Foreword
Within a generation the attitude and policy of the United States toward
alliances have undergone  a revolutionary  reversal.  The  nation  has  passed
from  it s  traditional suspicion  and  fear  of  "entangling alliances"  to a  policy
t h a t  heavi ly  stakes
  its
  security
  and
  interests
  co-operation
  of
  other
powers. In  World  War I the U.S. Government cautiously  def ined  its rela-
tionship with the powers allied against Germany as that of an Associated
Power. In  World  War II, though last to join the Grand Alliance, it  v i r tu -
al ly  integrated  its  resources with those  of the  British Commonwealth  and
co-ordinated its strategy and war aims with the British and the USSR in
the  most
  it has
  and built up alliances all over the troubled
world. The climax of its most intensive   experience  w i t h  coalition strategy
came in the phase of World  War II described in this volume, which should
therefore have  a  special interest  for all who are  concerned  with  the  impli-
cations
  Gen.,  U. S. A.
Chief  of  M i l i t a r y  History
30  April 1958
Washington, D. C.
  and
  A member  of Phi Beta
Kappa  and the  American  Historical  Association's
  Committee
  on the  His-
torian  and the  Federal  Government, he has taught History at  Brooklyn
College  and the
tured  on  military
College,
  War II, he
  the  Russian  area and
language a t Yale and served as an  instructor  in intelligence and as a historian
in the
  the  Operations  Division historical  project
in the War  Department  General  Staff  as a civilian  member, becoming  in
1949  the Chief of the  Strategic
 Plans
History.
  of  Strategic Planning
  for  Coalition  War-
fare:  1941-1942, and his  articles and  reviews  on  modern  strategy  and
  state-
  various  service
  Coalition
  War-
 national planning
and military  strategy.  The  1941-42  volume, of  which  th e  present author
w as  coauthor,  told  the story of  plans  and  decisions  as
  they  affected  the
missions and  dispositions  of the  U.S.  Army in the defensive  phase of  coali-
tion  warfare ,  when  the  Grand  Alliance
  was still in its
  strategic  planning in the  midwar  era
from  January  1943  through  the  summer  of  1944.  This  is the story of the
hopes,  fears,  struggles,  frustrations,  and  triumphs  of the Army
  strategic
planners
 coming
  to
 grips
  offensive  phase
  account
  of
  planning
 debate on European  strategy
which  followed  the  Allied  landings  in North  Africa  and  continued  to the
penetration of the German  frontier
  in September  1944.
  During  this period
the great  international conferences  from  Casablanca in  January  1943  to the
second  Quebec  in  September
  formulated
and decisions to the end of the summer of  1944,
  when  the  problems  of
winning  the war  began  to  come  up against the challenges of
  victory
  and
peace,  and a new era was  beginning  for the  Army  Chief  of  Staff  and his
advisers.
The presentation  util izes both  the narrative and the analytical  approach.
It sets  forth  the principal  steps in the development of the
  American
  strategic
case,  and  seeks  the  raison  d'étre  behind  that  case.  It  a t tempts  to  view,
through  the  eyes of the Washington high command,  the war as a whole and
in its main  component  parts. The
  method
  is to trace the plans, concepts,
and  ideas  of the  planners  up  through  the  different  levels—Army,  j o in t
staff  (Army  and
  Navy) ,  Joint  Chiefs of  Staff,  th e  meetings  of the
  American
staff  with  the  President,  and of the
  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff  at the  plenary
sessions with  President Franklin D.   and  Prime  Minis te r  Winston
  Churchill. The  chronological  and  structural  f ramework  for the study
is  provided  by the big conferences,  Casablanca
  (January  1943),  TRIDENT
  1943),  Cairo-Tehran
  treating
the  planning  for the war  against Germany  and  that  against  Japan  separ-
 
