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COIN: The Way Ahead

Richard J. Campbell

Foreword By: Ryan T. Smith, MAJ, USA

Edited By: Edward A. Herty, LCDR, USN

4 July 2012

Disclaimer: The opinions and conclusions in this report and slide set are that of the author and the authors alone.

They do not represent the opinions and conclusions of NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, or the U.S. Government. Nor do

the represent the opinions and conclusions of any private contracting company affiliated with any of the above

mentioned agencies, offices, or organizations. You the reader and end user are responsible for determining the value

and / or worth of the information contained in this document and the relationship the content has to your specific

environment, position, job, and assigned tasks, duties, and responsibilities.

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Foreword

Ryan T. Smith, MAJ, USA

NATO Training Mission, Counterinsurgency Training Center - Afghanistan

Right now the United States faces some enormous challenges. Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade

(Jenkins, 2010) 1 , a range of asymmetric challenges in as many as 24 different countries (DSB

TF, 2011) 2, an enormous budget deficit with 31.3 % more spending today as compared to a

year ago (Louis, 2012) 3, the possibility of unseen nuclear proliferation, or the misuse of state

sponsored WMDs (Moroney, 2011) 4, military developments in China (OSD, 2011) 5, and the

monitoring of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia (Woolf, 2011). 6 The

United States, like other countries, is also seeing dwindling resources and an ever increasing

population. Right now there are some difficult decisions on the table. This paper looks at just

one of these decisions. Whichever way it goes, in the end, it’s hoped that rational minds, good

leadership, clear facts, and an understanding of the intent are used to shape the way ahead.

1. Jenkins B. M. (2012). Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade. Santa Monica CA, RAND Corporation.

2. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence (2011) (DSF TF). Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations. Washington D.C., Department of Defense.

3. Louis, M. (2012). U.S. Budget Deficit Widened To $124.6 Billion In May. New York City, New York, Bloomberg L.P.

4. Moroney, J. D. P., et. al. (2011). Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program. Santa Monica CA.

RAND Corporation.

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2011) (OSD). Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China. Washington D.C., Department of Defense.

6. Woolf, A. F. (2011). Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union. Washington

D.C., Congressional Research Service.

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COIN: The Way Ahead

On 27 March 2012 Seth Jones, a RAND Corporation associate, testified before the House

Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Mr. Jones

is considered an expert witness by the House Committee. He began his testimony by saying

“Over the next decade, the United States (U.S.) will likely face a range of irregular warfare

challenges” (pg. 2). He went on to say that the challenges would include threats from non-state

actors like terrorists, drug-trafficking organizations, violent global activists, states that would

create irregular challenges, and irregular threats would be caused by weak governments. He

discussed some of these threats in detail, mentioned countries that have problems now, and

named some countries that he thought would have problems is the future. He continued his

testimony by outlining some Irregular Warfare (IW) strategies. The idea of dealing with IW

threats in other countries before the problems spill over to the U.S. is a well known concept.1 He

next talked about the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police model which is being

used in Afghanistan today.

He concluded his testimony by listing four specific “issues that should be considered” (pg.

8). The first issue was U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) be assigned as the lead

for counter terrorism (CT), insurgencies, and other IW threats. The second was that the U.S.

Department of Defense (DoD) should continue improving physical and mental health programs

for soldiers and families. The third issue was, improved training and education for all aspects of

IW. He said this particular area should not only be improved, but expanded, “especially for

conventional U.S. forces” (pg. 9) since he felt training was “ad hoc” at best (pg. 9).

1. The Quadrennial Review (Feb. 2006) mentions how DoD must, “remain vigilant in an era of surprise and uncertainty and prepare

to prevent, deter or defeat a wider range of asymmetric threats.” (pg. 1); The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug. 2006) “provides

study results, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare as introduced /

described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report and the subsequent IW Roadmap.” , The IW Special Study was

requested “via a memorandum approved by the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), Subject: Request

for Irregular Warfare Special study, dated 5 June 2006.” ; The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006) was discussed before the

House Armed Services Committee in 2006. Topics included prevention, and the direct and indirect approaches to IW.

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The last item Mr. Jones suggested was an assessment of inter-agency cooperation and

synchronization. He felt this area could also be improved with observations and lessons learned

(pg. 4, 9).

This report will examine the first, third, and fourth items that Mr. Jones mentioned. That is,

USSOCOM be made lead for IW, improved training and education, and improved inter-agency

cooperation and synchronization. The author of this report believes these three issues are

actually connected. The second issue Mr. Jones mentioned, improved physical and mental

health programs, is outside the scope of this report. There are six specific arguments that

support the first, third, and fourth suggestions. This report will examine the six arguments one

by one and present and discuss the evidence that supports the recommendations. Below is the

first reason why the three recommendations should be adopted.

