clothing procurement report

8/2/2019 Clothing Procurement Report

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REPORT OF THE

REVIEW OF THE POLICY FRAMEWORK

FOR CLOTHING PROCUREMENT

September 2010


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Commonwealth of Australia 2010

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part

may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Commonwealth

available through the Department of Defence. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction

and rights should be addessed to:

DirectorStrategic Communication and Ministerial Services

Defence Materiel Organisation

Russell Ofces, R25A153

Canberra ACT 2600

or by email

[email protected]

This version of the report does not contain certain information that is commercial-in-condence

or is subject to privacy or security considerations.


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REPORT ON THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR CLOTHING PROCUREMENTSUMMARY OF KEY FINdINGS ANd RECOMMENdATIONS:1. After major changes to the Clothing Systems Project Ofce (SPO) management

and business processes following the implementation of the 2006 Harding Reportrecommendations, SPO staff understand their business and work diligently,properly and effectively to do their job.

2. The Ministers decision in February 2010, not to proceed with the RestrictedTender contract option to source the combat uniform fabric from China, was madebecause of uncertainty about three issues the reliability of the tender evaluationprocess, the appropriate interpretation and application of the Priority IndustryCapability (PIC) policy, and the uncertain impact of the option on Australianindustry.

3. The Ministers intervention does not imply necessarily that the wrong decision wasmade originally by the Clothing SPO - rather, there was insufcient evidentiarybasis for it. It is still an open question as to whether the Chinese-sourced fabricwould have been compliant, on schedule and on cost, and therefore best value formoney.

4. There is a need to clarify the policy framework and its application to combatclothing, in order both to inform industry and to assist those ofcials required to

make rigorous and complex procurement decisions based on it.

5. There are no signicant conicts or inconsistencies in the policy frameworkapplying to the procurement of combat clothing and personal equipment. Rather,there are various major principles which need to be considered and reconciled,in terms of their relative importance and priority, in their application to differentprocurements.

6. There is one principal source of ambiguity or uncertainty related to the policyframework namely the Priority Industry Capability and its specic application tocombat clothing and personal equipment.

7. A revised denition of the PICs should be adopted, in the following terms:

PICs are those industry capabilities that confer such a strategic advantageby being available within Australia that their absence would underminesignicantly defence self-reliance and Australian Defence Force operationalcapability.

8. A revised denition of the Combat Clothing and Personal Equipment PIC shouldbe adopted, in the following terms:

This is the capability to undertake further technical development andsubsequent manufacture of clothing and personal equipment, to enhance the

protection and survivability of ADF personnel in combat. It applies particularlyto leadingedge technical developments which Australia is concerned toprotect. It does not require combat clothing and personal equipment to bemanufactured solely or even principally in Australia, and does not apply toclothing or personal equipment worn outside combat.

9. Strategic Policy Division should develop, for consideration by Government, a clearbasis and criteria for assessing the relative priority of the PICs and, therefore, therelative priority of any proposals for government intervention in the market.

10. In terms of the priority between the PICs [both in relation to the capabilities whichconfer the greatest strategic advantage by being available in Australia and inrelation to any additional costs or premiums to be paid for that local capability],the PIC for combat clothing and personal equipment itself does not appear tobe a high priority, compared to some other PICs, and, within the PIC, personalequipment appears to be a higher priority than combat clothing.

11. There are currently no intellectual property, unique technologies or unique industrialcapabilities in the manufacture of the existing fabric for the combat uniform, andthere are no compelling grounds currently under the PIC to limit the manufactureof the existing fabric solely to Australia.

12. In relation to the combat uniform jacket and trousers, the Combat Clothingand Personal Equipment PIC appears to have relevance only to the ongoingdevelopment of the fabric used and the case for the retention within Australiaof that capability rests on the prospects of sufciently signicant technologicalenhancements.

13. Further work should be undertaken, in consultation with DSTO, to assess thepotential for successful further development of the combat clothing and, inparticular, the relative potential and priority for further technical development ofboth the fabric and the combat uniform itself (jacket and trousers) comparedto that for other items worn or carried in combat, such as combat protectiveequipment.

14. Strategic Policy Division should develop, for consideration by Government,advice on those specic countries whose industry capabilities might also supportAustralian defence capability identied in the PICs.

15. Industry Division should undertake further research into the dynamics of theclothing market and industry, particularly its specialised components, and the likelytrends in industry structure, vertical integration and market concentration. This willprovide a better understanding of the relative weight and inuence of Defence inthe market, and the degree of reliance by both fabric and garment manufacturers


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in Australia on Defence as a customer for the viability of their entire business orspecialised parts of it. This will inform future Government consideration of anypossible PIC-based interventions in the market.

16. The Clothing SPO should develop, and maintain, a comprehensive picture of thesourcing of Australian combat clothing and personal equipment, including the rawmaterials, rened materials and nished products.

17. The Clothing SPO, in consultation with Industry Division, should develop a moredetailed understanding of the practices of other countries in relation to the

procurement of combat clothing and personal equipment.