  the  debates,
compromises, decisions, and  revisions, the  focus  is placed on the advocates of
the American  military  case—especially  on  General
  Marshall.
  literature  available
  for the
American
 contributions
on the art of
 strategy,
  the art of the calculated risk, as it developed  in World
War II. No attempt has
 been
partners in the  Grand  Alliance.  That  of the  British  and
  other  English-
speaking  allies is  being  disclosed  in accounts  that  they  are  publishing.
Whether  th e  Russians  and  Chinese  will  ever
  publish
  full,
  about
American
  And  unfortunately, despite
a flood  of personal recollections of World War II, of the two principal
 actors
  in
filling  some  of the  gaps  in the available  literature,  will  help
  those  readers
  field—staff
  officers,  civil
In writing this volume the author acknowledges most gratefully assistance
from many of the persons mentioned  in the Preface  to the
 preceding
 volume,
notably
  author
and, along with
volume, who provided  stimulating discussions  during  the processes of  plan-
ning
  and
  composition
  and
  offered
  valuable
  Alice
Bailey who gave  unstinted help  with  wartime  planning documents.
The author owes a great debt to Mr. Walter G. Hermes, whose  assistance
has been  invaluable. Mr. Hermes  investigated
 many
  topics essential  to the
completion of the volume, particularly  in the  field  of  strategy  and  planning
in the  conflict
information,  reviewed for the author countless passages and  references,  and
his
 broad
  knowledge
Army are  reflected  throughout  the volume.
A great  measure
  of thanks is due to Dr.  Kent  Roberts  Greenfield,  who
gave  unstintingly
  scholarly craftsmanship.  Others
in the  Office  of the  Chief  of  Military  History  who  were
  especially  helpful
were  Drs.  Stetson  Conn  and Louis Morton,  Colonels  George  G.  O'Connor
and  Ridgway  P.  Smith,  Jr.,  Drs.  Richard
  M. Leighton and  Robert  W.
Coakley, and  Charles F.  Romanus  and Riley  Sunderland.  He is  especially
indebted  to  Miss  Mary
perceptive,  and  watchful
x
  generous  help  he
wishes  to thank the many  records experts  who  aided  him—notably  Miss
Wava  Phillips, Mrs. Hazel  Ward,
  Mr.  Israel Wice  and his  assistants,  and
Mr.
  and his  staff  at the  Franklin  D.
  Roosevelt  Library.
Copy editing was  done  by Mrs.  Marion  P. Grimes, selection of  pictures
by Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and  indexing by Virginia  C. Leighton. Credit
fo r  maintaining a correct text  of the  manuscript through repeated revisions
is due  particularly  to two  high ly capable  secretaries—Mrs.  Ella  M ay Ablahat
and  Mrs.  Edna W.  Salsbury.
The
  author
  is  also  obliged  to  those  others who  read  all or parts of the
text in  manuscr ipt—to  Professors  Will iam L.  Langer  and Charles H.
Taylor  of
Univers i ty ;  to  Professor  Wesley F.  Craven  of  Princeton
  Univers i ty ,
  to Dr.  Harvey  A. De
Weerd  of the  Rand  Corporation;  to  Maj.  Gen. Frank  N.  Roberts,  who
encouraged  the
  from
A l b e r t
 C . Wedemeyer,  U SA  (Ret . ) ;  to  Maj. Gen. R i c ha r d
 C .  Lindsay,  U S A F ;
to  Cols.  W il l i a m W .  Bessell,  Jr.,  George
  A. Lincoln, Edward M. Harr is ,
William
  H.
  Baumer;
 of
nently, in the  events set  for th .
A  special  category  of  t h a n k s  is  reserved  to my  wife,  Gertrude
  G l i c k l e r
Matloff ,
interpretations presented
MAURICE  MATLOFF
Washington,  D.C.
  10
I.  CASABLANCA-BEGINNING  OF AN  E R A :  J A N U A R Y
1943
Casablanca  i n Retrospect  . . . . . . . . . . .  3 8
II.  A D V A N C E  IN THE  MEDITERRANEAN: JANUARY-
M A Y  1943  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 3
Critical Shortages
 Atlantic  . . . .  43
Rearming  t h e  French  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 4
Commitments  to the Middle  East
  . . . . . . . . .
The  Problem of the Neutrals:  Spain  and  Turkey
  ... 63
Role  o f
EAST:
  J A N U A R Y - M A Y  1943  . . . . . . . . . .  7 7
Stalemate  i n Burma
T h e  Clash  o f  Personalities  . . . . . . . . . . .  8 4
Victory  Through  Airpower?  . . . . . . . . . . .  8 7
Planning  f o r  Pacific  Operations  . . . . . . . . .  8 8
System  o f  Command  o f
  Joint  Operations  . . . . . .
  1 0 2
  . . . .
Strategy
Preparations  and Rehearsal for  TRIDENT  . . . . .  120
xiii
1943  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 2 6
Cross-Channel  and Mediterranean  Operations  . . . .  126
T h e  Pacific  a n d F a r East  . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 3 5
T h e  Balance  Sheet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 4 3
VII.
  FROM
  TO
  A V A L A N C H E :  MAY-MID-AUGUST
1943  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 4 6
Search  for the Formula  Continued  . . . . . . . .  162
Strategy, Production, a n d
 Manpower  . . . . . . . .  1 7 9
  AND  FUTURE  OPERATIONS IN
  JUNE-AUGUST
  1943
  185
  193
Air Operations and Command Problems  in the CBI . . .  198
Origins of the  Command  . . . . . . .  201
Sino-British Attitudes a n d Policies  . . . . . . . . .  2 03
Planning  the  Over-all  War Against
  Japan
  . . . . . .  205
X.
Debating  the  Issues  in the War Against Germany  . . .  220
Discussion  on the War  Against  Japan
  . . . . . . .  230
XI.  "THE  MEDITERRANEAN AGAIN":
N O V E M B E R  1943  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 4 4
Invasion o f  Italy
T h e  Balkans  a n d  Turkey  . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 59
Mediterranean Build-up  Versus OVERLORD  . . . . .  2 6 2
XII.  STRATEGY
  AND  C O M M A N D  IN THE WAR AGAINST
G E R M A N Y  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 7 0
The  Problem  of
The  USSR  in
T h e  Moscow  Conference  . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 9 1
  Fish or Cu t Bait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  303
XIV.  STRATEGIC STRANDS IN THE WAR
 AGAINST
AUGUST-NOVEMBER  1943  . . . . . . . . . . .
The Quest for Short Cuts  . . . . . . . . . . . .  308
T h e  Progress  o f  Pacific  Operations  . . . . . . . .  3 1 2
Shipping,
New  Techniques and  Weapons  in the War Against
  Japan
The JCS
  . . . . .
Opening Skirmish
Climax  at  Tehran:  28 November-1  December  1943  . .  356
Mop-up
  at
  Cairo:
  3-7
XVII.  STRATEGIC  INVENTORY:  DECEMBER
T h e  Tally  Sheet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  3 9 7
Preparations f o r  OVERLORD  . . . . . . . . . .  4 0 3
OVERLORD  Planning  and  Mediterranean  Options . .  412
OVERLORD  and the
  S E C O N D A R Y
  WAR-
T H E  CBI:
  J A N U A R Y - M A Y  1944
  . . . . . . . .  4 3 3
  4 3 3
T h e
  442
T h e  Battle o f t h e A i r
  Transports  . . . . . . . . .  4 4 7
T h e  Decline  o f t h e C B I  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 4 9
XX. THE  SECOND
  FRONT  AND THE  S E C O N D A R Y  WAR-
T H E  PACIFIC:  J A N U A R Y - M A Y  1944  . . . . . . .  4 5 1
T h e
E n d  o f a Mission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 5 9
O f  Troops  a n d  Transports  . . . . . . . . . . .  4 6 1
Eve of  OVERLORD  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 64
XXI. THE PROMISE OF MILITARY   VICTORY:  D DAY TO
SEPTEMBER  1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 6 6
ANVIL-The  Last  Rounds
Target-Philippines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Anglo-American
  Coalition  . . . . . . . . . .  4 9 0
  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .
T h e  Second  Quebec  Conference  . . . . . . . . .  5 0 8
Expansion  and Distribution of  U.S. Military  Power  . . .  518
T h e
Appendix
A.
  Summary
  of
  Current
 Cairo Conference  . 541
  Asia—A  Reflection
tember  1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  5 4 6
D.  Shipment  of Divisions  Overseas—January  1942-September
  1944
  . 550
tember  1944  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 5 5
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE
  TO
  FOOTNOTES
  . . . 556
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY  O F
INDEX
  1943-44  . . . 207
  377
3.  Planners'  Deployment  Estimates of  March  1943  an d  Actual Deploy-
ment
  1943 . . . . . . . . . . .
  3 9 1
4. Arm y Overseas  Deployment:  31  December  1942-31  December  1943  392
5 .  U.S. Overseas
Illustrations
  Outskirts
Generals  Henri  Giraud  and  Charles  de Gaulle.  . . . . . . . . .  38
High-Ranking Trio
  in New
  . . . . . .  218
  . . . . .  22 2
General  Arnold  With Lord  Louis Mountbatten  . . . . . . . . .  237
Roosevelt's Concept  of Postwar  Occupation  Zones for  Germany  ... 341
Aboard t h e
  Kai-shek  and  Madame  Chiang  . . . . . . .  351
The Big Three  in Portico of the  Soviet  Legation,  Tehran  . . . . .  358
The  Combined  Staffs  Meeting in
  Mena  House, 4 December  1943  . . . 368
Ismet  Inonu,  the President of  Turkey  . . . . . . . . . . . .  379
Supreme Commander,  Allied
General  Marshall  With  General
  . . . . . . . . .  4 6 8
Guard  of  Honor  on  Review  at The
  Citadel
  . . . . . . . . . . 509
Members
  from
 of December
on
  Pearl
1
  The
had not yet
sweeps of the Axis Powers in Europe and
in  the far  Pacific  and had themselves
taken
turning of the
both sides  would  be  starting
  afresh  and
 area
 close
 allies,
Great
  Britain
would  also  have  to  begin  anew.  After  a
ful l year of war,  th e weight  of  U.S.  forces
was beginning  to be  felt  in the
  theaters.
Prime Minister Winston
War  Department
early, direct, massive assault
new  phase  of  global  and  coalition  war-
fare  for the  strategic
The
the
full  of  surprises  and changes.  Gradually
the
nation,  recovered
preparations  for
pair  the major  part  of the  planners'  ad-
vance  work.
principle already  accepted  in  U.S.
  mil i -
They
1
 General
  Marshall
ton to  serve  as Assistant Chief of  Staff,  War  Plans
Division  in
Deputy Chief
parations  is
UNITED  STATES
(hereafter  cited as Prewar Plans  an d  Preparations).
See  also:  (1) Ma urice  Matloff  an d  Edwin M.  Snell,
Strategic Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare,
  1941—1942,
UNITED  STATES  A R M Y  IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington,
  Snell, Strategic Plan-
loff,  "Prewar  Mili tary
 