1. Importance of IW:

For some time now various departments of the U.S. Government and various U.S. leaders

have emphasized the importance of understanding irregular threats and stressed the

importance of understanding counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations (SO). In fact, IW

and COIN are mentioned in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (2009), our

National Security Strategy (2010), the Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint

Operations Concept (JOC) paper (2010), the Homeland Security Quadrennial Report (2010),

the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011), and a recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Notice (2011).2 COIN and SO are also at the forefront of debate. For example, recently

several key individuals discussed the current COIN efforts in Afghanistan and future COIN

2. Historically speaking, terms such as; Irregular Warfare; indirect and direct "approach"; asymmetric threats; deter, deterrence,

interdict, prevent, and disrupt, and nation states, failed states, and non-state actors can be traced back to the following documents:

National Strategy For The United States Of America (2002); Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 2.0 (2005); National

Security Strategy Of The United States Of America (2006). These documents introduce the language and terms that are found in

later documents such as the ones mentioned on page 2 of this paper and referenced in note 1.

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challenges before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Some of the individuals

that testified were General John Allen (2012), Admiral William McRaven (2012), and Colonel

Robert Killebrew (Ret.) (2012).

When the documents and testimonies mentioned above are examined we can see why IW

and COIN are important and why and how they tie into U.S. policy and strategy. For instance,

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was cited in a January 2009 Foreign Affairs article. He said,

“As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing

counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations” (CCJO,

2009, pgs. 28-29). Institutionalizing COIN and SO related skills means, permanent schools and

courses, with core competencies, for all levels and grades, based on sound doctrine. The 2010

National Security Strategy repeats this theme. For instance, the document says; “We will

continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,

stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats” (pg. 14). In the DoD

publication titled Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats JOC (2010), the relevancy of

COIN and SO for IW is also stressed and explained in more detail. The JOC paper mentions

“five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a

coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare

(UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO)”

(pg. 4).

The Homeland Security Quadrennial Review (2010) discusses “deter and disrupt

operations” as a way to effectively mitigate terrorist attacks (pg. 21). The 2011 National Strategy

for Counterterrorism (CT) also emphasizes the “disrupt and deter” or prevention model that is

addressed in each of the references listed above (pg. 6). The National Strategy for CT further

explains how the CT strategy will focus on a “collection of groups and individuals who comprise

al-Qa’ida and its affiliates” (pg. 3). It says insurgency is seen as a way for al-Qa’ida to advance

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its goals in some countries with the help from other groups, like al-Shabaab. A Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice (2011) titled 2012 – 2015 Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance, also

lists COIN, SO, and CT as “High Interest Training Issues” and explains how DoD “envisions

institutionalizing these areas as core competencies in the joint force to foster effectiveness in

these complex mission areas” (pg. A-1). COIN, CT, and SO all are being used right now in

Afghanistan and are seen as a-part of the larger deter, disrupt, and interdict strategy that is in

place today. During the research phase of this report there was no document that was

examined that countered the idea that COIN, SO, and CT are in important and that training for

these areas should be institutionalized. However, these topics are not embedded as core

competencies and it is unclear why. This is the first reason why USSOCOM should be made

lead in these areas. Next is the second reason why.

2. Current and future COIN challenges:

With emphasis being placed on COIN at multiple levels, one would think that COIN doctrine

and training would be standardized and COIN operations would be problem free. Unfortunately

this is not the case. When COIN operations in Afghanistan were scrutinized by a Defense

Science Board (DSB) Task Force (TF) several important issues were discovered (2011). For

example, the DSB TF was asked to examine COIN Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and “identify how DoD intelligence can most effectively

support COIN operations” (DSB TF, MEMO, 2011). They were also asked to provide information

that would influence investment decisions about COIN ISR. With these goals in mind, the TF

talked with 100-plus senior and mid level officials and representatives from DoD, the intelligence

community, commercial industry, non-profit organizations, and academia who were involved in

COIN, ISR, and IW. They also reviewed current literature on COIN, IW, and COIN ISR. The

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DSB TF report contained observations, significant findings, and associated recommendations.

The DSB TF reported the following nine items;

1. DoD lacks a common understanding of COIN.

2. DoD has assumed responsibility for COIN ISR by default.

3. DoD ISR is narrowly interpreted to mean technical intelligence collection by airborne

platforms.

4. ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with

populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COIN does

not exist.

5. The U.S. Government is not investing adequately in the development of social and

behavioral science information that is critically important to COIN.

6. ISR support for COIN is currently being overshadowed by counterterrorism and force

protection requirements.

7. Increasing the focus of ISR for COIN on incipient insurgencies would provide more whole-

of-government options and reduce the need for major commitment of military forces.

8. New S&T solutions must address the crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination

(PED) and associated communications caused by the deluge of sensor data.

9. New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve our

understanding of COIN environments (DSB TF, MEMO, 2011).

The DSB TF determination DoD had inherited COIN ISR by default since the Department of

State (DoS) had not pursued any type of partnership with any one agency or agencies within the

U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for the purpose of COIN ISR (DSB TF, 2011, pg. vi). There are

16 different agencies that make up the U.S. IC. The responsibility that DoS has to COIN

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operations is though the Security Force Assistance (SFA) program. SFA has four components

which are international military education and training, foreign military sales, foreign military

financing program, and peace operations. These four areas can be broken down further into

programs and operations. They are; Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Foreign Internal

Defense (FID), Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), and security sector reform. The U.S.

