CHAPTER 12

Combat Service Support

THE REQUIREMENT

OBVIOUSLY, AN OUTNUMBERED FORCE must be more

effective man-for-man, weapon-for-weapon, and unit-for-unitthan the opposition. In earlier chapters we have emphasized

the importance of individual and crew training to weapon

effectiveness, and the importance of tactical skill to unit

effectiveness. Likewise, units cannot develop full combat

power without a full complement of operating equipment and

weapons. This is what combat service support is all about.

CONTENTS

PAGE

THE REQUIREMENT 12-1

CONCEPT FOR MODERN LOGISTICS 12-3

LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL 12-10

CONSERVATION AND SUCCESS IN BATTLE 12-13

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—FM 100-5

THE ONLY MEASURE OF COMBATSERVICE SUPPORT

EFFECTIVENESS IS THEPERCENTAGE OF BATTLEFIELD-

OPERABLE WEAPON SYSTEMS

We are not interested in logistics systems ~per se. We are interested in operating weaponsystems on the battlefield. This means thatweapon systems must be supplied with fheland ammunition, and repaired whendamaged or otherwise inoperable. Themeasure of effectiveness for combat servicesupport is the percentage of weapon systemswhich are fully operable on the battlefield.There is no other criterion. When the Generalconcentrates his forces at the critical timeand place, he is, in effect, concentratingweapon systems (tanks, field artillery,helicopters, etc.). Therefore, he must, at thesame time, concentrate his combat servicesupport resources to:

SUPPLIES, SUPPORT, WEAPONSARE CONCENTRATED AT

CRITICAL PLACES AND TIMES

ARM THE SYSTEMS (Ammunition)

FUEL THE SYSTEMS (POL)

FIX THE SYSTEMS (Maintenanceand Repair Parts)

MAN THE SYSTEMS (Troop Support)

Combat service support is an element ofcombat power. The General uses theavailable resources of these elements to strivefor a combat power ratio of at least 1 to 3 inthe defense, or 6 to 1 in the offense. Hemanipulates his resources to attain therequired balance of power by directlycontrolling critical elements andestablishing priorities for support. Heconcentrates supplies and support, Just as heconcentrates weapons —at the critical placesand times. To do this, he must know:

� WHAT HE HAS (Resourceidentification and quantity)

� WHERE IT IS (Availability—immediateor near future)

� ITS CONDITION (Readiness)

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FM 100-5 –

The Colonels influence the battle bymaneuvering the combat service supportresources assigned to them. They keepsupport units close to the weapon systemsthey support, commensurate with the riskinvolved. They deliver supplies tactically.They plan the use of allocated transportation THE COLONELS “MANEUVER”to fit the scheme of maneuver. AND THE CAPTAINS “APPLY”

The Captains apply combat servicesupport troops and resources to the actualmaintenance of critical weapon systems, andto the provision of fuel, ammunition and foodwhere it is needed.

Commanders must think in terms of theirweapon systems support, not in terms ofgeneralized logistic support. Logisticiansmust insure that we have effective operatingweapon systems.

CONCEPT FOR MODERNLOGISTICS

OVER VIEW

The General must insure that his combatforce has the wherewithal to fight effectivelyat the outset of the battle and to fightcontinuously thereafter. Combat servicesupport elements provide the staying powerto sustain his force in combat. The supportsystem has no other purpose than tomaintain and support the weapon systemsand their operators.

The competition among the services foravailable strategic airlift and sealift, duringthe critical stages of a war, is very keen. TheGeneral must inte~ate the derdoyrnent of ONLY DEPLOY WEAPONSsupport, with the deployment if the troops SYSTEMS WHICH CAN BEand weapons which require that support, in SUPPORTED TO THEIR FULLexactly the right proportions. The criteria are OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL

twofold:

Weapons should not be deployed whichcannot be supported to their full operationalpotential.

Support elements should not be deployedbefore they are required by the weaponsystems committed to battle.

In a theater of operations which exists inpeacetime, war reserves should beprepositioned for use in the early stages, and

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–FM 100-5

to sustain the combat force until support fromCONUS can be established. Airlift must beallocated to transport priority needs duringthis phase, and for critical repair partsthroughout the war.

Considering the nature of the battlefield,support functions critical to battle areconducted as far forward as possible so thatcombat equipment can be armed, fueled, andwhen necessary, fixed close to the battlefield.Critical supplies must be hauled to the

THE RIGHT SUPPORT MUST BE forward elements. This support must be

‘“WHERE” NEEDED, provided swiftly. In addition, highly skilled‘*WH EN“ N EED ED technicians must be transported to Points

where their expertise is needed. The properapplication of command and control - ofcombat service support elements andactivities assures the right support, in theright place, at the right time.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

� Must respond to combat demands for criticalsupplies and essential maintenance.

� Must tailor resources and priorities to thechanging combat situation.

� Must be flexible enough to support from anybase arrangement.

H Must measure their success in terms ofoperating equipment and weapons on thebattlefield.

_ Must be trained to survive and accomplishtheir mission under combat conditions.

Throughout the support structure,resources must be austerely supplied,properly applied, and efficiently used.

Forward support for the combat forces inbattle is by far the most importantundertaking in the logistic system; all otherelements exist to make it happen.

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FM 100-5—

ARMING IT–AMMUNITION TO THE FIGHTING FORCES.

‘Y“When the General concentrates his forces at thecritical time and place, he is, in effect, concen -trating weapon systems. Therefore, he must, atthe same time, concentrate his combat servicesupport resources to.”

1.ARM THE SYSTEMS

The brigade fighting elements requireammunition resupply for the necessaryfirepower to suppress or destroy the enemy.

SUCCESSFUL RESUPPLYDEPENDS UPON

_ A smooth flow of ammunition from CONUSdirect to the units that support the weaponsystems.

� Careful estimates of requirements based onusage, experience, and type of combatanticipated.

~ The ability of the combat service supportcommanders to respond to demand forcritical needs and adapt to changingsituations.

The Generals authorize basic loads whichenable the combat units to fight the battleuntil resupply can be effected.

In order to sustain operations for specificperiods, brigades, divisions, and corpsindicate their ammunition needs bysubmitting their Required Supply Rates(RSR) for types of ammunition to the nexthigher commander. IJS forces often have tofight their battle at the end of a long,vulnerable supply line. Availability andtactical requirements may change, dictatinga supply that is less than the required rate. Toaccommodate these variables, eachcommander, from corps to battalion,announces a Controlled Supply Rate(CSR) to his next subordinate commandersin order to control consumption based onavailable supply and still accomplish themission. Ammunition resupply is closelycoordinated to assure proper routing andrerouting to meet tactical changes and toshift ammunition units to meet varyingrequirements.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN THE THEATER

Ammunition is packed on pallets or in containers basic loads and meet their operational

in CONUS � , shipped via fast sea transport requirements. Fighting elements send tactical

� , moved through fixed ports � , or over the uwheeled vehicles . back to the ASPS to pick

shore, in a rapid, steady flow to corps level up the ammunition and deliver � it to the

ammunition supply points (ASP) � . Materials forward areas. However, they may find it

handling equipment is designed for the job and necessary to use high mobility, or even armoredconditions of terrain and climate. The fighting vehicles for the last leg of the trip up to the

elements ~( brigades, artillery, cavalry, etc.) fighting maneuver battalions.

draw ammunition from the ASPS to replenish

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—FM 100-5

FUELING IT–POL TO MO VE THE FORCE.

T“When the General concentrates his forces at the

critical time and place, he is, In effect, concentrating weapon systems Therefore, he must, atthe same time, concentrate hls combat servlct’support resources to.”

2. FUEL THE SYSTEMS

Petroleum. oil and lubricants (POL) movethe force and support weapons systems.

Supply is based on quantities previouslyused and estimates for the future.

The divisions estimate their needs; thecorps controls the availability and flow.

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PETROLEUM SUPPLY IN THE THEATER.

POL is delivered to the corps from CONUS divisions. Divisions normally store POL in

u or off-shore sources. It flows into corps field bladclers � or on tank trucks. Divisions deliverstorage � (bladders or tank farms) from � to their brigades and other major units � .pipelines, trucks, or railcars; or in an emergency, Tactical refueling forward of brigade trains is byby aircraft delivery. Corps moves

m POL to the �battalion tankers .

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FM 100-5—

FIXING 1T–SCPPORT FOR WARD IN THE BRIGADE AREA.

T“When the General concentrates his forces at thecrtttc~l time and place, he Is, in effect, concen-trating weapon systems, Therefore, he must, atthe same ttme, concentrate his combat servicesupport resources to”

I 3. FIX THE SYSTEMS

Modern Army weapon systems, such astanks, attack helicopters, and air defenseradars require:

� Special parts.

� Special tools.

. Specially trained mechanics.

. Special technical documentation,

�Special technical assistance, whenrequired.

Therefore, special maintenance centers areestablished in the corps area for the followingcategories of materiel:

. Armament and combat vehicle.

. Wheel vehicle,

. Aviation.

� Missile.

� Communications-electronics.

� Clround support equipment.

These centers are in direct communicationwith the appropriate command of the U.S.Army Materiel Development andReadiness Command (DARCOM). Thecenters provide maintenance support of allweapon systems in the corps falling withintheir scope or category. They push parts,assemblies, float equipment and teams ofexperts to the division areas where the battleis the hottest, and the losses or problems arethe largest. The centers deal directly with andsupport those elements of the divisionmaintenance battalion dealing with thoseparticular weapon systems.

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CONTACTTEAM IHl

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MAINTENANCE SUPPORT IN

CORPS AREAS

The equipment of the combat force must be keptin operation since early replacement may not be

possible. Maintenance personnel organic to the

combat unit are the first on the scene when

equipment is in need of repair. Forward support

maintenance companies m extend theirsupport to combat units by sending contactteams � to work with them. Normally, morethan half of the repairmen of this company willbe outworking in the combat area. The forwardsupport contact teams are augmented, asneeded, by additional contact parties from

division rear � or technical assistance from

corps general support � . People, parts, and

tools are pushed into that forward support areawhen needed; when no longer needed, they arepulled back. Supervised battlefield

cannibalization may be used when the parts are

not available from the supply system, and anitem of equipment can be repaired using partsfrom other unserviceable equipment. The thrustof maintenance turnaround is forward in order

to maximize combat time by minimizing repair

and evacuation time.

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—FM 100-5

MANNING IT–THE BEST MAN FOR THE JOB

‘*When the General concentrates his forces at theimportant, but indirect impact on the conduct

critical time and place, he is, in effect, concen -of warfare; others have a direct effect.

Itrating weapon systems. Therefore, he must, atthe same time, concentrate his combat servicesupport resources to:”

I 4. MAN THE SYSTEMS ICombat service support includes a wide

range of assistance for the operating forces.Many of these services and activities have an

Troop Rephcements. The outcome ofbattle increasingly depends upon the properfunctioning of a few primary weaponsystems. As a result, the personnel systemmust be focused upon the support of thesesystems. For example, highly trained tankand ATGM gunners must be identified,segregated, and delivered to the weapons

EXAMPLE REQUISITION AND REPLACEMENT FLOW

FOR CORPS WITH NO THEATER ARMY

Replacements being moved from CON US to the immediate needs; or these personnel may be

theater may be allocated to corps or division and assigned, in an overstrength status, to units

moved direct to replacement activities which can logistically support them and

operating at those command levels. Small reasonably forecast a need for their services.

numbers of individual replacements needed to Major commanders in the theater of operations

man critical weapon systems and maintenance monitor the replacement stream within their

teams may be assembled and briefly retained in commands for the purpose of determining

dispersed forward locations to satisfy allocations and assignments.

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FM 100-5—

crew on the battlefield with the same care asthe weapon system itself. In short, thepersonnel system on the modern battlefieldmust be weapon systems oriented.

Before the battle starts, contingencyplanners estimate required replacements, byMOS, for the first 30 days. This estimate isbased on the strength of the deployed forceand the anticipated intensity of the battle. Asthe situation changes, this estimate isreevaluated and updated. When thecontingency plan is executed, a force-fedreplacement flow, based on this estimate, isstarted from CONIJS to the theater ofoperations. Headquarters, Department ofthe Army (HQDA), coordinates and directsthe movement of replacements.

