2.

Stratif ication, Emotional Energy, andthe Transient Emotions

RanÄaII Collins

Emotion potentially occupies a crucial position in general sociological the-

ory. As we attempt to be more precise and more empirical abour sociolog-

ical concepts, we find that many of the most important rest to a

considerable extent upon emotional processes.Durkheim raised the fundamental question of sociology: \7har holds

society togetherl His answer is the mechanisms that produce moral solidar-

ity; and these mechanisms, I suggest, do so by producing emotions. Parso'

nian sociology, which took the most reif ied, agentless side of Durkheim,

put the argument in equivalent terms: Society is held together by values.

But values, to the extent that they exist-and leaving open the issue of

how far they are shared, and under what conditions-are cognitions in-

fused with emotion. On the conflict side of sociological theory, !ileber's

central concepts also imply emotion: (a) the legitimacy thar underlies sta-

ble power, (b) the status group ranking by which stratif ication permeates

everyday l ife, and (c) the religious world views that motivated some crucialperiods of economic action. When we attempt to translate any of these

concepts into observables, it is apparent that we are dealing with particular

kinds of emotions. Marx and Engels are perhaps farthesr away from theo'

rizing about emorional processes; in their mode[s, everything is structural(even alienation, which for Marx is an ontological relationship, not a psy-

chological one). But it is apparent that in Marxian analyses of class mobi'

l ization and class conflict, emotion must play a part-whether it is the

murual distrust within frägmented classes that keeps them apart (Marx

185211963), or the solidarity that dominant classes have and that oppressedclasses acquire only in revolutionary situations. In these respects, lvlarx andEngels' confl ict theory comes close to a dynamic and non-reified version ofDurkheim's themes.

These are some reasons why the sociology of emotions should bebrought into the central questic>ns of sociology. What holds a society to'

27

28 Emortons and Social Macrt> Processes

gerher-rhe ,,glue" of solidarity-and what mobil izes conflict-the energy

o fmob i l i zedg roups -a reemot ions ;so i swha tope ra tes toupho lds t ra t i f i ca -;;.;:h;;*Jhi.ul f..t i ttgs, whether dominant' subservient' or resentful ' l f

*" .r., explain the conditions that cause people to feel these kinds of emo-

r i o n s , w e w i l l h a v e a m a j o r p a r t o f a c o r e s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y ' T h e r e i s o f.o"rr. u structural part of zuch a rheory, and a cognitive part' but the

emotional parr gives us something essential for a realistic theory on its

dynamics' r | -LL e t m e p u t t h e i s s u e i n a n o t h e r w a y ' T h e c l a s s i c s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r r e s

mentioned above implicit ly concern emorions' but they do not usually refer

t o r h e m e x p l i c i t l y . T h i s i s b e c a u s e o u r t h e o r i e s h a v e a m a c r o p r i m a c y ' 0 r a ti.or, a"rt *ith social l i fe at a level of considerable abstraction and aggrega-

ii"". fV. are told of something called "legitimacy"' ot worse yet' "values"'

f lo"ti.,g somewhere in u cuttt"ptual sky beyond the heads of real people in

".at."., situations. If we attempt a micro-translation of sociology-not

.,. l"rrut,tt an absolute micro-reduction, but a grounding of macro-concepts

in real interactions across the macro-grid of time, space and numbers-we

are led to see the importance of emotional processes' ln other words' the

micro-rranslarion of macro concePts (l ike those discussed above) yields

us emotlon.Unforrunately, this is not what classic (and even modern) microrhe'

ories have stressed. Mead and symbolic interaccionism emphasize process'

emergence, and cognition; Schutz and phenomenology emphasize routine

and Jognition; the exchange rheory ernphasizes behaviors and payoffs; the

"*p..,Jrion states theorY ag'i" ' tt""t ' cognition' Emotion of course could

be brought into these threories, but it is central to none of them. But there

are two crucial versions of micro-sociology that do not have to be pressed

very far ro yield us the cenrral micro-,. lynamics tlf cmotion as a social pro-

..rr-u process rhat wil l serve us fcrr unpacking the Inacro'sociological is'

sues mentioned at the outset.

T h e f i r s t o f t h e s e i s w h a t l c a l l . . I n t e r a c t i o n R i t u a l T h e o r y . ' ' T h eterm is Goffnran's (196?). But Goffnran, l ike everyone else' speaks of emo'

t i o n o n l y i n p a s s i n g . H e f o c u s e s o n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f m i c r o - i n t e r a c t i o n ' o nirs consrraints and levels, on rhe interplay between its subjective and ob-

jective componenrs. The crucial rhing to see is that coffman is applying

Durkheimian rheory ro micro-situations, he is concerned with how ritual

solidarity is generared in rhe l irt le transient groups ofeveryday.[ife, at the

level of rhe encounrer. These "narural riruals" (as I would call them) are

equivalent ro rhe tormal rituals Durkheim analyzed-religious c.eremonies

in aborigine tribes, patriotic rituals in rhe nrodern state-which produce

,r...d ol1".ts and moral constraints' Goffrnan broadened Durkheim in a

way that ,ho*s hc,* stlcial order is produced on the micro-level: thar is to

Transienr Emorions Z9

say, all over the map, in transient situations and local groups, which maywell be class-stratif ied or otherwise divided against each other, insread of inthe reif ied Durkheimian way (which Parsons followed) in which it seems tobe "Society" as a whole that is being inregrated.

Goffmanian analysis of lnteraction Ritual, then, is the analysis of awide-ranging and flexible mechanism, which produces pockets of moral sol-idarity, but variously and discontinrrously throughout society. It helps us toconnect upwards to the macro-structure, especially via stratif ication. Andit connects downward to the nricro-details of human experience and action,because rituals are made with emotional ingredients, and they produceother sorts of emotions (especially moraI solidarity, but also sometimes ag-gressive emotions) as outcomes. I wil l make considerable use of theDurkheimianr,/Coffmanian model of rituals in my stratif ication theory ofemouons.

'We see emotions in another important version of micro-sociology.

Carfinkel's ethnomerhodology, at t irst sight, seems to be pirched on a dif-ferent level. Wirh its concern for the construction of mundane reality, andits heavy use of phenomenological abstractions, it seems to be essentially acognitive theory. Cicourel (1971) even called his own version "CognitiveSociology." Nevertheless, I want to suggest that ethnomethodology revealsemotion at its core. Garfinkel's most important contribution is to show thathumans have inrr ins ica l ly l imi ted cogni t ive capabi l i t ies, and that they con-struct mundane social order by consistently using pracrices to avoid recog-nizing how arbitrari ly social order is actually pur together. We keep upconventions, not because we believe in them, but because we srudiouslyavoid questioning them. Carfinkel (1967) demonstrated this most dramati-cally in his "breaching" experiments, in which he lorced people into situa-tions that caused them to recognize indexicality (i.e. that they rely on tacitacceptance of what things mean contextually) and reflexivity (that rhereare infinite regresses of justifying one's interpretations). Interestinglyenough, the reactions of his subjects were always intensely emotional. Usu-ally it was an emotional outburst; (becoming red in the face, blurting out"You lcnow what I meanl Do you want to have a conversation or don'tyoul") Sornetimes it was depression, bewilderment, or anger at having beenput in a situation where they constructed a reality they later discovered tobe false. In shorr, when people have to recognize that they are tacitly con-structing their social worlds, and in an arbitrary and conventional way,rather than simply reacting to a world that is objectively there, they showintense negative emotions.

I suggest that Garfinkel's breaching experiments reveal somethingvery much l ike Durkheim's wor ld. ln th is case, convenr ional socia l real i tyis a sacred object; Garfinkel's experiments, violating the sacred object, call

lO Emotions and Social Macro Processes

forth rhe same effecrs as would violating a ritual taboo fbr a tribal member,

d.r".oring rhe Bible for a christian, or defaming the fiag for a patriot. In

Durkheimt rheory, moral sentiments attach to sacred objects. When rhey

are violated, this positive sentiment of moral solidarity turns negative, into

righreous anger direcred against the culprit. Just so in Carfinkel's experi-

*.nrr, there is outrage against the violator of everyday cognitive conven-

tions. Carfinkel's straregy parallels Durkheim's: to show the conditions that

uphotd a social fact by revealing the opposition that occurs when it is bro-

ke.,. Du.kheim used suicide and crime as means of highlighting the social

solidarity that is their opposite; Garfinkel extended the method to reality-

construction as a whole'

Erhnomethodology's lack of explicit focus on emotions is misleading.

One could wel l say rhar evcryday I i fe real i ty-construct i ( )n is an emor ional

process, ancl rhat rhe emorions that uphold reality come forth in intense

frr* *h"., rhe social realiry is broken. Furthermore, Gartinkel has shown

thar human cognirion is l imited; social order cannot be based on rational,

conscious agreement. (Durkheim, 1893/1964, argued the same' but in the

conrexr of criricizing uril i tarianism.) lf cognition does not hold society to'

gether, rhen, what doesi carfinkel tends ro leave this on the level of cog-

iir iu" pru.ti.es (mosrly borrowed fronr Schutz); but it is a peculiar form of

cognition, cognitive practices tbr httw to get by wichout too much- cogni'

r iÄ. Eth.,o*"thodology seems ro have an mysterious x-factor underlying

social order, which rhe very notion of indexicality prohibits us from prob-

ing. But let us take the plunge anyway: leave the cognitive plane, and rec-

tlgnize the x-factor as emotit ln.

