colombian army counterinsurgency

Crime, Law & Social Change 40: 77–105, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Colombian army counterinsurgency

TOM MARKSPMB 2307, 575 Cooke Str. #A, Hawaii 96813, Honolulu, USA (e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. In the virtual absence of societal involvement and government leadership, theArmy of Colombia (COLAR) responded to the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (FARC) during the Pastrana presidency with a combination of organizationaland operational innovation that has reversed the previous unfavorable situation. COLAR hasassessed FARC’s weak point as its relatively underdeveloped political structure. This allowedconcentration upon the key insurgent generators of power, the base complexes and mobilitycorridors. This strategy was successful in forcing FARC mobile warfare back to the guerrillastage but was unable to advance further due to significant shortcomings in operational fundingand equipment – notably air assets in a country the size of California, Nevada, Utah, and Idaho.Ironically, FARC remained extraordinarily vulnerable even as Bogotá refused to engage in asystematic counterinsurgency campaign, instead leaving the task of besting the guerrillas tothe security forces.

Introduction

Counterinsurgency is a political campaign. It can be carried out only throughan act of national will, a combined effort that harnesses all facets of power,civil and military, into a weapon that beats back the insurgent challenge.

What is unique in the present Colombian experience is that the system, un-til the August 2002 advent of the Uribe presidency, seemed unsure whether tofight for its life or go down grinning. Indeed, the military had the singular dis-advantage of being forced to engage in counterinsurgency operations at a timewhen strategic Cold War victory had caused all potential sources of support,both ideological and material, to turn their backs on the operational remnantsof the failed communist crusade. Hence, Bogota found itself quite on its own– at the very time when policy makers, both Colombian and American, hadlittle knowledge as to the realities of insurgency-counterinsurgency, particu-larly the philosophy and mechanics of internal war. This thrust the burden ofconducting counterinsurgency almost completely upon the shoulders of theColombian military alone, principally the Colombian Army, or COLAR. Ittook up this burden, at considerable cost (see Sidebar 1 for the human dimen-sion of the conflict), driving FARC to return to a guerrilla-driven approachrather than one where mobile or maneuver warfare leads.

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SIDEBAR 1: Human cost of the war .

Statistically, Colombia is one of the most hazardous places on earth. Figures for theyear 2000 claim 38,820 “violent deaths” in a country of 40 million people. The USfigure for the same year is less than 16,000 matched against a population of some280 million.

Still, virtually all sources place the number of dead in Colombia due to “thewar” at but 3,600–5,000 per year, a relatively low figure when one considers thatCalifornia’s 1990 murder figure was approximately 3,600 for a population of some30 million.

Insurgents in 2000 killed approximately a thousand civilians, autodefensas killedanother thousand (published data goes through only October, which requires theimprecision). Some 970 insurgents were listed as killed by the security forces, aswell as 89 autodefensas members. The army alone had 286 KIA for the year. Thepolice have been savaged, losing more than 5,000 men since 1990.

Yet the bulk of the burden may be considered hidden. Well known are the vari-ous estimates of more than a million displaced persons since 1995 and more than125,000 last year (1999) alone. Not publicized is the fact that, at any one time,there are 300–350 military personnel, most COLAR, assigned to the RehabilitationBattalion after release from the larger Military Hospital in Bogota. 71% sufferedgunshot wounds, 5% were mine casualties, and, significantly, 15% were listed aspsychiatric casualties.

Most controversial of all is the effort to measure the human rights impact ofthe war. It is a statistical minefield that the security forces have found they mustenter. They have gone to great lengths to demonstrate and publicize the nature ofdeaths and other activities related to the insurgency, as opposed to those attributedto Colombia’s extraordinary crime rate, to the point of publishing on the COLARwebsite <Ejercito.mil.co> the particulars of every individual who would otherwiseappear as but a bit of data on a table.

This information demonstrates clearly the validity of the security force’s long-standing contention that it is the insurgents who are overwhelmingly responsible forboth deaths and other forms of human rights abuses.2

Roots of the insurgency

What is paramount in understanding the present nature of things is that themajor insurgent threat, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia(FARC), became a going concern only when it linked up with drug pro-duction as a funding source. The money from, initially, taxation of the drugtrade, later, direct involvement in it, provided a resource windfall which madepreviously marginal political actors into central figures.

FARC, in other words, did not become a serious factor due to mobilizationof an alienated mass base. It became a serious factor due to the power thatcame from drugs grown by a marginalized population. In terms of national

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percentage, these marginalized actors would not be major players. They be-came so only because of their role as the base upon which drug cultivation –and thus insurgent finances – was built.

This dynamic is crucial. US policy under the previous administration fo-cused primarily on “drugs” but went to extraordinary lengths to avoid “coun-terinsurgency.” Certainly this stemmed, as well, from the multiple constraintsimposed by Congress, particularly in 1986 legislation, but policy obfuscationeventually took on a life of its own. This extended, during certain periodsof the Clinton administration, to placing a nebulous conception for “humanrights” before all else, even as Colombian military units grappled with acommunist insurgent threat, which in many ways began to amass superioroperational resources to those deployed by the security forces.

A communist insurgency today?

Though active Maoist oriented insurgent groups remain in the likes of Colom-bia, the Philippines, Nepal, and even Turkey, few take them seriously. This isto confuse strategic Cold War victory with local operational circumstances,where such rebel movements remain a threat.

Such has been the case in Colombia. There, the lack of concern by theruling elite played a key role. For decades, following their initial effort in theearly 1960s, the insurgents remained largely “out there,” out of sight, out ofmind, patiently building an alternative society. No one much cared.

Yet FARC had big plans. In a key meeting, its seventh party conference,held at Cubarral, Meta, from May 4th to 14th, 1982, it was decided that thepriority task was to create a revolutionary army capable of taking on thesecurity forces. To fund this endeavor and to gain manpower, FARC optedto exploit narcotics. By taxing all facets of the drug trade, it would obtainmoney. By protecting and controlling production areas, it would not onlysecure its income but recruit from the marginalized.

The result was that FARC, which began as a remnant group in the easternllanos, or plains, built there substantial base areas and eventually created aforce which 2001 order of battle figures show to be some 16,500 combatants(with another 50 to 70% that figure fielded in local militia). They are de-ployed in 66 fronts, grouped in 7 large Bloques. Led throughout by a singleindividual, Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias Tiro Fijo or “Sure Shot,” FARC’soverall command falls to a seven-man Secretariat which nominally reports toa central command, or Estado Mayor Central, currently with 25 members (itssize has varied).