18. An agreed and consistent terminology should be developed for the differentelements of combat clothing, with the combat uniform dened more carefully,in two ways rstly, to distinguish between the combat jacket and trousers andother items worn or carried in combat (such as footwear, headwear, outerwear,protective equipment and personal equipment); and, secondly, to distinguishbetween the uniform worn in combat and the uniform worn outside combat.

19. Army should expedite its work on rening its future uniform requirements,particularly in relation to the appropriate uniform to wear in different functionsand locations and to the development of a new mid-point camouage uniform,to inform the forthcoming Open Tender, and ensure that the requirements for

signature reduction are applied consistently to different items of clothing andpersonal equipment.

20. In conjunction with the Army review of its requirements and the Air Forceinvestigation of a DP uniform for its personnel, the Clothing SPO should investigatethe costs of different uniform options, so that the Army and Air Force decisionsare informed by a full understanding of the resource impact and the potential forresource savings.

21. The Clothing SPO should develop enhanced information on the past performanceof the Textile, Clothing and Footwear (TCF) industry sector in compliance withstandards and quality requirements. The SPO should also investigate furtherthe industry suggestion that there be an accreditation or pre-tender registrationprocess for companies with a proven track record and capacity to meet specic

requirements. This should operate on a panel basis, with companies able toseek and gain a renewable compliance certicate, and thereby avoid inclusion ofextensive documentation on these compliance areas in each tender response theymake. This compliance would be subject to agreed conditions, such as audit andrandom testing by DMO.

22. The broad principles of the DMO Assurance Processes are:

(1) Assurance relates not only to the quality of the product but also to broaderworkforce, social, ethical and environmental responsibilities.

(2) The cost of assurance should be broadly commensurate with the value

of the product and the likelihood and signicance or impact of any

shortcomings in compliance.

(3) The stringency of the assurance processes used should be proportionate tothe assessed risk [likelihood and signicance] of shortcomings in compliance.

(4) There should be cascading, complementary and mutually-supportingresponsibilities for assurance. The rst and principal responsibility forassurance rests with the supplier DMOs assurance processes should

complement and validate those of the supplier. Within DMO, enterprise-wideassurance processes should be complemented by SPO processes.

(5) DMO must either retain the capacity to be a well-informed buyer or customer[the preferred option], with an in-house capability to undertake assuranceactivities; or buy in such independent services from the market.

23. The following are the key elements or parameters of a comprehensive assuranceprocess:

(1) Careful identication and promulgation of the product sought.

(2) Inclusion in the tender requirements of the assurance processes required [bothabout the product and about the company, its manufacturing processes and

its nancial situation]; and the right of DMO to investigate and audit thoseprocesses, and the means by which DMO will exercise that right.

(3) Rigour in the selection of the preferred tenderer.

(4) Careful translation of the tender requirements into the contract documentation including any warranties or guarantees, testing program, or quality plans.

(5) Appropriate accreditation, registration and certication of suppliers, withdomestic and international bodies and standards.

(6) Effective Quality Assurance (QA) and audit processes, both by the companyand by DMO [or its agent], involving the testing of the product, themanufacturing facilities and the company itself.

(7) Careful contract management, to ensure maintenance of performance tospecication and within tolerances and ongoing compliance with relevantcontract requirements and standards.

(8) Maintenance of records of supplier performance, including on assurance andquality management.

24. DMO General Manager Commercial should review the policy and advice onintellectual property contained within the Defence Procurement Policy Manual


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(DPPM), including the relevant clauses in the tender and contract documentation,to ensure that they are sufciently clear and rigorous to protect Defences position.

25. Further advice should be sought, from technical experts, on the technical andpractical feasibility of formally qualifying the general export control on signaturesuppression. Experts should advise whether it is possible to identify a certaintechnical level of signature suppression in a uniform fabric above which exportshould be controlled and below which export would be allowed.

26. Subject to that technical advice, Defence, through the Defence Exports Control

Ofce, should seek international support for an amendment to the control onsignature suppression equipment and material.

27. Within broader advice provided by the Defence Exports Control Ofce, DMOshould provide clear and helpful advice to companies on export control issues,including a general warning about export permits in any tender, contract or otherdocumentation which involves products which are or might be subject to the DSGL.

This should apply particularly to any materiel or other GFM provided to companies.

28. The Clothing SPO, in consultation with Procurement and Contracting Branch,should identify additional ways to inform industry about the major principles andprocesses followed in making procurement decisions, including greater detail onthe processes and criteria to be used in selecting a preferred tenderer; and to

provide more detailed de-briengs to unsuccessful tenderers.29. The forthcoming Open Tender for the supply of disruptive pattern uniforms

should seek supply options unconstrained by country of manufacture of fabricor garment. But it should also require each tenderer to submit an option for themanufacture of both the fabric and the garment in Australia, to allow the evaluationof the tender responses to assess fully the Australian industry and strategicimplications of the options over the full life of the contract. The tender evaluationwill be informed by:

(1) the dynamics and state of the TCF industry

(2) any development work, and associated Intellectual Property (IP) or technology,on the combat uniform

(3) the relative costs of different fabric and garment options

(4) the detailed uniform requirements of the three Services

(5) the nature and volume of work for, and its potential impact on the viability of,industry

(6) policy advice on the relative priority of the PICs, competing proposals forintervention in the market and Strategic Reform Program (SRP) savingsproposals.