DISRUPTIVE AND LONG-TERlv'l EI/IOTIONS: OR "DRAMATIC"

EA,IOTIONS AND E]V{OTIONAL ENERGY

This analysis (trces us to widen our conceptittn of emotion, our or-

dinarv usage refers to emotions as experiences that are, for the most part'

sudden and drarnatic. "Don't be so etnotional" is advice predicated on this

conception. The famous emotions are the most dratnatic ones: fear, terror,

anger, embarassment, joy, and so forth. Some people and some cultures are

regar,,led as too "unemotional" (nore for example the currently trendy dis-

purrg.^.rr, of "WASP" culture). But both Coffman and Carfinkel tbrce us

ro ,.. th"r" are also emorions thar are undranratic; they are long-lasting'

underlying rones or moods, that permeare social l i fe. Carfrnkel's mundane

reality, for example, is characterized by the feeling-l stress that rhis is a

feeling rarher rhan an explicir cognition-that "nothing out of the ordi'

nary is happening here." This is an uninterest ing emot l ( 'n , f rom the pornt

of view of the actor but, if Carfinkel is right, considerable work went tnto

Transient Emotions I I

producing thar feeling of ordinariness, and into keeping ourselves frorn see-ing that work itself. Mundane reality is a "members' accomplishment., '

In Goffman and Durkheim, rhe ordinary-l ife, long lasting feerings aresomewhar more apparenr, These theories stress solidarity, feelings of mem-bership, and in Coffman's case, feelings abour one's self. These are, if ev-erything goes well, smoorhly persistent senrimenrs, rhough they may havean "up" feeling tone, or a "down," depressed tclne in some important cases,as I wil l demonstrate. Once we think about rhem, we readily accepr rheseas part of the larger realm of emorion. Solidariry feelings, moral senriment,the enthusiasm of pirching oneself into a sir,arion, or being carried alongby it; and at the other end, depression, alienation, embarrassment-theseare recognizably longer lasting kinds of emorions. Carfrnkelian mundanityis merely a generic emorional quality at rhe middle of the plus-minus scale.

My poinr is nor to enrer inro terminological controversy. It wouldbe useless for us to define emotions in such a way that we can only talkabout the dramaric, disruptive emotions; whatever we call them, we mustalso be able to talk abour the long-rerm emorional tones, even rhe onesthat are so calm and srnooth as not to be noticed. In theoretical terms. it isrhe long lasting ones (which I discr-rss below as emotional energy) rhar areof greatesr importance. But I wil l also arrempr to show that the dramaric,short-ternr emorions are explainable againsr the backdrop .f rhe long-rermemot ions.

INTERACTION RITL/AL (IR) AND EMOT]ONAL ENERGY (EE)

The basic model of riruaI interaction (iR) rhar I derive fromDurkheim has rhe following elemenrs:

1. A group of minimum size rwo assembled face-to-face. The sheer physicalpresence o i human animals in rhe same place is a precondir ion for rheemotional and cognitive processes that foll,,rw.

2. Focus of artention upon rhe same object or activity, and mutull aware-ness of each other's attention. Collective formalit ies, such as a churchservice or polirical proJocol, are imporranr only because rhey are oneeasy way to focus common attention. But any circumstances in everydayIif 'e thar focus atrenrion in this way (Coffman, i967, cites ordinary con-versations as an example) have the effect of producing a ritual situation.The crucial feature is that individua[s become caught up in a group ac-tivity, in which they are nrutually aware of what each orher is tJoing.This makes the group itself rhe focus of arrenrion, as a rransindividualreality, influencing members fronr ourside wlri le permearing rheir con-sc iousness f rom wirh in.

Emotions and Social Macro Processes

M e m b e r s s h a r e a c o m m o n m o o d . l t i s i n e s s e n t i a l w h a t e m o t i o n i s

;;;;;; ;, the outset. The feelings mav be anger' fr iendliness' enthusi-

asm, fear, sorrow, or many others' This model posits an emotional con-

tagion among the persons present' for they are focussing attention on

ii? ,r*" thing ancl ,r" u*ui. of each other's focus; they become caught

"p i" .u.tt other's emotions' As a result, the emotional mood becomes

;;;; and more don-rinant; competing feelings are driven out by the

*.'""r.oro feeling. On the ultra-micro level' this seelns to happen by

;i; p;.". ' t of rhfthmic entrainment phvsiologicallv (Chapple' 1981;

Mci le l la . td, 1985). That is to say ' act iv i t ies rnd emot ions have thei r

own micro'rhythm, a pace in which they take place' As the focus of

interaction becomes progressively more attuned' rhe participants antic-

,pr,.-.*n other's ,hvitt*t, and thus become caught up "in the swing of

t 'hings" (Wohlstein and McPhail, lg?9; Warner' 19?9; \Tarner et al ' '

1983"; Gregory, i9B3). Participants feel sadder in the course of a success-

ful f,rneral, more humorou, u, pu" of a respcinsive audience at a comedy

show, more convivial during the build-up of a party' more engrossed in

a conversation as its rhythms become established'

4. The ourcome of a successful builcl-up of emotionaI coordination wirhin

an interaction ritual is to produce feelings of solidarity' The emotions

rhat are ingredients of the rirual (in no. 3 above) are transient; the

outcome however is a long'term emotion, rhe feelings of attachment to

the group that was "rr"*ül"d

at that t ime' Thus' in the funerirl r itual

the short-term emotion was sadness, but the main "ritual work" of the

funeral was producing (or restoring) group solidarity' The emotional in'

gredients of a party *uy b. friendliness or humor; the long-ternr result is

the feeling of status group menrbership'

I refer ro these long-term outcomes as "emotional energy" (EE) (Col-

tins, 1981). This is a ,"the, undifferentiated term' that includes various

components. The most important component' I suggest' is very energy-

like. It is a conrinuu*, ."ngi.,g from a high end of confidence, enthusiasm,

good self-feelings; down through a middle range of lesser states' and to a

io* ..rd of depression, lack of init iative, and negative self-feelings' Emo-

tional energy is l ike the psychological concept of "drive" (e'g' in Hull 's

system), but it ho, a specil ically social orientation' High emotional energy

is a feeling of conficience and enthusiasm for social interaction. lt is the

personal , id. of having a great deal of Durkheimian ritual solidarity wirh a

g.oup. One gets pumped up with emorional strength from participaring in

the group's interaction. This makes one not only an enthusiastic supporter

of ,ho gio,-,p, but also a leading figure within it ' One feels good wirh the

Transient Emorions l j

group, and is able to be an energy-leader, a person who stirs up contagiousfeelings when the group is rogerher.

Ar the low end of the emotional energy conrinuum, the opposrte isthe case. Low emotional energy is a lack of Durkheimian solidarity. one isnot attracted to the group; one is drained or depressed by it; one wanrs toavoid it. one does not have a good self in rhe group. And one rs notattached to the group's purposes and symbols, but alienated from rhern.

There are more differenriated varianrs of emorional energy as well,besides rhis up/down, higvlow in solidariry and enthusiasm. \ue wil l seebelow rhere are two major dimensions of stratif ication (power and sratus)that produce specific qualit ies of emotionaI energy. Bur while we are con-sidering the main, generic level of emotionaI energy, I wil l mention onemore Durkheimian feature. Emorional energy is not jusr somerhing thatpumps up some individuals and depresses orhers. Ir also has a controll ingquality from the group side. Emorional energy is whar Durkheim (1912/1954) called "moral senrimenr": ir includes feelings of what is right andwrong, moral and immoral. Individuals, who are full of emotional e.ergy,feel l ike good persons; rhey feel righreous abour what rhey are doing. per-sons with low emotional energy feel bad. Though rhey do nor necessarilyinterpret this feeling as guilt or evil (that would depend on the religious orother cul tura l cogni t ions avai lable for label l ing rhei r feel ings) , at a.min i -mum, they lack rhe feeling of being morally good persons, which comesfrom enthusiastic participation in group rituals.

These feelings of moral solidarity can generare specific acts of alrru-ism and love; but rhere is also a negative side. As Durkheim pointecr out,group solidarity makes individuals feel a desire to defend and honor rhegroup. This solidariry feeling is rypically focussed on symbols, sacred ob;ecrs(l ike a tribal roremic emblem, a Bible or Koran or orher holy scriprure, aflag, or a wedding ring). One shows respecr for rhe group by parriciparingin ritua[s veneraring these symbolic objecrs; conversely, failure to respecrthem is a quick tesr of nonmembership in the group. Ir appears rhat indi-viduals who are already members of rhe rirual group are uncler especiallystrong pressure to continue ro respect irs sacred symbols. If they do not, theloyal group members feel" shock and ourrage, that is their righreousnessturns automatically inro righteous anger. In this way, rirual violarions leadto persecution of hererics, scapegoats, and other outcasts.

5. Rituals shape cognirions. The main objecrs or ideas thar were rhe focusof artention during a successful rirual become loaded with emotionalovertones. Those ideas or things beconte symbols; wharever else rheideas may refer to on the mundane level, there is also a deeper,

34 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

Durkheimian level on which symbols invoke membership in the group

that charged rhem up with ritual significance.

It is in this way that society gets inside the individual's mind. Ourlives consisr of a series of interactions, some of which generate more ritual

solidarity than others. (This is what I refer ro as "interaction ritual

chains.") The high-solidarity rituals give individuals a store of cognitionsthar thev carry around with rhem, and use to think and communicarervith. Whenever someone thinks in terms o[concepts that were the focus ofa successfirl interaction ritual, they are subjectively reinvoking the feelingsof membership in that group. We are, to speak in the idiom of Symboliclnteraction, imagining society in our minds; it would be more accurate,however, to say that we f-eel the emotions of social solidarity in the variousideas wirh which we rhink. This helps explain why persons who deriveemotional energy from group interactions continue to have emotional en-ergy even when they are alone. They are pumped up with emotional energybecause of a successful interaction; this energy gets attached to ideas, andthinking rhose ideas allows these individuals to feel a renewed surge ofsocially-based enthuasism.