Considerable irony is involved here. For decades, the government hadbeen faced with any number of insurgent movements, none of which were

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particularly powerful, but which together constituted a significant problem.At times, notably 1960-65, Bogota had even put together model counterinsur-gency efforts.

Yet overall, the government did little. Instead, it told its security forcesto deal with the rebels, to engage in operations designed to maintain “publicorder.” This they did by engaging in counterguerrilla warfare.

There was little else it could do. Though the government would at timesmove towards some sort of resolution – generally when enlightened or ambi-tious personalities appeared – grievances embodied in marginalization werenever structurally addressed. Development was controlled by an elite, as waspolitics, and bringing the margins into the mainstream simply was beyond themindset, and perhaps the capacity, of the system.

FARC, of course, was implacably opposed to that system (see Sidebar 2),and the insurgents put their money into their bite – and caught the securityforces in 1996-98 still in counterguerrilla mode. In a series of actions through-out those years, FARC demonstrated that it had entered the maneuver warfarestage of people’s war. Though coordination was effected in 1995 with theother major insurgent group remaining in the field, the much smaller Ejercitode Liberacion Nacional (ELN), the new war was principally a FARC show.

Modern communications equipment allowed a high degree of both tacticaland operational coordination. Simultaneously, Colombia itself was hammeredby the US, which decertified the country in both 1996 and 1997, thus deny-ing it aid and advice even as the insurgents moved to exploit weaknesses insecurity force organization, doctrine, and deployment.

A harbinger of what was to come was the overrunning, on 30 August1996 at Las Delicias in Putumayo, of a company base of 120 men, killing orwounding half, capturing the remainder. There followed other actions, oftencoordinated with demonstrations by coca growers in municipal areas.

Concurrently, a stepped-up campaign sought to clear entire areas of gov-ernment presence. Mayors and policemen were particular targets, for oncethey were killed or driven away, a region became ripe for control. Specialattention was paid to areas that would serve to isolate the national capital,Bogota. Urban militias were formed to multiply the combat power of FARCfronts themselves.

Just how far FARC had progressed was brought home in late February1998 when the under-strength 52nd Counterguerrilla Battalion (52 BCG) ofthe newly formed 3rd Mobile Brigade (3 BRIM), deploying only 154 men inthree of its companies, was lured into a prepared ambush and decimated at ElBillar, Caqueta.

As the Colombian presidential election campaign went on in August 1998,FARC launched a nationwide series of attacks. The most significant saw


SIDEBAR 2: FARC’s plans .

At its key seventh party conference held at Cubarral, Meta, from May 4th to 14th,1982, FARC outlined its “Strategic Plan for the Taking of Power.” The plan anticip-ated three phases – offensive, governance, defense of the revolution – over a periodof eight years (1982–90).

The priority task in the implementation of this design was to create a revolu-tionary army of 28,000 men in 48 fronts capable of taking on the security forces.The eastern mountain range, the Cordillera Oriental, was to serve as the “center ofstrategic deployment” from which the offensive would be launched.

To fund this endeavor and to gain manpower, FARC opted to exploit narcoticsand to increase its existing involvement in kidnapping. By taxing all facets of thedrug trade, it would obtain money. By protecting and controlling production areas,it would not only secure its income but recruit from the marginalized.

Captured shortly after FARC’s seventh conference, the official party text of thisproceeding, running 41 pages and titled simply Informa Central a la Septima Con-ference, has long been available in Colombia in photocopy. Also useful is a FARCpublication, Historia de las FARC-EP, which contains no publications data, but doescontain discussion of conferences and plenums from the II Conference to the 25–27December 1987 Plenum.

Myriad such FARC documents have come into the hands of the authoritiesover the decades of the conflict. Summaries and assessments are in circulation. Allmajor Colombian security force units have access to a “Power Point Paper” titledConferencias-Plenos, which presents the main conclusions and directives of im-portant FARC congresses and plenums. Long since reduced to virtual boilerplate forwidespread, continuous dissemination, the “paper” has lost all original identificationand publications data.

The VII Conference itself has been closely analyzed, as has the “Strategic Plan.”Though the plan was amplified at the VIII and most recent Conference in April 1993,and revised slightly, principally as concerns anticipated time frame since a 1990victory obviously did not occur, it remains the basic strategic document towardswhich all FARC activities are directed.

an estimated 1,200 insurgents attack a company of the Joaquin Paris Bat-talion and the co-located counternarcotics police base at Miraflores, Guavi-are. Overrun, government forces again took heavy casualties: 30 killed, 50wounded, and 100 taken prisoner.

Anxious to act upon popular sentiment for “peace,” the President-Elect,Andres Pastrana Arango, personally met with FARC leaders, then ceded tothem, on a “temporary” basis, a demilitarized zone (Zona de Despeje orArea de Distension – see Map 1), as the price for entering into negotiations.Centrally located in the heart of the country, within easy striking distanceof both the capital and other major targets, it was ostensibly an area wheremilitary activity was prohibited. FARC not only violated such prohibition

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Map 1. Demilitarized zone.

Map 2. FARC offensives from the Zona.


immediately, but subsequently used the Zona, as it came to be called, as acoca production base and recruiting zone, and as an unsinkable aircraft carrierfrom which to launch repeated strikes against government targets (see Map 2).

This activity reached a new high in July 1999, when a massive offensivefrom the DMZ sought to strike in all directions, including Bogota itself. It wasfollowed by another in November-December, but both were stopped cold infierce fighting which involved security forces knocking out FARC homemadebut nonetheless formidable armor.

Security force response

That the offensives were blunted stemmed from significant changes that oc-curred in the security forces, primarily the army, even as the insurgents weremaking headway.1 If any measure was key, it was putting in command leaderswho could recognize what they were seeing.

Naturally, it was the army that was expected to blunt the insurgents. Of itstotal 145,000 man strength, however, less than a quarter, some 30,000 men,were professionals. Of these, some 20,000 were being used in actual coun-terinsurgency operations. They were deployed in 3 Brigadas Moviles (MobileBrigades or BRIM) and 47 Batallones Contraguerrillas (Counterguerrilla Bat-talions or BCG), a total of some 60 BCG (numbers varied; there were fourBCG per BRIM).

It was from these units that the new chain of command came after thechange of administrations in mid-year 1998. Colombia is and remains a demo-cracy. Under civilian Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramirez Acuna, ArmyLieutenant General (called simply General in the Colombian system) FernandoTapias Stahelin became head of the armed forces (Fuerzas Militares); GeneralJorge E. Mora Rangel became head of the army itself (see Figure 1). Bothwere former commanders of the elite mobile brigades (BRIM).

