cmh_pub_10-4 corps of engineers - troops

UNITED STATES ARMr IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT

by Blanche D. Coil, Jean E. Keith

and Herbert H. Rosenthal

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988

Foreword

The world-wide operations of the U.S. Army in World War II involved anenormous amount of construction and the performance on a comparable scaleof many other missions by the Corps of Engineers.

This is the first of four volumes that will describe the participation of theEngineers in the war and the contribution they made toward winning it. Betterknown to the public in peacetime for its civil works, the Corps by the time of PearlHarbor had turned almost its full attention to military duties. At home the Engi-neers took over all military construction, and prepared hundreds of thousands ofEngineer troops for a variety of tasks overseas. These tasks included not only con-struction but also a number of other duties more or less related to engineering bothin rear areas and in the midst of battle. In performing these duties in World WarII the Army Engineers gained a proud record in combat as well as in service. Thisfirst volume tells how the Corps organized and planned and prepared for its tasks,and in particular how it trained its troops and obtained its equipment. The volumesstill to be published will describe the huge program of military construction in theUnited States, and Engineer operations overseas in the European and Pacific areas.

One of the objectives of the technical service volumes of the Army's WorldWar II series is to capture the point of view of the service concerned. In doing sothe authors of the present history, by thorough research and diligent solicitationof assistance, have also brought to their story a broad perspective, and they havetold it with a felicity that should make their work a valuable guide to the Armyas a whole, to the thoughtful citizen, and to the Engineers who served and whocontinue to serve the nation in war and in peace.

RICHARD W. STEPHENSMaj. Gen., U.S.A.Chief of Military History

Washington, D. C.10 July 1957

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The Authors

Blanche D. Coll has a Master of Arts degree in history from the Johns Hop-kins University and is a collaborating author of Ships for Victory: ShipbuildingUnder the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II. She has been on the staffof the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, since 1948.

Jean E. Keith, a Bachelor of Arts from Western Kentucky State College,has done graduate work in history at the Johns Hopkins University. DuringWorld War II he served as a gunnery officer on a destroyer in the Pacific. Hehas been with the Engineer Historical Division since 1951.

Herbert H. Rosenthal obtained his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University.During World War II he served in Europe with the 95th Infantry Division. Hewas associated with the Engineer Historical Division from 1948 to 1953 and isnow teaching at Southern Illinois University.

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PrefaceThis volume relates how the traditional tasks of American military engi-

neers changed and new ones developed in response to the tactical and logisticaldemands of World War II, and how the Corps of Engineers organized, equipped,and trained its troops in the United States to carry out these tasks overseas. Thebook is necessarily concerned with machines as well as men because the modernCorps which emerged during this period was an organization that increased itscapacity for work to the fullest extent possible by the adoption of power machinery.Dependence upon complicated machines, delicate instruments, and complexrather than simple engineering techniques was a natural accompaniment ofworld-wide military trends, but the situation nevertheless challenged those chargedwith plans and preparations to a full display of intelligence and adaptability.

More than half a million Engineer officers and enlisted men were in thearmed forces by the spring of 1945, comprising about 8 percent of the Army.Most of them were building or rebuilding hangars and barracks and offices at amultitude of military bases, laying down or repairing the strips at innumerableairfields, and enlarging or improving the endless network of roads and culvertsand bridges. Some were installing and operating miles of petroleum pipeline.Combat engineers were clearing mine fields. Still other engineers were manningboats and ships, making maps, purifying water, forging and shaping steel, or run-ning sawmills. In all areas of conflict, from battle front to rear bases, with groundand air forces, engineer troops were justifying the years of planning and preparationat home.

The day-to-day problems involved in readying engineer troops for such dutiesoverseas may have appeared simpler to the participants than to the historians whoreviewed the whole record later. The files are heavily weighted with the burdensof daily frustrations; successes account for much less space. We have been grantedcomplete freedom to evaluate and interpret, and to present a full and frankappraisal.

Many persons, both within and without the Corps of Engineers, have helpedto supplement and clarify the written record. The list is so long indeed that we havehad to be content in most cases to let the footnotes be our only acknowledgment.To those who read and commented upon the entire volumeMaj. Gen. ClarenceL. Adcock; Col. William W. Bessell, Jr.; Col. William W. Brotherton; Col. Ed-ward H. Coe; Brig. Gen. Miles M. Dawson; Col. Joseph S. Gorlinski; Richard M.Leighton; Lt. Col. David M. Matheson; Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold; Maj. Gen.

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Julian L. Schley; Brig. Gen. John W. N. Schulz; and Lt. Col. Eugene J. White-go our special thanks. Joseph A. Logan of the Office of the Comptroller of theArmy conducted a comprehensive review of statistical matter.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, Leo J. Meyer, and Stetson Conn of the Office of theChief of Military History and our colleagues in the Engineer Historical Division,especially Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, gave us the benefit of their criti-cism and greatly encouraged us by their understanding and support. David Jaffand Loretto C. Stevens edited the volume with care and patience. Margaret E.Tackley selected the photographs.

Among the many typists who worked on the manuscript, Dorothy Washing-ton, Elizabeth M. Ralston, Daisy G. Shield, Johanne R. Daggett, and Bettie J.Hazell earned our particular gratitude for their preparation of the final copy.Gerald N. Grob relieved us of many chores in checking and proofreading.

Librarians and clerks in the various records depositories proved untiring intheir efforts. To mention Eva Holt, Geraldine Jewell, Mary K. Stuart, and MaeE. Walker is to shorten a long list of persons who rendered this type of service withadmirable efficiency. Gladys Z. McKinney answered repeated inquiries aboutEngineer officers.

Research by Stuart W. Bruchey, Barbara B. Garner, Curtis W. Garrison,Keith Glenn, and Harry E. Ickes has proved helpful in the writing of the book.Useful drafts on mapping, camouflage, and intelligence were prepared by KennethJ. Deacon and on procurement of equipment before Pearl Harbor by Doris M.Condit. Edna E. Jensen worked up much of the material on procurement ofsupplies during the later war period.

As to the division of labor among the authors themselves, Miss Coll concen-trated primarily upon equipment; Mr. Keith, upon training; and Mr. Rosenthal,upon organization of troop units. Since a number of the chapters are the work ofmore than one of the authors, and since in some cases we invaded each other'sfield, there appears to be little advantage in attempting to assign more specificauthorship credit. An assumption of collective responsibility best expresses theway in which we have shared in the final product.

Washington, D. C.25 February 1957

BLANCHE D. COLLJEAN E. KEITHHERBERT H. ROSENTHAL

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Contents

Chapter PageI . ENGINEERS IN THE NEW ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Engineer Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Engineers in the Old Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Reorganization of Division and Corps Units . . . . . . . . . . . 12Formation of Armored and Aviation Units . . . . . . . . . . . . 16The Impact of the German Blitzkrieg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Changes in General Units After the Blitzkrieg . . . . . . . . . . . 22

I I . THE REVOLUTION IN EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . 27The Process o f Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27From Hand Tools to Power Machinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Strains on the Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Passage of Artificial Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Equipment for Aviation Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

III. EFFECTS OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ON MAPPING ANDCAMOUFLAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4

Mapping Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4The Air Force-Engineer Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69Divergent Opinions on the Team and Modification of Doctrine . . . . 75Camouflage for Open Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

IV. A START IN THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT . . 88Peacetime Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8Two Million Extra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Rearming i n Earnest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93The Beginning of Production Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

V. CONVERTING TO A CITIZEN CORPS. . . . . . . . . . 109T h e Nucleus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 9The "Terrific" Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Training the First Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

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Chapter Page

VI. REORGANIZATION AND GROWTH IN 1942 . . . . . . . 132The Wartime Task and Administrative Changes . . . . . . . . . . 132Refinement of Prewar Troop Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 136The Influence of Logistics on Engineer Growth . . . . . . . . . . . 142

VII. ACCELERATED TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146T h e Shortage o f Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6Engineer Replacement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

VIII. MOUNTING PRESSURE FOR SUPPLIES . . . . . . . . . 175On A War Footing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Pooling Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 0The Crisis in Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

I.. THE CUTBACK IN PRODUCTION GOALS . . . . . . . 193Attempts to Reduce the Army Supply Program . . . . . . . . . . . 193Tightening Controls on International Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195Fourth Quarter Production and the Final Reckoning . . . . . . . . . 198The Late Start in Maintenance of Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . 206

X. REORGANIZATION FOR GLOBAL WAR . . . . . . . . . 216Changes in AGF Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Supply and Maintenance Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Changes in ASF Units. . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . 229Distribution of Engineer Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

XI . THE ENGINEER SOLDIER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241Training the Corps of Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242Reflections From Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 4New Proportions and Capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256The Balanced Engineer Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

XII. CENTRALIZED UNIT TRAINING FOR ARMY SERVICEFORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0

West Camp Claiborne: The Experimental Phase . . . . . . . . . . 270West Camp Claiborne: The Permanent Center . . . . . . . . . . . 277

XIII. A LENGTHENED PROGRAM AND ADDITIONAL CENTERSF O R UNIT TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 3

Camp Ellis: A Study in Personnel and Command . . . . . . . . . 296Camp Sutton: A Study in Racial and National Tensions . . . . . . . 306