30. DMO should begin a broad campaign to inform the media and the publicabout the overall approach to procurement of combat clothing and personalequipment, with its relative priority within the PIC program; the numerous sourcesfor raw materials, rened materials and nished products; relevant internationalcomparisons; and the importance of value for money considerations in deliveringthe most effective defence force possible within a constrained budget. Theobjective of that campaign is to ensure that future decisions on the sourcing ofcombat clothing and personal equipment can be made, and sustained, in a lesspolitically-charged environment.

31. Based on the lessons learned from the tender evaluation process for theRestricted Disruptive Pattern Combat Uniform Tender, DMO [Procurement andContracting Branch] should develop additional advice on the assessment of riskand value for money over the whole life of the contract for inclusion in the DefenceProcurement and Policy Manual.


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INTROdUCTIONTASKING:1. On 29 January 2010, Mr David Mortimer advised Dr Stephen Gumley, CEO DMO,

of concerns about DMO and clothing procurement raised with him by an industryrepresentative. Dr Gumley decided that further investigation was required of theissues raised with him. He met with Mr Frank Lewincamp on 2 February 2010 todiscuss the proposed review, and formally commissioned it on 12 February.

2. On Wednesday, 10 February, Minister Combet decided to rule out an option,proposed by Australian Defence Apparel (ADA) in its successful bid for the RestrictedDisruptive Pattern Camouage Uniform (DPCU) Tender, for the use for the combatuniform of a fabric manufactured in China. That decision was made because ofuncertainty about three issues the reliability of the tender evaluation process, theappropriate interpretation and application of the Priority Industry Capability (PIC)policy, and the potential and uncertain impact of the option on Australian industry.

3. The initial task for the Review, commissioned in February, was to analyse theextant Commonwealth policy framework relevant to DMO procurement of combatclothing, to determine whether there is any overlap, conict or ambiguity within thatpolicy framework and, if so, to provide advice on possible actions and strategies toresolve those issues. A draft report was completed in early May 2010.

4. In early June, the Review was tasked to address additional terms of referencerelating to the processes and procedures that DMO could use to gain assuranceabout the supply of textiles, clothing and footwear from overseas sources. Itwas also tasked to investigate further some of the matters raised in the rst draftreport. The terms of reference for the Review are at Attachment A.

The Review did not address issues associated with ADF personnels

assessment of, or satisfaction with, the clothing and personal equipment

procured by the DMO. These issues are the subject of a separate review

being conducted by Mr Jeff Whalan.

5. This Report presents the ndings of both parts of the Review.

CONdUCT OF THE REvIEW

6. The Review involved two key elements:

interviews with Minister Combet and his staff, the Chief of Army (as theprincipal user or customer), senior DMO personnel, Land Systems Divisionand Clothing Systems Program Ofce (SPO) personnel, DSTO personnel,industry and union representatives, and staff of the Department of IndustryInnovation Science and Research; and

an analysis of relevant documents, relating to strategic and defence policy,defence industry policy, procurement policy and clothing procurement.

Full details on those interviewed and the documents analysed are provided atAttachment B. A summary of public statements made in February by Ministersand ofcials about the Restricted DPCU Tender is at Attachment C.

7. The analysis was conducted over a relatively short period of time, with relativelylimited consultation. Key issues have been followed up, to check or reconcileconicting views and accounts of situations, but that has not been done for allissues. Areas in which further information should be sought or further examinationis warranted, and areas of conicting views, have been identied in this Report.

BACKGROUNd

The Australian Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Industry

8. That part of the Textiles, Clothing and Footwear (TCF) sector engaged in thesupply of clothing and personal equipment to Defence is relatively small. A limitednumber of companies manufacture the goods, using a mixture of local andoverseas sites. Only one company currently manufactures the DPCU fabric for thecombat uniform (jacket and trousers) and does so in Australia. Two companies,currently manufacture the combat uniform garments (jacket and trousers) inAustralia, using fabric supplied by the Australian company. Other companies makea DPC material for equipment such as webbing, and a non-signature reductionDPC fabric for outerwear.

9. The company representatives themselves describe an industry sector in whichthere is a deal of rivalry, suspicion and tension.

The TCF industry in Australia is shrinking rapidly. The Clothing SPO advisedthat employment levels in the industry have fallen 50 per cent in the past 10years, with corresponding falls in investment. Substantial levels of assistanceare being provided by Government, including tariffs and funding for innovationand restructuring.

10. There is limited reliable information available about the dynamics of the specialisedclothing market, and, in particular, the extent to which both fabric and garmentmanufacturers in Australia are reliant on Defence as a customer for the viabilityof their entire business or specialised parts of it. This is a critical issue in anyconsideration of government intervention under the Priority Industry Capabilities(PICs). The companies themselves present a mixed and at times confusing story.