I have couched this on the positive side, in terms of persons wirhhigh emotional energy. The same would apply on the negative side as well.Persons with low emotional energy lack the charge of ideas with solidarity;and their ideas may even be charged with anripathy to particular groups.(\fe shall see how this firs situarions of group stratif ication.) This carriesover into their subjective l ives; they are depressed even when they arealone, and their thoughts move away from the symbols of groups that makethem depressed. Thus, emotionally-charged symbols motivate individualswhen they are away from rirual encounters.

STR ATII'1 ED /NTERACT1ON R ITUALS :POWER RITUALS AND STATUS RITUAA

The model of interaction rituals gives us the general process of inter-action. IR's themselves are variable, insofar as rituals can be successful orunsuccessful: that is, how much fricus and emotional contagion acruallytakes place, irnd therefore, how strongly the participants become attachedto membership symbols. This wil l depend on a number of conditions: (rr)eccllogical fäcrors, which allow or force groups ro come togerher, and inwhat size and frequency; (b) motivational factors, which affect how attrac-tive particular kinds of inreracrions are for parricular individuals; and (c)material resources which individuals use ro put on the sraging of rituals,that is, rhe material props for focussing attenrion and for generating certain

Transienr Emocions J5

f:r,ui,;:laot::"Jil:j:il:,äl.n u,,,,,ions in these conditions read us topower Rit,ars' whar

.r am call ing the dimension of power is arl rhosefacrors rhar bring togerher inai' iJr?t^*ho are unequal in rheir resources

:ä:,,iiläl:.rll. orders and

",i.., ,,r" "d;,ä;;,.,, ,.,.,*,",u.,,onbe c o m i n g .*n.. of"'lii i;:,tx:t :n:::I ;l,I^:ä"1::J:*?1cus, which builds up as the rirual .r...rrt i,f proceeds. (As always, it is alsopossibre thar the ritual wii l ror o..."J rr.cersfr1y, rhar it wi'. break downinro avoidance or con'ict; however, ter us deal *ith thrt

.uri,n.,,

,.ou_rarery') The focus of a prwer rituar is , i" o.o."r, of giving and raking or-ders' As many organizationar srucries rto* (.p".iary the classic studies ofinfbrmal work grorrps, many of wrrich are usecr as an empiricar base by Goff-man, 1959), rhe order- takers do nor n" . " r lnr i tv .u. r , o* . r l ,J . ; ; r ,orders;fur tl'rat nrarrer' the bosses d; "";-;i;;; expect rhem ro do so, ,r evenknow very crearry what they *u.r, aon..

'gut trre crucial irem of artention issh.wing respe* tb1,^tfe. orde.,r,rrU" '."*ess irself. Order_givers are rncharge of a Coffmanian frontsrag. p"ko.*un.e; rhey take the init iarive in

;,H, ;:j[l,,ä::ccessrul, ,ü ,p;;tJ ,i" o.gonr,u,ionar chain or com-

lla*e. person,,,,r,,, 'lh"'|";,.'Tf,:"J,|:oclasses Äuu. , c;tr";;;;; ,,rront.

or.t t "i * i" n ;;;;, o rde r-g i vers r", ",.,.,,.1., t!::..rJ?::rXT,.,:.in,

llpower-rituals; and their . irrul ,ra.,." ^rt", ,t,"*r"I""; l";; i ä,ri.,rv*Uot,of the organizarion' Their cognir,";r;; rhe ,,officiar,, sort (see evidencesummarized in Coll ins, Ig75; 62_57)

:: id.J::#ä if :ff I;: ffi :T,:: ;,,[:T,iil; iffi :tary force (as in cheies ),, o r u,'ri. ; i, i, f ilJ;.' fi ;T ;...r;..".1il sJii,;:^ä: ?;:::::privileges, or chances of p.o*otän-_,.f jä'U, bosses, reachers, and orherpersons in authority. The situation of raking orders, of being coerced, is initself alienating. Buc persons sublect to aut-hority usuary cannot evade irj;;;HT,J;:::'.,::,.. rrpually occurs in no.,-,truol .ituurto.,.s, *h-"., th.ynianbackstag;;h;;"h.r,iil::i:1,:iiT"*';.J;,.'i[*::*l^*-;i.mal work rourine in which ,1,"v pr,-*';;;ä".,.r, performance. In thissense, rhe order-raking clar.es haue , :;Ur.trrr*.

personality.,,Order-rakers nevertheless ,r. ;o;J'ro b.. pr.r.nt ar order-grvingll i l l ' :

, ld, ol" required to sive ";1";;J;;;;u1i., i.,, assenr ar thar momenr.I hey and rheir boss rutunily recognize .n.i-nrtr.r ' , posirion, anrr who hasthe init iative in the rituar .n".r*Jni.-ri lr, ' ;;*". rituars are an asymmer-

36 Emotions and Social Macrer Prt>cesses

rical variant on Durkheimian interacrion rituals. There is a focus of atten-rion, on rhe order-giving process. But the emotions thac are invoked areconstrained; there is a tone of respect, of going along with whar the order-giver is demanding. The more coercive and extreme the power differential,rhe more emotional contagion there is. The medieval peasant, or rhe childwho is being beaten, are forced to put rhemselves into a state of compli-ance, of going along with what the master/parent/authority f igure wants. Itis a coerced focus of attention; the order-raker has ro try hard to anticipatewhat the order-giver wanrs. Conversely, rhe order-giver uses coercion pre-cisely in order to feel this mastery over rhe subordinate's mind, to "breaktheir wil l." (Cf. my analysis of torture, in Coll ins, 19Bla.) Less coercivefornrs of order-giving have correspondingly less powerful ritual effects.

According to this theory, a successful order-giving ritual coerces astrong mutual focus of attention, and produces strongly shared emorion.Bur it is a heavily mixed emotion. Insofar as there is successful role-takingon both sides (and that is at the core of any successful ritual), the order-giver feels both hisiher own senriment of masrery, and rhe order.takers'feelings of weakness. On the other side, rhe order-taker has a mixrure borhof his/her own negative emorions-weakness/depression, fear-and rhemood of the dominator, which is srrong emotional energy, dominance, andanger. I propose rhat this is why persons, who are severely coerced (con.centration camp inmates, marine corps recruits, beaten children), tend onone level to identify with the aggressor, and wil l enacr rhe aggressor's rolewhen possible in the future. They have an emorional complex of fear andanger, although situationally the f 'ear side is dominanr when rhey are rakingorders. Conversely, I propose that order-givers, who use extreme coercion,acquire sado-masochistic personaliries, because of the role-raking thar goeson, thus blending anger/dominanr feelings with a sense of rhe fear and pas-sivity that they invoke in their subordinates.

Power rituals thus produce complex emorions. Order-givers and order-takers share the dominance/anger/fear/passivity complex, bur in very differ-ent proportions. They also share an orientation toward dominant symbols,but again with a different blend of emorions. Order-givers identify them-selves with the sacred objects of their organization; they respect these synr-bols as ideals, and are foremost in requiring orher people ro kowrow rothem too. This is the conservarism of dominanr classes, their self-appoinred motivation as uphcllders of tradirion, as resrorers of law and or-der, and righteous uprooters oi heretics and deviants.

Order-takers, on rhe other hand, have an ambivalenr arritude towardrhe dominant symbols. They are alienated from these symbols, and pri-vately speak and think of rhem cynically, if rhey can ger away with it (seeevidence summarized in Gans, 1962:229-262). Thus, the modern working

| : _ _ -_ ̂ _ ^u . . ^ t : ^_^ , ^J f . , __ rho h r , s i necs i r l pe l s o f t he i r bosses . and

Transrent Emotions t7army troops ridicule rl.re rheroric of theircome, so ro spea k,.,nega r i ve sacred ." u;..,r1",Xi[l'..TJ J|iL,'JJ ir.i.rT-ble, a suc-ldenly l iberated

. nr,l"r-t.king .irr, *r.rf." ;.ö;.: on rhesymbors thar ir fornierry had to bow

!,,. jK,o, wirhour career chances in rheacademic sysrem, who are forced order-irk.., in schoors, thus rend ro actsof vandalism and orher forms of "d;;;r*.," dire.etr precisery ar rhe ,,sa-

cred objects" in whose name rhey are subordinarecr: cohen, 1g55.) It isalso possibre that order-rakers hori rh" iu*r.rr.t symbols in a kind of su-persririous respecr' thar is, if rhey are so rightry .....J , i", ,n1." ,, r,r,t"opporrunirv frrr distancing rhenrserves, no backsrag", i;,;; i ;; they canrerreat from their nrasters,surveii lance, ,h"y or" ritually forced ro show re-specr for the sacred symbols ur r , r i * "s . Thus ar i r "s l r r " ; r " r . i rerarner , ,menra[iry' found among long-rime r.ru.n,, and peasanrs (and in a differenrconre'xt' among chirdren who are strongry coerced by their orr.nr, but arsosrrongly controlled, and given.nn oppi.,.rur_,it ies ro rebel). The differenceberween rhese rwo kinds of ora.r-rof"rri l i*ritua., depends primariry uponecological structures: whether coercive .n.,,.,rt is continuous, or allowsbreaks into backsrage pnvacy.I have schemaricalry outrined two porar. rypes of parricipation inpower riruars: order-giving anti order-tokrng (fbrmally ,tat"d in coll ins,1975:73-5 ' ) Bur power-r i tua ls are a cont inuum. There are severar k inc is ofpositions in the middle between ,h"

"*,r.r"r: persons who are order-transmrtters, who rake orders from some trbove tl_,". n.,cl ,,u""o".,ta., n,others below; I suggesr rhar these i^d;;;J;r; ten.r ro brenti rhe order-giversand order-takers culture rnto a narrow and rigicl ,,bureaucraric

pers.nality.,,There is anorher kind of mi,Jpolni i.,*.." exrremes: rhe person whcrneither gives nor takes orders, bur'who t;;;;; i l :n":":^t^".:::.,,.hong!, t c.',i.,,' r qzs, z+ i _Ä^, rr",:;ö'ä:,::'i ;',li: ;: :t:,,r._Xldimension on which rhere is effectivery no'p.*.r, rherefore, the effects oforder-giving and order-raking are u.rr- ' ."rlrr. In orrier k> explain whar

