cndi deterrence da

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CNDI 2010 Deterrence DAs

Regents

________________.......................................................................................................................................................................3*****Turkey*****........................................................................................................................................................................31NC Turkey Prolif (1/2)................................................................................................................................................................42NC Uniqueness Wall...................................................................................................................................................................62NC Link Wall (1/4).....................................................................................................................................................................7Link Magnifier (1/2)....................................................................................................................................................................11ExtendMiddle East War..........................................................................................................................................................132NC NATO Module (1/2)...........................................................................................................................................................14

NATO ModuleLinks...............................................................................................................................................................162NC Relations Module (1/2).......................................................................................................................................................19Relations Uniqueness..................................................................................................................................................................22Relations ImpactTurns Case/Hegemony.................................................................................................................................23....................................................................................................................................................................................................24Relations ImpactMiddle East Power Projection......................................................................................................................25CP Increase Military Presence..................................................................................................................................................26Consult NATO NATO/Relations Net Benefit..........................................................................................................................27CP - Russia Conditioning ...........................................................................................................................................................28AffNo Prolif.............................................................................................................................................................................29AffLink Turn - Relations.........................................................................................................................................................30AffProlif Inevitable.................................................................................................................................................................31AffTurkish Credibility Turn....................................................................................................................................................32

AffAT: NATOLink Turn.....................................................................................................................................................33AffAT: NATOImpact Turn.................................................................................................................................................34AffAT: Balkans.......................................................................................................................................................................35AffAT: Relations.....................................................................................................................................................................36AffIran Prolif Turn..................................................................................................................................................................37

_______________.......................................................................................................................................................................38**** Iraq****..............................................................................................................................................................................381NC Iran DA............................................................................................................................................................................39Link US Presence.....................................................................................................................................................................41Link Carriers.............................................................................................................................................................................44Impact Iran Prolif = ME Prolif & War.....................................................................................................................................45Impact Turkish Prolif...............................................................................................................................................................46Impact NPT Collapse...............................................................................................................................................................47

AT: Iranian Prolif Inevitable.......................................................................................................................................................49AT: US Nuclear Deterrence Solves.............................................................................................................................................50CP Increase US Military Presence...........................................................................................................................................51Aff US Nuclear Deterrent solves..............................................................................................................................................52Aff Iran & Middle East Prolif Inevitable.................................................................................................................................54Aff Iran Prolif Inevitable..........................................................................................................................................................55Aff- Israel- Iran War inevitable...................................................................................................................................................57Aff Iran Prolif Good.................................................................................................................................................................58Aff- Iran would not strike first....................................................................................................................................................60

____________________.............................................................................................................................................................61*****South Korea*****.............................................................................................................................................................611NC South Korea Proif...............................................................................................................................................................622NC Link Wall South Korean Prolif........................................................................................................................................64

Asian Prolif = War.......................................................................................................................................................................65AT: US Nuclear Deterrent Solves...............................................................................................................................................662NC North Korea Module...........................................................................................................................................................68

North Korean Module Link Ext. .............................................................................................................................................712NC Taiwan Module...................................................................................................................................................................722NC Hegemony Module..............................................................................................................................................................73AFF - Nuclear Deterrence Solves SK Prolif...............................................................................................................................74Aff South Korea wont Proliferate...........................................................................................................................................75Aff- North Korean Proliferation inevitable.................................................................................................................................76Aff- North Korea No Threat.....................................................................................................................................................77

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Aff- North Korea will not Invade South Korea...........................................................................................................................78Aff Asia Prolif Inevitable.........................................................................................................................................................79Aff Asian Prolif Good..............................................................................................................................................................80

_______________.......................................................................................................................................................................81*****Japan*****........................................................................................................................................................................81AT: Nuclear Deterrence Solves...................................................................................................................................................82Uniqueness/Link Magnifier.........................................................................................................................................................83Alliance Key Stability.................................................................................................................................................................84Link Uniqueness..........................................................................................................................................................................85AT: No RearmPacifism/Public Opinion..................................................................................................................................861NC Link.....................................................................................................................................................................................87ImpactsA Lot of Them............................................................................................................................................................88AffRearm Now........................................................................................................................................................................89AffImpact Defense..................................................................................................................................................................90

________________.....................................................................................................................................................................93****General Neg****.................................................................................................................................................................93Consult CP Prolif DA Net Benefit...........................................................................................................................................94

_____________...........................................................................................................................................................................95****General Aff****..................................................................................................................................................................95Aff Nuclear Deterrent Solves...................................................................................................................................................96AffGeneric Uniqueness/Link Takeout....................................................................................................................................97

AffTroop Presence Not Credible.............................................................................................................................................98_____________...........................................................................................................................................................................99****Prolif Bad****.....................................................................................................................................................................99Prolif Not Inevitable..................................................................................................................................................................100Prolif = Nuclear Wars................................................................................................................................................................101Extinction..................................................................................................................................................................................102Prolif Causes Arms Races.........................................................................................................................................................103Wildfire Prolif...........................................................................................................................................................................104Pre-emptive Strikes...................................................................................................................................................................105Terrorism...................................................................................................................................................................................106US Hegemony...........................................................................................................................................................................107Prolif Outweighs........................................................................................................................................................................108AT: Prolif Deters Asymmetry................................................................................................................................................109

AT: Prolif Deters Irrational Leaders.......................................................................................................................................110AT: Prolif Deters Middle East................................................................................................................................................112AT: Cold War Deterrence Models............................................................................................................................................113AT: Small Arsenals mean Small Impact...................................................................................................................................114

_______________.....................................................................................................................................................................116****Prolif Good****................................................................................................................................................................116Prolif Inevitable.........................................................................................................................................................................117Proliferation Solves War...........................................................................................................................................................118Stability/Deterrence...................................................................................................................................................................119Conflict Reduction ....................................................................................................................................................................120Checks Conflict Escalation........................................................................................................................................................121Conventional Wars....................................................................................................................................................................122AT: Accidents............................................................................................................................................................................123