Under their leadership, the military was able, in just a few years, to fielda revitalized force that could be employed in a manner more appropriate tomaneuver warfare, the new phase the conflict had entered. With primary effortdirected against what was perceived as the main insurgent threat, FARC, amulti-pronged plan was put into execution by COLAR to counter the insur-gent approach.

First, a critical areas assessment was drawn up, and forces allocated tosecure resources imperative to national survival and operations. Second, themilitary moved to blunt the insurgents’ own strategy for seizing power.

This involved cutting FARC’s “mobility corridors” (corredores de movil-idad), going after intermediate base areas, and, finally, attacking primary baseareas. It was a strategy which attacked the insurgent strategy and reflected the

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Figure 1. Generals Tapias (center left) and Mora (center right).

high level of operational art practiced by the commanders who came out ofthe BRIM/BCG tradition.

It took as its starting point the reality that the insurgents had well-developedconcepts for accomplishing their professed goal of seizing state-power. Toimplement its multi-year strategic plan, the product of the 1982 congressand subsequent plenums, FARC utilized the tripartite approach embodied inMaoist insurgency – mass line (development of clandestine infrastructure),united front (use of fellow travelers, both internally and abroad, witting andun-, especially human rights organizations), and military action.

The move to maneuver warfare in mid-1996 took military action to anew level, one whereby guerrilla and terror actions were used in conjunctionwith main force action. Task-organized columns (columnas) were used to hitprimary targets. Though light infantry, these have featured massive indirectfires, armor, and sappers, even as numerous guerrilla attacks seek to concealthe objective, and terror sows confusion.

For example, the August 1996 attack on the company-size base at LasDelicias mentioned earlier was but one of 22 simultaneous assaults, mostguerrilla actions, carried out throughout the country. As a COLAR workingpaper states: “These were carried out in different directions, each with great


Map 3. FARC Bloque primary objectives.

initial intensity that caused disorientation among the unit commanders, who,seeing their troops in imminent danger, caused even greater confusion inarmy headquarters as it tried to respond across the length and breadth of thecountry.”

Typically, a major attack will have a tactical and operational component,but both are intended to fit into FARC’s strategic plan. That plan assigns toeach FARC Bloque a primary objective – essentially, the major city (or cities)in that Bloque area (see Map 3). Local attacks are designed to facilitate theultimate taking of this objective.

Thus – to use an illustration written about extensively in US media –Dabeiba, a small town attacked in October 2000, was located along a strategiccorridor that FARC’s Bloque Noroccidental (Northwest Bloc) had for yearsbeen working to open up to allow access to strategically and economicallyimportant Medellin and its vicinity. COLAR 4th Brigade, I Division, has itsheadquarters in Medellin.

In FARC doctrine, the designated city-as-objective, whether Medellin orany other, is to be isolated by having its lines of communication cut andits sources of sustenance blocked, to include power and water. This requiressystematic domination of mobility corridors so that seemingly exterior lines

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Figure 2. MG Ospina, COLAR Director of Operations.

– imagine a spider’s web with the target at its center – actually become in-terior lines when considered within a countrywide context. Domination oftowns and human geography within or along “corridors” allows FARC freemovement of men and supplies.

Hence the tactical attack on Dabeiba was designed to drive out govern-ment presence, in particular the police. Such actions occur regularly. Theoperational intent, however, was to open up the mobility corridor using thesame tactical kill zone technique (called a “defensive curtain” – a defensivecortina). This technique has been used time and again, particularly in theCOLAR IV Division area, to hold the corridor by luring the military reliefforce into an area ambush. The town, in other words, was but the bait andthe 4th Brigade relief force, which was hastily dispatched, went for it. Withfive-score dead, publicity was substantial.

COLAR is well aware of this technique. Units of the IV Division, ledby M.G. Carlos A. Ospina Ovalle, now COLAR Director of Operations (seeFigure 2), successfully smashed identical ambushes in the July and November1999 fighting, east and northeast of the DMZ. Kill zones were as large asapproximately 50 square kilometers and hundreds of casualties were inflicted.They succeeded again in even more difficult circumstances in July 2000 in acombined Colombia Vegalarga operation near Neiva, Huila, where the killzone was circular, with a radius of approximately 10 km.


In the October 2000 operation, however, the 4th Brigade did not utilize theproven techniques and so paid the price. In particular, the troops were notlanded in post-midnight darkness, as has become normal practice, but wentin at early evening. Hence, they ended up losing a Blackhawk and the 22men aboard before forcing entry. More than 50 soldiers were killed becausethey were left in the kill zone and the badly hit helicopters were unable toreturn to reinforce them. Significantly, the shootdown involved only one ofthe potential landing zones (LZ) in the area. Area preparation is the key tothe technique.

At Dabeiba, sources indicate, a new wrinkle was that the prepared posi-tions, built to create a true zone ambush, were not manned in advance, as hadbeen the norm. Rather, “watchers” were in position and called for the “fill”only once the actual LZ had been determined by the delivery of governmentclose air support (CAS).

There seems to be more of this in the offing. An interview in February2001 with a COLAR Special Forces lieutenant, badly wounded in a dif-ferent incident, revealed, as per his experience, the use of pressure minesplaced on potential LZs. This technique, which was common in Vietnamand El Salvador, has not, to my knowledge, been encountered frequently inColombia.

Yet instances of explosives placed on LZs in Colombia by forces underMarulanda have been recorded since at least 1964. It is known, from inter-views conducted in February 2001 with COLAR intelligence personnel, thatFARC has been involved in intense workshops designed to implement andstandardize counter-helicopter techniques, apparently including efforts to rigcharges in the trees if the LZ lends itself to such.

Method to the madness

The point is that there is method behind the actions that occur, and the COLARcounter seeks to attack that method. The scope of maneuver warfare is il-lustrated by the Colombia/Vegalarga operation, which ultimately involvedtwo groups of four COLAR counterguerrilla battalions (BCG) each, oper-ating across a 40 km front, backed by heli-lifted 120 mm and 105 mm sup-port weapons, engaged with half a dozen coordinated guerrilla columns thatnumbered some 3,000 men total – with additional guerrilla actions designedto conceal the main objectives, and targeted assassinations in the rear toincrease dislocation.

The Colombia landing went smoothly, but an initial government effortto land under cover of darkness at Vegalarga was repulsed; a second was

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successful. Supporting arms were flown in using standard helicopter sling-rigs. Such techniques have become standard for COLAR.

