collingwood and greek aesthetics : rosen
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Collingwood and Greek Aesthetics
Author(s): Stanley H. RosenReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1959), pp. 135-148Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181656.
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Collingwood
nd
GreekAesthetics
STANLEY H. ROSEN
R
G. COLLINGWOOD,
writing
in
The Principlesof Art, has given
us an
interpretation
of
Greek aesthetics that is worth examining in
some detail.'
This
is
true
for at least two reasons. In the
first
place, Collingwood's work,
as in most
of
his
books,
is
original and
provocative2
and
it should be
more
widely studied by those who are
interested
in the
philosophy
of art. In the second
place,
it is
wrong,
which, when combined with the ingenuity just mentioned, makes it
perhaps
more
worthy
of
inspection
than
many
saner accounts. I hope
that
this
judgment
does not seem
perverse;
it
is
nothing
other than
a
reformulation
of the old
platitude
that we often learn more from those
whose views we
reject
than from those with whom we
agree.
I am
forced
to
reject Collingwood's picture
of the views of Plato and
Aris-
totle almost in their
entirety, yet
I believe that I have learned a
good
bit
about Plato and Aristotle in
doing so;
if this is so, it is only a sign
of the
truth which lies
in
platitudes,
and not of
any
scorn for
Collingwood.
In
the discussion which follows, it is my intention neither to deal adequ-
ately
with
the whole of
Collingwood's philosophy
of
art,
nor
with
that
of
the Greeks.
Apart
from its intrinsic interest and the usual
questions
of
space,
the
following justification may
be
given
for
considering
this
part
of
Collingwood's
book
in
isolation.
According
to
Collingwood,
Book
I
of
The
Principles f
Art contains
the
treatise's empirical
or
descriptive work
in
which
we
have
tried, so
far,
merely to repeat
what
everyone knows; everyone, that is,
who
is
accustomed to
dealing
with art and
distinguishing
art
proper from
art
falsely
so-called. 2
If the merely empiricalor descriptive work has
not been correctly done, as
I
shall have to contend, then the theory of
art
presented
in
Book III,which depends upon it, can by Collingwood's
own
scheme hardly be satisfactory.The empirical work itself falls
into
two
parts,
a
description of what art proper is not, and a description
of
what it is. In discussing what art proper is not, Collingwood
places
much of
the
stress of
his
description pon a historical study purporting
to
explain how Greek philosophy is in part responsible for current er-
roneous views and in part has been misinterpreted as a result of these
I
Oxford,
1938.
Reissued as Galaxypaperback, g9l. All quotationsare from the
i9gS
edition,
hereaftef
abbreviated
as
P.A.
2
P.A.,
pp.
273,
152.
I
3
S
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views.
It therefore follows
that there must be, according to
Colling-
wood's line of thought,a contradiction n Greekaesthetics, one partof
which
is
wrong,
and
has
generated
the false
views
which,
in
the
course
of
time,
have
been turned back
onto
the
part
that is
right by
those
cor-
rupted by
the erroneous
part. Complicated
as this
sounds,
it is
very
much
like his
procedure,
if
not his explicit formulation.
If
Collingwood
is right,
then
everyone,
the Greeks as
well as
ourselves,
is at
least
half-
wrong; and in Collingwood's
hands,the half has
a
distressing endencyof
becoming
the
whole.
Before
turning
to
the details
of the
argument,
it
may
be
well
to
present certain technical termsused by Collingwood throughout,some-
times with dire consequences.The first involves a distinction
between
imitative and representational
rt: A work of art
is
imitative
in
virtue
of its
relation
to
another
work of
art
which
affords
t a
model of
artistic
excellence;
it is
representative
n virtue of its relation to something
in
'nature',
that
is,
something
not a
work
of
art.
I
The
second
involves
a
triple distinction of
false kinds
of art: (a) the theory that art
is a
craft,
like
cobbling
or
carpentry:
the
power
to
produce
a
preconceived
result
by
meansof
consciously
controlledanddirected
action;
2
(b)
the
the theory that art is magic: Amagicalart is an art which is represent-
ative
and
therefore
evocative
of
emotion,
and
evokes of
set
purpose
some
emotions
rather
than
others
in
order to
discharge
them
into
the affairs
of
practical life;
3
(c)
the
theory that art is amusement: something
designedto
stimulate
a
certain emotion (which) is intended not for
discharge
into
the
occupations
of
ordinary life, but
for
enjoyment
as
something
of
value
in
itself. 4
All
three
of these
theories
are
rejected by
Collingwood
as
part
of his
empirical task.
Collingwood begins
the
negative
part
of
his work
by denying
that art is
a craft, andin connectionwith this, that it is representation.This view,
still
popular,
he
tells
us,
owes
its
origin to classical philosophy
which
in this
matter,
as in
so
many
others, has
left
so many traces on our own
(thought),
both for
good
and
for
ill.
s
Let
us first
look
at what
he has
to
say
about
the Greek
theory
of
=LotrmX)
?Xvv.
According to
Colling-
wood
etXnv
(like
the
Roman
ars) meansa craft or specializedform of
skill,
like
carpentry
or
smithying
or
surgery.