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Chapter Page

XIV. ENGINEER AVIATION UNITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314New Activations During the Equipment Shortage . . . . . . . . . . 314Basic Military Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Centralization Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 9Used Equipment Appears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320Evaluation of Unit Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322Engineer Aviation Unit Training Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

XV. ENGINEER GROUND FORCES UNITS . . . . . . . . . . 337Mine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6Drop in Qualify of Fillers in 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Harvest o f Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

XVI. A NEW ROLE IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS . . . . . 355Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5Early Organization and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Continued Threat From the Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376Emergence of the Southwest Pacific Requirement . . . . . . . . . . 379Final Objectives and Dissolution of the Command . . . . . . . . . 385

XVII. PREPARING TO RECONSTRUCT PORTS . . . . . . . . 391Port Construction and Repair Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392Port Repair Ships and Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399Dredges and Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

XVIII. A NEW MISSION: PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION . . . . 417Restricted Use of Pipelines by the Quartermaster Corps . . . . . . . 418The Potential Realized by the Corps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . 420Testing Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 6Training Petroleum Distribution Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . 429

XIX. AN OLD MISSION EXPANDS: MAPPING AND ENGINEERSTRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 8

The Beginning of an Engineer Intelligence Collection . . . . . . . . 438The Beginning of an Engineer Map Collection . . . . . . . . . . 441The Conflict Over Aerial Photography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446Adjustments to Mounting Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454

XX. IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 464T h e Over-all Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 4Clearance of Land Mines and Other Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . 468Bridging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 3

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Chapter Page

XXI. PRODUCTION IN HIGH GEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498The Sear ch for a Balanced Supply Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 498The Administrative Reorganization of January 1943 . . . . . . . . 507The Controlled Materials Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511The Shortage of Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515The Administrative Reorganization of November 1943 . . . . . . . . . 521Deliveries: 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 2

XXII. THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530Evolution of the Supply System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530Stock Control in the Measurement of Requirements . . . . . . . . . 539The Procurement Peak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546Inefficiency in the Midst of Plenty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554Spare Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 9

XXIII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 1

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 4

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 5

TablesNo.

1. Status of Major Items of Engineer Procurement Program: 31 December1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1

2. Status of Major Items of Engineer Procurement Program: 20 December1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6

3. Distribution of Training Time for Engineer Combat Battalion of InfantryDivision and Engineer Armored Battalion of Armored Division ... 127

4. Engineer Units in Troop Basis: January 1942 and July 1942 . . . . . . 1445. Engineer Replacement Training Center Programed Hours: 1940-41 . . 1646. Engineer Replacement Training Center Programed Hours: 1942-43 . . 1687. Construction Machinery Annual Requirements as of December 1942 and

Actual Deliveries in 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2008. Miscellaneous Equipment Annual Requirements as of December 1942

and Actual Deliveries in 1942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2029. Unfilled Requisitions and the Availability of Depot Stocks: December

1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 510. Number and Strength of Engineer Table of Organization Units: 30

June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 9

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No. Page

11. Construction Machinery: Annual Requirements as of February, August,and December 1943 and Actual Deliveries in 1943 . . . . . . . . . 526

12. Miscellaneous Equipment: Annual Requirements as of February, August,and December 1943 and Actual Deliveries in 1943 . . . . . . . . . 528

13. Tractors, Cranes and Shovels: Annual Requirements as of Selected Datesa n d Actual Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 8

14. Construction Machinery: Annual Requirements as of Selected Dates andActual Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 0

15. Boats and Bridges: Annual Requirements as of Selected Dates and ActualDeliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 2

Charts

1. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Engineers: September 1939 . 62. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Engineers: December 1941. . 1333. Value of Engineer Supplies Procured by Major Classes of Equipment:

1942-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 14. Organization and Procedures for Handling International Aid . . . . . 1855. Total Number of Engineer Troops, Continental United States and Over-

seas: 1942-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 76. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Engineers: December 1943. . 2187. Organization and Procedures for Handling Procurement of Supplies:

1939-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 88. Organization and Procedures for Distributing Supplies . . . . . . . . 5319. Engineer Depots: July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534

10. Tonnage Handled by Engineer Depots: September 1942-September1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 2

11. Elements of Supply and Demand Studies, Supply Control System . . . 546

Illustrations

Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Brig. Gen. John J . Kingman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Robins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81st Division Engineers Working on a Muddy Road . . . . . . . . . . . 10Col. Stuart C. Godfrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Bulldozer in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327-Ton Ponton Bridge Over the Chattahoochee River . . . . . . . . . . 38H-10 Portable Steel Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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Page

German Raft Built of Pneumatic Floats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4310-Ton Ponton Bridge at Fort Knox, Ky. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Pneumatic-Float Treadway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0SCR-625 Mine Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Aviation Engineer Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Five-Lens Camera, T-3A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Multiplex S e t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7Printing Maps in the Field, Carolina Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Flat-Top Concealing 3-Inch Antiaircraft Gun Emplacement . . . . . . . 83Dummy Planes in Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Soldiers Camouflaged With Individual Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Assistant Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . 8960-Inch Searchlight Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 0Abbot Hall, Headquarters of the Engineer School. . . . . . . . . . . . 110Camouflaged Revetments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 9Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134General Brehon B. Somervell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Engineers Constructing the Pioneer Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Brig. Gen. Roscoe C. Crawford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152Obstacle Course, Ft. Belvoir, 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Soldiers Firing the Springfield M1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Fowler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220Tractor-Operated Letourneau Crane M20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245Class in Automotive Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248Engineer Equipment in New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250Deactivating Antipersonnel Mines and Booby Traps . . . . . . . . . . . 256Class in Drafting at a Civilian University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Brig. Gen. John W. N. Schulz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Ponton Equipage Being Unloaded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276Welding Dredge Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 9Overseas Sawmill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1Negro Troops Training at Camp Sutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309Bantam Towed Scraper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Engineer Troops Preparing Base Course of Airstrip . . . . . . . . . . . 336Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338Engineers at Camp Swift, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344Sowing a Mine Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Brig. Gen. Daniel Noce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362Landing Craft Operated by Engineer Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371Engineers Placing Sommerfeld Track on the Sand . . . . . . . . . . . 374

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Page

Jeep Leaving Landing Craft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375Diver Coming Out of the Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395Members of Port Construction and Repair Group . . . . . . . . . . . 398, 399Layout Plan for the Engineer Port Repair Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404The Engineer Port Repair Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405Barth, Hains Class Hopper Dredge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415Preparing for Field Problem on Pipe-Laying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433Manifold Valve Installation on Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435Welder Joining Two Sections of Pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436Women Compiling Foreign Map Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443Col. Herbert B . Loper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445Laying Out Aerial Photographs to Check Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . 454Soldier Using Multiplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 5Sorting Maps for Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458Bulldozer Cutting Road Through Jungle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472Road Cut Through Hills and Jungle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473Beach and Underwater Obstacles, Normandy, France . . . . . . . . . . 474Soldier Removing an Enemy Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480Bridge Truck With Hydraulic Lifting Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485Medium Tank Crossing Treadway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488Tank Falling into the Colorado River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489Bailey Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 3Steel Treadway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 7Stacks of Engineer Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560Converting Stock Records of Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

The illustration on page 10 is from the National Archives; the illustrations onpages 43 and 46 are from the International News Photos; all others are from thefiles of the Department of Defense.

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CHAPTER I

Engineers in the New Army

Those who have attempted to describe ina simple phrase the tactics of the most com-plex war in history refer to World War IIas "an air war," "a mechanized war," "anamphibious war," and most inclusively,"a mobile war." Because its military cam-paigns accented movement, whether by air,by sea, or by land, and because the primarycombat mission of the Corps of Engineers isto aid or impede movement, World War IIhas also been called "an engineer's war."1

The far-flung deployment of Americantroops and the global nature of the conflictplaced a premium on logistics. As a con-sequence the engineer mission of buildingmilitary bases and routes of communicationtook on added significance. Although ar-rogating to the engineers an exclusive titleto the war would indeed be to lose perspec-tive, merely noting that the claim was madeattests to the importance of the engineer role.

During World War II engineer troopsbuilt airfields, camps, depots, and hospitalsfor the invasion build-up in Britain. Theyovercame German destruction in Italy byclearing the ports and roads of rubble andby throwing bridges across the rivers. Theycleared the beaches at the Normandy land-ings and rolled the supplies across them.Working under heavy fire, they threw pon-ton bridges across the Rhine, making cer-tain that troops and supplies would continueto push onward after the bridge at Rema-gen collapsed. Engineer troops opened new

supply routes into China, constructing air-fields on either side of the "Hump" andpushing the Ledo Road and the longest pipe-line system in the world through the moun-tainous jungle. In the long fight fromAustralia to Tokyo, engineers manned land-ing craft which delivered invading troopson island after island and converted thoseislands into operating bases. The founda-tion of this contribution to victory overseaswas laid at home in the development of doc-trine and equipment, the refinement oftroop organization, and the training ofcitizen soldiers.2

The Engineer Mission

The Corps of Engineers has a long his-tory of service to the nation in war andpeace. In 1950 it celebrated its 175th an-

1 On his return from a tour of the SouthwestPacific theater the Chief of Engineers quoted Gen-eral Douglas MacArthur: "Reybold, this is an airand amphibious war; because of the nature of airand amphibious operations, it is distinctly an engi-neer's war." Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold, "Engi-neers on Our War Fronts," Concrete, III (April,1944), 33. See also, Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold,Engineers in World War II, A Tribute, pamphlet[1 Nov 45], p. 1. EHD files.

