CMUN 2020

Camp David Accords

 

Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates, 

Welcome! My name is Aidan Healy and I will be your chair for this committee. I am currently a junior at Catholic Memorial and one of the Co-Secretary Generals of our Model UN program. This will be my second time chairing a committee, and I am excited to work with all of you! Apart from Model UN, I am also a member of CM’s Drama Club, Speech Team, Latin Club, and Tennis Team. Obviously, this year is going to be unconventional as we will be running our conference entirely virtually. However, I am still confident that we can have some great debate and exchange of ideas, albeit over the interweb. Naturally, standard rules of etiquette and decorum apply online as elsewhere. Of course, our primary goal will be to have fun!

If you have any questions or concerns, don’t hesitate to reach out to me at:

aidanhealy@catholicmemorial.org

Thanks!

 

Background of Conflict -

Understanding the Evolution of Relationships Between the US, Egypt, Israel, and Arab League.

 

 

The UN Partition of 1947

 

        In November of 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted thirty - three  to ten in favor of a partition to divide the territory of Palestine into two states: Fifty – six percent for the Jews and the remainder for the Arabs. Specifically, Arabs maintained the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, while Israel controlled virtually the rest of the region. Jerusalem was  to become an international zone, governed by an impartial, independent, and international body. On May 14th, 1948, the British officially left Palestine and the State of Israel was born.  

 

The Arab -Israeli War of 1948

 

        Despite the UN partition of 1947 being backed by Western powers and the Soviet Union, the Arab states highly detested the Partition. On May 15th armies from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq invaded Israel. Suddenly, the Israelis were forced to fight a coalition of three massive neighboring Arab armies.   Furthermore, the British (unofficially) allied themselves with the Arabs, arming and leading units of Syrian and Egyptian soldiers, and threatening to initiate their defensive pacts with Lebanon if Israel attacked.

 In May of 1948, on the brink of war, the population of Israel was only a mere 650,000 people. The Israeli army, Hagenah, had around just 8,900 fighters ready to mobilize. The Israeli arsenal consisted of just nine obsolete planes and lacked a single cannon or tank. Yigel Yadid, chief minister of war for Israel, estimated that in the best case scenario the Israelis only had a “50 – 50 chance”.

Initially, the Arab armies had a decisive advantage against the overwhelmed Israelis. Fueled by British leadership in the north and Egyptian power in the south, the Arab coalition captured a majority of Jerusalem, the Golan heights, and made advances in the West Bank and aerial attacks towards Tel Aviv. However, the global superpowers of the time – namely, the United States and the Soviet Union- interceded on behalf of Israel. As Israel slowly accumulated military support from the United States, Czechoslovakia, and the United Nations, fighting reached a standstill.

In February of 1949, Israel’s Arab neighbors agreed to an armistice. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan all brokered individual, separate peace accords with Israel. These agreements instilled the same borders outlined in the UN Partition of 1947, with Egypt retaining control over the Gaza Strip and Jordan keeping the West Bank.

The Arab – Israeli War of 1948 – or, the “War of Independence” – had dire consequences for both Israel and the Arab States. The Israelis suffered 6,000 casualties, around one percent of their total population. Israel also exhausted around 500 million dollars to fuel the war effort, crippling the economy of the new nation. Furthermore, the Arab states also suffered around 14,000 casualties in a humbling and embarrassing defeat for the boastful coalition. Also, more consequentially, around 750,00 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes as a result of the conflict and become refugees.

 

The Suez Crisis of 1956

 

        In July 1965, supported by arms and funds from the Soviet Union, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nassar nationalized the Suez canal. The French, who oversaw the creation of the canal, were furious that their ships would now be forced to pay a toll for transport through the dam. The French also believed Nassar was sponsoring terrorist groups in the French colony of Algeria. Thus, the French and the British decided to ally with Israel to overtake the Suez canal.

On October 29th, 1965, the Israelis attacked Egyptian positions on the border near the canal. Two days later, the Israelis’ were joined by British and French forces.  Eventually, the coalition was able to capture the Egyptian positions at Port Saud and Port Fuad, effectively seizing the Canal.