11. It is not sufciently clear at present how different the production demands are forDefence uniforms compared to those required by other services and companies for example, the police, re services and paramedics, or combat uniforms forother countries - and the extent to which production for Defence, especially ofthe high technology fabric, involves signicantly different manufacturing facilities


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or equipment. Nor is it clear what volume of business is required to maintain thetechnological and manufacturing capabilities, or what the relevant lead time andstart-up times would be if the local capability closed temporarily.

Garment manufacturers in Australia are not dependent solely on Defenceorders in order to receive the volume of business required to maintain acommercially viable capability to make close tolerance uniforms there ismuch other work in specialised uniforms (for example, re and emergencyservices and police forces). However, specic garment manufacturing facilities are currently dependent

heavily on Defence orders. Several companies expressed concern about the future viaibility of specic

facilities without ongoing Defence work.

High technology fabric manufacture for Defence appears to be qualitativelydifferent to the manufacture of fabrics with other properties (even, forexample, re retardancy). Therefore, the maintenance of a commercially viablespecialised capability for high technology fabric manufacture appears to behighly dependent (perhaps solely) on the volume and assurance of Defencebusiness.

12. The Review was informed of pressures for vertical integration and marketconcentration within this industry sector. Existing companies are investigating an

expansion into other elements of clothing manufacture (for example, from garmentmanufacture into specialised fabric manufacture and vice versa). If pursuedsuccessfully, such moves would have signicant implications for competition withinthe Australian industry, and the ongoing viability of particular local facilities.

13. A specic concern in relation to combat clothing is the potential market power ofa sector-dominating or monopoly supplier, particularly in high technology fabricmanufacture, and the consequent lack of market leverage over that supplier.Greater competition is more likely in garment manufacture, where the skill set isnot so specialised, and lead times for development or expansion of the capabilityare less.

14. Further research into the local industry and market is, therefore, a high priority.

Industry Division should undertake research into the dynamics of the clothingmarket and industry, particularly its specialised components and the likely trends inindustry structure, vertical integration and market concentration, in order to gain abetter understanding of the relative weight and inuence of Defence in the market,and the degree of reliance by both fabric and garment manufacturers in Australiaon Defence as a customer for the viability of their entire business or specialisedparts of it. This will inform any subsequent judgments on possible PIC-basedinterventions in the market.

Current Sourcing of Combat Clothing and Personal Equipment

15. The current sourcing of combat clothing and personal equipment is a complexmixture of local and overseas supply and manufacture of raw materials, renedmaterials and nished products.

In some cases, there is overseas supply of fabric and local garment manufacture.

In other cases, there is local supply of fabric and overseas manufacture of thegarment.

Some items are sourced entirely overseas. But all fabric for the DPCU, the Disruptive Pattern Desert Uniform (DPDU) and

Disruptive Pattern Naval Uniform (DPNU) is currently sourced from Australia.

16. Additional advice was obtained from the Clothing SPO about the currentsourcing of combat clothing and personal equipment. There is, through theDMO, a globalised supply chain for ADF clothing. All combat uniform fabric ismanufactured in Australia, while some of the garments (but not the DPCU jacketand trousers) are manufactured overseas, in China, Laos, Vietnam, the UK andItaly. A range of combat protective equipment is manufactured overseas, in Israel,the US, Germany, Vietnam, China and Latin America. Personal eld equipment issourced from China, the US, the UK, Italy and Israel.

In this regard, Australia is little different to most other countries. There is alarge, dynamic and highly competitive global supply chain for military clothingand personal equipment.

17. Further work should be undertaken by the Clothing SPO to develop, and maintain,a comprehensive picture of the sourcing of combat clothing and personalequipment, including the raw materials, rened materials and nished products.

International Comparisons

18. It has been difcult to get accurate information on the practice of other countriessuch as the US, UK and Canada in relation to the procurement of combatclothing. Conicting reports were presented to the Review. Such information isrelevant to the public discussion of sourcing decisions made in Australia.

For example, during the Senate Estimates hearing of 10 February 2010,Senator Johnston stated that I wouldnt have thought any one of our allieswould have entrusted that specication and knowledge [of Near Infra-Redsignature management] to a foreign manufacturer.

19. The following limited information has been provided to the Review:

A press report indicates that the UK is developing a new multi-terrain pattern(MTP) camouage uniform, to replace both the desert camouage and the


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traditional temperate or woodland camouage worn by troops stationed inEurope (Telegraph, 20 December 2009). The uniform is designed for all typesof terrain, and was to be used in Afghanistan from March 2010. The Ministryof Defence paid a US company an undisclosed sum for the new design, andhas secured intellectual property rights over the MTP camouage to preventothers from using it without permission. The report states that the kit is to beproduced by a Northern Irish company but will be made in China. Australianindustry representatives advise that the UK has sourced the fabric for itsuniform for some years from Eastern Europe and China.

The Canadian camouage fabric and combat garments are manufactured inCanada, which is reported to have a competitive domestic textile industry.

Industry Division reported that the French, German and Italian uniforms areeach manufactured locally at a very high cost premium.