2  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G
  FOR  COALITION  W A R F A R E
basic
  political
War  II—that  the war was to be waged as
a  coalition  effort.  Despite
American  view  that  the  basis  of  strategy
must
in  1941-42. The alliance was a war
marriage,
 United
member  of the
pair
  exist-
  Europa,
 partners to enter
power.  Great  Britain
nations
weight  against
intervene  actively  in the  Mediterranean
and the Middle  East,  through
 which  ran
it s  life  line  to its  empire  in the  Orient.
Its economy, while
war
avoid a repetition of its heavy
 manpower
I. By necessity and
rather
  than
  in
pire,
alliances  with
possible.
Reduced
  to
out, somewhat
the  long run, once  the  cancer  of
  Hitler-
a
against Germany, was a  land
 power
  with
cation. Though it possessed an enormous
population and
  great  resources,
  its in-
it  put its
durance
3
York ,  The  V i k i n g  Press,
  1947),  pp.
the
  massive
  Red
  Army
Western  eyes,
  power
veloped  into  a  baffling  hybrid—a  combi-
nation  of  Russian  National  Socialism,
Marxist  concepts, and
world  revolution
declared  state
  of war
  Union
  pause
  in
Both drives appear
with
the  break  with  the  Fuehrer  was the ag-
gressive
serting its claims on the Balkans—a move
tha t  Hitler,  confronted  with
  a
  stubborn
Britain
dangerous to
J u n e  effort
can  be characterized as  warfare  in  pur-
suit of aggrandizement. The  German  in-
vasion simply reinforced Russia's historic
desire to strengthen its position in eastern
Europe,
  an
  objective
  However,
  for
almost
  two
fight  for its  very  existence  and,
  while
by  no means  absent,  military  considera-
tions were more
  alike,
  it
would
partnership
Deane so
 have
its
  greatest
  whose
 whole
then  to prepare.
proach to  European  war, based  on its
experience
  in
  World
only  long  enough  to
Americans  war was an  aberration,  an
unwelcome  disturber  of normalcy.
I  and World  War II the
 national policy
enter  military alliances  nor maintain
 
twenty  lean
tary  Establishment.  Yet the legalistic-
moral  strain  that, historically,  has so in-
fluenced
the nations of the world would subscribe
to   principles  of justice and  morality,
  war,
istic  strain,  reflected  in
World  War I,  became  imbedded in the
pragmatism of  President  Roosevelt
World War II.
velt,
  gradually
and  resources  was  begun.  In  1940 the
Selective  Service Act was passed.  Aid to
Britain became  official  national policy in
the same year.  Lend-lease  was extended
to  Britain
  and to
ington,  laying  aside their earlier  aca-
demic
and  coalition  warfare—to  take  into  ac-
count  the  rising
  danger  of war
  peace
  to
periods  fo r  strategic  planners—the  plan-
ning  staffs  were
can  people toward  war. There  was a
dearth of  accurate  and  comprehensive
intelligence
ties  and  intentions  in  1941—a  condition
that was to
U.S. military
 continue
  against
Germany.
from
  agree
with
  the
and  1941 broadened
  his  knowledge  of
plans,
 as
 well
he  had
But he did not
  plans,
policy  limited
tionship. It
  freedom
using  U.S.
istration. For the  first  time in its history,
the United
ably  advanced in its military  planning.
4
planning
BO W  plans,  see:  (1)  Matloff  and  Snell,  Strategic
Planning:  1941-42, Chs. I-III;  (2) Watson ,  Prewar
Plans
  Conn
WAR II
  (Washington, Government
  Printing  Office,
By  successive  stages
  the  nation  made
  status
  of
  major
outright  military  collaboration  with
United States into  the war, in  Europe as
well as in the  Pacific,  was a natural  step
for  which
  Har-
the Far  East  and a  tradition  of
  helping
Throughout World
could never neglect the war in the  East.
This  compulsion must be  kept  in mind,
for  it was to
in the strategy  for the defeat of Germany.
Given its  domestic politics,  and the
added  pressure of the war with  Japan,
it  did not  seem  that  the  United
  States
could
  fight
"a democracy cannot  fight  a
 Seven Years'
that gradually,  under  th e  necessity  of
war, came
Britain. The  Soviet  Union's
small
  its
  fac-
Unlike  th e Western
  partners,  th e  USSR
allies.  The  Russians  had but to  push
westward  and
sure
  against
was  to  prove
  difficult.  Normally,  the
eral  terms  to the  Soviet  Union. The
Russians were to  take  formal
  part  in de-
  confer-
Potsdam.
  Chiefs
ing came of
the  Western  effort  in the global  war.
From the  start  these  conditions,
  added
understanding between the Soviet Union
and the  Western  Allies
basis for
 was laid
became a  necessity  for the  United  States
and Great  Britain  immediately  after  the
Japanese  attack.  Just  a few days before
5
 Interv,
and Maj
 
il l  and his principal military advisers ar-
rived
great  wart ime  conferences with  the
President  and his  staff.  Out of this  con-
ference—known  by its
bined  Chiefs  of
  Staff  (CCS)  system-the
ing out Allied strategy.
the U.S.  joint
chief  of  staff  and the
  senior  officers  of the
President;
  the
 other
 members
Admiral  Ernest  J.
  King,  Chief  of
U.S.  members  of the  Combined  Chiefs
and as the  President's
tary  officers—members
  of the  British
to  direct  the  operations of  their  services
from
  London,
tion  for  them  in the CCS. Field  Marshal
Sir  John  Dill,  head  of the
  British  Joint
in Washington.
able  organization  in which  decisions
were
  reached
strategies outlined;  the
resources.
  were
responsible
cal.
had  more
than with  their
  summit
th e  Foreign  Secretary, the  Minister  of
Production,  and the civilian  cabinet  of-
ficers
Admiralty,  and the Air  Minis t ry) .  The
6
V.  At the conference a  fixed
  distinction between  th e
forth
Rico and ambassador to
Commander in Chief. Admiral
  1941
  designated
Chiefs  of  Staff
  Committee sa t
to Mr.  Churchill  in his
 capacity
Chiefs  of  Staff  meetings  and also insured
close  liaison between British
Roosevelt
assistance  of the
  war-born  joint  staff
Cabinet,
II
illustrated at the  international  war  con-
ferences.
 system pro-
pean
  early  given
operations  against
  from  the
Other Partners
decisions
partners, but
also involved  to  varying
ada,
  Australia,
phery of the British-American  coalition.
Like
pated
in  military
  with
  Japan
 other major
powers,  China
state. Nominally  a  republic,  China  re-
sembled  a weak
shek,
great  part
munists  hovered  on the
politics  and
  worked against
  any  strong
l imi ted .
in manpower  illusory.
basic
organized a  huge  and  unwieldy
  army of
ground  forces  seldom  offered  more  than
token  resistance
  to the
t ive and  most  heavily populated
 areas on
 