AT: Near Misses........................................................................................................................................................................124AT: Pre-emptive Strikes............................................................................................................................................................125AT: Irrational Leaders...............................................................................................................................................................126AT: Nuclear terrorism ..............................................................................................................................................................127AT: Small Chance Enough .......................................................................................................................................................128AT: Not Enough Data................................................................................................................................................................129

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________________

*****Turkey*****

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Regents

1NC Turkey Prolif (1/2)

Turkey wont proliferate nowUS guarantee

NTI, 2009 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Turkey Profile, August, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html)

Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is amember in good standing of all of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use. Turkey is alsoactive in proliferation prevention efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[1] While Turkey issituated in a notoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran

acquire nuclear weapons, it has relied for its security on the nuclear and conventional deterrence provided byU.S./NATO security guarantees for more than half a century. Turkey's dedication to the nonproliferationregime is further solidified by its commitment to the European Union accession process , as prospects forTurkish EU membership would be gravely diminished should Turkey choose to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons.[3] Thanks in part to decades ofU.S. military aid and cooperation, Turkey has robust conventionaldefense capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles. Ankara is also working to procure advanced ballistic missiledefense capabilities. NuclearTurkey signed theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subject to extensive IAEA compliance monitoring through both itsComprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankara has also ratified theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to hostapproximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base .[4] There is somespeculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United Statesshould President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to thenear-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategicpurpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

US withdrawal of TNWs causes Turkish prolifit makes hawks credible and undermines non-

proliferation agreements

Thranert, 2009 (Oliver, Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division of the Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik, Berlin, NATO, Missile Defence and Extended Deterrence, Survival, 51:6, 63-76,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330903461674)

NATOs nuclear sharing has, too, always been a non-proliferation endeavour. The concept was born in the1960s, when the United States needed to convince the Federal Republic of Germany to forgo a nuclear-weapons option andto adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. To reassure Germany and to give Bonn as well asother European allies a say regarding NATOs nuclear policy, the Nuclear Planning Group was created and nuclear sharing

implemented. Today, Turkey is perhaps the member state most likely to want to develop its own nuclearweapons. It would not be easy for Ankara to conduct a clandestine programme, but if Iran develops nuclear weaponsand at the same time the United States were to withdraw its nuclear installations from Incirlik, those

voices in Turkey already talking about a Turkish bomb could become stronger and more influential .Turkish officials already apparently maintain in internal NATO discussions that if the United Stateswere to remove its nuclear weapons from Europe, Ankara would no longer feel bound to the grandbargain of the 1960s to refrain from developing its own nuclear weapons in return for a US nuclearpresence in Europe.7

4
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/iaea_dept_of_safeguards.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdfhttp://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdf


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1NC Turkey Prolif (2/2)

Turkish prolif causes a chain reaction that leads to nuclear Middle East war

Sokolski, 2007 (Henry, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, What NuclearChallenges Might the EU Meet?, June 14, keynote address at The EU Facing Nuclear Weapons Challenges

conference, http://www.npolicy.org/node/974)

One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with anuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU;and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities . Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way andacquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankaras relations with Washington,Brussels, and Tehran. significant To a very degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States areserious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey willchose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses adifficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this

position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclearweapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to dothe same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europes doorstep and

significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

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Regents

2NC Uniqueness Wall

Turkey has a strong nonproliferation agenda now

Kirecci, 2009 (Akif, Assistant Prof., Bilkent University, School of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences,TURKEY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, January, SETA Policy Brief no. 28,

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.setadc.org

%2Fpdfs%2FPolicy_Brief_No_28_Akif_Kirecci_Turkey_in_the_United_Nations_Security_Council.pdf&ei=1bgrTNasHM-

FnQfV5sHOCQ&usg=AFQjCNFYoFh-sSh5HWtcBObx93EEisHnow&sig2=G1gZkykGMnJmt5ZIHIk-Ew)

Given Turkeys emphasis on peacekeeping, a major dilemma could arise for Turkey when the issues ofusing military power, or authorizing sanctions against another country are brought before the SecurityCouncil. The most immediate issue before the Council will inevitably be the case against Iran because of its nuclear

program. The case against Iran has the potential to turn into an international military conflict. While Israel has pressed the USand the UN to take military action against Iran, the EU has shown reluctance. China and Russia likewise disfavor an

immediate military operation. Turkeys position regarding Irans acquisition of nuclear weaponry is clear; Turkeydoes not want a proliferation of nuclear arms in general, and in its neighborhood in particular. WhetherIrans nuclear program is designed for peaceful civil use or to reach military capability, making Iran a nuclear power posing a

viable threat to Israel seems to be at the core of the problem. Turkey has tended to accept Irans statements that itsnuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, while the US and Israel have not. The case against Iran in theUNSC seems to be deadlocked as there is a disagreement among the permanent members: the US and the UK lobby for widersanctions perhaps before a military campaign while China and Russia try to prevent it.

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2NC Link Wall (1/4)

Extend Thranertthe sole purpose of our European TNWs is non-proliferationtheyre the

critical symbol of the NATO security guaranteewithout them, Turkey will seek to maintain

deterrence with its own nukes

Plan causes Turkish prolifremoval of TNWs weakens credibility of NATO protection

ISAB 2007(International Security Advisory Board, provides the Department of State with independent insight andadvice on all aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and related aspects of public diplomacy

Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States, October 19th 2007)

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/95786.pdf

Turkey is a country to watch. It has moderately strong technical capabilities. Currently, it would onlythink about developing a weapon if Western support and security guarantees from the U.S. and the EUwere seen as insufficient for its needs. Turkey sees some cause for concern now with the Europeans pulling

back from Turkish membership in the EU and the EUs decided lack of interest in defending Turkeys interests in NATO.

Turkeys sense of protection by NATO could be adversely affected if nuclear weapons were removed

from its soil. The calculus could also be affected if Turkeys secular status should be altered by internal politicaldevelopments.