;lll.li:f" ar rhis neurral.'t"u"t .,tpn*l we must rurn ro rhe srarus

sratus Ritrars' I arn using the term "status" in an sense rhat is slighrlydifferenr from- orclinary. Srrtr, ,."r;;;*;r-;"rr"d ,,, a general term for hi-e.rarchical differences of all kinds. Br, ;;;; ;thing close ro whar Weber ,.,.on, by *;^;r',ff;:rli r::tj:i::.:,:. :ff;group'" The ftrncramentar Garure here is b"rungiug or not beronging. Thistoo rs a conf inuunr; in everyclay l ife, it appears as populariry vs.unpopular i ry . i

This d imension of .membership vs. nonmenrbers i r ip is analyr ica l , inthe sense that any individual (nn.l n,'ry l.,.rr.u""t can be classifiecl borh asro where ir stands in terms of starus membership, and rn rerrrr< nf ^,.,,,o-

l8 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

inequality. That means that every individual, and every interaction, is pro-

du.i.,g borh status rnembership effects, and power effects. The power ef'

Älrr, io*.u.r, mighr be zero, if there is no order-giving and order-taking

in rhar s i tuat lon; on rhe qrher hand, even extreme s i tuar ions of order-

giving also have a status dimension, insofar as the group is assembled and

some membership feelings are being generated'

In whar ways can individuals differ in their status participationl

There are several subdimensions here. First consider how the ritual situa-

tign irself is structured. How much does the individual participate/ Is he/

she always there, always taking part in the interaction rituals, always a

member of the groupl or is he/she isolated, never or rarely a member?

Along that conrinuum, we can see people who are on the fringes of the

g.oup, 1ur, barely members, barely participating; others are nearer to the

.or", *hile ar the center is the sqciometric star, the person who is always

most inrense[y involved in rhe ritual interaction. This person is the

Durkheimian parricipanr of the highest degree, and should be sublect to

the strongest effects of ritual membership that we examined above: emo'

tional energy, moral solidarity, and attachment to group symbols. At the

other end, there is the Durkheimian nonmember, who receives no erno-

tional energy, no moral solidarity, and no symbolic attachments'

Every individual may be calibrated somewhere along this dimension'

from central participant to outsider. \7e could measure how often and how

centrally they participate in membership rituals, and give them a score on

their overall Durkheimian solidarity or their "social density of interaction."

My hypothesis is that this correlates with emotional energy and m,lral

sentiments.There is anorher subdimension of status group participation. In what

kinds of groups does one participarel lt may be always the same group; in

rhis case we ger local solidarity. According to Durkheimian theory, this

should pro<Juce strong attachment to reif ied symbols, l i teral-mindedness,

u.,d o ,i.o.rg barrier berween insiders and outsiders. There is high confor-

rnity within the group, along with strong distrust of outsiders and alien

symbols.At the other end of this subdimension, there is participation in a

loose network consisring of many different kinds of groups and situations.

This is a cosmopolitan network structure. The Durkheimian rheory predicts

the result wil l be more individualism, more relativistic attitudes towards

svmbols. and rnore abstract rather than concrete rhinking. Stated in terms

of emotions, this implies that persons in cosmopolitan networks have rela-

tively weak feelings of conformity to group symbols, emotional coolness of

tone, and general rrusr in a wide range of interactions. When synrbols are

violated or ritual procedures gb badly, rhe members of right, localized

Transient Emotions j9

groups respond with anger and fear (especially if r ituals are backed up bycoercion on rhe power dimension). Can there be ritual violations in loosecosmopolitan groups, where rhere is less intensity and conformityl yes, be-cause there can be violarions of the appropriately casual and sociable roneof interaction. Goffman (1959, 1967) concenrrared mosr of his analysisupon situations o[ cosmopolitan interactions, and depicted just such viola-tions and their sanctions. Following Goffman, I would suggest that personsin these situations respond by amusement ro minor rirual violario.,, ty oth-ers, and with embarrassment, contempt, and a desire to exclude perpetra-tors of more serious violarions of rhe sociable order. The persons whocommit these Goffmanian sacrileges feeI anxiety and embarrassment.

This, then, is my set of hyporheses about how the various dimensionsof interaction ritual affect emotions. By way of summary, let us recapitulatethe model, f irsr in terms of the effects on long-term emorions (emotionalenergy), and then in their effects on short-term, rranslrorv emotlons.

EFFECTS ON LONC-TERM EMOTIONS:EMOTIONAL ENERGY (EE)

The IR chain model, as previously srated, proposes that inclividualsacquire or lose emotional energy in both power and srarus interactions.order-givers gain EE, order-rakers lose it; successful enactment of groupmembership raises EE, experiencing marginaliry or exclusion lowers it. Fur-ther, the arnounr of EE gained by status group membership is weighted bythe ranking of the group one has participated in (as c.nveyed by the mem-bership connorations of the symbols that were used in rhar encounter).This is to say, srarus groups can be addirionally ranked by the power of theirmembers in the larger society; there are communiries made up of upper-class order-givers, of working-class order-takers, and so forth; here themembership community can also carry an indirect reflection of the powerrelations, even when they are "off duty." Successfully using high-sratus sym-bols in an encounter both generares local solidarity, and a feeling of hiehrank; whereas successlully generaring solidariry in a low-ranking group gen-erates less EE. Interaction;rituals are connecred in chains over time, withthe results of the lasr inreracrion (in emotions and symbols) becoming rn-puts for the next inreracrion. Thus, EE tends to cumulare (eirher posirivelyor negat ive ly) over t ime.

"Emotional energy", however, is rather general metaphor that needsto be unpacked. I believe that there is a general componenr, an overalllevel of being "up" or "down." Bur rhis is an overflow of more soecificemot ional energies. Emot i rnal energy is speci f ic ro parr icu lar k inds , . r f s l ru-ations; it is a readiness for action, which manitesrs irself in taking rhe ini-

40 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

tiarive in part icular sorts of social relat ionships or with part icular persons'z

Thus, theie is EE specif ic to power situations-expecting to dominate, or

be dominated; as well as an EE specif ic to status situations-expecting to

be a central member, or a marginal clne, or not t() be accepted at al l . Fur-

thermore, these emotional energies tend to be specif ic to part icular net-

works and groups, or part icular kinds of them: some persons feel ful l of

confidence and init iat ive in a party clf professional acquaintances, but not

in a sexual si tuation; some feel confidence in a business negotiat ion, but

not a pol i t ical one'

i .opt" n)Lrve rhrough rhe chain of encounrers that make up their

dai ly l ives on an up-and-down f low of EE: They are more attracted towards

certain situations than orhers, and sometimes f 'eel disinterest or repulsion.

In each situation as ir unfolds, their own emotional and cultural resources,

meshing or fai l ing to mesh with rhose of the people they meet, determine

to what extent the lR wil l be successful and unsuccessful. These outcomes,

in rurn, raise or lower EE. The end result is motivirt ion to repeating those

sorts of encounrers with part icular persons and to avoid them with others.

Emotional energy manifesrs irself both physical ly irnd psychological ly,

but i ts underlying basis-rhe form in which i t is "stored," so to speak-is

probably not as energy per se. EE has some cognit ive conrponent; i t is an

expecrarion of being able 16 dominate part icular kinds of si tuations, or to

"no.t *"*bership in parr icular groups. The cognit ive side of this is that

symbols (parr icularized memories as well as general ized ideas or emblems)

have emotiqnal energy attached to them, in the sense that the symbols cal l

fo r th a h igh or l c ,w degree o f in i t ia r i ve in enac t ing soc ia l re la t ionsh ips us ing

rhose symbols. But rhis is not a process of conscious calculat ion, of the

a6or rhinking " l wi l l get a good feel ing of power or status i f I interact with

so-and-so." l Instead, certain symbols come to mind, or appear in the ex-

ternal environment, and spark off propensit ies (posit ive or negative) for

social act ion. The "expecrarion" may work on a subconscious level. l t is an

anticipation of being able to coordinate with someone else's responses' of

smoorhly raking rheir role in the ongoing f low of the interaction, and thus

anticiparing the bui ld-up of emotional force that goes on within a success-

ful IR. The process of "rhythmic entrainment" of the ultra-micro aspects of

interacrion is the mechanism by which emotional contagion occurs within

a successful interaction. Thus, there is a very f ine-grained, micro-

anriciparion rhat happens within the interaction i tse[f (on a level down to

fract ions of a second), as well as a more ft tng-term expectat ion of being

able ro enter inro such micrtt-coordination wirh parr icular kinds of peopre'

"Emotion:r l energy" exists as a c()mplex of these kinds of expectat ions, a

priming for successful r i tual interaction in part icular sett ings.

The low end of EE is depression, manifested in withdrawal, both from

ewnrecc i 'pnpc . rn r i rc r i . , i t r r l )enrecs ion mav he r m( ) re c , - rmn lex or ( )cess

j

Transienr Emorions 4l

rhan high EE.a I hypothesize that experience ar rhe low end of the powerdimension brings depression: low energy, and loss of motivation. But thismay happen only when order-takers experience a strong degree of uncon-trollabil i ty; when their lack of control is only moderate, th"y ."y rypicailyrespond by anger, rhat is, by a remporary increase in the output of EE, asvigorous reacrance against the situarion rhat is controll ing them (Frijda,l986: 290) .