Significantly, evidence exists that the FARC forces involved had intendedto use SAMs for the first time in the conflict but, for reasons not clear, wereunable to do so. This would have been the first use of SAMs but was appar-ently not the first time FARC deployed the weapon with intent-to-use. Anearlier report from a planned attack upon San Jose del Guaviare mentionedequipment which matched in particulars that described for this operation.

What has changed, to my mind, in the SAM debate is that earlier reportsI examined involved individuals who were assigned to guard boxes or con-tainers they were told contained SAMs. None claimed to have actually seena missile. More recent reports do claim to have actually seen the weapon.These reports have included mention of Caucasians (possibly ex-Yugoslav)responsible for making the equipment operational.

Regardless, once their very large kill zones were compromised in bothareas, FARC units withdrew as quickly as possible for the Zona. Both COLARfour-battalion response groups (4 × BCG from FUDRA; 4 × BCG fromIV Division assets) performed well, using two battalions each to push, twobattalions to hook left, in an effort to get behind the fleeing insurgents. TheFARC columnas suffered casualties but were able to remove most bodies asreported by area inhabitants.

Two under-informed media interpretations have relevance here. One seeksto present setbacks such as Dabeiba as common (a single Blackhawk was lost;the town ultimately was relieved – even if battered – but the two-decade oldBlackhawk itself is presented as a wonder weapon, so its loss is equated withthe downing of a Stealth bomber). The second claims that the US is seekingto bring the Colombian military, particularly COLAR, “up to speed,” and thatsomehow such US training is designed to “reverse” a tide of defeat.

These are flawed interpretations. Obviously, Colombia itself suffers fromstate crisis. Yet, amidst such, the military remains one of the most cohesive,competent groups in the country. Further, as I have indicated throughout thisarticle, it is fairly good at counterinsurgency.

Like all militaries which have just seen a curve ball, it is adjusting – andhas done so in solid fashion since the days when it suffered several localreverses occasioned by the FARC switch to mobile warfare. It implementeda viable counter, even as the insurgents continued to use the opportunityprovided by the government’s “Peace Policy” to recruit vigorously, drawingmainly upon rural youth exposed to both proselytizing and coercion, and toimprove weaponry.


Map 4. Principal FARC organizational structures.

FARC operational design

FARC internal documents reveal it is Bloque Oriental (Eastern Bloque – seeMap 4) that has been designated the locus of FARC effort, since it domin-ates what the movement calls the “center of strategic deployment” (centrode despliegue estrategico), the Cordillera Oriental area of which the Zona deDespeje is a key part. All other Bloques are to support its actions.

To that end, the Zona has been used in an effort to greatly expand BloqueOriental’s combat power. Particularly noteworthy in captured FARC videofootage, augmented by COLAR combat tapes, is the dramatic decrease ofthe average FARC combatant age, as impressments has been stepped up.Such kidnapping is intended to flesh out and multiply the combat units whichoperate within each front (the so-called “650 Companies” campaign).

To up combatant firepower, key units – but especially those from BloqueOriental – have been issued East German-manufactured AKMs provided bycorrupt Peruvian officials (after legal shipment from Jordan). Impact of thisinflux of high quality weapons immediately became apparent on the battle-field.

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SIDEBAR 3: Mystery of FARC weaponry .

FARC weaponry has improved substantially with recent purchases, but it remainsa puzzle for it does not reflect the amounts of money that documents and prisonerinterrogations indicate are flowing into the movement.

FARC formations have semi-automatic rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, andmachineguns. Yet, for a movement known to take in a minimum of $250 million peryear, the insurgents are relatively ill-armed.

In late 2000, a colleague and I were given access to the entire captured holdingsat a “typical” COLAR brigade. All weapons captured were kept in the unit armsroom, as is standard COLAR procedure.

Leaving aside pistols and various other miscellaneous pieces, we examineda total of 561 weapons. Of these, 529 were “long arms”: 291 shotguns, 217high-powered firearms (HPF), and 21 carbines. The remaining weapons were 2machineguns, 2 mortars, 3 grenade launchers, and 25 submachineguns.

Of the 217 HPF, 174 were either AK-47s or AKMs, 38 were Galils, and at least18 were FALs from Venezuelan official stocks. Only the AKMs appeared to be relat-ively new. They began to be captured in large numbers in mid-1999, following theirprovision by corrupt Peruvian officials. Corrupt Venezuelan security force membershave long been known to sell weapons to FARC.

The 10,000+ AKMs that made their way into Colombia were to have been part ofa larger order of 60,000 weapons. Recent press speculation in Colombia has statedthat the deal was bad for FARC, since the AKMs require 7.62×39 ammunition,which is supposedly disappearing. One of my sources disagrees. “It is the cheapestcommercial ammunition available in the US, going for anywhere from 13 to 23 centsper round, less if bought in quantity. Further, it is available in at least 20 differentcountries. So all FARC has to do is buy it in bulk and send it to Colombia.”

Particularly interesting were the AK-47s, with 52 being Chinese-made Norincos.A healthy number of these, judging by the dealer stamps on the magazine housings,had been originally imported through Long Beach, California and then sold leg-ally in the US. How they found their way to FARC remains unclear, but SouthernCalifornia is an area where FARC sympathizers are known to be active.

What is noteworthy in the inventory is that 55% of the total long arms capturedby a COLAR brigade, in an active area where FARC is the only real opponent,have been shotguns. Since the particulars of seizures are not documented on in-ventory tags, it is entirely possible that shotguns have generally been seized fromcivilians. Still, even if they are eliminated entirely from the count, the array andworn condition of HPF types does not appropriately reflect FARC’s resource base.

Previously, stocks of captured weapons, held at COLAR brigades, evinceda decidedly mixed nature, with healthy percentages from Venezuelan officialstocks and Norinco batches imported originally by California firms (as evid-enced by dealer stamps), in addition to the expected captured Galil rifles. Thismultiplicity of pieces (see Sidebar 3), though, seems to have been replaced,particularly in Bloque Oriental, by the AKMs.


Bloque Oriental, as it has increased its combatant numbers and improvedits weaponry, has been the linchpin of the maneuver war approach, launchingsix major maneuver (“light infantry”) actions using the Zona as its base fromwhich to strike (there has been an additional offensive effort since preparationof Map 2, which details five such attacks) – most crucially the offensivesof July 1999, November 1999, and July 2000. Yet each of these, as withthe actions of 1996, 1997, and 1998, has been accompanied by the normalguerrilla actions and assassinations, both within Bloque Oriental area andthroughout the remainder of the country.