The brink is nowUS-Turkish relations are strainedanything that gives the perception of

weakening the alliance triggers prolif

GSN, 2008 (Global Security Newswire. No Need for U.S. Nukes In Europe, Observers Say, 7/21http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/print.asp?story_id=5A1AA4C7-864E-4F15-AF82-0A7DE40E88DA

The major obstacle now to complete removal of those bombs is Turkey, said physicist James Acton, a lecturerat the War Studies Department at Kings College London .As a matter of principle the idea of withdrawing nuclear weapons

from Europe is something that an awful lot of people agree with, he said. The question is to what extent does the

withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Turkey make Turkey more likely to want to acquire nuclearweapons itself as a hedge against Irans nuclear ambitions. There would have to be extensive discussions toassure leaders in Ankara that NATOs defense commitment would persist once the nuclear weapons hadbeen pulled, he said.Its really a very insecure time for the U.S.-Turk alliance. Anything that gives theTurks the impression that this alliance is eroding would not be a good idea , said panelist Bruno Tertrais, aresearcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.

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http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/95786.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/print.asp?story_id=5A1AA4C7-864E-4F15-AF82-0A7DE40E88DAhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/95786.pdfhttp://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/print.asp?story_id=5A1AA4C7-864E-4F15-AF82-0A7DE40E88DA


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2NC Link Wall (2/4)

Withdrawing nukes weakens US security commitments and causes Turkey to proliferate

Laird, 2009 (Burgess, Carnegie Council national security analyst, A Guide to the Challenges Facing PresidentObama's Nuclear Abolition Agenda, July 21, Carnegie Council, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_rep

orts/0025.html)

Many disarmament advocates have argued for a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for quitesome time. The argument is that these weapons no longer have any operational utility as they were deployed to offset thesizeable advantage enjoyed by Soviet conventional forcesa quantitative advantage that disappeared with the end of theCold War and the demise of the Soviet Unionand that their number, size and geographic dispersal makes both the U.S. andRussian weapons difficult and costly to control and secure. In short, they are proliferation nightmares. Critics point out that

such arguments neglect the views of our allies, who see these weapons as concrete symbols of U.S.extended deterrence guarantees. And to be sure, the high value of these weapons has been frequentlyreaffirmed, most emphatically, in NATO's 1999 "Strategic Concept." The Strategic Concept asserts that "TheAlliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe

The Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make aunique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and

unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve the peace." Many U.S. allies, the argument proceeds, especially thenewer member states of NATO as well as Turkey and Japan would interpret a withdrawal of the non-strategicnuclear weapons as a significant weakening of U.S. security commitments and, in response, some alliesmight well undertake nuclear weapons programs of their own to ensure their security .

Withdrawal causes Turkish prolifsecurity guarantee is the only thing standing in the way

Lavoy and Walker, 2006 (Peter and Robin, Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the NavalPostgraduate School's Department of National Security Affairs, Conference Report: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation:

2016, Naval Postgraduate School, July 29,

http://www.nps.edu/ccc/conferences/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.html)

While Tertrais stressed that nuclear proliferation of any sort is unlikely in Europe, he identified Turkey as the biggestlong-term threat, with Ukraine and Serbia as even more unlikely and an EU member dismissed as wild speculation. IfTurkey were to move toward nuclear weapons it would be in a post-2010 timeframe and follow thecontinued breakdown of U.S.-Turkey relations. Catalysts for Turkish proliferation would include failure to

be accepted into the European Union and the continued progress of Irans nuclear weapons program and would be

exacerbated by a breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the United States withdrawing the nuclearweapons it has based in Turkey. Ukraine and Serbia would also become more inclined to initiate a nuclear program ifthe NPT broke down and they were denied entry into NATO and the EU, with Ukraines decision probably triggered bycontinued Russian-Ukrainian tensions post 2010 and Serbia triggered by increased Serbian nationalism post 2015. Tertraismost improbably scenario involved a current EU member post-2020 following the perfect storm of a complete breakdownof European society, and serious military threats in the European neighborhood. If Russia became hyper nationalistic again,Finland, Sweden, and Poland might attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. If Middle Eastern proliferation spilled over into the

Mediterranean Italy and Spain might arm themselves, possibly followed by secondary proliferation by Greece, Turkey and,once the nuclear taboo was broken, Germany.Although the prospects of a European proliferator are slim, some elements are

factors in all the most likely scenarios. Maintaining the U.S. nuclear security guarantee as a credible defense ,even if the missile defense system becomes effective and is extended to cover Europe, is one key element in dissuadingpotential nuclear weapons states. Additional guarantees from France and the United Kingdom can add to this nuclearpeace. Additionally, Europe itself can dissuade countries from arming themselves by allowing them to join the EuropeanUnion.

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2NC Link Wall (3/4)

TNW drawdown leads to allied prolifTurkey wont feel a credible NATO deterrent

Thranert, 2008 (Oliver, Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division of the Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik, Berlin, U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, December 10, Carnegie Endowment,

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533)

Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to preventnuclear proliferation within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided byU.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability ofNATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response toits calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing anuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATOs nuclear security guarantee would notactually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities ofits own.

Plan is perceived globallyeveryone is watching our TNW presence in Europe

Yost, 2009 (David S., Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in IR from USC, Assurance and USextended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85:4, 755-780, http://www.google.com/url?

sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fjournal

%2F122476701%2Fabstract&ei=IhQoTIH3K4L78AaV4OTFDw&usg=AFQjCNG16FUqmoMBmtQ5JyeWlsudcu4ol

Q&sig2=MuihrTak0QyrmY-RtgC5Sg)

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the newallies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to UScredibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security towithdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe . Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived asa signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO

Europe.Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not onlyin Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partnersand interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring USdecisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATOs nuclear postureand policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security . A loss ofconfidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some USallies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more inpotential hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessingcapabilities.

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2NC Link Wall (4/4)

Plan causes Turkish prolifTNWs are the only deterrent

Matishak, 2009 (Martin, staff writer, U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Department OfficialSays, August 5, Nuclear Threat Initiative Global Security Newswire,

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php)

The military value of the Europe-based tactical weapons has "dropped precipitously since the days of the Cold War,"Einhorn said. However, they continue play a role in the "cohesion" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ,he added without elaborating. In addition, "at least one" ally country believes the presence of U.S. nuclearweapons on it soil reduces the incentive for it to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability, Einhorn toldthe audience. Kristensen told Global Security Newswire yesterday in a telephone interview that Einhorn was referring toTurkey.