Negative experience on the status dimensi.n, however, mav have adifferent effecr. I suggesr thar [ailure of membershrp in a group ritual bringsa degree of depression commensurare with the social failure. Kemper (1978)however argues rhat low status may bring anger as weil as shame. scheff(1987a' l987b) argues rhar exclusion from membership brings shame,which may produce a spiral with rage (i.e. anger). Iwoulj r.su.Jrhorrr. u,a form of low EE, with rhe specific cognirive componenr directed towarclsone's social image (i.e. s'cial membership) in a particular group. Angeroccurs when there is an abrupr negative change in expectecl ,o.i^l *"m-bership feelings, rhat is, it is a short-term emorion due to rhe disruotion ofexpectations; the long-term effect of membership loss is nevertheless de-pression' Hence, there is no long-term increase in vigor of the sort thatangry reacti lnce brings for moderate levels of put down on the power di-mension, _rhar is, when rhere are a strucrural opportunities for mobil izinsreDeuron.-

The main long-term emotional energies resulting from stratif ied inter-action, rhen, are: (a) high levels of enrhusiasm, confidence, and inirrarrve,resulting from either power or status siruarions; (b) low levels of the same(i.e' depression, shame), resulring again from eirher power or status; (c)anger, which results from moderare levels of negarive experience (l believe,largely on the power dimension, although possibly on the srarus dimenslonas wel l ) , parr icu lar ly in s i ruar ions where there are suf f ic ienr possib i l i t ies offighting back' There is one orher long-term emorional disposition; theamount of rrust or disrrust of other people. Ar rhe trust end of the contin.uum, this simply manifests itself as high EE, wil l ingness ro rake inirrarrvetowards certain social situations. At the distrust end, it comes out as fear ofparticular situati<rns. I suggesr that disrrust/fear is attached to particularstructural configurations, namely, distrust of those who are oursiders ro thelocal group; ir is the result of rhe srructural subclimension of sratus groupinteracr ion, in which rhere is r ight locaI c losure of group boundar ies.

SHORITERM OR DRAMAT/C EMOT/ONS

Most research on em.tion has focussed 'n rhe short-term, dramatrce.motions: the "phasic" rather than the "tonic," the outbursts rhat disruprt he ongo ing f l ow o f ac r i v i t v (F r i i da . 1986 : 2 . 4 . g0 ) Mr r e ro r rmp - r i . t h - r

42 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

rhe short-term emotions are derived tiom the baseline of emotional energy;rhat ir is against the backdrop o[ an ongoing flow of emotional energy thatpar t icu lar d isrupr ive expressions are shaped. Surpr ise, for example, is anabrupt reaction to something that rapidly and severely interrupts the flowof current activity and artention. This is also the general pattern of moreimportant short-term emotions.

The positive emotions become intense largely because of a contagiousbuild-up during an interaction ritual. This is the case with enthusiasm, joy,

and humor: all o[ these build up in social situations as the result of a suc-cessful ritual. Psychological analysis tends to take these emotions from theindividual viewpoint. For example, joy is explained as the result of the mo-mentary expectation of success in some activity (Frijda, 1986: i9). This issometimes true; bur I am suggesting that joy and enthusiasm are particu-larly strong when an assembled group is collectively experiencing this ex-pectation or achievement of success (e.g., fans at a game). Further, thegroup itself by successful emotional contagion can generare its own enthu-siasm (which is what a party does).

These kinds of positive emorional outbursts are relatively short andtemporary in their effects. They happen against a baseline of previous emo-tional energy; for a group ro establish this kind of rapport, irs membersneed to have previously charged up some symbols wirh positive atrracrron,so that rhese symbols can be used as ingredients in carrying out a successfulritual. A previous cumulation o[ emotional energy is thus one of the ingre-dients in making possible the situational build-up of posirive emorion. Fre-guently, the positive emotions (joy, enthusiasm, humor) are generated by agroup leader, an individual who takes rhe focus, who is able to propagaresuch a mood from rheir own srores of emorional encrgy. Thus, this individ-ual serves as a kind of battery for group emotional expressiveness. Personswho occupy this posirion in IR chains are whar we think of as "charis-matic." In general, personality traits are jusr these results of experiencingpart icu lar k inds of IR chains. (This is r rue ar the negar ive end as wel l ,resulting in depressed, angry, and arrogant persons, etc.)

Love and sexual passion (especially the larter) also are situationallygenerated emotions. They are most intense rvhen rhere is an emotionalcontagion within the group (usually a very small group of two persons),focusing on precisely this emotion. Again, rhe previous experience in IRchains (in this case, especial[y interactions that consrirure a sexual market-place) determine the baseline of emotional energy, which is available ro bearoused in this way.

The negarive short-rerm emotions are even more clearly related tothe baseline of emotional energy.

Transient Emorions 4lAnger is generared in several ways. psychologica.lry,

anger is ofren re-garded as the capaciry to^mobirir" ..,..gy ro overcome a barrier to one,songoing efforts (Frijda, 19g6: lg, 77). Thls-*ea.,, thar the ,r;;;, of angershould be proporrional to rhe amounr of ,"d..1;;;; ' ;;;;"i l , is, theamounr of emotional energy one has for that particular project. High emo_tional energy may arso be. cailed "aggressiveness,,, the strong taking of ini-riative. This can have the .ocial ""ff".trowering their emorionar energy, r;;-;i Tri:ü'lffit rr$l::l**lThis impries that rhere is a connecrion berween. rhe generic quariry of highemotional energy-especially the EE generated in power siruarions-andthe expression of the specific emorion äf ,.,g"..

The disruptive form of anger' ho*"u.r, is more compricared. That isbecause anger in irs inrense forÄs is an e*prosiue ,";;;; i l l , trur,rr-rions' Truly powerfur persons do not become angry in this sense, becausethey do nor need to; rhey ger rheir *r, .,uUf,or, it. For a powerful person roexpress anger is thus to some extent an expression of *eakness. Ho*"u",persons who are powerlur can afford to become .angry; their p.wer-anger isil;:i:T I i # il; äT ::: :: i .,l;:.1: 1.;:, ;j;in ;,:,1*r :?t.*iorher person-it is an expression of their confidence thar they wi, be abreto mobil ize an enforcement coaririon to coerce that person'rnto compli.ance, or to destroy their resistance. Thus, previous stores of EE determrnewhen and how someone wil l express ;; l.r lr" anger.6

The most violero v e rc o m i n g a s r ro n s ; [:l;::. i] :ffiru*:: 1l: [ :T,:,.l,r,i

';15,i;srrong, rhe feeling is fear, nor anger.

'a prio, build-up of fear, which iseventually mastered by

.winning a confrict, thus tencrs to resurt in an out.bursr of anger ar just the *nm"n, . i r". i i* sure of the victory. Viorentarrocrries in warfare tend to happen in rhis kin, of situation. 1ro. "*o.pt.,and analysis, see Coll ins, 1989. )

Persons who are weak do not manifest anger in the same way. I sug-gest it is onry when rhey have enough resources to be abre to mounr someresisrance (or at leasr sonre sociar priun.y, a separate social circle in whichthey can urter symbolic, t[reats) ,Ä", *.^f.-O"rsons, order-rakers, have an-ger' This follows from the principle thar the core of anger is the mobil iza-tion of energy to overcome an obstacre. rt is only *hel there ,r. '".,orgtsocial bases ofsupport ro generare EE that one can react to a frustration (inthis case, being dominarid) Uv mobil izing ,ng.r. p.*ons who are roo weak(i 'e' structurally they lack resources or space rn which ro nrobil ize any <lther

:ä'.*"lit"d EE)' do not react to being dominated bv ,r,g.., t,,r by

44 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

In between these two situations there are selective outbursts of anger.This is rhe targeted anger that individuals feel against particular other per-sons. I suggest that this occurs because these individuals are structural ri-vals in the nrarket of social relationships, for example, two womencompeting for the same man, or two intellectuals competing for rhe sameaudience. Here one does not feel angry against someone who is strongerthan oneself (rebell ious anger), nor against someone weaker (dominanceanger); rather, this is a case of someone frustrating one's own projects, Theanger here is not really "personal"; there is no role-raking (as in the dom-inance/subordination forms of anger) ahhough the rarger is a person, andthe underlying structure is a social one; it is only an accidenr thar theobstacle to one's goals happens to be a person.

Another especially Durkheimian form of shorr-rerm emorion is ngh-teous anger. This is the emocional outbursr, shared by a group (perhaps ledby particular persons who act as its agents) against persons who violareits sacred symbols. It is group anger againsr a hereric or scapegoar. Suchanger only happens when there is a previously consrituted group; one canpredict that righteous anger is proportional to the amounr o[ emorionalcharge o[ membership feelings around parricular synrbols. The amountof such charge, in rurn, is highest where rhe group has high social densityand a local (rather than cosmopolitan) focus. !7here the group nerworksare diffuse and cosmopoliran, on the other hand, I suggest that the shorr-term emotion felt at disruption is embarrassment on behalf of the dis-rupter-that is, resulting in status exclusion, unwill ingness ro associarewirh that person, rather rhan a violent ritual punishment to restore syflr-bolic order.

Righteous anger is not very well undersrood, despite irs great impor-tance in polit ical senriments as well as dynamics of local communities(scandals, wirch-hunrs, polirical hysterias). The theorerical dil{ iculry rs un-derstanding just how this kind of anger relares ro rhe power and status di-mensions of group structure. ln the Durkheinrian model, it seems to be thegroup in general, and all irs adherenrs, who are outraged ar rhe violation ofits symbols. Bur I suspecr thar anger, and rherefbre violence as a punish-ment (burning a witch or heretic at rhe stake, throwing drug dealers orgamblers or abortionisrs in jail) is relared ro rhe power dimension, since theuse of violence is the ulrimate sancrion of power. To explain righteous an-gerr we seem ro need the power and status dimensions in conjunction. Thatis, where the status group srrucrure is dense enough and locally closedenough so thar there is a strong sense of group memhership, attached toreified symbols; rhis ritual community has a power hierarchy within ir,which regularly exercises coercive threats to enfbrce obedience to orders;under these c i rcumstances, r i rual v io lar ions (v io lar ions of membership sym-

fi:i.

ir1

::i

i:'l

Transient Em<>tions +5

iru rhe srarus dimension) are taken as a rhrear ro the power hierarchy

Righteous anger is a particularly inrense emotion because rr rs ex-pressed with a srrong sense of securiry, indiridurl, Äei ,r- '"rö have thecommuniry's support, and nor merely in a roose sense. Righteous anger isan emotion thar is an evocation .f the organized network thar has beenpreviously estabrished ro use viorence. persons,who feer righteous anger areevoking their feering of membership in an enftrrcement coalirion.

