Is ethnic prejudice declining in Britain? Change in social distance

among ethnic majority and minority Britons

Ingrid Storm, Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford (University of

Manchester)

Authors' pre-peer review version. Revised version accepted for

publication after peer review in British Journal of Sociology on

25.04.2016.

Abstract: Most literature on racial prejudice deals with the racial

attitudes of the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately. This

paper breaks this tradition. We examine the social distance attitudes of

white and non-white British residents, to test if these attitudes follow the

same trends over time, whether they are driven by the same social

processes and whether they are inter-related. We have three main

findings. Firstly, we show that social distance from other ethnic groups

declines over time for both white and ethnic minority Britons. For the

white majority there are both period and cohort elements to this decline.

Secondly, we see some evidence that social distance between the

majority and minority groups is reciprocal. Specifically, minorities who

experience rejection by the white British feel a greater sense of distance

from them. Thirdly, we find that all groups share the perception of the

same ethnic hierarchy. We see evidence of particularly widespread

hostility towards Muslim Britons from all ethnic groups, suggesting that

Muslims have become a ‘pariah’ group for many British residents of all

1

backgrounds, including a large number who do not express hostility to

other groups.

Word length: 8455 (including title, abstract, references, notes, tables

and figures)

Date of submission: 20.07.2015

Introduction

Ethnic diversity is rising rapidly across Europe, a consequence of both

high immigration and the growth of native born ethnic minority

communities. This historically unprecedented demographic shift has

triggered intense political and academic debate. Concerns have been

raised about the negative impact of rising diversity on social trust and

support for the welfare state (Putnam 2007; Banting and Kymlicka 2006).

The perceived threat to traditional national and ethnic identities has

fuelled the emergence of a new family of radical right parties in Europe

(Mudde, 2007; Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and also generated anxiety

among Europe’s mainstream political elites, with politicians of all

ideological persuasions speaking out about the alleged ‘failure’ of

multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013).

Against this negative narrative, there is growing evidence that majority

group citizens of many diverse countries are slowly becoming more

tolerant towards ethnically distinct groups (Ford 2008, Coenders and

Scheepers 2008; Bobo 2001). Research into observable behaviours shows

2

increased social contact between different groups, including growing

rates of interethnic marriage (Muttarak and Heath 2010). One

explanation for this apparent disjuncture is that the debates around

immigration tend to adopt a relatively short time horizon. The values and

identity attachments of individuals are difficult to change in the short

run, being shaped most strongly by conditions in youth and early

adulthood (Mannheim 1970), but over the long run new generations rise

with different values, producing steady change in aggregate attitudes

through the process of cohort replacement (Inglehart 1997; Tilley 2005).

Earlier research on Britain (Ford 2008), the US (Bobo 2001) and Europe

(Coenders and Scheepers 2003) has provided evidence that this

generational process of racial attitude change and minority integration is

ongoing in countries with long established migrant minority groups.

However, this research leaves several important questions unanswered.

New data collected in 2013 by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey

enable us to take this argument forward in several respects.

Firstly, the existing research on Britain ends in the mid-1990s. Since this

time, Britain has experienced a second wave of large scale immigration,

and an increase in popular anxiety about identity conflict and threats

from minorities. It is not clear whether the period and cohort shifts

towards more tolerant racial attitudes observed in the 1980s and 1990s

will persist in the more polarized contemporary social environment. On

the other hand, the majority of white adults in the Britain of 2013 have

3

grown up with ethnic and racial diversity as an accepted fact of British

social life, and so racial and cultural distinctions may not be as relevant

in drawing group boundaries as they were 20 years ago. We can use this

data to test whether race still functions as a ‘bright boundary’ (Alba

2005) in British society, as earlier research (Ford 2008; Song 2004: 864)

suggests it did in the 1980s and 1990s.

Secondly, we examine the variation in majority reactions to different

minority groups. Researchers have found evidence of persistent ‘ethnic

hierarchies’ (Hagendoorn 1995) in many social contexts. Ethnic groups

who are socio-economically disadvantaged and racially or culturally

different from the majority group are consistently less valued, by

different ethnic groups within the same society (Hagendoorn 1995; Ford

2011; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Other work has suggested that many of

the distinctions in such hierarchies have become ‘blurred’ over time as

groups are accepted as part of the mainstream culture. However, some

remaining ‘bright boundaries’ of differences in race, religious practice

and cultural background can leave some groups outside this mainstream,

and stigmatized by all within it (Alba 2005; Modood 2003; Song 2004).

The new data measures attitudes about a wider range of groups: Black

Africans, East Europeans and Muslims, alongside the Asian and

Caribbean groups asked about in earlier British data. These additional

categories provide a greater range of variation on racial, cultural and

religious difference. Specifically, it allows us to test whether Muslims

have become singled out as a particularly stigmatized or problematic

4

‘pariah minority’ (Saggar 2008; Modood 2003), attracting more intense

and persistent hostility from the majority group.

Research on the integration of immigrant minorities in the US has long

observed that it is a two way process of mutual change and acceptance

(Alba and Nee 1997). Integration requires not only that the white

majority population be fully comfortable having intimate social relations

with ethnic minorities, but that ethnic minorities feel similarly

comfortable about contact with the white majority. This other side of the

social integration issue has not been subject to systematic quantitative

research over time in a British context. Using ethnic minority survey

data, collected in 1993-4 and 2010, we can compare the racial attitudes

and attitudinal change of ethnic minorities with the majority. This offers

us a unique opportunity to extend existing explanatory theories to

include the attitudes of non-white minorities (Song 2004: 874).

Looking at increasing rates of intermarriage among the younger cohorts

of ethnic minorities, Muttarak and Heath (2010) found ethnic differences

even after controlling for generational differences and the ethnic

composition of residential areas, with people of Indian, Pakistani and

Bangladeshi background being less likely to marry outside their own

group. Since marriage in the vast majority of cases will reflect the

preferences of both parties involved, it is hard to know whether the

trends are driven by greater white resistance to marrying into South

Asian minority groups, or vice versa. It is also possible that these

5

processes are related: with the attitudes of the minority reciprocating

those of the majority. We will test this possibility, observing whether

experience of rejection by the white majority, through racial

discrimination, increases minorities’ hostility to the majority group.

Theory and hypotheses

1. Why should social distance decline over time and between

generations?

Interethnic prejudice and ingroup favouritism are cognitive shortcuts for

quickly judging the risks and potential rewards of associating with

someone one has never met. Research in social psychology shows that

prejudice can be reduced by intergroup contact, but also that this

requires some initial willingness and trust (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and

Tropp 2009). Attitudes to social contact with outgroup members should

thus be a good indicator of prejudice more generally. In this paper we

focus exclusively on interpersonal social distance, and more specifically

on acceptance of an in-law from an ethnic out-group. This question is

strongly associated with other social distance measures (Pettigrew and

Meertens 1995), and shows that the same patterns and trends in Britain

as accepting an ethnic minority as one’s boss (Ford 2008).