8  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR
  COALITION  WARFARE
early
  1942
air  route over the mountains  from  India
permitted  a  thin  trickle  of supplies to
reach China.
survival,
from  it s
United  States.  In  addition,  it  looked
to the  United  States  to act as its  cham-
pion  vis-a-vis
whose  past
  interference  in
suspicion.  Considerable  time
war  effort  would  become  clear  to the
United  States.  Like  the  Russians,  the
Chinese were engaged against only
 one of
only  one of the  international
  confer-
Kai-shek  confer  with
  th e  Western
a  tangled
  humil i -
presented  a delicate problem. The
French, proud of their past
 and  sensitive
of  their
people.
country  and the
manpower closely watched by the enemy,
France's capacity  to
 Africa.  In
contribute
 decisively
Axis  Powers,  France  was  accorded  an
honorary place  of  importance  for politi-
ca l  reasons.  In the
 case
  to the
alize  the  position. Both  the  British  and
the Americans wished to see a   friendly
France  re-established  on the  Continent,
though their methods
  and  means  of
  Americans   to  maintain  rela-
so
France  from  their own resources and did
not attempt to  foist  France on the  USSR
as a first
ing the  fiction  of France as a great power
with
weakness
muster .
lowed
British  supplies and  equipment,  they
could only  hope  for the day  when  Axis
defeat
  would
the  status quo ante  bellum.  Only in
circumstances
  where
to gain  acceptance
  of  their  own
British  Commonweal th  of Nations—in
general permitted the  British  to
  repre-
tween  the United  States and  Canada, on
the one  hand,  and the  close  wartime co-
operation  of the  United  States
  with
Australia
  to
counterbalance
  British
atmosphere  of  reliance  and  good  faith
between  these  allies  and the two  chief
Western partners.
  discussion
American grand
versations
 the
resort  to war.
that Germany  was the  predominant
member  of the  hostile
made in the  Atlantic  and European
area. Should  Japan enter  the  war,  mili-
tary  strategy  in the Far
  East
  conditional
understanding;
power
  was
 close
in
troops  on its shores.  Before  the  United
States
  Japan
stored, ships  built,  and  extensive  pre-
l iminary  operations undertaken  to se-
cure
munications across
  Britain,
simply  could  not wait for a decision in
the war
fore,
contained until
  offensive
  in
in  World
  War II.
First"
  held
  throughout
  the
  war ,
  the
and  applied  arose  early  in the  conflict
and remained  almost  to the end. One of
the
against  Japan.  This  problem  reflected  a
certain divergence
strategy.  For Britain,  with  predominant
interests  in the  Mediterranean,  the
Middle  East,  and on the
  Continent,
  the
in
early
9
 For
  accounts
the  Pacific  war. As a
  result,  differences
allies  over  the  distribution  of  resources
between the two wars.
expense  of the  Pacific.
The
  Search
United
  Kingdom
  they
  were
  first,  they
  defeating  Ger-
saw  the  emergence  of  divergent  British
and
  American
Germany
  early
  became
advanced
  the
and the Mediterranean. In the  summer
of  1941  during  th e  Atlantic
 Conference,
patriots
  would
fensive
 action
 would
  operating  on the
  large-scale
the  German
  military  machine.
  No  vast
World War I  would  be needed. At the
A R C A D I A  Conference  Churchill  fur ther
elaborated  on  these ideas  for the  Presi-
dent.
with  the  Churchillian  theory
called the peripheral
would  be on  swift
  the
 so-called
soft
  underbelly
the Mediterranean  involved entering
Balkans—either  to the  north  Balkans  or
to  Greece—to Germany. From  the begin-
ning, the British envisaged a  cross-Chan-
nel  operation  in  force  only as the  last
blow  against a  Germany  already in  pro-
cess  of  collapse.  These  two  ideas  of the
Brit ish—emphasis
  on the  Mediterranean
coup
British concept was a compound  of mili-
tary  and
ister's  predilections. It was  tailored  to
suit  scattered interests,  a  small-scale
economy, and  limited
of
 
land
Germany.  In the summer of  1941 the
Army strategic planners, studying the re-
quirements of a global war for the initial
Victory  Program,  concluded that  sooner
or  later  "we must  prepare  to  fight  Ger-
many by  actually  coming  to  grips  with
and  defeating  her  ground  forces  and
definitely  breaking  her  will  to
  com-
bat."
10
whelming  air  superiority  in  Europe.
11
already
  disposed
meeting  the German  Army
Army  of
theory
  concentra-
defeat of the enemies' armies. It  reflected
American
military  hardware  and the  faith  of the
mil i tary  in the ability to  raise,
  equip,
train,
of  relieving  the  pressure  upon  the
  Rus-
other  to its concept  of strategy and the
long debate
 From
no  doubts about  the
they  wanted it
ponement of this
came  in
an   invasion  of North  Africa—the  TORCH
operation—versus  the  American desire
fo r  an  early cross-Channel  attack—the
Bolero-Roundup  plan.
10
 Chart,  "Ultimate  R e q u i r e m e n t s — G r o u n d
Forces,"  App II, Pt II, Sec 1, JB  355, ser  707.
The  Victory  Program is discussed in (1) Watson,
Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI; (2)
 Richard
tics  and Strategy, 1940-1943,  UNITED STATES
ARMY  IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,  Gov-
ernment
William
  L.
  Langer
1953), pp.  735-42.
  prepared
a
and  embodied  its strategic  faith.  In the opinion of
the air  planners,  it was
 doubtful
spring
  of
  1944.
 The
  expressed
  the
  belief
might  not be  necessary.
Department,
ners  approved  AWPD/1, which
  James
  Lea
Cate, eds.,  The  Army  Air  Forces  in World War 11,
I,  Plans  and  Early
AAF I),  131-32, 146-47,
including  th e  evolution  of the  BOLERO-ROUNDUP
plan,  the  consequent  Anglo-American  debate,
  and
velt
and  XXV;  (3)  Henry  L.  Stimson  and  McGeorge
Bundy,
ston  S. Churchill ,  Th e
  Second
  Book
(London,  Collins,  1952),  Ch. V.
 