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Link Magnifier (1/2)

Perception of the US security guarantee is the critical factoronly trust in US/NATO deters prolif

Bowman 2008(Bradley, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International AffairsFellow at CFR, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-

book/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf)

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this wouldalso place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit.Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability

between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. Anuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Irans direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian powerwould lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would

significantly undercut Turkeys desired role as a respected andpowerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario,there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well asamong ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing forTurkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey wouldrespond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well. At the same time, there aresignificant disincentives to a Turkishpursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development wouldendanger Turkeys good standing in NATO, another keycomponent of Turkeys national security. Third, a Turkish pursuitoracquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into the EuropeanUnion.Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely opposea Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influenceTurkeys decisions on these issues.Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding thereliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkeys decision regarding nuclear weapons. Ifthe bilateral relationship with the United States is poor and Turkeys trust in NATO low, Turkey wouldbe more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, afully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO providethe best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons .

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Link Magnifier (2/2)

Ankara is on the brinkwithdraw is a sudden move that would spark prolif and only perception

of Western guarantees are relevant

Tertrais, 2008 (Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratgique (FRS), an Associate Researcher at the Centre dEtude des RelationsInternationales (CERI), and a contributing editor of Survival, The Middle Easts Next Nuclear State Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict,December ,

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nps.edu%2FAcademics%2Fcenters%2Fccc%2Fpublications%2FOnlineJournal%2F2008%2FDec%2FtertraisDec08.pdf&ei=zZMmTIfwMdH_nAf1mYm9Bg&usg=AFQjCNG7tEEwF4y9vsJlWrEr-VFtRoZwPw&sig2=-IHSDJRXPIgz2gvwvP4iKQ)

Like most Arab countries, Turkey has announced its intention to restart its civilian nuclear program. It already has a verysignificant nuclear infrastructure. Its main research center (Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center) has two modern(1986) pilot installations for conversion and fuel fabrication.[51] The involvement of several Turkish firms in the AQ Khan

network indicates that there is industrial know-how in the country which could be of use to a uraniumenrichment program. However, Ankara claims to be uninterested by enrichment .[52] The country operatestwo research reactors: a light-water 5 MWth reactor;[53] and a small Triga Mark-II unit, which is being converted to operatedon LEU.[54] It also has a small waste treatment facility (Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility). Scientists havemade computer simulations of reprocessing with the Purex process.[55] Generally speaking, nuclear science and technology

is very active in the country. Also, Turkey is one of the only States in the region to have started setting up the

regulatory mechanisms needed for larger-scale nuclear programs , under the aegis of the Turkish Atomic EnergyCommission (TAEK). Turkey is moderately worried about the Iranian nuclear program . It has generally goodrelations with its neighbor. It is covered by a formal nuclear guarantee, backed by a multilateral alliance, and has nuclear

weapons on its territory (including for use by Turkish aircraft). However, Ankara may be losing its sense ofconfidence about NATO. At two occasions1991 and 2003its allies were perceived as hesitant to fulfill their securitycommitments. The new generation of Turkish officers do not trust NATO as much as the previous one.[56] In addition,

political relations with the West have become more difficult because of Iraq, controversy about the 1915events, and a European reluctance to give a clear perspective for entry into the European Union. Turkish public opinion hasan extremely negative view of the United States.[57] (It is also opposed to the continued stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons.)

[58] Ankaras perception of the Western security guarantee will be a key for its future nuclear choices .[59] The military option would be an extreme one: a choice in that direction would require a deepeningof the crisis in confidence with both the United States and Europe. Additionally, domestic power games

may come into play: a nuclear program might be a way to consolidate the place of the military in thepolitical decision-making process. Defiance vis--vis Iran is stronger in the so-called kemalist circles .[60]

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ExtendMiddle East War

Turkish prolif causes an arms raceour impacts have a unique risk of escalation

Martin, 2000 (David, research director, Nuclear Awareness Project, Nuclear Threat in the EasternMediterranean, June, NAP, http://www.cnp.ca/issues/nuclear-threat.html)

The dark underside of nuclear power has always been its potential for nuclear weapons proliferation, either through theproduction of plutoniu -- an inevitable byproduct of reactor operation -- or through the transfer of sensitive nuclearinformation, technology and materials. Turkey's nuclear program will fan the flames of the nuclear arms racein the Middle East. Turkey has also been implicated in nuclear arms aid to Pakistan. An earlier attemptto build an Argentinean-designed reactor was likely aimed at plutonium production for nuclear weapons .Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkey's push for itsown nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactordesign, all point to possible nuclear weaponsdevelopment. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclearweapons development lends credence to this evidence .

Nuclear war

Steinbach 2002 Analyst, Center for Research on Globalisation http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has seriousimplications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. SeymourHersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel,as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strongprobability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the)next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) targetof Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satelliteimages of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching itsown satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously

complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclearweapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold fortheir actual use, if not forall out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of massdestruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflictcould trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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2NC NATO Module (1/2)

Withdrawing TNWs undermines NATORussian threat means member states are on edge about

security guarantees

Thranert, 2009 (Oliver, Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division of the Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik, Berlin, NATO, Missile Defence and Extended Deterrence, Survival, 51:6, 63-76,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330903461674)

Eastern Europeans particularly value Americas presence in Europe to counterbalance Russia in light oftheir 40 years as unwilling parts of the Soviet empire, which distinguishes them from NATO members whoexperienced the Cold War from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Today, many new NATO members view Russia asincreasingly authoritarian, and Moscows foreign and security policy as assertive, if not aggressive. After the Caucasuscrisis of 2008 Eastern Europeans feel the need more than ever to engage the United States militarily in Europe for their

protection. These new NATO members are likely to oppose any development that might lead to theimminent withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe, fearing a weakening of the US commitment .But threat perceptions do not only differ between NATO members old and new . While Norway does notshare the Eastern Europeans Cold War experiences, it is increasingly concerned about Russian security policy, not least

because Moscow has re-introduced its former practice of strategic bomber patrols over the North Sea. Turkey does notworry so much about Moscow, but is concerned about developments in Iran more than other NATOcountries. Ankara has a reasonably sound working relationship with Tehran, but from the Turkish perspective its basis is a

balance of power between the countries. If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons this balance would change. Given thesethreat perceptions, a full-scale debate about US nuclear withdrawal from Europe could trigger acontroversy that would undermine NATO cohesion . Many members could lose confidence in theAlliances defence commitments in general, and the US commitment to defend Europe in particular.Ending the US nuclear presence in Europe would also end Allies influence on NATOs nuclearpolicymaking. Only Washington and London would remain directly involved in NATO nuclear policy (even now thatFrance has become a full NATO member, Paris still does not participate in Nuclear Planning Group meetings). True, the

Nuclear Planning Group would continue to work, but it would quickly lose its salience, and NATO members would lose theirnuclear competences.