20. Further work should be undertaken by the Clothing SPO, in consultation withIndustry Division, to develop a more detailed understanding of the practices ofother countries in relation to the procurement of combat clothing.

Clothing SPO

21. The Clothing SPO is predominantly concerned with the sustainment function,rather than acquisition projects. It manages approximately 20,000 lines of clothing,

headwear, footwear and accoutrements. Each year, approximately 1,800 purchaseorders are raised, there are around one million demands for clothing in the supplychain, and around 7 million items are issued.

22. The Clothing SPO has been the subject of numerous reviews and audits inrecent years, many arising from specic complaints from clothing and equipmentsuppliers about partiality or bias in procurement decisions or the lack of adherenceto the required procurement processes. In 2006, a report of a major review,The Report of the ADF Clothing Review [Harding Report], made numerousrecommendations to address governance, management, business process andcultural issues within the then Clothing Group within the Soldier Support SPO.

23. The recommendations of the Harding Report were accepted. New structuralarrangements were implemented, with Clothing established as a discrete SPO,

and management oversight strengthened. The then Director, COL Simon Welsh,revamped the SPO business model and introduced new business processes. This

gave greater direction and clarity to the overall procurement strategy and speciccontracting. Signicant effort was also expended on staff training, and enhancinginternal supervisory and clearance processes. In the past two years, the SPO hassought to establish a greater number of long term standing offers and contracts,in order to reduce the workload associated with procurement action. In FY 2009-

09, 15 such contracts and standing offers were established, and in FY 2009-10 afurther 19 were established.

24. In parallel, the Procurement and Contracting Branch, under the SpecialCounsel DMO, updated the Defence Procurement Policy Manual [DPPM], andstrengthened the review, oversight and promulgation of changes in procurementpolicies arising from new legislation or government decisions. DepartmentalProcurement Policy Instructions (DPPIs) are designed to provide timely adviceof changes to policy or legislation. A new DMO-wide process guide, DefenceMaterial Instruction (Procurement), was developed in 2009, and replaced aninternal process within Land Systems Division of promulgating Standard OperatingProcedures (SOPs).

25. These changes have had a dramatic effect on the Clothing SPO. Both LandSystems and Clothing SPO managers are condent (a condence that appearsto be soundly based) that there is a clear policy framework; updated guidanceis received in a timely manner; there are sound internal business arrangements,based on probity and proper processes, clearly understood by staff; and that thereare appropriate processes, based on levels of risk and complexity, for clearance ofprocurement decisions by senior, experienced practitioners. The overall impressionis of a SPO staff who understand their business and work diligently, properly andeffectively to do their job.

Notwithstanding this, the workload pressures, public scrutiny, allegationsand inquiries and reviews over recent years continue to challenge the morale

and focus of the SPO, and to threaten the attraction and retention of staff.SPO management and staff have faced an onerous burden in investigatingcomplaints and assisting inquiries, in addition to their demanding procurementwork.

26. In relation to the Restricted DPCU Tender, the Clothing SPO did apply the extantpolicy framework properly. In relation to the interpretation of the Priority IndustryCapabilities (PICs) and the issue of overseas supply of clothing, it relied on advicefrom Industry Division of DMO.

27. However, there are some aspects of the Restricted DPCU Tender evaluationprocess that cause concern. After the contract was signed, reservations wereexpressed by two companies about the value for money outcome and thetreatment of risk. Whilst the Review did not examine the tender evaluation process

or documentation, it did not receive a fully satisfactory explanation from theSPO of the judgments made on risk and value for money. There appeared to beuncertainty about dealing with the risk of supply from an unproven manufacturer,and at what point in the tender or contracting process assurance about themanagement of that risk needed to be obtained. Specically:

The SPO awarded the contract on value for money across the whole contract,including both the initial phase and the follow-on option which proposed tosource the fabric from China;


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But the SPO did this without sufcient evidence of the technical compliance orassurance of supply of that follow-on option;

There was not, therefore, a fully comprehensive, whole-of-contract review ofrisk and value for money;

This does not imply necessarily that the wrong decision was made rather,that there was insufcient evidentiary basis for it;

It is still an open question as to whether the Chinese-sourced fabric wouldhave been compliant, on schedule and on cost, and therefore best value formoney.

Further details on the tender process are at Attachment D.

28. There has been some public comment [for example, in the media and duringthe Estimates hearings of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade LegislationCommittee in February and June, 2010] about the supposed inferior qualityof any fabric sourced from China. In that context, the Review must note thatChinese suppliers are able to meet successfully the combat uniform requirements,

including signature reduction, of countries such as the United Kingdom. It shouldnot be assumed that an overseas-sourced product is necessarily inferior to oneproduced in Australia. In addition, it should not be concluded that the supplierassociated with this contract would not have been able to provide a fully compliantproduct for the ADF.

The Chinese supplier provided two fabric swatches, in January and February2010, before its development work ceased. Neither met the technicalspecication, although the second was closer to it with progress being made.

It would be useful for the Clothing SPO to seek further information aboutthe capability of specic Chinese suppliers to produce a fully compliant hightechnology fabric, such as that being procured by the UK.