We expect four main mechanisms to reduce interethnic social distance in

Britain since the 1980s due to four main mechanisms. Firstly, the non-

white ethnic minority share of the population increased from 3.9 per cent

in 1983 to 11.9 per cent in 2013i (OPCS 1985; ONS 2014) both through

6

immigration and a steady increase in the size of the British born ethnic

minority population. Interpersonal contact between ethnic groups is

hypothesized to reduce anxiety about ethnic and cultural difference and

increase empathy for people from different ethnic groups to oneself.

Secondly, even those who live in places that are largely unaffected by

immigration will watch television broadcasts, support sports teams, and

read magazines that now more frequently reflect ethnic diversity as an

established part of British cultural and social life. Thirdly, participation in

higher education has expanded rapidly in the UK since the 1960s, and

education is associated with a reduction of prejudice (Coenders and

Scheepers 2003; Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008: 271). Fourthly,

there has been a general shift in norms and values over this period, and

blatant racism has become less socially acceptable. Compared to the mid-

20th century there is almost no cultural, intellectual or elite political

support, for discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (Ford 2008). This

previous research shows change to have continued over time as a result

of both period and cohort effects. Thus, our first hypotheses are that:

(H1a) white social distance to ethnic minorties has continued to decline

over time from the 1980s until the 2010s

(H1b) social distance between the white majority and ethnic minorties is

lower for cohorts born in the 1980s and 1990s than for previous

generations.

7

2. Why might Muslims be singled out?

Islamophobia, or majority group hostility directed particularly at Muslim

minorities, has become a growing concern in developed democracies

(Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Despite their ethnic, national and religious

diversity, Muslims may be singled out for particular hostile attention due

to both cultural and socio-demographic differences which set them apart.

The first cultural mechanism is the association between Islam, religious

fundamentalism and violence. Terrorist acts by Islamist extremists, such

as the 11 September attacks and the Madrid and London train bombings,

have increased the salience of Islam in Europe during the 2000s, and

inspired narratives portraying Muslim religion and culture as violent and

threatening, both physically and symbolically, to Western civilisation and

values. Muslims in Britain are also on average more religious, and have

more conservative social norms on gender and sexuality than the

majority (Field 2011). Negative views to Muslims can therefore also stem

from a perception that Muslims are opposed to liberal secular Western

values and lifestyles (Werbner 2005: 8).

A second issue is the distinct socio-economic status of Muslim minorities.

Britain's Muslim population tends to concentrate in relatively deprived

areas, and like other ethnic minorities, have lower social mobility than

average (CoDE 2014). The Muslim population also tends to be more

residentially segregated than other ethnic minority groups. The

combination of high segregation and concentration in poor urban areas

8

has inspire a narrative of Muslims as unwilling or unable to integrate into

mainstream society, despite their mobility patterns being driven by

similar social and economic factors as those of other ethnic and religious

groups in Britain (Finney and Simpson 2009).

From this we would expect that:

(H2a) members of the white majority will express more social distance to

Muslims than to ethnic minority groups

(H2b) the difference between the social distance to Muslims and social

distance to other ethnic minorities is greater among the cohorts coming

of age around 2001.

3. Are minority perceptions of social distance shaped by the same

mechanisms as those of the majority?

As outlined in the introduction, we look at the social distance felt by the

ethnic minority groups when faced with a possibility of acquiring an in-

law from a different ethnic minority, or from the white majority group,

with the aim to test four hypotheses.

The first expectation is that minority groups share an ethnic hierarchy of

preference with the majority (Hagendoorn 1995). All groups have a

preference for social contact with members of their own group. This is

followed by the white majority, whose status is the highest in the ethnic

hierarchy; the willingness to have an in-law from other ethnic minority

groups then follows the same status ordering for all groups, including the

9

majority. Such consensual ethnic hierarchies have been found in a

number of countries including the Netherlands and former Soviet

societies (Hagendoorn 1995), Sweden (Snellman and Ekehammar 2005),

Canada (Kalin and Berry 1996) and the US (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Hagendoorn (1995) proposed an inter-group differentiation mechanism

to account for this pattern. If a minority group perceives another group

to be lower in the status hierarchy than they are, their resistance to

social contact with members of that group should increase, as such

contact could be a risk to their own status. In contrast, contact with

groups who are perceived to be higher in the hierarchy is seen as status

enhancing, and will be less resisted.

(H3a) Ethnic hierarchies: all minority groups will prefer intra-marriage,

followed by in-laws from the white majority and with the Muslim in-laws

as least desirable.

In addition to status maximisation, another mechanism that can drive the

formation of ethnic hierarchies is cultural distance. It has been shown

that some immigrants and minority group members are more welcomed

(Ford 2011) and assimilated faster into their new societies (Maxwell

2012) than others. The literature on New Racism argues that although in

the past race was a more salient differentiator between groups, cultural

difference has become the more prevalent justification for prejudice

(Pettigrew and Meertens 1995: 59). South Asians, being culturally distant

from the white British due to greater differences in religion, language

10

and social norms, may have become more likely to be rejected by the

majority (Maxwell 2012). Cultural distance may also be a relevant

mechanism for how ethnic minority attitudes to the majority are shaped.

As a result, we expect that

(H3b) Cultural distance: South Asian groups, compared to other ethnic

groups, will feel a greater sense of social distance from the white

majority and other ethnic groups.

The mechanisms of status maximisation and cultural distance that

underpin the consensual ethnic hierarchy both make assumptions about

how the attitudes between majority and minority perceptions of social

distance are related. There are two possibilities here. Firstly, as white

prejudice towards ethnic minority groups declines, minorities may be

more willing to engage in social contact with the majority in a reciprocal

manner (Kalin and Berry 1996). This would narrow the distance from the

majority group, but not necessarily between different minority groups. A

second possibility is that the same underlying social trends drive declines

in prejudice for all groups regardless of their position in the ethnic

hierarchy. Education and experience of diversity should diminish younger

whites’ sense of distance from other groups; we can expect the same

effect for ethnic minorities. As minorities experience educational upward

mobility, and the British born make up an increasingly larger share of

young ethnic minorities, we can expect that they too will become more

tolerant, cosmopolitan and open to other cultures.

11

(H4a) Reciprocity: ethnic minorities’ social distance from the white

majority will decrease with diminishing negative attitudes of the white

majority, and increase with experience of discrimination

(H4b) Parallel changes: generational change and education will reduce

social distance between all ethnic groups: young, British born, and better

educated minority group members will be more open to out-group

contact.

Data and methods

We employ two sets of data to analyse majority attitudes, and two

parallel sets to analyse minority attitudes. In eight British Social

Attitudes (BSA) survey waves conducted between 1983 and 1996, white

respondents were asked if they would mind a close relative marrying an

Asian or a Caribbean (West Indian)ii person. In 2013, these items were

repeated, and additional items measuring views of intermarriage with

Muslims, Eastern Europeans and Black Africans were added.