The Soviet Union, eager to enhance their political influence in the Middle East, quickly sided with Egypt. The Soviets threatened Nuclear retaliation on Western Europe if the Israeli – French – British coalition continued their assault and didn’t relinquish the Suez Canal back to Egypt. The United States, alarmed by both the quick escalation of tensions and covertness of the French and British, threatened economic sanctions on France, Britain, and Israel. These threats were effective, and by March      France, Britain, and Spain had all withdrawn from the Suez Canal.

The Suez Crisis – or, the “war of Tripartite Aggression” as it is known in Egypt – didn’t result in any major border shifts or policy changes. However, the crisis was very significant to future political developments between Israel and Egypt. The Suez Crisis confirmed the suspicion of Egypt (and the wider Arab world) that Israel had not been created merely as a homeland for persecuted Jews, but as a base for Western Imperialists to maintain a stronghold in the Middle East.

           

 

The Six – Day War of 1967

 

        In the interceding decade between the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War, Nassar began to increase the use of fiery anti – Israel rhetoric and signed defensive pacts with Arab states such as Jordan. Fearing another Arab coalition led – by Egypt, like in 1948, Israel decided to preemptively prepare for war. On June 5th, 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces initiated a surprise arial attack on Egypt, utilizing two – hundred planes to destroy around ninety percent of Egypt’s air force. By the end of the day, Israel had gained dominant supremacy over the skies. Over the next several days, the Israeli’s surged through Sinai peninsula, easily routing weakened, demoralized Egyptian forces.

        Jordan, influenced by Egyptian state media, believed Egypt had won the war and begun to bomb Israeli positions in Jerusalem. Israeli responded by assaulting Jordanian positions in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. On June 7th, Israeli forces captured Jerusalem. On June 9th, Israeli tanks and infantry rolled into Southern Syria, capturing the Golan Heights. On June 10th, the United Nations brokered  ceasefire agreement between Israel and the Arab States, UN resolution 242, ending the war.

        Although the Six – Day war was brief, it’s consequences have been determinative to Middle Eastern politics for decades. In a mere 132 hours of fighting, an estimated 200,000 Arabs and 800 Israeli’s perished. Furthermore, Israel – in only a single week – had captured the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights.

    As war, President Nassar of Egypt resigned from his position in the Egyptian Government out of disgrace (he eventually returned after an outpour of support). The Arab Nations, especially Egypt, viewed Israel as the aggressor during the War. Egypt viewed it as their lawful prerogative to militarize and retake the Sinai Peninsula. Not surprisingly, tensions grew and violence increased between Israel and Egypt.

 The War of Attrition

The War of Attrition highlights the tensions between Israel and Egypt in the period between 1967 - 1973. The War of Attrition, known as the “war between the wars” saw frequent periods of shelling between Isreali and Egyptian positions in the Sinai. During this prolonged period of time, Israel suffered 1,400 casualties and Egypt lost 10,000 soldiers. Although suffering many more fatalities than the Israelis, the War of Attrition served as a morale boost for the Egyptians and set the stage for the final major conflict of the Saga. 

The Yom – Kippur War 

 

On October 6th, 1973, Egypt launched a surprise attack against Isreali settlements and defensive positions on the Sinai. This attack, launched on Yom Kippur, the Jewish High Holiday, was devastatingly effective. Egypt was quickly joined by Syria and Jordan, and the Arab nations all made rapid gains into their old territories taken by Israel in 1967. Although they were caught entirely unprepared, the IDF was quickly able to mobilize and, with the delayed assistance of the United States, the Israelis had held the Arabs to a stalemate. 

On October 25th, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. However, although the war resulted in no major border change, the consequences of the Yom - Kippur war were groundbreaking. In Israel, a growing sense of invulnerability quickly faded away. In its place, new notions of peace and stability began to grow. Also, the Isreali Labor party was blamed for the Isreali morale defeat in 1973, giving rise to the election of Menachem Begin and his government.

The Yom - Kippur War also gave Anwar Sadat international and regional prestige. Sadat used this prestige to dispel the Soviets (whom he despised) from Egypt and open a  relationship with the United States. Sadat knew that the United States was a key ally of Israel, and thus believed that the US could play a third - party role to mediate a peace agreement between Egypt and the now humbled Israel. Sadat was right, as just five years later in 1978 President Carter invited both Egypt and Israel to a peace summit at Camp David. 