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Nuclear war

Jackson, 1999 (Bruce, President of US Committee on NATO, The Conservative Case for NATO, Policy Review,Apr/May,http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3552212.html)

NATO is at the center of all U.S. military strategies. Critics have read far too much into the current absence of a serious rival to U.S. interests on the worldstage. This happy circumstance will surely change. If, for example, a threat were to emerge from a resurgent Russia (and given the events of thepast six months in Russia, that i s at least conceivable), there would not be time in which t o reconstitute a NATO-like alliance on the front line. In the event of concerted aggression by militant Islamic states,

perhaps in possession of weapons of mass destruction,NATO will protect our flank and secure our supply lines. And, finally, if thesecurity interests of the West are drawn to the containment of Chinese expansion, NATO will guard thestrategic rear of the alliance and make the forward deployment of U.S. forces possible. In all cases,NATO is the common denominator in the grand strategy of the West. The imperative of consolidating thecenter is axiomatic in military strategy, andNATO stands at the center of our alliance structure . If the centrality of NATO werenot enough, there is also the appeal of the plasticity of the alliance, particularly our ability to refocus its strategic concept. Conservatives, especially, who have a proud tradition as realists, must conclude thatthe new threats to transatlantic security come from out-of-area, and that NATO can be adapted to counter these threats to our interests. NATO reflects the American way of war. Politically untidy though theymay be, our arrangements with Europe reflect a national consensus on the part of Americans that we intend to prosecute our objectives in war not unilaterally but in coalition with our allies. Having made thisdecision, mechanisms like NATO become a fact of life. In order to fight effectively as a coalition, an alliance has to plan and train together as well as exchange views on the concept of joint operations.

Without the mechanisms of coordination developed within NATO, the success of ad hoc coalitions, like

Desert Storm, would be doubtful. Obviously, there is concern about the inevitable compromises that keep coalition partners in the fold and that may impinge to some degreeon U.S. sovereignty. But conservatives should recognize that these modest measures are necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, conservatives, in particular, should tend to favor coalitionmechanisms because they limit the potential overseas ambitions of governments even our own and they provide the means to share the financial burdens of defense with our European allies. NATOremains "the military expression of a community of shared values." It is often said that NATO is more than just a military alliance; it has served as the political foundation on which Europe has been rebuilt overthe past 50 years. NATO played and still plays a decisive role in consolidating the victory of the West in the Cold War. It is also the only institution that appears capable of countering the crimes againsthumanity being committed in the Balkans. It is not unreasonable to foresee that NATO as a political vehicle will continue to broaden the Euro-Atlantic community to include democracies as distant as Estoniaor Finland in Northern Europe and Romania and Bulgaria in Southeast Europe. Over time, non-NATO allies of the United States in our hemisphere, such as Argentina and Chile, may seek a closer politicalrelationship with NATO. In the future, and in the context of new missions, NATO might also institutionalize coordination with Israel, which maintains an historical relationship with the United States and hasrecently concluded a strategic arrangement with Turkey, NATOs easternmost member. It would not be unreasonable to suggest t hat a reformed alliance focused on a new set of missions might welcome a moreformal relationship with a country that shares our values and could contribute materially to the security and strategic depth of the Euro-Atlantic region. Regardless of how NATOs political role is manifested inthe next decade, conservatives will tend to support institutions of invested values dedicated to their protection. It should not come as a surprise to conservatives that Judeo-Christian values over the pastmillennium and democratic ideals over the past 350 years have required protection by force of arms. For the past 50 years, NATO has provided that protection with a very light hand. NATOs mission inEurope is unfinished. Even if one concedes that Americas interests will eventually diverge from those of our European allies, it is still far too soon for the United States to disengage from Europe. The most

obvious reason for this is that the Europeans do not want us to leave in the foreseeable future. We have seen a number of instances in which otherinstitutions have been unable to cope with serious European problems . NATOs effectiveness compares favorably to the performance ofUNPROFOR at Sebrenica and throughout Bosnia. And with the failure of the October 1998 Kosovo agreement which called for peace monitors from the OSCE Europeans and Americans agreed that

only a NATO mission could keep the peace. While critics have argued that U.S. vital interests are not at stake in Bosnia or Kosovo, the persistent pattern of political andmilitary failure at the periphery of our power (by coalitions other than NATO) should produce renewed

respect for NATOs singular role in protecting the Atlantic democracies . The European experiment for which NATO is the predicate isincomplete, and it would be foolish in the extreme to disassemble the security structure that has made modern Europe possible. A unified Germany is only seven years old and much remains to be decided aboutits direction, its purpose, and how it intends to manage its preponderant power in Europe. A European currency is a few months old, and the political affects of partial monetary union are as yet unknown. While60 million souls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are now formally NATO allies, the integration of these countries into NATOs military structure and the achievement of full interoperability are atleast a decade in the future. Moreover, there are another 50 million people in Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria who hope to come into Europe from the cold and who aspireto join the economic and security institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. Finally, and most important, there is a war of aggression and genocide in the Balkans where NATO forces are engaged. To paraphrase Lady