Our two ethnic minority datasets use comparable questions. The Fourth

national survey of Ethnic minorities (FNSEM) from 1993-1994 and the

Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) from 2010 both asked

questions about intermarriage with other ethnic groups, including other

minorities and the white majority group. (For full details of all the

variables used in the analysis see Appendix Table AI.)

Analysis

12

1. Trends over time

Figure I charts the trend in British attitudes to a relative marrying an

Asian or Caribbean person over the thirty year period covered by the

data. Attitudes were relatively stable during the 1980s, with around 50

per cent expressing opposition to intermarriage with either group in each

of the first four time points. Aggregate opposition then declined

considerably in the 1990s, falling in each of the three time points, and

declined again in 2013. Roughly half of the opposition to intermarriage

recorded in 1983 was gone by 2013. However, the evidence suggests

that the pace of decline has slowed. Opposition fell from c.55 per cent to

c.35 per cent in 13 years between 1983 and 1996 (about 1.5 percentage

points per year), and then to c.25 per cent in the 17 years from 1996 to

2013 (about 0.6 points a year).

There is very little difference in the aggregate trends in attitudes towards

the two ethnic minority groups. Further analysis (Appendix Figure AI)

indicates that the change in social distance to Asians and Caribbeans can

be attributed to both period and cohort effects. Each younger cohort is

more tolerant than the last, but there is an additional decline in social

distance over time within each cohort, supporting hypotheses H1a and

H1b.

<Figure I>

<Figure II>

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2. Cohort structure of majority group attitudes

Figure II shows the distribution of opposition to intermarriage with five

groups across birth cohorts in the 2013 BSA data. The overall

generational shift towards acceptance identified in earlier analysis (Ford,

2008) is seen here for all five groups. In every case, opposition is highest

amongst the oldest, pre-migration, cohorts and declines in a more or less

linear fashion as we move to younger cohorts. While more than a third of

the oldest cohorts express opposition to intermarriage with each ethnic

minority group, less than one in ten of the youngest cohort (those born in

the 1990s) express opposition to any group except Muslims.

Reactions to the five groups asked about do not suggest a clear or

consistent ethnic hierarchy: Social distance from four of the groups is

rather similar, particularly amongst respondents born in the 1950s or

later. Only the oldest cohorts show greater opposition to the non-white

groups than to Eastern Europeans, suggesting racial difference is salient

for them, but is not so for younger cohorts. However, there is clear

evidence of much greater social distance from Muslims than any of the

other groups, supporting the idea that Muslim religious and cultural

distance functions as a ‘bright boundary’. This distinct reaction to

Muslims also shows a generational dynamic - it is very intense amongst

the oldest cohorts: over two thirds of those born in the 1940s or earlier

oppose a Muslim in-law. Opposition then falls steeply amongst younger

cohorts, with evidence of convergence towards other ethnic groups.

14

Opposition to intermarriage with other groups runs at around 20 per cent

for those born in the 1950s, but 55 per cent for Muslims. Among those

born in the 1980s, the figures are 10-20 per cent for non-Muslim groups

and 28 per cent for Muslims. There is also evidence of somewhat greater

opposition among the very youngest cohort, the first to grow up in the

post 9/11 and 7/7 environment, but as this group is still relatively small in

our data (as those born after 1995 were under 18 at the time of the

survey) this cannot be taken as conclusive.

To determine which factors seem to be driving the decline in social

distance from ethnic minorities, we run two ordered logistic regression

models with the dependent variables being whether the respondent

would mind a lot, a little or not at all if a relative marries an Asian, or

Caribbean person respectively (See Table AI for details). The results are

shown in Table I.

The first model includes dummy variables for each year since 1991, and

compares them with the 1980s (when attitudes were stable). We also

include gender and a centred variable of birth year, as well as birth year

squared to account for the possibility that the relationship with

age/cohort may be curvilinear.

We test the impact of education on reactions to minority groups

(Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Ford 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008:

271) using details of the formal qualifications respondents have received,

15

with no qualification as the reference category. As prejudice could be

associated with economic insecurity (Bobo 1983), three other

socioeconomic indicators were also included: the Registrar General’s

measure of social class (the only measure available in all survey years),

unemployment, and housing tenure.

Being married and having children have been associated with more

socially conservative attitudes (Tilley 2005). Religious people may be

more concerned about religious differences between spouses (Voas and

Crockett 2005). As previous research (Ford 2008; Storm 2011) found that

Christian affiliation is generally associated with negative attitudes to

immigration and minorities, while regular church attendance is

associated with positive attitudes, we control for both in the model.

The second model includes interactions between birthyear and

educational qualifications and gender respectively, as Ford (2008)

showed a much steeper decline by birthyear in social distance to ethnic

minorities among women and people with higher education, and

including these interactions improved the model fit.

<Table I>iii

A number of key results emerge from this table. First, social distance to

both groups is significantly lower in the 1994, 1996 and 2013 surveys

than the earlier surveys, confirming that there is a sustained overall

16

decline in social distance this period even after controlling for

generational shifts and other social factors (Hypothesis 1a).

The period effects suggest an overall liberal shift across all respondents,

but in support of hypothesis 1b, we also find significant cohort structure

in the attitudes to both groups. The oldest respondents are the most

sceptical of new ethnic minority in-laws, and younger cohorts are

consistently more liberal. However, for attitudes to black Caribbeans,

this cohort trend levels off - those born in the 1980s or 1990s are no

more liberal than those born in the 1960s and 1970s, after controlling for

period (see Figure AI).

We also find significant gender differences - women are less opposed to

intermarriage than men - and educational differences: those with A-levels

are more liberal than those with GCSEs or less, and those with university

degrees are more liberal still. The interaction effects show that the

generational change in social distance to Asians has occurred to a

greater extent for women than men, as was also found in earlier analysis

(Ford 2008). Education appears to have had most influence on the

tolerance of cohorts born between 1930 and 1970. University graduates

led the trend towards social acceptance of interethnic marriage, but for

cohorts of graduates born in the 1980s or later such acceptance is

already near-universal. In these youngest cohorts, acceptance of

intermarriage is a social norm only rejected by those with no educational

qualifications at all and by a shrinking minority even in this group. (See

17

Figure AII for the predicted probabilities by birth-cohort and highest

qualification.)

3. Are Muslims a ‘pariah’ minority?

Muslims stand out in the 2013 data as the only group which still faces

widespread hostility from across the white population (see Figure II).