steps
BOLERO-ROUNDUP  plan,  the  brainchild
ference  the  Americans  and
against  Germany  was to  preserve  the
lines of communications across the North
Atlantic between the  United  States  and
the fortress  in the British
  Isles,
U.S.  forces should be
any
that  fortress  as a base  for  invasion of the
Continent.  In the early
gan to be
partment.  Secretary of War  Henry  L.
Stimson,  General  Marshall,  and the
Army  planners  became increasingly  dis-
turbed  over the  dispersion  of  troops,
ships,
crises in non-European parts
 Russians
 Practically
 all
Harbor
strategy. The  thinking  of the  Army  staff
was  sharply  reflected  in a notation made
on 22  January  1942 by  Brig.  Gen.
Dwight
  D.
adoption
ing  me  down.  . . .  We've  got to go to
Europe
followed  by a
  land  attack  as
partment planners, under General Eisen-
hower's  guidance,
 subsequent
itself  would not solve the problem of de-
feating Germany. As a solution, the Joint
Chiefs  adopted  the  concept  of  invading
Europe
  in
  force
as proposed  by General Marshall,  called
for  forces  to be  assembled immediately
(BOLERO)  for a  cross-Channel  invasion
in the  spring  of  1943
 (ROUNDUP).
  To
emergency
or the  USSR seem  on the verge of
collapse.
plan
Hopkins
The  relief  felt  by
1911-13;
1940 he again became Secretary  of War.
14
 entry,  Item
 assistant
  chief  of  staff  of
of  the War
came
  chief
his staff  found
Maj.  Gen. Dwight D.
". . . at
mitted
tives, our  efforts  will begin  to  fall  in  line
and we won't  just be
  thrashing  around
UP  was especially desirable  for a
 number
the
  soundest
sive  against Germany and an
  attack
  on
 using  the
sented  the shortest  route
In the British Isles, the  United  States
could  safely  land  its ground  forces  with-
out the aid of carrier-based air cover and
could  safely  develop air superiority over
northern France.  The  route  of  attack
into Germany
plan  would meet
a
industrial  and  manpower  mobilization.
a
  definite
a
  long-range
principle  of  concentration.  For a while
plans  went  ahead  for the  second  front.
General
  Eisenhower
the  European  Theater  of  Operations
(ETO), and U.S. forces  began  to land  in
considerable numbers.
  the
ister came  to Washington and supported
a  North  African  operation—as  he had at
ARCADIA.  So disturbed  was the  American
staff  over  the  evident
ening  the British with an all-out  offen-
sive  in the  Pacific—the  so-called  Pacific
alternative—a
Hopkins, Marshall, and  King  went to
London  for further  discussions.  Out of
these came the decision to launch a
North
1942.  TORCH replaced  BOLERO-ROUNDUP.
  out,
 the
President
tw o  basic
  factors—President  Roosevelt's
forces  against Germany  in  1942,  and the
categoric  refusal  of  Churchill  and his
staff  to
Channel
  operation.
  The
  need
Middle
  East
  influenced
tive  advantages that
  all  sides  recognized
operation. The shipping  situation  was
so  tight that all possible measures had to
15
  Notations
 by
 Eisenhower,
command post in  World  War II, see Ray S.  Cline,
Washington Command
(hereafter  cited as Cline,  Washington Command
Post).
 
14  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
be  taken  to get  more  ships. A  saving  of
over
  200
  ships
  per
  Middle
East
Mediterranean  instead  of  around  the
Cape of Good Hope. There were, it must
be recognized, serious questions concern-
ing the  feasibility  of launching  the  cross-
Channel  operation  in
tions
were  resources
decision  was a bitter pill. To  them  it
meant  the  adoption  of a  strategy  of en-
circlement,
later
many.
of  the  BOLERO versus
  Depart-
system—miscarried. In retrospect the plan
seems  to  have  been  premature. Neither
the
 British
 means
generating  a strategy of  their  own,  and
the
  impatience
it may appear  to the  latter. There  were
enough  forces  and means to
  undertake
TORCH.
The
Marshal Joseph  Stalin's
 disapproval  in a
friendly  gestures  as  offering  direct  mili-
tary  assistance in the Caucasus, develop-
ment of the Persian  Gulf  delivery route,
and a build-up of the
  Alaska-Siberia
 air
They could  expect no real improvement
in   military  relations
The  Pacific  was also diverting power
from  the  American
  resources  on which
 demands  in
first  year  of the war in the
  Pacific
  was
 armed
supply lines and  bases
 allotted  to
ful ly  anticipated  the  great need  for air
and  ground  service  units  for  Australia
16
  Plans
served  as Chief of the Strategy and Policy   Group
until  he  succeeded
17
sailings to the  USSR  along the northern  route,  see
Matloff  and  Snell,  Strategic  Planning:  1941-42, Ch.
XIV.
and  Pacific  island bases and had to make
successive
to the  Pacific  conflicted with  the determi-
nation
resources to the  Pacific  had
  begun
  to
produce
  results,
Japanese  forces  at the
1942)  by no
in the new  phase  of the  Pacific  war,
  was
"line"  of  bases  to  support  a  harassing
naval defensive,
  be-
yond
sives
 was
 plotted
inforcements  in the
the
  troop
Central  Pacific
be  needed  to  complete  these  tasks.
For the  Pacific
was  about equal  to the  total  number  of
Army  forces
overseas  and 17 of the 72 air  combat
groups
successfully,  but the  problems
 been
CBI,  as in the  Middle
  East,  the  United
jurisdictional, strategic, and  logistical
mainland
overseas
ward
vestment  of
structed in  February  1942  to increase
both  the  effectiveness  of  American  as-
sistance  to the Chinese Government and
the  combat  efficiency
  of the  Chinese
by  the Japanese  in late April, the  prob-
lems  facing  Stilwell's mission
ever,
Middle
ply  theater.  A  year
area.
strategic responsibility
come
18
African
th e
dia. Stilwell  was promoted  to lieutenant general on
25  February  1942.
 
16  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
1942  had  forced successive modifications
in the  plans  for the use of  Army  forces
in the   At the end of December
1942  about
marily  air and  service  troops.  This  en-
larged commitment  reflected,  in part,  in-
creased  operational  air
American  offensive  action  in the  Medi-
terranean. In part, it
Gulf  supply  route  fo r  shipments  of  sup-
plies  to the  Soviet  Union.
All in
  divisions
  and
overseas  were  deployed  in the war
against  Japan. The
combat groups overseas
 were deployed in
air  combat groups  overseas were  dis-
tributed among  Latin  American  and
South Atlantic  bases.  The
against  Japan  exceeded  by  over  85,000
the  total  U.S. Army  forces
  deployed  in
the  parcelling  out of  shipping  to move
and
end of  1942, the
strategy of scarcity. The  basic
  fear  was
survival of the
  1942 it had  become  apparent  that,
though the Western Allies were still not
agreed on  strategy,  their plans were  tied
to the outcome of the struggle on the
Eastern  Front.  But Stalin had  turned
down the  offer  of Roosevelt and  Church-
ill  to  send  an Anglo-American air  force
to support  the  Soviet  forces  in the  Cau-
casus.  He made it unmistakably  clear
that  Western  military  forces  were
  not
wanted
front.
their  first
yet squarely joined. That British notions
of  strategy had  tended  to prevail was not
surprising.
 British
  forces
19
  Statistical
  Digest,
1947,  pp.  2-12;  (2)  STM-30,  1 Jan 48; and (3)
OPD  Weekly Status  Map, 31 Dec 42.  According  to
the  STM—30  computation, total  forces  deployed
  in
numbered  377,644.
factors  on  A r m y
 planning  and the constant
Coakley,
of
  mind,
  since
  in
 he had asked for
twenty-five  to  th i r ty  divisions to be sent  from  Great
Britain
  to
  Archangel
  south-
ern  f ront  in the  USSR.  See  Winston  S.  Churchill,
The  Second  World  War: The  Grand  Alliance  (Bos-
ton,
 