DoS is responsible for foreign relationships and DoS establishes the policies for the SFA

program. If U.S. Forces are assisting another country with an insurgency, or stability operations

both of these areas fall under FID, which falls under the SFA program, which is a DoS

responsibility.3

With further research, one might suggest three more reasons why the DoS could not and

therefore did not assume the lead on COIN ISR. The first reason is that DoS does not have the

capability, capacity, or the expertise to plan, coordinate, disseminate, and asses COIN ISR

operations and / or outcomes. The second reason may be based on the fact that even though

the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) develops and oversees the execution of the annual

budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP), 80% of the IC budget is allocated to DoD

(Gaines & Kappeler, 2012, pg. 211).4 The third reason is, each of the agencies in the IC, to

include DoS, have distinct roles to play when it comes to designated intelligence related roles

and responsibilities. The DoS intelligence unit is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research which

concentrates on country and area studies. They look at political, social, and economic issues

and intelligence. An important piece of COIN ISR is Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection,

3. U.S. Code, Title 10, section 2067 and 1208 are the laws that regulate Security Force Assistance. National Security Presidential

Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, and DoDI Directive 3000.5, Military

Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations provides details about stability operations. U.S. Joint

Publication 3-29 (2009) explains Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and discusses how U.S. Forces providing FHA usually do

so in support of either U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or Department of State (DoS). FHA operations could

include simultaneous military, stability, nation assistance, humanitarian, civic, security, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

4. Gaines and Kappeler (2012) also mention the complexity of the current Intelligence Community (IC) roles and responsibilities as

they relate to Counterterrorism (CT) and terrorism related intelligence collection, sharing, production, and dissemination. For

example, each of the 16 agencies in the IC is responsible for collecting, sharing, production, and dissemination of terrorist related

intelligence. No one agency in the IC is solely responsible for these activities (Chapter 8), so there are redundancies and overlaps.

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on a large scale. Conducting HUMINT, as part of a COIN operation, in another country would be

difficult for DoS or for any of the other IC agencies.

During their study of COIN ISR the TF “discerned two imperatives” (pg. 14-15). The first

was that the conflict in Afghanistan should be given top priority and the second was that after

Afghanistan there would be emerging COIN challenges that could be worrisome. They felt these

challenges should be planned for now. The TF concluded that engagement in any particular

future COIN would be a political decision, but felt engagement was a certainty (pg. 14-15). The

TF also presented a list of what they referred to as “Possible COIN Challenges” (pg. 16). The

report explains that the list is not based on National Strategy, but on the possibility of one or

more of the following problems; “economic crises, climate change, demographic pressures,

resource scarcity, or poor governance could cause these states (or others) to fail or become so

weak that they become large targets for aggressors / insurgents” (pg. 16). The TF list of

problems is very similar to the items mentioned by Mr. Jones.

The DSB TF went on to mention that they felt that a weak, failing, or failed state or when a

states is not able “to exercise sovereign prerogatives in important regions, including border

areas” would allow insurgents to gain control in those areas. This point is worth dwelling upon

for just a moment. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in Rethinking Violence, claim that a

“number of leading studies have linked state weakness to a rise in intrastate violence” (pg. 7).

In fact they believe, “empirical finding appears fairly robust: weak, poor, underdeveloped states

are far more likely to experience violence than wealthier states” (pg. 7). 5 Traditional forces are

not able to train, support, or access weak, failing, or failed states whereas SOCOM Forces are.

____________________________________________________________________________

5. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in “Rethinking Violence” cite Fearon and Laitin “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” ; and

Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (Aug. 1998) ; I. William

Zartmen ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder Colo. Lynne Rienner (1995) ;

Robert I. Rotberg, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press (2004) ; M. A.

Kocker, “Insurgency, States, Capacity, and the Rural Basis of Civil War”, Yale University, (Oct. 2007) ; Gaines and Kappeler,

Homeland Security (2012), list http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/guevara.pdf for more information about guerilla warfare.

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3. Added ISR requirements for COIN:

ISR requirements in an insurgency are not the same as ISR requirements in traditional wars.

As stated in the TF report, “all-source and multi-INT intelligence is essential for achieving the

persistent, predictive, activity-based ISR required to successfully counter an insurgency” (DSB

TF, pg. 27). In fact, one of the most perplexing problems in a COIN operation is that no single

intelligence discipline or single intelligence source can effectively dominate the complex

environment. Traditional wars require observation of an area, or multiple areas to discover

enemy strengths, movements, and enemy activities. The enemy can usually be identified.