6
Now this
is
certainly
one
of
its
meanings,
but
by
no meansthe
only one. It
can
also nmean
raftiness
in the
sense
of
cunning:
for
example, in a speech of Lysiaswe
read of a
I
Ibid., P.
42.
2
Ibid.,
p.
Is.
3
Ibid.,
p.
69.
4
Ibid., P. 78.
s
Ibid.,
P.
I9.
6
Ibid.,
P.
s.
136
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man
with
a
t6Xv-
for
adulter).
I
Or it
can
refer
to a
way in which some-
thingis acquired, withoutanydefinitesense of art or craft.
z
Further-
more,
just
as in
English
here
is a
difference
between
a craft
ike
cobbling
and
an artor knack
ike
fishing as
used with
regard
o
amateur
ishermen),
andjust as there is a difference
between arts
like
fishing
and
arts like
flute-playing,
so too do these differences
exist
in
Greek.
What
unites
these
various-nstances
n
English
s that
all
are
manifestations f
tech-
nique,
an
abstract
term
which refers
to a
skilled
nmanner
f doing,
but
to
no
specific
manner:
the
manner varies
from
case
to
case. The
same is
true
in
Greek.
To have
a
'xv-1
is to be able
to
do
something
'exvy.x7,
and
tCXvmL
ike cobbling,carpentryetc,, arenot the only kindsof skilful
activity.
Collingwood
translates
xcxvn,
then,
in an
erroneously rigid
manner;
perhaps
he has been
misled
by
the word
technical,
which
he
does not want
to be associated
with art
proper,
and
which is
nowadays
usually applied to activities even
more
complex
than
cobbling.
But
there
is,
so
to
speak,
a
non-technical
use
of
the
term.
The matter
is made
clear
by
thinking
of the
colloquial
English
uses
of the
word
technique.
Just
as
Lysias
speaks
of
a
r'xv-
in
adultery,
so
do
we
say
of
a
man
that
his
technique
in love is
excellent. And
just
as
we
could
not
equate a
love technique with a cobbler's technique without misunderstand-
ing
or
blurring
the
meaning
of this
abstract
term,
so
too
would it
be
an
error
to
equate
the
reXvyq
f a
poet
with
that
of
a
cobbler,
if we
meant
to
say
thereby
that the
poet
exhibits
the
same
manner of
skilful
acting
as
does
a
cobbler.
But
this
is what
Collingwood would
make of
the
Greek
view,
and he
is
wrong
in
so
describing
it.
Poets
and
cobblers
both
practice
teXvat
but their
techniques
are
radically
different.
What
is
the
case,
however,
is that
Plato and
Aristotle
describe the
poet
as a
,uLd'-n)q
or
imitator, just
as
the
craftsman
(in
Collingwood's
sense of the term) is said to be an imitator. Poetry and craftsmanship are
both
techniques which
share the
characteristic
of
imitating, but
it
hardly
follows
from this
that the
'rexv- of the
poet
is
equivalentto
the
rexv- of
the
craftsman. A
large
share of
Collingwood's
objections to the
view of
notvLtx)LX
e'Xv
are
based
upon this
misunderstanding. The
term
'rxv-
has
a
whole
spectrum of
specific
meanings,
and if
Collingwood
wishes to
exclude art
from
all of these
meanings, then
he
must deny
that there
is
any
skill
involved
in
practicing art
proper.
That he is
very
nearly
involved in
this
absurdity, I
hope to
show in
a
subsequent
study of
his
description of
the
facts of art.
I
Lysias,
lEPI
TOT
EPATOSOENOTE
(DONOT,
16-17.
2
Liddell
&
Scott,
Unabridged
Greek-English
Lexicon,
gth
Edition.
5
I
37
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Meanwhile,restricting
ourselves to
an
inspection
of
his
description
of
Greekaesthetics, we turn to an error concerningPlato's theory of art.
Collingwood
correctly
observes
that,
in the third
book of the Republic,
Socrates
distinguishes
between
imitative or mimetic
and non-imitative
narrative n poetry.
I
As this
passage
s of considerable
importance
to
Collingwood,
we must examine
it for a moment. The passages too
long
to
transcribe
n its
entirety, but here
is a
resume:
Socratessays
that all
poetry is a narrativeabout
the
past, present,
andfuture,
and that some
narrative
s
simple
and some imitative (&itci
'ffpIaLe
and
'LIya
8W.
~LL
7ewq).
That
is, sometimes
the poet narrates the experiences
of
others in his own voice, and this is imitative narrative;when the poet
distinguishes
what
he has
experiencedfromwhatothers
haveexperienced,
this
is
simple narrative.
The
question
is
now whether
to allow one
or
both or
a
mixture of
these two forms of narrative in the best
city.
The conclusion
is that
we are
to allow a mixture: mainly it
will be
simple
narration,
but
a
small
part may
be
imitative
when
it
is
a
good
man
that
is
the subject
of
imitation.
When the person imitated is bad,
then
imitative narrative
s
undesirable,
for
obvious reasons.
