comelec memo re grace poe

8/19/2019 Comelec Memo Re Grace Poe

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURT

MANILA

EN BANC

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S.POE-LLAMANZARES,

Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. NO. 221697

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S.POE-LLAMANZARES,

Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. NO. 221698-700

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,FRANCISCO S. TATAD,ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS andAMADO D. VALDEZ,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MEMORANDUM(FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS)

PUBLIC RESPONDENT, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS(COMELEC), by counsel, in compliance with the order for the submissionof memoranda by the parties, respectfully submits this Memorandum.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Article VII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. No person may be elected Presidentunless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,


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a registered voter, able to read and write, at least fortyyears of age on the day of the election, and a resident

of the Philippines for at least ten years immediatelypreceding such election.

“Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines

from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their

Philippine citizenship”.1

WHY NATURAL-BORN?

The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices is toinsure that the holders of these high public offices grewup knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines.In their formative years they knew they owed from birththeir allegiance to the Philippines. In case any othercountry claims their allegiance, they would be faithfuland loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizensfrom birth. This is particularly true to the President who isthe commander-in-chief of the armed forces. ThePresident of the Philippines must owe, from birth,allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown upknowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth.Xxx.2

WHY RESIDENCY REQUIRED?

The Constitution and the law requires residenceas a qualification for seeking and holding elective public

office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to befamiliar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentialsfor growth and all matters vital to the welfare of theirconstituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate toevaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness forthe job they aspire for.3

We shall address in this memorandum the basic issue as to

whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to

1 Article IV, Section 2, 1987 Philippine Constitution.2 J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004.3 Torayno, Sr. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000.


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lack or excess of jurisdiction as to call for the exercise by this Honorable

Court of its review power under Article VIII, Section 1, of the

Constitution.4

Likewise, we shall discuss the issues set forth in the Advisory for

the Oral Arguments, as well as the questions that were directed, during

the hearings of these consolidated cases, to be addressed in the parties’

memoranda, notably the following:

1. May not foundlings be presumed as natural-born Philippinecitizens under the “Silence of the Constitution” precept, or in light ofits provisions on the Family, Social Justice, and Human Rights, andconsidering further the adverse consequences of adecision disqualifying petitioner 5 from running for President in theMay 9, 2016 elections to other foundlings in the country allegedlynumbering close to 4,000 in all?

2. Should not the COMELEC have made factual findings onwhether –

(a) Poe is natural-born based on the probability of her parentagebeing –

(i) Both parents – Filipinos;(ii) Father – Filipino; mother – alien;(iii) Father – alien; mother – Filipino;(iv) Both parents – aliens.6

(b) Poe is natural-born Filipino based on her height of 5’2”, colorbrown, eyes brown, hair black;(c) Poe is natural-born because of the probability her parents

were Filipinos considering that –

(i) Roughly 90% of Iloilo residents are Filipinos;

4 Id.; Article VIII, Section 1, provides:

“The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be

established by law.

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of theGovernment”.

5 Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares shall be referred to, interchangeably, as petitioner or as

Poe, for brevity.6 Other scenarios such as “Both parents – foundlings” were not mentioned.


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(ii) The place where she was found abandoned, viz.,doorstep of Jaro church, points to the likelihood that

it must have been a Roman Catholic Filipino fatheror mother or couple who brought and left her there.

3. Can there be a material misrepresentation on a novelquestion of law, i.e. whether or not a foundling is a natural-bornFilipino citizen?

I - THE MATERIAL DATES

1.1. On 23 December 2015, COMELEC En Banc promulgated itsResolutions on SPA No. 15-001(DC) (“Elamparo Case”) and theconsolidated SPA No. 15-002 (DC) (“Tatad Case”), SPA No. 15-007(DC) (“Valdez Case”) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) (“Contreras Case”),hereinafter referred to, collectively, as the “Assailed Resolutions”.

1.2. On 28 December 2015, Petitioner filed with this HonorableCourt the above-captioned Petitions for Certiorari.

1.3. On 28 December 2015, TRO was issued by the HonorableChief Justice of the Supreme Court restraining the COMELEC fromimplementing the Assailed Resolutions, and ordering COMELEC to fileits comment on the Petitions within a non-extendible period of 10 daysfrom receipt of said TRO.

1.4. On 7 January 2016, the COMELEC filed its Comment on thePetition in SPA No. 15-002 (DC) (“Tatad Case”), SPA No. 15-007 (DC)

(“Valdez Case”), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) (“Contreras Case”) docketedas G.R. No. 221698-700.

1.5. On 11 January 2016, the COMMELEC filed a Motion to AdmitComment, with attached Comment, on the Petition in SPA No. 15-001(DC) (“Elamparo Case”) docketed as G.R. No. 221697.

1.6. At the conclusion of the hearing on 16 February 2016, the

parties were ordered to file their respective memorandum within a non-extendible period of 5 days or until 22 February 2016 (due date, 21February 2016, being a Sunday).

1.7. This Memorandum for public respondent COMELEC isrespectfully filed within the required period.


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II - THE CASE

2.1. These are consolidated special civil actions for certiorariunder Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureas amended by A.M. 07-7-12-SC.

2.2. In G.R. No. 221697 entitled “MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S.POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS andESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,” petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside theResolution dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPANo. 15-001(DC) (“Elamparo Case”), the dispositive portion of whichstates:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Verified Motion forReconsideration of Respondent is hereby DENIED and theMotion for Partial Reconsideration of Petitioner is herebyGRANTED.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution dated 1 December 2015 ofthe COMELEC Second Division is hereby AFFIRMED WITHMODIFICATION. Respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy forPresident in the 9 May 2016 National Local and ARMMElections contains material misrepresentations as to both hercitizenship and residency.

THEREFORE, the Certificate of Candidacy for President inthe 9 May 2016 National, Local and ARMM elections filed byRespondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzaresis hereby CANCELLED.

FURTHER, the Urgent Motion to Exclude of Petitioner ishereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

2.3. In G.R. Nos. 221698-700 entitled Mary Grace Natividad S.Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, Francisco S. Tatad,

Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez , Petitioner seeks to nullifyand set aside the Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC

En Banc in the consolidated cases of SPA No. 15-002 (DC) (“TatadCase”), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) (“Valdez Case”), and SPA No. 15-139(DC) (“Contreras Case”), the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CommissionRESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY theVerified


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Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACENATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. TheResolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission FirstDivision is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

III - THE FACTS

3.1. On 3 September 1968, Petitioner was found abandoned in achurch in Jaro, Iloilo City, by one Edgardo Militar.

3.2. Three days after, or on 6 September 1968, Edgardo Militarreported to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City that Petitionerwas found on 3 September 1968. She was given the name “Mary GraceNatividad Contreras Militar” in her Certificate of Live Birth. She was alsoissued a foundling certificate.

3.3. On 13 May 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal,granted the petition for adoption of Petitioner by actors Susan Roces(Jesusa Sonora Poe) and Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe).Thus, Petitioner’s name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad SonoraPoe.

3.4. Sometime in 1988, Petitioner went to Boston College in theUnited States (“US”) to study. She graduated with a degree of Bachelorof Arts in Political Studies.

3.5. On 27 July 1991, Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.Llamanzares, an American citizen.

3.6. On 29 July 1991, Petitioner left the Philippines to live with herhusband in the US, along with her three children: Brian (born in 1992 inthe US), Hanna MacKenzie (born in 1998 in the Philippines), and Jesusa

Anika (born in 2004 in the Philippines).

3.7. On 18 October 2001, Petitioner became a citizen of theUnited States of America (“USA”) by naturalization. On 19 December2001, the USA Passport Agency in Washington issued USA PassportNo. 017037793 to Petitioner.