Sensors and other technological devices like low level and high level aerial observation

platforms play an important part in this process. As compared, COIN operations require a focus

on the entire population because it is not easy to identify the enemy. In COIN the entire

population in an area with an insurgency is suspect and it’s difficult to weed out the few

insurgents from the general population. The enemy could be anyone such as, taxi drivers,

elected officials, shop owners, school teachers, farmers, healthcare workers, power brokers,

host nation military and police, visitors from other countries, business men, and intellectuals and

so on. Therefore, information and intelligence about the country’s economy, social-structure,

culture, politics, the military and police, history, trends, social hierarchy, gender issues, racist

agendas, governance strengths and weaknesses, and social behavioral as well as movements,

locations, activities of individuals and groups is needed. This complex, multi-layered, in-depth

approach from many perspectives is unavoidable in COIN. Because of these characteristics

HUMINT is the best method to collect information, but a blending of intelligence is needed to

provide “activity-based intelligence” (DSB TF, pg. 27-29). USSOCOM forces are taught the

importance of information collection and HUMINT, traditional forces are not. As an example,

currently there is no standardized format for the collect of information in doctrine. This is another

deficiency. Appendix A contains a recommended format.

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4. Difference between traditional war and COIN:

Another reason why USSOCOM should be made lead is based on the differences between

irregular and traditional warfare surveillance. Slide number 7 of the slide set has a chart from

the DSB TF report (pg. 28). On the left side of the chart is a list of topics. The center column of

the chart shows how these topics manifest themselves in traditional warfare. The right column

shows how these topics manifest themselves in IW. Please take a moment to review the chart

and compare the two columns of topics and see how they differ. It is clear that the two types of

warfare are not the same. USSOCOM specializes in most aspects of IW surveillance.

5. DOTMLPF 6 solutions standardization, QC and QA:

The U.S. Army COIN Center is located at Ft. Leavenworth Kansas and is subordinate to the

Irregular Warfare Center Fusion Cell which is subordinate to the U.S. Army Combined Arms

Center (CAC). TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (2011) defines U.S. Army training policy and gives

CAC the following responsibilities:

“CAC designs, integrates, and oversees implementation of leader development and the

Army Leader Development program; executes Mission CoE and proponent responsibilities;

develops and integrates current and emerging doctrine; and supports and integrates Army

training and education support across all cohorts in support of Army ARFORGEN to

dominate in FSO in a JIIM environment” (pg. 13).

This would include evaluation, standardization, Quality Control (QC), and Quality Assurance

(QA) for COIN related programs of instruction (POI), training support packages (TSPs),

instructor development, and integration of best practices, observations, and lessons learned.

6. DOTMLPF stands for; doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.

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Even though the U.S. has been involved in two major COIN conflicts recently and several in

the past, and even though there is a strong emphasis being placed on COIN knowledge and

application from multiple levels, there are still a number of COIN related areas of concern. They

include COIN foundation documents, COIN strategy, standardized terms and definitions, and

the resultant language that is used to express the commanders’ intent, provide feedback, and

report outcomes. Plus, the role of security force assistance teams, training development,

standardized metrics, the information collection processes, interoperability and synchronization

of COIN strategy, and COIN operations, missions, support, and enablers. Added to this,

descriptive terms like whole-of-government, comprehensive COIN campaign, population centric,

and direct and indirect approach for COIN are being used without any clear doctrine based

explanation, or if you will, reconciliation of the terms with existing doctrine. Many publications as

already mentioned, see COIN as a subset of IW. Some individuals would argue this point.

Inadequate progress in several DOTMLPF areas is the fifth reason why USSOCOM should be

made the proponent of IW.

6. Overlap, redundancies, complexities, oversight and lessons learned:

Another justification why USSOCOM should be made lead is connected to overlap,

redundancies, complexities, oversight, and lessons learned. Since 2007 the COIN Training

Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) has been responsible for teaching COIN to Coalition Forces,

Afghanistan National Security Forces, Ministerial Advisors, AFPAK Hands, and USAID and

Stability Operations Information Centers (SOIC) staff. The two primary courses taught in Kabul

at CTC-A is the COIN Leaders Course (CLC) and District Stability Framework (DSF). One of the

topics emphasized during CLC is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) which is

different for COIN as compared to traditional warfare. The DSF course teaches the methodology

currently being used by USAID worldwide. COIN doctrine today contains little or no specific

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guidance about the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and deliverables in COIN operations

and little guidance about the interoperability between military, stability, COIN enablers, and

support elements. Because of this, it’s difficult to develop COIN related training. The gaps in

doctrine and unclear and confusing guidance in areas that relate to the roles of the military and

support and stability organizations have been researched by CTC-A staff. Several papers about

these topics have been published on the Joint Center for International Security Force

Assistance (JCISFA) website.7

SOIC, as mentioned above, is a part of the Afghan Civil-Military Integration Program

(CMIP). CMIP has a number of different elements within the program. For instance, CMIP

provides oversight and guidance to; the Consolidated Stability Operations Center (CSOC), the

Atmospherics Program-Afghanistan (AP-A), the Human Terrain System (HTS) Afghanistan, the

SOICs in each region, and Unity Net. CSOC concentrates on producing finished intelligence

products, AP-A passively gathers and analyzes atmospheric information, HTS conducts social-

cultural research and analysis, the SOICs provide focused information in support of regional

commanders, and Unity Net supports regional Village Stability Operations (VSO). A DoD Office

of the Inspector General, Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan

(DoD, FOUO, 2012) 8 discusses some issues with the overall program. The report details some

controversies related to training, overlaps, redundancies, complexities, oversight, and lessons

learned.