Indeed, what sets this central theater of operations apart is not the tacticsbut the maneuver art involved. The July 2000 attack, for instance, involvedcoordinated units from two different Bloques, Oriental and Central, and wasintended to lead to future actions.

As noted above, such attacks feature very heavy (in terms of guerrilla war-fare), coordinated columnas, task-organized manpower drawn from differentFronts. Such columnas are approximately battalion strength. When weddedto the other elements of FARC’s mobile warfare doctrine (use of indirect fires,armor, sappers, assassins, and air defense), these become elements theoretic-ally capable of engaging their COLAR counterparts.

That they have proved unable to do so stems from a basic error, assessedthus by a COLAR general officer: “FARC continues to seriously underestim-ate the capabilities of a modern army which is performing in proper fashion.”

Dramatic as such action is, however, the ultimate danger lies in FARC’srecognition of its relative political underdevelopment and its vigorous stepsto rectify this situation. Most interesting is its explicit assumption of the com-munist mantle, not just in-country via the Clandestine Colombian CommunistParty (PCCC), but also internationally, where it now presents itself in muchthe same fashion as did Sendero Luminoso in Peru, as the torchbearer for thewounded international Marxist-Leninist forces.

Thus it has stood up party schools and worked to expand not only cadre butthe political educational level of military commanders. The schooling systemis intended to solidify the FARC Marxist-Leninist ideological position, withall commanders being required to pass through ideological indoctrinationcurricula.

These are established, with programs of instruction (POI) and texts.COLAR sources interviewed in February 2001 indicated that they had notyet obtained these materials, which might well have actually been seized butremained at lower levels, given the low priority attached to such as comparedto more traditional order of battle (OB) data.

To cast its net still further, FARC has publicly advanced its national front,the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia. Hand-in-hand with this has

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gone expansion of the militia, to protect “liberated” territory, to the point thatmany of these local forces in the llanos are now armed with high-poweredfirearms (HPF), to include AKMs from the East German stock.

Battered democracy struggles on

Given its history, it is evident that FARC is in many respects a large focoin search of a mass base. This it has achieved to some extent, together withfunding, as a result of the 1982 decision (at the national conference) to link upwith the drug production populations and to tax that drug production process.

What is significant, since the creation of the Zona, is not the increasein the number of FARC combatants – almost 100% in some units – ratherthe growth of the infrastructure behind this increase. This infrastructure hashitherto been rudimentary but now shows, for the first time, signs of vitality– in the strategic space provided by inept government approach. If such getsoff the ground, FARC will be a much more dangerous foe than hitherto.

To prevent this, COLAR proceeded on the basis of identifying, prioritiz-ing, and attacking the mobility corridors in each FARC area, so as to preventaccess to populated zones, by either guerrilla units or the much larger mobilewarfare columns. It is the battle over these unseen “highways” which hasdriven much of the action of the last several years. Beginning in 2001, thearmy moved on to attacking the base areas used to “generate” FARC combatpower (see Map 5 for illustration).

Nevertheless, the contradiction in the government position was well un-derstood by the military. The security forces were fully occupied with theirfirst priority, getting their house in order so that they could address the fullrange of the FARC threat, from terror to guerrilla warfare to mobile war.They demonstrated that they were quite capable of responding to difficultcircumstances. The victories followed. There was satisfaction in this, but thatwas the trap General Westmoreland in Vietnam fell into, where the meansbecame the strategic end. The Colombian military recognized the dilemma.There was no shortage of officers who had read the basic texts on the VietnamWar.

FARC, in fact, has responded as did the communists in Vietnam, by re-turning to the domination of the human terrain. In this, it has proved every bitas ruthless as the Viet Cong. Torture and assassination, not to mention kidnap-ping and extortion, are so common as to go almost without comment exceptin the most extreme cases. That there are echoes of Vietnam in the FARCapproach should not be surprising. FARC (and also ELN) was trained directlyby the FMLN of El Salvador. The FMLN, in turn, was trained, both at homeand through personnel sent abroad, by Vietnam. FARC manuals are very


Map 5. Typical area of operations (IV Division) showing FARC operational infractructure.Numerals 1, 2, 4 identify major base areas which have since been eliminated in COLARoperations. See Map 6 for detail of area designated 2; Map 8 for area designated 1.

similar to FMLN manuals. And anyone reading either would swear he washaving a flashback to the American involvement in Indochina. Strategically,operationally, tactically, it is the Vietnamese approach.

What is that approach? Key is the constant interplay between the politicaland the military – with the Maoist template, if anything, being regarded by theVietnamese as too militaristic and parochial in its emphases (not enough em-phasis upon fostering “international solidarity,” for instance). On the ground,the Vietnamese emphasize that the “three stages” occur simultaneously asdictated by local circumstances, the so-called “war of interlocking.” The greaterlevel of command and control made possible by modern, off-the-shelf com-munications gear coordinates lower levels of activity so that they support orare part of higher levels. Widely dispersed guerrilla attacks, for example, haveboth local objectives and prepare the way for mobile warfare operations.

This brings us back to the problems with Bogota’s approach until Au-gust 2002, pursued hitherto at US urging: a country the size of California,Nevada, Utah, and Idaho (or, if one looks to Europe: France, Spain, andPortugal) had basically 30–45,000 personnel performing as firemen. Theyhad a well-developed approach, which could ultimately prove successful, but

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victories could not be considered secure in the absence of government popularmobilization to hold ground.

FARC understood this and pursued successive domination of areas witha vengeance. Recognizing that for the moment it could not go head-to-headwith the armed forces, it again concentrated upon hitting isolated, static policepositions and uncooperative mayors.

The need, then, were for local forces which could secure the ground.No counterinsurgency can be won without them, for they are the only wayin which human terrain can be dominated. Yet in Colombia, as part of the1990–91 settlement with another insurgent group, M-19, a prohibition waswritten into the constitution against armed bodies operating outside of thearmed forces and police.

Rather than dealing with this in straightforward fashion, as has every othersystem fighting internal war, by mobilizing anti-insurgent “people’s war” asmilitary auxiliaries, the Colombian political and judicial systems under Pas-trana fumbled and did nothing. They then blamed the security forces when thevacuum created in the vast country was filled by the autonomous self-defensegroups (autodefensas) which sprung up everywhere – and continue to do so.

By refusing to work with Bogota to find an approach to popular mobiliz-ation which will work, Washington and its European counterparts made thesituation worse. Indeed, they demanded that the military spread itself stillmore thinly by “going after” yet another foe, the autodefensas – “paramilitar-ies,” as they were frequently called in the English-language press – and thatthe police be increased in numbers.