29. Based on the lessons learned from the tender evaluation process for theRestricted DPCU Tender, DMO [Procurement and Contracting Branch] shoulddevelop additional advice on the assessment of risk and value for money over thewhole life of the contract for inclusion in the DPPM.


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dISCUSSIONCOMMONWEALTH POLICY FRAMEWORK RELEvANT TO CLOTHING

PROCUREMENT30. There are various elements of the legislative and policy framework within which

the Clothing SPO operates. Most directly, they are the relevant Defence strategicand industry policies and overall government procurement policy. But there isalso whole-of-government policy on industry, trade, employment and workplacerelations that is relevant to government procurement.

31. The Review found no major conicts or inconsistencies in the policy frameworkapplying to the procurement of combat clothing and personal equipment. Rather,there are various major principles which need to be considered and reconciled,in terms of their relative importance and priority, in their application to differentprocurements.

32. The principal or primary policy document for all Defence ofcials involved in theprocurement process is the DPPM. It seeks to provide up to date guidanceon all relevant policy across government. The DPPM states clearly [p3] thatit incorporates mandatory procurement policy drawn from the higher levelCommonwealth or Defence procurement guidance, in particular the CPGs[Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines]. These requirements are mandatory for

all Defence ofcials. Figure 1 [page 1.1.4] outlines the broader sources of procurement policy from

the wider legislative and policy environment including policies which governAustralian Public Service actions.

Chapter 3.10 deals with interacting policies that is, those broadergovernment policies which also apply to procurement. They include nancialmanagement, accountability, legal, outsourcing, international, industrialrelations, privacy, security and social policy considerations.

Chapter 3.12 deals with industry development and Australian IndustryCapability considerations.

Chapter 3.14 deals with legislation affecting procurement, including consumer

protection, superannuation, workers compensation, taxation, privacy, anti-discrimination, occupational health and safety, and environmental legislation.

Chapter 5.6 provides detailed advice on the evaluation of tenders, includingassessing risk, determining value for money and evaluating whole of life costs.

33. Some developments and changes in broader government policy wereforeshadowed in the Governments Procurement Statement in July 2009. As theseare formalised in policy or enacted in legislation, they will need to be adopted andimplemented by DMO for example, the Fair Work Principles whose associated

Act took effect from 1 January 2010 [noting that these did not apply to theRestricted DPCU Tender, whose contract was signed in December 2009]. ThePrinciples build on the existing provisions of the CPGs, with the following majorrelevant provisions:

Value for money is the core principle underpinning government procurement,with the Government committed to a fair, cooperative and productive workplace

Suppliers must comply with the Principles [particularly those relating to theworkplace, workplace relations, workers compensation, and OH&S] andprovide information in their tender responses as to how they do so, and mustrequire subcontractors to comply with the Principles as far as practicable

Overseas suppliers must comply with all applicable laws in jurisdictions inwhich they are based

Clothing and footwear manufacturers which have a commercial presence inAustralia must be accredited with the Homeworkers Code of Practice, or beseeking accreditation prior to signing a contract.

34. Procurement and Contracting Branch released DPPI 1/2010 on 19 February, toadvise DMO personnel of these requirements and to provide updated tender and

contract templates. These details were incorporated into the DPPM on 1 April. Arevised DPPI, 11/2010 dated 1 July 2010, provided revised guidance.

35. The TCF Union of Australia believes both that the Government is committed morermly to support for the local TCF industry and that DMO is not fully compliant withcurrent policy requirements.

The union argues that Labor Government ministers are committed tomaximising participation of Australian TCF suppliers, to extending the value-for-money consideration to include wider economic impact [for example,unemployment benets and other social welfare costs arising from workerslosing their jobs], and to applying ILO workforce principles and broader ethicalconsiderations to all government procurement.

However, Defence and all other government agencies must operate on thebasis of existing government policy, rather than intentions or aspirationsthat have not yet been translated into policy. While there were world-wide trends towards greater concern about broader social, ethical andenvironmental issues associated with global supply chains which maylead in future to policy and legislative change, Defence will continue toimplement endorsed or enacted government policy.

The union also stated that Defence is not yet implementing fully therequirements of the Fair Work Principles and its associated industrial awards,


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citing the requirements to procure only from accredited suppliers, and the levelof assurance Defence was seeking about the nancial viability of suppliers forthe whole life of contracts [for example, in relation to the capacity of suppliersto meet workers entitlements and award conditions, and to continue to do sothroughout the life of the contract]. The Clothing SPO acknowledges that it is still developing processes and

procedures to undertake this additional scrutiny of tendering companies and has not [due to workload pressure and lack of resources] examinedall existing contracted suppliers to ensure they are meeting the expanded

workforce obligations introduced on 1 January 2010. On the other hand, the Review was not given any evidence to indicate that

existing contracted suppliers are not meeting these obligations.

36. The Department of Industry, Innovation, Science and Research advised theReview that a number of initiatives and proposals are being considered, throughinnovation programs, projects and reviews [such as an ethical quality mark], butthat these are yet to be considered by government. DIISR is currently providingnancial support to the TCF industry through structural adjustment and innovationgrants.

