combating corruption 1 (epw april 2011)
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/27/2019 Combating Corruption 1 (EPW April 2011)
1/5
S
FIGHTING BRIBERY
Opportunity at Hand
to Tackle Corruption
Srir am Panchu
politicians. The office of Lokpal (a three-
member body) can only be held by former
judges of the Supreme Court or high
court. Exceptions to the jurisdiction of
the Lokpal include national defence (this
is difficult to understand given huge pur-
chases on the defence f ront). A major
cut- off of information on corruption is
that
The draft LokpalBill ofthe
government will make for apoor
mechanism to punish corruption.
On the other hand, the textput
out by the Anna Hazare team
meets in substantial measure the
requirements necessary forabody that can effectively tackle
corruption in highplaces.
However, while the government
bill is on the spot in seeking to
cover only corruption at the top,
the Hazare text loses focus by
attempting to deal with too many
things bribery,
maladministration andmisconduct. Where the NGObill
gets it right is in outlining the
processes, powers and jurisdiction
of the Lokpal. It should nowbe
possible to worktowards
establishing a constitutionally
valid, efficient, workable and
sustainable legal mechanism to
combat corruption.
Sriram Panchu (sri rampanchu5@gmai l .com) is
cams have downloaded on to
the Indian scene with increasing
regularity; each new foray into
public funds is termed the mother of all
scams and going by this phrase we have
a plethora of motherhood of criminal
public activity.
Anna Hazare has moved it from the
back-burnerof things we have to live with,
an inescapable global phenomenon, to
actually getting to grips with the state of
our moribund anti-corruption law and
fashioning a remedy. His campaign has
invoked the power of public conscious-
ness, drawn support from large numbers
and got his team an equal place at the
drafting table. The focus should now be
on securing a constitutionally valid, effi-
cient, workable and sustainable legal
mechanism to combat corruption.
Defects in UPA Draft
Parliaments attempts to create a Lokpal
first began in 1968; that bill lapsed with
the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The
same scenario has been repeated seven
times thereafter.Not much cause for sur-
prise here; public officials cannot be ex-
pected to be enthusiastic about promoting
a legislation to police them. In 2010,
the United Progressive Alliance
government brought forth the Lokpal
Bill to establish an institution to enquire
into allegations of corruption by public
functionaries. The Bill is hardly
remarkable for what itproposes to do, but
extremely noteworthy for what it does
not. First, it covers only ministers of the
union government and Members of
Parliament; it leaves out government
officers and judges entirely. The Lokpal
is to be appointed by a com- mittee
consisting of the vice-president, prime
minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha,
leader of the Opposition and min- isters
in charge of home and law, in other
public servants are not allowed to make
complaints to the Lokpal; considering
that they are closest to the scent, their
exclusion does not smack of bona fides.
Another limitation is that the Lokpal can-
not take up a case suo motu.
Stringent Requirements
What kills the Lokpal Bill is that without
the recommendation of the Speaker ofthe
Lok Sabha the Lokpal cannot enquire into
the allegations of corruption against the
prime minister, and ministers and MPs who
sit in the Lok Sabha; similarly, without
the recommendation of the chairman of
the Rajya Sabha, the Lokpal cannot
enquire into allegations of corruption
against min- isters and MPs who are part
of the Rajya Sabha. Neither of them
will find it easy to resist thetremendous pressure which will be
brought to prevent action. It is thus too
much to expect that the refusal to rec-
ommend will be the rare case. But most
crippling is Section 17 of the Bill. After
finding the offender guilty of corruption
all that the Lokpal can do is to inform the
respective Speaker or Chairman of the
House ofParliament, who will then lay the
report before the House. The competent
authoritybeing the prime minister in the
case of ministers and the respective House
of Parliament in the case of MPs will
decide on the action to be taken and
communi- cate it to the Lokpal. This is
said so in Sec- tion 17 (3) and with this
one sentence, hopes of enforcement,
punishment and deterrent fade away
instantly. Given that tainted money is
required for fighting elec- tions and that
Parliament splits on politi- cal lines,
people will have little hope in its capacity
to pursue penal action for corrup- tion.Nor is it possible to repose much con-
fidence in the office of the prime minister
when even the current incumbent, univer-
sally reputed to be personally honest andSeniorAdvocate.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected] -
7/27/2019 Combating Corruption 1 (EPW April 2011)
2/5
words consisting almost exclusively of well meaning, can turn a blind eye to
10 April 23 , 2011 volxlv I n o 17 EPW Economic & PoliticalWeekly
-
7/27/2019 Combating Corruption 1 (EPW April 2011)
3/5
F IG HT I N G BRIBERY
public fraud of a 13-digit magnitude, all
in the name of coalition dharma. If this
Bill were to lapse because of the
dissolution of the Lok Sabha, it will be a
worthy legisla- tive achievement. There is
indeed a provi- sion in the Bill for
detention, trial and pun- ishment. But that
is directed against any person offering aninsult or interruption to the Lokpal.