This judgment
about
art is in
line
with
the
view
that men cannot
imitate manythings
well, thatis, that each manhashis own business to perform, andshould
stick
to
it.
Since
a
part
of this
business
in
every case
is to
be
virtuous,
it is
sometimes
permissible to
imitate virtuous
acts.
From this Collingwood
infers that for Plato, some
art is mimetic
and
some art
is not mimetic. The question, however,
is what is meant
by
mimetic
in
this
whole
discussion.
In the literal
sense,
there
can
be no
doubt
that Collingwood
is right. But the following
observationmay be
made. Collingwood
himself has shown us that mimesis
may have two
meanings:
imitation
and
representation.
Socratesmay mean by
mimetic
narrativehere a narrationin which one representsneself as someone
else,
and
by simple
narrative
a
narration n which
one does not so re-
present
oneself.
If
this interpretation,or something
ike it, hasany merit,
it
would mean
that Socrates s
here using
,dpuaLg
n a specialised
rather
than
in a
general
sense. Or, should this appear to
be over-subtle, we
might saymerely
thatSocratesby his own statement
has not yet
worked
out
the details of his
argumenthere,
and so that the details concerning
mimesis
will
receive
their full
treatment in Book
X.2 (It is this which
Collingwood,
as we shall
see,
wants
to deny.) Now
the question
whether
there
is
any reason
to
subject this passage
o what
may look like casuistry
I
392
d
s
ff.
2
See
394
d
7
ff.
138
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cannot be answered until we
make
up
our
mind
about what is
said
in
BookX. If the literalreadingof the passage n Book III s consonantwith
Socrates' inal
position
in Book
X,
then there is no
problem
and
Colling-
wood is
entirely right.
I will now
show, however,
that
this
is
not the
case;
that the literal
reading
in Book III is
contradicted
by
the
literal
reading
n Book
X, despite
Collingwood'sclaims. This is enoughfor
us
to reject Collingwood,
but
it is not
enough
for
us
to
understandPlato.
I
can
only
show here that either some such
interpretation
as
I
have
sug-
gested
is
required,
or
there is
a
clear-cut
contradiction n the Republic:
whether
it is or is not susceptible of resolution
on a
deeper level,
on
this alternative,I cannot now enter into, but hope that my analysiswill
contributesomething
to
sharpening
he
question
involved
and
exhibiting
those of its
complexities
which
are blurred
by
Collingwood.
According
to
Collingwood,
an
unprejudiced eading
of Book X
in Greek (he rightly mistrusts translations) hows
that Socrates (again)
distinguishes
between mimetic and non-mimetic
poetry,
and,
in
this
severer
context,
nevertheless
banishes
only
mimetic
poets
from
the
city.
This is
simply
not correct.
For, by following Collingwood's
advice
and looking at the Greek text,
we find that Socratesnow explicitly
definespoetry as mimetic:
(Pau
X'
M
9cxpau)xcp
uyyLyVO4eVvJ
9PaXa
ywvva
[
LLlrnT)16X.
VEotxev.
T6Trepov,v
3'
Cye?,
xa
rv
6-V
iovov,
-
Xod xata
qvV
&XOi5v,
'v
8-
Trol'atv
vvop'c4opev;
Etxo6
y',
e,
xal
raufv.,
In
other
words, poetry
is
explicitly
defined as
imitation
by
sound
xoata
r-Jv
&xoiAqv.
his passage is never cited by
Colling-
wood, although it is crucial for understanding the passages to
which he
does
allude.
It
is
especially puzzling
to find this reference missing, in the
face of a sudden burst of Greek
quotations: he does cite, in a learned
footnote, two passages before ours and three after it (6oo e
5;
6o
I
a 4;
6o6
a
6; 607 b 2,6) where
he says that poetry is critically discussed
without being specified as representational
-
i.e. mimetic
-
poetry.
Collingwood says: In every
case except one, the qualification
is obvi-
ously implied in the context. (Little wonder, we may interpolate,
in light
of
the definition of poetry just noted.) The one exception
(607 b
6),
though a very interesting passage, is not one that affects the present
dis-
cussion.
2
Collingwood's accuracy
becomes further suspect
when we
note that at 6oo e g, poetry
is specified as mimetic, and his
argument
I
603
b
4..
I
P.A.,
p.
48,
p.
2.
139
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hopelessly
confused
when
we further
observe
that
at
607
b
2-6
(interest-
ingly separated by Collingwood as two passagesrather than given as one),
the whole
passage
is
extremely relevant.
In
it,
Socrates states
that
we
were
right to
expel
poetry
(unqualified) from
the
city,
such
being
her
nature
('rota'rrvJ
oi'aov)
-
i.e.
that
she is
mimetic.
It is
not
nmimetic
poetry
in
opposition
to some other
poetr),
which
is
being
expelled, but
rather
poetry
which
is
being
expelled because it is
mimetic.
This
is
clear
from
Socrates'
allusion to the
long-standing quarrel
between
philo-
sophy
and
poetry.
As the
whole
argumnent
hows,
the
quarrel
is over
the
claim to
knowledge.