This supports hypothesis (H2a) that opposition to intimate social contact

with Muslims would be stronger than similar contact with other out-

group members. We also hypothesized that this phenomenon would have

a generational aspect. Young people born in the 1980s and 90s, growing

up amid increased media salience of Muslim terrorism are expected to

have more divergent attitudes towards Muslims and other minority

groups (H2b). To test this hypothesis, and see what other predictors can

explain Muslims’ position at the bottom of the hierarchy, we show the

results of a logistic regression analysis restricted to the data from 2013

(when people were asked about Muslims, East Europeans and Black

Africans for the first time) in Table II. The model is otherwise similar to

the previous analysis (Table I), and shows that the generational

differences in social distance from Muslims are as large, or possibly

larger, than those seen for other groups. There is no evidence that those

born in the 1980s and 1990s express greater opposition to inter-marriage

with Muslims. Instead, the opposite is true.

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Table II also shows that in addition to age or year of birth, attitudes to

Muslims are largely determined by education, which also predicts social

distance towards other minority groups.

<Table II>

Social distance from Muslims is much higher than from any other ethnic

group. This suggests some people single Muslims out, even while

accepting other minorities. We can analyse the drivers of this 'Muslim

penalty' (Heath and Martin 2013), as all those who were asked about

their attitudes to Muslim intermarriage were also asked about either

black Caribbeans or Black Africans. This enables us to identify those who

say they oppose inter-marriage with Muslims, but do not oppose inter-

marriage with one of the black groups. As Table III shows, at least half of

those who said they mind if a relative marries a Muslim, would not mind

if they married the other ethnic minority group they were asked about

(Black African or Caribbean), while only a small proportion of

respondents express opposition to inter-marriage with the black group,

but not the Muslim group.

<Table III>

The logistic regression model in Table IV shows that those who single out

Muslims in this way are primarily people over 30, married and with

some, but not higher, education. In comparison, those who mind both

19

Muslims and Blacks, are older, less educated, and more likely to have an

Anglican or non-Christian religious affiliation. This is consistent with the

earlier analysis and indicates that there is a sizable group of relatively

younger and more educated people, who do not have general high levels

of ethnic prejudice, but who still show considerable social distance to

Muslims. This could reflect perceived conflicts between Islam and liberal

social values (Werbner 2005) related to the on average higher levels of

religiosity and material deprivation of Muslim minorities.

<Table IV>

Figure III shows the predicted probabilities of minding a Muslim in-law

by birth cohort when controlling for all the other variables in the model.

Overall opposition to Muslim intermarriage, shown by the darkest line,

falls sharply between cohorts. However, distinguishing between those

who only mind Muslims, and those who mind both Muslims and black

ethnic minorities, reveals a more differentiated pattern. The oldest

cohorts tend to oppose intermarriage with both groups, suggesting a

generalized opposition to outgroup marriage. Among those in middle age,

opposition to the black group declines, but opposition to the Muslim

group remains. These middle cohorts - born between the 1940s and the

1970s - are most likely to single out Muslims. In the youngest age groups

however, the difference is considerably smaller. Despite the increased

salience of Muslims as an outgroup after 2001, the cohorts coming of age

in this period (born in the 1980s and 90s) are in fact less likely to single

20

Muslims out than their parents. In other words, hypothesis H2b was not

supported - the experience of growing up in the polarised post 9/11

environment has not made the youngest cohort of Britons more likely to

single out Muslims as a "pariah" group.

<Figure III>

4. Ethnic hierarchy, parallel trends or reciprocity? Social distance

attitudes among ethnic minorities.

Figure IV shows that the period decline in white social distance from all

minority groups is also found in ethnic minority attitudes towards whites:

in almost all cases opposition to a white in-law declines between 1994

and 2010. The exception is the black Caribbean group, whose social

distance from whites was already low in 1994, when 11.6 per cent

expressed opposition to intermarriage with whites, notably lower than

the 38.5 per cent of whites who opposed marrying a Caribbean in data

from the same year. This figure remained unchanged in 2010. Although

resistance to intermarriage declines in all three Asian groups between

the two time points, they all express higher opposition than either the

African, Caribbean or Chinese groups, a pattern which does not change

over time, and is also reflected in marriage statistics (Muttarak and

Heath 2010). The particularly negative views about intermarriage with

Muslims found among whites also appear to be mirrored in the views of

Muslim minorities themselves - the highest opposition to intermarriage

21

with whites is found in the predominantly Muslim Pakistani and

Bangladeshi groups.

<Figure IV>

Table V based on EMBES 2010, suggests that a three tier ethnic

hierarchy operates in Britain, with the white majority at the top, Muslims

at the bottom and other ethnic minorities in-between. Ethnic minorities

and the white majority broadly agree on the relative acceptability of

different groups, supporting Hypothesis H3a. As predicted, white in-laws

are the least opposed by all minority groups, while the group which

consistently evokes the most opposition is Muslims. Non-Muslim Indians,

Black Caribbeans and non-Muslim Black Africans all showed much

greater social distance to Muslims on this question than they did to other

ethnic groups, suggesting that the pariah status of Muslims is recognised

by non-Muslim ethnic minorities. As with the BSA, the question about

Muslims was unfortunately only asked once and there is no comparative

question for other religious groups.

There does not seem to be a consistent pattern according to group status

outside of this three-tiered division. As shown in Table V, Black and Asian

non-Muslims are equally accepted by whites, yet non-Muslim Asians are

by far the least comfortable with an out-group in-law. Table V also shows

that while African Muslims are one of the groups most keen to

intermarry, Asian Muslims reject white in-laws the most. Hypothesis

22

(H3b) that singled out South Asians as most culturally distant from other

groups and thus least favourable to intermarriage is supported.

<Table V>

To further examine the cultural distance (H3b), reciprocity (H4a) and

parallel change (H4b) hypotheses, we conducted multivariate analysis. In

Table VI we analyse ethnic differences in social distance found in the

EMBES 2010 data in a logistic regression model, controlling for sex,

birth cohort, country of birth and education as well as the ethnic and

religious groups used in Table V. To test the reciprocity hypothesis (H4a)

we also include a dichotomous variable of whether the respondent has

experienced discrimination based on their race, ethnicity or religion in

the past five years. To control for the salience of religiosity to the

respondent’s identity (Perry 2014), we also include the frequency of

religious service attendance.

<Table VI>

Even after controlling for these variables, some ethnic differences in

social distance persist. Most notably, the analysis offers further support

for hypothesis H3b, as Asians are more likely than Africans and

Caribbeans to mind their relatives marrying a white person, and non-

Muslim Asians are more likely to mind intermarriage with a Muslim. As

for the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents the

23

results are mixed: Asian Muslims are somewhat more likely to be

bothered by the prospect of White in-laws, but non-Muslims are more

bothered by Black ones. There is no significant difference between

Muslims and non-Muslims among the Africans.

