cold war international broadcasting: lessons learned

Appendix B

Cold War International Broadcasting: Lessons Learned

BrieWng to the Rancho Mirage Seminar

A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta

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The Cold War Broadcasting Impact Conference, held atStanford in October 2004 and sponsored by the HooverInstitution and the Cold War International History Projectof the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,reviewed evidence from Western and Communist-eraarchives and oral history interviews to assess the impact ofWestern broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe dur-ing the Cold War. Conference participants agreed thatthese broadcasts had an indisputable impact, as docu-mented by external and internal audience surveys, by elitetestimony, and by the magnitude of Communist regime

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countermeasures against the broadcasts. Conference partic-ipants then explored the reasons for this impact, drawingon archival data from the target broadcast countries them-selves and the experience of veteran broadcasting oYcials.

Indicators of Impact

Audience surveys from among over 150,000 travelers to theWest, once-secret internal regime surveys, and retrospectiveinternal surveys commissioned after 1989 all indicated re-markably large, regular audiences to Western broadcasts—about one third of the urban adult Soviet population andcloser to a half of East European adult populations after the1950s. (See Charts 1–6.) These large audiences were furtherincreased by extensive word-of-mouth ampliWcation.

Information conveyed through Western broadcasts wasparticularly important in inXuencing attitude and opinionformation during crises. For example, when the USSR shotdown the Korean airliner in 1983, Western radio stationsimmediately reported the incident while Soviet media re-mained silent for a week. Soviet authorities then launcheda major media campaign in an attempt to mobilize Sovietpublic opinion behind the regime’s position that the down-ing was accidental. By this time, however, many had learnedof the incident, and Soviet culpability for it, from Western


cold war international broadcasting

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radio and were highly skeptical of the delayed Soviet mediacoverage. Outside information was thus more credible thanthe internal version of events and contributed to shaping al-ternative attitudes. (See Charts 7–9.)

As another example, Soviet media remained silent on the1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster until two full days hadpassed and never provided a full report or necessary healthprecautions. Instead, Western radio was the Wrst source onthe disaster for over a third of Soviets queried in a survey,and it was the most complete source for most. Westernradio thus Wlled the gap when Soviet media was slow and re-luctant to report on a major issue. (See Chart 10.)

Other examples of the role of Western radio in contribut-ing to the formation of alternative attitudes, such as theSoviet war in Afghanistan, were presented at the Hooverconference.

Reinforcing this survey data, both Communist and post-Communist elites have testiWed to the importance ofWestern broadcasts. Vaclav Havel, in video greetings to theHoover conference, said that RFE/RL’s “inXuence andsigniWcance have been great and profound.” Former Hun-garian propaganda chief Janos Berecz, in his paper for theconference, said: “I became convinced that Western broad-casts were among the accepted sources of informationamong the youth.” East German spymaster Marcus Wolf, inhis memoirs Man Without a Face, said “of all the various


means used to inXuence people against the East during theCold War, I would count [Radio Free Europe] as the mosteVective.”

Another indicator of impact was the massive resources de-voted by the Communist regimes to countering Westernbroadcasts. They organized expensive radio jamming on amassive scale, spending more on jamming than the West didon broadcasting. They placed spies in the Western radios andattempted to interrupt the Xow of information to themabout domestic developments. They took reprisals againstlisteners and Radio employees. They organized counter-propaganda, while at the same time secretly circulatingmonitoring of Western broadcasts among top oYcials toprovide information not available from their own controlledmedia or intelligence services. Even counterpropaganda hadto acknowledge and thus amplify in local media some infor-mation provided by Western radios. These countermeasureswere a signiWcant drain on domestic resources, yet theyfailed to neutralize Western broadcasts.

Factors of Success

How do we explain the remarkable success during the ColdWar of these Western information programs that, in na-tional security terms, cost very little? We have identiWed


56


nine essential elements, which are listed below, not neces-sarily in order of importance. Our analysis focuses on RadioFree Europe and Radio Liberty, which emphasized satura-tion home-service “surrogate” programming. The Voice ofAmerica (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC), and other Western broadcasters also had signiWcantimpact for many of the same reasons.