And
poetry,
since it
merely
imitates,
does
not,
ac-
cording to Socrates, knou about the things which it imitates. Poetry's
nature
is
mimetic;
as
such,
it
makes
a
false
claim to
knowledge,
and
so,
as
partisans
of
philosophy,
we
nmust
expel
it
from the
city.
This
issue
will
shortly be
raised
again.
Meanwhile,
let us
notice one
last
passage which
Collingwood trans-
lates within the
laws
of
grammar,
but in
such a
way
as is
not
only not
required
by the
sense
of the
words,
but
which is
incompatible
with
Socrates'
argument.
At
607
c
5,
Socrates
says
that
pleasure-producing
poetry and
inmitation will
be
accepted
once
miore if
it has
arguments
to
defend itself from the charges brought against it. Collingwood translates:
poetry for
pleasure's
sake,
i.e.
representation.
The
Greek
reads:
7rp68
'8OVv
ltTjLX
xxat
L
L[)at.
Now, xcd
can
mean
id est,
but its
usual
meaning in such a
context
is
and ;
there
would be
no
reason
to
think of
id est
here,
given
the
whole
context,
unless
we
were
trying
to
read
Collingwood's
interpretation
into
the
text. But
this
interpretation
has
now
been
disproved,
with
respect
to
Book
X.
It
should
now
be
evident why I
was
worrying
the
meaning of
,uuvcaL4
in
the
passage
summarized
from
Book Ill.
If we
may take
the
argument
just
preceding as established, then, as I pointed out, we must either face a
contradiction in the
Republic,
or
resolve
it,
either
very
subtly or
very
simply.
I
have
suggested
a
simple
solution,
and
must let
the
matter
stand
there.
I
turn
now to
a
second
point at
which
Collingwood is
apparently
justified in
part
of
his
interpretation.
At
607 a
ff., Socrates
seems
to
contradict the
whole
surrounding
argument by
saying
that
some
forms of
poetry
will
be
allowed
to
remain
in the
city.
The
Greek
sentence
reads:
xP...
eL8eVOL
8'
&rr
oaov
[.ovov
[IJvou4 Ozozi
xac
yxcop
'rozc
MyOoZ 7M0CWX rXpOC&CxTr&OvCI
7ro'?LV.
i.e.,
one must
know
that
of
poetrv
only
such
hymns to
the
gods and
I40
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encomia
to the
good
may
be admitted to
the
city.
What
this
means
is
that poetry as an independent endeavor has been banished from the city;
certain poems
which are consistent
with the moral
and
political
character
of
the
city
- in
other
words,
which can
serve
as
propaganda
-
will
be
retained.
There is no real contradiction here, although I grant that
the
language
is
confusing
because Socrates has
not
bothered to invent
a new
term
for
propaganda-art,
which is
certainly quite
different
from
the art
which
has been expelled.
But let us recall the passage in the Laws,
where-
in the Athenian
stranger says
that the laws of the
city
will be its
lyric
poetry.
I
It is in this sense that
the
present passage
must be understood.
The nature of poetry, as practiced by unregulated poets, which caused
it
to
be
banished from
the
cit),
is
perfectly
useful when
it
is
employed
as
a
tool of
the
city.
Most
important, however,
is
the fact
that,
by
re-
taining some poems
within the city,
it is not
thereby
argued that
these
poems
are no
longer
mimetic.
At the
very least, Collingwood
would
have
to admit
that,
if he is
right
about Book
III,
then he is
wrong
about
Book
X,
since the
poems
retained,
as encomia to the
good
and
hymns
to
the
gods,
obviously satisfy
the criterion
of
good
imitative narrative laid
down
in Book
III.
So far, then, we have discussed Collingwood's analysis of art as XVJ,
and
of Plato's
theory
of
the
mimetic nature
of
art.
In the
arguments
to
be
considered
next,
these
errors
are
combined in
a
way
which
generates
further
misinterpretations,
and
which culminates
in an omission of
what
is Plato's major
point
with respect to art. Collingwood says
that Plato
and Aristotle
took
it
for
granted
that
poetry,
the
only
art which
they
discussed in
detail,
was
a
craft,
that
is,
a
craft
like cobbling,
carpen-
tering
or weaving. The poet is a kind of skilled
producer; he produces
for
customers;
and the effect
of
his
skill is to bring
about
in
them certain
states of mind, which are conceived in advance as desirable states. The
poet,
like any other kind of craftsman, must
know what effect
he is
aiming at, and must learn by experience
and precept, which is only
the
imparted experience
of others, how to produce
it 2. This view of art is
said
to be the
predominant, if not the only,
Greek view: There are
suggestions in
some of them,
especially in Plato, of a quite different
view, but this is the one which
they have made familiar, and upon
which
both the theory and the practice
of the arts has
for the most part rested
down to the present time. 3
I
Laws,
8
ii
C-D;
817
B ff.
2
P.A.
p.
i8-19.
3
Ibid.,
P.
I9.
'4'
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There
are
at
least two
thingsradicallywrong
here.
First: let
us assume
that the Greeks hadonly one majorview of art
-
namelythatit is
yT
j.