In contrast to the white majority, there is no significant cohort effect, nor

do we see a clear association between gender or education and social

distance among the ethnic minorities. This leads us to reject hypothesis

H4b that parallel social changes are driving declines in social distance in

the majority and minority populations. However, what does seem to make

a difference is how long the respondent has been in the UK. Those who

are born in the UK are more likely than first generation immigrants to

accept white in-lawsiv suggesting that social distance is in part based on

experience of and contact with the white majority. However, contact with

the majority can cut both ways: those who report having experienced

ethnic discrimination are generally more opposed to marriage with the

white majority, in line with the reciprocity hypothesis (H4a). We also find

evidence that religiosity encourages minority social distance from all

other groups, with a particularly large effect for the question about

Muslims. This could reflect several factors - more religious minority

respondents may be more embedded within their own group (Perry,

2014), may have more conservative social values (Altemeyer, 1981) or

may simply place greater weight on cultural and religious difference

when judging those from other groups.

24

These findings suggest that cultural difference, but not group status,

shape minority attitudes towards other ethnic groups. There is evidence

also of a strong reciprocity mechanism with regards the white majority -

ethnic minorities who have experienced discrimination become more

opposed to inter-marriage with the white majority group. The decline in

ethnic minority social distance from the white majority does not seem to

be driven by the same social processes as drive the parallel decline in

white social distance. Minority attitude change is not the product of

cohort value shifts, or educational expansion, but instead the result of

being born and raised in Britain, and thereby having extended social

contact with the white majority.

Conclusions

This study showed a continued decline in white social distance toward

ethnic minorities measured as expressed opposition to interethnic

marriage in one's close family. The decline is clear whether measured by

survey year or by birth cohort, and applies to all ethnic groups where

there is data available, thus supporting Hypothesis 1a and 1b. The trend

seems to be caused in part by the growth in education, but the effect of

education also appears to have diminished in recent years. A large

majority of British respondents born in the 1990s accept inter-marriage

with all minority groups except Muslims.

The finding that all minority groups express smaller or similar levels of

social distance to whites compared to the other ethnic out-groups seem

25

to offer partial support for the ethnic hierarchy hypothesis (H3a), that the

same hierarchy of social distance can be observed among different ethnic

groups. Nonetheless, the ‘hierarchy’ we observe is a very rudimentary

one. The majority white group is consistently ranked at the top, one

pariah group (Muslims) is consistently ranked at the bottom, while the

other groups fall in between in no particular order. Race also matters as

a distinguishing factor for older whites, and in earlier surveys, but

younger whites in the 2013 survey showed similar responses to all

minority groups except Muslims.

The consistency of the large social distance towards Muslims expressed

among both the majority and minority non-Muslim respondents, does

offer support for the description of Muslims as a ‘pariah’ minority (H2a)

attracting uniquely intense hostility from all other groups. The

significance of religious affiliation and attendance in some of the models

also seem to underscore the importance of cultural and religious identity

as determinants of social distance, at least when measured by attitudes

to interethnic marriage in the family.

While the social distance from Muslims may in part be the result of

recent events and public discourses, the results do not support the

hypothesis (H2b) that this has disproportionately affected cohorts coming

of age in the 2000s. The relative social distance to Muslims as compared

to other groups is no higher for younger cohorts than for middle-aged

ones. While the results suggest that there is a specific anti-Muslim bias in

26

social distance, there is no indication that this is a growing generational

trend. However, measures for more than one year would be needed to

establish with certainty whether the specific anti-Muslim bias is declining

over time.

The decline in white social distance from ethnic minorities is mirrored in

minority attitudes to the majority - social distance from whites declined

between 1994 and 2010 for the three groups where it started highest,

and in the fourth group, black Caribbeans, it started low and did not rise.

The mechanisms driving this change appear to be distinct, however:

attitude change in minorities is associated with British birth, secularism

and positive social contact with whites rather than educational expansion

and cohort value change. Direct social experience clearly matters for

ethnic minorities - those born in Britain, who thus have more extensive

contact with the majority group, report much lower social distance, but

those who report experience of discrimination report greater social

distance. However, we do not find evidence that Muslim minorities, who

are on the receiving end of more hostile attitudes, react by becoming

more hostile to other groups: the views of Asian and African Muslims are

no different to those of non-Muslims with the same ethnic origin.

Taken together, the results suggest that racial boundaries between

whites, blacks and Asians have blurred in recent decades, and continue

to do so. Far fewer people express opposition to inter-marriage with

other ethnic groups. However, some boundaries remain bright, or may

27

even have brightened over time. Muslims are singled out for unique

hostility from both the white majority and other minorities, including

from many who express inclusive attitudes towards other groups.

Notes

28

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33

Table I: Opposition to a minority in-law, ordered logistic regression

Asian in-law Caribbean in-law Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Period (ref: 1980s)1991 -0.215* 0.091 -0.215* 0.091 -0.232* 0.097 -0.243* 0.0971994 -0.354*** 0.084 -0.353*** 0.084 -0.488*** 0.085 -0.486*** 0.0851996 -0.524*** 0.086 -0.523*** 0.087 -0.493*** 0.084 -0.495*** 0.0842013 -0.796*** 0.115 -0.786*** 0.116 -0.653*** 0.115 -0.642*** 0.115Sex (Female) -0.234*** 0.063 27.172*** 6.773 -0.135* 0.064 18.716** 6.733Birthyear centred 1.308*** 0.360 0.812* 0.381 0.378 0.346 -0.179 0.369Birthyear squared /1000 -0.341*** 0.093 -0.206* 0.098 -0.104 0.089 0.046 0.095Highest qualification (ref: no qualification)GCSE -0.159 0.082 25.257** 9.000 0.032 0.080 24.426** 8.747A levels -0.258** 0.091 33.994*** 9.417 -0.118 0.093 32.102** 9.935Degree -1.023*** 0.149 45.883** 16.084 -0.709*** 0.140 61.849*** 15.939Social class (ref: Unskilled/partly skilled)Skilled manual/nonmanual -0.064 0.076 -0.048 0.076 0.053 0.077 0.064 0.077Professional/managerial -0.216* 0.097 -0.217* 0.098 -0.170 0.098 -0.162 0.098Unemployed -0.186 0.143 -0.237 0.144 0.211 0.139 0.159 0.140Tenure (ref: Own) Rent council -0.221** 0.081 -0.228** 0.082 -0.165 0.084 -0.162 0.084Rent other -0.305** 0.110 -0.306** 0.110 -0.146 0.109 -0.142 0.110Marital status (ref: married)Separated/divorced -0.070 0.108 -0.091 0.109 -0.201 0.110 -0.218* 0.110Widowed -0.068 0.104 -0.121 0.106 -0.047 0.106 -0.087 0.108Never married -0.266* 0.106 -0.300** 0.107 -0.209 0.107 -0.243* 0.108Children in household -0.083 0.073 -0.082 0.074 0.111 0.072 0.102 0.072Religion (ref: No religion) CofE/Anglican 0.394*** 0.074 0.411*** 0.075 0.227** 0.074 0.237** 0.074Roman Catholic 0.107 0.115 0.131 0.115 0.193 0.118 0.214 0.118Other Christian 0.163 0.097 0.180 0.097 0.128 0.096 0.133 0.097Non-Christian 0.641* 0.316 0.723* 0.318 0.784** 0.287 0.833** 0.288Religious service attendance -0.157 0.083 -0.192* 0.084 -0.192* 0.085 -0.209* 0.086Highest qualification x birthyearGCSE*birthyear -0.013** 0.005 -0.013** 0.005A levels*birthyear -0.018*** 0.005 -0.017** 0.005Degree*birthyear -0.024** 0.008 -0.032*** 0.008Gender*birthyear -0.014*** 0.003 -0.010** 0.003Intercept 1 -1293.717 351.341 -780.210 372.020 -394.157 337.114 173.192 360.495Intercept 2 -1292.634 351.340 -779.123 372.020 -393.031 337.115 174.321 360.496N 4826 4826 4717 4717Log likelihood -4282.03 -4266.49 -4234.4 -4220.6Pseudo R2 0.066 0.0696 0.064 0.067BSA 1983-2013 (only white respondents), * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