Similarly a person held to be making a
false complaint may receive a
punishment of three years after summary
trial. A bill which seeks to curb
corruptionby public functionaries ends up
penalising complainants while leaving the
corrupt to the tender mercies of their
peers in Parlia- ment and the prime
minister.
AlternativeLegislation
The alternative legislation proposed by
the Anna Hazare-led civil society groups
seeks to remedy these deficiences.1 It cov-
ers all public servants ministers, bureau-
crats and judges. The members of the
Lok- pal need not be only from the
judiciary, they can be drawn from other
occupational quarters. Complaints can be
received from any source, including suo
motu by the authority. No prior sanction
is required for commencing action. TheLokpal is to have its investigative
machinery. It can set in motion the
prosecution.
However this is a central point in issue
the Hazare Bill goes much further than
creating a body to fight corruption. The
sweep and coverage of the jurisdiction of
its Lokpal encompasses complaints of cor-
ruption punishable under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, misconduct by a gov-
ernment servant, redressal of grievances
and to afford protection to whistleblow-ers. The concentration of all these func-
tions and powers in one authority has
caused serious concerns in several quar-
ters, including civil society groups and
perceptive individuals. The wide sweep
also makes for differentiated focus; re-
dressing maladministration countrywide
and checking formisconduct in a huge bu-
reaucracy is far different from handling
top-level corruption.
The area of public grievance arising
out ofmaladministrationunreasonable,
unjust executive action, wilful negligence
or undue delay in taking action, or defi-
cient administrativepractices and proce-
dures is colossal. A Lokpal consisting of
a handful of members cannot hope to
achieve much in this regard, even with the
officers of integrity that it hopes to get.
Superimposing the Lokpal on the entire
government administration will give it
power without responsibility, and a bu-
reaucracy all of its own.
Right Processes, Wrong Focus
The official Bill had the right focus cor-
ruption by public functionaries but com-
pletely deficient processes, powers and
jurisdiction. The Hazare Bill gets the lat-
ter part right, but has lost the focus. It
should have restricted itself to fighting
corruption in high places. This is not to
say that corruption at other levels is ac-
ceptable. It is not acceptable, and we have
a variety of legal reliefs departmental
enquiries, vigilance wings and recourse to
the high courts in its writ jurisdiction. The
point simply is that at present we do not
have any mechanism worth the name to
control corruption at the higher levels of
the executive, legislature and judiciary;
and if none is devised, we can bid goodbye
to all our hopes ofdevelopment and good
governance. That is why the focus in the
Hazare effort should be on corruption at
elevated levels. If this leadership is
cleansed (be it politicians, bureaucrats or
judges) the lower rungs will automatically
show more honesty. Cleanliness obeys the
law of gravity, it percolates downwards.
Leadership has its tone and tenor honest
leaders will choose men like them for the
crucial positions that matter, and will
relegate the others to lesser posts ormake
them dysfunctional. (Today the dishonest
leader does exactly the same thing.)
Further, a good portion of the bribes de-
manded at the lower levels the registrar
of documents, the police sub-inspector,the petty revenue official is funnelled to
the top. Another reason why the focus
should be on top-level corruption is
because that is where the decisions of
administration have an impact on more
lives, involving more money and affect-
ing more institutions.
While it is no truism that the more
honest officer is also the more effective
one, yet better governance is to be had
from the trustworthy plodder than the
clever rascal. Creaming off the corruptlayer will im-
prove personnel, practices and policies.
We must therefore concentrate on the
MP, the minister, the secretary and the
judge. A remarkable feature of the legal
system is that cases between individuals
involv- ing property, contracts and the
like have been on the decline; the vast
majority ofcases clogging the Indian courts
involve relief sought to quash an illegalgovern- ment order or to direct the
government toperform its administrative
duty. Many of these cases do not involve
a point of law; they are simply instances
of wrong admin- istrative action, and the
most common cause of such action or
inaction is that the demand for a bribe
was refused, or a bribe was paid by a
rival. A direct consequence of more
honesty in the administration will be a
more responsive and better function- ing
government, in turn lowering the need for
redressal from the courts.
Independent Authority
The primary need therefore is for an in-
dependent authority and a proper scheme
to effectively proceed against corrupt
holders of high office. The requirements
of this are obvious:
(a) A proper forum for selection: The
methods now under discussion between
the Hazare team and the government pan-el are likely to yield an appropriate search
and selection body, with transparency
in functioning.