Here
Collingwood's rigid translationof the term leads him to
misread
the
Greeks. It is the
point
both
in the Apology
nd
in the
tenth
book
of
the
Republic,
o
mention the
most
famous
instances,
that the
poet,
as
an
imitator,
s
inferior
o the
craftsmanwho makes things
like
shoes and
tables,
or to
the
skilled general who leads men
in action, or to the
political leader, and so
forth. We have only to
turn to the Greek text
to
see what
the
case
is.
Let
us
take
it
as
established
by
our
previous
argument
that,
in
the last
book of the Republic,all poetry is mimetic.
Socratesexplains, in termsof his theoryof Ideas,that the user of an art-
ifice
is
the
one
who
may be expected best to understand
t,
and not
its
maker
(i.e.
the
craftsman
s
Collingwood
uses
the
term.)
But
the
maker
is
carefully istinguishedfrom
he poetor imitator,whohas least knowledge
f
all.
Plato
writes:
ou're
&pOC
?a't 09XL
Oe p0&
OO
CL
0
4
LL'Ltr
7tcpL
6v
av
vuLL[LY
,tp4s x&XBo4
YN
7tOVtpW.
, ,,
-
OUX
?OLXEV.
-
XOCPICgL
v
'o
?'V
`
7r0t4)GE&
AJ1-TLXOq
rpO4
oPECV
srpl
Jv
&v
notj.
In
the rest
of
this
crucial
passage,
it
is
elicited that the imitator,
having
no
knowledge
of
any
value
concerningwhat he
imitates
(rOv
-r
V.L[LYrtX6V
p.ae7v
elaVatL
iLov
X6you
nrpL
xTv vLLteZ-ou) is, in the famous
phrase,
third from
the
truth
(-s
ae
81&
LuteutaOL
oUTo oi
7rEpl
v
pio pv
Ti
6Tv
LV
Mno-rTq
&?)rn0OLmx;).ollingwood collapses two
distinctions in reporting
on Plato's
theory
of
art. First,
it
is
true that the
word
for
poet
(7otoLrrq)
means
maker,
being
derived
from the
verb
to
make
(noLmw).
But
it
is
quite
clear
now
that
Plato
wants to distinguish two kinds of making, that
of
the
craftsman and
that
of the
poet. Second,
and related to
this,
both
the poet and
the
craftsman
are imitators, but
again they practise two
distinct kinds
of
imitation.
The
craftsman
(or the
man
of action)
imitates
the
Idea,
whereas the
poet
imitates
the artifact
or the action.
The
collapse
of these distinctions
probably
follows from the initial misinter-
pretation of
exvzY.
Further,
the whole issue of art
pivots upon
the central problem
of
knowledge.
Plato is
not
writing (nor Socrates speaking) as an aesthe-
tician,
but as
a
political philosopher. The question
here, then, is of the
political
function
of
art,
and
ultimately, of
its
epistemological status.
I
602
a 8
if.
142
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As
the
reference,
cited
above,
to the ancient
quarrel between
philo-
sophy and poetry makes clear, and as all of Socrates' discussions of art
support,
the artist is subject
to the delusion that
his
r6yy-
or
making
is
equivalent
to the
possession
of
knowledge,
and this is a delusion usually
shared
by
the artist's
audience.
Since,
from Socrates'
viewpoint,
the
artist does
not
know,
and rather
tends to
corrupt
his audience because
of
the
persuasiveness
and
pleasantness
of
art,
he must
be
expelled
from the
best
city;
art will be
practiced
now
by
the
guardians
or
priests
in accord
with right reason.
I
Nowhere does Socrates suggest
that
craftsmen
(as
such)
should
be
expelled
from the
city;
it is the
poet
or artist
who must
go, and for the reasons given. The poet's lack of knowledge makes his
t&epv-
olitically
dangerous
in a
way
that
the
texv- of
the
craftsman
is
not;
even should the
craftsman,
who
is
also
an
imitator,
be
subject
to
the delusion
that he knows
by imitating,
he has not
got
the
power
of
persuading
his fellow
citizens
of
this
error.
Who
would take seriously
a cobbler's
claims that cobbling
is really philosophy? But that
the poet's
claims are very, very
seriously regarded,
we need
not take
Socrates'
word;
we have
only
to consider
the role
of the artist in
contemporary
society.
Thus far I have tried to separate the r?yvy of the craftsman from that of
the
artist.
But
there
is
a
second
difficulty
here.
The
view that art
is
a
Texv1
in
any
sense
is
by
no means the
only,
qr
even the most
exclusively
important,
of the views
present
in
Plato's dialogues.
Equally, perhaps
even more famous,
and
in the
long run
at
least
as influential, is
the view
that
art is
not
a
-rXywv'
t
all,
but rather
divine inspiration.
This
theory
is
developed
in
the Ion. It
is
related to the preceding theory
with respect
to epistemology:
once again
it will emerge that
the artist has no real
knowledge.
In
interrogating the rhapsode
Ion, Socrates
proceeds to
develop the argument that, in order to judge speeches about things, we
must first
be experts about
the things themselves
2
Poets
-
and rhap-
sodes
-
speak of
many things, about
none of which they
are expert.