2 For the history of the Corps of Engineers over-seas, see Ralph F. Weld, Abe Bortz, and CharlesW. Lynch, The Corps of Engineers: The WarAgainst Germany, and Karl C. Dod, The Corpsof Engineers: The War Against Japan, volumesin preparation for the series UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

2 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT

niversary, thus honoring the date whenRichard Gridley was appointed Chief Engi-neer of the Revolutionary forces. Con-gress established a Corps of Engineers in1779, only to disband it in 1783. An actpassed 16 March 1802 established thepresent Corps and provided that it shouldbe "stationed at West Point . . . and shallconstitute a Military Academy . . . ."Although the faculty at West Point was butfor a short time predominantly "Engineer,"the Corps remained in charge of the schooluntil 1866. The Corps of Engineers hadmeanwhile been singled out to perform taskswhich have been variously known as "non-military," "civil works," or "rivers andharbors." In 1824, Congress authorizedthe President "to cause the necessary sur-veys, plans, and estimates, to be made ofthe routes of such roads and canals as hemay deem of national importance, in acommercial or military point of view, ornecessary for the transportation of the pub-lic mail" and "to employ two or more skill-ful engineers, and such officers of the corpsof engineers, or who may be detailed to doduty with that corps, as he may thinkproper . . . ." Thereafter Army engineerswere in the vanguard of westward expan-sion. They improved the navigation of theMississippi and Ohio Rivers, selected theroute of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal,superintended the construction of the Na-tional Road, and surveyed the routes ofmany railroads.3

The Army engineer is no less proud of themilitary history of his Corps than of itspeacetime accomplishments. Although hisunique contribution is as a technician, theengineer soldier is a fighter as well. The ex-ploits of the Union Army's Engineer Bat-talion at Antietam illustrate his versatility:

The night before the battle of Antietam theBattalion rendered three of the fords ofAntietam Creek passable for artillery, bycutting down the banks and paving thebottom with large stones where it was toosoft. During the battle the Battalion guardedand kept open these fords. The night afterthe battle, the Battalion, at the request ofits commander, was ordered to report to Gen.Porter to act as infantry and in that capacitysupported Randall's battery of the First Ar-tillery in the advance to Shepherdstown.After the arrival of the army at Harper's Ferryit built one bridge over the Potomac andanother over the Shenandoah and was busilyengaged on the fortifications during themonth it remained there.4

During World War I, the Corps of Engi-neers grew from 256 officers and about2,220 enlisted men to 11,175 officers andabout 285,000 men. In France its most im-portant job was keeping open the routesof communication but, as in the Civil War,engineer soldiers were prepared to act as in-fantry in combat, and their service at Bel-leau Wood and during the German offensiveof March 1918 contributed much towardthe Allied victory.

During the period between World War Iand II, the military duties of the Corps ofEngineers remained the same. If war came,its troops were to clear the way and build;

3 Historical sketches of the Corps of Engineersare found in. (1) Lt. Col. Paul W. Thompson,What You Should Know About the Army Engi-neers (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,1942); (2) W. Stull Holt, The Office of the Chiefof Engineers of the Army, Its Non-Military History,Activities, and Organization (Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins Press, 1923); (3) Engr Sch, History andTraditions of the Corps of Engineers (Fort Belvoir,Va.: Engineer Center, 1949); (4) Engr Sch, TheNews Letter, II (May, 1950); (5) EHD, The Corpsof Engineers Historical Index (1943).

4 Quoted in 1st Lt. C. A. Youngsberg, History ofEngineer Troops in the United States Army, 17751901 (Washington Barracks: Press of the EngineerSchool, 1910), Engr Sch Occasional Papers 37,1910, p. 11.

ENGINEERS IN THE NEW ARMY 3

to survey and map; to supply water andelectricity; to develop materials and tech-niques for camouflage; to operate railroads.With the exception of railroad operation,transferred to the newly created Transpor-tation Corps in November 1942, these werethe jobs for which the engineers preparedand which they carried out during WorldWar II.

Probably because of the broad scope ofengineer responsibilities both in peace andwar, the Corps had become accustomed toexpecting the cream of the West Pointgraduating class to elect service with it.When the top man in the class of 1941failed to select the Corps of Engineers, thehead of the Engineering Department at theMilitary Academy undertook to cushion theChief of Engineers for the shock:

You will probably have to take a bit ofjoshing over the fact that the No. 1 man chosethe cavalry. . . . This man, who is a veryfine one, was 'crazy' about horses when heentered. . . . This love . . . has stayed withhim and, since the cavalry is the only branchthat has many horses left, he was consistentin choosing the cavalry.5

Actually, this particular Chief of Engineersremained sanguine when top men failed tochoose the Corps. He thought that a differ-ent choice tended to silence protests fromother branches that they also needed menwho showed outstanding promise andtended to have a sobering effect upon thoseEngineer officers who regarded the Corpsas an exclusive branch, different from, andperhaps superior to, the other branches.Insofar as exclusiveness aided esprit, he wel-comed the sentiment; insofar as it posed athreat to teamwork, he deplored it. Butwhether this loss by the Corps of some ofthe top men of West Point was a cause forembarrassment or for silent congratulation,

such occasions were rare. In 1940, the Engi-neer quota of 40 was filled from the first 67men in a class of 445; in 1941, its quota of50 was filled from the first 69 in a class of427. The Engineers were indeed fortunate.Such men were accustomed to working hardand to succeeding. They were proficient inbook learningan indispensable tool in themastery of a technical profession.6

Accustomed to outstanding qualities inits West Point graduates, the Engineerssought to set a similar high standard amongappointments made from civil life. As oneEngineer officer expressed it, the Corps"should not be satisfied with anything lessthan 'A' No. 1 cracker jack ring-tail ele-phants to whom you can give a job, forgetabout it, and know that you will get onehundred per cent results." 7 The Engineerslooked to the construction industry, whoseranks were filled with graduates of technicalcolleges, to furnish many such officers in anemergency. Contacts with this "reserve"were assured through the civil works activi-ties of the Corps and through mutual mem-bership in the Society of American MilitaryEngineers and other national engineeringsocieties.

The esprit de corps created by the beliefamong Engineer officers that they consti-tuted a select group and that they were theheirs of many years' service to the nation ledLt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding

5 Ltr, [Lt Col Thomas D.] Stamps, Dept of Civiland Mil Engr, USMA, to CofEngrs, 23 May 41.210.3, Engrs Corps of, Pt. 17.

6 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, TAG for CofEngrs, 23 Apr41. 210.3, Engrs Corps of, Pt. 16. (3) Incl, n.d.,with Ltr, Maj Gen Julian L. Schley to C of EHD,4 Jun 52. EHD files. (All letters to the chief ofthe Engineer Historical Division are in EngineerHistorical Division files.)

7 Ltr, Brig Gen Dan I. Sultan, CO Ft. Logan,to C of Opns and Tng Sec, 28 Feb 39. 210.1,Engrs Corps of, Pt. 6.


the Army Service Forceshimself an Engi-neer officerto declare that "the senti-mental angle . . . was probably strongerin my own Corps than in any other in theArmy. . . ." 8 Sentimentality was exem-plified by the cherished Engineer button,different in design from the standard Armybutton and to be seen only on the uniformsof members of the Corps of Engineers.Confidence marked the Engineers' tendencyto translate its motto, Essayons, as "Let ussucceed" rather than "Let us try."9

Except at the very top, the Corps of Engi-neers always maintained a clear-cut admin-istrative division between its civil andmilitary functions. The Chief of Engineerswas the only person charged with both ac-tivities. In carrying out his civil works du-ties, he reported directly to the Secretaryof War. On the military side, he was re-sponsible to the War Department's Chief ofStaff for the development of doctrine, theselection of equipment, and the training oftroops. Once trained, the majority of Engi-neer officers and enlisted men were removedfrom his control except in technical mat-ters. The Chief of Engineers was in directcommand only of such troops as were notassigned to a territorial commander or werenot part of a tactical unit containing otherbranches. In the fall of 1940 most engi-neer troops were assigned either to overseasdepartments, to one of the nine corps areasinto which the United States was divided,to one of the four armies which took overtactical command of ground troops underArmy General Headquarters in October ofthat year, or to the GHQ Air Force. De-spite the limited nature of his commandfunctions, the Chief of Engineers exerciseda continuing influence on engineer troops.Although he could not order them to throw

a bridge across a particular river, they builtit with the equipment and according to themethods he had approved. Thus, in both acivil and a military way the Chief of En-gineers was the arbiter of all Engineer policyand was in the final analysis answerable forthe technical performance of engineertroops in the field and of officers and civil-ians employed on civil works.10

When World War II broke out in Europein September 1939, the Chief of Engineerswas Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley. Fifty-nineyears old at this time, he was midway in hisfour-year term, having been appointed on18 October 1937. General Schley thus beganhis service as Chief during the period whenthe Army was beginning to expand in sizeand to modernize its tactics and equipment.His retirement came just prior to Pearl Har-bor. Before becoming Chief of EngineersGeneral Schley had had the usual distribu-tion of assignments, about evenly dividedbetween military duties and civil works. Thetwo main administrative divisions of the Of-fice of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) Civil Works and Militaryformed a staff ofadvisers to prepare tentative plans andpolicy recommendations, to set approvedpolicies in operation, and to supervise theirexecution. Each was headed by an assistantto the Chief of Engineers who passed recom-mendations up to the Chief but also ap-proved without reference to him many

8 Quoted in John D. Millett, The Organizationand Role of the Army Service Forces, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Wash-ington, 1954), p. 406.

