnd] JII Itl n 1
-rlollnllrI I) 1111 ITt ddr TiJl Ir Iq illlll f tbf Srutli
S~~~ Ir(~~tlr ~ 1~1 I I 1~ ~ (1 I IJl I 1 ll~ II 111~11 111L~ 1~ aJ~l~I~~~1I1t110l1 1 q elFl 1) f ~ I ( llt 1 f fullf 111111 FImiddoth plltmn 1middot1 f 1 r )rgtdlfI 11 iIlol 1 rTlllIlr In) Ii 111 nl i I) 1111 lid nIl
1 I 111fllf d]l r ~I dill t r 01 I rlft pllll) III 1I 1111 1111 full 1( Irrj Ii 111 l [ - 11111111shy
I ) ~llrJ r I I I lIf gtlll)I
11 (IIIlt If j- 1rlIlIlIIlr I
11 j d II Irq I I rIrll II III If 11
ii rill]gt 1]1 If I jII n
d I rmiddot I I I 1 frld
rdll n to Kf1 nljt tl rH c 10 I ]lW~ rllll~
I) 11 111 tin) iltlll 1 Jr Lrl)lj 1 f
~II r 111 HLJijolfl1
i It
i ~ rmiddot
I
r dh Irl I j
11111 1) j TI
bull Ij L P
I d 1 r r ll-
1 1 111 loi1 - r 11] I 1middot
d r Illto i I L nl
J 01 l 01 d ]1 1~1)l1 ) tfl ]i) d 1 r I f I~ f ill ~
Ilr l ~ 11 1 lOllfr)ldh l1dl1l1~llp1llf d 1IIdl
pltlllltJ1l ~d I (pid )1 I lOll
11111middot111 llIj 111~ Illlnn d dl 1shy I H d
I J It
1 d I )
r I]
1 d II
-r rpt1
l j bull Id 1middot11[
1 d 111 - 1 d
( 11 rd 11 nlj t 1middot
1 Jd
nmiddot I
1 I Ir ~ I] d d
) I I flllqf1 oj lt11 J
li 11
II]
I I ~
nfgt Ii I ltof)
jtrl 1 j 11 (1] r I) Ill 11) Irmiddot Ind IIIi I rI) I 1111 IlI ~ll dl
It 1 I 1lIlH Il r l II h tin 1-111 (
Ld 111+ lrll ljt11 d 11 III Irtll] r
t1 1) llJlt 111 I rll11 (11)1 Ill )jl 011
il] I I I I II n[ tJ 1 llr tqllIHl1t~ bullbull1 Blr-I I tlln~ 1)(1 i ml hllll -llll (1lT1111l I)ll
1) d llid niH ltnr~ ltttdlllll 11 III) 1l111lll IlJllllrrrlfl
j 1
f I~q l[ lIn rlIHmiddottlt~ 11h of lwlt)
) d
ii I 1
I)
1111 11ll 1l1IlTl d uHIl 1ll111nflld l llqr I lid lIItr 1I1dmll I Lud 11 I Ilj)IH I t upply Hld ltwlld
I dILl 1)1111 11lt a Ir flJllghl by I )r gtllll a I Ir IlHJIllnrlli()J) and
]ltmiddot11 I (nl111 (IJIlIIjll lhtI 1111 Ir I dIILl1lrJ Till fqdd dililti1l WI fllllrId I I iI1 t11)1 ltof fin Itr tLIl1~ IlIllh I tlllrilr
rt d ]1 J 1t)1I rl Jlllr ltUPIlrt 1111 It h d ~h 11J))Id 11111d rl(1ll11II~ II
1111 1111 1llIrl mnill 1IIIIIdl Ilt1I k Iud 111 adlUII1jy proliel
]111 a tapul (orp v11I (otjtllnl
I~Jd lId 1I)If 01 I J Tln f)gadl 111 It dv AI ordill)1 ltI~ ll~I (li (Ir I f
j
1 111 nlfrlllIllllI irp rI and I J H II til ITI Lr ~)l LI 1ltQllHltld 11 In rn lrtrlllrlt1
Tf (1011 It ( 11 r I 1 d Illd t1l1 111111 II 111111 1r I) fllllr II dr I 11 rd III [111111 1)( fnllr 1UHlfOll Hltl a
m( 1111 -~H it) Till (rtnIJrl rl rr (fllllti~ aller- ~Ipwrlfon I a 1111 111 f 1111 101
jj I lnll dl PJ)) I 11ljU 1gt11 d 1 r )lllltilt1nC IJallalt()I Inri lrlddlltllItl IllllllllL 1111 lit bur r fl iI()lI
1 Iliflllnl d 111] Il I 0I11 d Lrl)ld ~t] II f Jr~anizd 11110 a talll Iri dl
c amp GSS QuCrt~
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
Jun~ 1938
STltImiddotAjLIlJ J (l11 rLI- Lifutfllmt Tuhnun WILL Till Hllm (()I1il1l TIL 10 Till AmI Lipul (ojuIll (jpI all
IVIILlTARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE MITTEILUNGEN IAll tna
H tlAloi Imiddot 1 IBmiddotgtIJ (01-1 rldllr~ Corp
Janunry 1938
Till Vll IN 11ft Ff ]--1 II) r K 1111 I IIt 111 II1It 1 (llIrd If iljllf
A fllltllllJJiIOIl of I pfl lOll nllll nil t I --11gt JpllU Ir AI trlllll) 10 t Ill lIlt III If 11 I II I L) 11 SI1II1)II11 tlrl~ in OHIT
1~)l7 tli ItIOtjr alt liJwd tlIht of thpl ]JI(tlt III gtorth Cillna 1111 fI-1 Ilr III aftlI 1gt dlvlltd II II fl]lIrtIIIIgt 1Il JIopPI prol
llld IIH III (llPllilJll ()f Tl1lllll
10) 1111111 Nil liU I iln J(I 11 phfPOltli(h I I r~( ht] r 1aJjr CPIIIrd Ialt(lw]
A fIII (f Ih ~Ilrlcl ltIffdr lllflllj tIll ltp(fJld hllf Ilf jir-
F~bruary 1938
Al I(tlnn- J I-I I-A IILD Hllrln ~I f)oi IFtlllfHIlCII1l11l1 rt1lrlt KrJI~~()1l11 I Fwld lt1lrlthd lOrI
IJrfwr
Tlu I)II Militlf Sl hll)l (11(ILdl lt11 (Ii~htfifth 1TInJvpr~ar I NovlmLtr J117 TII~ trlIl1lll lt()1 fr till l~uartfmllttrr Cfnm SIlff (If th fmlPrtt1 Arrn ~l 111middot111 ll11 It Ill lIr(lk If tIll Wr Var 11 rae- rIPIII d III 1n I
iorIJUIff) 11 LtI( lr()tOrtinl1ll~ lind 1111 rtrrpl I (llgttlin un Bin7lr
~
gas 1 sligh
born ~tPP nore
light
1 The fare e
~A (lii
mal
1n(H 11011
~8~~ beu
I
WfltI~lp~ )]~ )~ j~lnl~i il1 ~I(rI ~ ~1ljr~~ ~ In11) i~~l~llt f~t~~~~Vi~-l~I~~~I~~~ foj ~~elt
1111 dvpjopnllll f 1111 mHhlllf gl111 pnnjdri thf drfpl1lt( WJth I Jdli WPljJOll With whlh tltl olllkrl)IIII1(I HlvanlaRfC of tjw off(gtnsr T]H (tlllt of ffnnt Hul tl1( l1utnl)lf of llf1 pngaged mad nlltllank~ ~
~~~(~In~~~t~)~I~~)~~~lit II ~~ I1~ifI~~ ~ll)i~ ~~lJli~r1 1tll1 t~17~~f ~~i -I l dlrin) IIH olflIIIVI lIul frf~h n ~fnl hrlq~hl liP 1 tlip dpfpns(l (Pl1lm tJand hll11 up I hI at tar k 11111 111111 Ill tulk t hi 1 pOll Im (lf oilly off (ilsm~ I rlartll lt01IlL11)1l Ill If h)wlri tit11 ( n fnl m atl II] ylll r I hngl
trahzld In l)lrW furm of l(f1( In 1111 llIt hllr Op1l1Jnll ~talllll1(d warl at nl I a thll)~ Ilf Ihl Pt bull11111 tlw nft If thlnl In mnlnTlZatlOI1 Will [ rar 01 mllIlll(f
IOl[11l 1 -lt1 IlUTlt) HIIL jithrpohl iIJmiddot I Ir-II hI] I J LljOf (llgtft Pllhpk
Ill authof fPIPlt llit fulloltlg orld lfLlIf~ to itllluol 111 Jar inl
1) J11f Igllf If lIlon- I~ Allialllt if l~lIr()]lldll In1 r~ Ilt 111( Sino-faplllPltf Ir Ii) TIH nritlh En1jJrf 15J The Brll~tllt (lllIftrPIHI
fl Irldp allli nmnwr 71 Hplrmllnlnl
litlwrt1la clwk hllwI Ihl (rl11 BriLon 1 lllf 1111 nlnr(gttr gtitUttloll 110t 111 111 Ihl d( If --ijldoll ltIt durin) tilt Tllrhl
Till tnll~th of Ih lim 1lI~ lilt ur fnfl nf all mIJnt 110 llOwn In tahullfd form
Till (111 H 1 -IAI 11)[r HUfglrluli III SpanjPII I GtllPrd WwmgPf
TId lrtlll( i Ihf fifth inLllnwnl (If tlH mthnf JlOllllt of th( Sp (lv1l lr dptrihinl thl IlhHq~IHt n1r1lnll HI AtulJagt
In il~ uf Iott11 1 11 It tb aUlhr (lIl1tIltIl11gt III tpganl tu thrrt( of tllP ((lIrlHl1lnl olunltrnJrllh1t at Tptud 111 J)pcpmhlf arl frronlshy
March 1938
Alit HAII- SII 11lLln II LII~ ILuflm~rlff lind ihn- irlmnIlI I (nltlllll -)1hlul
Tlltrl If(gt II pr u I hIt 1 11 of Iml1) III 1 hi1h III ml d t rtwtl Ill ) IT I follo
(11 1I11~h (110-11 t wll Ii 1ltlntI(1 or iIlly-lllinn fUfgtl I~ I In(Illfhlrv lJ (a
In Ihl Ilaln-Ah-lIILUl r tlllrt 1- I fcaffity of targelgt ~plllih (jvil War FrItwo hflJI) a HpltlIlIlrd ha trill to ~a( thr ~ huildmgl of Madrid mil lur thi fI~on tlll- eity ha-1 ~uff(r(d (nmp fllight damag(-1 only Flr norf ltrionlt dlmlg(4 and many more ( must he (xpPltcd ill futun Wanl
mrr
Russ
and
78
i
i
ftXllriJ-O70 ~ bull Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
Both in China and Spain only high expo~iyeomh5 have heen ~5ed MILITAR-WdcHENBLATT (Germany)~~~~~~~ri~~~~~~t~h~iru~~~ ~a~116d~~~~Ji~~e~ ~~~~~e~h~aratJveJY By MAJOR EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
bom~it~~ltg~t~t~fr~~~~heI~~~e~~~~~n~Fni~iJ)J~o~~rhp~~f~~~ ~eps are taken~ It is very important to anticipafe events and take the
lecessary precautions ahead of time
1 -li
ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND THEIR E1I1ILOYlllENT LFlitgtgerthwchr-Waffen und Ihre Vervendung I l1-a]or KrzIHn_k
There arc four kinds of antiaircraft welljJons ~uns heav) machine gun ~ tight ma~l~jnc guml and searchlight
I 1 lntlUlrcraft guns may be classified 3lt follows
Light guns (up to- SO-mm cali her I Medium guns (up to IOO-mm caliber)
Heavy guns (over lOO-mm caliber)
eerr~m7~~i~~f ~~h~ni~~Jails whi1P til(gt light and m(gtdium tYJlP Heavy machine guns are oriinarily of from 25-mm to 40-mm calihtr
Adirect hit by the 37-mm or the 40-mm (an hrin~ down In airplan(J hilt malier llhells e~U1not be riepended upon to rio ~o I Light machine gum - caliiJ(nl from 125-mm to 20-mm are parshyiitkularly useful against low-flying aircraft ] middot1 ~1
EXPEpoundUENCES IN II1~ RAID PROTECTIONI lLuftschutzerfahrungen LifuLColonfi Trimm rery little is known today from practical experience of the efTed of
incendiary bombs and shells because the experienc( of the civil populashytion during the World War as regards air warfare was very limited The Gennans used incendiary bomhs against Rheims but the fires causpoundd hy ilem were (asHy extinguished The efTict of the inc(ndiary shell that will
be used in the future is yet to he determined - On the other hand much is known about poisonous gases and with
timel preparation and training effective protection against gas attacks can be obtained
CUIOUFLAGE ANn BLACKOUTS lTarnung - middot(rdunkflungj LicutColonel Schurgi
atural camoullage mEthods consist of planting trees to make roadR and buildings less conspicuous to air ohsprvers Artificial means consist in uing nets find shadow outlinegt Roads and roofs should b( of a dark color bright tints should hI uvoidpd Complete blackouts is lhe best prot((tion
at night
PnICAUTIONS AGApoundNST GAS ATTACJ~ iBrandchutz im LuftschutzJ Major Gcnpral Zar
1 Gas attacks may he (gtffectPd eithtgtr by mfans of bomhs or by Rpmy from ~airplane5 Atcfrding to tIl( author a gas attack will comp aft(r an air ~rald ~rhigh Ixploltj( bomb in ordlr to prevcnt or interfere with the salrage ~tork
) PHYSIOIOGJCAI l-nmiddotJ-CT 01- GASISmiddot Gift- und Gaslmmpfstoffc und ihn phYfliologil-cl( WirkungJ Liput
Colonel Mader A description of the effects of variaugt gases on the human system
~
~ IJ ~ Gasschutz cler Zivilbevolkerung im AuslandeJ Major Hirsch Most countries in Europe are taking precautionary meaflures against lair raids and have adopted gas masks for the protection of the population
Suttable types are the Swiss C mask the German VM 37 and the GT 6 as ~ell asthe Italian and Czech types
ANTI-Am Rlw nUILDING CONSTltUcTION UhfT Imutechnischen LuflflchutzJ Colonel Bodenstein
Roofs should he conHtructed of reinforced concrete or of a non-inflamshymaterial as a precaution against incendiary hombs Steel frame
are suitable types Well-huilt shpliern for the population are ecessary
AIR RAID smITEitS Der Schutzraumj Major General Palla
Air raid shelters should ofTer protection against high explosives gas nd incendiary shells
Shelters Rhould he huilt in hasements completely underground if posshyible and should not accommodate more than 50 persons l~ach pCfllOn hould have an air space or from 105 to 140 cuhic feet and a floor space or bout 7 square feet The author offers suggestions for design of a shelter nd (or its ventilatJon
1 April 1935
TilotWIlTS ON TilE DUitATION OF l-llTUitE WARS G(dallken fllwr die Dauer von Zukunftskriegen Major Mende
CCWlEltATION lIlTWI)BN INPANTltY ANO ARTILIERY l7wmmmlllwirkell von Infmt(trie und Artillerie1 LieutColonel
Lancell(gt fhi importHlt qu(sdon will always hegt the subject of discus1ion because
cOOpNatlOrl hetween the two arm neVN attained perfection during the World War
The artillery officer mut visualize the situation of the infantry officer Th( main difference hetWfen infantry and artillery is that in the infantry pwh man fireR 11 WfapOIl while in the artillery only one man directs the fire
- the hatllry eummander --- who in turn is Hubordinated to the hattalion commander All nUwr mcn perform suhordinate duties
Artillery should not ()(l subordinated to the infantry but both shouJd work in dmlC cOI)l8ration
The infantry regimental commander indicates to the artillery battalion commandN the assist~m(( required by the infantry leaving the artillerycommander freedom of execution
Th( maill value of an artillery battltlJion lies in the fact that the fire or all )atteries can be concentrated where the inIantry regimental commander de~If(s it most The performance of the artlllery mission - above aUt the Huddn concentration of all hlltteries on a particular sector - requires the pnergetic ~tIJfrvjsion of the battalion commander The effectiveness of artillery fire IS of such great importance that it justifies the granting of ibdeshypendent action to the artillery hattalion No special missions should be ugtsigned to hattmiel
Am ATTACKS ON GIWl1ND TROOPS jFliegerangriIT auf Truppen und seine AbwchrJ LieuLColonel
Greiner The author divides this subject into three parts (l) Attack on troops while entraining _ The object of this attack
may be the destruction of railway ihstalJatons so thllt they may not be tvailahle for loading troops Such an attack will also disrupt train schedshyules The troops must organize a system of aerial surveillance hut fire Iwuld only be opened when ordered by officers
(2) Attack] against troop trains in movement ~ While travelling in open cars evpr~ availahle machine gun should be in r(adineslI to repel the air attack
(3) Attacks against troops ~It the moment of detraining - The same precautions must he talt(ll as when entraining troops It must be rememshy
~~f~ ll~~~~~ trll~~t ~lt~k~Cpl~~e~I~~el~~ ~h~rroJ~dI~~t ~rgehiy~~~~= ahle that troops dpoundtrain at night but even so antiaireraft defense is impreshy~(indihh
rlll~ CYCLIST SQUADRON IN TilE RECONNAISSANCE 1NIT IDie Radfahrerschwadron in der AulkliirungsabteiJung1
The author compares the efficiency hetween the cyclist squadron and the cavalry platoon which form all organic part of the division recormaisshysance seetlOn
According to German Field Service Regulations and to German leading military thought the cyclist squadron has three missions to perform
(1) Security missions (2) Combat missions (3) Messenger service
Hegulations prescribe that cyclists may be attached to mounted recon~ naissance platoons
According to the author cyclists can travel from 25 to 30 miles per day while l mounted Jllato~n requires 10 hours to cover the same distance and at the end of the journey the cyclists are fresher than the horsemen While it is true that cyclists cannot be employed where roads are not availshyable yet enemy movements in such sections can hardly be expected
Does the cyelLl1 offer a better target than the cavalryman Neither (an obserVe woll while in movement However in a sudden encounger the
cyclist wiU have the advmtage Even at a few yards distance the cyclist cun throw himself 011 the ground take eover and commence firing The cavalryman always offers a target whether or )lot he gets off his horse or zigzags at a gallop In an encounter between a cyclist and a hOOScman the mounted man is lost
The cyclist also posseSses advantagC$ in reconnnicsance and surveillance as he can stop anywhere lay his bicyclpoundt on the ground and Qhservc At night he cln move faster thail the mounted trooper ilnd wjthout lights or nohw
THEN) OF THOUGHT ON INFANTRY qUESTIONS IN THt UNITED STATES
Jnrallleristill(~he Fragcn in ~meriknnischer Beleuchtung
79
Cdtaloof Selelted Periodic~l Articles
THE SP~IltHI WAll THE nECITlnu Of TEllUEI Tm lrmo R1VlR DIlIl
Iom spanid) n K rh~ Di icdrgtrPfoherung on Tfrue D(gtr Durrhhruch cudhch d(s Ehro J Coonfl v Xylander
An aecount of the Iwurgrnt opprations that led to thegt r(cptuffgt of TpTUP] and trw hr~~lIInlllK of thp ririVl to till q L tn ltHhuif tll( captuf of Ca1pp on If obrch 1 il
8 April 1938
TIIEgtt Hltl--r WAf I~ 1915 11)(( lil1t~lm( K d(~ ram~ Ilflj dmlrll Rlchmann
(rtnl~IJ IJH(IZATlOi r)F THE Am fOlHt lIton(TlO1- of JHshyIIln1 (IWI~ Tf) HlJS~IN 11-
II )1 lld flltJrlulllttOI dr LuftwlIT( J)fr Schut7 (hr lltl~~hlr II
rLI II ltInf nltl rUc TIlflJriPIl 1 Cnnnf agli
~tltrl ~h J~d Im rIll lilt tirrraft (llfl -uJllci(middotntly ahpld nf tim II Ioid Ihrl fUI) Tin dld m(1I1IlP-~lln bull dl()11 lllld (IIldlilll
Ijmiddot d flllP 111111
(anl()ufLw r1] t t(middot bull tltlily 1((1 dummy roId IlIIH ImJltd I pTftdllli hIT qr - llld Ihd plrtl(ltllr (ttrntlon lthlIzld 1( f11 n III I IfIl(HlLIIIIIf t j1 bullbull 1 I d PI ld Ial t hi l11nol ho I hi 101 II Inn of Ih 11nlrt All I IIgt IT lIlllllr rlft PIltIOI1 (1111 111111r ddltlI( mE Illlt
Vl11 ]1 1middot(01 ~ 11 I d d I hUTlIll llrJ rl ~dl 1 I-TO Jill d LI If (iI 11H I from Il( I Ttll 1111 t
Hill til1lr il-tdlltlll Lf)llI] I 1Il( ILllrd HIgtlp to I IHmv 1llt(lt-gt 111 orriN to atlr1(t Ittntlfln InrI dr(ph thrm
1111 Ptli(H I III m altw) C1Il I mlnlmlZerl ] fn idilll~ nul til( InmiddotlIIllI0I 111 infO (dtnlaquollflq d 111111 1)lhlr h1l1fll or In ~rOUH at thp middottnmltip of t1 filII 1th I dhIlUP of frolll IOO tn nn vardl IHtlll 1 h 1l1IInlj lHi mlllljOlll- ~f 1 ltholdd Ill Ld n to hIYP mplll1lt at hmr II) Tijlnr Itlllut dr Ll (ratfr-middot (111 f d IJ Plllll bomh
flJ1 r11middot of pltl1)ll I Xl-I cnne rIllnf und rr(lIlHI hI1Wlr Ihp rTf nciI 1lHl1 t h fll
15 April 1938
1111 1- TI I I 1lt1 ( L lt] H II I lltCl1 TIll IT1 iA J()I---T Of lEW It r Ill] n~) ~ lchrl(hUlldlpll I a(11 ltahcnlsclfn Amjebshy
t n
It 1 I 1 1 1111 lllfnrlllllllll lol11Inllllf~ olhrr nat 1011 l1l order lrpn m tJnll of ar Tlw mJJl uhj((tlt to ht (ollltj(lt rpd trl
( nm( Illd nlhLlr nutt(gtTgt Thll mfllrmatinl1 Will n1lk( It h 11] du TLIIll rlllllllqltlll~ that will ddill( thp attitudr that r1 III) II]H) ~I1J II Ilnri r 1( rIal elr(t1mftann
Tfw IH f Illll 1d Ill Int Ihhn)C lrVII hnuld POo-(4 -Ultah11 rlquirl shytt Ill Illlt I Jnli l tlll j 1I(h In tlnl(lt lbl1tt- tn ob1[ nWlltd