It had
any
  appreciable
  mouth,
  and
siderable measure determined by
Troops had been parcelled out piecemeal
to meet immediate threats,  crises,  and
needs in the  primarily  defensive  and
garrisoning phase of the war. New to the
art of military diplomacy and negotia-
tion, the Americans were
planning on an orderly,
concentration  in  which  the
  effec-
tive
dissipation o f  forces  and  materiel  in what
they regarded as
 secondary ventures  still
tive
staff.  Active  and passive  fronts  were  now
established all  over  the world. The
TORCH  decision  had  thrown  all  Allied
strategic  planning into  a  state  of  uncer-
tainty and  flux.  The old  issues  of en-
circlement
th e  Army  staff  hoped  had  been
  settled
agreement  in the  spring  of
  1942
  on
th e planners was how to limit operations
in
question  during  1943  and
sideration  of  possibilities  of
them could  be  reached. The
  positive
 as-
pect
invasion
  the
this  was the attempt to  guide  the  inter-
mediate  operations
sent
 
Allied coalition  remained
their application
the  establishment  of a  foothold  in  Nor-
mandy  in the  summer  of  1944—was  th e
period  of increasing  plenty.  The  power
to call the turn on  strategy and to choose
the
with  its  partners,  had to  come  to grips
with the  offensive  phase  of the  coalition
war.  U.S.  troops and
  full
impact
larly, the
to  survive  the
strategy.  The  balance  of power
  within
As  the new
not yet  found  a  common  ground  of
agreement.  Between  the  United  States
and the United  Kingdom,  fundamental
war strategy and  planning  for the im-
mediate  fu ture  were  unsettled.  Into  this
vacuum and state of  uncertainty  the
President,  at the Casablanca  Conference
in January  1943, introduced
  conse-
quences
ficial  meeting  with  Prime  Minister
Churchill
a  historic occasion,  marking  a  double
first  for the  President:  the  first  time that
a
fice  and the  first  time
  that  a  U.S. presi-
Roosevelt's  departure
 The
across  the  hazardous  Atlantic at the
Nor th African  port of Casablanca. There,
on the  outskirts,  in a  large
  hotel  on a
the  President
19
THE
  ANFA  HOTEL ON THE O UT SK IR T S OF C A S A B L A N C A , site  of the
  first  midwar  inter-
military  staff.  General  Marshall and his
staff, Admiral King, and General
 Arnold
had
  Anfa  Hotel
palm trees, bougainvillaea, and  orange
groves  and
tected  by  barbed
groves, and
seem  incongruous  in the wartime  atmo-
sphere.
In
global
tables  they  carried
hours of the
series  of  Combined  Chiefs of  Staff  con-
ferences.  In the  absence  of  Admiral
Leahy, who had  become  ill en  route,
General  Marshall,
  Their  British
Brooke,  Chief  of the  Imperial General
Staff,  Admiral  of the  Fleet  Sir  Dudley
Pound, First Sea  Lord,  and Air  Chief
 
20  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
Marshal
  Sir
  Charles
Field
 Marshal
British  Joint  Staff
  Mission in Washing-
hovered  the two
American invitation to participate on the
ground  that the critical situation at  Stal-
ingrad demanded his
  cam-
paign.
  The
  practical
American
North  African  campaign
  had  been  dis-
Africa  already
 campaign
British  and
tion
though
would  do its
  hand,  the
Balkans
 and
  leave
the  Americans  predicted
  showed  signs  of
peninsula. The Americans
over  the  prospects  of  German  collapse
in the
armies and air
German
3
had
 had
  much
  in
  common
 since
 early
  in
the
 war,
the answer given  would
Minister  had no  doubt  what  the correct
course  of  Allied action  for  1943 should
be. In November  1942 he had  cabled
the President that the  "paramount  task"
before  the United States and the
  United
Kingdom
1
Corps  in  France  in  1940;  he became commander of
the  British  Home Forces  in  1940 and  Chief  of the
Imperial  General  Staff  in  1941.
  Admiral  Pound  was
named First Sea Lord  and  chief  of the British naval
staff  in May  1939  and  became  Admiral of the
  Fleet
in  July  1939.  Air  Chief  Marsha l  Portal had  served
on the Air  Council  and as Air  Officer,  Command-
ing-in-chief,  Bomber  Command;  he was appointed
Chief  of the Air  Staff,  Royal  Air  Force,  in  October
1940.
2
3
42,  t i t le: German  Strategy
  in  1943. ( 2)  Comments
1943,  n. d.  Both  in  Casablanca
  Books,
Africa  and  open  the  Mediterranean  to
military  traffic  and,  second,  to use the
bases  on the  African  shore  "to  strike  at
the underbelly  of the  Axis  ... in the
shortest  time."
it, it was the obvious immediate  objec-
tive for consideration  at the conference.
The  British
 with
complete.
5
place
staffs. Neither the U.S. and  British Chiefs
of  Staff  nor  their
 planners had been  able
 subsequent
Marshall's own
been
concept  and had  afterwards  been  so en-
grossed
  that
they
the eve of
 building
 up
and
 North
sion for a  month  or  two.  Such
  circum-
General  Marshall
in the British  Isles, but
  Marshall
in  defense of the plan. His  course would
serve
a  major  cross-Channel  operation  was
still  a  cardinal  objective  in American
strategic planning.
Cross-Channel  Versus
cross-Channel  operation  in  1943.  Early
in the
question was the  extent  to  which  the
associated powers  had to
 which  they
improve
  the
Axis.
6
the  American and  British leaders  to de-
cide  on the
he  added,
BOLERO  and  from
8
American
BOLERO.  It was Marshall's  belief
  that
  in
  "ab-
4
42,  No.
was  circulated  as JCS  153, 18 Nov 42,  title:  Plans
and  Operations  in the  Mediterranean,  Middle East,
and  Near  East. (2)
tions,  see: (1)  Cline,  Washington Command
  Post,
  Strategic
7
  Min,
  G Y M N A S T  was the  code
  name
BRITISH
  AND
  LEADERS  AT
Roosevelt
Henry  H.
of  the Fleet Sir  Dudley  Pound,
  Field Marshal Sir  Alan  Brooke,  and Air  Chief
Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal.
normally
main  British-American  effort  against
operation
  aimed
  at
  northern
  France.
spring of  1942  in  defense  of the
  BOLERO-
ranean
centration  of
not become  committed  to
Kingdom awaiting a hypothetical  Ger-
man
  collapse.
  A
Kingdom  would
whether  further  operations  in the
  Medi-
portionate  to the  hazards  involved.  Any
Mediterranean undertaking  projected
  weighed
situation
the
over-all
  planning
British
Germany
until  late
  in the
limited  by the
from
1943. If the  Allies  prepared  for
  that
the  USSR throughout  the  summer.  Sir
Alan  then went on to say the British and
Americans should  definitely  count  on
entering
  the
 Continent
  in
  force
  in
  1944.
try to
to do this was to threaten Germany every-
where in the Mediterranean, try to knock
Italy out of the war, and try to bring Tur-
key in.  Intensifying  British-American
scatter  its air  resources. Mediterranean
operations,  especially against  I taly,
would  result  in a  considerable  diversion
of
the deterioration of Germany,  the British
called  for a  continued  build-up  of
British-American  forces  in the  United
Kingdom  in  preparation  for an invasion
of  th e  Continent.
appeals
of  Italy
launched. He was attracted by the  possi-
bility of
The Germans would then  have  to take
over  the  defense  of Italy and the  Italian
commitments  for the defense of the
Balkans.
 war. Turkey
the Rumanian  oil  fields  and for
 opening
  USSR.  With
staff,  to be  thinking purely  in  terms of a
S L E D G E H A M M E R  operation.
11
In
  addition
that the President was not  disinclined
toward  fur ther
wanted U.S.
9
  (1)  Min, 55th  mtg  CCS, 14 Jan 43. (2)  M i n ,
58th  mtg  CCS,  16 Jan 43. (3)  Min, 60th  mtg  CCS,
18  Jan 43.
  (1)  Min,  57th  mtg  CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2)  Min,
58th  mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
11
  Official
  Casa-
WORLD WAR II  (Washington, Government
  Print-
Churchill ,
  Stim-
 