9 (1) Thompson, op. cit., pp. 18-19. (2) TheNews Letter, op. cit., pp. 3-4. (3) Samuel T. Wil-liamson, "Fighting Handymen on Every Battle-front," New York Times Magazine, April 11, 1943.

10 AR 100-5, 28 Nov 33, 26 Jun 42.


MAJ. GEN. JULIAN L. SCHLEY,Chief of Engineers from October 1937 untilOctober 1941.

matters within established policy whichwere not routine. (Chart 1)

In addition to the Civil Works Divisionin Washington, the Corps of Engineersmaintained an extensive field organization,the Engineer Department, for on-the-spotsupervision of its rivers and harbors projects.For this purpose the United States was di-vided geographically into eleven divisions,each made up of several districts. For ex-ample, the North Atlantic Division includedeight district offices, seven in the UnitedStates and one in Puerto Rico; the LowerMississippi Valley Division, three districtoffices.11

The relative importance of civil worksand military activities varied according towhether the nation was at peace or at war.When, in the years following World War I,the military activities of the Corps of Engi-neers were, in common with those of otherbranches of the Army, afflicted by pau-city of funds and other frustrations, thespirit of the Corps' officers was kept highthrough assignments to rivers and harborsduty and to various public works sponsoredby the federal government. While Armyofficers in general struggled with outmodedequipment and small-scale training exer-cises, many Engineer officers found them-selves in the center of New Deal pump-priming. Some in this group were loaned tovarious New Deal agencies; others wereassigned to work within the Corps itself.No matter where they went they foundchallenging jobs, supervising the building ofvast networks of roads and the constructionof such huge installations as the Bonnevilleand Fort Peck dams. The Engineers main-tained that such experience did more thanbuild morale. Typical of their attitude wasthe enthusiastic agreement of an Engineerofficer with a congressman's summation

that "while their jobs may have to do withengineering projects which have no im-mediate military connection, such assign-ments do equip them in the best possibleway to tackle the problems which wouldconfront them in time of war." 12 The uniquecombination of civil works and troop duty,the Corps was convinced, produced some-thing more than the pioneer infantrymanwho served as the engineer of other armies.The Engineer officer was a soldier with aknowledge of civil engineering. Tours ofduty with civil works afforded him an op-portunity to learn about the latest construc-

11 Orgn Charts OCE, 1 Sep 39, 1 Aug 40, 27 Feb41. EHD files.

12 Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for1941, Hearings before the Subcommittee of theCommittee on Appropriations, HR, 76th Cong, 3dSess, p. 657.


BRIG. GEN. JOHN J. KINGMAN,Assistant Chief of Engineers., MilitaryDivision.

tion techniques and equipment and to gainexperience in organizing the work of largegroups of men. Yet on the whole, the rela-tionship of the Civil Works Division and itsfield offices to the wartime mission of theEngineers was an indirect one.

Developing fighting engineers was the jobof the Military Division. During the periodwhen Schley was Chief of Engineers, Brig.Gen. John J. Kingman was his assistant incharge of the Military Division. Kingman'sdivision was composed of six sections: Op-erations and Training; Personnel; Supply;Intelligence; Construction; and Railway;and of two field agenciesthe EngineerSchool and the Engineer Boardlocatednearby at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Centralto them all was the Operations and Train-ing Section (O&T) which had the task ofover-all planning both for the proficiency ofpersonnel and the efficiency of equipment.O&T prepared tables of organization(T/O's) which outlined the structure ofeach troop unit and tables of basic allow-ances (T/BA's) which listed the types andamounts of equipment to be issued. O&Talso supervised the training of all officersand enlisted men, drawing up general edu-cational programs, determining specific cur-ricula, and preparing training literature.The Personnel Section decided whether offi-cers would be assigned to troop units, toschools, to civil works, or to other duties.The Supply Section computed the quanti-ties of equipment needed, bought it, sawthat it was delivered when and whereneeded, and supervised the development ofnew types. The other two sections of theMilitary Division in Washington had morespecialized duties. The Intelligence Sec-tion had charge of all military mapping, in-cluding supervision of the Engineer Repro-duction Plant, and was consulted on the

development of new techniques and equip-ment for map making. This section alsoinvestigated new applications of engineer-ing skills in the light of changing militarytactics. During peacetime years the prin-cipal job of the Construction Section wasthe provision and maintenance of seacoastdefenses. While this work continued andeven increased for a time, the section'sother responsibilitiesthe preparation ofdesigns for structures and installations intheaters of operations and the preparationof plans for the management of public utili-ties thereeventually overshadowed it.13

For advice in theoretical and technicalmatters all sections of the Military Divisionlooked to Fort Belvoir, the Engineer centerfor the training of men and the development

13 OCE Mil Div Manual, Duties and Procedure,1937 (Rev).


MAJ. GEN. THOMAS M. ROBINS,Assistant Chief of Engineers, Civil WorksDivision. (Photograph taken 1943.)

of new equipment. Here the EngineerSchool conducted advanced courses for of-ficers and for enlisted men, prepared exten-sion and conference courses for NationalGuard and Reserve officers, and wrote train-ing literature. In this quasi-academic atmos-phere, Engineer doctrine and methods oftraining were critically examined andrecommendations for revision forwarded tothe Chief's office. The Engineer Board car-ried on a similar function in regard to equip-ment. In the course of its investigations theboard engaged in theoretical studies andperformed experiments and tests in order toplace more efficient tools and equipment inthe hands of engineer troops.14

Until mid-1941 the Chief's office and itsagencies at Fort Belvoir constituted a smallorganization. Everyone knew everyone elseand business was carried out in an informal,

personal atmosphere. Co-ordination, re-called one Engineer officer, "was a matterof going next door, or walking down thehall" to ask the advice of friends.15 For hispart, Schley met regularly and often dailywith Kingman and Brig. Gen. Thomas M.Robins who was his assistant in charge ofthe Civil Works Division. General King-man visited Fort Belvoir frequently and en-couraged his subordinates to follow hisexample. He and Schley also made manytrips to engineer units stationed in the field.These visits, with the opportunities theyafforded to exchange ideas with those closestto engineer troops, were supplemented by aseries of Information Bulletins throughwhich OCE sought to keep the field abreastof developments in military engineering athome and abroad.16

The administrative organization of theMilitary Division provided a comprehen-sive framework readily adapted to meetan emergency situation. It was not untilmid-1941 that the military activities of theCorps began to compel the attention ac-corded to civil works activities in peace-time. The importance of civil works waswell defined by the chairman of a Congres-sional committee when he remarked to Gen-eral Schley: "We do not have much op-portunity to discuss with you the militaryside of your responsibility, because, nor-

14 ARs 350-300, 19 Oct 38, 15 Jun 42; 100-30,26 Jan 32, 14 Aug 42.

15 Interv, Col Gerald Galloway, 12 Sep 50. Seealso similar remarks by Col. Miles M. Dawson inInterv, 20 Sep 50, and Ltr, Col William M. Bessell,Jr., to C of Mil Hist, 16 Jan 54. (All interviews andall letters to the Chief of Military History are inEngineer Historical Division files.)

16 (1) Incls, n. d., with Ltrs, Schley to C of EHD,4 Jun 52, and 26 Jun 52. (2) Interv, Brig GenClaude H. Chorpening, 10 Jul 50.