tI n~I1 1nd l hlghl- dllopld gt11)(gt of patriotl~m I~l lI1 1 Il( lllI)- nltaillfd llY 01(111 of Uhmlrlll1 Ilr1 shy
n r- f l1JfP71l111l
MILITARY ENGINEER
July-August 1938
llll1II n iT r- (ff~ RIJJt Lllutfnant Thomplton Till lilIH(TfO1I Till BIUTH 11(1 ~faj)r I1fllold Bnti~h
MILITARY SURGEON
April 1938
Til 11t1TIJ 11 1 TIlTL~ Or TilL -lEIJlCAL DEiAltnIEr-T 01 TH) Jt- TilL 1II)hT 1 I Or II Ill IN] IN NATIONAL lhl EN-E ~laJ(jr (lt III rd HI~ nold
TI IrA L 1u)f1 H ~I(f I III HI-I Till CIIAWN 11lt EnIIUII 1 IJIr 1IlJlrltl Fr( tlltl rm-
May 1938
Tm fI(I-IZTp ~j) rrgtTd)l-ltlt III nn MIIHfAL SrR(IS IN ltlI1111 (JjJnT11)~ II 11 ~ltII ~jA tlJlU E II) (aJlloIin gtLtlIl (1)(1 11 II C 1111 IIIlHI
June 1938
TlIL nfl(lIAT11) 11 f I r TI1INfgt IIf TilE ~lEnJ(AL SIln Wi ~ IN ~lmiddotI ltJImiddotUTI- f Nh 1~1) ltJ II n)HIu III Capllull faun lind L ll ()I HIII IJ
July 1938
C oltlHIHIIIIiIN OJ fW IIHLtI VIIIl ro j1I AiJYANl II tf ()j 11J)shy
f IL fh VhlelIrJl Jn1 ELlY JJ17) MIJor Frifll Illgt ]fAI IlLHAPY IS Till NLT WAlt (aptam Lowman
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
June 1938
TllI JJTlIWISI I)In 001 IN TIIi OlmNT Captalll Knox 1111 TIItI J flU J JllT OF TItHlTOIlTAI WArEItlt LiltlfCommandlr
ffIllgtl rt TilL JJoT 11NDIHLfl ~A)i 1-lt IlihTOIlY Smith
C amp G88 Quarterlj ~ - -~
July 1938 Li(
JAPANS IUSING SUN LiCut(gtnant Eller ~ TIllS NAVAL nAn LjCutCommander Hamilton ~ Im REBEL HAMS Pratt ~bullbull
August 1938
llWNI TSAO LipuLCommandlr JlOVC1l l Lei lIlt~~SSllN 11AItNtl AT SIIANlIiAI IN Ifl12 Li(gtIHCommttJ(]Cr Smt~
PIONIERE (GNmIIlY)
By M AJOH Ilt~f BENITEZ Coaft Arti1lCry Corp
February 1938
LNIJ IOHTlFJeATIONs 1(pfiltllwn zur lltuzlitlichell LandeslwfCstigungj Colonel Dittrr i
BI1f(lufJOn tll fxpNipncf gainCtl in tJ1C Vorld Var tIl( French ha~ ~ dlvllo]Hd 11)(gt ltm-ealllri fort ifwd rtl~iolJl Inginn fortifi[c1) rhmiddotfpn rmiddot By~t~ j
m whieh (OIWrttl and It(11 Irl tXIIIllIVfly lld lEalh ngion fortifi( IUll t fulfill the following conditions bull (1) Thl (XlllIt o[ the front multt loe such that all attachr cam i
ollll1anlgt tlH pfl~itiun nor can tlw (Twm 0 lrtlllfry prpvfnt moV(menta 1j brr IroOPH Within the furlln] 20111 in~ hold~~) Slrong lIank fith(T Tf1ting on tprram ffttufP or artllicial IItroq t~h~
(1) EeflIent eommunlation netwurk tnsurinr~ rapId movpmfntHwit1 i wil Ihf ZO)lf and al o rapid eommunieatlOn to the r(ar ~
(4) Illpound front mtlt he fldly protect(d and 1rIngtlJ(gtllrri by lililf-rnnlul j lP
or artlfiial oh1I1(Jlaquo1 lme (5) Comfort mU1t hp provided fur the garnon hy tllp on-trllctlOnc
living quartlrH and otlHr eOIlVfn1IIl(Pl Thi 111 altUf r(flt during (I j nat fi(htinl 1Ild at nll plTio(k j tle~
In formlf tinHfI fortnhW1 W(f( hflrI w a mafr If hOJ]or and~1
l~~j f ~ Ii ~~I~ifl M Tfllf~~ i~f~ 1~r~~I~~~(~~ ~ailr~ ~li~ t Ih~I ~~)t I~I~I~~tt ~ the ~pe tlip almntlonmPllt of H(gtiml and LJ ltlfl hy Juffre hdnfl tlp fint Jat t of tIl( MapH and th( ahandonmlnt h IIlIIdenJurg tnd LupoundilldorfT oft I
forI r~ii~I~)(IIIt~~hII(r~~ ~I]If~ I(YI~ ~~llfIW( fnrtlfieat ion ~Yfgttrm ~ ti II prrnt (rv IJ()lI Hul tll land forlllieIIIOil (If t)(la~ pnoopss rna ~Co arivantagflt ltlVlr thop of fnrnwr timl I Th
it(O
-- Im TlLININ(f OF JMINI~IR LJPElt- tP ~II- -i ~~ lS(hultl1~g 011 PllgtTi~rr(lhnrIl IlBd Trupp] LIIut CIOllPI Dlrmiddot -1m
lt~ (0101111 Oll i(hlPwell pre
ln~IIl((f8 III In lfhllllaquo( through dolt( (ountr An lCount Of 4~middot t( t 1lt l IM n N-l ~lrrtl d out hy tlip 2d lngtn lr BIIIlllOn in tJw reg- f r northll~t of Bn IllLll
Attllk of r1 ef IIllf A Imllar a((ount of 1 I 1ctlCJl pX(gtrcISl It vh
ul by t1~lnl~III~~~~ II~~I~I~~~~dglng ltllltpmPlt ti~ I(rgln von Fluzkiwln 1Il dC1l RIlC11l1 CapllIn Schroder en
dccrlptioll Illustrated hy photographs of til( work (arrl(d OU1dJO till 3d Motorized ComplIlY of the 5th Fngill(pr Battalion laying rlwrmiddot ()vCr til( Rhil)l )t COllftallC(gt
Thl work Wt~ dOll I h- congttrucHlg a ponton imdge laYlllg the c~ Jilt on til hridg( d((k lilt ltlJOtt~ thlm ~ra(hlllly by pa ing tbC1ll 01 drllm whIlt dirnLlltlJIIg til( hrll~( II gt((tiOIl from south to north
Nl -mTlIo[)S Imiddotnlt tlto~~lli( HIJltS It OTnRIZEIl tNIT~ INIIJ( VIg(gt 1111ll Fluzuhprglllg dtr mntori iprf1l Einilfltf1l1
Mtjor l1lrlullg
A (ontinuatlOn of m articlf publihpl in Novfmlwr lHHI ful TIlt authnr~ idp i~ to COllfltrud a bridgf COTliltillg of two strelbull - shy
(dJI l on which motor vphiC(s could ridp if I)TO idpd with a l1)cial rlrr~ J aHachld til (hI ()utllHh of Iadl whfPl ~
III tld1 iU1Llinlllll Major JIartllllg prop(l~elt tll( Up of two amphih j lanl each of vhich Inn~ a drum around whih cahlf jlt wound i JjtlrumR ITl rotIIt-1i II) 1111 tank lll~ilH H]11 tlw ahl m he paid oul orwo ~ _ 1IJ1 mechal1ldly Ill( tlIlkl talpound up thpir Il(Jltllioll on OPJlo-it( iri(s (lft II rir with tilt twn (dllj drftdwrillltt frnlll onl 10 th tillr 11)[ aTl ((urld to IiIi grouud hy Illltnl of 1111 pil14 drivlll thrllul~h nJWnl~l Fr In till loor and tllPY arl fllrlhpf IlPPllrltd hy I nIh 1
ThiH irpa hWI nol 11 IHPII 11111 111 IfllIic lInti lOIlW tl1ldlfiratl i(( lIlay hI 1(lIImry In 11Illlr middotllfHllIry nlull ~~_
~GT QUARTERMASTER REVIEW Fa
May-June 1938 JTh THE HOLE OJmiddot 11ll- NI~TllEnLANJ)fi IN THl- IOTtLpound) OF TonAY Dr a_
Akpoundon ~ PLANNIN(f BRANCH COr-~TRu(nON DiISION OFFIn~ O~ Tim Qp ~
TEIlMANSTEIt GENEHAL Captain Lamh
80
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
A comIERCIAL VIEWPOINT ON THE ARMYS rIOTORIZATION 11WGRMl LieutColonel Rockwell _ ~
MASS PROCURE~lENT OF SUPPLIES FOlt WAH fohn Mille
JUly-August 1938
Am-FEP ARMIES OF TOMORROW THE SUPPLY OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION IN DEFI~NSE Lieut Colonel
Lederer RAsstGNA 01 CULTURA MILITARE (tly
(Formerly Rivistn di Artiglierl e Genio) By MAJO~ EM BENITEZ Coast Artillery Corps
January 1938 (Commencing with this i5ltue ttle iRivista eli Vanteria and the Rivistu di Artiglieria e Genio have been combined and wi apppar as one publication However the parts dealing with artillery engineer and infantry Hubj(cb arc Iwpt separate from the genffal mattff ~It(~ tion)
WMt AND ll-CtJ [La gucrrc c In pacej General Corsclli
For over more than 3400 years beginning with 149b BC to til( Dulshyhreak of the World War in 1914 many att(gtmpts have h((( made to srttll intemationltlJ affairs hy conciliation and mediation Ill( uague of Nltiolls and the Kellogg lact among others hwe resulted in failuTs HistoTY hov3 that war is inevitahle and human palt~ionl and natIOnal interpsts ~11 predominate over all the methods created to prpwnt war
War says ~lusso1ini is a piH(I01ll(IIJl whirh u(ompanit- thlgt deelopment of mankind 1t is a tragic destiny that will always wpigh uponmens shoulders Pacifism Oil til other hand is not a husing tmiddotitlwr shy
War is a social tonic which stimulates the enerpy of a rale and the national virtues it destroys all political social psvchical and moral impurishyties that accumulale in times o[ peaee
Modern war is totalitarian in characttr and rfquiregt tht pr(paratlon of the entire nation for wur
A BmDS~tn VIEW OF THIlt YEH 1937 IIanno 1937-XV in una rassppna panoramica]
A summary of the chid evcntgt of thp )last year in Itldy ano ahroad Considerable progr(lss has h(gt(gt1l made ll(ordin~ to tlw author in Italy The budgfmiddott ha~ hpPtl halatllp( and the army navy and air forer haY(I h((n reorganized
In regllrd to the army thl XX Corps was crpated and ~pnt to Lyhia oganWd to suit the ~pe(ial conditions thfrp ImproenHnt havp I)(cn made in the organization of the Cast division the motorized diyi-ion til moto-mechanized brigadp and til(gt cltalr-- rfginHllts Th( army hal )((Il
provided vith tilt r(relltly adopttd machine gun antiaircraft gUll ~O-mm -ii-mm antitank gun 81-mm mortar for the infantry ali(I the 75118 hatterils
for the division artilterr and for the artillery of til fast-division t The ar of quick decision h not an empty phrasC hut a dodrill( ~ hich depends upon a qui(k and dettTlllinCd preparation
~the 1t~~~i~a-~~~o ~cl ~l~~O~it~~i~~lte~h~Shi~l~~l~~lS j~l~~dcl~~fdthe c-uipoundErs Cavour Cesare Doria and Duilio The Italilll NlY when tll
present program is eompleted will hay a total of H20OOO tons (()nsi~ting of the [ollowing ships 6 battleships 7 heavy efuis(rs (10000 tOil 1lt1 light cruisers 10000-8000 tOil) 15 destroycrs 44 torpNlo chasfls 3lj torpt-do
boat5 98 luhmarines and auxilia~~~~~il~
1 Tile Nl~W TItJNIKG RFGUlATIONS l Illnuovo regolanHlnto di isttuziollPj ~ These regulations supersede ~~_~)Ii~hed in J9HJ
ij TilE I~~~E~~ ~t~ ~~~~~middot~~~I~~~~~~T AND Tim CHARACTEHshy
A (Lattuale eorsa agli armamentie Ie c~rat~erigLicllf delli flolt del ~ futuro Consul-General GmocclJ)cth A review of the comparative strength of the six principalllJ val p()vcrt asI follows _ _ _
i -- i I
Balle- I IDclfrOl1- SIIJ- I A ircrnft 1 1 hip (middotndlcr cr i 1IrtrilICH ((l(rhm 1oM1____ __ bull__ I_~__t ____I~__ 1--1---[ 1011WgC
_i~~--~--I~--~--i~--___ ~ _Imiddot I ~_ 2 1~_ i ~ i~~ ~ il~)(j I __~~ _ 610000
France 6 4 20 tmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot[ 851 I 8 ill 715000
G-T613 -~ 9r7lfiiiTI36 1--2 13ampLOOO
~ nrita~I~~ 2 111 ~ I~~II~~I- ~~ ~I~~lll ~1~-i71O271135~81r~~- 34 ~f--~~1600
middotObsolescent tModern under construction or projected
-
Accordingmiddot to the author navies Of the future will not differ fundashymentllly from those oC th~ last half century Battleshipswill continue tn form the backbone Qf the fleet there will be a large number of armored cruisers and destroyers and even a larger number of submaTines and a few aircraft carriers
TilE SINo-JAPANESE W An La gtH~rra cino~giapponesc1 (I) ColonelOxilia
The hiltory of the present war may be traced bllckto 1894 when the ~apanesl seized Korea In 1900 the powers sent OJ strong contingent to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion
Russia had its revolution in 1917 China had hers in 19U Japan johHd the Allies during Worl4 War cl1)tured Kino-Chiau
and obtained mandalpound ov c islands by the Treaty of Versailles IntlfIlal difwrders in opportunity for Communist peneshy
tratioll trom Hus~il In ai-Shek came to power and had to maneUvr between RUBsian pressure on one sid amiddotnd Japanese expansion on the other The prCSelt struggle is very similar to the situation in Spain
- a fight b(tweell th~sp two influences JapItl rommercial expansion requires a market for her goocia She is
~tricUy an agricultural country U1d lacks coal and iron mine oil and cotton whit-h arc (ssential to her industrie China offers Japan a solution to her Irohlms
TII~ SlNISII WAH lLa guerra di Spagna1 il) Captain Mele
fll( revoll hcgan in Morocco on 18 July 1936 The greater part of the army went over to the Insurgents while the navy with the exception of (JIll haltlfship tnd four cruiflcrs remained IOYlll to tllf government
ily 1 August the Insurgents had gainpu control of a large portion or Spain Tolosa fell in August lrun in September to be followed by San Sfb1stian 1m Toledo rhe Iiege of Madrid hfgtgan in October where desshyperate filhting continncd well into January On R February Malaga wa (allllred
J)ISTRlllVTlUN OF IIIE [middotN(JEEltS OF TIII~ ALPINE Dl]SION IN A )IOB1LJo~ WAR
II reparti del genio della divisi6ne alpina nella guerra di movishymentoJ (010n(1 CUJlJnis-ini
The Alpim Divisioll c()n~ists of two Alpipe regiments one artillery reginHnt om engineer COmT)(UlY and service LroQjIgtI TIl(gt engilleer company con~istgtl of five platoon4 with about ~OU ~peeialiHts ltlnd 150 drivers Their IfJuijJment consiltts of a light mountain hridge 30 kilometers of win 3 parchlilhts and 1~ rttdio slations In the Alpine Division the engineers eonstitutp only ppr cent of the whole strength a5 compared with 6 per C(nt in 1m ordinllry infantry division The author shows that the engineer stnngth is illsllflieient antI sUJgests an organization consisting of two engineer (ompanies specially trained Cor mining work a signal company providf(1 with tp1pgraph wire and radio crjllipment and a searchlight section of six scarehlight Ilw intirf engineer foree to 1)( commanded hyan engineer oiliecr
February 1938
A loHTLtUl~ECllON1CLE OF THE E-IHTION OF DON CHRISTOshyllllm Di-~ GAMA INmiddotABYSSUIA
I Vna cronaca Jlortoghese sulla spedlzione di don Cristofaro de Gama in Abilsinial 1) Prof Naldoni-Centenari
1he Portuguese expedition under Don Christopher de Gama consisting of 400 ~oldiers well trained and equipped with Over 600 rifles sailed on 9 fune 1541 Da Gamas hrotherwas Goernorof the Portuguese East Indies This Purtuguese force was sent to help tJlP Negus of Ahyssinia lgainst the King of 7(gtila
Im SINO-JAlANESpound WR ILa guerra cino-giappones(1 (U) Colonel OxiJia
In this instalment Colont Oxilia gives a brief description of China and then analyzes the strength of the armed forces of the two nations at the beginning of the war
The cause of the Mnflict may he attrihuted to the strong anti-Japanese feeling after the cstablishment of Manchukuo in 1931 which led to many local quarrels between Chinose and Japanese troops
The author believes that the origmal Japanese plan was to cut off all lontact hetween Russia and China cross the interior of Mongolia and the occupation of the live provinces in North China Hopei Chahal Sulyan Shansi llid Shantung At present it is hlrd to determine the Japunese plan
The Chinese plan is even more difficult to follow At first it -appeared that tilt Chil(se favored the operations at Shanghai in order to splitmiddot up the Japancie forces but these operations assumed far greater importance thall wa anticipatcd
ROADS AND rIOTOHS [Stmde c mutori mcntalitit dplla motoritltzione[ LieutColonel
DlmtC di Marco 1h( imjl(lftnnce oC roadH hus become very evident in the last few years
Committed liS WP are to a wal of short duration it becomes npCessary to have adequate roads to deriVe the benefits of speed offered by motor moveshyments
81
1101
Ca~al()i~f Selected Periodical Articles
111 rll ~ll1 L 10(1 1dl Hl--L I It (1lt1111 J 1( dLmiddot ll 1) 11 II
ld-ll)l ~ --1gt1111 t ill HIIII) If thmiddot Jill f th 11)11 f ~atlull TIll ) II u dl~ lL tLI lItJuj of till r II] 1 _ tuvlrdshythl Jnll-h lril1l1lhlrt1Jn ld dlUltlfl lj ~dnr 1( 11
Plrltlld nJ)l~ HI tl)11 nlI]
d 1111 ~nl H Ill ILl ~lrrl I ] 1)1t
I r II
tlldtlh r
11) 11l 11111gt11 1~ I
[ HI I I 11 I
~ I dmiddot d) )j l) f r bull
h 1111 111 J Imiddot [r1 d IlL )1 I r I II
) fl II I rl l f r gtI )01 t Ilrpl
ill I( 1)ljl I 11J
Ll II ~ r)i 1 bull I 1 11 I
~1 middotI)roIll Ir 1
1111111 II)
d )1 (1111 I i I ~
1middotrIi r 11 t III 1
RESERVE OfFICER
Junt 1938
(111 I
REVUE DE CAVALERIE 1111)
Jllury-Februny 1938 I 1
l r ITnillpll ill ] L~t I) 1 rllt n Ii (1111 II
JI1 1) J IJll 11 j
1 III T II I I iII J HI ( gt1111middot1 Il nJ11 I
Lt J
f l j Irlp r IT I I rmiddot lId 1
f l-fll 1)1 uLlt1 ] 1 r
11111- rLd 11a1 )IIt( I-
I )01- d ) PIIIII Ill
II (qlt 011 i1 1111lt111 nt I 1 I 1 r I oil
I lld - I II] I d t]r I I r I d I dlddI llf I ndljll 11
111--11111
-11 1111) 1111)) Jmiddotft
n dill lin rmUlI( II I dunn tlllh
f Illlt )ullr 1 IILd ll tholl
tJ I till ji
fL I I I] 1]1
bull middotr 1[i J (f I Jr IIT 11middotIf d 1) d
( It rl r(
I II j I f 1 1
Ild 1 1111)) Imiddot ll ltIII
( )1 PI itr )r f J I I f If 1 gtr f Ir
lId jf lit I]n 111 11101
JllJ HIlJd -II )(1 - )1 lflljmiddotInl 1l11llj111 111111
rio _ If lilli I )nlf) 1)0 (rl 11 f 1middotIIIId 1t11 IIrl I) 1ilJ fll ) III
jWj )1 hlllll l I il Id 1 t oj hl llli I I
dll) ltl II dl III I f ICd11 Hid 1)) 11 II 1 11l1)1r1
H II t HrJlllll I a H 1)1I of 1111
nilt Jlfln Thb H1IIII I lInllmiddot
C amp GSS Q1WIterii Vo -~ -
rapidly till rtmiddotlllrtUc])llH thaI th (1))1 llOUid i()J~1tally han and Whl IIHY han har Till yfgtl1 In I Ill nvdlIill~ of tltl )lottion dlarl(t(~ ~i I)y Illl(flIlal u lllkftgt inlln iv( r(annlilwnt gllwrl rcnr~IIIiali()n ~ Il1Hil)1l1111ion of I ill arm
1 FinIIHmiddotid and rflrnllIlWnl 11(riOnmiddot In Flruary 1f)3 Cu~ THOll ari()I1ccl I Inul dh lilt d 1) If li Ylr- o( 1()(1 million IOllIHI ~I(lrhr I IU)IIIlt 111 1 IIf Wal 11 and dr IU1111lt nmiddotL If Ii in llld~(tCii Icili 1HIIIIllII) Iwe
II 1t)n111ll 111lt)11 I~PIII lal IIlPI 11r - 1I11middotrnill~ tIll Ilwhiledi lilli Ih luLltllr dihi)l Ih 11I1h )ll1n1llHI arm
Illi mnllll dll lltlf h Ihl IlHJ t oritJ)tl wI dlrill~~ Irtltlnn 011 t~rr 1 II IlIIJTllt I IIJl~l(Iomiddot nf 1lIk If 1 1111110)) ~ nH~I)ilr hrigaa mpn JIllI d nf r Illll)lb of ill lank Ind IIdlll1 o(molurLd IIlrant~ 3 ca 1 n lflllllll of (ILlrv trlllri II 111- Illl ltlulIlmiddotd hllr- arlllilr 1ll(Jto~ f1an lIl)1 r mil llnd lllll- eml