34

Table II: Opposition to minority in-law (2013), ordered logistic regression

Muslim Asian Black African Caribbean East European

Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SESex (Female) -0.049 0.115 -0.404* 0.204 -0.303 0.224 -0.370 0.205 -0.240 0.213

Birth cohort (ref: born before 1940)

1940s-50s -0.247 0.179 -0.058 0.286 -0.720* 0.292 -0.128 0.286 0.205 0.302

1960s-70s -0.941*** 0.219 0.506 0.380 -1.628*** 0.403 -0.409 0.377 0.517 0.398

1980s-90s -1.509*** 0.272 -0.321 0.537 -1.782** 0.562 -0.411 0.455 -0.703 0.615

Highest qualification (ref: no qualification)

GCSE -0.102 0.167 -0.673* 0.277 -0.186 0.296 -1.051*** 0.271 -0.726* 0.292

A levels -0.445* 0.181 -0.747* 0.314 -0.662* 0.325 -1.199*** 0.308 -0.540 0.319

Degree -0.958*** 0.207 -1.491*** 0.410 -1.066** 0.395 -1.785*** 0.368 -1.688*** 0.453

Social class (ref: Unskilled/partly skilled)

Skilled manual/nonmanual 0.078 0.155 -0.074 0.250 0.064 0.274 -0.050 0.263 -0.326 0.257

Professional/managerial -0.239 0.179 -0.420 0.308 -0.447 0.324 0.042 0.315 -0.635* 0.312

Unemployed 0.023 0.308 -1.037 0.667 -1.012 0.790 0.222 0.488 -2.327* 1.060

Tenure (ref: Own)

Rent council -0.053 0.169 0.510 0.274 -0.563 0.311 0.464 0.273 0.604 0.293

Rent other 0.377* 0.183 -0.546 0.358 -0.116 0.415 0.528 0.300 -0.203 0.367

Marital status (ref: married)

Separated/divorced 0.040 0.166 0.183 0.302 0.029 0.320 -0.246 0.316 -0.079 0.320

Widowed -0.139 0.191 0.076 0.303 0.032 0.310 0.776* 0.300 -0.172 0.326

Never married -0.326 0.183 -0.195 0.316 -0.047 0.390 0.221 0.315 -0.338 0.339

Children in household -0.085 0.142 -0.712* 0.277 -0.006 0.293 0.210 0.256 -0.737* 0.290

Religion (ref: No religion)

CofE/Anglican 0.249 0.146 0.633* 0.256 0.549* 0.263 0.208 0.250 0.452 0.263

Roman Catholic -0.334 0.199 -0.005 0.393 -0.146 0.390 -1.162** 0.431 -0.438 0.445

Other Christian 0.019 0.155 0.670* 0.273 0.208 0.298 -0.589* 0.282 0.471 0.281

Non-Christian 0.099 0.410 1.424 0.925 1.911** 0.664 0.300 0.565 0.512 1.166

Religious service attendance 0.282 0.158 -0.162 0.272 -0.320 0.296 0.548 0.281 -0.427 0.303

Intercept 1 -1.121*** 0.288 0.026 0.466 -0.586 0.500 -0.319 0.479 0.116 0.489

Intercept 2 0.037 0.286 1.119 0.471 0.624 0.503 0.819 0.482 1.442*** 0.499

N 1334 674 683 680 678Log likelihood -1277.454 -427.3963 -390.148 -442.325 -386.548

Pseudo R2 0.077 0.097 0.123 0.111 0.110

BSA 2013 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

35

Table III: Percentage who would mind if a close relative marries a […]:

Would mind…(%) Mind both Mind (1) only Mind (2) only Mind neither % N(1) Muslim and (2) Black African 20.3 28.0 1.8 49.9 100 932(1) Muslim and (2) Caribbean 23.9 25.9 1.3 48.9 100 919(1) Asian and (2) East European 16.3 7.5 3.4 72.9 100 910N 557 567 60 1577BSA 2013

36

Table IV: Would mind if a close relative marries a […]:

Only mind Muslim in-law

Mind Muslim and Black in-law

Coeff SE Coeff SE

Sex (Female) 0.218 0.135 -0.343 0.155

Birth cohort (ref: born before 1940)

1940s-50s 0.145 0.214 -0.302 0.213

1960s-70s -0.361 0.258 -0.807** 0.282

1980s-90s -1.070** 0.329 -0.830* 0.360

Highest qualification (ref: no qualification)

GCSE 0.670** 0.199 -0.557** 0.203

A levels 0.581** 0.215 -0.933*** 0.230

Degree 0.250 0.244 -1.405*** 0.281

Marital status (ref: married)

Separated/divorced -0.139 0.190 0.076 0.227

Widowed -0.801** 0.234 0.548* 0.226

Never married -0.526* 0.217 -0.033 0.254

Religion (ref: No religion)

CofE/Anglican -0.039 0.172 0.403* 0.188

Roman Catholic 0.237 0.227 -0.614* 0.303

Other Christian 0.265 0.179 0.027 0.209

Non-Christian -1.142 0.642 1.138* 0.466

Constant -1.257*** 0.335 0.167 0.356

N 1321 1321

Log likelihood -743.060 -603.726

Pseudo R2 0.049 0.124

BSA 2013 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Controlled for social class, unemployment, tenure, marital status, children and religious service attendance)

37

Table V: Percentage bothered by a […] in-law by ethnoreligious group in 2010 (2013)

Black Caribbean African non-Muslim

African Muslim

Asian non-Muslim Asian Muslim

White (BSA 2013)

White in-law 14.24 22.11 18.12 28.24 37.57

Black in-law 41.62 42.14 23.12

Asian in-law 22.61 29.15 18.25 24.02

Muslim in-law 37.30 42.93 58.69 49.52

EMBES 2010 (BSA 2013)