Within the theater of operations,requisitions for replacements are initiated bythe highest level organization which canaccurately determine requirements. In somecases, companies and battalions may berequired to initiate requisitions because of thenon-availability of current strength data athigher echelons. Requisitions are forwarded—from division to corps to theater army andthen to HQDA. Each command echelonvalidates and adjusts requirements based onimmediately available assets, enrouteper~onnel, and further refined loss estimates.

Troon Subsistence. The intense combat

relatively short duration generally precludesthe practice of providing hot meals in thecombat area. Under these conditions, fieldrations will be provided in individuallypackaged meals that are easily carried andreadily consumed by the soldier; thussustaining him without reducing his combateffectiveness. When combat conditionspermit, and rations and cooking equipmentare available, troops are served at least onehot meal daily. Food preparation should beconsolidated at battalion level wheneverpossible and the meals transported to thecompany level units.

Troop Health. In all our wars, more soldiershave been lost to commanders throughdisease and sickness than through enemyaction. In fact, the proportion has run as highas 3 to 1.

To insure that soldiers are physically ableto fight, commanders must establishcomprehensive programs of healthpreservation and restoration. They mustprescribe standards, allocate medicalsupport to perform specific tasks, and insurecompliance. Colonels insure that medicalpersonnel and assets are provided to supportthe mission. Captains supervise tasks ofassigned individuals responsible forproviding health services, and require troopsto observe the rules of hygiene and

whic~ could take place in a violent battle of.—

sanitation.

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1RATIO OF PREVENTABLE CASUALTIES TO COMBAT-CONNECTED CASUALTIES

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—FM 100-5

LOGISTI:oCNOTMRi$ND AND

ORGANIZATION FOR LOGISTICS - -- --

Because success in battle dependsincreasingly on a few primary weaponsystems, support must be focused on thesecritical systems.

At the edge of the battle, in the brigadearea, support to weapon systems iscoordinated by a Forward Area SupportCoordinator (FASCO), an officer whorepresents the division support commandcommander. This individual is theconnecting link between combat and supportelements and insures proper support tocombat systems. He coordinates theoperation of the forward support elements ofmaintenance, supply, transportation, andmedical which are located with the rearelements of the brigade they support. Asrequirements change, these division supportunits push forward additional resources andwithdraw them when no longer needed.

The FASCO reports to the divisionsupport command (DISCOM) com-mander, who also commands and directssupport activities throughout the division inaccordance with the General’s priorities andthe changing battlefield situation.

The DISCOM focuses on weapon systemsavailability and readiness through theDivision Materiel Management Center(DMMC). Here, the readiness of weaponsystems to fight is continuously examined,and management action is taken to keepthem operational Maint”~ance priorities arecontrolled to insure that operations of themaintenance battalion optimize weaponsystem readiness. Action is also taken toobtain critical repair parts quickly, whennecessary to return a weapon system tocombat. The DISCOM moves suppliesforward and shifts support resources to meetoperational needs, and reacts to shiftingdeployments and changing combat losses.When division requirements cannot be metlocally or technical assistance is needed insupport of combat systems, assistance isobtained from the corps support command(COSCOM).

Logistic support for non-divisional unitsfollows the same pattern, whether locatedwithin the division area or behind thedivision rear boundary. Direct support isprovided by corps DS units, unless attachedto a division for support. The DS units -irawon the COSCOM for supplies and expertise.

Integrated general support, supply, andmaintenance are provided to all elements ofthe corps by general suport technical centersoperating under the COSCOM. A corpssupport command may have all of thefollowing centers:

� Armament and Combat Vehicle

� Wheel Vehicle

. Aviation

� Missile

� Communications - Electronics

� Ground Support Equipment

The centers are tailored to support theforce. Their size, types, numbers, and -’location depend on equipment density withinthe corps, the intensity of combat, andgeographic environment. Each centerprovides general support maintenance,repair parts supply, and end item supply for agroup of weapon systems or materiel items.They assist forward support units ontechnical problems and in battlefieldrecovery and damage assessment, operate acollection point for battlefield recovereditems, and manage their use as acannibalization source for repair parts andassemblies.

To tailor the general support structureausterely, two or more centers may beconsolidated. On the other hand, optimumweapon system support may be achieved byhaving more than one center of a particulartype. General support repair parts, except formissiles and aircraft, may be consolidated atone of the centers or at a more centralizedlocation. In addition to the technical centersidentified above, the COSCOM may have

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FM 100-5—

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W OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR COMB-AT WEAPON SYSTEtiS

general support activities to receive, store,and issue POL, food, and other supplies notprocessed by the technical centers.

The centers provide the highest level oftechnical competence on weapon systemsavailable in the Corps. Each center worksdirectly with the CONIJS logistic centers anddevelopment commands of the IJS ArmyMateriel Development and ReadinessCommand (DARCOM) in order to draw ontheir technical expertise and support.DARCOM technical specialists rndrepresentatives from industry will provideon-site assistance on weapon systemtechnical problems.

The COSCOM commands the centers andmanages logistic operations throughout thecorps. The Materiel Management Center

The COSCOM sends requisitions directlyto CONIJS to meet the needs of the corps.

In a large theater of operations involvingmore than one corps, the Theater ArmyHeadquarters provides overall managementof logistic operations. It sets priorities,assigns logistic missions, and allocatesresources. Through its MMC, thisheadquarters specifically controls andmanages selected items which are so criticalthat the Theater Army commander retainstheir control. Most of the major combatweapon systems will be controlled here at themajor item and critical subassembly level.

The Theater Army commander mayestablish an Area Command (TAACOM)behind the corps rear boundaries tohandle materiel as it passes through theport system. The TAACOM does notnormally carry backup supplies for thecorps. It provides support to whatever

(MMC) of the COSCOMmonitors the operationalweapon systems and takesthem fighting.

continuously un{ts are iocated in i~- area which mayreadiness of include some weapon systems such as air

action to keep defense, or combat units in theaterreserve status.

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—FM 100-5

MANAGEMENT INFORMA TIONS YSTEMSAND COMMUNICATIONS

Visibility is the key to the General’s controlof resources. Management informationsystems and communications are the toolsthat provide visibility. Through the mediumof automatic data processing (ADP)systems, the commander knows what he hasa-vailable, where it is, and its state of combat

COMPUTER BASED SYSTEMS readiness. computer-based systems areARE HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS IN highly mobile and environment adaptable,

COMBAT THEATERS b tu in the combat theater they are highpriority t: rgets for sabotage ‘and directenemy action. Therefore, security andbackup for ADP support are importantplanning considerations.

In addition to providing managementinformation, ADP operating systems arecapable of processing huge volumes ofrepetitive information. In this capacity, thecomputer analyzes demands that support theweapon systems in accordance withpriorities established to satisfy the combatcommander’s needs. It assists the managerin setting stock levels to meet demands,determining availability within thecommand, and placing orders on the CON(JSbase.

Earth satellites and other electronicdevices provide us with vastly improvedintercontinental communications. Hugevolumes of data bits are transmitted halfwayaround the world almost instantaneously.Transceiver terminals within the theaterprovide channels of communication betweenthe COSCOM and TAACOM materielmanagement centers and the sources ofsupply in CONIJS. Support managerstransmit information to the commander’sheadquarters in response to his queries.These data and management informationlinks bring CONIJS-based managers andtechnicians close to the pulse of thebattlefield. They provide a sharpenedperception of weapon system requirements,and a quick response to the combatcommander’s needs.

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FM 100-5—

In the last three wars, our Army was notfully committed until IJS industry was inheavy production of military equipment andlarge quantities of war materiel were readilyavailable. We cannot expect this luxury in thefuture. We will fight for many months withwhat we have at the start of the war. Supply SUPPLY PRIORITY GOES TOpriority will go to weapons ammunition, AMMUNITION, POL, ANDPOL, and repair parts. Austerity will be the R‘PAIR ‘ARTSrule. Elaborate construction and othersupport for “standard of living” has no placeon the battlefield we see before us.

Every commander at every level—General,Colonel, and Captain—must conserveresources carefully to sustain our combatforce. Ammunition and POL must not bewasted. Weapon systems must be taken careof and maintained by the operating troopsand their support elements. Equipmentdamaged in the battle must be recovered,repaired, and used again.L

Whatever indigenous resources exist in thearea must be obtained and used to supportour combat force. If available, POL, food, andother supplies can be procured locally.Facilities normally used for civilian purposescan be obtained for support of the war effort.Civilian transportation of all kinds must beused to reduce our requirement for militarytransport. In secure rear areas, local hirecivilians will be used to the maximum toreduce our requirement for militarypersonnel.

For success in battle, fighting with what we have, conservation ofour limited manpower and combat equipment is absolutelyessential.

12-13

‘L.

CHAPTER 13 Operations Within NATO

OVERVIEW

THENATO ALLIANCE links together 15nations in a combined effort to insure the security and freedom of itsmembers. Article 5of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "Theparties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all . . ." The principal military commands of NATO are Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) a n d Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). ACE is responsible for the defense of all NATO territory in Europe except Britain, France, Iceland, and Portugal. In the Central Region of ACE, forces are provided by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the IJnited Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Canada. In the Southern Region, forces from the TJnited States are joined by those from Italy, Turkey, The United Kingdom, Portugal, and Greece. The Northern Region includes military forces from Germany, Norway, and Denmark. These national forces may operate outside their own territory; however, each NATO nation retains sovereignty within its territorial boundaries and controls political, civil, and economic activity.

CONTENTS PAGE

OVERVIEW 13-1 FACTORS AFFECTING NATO OPERATIONS 13-5

NORTHERN A R M ALLIED AIR FORCE LLlED NAVAL FORCE LLlED AIR FORCE SOUTHERN EUROPE

ACE has a single supreme commander of military forces who reports to the Military Committee of NATO. He exercises operational command over subordinate elements, which are also commanded by NATO commanders.

FM 100-+

UNITED S%#i*ESEUROPEAN COMMAND ‘,,.,,t 4.COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

DEPUTYCOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

STUTTGART-VAIHINGEN, GERMANY

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

US ARMY EUROPE US NAVAL FORCESAND 7TH ARMY

*EUROPE

HEIDELBERG, GERMANY LONDON, ENGLAND

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

US AIR FORCESSEPARATE COMMANDS

EUROPEAGENCIES UNDER

USEUCOMRAMSTEIN, GERMANy ,

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The United States European Command(U SE UCOM) is the senior US militaryheadquarters in Europe. USEUCOM develops

plans for general war in Europe to support NATO’sstrategy of flexible response. The commandexercises operational control over componentforces assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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–FM 100-5

For contingency operations, USEUCOM +maintains small, specially-tailored forcepackages for rapid deployment throughoutthe command. These include Air Forcefighter squadrons, Army airborne units, andMarine landing teams.

IJpon alert of impending hostilities,national combat and combat support forcesare phased into NATO commands.Operational command of these forces isrelinquished by national commands so thatwhen hostilities occur or are imminent, theNATO commander, not the nationalcommander, employs the forces. A similartransfer of authority occurs for post D-dayaugmentation forces; national commandsprepare the units for combat and thentransfer operational command to NATO.However, each nation retains responsibilityto provide combat service support to theirforces.

The implications of this commandrelationship vary with the echelon ofcommand. For the General, it is a matter ofdaily importance. Some US Generals arecommanders of large NATO organizations.Whether he is a NATO commander or not,each will be concerned with adherence toNATO procedures, coordination with alliedforces (whether combat, combat support, orcombat service support), and with the actionsrequired to insure a useful meshing of effortbetween dissimilar organizations. TheColonels and Captains will be concernedwith certain routine NATO procedures and,though not as often as the General, thecoordination of foreign and US forces inoperations and suppoi.

An important consideration is thatthere will be differences between thevarious forces which encompass morethan the ea8ily recognized variation inlanguage. They will include variationsin doctrine, organization, training,logistics, food, and customs as well. Thecommander must recognize these andtake them into account in his planning.

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FM 100-5—

. Some of these differences are beingeliminated. Standardization Agreements(STANAGS) establish procedures andguidelines for the employment andcoordination of all arms in land combat. (Alist of STANAGS relevant to land forcetactical doctrine is at Appendix A.) AsSTANAGS are adopted, they become a partof the various nations’ unilateral procedures.Allied Publications (APs) provide NATOallies information pertaining to tactics,intelligence, training, doctrine, securityrules, exercise procedures, technical andadministrative matters. Rationalizationefforts (reducing duplication of effort,particularly in the development of expensiveweapon systems; establishing commondoctrine; improving interoperability) are inprogress. They will, in the long term,facilitate combined operations.