First, a clear sense of purpose congruent with the aspirations and

possibilities of the audiences. We knew what we wanted—toconstrain Soviet power (without provoking suicidal revolt),to keep alive hope of a better future, to limit tyranny, and tobroaden the boundaries of internal debate, all in order tomake the Soviet empire a less formidable adversary. Thesewere long-term, strategic objectives, not short-term policygoals. They emerged after some fumbling in the early 1950swith notions of early “liberation,” “rollback,” and “keep[ing]the pot boiling.”

Second, a capability for sophisticated appraisal of the adversary.

SigniWcant Radio resources were devoted—especially atRFE and RL—to detailed analyses of national Communistregimes and the societies they ruled, based on extensive in-formation collection and associated research that drew onWestern press, oYcial Communist sources, interviews withtravelers, and regime opponents within the target coun-tries. A cadre of specialized researchers was developed with


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deep area expertise. This information and analysis functionwas not envisaged at the outset—it was developed at theRadios over time in response to operational need. It be-came in turn a major input to U.S. government and schol-arly analyses.

Third, diVerentiated and tailored programs for multiple audi-

ences among and within the target countries. RFE and RLwere saturation home services with something for everyone(although RL focused more on elites and the urban intelli-gentsia; RFE more on the general population). Balancedworld and regional news was a staple for all audiences. Pro-grams for Communist elites included coverage of conXictswithin and among Communist parties and reports on socialdemocracy in Europe. Programs for non-Communist elitescovered Western culture and intellectual life and, as internaldissent developed, ampliWcation of that dissent. Programsfor general audiences covered everything from agricultureto religion to labor to sports. Banned Western and internalmusic was featured. Willis Conover of VOA introduced ageneration of Russians and Poles to jazz, the RFE Hungar-ian Service “teenager party” program attracted a generationof Hungarian youth to RFE, and Western music attractedlisteners in the other RFE target countries as well. In theUSSR, the Magnitizdat phenomenon introduced bannedSoviet underground music to a wide public.


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Fourth, programs that were purposeful, credible, responsible, and

relevant to their audiences. Events of the day were covered,but thematic programming was important as well (e.g., aseries on parliamentary institutions in a democracy). Com-mentary was included along with straight news and newsanalysis, and audiences were attracted to star-quality com-mentators. It was essential that programs built and main-tained credibility by reporting the bad news along with thegood, for example in coverage of Watergate and Vietnam.Responsible programming was (at its best) calm in toneand (after the early 1950s) avoided tactical advice and espe-cially any encouragement of violent resistance. Program-ming emphasized local developments and was attuned tothe listeners through constant audience feedback obtainedfrom traveler surveys and listener mail and through contin-uous management of quality control.

Fifth, decentralized broadcast organizations. RFE and RLwere the models, with autonomous country broadcastingunits rather than central scripting. Over the years VOA andBBC moved in this direction as well—and gained larger au-diences. Émigré broadcast service directors with intimateknowledge of their audiences, many with prominent repu-tations, were responsible for broadcast content, withinbroad policy guidelines and under American managementoversight.


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Sixth, multi-media operations. Distribution of printed mate-rials supplemented broadcasting in some instances. In theearly 1950s, program content was spread in Eastern Europeby balloon leaXets. Subsequently, leaXets, periodicals,Western books, and locally unpublished texts were distrib-uted (by open mail and by travelers) in target countries.

Seventh, appropriate funding and oversight mechanisms. SuY-cient public funding was provided by the Congress (al-though RFE raised some private funds through theCrusade for Freedom). The CIA covertly (until 1971) andthen the Board for International Broadcasting overtly (after1972) made grants to RFE and RL and exercised Wscal over-sight, working with the OYce of Management and Budget,the Government Accounting OYce, and Inspector Gener-als. The BBC World Service had an analogous relationshipto the British Foreign OYce.