24  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
quick,
ranean
  Italy.
American  intention  of relieving German
pressure on them. He may  have  been
influenced  at this  time  in  favor  of a
Mediterranean  strategy
UP  but
British-American   operation  against  Ger-
scale  operation on the  Continent  might
be postponed  until  somewhat  later.
Meanwhile,
  the
Kingdom
showed  signs of
  predilections
  of
Chief of  Staff  had to  recognize that
  cer-
on the  possibility  of a  1943
  ROUNDUP.
amphibious  operations.  Thus  Marshall
and the  JCS,  in a special  session  held
during  the  conference,  Lt.  Gen.  Dwight
D.
originally
mated would  be necessary.
operations  following  his  early
  BOLERO-ROUNDUP
be the submarine menace and delivery o f
supplies
followed
  the
  Chief
be  attracted  by some  aspects  of  Mediter-
ranean  undertakings.
vantages
Germany
  from
conceded  the  argument
  were  the  effects
  line  communications
  vet-
th e
campaign  was over.  If these  forces  could
be employed without having to be
  trans-
ported
critical  Allied  shipping  situation  in the
Atlantic would not be aggravated. Econo-
my of tonnage—especially in  view  of the
ever  present
13
blanca  Conf  Book.
  President,
JCS,
 
C A S A B L A N C A - B E G I N N I N G  OF AN ERA 25
consideration."  Between  the two  most
  Mediterranean operations,
of  Sicily  would
Sicily in
  Allied hands,
operations
  in
  Burma,
drawal  from  the
  war, forcing  Germany
Prime
  Minister
Chiefs  of  Staff  agreed  to  undertake  an
operation  against  Sicily
the Mediterranean  operation  only
Mediterranean. He  still  wished  to  make
the  main  effort  against Germany across
the Channel. At the
Turkey  to
flow of lend-lease
ment that all possible aid should be given
to the  Russians  in
far  to go in  sending  convoys
  over  th e
that  the  heavy losses of
  1942 must
  not be
themselves, simply  to get
other
th e  invasion  of  Sicily,  if  this  proved
necessary.  Admiral King, while main-
taining  that
 every  effort
agreed  with Marshall  that it would not
be  wise  to  continue  the  Murmansk  con-
voys  if the losses became prohibitive.
17
ways been a
USSR and who had been  willing  to have
Marshall  go to the  Soviet  Union
  to dis-
18
not be continued at prohibitive cost to
the United N ations effort ."
19
  No
 attempt
15
  divergences
see: (1) min,  sp mtg JCS and  President,  15 Jan 43,
Official  Casablanca  Conf Book;  and (2)  Churchill,
Hinge  of Fate, p.  678.
For a discussion of  Mediterranean  alternatives
in   Allied strategy  and the  f inal  compromise  on
Sicily  at Casablanca, see H. M.  Smyth,  The  Sicilian
Campaign  and the  Surrender  of  Italy,  MS, Ch. I,
OCMH  files.
  of  Marshall's
especially:  (1 ) min, 2d Anfa  mtg, 18 Jan 43,  Official
Casablanca  Conf  Book;  (2) min,  60th  tg  CCS, 18
Jan 43; (3) min, sp mtg JCS and  President,  15 Jan
43 ,  Official
17
  (1)
 18 Jan 43. (2) Min,  2d
Anfa  mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3)  Min,  55th  mtg  JCS, 19
Jan 43. (4) Min,
 His-
  of
  Staff,
MS,
 Sec.
  Coalition
  Warfare ,
Ch. IV, "The Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and Aid to  Rus-
sia,  1942-43," by Capt Ernesto G iust i.
18
  below.
 
26
  STRATEGIC
  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
was  made to  define  just what  would
constitute  "prohibitive
  The  very
f lexibi l i ty  of the  term  indicated  that  the
over-all  shipping situation  plus  the  rate
of  shipping  losses in the  months  before
the
  invasion
on  Sicily  be  made  with
  "the  favorable
if  possible.
  Soviet
Italy.  General
east,  crossed  the  Tunisian  frontier,  Gen-
eral  Sir  Harold  R. L. G. Alexander
would  become  Deputy
  com-
tions  in Tunisia,
Planning and preparations in the theater
fo r  HUSKY were  to begin at once.  On the
other  side  of the  Mediterranean, opera-
tions
with  an  agreement
  between  the Presi-
left  as a British  responsibility.  The de-
feat  of the  U-boat  menace  was
 accepted
the  resources  of the
many,  the  conferees  did  call  for the es-
tablishment of a  combined command
and  planning  staff  to  plan  for a  return
to
tions.  This  return  might take the  form
o f  small-scale  ra ids ,  an  emergency
operation  in  1943 in the  event  of a
sudden German  collapse, a  limited
operation in  1943 to secure a bridgehead
on the  Continent  for  later  exploitation,
or "an  invasion  in
  suffi-
and a
commander
  for a  1944  R O U N D U P  could
be  appointed
elsewhere,  U.S.
modified  BOLERO).
 staff
  from  the
President  and  Prime  Minister  Summariz ing  Deci-
sions  by the  CCS. See  also  min,  56th
  mtg  JCS, 20
  (1) CCS  155/1,  19 Jan 43,  title:  Conduct of the
War in  1943. (2)  170/2,  23 Jan 43,  title:
  Final
  Rpt
Decisions  by the  CCS.  (3 )  Min,  66th  mtg  CCS,  22
Jan 43.
Command,
  Control,
  Planning
the  COSSAC  (Chief
  nucleus
  of
  SHAEF
45 .
23
experts, it was estimated
 could
at
  1,118,000
43,   t i t le:
  Shipping  Capabilities  fo r  BOLERO  Build-
up.
nitely count on reentering the Continent
in  1944
airpower.  Both  sides  agreed that
  the
  King-
To  defeat  Germany,
to bomb
remained  a prerequisite to any major
ground
  urg-
ground  as
Chiefs,  preferring  Mediterranean action
of  the  bomber  offensive  in Allied
strategic
jectives? Specifically,  how  should  Ameri-
can  concepts of air  tactics and  command
be  accommodated  to the  f luctuat ions  in
combined  strategic
directly  interested.  So was  General
Marshall. He and his  planning  staff  in
the  War Department had
  steadily
gram.  During  the  debate
Marshall tried
timing by using an
ground
  forces
in the
 plan.
25
The  decision  in  favor  of  H U S K Y  clear-
ly made uncertain  an  all-out  invasion  of
th e  Continent  in  1943.  General Arnold
supported  the  views
  conference.
Arnold
in the postponement  of that  planned  in -
vasion.  More  time would
matic strategic  air bombardment.  That
bomber  offensive would perforce become
a  more independent operation,
AAF
th e  United
The postponement of the continental
invasion
clearly set  forth  in a document  issued by
the Air planners on 9  September  1942
and
  known
24
25
26
  A
  a
reaffirmation  of  A W P D / 1 ,  is  contained  in  Wesley
Frank  Craven  and  James  Lea  Cate,  eds., The  Army
Air  Forces  in
 