 

Roles

 

Delegation of the United States

 

 

The Delegation of the United States are the hosts and leaders of the Camp David Summit. As such, the members of the delegation must decide on a strategy to coerce both Egypt and Israel to create peace. Entering the summit, the United States has an alliance with Israel and not Egypt. Under the guidelines of this alliance, any deal which the United States wishes to propose must first be approved by the delegation of Israel. Furthermore, the favorability of the Carter Administration is rapidly decreasing as domestic turmoil and economic woes - caused by rising oil prices and stagflation – increase. The Delegation of the United States believes it is in their best interest to create a quick, sustainable peace.

 

Key Questions:

 

1. What role should we assume during discussions? Passive? Aggressive?

2. Should we draft a proposal? If so, should it favor Israel, Egypt, or neither?

3. Is it appropriate to create multiple peace proposals?

4. Is it appropriate to create separate peace proposals?

5. What components of a peace agreement would be advantageous for American foreign policy? What aspects of a peace agreement would hinder American foreign policy?

6. How should other international communities – specifically, the Palestinians – be represented?

7. How should the United Nations be involved?

8. How should Jerusalem, a city claimed by countless of people neither Egyptian or Israeli, be treated?

9. How can international law be followed? Can it be amended?

 

 

·  President Jimmy Carter:

 

        The Camp David Accords were the creation and project of President Jimmy Carter. On his first day in office, Carter announced that one of his top priorities was peace in the Middle East. A deeply religious man, Carter wished to see peace between Israel and Egypt to secure access and stability to the Holy Land. Carter was also a great friend of President Sadat’s, and Carter believed that peace between Israel and Egypt would bring prosperity for both Carter and Sadat who were both experiencing domestic turmoil and economic depression.

        Many people were pessimistic about Carter’s chances to achieve legitimate peace between Israel and Egypt, believing he should be focusing on domestic issues. Carter strongly believed that the success or failure of the Camp David Accords will almost determine his reelection chances. Carter must decide the strategy and direction of the delegation of the United States.

           

·  Vice President Walter Mondale:

 

Walter Mondale was very weary of Carter’s vision for peace in the Middle East, believing these policies were naïve. In fact, Mondale warned Carter that the Camp David summit had a very little chance of success. Although he was present and active at the summit, Carter preferred to confer with his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Walter Mondale was much more cognizant of domestic issues facing the Carter Administration during the summit, and was advocating for a quicker trip.

 

·  Secretary of State Cyrus Vance:

 

Cyrus Vance was a key player during the Camp David Accords. Vance, a confidant of Carter, was one of the few Americans who viewed the Camp David Summit as an opportunity for peace. However, even Vance’s expectations were quite low. Reportedly, Vance advised Carter: “Our main objective is to break the political impasse at the highest political levels... not to produce a detailed agreement”. Vance viewed the Camp David summit as an opportunity to create a framework for other, lower level officials to craft a detailed peace. Vance valued the virtue of patience and calculation concerning international diplomacy, especially in the Middle East.

 

 

·  National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski

 

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a very brash and imaginative national security advisor. Although Brzezinski and Vance agreed upon the Carter administration’s approach towards the Middle East, Brzezinski had almost the polar opposite attitude than Vance and disagreed with him on Foreign policy elsewhere. Brzezinski was considered the “bold side of Jimmy Carter '' and a famous political innovator, constantly interjecting fresh ideas into ancient problems. If anyone can create peace in the Middle East, it's Zbigniew Brzeziński.

 

·  Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel

 

Samuel Lewis, as acting ambassador to Israel, played a prominent role in crafting the Camp David Accords. Lewis was an expert in the political situation in Israel and the modern dynamics of the Begin administration. Any American – sponsored deal or proposal that would go to the Israelis would have gone through Lewis. If Prime Minister Begin, a hardliner concerning Israel's territory, blocked a road to peace, it would be Lewis’ responsibility to get him back to the table. However, the foremost objective of Lewis was to ensure that an agreement, if any at all, would preserve the precious relationship between the United States and Israel.