The series of Information Bulletins began in 1933and extended through 1943. A set is on file in theOCE Library.


mally, by far the larger part of the fundswe appropriate to your branch are fornonmilitary functions." 17 Most congress-men thought of the Corps of Engineers inrelation to improvements that would bemade to the rivers and harbors adjacent totheir home communities. Conscious of thispersonal interest, Schley felt "it was the partof wisdom to be present" at the hearingson the appropriation bill for civil works,even though he had perfect confidence inthe ability of Assistant Chief of EngineersRobins to make the presentation. The Chiefof Engineers felt no such compulsion toappear in defense of the military budgetand, unlike the chiefs of other arms andservices, did not do so. General Kingmanusually represented the Corps at suchhearings.18

For the fiscal year 1938, Congress appro-priated but $599,400 in military funds,$234,465,300 in civil funds to the Corps ofEngineers; in 1939, $4,358,380 in militaryfunds, $201,885,800 in civil; in 1940,$3,044,340 for military activities, $279,-364,000 for civil works. By 1941, however,military funds began to comprise a signifi-cant portion of the budget. For that year theEngineers received a military appropria-tion of $66,405,955 as against a civil worksappropriation of $214,878,310. Another$200,000,000 came to the Corps early infiscal year 1941 for the construction of mili-tary airfields, a program hitherto under thejurisdiction of the Quartermaster Corps.19

The transfer of the supervision of AirCorps construction from the QuartermasterCorps was the first of two steps in the con-solidation of all military construction in theCorps of Engineers. Vital as was the con-struction program to military preparedness,responsibility for its execution perpetuatedthe split personality of the Corps, for the

military construction program, like the civilworks program, had little direct bearing onthe creation of engineer soldiers. Schley wasconfident of the Corps' ability to carry outcivil and military construction as well as pre-pare its troops for war. Normally, he ex-plained, between one third and one quarterof the Regular Army officers were assignedto civil works. Most of the personnel en-gaged in civil works were civilians. It waspossible therefore to transfer officers fromcivil to military duty without danger to thefunctioning of the organization, and thiswas done beginning in the fall of 1939. Asimilar policy, he promised, would governthe supervision of military construction.20

This transfer of officers was but one as-pect of the shift from a peace to a war foot-ing. During the period 1939-41 the num-ber of engineer enlisted men increased fromsomewhat under 6,000 to almost 70,000.

17 Statement of Congressman J. Buell Snyder, 20March 1941, in War Department Civil FunctionsAppropriation Bill for 1942, Hearings before theSubcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,HR, 77th Cong, 1st Sess, p. 23.

18 (1) Hearings on Military Establishment Ap-propriation Bill and Hearings on War DepartmentCivil Functions Appropriation Bill, 1940, HR, 76thCong, 1st Sess; 1941, HR, 76th Cong, 3d Sess; 1942,HR, 77th Cong, 1st Sess. (2) Incl, with Ltr, Schleyto C of EHD, 4 Jun 52.

19 Incl, Appropriations for Mil and Civil Func-tions CE, with Memo, C of Budget and ProgramsDiv OCE for C of EHD, 6 Jun 55. During the fiscalyears 1938-41 the Corps of Engineers also receivedapproximately $14,886,600 for construction of sea-coast defenses.

For the military construction program, see Le-nore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps ofEngineers: Military Construction in the UnitedStates, a volume in preparation for the seriesUNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

20 (1) Hearings on War Department Civil Func-tions Appropriation Bill, 1942, HR, 77th Cong, 1stSess, 20 Mar 41, pp. 23-24. (2) Testimony of ColStuart C. Godfrey, 11 Mar 40, in Hearings on Mili-tary Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1941, HR,76th Cong, 3d Sess, p. 657.


1ST DIVISION ENGINEERS WORKING ON A MUDDY ROAD, Ardennes,France, November 1918.

Concurrently with the reception and train-ing of these citizen soldiers the Corps ofEngineers adjusted to the radical changesin weapons, structure, and tactics that dis-tinguished the new from the old Army.

Engineers in the Old Army

The United States Army of the twentiesand thirties was largely a product of WorldWar I. Trench warfare characteristic of thatconflict had left a deep impress on militaryorganization and tactics. The basic unit ofthe old Army was the square infantry divi-sion which took its name from the four in-fantry regiments it contained. Tied to aclumsy combination of foot soldiers, horses,and motor vehicles, the square divisionlacked mobility, and its planned wartimestrength of 22,000 men would have made it

difficult to maneuver. The Army of thethirties was too small to permit the organ-ization of echelons higher than a division,but in case of emergency, the War Depart-ment planned to group divisions and sup-porting units into corps, armies, and ageneral headquarters.21

Engineer functions in these echelons ofcommand conformed to experiences win-nowed from World War I. The major taskin that war had been repair and mainte-nance of the muddy roads of France, andthe Engineers expected that road and otherwork to keep the routes of communicationopen would account for seventy-five percent

21 For a detailed discussion of the reorganizationof the Army, see Kent Roberts Greenfield, RobertR. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization ofGround Combat Troops, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947).


of their efforts in a future conflict. Next inthe order of engineer jobs during WorldWar I had been the preparation of defensiveworks, the erection of obstacles, and the con-struction of shelters and other buildings.The Engineer Field Manual of 1932 re-flected that experience. Most of its space onfield fortifications was devoted to trenchconstruction. There were few pages on anti-tank obstacles, and there was little apprecia-tion of the value of antitank mines.Construction of airfields was given butlimited coverage.22

The engineer units which evolved as aresult of World War I were classified eitheras general or as special units. General unitsincluded the engineer combat regiment ofthe infantry division, the engineer squadronof the cavalry division, and the general serv-ice regiments and separate battalions whichwere distributed among corps, army, andcommunications zone. The combat regi-ment did any temporary engineering workrequired for the accomplishment of the divi-sion's missionrepairing and building roadsand bridges, creating obstacles, assisting inthe organization of defensive positions, con-structing advance landing fields for the AirCorps, maintaining the division's water sup-ply, providing maps, and building troopshelters. While the combat regiment wassupposed to fulfill only immediate front-lineneeds, its work was conditioned by the slow-moving character of the division. The engi-neer squadron, being part of the moremobile cavalry, emphasized hasty road re-pair and reconnaissance but performed thesame general tasks within the limits of itspersonnel and equipment.

According to Engineer doctrine in thenineteen-thirties one sixth of an Engineerforce in a theater of operations would havebeen composed of these divisional units.

The bulk of engineer troops, nearly twothirds, would have been located in generalservice regiments and separate battalions forduties behind the front. For the more ex-tensive and permanent work required in therear areas the general service regiment wasequipped with a variety of tools and spe-cially trained soldiers. With its large pool ofunskilled labor, the separate battalion wasdesigned to support other units as well as toundertake missions of its own.

Special units, intended to comprise onefifth of an Engineer force, were organizedto perform particular tasks. They includedlight ponton companies and heavy pontonbattalions for the care and transportationof bridging equipage, topographic units tomake and supply maps for army and gen-eral headquarters, water supply battalionsto deliver water in areas where the local sup-ply was inadequate, dump truck companiesto transport construction materials, depotcompanies to handle engineer supplies, shopcompanies for the general maintenance ofengineer equipment, and camouflage bat-talions to supervise camouflage and supplyspecial materials.23

Although mobilization plans called for allthese organizations, they constituted merelya paper classification. In September 1939the Regular Army had only twelve activeengineer units. Eight were combat regimentsor parts of regiments down to a company;one, a squadron minus a troop; another, onetroop of a squadron. The other two weretopographic battalions. The small size ofthe peacetime Army coupled with the neces-sity for a core around which to form an

22 (1) Info Bull 34, 27 Oct 39, Hist of CE. (2)Military Handbook for National Guard and ReserveEngineers (Engr Sch, 1937), p. 153. (3) EngineerField Manual (2 vols., Washington, 1932), passim.(Cited hereafter as EFM.)

23 EFM, I, Engineer Troops.


initial protective force had dictated this con-centration of enlisted men within combatunits.24

Reorganization of Division and Corps Units

Shortly after General Malin Craig be-came Chief of Staff in 1935 he ordered a re-examination of the organization and tacticsof the Army. The aim was an increase inmobility; the means, the use of mechanicalpower to the utmost and a reduction in thesize of troop units. The period between thetwo wars had been marked by great im-provements in motor vehicles, tanks, andairplanes, which made the adoption of newtactics imperative, while advances in thedesign of weapons made cuts in personnelfeasible without a loss of fire power. In thecase of the infantry division, still furtherreductions could be made by relegating per-sonnel and equipment needed only undercertain contingencies to corps.

With these guiding principles the Armyembarked in 1936 on a reorganization of theinfantry division. The new triangular divi-sion that resulted contained three instead offour infantry regiments. Reductions in otherelements reduced the planned wartimestrength of the division from 22,068 to13,552 men. The engineers shared in thegeneral cut. The combat regiment of 868officers and men was changed to a battalionof 518. But in relative numbers the engi-neer component remained about the same3.8 percent of the division's strength. By wayof indicating what could be done to reduceauxiliary units, Craig had mentioned thepossibility of eliminating the engineers fromthe division entirely. The committee whichspecified the organization of the triangulardivision rejected that idea, possibly becauseof the expectation that increased depend-

ence on motor vehicles would mean in-creased dependence on roads and bridges,but more likely because of the desire toavoid so drastic a change prior to testing.At any rate the new engineer battalion re-tained substantially the same functions asthe old regiment.25

After the triangular division was tested in1937, its officers recommended further cuts.For the engineers this meant a drastic re-duction to a single company of 175 officersand men, only 1.7 percent of the division'sstrength. Proper reconnaissance, the argu-ment ran, would enable the division to de-tour around blown bridges and other ob-stacles in the movement that precededactual combat. Once the battle was joined,the division would require only emergencyrepair of roads, while other engineer taskssuch as demolitions and roadblocks couldbe executed quickly. There seemed there-fore to be little organic need for divisionalengineers in open warfare. In the follow-ing months this viewpoint was to meetstrong opposition from the Corps of Engi-neers.26

Responsibility for expounding the opin-ions of the Corps of Engineers on organiza-tional matters rested with the Chief ofEngineers, and more specifically with the

24 (1) Annual Report Covering Military Activi-ties of the Corps of Engineers for the Fiscal YearEnding June 30, 1939. (Cited hereafter as Ann RptOCE. These reports are in EHD files.) (2) TheEngineer Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939 (Ten-tative), 15 May 39. EHD files. (3) Mark SkinnerWatson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Prepara-tions, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 26-30.

