combating adverse selection and moral hazard :
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Combating adverse selection and moral hazard :. Collateral. Net Worth (=$Assets - $Liabilities). Net Worth – – The Foundation of Credit. Factors Causing Financial Crises. Asset Values Drop: Net Worth Down Stock market decline Decreases net worth of corporations. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Combating adverse selection and moral hazard:
• Collateral
• Net Worth (=$Assets - $Liabilities)
Net Worth – – The Foundation of Credit
Factors Causing Financial CrisesAsset Values Drop: Net Worth Down
Stock market decline Decreases net worth of corporations.Unanticipated deflation Debt burdens up/net worth downUnanticipated depreciation $ debts up/net worth downAsset write-downs (bad debts) Net worth down
• Deterioration in Financial Institutions’ Balance SheetsCapital Ratios Down Decline in lending.
Interest Rates Rise Worsens adverse selection (who would pay the high rates?)Increases business needs for external funds
worsens adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Government Fiscal Imbalances
Fear default of government debt Capital flight…Currency crisisBanking Crises
Loss of information production / disintermediation.• Increases in Uncertainty Decline in
lending.
Crises (and Threatened Crises) We Have Known• The L o n g Depression, 1873 – 1896 • The Great Depression, 1929 – 1939• Mexican Default, 1982• Continental Illinois, 1984…Oil patch loans…TBTF• Third World Debt Crisis, 1980s Lost Decade• Savings & Loan Debacle, 1986 – 1990• Black Monday, October 19, 1987• Tequila Crisis, 1994 – 1995• East Asia Financial Crisis, 1997 - 1998• Long Term Capital Management, 1998• dot.com bust, 2000• 911, 2001
• Subprime-triggered crisis – Run on shadow banks The Great Recession, 2007 –
The Great Depression: Mother of all Crises
Stock Market Crash Spending cutback
Bank Panic Monetary Contraction
Bank Failures Reduced Lending
Price Deflation/Deflationary Expectations Debt Deflation
Declining Net Worth Reduced Lending
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Producer Price Index
Onset of the Depression: Persistent Deflation…Persistent Job Loss
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New Deal Reflation
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real m1 balances (ppi deflator) demand deposit to currency ratio real m2 balances (ppi deflator)
Ratio of Demand Deposits To Currency
Real Money Holdings
New Deal Reflation
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PPI
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Stimulus and Retrenchment: Recession in Depression
U.S. Financial CrisesStage One• Mismanagement of
financial liberalization and innovations
• Asset price boom & bust• Spikes in interest rates• Increase in uncertainty
Stage two: Banking Crisis
Stage three: Debt Deflation
Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2009• Financial innovations in mortgage markets:
– Subprime and Alt-A mortgages– Mortgage-backed securities– Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
• Housing price bubble forms– World savings glut
Increase in liquidity from cash flows surging to the US – Subprime mortgage market housing demand and prices up.
• Agency problems arise– “Originate to distribute” … “Moving, not storage”
principal (investor) agent (mortgage broker) problem. – Commercial and investment banks/rating agencies …
weak incentives to assess quality of securities• Information problems surface…A “Minsky Moment”Housing price bubble bursts/Crisis spreads globallyhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/04/29/business/2009-wide-housing-graphic.html
Easy Money
Policy
Capital Inflows
Eager Home Buyers
InnovativeBanks
Rating Agencies
AmbitiousMortgage Brokers
SecuritizationMBSs
EscalatingHouse Prices
Gov’t SponsoredEnterprises
Developer Clout
Bank Regulators
The best of times
A “Global Saving Glut”
The Shadow Banking System: A Fragile Financial Infrastructure
Thus a long-term corporate bond could actually be sold to three different persons. One would supply the money for the bond; one would bear the interest rate risk, and one would bear the (credit) risk of default. The last two would not have to put up any capital for the bond, though they might have to post some collateral.
Fisher BlackFundamentals of Liquidity, 1970
Banks have public backing…and are heavily regulated•Lender of last resort, the Fed•Bank creditors (depositors) are insured, FDICShadow Banks: Lack Public Backing Substitutes•Liquidity put
•Underlying asset values fall•Short-term funders back off•Sponsor steps in per prior agreement…line of credit
•Credit put•Buy Credit Default Swaps from private insurers
•Private insurers can’t possibly reserve against systemic risk
The Shadow Banking System: A Fragile Financial Infrastructure
The Shadow Banking System: A Fragile Financial Infrastructure
Denizens of the shadows•Federal loan programs/GSEs•Investment banks/Pension funds•Finance companies•Monoline insurers/Mortgage insurers•Structured investment vehicles (SIVs)•Conduits: repos/total return swaps, securities arbitrage•Credit hedge funds•Money market intermediaries
The Shadow Banking System: A Fragile Financial Infrastructure
Steps in Shadow Credit Intermediation (example)•Loan origination by finance company using CP•Loan warehousing by conduit using ABCP•Asset backed security (ABS) issued by special purpose vehicle (SPV) selling ABS•ABS warehsing by TRS/repo conduit using ABCP •ABS Collateralized debt obligation (CDO) issued by SPV selling ABS CDOs or CDO2
•ABS intermediation by Special Investment Vehicle (SIV) using ABCP or repo•Wholesale funding of all of the above by MMMF using $1 Net Asset Value (NAV) shares
Easy MoneyPolicy
Capital Inflows
Eager Home Buyers
InnovativeBanks
Rating Agencies
AmbitiousMortgage Brokers
SecuritizationMBSs
EscalatingHouse Prices
Gov’t SponsoredEnterprises
Developer Clout
Bank Regulators
The best of times
House Price – Foreclo
sureSpiral
Demand –Jobs –
Wages – Income –
SpiralDeleveraging – Debt DeflationSpiral
GovernmentRevenue – CutbackSpiral
Global Repercussion Spiral Macroecono
mic Linkages
and Feedbacks
Vicious Spirals Unleashed
Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2009 (cont’d)• Banks’ balance sheets deteriorate
– Write downs– Sale of assets and credit restriction
• High-profile firms fail– Bear Stearns (March 2008)– Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 2008)– Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Reserve Primary Fund
(MMMF) and Washington Mutual (September 2008).• Fed pumps up bank reserves: TARP/TALF,etc.