Eighth, distance from oYcial government policies and journalis-

tic independence. The CIA took a laissez-faire approach toRFE and RL—a relationship insisted on by the Radios’inXuential boards and CEOs. After 1972 the Board forInternational Broadcasting (BIB) provided a “Wrewall” be-tween the Radios and the State Department and otherExecutive Branch oYces. The BIB legislation provided for“an independent broadcast media, operating in a manner


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not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives ofthe United States and in accordance with high professionalstandards,” giving RFE and RL considerable journalisticXexibility. Advocacy of speciWc U.S. policies was not re-quired and, in fact, was avoided. The BBC enjoyed similarautonomy in the British context. VOA’s journalistic inde-pendence, aYrmed in 1976 by law in the VOA Charter, wassometimes challenged by administration policy interferenceand complicated by the requirement to broadcast adminis-tration policy editorials.

Ninth, receptive audiences that identiWed with many of the goals

of the broadcasters. Soviet and East European audienceslived in an “information-poor” environment, were subjectto regime propaganda and censorship, and were deprivedof other alternative information. East Europeans wereartiWcially cut oV from the rest of Europe and were mostlypro-American. Soviet listeners were more under Commu-nist regime inXuence, but a signiWcant minority were pro-democratic (or at least proto-democratic) in outlook.

Conclusion

Western broadcasts had a remarkable impact in the USSRand Eastern Europe in the circumstances of the Cold War.


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They reached mass audiences, as documented by travelersurveys at the time and conWrmed now by evidence fromthe formerly closed Communist archives. They reached keyelites, both within the Communist regimes and amongregime opponents. The keys to the mass and elite audienceswere the credibility and relevance of the broadcasts. Gov-ernment mechanisms were geared to providing publicfunding and oversight while ensuring management auton-omy and journalistic independence.

Charts


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chart 1

Weekly Reach of Western Radio in Poland: 1962–1988

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

62 64 66 68 70 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87

Year

% o

f Adu

lt P

opul

atio

n

RFE VOA BBC DLF

RFE

VOA

BBC

DLF


chart 2

Weekly Reach of Western Radio in Hungary: 1962–1988

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88

Year

% o

f Adu

lt P

opul

atio

n

RFE VOA BBC DLF

RFE

VOA

BBC

DLF

chart 3

Weekly Reach of Western Radio in Czechoslovakia: 1963–1988

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

63 65 67 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88

Year

% o

f Adu

lt Po

pula

tion

RFE VOA BBC DLF

RFE VOA

BBC

DLF


chart 4

Weekly Reach of Western Radio in Romania: 1962–1988

010203040506070

62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88

Year

% o

f Adu

lt P

opul

atio

n

RFE VOA BBC DW/DLF

RFE

VOABBC

DLF

chart 5

Weekly Reach of Western Radio in Bulgaria: 1962–1988

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88

Year

% o

f Adu

lt P

opul

atio

n

RFEVOABBCDW

RFE

VOA BBC

DLF


chart 6

Weekly Reach of Western Broadcasters in the USSR: 1980–1990

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

% o

f Adu

lt Po

pula

tion

BBC DW RL VOA Any WR

Any Western Radio

VOA

RL

BBC

DW

chart 7

Sources of Information on the KAL Incident

62

48 45 44

2419

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

AgitpropMtgs

USSR TV WesternRadio

USSRRadio

Word ofMouth

USSRPress


chart 8

Credibility of Media Sources on KAL Incident Among Listeners

and Non-Listeners to Western Radio

1830

52

79

166

0

20

40

60

80

100

Believed USSR Media

Uncertain Believed Western Radio

Western Radio Listeners Non-Listeners

chart 9

Attitudes Toward the USSR Action in the KAL Incident Among

Listeners and Non-Listeners to Western Radio

22

70

31

20

47

11

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Western RadioListeners

Non-Listeners

Approval Uncertain Disapproval


chart 10

First Source of Information on the Chernobyl Disaster

36

28

15

108

20

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

WesternRadio

USSR TV Word ofMouth

USSRRadio

USSRPress

AgitpropMtgs


cold war international broadcasting: lessons learned

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