23 (1) O&T Office Study 131. EHD files. (2)Lecture, Col S. C. Godfrey, The Streamlined Divi-sion and Its Engineer Component, 9 May 38.350.001, Pt. 10. (3) Military Handbook for Na-tional Guard and Reserve Engineers, pp. 24-25.

20 Rpt of Fld Sec Test of Proposed Inf Div, App.A, 21 Mar 38. McNair Papers.


COL. STUART C. GODFREY, Chiefof Operations and Training Section from1937 to 1941.

Operations and Training Section. From1937 to 1941 O&T was headed by Col.Stuart C. Godfrey, who had served over-seas during World War I. Thereafter, hehad had tours of duty as an instructor at theCommand and General Staff School, as atroop unit commander, and as a District En-gineer. Among his assistants, Maj. Louis J.Claterbos, who became his executive officer,Capt. Gerald E. Galloway who headed theorganization and equipment subsection,and Maj. Kenner F. Hertford, who suc-ceeded Galloway, were particularly con-cerned with the organization of engineerunits. These men did the spade work inpreparing the arguments with which Schleyand Kingman forcefully promoted the En-gineers' point of view.27

The O&T Section obtained some of itsarguments in turn from the EngineerSchool and the Engineer Board, and fromunits in the field, but the Chief's office wasoften guided by different considerationsfrom those of these subordinate organiza-tions. O&T had to face the practical prob-lem of not making impossible demands onthe General Staff. The proposals that wentforward, therefore, were usually limited torequests which would not be consideredunreasonable. At the same time the Engi-neers tried to assure themselves a sympa-thetic hearing by making a concerted effortto place able officers from the Corps in po-sitions of responsibility on the General Staffitself.28 "I believe," Godfrey advised Gen-eral Schley in February 1939, "that themost effective way to ensure full considera-tion of our needs, for men and equipment,is to secure a larger representation on theGeneral Staff. Major Wood's detail to G-4has already been very helpful in this con-nection. The present opportunity to rec-ommend an Engineer for detail in the im-

portant Mobilization Section of G-3 should,in my opinion, be taken advantage of, evenat the expense of some other activity." 29

In mid-1939 there were five Engineer of-ficers assigned to the General Staff, whichat this time numbered about one hundred.In the fall of 1940 there were six, one ofwhom, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, wasdeputy chief of staff for supply and transpor-tation, and another, Brig. Gen. Eugene Rey-bold, the G-4. Many of the letters andmemoranda addressed to the General Staffwere delivered personally by Schley or byKingman, who, on these occasions andothers, sought to keep themselves posted on

27 Orgn Charts OCE, 1937-41. EHD files.28 (1) Incl, n. d., with Ltr, Schley to C of EHD,

4 Jun 52. (2) Interv, Maj Gen Clarence L. Adcock,27 Dec 51.

20 Memo, ExO Mil Div for CofEngrs, 21 Feb 39.475, Engr Equip, Pt. 1.


the staff's point of view as well as to presentthat of the Engineers.30

The Engineers' views were naturally mo-tivated in part by branch loyalty. Thus, oneunit commander wrote in 1938: "If we arenot careful, such organizations as Recon-naissance Squadrons will beat us to thepunch in providing their own means forwhat should be our work." 31 But the basisof their arguments was usually a carefullyreasoned estimate of what a given situationwould require of military engineers. In thereorganization of the infantry division theEngineers were faced with a current ofopinion which would have diminished theirposition and they fought to maintain it, con-vinced that the military situation had beeninadequately evaluated.

While the Engineers were acutely con-scious of the new mobility, it was the vul-nerability of vehicles to obstacles which theyemphasized and on which they based theircriticisms of the proposed cuts. They insistedthat the growing use of motor transport de-manded more, not less, road worka factthat had not been apparent in the 1937 testswhere there had been no mud and no shell-ing. Predicting that the enemy would at-tempt to blow every bridge along a line ofretreat, the Engineers foresaw a need formore bridge building, which would be com-plicated by the necessity of supportingheavier trucks and tanks. To impede themovement of the enemy, on the other hand,roadblocks, antitank mines, and demolitionsalong possible avenues of attack had becomeincreasingly important.32 In support of theirposition the Engineers pointed to the pro-portion of engineers found in British andGerman divisions and to the remarks of anon-Engineer military attache in Germanywho wrote:

I have become very much struck in recentmonths here by the enormously increased im-portance which the German Engineers arereceiving. . . . The reason for this increasedimportance is the motorization and mecha-nization now taking place in all armies in theworld. I do not take issue with such mech-anization and motorization, but desire topoint out that there are disadvantages as wellas advantages thereto, and that no unit of thearmy is better designed to take advantageof the weaknesses of motorization than an en-gineer unit.

... By all means motorize a part of ourarmy, but by all means also, along with thismotorization, give to the engineer corps thatincreased importance which is rightfully theirsthrough the sensitiveness of motor transportto the demolition and obstruction of routes ofcommunication.33

The General Staff did not accept the1937 tests as conclusive and scheduled moreextended ones in 1939. For these the engi-neer component in the division consisted ofa battalion of 11 officers and 269 enlistedmen. This was the peace strength of theunit; its war strength was 15 officers and393 men, about 3.7 percent of the wholedivision. As set up the battalion was re-sponsible for reconnaissance, hindering

30 (1) Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post:The Operations Division, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951),pp. 23-24. (2) Ann Rpts OCE, 1939, 1940. (3)Longhand notations on memos for CofS. 320.2,Pt. 22.

31 Ltr, Maj Henry Hutchings, Jr., CO 8th Engrs,to Godfrey, 13 May 38. O&T Office Study 114,EHD files.

32 (1) Memo, CofEngrs for CofS, 2 May 38, sub:Engr Component of the Inf Div. Loose Papers O&TSec, EHD files, Orgn of Inf Div. (2) Lecture, God-frey, The Streamlined Division and Its MilitaryComponent, 9 May 38. 350.001, Pt. 10.

33 Extract from a letter from an authoritativemilitary observer in Germany, November 1937, Incl,with Ltr, ACofEngrs to CofCav, 16 May 38, sub:Div Units for Cav Div (Mecz). O&T Office Study114, EHD files.


enemy movements, improving road andstream crossings, taking measures for de-fense against mechanized attack, and help-ing to organize defensive positions. Roadbuilding, map reproduction beyond simplesketching, and emergency bridging werecut out so far as divisional engineers wereconcerned. When the Office of the Chief ofEngineers objected to the elimination offloating bridge construction from the bat-talion's functions, the War Departmentpointed out that absence of streams in thetesting area would prevent experimenta-tion! While the Engineers had succeededin securing almost as much relative strengthin this division as in the one tested in 1937they still felt there was a strong sentiment infavor of reducing their strength to acompany.34

In September 1939, before the War De-partment announced new tables, Schleypresented his views to the General Staff onceagain. He proposed that the engineer bat-talion be organized with a peace strength of350 men and a war strength of 520. Al-though these numbers were considerablyless than the 800-man battalion recom-mended by the Engineer Board and theEngineer School around the same time, orthe 642-man battalion recommended bySchley himself in 1937 when he was com-mandant of the Engineer School, their ac-ceptance would have raised the wartimestrength of the engineer component to 4.3percent of the division. In support of thisrecommendation, Schley stressed again theunrealistic nature of the 1937 and 1939tests, where favorable weather and lack ofdestruction had minimized the need for en-gineer troops, and called attention to thereserve of fire power which the engineerscould supply. He also noted a new factorthe experience of the German Army in Po-

landand observed that its rapid advanceagainst obstacles "must have demanded agreat amount of engineer work." 35 TheGeneral Staff was not persuaded. In Sep-tember 1939 the War Department author-ized a peace strength battalion of 300 en-listed men. Shortly thereafter the battalion'swar strength was set at 420 enlisted men, or3.5 percent of the division. The relativestrength of engineers in the triangular di-vision was thus to be .3 percent less than inthe square division, but this was a far cryfrom reduction to a company.