Thatcher,now is not the time to go wobbly on NATO. If it is the end of NATO, it is the end of a lot morethan NATO. Advocates of NATO expansion, and proponents of NATO in general, often ask critics to imagine the past fifty years without the alliance. Critics who argue that NATO is unnecessarymust also maintain that U.S. security is defensible in the future without what has come to be regarded as the Wests insurance policy. A world without NATO would be aworld with a radically changed political order one about which we know little, and what we canimagine is troubling. We can imagine that the United States would be without an immediate brake onRussian imperial recidivism. We would be unable to moderate and guide the rise of German power. We would lack in centives to keep Turkey engaged in Europe. T he reinforcementand defense of Israel in extremis would be vastly more difficult . The boundary lines within which we now contain rogue states and

pursue the containment of weapons of mass destruction would have to be abandoned and movedthousands of miles closer to the territory of the United States . The defense of the Gulf States would beproblematic at best. And a credible Pacific security policy would be heavily burdened by the requirement tomaintain major forces in an unsettled Atlantic region . At a minimum, the disestablishment of NATO wouldrequire military expenditures at near wartime levels . A conservative view and I believe the correct view is that the current international system inwhich NATO serves as cornerstone has been remarkably friendly to U.S. interests and has not imposed particularly onerous financial burdens on our economy . Overturning theconditions that brought about such a relatively felicitous state of affairs risks exposing the United Statesand our remaining allies to a much harsher international environment, one that may make far greaterdemands of American blood and treasure.

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NATO ModuleLinks

TNW withdrawal guts NATOit makes a unified political signal impossible

Yost, 2009 (David S., Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in IR from USC, Assurance and USextended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85:4, 755-780, http://www.google.com/url?

sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fjournal%2F122476701%2Fabstract&ei=IhQoTIH3K4L78AaV4OTFDw&usg=AFQjCNG16FUqmoMBmtQ5JyeWlsudcu4ol

Q&sig2=MuihrTak0QyrmY-RtgC5Sg)

Moreover, the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe could be seen as a break withthe historic transatlantic bargain whereby the United States plays a leading role in return for providing asecurity guarantee. It could contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment tothe collective defence pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a time when the meaning of collectivedefence is being reconsidered, owing in part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyberwarfare. Some European allied

observers hold that the complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would be interpreted , at leastin some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso facto weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent .The implications for assurance of the NATO European allies could therefore be profound. Theconsequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe would include the lossof the crisis management options provided by an alliance deterrent posture involving aircraft frommultiple allies. This arrangement makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signalone of a united and resolute alliancedistinct from a US (or British or French) national action. It is difficult toimagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent

benefits for alliance cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but the examination of other approaches maywell be an issue in the alliances Strategic Concept review. In this review assurance and extended deterrence will beconsidered in a dynamic context involving other NATO policy challengesincluding missile defence, relations with Russia,the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms controland disarmament, and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made remain to be seen.

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2NC Balkans Module (1/2)

Turkish prolif causes a chain reaction that leads to Balkan instability

Sharp, 1993 (Jane, Europes Nuclear Dominoes, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, pp. 29-30, Google Books)

Turkey is another state that has little nuclear expertise and appears not to have any nuclear ambitions in the short term butits security could be easily destabilized by its neighbors actions. At least four of its neighboring states arenuclear and three are near-nuclear: Israel is an undeclared but obvious nuclear-weapons power; Iran is close to beingnuclear-weapon capable, and is reported to have bought or stolen three nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan; and Pakistan isalso close to achieving nuclear-weapon capability. Russia is and will remain a nuclear-weapons state for the forseeablefuture. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan control former Soviet strategic missiles for the time being. Theirnuclear status will remain uncertain in all likelihood through the 1990sor until their weapons are finally dismantled.

Without NATOs security guarantee, Turkey might find its neighbors sufficiently threatening to assertitself as a regional nuclear power, straddling the Balkans and central Asia . Should Turkey acquire nuclearweapons, Greece would certainly want extra reassurances from the United States or NATO which, if notforthcoming, might make Greece a candidate for proliferation. Serbia could also see itself at risk from anuclear Turkey and would be able to look only to Russia for a security guarantee. Yugoslavia threatened toleave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime at the 1975 review conference on the grounds that the nuclear

powers were not living up to their part of the bargain. As the most aggressive, least trustworthy state in Europe,Serbia bears close watching as a potential proliferators, despite being a party to the NPT . Armenia wouldcertainly be unsettled by a Turkish bomb, given its history of enmity with Turkey . In September 1991,Armenian government spokesmen indicated an interest in signing the NPT, but the government has taken no action.

Azerbaijan has signed the NPT, but it would not remain passive in the event Armenia went nuclear. It is notdifficult to imagine the proliferation chain.

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Balkans Module (2/2)

Balkan instability escalates to global wars

Baker, 1995 (James, Former Secretary of State, Flash Point in the Balkans: Drawing the Line at Macedonia, LATimes http://www.hri.org/news/forpapers/95-04-30.frp)

The first great European conflict of this century began in the Balkans. Unless we are careful, so may thelast. Three years after the beginning of war in Bosnia, international attention remains riveted on the fate of that tragic nation.But Macedonia is perhaps an even more dangerous flash point in the Balkans. Unless the international community takes

strong action we could see the outbreak of a general Balkan war that could draw in the European powersand even the United States. And there will be no such strong action without firm U.S. leadership. The strategicimportance of Macedonia transcends its size, about that of Vermont, and its population, just a fraction more than 2 million. Itlooms large because of the Balkans' unforgiving geography and Macedonia's own volatile ethnic mix. Tension between the

country's Macedonian majority and Albanian minority -estimated at between 20% and 40%- already runs high. Should thistension escalate into civil war, it might prompt intervention from Albania to the west. Conflict couldspread across Macedonia's northern border with Serbia -where there is a large and restive Albanian population in Kosovo.Greece, already consumed by an angry dispute with Macedonia, might be tempted to become involved. Turkey, Bulgaria and