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3.8. On 11 December 2004, Petitioner’s adoptive father, the actorFernando Poe Jr., was stricken ill and admitted at the St. Luke’s MedicalCenter in Quezon City. He eventually slipped into a coma.

3.9. When Petitioner learned of her father’s condition, she wentback to the Philippines on 13 December 2004. The following day,Petitioner’s father died. Petitioner stayed in the country to comfort hergrieving mother and to assist in taking care of the funeral arrangementsand in the settlement of her father’s estate.

3.10. Petitioner stayed in the Philippines until 3 February 2005.

3.11. Petitioner claims that as a result of the untimely death of herfather and her need to continue giving moral support and comfort to hermother, she and her husband decided to return to the Philippines forgood sometime in the first quarter of 2005. Petitioner further alleges thatshe had already resigned from work in 2004. In early 2005, Brian’s andHanna’s schools in the US were informed that they would be transferringto the Philippines for the next semester. Petitioner and her husband alsobegan negotiating with property movers in order to arrange the relocationof their household goods, furniture, and cars from the US to thePhilippines. They also inquired with Philippine authorities as to theprocedure for bringing their dogs into the country.

3.12. Petitioner returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.Petitioner’s husband however stayed in the USA to finish pendingprojects and arrange the sale of their family home.

3.13. Meanwhile, Petitioner and her children lived with her motherin San Juan City. Petitioner enrolled Brian in Beacon School in TaguigCity in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005.

Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, whenshe was already old enough to go to school.

3.14. In the second half of 2005, Petitioner and her husbandacquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.Petitioner and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their

family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

3.15. In April 2006, Petitioner’s husband resigned from his work inthe US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and beganworking for a Philippine company in July 2006.


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3.16. Also in 2006, Petitioner and her husband acquired a vacantlot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.

3.17. On 7 July 2006, Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 or theCitizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (“R.A. No. 9225”).

3.18. On 10 July 2006, Petitioner filed with the Bureau ofImmigration and Deportation (“BID”) a petition for the reacquisition of herPhilippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Simultaneously, Petitioneralso filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her threechildren who were all below 18 years old.

3.19. On 18 July 2006, the BID issued an Order grantingPetitioner’s petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship. The same Orderlikewise declared that Petitioner’s children were “deemed citizens of thePhilippines.”

3.20. On 31 July 2006, the BID issued Identification Certificates or

“ICs” for Petitioner and her three (3) children.

3.21. On 31 August 2006, the Commission on Elections(“COMELEC”) registered Petitioner as a voter of Brgy. Santa Lucia, SanJuan City.

3.22. On 13 October 2009, Petitioner secured from the Departmentof Foreign Affairs (“DFA”) her new Philippine Passport with No.XX4731999.

3.23. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino IIIappointed Petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Reviewand Classification Board (“MTRCB”).

3.24. On 20 October 2010, Petitioner executed an Affidavit ofRenunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of AmericanCitizenship before a notary public in Pasig City.

3.25. On 21 October 2010, Petitioner submitted to the BID thenotarized Affidavit of Renunciation. She then took her oath asChairperson of the MTRCB before President Aquino on that same date(21 October 2010).


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3.26. On 12 July 2011, Petitioner executed before the Vice Consulat the US Embassy in Manila an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation ofNationality of the United States.

3.27. On 9 December 2011, the US Vice Consul issued toPetitioner a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States,wherein it was stated that Petitioner “expatriated herself” on 21 October2010, the same date shown in Petitioner’s US passport.

3.28. Per the Petitioner’s travel log from the BID, it appears that

Petitioner travelled and used her US passport on 26 July 2006, 11September 2006, 01 November 2006, 20 July 2007, 23 July 2007, 31October 2007, 05 October 2008, 20 April 2009, 21 May 2009, 31 July2009, 03 August 2009, 15 November 2009, and 27 December 2009.

3.29. On 02 October 2012, Petitioner filed with the COMELEC herCOC for Senator of the Philippines, and wherein she answered underoath “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in thePhilippines before May 13, 2013”.

3.30. On 16 May 2013, Petitioner was proclaimed as Senator ofthe Philippines after topping the 2013 senatorial elections.

3.31. On 19 December 2013, Petitioner was issued a diplomaticpassport.

3.32. On 18 March 2014, Petitioner was issued a regular Philippinepassport.

3.33. On 16 September 2015, Petitioner announced her candidacyfor President of the Philippines in the May 2016 elections.

3.34. On 15 October 2015, Petitioner filed her COC for President ofthe Republic of the Philippines.

3.35. Petitioner attached to her COC for President an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to

before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

3.36. In her COC for President, Petitioner declared that she is a“natural-born Filipino citizen” and that her “residence in the Philippinesup to the day before May 9, 2016” is “10 years and 11 months”.


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3.37. On 16 October 2015, Private Respondent Elamparo filed aVerified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate ofCandidacy of the petitioner. On 19 October 2015, Private RespondentTatad filed a Verified Petition for the Disqualification of Petitioner. On 20October 2015, Private Respondent Contreras filed a Petition for theCancellation of Petitioner’s COC. On 9 November 2015, PrivateRespondent Valdez filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancelthe COC of Petitioner.

3.38. Clarificatory hearing for the Elamparo Petition was heldbefore the COMELEC Second Division on 10 November 2015.

Clarificatory hearing for the Tatad, Valdez, and Contreras Petitions wasconducted before the COMELEC First Division on 25 November 2015.The parties were directed to file their respective memorandum.

3.39. On 23 November 2015, the parties filed their respectiveMemorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence for SPA No. 15-001 (DC).

3.40. On 3 December 2015, the parties filed their respectiveMemorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence for the consolidated

petitions under SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and SPANo. 15-139 (DC).

3.41. The petitions were submitted for resolution upon the filing ofthe required memoranda.

3.42. The foregoing facts appear as findings of facts of theCOMELEC En Banc in the Assailed Resolutions, based on the evidenceon record, the submissions of the parties and their admitted/stipulated

facts during the preliminary conference and during the clarificatoryhearings.

3.43. On 01 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Divisionissued its Resolution in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) finding that Petitionercommitted material misrepresentation in her COC for President whenshe declared therein that she would have been a resident of thePhilippines for “10 years and 11 months” up to the day before the 9 May2016 elections.

3.44. On 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division issuedits Resolution in the consolidated petitions under SPA No. 15-002 (DC),SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) finding Petitioner hadcommitted material misrepresentation when she declared therein thatshe is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for“10 years and 11 months” up to the day before the 9 May 2016 elections.


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3.45. On 07 December 2015, Petitioner filed her Motion forReconsideration of the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated01 December 2015. Private respondent Elamparo also filed a Motion forPartial Reconsideration of said Resolution on the same date.

3.46. On 16 December 2015, Petitioner filed her Motion forReconsideration of the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELECFirst Division.

3.47. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued itsResolution affirming with modifications the COMELEC Second Division’s1 December 2015 Resolution. The COMELEC En Banc found thePetitioner’s COC for President contains material misrepresentations asto both her citizenship and residency.

3.48. On the same date, the COMELEC En Banc issued itsResolution affirming the COMELEC First Division’s 11 December 2015Resolution finding material misrepresentations in Petitioner’s COC as toboth her citizenship and residency.

3.49. On 28 December 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petitions,challenging the Assailed Resolutions before this Honorable Court.

3.50. On 28 December 2015, the Supreme Court through theHonorable Chief Justice issued a TRO restraining the COMELEC from

implementing its Resolutions, and directed COMELEC to file its commenton the Petition within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt ofthe TRO.