The heart of American assistance, though, was the $1.3 billion aid pack-age to support the counter-drug component of “Plan Colombia,” the schemefor putting Colombia on the path to peace which was hatched early in thePastrana presidency with US aid. Most of the US contribution was to supporteradication efforts in the southern areas, where a great deal of Colombiancocaine is produced – and where FARC is present in force.

The danger, of course, lay in American money, eagerness, and know-howbecoming a source of strategic distortion.

Thus, even as politicians on both sides engaged in the campaign necessaryto obtain the assistance, the security forces kept a close eye on what wasdemanded as the quid pro quo. At one point, COLAR – which was to stand up,with training from US Special Forces personnel of 7th Special Forces Group(Airborne), a new counter-drug brigade as the cutting edge of the big push –favored outright rejection of the package. But Colombia’s politicians wantedit, with the result the creation of a military within the military, a special “drug-fighting” component.


To compartmentalize the “US component” of the struggle – to seal off asmuch as possible Colombia’s overall campaign from the possible meddlingof American politicians responding to their perceived domestic concerns –Bogota detached the extreme south of the country – the departments of Putu-mayo and Caqueta – and made it a special counter-narcotics zone, Joint TaskForce South (JTFS), to use the designation normally found in US sources.There, the US-aided counter-drug campaign could focus upon eradication. Inthe rest of the country, the security forces could engage in counterinsurgency.

Contradictions guarantee pathos

Yet Colombia’s forces were numerically quite inadequate for a campaign inthe geographical and human areas involved – neither did they have adequateoperational funding. Ergo, we find ourselves back at the autodefensas, who –authorized or no, legal or not – have filled the gap and engaged in some of themost vicious fighting against FARC (and ELN).

And they make no bones about their favored methodology: to go after theinsurgent infrastructure. In internal war, there is no way around the realitythat a vacuum will be filled. By refusing to mobilize the population, Bogotainsured that people’s war was waged out of control in every nook and cranny.By encouraging Colombia to adhere to this misguided approach, the USpoured oil on the flames. The result in many areas was pathos.

Worse than this, the US gave voice to human rights activists whose primetarget appears to be the government. This made it doubly dangerous to be anarmy officer, for it meant a multi-front war. What many Colombian sourcestook to calling the “human rights cartel” too often functioned as a weaponssystem for the insurgents, trying ceaselessly to go after the security force’stop commanders, those of the army in particular.

This served to highlight yet another point: the inadequate legal environ-ment under which the security forces operated. Civilian law governed theconflict, rather than a combination of emergency provisions and normal stat-utes. This created a situation which, operationally speaking, was impossible,where a misdirected strike becomes a cause for a charge of manslaughter, andso on.

What was absent from the debate on legal issues and human rights was apositing of any realistic options for a state faced with an insurgent campaignbuilt first and foremost upon retaining the initiative through terror and guer-rilla action – retaining the initiative due to its ability to operate in areas wherethe government was absent.

The point would seem elementary as it concerns human rights groups,which have been among the fiercest opponents of popular mobilization: you

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cannot demand the creation of a vacuum, then seek to blame individuals fornot being in control of what happens in that vacuum.

There is a school of thought which looks to the past, to the errors whichhave indisputably been made – and continue to be made – by Colombia inthe handling of the insurgency, and argues that the key is conversion of theguerrillas into legitimate political forces – by all means short of force. Thereinlies the dilemma of the present situation: such advocacy is understandable butwill not work.

An ongoing insurgent movement involves a different dynamic than anemergent one. It becomes an alternative social structure, able to recruit, as-sign, promote, and control. It is a mistake to equate existence with legitimacy.

The insurgents in Colombia have no significant support base. To the con-trary, they “control” territory in areas where there is little – save, in manycases, coca/poppy/marijuana and a transplanted work force. FARC’s minimalpopular support guarantees that terror is its dominant tactic. This, as was thecase with Sendero Luminoso in Peru, distorts the actual insurgent position tomake it appear as one of strength and widespread dominance.

Perhaps, of most importance, while the state certainly had a role in creat-ing the original insurgency, and then made it worse, FARC combatant num-bers do not stem from this earlier era. The present insurgents did not becomea serious concern until their historically-recent linkup with the drug trade,then supplemented by “revolutionary taxation” in the form of kidnappingand extortion. Thus they – and insurgency/counterinsurgency – cannot beseparated from narcotics/counternarcotics.

There are times, then, when negotiations and “humanitarian assistance”alone are inadequate. The insurgents, as disciplined groups – this term tomake clear that leadership and manpower invariably have varying agendas,which are not necessarily overlapping – are not agrarian or national reformersany more than were the Viet Cong or Filipino CCP.

They are political actors. They produce the bulk of the death and destruc-tion being visited upon the country. Indeed, one of the signal successes ofthe human rights agenda has been to deflect attention to the symptom (thepopular reaction against insurgency) rather than to the cause (insurgency).

In this fight, Colombian government policy may not be “right,” but cer-tainly there is much that is being advanced as analysis of the Colombiansituation that is wrong. Drugs, to repeat, are not the central element of Colom-bia’s problem. That is state fragmentation. We can talk of nothing until thegovernment actually exercises its writ within its national territory.

This will come about only through a combination of military and socio-economic-political means. Security force adaptation is a necessary but notsufficient component in this campaign. That must be a national effort which


mobilizes the Colombian people in a determined, counterrevolutionary socio-economic-political restoration which not only ends the FARC insurgency butleaves Colombia a stronger democracy.

Playing Devil’s Advocate here, perhaps we all should start supporting thegoal of the human rights cartel and advocate a total US pullout. There arethose, in Colombia itself, who have long felt the best thing for their countrywould be to tell the US to take a hike. After all, they argue, “Who has thedrug problem?”

Colombia as a society is as opposed to drugs as any other place, for Bogotahas for more than a decade experienced the corruption, crime, and economicdistortion narcotics bring. Yet, when all is said and done, those issues couldprobably be dealt with. Pontificating politicians like to think that it is the USthat has Colombia over a barrel and thus can make demands. Au contraire,would seem the logical response.

Where the US fits in

Reduced to its simplest essence, the operational reality “down there” is thatthe communist insurgents of FARC have become integrated with the drugindustry – and, increasingly, have gone into business for themselves. Therehave been no recent operations against base areas which have not foundFARC operational infrastructure to be co-located with narcotics productionfacilities.