The immediate goal is interoperability inboth equipment and methods of operationswhich will allow multinational forces to worksmoothly and effectively together. AlliedTactical Publications (ATP) establish abasis for a common understanding ofdoctrine between nations and provide NATO

~’ commanders with guiding principles.Currently available ATP include Land ForceTactical Doctrine and Tactical Air Doctrine.

FACTORS AFFECTING

In Europe, the ground forces of both theWarsaw Pact and NATO (which areprimarily armored and mechanized) aresupported by modem, highly capable airforces. Warsaw Pact forces are equipped withstandardized weapons and have a commondoctrine; NATO elements are much morediverse. Areas requiring particular attentionare:

Command and ControlRelationships

Field Standing OperatingProcedures

Requirements forCoordination

NATO OPERATIONS

Liaison Teams

Language

Organization for Combat

Combat Plans and Orders

Fire Support Relationships

Communications

Intelligence

Combat Service Support

German Territorial Forces

EnvironmentalConsiderations

13”5

–FM 100-5

Command ;nd ControlRelationships

Combat and combat support forces fromvarious national forces are placed underNATO command. The usual commandrelationship established is operationalcommand, with logistical responsibilityremaining with the nation concerned. Atcorps level, and below, most national forceswill be found in a unilateral organization.The cross-attachment of different nationalmaneuver units is seldom practical belowbrigade level. As noted earlier, host nationsretain sovereignty in their territory. Hostnations also have overall responsibility forrear area protection in their nationalterritory. US elements in the area behind thecorps rear boundary are responsible for self-protection and coordination withappropriate host nation authorities.

The NATO strategy of flexible responserequires the capability to employ nuclearoptions at various levels of conflict. NATOforces, therefore, should be capable ofoperating satisfactorily in combinedconventional-nuclear operations. Command,control, and communications support isessential to deterrence and to employment of

POSITIVE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR theater nuclear forces. The wartimeWAR HEADS ALWAYS STAYS operational command of the forces, delivery

WITH THE US vehicles, and units, will be exercised by themilitary command structure of NATO. TheUS, however, maintains positive control ofthe nuclear warheads in peace and war.There must be continuing- command andcontrol procedures, to include efforts toupgrade situation reporting and messagehandling procedures, to enhance the overallflexible response capability.

Field Standing O cratingfProcedures ( SOP)

Prearranged Field Standing OperatingProcedures and lists of commonly used termsin the language of the nations concerned arenecessa~-to effective operations. These aredeveloped in multinational training

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FM 100-5—

—

exercises in peacetime, and should become apart of the standard procedures for NATOunits.

Requirements for CoordinationIn addition to the close command

relationships mentioned above, certainaspects of coordination require specialattention. Boundaries are always sought outas weak points. Boundaries between forces ofdifferent nations are particularly vulnerableand require detailed liaison and closecoordination of all allied actions in areasadjacent to the boundary. Operationalprocedures must be established andimplemented by national commanders toinsure mutually supporting and responsivetactical air, army aviation, and other firesupport. Planning is required forcontingencies which include movement ofboundaries and the frequent restructuring offorces to support an adjusted mutualboundary. ,

In a multinational operation, recognitionof forces, both friendly and enemy, takes onincreased importance. Standard proceduresfor battlefield recognition must be developed RECOGNITION BECOMESand exercised frequently. The procedures EXTREMELY IMPORTANTshould be designed- for common equipment,such as flares and flashlights.

o4

Liaison TeamsLiaison teams are of increased importance

in a multinational structure. They arerequired in many situations in which theywould not be necessary in unilateraloperations. Team members should bebilingual, and must be knowledgeable oforganization, procedures and equipment ofboth the US forces and the other NATOcountries with which they will be operating.Teams should be formed, trained, and

13-7‘ ---

-FM 100-5

equipped prior to hostilities. Communicationequipment must permit operations in boththe allied and US nets. If the US or alliedteam’s standard equipment will not suffice,US forces should be prepared to providecommunication equipment to, or receiveequipment from the allied force.

9Language

US forces must have a capability forcommunication in the language of the forceswith which they will operate. Besides skilledinterpreter-translators in the positions whichare usually required (e.g., intell, liaison),battalion and higher commanders willrequire enough language capability tocommunicate with adjacent and supportingcommanders. Key word lists (e.g., for artillerycommands) printed in multiple languageswill assist in alleviating the communicationproblem. All personnel should receivetraining in the basics of communication inthe allied language, recognition of roadsigns, directions, and methods of effectingsimple coordination.

9�

Organization for CombatA thorough understanding of concepts of

the organization, procedures, andemployment of national tactical units isrequired. As an example, commanders mustbe aware of the differences in the capabilitiesof allied weapon systems, which have amarked impact on how they must be disposedand their plan of maneuver. Other nationalforces may consider a “brigade base”concept, similar to the US separate brigade,as the normal method of operation. Suchbrigades may have combat support andcombat service support elements as part oftheir normal structure. When a US brigade isunder operational command of such an allieddivision, US combat support and combatservice support must be provided from the USdivision or other supporting units to meet theUS brigade requirements.

Seldom do we expect to cross-attach below <brigade level. Placing battalions or smallerelements under the operational control ofother national forces is possible, butincreases the coordination requirements,particularly in the areas of liaison teamrequirements, communications, fire support,and logistic support.

eCombat Plans and 0rder8

The NATO format for plans and orders isthe same as the US Army five paragraphfield order. However, differences in tactics,terminology, and graphics must be taken intoaccount. In issuing orders to others and inpreparing to execute orders from others,commanders must take particular care toinsure mutual understanding of requiredactions through personal contact ofcommanders, use of interpreters and liaisonteams. Also, great reliance should be placedon graphic displays, such as map overlays.

l%e Support–Relation8hip8In NATO, fire support coordination

techniques are generally in consonance withestablished US procedures. Advanceplanning and training reduce the timerequired for translation of terms whensupport is requested across national lines.The reaction time for tactical air support andconventional, nuclear, or chemical firesupport can be reduced through the use ofpreplanned fires. Additional methods whichwill assist planners include liaison teamswhich possess a bilingual languagecapability, adherence to STANAGS, FieldStanding Operating Procedures, and keyword lists printed in multiple languages.

9�

CommunicationThe degree of success achieved in

multinational operations will depend on ourability to communicate with all allied forces

13-8

FM 100-5—

~ situated in our area of operation. Differencesin equipment may create some difficulty, ifthe potential problem is not foreseen. Forexample, US radio secure voice equipment isnot compatible with all allied radioequipment; some allied wire secureequipment is not compatible with US wireequipment. The use of agreed communica-tions terms as directed in AlliedCommunication Pamphlets (ACP) willreduce transmission time and misunder-standing among allied forces. US personnelmust be trained and ready to use theseprocedures, and if equipment is notcompatible, to exchange the equipmentnecessary for effective communications.

IntelligenceWithin the NATO military structure, the

land warfare function of intelligence isdependent upon the support of nationalforces. Each allied nation has intelligencewhich is needed by major NATOcommanders. Intelligence dissemination canbest be achieved by providing NATO

~ intelligence channels with a liaison elementand an automated data processing supportcapability which will allow the liaisonelement to access Army component andnational data bases. Provided withdedicated, secure communications facilities,the liaison element can furnish a timelyresponse to NATO requirements.Commanders at all levels must insure thattheir intelligence efforts are coordinated withtheir allies. This relationship takes onparticular significance when UScommanders at any level share a commonboundary with other national forces.

oCombat Service Support

Each nation hastheresponsibilityto assurecombat service support to its forces, butefficiency and economy require maximummutual support between nati~ns. in the past,US forces have relied primarily on organicnational support; however, greater reliance is

now being placed on the highly developedEuropean national support structure. Thistrend can be expected to continue, in bothpeace and war. Using host nation supportallows a reduction in US support elements,while maintaining required support ofcombat forces. US elements must be preparedto coordinate and mutually plan to obtaincommon supply items from allied units or toprovide items to them. Each nation isresponsible for providing support of itsunique items to elements cross-attached toother nations.

German Terr~orial Force8The US combat service support

commander is responsible for coordinatinghis activities with the host nation. In theCentral Region of Germany, for which mostof our forces are designated, the GermanTerritorial Forces provide host nationsupport to US and other NATO allies. TheTerritorial Forces are divided into threecommands and their NATO responsibilitybegins at the corps rear boundary andextends to the national boundary. Theirprimary missions include:

� To insure logistical support of NATOforces within the scope of nationalagreements.

� To support NATO forces by the provisionof local resources.

� To insure cooperation between NATOforces and civil defense authorities.

� Responsibility for:

� Security

. Damage Control

� Military movement control

� NBC reporting and warning

� Engineer support

13-9\

— FM 100-5

e

Environmental Considerations

US commanders and troops must be prepared tofight in the unique environment of the centralNATO front—generally the environment of WestGermany.The climate of Germany is generally cold and wet.Although there are sunny warm days in summerand snow conditions in winter, the predominateclimate is a low overcast with rain.

This chart shows the meantemperatures for the fourseasons in Germany. While thetemperature means do notappear to be particularlysevere, US forces must be wellequipped and trained tooperate for extended periodsin cold weather and snow.

This chart shows the meanrainfall that can be expected inGermany. This is particularlysignificant in late winter andearly spring when the snowbegins to melt, the groundthaws, and spring rainfalloccurs. During this period,cross-country wheeled vehicletrafficability will be seriouslyimpaired.

48°

.

7.1-

46°

320

t- 6.9

-TI

—

—

13-10

FM 100-5—

* SUMMER 20 JUNE -20 SEPTEMBER

FALL 21 SEPTEMBER -20 DECEMBER

WINTER 21 DECEMBER -19 MARCH

SPRING 20 MARCH -19 JUNE

Fall, winter, and early spring are featured by

frequent fog which lies heavily on the land andoften does not lift until midday. Frequency andduration of morning fog are as follows:

I 4

—

3.2

5

.

33

6.

m

11

3.6

Approximately 1 out of 3mornings during the fall andwinter, US forces will haveless than 1 km visibilitycausing a significant reductionin the frequency of long rangeengagements.

,

13-11

—FM 100-5

The cloud layer over Western Europe is typicallylow and scudding on westerly winds. The averageceilings (morea percentageGermany are:

than i509Z0 cloud cover) expressed asfor three month periods in West

NO CEILING 29.7% 33.9?40 25.1?40 15 .7%

1500-2000 I 3“9I 2-4I 4=0I 5=6I

The incidence of ceilings less “ ~;~ ‘ ~~‘; ,+ b :’ ‘ “,:”4: ..i-;; :,, :;”., ,than 500 feet is markedly ,:,-. ,-’, ,,

increased when coupled withfog as in this chart:

.,...,‘,-

Due to the incidence of ceilings that are 1,000 feet or less,

commanders can expect a one-third degradation in close air supportmissions during the December-February time frame.

13-12

FM 100-5—

The topography of Germany is fine grained— compared to the areas in the US where most

of our troops are trained. Germany is morelike the Piedmont of Virginia and thecountryside of New England. There are manyhills, streams, small forests, and villages. Itis not easy to find long-range fields of fire fortanks or ATGM. For example, line of sightcan be thought of as being like this.

But, due to landforms (hills and valleys), vegetation, and manmade features, line ofsight is interrupted as shown in this chart.

I FULDA GAP I 58% I 25% I 17?40 I

I NORTH GERMAN PLAINI

21%I

78?40I

1?40I

As a result of this loss of intervisibility, line of sight is broken into segments as depicted here.

13-13

—

–FM 100-5

This chart portrays the minimum segmentlengths necessary to achieve a hit when firing anA TGM, given the target range and speed.

—

1000

2000

3000

5 8 1541901126116212341

I ‘31’201’80124013001

15 I 8 I 9011261162119812701I

As an example, if an ATGM attacks a and fires in 10 seconds at a tank movingtarget at 2000 ‘meters, the missile time of toward him at a rate of 8 mph, the tank mustflight is 10 seconds. If the gunner acquires remain exposed for 72 meters to score a hit.

13-14

FM 100-5—

The probability that the tank will remain exposedthe required length of time is shown here.