3.51. On 07 January 2016, the COMELEC filed its Comment onthe Petition in G.R. No. 221698-700.

3.52. On 11 January 2016, the COMMELEC filed a Motion to Admit

Comment, with attached Comment, on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697.

3.53. On 13 January 2016, the Supreme Court’s Clerk of Courtissued an Advisory on the Order of Presentation and Arguments,enumerating the issues to be covered in the oral arguments, thusly:


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A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES:

1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the

Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of

Candidacy (COC) filed by Elamparo, Valdez and

Contreras and the Petition for Disqualification filed by

Tatad.

2. Whether the COMELEC should have dismissed

and not entertained the Petition filed by Tatad against

Poe:

i. On the ground of failure to state the cause

of action;

ii. For invoking grounds for a petition to cancel

or deny due course to a COC under Section 78 of

the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) in relation to

Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

(COMELEC Rules);

3. Whether Rule 23, section 8 of the COMELEC’s

Rules of Procedure violates Article IX-A, Section 7 of

the 1987 Constitution or whether it is contrary to

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

4. Whether the COMELEC usurped the jurisdiction

of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal when it ruled on

Poe’s eligibility to run as President, particularly withrespect to her citizenship and residence.

5. Whether the COMELEC is precluded from

determining whether Poe is a natural-born Filipino

citizen considering the SET’s November 17, 2015

Decision in Case No. 001-15.

6. Whether the COMELEC’s ruling on Poe’scitizenship effectively revoked the July 18, 2006 Order

of the Bureau of Immigration declaring Poe to be

presumptively natural-born Filipino and approving her

petition to re-acquire natural-born Filipino citizenship.


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B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

I. ON CITIZENSHIP.

Did Poe commit material misrepresentation under

Section 78 of the OEC in relation to Section 74 of

the OEC and Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules, when

she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born

Filipino citizen?

i. Who has the burden of proof in proving that

Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen?

ii. Did Poe intend to mislead the electorate by

stating in her COC that she is a natural-born

Filipino citizen?

iii. Is Poe considered as a natural-born Filipino

citizen under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935Constitution?

iv. Assuming that Poe is a natural-born Filipino

citizen, what is the effect when: (a) she

renounced the same and took allegiance to the

US; and (b) when she availed of the benefits of

repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225?

v. Did Poe in any manner recant her Oath of

Renunciation of her US citizenship?

vi. What is the role of international law on the

matter of citizenship

II. ON RESIDENCY.

Did Poe commit material misrepresentation,

under Section 78 of the OEC in relation to

Section 74 of the OEC and Rule 23 of the

COMELEC Rules, by stating in her COC that


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her period of residency up to the day beforethe May 9, 2016 election is 10 years and 11

months?

i. Was Poe able to prove that she re-established

her domicile in the Philippines on May 24,

2005?

ii. Is the Court’s ruling in Romualdez-Marcos vs.

COMELEC applicable to Poe’s case such that

the decisive factor in determining whether she

has met the residency requirement is the fact

of residence and not the statement under oath

in her COC?

iii. Is Poe bound by the entry in her 2012 COC

that her period of residence in the Philippines

before the May 13, 2013 elections was 6 yearsand 6 months?

iv. Can the period of residence of Poe in the

Philippines prior to her reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship/renunciation of her US

citizenship be used to satisfy the 10-year

residency requirement under the Constitution?

3.54. On 14 January 2016, the preliminary conference wasconducted.

3.55. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing, and oral argumentswere held on 19 January 2016, 26 January 2016, 02 February 2016, 09February 2016, and 16 February 2016.

3.57. At the conclusion of the hearing on 16 February 2016, theHonorable Court ordered the parties to file their respective memorandumwithin a non-extendible period of 5 days.


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IV - THE ISSUES

PROCEDURAL:

A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC ACTEDWITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONAMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THEASSAILED RESOLUTIONS CANCELLING THECOC OF PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OFMATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION AS TOHER RESIDENCY AND NATURAL-BORNSTATUS.

B. WHETHER THE COMELEC HASJURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS TODENY DUE COURSE OR CANCEL

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) FILEDBY ELAMPARO, VALDEZ AND CONTRERASAND THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATIONFILED BY TATAD.

C. WHETHER THE COMELEC SHOULD HAVEDISMISSED AND NOT ENTERTAINED THEPETITION FILED BY TATAD AGAINST POE ON THEGROUND OF FAILURE TO STATE THE CAUSE OFACTION AND FOR INVOKING GROUNDS FOR APETITION TO CANCEL OR DENY DUE COURSE TOA COC UNDER SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUSELECTION CODE (OEC) IN RELATION TO RULE 23OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE(COMELEC RULES).

D. WHETHER THE COMELEC IS PRECLUDED FROMDETERMINING WHETHER POE IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN CONSIDERING THE SET’SNOVEMBER 17, 2015 DECISION IN CASE NO. 001-15.


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E. WHETHER THE COMELEC USURPED THEJURISDICTION OF THE PRESIDENTIALELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHEN IT RULED ONPETITIONER’S ELIGIBILITY TO RUN ASPRESIDENT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TOHER CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE.

F.

WHETHER RULE 23, SECTION 8 OF THECOMELEC’S RULES OF PROCEDURE VIOLATESARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 7 OF THE 1987CONSTITUTION OR WHETHER IT IS CONTRARY TOSECTION 3, RULE 64 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

G. WHETHER THE COMELEC’S RULING ONPETITIONER’S CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELYREVOKED THE JULY 18, 2006 ORDER OF THEBUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DECLARING POE TOBE PRESUMPTIVELY NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOAND APPROVING HER PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRENATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP.

SUBSTANTIVE:

H.ON CITIZENSHIP

DID POE COMMIT MATERIALMISREPRESENTATION UNDER SECTION 78 OFTHE OEC IN RELATION TO SECTION 74 OF THEOEC AND RULE 23 OF THE COMELEC RULES,WHEN SHE STATED IN HER COC THAT SHE IS ANATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN?

i. Who has the burden of proof in proving

that Poe is a natural-born Filipino

citizen?


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ii. Did Poe intend to mislead the electorate

by stating in her COC that she is anatural-born Filipino citizen?

iii. Is Poe considered as a natural-born

Filipino citizen under Section 1, Article

IV of the 1935 Constitution?

iv. Assuming that Poe is a natural-born

Filipino citizen, what is the effect when:

(a) she renounced the same and took

allegiance to the US; and (b) when she

availed of the benefits of repatriation

under Republic Act No. 9225?

v. Did Poe in any manner recant her Oath

of Renunciation of her US citizenship?

vi. What is the role of international law onthe matter of citizenship?

ION RESIDENCY

i. Did Poe commit materialmisrepresentation, under Section 78 of the

OEC in relation to Section 74 of the OECand Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules, bystating in her COC that her period ofresidency up to the day before the May 9,2016 election is 10 years and 11 months?

ii. Was Poe able to prove that she re-established her domicile in the Philippineson May 24, 2005?

iii. Is the Court’s ruling in Romualdez-Marcosvs. COMELEC applicable to Poe’s casesuch that the decisive factor in determiningwhether she has met the residencyrequirement is the fact of residence and notthe statement under oath in her COC?


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iv. Is Poe bound by the entry in her 2012COC that her period of residence in thePhilippines before the May 13, 2013elections was 6 years and 6 months?

v. Can the period of residence of Poe in thePhilippines prior to her reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship/renunciation ofher US citizenship be used to satisfy the10-year residency requirement under theConstitution?

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

ATHE COMELEC DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHENIT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONSCANCELLING THE COC OF PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF MATERIALMISREPRESENTATION AS TO HERRESIDENCY AND NATURAL-BORN STATUS.