CAC COIN, CTC-A, and SOIC are not the only organizations involved in COIN in

Afghanistan. Another program working on COIN is the COMISAF COIN Advisory Team (CAAT).

7. COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) documents published on the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

(JCISFA) website include; CTC-A Records of Proceedings for COIN Training Center-Afghanistan Curriculum Review Board (Aug.

2011) ; Murray, M. G. ed. CTC-A Doctrinal Gaps in COIN / Stability Operations (Sep. 2011) ; Murray, M. G. ed., R. J. Campbell

author, CTC-A Analysis of COIN Doctrine, METLs, Training, PowerPoint slide set (Aug. 2011) ; M. G. Murray ed., R. J. Campbell

author (Jan. 2012) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Revision Pre-analysis; Campbell, R. J. (2012) Small Wars and Big

Armies ; Campbell, R. J. and R. T. Smith ed. (2012) DoD Inspector General Response Letter.

8. Depart of Defense Office of the Inspector General, (FOUO) Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan,

Project No. D2011-DINT01-0123.000 (Draft Report, Mar. 2012).

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CAAT is headquatered in Kabul and has teams in each of the regions that advise and assist

regional commands on COIN related subjects. CAAT is made up of both contractors and

multinational military members. The following is a job description for CAAT as taken directly

from their website:

“The CAAT originated in August of 2009 as a result of a request to the U.S. Deputy

Secretary of Defense via the CENTCOM Commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. The intent of the request was to provide COMISAF with a 'directed telescope' that

would help him operationalize his intent for the COIN campaign at the tactical level.” 9

At one point CTC-A provided COIN training to a larger audience. This included Ministerial

Advisors, AFPAK Hands, and SOIC. Currently these three organizations provide COIN training

to their own personnel. This division of effort may be creating problems. For instance, CTC-A

contractors are from one company, SOIC contractors are from four different companies, CAAT

contractors are from two companies, and MAC and AFPAK Hands COIN training contractors

are from separate companies all together. None of these important COIN elements have the

same contracting company, so the training is not the same and CAC COIN does not monitor

any of these training programs for standardization, QC, and QA. Therefore, contractors from

these various companies, may not receive any training at all, or receive training that is

completely different in quality, quantity, scope, and context. Additionally, there are no

established standards for contractors that provide COIN training development, subject matter

expertise, or COIN training and instruction to the military.

Another up-coming issue is COIN integration and awareness training for the DoS worldwide

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, as part of a larger strategic plan. A deter, disrupt,

9. https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/SiteAssets/CAAT_Welcome_page.aspx

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and prevent approach suggests that insurgencies are caught early-on in the proto stage, that is,

before they become full-blown insurgencies. Local police from the host nation and information

about the population are the best preventative medicine at this early stage. Insurgencies are

notorious for having elements of terrorism, organized crime, and opportunistic activity. Again

policing and police intelligence is the best measure to control and defeat these elements early

on. A preventative approach sees drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, human trafficking, and

money laundering as precursors for insurgencies.

For that reason, DoS along with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers program

(FLETC) are establishing several more international training centers to train police and

counternarcotics agents. The COIN piece of this training focuses on the criminal gangs, money

laundering, and criminal patronage networks that support and / or run these underground

activities. At this point, even though it’s already underway, it’s unclear whether the FLETC COIN

training is based on the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), U.S. Military

doctrine, or the Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook (2009) (FOUO)

published by John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. This generates more issues

since the definitions are different and since there seems to be little coordination between the

military and DoS in de-conflicting these documents. The COIN ISR piece and the confusion

between DoS and DoD and the responsibility and oversight of COIN ISR have already been

discussed. These issues need to be sorted out. It is believed that USSOCOM is the best

organization to provide COIN related support, doctrine clarity, training development, and training

at the FLETC programs because of the units’ history and experiences with IW.

6. Complexities

By now the complexities that make up and characterize an insurgency and COIN

operations should be obvious. However, these complexities are worth taking another look at

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from the operational perspective. Theory is one thing and application on the ground is yet

another. Slide number 10 of the slide set provides an expanded look at some of the topics that

have been analyzed, managed, and developed to help with the COIN efforts in Afghanistan.

Each topic very likely could produce many studies and reports which some have, and cost a

considerable amount of money which some have, and most of these topics can take a

significant measure of time to figure out the solution which again some have. The list is by no

means complete. Traditional forces deal with traditional warfare from small scale conflicts to

large scale wars in a capable manner. Traditional forces can and do proficiently deal with

humanitarian crises such as emergency evacuations, and emergency shelter, food, water, and

security needs. However, traditional forces have not mastered the ability to adequately deal with

a small scale or large scale insurgency. Insurgencies require units that can conduct special

types of missions such as IW, SO, CT, and COIN. The complexity of COIN in IW is yet another

reason why USSOCOM should be appointed lead in this area.