multaneously against both Germany and
Japan  with  the  resources  available.  Be-
tween
  Germany
tive.  The
accessible
  to
  Allied
air
  forces.
  For
  1943
given
  Ger-
many
 of German
be   successfully  executed  by  mid-1944  if
over-all  requirements  of  approximately
 aircraft  fo r
 1943 were met.
In  AWPD-42,  production  s c h e d u l e s ,
priorities  and  allocations  for  aircraft,
and training and  deployment  programs
were
that
  time
  it
  would
many.  A  similar
  strategic  air  offensive
launched against  Japan.  The  contem-
plated  air  offensive
  against Germany was
 combined strategic
U.S.  airmen
war.  The  U.S. air  forces  in the European
theater would concentrate on the de-
struction  of
  selected vital
centrate  upon
dustrial  areas.
was  th e  fear  that  its  troops  and  planes
would be
strategic
the Air  planners believed wholehearted-
ly  in the
(CBO)  from  the
  United  Kingdom  pre-
concurrent decision  to
27
  The
"the  progressive
ing of the morale of the  German  people
to a point where their capacity for
 armed
(a)
portation,
vided  also  for  drawing
  Medi-
progressive  weakening  of  Germany
with his operations
(Chicago,
hereaf ter  cited as  Craven  and Cate,  AAF  II),  277-
79,
  (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43,  title:  Conduct  of the
War in  1943. (2) See also
  Craven  and  Cate,
cept of a  cross-Channel  air-ground opera-
tion,
Chief
  Marshal
became  an
  immediate prospect,
give
 opera-
tions.
29
command.  The  scepticism  expressed
daylight
  precision
30
  The
Arnold enlisted  the support of  Maj. Gen.
Ira C.  Eaker,  the  U.S.  Eighth Air Force
commander,  to  present  the case for the
as
  yet
experienced  crews, lack of  long-range
fighter  escorts,  improved  German  fighter
tactics and  antiaircraft
  fire,  the  require-
program  of  bombardment  had  been  de-
layed.  A
  year  after
U.S.  airpower.  Marshall  felt
 Churchill's
  sympa-
can  cause,
  British  decided
has
  since  recorded  his  satisfaction  in the
t r ibu te  later  paid  to him by  U.S.  Air
leaders  for saving  their daylight  bomb-
ing program  at Casablanca.
win acceptance for AAF air  tactics;  it
was another  to  insure
  full  control by the
  argued
demonstrated
England should  therefore  be put in the
hands  of the British,  but , Marshall  in-
sisted,  the  bombing  methods and  tech-
niques  of the
by   the  CCS.  The  British  gave  their  as-
sent  to  this  arrangement.
a  definite  place  in  Allied  planning
against Germany. However, its contribu-
tion on the use of airpower was more  in
th e nature of general policy and  guiding
principles
target  priority  list
  of the  combined
translate
30
  AAF II,
296—302.
In January  1942  Eaker
  had organized the  VIII
  in
  England,
33
  (1)  Min,  56th  mtg  JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2)  Min,
65th  mtg  CCS,  21 Jan 43.
 
30
  STRATEGIC  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  WARFARE
Old
  Versus
British  delegations  to
strategy, the cross-Channel-Mediterrane-
ranean  offensive—against Sicily—the  con-
tinuation  of a modified  BOLERO,  and the
agreement on a  round-the-clock  com-
bined
 bomber
plex
would  be  made  from  the  United  King-
dom or in the Mediterranean. The  U.S.
and  British  staffs  remained
tions had not  been settled. The  stake  for
operational
fu r the r  Mediterranean operations would
continue  to be
  R O U N D U P
  type,
desired
 by
Minister. In and out of a  series of inter-
national  conferences  in
issue.
i t ive  solution  of the cross-Channel-Med-
iterranean  issue,  it did  represent  the  last
real  fling  of the  "either-or"  school  of
thought  in American strategic thinking.
Hereafter,  the  U.S.  staff  would  increas-
ingly have  to recognize  that a new period
of  complex  choices had  been  ushered  in
—one  that
terranean,
  and
of
ing questions  in European  strategy down
to
 opera-
alternatives
  in
  such
the  United  Kingdom.  The
that.
divergence
of  the war against  Japan  to the war as a
whole .  A s  long  as  plans  for defeating
Hitler  first  remained  indeterminate,  the
precise place  of the  China-Burma-India
and  Pacific  theaters in the over-all
strategy  of the war  remained
  uncertain.
years  weighed
Their
final strategy against Germany was all the
greater  since  the  Americans  had early
assumed
against  Japan.  It was a serious  question
w h e t he r  the American  people  and the
A r m y  could stand  the  effects  of the
exhausting, long, drawn-out fight
Divergency  of
the British that they  still  regarded  as
basically  sound  the  accepted  principle
of  British-American  strategy: "To  con-
duct  the
cable date,
defensive  in  other  theaters
JCS  prepared  a
  modified  version  that
velop  offensive
more  seriously  than  apparently
quests in the
the  British—of  Japanese
vent  the
ther expansion,  provided  communica-
36
Burma  Road,  but the  U.S.  Chiefs  dwelt
more on the urgency of doing it.
Pacific  Operations
Chiefs  elaborated  on these  positions.
Each  time the  British  brought  up the
question of
with  the  question  of
tance of the  Pacific  effort.  To
  bring
  the
 possible
  was
coming  to  grips with  Japan.
  It was also
JC S  had  greater
  peace  of  mind about
threat
carriers against U.S. lines of  communica-
tions to the  Pacific and against the Amer-
ican  west  coast.  The Japanese must be
permitted
  no
  pause.
idea  of  surrendering  and  would  con-
tinue to be  aggressive  until  defeated  by
attrition.
37
at Casablanca General Marshall made
 the
  contained
  in
  Basic Strategic
  Concept
for  1943, circulated  as CCS 135 on 26 Dec 42 for
consideration
largely  the
JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42,  title:  Basic Strategic  Concept  for
1943;  (2) JCS  167, 11 Dec 42,  t i t le:  Basic  Strategic
Concept  for  1943;  and (3) JCS
  167/1,
British  Chiefs  of  Staff.
 
32
STRATEGIC
  P L A N N I N G  FOR  COALITION  W A R F A R E
vision
Atlantic and
  that
38
specifically  warned  that  sufficient
Pacific.
39
hampered
had  made
standing
Allied  effort
Chiefs  turned
  th e
terranean
  area.
Pacific,  Churchill  promised  that,  after
th e
He  went  so far as to  offer  to  enter  into
a  special  treaty with the  United  States
Government  to
  this  effect.
  The Presi-
plying
ment"
th e  fight
  against  Japan  once
41
The
  British
 all-out
 war.
American resources
many,  unsuccessful.
  They  preferred
 more
 or
less
  fixed
Sir  Dudley Pound  even suggested  that
  it
would
  be
  impossible