4.1 In Rober t E. Olanola vs. Comm ission on Elect ions andCelso A . Tizon ,7 the Supreme court clarified the concept of grave abuse

of discretion as one which entails caprice and arbitrariness in theexercise of discretion, a willful and unreasoning action amounting to anevasion of positive duty, thus:

The term "grave abuse of discretion", in its juridical sense,connotes, as Litton Mills Inc. Inc. vs. Galleon Trader, Inc.,and a host of other cases teach, capricious, despotic,oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalentto lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree asto amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason ofpassion and hostility. The word "capricious", usually usedin tandem with

7 G.R. No. 165491, 31 March 2005.


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the term "arbitrary ", conveys the notion of willful and

unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective handof certiorari , a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness inthe exercise of discretion is imperative.

4.2 Grave abuse of discretion, therefore, which justifies theannulment of the Resolutions of the COMELEC, requires more than justa showing of mere abuse of discretion. Rather, it demands a clearshowing of caprice, arbitrariness, and despotic manner in the resolutionof the cases raised before the COMELEC.8

4.3 In Engineer Leonardo C. Leyaley vs. COMELEC et al.,9 theSupreme Court underscored that the remedy of certiorari has a very limited function. A writ of certiorari is issued only to correct errors of

jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment or errors in connection withthe legal soundness or wisdom of a decision:

Note, further, that the function of the remedy of cert iorar i isvery limited. In People v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded

thus:

As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is aremedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdictionand not errors of judgment. The raison d'etre for the rule iswhen a court exercises its jurisdiction, an errorcommitted while so engaged does not deprive it of the

jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it ofits jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be avoid judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of

justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue orquestion involved affects the wisdom or legal soundnessof the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court torender said decision – the same is beyond the provinceof a special civil action for certiorari. x x x10

4.4 Thus in Rudolfo I. Beluso vs. COMELEC et al.,11 when thelegal issue ultimately aims to correct the wisdom or legal soundness of

the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision,the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.

8 Bartolome Balingit vs. COMELEC et al., G.R. No. 170300, 9 February 2007.9 G.R. No. 160061, 11 October 200610 Emphasis supplied.11 G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010.


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4.5 In both Assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC did not act withcaprice and whimsicality characteristic of grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Assailed Resolutionswere rendered by the COMELEC in accordance with its constitutionaland statutory mandate to resolve elections cases and controversies,including petitions to cancel and/or deny due course to a COC on theground of material representation of facts which are false as specificallyprovided for in Sectiion 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Petitionerwas given an opportunity to be heard. She submitted her pleadings andsupporting evidence, which were duly considered by the COMELEC.The COMELEC acted within the purview of its jurisdiction and powers.

Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated.

4.6 Record shows that before issuing the Assailed Resolutions,the COMELEC conducted hearings, required the parties to filememoranda which were exhaustive on both sides, considered anddeliberated on the arguments presented by the parties, and thoroughlyreviewed and studied the respective allegations and the evidenceadduced by the parties. The Petitioner did not present any witness butsubmitted documentary evidence,12 which were all considered by theCOMELEC.

4.7 When the COMELEC decided the petitions before it, it did sobased on the facts as established by evidence and as shown in therecords of the cases.

4.8 Verily, the requirements of administrative due process asreiterated in Solid Homes v. Laserna13 were fully met. Petitioner wasafforded the right to be heard; she was allowed to present evidence tosupport her case, and the COMELEC considered all the evidencepresented. The Assailed Resolutions are based not only on suchevidence, but also on relevant constitutional and statutorypronouncements. The evidence on which these Resolutions are basedare substantial. The COMELEC En Banc indeed undertook anindependent consideration of all the facts, evidence, and laws relevant tothis case. The Assailed Resolutions were rendered in such a mannerthat the parties were able to discern the various issues involved andthe reason for the

12 See Petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence, which includes Petitioner’s Foundling Certificate,Decision of the Municipal Court on the adoption of Petitioner, Birth Certificate, Petitioner’sPhilippine and US Passports, Official Transcript of Records of Petitioner’s children, e-mailexchanges, Condominium Certificate of Title, Declaration of Real Property, TransferCertificate of Title, Petition for Reacquisition, Oath of Allegiance, Order dated 18 July 2006 ifthe Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance, Petitioner’sCertificate of Candidacy for Senator, Stub of Petitioner’s application form for registration asvoter, among other documents.

13 G.R. No. 166051, 08 April 2008, 550 SCRA 613.


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disposition. Indeed, the Assailed Resolutions expressed therein clearlyand distinctly the facts and the law on which they were based.14

4.9 That there was no categorical ruling on the probability ofpetitioner being a natural-born Filipino citizen on the basis of her physicalappearance or height or complexion or color of hair or the circumstancessurrounding her being found (such as the distance of Jaro from thenearest international airport, etc.) does not mean that a violation ofadministrative due process occurred. Firstly , these facts - petitioner’sheight of 5’2”, fair skin, brown eyes, black hair, etc. - were undisputedby private respondents. Being undisputed, there was no need toascertain their existence. Secondly , and this is the more important

consideration, these facts by and of themselves did not and could notshow bloodline to a Filipino parent as required under jus sanguinis.These facts could not establish that petitioner as a foundling was anatural-born Filipino citizen. It would not have mattered at all if petitionerwas shown to be 5’3’’ instead of 5’2’’ or she was dark complexionedinstead of fair skinned.

4.10 That Petitioner is a foundling is shown by her BirthCertificate, openly admitted in her Verified Answers, even stipulatedupon by both sides, and reiterated in open hearing before the COMELECby her counsel. She put up the affirmative defense that as a foundlingshe is natural-born. Therefore, it was incumbent upon her to prove heraffirmative defense that as a foundling she is natural-born which she hasfailed to do.

4.11 The circumstances on physical features of the petitioner orthe circumstances surrounding her being found were not ignored by theCOMELEC. Instead, they were rejected by the COMELEC as insufficientto support the conclusion that as a foundling she is a natural-born

Filipino citizen born of a Filipino parent. The COMELEC found and ruledthusly:

Contrary to Respondent’s argument, the probability that shemight be born of a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove hercase. It is Respondent’s duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino. The Constitution is unequivocal: unless one isborn of a Filipino parent, he or she cannot be regarded anatural-born Filipino citizen. Respondent cannot shroud herfailure to meet this qualification by hiding behind the cloak of

probability. The burden of proof rests on her; any doubt as tothe question of her natural-born status is resolved againsther. Respondent cannot invoke any presumption of natural-born citizenship.15

14 Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: “No decision shall be rendered by any court

without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”.15 See COMELEC First Division Resolution in Tatad, et al.


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4.12 Grave abuse of discretion cannot be ascribed to theCOMELEC for its purported failure to enumerate and discuss in detail inits Assailed Resolutions each and every factual allegation made by theparties. A judge is not required to set forth and discuss each and everyallegation and evidence adduced by the parties to a case.

4.13 Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution requires onlythat the factual and legal bases of the COMELEC’s decision are clearlyand distinctly laid down in its Resolution, thus:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any courtwithout expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts andthe law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of adecision of the court shall be refused due course or deniedwithout stating the legal basis therefor.

4.14 In Civil Service Commission vs. Juliana E. Ledesma,16 thisHonorable Court explained the requirement laid down by Section 14,

Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not simply ignore the chargeof dishonesty, as the CSC alleges. Rather, the appellatecourt found that the evidence did not support the chargesenumerated, including that of dishonesty. The appellate courtappreciated the evidence presented and the facts of the casedifferently from the CSC. The Court of Appeals discussed atlength in its 15-page Decision the factual and legal basis forits verdict of simple misconduct. The appellate court Decisionthus sufficiently complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the

Constitution, which requires only that a court’s decision beclear on why either party prevailed under the law applicableto the facts as proved. The constitutional provision doesnot require a point-by-point refutation of the CSCsResolutions so long as the basis for the Court of Appealsdecision modifying the former is clear.