PROBABILITY

t) 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 ~

NORTH GERMAN PLAIN

These curves show that thehills and forests in theAmerican sector provide moreexposure for attacking tanksthan the flat land of the NorthGerman Plain where attackingtanks are more often screenedfrom view by vegetation.

In the previous example, the tank had to of this occurring. ATGM training must takeremain exposed for 72 meters. In the Fulda this into acco~nt. Gunners mist practiceregion, the gunner would have a 73% chance acquiring and engaging targets that are

13-15

‘---

—FM 100-5

moving at different speeds over differentterrain. They must be able to determine if thetarget will remain exposed for a sufficientdistance to achieve a hit. This only portraysthe intervisibility situation with regard toATGM. Tanks, due to higher muzzle velocity,have a much higher probability of the targetremaining exposed for a sufficient distanceand therefore a higher probability of hit.

The landscape of Germany is steadilychanging as population and industriali-zation grow. Manmade structures cover moreand more of the countryside. There arehundreds of towns and cities of over 50,000population, and increasingly the smallvillages are connected by continuous stripdevelopment along the interconnectingvalleys. Cities and towns present continuousbuilt-up areas covering hundreds of squarekilometers, as around:

Munich sq km 310

Nuremberg/ Furth sq km 247

Stuttgart sq km 207

Frankfurt/ Mainz/ Hanau sq km 560

Heidelberg/ Mannheim sq km 302

The Ruhr sq km 1155

Cologne/ Bonn I‘qkmI 393

The urbanizationimDact on military

of Germany has a majoroperations (see Chapter

14~ German buiidirigs are sturdy brick,stone, and concrete. Buildings provide coverand concealment for troops. Villages provide

natural strong points. Built-up areas restrictvisibility and fields of fire. Buildings providenatural shelter and concealment forheadquarters and support activities. Theyalso make target acquisition more difficult.

Combat in Germany will automaticallyinvolve repeated, almost continuous battlefor cities, towns, villages, and adjacent built-up areas. The total percent of built-up area byGerman state looks like this:

Bavaria 6.5%

Hesse 10.0%Lower Saxony 9.5%

Baden-Wurttemberg 8.7%

Nordrh em-W estfalen 15 .0%

ITo accomplish our NATO mission, US

commanders must insure that their units arenot only capable of the combat tasks forwhich they are designed, but that they aretrained in NA TO procedures and are alert tothe differences in the various armed forceswhich may affect combined operations.Personnel at all levels must use commonprearranged terminology, understandstrengths and limitations of the forces withwhich they work, and adhere to NATO fieldstanding operating procedures. They mustalso understand the environmentalconsiderations as they apply to militaryoperations. US forces employed elsewherewithin NATO, or within any internationalalliance, must, of course, take similarconsiderations into account.

13-16

‘w

—

CHAPTER 14

Military Operations in Special Environments

INTRODUCTION

A.LTHOUGH THE PRIMA.RY MISSION Of the US Army is tO

prepare for the defense of NATO, it is entirely possible that itwill find itself committed to battle elsewhere. This means thatour Army must also be trained to fight in other environments.

CHAPTER

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 14-1

MOUNTAINS 14-2

tiowto Fight in the Mountains 14-3

JUNGLES 14-6

Howto Fight in Jungles 14-7

DESERTS 14-9

How to Fight in the Desert 14-11

NORTHERN REGIONS 14-13

How to Fight in Northern Regions 14-14

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BUILT-UPAREAS 14-15

Characteristics of Urban Combat 14-18

Fighting in Built-U pAreas 14-19

Reconnaissance and Intelligence 14-24

Concentrate 14-24

The environments that have a strong effecton the conduct of military operations are:

. Mountains

� Jungles

� Deserts

� Northern Regions

. Built-Up Areas

The special manuals which coveroperations in special environments are beingr&ised and updated in accordance with theprinciples set forth in this manual.

14-1

——

—FM 100-5

� EFFECT OF FIRE

Less than In normal terrain due to

considerable natural cover

� OVERHEAD AND LONG-RANGE FIRES

Use greatly increased due to goodelevation and observation

� GRAZING FIRES

Lunited, due to steepness of slopesand increased dead space

� HIGH ANGLE FIRE

Increased use Adds Importanceto fteld artillery, mortars. andgrenade launchers

MOUNTAINS

Mountainous terrain exists throughout theworld from northern regions to the tropics.The Army must, therefore, maintain thecapability to operate in this type of terrain.This capability is provided primarily by theinfantry, airborne and airmobile divisions,and Army aviation units. The helicopter hasrevolutionized mountain warfare to theextent that military mountaineering skillsare no longer necessary for the majority ofthe forces committed to mountain combat.Their mobility will come primarily from thehelicopter and the boot, rather than the pitonand the rope. Only small forces conductingRanger-type patrols and raids will normallyhave recourse to military mountaineeringskills. Thus, light airmobile infantry willplay the dominant role in mountain fighting.

Environmental Effects. Mountainousterrain, as discussed here, is not theextremely high, severe alpine-type peaks, butrather the lower, more mature mountainstypical of southern Italy or Korea. Thus, theeffects of altitude on troops are not a majorconsideration in this environment.Mountainous terrain is usually characterizedby one or more of the following: some <exaggerated features, heavy woods or jungle,rocky crags, compartmentation, routes ofcommunication limited in extent and of poorquality, degraded radio communications,and highly changeable weather conditions.Mountains may consist of an isolated peak,single ridges, or complex ranges extendingfor thousands of kilometers.

The environmental effects of mountainoperations significantly influence the use ofweapons and equipment. In general, theeffect of fire is less than in normal terrainsince mountains offer considerable naturalcover such as rocks and cliffs. The use ofoverhead and long-range fires, however, canbe greatly increased, due to the elevation andgood observation afforded. This capabilityemphasizes the importance of occupying theheights in order to fire down on the enemy.The steepness of slopes, however, does limitgrazing fire and causes a great amount ofdead space. This gives added importance toweapons with a high angle of fire, such as

14-2

FM 100-5—

field artillery, mortars, and grenadelaunchers. Due to the difficulties ofmovements in rugged mountain terrain, allequipment should be as light as possible,preferably air transportable.

Mobility in mountains is extremelydifilcult if only ground movement isconsidered. Highways usually run onlyalong the valley floor; existing roads andtrails are normally few and primitive; andcross-country movement, particularly acrossterrain compartments, is particularlyarduous. The extensive use of the helicopter,however, can normally overcome thesedifficulties. Although subject to thelimitations posed by the enemy air defense,weather, and density-altitude considera-tions, the helicopter is by far the principalvehicle for moving forces engaged inmountain operations.

Finally, mountain combat lacks the unitycharacteristic of combat in level or rollingterrain. The configuration of the terraintends to give the battlefield a piecemealcharacter and induces more or less isolatedconflicts which are difficult to control byhigher commanders. The terrain also greatlyamplifies the normal advantages of thedefender. The dominant terrain provides thedefender, while usually denying the attacker, ADVANTAGES AREexcellent observation and firing positions. OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVORMan-made obstacles significantly increase OF THE DEFENDERthe natural obstacle of the ruggedmountainous terrain. The defender can moreeasily deceive the enemy as to his strengthand dispositions. Since the defendernormally has more time to develop lateraltrails, he can usually shift forces on theground more rapidly than the attacker.Delaying actions are particularly effective inthe mountains and can be accomplished by amuch smaller force than is ordinarily needed.These advantages combine to make themountains an ideal place for defensivecombat.

HOW TO FIGHT IN THE MOUNTAINS

The fundamental principles of thedynamics of the modern battlefield apply tocombat in the mountains. The focal points

14-3

—

—FM 100-5

of mountain combat are the heights. Theessence of mountain warfare is to attemptalu’ays to fight from the top dou’n. Adetailed discussion on how to fight inmountains is contained in FM -90-6,Mountain Operations.

Employment of Large Units. Inrugged mountains there are limits to theemployment of large forces: Deployment isgreatly hindered and restricted. Frequently,adjacent units cannot provide mutualsupport. Rapid shifting of forces, except byhelicopter, is often difficult. Small units, onthe other hand, have many occasions forsudden and bold action. As in other specialenvironments, Generals must consider thecapabilities of the forces committed tomountain operations. While the normal

LIGHT INFANTRY IS THE infantry division is an appropriate force forPRINCIPAL FORCE operations in mountainous areas, some of

its heavy equipment and heavy weaponsmay not be suitable for the terrain. Theairborne and the airmobile divisions,however, because of their light equipmentand training, are even better suited formountain operations. It is the light infantrythat will be the principal force and bear thebrunt of mountain combat. Army aviationunits should be committed to the maximumextent possible in support of the infantry toprovide tactical mobility and to accomplishresupply and evacuation.

Direction of the Battle. Theimportance of gaining the heights andfighting down to the enemy must beimpressed upon commanders at all levels,but it is particularly important for thebrigade and battalion commanders whonofially assign intermediate objectives,defensive positions, etc. Gun emplacementsand observation posts on commandingheights can dominate the valley below.Friendly advances should, where ‘possible,be made along ridges, although cautionmust be used not to fall into an ambush, nor

IMPORTANCE OF FIGHTING invite observed artillery fire. MovementFROM THE TOP DOWN MUST BE through a valley, without security on the

CONTINUALLY STRESSED high ground, invites destruction.Counterattacks, when launched down adescending slope, have the advantage ofpermitting more rapid movement. Even

14-4

FM 100-5—

airmobile assaults that merely gain theheights to the flanks or rear of an enemyposition can frequently cause the enemy topull back from his forward positions. Thisconcept of always striving to fight from thetop down should permeate the entire forceengaged in mountain combat.

Since mobility in mountain combat derivesfrom the extensive use of helicopters, theColonels must actively direct airmobileoperations to quickly build up a favorablecombat power ratio at the point of contact.While it is usually light infantry forces thatare moved about the battlefield, there are alsofrequent occasions when available helicopterassets could be used to concentrate bothdirect and indirect fire weapons. Whenconducting airmobile operations to theflanks or rear of enemy positions, particularcare must be exercised in the mountains tosuppress or avoid enemy air defenses.Because of their normal emplacements on theheights and their good obsemation and fieldsof fire, machine guns and automatic smallarms weapons pose a threat to helicoptermovement. Good intelligence, carefulplanning, and suppression of enemypositions are required. Close air support isthe most effective way to bring heavyfirepower to bear.

Fighting the Battle. Since decentraliza-tion of control is forced upon the commandersof large units by the piecemeal character ofthe battle, the initiative, resourcefulness, andjudgment of small unit commanders will betaxed to the utmost. Small unit commandersmust expect to operate independently orsemi-independently. The degree to which theCaptain has trained his force in the TRAINING AND PHYSICALtechniques of. -mountain combat. and CO IUDITIOIUIIUGWILL BE ANphysically conditioned them for operating m lmpOR1-ANT FACTOR INthe rugged mountam terrain w1ll be the ASSUR[ NG SUCCESSmeasure of his success. ,

Because of the increased advantages of thedefender in the mountains, the small unitcommander must often emphasize the use ofsurprise in the attack. Frontal assaults indaylight are normally prohibitively costly.Helicopter assaults on heights whichdominate the defender’s positions are

14-5

\

—FM 100-5

normally the most advantageous. Ifhelicopters are unavailable, the envelopmentconducted by a stealthy approach at nightand without preparatory fires usually offersthe best chance of success. Conversely, in thedefense, small unit leaders must emphasizesecurity measures to prevent being surprisedfrom stealthy or unexpected enemy moves.

JUNGLES

The jungle regions of Asia, Africa, and theWestern Hemisphere are potentialbattlefields. Past wars have providedvaluable experience for the US Army in theconduct of jungle operations. Infantry,particularly airmobile infantry, artillery,and light armored forces are valuable assetsin jungle warfare. Close air support isessential.

Environmental Effects. Jungles areareas located in the humid tropics whereinthe land is covered with such densevegetation that it impedes militaryoperations and tends to obstruct militarylines of communication. Types of junglesvary from tropical rain forests and secondarygrowth forests to swamps and tropicalsavannas. The dominating features ofjungleareas are thick vegetation, high and constanttemperature, heavy rainfall and humidity.Seasonal variations in rainfall have highlysignificant impact on military operations.

Military operations in jungles are affectedprimarily by two factors—climate andvegetation. These two factors combine torestrict movement, observation, fields of fire,communications, battlefield surveillance,and target acquisition. However, thesefactors favor military operations byproviding excellent cover and concealment injungle terrain.