 

 

·  Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt

 

Hermann Elits, as acting ambassador to Egypt, played a prominent role in crafting the Camp David Accord. Although not experienced as his counterpart Samuel Lewis, Eilts was also an expert in the everchanging domestic political situation in Egypt. Any American – sponsored deal or proposal that would go to the Egyptians would have gone through Eilts. Unlike Lewis, whose work consisted mostly of shaping the single mindset of Menachem Begin, Eilts was forced to convince an entire Egyptian cabinet hesitant of granting concessions for peace. Furthermore, although not his main priority, Eilts wished to forge, for the first time in modern history, a working relationship between Israel and Egypt.

 

 

-   Defense Secretary Harold Brown

 

Although present at the summit, Defense Secretary Harold Brown didn’t play a massive role in the summit. Brown’s chief priority was to preserve United States geopolitical power in the Middle East and a healthy military relationship with Israel. In Brown’s eyes, peace with Egypt – a Soviet client – could only bolster U.S influence in the Middle East. However, Brown was weary of any agreement that could grant Egypt too much power, which would in turn give the Soviets or fellow Arab states a foothold into Israel.

 

 

 

 

Delegation of Israel

 

        Out of all the delegations, The Delegation of Israel is most hesitant towards peace, as the status quo benefits them. However, Israel is aware that international reputation, an alliance with the United States, and a possible relationship with a leading Arab nation are all at stake at the Camp David Summit. Thus, the delegates of Israel must decide to what extent they are willing to sacrifice land, settlements, and other concessions in order to create the benefits that follow peace with Egypt.

 

Key Questions:

 

1. Is peace worth land and/or settlements? If so, how much? Focus on Sinai.

2. Does Israel have a religious obligation to protect Jerusalem?

3. How important is maintaining an alliance with the United States? Is it worth entering into an unfavorable peace treaty?

4. What does “strength by peace” really mean? Is it a sustainable long term policy?

5. Will peace with Egypt lead to future peace accords with other Arab states?

6. What precise language is important to be incorporated  into the agreement?

 

Prime Minister Menachem Begin

 

 

Menachem Begin, founder of the Jewish militia group “Betar”, was the first member of the Conservative Likud Party to be elected as Prime Minister of Israel. As Prime Minister, Begin adopted a hardline towards granting land for peace. Instead, Begin opted for a “peace through strength” approach. This policy led Begin to claim that the lands taken during the Six – Days War were “defensive positions” and “buffer zones”. Begins stubborn approach, fueled by his days as an Israelis militant and right – wing conservative outcast, pertained to everything: Land, settlements, Palestinian right of return, demilitarization, and even the specific language used in any potential peace treaties. Begin was quite pensive to hearing any peace ideas but his own persistent, passionate conservative stances.

Additionally, unlike Carter or Sadat, Begin’s favorability was high and the domestic situation of Israel was stable. Begin could afford to play hardball at the negotiating table and walk out without a deal. In Begin’s mind, he had nothing to lose by not agreeing to a proposal, with one possible exception: The precious alliance of the Americans. Still, that didn’t change the fact that Carter and Sadat believed they needed the peace agreement; Begin did not. In the eyes of both the Americans and Egyptians, the largest potential threat to creating a peace was  Menachem Begin.

 

-   Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

 

For all intents and purposes, Moshe Dayan was the Israeli Han Solo. Dayan, Foreign Minister in the Begin cabinet, was the legendary innovative Israeli military genius responsible for the IDF’s rapid victory in the Six – Days War. Dayan was the closest confidant of Begin, yet he wasn’t afraid to stand up to him. However, unlike Begin, Dayan views peace as a great opportunity for Israeli security and economic expansion.  Also, personally, Dayan wishes to achieve personal glory for one final time in his career. At the time of the Camp David summit, Dayan was the most popular man in Israel. He used this well-known fact to gain leverage over Begin and his hardline policy. Dayan, a good friend of Carter and the American delegation, is concerned with maintaining a healthy relationship with the United States.

 

-   Ezer Weizmann, Defense Minister

 

Ezer Weizmann grew up in Haifa, a mixed city of both Arab and Jewish influence. Weizerman was the architect of the IDF’s merciless air assault during the Six-Days War. However, after talking with Egyptian diplomats, Weizerman quickly adopted the belief that the Six-Days War was a mistake. Furthermore, at the Camp David Accords Weizerman – due in large part to his cultural upbringing – was the most susceptible to the Egyptian position. Weizerman was also a personal friend of President Sadat, thus making himself a crucial negotiating link between the Isreali delegation and the Egyptians.