4.15 Likewise in Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose andTransport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez Jr., HonRamon M. Bato Jr., and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices,Court of Appeals,17 the Supreme Court reiterated the import of Section14, Article VIII of the Constitution, thusly:

16 G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005.17 A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, 21 January 2012.


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The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essentialpurpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a

judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under

the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provisionnowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration andresolution of the issues raised by the parties arenecessary.18[12] Cogently, the Court has said in Tichangcov. Enriquez ,19[13] to wit:

This constitutional provision deals with the disposition ofpetitions for review and of motions for reconsideration. Inappellate courts, the rule does not require anycomprehensive statement of facts or mention of theapplicable law, but merely a statement of the legal

basis for denying due course.

Thus, there is sufficient compliance with theconstitutional requirement when a collegiate appellatecourt, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion;states that the questions raised are factual or havealready been passed upon; or cites some other legalbasis. There is no need to explain fully the court’sdenial, since the facts and the law have already beenlaid out in the assailed Decision.

4.16 Both the Assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC clearly anddistinctly set forth therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the lawupon which the rulings were made.

4.17 Necessarily, therefore, the COMELEC acted only inaccordance with its mandate and pursuant to the parameters defined bythe Constitution and relevant laws. No abuse of discretion, much lessgrave in character, can be ascribed to the COMELEC.

4.18 Notably, Petitioner did not offer to present any witness,during the hearing of the petitions. The proceedings before theCOMELEC under Section 78 are summary in nature; however, Petitionermay present such witnesses as she may deem necessary, but she didnot. Nevertheless, due process, as defined by the Constitution andrequired of administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial functions, hasbeen fully complied with.

4.19 In the case of Ellan Marie P. Cipriano vs. COMELEC et al.,20 this Honorable Court affirmed the summary nature of the proceedings

before the COMELEC and defined due process thus:It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must benotified of the petition against him and

20 Supra.


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he should be given the opportunity to present evidencein his behalf. This is the essence of due process. Dueprocess demands prior notice and hearing. Then after

the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal showssubstantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words,due process requires that a party be given anopportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side ofthe case and that the evidence should be considered inthe adjudication of the case. In a petition to deny duecourse to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since theproceedings are required to be summary, the partiesmay, after due notice, be required to submit theirposition papers together with affidavits, counter-

affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu of oraltestimony. When there is a need for clarification ofcertain matters, at the discretion of the Commission enbanc or Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.

4.20 The Assailed Resolutions were issued based on findings offacts, and the relevant law and jurisprudence, and upon consideration ofall the evidence offered and presented and on the facts admitted andstipulated upon by the parties before the COMELEC.

4.21 In the case of Jaramilla vs. COMELEC et al.,21 the SupremeCourt held that the findings of facts by the COMELEC shall be bindingand conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, thus:

The Court reiterates that factual findings of the COMELECbased on its own assessments and duly supported byevidence, are given conclusive weight in the absence ofarbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion.

4.22 In Dagaloc vs. COMELEC et al.,22 this Honorable Courtreiterated that findings of facts of administrative agencies will not bedisturbed by the courts, unless absolutely no evidence or no substantialevidence supports such findings. This Honorable Court in the same casefurther declared that the same rule applies with more force in the case ofthe COMELEC. This is because the COMELEC is an independentConstitutional organ that is on a level higher than statutory administrativeorgans, thus:

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will

not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there isabsolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence insupport of such findings should be applied withgreater

21 G.R. No. 155717, 23 October 2003.22 G.R. Nos. 154442-47, 10 December 2007.


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force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers ofthe Constitution intended to place the COMELEC --created and explicitly made independent by the

Constitution itself on a level higher than statutoryadministrative organs. The factual finding of theCOMELEC En Banc is therefore binding on the Court.

4.23 The same rule is found in Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules ofCourt, which provides that the findings of facts of the COMELEC, whensupported by substantial evidence, are non-reviewable:

Section 5. Form and contents of petition. — The petition

shall be verified and filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. Thepetition shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and theperson or persons interested in sustaining the judgment, finalorder or resolution a quo. The petition shall state the factswith certainty, present clearly the issues involved, set forththe grounds and brief arguments relied upon for review, andpray for judgment annulling or modifying the questioned

judgment, final order or resolution. Findings of fact of theCommission supported by substantial evidence shall befinal and non-reviewable.23

4.24 The COMELEC’s findings of fact in the Assailed Resolutionsare supported by substantial evidence culled from the records of thecases.

4.25 Having committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction, the COMELEC’s Assailed Resolutions aretherefore beyond this Honorable Supreme Court’s limited certiorari

jurisdiction under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court.

B.THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THEPETITIONS TO DENY DUE COURSE TO ORCANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC)FILED BY ELAMPARO, VALDEZ, AND CONTRERASAND THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FILEDBY TATAD.

4.26 Section 2, paragraph 1, and Section 3 of Article IX-C of the1987 Constitution vest upon the COMELEC broad powers in the (a)enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the

23 Bold and underlining supplied.


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conduct of elections and the (b) resolution and determination of electioncontroversies, thus:

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shallexercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over allcontests relating to the elections, returns, andqualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city

officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contestsinvolving elective municipal officials decided by trialcourts of general jurisdiction, or involving electivebarangay officials decided by trial courts of limited

jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission onelection contests involving elective municipal andbarangay offices shall be final, executory, and notappealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, allquestions affecting elections, including determination ofthe number and location of polling places, appointmentof election officials and inspectors, and registration ofvoters.

x x xSECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit enbanc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules ofprocedure in order to expedite disposition of electioncases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All suchelection cases shall be heard and decided in division,provided that motions for reconsideration of decisionsshall be decided by the Commission en banc.

4.27 In connection with the foregoing, Section 78 of the OmnibusElection Code (OEC) further vests upon the COMELEC the power todeny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (“COC”) of acandidate for an elective position on the ground of false material

representation of any information required under Section 74 of the OEC:Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel acertificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking todeny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacymay be filed by the person exclusively on the groundthat


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any material representation contained therein asrequired under Section 74 hereof is false. The petitionmay be filed at any time not later than twenty-five

days from the time of the filing of the certificate ofcandidacy and shall be decided, after due notice andhearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

4.28 The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to cancel the COC of acandidate for President or for any elective office is a settled matter in

jurisprudence. In Ellan Marie P. Cipriano vs. COMELEC et al.,24 thisHonorable Court affirmed the power of the COMELEC to cancel anddeny due course to a COC pursuant to its statutory mandate enshrined

under Section 78 of the OEC, thus:

The Constitution has also vested it [the COMELEC] withquasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all contests relating to theelections, returns and qualifications of all electiveregional, provincial and city officials; and appellate

jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipalofficials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, orinvolving elective barangay officials decided by trialcourts of limited jurisdiction.

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution,the Commission also exercises other powersexpressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code,one of which is the authority to deny due course toor to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exerciseof such authority, however, must be in accordance withthe conditions set by law.

4.29 Likewise in Nardo M. Velasco vs. Commission on Electionsand Mozart P. Panlaqui,25 the Supreme Court without equivocationupheld the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the cancellation and/or denial ofa candidate’s COC, thus:

The remedies available in the two proceedings likewisediffer. Velasco's remedy from the adverse decision in hispetition for inclusion as voter is as provided under

Section 138 of the OEC quoted above. From the MTC,the recourse is to the RTC whose decision is final andexecutory, correctible by the Court of Appeals onlyby

2424 G.R. No. 158830, 10 August 2004.25 G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008.


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a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the

approval of a certificate of candidacy or its denial isa matter directly cognizable by the COMELEC, withthe decision of its Division reviewable by theCOMELEC en banc whose decision is in turnreviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rulesof Court and Section 7, of Article IX-A of the 1987Constitution.26

4.30 In the consolidated cases of Tecson v. COMELEC ,27 the

Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to takecognizance of petitions for cancellation and/or denial of COC filedagainst Fernando Poe Jr., then a candidate for President.