– Lend and lend freely • Bailout package enacted
– House votes down the $700 billion bailout package (9/29/08) Stock market slumps Bailout passes on October 3. – Congress approves a $787 billion economic stimulus plan on
February 13, 2009. • Recession deepens
Responses: No Bank Left BehindLender of Last Resort / Spender of Last Resort
• Tax Rebate $124 bil.• Fed Fund Rate Cuts• Fannie/Freddie $200 bil.• Bear-Stearns $29 bil.• AIG $174 bil.Fed “Facilities”• Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) $58 bil.• Treasury Security Loan Facility (TSLF) $133 bil.• Term Auction Facility (TAF) $416 bil.• Asset- Backed Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) $1,777 bil.• Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) $540 bil.• More Fed Fund Rate Cuts … Hold At ~0%• Fed Purchases of Long-Term Securities: GSEs & MBSs $600 bil.• Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) $200 bil.• Emergency Economic Stabilization Act/TARP $700 bil.
Government LoansGovernment Equity
• Stimulus Package $787 bil. aka The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
• TARP II• Stress Tests
House Price – Foreclo
sureSpiral
Demand –Jobs –
Wages – Income –
SpiralDeleveraging – Debt Deflation
SpiralGovernmentRevenue – CutbackSpiral
Global Repercussion Spiral Macroecono
mic Linkages
and Feedbacks
Vicious Spirals Reversed? Tackle them all together!
StimulusProgram• Infrastructure Spending• Tax Cuts
Federal AidTo States
RefinanceMortgages
Revive dual banking systemCash for Trash• Recapitalize banks• Revive securitization
G – 20• Coordinated Stimulus
Macroeconomic Linkages and
Feedbacks
Vicious Spirals Unleashed
FIGURE 2 Treasury Bill–to–Eurodollar Rate (TED) Spread
Source: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
Dynamics of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies
• Stage one: Initiation of Financial Crisis.• Path one: mismanagement of financial liberalization
• Weak supervision and lack of expertise lending boom.• Domestic banks borrow from foreign banks. • Fixed exchange rates give a sense of lower risk.• Securities markets not well-developed Banks important
• Path two: severe fiscal imbalances:• Governments force banks to buy government debt. • When government debt loses value, bank net worth down .
Additional factors:• Increase in interest rates (from abroad)• Asset price decrease• Uncertainty linked to unstable political systems
Dynamics of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies
• Stage two: currency crisisBank losses currency crises:
• Government cannot raise interest rates (doing so forces banks into insolvency)…
• … and speculators expect a devaluation. • Foreign and domestic investors sell the domestic currency.
• Stage three: Full-Fledged Financial Crisis:• The debt burden in terms of domestic currency up • Banks more likely to fail:
– Individuals are less able to pay off their debts (value of assets fall).
– Debt denominated in foreign currency increases (value of liabilities increase).
Financial Crises: Mexico 1994-1995 ...Tequila
• Financial liberalization in the early 1990s: – Lending boom/weak supervision/lack of expertise.– Banks accumulated losses/net worth declined.
• Rise in interest rates abroad.• Increased uncertainty (political instability).• Domestic currency devaluated Dec. 20, 1994.
– Tesobono burden • Rise in actual and expected inflation.
Financial Crises: East Asia 1997-1998
• Financial liberalization in the early 1990s: – Lending boom/weak supervision/lack of expertise.– Banks accumulated losses/net worth declined.
• Uncertainty increased – stock market declines and failure of prominent firms
• Domestic currencies devaluated (1997). • Rise in actual and expected inflation.
Financial Crises: Argentina 2001-2002• Currency board: 1 Peso = $1• Fiscal imbalance
– banks coerced to absorb government debt• Appreciation of $ Argentine recession• Rise in interest rates abroad.• Uncertainty increased (ongoing recession).• Domestic currency devaluated, Jan. 6, 2002• Rise in actual and expected inflation.
Sequence of Events in Emerging Market Financial Crises