(b) Independence of the body: The Lokpal
will not be subject to removal by govern-
ment or legislature, but only by the presi-
dent based on the recommendation ofthe
Supreme Court after a full hearing.
(c) Wide net of offenders ministers,
bureaucrats, judges, legislators and all
others on the pay of the state in its expand-
ed definition including agencies and cor-porations. The focus should however be
on the higher bastions. The Lokpal can
and must train its sights on the
leadershsip of the country the prime
minister, chief ministers, cabinet and
other ministers at the centre and the
states, civil servants above the level of the
joint secretary, heads of statutory bodies
and commissions, senior officers of
government corporations, agen- cies and
institutions including educational and
medical, and judges of the SupremeCourt and high courts.
(d) Enabling receipt of complaints and
suo
motu action. This is provided for.
-
7/27/2019 Combating Corruption 1 (EPW April 2011)
4/5
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 23 , 2011 volxlv I no 17 11
-
7/27/2019 Combating Corruption 1 (EPW April 2011)
5/5
F IGHT INGB RIBERY
(e) Powers of investigation, and an inves-
tigative body answerable only to the
authority. While the Lokpal should have
an investigating team under its control,
answerable to none other and needing
no sanction to commence the task, it is
neither necessary nor feasible for it to
take over the Central Bureau ofInvestiga-tion and the Central Vigilance Commis-
sioner. Those bodies should continue to
operate in areas other than marked out
for the Lokpal.
(f) Powers of prosecution and a
prosecution wing selected by and
answerable only to the authority. This is
not yet provided for. It is essential if one
is to move independ- ently after
investigation. The best of cases can fail
with an inefficient, indifferent orcorrupt
prosecutor. Witness the keenness of the
Supreme Court in ensuring the choice
of the prosecutor in the 2G scam
criminal case.
(g) Suspension of the accused on launch-
ing ofprosecution: Where a prima facie
case is made out and a charge-sheet is
filed, the accused should step down from
office till the conclusion of the trial. This
provision needs to be incorporated. The
reason is obvious.
(h) Time limit for completion of trial: It
should be provided that the trial should be
( j) Removal from office on
conviction should of course be
acccompanied by a permanent ban on
holding office under the State. Tracing
and recovering resourc- es obtained by
corrupt means and assets acquired
therefrom in the hands of the offender
and benamis is essential. The Hazaredraft takes steps in this direction.
Attachment of assets at an initial stage
after investigation is desirable; they can
be frozen till completion of trial. All
persons suspected of being benamidars,
relatives or otherwise, will have to
account for assets in their possession and
establish an independent legitimate
source forsuch acquisition.
(k) Deterrent punishment: This ought to
mean what it says that the punishment is
so heavy that others to come hereafter
pause a hundred-fold before attempting
such offences. Those who deprive the
State and its citizens of vast amounts
of money which could have provided
food, shelter and basic human rights to
thousands and millions of people must re-
ceive the maximum punishment that the
law can give. Ifimprisonment for a term
from three years up to life, based on the
extent of the crime, is mandated one can
realistically expect marked improvement
in morality rates. Those who want to
hold offices of public trust should know
that breach of that trust will bring corres-
ponding retribution.
(l) Protection to whisle-blowers and those
bringing forth complaints is necessary to
enable information regarding corruptionto come out in the open for scrutiny and
action. This can come well within the pur-
view of the Lokpal.
Making the Impossible Possible
The Bill put forth by the Anna Hazare
team meets, in substantial measure,
the requirements for an effective body
tackling corruption at the top level. The
Hazare team is close to achieving what
many thought was impossible a viable
anti-corruption legislation. If they can
succeed in this endeavour, they would
have rendered this country a service be-
yond measure. If they limit the present
efforts to this object, real and tangible
success is at hand.
held on a day to day basis, and a time limit
of three to six months forcompletion and
judgment. If this is the time span, the pre-
vious provision of suspension does not
cause excessive hardship.
(i) Trial to be held at a high level court,
obviating recourse to multiple appeals
and challenges to interim orders. This is
crucial. The current proposal makes it
possible to appoint more special judges
under the Prevention of Corruption Act.But when it comes to cases against lead-
ers, we must provide for trial by a high-
level judge a judge of the Supreme
Court, or a chief justice or senior judge
of the high court. That the verdict is in the
hands of the senior judiciary should be
source ofreassurance to those who worry
that the Lokpal has too much power. It
should also reassure the person wrongly
charged; otheraccused will of course be
chagrined that they have lost the dozen
years of appellate ladders beforeconfirmation of sentence (the practical
reality of the euphemism the law will
take its own course).
12
W