4.31 In the Tecson case, the Supreme Court recognized theCOMELEC’s jurisdiction to cancel and/or deny COC under Section 78 ofthe OEC, subject to review by the Supreme Court under Rule 64, inrelation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, thus:

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJand to have the COMELEC deny due course to orcancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for allegedmisrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was anatural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitionerFornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus ElectionCode . . .

x x x

in consonance with the general powers of COMELECexpressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code ..

x x x

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus ElectionCode which would authorize "any interested party" to filea verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate ofcandidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification casesmay be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 inan action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RevisedRules of Civil Procedure. x x x

26 Bold supplied.27Tecson v. COMELEC, supra. (Bold supplied).


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It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in

G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and couldwell be taken cognizance of by, this Court. . . .28

4.32 In contrast, this Honorable Court in Tecson dismissed thepetitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al. and Zoilo Antonio Velez,forhaving been filed directly with the Supreme Court or for “want of

jurisdiction.” This Honorable Court explained in the said case that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as PET does not include cases “directlybrought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for

President . . . ”:

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of thetribunal over contests relating to the election, returnsand qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of"candidates" for President or Vice-President. . . . Insuch context, the election contest can onlycontemplate a post-election scenario . . . .

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of theSupreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7,of the 1987 Constitution, would not include casesdirectly brought before it, questioning thequalifications of a candidate for the presidency orvice-presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria JeanetteC. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.,"and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.

Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." wouldhave to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

4.33 Clearly, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to cancel and/or denyCOC of any candidate for any elective office, including the President, onthe ground of material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the OEC.

4.34 All four Petitions are grounded on Petitioner Poe’s falsedeclaration as to her material qualifications, and her deliberate attempt tomislead the electorate by stating in her COC that she is natural born

Filipino and/or she has 10 years and 11 months residency in thePhilippines as of the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.

28 Id., Bold supplied.


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4.35 Furthermore, all 4 Petitions were filed within the 25-dayreglementary period prescribed under Section 78 of the OEC for apetition to deny due course to and/or cancel certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificateof candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due courseor to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by theperson exclusively on the ground that any materialrepresentation contained therein as required under Section74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time notlater than twenty-five days from the time of the filing ofthe certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due

notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before theelection.

4.36 In the consolidated cases of Mike A. Fermin vs. Commissionon Elections and Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen,29 this Honorable Courtclarified:

Having thus determined that the Dilangalen petition isone under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court nowdeclares that the same has to comply with the 25-daystatutory period for its filing. Aznar v. Commission on

Elections and Loong v. Commission on Elections giveascendancy to the express mandate of the law that "thepetition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificateof candidacy." Construed in relation to reglementaryperiods and the principles of prescription, the dismissalof "Section 78" petitions filed beyond the 25-day periodmust come as a matter of course.

4.37 Necessarily, therefore, the COMELEC properly acquired and

exercised jurisdiction over all petitions for cancellation and/or denial ofdue course of Petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

C.THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT TOOKCOGNIZANCE OF THE TATAD PETITIONUNDER SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUSELECTION CODE.

4.38 While the Tatad Petition is denominated as a Petition forDisqualification, a perusal of the Petition and other pleadings submittedin the said case - including the Formal Offer of Evidence and records ofthe

29 G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, 18 December 2008.


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hearings for the said case - reveals that the grounds invoked are propergrounds for the cancellation and/or denial of due course of the Certificateof Candidacy of Petitioner under Section 78 of the OEC, not one fordisqualification under Section 68 of the OEC.

4.39 The Petition impugns the claims of Petitioner in her COC withrespect to her qualifications and eligibility, specifically that she is anatural-born citizen and has 10 years and 11 months of residency up tothe day before 9 May 2016. What the Tatad Petition actually assailedwas the truthfulness of Petitioner’s statements in her COC that shepossesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications ascandidate for President of the Republic of the Philippines.

4.40 A perusal of the Tatad Petition easily reveals that the issueas to Petitioner’s lack of citizenship and residency requirements and herfalse statement in her COC with respect thereto was properly raised. ThePetition made the following allegations, among others:

a. Petitioner is utterly disqualified to run for President inthe coming elections on ground/s of lack ofcitizenship and residency qualifications.30

b. Petitioner possesses no jus sanguinis citizenship.31

c. Petitioner’s COC for Senator shows a declaration asto Petitioner’s period of residence in the Philippineswhich if computed as of the day before the May2016 Elections, would reveal Petitioner’s non-compliance with the residency requirement.32

d. Petitioner was never repatriated under Republic Act9225 because she is not a natural-born Filipino.33

e. Petitioner was a foundling;34

f. Petitioner was subsequently adopted by spousesRonald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora;35

g. Petitioner was naturalized as an American citizen in2001;36

30 See page 9, Private Respondent Tatad’s Petition filed before the COMELEC First Division.31 See page 14, ibid.32 See page 21, ibid.33 See page 23, ibid.34 See page 6, ibid. 35 See page 7, ibid.36 Ibid.


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The Petition likewise made a general prayer for such other just andequitable reliefs, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfullyprayed of the Honorable Commission to (1)DISQUALIFY Respondent Mary Grace Poe Llamanzaresas a candidate for President in the coming elections; and(2) GRANT such other reliefs a[s] may be deemed justand equitable in the premises.37

In addition, the Memorandum with Offer of Evidence dated 2December 2015 of Private Respondent Tatad offered in evidencePetitioner’s 2015 COC to show Petitioner’s attempt to mislead “theauthorities” with respect to her qualifications, thus:

To prove that Respondent evidently contradicted herselfin declaring that before the May 9, 2016 elections, shehas resided in the Philippines for 10 years and 11months. To further prove that there is a deliberateattempt on her part to mislead the authorities as regardsher lack of residency qualification.38

Furthermore, during the 25 November 2015 clarificatory hearing

before the COMELEC First Division, Private Respondent Tatad, throughhis counsel, Atty. Manuelito R. Luna, argued that Petitionermisrepresented her qualifications when she deliberately changed thecomputation of her residence so as to make it appear that she met the10-year residency requirement:

The records are very clear and I would like also theCommission to take judicial notice of respondent’sCertificate of Candidacy for President wherein shedeliberately change[d] the computation to reflect that

before the May 9, 2016 election she will complete aperiod of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)months. That is obviously Your Honor amisrepresentation because she is bound by her previousdeclaration in the 2012 COC for Senator. No person canbe allowed much less a candidate to make a mockery ofthe election law.39

4.41 Clearly, notwithstanding the use of the caption “VerifiedPetition For: Disqualification in Accordance with Rule 25, COMELECRules of Procedures” and a mistaken reference to adisqualification

37 See pages 24 and 25, ibid.38 See page 5 of the Memorandum with Offer of Evidence of Private Respondent Tatad.39 Transcript of Stenographic Notes, page 5, 21 November 2015 Hearing of the COMELEC First

Division.


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petition, the Tatad Petition is essentially a petition for cancellation and/ordenial of COC under Section 78 of the OEC.