The outbreak of war in Europe hadmeanwhile led the President to increase theRegular Army by 17,000 men. However in-adequate the expansion of the Army, itmade possible the formation of four moretriangular divisions and of a few corps andarmy units. In its search for mobility theWar Department had considered the com-position of army corps along with the in-fantry division but no firm conclusions hadbeen reached. The authorization of moremanpower and a definite decision on theinfantry division brought the question upagain. Under the old Army organization,engineer units had been allotted on the basisof one general service regiment, three sepa-rate battalions, one depot company, and onelight ponton company to a corps. Sinceunder the reorganization many functionsformerly performed by divisions had beenrelegated to corps, Schley proposed tochange the character and strength of thecorps' engineer component. The new or-ganization which he recommended in Sep-

34 The preceding paragraph and the discussionfollowing are based upon: (1) Corresp in 320.2,Pts. 22, 23; (2) Loose Papers O&T Sec, EHD files,Orgn of Inf Div; (3) O&T Office Study 131, EHDfiles.

35 Memo, CofEngrs for CofS, 12 Sep 39, sub:Engr Component of Inf Div. 320.2, Pt. 22.


tember 1939 consisted of a corps combatregiment with 700 men in peace and 1,120in war, a general service regiment of thesame strength, and a light ponton company.The combat regiment was to reinforce thedivisional engineer battalion in such opera-tions as river crossings. The general serviceregiment, with its heavier equipment, was tobe responsible for combat-support bridging,maintenance of roads and railroads, andgeneral construction. The ponton companywas to maintain a pool of bridging equip-ment and boats for assault crossings.

Although it accepted the strength of thegeneral service regiment, the War Depart-ment eliminated the light ponton companyand reduced the war strength of the combatregiment to 782 men. In explanation, theWar Department laid down the principlethat, as in the case of the division, corpstroops were to maintain the same ratio toover-all strength in war that they had inpeace, 6.3 percent. This seemed reasonableto the General Staff in light of the fact thatless than half of the 11 percent of engineertroops in the American Expeditionary Forcehad been assigned to corps.

In the weeks that followed the engineerscontinued to contend for more troops indivision and corpscentering their atten-tion on proposed war strengths which wouldnot have required any immediate increase.While acceding to the elimination of theponton company from the corps, OCE sug-gested that it be replaced by a topographiccompany to compensate for the reducedmapping potential of division engineers.Schley and Kingman wrote repeatedly ofthe need for more Engineers. They ques-tioned the use of percentages in settling thematter and, particularly, the percentagesused by the War Department. Engineerwork could not be measured solely by the

decrease in numbers of divisional troops.The area to be covered must be taken intoconsideration, and, with greater mobility,the area would probably be larger than be-fore. When it suited their purposes, the gen-erals used World War I experience, but moreand more they stressed the current Euro-pean war and the fact that the engineerswere fighters as well as technicians. On 3October 1939, Schley wrote caustically:"The Germans believe that the moderntrend toward motorization and mechaniza-tion demands a much larger proportion ofEngineer and other technical troops with thecombat troops than formerly. We seem to bemoving in exactly the opposite direction." 36

The General Staff capitulated under theweight and persistence of these arguments.By December the War Department had ap-proved the topographic company, and awar strength of 520 for the engineer bat-talion and 1,100 for the combat regiment.Engineers now composed 4.3 percent ofdivisional and 8.0 percent of corps strength.Thus a relative gain had been madea gainthe Engineers had insisted was essential tomeet the demands of modern warfare.37

Formation of Armored and Aviation Units

Important as it was, the reorganization ofinfantry units was but the first step in thetactical reorganization of the Army. In 1939the Engineers began to find their place inthe units that were being evolved to exploitthe power of the tank and the bomber. Ingeneral, armored units were to embody the

38 Memo, CofEngrs for ACofS G-3, 3 Oct 39,sub: Orgn of Div and Corps Engr Units. 320.2,Pt. 22.

37 (1) Ltr, AGO to CofEngrs, 11 Dec 39, sub:Div and Corps Engrs. 320.2, Pt. 23. (2) T/O5-187, 1 Nov 40.


classic cavalry doctrine of mobility, firepower, and shock action.

During the thirties the Army had organ-ized the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized)to develop the special techniques of tankwarfare. Repeatedly, the Chief of Cavalryand the Chief of Engineers had recom-mended the attachment of an engineer unitto the mechanized brigade. This was theonly way, the Chief of Cavalry pointed outin April 1937, to gain practical experiencein how to increase the mobility of mecha-nized cavalry. Lack of funds was the mainreason for the War Department's disap-proval of this proposal.38

The most the Engineers could get at thistime was the assignment of an observer tothe Cavalry training center at Fort Knox.After a short time in this capacity Capt.Robert E. York came up with rather moder-ate proposals. While he boldly insisted thatengineer troops would play an importantrole in support of mechanized cavalry, hewas clearly under the spell of armor's poten-tial mobility and was hard put to find spe-cific tasks for his own service. The mecha-nized brigade would move so fast that onlyminor road repairs could be executed. Con-struction of shelters and other buildingswould be unnecessary in a tactical move-ment. Mapping would probably be limitedto preparing and reproducing sketches andoverlays from aerial photographs. Recon-naissance would be confined to obtaininginformation about obstacles. The removal ofroadblocks, mine fields and other deliberateobstacles, if necessary by demolitions, wouldconstitute the main task. But he doubtedthere would be much, if any, need for bridg-ing. Detours could in almost all cases bemade in less time than it would take to con-struct a bridge. But despite the nebulousnature of these tasks the mechanized cavalry

insisted on the need for assigning engineertroops immediately. Delay in attaching anengineer unit, wrote the commanding officerof the mechanized brigade, would "retarddevelopment of the full capabilities ofmechanized cavalry with respect to its chiefcharacteristic, mobility." 39

At this time OCE's Military Division wasrecommending a squadron whose mainfunctions would be reconnaissance, map-ping, stream crossing, and the removal andconstruction of obstacles. The followingMay, Kingman also urged the organizationof a squadron, though he conceded thatshortages of personnel might not permit aunit this large. In January 1939 the MilitaryDivision, at the War Department's request,submitted a T/O for a troop, a unit thatKingman considered adequate for peace-time, but too small to function effectively inwar. Despite all this counseling, another yearslipped by before the War Department ap-proved the activation of the 47th EngineerMechanized Troop with a contingent of 128men. Its functions, which Brig. Gen. AdnaR. Chaffee, the new commander of themechanized brigade, wholeheartedly en-dorsed, included demolitions, hasty repairsto bridges, and the provision of emergencycrossings for small streams. The importantfact was that the Chief of Cavalry and theChief of Engineers now had the oppor-tunity they had so long soughtthe oppor-tunity to arrive at conclusions from actualexperience.

Whereas the Engineers had long beenconscious of the need for engineer mecha-

38 The discussion of the formation of engineerarmored units is based upon (1) O&T Office Studies114 and 155, in EHD files, and (2) Corresp in320.2, Pt. 23.

39 4th Ind, ExO 7th Cav Brig to CofEngrs, 15 Oct37, on Ltr, York to TAG, 24 Aug 37, sub: EngrComponent of Cav Brig (Mecz). O&T Office Study155, EHD files.


nized units, it was not until 1939 that theyrealized that similar provision would haveto be made for the Air Corps. To be surethere had been some co-operation on cam-ouflage and aerial mapping, but the con-struction needs of the Air Corps hadscarcely been considered.40 The initiativecame from the War Department, which, inSeptember 1939, asked the Engineers tosubmit T/O's for engineer units of the GHQAir Force (the Air Corps' operating arm).In replying, Kingman made a distinctionbetween the construction of landing fieldsin forward areas and the more permanentbases in the rear. For the first, he proposedthe creation of an engineer aviation regi-ment of three battalions with a total peacestrength of 43 officers and 1,050 men. Itwas to be trained with the GHQ Air Forceand to concentrate on "hasty methods ofutilizing existing facilities for landing fields,or improvising new ones." For the more ex-tensive and deliberate construction in therear Kingman recommended use of the gen-eral service regiment, which would be equalto the task after receiving special trainingand equipment. The ultimate size of theengineer component of the GHQ Air Forcewas left open pending experience, but King-man recommended that one unit of eachtype be constituted.41 These units wereneeded to work out new methods of emer-gency runway construction, camouflage,and bomb and fuel transportation, as wellas for the supply of power, water, and otherutilities. "There is so much for Engineertroops to do to make the GHQ Air Forcemore effective on M-day," Maj. Gen. DelosC. Emmons, commander of the GHQ AirForce, wrote in February 1940, "that therecan be no question as to the immediate needfor the units above recommended. Muchof this necessary development has been neg-

lected because of the lack heretofore of En-gineer troops with the Air Corps." 42 TheEngineers decided to convert a general serv-ice regiment into an engineer aviation regi-ment after the April-May 1940 maneu-vers.43

The Impact of the German Blitzkrieg

The maneuvers of 1940 and 1941 wereto form the basis for further changes in engi-neer organization and equipment. But inthe spring of 1940 the lessons to be learnedfrom maneuvers were overshadowed by theGerman blitzkrieg. The fall of France andthe Low Countries and the retreat of theBritish to their island caused an explosivereaction in American thought. The UnitedStates was jarred into an expansion of itsmilitary forces that overwhelmed previousplanning. By the end of June Congress hadauthorized a Regular Army of 375,000 men,and before the summer was out had pro-vided for calling up the National Guard andfor the unprecedented institution of a peace-time draft.