others could follow. Under such a scenario, the West Europeans, the United States and even Russia could beforced to pick sides -with disastrous consequences for the peace of Europe . The Clinton Administration is clearly aware of the risksin Macedonia but appears unwilling to take decisive action necessary to address them. There are already 550 U.S. troops in Macedonia as part of a U.N. observer force -ostensibly to maintain stability. TheAdministration is apparently contemplating the dispatch of another 1,500 soldiers, perhaps as part of a division-sized NATO contingent. Even as it considers increasing our military presence on the ground,however, the Administration has refused to take a firm stand against an irresponsible Greek embargo directed at landlocked Macedonia. The embargo was imposed 14 months ago because Athens, forhistorical reasons, objects to Macedonia's flag and even its name. In a further bow to Athens and to the Greek American community in the United States, the Administration has not sent an accredited U.S.ambassador to the Macedonian capital, Skopje. The Administration's approach on Macedonia is not just confused -it is contradictory. The United States is in the grotesque position of defending the territorialintegrity of a nation we refuse to have full diplomatic relations with. The arguments that the Administration offers in defense of its policy, not surprisingly, do not hold water. For example, oneAdministration official has admitted, "We have repeatedly said that the embargo is wrong. But we have a 150-year history of friendship with Greece and we are not going to destroy that bilateral relationshipover this." This statement rings hollow, coming from an Administration whose actions have caused our far more important bilateral relationship with Britain to reach its lowest point in modern history. Inaddition, the statement's premise is false: The U.S.-Greek relationship is far too important for both countries to be "destroyed" by Washington sending an accredited ambassador to Skopje. The suggestion thatAthens would sever relations with the United States over this is, frankly, either breathtakingly obtuse or disingenuous. Some of Greece's partners in the European Union are far less squeamish thanWashington has been in condemning Athens' irresponsible embargo against Macedonia. Last year, the European Commission filed a petition against Greece in the European Court of Justice, calling theblockade illegal and unwarranted. The court's final decision is expected this summer. Meanwhile, the embargo continues. Since it was imposed, Macedonia has lost about 50% of its yearly export earnings.Today Macedonia's gross domestic product is roughly half what it was in 1990, and unemployment is running about 35%. Athens' embargo is making a bad economic situation worse and is recklesslycontributing to the rising tension between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians that already threatens to tear the country apart. The moderate government of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov is increasinglyembattled. Moving decisively on Macedonia will require the Administration to stand up to a Greek American community that strongly supports Athens' stance against Macedonia. It is never easy, much lesspleasant, to confront a powerful domestic constituency in order to serve a greater national interest. The Bush Administration deferred full recognition of Macedonia in part because of polit ical pressures duringthe 1992 presidential campaign. This was a mistake and one that I, as secretary of state at the time, still regret. Today, with U.S. soldiers at risk and the potential for a broader Balkan conflict far higher, thereis no excuse for our failure to act. First, the Administration should move beyond pro forma disapproval of the blockade to an unambiguous condemnation. It should also announce the appointment of a U.S.ambassador and dispatch him or her to Skopje immediately. This would clearly signal to Athens and other capitals in the region our seriousness about supporting Macedonia's independence and territorial

integrity. Second, the Administration needs to work with its Western European allies to broadly redefine the NATO's missin to encompass the preservation of peace and stability in Europe. This redefinitionshould permit NATO military action anywhere and under any circumstances when that peace and stability are threatened -should a majority or a super-majority alliance members concur. Five years after theend of the Cold War, NATO remains an organization in search of a mission. It need only look as far as preventing a broader Balkan war. Third, the Administration should take the lead within NATO inforging an effective policy to contain the Balkan conflict. This should begin with an explicit NATO warning to all Macedonia's neighbors -Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and, yes, even NATO-member Greece- thatany adventurism in Macedonia would be considered a threat to European peace and stability and would be met with the full force of the alliance. Had NATO been in a position to have taken a similar stancetoward Bosnia at the beginning of the conflict there, it would have been better prepared to deal with, and perhaps even avert, the disaster that unfolded. By acting now, NATO can avoid yet another tragic"might have been." But warnings, as the Administration's self-defeating policy of empty threats in Bosnia has made clear, are not enough. Resolve must match rhetoric. The warning needs to be backed up by acredible use of force. This means well-armed troops on the ground supported by air power. A division-sized NATO force, including a substantial U.S. component, should be sufficient. If we do not move

quickly, there could be a repeat of the Bosnian humanitarian nightmare, as Macedonia plunges into chaos. But there is far more than humanitarianism at issue for U.S. policy-makers. The U.S.has fought three European wars in the century -two hot and one cold- and three are enough. We shouldhave learned by now that we cannot ignore a fundamental challenge to continental stability. If generalinstability occurs in Europe -and a deterioration of the situation in Macedonia risks precisely that- the U.S. willbecome involved whether we like it or not. It is better to accept the cost of deterrence now than pay theprice of broader conflict later.

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2NC Relations Module (1/2)

Prolif guts US-Turkish relations and causes regional conflict

Kibaroglu, 2005 (Mustafa, Associate Professor, Bilkent University; Senior Fellow, Harvard, Beyond Iran: TheRisk Of A Nuclearizing Middle East, February 9, speech given at The Washington Institute Policy Forum Luncheon,

http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WINEP/perspex-winep-beyondiran-Kibaroglufulltranscript.pdf)

I want to conclude by discussing the third issue that we are asked to comment on today as to what actions by outsidepowers, such as the United States, might influence the thinking in these regional states? I will answer this question a bitdifferently. I think both sides of the coin must be discussed here. I mean, the outside powers may have either a positive or a

negative impact on Turkey so long as the nuclear issues are concerned. Should Turkey decide, at some point in the futureto go nuclear, the outside powers, the United States in particular, may exploit every opportunity to stop Turkey goingdown that road. Many analysts argue that the strategic value of Turkey for the US is diminishing since the end of the Cold

War. Hence, the US administrations may put an unbearable strain on their relations with Turkey in everyfield, extending from economic to military and political issues. There are examples of such an attitude,even during the Cold War years, when Turkey was considered to be a staunch ally of the US. Im talkingabout the letter by President Lyndon Johnson sent to Ankara in June 1964, and also the arms embargo from 1975 to 1979imposed by President Jimmy Carter, both because of Turkey using its legitimate right to intervene in Cyprus to protect the