..",r1jr".;;*ill;, woutd poinr to rhe fact.thu, ,h" *o* u_i"n, pr.,irl,-

med i e v a r 0,,., *o n, l1n :; l; : "1,"T il ä:"::: iä:,:: il, *;i:::" lltr ibal societies) occur. where the porit icar nr"n,, are both highry coercive inrheir ordinary operarions, ,nd ,r. acriue i l enforcing group cultures (cor-l ins, l98ta; Douslas, t - ,9 !6, tg ' i ) . Heresy r r ia ls una uät"* ,u"r i o"^ , r f , -menrs have disappeared precisery rn th. i"g.." of rhe separation of churchand srare; ir is where these spheres irn"-oo*., hierarchy and the sratuscommunrrv) are lused, that . r ighteous anger is mosr prevarenr . In some de-gree, however, the porirical hierarchy ,r-i i i ."rnnin, the focus of srarus rrr_uals, rhat is, claims ro .be

a .orn*u^i,f as well as an organizarion forwielding power' This makes ir possibre ro mobirize deviance.hunring as aform of starus inrrusion into the polit ical ,ph".;: ;r;; ,. ' . j"ri"",, 0,u".-entiated modern socieries. And it is acruocates ot a return ro the fusion ofcommunity with polity who are most strongly involved ,, ,,ao.ul ..,rr.0..-neurs" in modern deviance-hunring. (Sucfr advocates seem to come fromthe localized secrors of modern r;*;;-;r;"cialry the remnanrs of rradi-rional and rurar communiries; in adtJit ion, ,h. nrr"r,-,p, of socialist regimesro recreare rhis same kind of coilecrive soricJarity herps exprain their con-cern for rituals of conformitv.)

Fear is another short-term negative emotion. The most intense antlbriefest forms of rear are rh<-,r" rhur"n'or, Jrrpty crisrupt acriviries; at theextreme, intense fear experience is next to r ri"rt l" r"roo,*r.. 'Crr_* ,, ".

expression of fear in a more complex sense; ir is a social .all fo, t"tp indistress' Adults do nor cry very much because rheir horizon widens our.in,::1 :i:"rarively "shorr-rerm

and simply physical rhreats or discomforrs,rne most important form of fear becomer fear of ,o.irt ..,nr" ,."."r, rrrrr-ever' fear of being coerced or fear of ,o.iull*.rusi.n, "."

*lr. 'r."*-*.*experiences' Furrhe'rmore, since the problem is itserf the sociar , i,u?r,on,crying (which is a communicarion of helpressness) is sub.rdinated by morecomplex adjusrments of EE' one .onnoa ,r*i ly so rcadily call on others forsympathy' if one is being coerced or excluded.' crying, as a fbrm of emo-tional communication' is upstaged by more Ji.".t "-orionar

response rnthe form of fear and avoicjance.

46 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

ln social relationships' fear is basically a response 1s 56rnssne else's

anger. lt is an anticipnto'v "*otion' the expectation of being hurt' Thus'

ir is most directly r"lu,"J to lo.,g-re,m.emorional energy deriving from sub'

ordination on the power dimension' lt occurs in similar circumstances to

dep ress ion ,bu t i t has ' ^o ' " con f ron ta t i ona l s t ruc tu re 'Wheredep ress ion i sa wirhdrawat of EE (i.e. withdrawal of artenrion from particular acrivit ies)'

fear is a kind of '"ti"i tt^gi"g betbre the consequences of expected ac-

tions. lt is socially a more Ä*ltt* emotion than either anger or depres'

sion. Depression can U"-ät'ati as kind.of sinking of EE levels because of

. r ' " . . u r ' a , " " " i nge f fec t so fnega r i uesoc ia l s i t ua t i ons ; f ea r i sanega t t vean -ticipation of what *ift noppltt ' which assumes enough EE to take some

initiative, or at least '"*uit ' alert to situations that carry social dangers'

Hence, one can ",.0.;;;;"

fear of status loss (membership- exclusion), as

well as fear of power coercion' On the power dimension' fear is probably

mobil ized together *i 'h "tgt' '

in cases whe.re a person is able to mobil ize

anger, but has low t""f-f"?1" in being able to win positive results fiom

its exPression.

TRANSFORMATIONS FROM SHOR?TERM EMOTIONS

INTO LONG-TERM EMOTIONAL ENERGY

The results of various short-term emotional experiences tend tt l f low

back into the long-term ""t"tt"""f

makeup' which l have called "emorional

energy." Emotional .".;;;,;h;";h' does not have to depend upon the dra-

matic emotio.tr; , i ,u",ioä' of u'itottt" 'ted domination or beltlnging add to

one ' ss to reo fcon f i c l enceandsenseo fa t t r ac t i on towardspa r t i cu la rk indso fsituations; undramatic feerings of subordination and unpopularity have sim-

,irr..."*"i,". effects' The Jramatic short-term emotions also spil l .ver'

thoug^ it is an u."*r*i.,.d quesrion whether their very qualiry as dramatic

makes them more important for long'term emotions' or brackets them as a

s o r t o f e x c e p t i o n . i . t ' h t t u " o f p o ' i t i u t s h o r t - t e r n e m o t i o n s ( j o y ' e n t h u -siasm, sexual parriott), it '"t* ' t i tt"tv that these experiences should build

;,* ,;;; "?

EE, although perhaps in a verv situation-specific wav (i 'e'

one become, urru.h"d"io"r.o*,t"* itrst those siruacions with particular

partners).l n t h e c a s e o f n e g a t i v e e n ) o t i o n s , t h e r e i s a l o n g - s t a n d i n g c l i n i c a l

tradirion that sees ,rrul ' lutit situations as the major determinant of long-

term social un.1 pry.nJogical functioning' Particular experiences of inrense

anger, fear, or shame aä rega"led as controll ing one's whole subsequent

functit>ning. This may w"ll bl true' to a <legree; however' it should be seen

against thJ buckground of rhe overall level of emotional energy' A person

whogenera l l yhas favo rab le , i f und rama t i c ' expe r i enceso l l t hepowerand

Transienc Emotions 4Z

status dimensions of rheir everyday inreractions, wil l l ikely get over an ep-isode of extreme anger, fear, or shame. I suggest it is only when the indi-vidual's overall "marker position" of inreractions is on the negative sidethat parricularly inrense dramaric experiences are stored ,p ,nd carriedover as "rraumas," especially in highly charged memories of the sort tharFreudian therapy is designed ro ventilate.

scheff (1987a) proposes a model with a more sociar micro-mechanismthan rhe Freudian: There is a shame/rage cycle in which an inclividual whoexperiences a shaming situation feels rage against the perpetrator, whichcan lead to further confl icrs; rhese rypically have unsatisfacrory ourcomes,resulting in further shame and rage. Rage ar oneself can also become partof a self-reflecrive loop, intensifying this process. Scheff presenrs evidencerhat the traces of previous emotional arousals, especially anger, can remainat an unconscious, trace level; that there are unconscious shame behaviorsthat are manifesred in rhe micro-details of inreracrions. I rhink, though,that scheff has chosen a sample of cases in which rhese shame/rase cvclesare well esrablished; however, he has nor considere<l the cases in *"hich thecycle does not occur or terminates quickly. That is to say: Scheff concen-rrares on social relationships among individuals who are relarively equallymatched, who are at the middle levels of dominance and popularity, suchthat rhey can conrinue long cycles of shaming and raging at each other.More extreme differences in power would not allow a conflictual cycle ro goon; and if persons are not confined to the same network of status inrerac-tions (i.e. rheir market possibil i t ies are more open) they may cur shorr ashame cycle by leaving th^t interacrion and findine anorher where thc re-source l ineups may be differenr.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

I have formulated the principles of this general model of inreracrronri tuals by considering the dimensions that seem to be involved inDurkheim and Goffman's discussions of r irual inreracrion. Above, I havesuggested how the micro-mechanisms I have p.sited are congruenr withexperimental evidence, especial ly on rhythmic coordination berween inrer-actants' The IR model irself needs to be expl icir ly resred, especial ly for i tseffect upon emotional sol idariry. This could be done eirher experi.". , tol lyor in a natural sert ing, provided that before-and-afl ter measures (or prefera-

! bly conrinuous meäsures) of emotional intensiry were available. The unob-trusive measures described below could be of use.

i Testing the IR Model. The mosr imporranr resr is ro show rhat there is a'circular relationship between the amount of focus of mutual attention, the

48 Emorions and Social Macro Processes

amount of coordrnation of activity (especially micro-coordination on an

unconscious level), and the build-up of a common emotion. As indicated,

it does not matter which emotion is involved at the outset-happiness,

grief, conversational enthusiasm, and so forth-the model predicts that if

rhe conditions of focus and murual coordination exist, the shared emo-

rional intensity wil l build up correspondingly. A further part .of the model

ro be tested involves the after effects ofa successful ritual (i.e., an interac-

tion rhat evoked this shared emotion): the participants should come awaywith enhanced EE, and they should have favorable emotional attachment

to symbols generated within rhat interaction.The emotional effects of power and status rituals are specific applica-

tions of the more general [R theory. The theories of power and status rit-

uals rhat I have spelled our above are congruent with a good deal ofempirical research that was carried out for other purposes, but relativelylitt le has been done explicit ly attempting to test these principles. In noneof rlr is is emotion treated very explicit ly, but only sometimes in passing,while the main focus has been on the cultural and behavioral consequencesof stratif ication. The multidimensional theory that I presented in Con/lictSociology, (Coll ins, 1975) was in part derived to fit the empirical generali-zations found in stratif ication research up to that t ime, and to make themcongruent with the observations upon which Dahrendorf (1959) and Coff-man (1959) drew in building their theories. Subsequent research also fitssome of my predictions regarding class cultures.