When we
want to
know about medicine,
we consult a doctor;
when
we
want to
know about war,
we consult a general,
and so on.
But we never
consult the poet about these
things, even when
he imitates perfectly
war
or sickness.
And should we wish
to know about poetry
itself, we
I
See Phaedrus
271 C ff. for a
description of how to
speak and
write
'reXvLxtq;
one
must know the
different
naturesof the men &
the kinds of argument
o
which
they will
respond, when to speak and when to keep silent, etc. In other words, one must be a
philosopher.
Compare 277 B-C.
2
Ion,
S3
b
ff.
I43
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would
consult,
not
a
man
who is
a good
reciter
of
Homer,
for
instance,
but one who knows about poetry as such, by skill and systematic
knowledge
(t6Xwvjn
oc ia
npv).I When
we do
interrogate poets on
the
matters
about which
they write,
we findthat
they
do not
understand
them
(as
Socrates
recounts
in
the
Apology).How, then,
do
poets make
poems.?
t
cannot,
as
we
have
just seen, be by
rxv,
for
then
they would
know
the
things
which
theyareable to describe. (It
is now
assumed hat
a
reXvLrq
as some knowledge about his production, probably
what
is
called
secondary
knowledge
in the
Republic
not true
knowledge,
but
better
than that
of
the
poet).
The answer is
this:
Vrowreq
yap OZ
'r
TCI)V
e'7CV
7COLJTL
0. &yaOol
oux 'ex evq
ax'
evoeoL
ovtrs xoaL xCtCx6VoL 7toiV'r
TMUOC
T&
XoXO
AeyoUaL
7Mt0LY)paLo,
OcL
OL
LXOuTC0OLQoL
&yOoO1
JCaurcq.
All good epic poets speakall their beautifulpoems, not from craft, but
through
their
being inspired and possessed, and
the
same
is
true for good-
lyric poets. 2
The
poet must
be E`XcppoV
(out of his mind) before he
can
7roLSLV
(poetise). Thus,
the
poets speak as messengers for the gods (oA
ad
=OL-?yol
ou8E'v
&'
'
epptvi5
dLai trv
Os@v); the god
himself
speaks
(O
OE64
oc4
E'LV O
Xeycow)
3
The view that poets are divinely inspired, then, denies that art is a
r6xvn,
but,
like
that
view, also denies that the poet has knowledge.
The
first
part
of this view
(the second is usually forgotten)
has
had
a
con-
siderable influence in
the
history of aesthetics, both in its orthodox
and
in
its more extravagant interpretations. That Plato does not take it liter-
ally is,
I
think, clear from
the
bantering tone of the whole dialogue.
(This
is of
course not
to
say that it has no significance for Plato.) We
may
note
one
decisive passage. Socrates says to Ion at 53 2 d 6:
M\X&
aoCpo?0
eV
7OtUEaTC
?'V.CZ
O'L Cpaol
xac
U,7txpLTML
xod &v up?L
Oere
rok
7roL .Lcxroc, y&) 8K
oi'rv &Xo6 wro
i
?kyo, otov
CLxbo
L86Y
TV
iVOpCOWOV.
You
rhapsodes
and
actors,
and the
poets whose work you sing, are wise,
but
I
speak nothing
else
than
the
truth, as is fitting to an ordinary man.
That
the
poets
are
not
aoyop6
requires little argument; in the Socratic
doctrine,
not
even
the
philosopher can make this claim. The
aocplO
of
the
poet would,
of
course,
be
that
of
the
gods who speak through
his
lips.
But if
the
poets speak
coypEo,
whether
it is
theirs or not, we ought
to
study
their
divinely inspired poems
rather than the
mundane treatises of
lI
Ibid., 53
2
c 6.
2
Ibid.,
S33
e
S.
3
Ibid.,
S34dff.
144
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philosophers
and other technicians. Nowhere does
Socrates
say that
we are to do this; his instructions are exactly the reverse. As a lover of
wisdom,
we may safely
assume that
Socrates
does
not
then
believe
the
poets
to
speak it,
and so
we are
not to
take
literally
his injunction
that
they are divinely
inspired.
What
he is
really saying,
for
better
or
for
worse,
is that
poets
are
ignorant,
and
that their
ignorance
is
akin
to
madness.
I
This does
not mean that
he denies their
great
gifts,
but
simply
that his
concern
with
poetry,
as in all the
dialogues,
is
epistemo-
logical.
Why
does
Collingwood
never
refer
to this
theory
of art
as divine
inspiration? It would be base to suggest that he omits it because it does
not suit
his
interpretation;
and in
fact,
it could
actually
be
made
har-
monious
with one
aspect
of that
interpretation.
If artists are said to be
divinely
inspired
because
one wishes
to
account
for their ignorance,
and
consequently
for their danger
to society,
we might rejoin
that
this
is
to
misunderstand
the
function of
art
proper,
which,
as
Collingwood
holds,
serves
no
political
end.