37. Clothing SPO staff report that there are some minor areas in which the CPGs andthe DPPM impose different requirements for example, in relation to the number

of delegates that need to sign off on procurement decisions. But the SPO staffindicate that these differences relate to process only, and are condent that theydo not affect decisions or outcomes.

It is recommended that these minor differences be examined, to determinewhether the DPPM processes need to remain different from the CPGprocesses.

38. The only other area identied by this Review for further guidance and discussionin the DPPM is that of PICs, which are not currently covered in the Manual. Theyare described briey in a separate Australian Industry Capability manual. It isrecommended that Procurement and Contracting Branch, in consultation withIndustry Division and drawing on the Defence White Paper, promulgate advice onthe denition and application of Priority Industry Capabilities, for inclusion in the

DPPM.

39. There is one major source of ambiguity or uncertainty relate to the policyframework, identied by all parties - that is the PICs and their specic applicationto combat clothing and personal equipment.

The Clothing SPO advised that, consequently, the applicability of the PICs tospecic procurements was a judgment exercised by the Program Managerlevel within the SPO, with the advice of DMO Industry Division.

40. That uncertainty was the major reason for the Ministers decision to rule out thecontract extension option of acquiring fabric from a Chinese supplier. Pending theoutcomes of this Review and further clarication of the PIC, the Clothing SPO thenceased action on both nalising related tenders and negotiations with preferredtenderers for already released tenders.

Since the commencement of the Review, the Clothing SPO has sought toremove some of the uncertainty for industry and ensure ongoing workload,by notifying ADA and Pacic Brands [CTE] that it will direct source the DPCUequally from the two companies for the 24 months following the current 12month Restricted Tender contract period, with the fabric sourced from thefabric supplier in Australia. The contracts were signed on 26 May 2010.

During this time, the Clothing SPO intends to release an Open Tender for thefurther supply of disruptive pattern uniforms and award the contract.

41. Industry representatives are divided about the clarity and consistency of the policyframework, with contention about the interpretation of the PIC and the denition ofcombat clothing.

Analysis of the PIC

42. The concept of PICs was introduced in the Defence and Industry Policy Statement2007, and taken up in Defending Australia in the Asia Pacic Century: Force 2030

[Defence White Paper 2009], 2009. Further advice on the PICs was providedin a Fact Sheet published in July 2009. The recent Defence Industry PolicyStatement [Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smaller and More AgileDefence Industry Base], released in July 2010, did not elaborate further on the PICconcept, and left the denitions of PICs in general and the Combat Uniform andPersonal Equipment PIC unchanged.

43. The general aim of the PICs is clear to ensure that certain strategically importantindustry capabilities continue to be available in Australia. PICs are ... thosecapabilities that confer an essential strategic advantage by being available from

within Australia and which, if not available, would signicantly undermine defence

self reliance and Australian Defence Force (ADF) operational capability [FactSheet, July 2009].

The Fact Sheet states that the National Security Committee of Cabinet willmake decisions about whether and how to provide support to PICs based ona robust business case. Support will only be provided in cases where marketfailure would be so detrimental to Australias strategic interests as to justifyintervention.

This of course allows the possibility of a judgment that market failure would notbe so detrimental to Australias strategic interests, and that some underminingof defence self-reliance would be acceptable - and hence that overseas


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supply is acceptable (even if local supply is preferred or there is some strategicadvantage from the availability of the industry capability in Australia). Such a possibility would call into question the word essential in the

denition. Is it sensible to suggest that an essential strategic advantage notbe maintained because the market failure would not be so detrimental?

That would indicate that the strategic advantage is not essential. If the strategic advantage was truly essential, the government would

have to intervene. The robust business case would relate only to how tointervene, not whether.

This issue would be claried, at least in part, by simply removing the wordessential from the denition of the PIC. The denition might be recast in thefollowing terms: PICs are those industry capabilities that confer such a strategic

advantage by being available within Australia that their absence wouldundermine signicantly defence self-reliance and Australian Defence Forceoperational capability.

44. The Combat Clothing and Personal Equipment PIC states: This capability relatesto the ability to undertake ongoing development of the combat uniform, especiallymulti-spectral and other signature reducing characteristics, and enhancements topersonal survivability (such as ballistic, blast and ash protection). It does not includenon-combat clothing nor imply that local manufacturing is always necessary. This

denition contains uncertainties. While some scope for interpretation, judgment orexibility is clearly desirable, to allow responsiveness to changing circumstances,there is also merit in providing some clearer guidance on the meaning andinterpretation of the PIC, in order to assist both industry and those ofcials requiredto make rigorous and complex procurement decisions based on it.

45. The PIC explicitly relates to the ongoing development of the combat uniform, notto the production of the current combat uniform. This implies that the sole concernis to retain in Australia an industry capability, either independently or in concertwith DSTO and other research and development bodies, to test, produce andcommercialise new technology related to the combat uniform, and, if necessary, toprotect such technology through local manufacture.