Turks from the atrocities of the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, in the nuclear field, over the last four decades, successiveUS administrations have done their best to blockade Turkeys attempts to establish nuclear power plants,because of their fear of alleged illicit cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan.8 I can see that some concernsdo still exist. Therefore, even the smallest sign of thinking of nuclear weapons option may again prevent Turkey from

enjoying the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the future. Added to these, even the mere rumors that Turkeymight be developing nuclear weapons may make Turkey a target of the war by proxy tactics of itsneighbors, as they used to do so until recently. Bearing in mind that Turkey has signed as well as ratified the AdditionalProtocol, which gives extended rights to the IAEA to conduct thorough inspections in any location in the country, itwould be only a wishful thinking to conceal clandestine activities from international inspections . ShouldTurkey defies its solemn obligations to provide full transparency, it may well be taken to the United Nations Security Counciland become subject to comprehensive sanctions, including economic as well as military measures. The glorious history of theTurks, and Turkey, which has always been loyal to its international obligations, would not deserve such a treatment by the

international community. Therefore, I would recommend to those in Turkey who may have ambitions to develop a nuclearweapons capability, to forget about them. As such, they will serve our country better by using Turkeys resources morewisely and more efficiently in other fields that our people would really need.

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Relations Module (2/2)

US Turkey relations are key to avoid the rise of another hostile global rival

Malik, 1997 Senior Associate At The Strategy Group (Chicago Tribune, 5/15)

Despite its Islamists-led government, Turkey is again one of America's favorite allies, and Washington hasstepped up efforts to help latch it more closely to Western economic and security systems. Americans are warningEuropean governments not to belie the continent's secular credentials by barring Turkey from the European Union. The EU has so far refused to act on Turkey's decade-old membership application. StrobeTalbott has brought it out into the open. The American deputy secretary of state publicly ridiculed the EU's argument that having Muslim Turkey as its member would trigger a culture clash. References toTurkish culture, he said at a U.S.-EU conference in Washington, are "euphemisms for religion." Must the "European-ness" of a village, he asked, be judged by "whether its landmarks are church spires of

minarets"? America's No. 2 diplomat also dismissed the suggestion that Turkey's human-rights violations(in combating Kurdish insurgency) disqualify it for the EU membership . He reminded Europeans that "many current EU members haveovercome far greater traumas in this century--and that's putting it mildly." Talbott probably was alluding to the past Greek and Portuguese dictatorships, anti-Jewish pogroms and the holocaust. One Americandiplomat grumbled later that West European statesmen opposing Turkey's admission into the EU are being shamed by Turkish generals who are fighting their own government to preserve the secular characterof their state. U.S. officials use the words "crucial" and "critical" to underscore Turkey's importance to American interests in that region. And the administration has established contacts with Islamists in theTurkish government. This pro-Turkish stance is the latest among a half-dozen twists that America's Turkish policy has undergone in eight years. The unraveling of the Soviet Union led U.S. policy-makers todrop Ankara from their strategic equations. Turkey had been NATO's front-line member against the Soviet power. It regained importance to Americans during Desert Storm as a key partner in the anti-Iraq

coalition. Then early in the first Clinton administration, human-rights concerns considerably strained U.S. ties toTurkey. They were all but repaired again by Turkey's strong support for American efforts to end theBosnian crisis. The American peace broker for Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, assured the Turks publicly that the human-rights debate would not harm U.S.-Turkish relations. Perhaps unforeseenby him, the Islamist Refah party soon came to power at the head of a coalition government in Ankara. And despite the State Department's half-hearted assurance that "secularism" is "not a condition" of good

U.S.-Turkish relations, Washington remained leery about Turkey's Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Thattrepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed,though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working withinthe secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string ofother events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease inWashington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russianannouncement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperateconflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over.Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATOexpansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined

Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and callingfor a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the UnitedStates needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that areresentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both . Turkish politics, however, remainextremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it withWestern Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States,happily, is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkishrelations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, influential

groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkish government. Yet Turkey is likely to remain strategically important toAmericans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood .

Nuclear War

Khalilzad 95 US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Former Defense Analyst at RAND[ZALMAY, LOSING THE MOMENT? THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD AFTER THE COLD WAR,

WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, SPRING, LN]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a

return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such avision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadershipwould have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American

values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealingcooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regionalhegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the riseof another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hotwar and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be moreconducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolarbalance of powersystem.

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Relations Uniqueness

Relations are strong now

Rozen, 2010 (Laura, Politico.com staff writer, Obamas Turkey bind, Politico, June 21, Lexis)

But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey relationship in the wake of either the flotillaepisode or Turkey's vote against the Iran sanctions resolution . "We have excellent relations with allmembers of the administration," Tan said. "We are able to talk with them in an extensive, comprehensivemanner, in face-to-face meetings and several phone conversations," he said, citing recent conversations between Davutogluand Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and with National Security Adviser Jim Jones.Tan said Turkey shares the UnitedStates' concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear weapon. But he said Turkey's vote against the Iran sanctionsresolution will allow Turkey to remain an intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the internationalcommunity "to keep the door open to" Iran's returning to the negotiating table. The U.S. "has indicated publicly and privately

that we are very unhappy" with Turkey's "no" vote on the U.N. Security Council Iran resolution, "but [we] want to moveforward on crucial elements of relations," a U.S. official told POLITICO Monday on condition of anonymity.

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Relations ImpactTurns Case/Hegemony

Collapse of US-Turkish relations causes regional escalating wars, loses the war on terror and

devastates hegemony

Menon & Wimbush, 2007 (Rajan, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh UniversityFellow, New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, .

Is The United States Losing Turkey? Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey

%20PDF.pdf)

If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests willbe severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so thanduring the Cold War. Here are some of the most important reasons why this is true: Turkey is the top of an arc that starts inIsrael and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to,countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security , whether because they are allies and friends,adversaries, or loci of instability. Turkeys critical location means that instability within it could spill beyondits borders, with the unpredictable ripple effects traveling across its neighborhood, particularly theMiddle East. Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the

Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets.Turkey is a passageway for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, is the terminus.Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, andpotentially Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, on Russias energy pipelines. Turkeys substantial economicand political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries , whose strategicsignificance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is not only a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-

supported secessionist statelets, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also afellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over intowar, just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider conflagration that draws in Turkey (Azerbaijans ally)and Russia (Armenias patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim,and its alliance with

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