FARC has fewer than two score major base areas which support its oper-ations (see Map 7). Our $1.3 billion in “Plan Colombia” support was over-whelmingly devoted to the operations directed at just one of those base areas,that in Putumayo (the small department in the extreme south).

Colombian political support for our participation came from the same per-sonalities who had made such a hash of the war in general. Their motivescould be attributed to a mix of logical and illogical reasons. At heart was themisguided notion that only by pressing ahead in a search for “peace” couldBogota retain the backing of Washington and its European allies. Thoughstrategically this stance could be supported, the operational implementationwas an embarrassing mess which placed the country at risk.

Militarily, though, support came from the entreaties of the recently resignedMinister of Defense, Luis Ramirez, to the military that it not act upon itsintention to refuse the aid package entirely – the military’s motivation beingto avoid precisely the sort of meddling inherent in US Congressional debate.The military was convinced by Ramirez that the politicos would cover the“meddling front,” while the military could create a firewall of sorts by carving

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Map 6. Eliminated base area.

Map 7. FARC major base areas.


out a Joint Task Force South (JTFS) area (Putumayo and Caqueta) for “PlanColombia” operations.

The material benefit to the military, it was argued, would on the surfacebe substantial: in numbers and equipment, the 3 × “heavy” battalions of theCounter-Drug Brigade (CD Bde) would equal the heart of the Colombianstrategic reserve, the 3 × BRIM (mobile brigades). Plus the number of heli-copters to be provided, about 60, would equal the approximate total that couldbe fielded by the air force and army aviation combined.

Against this, though, the Colombian military weighed reality: when allwas said and done, the US was funding a brigade which was going after abase area; and the US was providing a helicopter force, most of which wasaged (though refurbished) and weighted down with armor to the point thateach helicopter, according to COLAR sources, could carry fewer than half adozen troops.

In contrast, the 20-year old Blackhawk, the combat workhorse of the war,was normally loaded with two squads, or 18–22 personnel. The low numbersof troops that could be put on the ground in a first wave made any operation aproblematic exercise in terms of time and space (and presentation of potentialtargets). Further, funds for interdictions and the like, though having benefit,were not true force multipliers in the war effort.

One may quibble about particulars here, but the Colombians reached thelogical conclusion that our involvement generally supported our goals, nottheirs. It was obvious, then, that where the hostile Congressional faction’s ar-gument fell down was in viewing our assistance as crucial to the Colombians.

This it was not. If we had pulled out, their internal war effort would indeedhave been affected. The people who did the fighting believed this all along.Where we were especially important was in general support, such as throughthe MILGRP. Yet, when all was said and done, what we actually providedwere the “add-ons.” None involved amounts of money or services whichColombia could not handle if required to do so (and it could certainly contractfor services directly itself).

Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, Colombia could fund its own war; andthere are alternative sources for everything the US presently supplies, fromequipment to training. “Soviet Bloc” gunships, for example, as best can bediscerned, have not appeared in the Colombian inventory only because thelevel of bribes being demanded has thus far been too high. Yet the hardwarehas been available, as have been maintenance packages.

Thus the tail wags the dog – not the other way around, as some in Wash-ington seem to think.

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COLAR operational design

Even as such controversy swirled about, the Colombian military was determ-ined to survive the political games and to press on with its approach, thusto take the fight to FARC: minimally, placing it in a situation where it waswilling to negotiate in good faith, something it had not done up to that point;maximally, driving it from the field.

This was not far-fetched. By any realistic assessment, FARC was extremelyvulnerable. For it was in reality a stunted political movement – still in searchof a viable mass base – which had militarized itself to the extent that it was atarget for a military response accompanied by a supporting level of develop-ment (civic-action) and area domination (either by a revitalized police force,a newly formed militia, or other means).

FARC has reached critical mass and become a dangerous opponent dueto its ability to recruit from a particular fragment of Colombian society (therural poor, especially those tied into the drug production/trade cycle) and tomaintain funding external to that fragment (drugs, kidnapping, extortion).This places it in “free rider” status with respect to society and exposed toassault at its critical nodes.

These, COLAR, which has assumed the leading role in counterinsurgencyplanning in default of national leadership, judges to be the base areas andthe mobility corridors, without which FARC would be capable of only thelow-level guerrilla activity which characterized it in the past.

What the FARC switch to maneuver warfare in 1996 meant on the groundwas that guerrilla and terror actions were used to spread out governmentforces, which then could be defeated in detail by columns (columnas) de-ployed in what were essentially light infantry units using appropriate tactics.These were augmented by support from homemade mortars (ramplas) andarmor, as well as sappers trained in the Vietnamese fashion.

Yet absent FARC roots amongst the population, FARC formations, whetherguerrilla or maneuver warfare, were largely dependent upon supply lines andbase areas. In 2000, COLAR completed the series of actions designed to dis-rupt or cut the major mobility corridors being used to project FARC power outof the eastern plains (llanos) and the Zona. In 2001, while continuing to attackthe mobility corridors as divisional targets, COLAR-coordinated operationstargeted the base areas.

As COLAR assesses the battlefield, base areas are “generators of action.”These it further categorizes as “generators of combat power” (areas gen-eradoras de poder de combat), those whose main function is to produce thewherewithal for FARC to wage internal war, and “generators of direct action”(areas generadoras de acciones delictivas), those used as staging areas forassaults aimed at facilitating FARC expansion.


Map 8. Consolidation of logistics units and activities (Coca – Weapons).

Both types of base areas were hit by COLAR major operations. This wasparticularly the case of the base area of 16 Front, for this was the area seized(left position of the two on the map) in the important March 2001 operation,“Black Cat” (Gato Negro). The base occupied a central position in the FARCsupply scheme, for it was a key link in the exchange of coca for arms (seeMap 8).

It was by eliminating such critical nodes that COLAR planned to causethe progressive contraction of FARC’s power projection capabilities. Unableto use local forces to dominate the areas thus seized, the military engaged inimaginative positioning and rotation of units so that a vacuum was not merelyseized against by the insurgents.

Complementing this were limited civic-action, a burgeoning use of in-formation warfare, and enough special operations, normally at the initiative ofthe brigades, to keep FARC formations off balance (see Figure 3). The police,who remained the principal local force, were virtually outside the structureof joint planning for counterinsurgency, this despite being administrativelyunder the Ministry of Defense (which at one time had operational controlover the police, this control is now exercised by the Ministry of Interior).