This
is one criticism
which
he enjoins
against
Plato,
who,
he
says,
discusses
amusement art,
which
I
have
defined
above
as
the
stimulation
of an emotion for pleasure
in
itself,
not
for release into practical life. And Plato was wrong, he continues, to
think
that the evils
of a world
given
over
to amusement
could
be
cured
by
controlling
or
abolishing
amusements.
2 Presumably
the
error
is
corrected by
Aristotle
in
the
Poetics,
who
speaks
there as
the champion
of
poetry
for
pleasure's
sake,
that
is, representation
(Republic
607
c),
called
for
by
Socrates
at
607
d. Apart
from
the
errors
already
discussed,
it
is
missing
Plato's most important
point
not to see
that
he explicitly
criticizes
all
art,
and
that the distinction between
imitative
and other
narratives
in
Book
III of
the
Republic
rests upon
a different,
more
technical, and so, less general usage of the word.
Thus,
Collingwood
is mistaken in
thinking (a)
that Plato
does not
discuss
art proper
(whether
he does
so correctly
or not
is another
matter),
and (b) that
Plato
wants to
criticize,
of the
false
kinds of
art,
not magic
or religious,
but only
amusement
art. Contrary
to
Col-
lingwood's
assurance,
Plato's
criticism
is intended
to hold
up
against
magic
art,
which,
we
recall,
is
representative
and evokes
specific
emotions
in order to
discharge
them
into practical
life.
In many
ways,
I
It is often
the case that philosophers (such
as Spinozaand Maimonides),
in
attributing
prophecy to the imagination, ind a correspondingdepreciationin the intellect of the
prophet.
2P.A. p. 98.
6 '45
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this is the least comprehensible of Collingwood's errors,
because it is
precisely against the effect of art on the affairs of practical life that
Plato is legislating. It seems safe to say that, if art had no such effect,
Plato would not have expelled it from his
best
city.
Plato may, of course,
have
confused
magical
art with art
proper,
but Collingwood
would
still
be
wrong
in his reading of Plato. Certainly
Plato did not think that art
proper
has
no
consequences
in
practical
affairs.
To decide
whether
Plato
or Collingwood
is
right
would be
the subject
of a
long
and
separate
inquiry. We may not
care
to agree with Plato, but we must see that he
is, as a political philosopher,
a
radical enemy of art, or what comes to the
same thing, of philosophically unlegislated art. This position of Plato's
has nothing
to do with his own status
as
an
artist,
or as
a lover of
and
commentator
on
art.
It has to
do
with
the
place
of art
in
the best
city,
and because Collingwood
does
not appreciate this,
he
is
led to
the
absurd view that,
for
Plato, poetry
is
equivalent
to
shoe-making, to
the
confusion
of
Plato's
extremely complex
analysis
of the
epistemological
character
of
art, and
to a
misunderstanding of the relation between
the
work
of
Aristotle
and
that
of
Plato
with
respect
to
art.
Aristotle
could not
possibly
be the
sort of defender that Collingwood
suggests he is, because Aristotle's subject in the Poetics s quite different
from Plato's subject
in the
Republic.
In
the Poetics, Aristotle is not con-
cerned
to
show
the
epistemological clharacter of art, nor the place of
art
in
the best
city,
but
gives instead
an
analysis (limited, perhaps)
of
the
function
of
art
(through
the
most
important
-
for
him
-
example
of
poetry)
in
actual
cities.
When
Aristotle
comes to discuss the place of
art
in
the best city, as
he
does in Books VII-VIII of the Politics, his posi-
tion
is
in
essence, though
not in
degree, that
of
Plato:
art
has
as
its
end,
not
merely amusement,
but
moral training,
and
as such
it
must
be
sub-
ject
to
political restrictions.
I
will
not
quarrel with Collingwood that,
in
Aristotle's
case,
art is
described as a
t6xv, for Aristotle has no theory
of
art as
inspiration
-
i.e.
as
atechnical.
But
we
must recall
our
previous
discussion of
the
meaning
of
the term
eyxv-.
Aristotle is if anything more
insistent than Plato in differentiating activities according to their func-
tion.
If
we
consider only the doctrine
that
the
end
of
art
is
xVoxapaLq,
t
is
clear
that
the
-rxvn
of
art
is
radically
different from the
-TxV-
of cobbling,
for
example,
which
has
as
its end
the
repairing
of
shoes. When we
turn
to
the
Politics,
we find that
xa&ocpa6L is only one end of art; another
is
instruction (-aLc). Aristotle, contrary to Collingwood, does not
limit
xacOapatc
to
amusement art
or representational drama. Art-
I
See for example the
distinction
with respect to
the use of the flute
at
3
+i
a 38.
146
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forms
may
share
a
plurality
of ends, depending
upon
the context
of
their use. Flute-playingmay amuse,purifyor instruct, andhow we are
to
behave
toward
it
depends
upon
the
purpose
we have in mind.
It
is
with respect
to
instruction,
the same
end
with which
Plato
is
always
concerned,
that
Aristotle
recognizes
the
need
for
regulating
art.