The jungle climate contains numeroushealth hazards for troops, particularlyunacclimatized soldiers who have little or noresistance to many of the endemic diseases.Thus, an increased disease rate from

DISEASE CAN QIJ ICKLY diarrheal diseases -and. fungus infectionsDECIMATE TROOP STRENGTH maY occur” P@eCtlOn 1S required against

AND EFFECTIVE ESS mOwl@S, file% fl-, l-h-, and Otherparasites. If these health hazards are notcountered, more troops may become

14-6

FM 100-5—

— hospitalized during jungle operationsbecause of disease than because of wounds.The environmental effect of the climate anddense vegetation dictate that all equipmentaccompanying combat forces must berugged, lightweight, and man-portable. Thefighting load of the soldier should be keptunder 40 pounds. All weapons and equipmentwill require daily maintenance in a tropicalclimate. Because of the normal scarcity ofroad and rail networks, combat servicesupport and engineer support requirementswill be increased.

According to the type of vegetation, groundobservation in jungle areas can vary from afew feet to 20 or 30 meters. Aerial observationis often ineffective due to the jungle canopyand, during the rainy season, due to heavyrain, low hanging clouds, fog and haze. Thevegetation also severely degrades fields offire in jungle areas except along trails androads. The dense vegetation does provide,however, excellent concealment. Whilecamouflage is enhanced in the jungle, it mustbe remembered that vegetation does notprotect the soldier from enemy fire. Troopsmust not mistake concealment for cover.For example, in most jungle areas, trees willnot provide extensive coverage. Cover injungle areas is provided by surfaceirregularities, such as ravines, gullies andlarge rocks.

Finally, the jungle environment is aserious obstacle to movement. Densevegetation, gullies, steep hills and cliffs,rivers, unfoldable streams, and swampshinder movement. Vehicular movement isnormally canalized, impeded, or impossible.Cross-country movement by foot is slow anddifficult. High mobility in jungle areas isattained most effectively through movementby air.

HOW TO FIGHT IN JUNGLES

The battlefield dynamics and thefundamentals of offensive and defensiveoperations discussed in previous chapters areapplicable, with modifications, to meet theconditions of the jungle environment. Adetailed discussion of how to fight in junglesis found in FM 90-5, Jungle Operations.

Employment of Large Units. The firstand perhaps most important task of theGenerals who employ large units in jungleoperations is to configure the force properly.The force must be composed of the proper mixof units and weapons, properly trained andproperly equipped for jungle operations.Infantry, because of its versatility, mobility,and capability to conduct operations in alltypes of terrain and climate, will play thedominant role. Other combat and combatsupport units are used primarily to supportthe operations of infantry elements. Infantryforces must be lightly equipped to enhancetheir mobility through the jungle by foot, aswell as to enhance their mobility over thejungle by air. Army aviation assets are,therefore, crucial to a successful junglecampaign. Armor units, designed to supportinfantry operations, can also be used in thejungle particularly during dry seasons andyear-round to provide security for lines ofcommunications. Some heavy infantryweapons, such as TOW, Dragon, 90mm and106mm Recoilless Rifles, will be of little use inthe jungles. The use of lighter weapons suchas the 5.56mm rifle, the 7.62mm machinegun,the 40mm grenade launcher, the M72 IAW,and mines and booby traps should beemphasized. Where visibility is limited andfields of fire are restricted, small armspredominate and thus infantry units havethe greatest utility.

As in other environments, it is primarilythe General’s responsibility to “see” thebattlefield. However, due to the restrictedjungle terrain and the scarcity of intelligencegathering assets below division level, thisresponsibility is even more important in thejungle than in other environments. Becauseof the environmental effect on normalbattlefield surveillance efforts, emphasismust be placed on patrolling, particularlylong-range patrols. In addition to patrols, thecommander must use all sourceintelligence —for both maneuver andtargeting.

Since the principle of achieving favorableforce ratios at the point of contact isapplicable to jungle warfare, the Generalsmust play a role in achieving the necessaryconcentration of combat power. This is done

14-7

—FM 100-5

HELICOPTER TRANSPORTATIONSHOULD BE USED FOR

INFANTRY UNITS WHENEVERPOSSIBLE

through the proper control and allocation ofmobility assets. These assets include ~airmobile, water, and ground transport.Since combat actions are likely to be shortand violent, the General must insure that allmobility assets are immediately responsiveto move troops rapidly to the area of contact.Additionally, Generals concentrate combatpower by shifting available air and fieldartillery assets to the engaged unit. The usualtechnique is to employ infantry forces to findthe enemy, pin him down, and cut off hisescape; then, to concentrate field artilleryand air firepower on the enemy to destroyhim.

Generals must give overall directions to thejungle campaign. They should employ troopsin those areas and against those objectivesthat give promise of success. For example,aimless wanderings through the jungle insearch of an elusive enemy is often fruitless,whereas an attack against his bases ofsupply are often quite profitable if they areknown and accessible.

Directing the Battle. Unlike battles inthe wide expanses of the desert, jungle battlesare normally very decentralized. Since it isdifficult for the Colonels to be present at the ~scene of each engagement and sincevisibility is so restricted by the densevegetation, Colonels are usually forced todepend on accurate and timely reports toproperly direct the battle.

The fundamental task of the Colonels is todirect the concentration of combat power atthe point where it is needed as rapidly aspossible. Normally the quickest responseavailable to the Colonels is the application ofair strikes and artillery fires to support theengaged unit. Since the commitment ofadditional ground forces by foot is extremelyslow and arduous in the jungle, infantryunits must be committed by helicopterwhenever possible. It may be possible tocommit some forces rapidly by groundvehicles or water transport. Armored unitsmay also be committed in support of theinfantry by road or, where possible, throughthe jungle. Normally, as a favorable forceratio is built up, the Colonels employcommitted units to the flanks and rear of theengaged enemy.

14-8

—— .

FM 100-5—

Finally, Colonels infIuence the battle by— insuring effective combat service support.

The Colonels must weigh the difficulty ofresupplying troops in the jungle against theamount of supplies required to be earned bythe force in order to insure that proper trade-offs are made. Units should be as self-sufficient as possible, yet not overburdenedby the weight of their supplies. Helicopters ortactical airlift must be carefully husbandedfor the resupply effort. Resupply convoysshould be protected and accompanied bysecurity elements.

Fighting the Battle. Battles in the jungleare characterized by:

� Restricted maneuver

� Slow tempo of operation

. Close combat

� Extremely limited visibility

� Difficulty in providing logisticalsupport

Jungle engagements are most often foughtJy platoons and companies rather thanbattalions and brigades. Ambushes, patrols,and raids are types of combat operationsparticularly suited to the jungleenvironment.

Because of the ease with which small unitscan be surprised and engaged in the densejungle vegetation, Captains must payparticular attention to the security of theirunits. Security measures are intensifiedbecause of reduced observation, difficulties ofcontrol, communications, and movement.The use of OP/LPs to attain all-roundsecurity is essential. Perimeter defensivepositions are organized and closely linked formutual support. Trip wires, mines, flares,and remote sensors give early warning of theenemy’s approach. Units advance so thatenemy contact is made with the smallestportion of that force. Captains mustmaneuver their units so that the entire unitis never caught in the kill zone of an enemyambush.

AMBUSH . . . THE MOST

IMPORTANT TYPE OF ACTION

IN JUNGLE COMBAT

Captains must be masters of the ambush.In no other type of military action is theambush more important, more effective, ormore frequently employed than in junglecombat. The ambush takes maximumadvantage of the principles of concealment,surprise, and offensive action to reduce theenemy’s combat effectiveness when they areon the move or temporarily halted.

The Captain is responsible for training hismen to move, live, and operate with completeease in the jungle environment. This highlevel of individual training is particularlyimportant when conducting patrols. Whilepatrolling is important in all types ofwarfare, it has increased importance underjungle conditions. Many types of patrols,such as long-range reconnaissance patrols orcombat (raid) patrols, will require deeppenetrations into the jungle. The successfulaccomplishment of these missions willdepend on the degree of individual training,physical endurance of the men, and thedynamic leadership of the Captains andother small unit leaders.

DESERTS

Many desert areas of the world arepotentially vital to the national interests ofthe United States. For a wide variety offactors—strategic location, naturalresources, assistance to an ally, deterrence ofaggression, etc.—the US Army maybe calledupon to fight in desert regions. War in thedesert is more suitabIe to armored andmechanized infantry forces; however,airmobile forces can be employed to goodadvantage. For the initial lodgement,airborne forces are valuable.

Environmental Effects. Deserts aresemiarid and arid regions containing a widevariety of soils in varying relief. Desertscharacteristically exhibit frequentenvironmental extremes. Temperaturesoften range from 30-130 degrees. Clear dayswith unequaled visibility and flightconditions quickly change to raging

14-9

.

—FM 100-5

sandstorms that can halt all military ~operations. Long periods of drought areinterrupted by sudden rains bringing flashfloods and mud but little relief from watershortages. Large areas of generally excellenttraffic ability are interspersed byinsurmountable mountains, dunes,impassable ravines, bogs, and sand seas.

Those desert areas where there is a generalabsence of pronounced terrain features havea significant effect on military operations.Generally, large forces are not canalized bythe terrain and, therefore, large scale use ofmines and obstacles is required. Key terrainin the classic sense loses its importance tosmaller units. Although a scarcity of largeterrain features decreases the availablecover, small indentions and wrinkles in theground do provide cover for small units andindividual weapons. Every effort must bemade to capitalize on existing cover. Thegenerally easy observation and long fields offire make undetected advances andwithdrawals extremely difilcult.

Deception measures of all types (e.g. feints,ruses, decoy equipment, etc. ) becomemandatory for success. Movement at night orduring sandstorms while maintaining strict <communication security assumes enormous

THE USE OF DECEPTION IS A importance in order to conceal intentions.PRIMARY MEANS OF Engagements are often fought at long

ATTAIN ING SUCCESS ranges, thus placing a premium on accurategunnery at maximum range. Finally, thescarcity of prominent terrain featuresseverely incr~ses the problem of landnavigation. Dead-reckoning techniques mustbe used.

Because of the sparse vegetation,concealment in the desert is more difficultthan in many other environments.Concealment, however, is not only possible,it is absolutely necessary. The proper use ofcamouflage nets, pattern and mud painting,covering of reflective surfaces, and othertechniques are necessary to insuresurvivabilityy on the desert battlefield.

The desert environment has a debilitatingeffect on troops who have not been properlyacclimated or trained. Continued exposure tothe sun’s rays causes profuse sweating,sunburn, dehydration, cramps, heat

14-10

FM 100-5—

exhaustion, and even heat stroke. Proper‘————’field sanitation and personal hygiene must

be emphasized by commanders to preventdysentery and other diseases. Thepsychological impact of the environmentinduces mental fatigue, impaired perceptionand depression which, coupled withpressures of combat, can overwhelm thesoldier and render him ineffective.Acclimation and proper training can defeatthese environmental effects.

The desert has an even greater detrimentaleffect on machines. Dust and sand can be asdeadly to our vehicles as enemy fire. Fuel,lubricants, and intake air are easilycontaminated, resulting in ruined enginesand eroded components. Intense commandsupervision is required to insure continuousavailability of these three preciouscommodities—clean air, fuel and lubricants.Vehicle cooling and electrical systems arevulnerable to desert extremes of temperature.Tracks, tires, and suspension system suffer agreat deal of abuse in the desert. Sand androcks literally grind away rubber tracks,while thorns repeatedly puncture tires. Thus,a larger supply of spare parts is required inthe desert than in more moderate

— environments. The intense desert heat canquickly cause communication equipment tooverheat and malfunction. Proper operationof equipment, as well as proper preventivemaintenance, are required to insure effectivecommunications.

HOW TO FIGHT IN THE DESERT

In desert warfare, the battlefield dynamicsand the fundamentals of offensive anddefensive operations previously discussedare applicable. Certain fundamentals,however, require emphasis or modificationfor success in the desert. These are discussedhere. A detailed discussion on how to fight indeserts is contained in FM 90-3, DesertOperations.