 

 

-   Aharon Barak, Attorney General

 

Aharon Barak was a close advisor to Prime Minister Begin and the primary Isreali attorney at the Summit. Barak, a legal genius, was well – versed in international law. Carter admired the intelligence and ingenuity of Barak, and viewed Aharon as a necessary facilitator and supervisor of any agreement passed. Personally, Barak was most concerned with creating an agreement in line with standing United Nations international law. This led Barak to become the point – man on many of the key issues at the Summit, especially the crucial wording of the Accords.

 

-   Major General Avraham Tamir

 

Avraham Tamir, although present at the summit, did not play a massive role. Tamir, a major general in the IDF and personal military advisor to Begin, was chiefly concerned with maintaining Isreali defensive positions and regional stature. Tamir’s role made him inherently against peace,  however he did recognize the potential military opportunity which could amount from and Isreali – Egyptian alliance.

 

 

-   Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States

 

Simcha Dinitz, as ambassador to the United States, was chiefly concerned with maintaining a positive relationship with the US throughout the summit. Since Begin’s hardline views threatened this relationship, Dinitz was forced into a balancing act. Ambassador Dinitz was oftentimes at – odds with Begin, but also had to ensure that a deal with the Egyptians, for the sake of keeping an alliance with the United States, was still on the table. Therefore, Dinitz was often considered the most objective moderate Isreali thinker at the Summit, as he was simultaneously  weighing advocating for an agreement with the Egyptians but also endorsing the “strength by peace” approach of Begin.

 

 

Delegation of Egypt

The Delegation of Egypt is split concerning their perspectives towards the Camp David Summit. The delegation must weigh the importance of Egypt’s relationship with the Arab world with the importance of creating a peace with Israel and its ensuing benefits.

Key Questions:

1. Is creating a peaceful relationship with Israel worth alienating the Arab World”?

2. Similarly, how desperate are we for peace?

3. What are necessary concessions needed to be made by the Isrealis?

4. How important is a relationship with the Americans?

5. Do we have a religious obligation to sue for Jerusalem? Can a peace proceed without the status of Jerusalem to our satisfactioN?

6. Is a peace deal solely with the United States plausible? Is it advantageous?

7. Would our constituents approve of a peace deal with Israel?

 

-   President Anwar al – Sadat

 

Without President Anwar al – Sadat, this briefing paper wouldn’t be getting written. Sadat was a bold, reckless, courageous visionary who was willing to be flexible as long as his goals were being achieved. After assuming the Egyptian president after the death of Nassar, Sadat changed the course of Egyptian policy towards Israel. During a speech on November 7th, 1977, Sadat said: “I am ready to travel to the ends of the earth if this will in any way protect an Egyptian boy, soldier, or officer from being killed or wounded.… Israel will be surprised to hear me say that I am willing to go to their parliament, the Knesset itself, and debate with them.”

Sadat believed that the majority of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs was psychological and that he could make peace not only to the Israelis but also to the Arabs. Then, Sadat asserted there would be prosperity that Egyptians desperately needed but which wars had chronically destroyed. Sadat, as a result of this “noble peace prize attitude”, was a great friend of President Carter. Furthermore, Sadat’s relationship with the United States and willingness to create peace with Israel came at a price, as many members of his cabinet and fellow Arab leaders began to despise Sadat. Unfortunately, on October 6th 1981, Sadat would be killed for his willingness to cooperate with the Americans and Israelis  at Camp David.

 

-   Mohmad Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs

 

Mohamad Ibrahim Kamel was the closest advisor to President Sadat and his minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite being great longtime friends and fellow militants with Sadat, Kamel viewed talking and cooperating with the Israelis  as treasonous and anti – Arabic. Kamel was dogmatic on Arabic unity; the primary priority of Kamel’s foreign policy was to maintain Egypt’s prominence in the Arab League, a position which was gravely threatened by Sadat’s peace initiatives and the Camp David Summit as a whole.