6. Oversight & Lessons Learned

Thus far, the topics that have been addressed are; the importance of COIN, Afghanistan,

future COIN challenges, COIN ISR requirements, the difference between IW and traditional war,

lack of progress in DOTMLPF areas, and overlaps, redundancies, and complexities. It is

believed that if there were adequate oversight in these areas, these areas would not have

issues. There is no element, agency, department, section, or center that has reached out to the

COIN community at large and tried to coordinate efforts. In fact it is just the opposite. COIN

elements such as training centers, Civ-Mil programs, and COIN schools have had to examine

the problems and try to fix them basically on their own. With this list of issues the same answer

keeps coming up time and time again. USSOCOM should be made the lead proponent for all

aspects of IW which would include all DOTMLPF functions.

17

What makes USSOCOM a strong lead for IW? Admiral W. H. McRaven, the current

USSOCOM Commander said it the best during his testimony to The 112th Congress Senate

Armed Services Committee (2012). For instance, he pointed out that;

o USSOCOM is unique in that it has agency like-like responsibilities

o USSOCOM is a functional Combatant Command with global responsibilities

o USSOCOM is the lead Combatant Command tasked with synchronizing the

planning of global-operations against terrorist networks

o It provides training and recommend sourcing solutions for SOF forces supporting

Geographic Combatant Commands’

o USSOCOM executes global operations against terrorist networks when directed

by the President or Secretary of Defense

o It is responsible for strengthening the role of NATO SOF HQ and special

operations capabilities within NATO

o USSOCOM is also empowered by unique legislated budget and acquisition

authorities in Major Force Protection Program-11 (pg. 2-3)

Besides having unique responsibilities, USSOCOM is diverse in it’s’ makeup and therefore

versatile. Versatility, or adaptability and flexibility make it well suited for complex one-of-a-kind

missions that characterize irregular threats and IW. Currently there are about 66,100 personnel

in USSOCOM assigned to five different subordinate commands. This will grow to 71,100 by

2015. The largest of the components is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command

(USASOC) which has about 26,000 personnel. It is made up of, HQ USASOC, the U.S. Army

JFK Special Warfare Center and School, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, 75th Ranger

Regiment, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 528th

18

Sustainment Brigade, and the 4th Military Information Support Operations Group. Another

component of USSOCOM is the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command which maintains

about 8,900 personnel. The breakdown is as follows; 2,400 Special Warfare Operators

(SEALS), 700 Special Warfare Boat Operators (SWCC), 700 reserve personnel, 4,100 support

staff, and 1,100 civilian personnel. Air Force Special Operations Command consists of several

Special Operations Wings and two Special Operations Groups. They provide USSOCOM with

Combat Controllers (CCTs), Pararescuemen (PJs), Special Operations Weather Team Airmen,

and Tactical Air Controller Party Operations. The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations

Command (MARSOC) is about 2,500 personnel. MARSOC consists of the Marine Special

Operations Regiment (MSOR), the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions

(MSOABs), the Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG), and a Marine Special

Operations Intelligence Battalion (MSOIB). Another component is Joint Special Operations

Command (JSOC) which is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM. The task of JSOC is to study

special operations requirements, ensure interoperability, and equipment standardization, plan

coordinate and develop joint special operations tactics.

19

Summary:

The following is an excerpt from Vice Admiral E. T. Olson’s testimony to the Committee on

Armed Services, House of Representatives, on September 27, 2006. The hearing was about

Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. Vice Admiral Olson explains what IW is,

he also explains what IW isn’t, and he explains why USSOCOM is “uniquely suited” to lead

many of the IW missions (pg. 3). Please note the testimony took place six years ago.

“The key words in the working definition of irregular warfare are that irregular warfare is a

form of warfare. It is not a list of units that conduct irregular warfare. It is not a list of capabilities

for irregular warfare. It is not a list of weapons systems for irregular warfare.

Instead, it is more an approach. It is a set of activities. It is what we do with the capability

and with the units and the systems, not those things themselves.

Irregular warfare does include aspects of insurgency and counter insurgency, guerrilla

warfare, unconventional warfare asymmetrical warfare and much more. There can be irregular

warfare activities conducted in a regular or a major warfare campaign. Irregular warfare

activities may include direct action and indirect action approaches.

But irregular warfare is certainly not just about a range of military actions or military options.

One tends to think about irregular warfare as something other than direct force-on-force

confrontation between uniformed armies extending to other less kinetic actions by the

Department of Defense, and that is true.

But it is also important to know that irregular warfare activities include many of those

activities that are squarely in the domain of other agencies of our government and in the domain

of coalition forces and coalition nations in a global campaign.

Irregular warfare is clearly bigger than the Department of Defense, and although the

Department of Defense (DOD) does have a key role in leading and conducting many irregular

20

warfare activities, it is certainly not confined to DOD. And even within the Department of

Defense, irregular warfare is much bigger than the United States Special Operations Command,

although United States Special Operations Command has a history and a culture and a maturity

of thought and actions that make Special Operations Command uniquely suited to leading

Defense Department efforts in many of the areas of irregular warfare.