Employment of Large Units. Itis theresponsibility of the Generals to insure thatlarge units committed to desert operationspossess the most effective mix of weaponssystems. Only mobile forces can play animportant role. Freedom of maneuver and thevastness of these regions favor a fluid type of

CLEAN AIR, FUEL ANDLUBRICANTS ARE ESSENTIALTO VEHICLE OPERATION

14-11

—FM 100-5

warfare. Thus, armored/mechanized, andairmobile forces must constitute the bulk ofthe fighting forces. The value of foot mobileunits is generally limited to the static defenseof key positions and installations. Air power,to an even greater degree than in otherenvironments, is crucial to winning the landbattle. Conversely, air defense is vital topreserve our freedom of maneuver.

The requirement for Generals to dispersetheir forces and then rapidly concentrate ismore urgent in the desert than perhaps anyother environment. Because of the scarcity ofcover and concealment, forces must bedispersed over a broad front. and in greatdepth. Yet, the requirement for favorableforce ratios at the point of engagement, asdiscussed in previous chapters, continues toexist. The offense in the desert most oftentakes the form of wide envelopments andturning movements instead of penetrations.In the defense, forces must be equally mobileand responsive to rapidly concentrateagainst the enemy’s attack. To achieve thissuccessful concentration of forces in thedesert, Generals must be particularlysensitive to the following two requisites.

First, in the open, barren expanses of thedesert, Generals must constantly insure theoperational security of their forces. Forexample, dust and diesel plume signaturesmust be taken into account. Communicationssecurity, the use of radio listening silence,and the use of wire, whenever possible, mustbe strictly enforced. Lines of communica-tions must be secured. Strong air defenseforces must be deployed to protect forces,particularly when moving. In short, thoseprinciples of security applicable to any otherbattlefield take on added importance in thedesert.

Second, because of the difficulty ofmaintaining air-tight operational security,Generals must undertake active measures todeceive the enemy. Feints and ruses throughsuch stratagems as dummy equipment,notional radio communications, and falsedust signatures provide opportunities fordeceiving the enemy as to our true intentionsor dispositions. Effective deception andsecurity are indispensable conditions for

14-12

successful concentration of forces on thedesert battlefield.

Direction of the Battle. Because battlesin the desert tend to be less decentralizedthan in other environments, the Colonelshave a more personal and direct role insupervising and directing the battle. Leadingfrom the front rather than from commandposts to the rear, they are in excellentposition to sense the tide of battle. They mustseize opportunities to exploit enemyweaknesses as soon as they becomeapparent. Indecisive delays can causefleeting opportunities to be lost.

Brigade and battalion commanders willoften personally coordinate the interactionsof tanks, mechanized infantry, and fieldartillery. Thus, pure tank and mechanizedinfantry companies and even battalions willoften be retained under battalion and brigadecommanders. However, when companies orbattalions are required to be committed toaction outside of the zone of the battalion orbrigade commander’s personal influence,they must be suitably cross-reinforced toform effective combined arms teams.

In desert battle, because of the open nature ~of the terrain and the more centralizedcontrol of the battle, Colonels become deeplyinvolved in the contest of suppression andcounter-suppression. Enemy ATGM and airdefense weapons are the principal targets forsuppression by indirect fires.

Since in mobile desert warfare everythingdepends on the proper functioning of vehiclesand weapons, Colonels must pay particularattention to the maintenance of continuousand adequate combat service support. IJnitsshould be organized and equipped to sustainthemselves for 72 hours without majorresupply. Since the security of a line ofcommunication (LOC) is particularlydifficult, traffic should be kept to a bareminimum and carefully regulated. Vehiclesmoving along open lines of communicationare particularly vulnerable to air attack. Thisvulnerability, therefore, demands strong airdefenses and, as far as possible, only nightmovement along LOC.

FM 100-5—

Fighting the Battle. Perhaps the most~ important characteristic of small units in

winning the desert battle is the ability to hitaccurately at extremely long ranges. Thiscapability, particularly for tank andantitank weapons, is often the decisive edgeneeded for victory. Captains and all smallunit leaders are responsible for traininggunners to achieve the maximum resultsfrom their weapon systems.

Since the very survival of units in thedesert depends on their ability to avoiddetection by air or ground observation,emphasis on cover and concealment iscrucial. Whether fighting in the offense or thedefense, Captains must force their units totake advantage of the small folds andwrinkles of the seemingly featureless desertterrain. When units must cross open areas toaccomplish their missions, they must moveat night or use smoke in large quantities aswell as fire suppression.

As soon as time permits, fighting positionsmust be dug for dismounted infantry and hulldown firing positions scooped out for tanksand other vehicles. Additionally, personneland vehicular camouflage must be anintegral part of every individual and unit

— endeavor.

Captains will have to orchestrate theteamwork required between overmatchingand maneuvering forces. They must insurethat suppressive fires from the direct fireweapons are accurate, timely, and effective.Particular emphasis is given to thesuppression of enemy ATGM.

Finally, all small unit leaders fromcompany commander to vehicle commandermust personally supervise and strictlyenfo~ce proper preventive maintenancepractices. Without proper maintenance,armored and mechanized forces in the desertcannot operate.

NORTHERN REGIONS

The northern regions, including the Arcticand sub-arctic, comprise about 45 percent ofthe North American continent and 65 percentof the Eurasian land mass. This area haspotential importance to United States

national interests. The US Army must,therefore, maintain the capability to conductmilitary operations in the environment.However, the probability of large scalecombat operations under extreme arcticconditions is unlikely. In arctic regions suchas the polar ice cap, for example, so manyresources are needed for the survival of theforce that little remains to accomplishanything militarily useful. Therefore, thelikelihood of large forces being committed tosuch an extreme environment is small. TheArmy, however, must be able to operate airdefense forces in the Arctic and, asnecessary, airmobile elements for relief,resupply, reconnaissance, and surveillance.

It is quite possible, however, that the USArmy could be called upon to commit largenumbers of troops to combat operations inthe northern, sub-arctic regions of Europe,Asia, or North America. This discussion,therefore, focuses on these sub-arcticnorthern regions.

Environmental Effects. Northernregions are characterized by extreme coldand deep snow during the winter months.Seasonal effects differ between winter,summer, and particularly the transitionperiods (spring breakup and fall freezeup).The summer months have long periods ofdaylight; the winter has long nights. Asidefrom the purely climactic effects, militaryoperations are also influenced by the vastdistances and isolation common to theseareas.

Certain weather phenomena are peculiarto these regions. Whiteouts and greyoutscause a loss of depth perception, whichincreases the hazards of flying, driving, orskiing. Ice fogs can form over a body oftroops, bivouac areas, motor parks, convoys,etc., and disclose their locations.

AIRMOBILITY IS THE MOSTEFFECTIVE YEAR-ROUND

MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION

One of the most important environmentaleffects is the impact upon mobility. Mobilityvaries considerabley according to the season.The most suitable time for ground operationsis from mid-winter to early spring before the

14-13

—FM 100-5

breakup period. The worst period is duringthe spring thaw when the ground becomessaturated, roads become flooded, oftendisintegrating, and low lying areas areturned into a morass of mud. During wintermonths, light infantry units achieve mobilityby foot or, sometimes, by skis, snowshoes orsleds. Airmobility provides the most effectivemethod of movement for light infantry unitsyear-round. Tracked vehicles possessgenerally good mobility, except during thetransition periods. Wheeled vehicles andtrailers are not generally suitable for sub-arctic operations.

Another important environmental effect isthe impact of extremely low temperatures onweapons. In extreme cold, metal becomesbrittle and increased parts breakage occursin all types of weapons. Many weaponscreate ice fog which, on a still day, mayobscure the gunner’s vision, thus requiringmovement to alternate positions after thefirst shot. Care must be taken not to bring aweapon into a warm shelter becausecondensation causes the weapon to freezeand malfunction when taken back into theoutside cold temperatures. Tank weaponsface a particularly bad obscuration problemfrom ice fog and soft snow blown up by themuzzle blast. Extreme cold also decreasestank gun ammunition velocity and, hence, itsaccuracy. Field artillery or mortar bursts areless effective because of the dampening effectof deep snow or mud.

Finally, the northern environmentsignificantly increases the time required toperform even simple tasks. Experience hasshown that five times the norm may berequired. For example, starting and warm-uptimes of armored vehicles may approach 2hours in temperatures of -50 degreesFahrenheit. For troops conducting a footmarch, additional time is required foradjustment of clothing and equipment,checking for presence of correct equipment,striking shelters, loading equipment, etc.

In sum, the northern environment posesspecial problems to military operations. Theproper equipment, training, and the highestcaliber of leadership are the ingredients forsuccessful northern operations.

14-14

HOW TO FIGHT IN NORTHERN REGIONS

The battlefield dynamics and fundamen- ~tals of fighting on the modern battlefieldapply in northern regions as in otherenvironments. The fundamental difference isfound in the necessity for taking activemeasures to counter the effects of severeclimactic conditions. A detailed discussion ofhow to fight in northern areas is found in FM90-11, Northern Operations.

Employment of Large Units. Innorthern regions the large quantity ofshelters, warming tents, and otherinstallations required, coupled with thedifficulty of concealing their locations, offerslucrative targets for enemv air attack. Thereverse is also true-enemy installations arevulnerable to friendly air attack. Thus, airpower takes on an importance in northernregions nearly equal to its importance indeserts. Air defense, the reciprocal of airpower, assumes an equally important role.Generals, there, must be able to conduct theair-land battle, as described in Chapter 8.

It is the job of the Generals to insure thatthe proper mix of forces, properly equippedand trained, are deployed for northernoperations. There is no clear advantage to theuse of either predominantly heavy orpredominantly light forces for northernoperations. Each has its advantages anddisadvantages. Light infantry forces canattain excellent ground mobility during thewinter months if properly trained andequipped. They are severely limited duringthe summer months and transition periods;however, light infantry forces are ideal forairmobile operations year round. Whilemechanized and armored forces aregenerally excellent in summer and wintermonths, they are severely restricted duringthe spring and fall transition periods. Armyaviation assets for airmobile operations andresupply assume an importance in northernregions equal to that of the jungle. Engineerconstruction for improving lines ofcommunications, erecting shelters, etc., alsoassume added importance in northernoperations.

As in other environments, Generalsemploying large units in northern regionsmust also be able to concentrate their forces

FM 100-5—

— so that, in the defense, they are able toachieve a favorable combat power ratio.Because the ability to concentrate hingeslargely on the mobility of their units,Generals must always consider the impact ofthe environment. Remembering that theimportance of mobility is relative to that ofthe enemy’s, the skillful General can turn theeffects of the environment to his advantageand achieve a mobility differential superiorto the enemy ’s.

Finally, as in all environments, Generalsmust give overall direction to the campaign.In the sub-arctic they must pay particularattention to the seasonal effects. Forexample, large offensives that depend onground mobility should normally not beplanned for the spring breakup. Instead,increased airmobile operations may beconducted during this period.

Directing the Battle. As in theconventional situations in temperateclimates, brigade and battalion commandersare responsible for the immediate direction ofthe battle. They must fit the forces to theground and maneuver against the enemy asthe battle develops, while coordinating the

- concentration of firepower. In so doing, theymust be sensitive to, and make allowancesfor, the impact of the climate on mobility andweapons effects. Thus, additional time maybe required to make simple moves oradditional firepower may be required toachieve desired effects.

Of particular importance in northernoperations is the opportunity to achievesurprise and the corresponding ever-presentdanger of being surprised. Because the severeweather conditions increase the naturaltendency for troops to seek protection, theopportunities for achieving surprise byattacking during blizzards, white-outs, etc.,are abundant. Conversely, the requirementfor increased security in the defense duringsuch periods demands intensive supervision.

The Colonels must insure that the properequipment for cold weather operations is notonly available to their troops, but is used.Special clothing and shelter above thatnormally required for field operations areessential.

Fighting the Battle. Companycommanders, platoon leaders, and squadleaders or tank commanders fight the battleas they would in temperate climates, usingcover, concealment, suppression andteamwork. The difference is that innorthern fighting the utmost in forceful anddynamic leadership is demanded of all smallunit leaders in order to cope with the effects ofthe environment. Leaders at all levels downto the squad must make decisions farsurpassing the scope of their usualresponsibilities. The human element is all-important. Combat effectiveness is mostdifficult to maintain unless troops are keptwarm, fully hydrated, and in condition tofight. Thus, a force that is exposed to theelements for long periods without adequateshelter or warming equipment can suffercasualties from the environment as surely asfrom enemy fire. The Captain has anenormous responsibility to keep his troops fitto fight the battle.