In certain respects the COLAR approach resembled that of US forcesin Vietnam under General Westmoreland. The difference, though, was sig-

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Figure 3. Special Operations (SO) have been used to hinder FARC freedom of movement andplanning. Troops return FARC personality for coroner’s inquest after successful ambush.

nal: the COLAR strategy was predicated upon a determination that weaklink of FARC – a Marxist-Leninist movement committed to seizing power,supposedly for the people – was its limited mass base.

While it was in form a classic insurgency following the Maoist approach,as filtered through the Vietnamese and the FMLN of El Salvador, its mass lineand united front components were severely underdeveloped, leaving only themilitary component. That component was subject to disruption by the normal(if fairly complex) application of operational art and sound tactics.

Whether such a strategy could be successful depended upon any number offactors, not least of which was enhancing COLAR mobility and sustainabilityof units in the field. The most immediate factor here was enhanced operationalfunding.

This cannot be overemphasized. Equipment shortages, naturally, weresevere. In June 2001, for instance, only 2 of the air force’s 6 × C-130swere operational due to lack of spare parts. Even so, it was the allocationof meager funds sufficient for only half the necessary flight hours which wasdevastating.


In a tangible sense, the funding needed to purchase, in particular, aircraft,as well as the other components for an improved tempo of operations, de-pended upon the state of the economy, but this appeared to be steadily ifslowly improving.

Yet more important was the intangible, the political will to allocate a grow-ing proportion of the budget to counterinsurgency needs. For this to happen,Colombia had to wait until the presidency changed hands in August 2002.

What is to be done?

Overshadowing all other factors was the lack of leadership by President Pas-trana. With less than a year remaining in office, the President was alreadyviewed as a “lame duck.” Fears were high that he would attempt one or aseries of final desperate gestures to conclude some sort of agreement – evenif completely sham – with FARC. In most circles, however, it was felt thesystem contained enough checks to be able to block any moves fraught withdisaster for the country.

Meanwhile, the leading candidates to replace him all spoke privately of theneed to take a more realistic approach to the counterinsurgency. The shadowcabinets of the frontrunners actively gathered information and solicited pro-posals for a new course when there was a change of power.

This reduced any calculation of the future to a stark query: could the se-curity forces “hang on” in the absence of systemic mobilization for internalwar? This seemed likely, for the situation was not critical – just bad.

The most ironic feature of the Colombian war was the relative ease withwhich the mess could be sorted out. Unlike the Vietnam and El Salvadorconflicts, creation of institutions, to include those of civil society, was notnecessary. Reform was necessary – and that is quite a less complicated matterthan wholesale construction.

In particular, the mechanisms of governance and economy were of longstanding and could function well when allowed to do so. Corruption was notso pervasive that it could not be rooted out. Just as fundamentally, the shieldbehind which reform could take place was sound – the security forces wereone of the most coherent and competent organizations in the country. Whatwas urgently needed, then, as a new administration assumed office, were:• A National Campaign Plan—"Plan Colombia” was a statement of stra-

tegic vision rather than a plan. The closest thing to an actual counter-insurgency approach is COLAR’s ongoing effort against the mobilitycorridors and base areas. This, by default, is the guiding concept of thestruggle but is not systemic mobilization directed against the insurgents.A key element of that mobilization must be the constitution of local

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forces, adequately controlled by integration with the regular securityforce structure.

• Political Leadership—There has been no one running the war – there aremany small wars being run simultaneously. Principal blame for this restswith the befuddlement and corruption of elements of the national polit-ical class, exacerbated by the lack of leadership displayed by PresidentPastrana. By default (second use of the term), COLAR has thus directedthe fight; yet it is but one branch of the armed forces.

• Coordinated, Integrated Effort— Colombia as a system has not beeninvolved in its own struggle. Though commendable initiative has beenshown by some government organs, others, in particular the offices ofthe Fiscalia (Attorney General) and Procuraduria (Solicitor General),have until recently proceeded as though an internal war was not ra-ging. Within the military itself, though great strides have been madein fostering a joint approach, even the forces falling under the Min-istry of Defense are not integrated into a coordinated effort. The police,who have done an excellent job at neutralizing insurgent efforts to buildurban infrastructure, have alienated the other services through their pre-vious, overly close relations with the US and thus are not integrated intoCOLAR’s “Plan 2001” or any other national scheme. Yet they are thefirst line of defense.

• An Appropriate Legal Framework – Emergency laws and regulationshave not been passed (though a first step was taken recently in allow-ing the declaration of emergency zones). In their absence, it is difficultto expect sustained progress to be made in restoring the national writover alienated territory and populace. Not only have the security forcesbeen left unprotected and operationally hamstrung, the door has beenopened to abuse of human rights concerns by activist groups. Thus thefirst responsibility of the state, to secure the lives of its citizens, hasbeen abrogated. Instead, a military with a relatively good human rightsrecords has been systematically, consciously hampered in its efforts toconduct stability operations.

• Enhanced Information Warfare – COLAR presently conducts some ofthe most effective information operations being waged by any armedforces in the world. Yet these are not integrated into a national concept,directed at both internal and international audiences. Neither have theybeen deployed as an integral element of military strategic planning.

• Enhanced Operational and Acquisitions Funding – That the situationhas moved from a case where the security forces were on both the tac-tical and strategic defensive, to one where they have seized the initi-ative, has been due to developments detailed above. These have been


accomplished with a paucity of resources and vitally needed equipment,especially aircraft of all sorts. So short has been funding that at timesoperations have ground to a halt at all but the local level. Critical short-ages of spare parts and mobility assets have hampered operations of allservices, COLAR in particular.

• Enhanced Operational Flexibility – With adequate operational funding,present COLAR planning is solid and likely will be successful. Pos-sibilities exist, though, for further force multiplication. This can comethrough integration of more systematic civic-action in reclaimed areas,augmented by an increased tempo of special operations. These should betreated as strategic assets, rather than run at local initiative in responseto tactical opportunities.

Notes

1. These I have covered in detail previously in that most academic of outlets, Soldier ofFortune (see April, May, August, and September 2000 issues).

2. Recently published sources include two excellent works from the Colombian Ministry ofDefense: La Fuerza Publica y los Derechos Humanos en Colombia (Bogota: Ministeriode Defensa Nacional, March 2000), with complete statistics through 1999; and InformeAnual Derechos Humanus y DIH 2000 (Bogota: Ministeria de Defensa Nacional, January2001), with complete statistics through October 2000 (available in English as AnnualHuman Rights and International Humanitarian Law Report 2000). Statistical updates arepublished monthly by the Ministry of Defense in all major Colombian media.

colombian army counterinsurgency

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