B 1111 IlLllllrv 1111 in hh Ihl follOJllll lhrumiddotkrJ li~ IpllIll(mt~ prot 11 I 111 1 llr d IIIfcl IJ Cllll-lllllll I rlImiddotlllnll Il1( l~r)JI) 1111( mNr~ mitl 0)1 II ltdL111 rv of I Itl ii l f))1 i OIllIHJ-1 II IIf ~ lilttahtlllgt of muhuw gu hav 11101 3 lrlIllb- pf )IJI tdiOlh I Il h dli-illl 111 lbr Ill IrlJ mulofzd Tf Hlu I Jl d IIOlt I Xlll in Plll hut fInl (r II Ion of (orp -1111lt11 lJlIt~ a~ gral llI hill Vlll hll diltJn [nr 1--1 I v rd IIIIl (0r) al 1l(I~illllnl~ of war
( Illmiddot hll)) (()llIlllll)ll mjllomiddot( Ill til I nIlft -uIr10r If Count 1 ill I I t ()f IJlIH IlHllliJ( r- of whJlm fnllr lfl Il1lhtlry (lidlr lflilror h I II 1111 C d hy j O1I11r lli1 II Ill ]I )-t f I~-II 1IIl IhHf of 1tiT haq I Imiddotptdoli llId
III gt1 1(1 tIJIli111l rof 111 trlll Cl tllmiddotrd I ruel UTI of t )11 lrllJ I) Hnl III lllllltlllilild hut tlllllrlZltlll Illd 1l1(middotlilallllllllgtlJ
Jdl-IJd lnUI )~)lh IllJIltlnZltioJl 1 adlnld nnly in RU JJlllfllllnlrIIJlI 111 IIH Ldry llllIlHltr- mil infantry t w mrl
1illImiddotxI~I III TOflI lllllld IOJll1lmiddotl1ldj( m ]1Tl)rLI1t llOtOrtlllfJh ~ klli 111 lmiddotlJIJlII]d lnn and loLd motoriIIlI in llil Illi IrgtJIJltJht1ll lrIn In cull l Lin I lIllw r l~lInc nl lf nlOnnl d 111 II 1 III lOf IlHhlllll cl TIl( t~ SOl middotJJnmiddot III prltI Jf r(middotQntIlIll1Ioll ill Ilf Il)i hrl)uh f four I of1 Llhll II light lId fo1JT Illnld thn nf Irlll tlllk- infant 151
11]1111 11ht I (lmplIIH 1I1 ludl i ammiddot A FII h 1-1 tT hllltit 1lJard lalll-l orIl1ll]n I du IO) 1)1[
III) 1111 VI1I1 rlI I))OlIrLtll1111 i Ihll11 ln hl tJI 101 Ill ~ll)l Bntl h mtllLlry nc II 1)11 It huld 11lt1 d Illl tit )11- h of 1111l11fgt lld lcIl1l1ll11( ftI- ~ ltilJJ rtll HntlHl dUI
Tl~ ImltLlry rpl-nll rojl Flrl 1III1IId IIIlJj~ tl IIl-lILLr r ldiI-- 1 Inal ddt n ro to na ell
Ild ur TIIltIl1l111lti rOfll It hHllI IUI nl lllJll1l(middotd rdl lhltarmyfi~1 ~ Illn f 11 I t prlt)1 1 Ill 1rnl)r1 1)1111111 Ili In 1111 llwlropohs orl -HilIIll I)t (on ar mtinlilli Ii 10 I r11111 rIllltll~ llnblllllIlJ a urp I ~
~~~ ~lf ~~ r~l n~ ~~~ I~[~na 1(t~~j i~~ l~l J~l~ I~l~~llt~ ~~ ~I~i~~~i~ fi of [1111 r Thh ]lllIr 1 qJIIILLllI ly fln prnINli)l1 Illfl 1l10hL11tJ 11
[hII~~ t111I~I~)~~~11~)I1~~lI~I~middot1~)I1II)~II nl of 1 Plllpiw Ihl d~ pn I lilt 11 1lll lIl1lll]Id Iv Ill] 111 n __ ~lr for ~11111] (rpll Bnt1l11 i-Jwulda nN pn illOll ~Ir uf OIlJ dnrllllll 11kI Jl1 L ()nl mOlIOlrllltlOlI L11e mrrk I~t
It lOll 111 11lmil a 19nrUI- oTmiddotII i I rlllU el lltlll ~X Third llllUIOf)I(1 lrmy rpuirr llUlllrnll1 1)(middotI)I11--gt dllicult 10 recr h
111lt1 Ill rUel Htll thlllk II) Ih pr)ft ~Illd -oldippmiddot inat Brittin G
111 forlIl tILI lwcmiddotIt1i-t It hl III tldlt I(jint a 1l1lrlHd advanlagec- tQ lllllJal LCPI lrJl 1(1
1lw-p hndl~ Irt thl 1l1ditary rhln tlut qrm tilt hl i of at_ hf( il)II IIllIII) Hri(bh mLlltr~ nwn 11 ri IT th P(Olllll1)I rlltOll~ t~ II
n11LfotlP (hIlI for Flr-t Hrill~h rt-tHlrmiddot HI fnragt ar nmiddotdllllmiddotd r_)ure-- in gltl~OiW~1 act
11lI1taulttlbll ~ SPlt ltlnd 1ll~~lani I I -nILlll~ 11 uhlll~tntl Hltltr lllolorJzlllunr Il~
1111 folOf It 11IT 011111 1l1ll1 nl - dir Third IlWIhI11 d 11)111 uHi Irlurlut 111 hI mon 1-1 t
purd Ihm Irqr~I- lIld fILlgl 1
111 llonOlll( llIci nuILII [II-ll fJrci thp Britih lrm tllo~ 1 ~11 1ll01Ilnlllon lIIri 1llllllllitlIOlllmiddot illlprnIllWnl ill Iqllilllllnt md r i ~~ tltl( tltln of IIIW (nl~ll -- I Ii III J lhrl1 11 umpn-middot Llnt- af]l])ftfl - I I
ld Ir(or Ih hlhl jwl 11lr- (lrellll 11llll has l lrl (fl l bull h~ 11)11 n Y]CIpl tllIltJl1H llll 1lH mlltlnk 1111dllH I~un Thl mid 1fr~
11 l~~I~If~~t~~ ~I~I~middotIi~(~rt~l~~i ~II)I~~~~~~ 1IIi~df~(~_~~~~ illl
-Irnllg nnnr Hlr LI](l 110111)11 Ihlt houlti Iuhl it to lI~t un
~ iI~1 ~(I( II u~~ t 1~t~~lllI11~I~ ~ 11 ~r-lll ~I i r II~I~~ )i~f~~I~~~ I~ ~)1~11~1 ~ll]~t g
1 onmiddot ()IIlt f tL Illll- lll I Ihl to 1m lilnn~- mtJIllwnt j ~i lvtlr Irl I lIr I dl 11I11middotd tu tlan pl1fll umh1 qlld Tltl 1ltIn p(nlul- Ir ~ n I 1- lrmnllmiddotd mlll1ll1 for mlI hull 11111- 111lt11 rI( in hltlJc III I~ fIiI Illl lil~hl tlnk~ lwi II1lttrttl l)liltrtloll 1HIUPIl nh~ln lIn]lI lhlimiddot fill t Ill Finlh r ll1l1fllI- 11111 1111 tnr 11 lt t lldly Il n-l11 rll1m 11 III~ 11111111111111 md il JIllI 111 IXjllrlllllllllll lll~ 1l11] 11 11 I)f 1lli 1))111lt11) I Ill Yr lilrlflfl hayl Ill 1(IIl
r ~Ir) ~l in ~i t 1iI I~Ir 1 ~ l l~lllll~~~ ~ t~ r ~~I 11~1h~~ 111 I r~I)llIJ (a I 1 HII pIll] Ipm In hI1 gi (11 ~II i rt(t Illn C(l1lltu i
~I lll~l~t 1rt~ 1111(1 1)~~II~~~I( I ~I~I~)t~~itl~~~~hr t Yllf~~ I(~rll~il L~ll~ l~j~~ dlCltlt r mel plrtHu11rl ululrahit (In lIr lind arlJ11III tlwir I 1 thmiddotll1 tl Ilc ]Id ~111llIlrmiddot proId 1Jut I hI (lf(llj1 r1 -IlIri)r1ly 111IItlly ani Itank and lIllllalrNaft Lll u- ~uan JITImiddot(middotllqtllf jnrlglnltnt Itmiddot)rj)lllallll If tlw Hriti h lnny 1lt toll for mfurmat](lll til Ill llln lllpfjmiddotr dlfmitlmiddot it hnnltllw rltl1IfoPt 10 illfn IIOll of a middotlllllinlIlt1i vlr llot pl 111(11
illl 110
In 1)0
ll~ t~
0 sh ~ th
Catalog of Selected Periodical A~ticle8
March Aprii 193~
~~~a~~ ~jII)~i~middotSi~~O~~~i~l~it1(~~~~~~colon(gti Oario
~hdl~~~t~fht~~e~J~h~tl~~~se~~tsttlhrr~~~~~le~fthke~lf~~~ C~n~~l~~~ tiely recent comhats In Morocco
The firnt example illustrat(s t n(lInnulf1Rlmc( hy two platoons of armored cars (6 cars) and 1 half-seetion of tmks (2 tank~) to reeonnoiter terrain and dispositions in a locality TIl cfIJIHI pxample il]uRtrates employshyment of Il squadmn of armored ears (3 platoons of 5 carf and 1 platoon of 1 cars) to attnck the hostile flank and nllr to asht the main forlt wnos(gt Ranks ana i(ar were t11r(lt(tI(d hy the mmy TIll third example iJlustrah~s (gtmploy~)(nt of ollcylatl)cHl of three arrnofPd (ar UB a (nvcrin~ dptachment pr~tectll1g roudhlldltS Il (ach ca-( employment of cars in depth pcgtrshyTlItte~ Uco~phshlng th~ ry-tlsslon without los~ of cars lack of depth would ha~e Jeopardlz(d the mUISlOn and would hav( lost cars Each account h illustrated by a sketch showing lisposit iOlll and movemllts and hy photoshygroph~ showing gCneral tlaturP of the terrain
HgNNgN(A~JFS HAW I Tim 1( WITH CHlN IUn raid de Hpnnrnkampf dans la gUNr( dp ChilC1 By M 1(allfiavant
A hri(f narrativ( of a raid b) (illwral RellHlIkanwf distinguishedRusltian cavalry Ilucifr during tlw Huian lIwasion of Manchuria in 1900 ineident to tl1(gt Hoxir trnublls Jtelllwnkampf statitJ))pd at Tchita in Tral1sshybaikal was ordenmiddotd to bring rlinforcemn1 tn OIl qf th lIorthlm invading columns sprpe time afhr hotilitips IHgan Dptined to return to Tchita he sought 1)euro1mission to participatp in tlw ampaign and was giv(gtn commmdshyof an advaJHCd detachment Vith this impruviRed detachment 110 marched
~n~~r~~~U~lliii~~~ ~d~~lr~~i~s ~i~~l~~~d ~fipl~~lu~i~i~~~d oa~~~ three capitals of ~ranchuria ami deftated llUmrrOlls Chinese forces vastly superior to his own handful of Cossacks R(gtnnkampfs audacious conduct of this detachmcH was thf most important pjpmpnt in Hussian success during the camplIgn and hrought him mallv honors Against other Russian columns Chillpg fought wrll and wlh somp SUllCSS against HCllmmkampfs Cossacks and IllS skJifuU Ipadlrshlp tlwy were J(gtlpless The account is illustratpd with maps and a photograph of this great (tvalry leader
middot()[UT10N OF HIClTISIl CmiddotiLltY I~volutioll de la caval(rie hritanniquej LieutColonel Cuny
Change in organiZation usually slow are at times accentuated as at present for Rrilih cavalry Changil are imposd hy permanent factors of needs possiuilitirs and traditions of the arm whogtc peculiar characteristic is that it mURt h at the same time contitwntal and colonial Bffore studying HftltrimNlt~sincf til( war it i~ Illc-mry to c()n~ider dominant trafts witilOut which evolution would han 110 meaning
Equestrian resources of the United Kingdom - England is horse counshytry par excellencpound there the thoroughbred was developed the chase pershypetuated raees organized alld polo horn Horse sport is n need of national life and the claiRic figure of fohn Rull remains that of a portly cavalier clud in red coat and ridill~ boots rr~llln dvilizalion has not eliminatfd the taste for the horse hut it has chmged and commercialized it While horse actities remain It common hond hetwNn crowll 11ristocrlcy md the p(Ople iJreedlrs eOlH(lltrat(gt dTorls on produ(tion of de luxe horses and the less distinguiilhed horsE of army t) pe ha~ almost disappeared This slow dimunition in hor-f population IlPforC (ver illcwltlsing llumberll of automobiles to one of the principal (alls of nlelimnizatioll in BriUsh cavalry
The English cavalier As cverywhere else the mounted man feels a s~nsation ~f supclior force promptn(gt~gt and attraction that beinf mounted g1middotes TIll ~wntlm(nt dfvlopll rapid and hold methods of mind broad iskm j balancing (hsires and means ill a word seJf-eolltrol Master of his hoe the English gentleman hecomes mallter of himself it was not hazard that recruited the majority of gnat [ltnglhh leaders during the war trom the cavalry (Allenby Frrllch Haig) Ih( 1~llglish cavalier is more ~nterested in sport than in fine and learIPd pquitatiorl before everything he IS the rough and hold eavalier ready to ride at an obstacle without too much lculation and reflection The team spirit that characterizes the Anglo-Saxon IS manifested ill til( ta~te for rarCs hUlltll and game Excitation of til struggle team dhwiplin( sllit the (IId and slow tmperament This spirit or association is found throughout thp history of British cavalry where brilliant isolatd sections ire til exception comhined actiun the rule Finshyally the Englih flavr becomr ma~trR of brding caring for and training hOIllel With them horHcmastrrRhip is pla(cd ahowgt horsematlship
Thl Briti9h cavalry -- Thf traits are inherittmiddotd hy Britih cavalry III ilg higttory two currents can he diting1ishrrl the cavalier of gentlemen bold and undisciplined the puritan of 1c1 brilliant citizens who triumphed by energy and diseipline With the c01vaJiffs EngJiHh cavalry was bold and keen with t~(gt hourgeoilt it heetlmp methodicalllnd ordered and has so remained middotictorigts of Mnrlborough lnd Cromwell were due to powerful shock of rigid cavalry after preliminary fire preparation From the ueginshyni~g of the eventeenth ecnturv English ~avalry possessed a fire arm and tned c(mhination~ of fin and movem(gtnl ThrRe attempts developed during the eighteenth century by sp(cialization in mOllnted Hms of which truces are ound in divPrse organizations ronsidcred sincr the war
When the Empire waH ound(d and nlonial scrvi lldded to continental service platoons of preceding days were grouped under a colonel and given an organization suited to modestneeds of colonial war and garrison service
Th~ platoo~ system suiting ttllditiuns and ontingfnt ltituations persisted until the f11ddle of the nmete~nth c(ntury The larRc ravnlry unit L still
th pxceptJOn Ill England for- It doe not fit ne(d~ or colonial serice and reliels Of 20 line ~(giments Ii are ill I~ngl~nd 4 in ERJlt 5 in India Nea~ly hult ar-e st-tlOlled ~)frleas RQ are rlwied periodhaJly Colonial SETVlCe reqUlr~s tillS rehef and also a life eqmpmfllt rfffetiv(gtl and tactics
~~~~t i~~~~~l O~l~~~J~ of Jc~)li~i s~~~(~rt~~~nr~it~u~~~dnhrdi~~~~~l~ yCt illterc1mngeah)p this ItN(Hity explains the dela~ sand hCRitntion in reorJianization To nec)s of (oionial S(rvle(gt must hr add(d needs of a contmental war F~nlllsh (tvalry is thTgt ouly Oil( that fa((gts such a doubl ohhgatHlI pr~amza~loll mllst bHlupplp PllfJu~h h) nllpt nLd of II small
~h~rSil~kII~~ee~~~~t~~~l~ ~it~~Si~~~I~~~Io~V~a~I~i~~i~~~~~eit ~~i~ri~~forced in case of llcld ~ t
m(lnt~rmiddot~~~i(i~~a~~i~r~i~~~~l~t~~(gtc)~~~~~~~ ~~lt~I)( tI~r~~~o~~~~ e~l~t7~~ dplwntis (8scntmliy on perfe(twil III fire arms and means of transport As great as may he the esprit of corps and caste in the British cavalry it still reognizes the necclity of adapting it~(lf to the cxigellies of the tines by adoptilll newm(alls offerod byindustry frlwrfforf Ill mean are adoptedhut eSlmt pr~H~lpl(gts and miSSIOns rfIDalll thr unpoundgt tiS in tIll past
EVOLUTION SINCE TilE WAlt
Modifications sinee-thc war hay blen influenced bv battle experiencesSin(e 1870 lingJish uvulry has not w(n an arm ormollnt(d attackmiddothy Jarge units it has been the arm of recollnaisance and fire-powpr The South Afrkan War confirmed these views At the eve of til( war British cavalry was therefore farther advanced than continental cavalry Its fire weapons and fire instruction was Iluperinr to _that of infanlry This fire-power did not exlude the mounted attack hut favortd it it lwrmitted fixing the (memy mU1Huvering thenmiddottttac1dng with the armo blanche Cavatmiddoty was therefore trained to fight by shoek firp or (ombination uf both It was the arm of security and was utilized to hold ground and to constituteL mobile reS(gtfve British cavalry Rhowed the benefit of these conceptionR under differllt regions and conditiolls during th(middot war During tiltmiddot earlv days of the war llll thr(gte cavalry divhioll rllHlpred $plpndid sprvi(e badly used
~~~i1~~~r~~Jtol~lrf~i~~ti~e~e~I~~l~l~~r~si~~t~t~~~l~)~~~~~ti~~executed a march of 320 kiiompterH in 3 days and caused the dehacle of the Turkish armies From these different and contradictory operations some would have reduced cavalry to a IltIroly colonial roh others affirm that augmentation of fire-power and motorized materifgtl authorized a role in continental wars The Britlh high eommand without dpeiding between the radical opinions formulated the following conciu-ions to he drnwn from employment of cavalry in the last campaign
(1) Importallce of division eavulry and [(gt((gtit) of attachillg a regiment illstpad of a sqnadron to eaeh infalltry diviRion
(2) Distant rpconnaissallce i~ tll( fundioll of aviation and armored cars cavalry executes clostgt and dplailpd nconnahNlll1(
(I) Impossibility of llsing t large cavalry unit pXppt as mobile reserve to explOIt succ(ss
In resum(~ avalry ~hould endor to cOlcilialr two opposing factors mohility md fire-power and to this end it hns worked for eightcn years
TIJ[~ f~VOLUrION FIW~1 1119 TO 1937
Four stfPS in evolution can be distinguislwd dllring this period the overloadEd c~lvalry mixed cavalry or h011pound motorized pure cvalry mechashynized cavalry Changes howe been due to progress in means available Principlcs of employment and distribution in the Empire have remaillfd loll~tant to new weapons and vehicles tlmort (omlliete transformation of British cavalry call be attributed
(1) Overloaded cavalry 1919-1929-- Increas( in means of fire after the war reduced mohility of regiments I)(low that of 1914 The horse beClrne a beLlt of burden crushed under weight of materiel and was incapable of aRsuring fluidity and rapidity of movement indisl)ensable to cavalry missions Between 1919 and 1927 elvalry was reduced from31 regiments to 22 from a proportion of 77 ~ in 1914 to 5S f At the same time guard regiments werc reorganized us line regiments and lancers dragoons and hussar amalshygamated into a lingle orpll Bgttwe(gt11 1927 and 1929 fir(-Pnwer of rc~iments
~~~~S~std~~t~~~JI~~~t eO~p~~~~ ~r~~lm~~~If~~rt~~~~~l~~~o~~~~~il~e~ ihor~ drawn lhe hrigad(gt fntirely horfc contained thnf ngtgimlnts Imd disposed 66 automatic arms Only hi till division did motor~ app(gtar mid tilt division existed only 011 palwr it had 18 can nOli 227 automatic arms 9000 horses 434 wagons and only 361 automohiles
(2) The haIr mechanized cavalry --Progress in v(hicles permitted augshymenting mohility lIld fire-power and r(ducing rfT((tiPs without reduchlg number of units In 1927 tht Wllr Omce adopted the six-wheel tru(~k and the armored car The six-wheel truck permitted first light(lling by H3 kilos loads trallsported by horses extending radius of action 16 to 20 kiloshymetern second transport ill truclR of machine guns j munitions and rolling kitchens The motorized sig-nlli deta(hnwnt could he left far behind llnd still rejoin when npoundcded Cross-country carriers permitted doubling the number of automatie nrtn Thus transformed the regiment bacame a more powerful unit able to cover 36 to 48 miles at a rate of 5 or 6 miles an hour It waR comtmsed of a squadron of armored (ars cOIllltituting tho motorized
Woel~i~~n~~11~d t~~~~~~~1(~~~~lf~il~~r~r~ c~~~~~~~it~ i~19~~ Modifications indicated accomplished in 1929 occasioned a reduction of 1300 men and 1400 horses-for the cavalry During this period two types of cavalry were cre~ted entir~ely mechanized units (armot-ed car) Ind mixed
83
V lttlaloff of Selected Periodical Articles
Ullll U- d 1l1lr W 1111lt1(11 (tvdry or llHhptlldll1l hrlathl that (oll]d
form lvalr~ Ull lu]l fhl orgtnlzaliOll (hd not htand tIl-LltI III IPs- than tvo [armiddot anntht r t1r~anJ7tl(m lparatcd hO[I mri motor pfmrnts and rIlkd h~ht T i~ur( lib JJ Uklng nwtorJ1w tralll- (mplYlIlg light marhin( ~Ull III plan tf till dl1iurnltll nIl