4.42 This Honorable Court has ruled in a plethora of cases thatthe COMELEC possesses the power to determine and rule on the casesbefore it on the merits based on the true nature of the case, byexamining the allegations contained in the petition and in every pleadingfiled. Petitions are determined by their allegations, rather than by theircaption and/or the prayer contained therein. Thus, in the case of DelaLlana v. COMELEC,40 this Honorable Court declared:

The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broadpowers, involving not only the enforcement andadministration of all laws and regulations relative to theconduct of elections, but also the resolution anddetermination of election controversies. It also grantedthe COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate itsrules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuringthe expeditious disposition of election cases.

Concomitant to such powers is the authority of theCOMELEC to determine the true nature of the casesfiled before it. Thus, it examines the allegations ofevery pleading filed, obviously aware that indetermining the nature of the complaint or petition, itsaverments, rather than its title/caption, are the propergauges.

x x x

The fact that petitioner prayed for annulment ofrespondents proclamation in his petition is immaterialand does not change the nature of the instant petition.The prayer in a pleading does not constitute anessential part of the allegations determinative of the

jurisdiction of a court. The question of jurisdictiondepends largely upon the determination of the truenature of the action filed by a party which, in turn,involves the consideration of the ultimate facts allegedas constitutive of the cause of action therein. The prayerfor relief, although part of the complaint, cannotcreate a cause of action, hence it cannot beconsidered a part of the allegations on the nature ofthe cause of action.41

40 G.R. No. 152080, 28 November 2003.41 Emphases supplied.


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4.43 Moreover, in Ramon R. Jimenez Jr. et al. vs. Juan JoseJordana,42 this Honorable Court further explained:

Generally, the court takes into account only the materialallegations of the complaint, without consideringextraneous facts and circumstances. In some cases,however, the court may also consider -- in additionto the complaint -- annexes or documents appendedto it, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissionsin the record. It must then bear in mind that the factsproving the existence of a cause of action do not have tobe established or alleged by the complaint and/or the

other pleadings at the outset but, under exceptionalcircumstances, even during the trial on the merits of thecase.43

4.44 Corollary to the above disquisitions, the COMELEC isfurthermore granted vast powers by the Constitution. In the case ofBedol v. Comelec ,44 the Supreme Court ruled:

The above-quoted provision should be construedbroadly to give effect to the COMELEC’s constitutionalmandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission onElections, which held:

xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution givesthe COMELEC the broad power ‘to enforce andadminister all laws and regulations relative to theconduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendumand recall.’ Undoubtedly, the text and intent of thisprovision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and

incidental powers for it to achieve the objective ofholding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credibleelections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has notbeen niggardly in defining the parameters of powers ofCOMELEC in the conduct of our elections.45

4.45 In this regard, the COMELEC may liberally construe, or evensuspend, its rules of procedure in the interest of justice and speedydisposition of all matters pending before it.46 In the case of Pacanan v.COMELEC,47 the Supreme Court ruled:

42 G.R. No. 152526, 25 November 2004.43 Emphases supplied.44 G.R. No. 179830, 3 December 2009.45 Emphases supplied.46 Quintos v. Comelec , G.R. No. 149800, 21 November 2002.47 G.R. No. 186224, 25 August 2009.


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[T]he Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberalconstruction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting theeffective and efficient implementation of the objectives ofensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful andcredible elections and for achieving just, expeditious andinexpensive determination and disposition of every actionand proceeding brought before the Comelec.

4.46 Consistent with the aforequoted ruling of this HonorableCourt, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the rule on theconstruction and suspension of its rules:

Sec. 3. Construction. - These rules shall be liberallyconstrued in order to promote the effective and efficientimplementation of the objectives of ensuring the holdingof free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible electionsand to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensivedetermination and disposition of every action andproceeding brought before the Commission.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all

matters pending before the Commission, these rules orany portion thereof may be suspended by theCommission.

4.47 This Honorable Court has ruled petitions for disqualificationas petitions for cancellation and/or denial of due course of COC uponproper determination of the real nature of the petitions. In Fermin vs.COMELEC,48 the Supreme Court determined that the petition filed byprivate respondent Dilangalen, captioned and referenced as a Petition

for Disqualification, was in reality a proper Section 78 petition. ThisHonorable Court thus proceeded to resolve the said petition underSection 78 of the OEC:

After studying the said petition in detail, the Court findsthat the same is in the nature of a petition to deny duecourse to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.The petition contains the essential allegations of a"Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made arepresentation in his certificate; (2) the representationpertains to a material matter which would affect thesubstantive rights of the candidate (the right to run forthe election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) thecandidate made the false representation with theintention to deceive the electorate as to his qualificationfor public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,misinform, or

48 Supra.


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hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.It likewise appropriately raises a question on acandidate’s eligibility for public office, in this case, his

possession of the one-year residency requirement underthe law.

4.48 The Supreme Court further rejected private respondentDilangalen’s insistence that the petition filed against petitioner Ferminwas a petition for disqualification pursuant to Rule 25 of the COMELECRules of Procedure:

In support of his claim that he actually filed a "petition for

disqualification" and not a "petition to deny due course toor cancel a CoC," Dilangalen takes refuge in Rule 25 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section1 thereof, to the extent that it states, "[a]ny candidatewho does not possess all the qualifications of acandidate as provided for by the Constitution or byexisting law x x x may be disqualified from continuing asa candidate" . . .

4.49 The Supreme Court eventually dismissed the DilangalenPetition in the Fermin case upon reaching the conclusion that Ferminwas able to comply with the 1-year residency requirement.

4.50 Additionally, in the consolidated cases of Alfais T. Munder vs.COMELEC et al.49 and Atty. Tago R. Sarip vs. Alfais T. Munder et al.,50 apetition for disqualification was filed against Munder on the ground thatthe latter was not a registered voter in the municipality where he soughtto be elected. The Supreme Court, upon examination of the pleadings,ruled that the petition was in reality a petition to deny due course toand/or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78.

We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petitionfiled by Sarip. The main ground of the said petition isthat Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that hewas a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong,Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not. This ground isappropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or toCancel Certificate of Candidacy.

4.51 This Honorable Court finally determined that the petition filedby Sarip should have been dismissed for failure to comply with the 25-day reglementary period for the filing of a Section 78 petition.

49 G.R. No. 194076, 19 October 2011.50 G.R. No. 194160, 19 October 2011.


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4.52 Clearly in the above-cited cases, the Supreme Courtdetermined the real nature of the petitions based on the pleadings filedand the allegations made in the petitions. Having determined these

petitions to be for cancellation and/or denial of COC, this HonorableCourt proceeded to properly resolve the same under Section 78 of theOEC.

4.53 The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretionwhen it took cognizance of the Tatad Petition as a petition forcancellation of COC or denial of due course under Section 78 of theOEC.

D.THE COMELEC IS NOT PRECLUDED FROMDETERMINING WHETHER PETITIONER POE IS ANATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZENNOTWITHSTANDING THE SENATE ELECTORALTRIBUNAL’S 17 NOVEMBER 2015 DECISION INS.E.T. CASE NO. 001-15.

4.54 The COMELEC is not bound by the 17 November 2015

Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s (“SET”) finding that Petitioneris a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. It is likewise not precludedfrom making a contrary determination as to the natural-born citizenshipstatus of Petitioner vis-à-vis the issue of material misrepresentation inher COC under Section 78, OEC.

4.55 While the SET and COMELEC cases are similar on the issueof natural-born citizenship, the fact remains that these cases areindependent of each other: one is a petition for quo warranto against an

incumbent Senator, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of theSET, while the other is a petition to deny due course to or cancel thecertificate of candidacy of Petitioner as candidate for President in the 9May 2016 elections, which is within COMELEC’s exclusive jurisdictionunder Section 78, OEC.