MILITARY OPERATIONS INBUILT-UP AREAS

Many areas of the world, especiallyWestern Europe, have experienced a massivegrowth in built-up areas and man-madechanges to the natural landscape. Thesechanges significantly affect potential futurebattlefields. Avoidance of built-up areas is nolonger possible. Rather, military operationsin built-up areas are an integral part ofcombat operations and present specialopportunities and challenges to commandersat all levels.

Environmental Effects. Built-up areasand man-made changes to the terrain take avariety of forms. New highway systems haveopened up areas previously consideredunsuitable for fast mobile operations. Whilethese roads are generally restrictive, theareas they cross require a greater degree ofattention than in the past. Major cities havelost their well-defined nature and havespread out over the nearby countryside andinto suburbs. Highways, canals, andrailroads have been built to connectpopulation centers and have themselvesattracted industries, and directed urban

14-15

—

—FM 100-5

growth into strip cities. More agricultural ~land is being converted to urban use whichreduces terrain suitable for fast-movingarmor operations. Rural areas, while losingsome of their population, have retained theirprevious character. Small farmingcommunities are scattered every fewkilometers throughout the more open areas.These villages are generally located alongstreams and have an extensive network ofsecondary roads. Each of these man-madetopographical changes affect militaryoperations. Future trends indicate anincreasing density of large cities and theirresultant urban sprawl. These trends are notconfined just to Europe, where growthappears more dramatic because of reduceddistances, but include many other advanced

KEY

EUROPE

.1 MORE ADVANCED“..J..~ ; REGIONS OTHER

THAN EUROPE

DEVELOPINGREGIONS

1980

14-16

FM 100-5—

Withwill glareas,Rivercontinl

in Western Europe, nearby large cities d‘ ---.- ..~,~ “;=‘), ::?3:,@-, \<.-.

row together in megalopolis. Entire ~-.- ---- ‘ J<6.-~“

such as the Ruhr and Rhine-Main 4y&Complex, will assume a near- 0(

uous urban character. kll

t -,.-1

/1

�BERLIN

NETHERLANDS /

(

EAST GERMANY

BELGIUM *

L411L-fLJllA ~ ‘“-’”’,-.,

,’1

LEGEND

1 NEARLY UNSEllLED

� HIGH PERCENTAGE OFDISPERSED SETTLEMENTS

SPARSELY SETTLED

MORE DENSELY SEllLED

DENSE SettlementPATTERN

VERY DENSE SettlementPATTERN

COMPACT BUILT-UP AREA

.-. ....

?k CZECH.

I\

vb 7+

TRIA

, .,s ) v

SWITZERLAND ,.”..# !,

1This map shows the nature of built-up area development in West Germany. I

.

14”17

—FM 100-5

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN COMBATJ

It is necessary to discuss four differentcategories of built-up areas because eachpresents different problems andopportunities to tactical commanders. Theyare:

Villages (population of 1000 or less).

?

Strip areas (generally intercon-necting built-up areas betweenvillages and towns along roads andvalleys).

?

Towns and small cities (populationup to 100,000 and not a part of amajor urban complex).

?

, Large cities with associated urbansprawl (population up to millionscovering 100 or more square miles).

Commanders will be faced with situationscontinuously involving the differentcategories of built-up areas. Smallvillages O and strip areas ~ will be mostcommonly encountered by company and

THE CATEGORY OF A BUILT-UP battalion commanders. The town and smallAREA RELATES TO THE city o will impact on the operations of

COMMAND-LEVEL OF brigade Or division operations. LargeOPERATION REQUIRED cities ~ or major urban cornPlexe5 Will

require operations at division or corps level.Commanders at various levels must considerwhat increased advantage is possible byusing or not using a built-up area within theoverall concept of their operations, keeping inmind that the decision to attack or defendcertain urban areas may have political aswell as operational considerations.

The defender has the advantage in the useof built-up areas. He has superior protectionreadily available, as well as concealment andcovered routes of movement within the area.On the other hand, the attacker can isolateand bypass some built-up areas, but will berequired to attack others. He is then facedwith fighting from the outside into a welldefended position. Both attacking and

14-18

FM 100-5—

defending forces will take advantage of the~ cover and concealment offered by built-upareas to position command posts, stocks ofsupplies and combat service support units.

Commanders must use their forces to bestadvantage. If the force is armor/mechanized,it must be able to fight in urban areas andextract the full advantages of mobile armorprotection and firepower while minimizingtheir disadvantages. If light infantry forcesare available, the built-up area offers theopportunity to fully use their capabilities ofholding well protected positions whileminimizing their vulnerabilities to modernweapons.

FIGHTING IN BLTILT-LTP AREAS

The whole subject of combat in built-upareas is one in which the US Army is not wellversed. Our doctrine has centered ontechniques of combat in cities or in house-to-house fighting, and the placement ofweapons in the defense. These techniquesremain important and will be updated in FM90-10. However, the larger problem ofconducting operations in continuous andcontiguous built-up areas and the principlesof these operations are new. It is a novel anduntested dimension of warfare.

VILLAGES

The typical village, especially in Europe, has stone, brick, or concrete buildings (stores,

houses, and barns) in a cluster, with a number of more modern and more Iightlyconstructed

houses on the outskirts. Villages provide ready-made cover for platoons, companies, and

even battalions. Therefore, they can be readily developed into strong points through the

application of obstacles, carefully sited weapon systems, preplanned fires, improvement offields of fire, and so forth.

Defense. Villages provide formidable positions on first floors and in basementsbattle ~ositions when occupied bv well- protect from some of the effects of indirect~raine~ troops with mod~rn antitank fires. Antitank guided missiles can be fired. . .-weapons. The ‘defenders are provided strong from within buildings, if sufficient spacecover and good concealment. Thick walls exists, and armored vehicles can be concealedprotect from direct suppressive fires; within barns or large buildings.

14-19

\

—FM 100-5

Villages are often spaced 2000 to 4000meters apart. ATGM and tanks may be ableto cover the open ground between villagesand provide mutual support to other villages.Thus, battle positions within a group ofadjacent villages could provide a system ofprefabricated and mutually supportingpositions. Enemy armored forces may be ableto bypass one or two villages but wouldprobably take high losses from tanks andATGM in attempting to bypass the group ofvillages. Thus, enemy units will be forced todevelop a combined arms attack against thevillage or group of villages. Such attacks arecostly to the enemy in time and casualties. Ifthe defender is fighting outnumbered, he maychoose to use the villages as battle positionsfrom which to attrite the enemy and thenmove to new positions before the enemymounts a deliberate combined arms attack toclose on the position. Movement from thesebattle positions can be covered fromsupporting battle positions or nearbyfavorable terrain. If the defending forcechooses to defend a village, he should fullydevelop it into a strongpoint. Coveredapproaches to villages should be controlledby infantry fires and covered by indirect fire. <

Offense. The cardinal principle of theoffense is to attack where the enemy is weak.Thus, defended village strongpoints shouldnot be attacked if they can be suppressed orbypassed. However, within the activedefense, or in the offense, it may be necessaryto eliminate resistance from a defendedvillage Yhich blocks a supply route or isinflicting losses on bypassing forces. Theattacking force must bring overwhelmingforce to bear on the strongpoint andsupporting enemy positions. Identified orsuspected targets should be destroyed bydirect fire to drive the defender back into thevillage. Artillery fires, with delayed fuzing,

SMOKE MUST BE USED TO should be used until all or most of theCOVER THE AITACKING FORCE

APPROACH buildings have been penetrated. Theapproach of the attacking force to the villagemust be covered by smoke. Mechanizedinfantry, accompanied by tanks and combatengineer vehicles, should move to the cover ofoutlying buildings and then seize the villagein its entirety in one assault. Combat

14-20

FM 100-5—

‘—

engineer vehicles can employ the demolition confusion of the initial assault. House-to-gun to destroy strong buildings that slow the house fighting may be required but is costlyassault. Tanks provide close support in casualties and time. Night attacks maybethroughout. Adequate forces must be used to gain entry into the village if it is notemployed to carry the assault quickly with possible to suppress or obscure the defendersthe object of securing the whole village in the with available fire support.

(

\_

B

STRIP AREAS

Where houses, stores and factories have grown up along roads or down valleys between

towns and villages, they can present an approximation of a fortified line. These areas provide

the same advantages to the defender as those discussed for villages.

Defense. A defender may not be able to offense. Defended strip developmentsoccupy the entire strip and associated must not be permitted to slow the mobility of

the attacking force.villages and towns—certainlv not if the . They are not easily--defe~der - is outnumbered. ‘However, if bypassed and therefore weak points should

be isolated through suppression andvisibility is good and if sufficient fields of fireare available, the defender can occupy

obscuration. Heavy concentration of directand indirect fire should support a penetration

positions within the strip and deceive the through the strip by a fast moving armorenemy into thinking it is an extensive force. If the enemy force does not withdrawdefense line. Tanks and ATGM can inflict after the penetration, suppression andhigh losses on attacking enemy armor and obscuration of the flanks must continue forslow his momentum. Strips afford covered the force to pass through. Eventually theseavenues of withdrawal to the flanks. areas must be reduced by follow-on forces.

14-21

—FM 100-5

TOWNS AND SMALL CITIES

Towns or cities that have a definable limit present different problems. The outlying terrain

can dictate the value of the town within the operational concept of the force. If the town can

be easily bypassed and sufficient routes exist around the area to support operations, then it

is of limited value operationally. The town’s operational worth is high if the adjacent terrain

is restrictive, if it provides good supporting defensive positions, and if routes of

communication pass through it. The decision to attack or defend a town or city must be

made by corps or division commanders because of the forces required and the time

consumed. Further, the decision to attack or defend a city maybe tantamount to a decision to

destroy it. Political considerations may weigh heavily in such cases, particularly if the city has

a cultural or historical significance.

Defense. A smaller force can gain a Parks or stadiums. with obstacles or fire.significant combat power advantag~ whendefending a town or city against a largerattacking force. To achieve this, criticalapproaches must be selected and tanks andATGM sited to gain maximum attrition of theattackers. Obstacles and mine fields assist inslowing and canalizing the attack. Reserveforces should be placed where they canquickly reinforce at critical areas. Becausedefending forces are vulnerable to airmobileor airborne landings within the town or city,the defending commander must coversuitable landing and drop zones, such as

Should a decision be made to continue thedefense of a town or city after adjacent unitshave withdrawn from terrain outside of thecity, sufficient combat support and combatservice support units should be attached sothe defense can continue in isolation. Thedefending commander must then redisposehis forces to meet an attack from anydirection. A decision to leave a defendingforce to fight in isolation can only be justifiedif the time to be consumed by the attackerwarrants the probable loss of the defendingforce.

J“

14-22

Offense. Attacks on defended towns orcities should strive to isolate the defendingforce within the town from his larger force. Ifthe attack of the defended area is required,the cohesion of the defense should be brokenby forcing a quick penetration of thedefenses, preferably from the flanks or rear.

Feints and ruses can deceive the defenderas to the point of major effort. Assault unitsare task organized with tanks, infantry, andcombat engineers for the breakthrough.OverWatching point target destruction fires,obscuration, and indirect suppression help to

FM 100-5–

must suppress enemy AT weapons in order tomaintain their mobility. Direct and indirectfires and, in the near future fuel airexplosives, are required for suppression.Artillery fires are used to blockreinforcements moving toward the attackcorridor and obscuration throughout the areawill reduce the defenders’ ability to employweapons. Once the momentum of the attackhas been gained, commanders mustmaintain that momentum until the defensehas lost its cohesion. While a quickbreakthrough of the defense is sought, anattacking commander must have sufficientforces available for house-to-house clearing if

gain an entry into the town. The assault units required.

LARGE CITIES/MAJOR URBAN COMPLEXESMajor urban complexes such as Frankfurt/ Mainz/Hanau or the Stuttgart area are so large

that they cannot be captured or defended in their entirety, and they cannot be avoided by

bypassing. The commander has no choice but to conduct the whole range of military

operations within them—attack, defense and retrograde. These areas have the

characteristics of a concrete jungle, and as in any jungle, visibility is reduced and cover and

concealment abound.

14-23

–FM 100-5

The major urban complex affectsoperations by:

�Reducing the mobility of large forces.