11) PUfl dr) 1lItli (IVIIT and n1fChaniz(d fpoundguiatlOll Q In 199 rlmiddottonHl1lmd lInplu)-IIIl1l1 of nod rn nllanI fnJatJrIl 1lHIhalllZ(l v(JHclp armurlli (ar~ m( ~n of Jlillllll)watlOll) to pruvlcl mnlHbty and firf-pmnr ltl1iultlllify 1artllu11T qu till If or (Lvlir Till fullcmlll n1l111 (rt III
(( two (ari lt r It Ihlll blt HLHIIW glIH rfpiaing t))chuJl gUll tntl ~IJtJflltll
rtn~t LInd Ij]middot f IrIIrt oil addl II 111 111 d Ihlj 1 Blhy Jutm PjUlpraquolmiddotd l1h rlIllO fur
01 ndllJ II ilII1i 11l armor ri (ltdI1l Ild Ltl Ql1llr IlItI liu )101 HI r 1 I tllIljlV n I rUL pori phll h II lt Iimiddotj nddlll thtll I In 1laquo- ]11 II r ( ~
fJl LIT) dll r oWlhlt]Il lrlll] r I HIIJII III f Ir I( T rLIl~~Imiddot P Trnltllllf tllllhulH JH 111
IfJliI
JIl l)~ 11 r Irlll Til I l I I d of 1 uulrl)j )11 ~I Ing lllrht ml[ hIli IrlnIHr j r Ill dl 1 1111 l11 r lUlrirlm qf] p1ltn011 (Ih 1 I1ILI fl d 1lrl 110 Plllhlll 11111 plulrlln ju 11IPIlt1d
IIIHIlII r f 1II r I d frorn tltl a Ill nUl1l Ilt P0gt-I I rI 1 ll)hl III I 111 1111 (I) Tltll for dlmiddot-mnunllclrfHlIl TIlf Br(11
)flIl) 1 [lIlItltj 1 II) r fr Tr Ill Irl HlltlJH of frlt rnfhIIlIifd trlnl)rl I rll]It dill 11JIII) ill l]tl If IIll) dunl nl lTj rlt IT Thl10r)1111l shytlOJIl hlIl til fl (I rlun Iut nlllll t llluhJilt) illort qUdllltH II UJ IU IIJlII Illmiddot r 1111 Ill Ifl drmiddotH~rHd fnf dn 1l)1l rItlr- I)f for
Tlll1111 UTilI V ()-I rll) 1 di nlJlrl Ifl I hi n llilt 11I1) nl-l~d (Irl-~lIllltllll of thl Innlill 111hlllll mlnr7 1l1ll1 nt or a cflm)mltllln ()f thl
I TlIlfl )flllllt lIlll 11 11 Illdj rI Oil nl1gt111111 dll] m )1- ~I 11 t1J -1))1 1ll1 dIU) lllrd-J II Ill BnlJh Hilly
lllll-II I ( ~ 11)1) HI 11l 1lrI Ilf Ill( flnigt Callr eompmlllit I Itf)middot ~Ttllltllld 110 ljllth of thnl f()IflHnt I lr()Up of
r lId IT ~ I 111111 IJKd jOPI cIdry flltUfJtd hy rnotlfrn l I ill y lId r ro It ~()II In n 111111gt wllPrl mllhll)rl Llnnot
) fdl)1 lll~ d I 1 rrllll 1( Ii 11 hor (nd rnlChllluld llnltltl 11
I 1 llllll f lrnl I ri 11111 Thl 11 11Iil tlll- (hlll ((0 H I t rr (II lr Illn Illfl Ilvtln 111 hI[ IlO IllIlTp
I ( r I 1Ij~ t 11 h lillI d 1tlr 1111 jln ( dill qrgtlllllillIl lt1 not (oil
111 d I III middotf 1ll11 fI I fllr 1IrlTntmiddotnlmiddot WIth ni~ IWldl I lllllllil dl](jmiddotrl III 1~)11 til f(nrKIIlIZ Ih
rwl 111 Iry II) fllnn 10 Il1lthll1lpt hTlfldl- ll dn)IIIIl In 11 Iptntr Ijl) till IT ()jJUt
UI~ fr llmiddotrlI) hljl rl~1l1lllIh IIllu J f(flnlllIh IIf Jlurtpl ld f Itll tulk l11l0 luH rlglnlrnl IH 1Hn
d ld d L () n ilr lnd fl 11 dllnii~ I n till 111gt grlujltd I [lI(l~f
III Enrland 1 111 Eg pt 5 hnflt f(~lshyTld rllnlnI7ltlOn tIiTi11 tlw Ilorllld
lrjdllillQ tIll 1l1l)1l]middot dlIIIlJ dllt(Iod dunnl T11ull If (lalry (mhl~fd ofl rfglllwllt
Td IIf jJllrtt1 (lvdry jngIJl IIf Llnkl of 1 bull 1 llJldrJI1 )f pngllHtN ll1lhanizfd COIllshy
r~allllItll WI lot (onllllu(middott iftlr 11middotIc 11171111 WlrUIII( lIT crlllmiddotd 1111 rolloWlllj~
1 [lpht r 11l1 III f Ill jllllIlf rl 11 drj to lu (on(rt lilt]) h~hl d Illlll lb I bull flJllllllt Ill) d I)f It)ht tank lIul porl drl~()Ill frU nllill 1 til IP)P Irrl)~ jIlrll IIlllt
1111 n )111 Iii lull dVldld lHtwIIlI dn 11O1l (lvilry and I lid IJl rt)Hh I1(h lnnlr orgUl1ltOIl Th htLgtadll tl) Clltlillt
Jlfh~ Lmk r lm Illlt 1IId bull btttllll]1 IIf Ji)rl(1 lllflntry tgtI1(ally ontII shy j fr till III ~ ToJ lIld ( Ili-llt n ((JI)Jal~aJn and ahlJ( tlk llllult1 I ImlJJf tlth fIrgtlllzttllJll lll1r_ of till 11Ilc consisted uf ~ armored car r 111 llt~ hi LIdmiddot r )IIP nt lIld 10 jllrmiddot r4glm(llb of wllleh) Vprp in IIdl1 (Il Il IIf II l1Jdlll1 fOImiddotflInHmiddotnt 1111 1I(l4lry InfuTf till Il t 1(I Tl illlnt l[d jl Ilil 11111111 II alltI (ollfIPl1n n gtlltld ill de( Iioll to t r r-(lrt1l 1 n 11111 III 111 111lt111 illtl) h~ht tank n~~JnHllh lUi r(turn thl r III I JIlllld T)Irt fltJr III l~Jh l(vt1ry uf tIf 110(gt will (olllist of 2 r 111 11 If lfIJn d Ir~ 1 r mv III of hht Ilnk~ bullllltl ~ burH rqirrlllltl rlt 111 d rf tltllll nl r I II
Irvmiddotrlld Iqr of itLl cudmiddot rlt flJfl1 1 1I I far from detmite 1n Hl17 lllLlt1 tJf jJr drIVI n unltlmiddot1l mto platoolll and thlT1 Igt
lP fJlllIll1lji Iidqqr f li)ht tndl Lnrl plltoOnq of ]Jorligtf cavalry Jtrolt
Tl f bull lltlrf h (Ill rltllllmiddotd mohd rllviil)lI I 011 t1IlpJ1Ifti dllrl1l lIIH wai tf 111 1 IllllJdl of 1 )rtlIllf t1111 Ilf hattailllll (Of[(1l11Vt IPIlWllt J rld f i[vdry Ih IIImp)d IIf ~ tank fIfimpnh and 1LltlIion [ )r1l lllf (Ilry ITlIIIII lt111( 1)11 1( Uril) middottllHllt 11 1rllll If Itl IIllt Iltmiddot nJl 11 lInd) Ir arm Ind hlrVH FtJlOlillf~ mllHIlVpr or lln I II Ir ClUll III I HI d tlld(p 1hi IllnJlIi lIiv) i1~~htf mllTt hOlllI1~~tnOI lllr P(II dill alld I fi for 111I1 modlh(d till or~allllatLUIl 1hl port(( IIdlntrj WOIi Llklll rllm till hTl)ld fldu(fd hy half and organi(illlto a IhI-IHl orJLnIlltJ)IJ (har~1 rI WJth qf(ornim n~ll~laJJ( that tallkfl (allllnt ltf (llnl tl1 (J( jlfIII~ l1ld hlrldul Ilrrillll -I(h il loday th organization nil vliHh Brill Ii Idr h 1lt1 h(middot oqllHZftl and tranllu Entirely mcthashy1I11d II h(lr l h11 llllriv dhIPIIITNI for iJg-ht tanIH Lmd mechanizeu
b4
c amp GSS Quarter~ - ~ ~
(ONCItISIOtgt
Thll1 for f1ghtf1 y(ar~ HrHirh (valry ha- IWN ylLbtlt1 tl)rtalllzin~t contmuoUR attpmpt-q La 1)l)cJ1JlU two apparlllily lrr(gt(mHllahlf faew~ mohility and lirl-powpr Thi~ evolution ha- TIgtull(d from pfrfplti(m~ rnat6ri(I f1jlpoundcially erool Otlntrv ImllHjlOTt thi(l( ftrf(lltlll uf math haH elirninatNl t he duality IJ(lWPPIl (ontilHntnl anrlluionial (lvlirv Malo fi~ ~ ~ll111 1~lt ~~~l~I~ ~ ~llt~ ~ll~t11~~l1 ~1l~ I~~ 1~)(17 ~ i~~91~ r1l~eo1U
l ~n nlf r~iill(l1l~ WPrl nWlhalllztd tOlllY 111 pTIlllort IOn is eomple~~ rlv~rHltl ox ll1fyliatllZld fur ~ horop) l1ld IllPlropuhtm ((aIry j- aIm
(I1trrMI~(~~lnll~~I~ tllH qf thic rW cltlyalrj It Itgt ~t111 too ~non (014 ~ It paS~Il through a pltal of tfllformLlll1l with ILet of llhl1rkl men a trlill(gti (allrt It (allllot Ill Jlld~ttl lJlf()TlJ-1~ IXl-tlt and 1lt trUllld bull
Jlowvr tldn JrlPlhUlllld (Lvdry IHj)l ih 1lvt1rv cpiril It I 1t4 pur and II t radilll)gt alld pmiddotfu 1 to 111 clmfllundl d with lilt tall IHI AItiloUf(h cppnIc of tIlIir bur( It oIIHlrl pnlrVI the ~am( I the trlill tllIl1~lvl with tHlt care [or tlwir I1PW roll If ehangpound poi pamCui If ltllOultl hro nmiddotIo~Il1fgtr thai till (Ivdry 111gt -Ilfnltrod thl mllrmll alld lia adapttmiddotd 11lf wllh up)l() and prllIlId 1Ilgte to III tha IW(ti~qtl(l o[ tht tinH~1 1M
-oBH1 tinmtl that UI1Y hI1 10111 tOl Llr If1 till WLY of nlcchamzath 4oUI IIIIY a~llt If thl molJl1 dlII)IJ (middotlrnpl)gtmiddot(l (If Iliht IIlllt Jilhout l(rllltfl1 CUI pllwpr will hI (apIIlI of fUfmountmg HhLllH rllIforctt with 11 W~ anlitank ann JIIfY r(mlrle Oil tJf dlvlr~lty of unit 1111 Inp sa) Oland jPlIfth of (OlUTnIlI (Ilnrnwu Ilfrd for uppIy and maint In~ Othprl npiy to tfwp objet t11l11 that tJ( 11r)~I UTllt will not ~u 1 lJOlI lOl ttlllld Iwfort tlH middlmiddot f JaH It th bull1 It (1111( mHllIlIci ill the IXJlIThllI( TIll hi rony jJTlJjlflrtllJ1) of Ilf1d 11111 1111 io~lrj to hp liml unib in Egypt lndil mrl Jllfdmd (I111idf1ng till whlf of thl (aa~ an of thl Jmplrl blHh oc til Ix 11 Ill rq~1rlHnh ))1])1111111 tblrl lxlsi for natlVI hor(middot f(gmllllb III IndIa Hul )tgt hllr TIgmHIllt 11f 1 Ilnllllrl a hel Seoul 11 nil 1111~lilh tlrnllrJd army Atli(lligh till (lnll1Wln- 11IY (oll lt In
~I(~~~~gl~IJII~ f IS ~I~ ~11 I ~~~I~H~ I ~i~ ~ iN ~ 111 ~~t~ll ~t(itI r~ HIluJar (Ivdry tillt TI ff( (IltltUit 11J~ I (nnllfltn(I -1
of lhl IrnjJ(middotrial (lytlry It 11I11middotttlllmiddotgt tlJf 11111)(1 jllmi thmiddot enlt
lII~aJ lir41 on tlH halilp filld [t- Tj~lllllll)ll 1]111 tI or will lat 1laquo trallrnrnllll It h (llftl lilt ltt I fOII~ hilt 1 fllur J1)1I1l1 Ill ItllltfJert~ rtf fortigt lh
ltlthE
Ttl ~llPIIIl- 11 11 HII(~L lolUlltlt( N SH1A ~~~FtlOlli nl I fool ~it Ill Ion 11 I ~~IIlTl d (1 l)~ tin h tl 1rdllmiddotI11 flmiddotJ (apta hu
H1J()1
Thi tudy (1)111111lt thl ~Imiddotl))~rljlh f-j rlt Il~ III( Ardl I(IIlt ~l~lll
~~~t~ ~~ ~f 1~It~ll~I r~1 t11~~11~ [~ It ~~ f(l n ~~rLI I~ ~~I~~~~~ ~~ ~h cllIgt for lmprIlV(I1I1IlI Illlt HI 1(] 1 illu rtlld It h phIIl-taph of he IS
IYln 11 h
I 1HAl lION In I nn 1 ]1 nlll)j I ltll1 I nit ~T Iioxlrtilhlll tiP 1d1middotunlmiddotth iqu I plrlll du mh I (1111111 dl Br iJ
l11~ lrtill(middot dh(ll~i thl prlltiu linn If ih~ 111)111 fr0111 (nlll lld ullporLLllIp hv ria~Oll of gramiddot a1t of pllrnhlI111 III FrlIHl
REVUE DINFANTERIE FrlII Ih LIUH lUi TI()IJ Inflllln
January 193B
Till A B ( 01 Hl1L1EHY II]U IIA 11 ( du tlr dt 1lrtllkf1I I (ltltHh I 1Jmiddot-nngtIIIL
A Implltitd di-( U~-IH1 of artilh T 1111l prdhltHl
TANI- IN ( ItI Illl NI E rH [I[I Flit Altl 1ldl ~shy l~ lly lBlh
ILlgt dlln dlll 1 ddlll~I( A 111 1ft rnlt1 ILvril~1lI1I19H l~ Lilut(1l1I(middotj l1rn
An ICqtlllt by 0111 of til( Itatiing Frtl1 h Llllk mthoritw of tht trtl l~ ~~ tI~~~~v~~~~~1~ltl~I~I~Ir~~~I~)I~ltl ~~ I~i~ J~li))~~l~I~~l~I~fi~Imiddotll~t~lr~~I~~ ( tilnyX J1ay i)JX TId lrllll 11 (Uir( 1) t 1parlll tilfu ill QuHter A ~I No fD rUlll 1lX pag X4
tl TIm AllTOlOJllll Silo 01 191 ~1l11~ U1ITAI INTltLr f ILt ~l~l~og~~~tll()llohlh dl ) 917 ltmiddot J1lllllnlllllltttlrtmiddot 1 ClIjlU ~
Thl fori flf Frll(h alltoll1nblltmiddot 1111nllfllll lIT1r til Id rtlIl1h III Hlig i_1 l(jllIllllp lnl I)f fwmhlll IIIP ajljltarIlHI nf 111 I 1lIgllloc tnd uf llladllT~ ~I Ihlflf~ otlHmiddotr fUll tlt11I 111111 lri ttlJIgtlrlIIImiddotd (If fr(lt illtlnct g
February 1938
TANk~ IN Till (OUN ntt1 fIIC Till I otrNTI~ltATTACl or ~[at ~~ Hl1lOY II-I hllH IJih
[Lt (barR dlIJH la (Ilntn~altaqu( 1a ontrlmiddotlttIlUt de hUn Bdloy (11-13 juin JJ1X] LwutCoh))wl Pprr md Mw AUHCnac
Spp dig(~t in (~uartlr1y No 69 hlllP 1)IX IllL~i ~middotL
-
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articies
MARKSMANsmr TltA1NING FOR THE 60-~~M AND 8I-MM BRANDT
lMet~~~~tir fietH ~~ur martier Ba~~[d~ 81 ou de 601 Captain Loubiere
Method by which practice may be gained in correcting fire data as a result of actual observation at ranges of several hundred yards wi~hout the firing of liv( or training ammunition
March 1938
THE MODERN TANK ITS CAIAUILlTll-S AND EMPIonENT IN Tim ---_ATTACK )LI char moderne Sea pOHsihilitiilt mn emplai dllnH rattuque1
LicutColonel Pprre The tank is not a weapOIl which will win wars quickly lind painlessly
neither hafl it provpd a ailur(- in the Spanish War In an article which ill the reproduction of a conference hefore a large group or reserve officers he points out that if the tank has armor RutficiEntiy thick to protect it against the fire of antitank weapons striking it at 30 degree angles at ranges greater than those at whieh thf tank Irlw (an sec ancI return the hostile fire immedishy
~~~~h~~Cotr~~EC~j~~HI~~11~h~~erl~~t~~1s~i1~~ti~~frni~~)titl~~Il~~o~~~ cumbtd to antitank rifles He attributes this to the fa(t that these weapons ere unabl(middot to pemtratp the armor of tanks at other than short ranges and say the fact that tlw tanks Quid spot these weapons at such ranges and instantly return effctie fire was the reason He also points out that on the battlefield most of th targets which antitank guns get will he sitch that the bullet will not strike llCrpcndicularly hut at an angl(
In speaking 01 Amprican tanks tor some of which a sp(ed of 60 miles an hour are claimed he says that there is little advantage in sllch speedsshyfor one does not fight at 60 miles an hour He draws a great distinction between the maximum speed of a tank its average marching speed it speed in varied terrain and its comhat speed The latter he says no matter how
fra~~~~clitl~~mdilftce~t~ ~i~i~rn)iti~in~~~~il~~ ~ohl~t~r saee~Osu~~ search the terrain or to fire accurately This hrings out the essential differshyence hetwepn the French gtlchool of thotlght on tanks and the British The btter hag insisted that gpe(d is the hcst protection for the tank and takes precedence over armor The French school answered No since you are ohliged to ahandon tllis speed at the moment you fight effectively that is at tre time you run the grlatest dan~er
Colonel Perre says the expenence of the Spanish War confirmed the French reasoning and add~ that thf British and their followers arc now husi1y engaged in augmenting the armor of their tanks
He brings out that while modern tanks can make one days march of approximately equallpngth to that of truck columns the strategic mobility l~ much le~s A complet(gt overhaul is necesltary after 3000 kilometers and thererore every tank movemeurolIl must IW (awfully weighed to see whether it
nside(-l the most difficult type of tank attack that against in a defensive position an enemy who has had time to coordinate He first poinLc out that tanks are ablE to approach hostile resistshyfirp at colte range and hence obtain a maximum effect with the
expenditHrf of ammunition On the other hand tanks run great Itn ther llrc immohilized in combat and consfQuently cannot ound Their vision is ~mch that they cannot fire effectively nt
00 meiers and their presence in a zone only insures a temporary 11 whilh is likely to vanish when they move on Likewise the erent to varied terrain the necessity of locating the enemy and
tanks to provress with relative slowness from the moment fff(tiEJy~ Tlw autllOf thus concludell that when opposed
pable of strong Tlsistan(( tanks must act in close liaison IIlth the ot IN arms infantry artillerY and aviation This permits the infantrY to occupy terrain held hy the enemy and to mop it up The infantry
idly the (ffc(t of tml action which is essentially fleeting r(middot tllln rpmind(d thosl (If his auditors who had participated what til( infantry dreaded most when moving to the attack ouYd of ma(hine gun fire grazing machine gun fire coming
from a zon(l of temdn vhib)f from th( line of rlrparturp aurl at the most 1200 met(rg deer
If shortly after H hour this hand of terrain is invaded by tanks in depth protected and ~uppoIted IW other arms all or nearly all of these deadly automatic weapons will he silenced and thp infantry can advance Colonfl Perr~ spraks of this as the notion of tank employment in Ilretlg as opposed to thp linear emplovmltnt ff th() last war Th~ most powerrul tanks 3hould lorm the advanced ~middotchelons and since they have to coordinate their advance with lTtil(ry fires theuroy me under the orders of the commander of the arge unit tllf~(ommon (hier of the infantry and artillery
Not J($S Ir)gically he contends thf lightr-r tanks constituting ~e rear echelons n(fd not be fiO fust They IJPnefit from the protection of their Iurger hrC)tnera and or the fires of til infantry Sineeuro they are the IoseRt to the inrant~ ancl mUHt r(gtguJat(~ their advanceon that of the infantry they aro
bordmated to the infantry commanders olonel P(rrb points out thlt luch a systlm is cllpllble of powershythat with it attacks can he arranged much more qUlckfy than
Iistonmiddot d(middotcisive battles have occurred only when armllshyent pcrmittfi the (jomiJiiling I)r mallllVN with an action of frontnl rupture his combination was tIl(gt (RSPHl of Napoleonic- maneuver When fronts reinvioJahle flanking maneuvers mcrcJy throw huck the enemy He points ut that tlH- tank now giveR the high commllnd n hattering rllm capllble or ~ning a deep hreach and that this perhaps will give back to Victory those Ings which the pitiless automatic weapon had shot off
TaE AERIAL INFANTRY MISSION ILa mission aerienne daccompagnement de Iinfanterie aU combat1
Lieutenant Roy fhe author states that under modern conditions the infantry mission
(contact-liaison mission) haa become almost impoa3ible because of the deadlishyness of fire from the ground It therelore must be abolished No plnne
W~~1d eWaCrcrnt~rr tci~~~~a~YHu~t ~rdi~~g~ltitudes required during the
The befit that can be done is to combine this mission with dose reconshynaissance missions or rather to modify til( latter slightly When the ceiling is very high the plane occMionally can dive down to aRcertain one or two definite points A specific queRiionnaire should be given the observer belore the start or the mission Most of the information will hetransmitted hyradio