4.56 Furthermore, the decision of the SET does not constitute alegal precedent. It is an established rule that only decisions rendered bythe Supreme Court form part of the law of the land and constitute stare

decisis binding upon the COMELEC. Article 8 of the New Civil Codewhich relates to decisions of the High Court, provides:

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting thelaws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legalsystem of the Philippines.


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4.57 The Supreme Court in Fermin v. People categoricallyexplained that only decisions of the Supreme Court constitutes a binding

legal precedent, thus:The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to

judicial precedents. It requires courts in a countryto follow the rule established in a decision of theSupreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a

judicial precedent to be followed in subsequentcases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of staredecisis is based on the principle that once a questionof law has been examined and decided, it should bedeemed settled and closed to further argument.

4.58 The COMELEC’s independent determination of the issue asto Petitioner’s citizenship vis-a-vis the exercise of its mandate underSectiion 78, OEC, is consistent with its character as a constitutionallycreated body independent and separate from the SET. Article IX(A),Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution decrees the independence of theCOMELEC:

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall

be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, theCommission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

4.59 Necessarily, the COMELEC must decide and determine theissues brought before it independently in the exercise of its adjudicatorypowers.

4.60 Moreover, the SET case and the instant cases have differentreliefs. Also, the SET decision is not yet final and pends before thisHonorable Court.

4.61 The Supreme Court, in Dela Llana vs. Commission onElections,51 declared:

The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broadpowers, involving not only the enforcement andadministration of all laws and regulations relative to theconduct of elections, but also the resolution and

determination of election controversies.

4.62 Clearly, to argue that the SET ruling precludes theCOMELEC from making a contrary finding is to encroach upon theindependence of

51 GR No. 152080, 28 November 2003. Emphasis supplied.


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the COMELEC and impede the performance of its duty to determine andsettle election cases and controversies including petitions brought underSection 78, OEC.

4.63 In Go v. Ramos52 , it was held:

Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own, in that, unlikeother cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter ofcourse. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable ina judicial or administrative case, whatever the correspondingcourt or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence,it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasionmay demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases ofcitizenship only if the following concur:

1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in acontroversy where said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative tookactive part in the resolution thereof; and

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.53

4.64 It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the COMELECcommitted no grave abuse of discretion when it made an independentdetermination of the issue as to Petitioner’s natural-born citizenship vis-à-vis its mandate under Section 78, OEC, separate and independentfrom the SET ruling.

E.THE COMELEC DID NOT USURP THE JURISDICTIONOF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNALWHEN IT RULED ON PETITIONER’S ELIGIBILITY TORUN AS PRESIDENT, PARTICULARLY WITHRESPECT TO HER CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE.

4.65 Petitioner argues in her Petition that by cancelling her COCfor President despite the supposed absence of any false materialrepresentation therein and before the conduct of the 9 May 2016

elections, the COMELEC “effectively passed upon her eligibility for thePresidency.”54

52 G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009.53 Underscoring supplied.54 Petition, p. 197, par. 266; underscoring omitted.


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4.66 Petitioner relies on Section 4, Article VII, of the 1987Constitution to support her claim that the petitions filed before theCOMELEC properly belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the PET.

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shallbe elected by direct vote of the people for a term of sixyears which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day ofJune next following the day of the election and shall endat noon of the same date six years thereafter. ThePresident shall not be eligible for any reelection. Noperson who has succeeded as President and has servedas such for more than four years shall be qualified forelection to the same office at any time.

x x x

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of the President or Vice- President, andmay promulgate its rules for the purpose.

4.67 In Fermin vs. COMELEC et al.,55 this Honorable Court ruledthat a Section 78 Petition, or a petition to deny due course to or cancelCOC, involves and relates to the qualifications of a candidate for electiveoffice. This Honorable Court further affirmed the “appropriateness” ofsetting up the qualification or eligibility of the candidate under a Section78 Petition as an issue, thus:

After studying the said petition in detail, the Court findsthat the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due

course to or cancel a COC under Section 78 of the OEC.The petition contains the essential allegations of a"Section 78" petition . . . It likewise appropriatelyraises a question on a candidate’s eligibility forpublic office, in this case, his possession of the one-yearresidency requirement under the law.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to orthe cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack ofqualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a

material representation that is false, which may relate tothe qualifications required of the public office he/she isrunning for . . . . Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is tobe read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for publicoffice.

55 Supra.


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4.68 This Honorable Court further explained in Fermin that a

Section 78 Petition is similar to a quo warranto proceeding because bothdeal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, thus:

Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding underSection 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility orqualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in thefact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation,while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation ofthe wining candidate.56

4.69 Petitioner’s ratiocination that the question as to hercitizenship and residency qualifications may be raised only before thePET deserves scant consideration. The case of Atty. Romulo B.Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribuunal 57 is instructive: the

jurisdiction of the PET as “sole judge sole judge of all contests relating tothe election, returns, and qualifications” of the President begins onlyafter the proclamation of the winning candidate. This Honorable Courtruled, thusly:

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential ElectoralTribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) andHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) areelectoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusivelyclothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to actrespectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications" of the President andVice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In alitany of cases, this Court has long recognized thatthese electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction overelection contests only after a candidate has alreadybeen proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunalprovide that, for President or Vice-President,election protest or quo w arranto may be filed afterthe proclamat ion of the winn er .

4.70 The consolidated cases of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson et al.

vs. Commission on Elections58

likewise clarified that the jurisdiction ofthe PET pertains to post-election scenario, or after proclamation of thewinning candidate, thus:

56 Ibid.57 G.R. No., 191618, 23 November 2010.58 Supra.


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Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" inreference to a post-election scenario. Election contestsconsist of either an election protest or a quo warranto

which, although two distinct remedies, would have oneobjective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidatefrom office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the PresidentialElectoral Tribunal ," promulgated by the Supreme Courten banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise . ..

x x x

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction ofthe tribunal over contests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of the "President" or"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quowarranto proceeding is generally defined as beingan action against a person who usurps, intrudesinto, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.In such context, the election contest can onlycontemplate a post-election scenario . In Rule 14, only

a registered candidate who would have received eitherthe second or third highest number of votes could file anelection protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.59

4.71 This Honorable Court held in Tecson that the jurisdiction ofthe PET does not include cases questioning the qualification of acandidate for the presidency, a clear ruling that debunks Petitioner’scontrary claim.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987Constitution, would not include cases directlybrought before it, questioning the qualifications of acandidate for the presidency or vice-presidency beforethe elections are held.

4.72 As similarly explained in the Tecson case, this Honorable

Supreme Court ruled in Ongsiako-Reyes vs. COMELEC et al.

60

that theexclusive jurisdiction of the HRET over all contests relating to theelections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the HouseRepresentatives begins only after election, upon valid proclamation,oath, and assumption of office.

59 Ibid. Emphasis supplied.60 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013.


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Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELECretains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over theissue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over theassailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition isduly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averredthat she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only afterthe candidate is considered a Member of the House ofRepresentatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI ofthe 1987 Constitution. x x x

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considereda Member of the House of Representatives, there mustbe a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a validproclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption ofoffice.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made thepronouncement that once a proclamation has beenmade, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus,

its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns,and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdictionbegins. However, it must be noted that in these cases,the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context ofa proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oathof office, but who had also assumed office.

4.73 It is therefore clear that prior to proclamation, oath, andassumption of office of the winning candidate for President, jurisdictionwith respect to material misrepresentation in the COC vis-à-vis the

qualifications or eligibility of the candidate belongs to the COMELEC.

F.RULE 23, SECTION 8, OF THE COMELEC RULESOF PROCEDURE DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ANDIS NOT CONTRARY TO SECTION 3, RULE 64, OF

THE RULES OF COURT.

comelec memo re grace poe

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