The nine core activities of Special Operations Forces have significant overlap with the

activities of an irregular warfare campaign, those being: counter proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction; combating terrorism; direct-action special reconnaissance; unconventional

warfare; foreign internal defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; and informational

operations; and synchronizing Department of Defense activities for the global war on terror. But

irregular warfare activities, of course, include activities beyond the range of Special Operations

activities” (pg. 3-4).

Six years ago the suggestion for USSOCOM to lead DoD efforts in IW was a bit

controversial. Today, Mr. Jones’s recommendation for USSOCOM to lead IW efforts is not at all

controversial. Demonstrated behaviors, proven accomplishments, and of course time have a

way of proving some ideas more worthy than others. This is one of those ideas.

When the proposal is adopted there will be more work. Not more work for more people in

general, but more work for the people that the decision directly affects. For example, there will

be funding and organizational questions, control issues, and specific tasks, duties, and

responsibilities will have to be identified and defined, and perhaps some laws will even have to

be reviewed. Plus, the decision will create changes in several departments and agencies to

include the National Security Council, DoS, Homeland Security, DoD, USAID, USSOCOM, and

the IC. USSOCOM will have more work on its’ plate, not less.

21

On the other side of the coin, improved interagency cooperation and synchronization will be

a by-product, as well as, improved doctrine, analysis, validation, training development,

dissemination, standardization, and QC and QA. The decision itself will bring with it clarity and

focus, higher standards, and professionally constructed longer-lasting results. It should be

stressed that the intent of the suggestion to make USSOCOM lead is not a political decision.

The intent of the decision is to provide the sharpest minds, most dedicated individuals, and most

advanced techniques in response to a continuum of complex real-world IW related challenges

and threats.

The individual members of USSOCOM conceptualize the intent and understand the

significance of the decision. They have demonstrated in the past with individual and unit

behavior that they will also relish the challenge. A nonbiased examination of the various U.S.

agencies and departments that have been involved in IW for the last six years will in fact

support the recommendation.

In summary, this narrative is right back where it started. Whichever way it goes, in the end,

it’s hoped that rational minds, good leadership, clear facts, and an understanding of the intent

are used to shape the way ahead.

22

Appendix A

The U.S. Army COIN manual FM 3-24 (2006) recommends the use of ASCOPE as a format

to analyze information (pg. 3-3). COIN doctrine currently does not provide a standardized

method for the collection of information. ASCOPE should be taught not only as a method of

analysis, but also as a collection format. The collection, analysis, display, verification, and

dissemination of intelligence are time consuming processes. The ASCOPE format could reduce

this time by presorting a vast amount of information into usable categories. This will also enable

soldiers from the U.S. and other contributing nations, to start collecting information in a targeted

manner from their arrival in any operational area. A standardized collection format for COIN will

also facilitate analysis and fusion, and enhance the use of data-mining search engines /

databases such as CIDNE and Nexus 7. A primary complaint of CIDNE and NEXUS 7 users

and programmers is that the information feed into these search engines and data bases is in

many different formats. This makes it very difficult and time consuming to sort out the good

information from the bad information. Presorting at any level would help immensely.

Population-centric information and knowledge and understanding of the civil considerations,

as they are called in U.S. doctrine, is paramount and cannot be overstated or underestimated.

The lack of a standardized collection format is a complaint that is heard quite often and so far

the issue has not been officially addressed. A solution is the use of ASCOPE as a collection

format. For example, the 5 Ws (who, when, what, where, why, how and how long) can be

utilized for each letter of the ASCOPE mnemonic. This would greatly improve the quantity and

quality of gathered information and presort literally millions of bits of gathered information into

COIN specific categories, saving valuable time and man-power. The following is an example of

the format and explanation (Campbell, 2012, Figure: 1).

23

Area

Structures

Capabilities

Organization

People

Events

Who What When Where Why How & How Long

Figure 1: ASCOPE Collection Format

Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People & Events.

With the ASCOPE collection format each letter of ASCOPE uses who, when, what, where,

why, how and how long. When the ASCOPE format is used, information about the civil

considerations is preprocessed at the lowest level. Every patrol report, AAR, BDA, and SITREP

that contains any information about the civil considerations should report the information in the

same manner. The most important information is up front, the name of the person or persons

involved, when is next, or the time date group, since information in COIN is perishable. Then

details about what occurred, or what was observed, where it happened, why, and how it

happened, and how long has it been occurring. The ASCOPE format is not an algorithm. It does

not have to be followed step by step like a math problem. If there isn’t any information about a

24

certain part or parts of the format, it can be skipped and gathered at a later date. Every section

of format does not have to be filled out every time it is used in the field. The format is flexible. An

extended explanation is next and examples of questions that would be asked while using the

format are presented.

A = Area: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

S = Structure: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

C = Capability: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

O = Organization: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

P = People: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

E = Event: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

A = Areas are localities or physical terrain that have direct impact on the population and its

activities. Examples include tribal regions, police districts, political boundaries, religious

boundaries, territorial boundaries, military boundaries, polling stations, and government centers.

Areas are where the population congregates (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).