Whereas the Polish campaign in the fallof 1939 had reinforced the arguments ofthose who predicted a return to open war-fare, the retirement behind fortified posi-tions which characterized the "phony war"the following winter had caused some to pre-

40 (1) Memo, ExO Mil Div for CofEngrs, 21 Feb39. 475, Engr Equip, Pt. 1. (2) Ltr, Lt Col J. A.Dorst to Lt Col L. E. Atkins, 6 May 39. 210.3,Air Forces, Pt. 1. (3) Ltr, Atkins to Dorst, 17 May39. Same file.

41 1st Ind, 16 Oct 39, on AG Ltr 320.2 (9-19-39) P (c) to CofEngrs, 21 Sep 39, sub: T/Os.320.2, Pt. 22.

42 Memo, CG GHQ Air Force for CofAC, 6 Feb40. 320.2, Pt. 24.

43 (1) 3d Ind, Actg CofEngrs (Kingman) toTAG, 21 Feb 40, on memo cited n. 41. 320.2, Pt.24. (2) Info Bull 45, 13 May 40, Changes in Orgnof Engr Units.


dict a repetition of World War I tactics. InMarch 1940 Godfrey had written: "No de-velopment in recent warfare has been morestriking than the renaissance of deliberateland fortifications. The Maginot Line andthe West Wall have rendered quiescent thethreat of an offensive on the West Front." 44

The German attack in the spring of 1940banished this idea once and for all. But tothe Engineers the blitzkrieg meant morethan the triumph of mobile warfare. Tothem the blitzkrieg, in which German engi-neers took a prominent part, offered sureand final proof of their claim to an en-hanced combat role.

The person who did most to publicize thisconviction was Capt. Paul W. Thompson,who had been in Germany as a military ob-server shortly before the outbreak of thewar. In May 1940, Godfrey recommendedthat Thompson be called to OCE to analyzereports from abroad.45 The analysis of theblitzkrieg which Thompson made from Ger-man published sources received widespreadattention throughout the Army. His firstarticle appeared in the September-October1940 issue of the Infantry Journal. By April1941 the editor of the magazine consideredThompson "one of the wheelhorses of thecorps of Journal authors," and within thenext eight months published five articlesunder Thompson's name. At the same timeThompson was writing extensively for TheMilitary Engineer, the journal of the So-ciety of American Military Engineers. Inthe JanuaryFebruary 1941 issue he beganto publish a series called "Engineers in Bat-tle." In September, the editor of The Mili-tary Engineer remarked on the popularity ofthe articles, and upon the publication of thelast one in December announced that theseries would be issued in book form.

In writing for the two periodicals Thomp-

son tailored his presentation to his audience.Most of his articles in the Infantry Journalwere general descriptions in which engineertroops were mentioned only incidentally.He did, however, call attention to matterswhich were the particular concern of engi-neersthe character of the terrain, the roadnet, the rivers and canals.46 His "Engineersin Battle" series was naturally concerned al-most exclusively with the role of engineers.

Typical of Thompson's descriptions of theexploits of German engineer troops was his"Engineers in the Blitzkrieg," which waspublished in the Infantry Journal. In thisarticle Thompson stressed particularly thecontribution of German engineers to the fallof Fort Eben-Emael. The capture of Eben-Emael in Belgium was a crucial point in theGerman plan of attack. Considered by theAllies almost impregnable, the fort had beeneffectively neutralized and forced to sur-render in well under forty-eight hours. AsThompson described the action from thesources available to him an initial heavybombardment had been followed by pene-tration by engineer parachute troops. Anengineer battalion, reinforced with infantry,arrived on the outside of the fort and estab-lished contact with the parachutists within.After this, in Thompson's words:

The AA guns went into battery, firing directat the ports of individual works. The infantryprepared to repulse any sorties or counter-attack. The engineers crawled forward, con-centrating on certain individual works. Theycarried their explosives, grenades, smoke

44 Memo, C of O&T Sec for CofEngrs, 7 Mar 40,sub: Land Defenses. 660, Harbor Defense (S) .

45 (1) Infantry Journal, XLVII (September-Oc-tober 1940), 521. (2) Memo, C of O&T Sec forCofEngrs, 24 May 40, sub: Engr Intel. 091, Ger-many, Pt. 6.

48 Thompson articles in the Infantry Journal,XLVII, XL VIII, XLVIX (September 1940-February 1941) and in The Military Engineer,XXXIII (1941).


candles, flame-throwers, poles, and otherequipment. . . . Finally, they reached theouter walls of the works themselves.

Here the scene must have been one of terri-fying action. Flame-throwers are playingagainst ports, grenades are bursting, projec-tiles from the AA guns are ricocheting, andengineer soldiers are hugging the dead spaces,throwing and placing their charges. Withtheir explosives they are attacking the sensi-tive parts of the work, the ports, the turrets,the hinges.47

In a number of respects Thompson's reporton the capture of Fort Eben-Emael was inerror. The parachutists arrived before thebombers; the defenders held out longer thanhe believed. But he did not overestimate thedecisive part played by German engineersin their employment of explosives.48

In expounding the role played by engi-neer troops in the capture of Fort Eben-Emael, Thompson and other Engineer com-mentators were aware that in the AmericanArmy assault of permanent fortificationswas fundamentally an infantry mission.They were aware as well of other differencesbetween the German engineer and hisAmerican counterpart. The German engi-neer was trained as an infantry soldier firstand as a technician second. His main jobwas combat engineering. Road building andother construction (except for emergencybridging) was left to the semimilitary Ar-beitsdienst (Labor Service) and the Or-ganization Todt. Thompson warned againstblindly accepting German doctrine, notingparticularly that it had been developed tomeet a specific enemy in a specific theaterof operations:

We must ourselves keep in mind the possi-bility of operating under widely varying con-ditionsconditions where water supply mightbe more important than assault tactics, wherelabor battalions from the interior might notbe available on call, or where our own air

superiority might not be such as to make ofcamouflage a superfluous art.

But he continued:

There is one conclusion . . . which is in-contestable (and obvious). It has to do withthe intimate coordination which must existbetween members of the combat team. TheGerman blitz campaigns have demonstratedthis fact more forcibly, perhaps, than it everbefore has been demonstrated. And as a corol-lary fact, the campaigns have demonstratedthat the engineers are now an elite memberof the team.49

An elite member of the combat teamitwas a refrain repeated over and over, andnot merely by the Engineers themselves. Areport of the Military Intelligence Divisionof the War Department General Staff hadthis to say:

The results of the two recent major cam-paigns, Poland and the West Front, are elo-quent testimonials to the importance ofcombat engineers. Formerly it was the in-fantry and the artillery team that was all im-portant, but in the light of recent operationsthe combat engineers take their place besidethe artillery, so essential are their functionsto the success of ground troops.50

Pointing to German tactics, Schley recom-mended in July 1940 that the War Depart-

47 Paul W. Thompson, "Engineers in the Blitz-krieg," Infantry Journal, XLVII (September-October 1940), 429. This article was distributed asInformation Bulletin 63, 31 October 1940.

48 A detailed account of the operation, translatedfrom foreign sources, is contained in Hq EUCOMHist Div, The 7th Infantry Division on the AlbertCanal, Pt. 8, "The Battle of Fort Eben-Emael, 10and 11 May 1940." MS, OCMH.

49 (1) Paul W. Thompson, "Engineers in the Blitz-krieg," Infantry Journal, XLVII (September-Oc-tober 1940), 432. (2) See also, Address, Maj. Gen.J. L. Schley, The Engineer and National Defense, 18Sep 40, EHD files, and Rpt, Assault of DefensiveInstallations, 29 Nov 40, First Research Course,Vol. I, Engr. Sch. Library.

50 MID WD, Tentative Lessons Bull 9, 5 Jul 40,sub: Preliminary Mil Attache Rpt From Berlin onWest Front Opns, May 40. 091, Germany, Pt. 6.


ment provide for joint exercises with otherarms in the attack on fortified positions, buthe was told that engineer techniques wouldhave to be perfected first. Before this replyhad arrived, the Engineers began to plan aresearch course which would examine andimprove upon the tactics used in the battlesof Europe. In the fall of 1940 and again inthe spring of 1941 officers from nearly allengineer units and from a number of otherbranches of the service were brought forseveral weeks' stay at the Engineer School.After a period of orientation they were as-signed to committees to explore designatedtopics.51

These topics reflected, in nearly all cases,the combat rather than the technical aspectsof military engineering. Thus eight of twelvesubjects studied in the first course were con-cerned with tactics and techniques of theassault in four different types of opera-tionsagainst an organized position, againstobstacles in barrier zones, against organizedriver lines, against enemy air bases. But someof the committees accorded more attentionto the assault tactics of foreign armies andthe duties of engineer troops in defenseagainst them than to the role of engineers inovercoming the defenses of an enemy. Thisapproach was true of the committee on bar-rier

cmh_pub_10-4 corps of engineers - troops

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