go od~th~~~I~ sc~~I~~~t~s~~nWUh~ 1~~i~ili~~~hol~~l~flla~~ ~e~ the lines at low altitude and have the benefit of surprise appearance and rapid disappearance However nothing much can be expected in the way oC informatIOn unless the observers are well trained in such work and unless only very simple things arc demanded of them for example Does the enemy occupy Iuch and such awood Have our leading elements reached the line x - Y Why does not such battalion progress rn such a case the speed of the plane will permit it after droPl1ing a message at the division command post to land at its airdrome and furnish by telephone information to the staff a few moments after obtaining it The use of radio in the latter case will be less important The author believes thut persevering in old methods would he fatal at the present time
THE TitANSFOItMATlON OF INFANT1W AND JUiVISION OF TERMINOLOGY [Les transformations de linfanterie et In refonte de la terminologieJ
Major Laporte
Changefl in terminology neccssitatcd by changes in French inCantry organization
~NGINEEILS AND MfCnANIZE~ UNITS lGenie et unites bhndees Captain M
THE LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR ACCORDING TO TWO RE(ENT AlltlCLES
[Les enseignements de In guerre dEspngne daprfs deux puhlicashytions reurocetesj Major CailiouX
A discussion of the accounts of Dr Herman Klotz a former German naval officer and of GeMral Temperley It is concluded that tanks and aviation are merely auxiliary arms of the infantry which remains the Queen of Battles Antitank defense and antiaircralt defense have been effective The tank no longer can count on technical surprise it is on an even basis with antitank defense and the morale of the eivil population ltan resiit bombardments by air forces Militia when engaged as interior units on a continuous front have been able to stop better trained troops and a situation not unlike that of 1914-18 has resulted
REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE (pmcc)
By MAJOR RG TINDALL Infantry
January 1938
NOTES ON THE HIGHER CONDU(T Q WAR FROM 1792 TO 1797 ANn FROM 1914 TO 1918
Notes sur In conduite Buperieure de Ia guerre de 179 i1 1797 et de 1914 it 19181 (I) Marshal Franchet dEsperey
tionalr~ ~~~~e~7t~lt~lyi~h~I~1t[~9~~ei~~~r~~r~h~~~~~r~I~~il~ effected through Carnot who middotat times even supervised the actions of the various fourteen army commanders
NATIONAL DEfENSE [La DCfense Nationale] LieutCoJonei Fabry
An article advocating a single chief [or the army navy and air forces of France Incidentally simultaneously with its pUblication the French government took such steps The actual reorganization effected ia covered in a Hueceeding article in the March issue of the Revue Militaire Generale
COMPOSITION AND POWER OF THE NAVY ITS ROLE IN NATJONAl~ DEFENSE
[Composition et puissance de In flottc Son role dnnA 11 DMense nationale1 Vice Admiral Darlan
The author brings out that France cannot fight n successful war unless materials can he imported from abroad and troopR transported from her colonies Thus the tllsk of the French navy is to keep the sea lanes open for French commerce and France must have n fleet at least equal to that of
d~~~~~f~afe~~t~h~t~amp~i~nnheei~~tl~t~~~t~tI~~g~~~~~~~~ed ~ao~hi~~~~~~~ ground-air~l]aval cooperation although he points out that thlS
85
- rl [ro 110 I r Vn-Ilth nr f)HP
-ltlldd I lt1 ltI I rl Ilmiddot in--i-h (1) orniudnv rr r I 111 (If tlw air forI IVI 11 1 111llIhl jill 11l IlllllllrIt pt did 1 i 11 I d In nrdl f I
f Ii Ii I Iii] rt) jltI III 1 1lt1 I I I 1111 1))11)1lrmiddot 1111
11lt d tllll If 11 lmiddott f I II h()~ 1h1 I I 111t itlljP 111 I I I r hll lldl ]l[ lId I L 111 ti I ]II
Irl 111 I~ r f 1 dr middotn n I Imiddotltl -1 I( I bullbull r I v n ttl oj 11 I jdlf III pI 1)1 I I old 11 I11TI) rlo fI dlt middot)dI]IT
J(rl~~Ir1 I~~I I r J
11 bull L II I( 1111 11111 I II
II I I I I 01 I I I Idl d
fflr I II Ii (
i t Till
I-UlImiddot1 I tr 11 bull I Id) I) Lt I
rlId1 I n oJ I I) It
)Jiid tf f r r I trtlJ
(1111 If II pli 1 H r H)d d i r d 1 1 d I) I lt I o
fr middotf 1 Iil Ir f bull II 1 I) I fr I
middot1 ft1 1 f 11
q I I bull -I d II Ir rt~ j j II
fr Ii
I ii fI j
11 1lt l I
11 1 (It]( T
rII I r I~ 1 t In 1lt1 h 1 I 1IlllJJIlll~ hu III d b I 111 rt
uljag huj ll rll
r qJfOIIl1llth In)) llgt~ II ul r nth
Ill 11l1 II fiTiIIIO 1
Ilhl 111JllmITJ11 1
ld r l~ll t lp mil ( jlgtI 11)1) 01 lIld 11~middotd tl 1 Inn 11 11nl1 1 f r qPH rj 1
f r 1 j nlil 111 fr
Till J 11 r II 111 11 J 1raquo -1 JJL) L r j ]j) r I (gt1 I)trd
[I imiddot II 1t d to( -Ilfllh )11 r -1 I 1 IlJLd L11 1 f lll)r
I tri jlj d cpU rtf t ll
11111 I L d)middot 1 HI (1)(1 jlilll 1 )1 I 1r1 I J I qr i Off 01 rltllJ t I 1lIlIlll llll I I~ II ~t I~ II f d TI I Id t fIr tl If ltgt1011111lt)1 d
l~ IIj ( r I I 1 rJ Illlldlllt dlHd inrH) lJllII II I d fl II II fld- f dl )Illo
Iilt In HIl 1llTiIlll Ir llj I I II I r)jfllll pll H Ll h I iOIl
I Ill II d [1111)11 f rl I llIld [Illt o I ( i r ( fl dl d liP tt 1 I nllt L11
101 II I dt r 1 f 1111 ltI [ r h f 1[1111
1 11 I 1 I I I I 1 III I] t tIl 11111 d (I rlr I gt
d d Ill r h IWI nIhlllqht nllt ill
Ii II d till pr J1ftflllll fnr Iltl r j] 1middot1 d 1111 Illltllil IlllllrIPI wa I)f nJIIIo
II 1J III I II 111lt1 r If I 10 r11 l III~ t hlll~1
8fi
c amp GSS Qummiddott~ Vo ~
KlLO)OO()() mdl lrmgt (if fid~( 1O()()OOO art HI(r) j-JtgtIL~ aIIOOOIJO hand J-r( nl]h nb~
1Irt of tllfP mppltl Irl olitwwd Jv Illtl1ill~ lllohiJillIliol1 lJlplt~ l whi(h Wfrt t IWII lta 111~ nlllllt 1 lImiddotIII illdll 1ry WI Illordinal(d L ~ orde 1llr 1 lahlid11ll1nl iJhe
TIll ralh) WI 11ll)1 1111lllIII alII I 11 flllil lrily Two hips ftn J rti middotlallllI l t lilT Ill (11 I l1I--1 (1111111) l1lltll1~ II Llt)middot inrfroz1 llHat lminl 11111Ipl 1 mItII1 rlldII 1Ial~ fill 1JlJlllf h I nirlltUII produ - Iro~ IllllWn I IIWr)Oll ItTII 11l1 IJllIIILUi ]l11f(hI~Igt of nat fl mad~t of jI
AWImiddotIItHII 1)1lt111 lId 1lI II or 1[1 Itllgti pn-mnlilly 1Itf)[lJll d t
111 1 ~iJII~l h~~ ~~i 0 r I r~ ~II ~ II~ ~ II~~I~~I- III Lilli Ividual ~lalu 1~on~ (111 11 r ilrl 1111111( 11 pll d ~Idl 1) -Ill ~ 11 111 plrtltloll hrlwf1 irlng Imiddot1t II II IInlY llId tIll nllIIrj r1l1 II II L Ill If I hI XllPdltlo1 i IInI r ~~~~~~II~~I t~lItlJfI~ 1( ~it( ~~ ~ ~ ~11 I~ II)~I~ nt~~~~(j~ag~l J~emi ~( Ij I~ 11 j I~I 1~~~IL~~1( I hHl I It IJ I II I hh IIt Il1 11111 t hI nH1 h 111 l(llJPt~ 1i1~f~1
llllfm dciJe
llIL OII1 Lit IN TIll lln thr ILollllipt dall 11 (111111 LIjltlf I)I Ildlrmiddot mati
111laquomiddot11 )011 of III rolt ltif Iflp Vr II] rhcPf Ill Jl-ltilJll il ffgardl OpUo~ 1111111 Ilid 1111 FfIIl] (hTlflr
0 1February 1938 ~ (middotrrot
-oll-Ot- 1111 1I1dllll 11-111 11 1t lltll1 17~2 111 17n ] [IJI 1l1 1 1 1111
nI llr la cnllil 1111 111flllIrlt dl ll J-IITr til 17l~L 17fr7r til 1~11 t I l~ll I I II llr-lttllrlIlftpI r11 IrY
Thl FOfll1lmiddotr I fHllllltld r f 1 llf SIIllIl-1 IflB 1111111gt ll~ -lrtfS IVlfl1lll 111 d oIHflll IIf H 1~ middot11 r 11 Ih Hill lor d If If ill 19il~ ( ([lIl t Imiddot FrlIHli ~OlrllJ1l( lIfprplr d fur 11 r]I lJ) d- of war F i~ond IVn it 1)1 [wrtlllalil y f ( IIIL )nITr -1)111] rI h I1l 1 Wa IH)lS1 ~Ytl llldlf IIII I If( 1Irr1Illl I d I Illlllllll IIllllllr din 11111 Thill lftlf 1 1deg of 11hIIl1lgt1011 I) I~ till 111 gt1 111~Irl I lnnlnl nllllll ha[pd ~J jMgt] Ill gJJfdl +11[1(111111 If I hr ll I hI 1 f 11 fnllTwnl InlhlarlldUIi
~(il~I~- ~I(~ ~~III1II~ I~~ ~ I~ l~ iI 1-111 I~ ~~rlll If ~lfJ l~~~ rlll~~~~~r ~~ lRd1 Imiddotr 1lllt ronlt t hltIfIIJImiddotI11 fq 11 1 IllI11 if (I)mrrll1ld hut ttl~ ~el WIS lirnltld In IIH --llfn 11)tpr f]OiT(I
I111I l~~~~lI~~t~II~~ 1)t i~ ~ l~ 11 r~)~1 I II 1 ~l~Th~~~~I~ji(~I~k hllll tIl h1 L ltJllllICmiddotrj Ill 111 ti fl II Id PIli Ill Ill Innh I hn III I- 1(middot d)[ 111111111 Ilt fo tiltgt ltl1I111 fllf
1[ ingthl- th ]1 IL lI--tti III lPll f 1I ri-Ill Ihl Ix(rllth p a r[~tlLtl IH1fgt 11 111111 [ If I 1111 II) IlIml ItrJll whi(h Ill[rshy1lmnll))1 ~lllllld n[llrllr
TAl 1I PI )LrLIUf) -]) pI TltltoH)tq llLl~ 111(1 (lip jhll f 11 dmiddot IkllllI11 I (11I d lpn
Thf Iuthof I in rpmiddot)hltlll 1lltl11l-t pf - nlplLt Ffillth tUmiddotlmiddot II) fshy1it-11lr tIlt 1lHplo-mfllt If LIgt1 Itllk 111 rIl11t tIll -tlry r II( I(3 of 111 1llt Ind l)Jj In gthw 1111 111 )p~r - 111lt1 lrJmiddott I(ht III 11111 m1)1IY of an wflll n Irl Illtf 11111 Inti (0l111jllff Ihpp nh It tu k of Cln)hrtl Sn~ltllh 1lJlI mlll- Iilt t hn 1)Hl1illl hi 01 id_
011 III ldnryt11~)~ti~~~I~ ~~~Il~~~~~~ -lIfprN Ill J III illltq~- ~t~ tit onl antltanl 1lii ~hllh 11111-1 ll 11 1111 Iwl TIll lIltll~lt ma ~llll (If today lrmiddot lfJI 1j-litl 1 Jr~~lrlh lrmrmiddotJ 1111 hilt II nr~6 X(( lIJ(TII IIH armor )[ IIii Illd 1)111 111 tnlltllll wljum IllIIt hr IT Iq~r 1IIe tlllnmiddotfllJI llJr i l1d~middot Ihl t llll~ 1lll Ilwll lo(L(gt Llrl ttlbull llrt tjlllll nlh middot11 (1 hn
If till 1middotIWIll hI 1111 111l m1l11 olllllh~( IJJlhl III dprltd Ld ar(llilr wh l)(lt ht th (lIl- dll Illt- tI nlI1111l al tl1 111)( nf rarp ~tain wllh II IlWl )-Ilt)gt III Ir~llgt 11111 Imlllr th 111ll lP(Iar~middot fortmiddot J
Mtdlt-Q Iq dll Iln1f I rlg 11[1 whlt 111 1tImiddot Ih lank Iodnl Ilon clogtp ral~1 Tit 1111Ir 111 dl) It Llr Ililtpr Ill qUWIlf ill1 (l1Hlu~i~~ iur
III dIJl- lilt j h t) til) thlllt Irtillf ll)ljlllrt Imt 1)( ltlPtl inf adql1ld Il IhL Igthl I)f liltgt LIllIgt Ir 1middotlIl1p] Ill wanl t far grelt ~ IJI of Intj)Il11 wI gtllJO IIltmiddot dll Il hIgt lillll 1lt1111 fltlr arlilil p ~b 11ft III all lltI1 1111 Ill Irtll t~ qtIP1 IJ1~ IIill dur1llg an tttar~middot rei t 1)1 IllrpO( of an lrll1 n dl t]llllll III Ilf fj ld]lhtl1ll1l of nlwf It(1n~ Ph( Itnmiddot ~JImiddoth hthlh hIIIIIIlJlI rtmiddottmiddot Illdl illt 111I Fnllch ltlrlll~ r~iE nmiddotdIIY Ihlgt~ an HUr l muhlllr1 11IIllt(d II 111l1lt tlI lllllCIII ~lld I f 1 f lrltll) II lt11111111 flllllllil Hp)lrl d 1111111laquo tH th~ ~)Ini Ill dimiddotappPlf llh tilt (Ill tll) (Imiddot tllllll gt1rth lw Link i d (I1111on~Jlln IH rIII)P ~
Sill 11 hmiddot If I ln I IhlL 111 It IT tin Irt t1ltry nhlnmiddot(r Ill fol~-I In i Ill pnl~~nllIn If Llllk l1l1l1t lormiddot It ih I hlll I hal of mfalltr IlII mn ttfl o r jllll 1111 ullllt (In rIr litll] lltlll1 anti qlUltlnn h fldio) ~Iw
[1 ~IIIr~I~~lil~ fIJt(~t II~l ~~Jiil~~~~I iJ~I~riJI~~)~In~~~1 ~~d~~~ hp 1111011 JIl ngarltl In dlp1lImiddotII1P llt- ~
Sl1r)))jmiddotp IllIIY1I IJllin ft11 tltll if It I 1I11lly IXpll)ltmiddot 1l)tllw adl i ary j not ~ion tinw to brin up fflIlfuflllIHIlIltt Tht Link is (mmrL shy~llltahl( to rtLiir( urpn ( hut nnly If fgtl1lphYlillll InIlt on a WHIp front amiddot ~ ltv(fll (1l1)11~ (lPIp Ill( llI1 Iwr m~It IIll p(middotlwlnllllWIlt ill dtlI h of tapt t-ltO a1 to mhmPrg(gt -itnuitanlnl1ly 1111 Illtif illLlJllry JlllsitHl) of tilt (ILPn - )[1
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles =shy
Behind the tanks the infantry mU~t push forward a3 rapidly as pos1ihle The author docs not wish to (mtircty eliminate ~alts on succ(gtslivc ohj(lelivLgtH althe following pUHlagc will show but he wiahc~ t~ rcdttcc these in time
Halts must not be prear~anged except wh(~re thp horizon changs in order to reconnOiter the terraIn herOiC movlngmlo 1t and because thNe the attacking troops find shelter behind the protecting crest against Olseishy11tion and lire But these stops must tJ( t(gtciuced to the minimum II [W minutes and not a few quarlNs of an hOUf ll~ long- ll1 the j)lfm is not broken as long as hill artillery has not helm reached Olnd r(main~ apthl( ofl toiler(nl rea(tion
~we~h~afil~tO~I~d~~tist ~~I1~~II~ll~~f~h~(tii~~~[ekt~~~~w~e l~s~~lli~l~ marguJ OfSUf)CrlOntgt httle by httle a the Infantry reaches the limit of t hf range of Its supportmg cannon
On the contrary in l tank attack the dehouching of thl infantry should he quite prudrnt IJ(cause since the automatic weapons of the enemy have remained sillnt for the m(J~t part the mopping tip (If the tanks jg stilt itllom~ prete The ap[learancl of the first infantry will cause the weapon of til( defense to open lIJl and permit the tanks to dCstroy them TllPreforp til Ulfantty should beware of (gtxpoing many men at first If HlP infantry dehouched in ms~ as it o(casionally did in tlw World War in orriN to avoid the hostile artillery harrage it risks falling an CaJY prey to thl hostile al)toshyrnatiwctpons But it can progressively become hold(r a thf tankskno(k out the hostile weapons Thus a tank attack will maintain its otiensiv( po~er and the infantry can g-o ra~ter and fastlr inlt(a(~ of Jlower and 5Iow(r
The author llllst-l that thp nr fones Will contribute most dT(~divflv 10 ctory by a close (~ollabomtion with ~round [orces ~tncl dp(rips any mai1
comhatants He concludefl that ofTpHiive tatlics anrI thf organiwtion of Jarg(f
unitsshoilid he bapd upon thcfmrJluyment of powerfully armed mel armor(d mechanized vehicles - He imistl on the impossibility at present of havingshyiarge unillt (qually apt at defcnltc of largp irontR and of atta(k and urgls tbespecialization of units This IIf iays if a nfcessity in modpfI1 limps
To wish to escape this in the domain of military organization is to ill~~mn ourop]middotmiddot to oly hwc mfdiocre units which ar jack of all
trades wher(gtas SlH(SS in war dfmaflds maximum quality and ffi(iPtHY 01 the instrumpnts mploypcl for each task
Prolongp(] staiJili7Jioll says tllp author was a (ollltequPH1 of thl 1~im(gtS Qf tl( offltsw tJ1IatI pmployed in til(gt last war ami will ](gt npro~ duced again if Ill(gt same conditions of lack of prpparaliol) ~llfJuld rp()ur But just as til situation in the last wlr (hallwcl rapidly in favor of that s[de which first crpated an instrunl(gtnt of a~tak 1ppropriatp to the neecis o(the hour 00 i1) the fulllrf that army wlill-h first obtains and learns 10 usc of(ensin mfntll -ititcci tn th (xigtlwj of tllf lge will rapidly pnd tillt war tII icor
TIIf EOIUTlON OF nm oHLITHY NII -IAHITtm H()[~ OF Tim FRENCH COONIAI EIlltJ
jLuvolution dll role militairc et maritihlP elP Iempir ()lonial frll1~ cais1 Major Rpgnaut
di~cusioll of til( defCIlSe of French colonits today and thpound ait tllfY ilght afford Frall(( in all Iuropfgtan war ~ ~
_jj- OllGNI7It( L[AISOl l-l 1 J~nJTlON OF m~IOLlTl()r-S l()rglni~aion dt liailtJIl- dan la Illigtpound (II oCuvre lt1( d(structiOlls1
Colonel Hot1SSfgtU
Thegt author disCllS(S tie 1Ilt(gt of dfgtmolitiIJllS under two glntrt1 CllS(gtgt first a ~ttat(gtgi( withdrawal planllrd well in-adyu( su(h as till ntir(mll1t
of the Gfrmans to tllt IlrndtniJurg Iinp in thl spring or 1917 and slcondly in delaying adion TIl( attr (lse bring Ollt stvlral ditricultit~ in tilpound actual
ion IJf dfmolitloI1S s Oil that smlll (gtnginePr partiltgt will he s(attfrec1 over til(
of tile infantry units preparing (hmoiitions This prltparatioll t it is till matt(r of ittuaily exploding till laid (harglH wllith t must not ht done too (hrly or too late llnd ahove all it t(gtr~ e dOIlI olition will Ilpoundgt IxplodNi in gfncrai on t J1)(ciai unI(r of eX(Ushy
hy th( authority whit-h has IJ(Jell dl1pgalpd to -ie this order ion may he made hy higJwr commanders down to and inlllding talion commandCrs battalion commanfiCr fighting a dpJaying action may find in
Ilumlwr of prepared demulitiuns whieh prohahly will have I)(en df1taehmentJ of (llgitw(lr bplollging to various difTerellt units
moment that is when battalion boundaries arp fi)((d
~~ d~~ii~i~r~fd~E~~7~~~t~lll~~~~~(~h~ ~~m~)~)~~~fg(~~~I~~c1~f~~IYnhljo~I~ nginrcr QIIi((r 1hll~ the tran~missi()n or ordpl1l for thp actual (lxgtculiou of emolitions will require cHreful liaison ~Irrallgments
Golanel HOUfseau points out that this situation whieh is ((flain to arhw n the Cafie of delaying action whcrf thing must he done rapidly docgt not
m to he cowr(i hy l)rescnt French rpgllati01l3 lIe imdsbl that unlNlH he JulStion il )wlved grave (ol1seqtrences might arise in war and IIrg(gts he study or SUdl problems on the ground hy units or all arms
March 1938
OllGANIZATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE [Organisation de la DC(cnsc nationaie (ilflfrai Azan
A hrief discull1iou of the effect of the decref signfd in lauuary hy tlw resIdent of France These charge a Miniltr of National Defense with
coordinating the Ministrs of War Air and the Navymiddot TOl15sist ntm hehas a permanent committe of Nltional D(fense Likew-ise he has at his dtiposhyIition the three Chiefs of Starr of the Army Navy and Air Force and he selects one of the( to act as Chief of Staff of National Defense Likewise a new commiittc has been crertted in order to intensHy the production of war materiel
The Chip of Staff of National Defengte (GcncrrJ Gamelin has been sfl(cted to fill thi~ f)()~t) if churgld in time of peace With the study of those qU(ltionfi (onfidcd to him by the Minister IIf (QordlnntcfI the Army and Air Fur((t plans of mobilization aAd opPflltion and the studies of combined Army Nuvy Air Forc( tlpcratiollR
The ffcdll of tillc measurcs will hring ahout a far more unified direc~ tion of olllratiollH in war than in th~ past
l1II~ WAit IN SIAIN TIIIH9~IIlJNATJC)N 01- Am FOlWEll wITn NAVAL Nt) mWUND FOWES