In an
interesting
discussion
about
the
degree
to which
different
kinds
of
art-
forms
are able
to
represent
states
of character,
he even pursues
this
need
with
respect
to
art-forms
which
aye
least
representative
in this
way:
oG
,L~v
&XX'
aov
&LOC(9peL
XX
7t?pi
T9V
TOUcv
OccopEav,
eZ
A
TM
llotu'ao)vo
Oertpsv
rouq
Vtouq,
&XX 'ra
floXuyvc'Tou
x&v
et
'nc
OMor
rc-Ov
ypoacp6cv
~
6v
& ,11roncot6v ,crrv TOLX6O.
But
insofar
as there
is a
difference
in
looking
at
these
works,
let
the
young
not
see the
works
of
Pauson,
but those
of
Polygnotus
and
any
other
painter
or
sculptor
who
may portray
moral
character.
,
And that
Aris-
totle
does
not
limit
representation
to
a
species
of
poetic
drama
is
made
clear
by
the
very
next
sentence:
'v
8=
'ooLZ UL6xeaV Oavoz4
EalL
L,nMra
'Wv
,
O\v
xc't -rot'',
v,
6,
Musical compositions
are in essence imitations
of states
of
characters.
This
is clear. 2
So
far,
then, Collingwood
is wrong
in his view
of
the
intention of the
Poetics,
he is wrong about Aristotle's doctrine of
XaOmpapt
and
he is
wrong
about Aristotle's
doctrine
of
tL?aLq.
This
last
error
must
be
examined
more carefully.
Collingwood
poses
the
question:
did
Aristotle
think
of
art as
essen-
tially
representative?
This,
as we know,
is
Collingwood's
way
of
asking
whether
for
Aristotle
art
is mimetic. Collingwood
answers
himself:
He
makes
it
clear
at
the
beginning
of
the Poetics
that
he did not.
He
there
accepts
Plato's
familiar distinction
between
representative
and
non-representative
art...
3
We
have already
seen that
this distinction
is
not so familiar. But, we may ask, does Aristotle accept this distinction in
the
Poetics
regardless
of whether
Plato does
or not?
Here
is the sentence
which leads
Collingwood
to say no :
e7roWOLEM
'
Xocl
T7q
rpCyc3LzX
7CO'VJaqL
8ae
XC8
XOal
4)
8LOupOLo-
7OL7TLX'
XOd
'r71 OCi'XIJTLXY
q
7C'LOT7
XOCL
LOXpLa'TLXY5
teXcaot
TUy&xvUoaV
OicatL
t1LPL4aCL4'
au
OXOV.
Epic,
tragic,
comic
and
dithyrambic
poetry,
the
majority
of
flute and
lyre music,
are all
in general
mimetic. 4
Now
even
in the
face of the
' POl.
1340 a
22.
2 1340
a
25
3
P.A.
p.
go.
4
Poetics,
1447
a
13.
147
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fact thatapparently
ome forms
of flute and lyre
music
are
not mimetic,
it must be transparently clear that this exception is insufficient
for
invalidating the claim
that Aristotle considered
art essentially
representative.
And there
are no exceptions to
the view that
he
considered
poetry as essentially
representative.
The strongest case
that
Collingwood
could
in
reason have made
would be this: for Plato,
not
all poetry is mimetic;
for Aristotle,
not all music
is mimetic. Were this
the case,
it would not transform
the Poetics
nto a
Defence ... of
Representational
Poetry
I
as though Aristotle
recognized any poetry
which
is not mimetic. As
a matter of fact, Aristotle
asserts
in the first
line that he is speakingof poetry
as such
(7cept
-OLYTLXTJ
ocu> -r
XXL
,tiovdt83v
au'rr),2
all
of which, to repeat, is
mimetic.
We have already
discussed the first part of
Collingwood's
hypothetical
case.
As
for
the
second, two lines
may be taken. The
first,
and admittedly less
satis-
factory,
is that
the exception
noted is too
trivial to take
seriously.
It
would perhaps
make
more sense to say
that
those
forms
of
flute and
lyre
music which
are not
genuinely
artistic
are not
mimetic,
thanto con-
clude that art
is
not essentiallyso.
But fortunately,
this
passage
does not
stand alone
in
the Aristoteliancorpus;
we have just inspected
a
passage
from the
Politics
which Collingwood does not seem to have known, in
which
music
is declared to
be
manifestly
mimetic.
Since this
passage
s
utterly unambiguous,
and
since
Aristotle
never
amplifies
what he
means
by saying
most
flute andlyre music
in
the Poetics,
nor
gives
any
exam-
ples
of
music
which is not imitative, but
only
of music
which
is,
I
submit that
either the suggestion
which I
have made, or one something
like
it
-
stylistic caution,
perhaps
is
the
correct
explanation
f
the
case.
I
do
not
insist
upon
my suggested
reading,but only
that
Colling-
wood's interpretation
of
Aristotle'stheory
of
art
is
as
grossly
inaccurate
as
his
interpretation
of Plato.
But
finally,
it
should be
urged
that,
as
always,
Collingwood
is
provocative
and
valuable
in
his
analysis,
which
notices what
are admittedly
ambiguities
in
Greek
aesthetic theory.
1
P.
A.
p.
sp.
2
Poetics)
I447
a
i.
The
Pennsylvania
State
University
148