A weakness of the l iterature on social class is that it has mostly usedcrude conceptualizations of its independenr variables. Unidimensionalschemes (irs used by Gans, 1962, 1967, in his field research, as well asBourdieu, 191911984, and virtually everyone else) leave one not knowingwhich factor (power or status rituals) is really operating on the micro-level.Worst of all are scales that combine different measures (education, income,occupational prestige, etc.) as if they were all indicating some underlyingdimcnsion called "stratif ication." This is searching for a myth, and itwashes out the actual grid of causal processes that distribute people acrossseveral dimensions of the social landscape. Occuparional prestige scales areperhaps the least desirable way of measuring stratif ication, because they aretied to the realm of vague ideologies rarher than actual work experiences.(For instance, "professor" ranks quite high, but if the same person is iden-tif ied as "si.rciologist," he/she drops about fifteen points (see Treiman,1977); if they are identif ied as "assistant professor in a junior college" theydrop sti l l furrher.) Jencks (1985) showed that public ideas about vaguelyspecified occupations hide most of the variation even in what people actu-ally rhink is a good job. Therefore, a measure of strarif icarion ought to dealwith what people actually do in their work experience, nor with what other

Transient Emotions 49

we have squeezed. most of the juice out of the standard census demo-graphic caregories as independenr variables, but cling ,o ,t.- i.."use theyare easy to measure. what is needed is ro measure explicit ly the power andstatus dimensions of peopre's work and other sociar experience, ,, ,, ,.ru-ally happens' only Bernsrein (r97r-75) has paid much artenrion ro micro-measures of siruarional behavior, but only for the a"p".d.ni ua.iabres(speech codes), while relying on crude grobar measur., o[ th" independenrvariables (social class). The work of Kohn's group (Kohn, 1977; Kohn andschooler, l98l) is perhaps closest ro measuring the operative'conditionswirhin work siruations. Their measure-croseness of supervision-is an in-dicaror of rhe order-giving/order-raking dimension, although ir only exrendsfrom a neurral poinr down to rhe order-raking side; it strh lacks a 'easureof degrees of dominance on rhe order-giving rid.. Clor..,"r, uir,rp.ruoio.,may also indicate rhe social densiry fr.roi u dimension of ,rrtu, g.orpstrucrure. Kohn's orher principal independent variable, complexiry of work,appears related ro the diversity of communications, i.e., the other srruc-tural dimension of status communities, but mixes rhe social .omprexity of ,job with the complexity of a marerial task.

In general, I would inrerpret Gans (1962, 1967, 197 I, Bou*Jieu(197911984)' and Bernstein (197r-75) as showing rhe effects of the socialnerwork dimension; Rosabeth Kanrer's (1977) comparison of secreraries,women managers! blocked-mobirity men managers, and upwardry movingmen managers is another version of rhe power dimension.

In the realm of independent variabies, I would strongry advocate rharnerw.rk posirion be broughr into the srandard sociologic"ai roolbo*. Brrt(1982) has shown that people's nerwork position has an i,nporr^n,

"ä., o.,

the way they behave and on rheir cognitions; there is a good deal of *ork(Laumann, 1966; Laumann and Rnpji, DZOy rhat describes diftbrence innerwork positions of members of diffeienr social crasses. Arrhougi ihi, *ortis mainly interested in macro processes, such as community power struc-ture' as dependenr variables, an equaily significanr puyoff ,hourd e*ist fo,explaining micro-variables, rhe attitudes an-"d b"hauio.s of indiviJu^rr-,n-cluding their emotions. Nerwork position should be a good *.nrrr"'or th.status srructure' including Äorh the condition of sociai density of inrerac-tion, and the cosmopolitan/local distinction.

Testing Poqaer ond status Effects mt Emotimu. what is needed is a mul-tivariare design, measuring independently rhe amounr of order-giving andorder-taking that happens in one's daily l i fe; rhe amounr of rime in thepresence of orher people versus arone; the amounr of criversity of commu-nications/focus of artention. This coulcl be done by inrerviews, though aberter rneasure wouLl be observarional. possibry a compromise wourd be toger people ro keep a diary of these items over a oeriod of rime. Conrinrrorrs

50 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

observation is difficult in practical terms, bur periodic sampling of different

t i.d, of work situations might be just as good'""'--

it" general rheory oi stratif icarion I have formulated has as depen-

de.,t uariaüles the cognirions, behaviors, and emorions of individuals. As

indicated, there is much more available research bearing, at least inferen-

u"rir, ""',rr.

effects of everyday life porver and sratus rituals upon cognirive

cul turethanupone,not io. ,s 'Forspe. i f icpurposesofdevelopingthelRthe-ory of emotions, it woüld be necessary to measure explicit ly the emotions

i n t h e s e r i t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s m e a s u r e m e n t n e e d s t o b e d o n e f o r b o t hi;";-;; emotions (emotional energy)' and the short'term' disruptive

emotlons.

Meosuring Emational Energy' Since methodologies for studying the short-

term, dramatic emotions "t"

tno" widely known' I wil l concentrate here

." ,Ä. problem o[ measuring EE' My argument' that EE builds up or de-

clines over a serles of i.,te'"action rituals' depending upo.n the ups and

downs of one,s experiences of power and status, is inferential. There js little

direcr evidence for it. Muru, and Lamb (1980; see also Kemper, 1990) have

shown that power experience has some continuing effects upon hormone

levels. Heise (1979, 198?), using pencil and paper studies.of hypothetical

evenrs, shows rhat social actioni int.tg. the affectual loadings of vari.us

categories of persons along power and status dimensions (as well as on a

,."ä*r dimension of ".tiu.-"tio.,,

which may be equivalent ro the underly-

i.,g dirrre.trion of my EE)' Heise postulates that chains of real-life interac-

tiJns are morivated by ongoing shifts in these affect levels'

l n o r d e r , o r n " u r u r . s h i f t s o f E E i n r e a l - l i f e s i t u a t i o n s ' i t w o u l d b eclesirable to follow people's experiences across a chain of interacdons' A

long-ter'm design *ouli b" .,.t""u'y' Possibly this could be construöred in

a labo ra to rys i t ua t i on las t i ngseve ra ldays ;obse rva t i on inna tu ra l cond i t i onswould also te desirable, especially ro esrimare how long emorional effects of

interactions may last. Lurp..t, however, that the time-decay o[ emotional

energy, if it is not reinvested and reinforced by subsequent interactions' may

be less than a few daYs'For independent variables, we would measure experiences oi order'

giving, o.d"r-tukir,g, and egalitarian interaction; the social density of inter'

ä.rioi (amount of fo.u., ,*ou.', of em'tional contagion); and the variety

(cosmopoliranism/localism) of interaction patterns. For the dependent vari '

"able-a measure of EE-it would be best to use unobtrusive measures. Here

are some possibil i t ies.Voice. The anount of confidence, init iative, and dominance (high

EE) vs. apathy, withdrawal, depression (low EE) may be measurable by the

Transient Emotions 5l

style rather than content of talk. Recordings of voice samples in particularkinds of inreracrions may be measured for: (a) loudness of tone; (bi speed oftalking; (c) f luidity, hesiration pauses, and (d) false starts. one of the bestindicators may be the latency of speech: the amounr of rime in delay be-rween and end of one speaker's turn, and the start of another. Abil ity toget the floor, vs. incidence of contested speech turns, may be another in-cicaror. It may also be possible to find measures of EE by a micro-analysis ofthe sound wave frequencies on subliminal levels. (See scherer, l9gz, 19g5,for studies of the emotional dimensions of recorded speech.)

Eyes' Eye contact, dominating or avoiding mutuar gaze is anotherpossible measure of EE (see Mazur, er al., 1980; Mazur, 19g6;. Hr*"uer,this perhaps applies more ro the power dimension of EE than ro the srarusdimension.

Facial expression. Ekman and Friesen's (r975r1984, rgig) manualshows the ways that emotions are expressed in the several zones of the face.Ekman's work (1984) also indicates which zones are mosr easily controlledby deliberate efforts to mask emorions, whire other zones tend to expresssponraneous emorions. The limiration of this method is that it has focussedprimarily on the dramatic, disruptive emotions. But facial measures of EEcould perhaps be developed, both for high EE (confidence, enrhusiasm) andlow EE (aparhy, depression).

Bodily Postures and Movernents. Ekman (1984; also o'Sullivan et al.,i985) has also considered bodily movements as emotional expression, andindicared the extenr ro which rhe body is contro l lab le in maskinn

"*" -tions. Again, we need to consider bodily measures of high and low EE, aswell as the dramatic shorr-rerm emorions. since high EE is social confi-dence and dominance, ir should be manifesred in mouements towards otherpeople, especially movemenrs that take the init iative and rhat lead rorhythmic coordinarion. Low EE, conversely, should show movements andpostures of withdrawal, and low iniriative. Depending upon the amount ofcompliance vs. rebell ion, low EE persons in a social situation should showeither a partern of following orher's nonverbal leads; or a freezins of move-ment; or (in the case of cgnfl ict at moderared levels of EE) a rapid or jerkyalternation between orienting roward and away from the oth..r.