ILa ~ucrrc dI~sPJlg~l(gt La (ombinahon des forc(gts de Iair avec les furce nlvtics IL avcc larmee de terre] General Armengaud
((Iwral Armengaud of the Frltnch Air Force rccentlyentered Spain and
~~ ~ith)~J~~lg(J~~r~~~ent~~c~viltso~o~ll~f~i~~f ~~~~~J~~ J~~~~~t~~ ~ ill QU1r(riy No (i9 fUII(~ 192H pag1 121
INFANrltY AND CAVALlty Ilnfant(rie (~t Cavalerie Captain VNflicr
A lttudy of the dHfprPllles in Imiddotrench regulation hetween the action of dimlHmted cavalry and infantry
WE U]S1 I)] Till lwO-SI~S CMML 1II falll erltlI(r 1(1 Canul des DPllX Mers C~ptllin TOUTte
Ill(gt author sllgg(stH the digging of a ~lnal from Narvonrte on the ~outllCrn ]middotrPIIImiddoth Meciilfnuwan coast to Bordeaux thull giving France a -hnrt rout from till M(dit~rruwan tf) the CH~eaJl no wants tlii canal to lip wilipound ennllgh to hamill any vfHHt1 Hmaller than thp Normundie The rotltp suggpstPCj would parallel the Garonne river for approximately half itl way His artitl(l appear~ to hVe hfcn fltlggested hy the Spanish War situation
FnOM MAN TO U~[lJ~lt bull IDe lhomme au c1wpound] Captain Manie
A psychological study of leadership of more interfst to- French soldiers t111Il other
REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE (Switzfriltmd)
By MAJOR TR PnltllIs Coast Artillery Corps
Deccmbcr 1931
Tim INEITABIIIrY OF CONTINUOUS FItONTS ILa fatalit( des fronts continus] General Rouqu(rlll
(SI( dig(st page 44)
TACTICi[ NOTES FOR THE USE (jF FUTUItE CPTAINS INotes de tactiqtte il Iusage des futurs capitainls] (1) Colonel
L6derr(y
AlmONAUTl( IATIRIEL ILes materiels acronautiqles1 Captain Sch)
Dlgt(ription of tilt Belgian pursuit ship Renard It 361 and thc Fairey
HaWgt light bomhardment The former has a top speed of about 350 milltgts pltgtr hour at 6600 feet cruising speed of 250 milell ner hour at 13000 feet range of 660 miles aod a maximum altitude of ahout 39000 reet The Fairey Battle can he ucd either for distant reconnaissance or 115 light bombardment All light hombardment it can (arry 1100 IlOunds of bombs It r(gtachc~ a maximum altitude of about 25000 feet has a range of 1000 milCH at cruising speed Jnd has a top speed or 256 miles per hour at 15000 f(gtltt
January 1938
THE FIXATION Of FlWNTS IIimmohilisatioll des fronts LifuvCoJonel Mayer
(fiN digp-t pa Hi) I
hUmSSIONS ANllIiIlRn~N(lS 0 THE SINISH WAR IInljlrcssions et pXluriellCeS de lltl guerre dgspagne] (III) Capshy
tain Bauer Th(~e notCH are a continuation of C~tllain nauers observations ufter a
months tour in Insurgent Spain He notes the fxceltent discipline or the Insurgents (omparing it lo that of peace timp armies in their ohservance of military (ourtcRIPH Soldiers arc dvolld to their officers The officers earn
t~i~h~e~~~t ~~l~~ ~r~jmiddot~~eJir~~~e~i~3~ge~~~~J~~or officers is carried
r Jln~ ~l~~~~~it~~Ye~~~~~~~e t~~d~Pf~r~~d n~~~~i~~a~e~~~nh~~~~ 1)( rought without typewrjters and ink In the Insurgent forces paper work
87
K
r
1
I
1
I 11 d r f ii JI I I I
1 11 I 11111 I 11t1 1 I I ~ bull f I iJ i
I )1 fl doI r
I I
II
11 1
fl 1 jfji II
bullbull I 1 r J 1 oj I rmiddot middot
I d ill 110 I ( I r r d 11
q ) 1111 I I orj I 1fI
i 1 UlIr Itl J d If )) II
gt~ Caihlor~f Selected Periodical Articles
I fnl to hamiddot II hi II i(] I nllllllllHP jnt no amlHmt of It
Ill lllLultj - jlIrd I d Hi II 11LI
difficulty or lwrnlliitJ11Ti middotlllill Th irf liimU (middotll to) 11 dI1l71d- f )middotdlfI I mllt
rl lmiddotr I I r I~
1 ( 1
I nillr4 Pll(Htllltf d TIIl bull r II ( d Ill ~panh jJl1 r TI II PJllImiddot I
If) t h(middot frullI tlkH~ Hf 1
~ftf~I~ middot~~ll) dl~)l ~I ~[I jl LIiIIIl fl It gt1
(I) Lilli HI Ink tn SpI) 1 ttllH fnln 11
-1 Inlf I I
Ilq t I lr d111 fIIT I) rTlIitl) d I
II tH d I ()J d f J I r 1111-1 101) rI II IHld I
1 [ llr
Till ~1 I I - I T I ~
I [I ~ I
jl I III - -1101 -- rdd
I r J d r 1 1 I d 1
l11
11ll j117 L~j 11 1 11
I r II j I r
I 1middot1 d f 1 c
1 11
I I 1 fl 1
1
bull
t 1
d I
I II
I I ~
f I I 1Il I
lJ I d rllmiddot J II llft Ill 1laquo1 1 1]11] I d I I 11[11
I IltJI fr n t trd nIIfol f f I ( In(middot (IrI I d]Ij fr l1[( ) 01111] rmiddotITlttr](j 1111111 111 d~ )1 11
r I I t laquo pI p T 1 Ir -1 P 11 lJfllrn d rll 11 h Io 1 11 ~ I I
I j I t1
f I r I IIIHIII 1 oJ
I J rmiddotI Ir 11 rl I rn]
t 1 )r i I I 11 d1 j i
1 middotrmiddot 1 I fl
dr 1li frq bull rr1 r) T I fmiddotr II) 1 I f ] rl 1
11 111 1 1 I I f 11 I 11) I - ill ljr nd f r I t
] I) f f Iemiddotf Ir II d 1 r 111111
1
l
f 111 I
i
middott Itll f 1 I
1 oj
I f I
r
r
t II 1 1 lIP]) It I I) f 11 1
r 11 lOr Ii I f) III Ill 11II d 1111 TIll rI I nil 1)1
frIll 11d Itld J 11 1r 1 Jill t I 1 I u uf d fllI 1 It I llld
I 1I1ln d r 1ll1 111111111 1lift II~ III
1 r r 1 1 ~ JI 11 Illd II 11 11 togt ( 101 rlllll
11 11 j)~1
1 d f 111lt)1 d ]011 I rI tIl11 11
I 11 I Idl II 11 lll 11 r 11 I] )
] f I I I Ii (1 1 t1 d 1 1 1] 111gt I tmiddotr llq III d
lr ldr 11111 Ill 11j I
c amp (88 Quarterq Vol ~ ~
111 (JInIAN AHY 1- Hl7 t lLarm(middot1 allimlluil Ill 1~1i71 ((lloltl vX-lllIdlr re
Sf dil~Imiddott PI)tl 17 ) 1~fr hllHI j()NS -u 1HJJnc of Till ~ljlIl R ~ i~ IllfIpr~II P1 111 rIlIHImiddot tiP Lt gtllrn 1I]ltIlgl)(1 d Partamp ~ Ihf)
Jt ]1111)11 ~1111l )11 r( d a 1 tl tilll~ lruulld fOT IlIW fapllll11 d(11gt jlh
11IIIU l11P Illld ar 1hlTI b 1m 1I01lld IXImiddotppt)Il flt)wr In i Ojllll l- 111 il 1 111 1lt 111( It Ii 1 J hi In urgPIII Ul~dpr an~ clrCll - from
1111 r 11 1 lnmiddot lgII1 all (11111111 r 11111 lIy tlIlr IIHnlWCi to tIl guar iIIIOlII liP II] AI111OlrqldHTImiddotlrrmiddotL)Imaok OIlIIH)thlrhaD~ pr(~~ Ii IT r III 111 IPdmiddot n IIThd - and l1niill~Iollahly 11)(11 uh prlry i~~1 - lanSi 11IIOlfAI~I1 I~if IIii ~I (1)Imiddot1t iiI fOri of (bout lOn lirpllllf f(Hlm 1j~lIO (1 111111i L 111lt1 iI 1111 0111middot1 IIf till f l(j~t of thlmiddot Imiddot Wft ()hSIJI~ J ascl( 1 Iil 111 11111 (oldmiddotI]r had n(lIuPI tn fUflmiddoti~~n IMUon for h~lr j the~ IIlrdul) 1lt) II ITI Ikfl uri to whom (fI II]IP (an Ill gl In th~ Ins J 111 11111111)1 I] fllt1 IIlIlI mOllths of I Ill 1 11 11 broughl down lh enerr Pfs(c 1]111 ]1lrllll Illl 11)11 IIImiddotrtd Ill ([)filfTllld n(IIld thl 1IIlpngt-1ifmiddot11ISOI 11111111 I ltlr 111 middot1 f 111 wn Fnlul) t)I) HwltIm lIltl tiHflt E))gl~~ I P(C 1)11 h IlH r III IId (i I 11 111 lhL1) TIll Irh1lrjllIt rf(Plvfd an apprOl ~ (If ~h Iii 1 h 1lJd 1I11111Hr dUfll thh IIITlIH 1Illtl III Iddllon fLptUlaquod a numk I Itt f l1llt 1111 11111 Ill Ilil Tlli follllillg inlllh pl1- hrlt)ufht do~ illtcal I 1lld 111qnr~111 lilll ~ (I flIlin II Ind ufri ~1 LlJlfP-XIlUport 171 j lUn( 111 l)l~l Illd 1))10 lJ HrI~IIP1 XIX alld I~ Iol a total of 87 ljr1enl
I lrJ1111 f ))]IlnII111 III If Illagl thl Illllju[lttmaldy g()S~1 111 (Jll1lll1t fnrmiddot ()Il~f) lu If)HlltlIIOInlIPdTftuanwithtwen ~~~~It~ VII 11Jt)~ Ilf 111i11ll lIlli ~rl 111L11I1 Sm thn fIITI-(I hI( olItre] I I r Irl 11 ()lli III jU(g( 11 ~111 (PIdlll) PVIIlI h) futilp ltIh lHJtl1llugsa ~ 1)1111 III 11111111] InI Nil )~ltIInlmilt Tmiddott1I1l111~ Iohtlfal plllr vIli parr l )(1
t1 middotIf t) (ljll1ll1tll t fhlgt ptlli( of t IHlpUJttloll I()gml~ 11((1 at any pril fi Hnll 111- lta( hld thollll] of icllm fpml lIJlll) 1l)1 lttill tIl dfgtcL~ ~ J~~ f waf i~ hI InJ~ q1iLtlllld 011 Ill IItmiddotl of 1I111l1 md no 111fl IIw Onefl- rill
~r~~)I~ olfl llllI I1 111 t1 t I IlllhardllHl1t of Cit It illIL(P t hI law ((1 1I]t~O jLt 1lfJ It rl Itdo](Il mel prlllltlni~~ d thmiddot 1flrol1 of IwlYY artilkl) 1OIl
All tIl(gt grr at al1HI ill thp nOTth WI PffIIlTPd in thi~ ly Such ur I til t I f I ullon r luirimiddot ( In~p colla lIflIl(n wit 11 t Ijp l~rolJlil fOfct and t hi cann t Jll~ Imiddot illl]lr)-middot1 hI 1111 III (illil 111lt thl alllmnrnY of tIl( arm V of the LtJ hl- vir d [llil 1111111- 1)middoth If 1111 Ilnl]r~IHHI HI (middotPTtain tJUntrmiddotiflt llOtalr- l inffJ 1 rlllll 11 n I hi IUlll1))1 f 1 ILt HlI 1l1111r1 to ground llIulllrtion L ll(l~ 1dI1l1111lnlv ndulld f~llhl~~
11nl~lilHT 1111 lrlIld IT Jllollfilmiddot Ill 11HHllt 1111htlr) princlPlelI lilF
ll~llt~IIlf ~llIlrIIT(1 ~ri n~IIII)l~tll Itll~~alr~I~~~ lL~~)I~~ca~I~~J ~~~l~ d)lrl d1 Ilf 11111 angt IIIHI 11 fliT thl fTrnoI ~u Ld 1- IItt a1drr-mrn
1lal~ItlOlIlil--I af 1wl lrolllllln ~5 Tul 1937 tIll Nltltionahl 7jIll 01
1111))[1 ~~1n~~I11li ~~Iit ) f I hp Ifr- let im of purltuit s Jfr1
t lllllJl1q1 h l~ I n1l 11mllltt a TPtlt a t Ith tflOJl~ in thC fi~ nIl - I - I hi jrlllt l1l1llliIl1lTl~ in (Oil limnt and usuC
b llhn1 Ihi lItTlIllnn of lhe hjlwr mlllanthT Tro
~~I~I 1 ~ 1111li~~~~ lI~flll~lqi~~~111( 11( 1~1~~ ~S~ (llI~I~(I~~~ ~~~ ~ti~ 1~lln 1 mln~ fldlt If -Ill Itch 1- tJlI OIH of Ill PCllIllt prlr (nd
I~H~~~lIrI hll ~~f f(lii~~It~~ 1)11~nmiddot~1Iy~ riltlj~nt~1~t~~~~Ih i In 1 1111 (fm1I1 uni lll]illl lant ITt tlld ii~htb lrmuHd alill clnmiddot 1 j~~
JIll fllmiddotd in 101 ( I hI nth- 1 lih ~I( h Link ar u~lf1l1 111 fill f(0I11hlhl
~ 1 II~~I ~ II fIiI l~ I~ ~l ]~ 1~1r 1~I~1 ~~I~~~~ui~1l ~~t ~lf~lIl~O~I~ I ~Ir~~ 11-(1 Hut II 1 IIrlILh)1 1 nt1 Illl llllll1l lilt it- TubllPr lrat~cir- 1 1 ~I 11 hr II -upplu II Lltl1l1l 1l1I~ In 111f t11i It Brll1llll BllellltCL ici tl Jlrtlll Ilut I IIII 1 1h 1 [11 If UfPTi 1 h1gt pIlt td thv hlV( ~1I((lIm~J n~l~l 1]1 111111111 Ill 11 1IIIIlll 11Id 11111 hIII] l~rll)lIl 11llti inlttli 1 hI~llll 111 Ill lh1l1 11111 In middotd Jr IlrOtl] If hlllt lhl Thf(lITClr- 1 Link 1111 11 II) ]w I lo)mlr()nll~ wei -IH 1 liw I]ualilv 111111 (s IllfJll 11 I 11-] 1111 111 lh Illlf h 11111 rtl)pmiddot1 Imlo clIlnt sll11d ll~t 111( l1111n] Iq~ lll III IIIud Ihal It J Impllo lhh tn attachc~I jlrf ~~fll]h lit IlllrlI f tI prOlJIrh ITtllll l11d pnplfld l1HtIl llh ltntt 11011 I 1 IIf t Ill It ilL m )fIlt lll~ Ollt fl(d1 thp 1lInpll ltIf a (rrl~ to ( Hill r i III II ill Ihl [l1rl f IH rd ILI~ II tIll hltll of (lIllhTl1 W f~ h( Itrul Lt I I 1111d Il1lllOkr d 01111 11 11 Brit bh LillI wII It I 111))1 fr) Hlir I
I 1] LIlli til ftr1 h 11 Tnlll 111 ill 1t1 111 1l110~ hoth 111 lHlth Hul drp para
~~1 1 III~ t1111 I~ ~I~ 1 I r1] ~I~h ~ ~11 Il~ h7t II~~ It Irt i11fT) ~(~~ Th ItUmiddotiln mllllnk i~lll of 1~1-Il1l1 1lhlllT hal fIVt1l ~~ont a((ount I
II If 111middotll1ld 11l1JOl)1 I 1 )HLI middotlIhmiddotlltIj~Imiddot It 1l1Hlrfllhat j HIIIIlI 11I11 IhI1 If 111 1] 1-1 WIlli III (E lr~ 11l a nUJor ~ 11 1Lnph Ilf I~ ftll Illiull 111111 Oil Ih lJaI hpPIl wlll1(lt 1 llnllllllll) 1111111 1 dlI( dl11 hll Illr~1l11 ilILlion aruwl Ith~17lt - 111111lt11 hl 11Ild Hl(lI 1)(11 fl[ lltIOl tinllq II Iud
ljUUI 101- IHI IHIJ Imiddot Igt ItImiddot I
d1 HI111lli nt- 1Imiddotmiddotrimiddotll 11) [Tlt~ ~ I (ilIHral ~ilgt~f1 ~
TL 1]1] llliu] 1r1I1111 nf plf1I1111 Jl1111P11l1~ III Ituooja ha~h11 1h r illll of a I rl111 ] IrId Infant f I II 1hi army nlLll1U Irlt ~lf 1 1
IIIfn 111rlclIlrt Iollrquol lTIPntlr Lll1h frlIl()OJtllqlllnlf ~ pI)~liP mug Hal1dIIllPf Pari 19J7
88
f-middot ~- -gt~
VolXVIII No 70= ~
at Kiev and 1936 in While RU~ltlhl and at l~oSC()w lumiddotrgf scale d~hllrkatiol1 were executed partly by paralthut and partly ~ hy fHlccccding landingH of transport Jllanes These exercisel ure inloresting and ontgt calllot deny them some value Olle should howewr (xaminc th(m without prejudice tQaetermine to what extent they are actually practicalle and to whht extent they are artificial and of doubtful value
Individual training is conduded fint wry mplh(ldi(~t1ly in s(iwols whfrf tberuture fmrachuthts jump from high IOWlfl wilh tllP Pllrllimtfmiddot alrpadr opened to overcome tim initial (ar Tlwi Uwn PN(((ti to tetuul jtlmp~ frDm ditTerltnt altitudes gradually pftting lowN hut still high flwtl~h to guaranteltJ the certain operation or Ow paraciltllt Acturaey of Jandilll on a prescrihed Rl(ti~ ~ou~ht t~ fa~i1ital( II( ~rouJlig of a Iumbtr ormtn landin~ at Ollt tunCj with till ohJect th( (pltgtl1Ing of tlw paraehllC IS clelLHrl todimmilh the di-llenionTuITI)s af practicP(l with arms and mLlllitl()IlSI FoUowing this group d(seents are practicd and tlw ffort jl-l made to jWfP lS closely h)gftlwr as poltltilllf A soon as twy rIwh Ow ground tllIY nrilnt themselves march and fire bolh day and night
The dropping of iSl)iaf(] individuals for propaganda or fspiollagl purshyposes e~pcially at night is -implt In a sparsjy pOJHllalNi (()Unlry it is also relatively (as) to drop Hmali groHp (hargpd with fltst rltdions or ollwr pedal tasl5s 1I()Vf(r if tl~ jump la~I1 pJa(p at Iliglt ~h( rfgrO(lpnllntvi the parll(lpants ma be iJfJwult alHIf thpy an to IZP Important poiut it isimproiJabl( that tiWl WIll I)p tlllrlf[en((d If till ohjP[t itgt dttrudioll it can only h(middot sUjJNliliIl imp til jnwlitiol1 of Iar~( w(rk~ will rP1lllir( hundred of pound of exposin and it io diflieut to ltpp how a small dpLa(hshyment can tran]lort thc (xplOJ-ivPl on fooL aftlr landing from a parahult
In Rwsia they visualizf and f(alizmiddotd ill tlI mamIIrs dtfd th( landing Qr Reveral hUlldred mln to ~Il(p important ()hj(Ctivrc alld (middot(n o attack r(sPTPI or the rpJr of hostilp JHlitiolllt But OI( (an lJl lt(lI11Pwhat skeptical of till nsults to he lXI)(tIltd in war and lot ill mallfuvtr This j how they an Ix)(gtctrd to opPTatl
After dropping atest parachute to indicatp th( dir(ttion of tlH wind a first wae of5 or 30 pamchutists is launched Tlwltp I (J ol)lain tllf minimum dipersion do not ulwn their chutf- ttntil as late as polt-ihl( UtiHr wafS follow and ~r(jup t1wmpl(gts with tll(gt pr(((din~ ww(s or at past (oordinat( ith their Htion ~[achinf guns small fhld pil((s and ammunij ion are l1s) dropppri nut it it to hI qH~tif)lHd if till parathu (arrdlg w(apons and munitions will not Ill widely dispersed silwp t lwy eaHn~1 fl( oj)(llpd jU5t hefore they rftch tllf ground as can tholtl of tlw mPH dropped
It is eqwct(l that t1w fleharkmclIb will takp placf in the proximitmiddot of enemy landilg fiplds un(jN tIll llro(pdion of pursuit aviation as wpfl as homharilnwllt or attak aviation to attaek t11f ground dEf(ndlrlt Jt is a
~~~~~~~ltl (l~ ~~~71~Ie~~~l i i~~(kVi~~~~ ~li~~ ~~~I~~~(~ f~l~lmT~~~ t~il~~~(follolling this larglr fonI togltJwr with nM(hinl -gun ca~lllt)u ltlnd ammunition will be 1lnd((1 in plallfo tlwy (In talk of llyinlln Jutolll)hillS and tank Tlwy will thus 1)( ahl( tf dphark ltlIc(fosimiddot( gfl)UI (If l tholisand men (JtlI half an hour wi suUit to unload middotIOO() or 5Ollj nwn a forel aliI to obtain important rpsuts Obi()u~y this rl]uires tl( (mploynWIlL of a
bull talXf numhN of t ranport- Actually ahout 700 m(fj Wlre droPPfd hy paraelmt(gt ill t11P Ki(v manllshy
1 Hi in 1935 111 tlw ~lillk mallPUV(fS in 1lJfi about 1500 HlIll with 15 marhn(gt gUllS and g tnneil mortar__ WPrP dropped hy paralhutp and attaewd a-tandirrg ild 90 mil b(hind tll front In th(gt iloscow 1l1lIlPUprs OOO parachntist W(f( droPP(d in SlcCsshC WtVPS thlY fizlci ltIll airdrolt1f on vhich a compldl rlrimpnt of infantry wa __ d(gtharkri from transports
Oh iOllSI these operations wpre not (olldue(d undfr (fitahlP war mnditioll W(gt do lot know how th( tfrrdin was O((upifd anrlchflndlri In Iar it vmlld hav( IIP1l d(flndNI Till lranltlorl pianps (arryinJ the pJilchutbts f](V at ahout ~j()O ft( Tlwre was thus a good (hanel that thro Qe-ienhf I)lahine glllllt would hae (alJSlci 10i(1 to lw trilll~l0rts crews Jnd paradHlt ist at t 11 (inl of Imding lnd lafun 11HY loulrl rpJroup thrm~(ns and hI afmbkd in (oJHhlion to mallPllypf and fight
Admitlin~ that tllP ~llC(sit wanlt of para(huth(s wtrp ahlt to i-piz[l a landing- (wId alm(j~1 in~tantly altllOu~h it MiIlS hi~hly improilahli tlu defendfT- hpll drivp aWlY would COlltjllll lo t1~h usil1~ IOIlI ran~( machhw gUll lin against tht tranltlrts mlking the latN landings
RUsiiJ1l in~truct ion of paradmtits j tlrtainly priolls wtl is Hh(Ppt il( ofinterlsting rpsults It is IIPfitll(gtlpss plrmissilt to ngtrrl till SP(IuIlt dtScrib(gt(j as of slight (hanc[l of SIIlPo 111(gt1 (onltidPTatir)J]s should not pffient the trainin~ of military paraeilutists with a view to (rtain operashytions which may he posihh in sIJecial eases and which Wf gthould he preparfd to excrute FralHp hoW lt)mmellpd thi work and groups of parachutists have aJrraliy taken lart in sma olHrat ion~ It ilt wif though 1101 to ht our imaginations wltlndpr to (X(lt in tlw maUN It is not sullirient to havl parachutists tflaquohnieJll~ wpl instrueted it is equally important that thrjr instruction and ta(~kal fmploymlIt should be wiicly laquooncehed and conshyduetId
ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY (Glealllriluin)
July 1938
ASIIW)JIE ~1()P1mNliIJl) By th authors of Air Stratq~yl
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articlesmiddot
ROYAL ARMV SERVICE CORPS QUARTERLYmiddot(Hreat Drituitl)
May 1938
PhTItOJ SUIJY IN WAR ~ SO~fE lROBLE~IS Sm-IE TACTICI Ll-SSONS IN CONNECTION WITH MT E~lPLOYED IN