. Providing instant fortified positions forthe defender.

�Restricting observation.

�Reducing the effects of almost everyweapon in range, lethality, or both.

.Hiding the signature of weapons.

.Reducing the range of radios, butreducing their emission signatures.

� Creating rubble obstacles.

� Increasing problems of civilian controland the requirement to work with civilauthorities.

.Reducing the effectiveness of recon-naissance and surveillance sensors.

.Providing cover and concealment toconcentrating forces.

�Complicating commandprocedures.

Despite these effects, forceswithin such areas. To do so,

and control

must operatecommanders

must collect intelligence “and combatinformation, concentrate forces, applycombat power, move and support the combatelements.

Built-up areas such as Stuttgart and theRuhr will quickly soak up infantry; therefore,as in jungles, airmobile forces will be useful.

RECONNAISSANCE ANDINTELLIGENCE

Urban areas increase the difficulty ofreconnaissance and intelligence operations.Forces within built-up areas are affordedgreater concealment, not just from visualmeans, but also from sensors. As an example,infrared sensors will pick up the hot spotsfrom built-up areas; however, sensor returnswill be so numerous due to fires and othernormal heat sources associated with citiesthat interpretation will be difficult. SideLooking Airborne Radar (SLAR) will bedegraded by the masking effect of buildings.Overhead aircraft reconnaissance will be

vulnerable to concealed enemy air defenses.The large number of warehouses and otherlarge buildings make it easier to concealvehicles, command posts, and logisticalcomplexes, thus increasing the difficulty ofdetection. The enemy may increase emphasison wire communications because of poor line-of-sight radio communication. This willimpair SIGINT operations. Ground radarwill be degraded in detecting activities withinthe urban complex itself. Remote sensors(REMS) may be employed to cover lightly orundefended areas; however, theireffectiveness is reduced by line-of-sightmasking by buildings and their monitoringstations must be carefully sited.

A key source of intelligence will beHUMINT—the exploitation of indigenouscivilians and police units. Extensivepatrolling will be required. Undergroundarteries such as subways and sewer systemsmay be used for this purpose.

Only a part of the complex maybe a battlearea or there may be several separate battleareas. Air cavalry units can improve acommander’s reconnaissance capability inboth the offense and defense. They can covergaps between defended areas to detect enemyforces attempting to bypass. In the offense,they can locate the weak points in the defenseand also provide flank security to theattacking force, but they will be vulnerable toambush.

Extensive outposting will be required inboth the offense and defense to overcome thenatural concealment offered by built-upareas.

CONCENTRATE

Attack. When the enemy strongpoints andweakly defended areas have been determinedthrough reconnaissance and intelligenceoperations, the commander must concentratehis force on a narrow front where the enemyis weak. The object of the attack is tobreakthrough and disrupt the enemy rearwhere his command and control, combatservice support, and air defenses are leastprotected. In order to concentrate sufficientcombat power for the breakthrough, thefundamentals outlined in Chapter 4 should

14-24

FM 100-5—

—be observed; however, the concentration ofthe force may take more time due to rubbleand other obstacles. While the urban areaprovides extensive concealment for theconcentration, the additional time requiredwill dictate the execution of deceptionoperations. Airmobile forces and attackhelicopters units can bypass strongpoints ifenemy air defenses are isolated andsuppressed; however, particular attentionmust be paid to small arms and machinegunair defense fires.

Defense. When the area of the enemy mainattack has been determined, the defendingforce must shift combat power to meet theattack. Because of the increased cover andconcealment offered by urban areas, adefending force may be able to defeat anattacker with relative combat power greaterthan 3:1. While urban areas reduce some ofthe effects of artillery fires, this will assist inslowing the attack until additional weaponssystems can be brought to bear. Attackhelicopters and close air support can rapidlyadd combat power while additional armoredand mechanized infantry forces aremaneuvering. The masking effect of..buildings allows light infantry and ATGM tobe brought in closer to the actual battle areathan on the open battlefield. However, theylack the mobility to mass quickly unlessmoved by helicopter.

Fire Support. Field artillery is theprincipal fire support means of forcesoperating within built-up areas. Thesuppressive effects of artillery rounds,particularly improved conventionalmunitions, are reduced by the additionalcover provided by structures within theobuil~- [NCR EASE MUN [TlONSup areas. Increased use of delayed @zing M EFFECTIVE ESS WITH DE~YEDrequired to penetrate buildings and improve FUZINGmunitions effectiveness. Direct fire weaponssuch as self-propelled artillery, combatengineer vehicles, and tanks will be requiredto overcome or suppress strongpoints.

Suppress and Move. Armor andmechanized forces must retain theircapability to move within urban areas inboth the offense and defense. Suppression ismore difficult in urban areas due to reducedweapons effects and increased protection

14-25

=-

J—

—FM 100-5

SMOKE SHOULD BE USED WITHDIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRES

afforded enemy weapons. Direct and indirectfires must be employed in conjunction with <smoke in order to suppress the enemyweapons along attack corridors. Fuel airexplosives, when introduced in the nearfuture, will provide area suppression(through overpressure) against snipers,antitank gunners, and other direct fire .weapons without destroying buildings andcreating large amounts of rubble.

Support. Continuous support is requiredfor urban area operations. Obstaclebreaching and reduction is key tomaneuvering within urban areas andcombat engineers must be fully integratedinto the combined arms maneuver team.Combat service support operations can takeplace closer to engaged elements than isusual in more open terrain.

Isolation. Small units, both in the attackand defense, will often become isolated whilefighting within urban areas. The commanderof the isolated force must continue hismission within the overall concept of theoperation. The larger force commander mustdecide whether to Iinkup and reinforce theisolated unit or order their withdrawal byexfiltration.

A Z’GM. Antitank guided missiles and lightantitank weapons may be fired from theprotection and concealment of enclosedrooms. Firing signatures are hidden, and hitand kill probabilities improve when weaponsare fired from high elevations. Tests haveshown that the minimum safe requirementsfor their use are as shown below. -

WEAPON MIN. SIZE MASONRY1 1 I

LAW 7’X1O’ MIN OF 4’ TO BACK WALL 20 Ft2

DRAGON 15’ X15’ 17’ X1l’ 20 Ft2

TOW 20’ x 30’ 20’ x 20’ 20 Ft2

All glass should be removed from windows, doors and within rooms. Soft furniture and curtains should be left to

absorb sound. Firers must wear helmets and ear plugs. Don’t stand behind weapons being fired.*oPen door and window space

14-26

-

FM 100-5—

It is obvious that the ability to conductoperations in built-up areas will steadilyincrease in importance. It is equally obviousthat new weapons, new techniques, andtactics will be required. At the present timesuch operations would probably be slow,laborious, and costly. Additional researchand experimentation are required. For thedetails of the current state of the art, see FM9-10, Military Operations in Built-[lpAreas.

14-27

.

—

STANAG 2003

STANAG 2008

STANAG 2014

STANAG 2017

STANAG 2020

APPENDIX A

Relevant STANAGS

Patrol Reports by Army Forces.

Bombing, Shelling and MortaringReports.

Operation Orders, Annexes to OperationOrders, Administrative and Logistics0rder8.

Orders to the Demolition GuardCommander and Demolition Firing PartyCommander.

Operational Situation Reports.

STANAG 2022

STANAG 2036

STANAG 2041

STANAG 2077

STANAG 2082

Intelligence Reports.

Doctn”ne and Procedures in the Techniqueof Land Minefield Laying and Recording.

Operation Orders for Road MovementTables and Graphs.

Order of Battle.

Relief of Combat Troops.

STANAG 2096

STANAG 2099

Reporting Engineer Information in theField.

Fire Coordination in Support of LandForce8.

STANAG 2101 principles and %ocedure8 forEstablishing Liai80n.

STANAG 2103

STANAG 2104

Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radio-Active Fallout and Biological andChemical Attacks.

Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning toArmed Force8 Operating on Land.

A-1

—FM 100-5

STANAG2113

STANAG 2134

STANAG 3156

STANAG 3204

STANAG 3345

STANAG 3463

STANAG 3465

STANAG 3466

STANAG 3570

STANAG 3700

Destruction of Military TechnicalEquipment.

Offensive Air Support OperationsA TP-27.

Aircraft Paratroop Signal Lights.

Aeromedical Evacuation.

Forms for Planning Air Movement8.

Planning Procedures.

Safety, Emergency and SignalingProcedures for Military Air MovementFixed Wing Aircraft.

Responsibilities of Air Transport Unitsand User Units in the Loading andUnloading of Transport Aircraft inTactical Air Transport Operation.

Drop Zones and ULLA Drop Zones -Criteria and Marking.

NAD-NA TO Tactical Air Doctrine A TP-33.

A-2

APPENDIX B

CAPSTONE

100-5

1OO-5A

100-5-1

“How to Fight” Manuals

101-5

71-100

71-101

COMBAT

71-1

71-2

7-7

7-8

7-1o

7-20

7-85

17-12

17-50

TITLE

Operations

Electronic Warfare (SECRET)

Conventional-Nuclear Operations

Command and Control of CombatOperations

Brigade and Division Operations(Mechanized and Armor)

Brigade and Division Operations(Infantry/Airborne/Airmobile)

The Tank and Mechanized InfantryCompany Team

The Tank and Mechanized Battalion TaskForce

The Mechanized Infantry Platoon/Squad

The Light Infantry Platoon/Squad

The Rifle Company

The Battalion (Infantry/Airborne/AirAssault/Ranger)

Ranger Operations

Tank Gunnery

Attack Helicopter Operations

B-1

\

–FM 100-5

17-47

17-95

100-999

4

ACCB

Cavalry

Air/Land Operations

COMBAT SUPPORT

5-1oo

6-20

11-50

11-92

21-40

24-1

44-1

44-3

44-23

44-90

90-1

Engineer Combat Operations

Fire Support for Combined ArmsOperations

Communications in the Division

Corps Signal Communications

NBC Defense

Tactical Communications Doctrine

Air Defense Artillery Employment

Chaparral/ Vulcan Employment

Redeye Employment

Hawk Employment

Employment of Army Aviation Units in aI High Threat Environment

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

90-2

90-3

90-4

90-5

90-6

90-7

Tactical Deception

Desert Operations

Air Assault Operations

Jungle Operations

Mountain Operations

Denial Operations and Barriers

B-2

90-8

90-10

90-11

90-12

90-13

Counter Guerrilla Operations

Military Operations in Built-Up Areas(MOBA)

Northern Operations

Airborne Operations

River Crossing Operations

B-3

FM 100-51 JULY 1976

The proponent agency for this field manual is the US Army Command andGeneral Staff College. Users are invited to send comments and suggestedimprovements to Commandant, USACGSC, ATTN: ATSW-TA, FortLeavenworth, KS 66027.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

FRED C. WEYANDGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:\ --- PAUL T. SMITH

Major General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, USAR: Two (2) copies to each DA Form 12-11 account, plus DA Form12-11A, Requirements for Avn Co, Bn, Gp and Bale; Engr Bn, Armored, Inf, and Inf MechDiv; Engr Bn, Airborne and Airmobile Div; FA Tactics; The Rifle CO, Plt and Squads; TheInf Bn; The Inf Bale; Med Spt in Div, Sep Bde and Armored Cav Regiment; Tactical SigComm Systems, Army, Corps and Div; Sig Bn, Armored, Inf, Inf Mech and Airmobile Div;Sig Bn, Airborne Div; Tank Units, Pit, Co& Bn; The Armored Bale;Div Armored and AirCav Units; The Armored Cav Regiment; and Mil Police Spt Army Div and Sep Bde (Qty rqrblock nos. 3,28,29,39,78,79,80, 82,106,110,111,129,130, 131,133, and 134) and DAForm12-1lB, Requirements for Supply and Services in Div and Sep Bale; Combat Intelligence;Denial Opns and Barriers; Desert opns; Jungle opns; Night opns; River Crossing Opns;USA ADA Employment; The Div Spt Cmd and Sep Bde Spt Bn; the Field Army Spt Cmd;USA/AF Doctrine for Airborne operations; The Division; operations of Army Forces inthe Field; Combat Service Spt; Tactical Nuclear operations; and Army Airspace ControlDoctrine (Qty rqr block nos. 267,273,293,306,307, 308,312,348,380,381, 399,404,405,406,411, and 426).