 

 

-   Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

 

Out of Sadat’s cabinet, Boutros Ghali was the most receptive to the Camp David peace process. Ghali was a devout Christian who married a Jew, a peculiar religious archetype for an Sadat administration cabinet member. Boutros Ghali was a key link between the Isreali delegation and the Egyptian delegation, and also a key salesman for the ideas presented by Sadat to the otherwise reluctant Egyptian cabinet. Ghali worked closely to convince Kamel in particular to become receptive to a peace agreement. Ghali was also extremely cognizant of the benefits of an Egyptian relationship with both the United States and Israel.

 

-   Osama el – Baz, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

 

Osama el – Baz was educated at Harvard University and considered the most brilliant legal mind in the Egyptian delegation, almost on par with Aharon Barak. However, Baz was also the most radical and extreme of the Egyptian delegation. As undersecretary of foreign affairs, Baz concurred with Kamal that peace with the Israelis was inherently dangerous for Egypt and would damage their standing in the Arab world. Additionally, Sadat trusted Baz the most out of all his advisors, oftentimes screening proposals by Baz before bringing them before the rest of the delegation. Baz was also admired by President Carter, who viewed him as an expert on international law and Arab culture. In Carter’s view, Baz was the most rational radical of the Egyptian cabinet. By convincing Baz of a peace deal, Carter could convince the entire delegation.

 

 

-   Asraf Ghorbal, Ambassador to the United States

 

Asraf Ghorbel, a prominent international diplomat, was present at the Camp David Summit as the Egyptian ambassador to the United States. Ghorbel’s sole objective was to enhance the relationship between the United States and Egypt, a relationship which had only officially begun five years prior. However, Ghorbal wasn’t sure that peace with Israel was the best way to enhance a relationship with the United States and in Egypt’s best interests. Although not wholly against the idea of a peace agreement, Ghorbal believed the best approach was to forge a separate agreement with the Americans and save face with the Arab league.

 

 

-   Hassan el – Tohamy, personal aide to Sadat

 

Hassan el – Tohamy was the most colorful character present at the Camp David Accords. Tohomay, a former intelligence agent, functioned as Sadat’s personal astrologer, court jester, and spiritual guru. Tohamy was a man of tremendous religious devotion, and frequently curtailed negotiations with religious debates and anecdotes. Tohamy’s chief concern is recapturing Jerusalem for the Arabs, which he views as Egypt’s divine right. Tohamy's presence is an important reminder of the religious ramifications and implications constantly present during the negotiations.

 

Major Areas of Negotiation -- Research these!

 

o   The construction of Isreali settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and West Bank.

o   Legitimacy of the land acquired by Israel during the Six – Days War.

o   The statues of Jerusalem.

o   Palestine and the Palestinian right of return. Note: Palestine is not present at the summit. 

o   Isreali annexation of the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights

o   Egyptian – sponsored terrorism into Isreal

o   Trade and the Suez Canal

o   United Nations Resolution 242

Nota Bene: Understand how/which of these issues are still contested in the Middle East today. 

BIG QUESTION: Could the Camp David Accords have been more effective in treating these issues?

Works Cited

 

Bowen, Jeremy. “1967: Six Days That Changed the Middle East.” BBC, Middle East Editor, 4 June 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461.

Brown, Derek. “1956: Suez and the End of Empire.” The Guardian, Guardian

News and Media, 14 Mar.2001,www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1.

“Camp David Accords Fast Facts.” CNN, Cable News Network, 6 Sept. 2020, www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/world/meast/camp-david-accords-fast-facts/index.html.

Editors, History.com. “The Camp David Accords.” History.com, 14 Nov. 2014, www.history.com/topics/middle-east/camp-david-accords.

Ray Sanchez, “Israel's War for Independence.” CNN, Cable News Network, 13AD, 11:30, www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/08/world/israel-neighbors/.

Network, The Learning. “Nov. 29, 1947 | U.N. Partitions Palestine, Allowing for Creation of Israel.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Nov. 2011, learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/nov-29-1947-united-nations-partitions-palestine-allowing-for-creation-of-israel/.

Rubinstein, Elyakim. “The Players of Camp David.” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 24 Feb. 2019, www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-players-of-camp-david/.

Wright, Lawrence. Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David. Vol. 1, Oneworld, 2015.