OlEltATION8 AGAIN~T AN IItRTGULAll FNEMY Till MAINTHNANc[] OF A MOIIII1l1middot()IUg HY Alit IHlItINlt ()Pf~IA[IH)NS IN
J)ER-l-~lT COUNTIlY
ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Gnlt nritain) June 1938
Tm USl- UF Im~()ITIONfi IN Tm~ (BIIAIGN IN SOUTH POLgtND DUIUNG O(TOIIEH Ill14 Captain Meltzer
SIt(AOltjl - Tm~ F()UNHlNfi (W Till- mw lJI-FImiddotNCImiddotH CoIOlw1 Malan
ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain I
July 1938
1111 ~lIL)nmNT OF A ImiddotANK IlHlGim AT1I1 IN ~H)j)~HN WAit
UNITED SERVICES REVIEW Grfat Britain)
28 April 1938
-(j~m ligtfII(TIONl of TIII~ ANSCIHllsS CoJOIwl B(adon
5 May1938
HY f-WAN IS IN CHINA Mljormiddot aenamara CAN Im ClIINISP ImSIST lNf)IFINln~ly A (tOHImiddot-- STUnI m Tm~ Pm
KST It Air Commodore Charlton
19 May 1938
J)I~lOCHCllS nmus IlICTATOnSlIIlS Tim nllOltTMCE OF 1~N1TEi) jmiddotW-l Air Commodore Charlton
1middotUDlN( TIII~ I~H~ OF Tim AIlligtfBN LEsSONS OF 11IP AlJlmSHOT IlOAIl ~lOYI~Il-oIr middot)Xlm(lfm KG Mandeville Roe
26 May 1938
nIOTAIN1 ltFiHigtMImiddotNT A 1)1IINSln IUfH Air Commodore Charl-Ion
2 June 1938
Aim w ItHFmNSII OF Am IlmmAIUnllNT Air Commodore Charlshyon
9 June 1938
AlT(ti ANII 1011NnR-ATTAtK IN SPAIN Major-Gelpral Fulpr Im NlIW FOH A j)J)IItTlIENT OF SUIIl Air Commodore Charlton
16 June 938
Fm-Nllt lJtlltW1 IIWDtlCTION Air Connnodort Charlton
23 June 1938
Im TltHTIi AIIOIIT Am WAltFAltl Ajr ComrylOrior( Charlton
30 June 1938
Till PI- iLol-mNl Ill (JI)IN( Air CommodorC Charlton
7 July 1938
1hmss InmHSAL Fun WAlt WBAT TIII~ llI(1TOIt tnliNTIU~S IIVE J[~H-l IN HpAIN Air Commodore Charlton
14 July 1938
Im tIlWROUS Mil PImiddot(tWP N1IONS WllIeH RllPPI) WAit 1IjTEshyHIS Air COlllm(J[jorcgt Charlton
21 July 1938
LJSS()NS OF TIm SIANI~H VI Air Commodorl Charlton
28 July 1938
h110lnANIp ojmiddot Tim Rsqu (OUNTln Air Commodorp Charlton
VETERINARY BULLETIN (~IPJll(nIllt to The Army MCdical Hullptin)
July 1938
~1 oUIIl1m 1I0HSE~IH)J~INt POIt tOAIl lIIAllCIIE~ Liputenan( JOIl(g
89
19
Readers Guide and Subject Index
A flll Vurrllflt Ir Arm AmmUnltlOm Io)lnlllil
I~~~~~~~ itl nllf ntltnnk llllt iI bull r I ~ rr ~ (rnamI Ann r ~r I
middotTlllllfU1 ~ f 1I01wl I ~ru7dln l I Tt
rmrod rlnflr - rllljlI+ Ij
I nnhd IlrlI1 j
Inbull j l~k
~
tilf J jn
If) 11-(gt[
jnrall) IIIIIInrrrSlr
IO
G
K L
I rt
1-nrl ~ f r 1
a
1 j 1-[_1-
I
v
LiST OF PERioDICALS INDEXED
AND
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
A Ord 1 (Irl A Quar r1n Irt linIn)
Bul Bdglt Mil HI) 11-r gtlIUUlrimiddotq 1111shyum)
Cln Dd QUilr c h II fmiddot (lT1i fly II uunda) Cay Jour (dr) rurnal C1V Jour 1GB] (-dr JltlIJrlm 1(pound1 at Ilntam)
Chrm Wlr () 11= d rlan illl111l CA Jour 1 r I rj I nllt fA Jour 111 r1 r 1 ur1 Ftp Forc 1 jh rr 11 Bnl]) L Fr ncc MIl J a lrIll hltaITP 11 rtI)
Jour RAMC ~Jlrnd f II HOIl Army 11lwll (middotrJ Cn 1 BTllulI
Jour R Art 1ur11 ( ltl HlI rllllf~ ((rnl UrllI Jour nusl f 1 bullbull r 11 [(~llOoI nil JI1IUI
ren I Bnta Jour USII Journi f II llld n JIIlltulllm of
101 (1 Brl IJI])
Kr~fl Kruflfahr)1IIprlTlIPI II) MeG 11 (fJ(Ilt
MIl Mltl flhlln~ Llhall 111111 t 11r)
MH~Wo(h )llttrmiddot~ 111111( rmatl1 Mil Eng ~llll1ar It lt r MIISuro Iljlln Nllv In~t Proc - 1
PIon II II rmn~)
QM R tur n r It ~ w
Rn~Orf_Hmiddotr (H1Imiddotr
Rv tift CY ll _II d I allt IIruu)
RY dlnf-ll Ill dlpln ril IIrlllll) Rv Mil Gcn H 11 Idllln (i(nlra[ (irallr)
Rv Mil Su[o itnu(gt 1I11111j[middot SUll~~ (SWIIwrjlllld) AAF Quar ltoynl Ar FUTr IJllarlltly (nnt Bntuln)
nASC aUlr JtuY1l1 nIl) - nH Iri~ (lllllf(rly Gil) Hrlhll
Boy Eng Jour ItnyullI)IHr Jurnulllnnl Ilrllaln) RTe Jour Itul lank (q~ Jourllul 1rlIt Irllln) U5 Rov llnllnl ~Irvln~ Itnl w (Ir at HfI~nln)
Vet Bul VrlNjnll~Y IIlIlh till
Jan Jllnu~rj Jul bull Tullo Fob middotFhruar Aug AJJII~t
MOl tlnrrh Sop Imhrr Apr Apr1 Oct_ Ilrluaf
May 111 Nov Nombir
Jun JUII Dec [Imlr
A
ABYSSINIA
AERIAL WARFARE
I 1 J f)I r ll t HI L) ( I I h rul~h 1 I) I- If UK Jji1)
II pngtj~IL Var n J v f It 1 Ir I UpI)II Jour Jul-UjJJIK)
Vi1 th h1h (ornmlfId 11 0 Ii r IMI (aoshylUI1)
lodrn wllraJd It Jl)7 f lila I dur IU)l HUR)
rrrll )Id (hal oJ Ilmd warmn IJollr I~IISI JUH)
~hmor(gt mod rnI1 d It 1 Quar Jul Ink) Ar 1 IlPIrfllll1~1~( of fl1T Jnmllnrdrnlt nl 11 Itfv
lIm) Th trill h hul aIr Hflln 11S It ~ I lull 1laH) 1 Ir c~ n h l fnr nr IllS n -7 Jul 1~lJ8) Thr hHarq f (I ~ It ~ -I j Jul IJ38) 1-11 of thl Spnlll~h l1r n~ Jt~ ZlJu 1IlH) TIH n r1l11 rlitlWI r - rrlucutOrl of tilt popltllnliull
111 -IJullJIK) rnt Drttummiddot9 Illr lrujm lLa rrnnr hill shy
1118) r rltII1Il1 Ihr lf[I~ (11 111 lllr 1Jl1)
i~~gt~~I~~1 n~f rt~ ~~ 11tI~~~lnt~~~1 n~rj~~d~ M~ll~~ - Ilnr 1l3H)
II-llr mi bUlilh~ rHlq1rlCIfl (11 Mill In19) or rlld Ilhrtr~ 111 l1U- ~l[r 11ltl) r atl-llkltJn IHud rop~ ll1middotmiddotoch-l Apr 1938) n pecunty lind Ill( Ir dTtnl IR 111 (( middotJlln I~~middot inlpr -~Ion~ 11111l P rH nrs of Ihr SplIlllqh Wtr (Ih ~
1lt - Jan l-ltIgt llll)Ih l~n7 hlllII~OrS 1Il II( I1llllrad Ilmiddottru1 Ill
SW_~l J 19)11) AIR ARM
Orglnlzlton and EquIpment
r furclt XllIn~lOn (lI~ I- rc - lUll 191fll bhmore mOIl rmz I H F Quar-Jul H138) Frrllfh rcratt rrllductlOlI ItS H -Iii JUlI (9311) ((f1I1 ilnll1H11 nr plthltm (I[limnmiddot MI J)I~~
I~118) rlalltllt 111111 rlO I I ~II SU1-or -- I)(c IV71
Trlnlng TactIcs
Til rIlt I ililI01l Oth InfChUnlZlrl caulr~ (n k Ju u 1)Hl)
11( IWIIII rntta IInvTour Julu~ 9~~1 Ill Iom r 011 t1 nln~ t throurh (FII-Ilt1fc Ac
11lfl) r J10WN 1I1l1 tngtnp ITH1 InllIt (Inf Jltlur Ml Jun I ll 11h h middot)I1Hl111illlll jllll1r l tll (i JunlQgt Twln1 awl 1dlnl~lrull 1~middot f Ii Vllrll hHmiddotltt~
IJur Iltl-l MI IV) r~rmiddotd IIrl1111lt or tomorrow (Ql HI - Julmiddot l~ 1l3QI
qllmorl llIolh rIIIZJ (ICF tlullr - Jul lillS) Tlw TtJaHltt 11111gt or 11 nwhmiddot fun hy Ilir durllj( 01 tat~I1~
1 10 rl -(nl IltA~( llllr 1IIuv 111)1 [11111111 1111 111[lh mrm (IS It 11 a 1gt~ r llgtT1IIltI1)furlgtnllllurdmIII1 IllS1 211
11lH) ilwlmlhnlHltll mrvnrlllr (l1-1 21J1In 11311)n dnlupln II of 11llnr IU- t~ ao Jln 1l3S1 Ir~~l rrlwnrnnl for Ir (IS It 7 llll JJI) I~ f l ~[I11h VHr (1 It v 1 luI lllH (rrat Ilnll11111 nlr prn]] nI 111 Fww 1111 11)middot11 JJ
l)]~)
Ir raldwd tl(rIltI 11Il1111tHI 1I1nr 1911raquo IXl rlo 1lt HI nT Wid pr(ull I rlll 1I11t ~lur I~~ jr lIIrl~ n lruJ Irop (0111 WllIh I Ir 11l3~1
lr)u1Hi WUtH7l1UOIl of II Hlr rOTl lrl (1 or orpll~J rnlv I 1tu~~inn )1 (1I1l1middotVIHh 8 Apr 19lRi
Thr nnlul hlflllllrj 1l1I~n (ltv dInf - Mllr 1~1ll T ucunty lIJ)d Ihl HT oT(J)I1 (ltv ]11 GlI Jlln IW
Imp~a~ IJ~~l ~I~jl~3~) of t111 fllll11lh WHf (ll M
S Tw
F
lion
Th~
Tho
otl Bom
M 1111 A~tll nll
M
Anll [)~fl
nU1l1
Irr Iu
Tan Th orr
Tar
~r
n
I Imiddot Th
(~II
T bull
Th
M
p
So Tt
n I I
TI
TI
tI
N
T
I
2
(LIIIri1~
10-111
fA Ord -Sl
lIlay-JUll 1918) middotIatlon oltgtufnational
Jour-1I1IIy-J1InI93S) - ~Iay-Jun 1938) ht- Jul 1918)
C]wm War - Jul 1938air 1gt1( Gal-Jun
~XlfljIN-o70~ Readers Guidea1d SubjeetIlidex0=-- shy
T~j-~~(lr9a8) in the IAoninvad IliltricL R~ M~i Or~1~~~il~3gl)n thil PlltCution of d molitlonll (ltv 1gt1H Itenmmkllmrtll raid in the WilT witn China (Rv de CavshyMar~Apr 1938)
troog landinge rrom alrpInnlll In Hu~a (Itv ~1i1 SusS( - ~ The J~l~e ~(J~938n the Leningmd ljHl~lct mv Mil lt~fanlry and cavulry (ltv Mil Gcn - Mar 1966)
Fe ANfMALS11l~8J of Rabat and KhemislCt (ltv
Arab hOT5( hrrtJlng in Syriu ( 19JB)
the aupp y 0 oraea n OUt middotllTm)middot (ltv Mil ~uir~(f - Jun
1938) ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
ntJmiddotairuaftbull (A QlIlT - Jul 1938) (C Jour-shyBo~~~u~~h~~~mln t~l tone of the Interior
A~tlalt~rll(~(omI1UlltntllgtnH leA Jur ~hl)-Jun 1)3K) Aahmore mo(hmiddotrnteltmiddotd (llF qullr _ Jul t1IH) nliir~Talt wellln lind thmiddotor middotmplymlnt (1111 MIlt
Mar 191l) ANTIAIRCRAFT OEFENSE
nli-airer I (AQullr -Jul 13f1) Dtlen~ lIJtainstlUr ~Ul~k ICa Juur - Jul-Au1 W18) BambinKIllrllllo111rl thzonflhltlntlmiddotnnr ICAJoUT
~lay-Jun 11ll8) ~ntltrtrillt fommUlliclltiurll IC Juur - ~ll1)-Jurl 1JIi) St-unty lur tlalIIrviI r ~u)plY ((wm War Jul 1~HI) AJhmore illdmiddotrnlzmiddotd (ItAf quaT Ju119l1l) Theaaial danl(r - Imiddotduclltion of thmiddotJopulatlon (La Franr ~1i-1 Ju11938)
lllurrnft weapon IIrlfl thr cltnfIgtmct (1gt11 -111 MIT 1JlII)
~lairrll1 uui(hfll (m~lrurtln (111 ~II Itr 1~)Pi)
~~~7g~~I~~~~ij~t ~~~i~~~ ~~n~~r~I~middotmiddott~~~~ rr~~rL~ ANTI GAS
Pn-ltoutlOfl tL~njnt Ia~ nttark~ (gt111 ~lItt gtlaT 1938) GLlprotcctlUa or lhe CIV pjoulatlot] ulwad 1-111 -htt
olul31) ANTITANK
R~~rit~~~~~n~~~~~~li~~t~IYHJt~~~~j8)IU 1lIH)
~~IOO nmiddotfle-rtwn lin Infntry mutt mmiddot1 ami tactlr~ Ilnl Juur Jul-u 19JH)
neSpom~h Vllr A reVJ( th hest )] 110 dnt Jour - Jul-AuK 1935
TILnD -Ilrmored rconnngts~anr vmiddothltI(middot~ and rh dfln~ Igamt the~e (Krull _pr I~Jax)
lhp Bnt~~h Army in 197 tl~v laquo( (L I-Fh 1311) jbgt rnooHn tank Its (IIpnl1)htmiddot~ und mgt1) mat m Ow
aacK (ItvdJf-- Mr IJJRJ TlCUe()fYflterday und 01 trmorrgtw (It~ gt111 FI
ICI=~SJ~~~l-~6~rJ3S)ell of the- SpluJ1h War (itvIlI
lak llttack agllinst antitank gun~ IS FnwJn lthtury Dta
ARMAMENT
Ppa---dn=~ in Endlln A sludy r mduHlr1 mohilzaln
B~~~~d ~~~~~~~ I~~~ Itcbull 26 IIlY EJ8)
ARMORED CARS
ART OF WAR STRATEGY
1betlnx in Smin TarII~i~tm fall1 I bullp [It folh tNmiddothmtgt fA Ord - Jul-Auf Hll8) bull
StratlrC and cnt(1l1 mafHinlmiddot Tlu IT rIllgt (1) nUT naljfml lCUnt~ (A Ord - JUI-lUf J~18)
Tle malor tactiClt of thl cncunt r baltIc (A Quar - Jul 19381
nttmy thai Clln llta~k - a l~illn llml 11 lt1middotfnf laquo(no DefQuar -- JullIIJ
A ~y~tcm of anti-tank dr n~middot (ClIlI D( r (lmT -- Jul 1l1II) ~crale (shouldr to IIhould(r) (Cw Jour [Gil) Ju 1935)
yenhS~sa~j~h~~i~ r~~t~r~h urri~~~lrll~~rllon (Inl Jour-Jul-Auo 1938)Counterbalv-ry In mohH warlaT( lJuur It rt ~- Julll38)
Will the hIgh commanlt lak If thgtgt aLr (Me filll -- Jun 1938)
Tldie2l and udministraHlt lessons of the VaT In Abys~mm aour nUSI ~ gttay 1138)
The battl fI War~aw AUlu~t 1920 IJur HU-- - May 1938)
Modern war and llq maze f maChLnl (Jour llVSI -tay 1938)
PCIor waT~ (Jour IJsn - pr 1~13i) Ashmor~ modfmiddotrnigtltmiddotd lJtAI~ QUilT lui 1l8) lltlme tllMka hIWlnR In cOllnfdlUfl wult 1gt11 fmiddotmplu-lt In
~r~ai~r) agllinst un irnKunr 4middotn my (llSC ltjmushy
r~~~kro~ri~no~~n~i~J~~lItmiddot~T ~_tj~i ~~8) - Jul H138)
t~tkrh~a~~tf~-~~t~ckAJSyent~~l_(~~l~rljH) Jun (llll) ~1llI of th Splfllsh War (US llv - 21 Ju 1l81
ftfR~~~ f~~ins the qurrn of haltls ILa FrnnC( Mil - If
Theaerial dangT - cducntion of ~hcppultion 111 Franc( Ml-lJul1918)
Thoullhtlion llll duration of futtlre war U1114 Voch -- 1 Apr1938) _
The rnod~m tank Ita capllbilitll~ lInd mploymlnl In thlt 1 It~ck (ltv dInr - Fh 1(38)
N(J(t On thl bllhr conduct or wnr (rom 1792 tu 17l7 lind rtom1911toJ)16 IlvMIIGcn-Jllnfeb1938
T~~~ Yllwrday and 01 tomCJrrow (nv ~1U Gen - Feh
Th~~~~v~ea~~(j~i~~~alv~ti~~i~~o~~~t~~ghl~sa(lr~Mil SuiIIIC-Fcb 1938)
Me hRlliwllltgtn [Sec Original Military Study) Tal~rK~~~lk against antitank guns IS loftiKn MIlitary
Thelnrvltabillty o(~onllnu()ul fron19 [SlcFJrlI(Jl MlItnry l)lIWlIAj
TIlt fixation or rr~ IS -onign Military IlhttlIs
ARTIllERY
Orgarilzatlon and Equlpmcnt
n )lnv~tlt ~oldl~r nltcUlry (1-A J()ur 11lly-Jun 1IJH) Cmmun1ltatin wlthm thCliht huUalm iImiddot- Juur _bull ~layshy
Jun 19~R)
~~~~l~~~~~ ~~jh~~~~m~~~~f~~middot~~~~[~rij~IU~~ilI Mny 1938)
(lur artlll~ in 1ll5 (Jtll~ (ljl -hl- Imiddotmiddoth 1118)
I Training Taetla
k~~~ ~~~~ltf~~~g (~[~J~~ - ~l~t~~~ l~i1~ Tralfllfll rurrrinntionll1937 (Jour It r - JullllI)
~~~~~t~~~II~t~~7l~~I~I~~a~~ltl ~r~lif~~~(~1Iw)~~a Apr 113B)
11w A II cmiddot I artdlry fir~middot IItv IIn - Jlln Inll)
ATTACK
Ikllt-n~ nIIin~t aor ntrlltk ~(av Jour - Jul-Au 1l8) The mounttmiddotd attnck In open rdgtr (Cav Juur-~ Jul-Aug
1918) _ EqUIpping for aHk r nVNlt (Mit Fn~ -- Jul-AuI In) TIll emplQymlnt of a tllnk IlfiJllldc (ftTC Jour -- Jul 1918) AHack In modern war ItTC Jour - Jul 1911I ttark Ilnd counter-attack in Spalll HJS ltull ~ iI Jun 1J11l) lr atlacks on ground trop$ (~liI4Wochmiddot--l AIr 1l38) Tlw traimngofcnglnpgtrlplldcrllnncl men (PIOn --[-1middot11913) Th mod~rn tllnk Ita cllpnhihllS and empymltnt in It
(Iaack ltv dInf-Mnr 1J38) Tllnk nttak I~hangt antItank guns I~ l-nll~lI Ilitury
Illlltlmiddotgb AUSTRIA ARMY Of)
n PUhly-lh~ar old mlilary schuu (1)liJ Milt 19111) fltJ
BELGIUM (ARMY OF)
I11slry vI the Inspcctorut GeMral [ the Army unll the HIIshylUln tmimng cent durinllthpoundgt World Vnr Hlul DIlI1 lgtJl-Jln-eh MUT 1938)
Ihmiddotsrijltim Qf educatlflnal and vQcational trnlninK 01 thlt Illll(nln SQ1lti1(t (nul Beige ~fi - Jlln 1938)
Aronalltir mat(middot (Rv Mil Suisse - Dec 1(37)
BUlGARIA (ARMY OF)
Motorlzalionothenrma N(wconccpliQngoforlnniznlion Iquipmcnt and emplnym~nt in fflr(iln armilt~ (Kraft- shy
May 1(38)
CAMOUFLAGpound
Air PW(T afld ro~)p 110VCmLnt (lnl Jour -- May-Jun 1938) Tnllllnr ruminatnR 1917 (Jour It An ~ Jul 1938) Cnmoulnlc nnd blackQut (Mi Mitt -- Mllr 1131) Ground orgullTatltm of t~e Ilir rjf~ Prutcction of airpoTL~
lI~rordmg to ItWltB18n Views MJImiddotWch -8 AN 1938 imlT(middotgHlonq Ilnd IXpctl(ncog of the Spanl~ War (itv ~1il
Suissc--Jun Feh HJ3S)
CANADA (ARMY OF)
(anlth~ tltgtrltlgn pohcy (Cup j)1f Quur-middot-JuI191S) lrQhlltms of defence on the PaCIfic (Can I)f Quar Iu
1J38) CAVAlRY
Organlzltlon and poundqulpmcnt
1918)
CHEMICAL SERVICpound
New wllr I(IUI(gtI [Qr uhl (A Ord - Mlly-Jun ll38) SNurly rr thl ReTVic f RuPIlly (Ch~m Wnr - Jut 1938) lrenutionsIiKuinKtluHlIlIlIkll (MllMltt-Mar1938) PhYRiuloKIlal ~fT(lcL nf j(HStfl (Mll Mitt ~ Mar ]9381 GUIII)roI~tlon of Ill( civil popullltIon nbruad (Mil MIlt-
MlI~ 1938) CHINA (ARMY OF)
~ fhl(91~JlIn~ luraquoitiVlt EXjledition in Chlnll (A QUII1-- Jul
fhumifr in tlw EuM 1 mth~ f til( wllr in Chinu (Jntbull JQl1r-- JUI~lUr 1131) Why Jupun i~ In (hina ((lR W -(j MIlY I9JB) (~an 1Ill Chin~~ rl~i~t illdJinitdy (US Itev - ~luy 13H)
COAST ARTIlLpoundRY
Bombinv plratiolll ill Illlt ~)Jl 01 the iukrior teA Jourshy1ny-Jun lJaS)
~~i~i~r~ft th~mDr[~~a~(~~i 1(~itr3~-(E~Yj~~i 9rel4 jullJ8)
IIm)lIrdmnltatiltgtI (f Jour --Jul-AuJ 193H)
COAST DEfENSE 11lt(ltU or the Bdg1Un rna~( HII44 918 (CA J9uf-Jul~
Aur19J8)
COMMAND STAFF AND LOGISTICS I((IJ[lr~dn(SIlt ioElIRlund IItudy of indo~lrjal m(Jbillzation
JllP flrgalliza1ltI1l and runmiddottion~ or the llltiwal Stfvi(g in cumbimmiddotd opmtouns IIf lund and ~tU frorl_ (Mil Sur shyMy Jun 1J38~
jllctltII IIml Idmml~trllliv(middot ll~ of tlimiddot Var in AUYl8lniu (Juur HOSJ - IIIY IJ38)
Air-hd armimiddotq r omormw (lI H Jul-Aul 1l38) 11lI J~e~~~(JiJ38nfulltTY dhmiddoti~irHl in dmiddotrltn~ (QM iev-shy
dw supply in war soml prohlmiddotml dlA~G QUilt - May 1938)
fill 11middot((1 for a d~partmnt nl SUJII) tU-l IlIv- 9 Jun I ~)3)
NftllH un Iimiddot hirtr cdud f wnr rrltgtm 1792 to 1797nnd frum 1914 I 1918 (ltv ~H1 Gell -- Jan (U 138)
National d(fn~ ltv lI1H (itll ~ Jnn 1938)Ihll l~thOrian Campairn 111 s~rice of supply (ltv Mil
(II-Jun 1938) OrgmTatinn Qf national ddnM (f~vom Gn - Mar 1938)Thu lIupply Qf hlgtrsClI in our urmy (ltv igt1J Smpoundgt - Jan
1938)Tlw mlhlCnce on our tn(tilt~ lllthelltroductionnrmllllof
motnmcd and nrmnnmiddotd (hi((H by our n~lghuors itv Mil SUIC - FllJ 1938)
Mprhlllliwtion [S~ OnginJl Hitary Study)
CONVOYS Air powrllnd lrQnp mOYnQnt (In Jour - ~by-Jun 1938)
COUNTERATTACK AUa~k and rou1l1r-al1u~k ~n Spain (Ult(middot J Jun 1938 1l11k~ In tIll d r11~1V Wlth th Fr Army Aril nud Muy
191H_ (ilvdInf-Jun Ul38)
COUNTERBATTERY Cuuut(gtr lJaUlry in mohile warflllltmiddot IJQUr It rt - - Jnl 1938)
COUNTEROFFENsIVE
Ihe hnUle or middotWIlnltlW AUI(Usl 1920 An fxample of tho rltlunter-n(f~nsl JUf ltV -Muy ll3B
)
r I DE~lLpoundS
Ill ImiddotTOlIlin of the An-l(lIin 1817 St Forlln Mllilflty])1gIHj
DElAYING ACTIONS Command -- Conlrol -- Cummun$tions A rtgim~1l1al
viewPQint (Cnv Jour-Jul-Aug 1938) envnlry tllk s to wheels (I~II orr - Jun InR)N(w ways fQr motor and ridr (Kraft - Milt 1938) HOff( hreding In the region of Rabal and Khemil~eL (Uv
dcCav-Jan-ub 1938) Evolution of British cavalry (ltv du env - 11ar-Arot 1938) ThesitulltionnndmodlofArnhhoTIIImiddotlmedlnglnHgtrill (ltv
de (IIV 4_ Mnr4Aflr lI3S)
hi i~~middot~~~rll~orlli rfK~~~1formalllHJ in 11middot ltuIllllryi
Training Tac1los
Did th(y knQw hoW (Cov Jour - May-Jun 1l38) The rol f iution with m~dlRnllmiddotd ravry ((IW Jm
Jul-Aug 1938) IJdcnAe aloinllt or nllnck (Cav Jour - Jul-AuK 1938) Th( mounted Ilttnltk In pen Qrder_ (Cuv JQur - Jul-Aug
1936)
Orgllflllmg hui~on in the ~I(utinn of demolitions (I~v Mil 01 FlJ 1911raquo
DEMOCRACY
)emocru~ middotr~us dlcta1L)llIhil~ (US R(gtv - 19 IllY 1938)
OJMOLITIONS
TInmiddot vtj fll hmlOliliuJlllin th~rllmJ1Li~n inSnulh 1lano during
()r~lfl~~r~ Ut~l~n j~t~h~~~cJu~i~l~t~~~~i1~lons (ltv Mil r4n--b1938)
DICTATORSHIP
1)~mj)rmriltlJ Vltlt~ dirl~tlt)l1Lhip~ (U~ IlIv - - 19 MIIY 1938)