Who lives there or uses the area, areas, or physical terrain? Who owns the area? Who moves

through the area? Who will not go through the area? When do they live there? When did they

get there? What are the exact boundaries, limits, or markings, and what is the direct impact on

the population? Where did they come from and where are they now? Why do they live there,

and? Why did they leave the area? How do they secure the area? How long has the area been

used, how long has the population lived there, how long are they expected to stay, and how

long has the area or terrain had a direct impact on the population?

25

S = Structures are existing important infrastructure. Examples include hospitals, bridges,

communications towers, power plants, dams, jails, warehouses, schools, television stations,

radio stations, and print plants. For COIN, some cultural structures may be even more vital,

such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and museums. Analysis of these structures

includes determining why they are important with respect to their location, functions,

capabilities, and application (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).

Who uses the structures? Who built the structure? Who owns the structure? Who provides

security for the structure? When are they used? When were they built? When were they

destroyed? What are the locations, functions, capabilities, and application of the structures?

What are the significance of the structures? Where are they in relations to other structures and

areas? Why are the structures important to one group and not other groups? Why does a group

use them? How long have the structures been there? How long have they been inoperable?

C = Capabilities are key functions and services and include, but are not limited to,

administration, safety, emergency services, food distribution, agricultural systems, public works

and utilities, health, public transportation, electricity, economics, and commerce. Sewage, water,

electricity, academic, trash, medical, and security (SWEAT-MS) are the essential services local

authorities must provide. This analysis must include who is officially and unofficially responsible

for these functions and services (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).

Who is officially and unofficially responsible for these functions and services? What makes

them key functions? When are the capabilities available, functional hours, days, and dates and

so on? What are the limitations of the capacities, capabilities, and limitations of the capabilities?

Where are the capabilities? Why are they key functions? How do the capabilities impact the

26

community or area? How are the capabilities secured? How are the capabilities paid for? How

long has this capacity been available? Or how long has this function not been available?

O = Organizations can be religious, fraternal, criminal, media, patriotic or service, and

community watch groups. They include media, IGOs, NGOs, merchants, squatters, and other

groups. Counterinsurgents must understand what organizations are important (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-

12).

Who, belongs to the group? Who doesn’t belong to group? Who funds the group? When, does

the group meet? What, does the group do or what do they represent? What is the goal of the

group? What is the history of the group? Where, does the group meet and how often? Why,

was the group formed? Why does the group stay together? How, did the group form? How

long has the group been formed? How long have certain people been in the group?

P = People include all nonmilitary personnel in the AOI. Analysts must consider historical,

cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors when examining a given

population. Any affiliations may have tremendous effect on the local population’s support to an

insurgency, including areas where people and insurgents may transit, retreat, evade, or hide. In

addition to sociocultural factors, JIPOE must determine how people communicate, who are key

communicators, and other formal and informal processes used to influence the population (JP

3-24, pg. VIII-12).

Who are those people? Who is that person? Who is that person related to? What, does that

person do? When, did that person move here? When did that person leave here? What is that

person’s position in the community? What tribe is he from? Where did he move from or come

27

from? Why is he the head of the community? Why, is he or she here? How, did he get here?

How did he become the head of the community? How long has he been here? How long has

he been gone?

E = Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect the

OE. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, changes in government, key

leader succession, economic reforms, political reforms, holidays, observances, anniversaries of

key historical events, riots, and trials. Events may spur an increase or decrease in insurgent

attacks. JIPOE must determine when events are occurring and analyze the events for their

political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12).

Who, goes to, or attends the events? Who benefits from the event, or who does the event

support? Who arranged the event? Who supports the event? When, does the event occur, or

how often does it occur? Where, does the event take place? What is the significance of the

event? What is the reason for the event? Where are the boundaries of the event? Where is the

event in relationship to other events or activities? Why, is the event important? Why is the event

taking place where it is and when it is? And how, is the event organized? How is it funded?

How is it provided logistical support? How long has it been a routine? How long does that

event or holiday take?

The ASCOPE collection format can easily be incorporated into the U.S. Army Soldiers Manual

of Common tasks (SMCT), the Universal Task List, and into any MOS task list. The ASCOPE

mnemonic, as an information collection format, helps a person, or unit organize a large amount

of detailed information. The presorted information assists the fusion of the intelligence and it

saves man hours. The format also standardizes civil considerations reporting, so every report is

28

in the same format; no matter how the report is submitted i.e. written, verbal, digits, or

PowerPoint. The ASCOPE format standardizes collection, and incorporates quality control and

quality assurance into training. The format synchronizes collection at the lower levels with

information processing at higher levels.

Observations of commanders in the field in Afghanistan support the idea that an improved

collection process is needed. It has been reported that commanders “appear overwhelmed”

when it comes to detailed knowledge of their Area of Operation (AO) and internal & external,

military and non-military enablers and partners in their battle-space. They simply don’t know

what CF and host nation enablers are available, the role of the enablers, who is responsible for

them, and the capabilities of those enablers. Utilization of the ASCOPE format can be the first

step towards improved Situational Awareness (SA) of enablers and partners in a battle-space.

In particular, under the “O” for organizations, the “C” for capabilities, and the “P” for people. If,

the ASCOPE format is adopted as a collection format.

29

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