A combination o[ several of these measures-voice, face, bodilv pos-ture and movemenr-could be srudied simulraneously. The resulr of srchmulti-measure studies would l ikely show us which measures are redundanr,and which are mosr highly correlated with long-term paterns (i.e. with theflow of EE across siruations). Afrer a series of such stuclies, we could con-centrate on the most efficient measures of EE.

I

52 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

Other Hypotheses to Test. I have suggested tests of the basic mechanism of

inreraction ritual itself, and of the hypothesized effects on emotions of

order-giving, order-taking, and rhe social density and diversity of interac-rion nerworks. There are many ramifications here that need investigation,including specific topics l ike the righteous anger produced by rirual viola-tions of symbols generated in communities of high social densityi the car-ryover between dramatic and undramatic short-rerm emotions into long-term emotional energies; and the reverse, in which long-term emotionalenergies provide the baseline for short-term emotions. These elemenraryprocesses, too, could eventually be integrated with the more complex con-dirions ser forth in Kemper's (1978) rheory of emotions.

A PAYOFF FOR MACRO-SOCIOI.OGY

Once good measures of EE, and its various subdimensions, are avail-able, a further step is possible: to carry our unobtrusive emotion surveys.The sociologist could sample a population of people across situarions, muchas we now sample attitudes (usually absrracced from situations). This wouldgive a map-a dynamic map, over time-of the emotional ecology of so-ciety. One might analogize it to an emorional weather map. Such a sam-pling of emotional patterns on the micro-level, when aggregated, rells usabout the emotional patterns of the macro-srrucrure. This in turn shouldgive us a nleasure of the dynamic facrors involved in macro processes ofeconomic l ife, polit ics, cultural movemenrs-indeed, the whole range ofconcerns of traditional macro-sociology. An accurare view of the macro-structure, stripped down to its skeleton of micro-situations l inked togetherin rime and space, would reveal waves of emorion, artached to cognirionsand motivating physical behavior, f lowing across social space. We wouldthen be in a position to test theories of how emotional energies operareboth to stably reproduce social srrucrure, and to energize rhe dynamics ofconflict and change.

Norrs

l . My usage is similar to Kemper's (1978), excepr Kemper wishes ro srressthat groups are almost always unequal in status, whereas I conceive status groups ascapable of being completely independenr of each other. One group of friends (orcorel igionists, or ethnic members) can be more or less obl ivious to anorher cl ique; Iconfine "status" to the internal structure of each group, leaving open rhe questionof whether the various groups have any ranking in relation ro each other. Kernperalso goes on to define "srarus" as rank given to individuals voluntari ly, a wil l ingness

Transienr Emotions 5j

to compry wirhour being forced, so that Kemper,s power vs. starus is the differencebetween enforced compliance and volunrary .o*pii"n .. f "*.."

,ür'ri'.re rs sucha thing as voluntary compriance, but r would regard this u. o ,ro"rä.n arion ofstatus into power, of using status 1g59g1sg5_1hcred svmbors thar come f,om ,trrus ,i,rrtr-in llai; ,til.iillLäil"ä',':fä1,::;situarion, rhar is, in rhe realm of power. Instead, I confÄe ;r,;r;J;;;;;;ns

to the"horizontal" dimension of being incruded or excruded, fr.n' ;;;;iy ,..]"fr., .."r-r i l i tar ian accivit ies. The sociorogicaay most important variarion in starus groupstrucrure is i ts shape as a nerwork, especiaty i ts densiry ""J

, i . a"*r* 'of .or*n-pol iranism or rocar crosure of the network around parricular individuars. As weshall see' these dif ferences in "horizonral" srrucrure oig.orp, ^lr ,r* urä*"k. pr"-

ffi::ilt the emotions that flow from a Durkheimian model of rhe forms of group

z' Fri jda (1986: l l , 7r) describes emotion as a felt bur latent ac.on ren-dency; a readiness for conract with the environment at the h;gh end, and at rhelow end disinterest and aparhy.

J' Somerimes cerrain persons may have this kind of serf-conscious del ibera-t ion; but rhat is the resurt of speciar circumstances,.probabry much previous expe-rience in moving through hyper-comprex "cosmoporitan" networks, 'rogerhe. * i thmany ups and downs in the power/acceprance (sratus) tlimensions.

4. I am leaving aside complexit ies on the physiological level, where severaldifferent components of hormonar and neura. ,rr,.*, are apparenrry invorvea. Inphysiology general ly, specif ic srates of.rno,ion"r arousal are due more to rhe bar-ance between various sysrems rather than to the activation of some system by i tserf.see also Fri jda (1986: 19) on both simple and.orno,"* varieries.f depression.5' Kemper's theory has rhe addit ionar complication that he postulares anger(as well_ as shame) result ing from situarion, in ,uhi.h an acror feer.s he/she is short-changed in sratus' vis-ä-vis someone erse- Thar is, Kemper dears with the morecomplicared situation of comparisons be*veen rhe starus one thinks oneserf (andsomeone else) ought to get, and what they accuary ger. I prefer to begin rhe expra-nation from a simpler and, I bel ieve, more fundamenral process: the emotions thatderive from dominating or being dominated, b. i ; ; , member or a nonmember. TheKemper theory adds not onry expectarions rru* io., experience, but arso a morarjudgment as to the propriety of th.. out.orn" .orriprr.d ro some valued idear. Thetwo theories may be congruent, in rhe folrowing respects. r propose thar experrencesin power situations, and in status-membership situarions, result in. increases .r de-creases in em.t ionar energy. EE itserf invorves expecrari .ns for future siruations; butthe lR mechanisms, which produce EA i" tf,. ftrri oln..,

"r., ., i" ro*1, nrl,_..,f",mechanisms of emotionar pro,Juction. Emotionar . . , . .gy b".o*es an ingredienr inal lowing furure siruations to occur, and in determining their emotionar ourcomes.The expecrarions rhat a1 im.n11ant in Kemper,s model may be regarded assituational ly-specircic arousars of EE. Kempert t 'h.ury seems to me to explain asecond-order qual i ty of enrorions, those rhat arise from viorat ion or c.nf irmati .n ot

54 Emotions and Social Macro Processes

exDecrations. Both types of mechanisms may be operating in the same situation, for

i.,rt"nce, there can be depression from non-acceptance in a status group (my hy-

pothesis of first-order effects), and anger from one's assessment of this non-

acceptance as unjust (Kemperi second-<lrder effects).

Kenrper adds further complexit ies, including the attr ibution as to the agent

responsible for che experience (one's self, orher persons, impers6nal forces). I would

suggest that these cognit ions themselves are explainable (at least in part), by the

Durkheimian theory of social density ( including Douglas' 1966, 1973, "grid" and

"group" model). Blaming oneself only occtrrs when there is a relat ively dif ferenti-

ated group srrucrure producing categories of individual agency and responsibi l i ty;

blaming impersonal forces (e.g. magic) or taboo violat ions, are cultural act ions gen'

erated by part icular kinds of group srrucrures. Thus, an individual 's prior experience

in l iving within part icular kinds of network structures should affect what agency

they perceive as operative in their immediate situations, and wil l shape specif ic

emotions along the lines Kemper proposes.

6. Notice that dominant individtrals may del iberately provoke weaker persons

to become angry, for example, the game of trading insults found among youth gangs

(at one t irne cal led "the dirty dozens"). This is a game to humil iate weak persons,

who are goaded into expressing anger, but are unable to back it up by a show of

physical dominance. This is playing on the underlying principle that strong persons

keep their cocrl; when they do rise to anger, they express it in such a powerful fornr

as to drastical ly penalize anyone who is i ts vict im.

7. Thus crying, l ike anger, tends to occur in a relat ively "real ist ic" manner;

i t is mosr often expressed in sicuations in which i t has a chance of accomplishing

its end.

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Cambridge: Harvard Universiry Press.

Burt, Ronald S. 1982. Toward a Strrctural Theory of Action. New York: AcadenricPress.

Chapple, El iot D. 1981. "Movement and sound: the musical language of bodyrhythms in interaction." Teather's College Recmd 82:615-648.

Cicourel, Aaron V. 1973. Cognitiue Sociologl. New York: Free Press.

Cohen, Albert K. 1955. Deliryuent Boys: The Cuhure of the Gang. New York: FreePress.

- _*-*-",,!...giT.EI-1

Transient Emotions 55

collins, Randall. r975. conflict sr.,ciorogy: Toword an Exprtuwtuy Science, New york:Academic Press.

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Douglas, Mary' 1966' Purity uru) Danger. An Anarysis of concepts of poiluüon andTirboo. London: Routledge and Kegan paul.

Douglas, Mary. 1973. Natural S1mbc,ls. Baltimore: penguin Books.

Durkheim, Emile. 189l/1964. The Divisit.rn of Lüor in sociery. New york; Free press.

l9lzll954. The Elemenwrl Forms of the Rerigioru Li/e. New york: Free press.

Ekman, Paul. 1984. "Expression and rhe Nature of Emotion.,, rn Klaus R. schererand Paul Ekman (eds.), Approaches b Emotion. Hi l lsdale. N.J.: LawrenceErlbaum.

Ekman, Paul, and wallace V. Friesen. rg75-r9g4. Unmzrsking the FaLe. A Gukre toRecr-rgniling Emorioru t'rom Facial Clues. palo Alto, Co"nsulting psychologistsPress.

1978. TAe Facial Auion coding sysrem (FACS). palo Arto, california: con-sulr ing Psychologisrs press.

Frijda, Nico H. 1986. The E'mttions. cambri<Jge: cambridge university press.

Cans, Herbert J. 1962. The L|rbar Vilüryers. New york: Free press.

1967. The l*vittowners. New york: Random House.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Srulies in Ethnomethodorogy. Engrewo.d criffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall .

Goffman, Erving lg5g' The presentatfttn of SeIf in Eoeryday Lrle. New york:Doubleday.

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