38

Table VI: Ordered logistic regression: Bothered by […] in-law

White in-law Black in-law Asian in-law Muslim in-law Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Sex (Female) 0.229 0.136 0.451** 0.159 0.147 0.184 0.191 0.150Birth cohort (ref: Before 1960)1960s-1970s 0.260 0.203 0.057 0.233 0.114 0.267 -0.057 0.2051980s-1990s 0.145 0.222 -0.199 0.267 -0.389 0.282 -0.351 0.229Born in UK -0.434** 0.158 -0.190 0.171 0.277 0.229 0.028 0.173Highest qualification (ref: No qualification)GCSE -0.210 0.202 -0.265 0.236 -0.231 0.285 -0.099 0.245A-levels -0.193 0.204 -0.448 0.242 -0.417 0.295 -0.273 0.234Degree -0.179 0.201 -0.240 0.234 -0.573 0.314 -0.047 0.234Ethnic/religious group (ref: Caribbean) (ref: Asian non-Muslim) (ref: Caribbean) (ref: Caribbean)African non-Muslim 0.116 0.244 0.430 0.226 0.010 0.197African Muslim -0.168 0.338 -0.061 0.339Asian non-Muslim 0.922*** 0.201 1.326*** 0.166Asian Muslim 1.100*** 0.189 -0.409* 0.172Discrimination 0.307* 0.140 0.342* 0.171 0.459* 0.183 0.381* 0.154Religious attendance 0.233*** 0.049 0.179** 0.057 0.293*** 0.072 0.372*** 0.058Intercept 1 2.133*** 0.326 0.468 0.335 2.587*** 0.440 1.578*** 0.340Intercept 2 2.908*** 0.339 1.183*** 0.339 3.237*** 0.449 2.420*** 0.346N 2117 1090 984 1277Log Likelihood -1482.723 -1209.188 -481.281 -1202.445Pseudo R2 0.048 0.026 0.037 0.081EMBES 2010 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

39

Figure I: Percentage who minds if a close relative marries Asian or Caribbean

840

10

20

30

40

50

60

70AsianCaribbean

BSA 1983-2013 (only white respondents)

40

Figure II: Percentage who minds ethnic minority in-law by birth cohort

1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

MuslimBlack AfricanAsiansCaribbeanEast European

BSA 2013 (only white respondents)

41

Figure III: Predicted probability of minding if relative marries a Muslim by birth cohort

1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Mind MuslimMind Muslim onlyMind Muslim and Black

BSA 2013 (Controlling for all variables in Table IV)

42

Figure IV: Percentage who mind if a close relative marries a white person […] by year and ethnic group

year 1993-4

year 2010

year 1993-4

year 2010

year 1993-4

year 2010

year 1993-4

year 2010

year 1993-4

year 2010

Pakistani Bangladeshi Indian Black Caribbean Chinese Black African

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

4th National Survey 1994/ EMBES 2010. Not all ethnic groups were included in both surveys.

43

Appendix

Table AI: List of variables used in the analysis

British Social Attitudes Survey 1983-2013

Variable Question Original Categories Recoded Categories Percent / Mean(SD)

N

Asian in-lawvvi Do you think that most white people in Britain would mind or not mind if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of [Asian / West Indian] origin? b) And you personally? Would you mind or not mind? (If mind) A lot or a little?

Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 57.4 6961Mind a little 2) Mind a little 20.2Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 22.4

West Indian in-law [Seeabove] Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 56.3 6751Mind a little 2) Mind a little 21.4Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 22.3

Year Survey year 1983, 1984, 1986, 1989 0) 1980s 56.2 302641991 1) 1991 9.61994 2) 1994 11.51996 3) 1996 12.02013 5) 2013 10.7

Sex Sex of respondent 1) Male [Ref] 1) Male [Ref] 45.1 302642) Female 2) Female 54.9

Birthyear centred Recoded Year of birth Range [1889,1996] Range [-57.2,49.8] 0.0(19.1) 30165Birthyear squared / 1000

Recoded Year of birth Range[1889,1996] Range [3568.3,3984.0] 3782.2 (74.4) 30165

Highest qualification Highest educational qualification obtained No qualification 0) No qualification [Ref] 38.0 26487CSE or equiv. / O-level or equiv. / Foreign or other

1) GCSE 27.9

A-level or equiv. / Higher education below degree 2) A-level 24.1Degree / Postgraduate degree 3) Degree 10.0

Social class Registrar General's social class Class V / Class IV / Never had a job 0) Unskilled / partly skilled [Ref] 28.2 29637Class III manual / Class III non-manual 1) Skilled manual / non-manual 44.1Class II / Class I 2) Professional / managerial 27.7

Unemployed Current economic position 10 other categories of employment and economic inactivity 0) No [Ref] 94.0 30264Unemployed 1) Yes 6.0

Tenure Accommodation tenure Own outright / Own on mortgage 1) Own [Ref] 68.2 29986Rent local authority / Rent new town 2) Rent council 22.2Housing association / Property company / Rent from employer / Other organisation / Rent from

3) Rent other 9.6

44

relative / Rent from other individualMarital status Marital status (summary) Married 1) Married [Ref] 63.5 30217

Separated/divorced 2) Separated/divorced 8.3Widowed 3) Widowed 10.6Never married 4) Never married 17.8

Children in household What is (name)'s relationship to you? [Recoded from household grid ]

Other relationship of household members 0)No son / daugther in household [Ref] 59.0 30264Son / daugher [incl step/adopted] 1) Son/ daughter of respondent lives in

the household41.0

Religion Religion summary No religion 0) No religion [Ref.] 37.6 26718C of E / Anglican 1) C of E / Anglican 33.9Roman Catholic 2) Roman Catholic 9.8Other Christian 3) Other Christian 15.7Non-Christian 4) Non-Christian 3.0

Religious service attendance

Frequency of attendance No religion / Twice a year / Once a year / Less often / Never 0) Less often or never [Ref] 79.2 29448Once a week / Once in two weeks / Once a month 1) At least once a month 20.8

British Social Attitudes Survey 2013

Variable Question Original Categories Recoded Categories Percent NBirth cohort Year of birth Range [1916,1939] 1) before 1940s 14.11 3239

Range [1940,1959] 2) 1940s-50s 32.66Range [1960,1979] 3) 1960s-70s 33.59Range [1980,1996] 4) 1980s-90s 19.64

Asian in-law Do you think that most white people in Britain would mind or not mind if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of [Asian / West Indian/ Black African / Muslim / East Asian] origin? b) And you personally? Would you mind or not mind? (If mind) A lot or a little?

Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 76.0 920Mind a little 2) Mind a little 13.0Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 11.0

West Indian in-law [See above] Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 75.4 951Mind a little 2) Mind a little 13.8Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 10.8

Black African in-law [See above] Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 78.4 957Mind a little 2) Mind a little 13.0Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 8.7

Muslim in-law [See above] Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 50.5 1874Mind a little 2) Mind a little 22.5Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 27.1

45

East Asian in-la [See above] Not mind 1) Not mind [Ref] 80.4 921Mind a little 2) Mind a little 12.3Mind a lot 3) Mind a lot 7.4

EMBES 2010

Variable Question Original Categories Recoded Categories Percent NFor each of the following statements please indicate how much it would bother you…

White in-lawvii If one of your close relatives were to marry a White person [if not White]

Not at all / Not very much 1) Not mind [Ref] 73.54 2,604A little 2) Mind a little 10.64Rather a lot / A great deal 3) Mind a lot 15.82

Black in-law If one of your close relatives were to marry a Black person [if not Black]

Not at all / Not very much 1) Not mind [Ref] 60.61 1,508A little 2) Mind a little 14.66Rather a lot / A great deal 3) Mind a lot 24.73

Asian in-law If one of your close relatives were to marry an Asian person [if not Asian]

Not at all / Not very much 1) Not mind [Ref] 75.75 1,171A little 2) Mind a little 9.82Rather a lot / A great deal 3) Mind a lot 14.43

Muslim in-law If one of your close relatives were to marry a Muslim person [if not Muslim]

Not at all / Not very much 1) Not mind [Ref] 54.05 1,543A little 2) Mind a little 16.27Rather a lot / A great deal 3) Mind a lot 29.68

Sex Gender of respondent Male 0) Male [Ref] 48.04 2,787Female 1) Female 51.96

Birth cohort Year of birth Range [1913,1959] 1) Before 1960 [Ref] 18.98 2,787Range [1960,1979] 2) 1960s-1970s 47.76Range [1980,1992] 3) 1980s-1990s 33.26

Born in UK Country of birth [Any other country] 1) Born outside UK [Ref] 63.83 2,759England/ Scotland / Wales / Britain / UK 2) Born in UK 36.17

Highest qualification Do you have any British or overseas educational or work-related qualifications? [If British:] Which is the highest British qualification you have? [If overseas:] Which phrase on this card comes closest to describing what sort of overseas qualification this is?

0) No qualification [Ref] 23.75 2,3541) GCSE or eq 28.592) A levels or eq 21.843) Degree 25.83

Ethnic/religious group Screen 5 Ethnicities + Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which one?

Black Caribbean 1) Black Caribbean [Ref] 23.97 2,787Black African + Not Muslim 2) African non-Muslim 15.29Black African + Muslim 3) African Muslim 5.49Indian / Pakistani / Bangladeshi + Not Muslim 4) Asian non-Muslim 20.02Indian / Pakistani / Bangladeshi + Muslim 5) Asian Muslim 35.24

Discrimination In the past 5 years, do you feel that you have No / Language or accent / Age / Gender / Sexuality / 0) No 67.32 2,659

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experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?/ If yes, do you feel you have been discriminated against for any of these reasons?

DisabilityEthnicity, race or skin colour / Religion 1) Yes 32.68

Religious attendance Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? / Frequency of religious worship with others

No / Not at all 1) Not at all 22.31 2,761Yes + Occasionally / only on festivals 2) Occasionally / only on festivals 19.81Yes + At least once a month 3) At least once a month 10.83Yes + At least once a week 4) At least once a week 33.65Yes + At least once a day 5) At least once a day 13.4

Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities 1993 / 1994Variable Question Original Categories Recoded Categories Percent N

Ethnic groupviii Ethnic origin White 1) White 35.56 8,012Caribbean 2) Caribbean 14.93Indian 3) Indian 24.08Pakistani 5) Pakistani 15.3Bangladeshi 6) Bangladeshi 7.46Chinese 7) Chinese 2.67

In which country were you born? / Family origins

African Asian Classified as 3/5/6 according to country of birth or family origins

White in-law Would you personally mind if a close relative were to marry a white person?

No 0) No 62.83 2,381Yes 1) Yes 37.17

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Non-response and “Don’t know” has been coded as missing throughout.

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Figure AI: Percentage who mind (a little or a lot) if their relative marries an Asian or Caribbean, by birth cohort and survey year

BSA (1983-2013)

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Figure AII: Predicted probabilities of opposition to Asian or Caribbean in-law

1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8Mind Asian in-law No qual

GCSE

A-level

Degree

1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8Mind Caribbean in-law No qual

GCSE

A-level

Degree

BSA 1983-2013 (only white respondents) – Average marginal effects based on logistic regression models, controlling for all variables shown in Table 1.

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i This figure is based on the Labour Force Surveys and includes all non-white

minorities.

ii The question asked used the term ‘West Indian’ in all years of the BSA. However, to

be consistent with the other survey data we will refer to this category as ‘Caribbean’

in the remainder of this article.

iii The model does not fit the proportional-odds assumption or the parallel regression

assumption for either attitudes to Asian in-laws or Caribbean in-laws, due to the

relationship with education. However, as all the other variables meet the

assumptions, and have the same relationship in the multinomial, logistic and ordered

logistic regressions, we only show the ordered logistic models here. Multinomial

regressions (available on request) show that all levels of education are negatively

associated with ‘mind a lot’, whereas only degree level is negatively associated with

‘mind a little’. GCSE level education is positively associated with minding ‘a little’ if a

relative marries a Caribbean.

iv In alternative models, age of migration to, and length of residence in the UK were

both significant in the same direction, but due to multicollinearity these variables

were excluded from the model.

v For some of the analysis the three category ordinal outcome variables (how much the respondent minds if their relatives marry someone of a different ethnic background) in the BSA and EMBES has been recoded into a binary variable where Don't mind (1) = 0 is contrasted with Mind (2/3) = 1

vi In the BSA surveys before 2013 one half of the sample was asked about Asian origin and the other about black or West Indian origin. In 2013 there were three versions of the questionnaire and each respondent were only asked about two of the five ethnic minority groups: 1. Asian and East European; 2. Black African and Muslim; 3. West Indian and Muslim. The exact question wording was: a) Do you think that most white people in Britain would mind or not mind if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of [Asian] origin? b) And you personally? Would you mind or not mind? (If mind) A lot or a little? The variable (b) was recoded into a dichotomous variable with “mind a little” and “mind a lot” coded as 1 and “not mind at all” coded as 0. We refer to “West Indian” as “Caribbean” throughout the paper

vii In EMBES, respondents were asked about all except their own ethnic or religious group. In order to test the reciprocity hypothesis (H2a), they have been divided into categories that were as close as possible to the categories they were asked about, (and that white respondents were asked about in the BSA 2013). The original ethnic categories were Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, and the respondents were also asked their religious affiliation which enabled us to distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims.

viii The FNAS ethnicity variable had a category “African Asians”, which have been redistributed according to their country of origin as either Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi to make it comparable to the EMBES categorisation.