DISCIPLINE
lrnn 1Ii~dplinc i~ mort nClt~SIlry thnn 4r Itt tlw ~ltllil Army (La Ifllnn Mil )-ZO pr 1118)
ECONOMICS
TIlt (middotvnluatiol1 (If lIw Imlire (ftna CuI MlI- Feb 1988)
91
lt1]) )1)
-i )IoIlt1umiddot JIf)
I
lrl It I)
F
rItHH C[ MllITAnv t rMVAll
I)
FOIlTIFICATIONS
)1 11
11
) fFlA-ICf ARMY OF
) lll
I ) t 101 1 JtI
f
I I 1 I )
) I 11 I -I
I l J]101 1 lt1 I 1 I I (~J
I ~
j I 111
111
Supply
1e
I dlII I 01
i I)
fr I 1 lt1 I I 11)
1 I T[
) JII
1 1
rflANC[ NAVY or
11 I 11 (I 1 J
01 r I 111 11
VUTUflE VJlprAPE
Jl I i~ 11
(i
G(OGnAPIlY MILITARY
It If 1 1-1 11
Cf)nmnd and St lit
1 )q~ J 1 I~I J ) I j gtq bull I II d) d I 1 r
OrlJ IJ Hon nd Equipment
Ii III 1t
I
) ))11I
I II I l[)1
IIrp111tHII
d)l It
I a Irall 111
Trdllinn
1111 1 r 11
[I)middot
1111 d l
II III I 101 h
1
GtRMANY NAVY Of I
11 I )f 01110 )1(I )tl In I~ c 1 1] 1 I IIlt I
Gn[AT nnlTfllN nFlMYOr)
I dr I ~ I 11 -
I )))]1
1 I 101)1 Id j
1 ~ I
Orrl1nr1tn 1nd flUlflnHlt
)1)11 I jn
l r 11)11lt) h qrgt 1111 1ul-IJI
1middot -1 rnll d
middotIlf I II
jl 1 I~ 11 11 r bullbull -1 bull ) nrlnp I r L ft ~ hIgt
1 ~ 111 1-lt1r- bull [eImiddot I 11pI+P 11 ) - I 01 ltd 11 III II 11
1 lIlt1 1)lt1(10 11lt)
ril L ~ lt I d1 I~ l
t bull I1
middotmiddot)r J t 10 I 1)1 r11l hr f ) r
fTl I 1-
Supply
p 1gt1111 It-( 11Ie 1
11 rr IrjllrllIrl Ic~ I - I lr 1) 1lt1111
TrlllJlnl
GRfAT ORITIIN NAVY or)
I j ]1 11lq1 gtI(q)middot11 lItO 1
lNrANl HY
Ornn)r Uon lllrl flUi[HPfllt
rllnlng Tlttlcshy
11tIIr
C amp GSS Qualterl Vol -- ~
h 111111 alld 11-1111 ilf1r1
jlnl middotlr]IIgtl1 Ilr lII~)
INTELLIGENCE middotMILITAHY AND NAVAL)
I 1 I ~ f
1 1
ft) I
1
JAPAN flnMY orl
Ip I ~I d1 1 11 II
1middot1 11 d I
JAPAN NAVY Of)
] j lulllli1 I I -I 1 I ~ Ir
Inolc1 lt111middot 11 11 1t1-lll11j Il)
JOINT OPERATIONS
Ifl r 111111lt11 ] 1 11 111 I
1 I 1- 1 rbull ~1 Il 11middot1
L
LflnGr UNIlS
ArlllY
11 middot1 +]11[1 1101 (h I] li-I
92
LAW (MILITARY AND INT~RNATIONAL)
ReadersGuide andSubject Index
MOBILE WARFARE NETHERLANDS
(uolN Imtry III mhil warfare (Jour It Art _ Jul 191fI) The Ie of the Nelherlandll in lhl wlt)rhl of lO(lay (QM Rov lJ malntrlam of ~I mohilmiddot lorc lJy nir durinl tll1NlItiona in - Mayhm 1l1H
dlt~(rt (ountry (ltMC ltlmr gtlal IJIH)t()I()~Illt101l and mllnuwr 111 ~ltl- 1 IWI) NIGHT OPERATIONS Ih~t~~UWt~~fd~rI~]~~l~~1 t~I~~IJgtinc illviniun in II mobile Nhht rill( crmiddot~liug (ImiddotA Juur- Jul-Aul IJHI)
MQBILITY
)nmmiddot rdtclion~ ltHI infantry materiel and t1ctjCgt (In Jour Jul-Auj 1938)
[nII~1IY III waf shy 80ml Ir()bllm~ (ltMC QUat shy MIIY
lw way~ fUf mutor and ridt (Kraft -~ ~lur 1l38) Tllnk~-armor(tl r(nnnal~~arHmiddot( vmiddothidr and the dcfcll~c
agaln~t th~ [Kraft shy pt 1938)
W~di~lh~~ln (n~~7C~i((~~1i~~IdJ lS)
jJl~~~~~~~~~~nt() j~~~~r~~U~ ~~i~~~~t~~~lj~ the cavalry ISlte Forliln Military DiJe8t~J
MOBILIZATION
Industrial MobilIzation
IrlpllrctlIlC5I in 1nllano1 A Iltudy of indu~trnl mohllizatlon (A Orrl- MnymiddotJun 1938)
o OBSTACLES
f1~uI~~ J)fet~IJI~~14~ iRt~~cE~~mJ~~ij~~l~~~)Poland Eludlul tl eytll uf thc airm)ll (US 1tev- W May 1938)
OIL Pelrol 9u1lgtly in war shy flomc prob[cm~ (RASe Quar shy May
1(38) ORGANIZATION
Sllfallliint-d fighting teallls (Me GIlZ-Jun 1938)
p
MACHINE GUNS
1-u-t ~hl~~~1(~~~~~~IA~~(i)~~jlidj and I h J(
MANEUVER IN WARFARE
S- Sani~h Vnr A rcvi(gtw of til(gt It fltgtrljrr 1ltill 1 JldJouf-Jul-u~Il38) (~blQ-z1llon nnd mmlfUcr (gt1ll htt _ F(h II))
4 MANEUVERS ~~t~~~E~Jl21i1~~l~it~~~~~rJ~~~~ ~middot1)illi~hi~ lDaR)
lc~~tJI1Dn of till arm1 -W cnnpptHgtnq f rl-am7~111n
~t~Jf~h~l~)I)~~~~ltI~f~~~ln J~~ (~~~1~1~1 ~u~-Jan 1lJ8)
~ ]3ndmg from arplan1 ill HUI (Itmiddot ~hl SUImiddot shyt r~lt~e~~~ Army In 1)li jStV F)rti)n ~l1lilr) 1)11131
MARCHES
h~i 3lIIl~t air at tap ICny Jour - Jillmiddot u l~laH)
~~~~r~~~~~~~~i~x~e~~ou[[ ~~r_~~J~~~f~)n ID1) YIamplti hltllgt~hudng Dr wad ruard~ ( t Bul -- Jill
il~Y1 (Of mtof Inl rilter (Krafl -- ~Tar lllii) middotmiddot~f1ttJd~ on ITOum trnolq (~111_Wmh -- 1 Al)r 1J3H) 1tJe-=rgo the ollIh in 1l17 ~( Forcir11 ~111tlry ~ [~~laquotal
MARKSMANSHIP
~lrb~~tlJn5hiP lrainillJ for tll )I)middotmrn mill HI_mill Brandl rOftat ltvjTnf Fth lllH
MARINE CORPS
~~~(tmhrlt-d flrhtinl~ tm1 DJ(middot (17 JUIgt 111lt1
~ MECHANIZATION
t~~ElfJ~fJ~ii~~~~~111 (jOlf HA~IC - ~by H)~Jll)
rtltllngrumtnations1937 (JourIlArt-JuI193l) ~lTlftand mechanised land warfare rh BaUle uf GUHlashy111m 1937 (Jour mJS[ - gtlay 1~J8)
JunlnB)unill(orelgnarmi 1918)
ill for~~~o~lf~rh~~~~f~~~ d rlll~h rmy in tn1 (ltv d Cav - Jan-IH nJtHj flMtld vlhir ejmIJll~ In Moroc(o Ill ltI ClV -- Marshy
11l~1~)f nriti~h mvalry ltv I (w -Iarpr ljIB) teutnmnhll Show of IJn amI irmiddotr rlllllary 1I)1rlt~t (WI
dnf-JanJrJ8) n(lnl am rnc hani7d unit~ (Iv dfnf - Ir ~j~8) elnHuenrnon OUT ta t1l~ or Ih 1ntrduIn r muw of IlIDI~riUllandarmrJ ~middotddImiddotIyournrI()rr lit Ij] Sutw-loh IJl8)
k=~~niu ~~~~ri~~h~1i~~1 yen~i~IIIP (aalry I~~oreirn Miltary lJiKtHj
MEDICAL sERVICE
provLoatlln and pradkul work 111 (ami (Jour It Me shylilY 1938) tPloblemofm(chanlzati()nllsilllrrtCtsllltm(djcII~(rvicl
l1otU nAMe _ May HJ3B)
MORALE
lorlllc I~houldcr to shoulder) (Cav Jour JGB) - Jul 191S)
MOnGAN Sir Hcnry (l615-H1HB)
Ih momiddotd ~Iand(rrd mlln in history (Nav InBt Iro( -- JUII lJall)
MOTORCYCLES
lHnary motorryde~ (In Jour- lIlal-Jun 11l3ll) lJc y(li~t quadran In th(gt rcconnlllgsallce unit (Mil-Woch
TI~ l~il~lr)J~~Lr() ([( (R de Cay - JIIII-I~~b 193R)
MOTORIZATION
Ar powIr anllroop mov(mtnL (In Jour - rfily-Jun 1laH) 11htary monrl)rh~ In JOUt- Iay-Jun IIR) omrdlrtlltm~()n mrntrymaterid and ladie (fnfJourshy
rulmiddotAul 1918)TllmiddottIC11 and atimiJ1IHlrntlv 1ltl~onS flf the Wllr III AblMlnla
(JourltllSI-gtlay llaS) ircraft ant m(halli~(middotd land warfare The Battle uf Guadl
A ~~J~r~~~~~~i~7~ihitl~J~ ~h~a~rsl ~lorJzation procrllm QIT Itv-May-Juo 1918)
SlIlH tatkallr-~~nq In rlnlrtion With M 1 fmpIHY(] )11 llrationq alin~t an irwgullr (filmy (RAsG qunrshyMay 1)IH)
Eludllll til( (Y~ f th mmln (US Rev -1J l1ay 1l1R) New wayq [or motor and rid(gtf Kraft - lInr 19J8) ArmorlI mmiddotclultlizmiddotJ ad mutorpd unit~ r foreill1 armLe8
TI~~~7~la~~~Irco~~~f~~a~~I~nl~I~) and the dcfctl~e alain~t thltsc (Kruft-Apr 1938)
Motorization of thenrm~ New conceptionsa1 orgrtnization bull lluJmcnt and cmplolmfnt in forClgn Urmlcg (Kruft shylIfay W18)
Ifntorizatlon and manltlIVtr (lliI [ltt-Feb1J38) tw inmiddottl]()dH fr rrosHlnl rivrrH h) motorized tinlt (1(011
1middotmiddothll)K) (oa and mlor~ (Ita Cui Mil- F(b 1918) Trllt tollitary molnnyd It dv Cav - Jan-Igteb 1938) Ijp Jrll~h rmy m 1~l7 llv d~ Cay -Jufi-Jd lilaH) Ih utnmIJmiddot Show of 1l17 od (~ m[iry IntllmiddotHt (ltv
lnl ~ Jan WaH) T)w mftulw On our ptir~ nr lh in1tnduIiltm of rn ~~ f
UWod aud armord middothid~ by nur ]( IlIhlJorq (ltv 1111 -l1i ~middotmiddot- FdJ 1111)
111~~~1~~~~~~~J ilr~~~ ~~~~~I Irmal I()t~ In tli callulry
N
NATfONAL DEFENSE
Ihc dd~ ( Switt rbnd The (1f(11arltdn~ gtolhieH of n llml In urnwd 1uro]Jmiddot ( Onl - Muyjun iJ18)
lrqrtlnl~ in 1ljtul11 1 fltuly f irlltlu~trilll ftIohih7l1till (A Unl gt1 Jun ll)aH)
StralJlcandrliilmiddotam1l1rml~ Tlwirrlntlnlt(]UUrnnt]oll
j~I(I~~r~tifpoundr~i~I~~~~~~f~~~rllUNlI~ t~lf 1(1~~(~ - Jul I~Q ~
Tinmiddot ur~atlI7an()1l nIH ntlVl1h~ uf tlamiddot Mdk11 illIHlflftlNlt of til Army 1he imIHlrlnm of mNidn~ in IIIHlollUI If~ (Iii SUrl - Aflr 1l18)
A~hmorl uJ-rni1ltd (ltH Quar- J111191H) )IIJ~~Il~~~futiI~(Ul1dlnl of Ih t1lW d(fmiddotl1lmiddotImiddot~ (Hoy jng
IHltai1 f(middotnrmllrnmiddotnl (UH RIv - 2( Mill HJ38) Nnliunnl dfr)IJw [tv 111 (jll - Jntll~Il1i)
C~I~~tJ1( It~I~liG~ ~ ~~ jJli It~j rIlI~ In national Organization of nnlional dlfensc (ltv 1111 Gcn - Mar 19111) l1echanrzation JSt~ ()ri~lnal Milllary StudyJ
PALESTINE
latcHtillC loteH (HUll Cui Mil- Feb 1938)
PERU (ARMY OF)
r1H (rllf~inK 01 the Andltl In 1811 Scc loreigll Military DilcstsJ
POLAND (ARMY OF)
TankR - armored fcconnaiMllncc vlhicJes and lim dcfenBc ngulnntthlc (Kraft-Apr 1938)
PORTUGAL (ARMY OF)
A PurtUlUllIC chronidu 01 the mrpcditlon f Don Chrilltopher (III Gamll ill (lhylinia (UI1Il Cui Mil - Feb 1938)
POSITION WARFARE
11 incvitlllJility ulcontinuoUlfronts IS(( ltorcign MillLary l)il(81f1J
The Ibntiou of fronl JSec Jltoreiln Military Digests
PRESS
Illlt inl1u(n(( of the prs~ in Great Britain and America (JuurUSlI-AprI918)
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda (Jour USlJ-Apr 193R)
Q
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE
Planning Branch Construction Division Offi(( or the Quar termasht General ~Qt Hev - May-Jun 1938)
A (olnmrdal Vl(gtwllOint on the army9molotitnllOn program ((~M ltlmiddotv-MllyJun W3R)
Air-fed Ilrmies of tomorrow (QM Hev -Jul-Au~ 1938) TIIC HUIlPly or an infantry dlmiddotjsion in deflmiddotnflC (Qrt Revshy
JulAug 138) Prt rol ~Ullily in war - somc llwblems (HliSe QUllr - May
]J38) Slme IneUeul [cgtlons in rOnncmiddottion with MT emplollil in
tJPernlinsn~ain~t In krlI~IRr enemy (ItASC QUllt shyMay 1938)
Tim maintenance orn mohile farec by air during opeflltlou9in dtHert Ctluntry (HASC QuaT - May 1938)
R
RAIOS
A~hmnre m(Jd~rnltlltf llo IA9~On~ lOr the SPlJlildl War AirmidHnnd theirffT(cta l~xl)rjenrlJ In GII~ pro(ction
MarHI3SAnt-nlr mid fgtll1ldlnj nrn~lruttlon (Mil Mitt - Mar 11138) Ilr raid shdt(rII (lliJ Mitt- Mar 1938)
RECONNAISSANCE
rile fol of (nllItion with mcrhlni~1d cnvlllry (Cav Jour-JIll-AUf( 111)8)11 yrll~t Rlulldron In Ih reconnaissance unit (Mil-Woeh -1 Apr 1935)
H~NN~NKAMPF Gtllurni Paul (1854-191B)
ltennenkllmpfs mid in th( waf witb Chinn (Rv de GavshyMnrmiddotAp(1938)middot
93
-- - --- --
I
r
Reltders-Guidc alld Subject Index c amp GSS Quarter~
ilvht n r (r r
LlIlppm~ fflr T1Nw 1IllljId [ (f
Fb lil~l
r ~ rmiddot I f
d ROUTES COMMUNICATIONS
1P)IJIWrflId 11 1 I ~ JI IfWIIIr I t II
middot1 ltI ~ 1 IIK
11
VI11ltrwymiddot
I
PUSSIA
1 )1
Ibullbull
1 1 1
11[ 1
11middot
[IWowrn J
SLCURITY
lid I
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
~IGAl SErtVIC(
i 1Jf 1_
SPAIN ARMY OF
middot1lt1
5unMARINfS
1 ]1
ljPPlY
1It
III) 1 11
11 110
1 I~ )1
) 1 I I~ 11 H
middot1 I I) I Un amiddot bull ~I
Pi J- I ~ I J Il n I I )
lr1I))
i (
Ilj I 1
I II 11 If
11middot I 1]1 1 I
SWITZERLAND ARMY or
tf lIf Irlo IhpllllrmlulhlllofmatIPIof ltI fl j -)1lt1 loy ur IvhlT Iltv
F 111gt
T
TACTICS OPpoundRATiON5
LI rlfr 1llllll(tlwr uIIWlHJ I f Jlnrhmiddot IJIIU I lay
j 1 tT-It JunlllIlJ I ll lid mHn jlbIgt Il
I i~ lt bull I I ILl 1 T 11 I 01111101 Ib ~ld
( ]11middot I I I I J n 11lt 1 lllf~
Ollrn~ Cot~It
IImiddot lhItll fluar Jul ) shy
([UHr I111-ullIIK) bull rd r II 1 ~ J ur Jul- 0 111
1 1 bull rmiddot - I fl1 nl 1111111 I~J RI I1gt-)IrJtl 1 lola
1 1
Spc1ilIWilrtilro
r r In JII) ~ joll Jul-AIW 1lllll r II Id~ n IRI7 [ ForI)n ~ftlIH
[ nltlllnUlrPldli 1~f(middotrI1 1lhtnrv
Troop Movoment~
lav-JunlfIR) lui fJH)
War In Abyl~IlI
1+ ~11lY 11ll1 lib til ~UI~
1gt1
TRAfnC CONTROL
1 wtmiddotj IrpJnrnnt 11IJ lw1un Inll 1ludIlmiddot h I II IlIrmrl (0-0 It v 11 III~ Jllkl
TRAN~PonTATION
rl-rdlrlllnlIl[ Ilfluf fUIII[I1ro r 1 n rlnlr~ nl t1 I Inigtlt 11II]t
bd nf 11 fj) 1 UIltll1 11 7 IJnlr It All JulllK) J I lr1 ltI nlmITnll~p 1lt0 of tl1l ur III AhI1rpn
r I ~11lt1 f flV 1l1k) fIJI vnr JI II n~ 0 11lt10111 (f HII Ill
1111 -10 til 11f1I l~ n )) rnn 11gt Wllh L1 Inplyp 1ll
Irolll wjrit n Irrltvla~ I my IltASt ~11-1I1I1yll3f1)
I IIlt mllllllHlllel f a rongtrgt furmiddotI hy nlr dUnnv OIlgtrnliOll~ In (fp~Ht rnunlry (ItAS QuaT- ~fllY IDJ8)
~~~~I~I~~I~() 1~~)(~rl~I~dn g~C~~ M~9t~J~r 19MI Itl~ llud molltgtr I HIl1 ( 111 tl1 - 1111 l~lH) imltltgttNiOll and ltXI rmiddot I thC Spnnlllh VIlT illv)1]
0U1~1 IlIn lph 1l3l)
(T
UNITED STATES IARMY OF)
Commilnd ilnd Stl
1tIIIIHTIlIllIlf IJIfJour Ifngt-Junl)]R)
Orlpnlxltlotl IInd Equipment
J ) f)alllaln Il IIrtlIIlt Ib I(dco1lhrutrttnrntol 1)1 fllI) TIllt mp)r[n~ or nHOrnp 11 1llOnal dpfenll 1 ~urmiddot Apr 1l1lt1
npf -11 nil nIW rnnrt71l1un program ~I Hmiddot~ 11 _1 1)lt)
Trlld flll1I11 11ITIr )1141111]lt lT lO t rfllah II-middotrh I Alr l~IIR)
UNITEO STATES INAVY OF)
Commnnd and Stltlff
I~~ w1 ru I 1 If~t Proc - Jul 1l3H)
Orgilnlxatlon and Equipment
t ()rnl (~avlnHtTr()r-Ju
Trllnlng
I) Hb1 mm I PrIOr lui ngt Ih)lll1 1 In Irr Il) 1111
VETERINARY SpoundRV1CE
gtIhld Jrmiddot~lJ)I Igtr r1 marrhl It Bu-J~l tl1lt)
w WAR PEACE
~tr3Ir nil fticmiddott m1lfnn~ TIl Ir UmiddotlllttOn t Hur nnllnnll rurlfy (AOri- JI-1Jf(EIlll
I~middotqnmiddot frH )Hllll IF JIlr [lI-JUfl 1flaKl irOHT or nr (Jour lSll - pr Ilf) 1~t 1fruHmn1 or 1IPII rnr VM 1(~M H la)
lUT lJJ~) I lip gtarhnrou a)middot lt It 11 Jul ]118) 1IIIra 0 mhtnn n~liw (gt1t1 1l1t~ JIII1 FJ 19J Wnr lIId l1(nclt Iltn4 (ul gt1 -llTI1l8)
WARS
FIUC
ITALY-ABYSS1NIA (1935-1936)
(nmpitlnHll1hwp
hrdt Mar 1~11~) ~-~ 1( i of uply I1h ~_
1
CHINA
BOXM RCbclllon 11(00)
Itllnampr rud 111 II Hr llh (llInll It rio (at shylr Ir 1)lt)
JIPAN-CHINA 1930~
11 1111111middot 111 11111111 (mil 1 IUH -1 Il
111 r ill Ih I~T T11 In 11Ih~ of Ihr wllr til (Inn Jr Imiddotur Iu umiddot)llil
1 dlUrl)ll 1111 ([1 (I (rlt nt (Nfl I~I lr~middotr - Jl lIR)
1( ~gtn~ klrm at ihIl11~h11 It In (Nav In~t lrur - ~cf 13H)
h Jo1lnn 1laquo 1 rhlnn IllS n - r If) lt)1)) (ui tillt (hUllt r l( nllil)lll 11- Itt ~IIV 19~ I)middot War I Ih Ir Ii~( (hl gt-Itl Inn 11l11) Illlt ~1lmiddotalllmiddot Witt 1tl4 (ul 11 -JlI1 Fb 1138)
1lllt()
P(NINSULAR WAR IIBOB-tBI41
(air) Inll lInoupmiddot rIO( 1 nlllmlnr ur middotmiddotIlllllIJ ithrllth Jllh IHill (a~ lollr (Inl-Jul 1)l~)
nUSSIA-POlAND (1920)
II 1111 I fltnI U)III 11~1l 11 Igtnmpl (ll It UIl rnrr nmiddot IJuT HII - Mnv 1~3R)
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 11936_19361
I 1(1~~~1 ill -r~li~~uni~~ltll fnll til krpp parI WI1h lIrhnigt
Tallk ur unt 1 lnl~ (tI1I I It r t~unr - Jul 191f~) J1~~()111 r~om Splln (1 Jour-~ Mny-Jun llJ8) lh S]gtmll~h Vur rllw of thp I)(~t ron ign Ojl1n101 (Jr
I~~rrl--1I~TX~~~~n~~~(1 nnd wnrfllfo flw bllltr 01 Gu~dl Injnfn1931 (Jour nUSI - Mny IU3l)
V~ ~
94
~d eollUlmiddotattaek ~ss~_(yen~uIfl938)9 JUll 1938)
-2IJui193S cmiddot S R(v-28 Jill 1938
1937) (BulBelgeMiI
Feb 1938)eli the Ebro River
Feb 1938) two recent artldlR
en-Mar 1938)
Imt=~J~~~FcetJ~8) of the Spanish War (Ry Mil
SOUTH AMEmCA ~=1K or the A~Tr8~A~ Ponign MililMy
CIVIL WAR (1861~1865)
iR ~~i ~~c 7J~~rI~ pct~J~I193i)1 193R)
WORD WAR (19141913)
C _ Soclo-Economlc History
WuGerm(lny dclcal~ 11l1918~ (Jollr RUSI - lay 1l38)
G - Arm and Selllce~
ARTILLERY
~ ~~l5Il of the Dlginn coast 1914_1918 (CA Jour - Julmiddot I Aug 1938)
OurutUery ill 1915 (HWI Cui ~m - Feb 1938)
CAVALRY
[)Id they know how (Cav Jour - MayJun 19311) A cavalry offieera experhmiddotneea on the Indian Frontier during
the Wat (Cav Jour [OBI - Jul 1938)
ENGINEER
The UIoe of demolitionllin thedmpaign in Soulh Polnnu duro Ing Oclo~r 1914 Roy Eng Jour - Jun 1938)
MFD1CAISEltVICamp
Contributions or the World Wat to the advancement or mfdimiddot cine (MiiSurg-JuI1938)
TANKti
TankB in the ddenaiYc With the Flrtlt Army 111 AJlril and Muy 1916 (Rvdlnf-Jnn 1938)
Mcchnniution [SiX Originnl MiliLnry Study)
H _ Military Candu t of tho Wnr In tho Flold
The other lidpound of thpound Hill No XVI Aubpoundrn Hidgc 9th of May 1915 (A Quar-Julll38)
Jh~ ~~~i~n~o ~fi~U~~nlv7Jamp~fobft~Yi~uNlt~e~~her 1H4
N~~lo~(t~ ~~~h-~~~d~rol~ (rom 1792 to 1797 nnll from 19141() 1918 (ltv Mil Gcn- Jan l~poundh 19311) bull
Organizing liaiwn in the (middotxNution of dmiddotmltllitlons (Rv Mil Gn - Feh 1938)
J _ Campaigns amp 9attlos
EUROIEAN AUF- - Ilul~IAN TIfFJITfm
The u~c of tlemotionll in th campaign in South Poland during October 1914 (Hoy Eng Jour - Jun 19311)
EURONAN Anp - WESTERN TJfAT~n
1914
Did they know how1 (Cav Jour- lnymiddotJun 19311) The defln9C of Dhmudc 17 October to 10 Nov(middotmhcr 1914
(nul Dolge MiI- Feb Mllr 1938)
ERRATA (To June 1938 Quarterly No 69)
Readers Guide and SubjectIndexgt
1915
Tho nthllt ~Ido of the Hill No XVI Aubcftl Ridge 9lb of MaytHU5 (A Quar - Ju(1938)
1917
orfl~~i~l~lbli9MfI the exe~tlon of demOlitions (RvMII
1918
fanks In th( d(teulliv( With thQ FIlI~ Army April and MllY 1918 (Rvdlnf-JanHl38)
L - Nava Hiltory
Thc lIulJrnlirinl war In 1915 (MnmiddotWoeh - g Apr 19111)
WEAPONS
A lIy~tem of antimiddottank delenn) (Can Der Qubr--Jul1938) Some rdl(lonll on Infantry mate~lel and tactics (Inf Jour
JulmiddotAug 1938) Strenmlined lightlng team (Me Gaz- Iun 1938)f and lhe defenllC
Feb 1938) nt (Mil Mitt-
Mar 1938) ImplCSlllons and erperiences of the Spani5h War (Rv Mil
Suifll(l-Jsn Feb 1938) ank atlack agaimlt antitank gunll Sec Foreign MlIilllry
Digestlll
WITHDRAWAL
(1) P(lgc 94 - Title should read MANGIN Counterattack or June
11 lrl)8page 112 Line 9 Muzzle velocity should read 831 mete~ per second (2725 fs) instead or 381 meters per second
I I
95
I
- 1]
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- Untitled
-