46. There are a number of issues with the Combat Clothing and Personal EquipmentPIC. Firstly, there is ambiguity in the term combat uniform.

What is implied or intended by the use of the term combat clothing inthe title of the PIC, compared to the term combat uniform used in thedescription of the PIC?

On some interpretations, the combat uniform is the current Australiancamouage or Disruptive Pattern uniform the DPCU. On others, it includesadditional items worn with the jacket and trousers, such as headwear,footwear and webbing.

It would be helpful to develop an agreed and consistent terminology for thedifferent elements of the combat clothing the jacket and trousers; otheritems worn as part of the uniform in combat, such as footwear, headwear,webbing and protective equipment; outerwear for specic purposes; and otherpersonal equipment.

At its simplest, the term should mean the uniform worn in combat - and thatappears to be the most appropriate and useful denition. In that case, theterm does not apply to a uniform worn in ofces or barracks, in much trainingor in other non-combat circumstances, even if it is very similar to the uniform

worn in combat.

47. Secondly, the manufacture and supply of the combat clothing and personalequipment involves several stages the sourcing of raw materials, themanufacture of the fabric or rened materials, and the manufacture of the garmentor nal product - and the PIC currently provides little guidance on those stages.

Raw materials are predominantly sourced overseas. In general, these arewidely available and generic, so assurance of supply is not an issue. In somespecic cases (for example, for ballistic protection in protective equipment),ingredients or raw materials may be scarce, especially in major conicts, andsteps would need to be taken to assure supply for manufacturers of Australiangarments and equipment.

In relation to the combat jacket and trousers, the PIC does not seem to applyto the manufacture of the garment except perhaps in circumstances inwhich Australia is seeking to protect some unique technology in or applied tothe fabric, or some aspect of the design of the garment (although it is difcultto see how garment design would have such advantage that it required strongprotection). There may be other strategic reasons, related to the assurance of supply

and short-term responsiveness to changing demands, for maintaining atleast some garment manufacturing capability within Australia but that isnot currently envisaged or encompassed by the PIC statement.

Assurance of supply of garments might also be met by other means,including stockholding and using a number of manufacturers.

Industry representatives concede that there is nothing about garmentmanufacture that qualies as a PIC. But they argue that some Australiangarment manufacturing capability should be retained for assurance ofsupply and responsiveness to changing operational demands.

The PIC, in relation to the combat jacket and trousers, appears to haverelevance then only to the ongoing development of the fabric used thetechnology and industrial capability to apply dyes and chemicals to the fabricto give it specic properties such as visual reduction and signature reduction(NIR, thermal).


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There are currentlyno intellectual property, unique technologies or uniqueindustrial capabilities in the manufacture of the existing fabric for theDPCU. Given the widespread availability of current NIR technology aroundthe world, there is not a compelling argument on those grounds to limitmanufacture of that fabric to Australia.

There may however be an argument for some local manufacturingcapability to assist with further development, testing andcommercialisation. Some TCF companies argue that a local manufacturing capability

is essential to undertaking local research and development. Otherssuggest that the R&D could be undertaken offshore, in countries suchas NZ, the UK or the US.

If a local capability is needed for this purpose, the critical issue is howmuch capability.

The argument then for the retention within Australia of the capabilityrepresented by fabric manufacture rests on the prospects of sufcientlysignicant technological enhancements (see section below).

48. The description of the Combat Clothing and Personal Equipment PIC should berevised. The following draft is suggested:

This is the capability to undertake further technical development and

subsequent manufacture of clothing and personal equipment, to enhance theprotection and survivability of ADF personnel in combat. It applies particularlyto leadingedge technical developments which Australia is concerned toprotect. It does not require combat clothing and personal equipment to bemanufactured solely or even principally in Australia, and does not apply toclothing or personal equipment worn outside combat.

49. More broadly, there is an issue of priority between the PICs both in relation tothe capabilities which confer the greatest strategic advantage by being availablein Australia and in relation to any additional costs or premiums to be paid for thatlocal capability.

This becomes particularly relevant in the context of the affordability of theDefence Capability Plan (DCP) and the achievement of the Strategic Reform

Program (SRP).

Part of the SRP identied savings for DMO was to be achieved in clothingprocurement. The Audit of the Defence Budget identied savings and productivity gains

of $13-19m per annum in clothing procurement through the consolidationof suppliers, greater standardisation of uniforms, and moving to lower costsuppliers [p215]. It goes on to state that two of the biggest opportunities forsavings are the use of global sourcing and consolidating the local supplier

base [p216]. It says that these are examples of a potential saving whereDefence personnel believe they are constrained by Government policy ordirection, and do not feel able to fully pursue the opportunities [p217].

The intent of these ndings is clear reduce local sourcing, consolidatelocal suppliers, and increase global sourcing.

These ndings, and the specic means of achieving the savings in the supplyof ADF clothing, were endorsed by Government.

Anticipated savings of approximately $1.5m will now not be made from the

Restricted DPCU Tender contract. Both CEO DMO and the Chief of Army are concerned that, if identied savings

cannot be made in clothing procurement, they will be required to nd offsettingsavings elsewhere, possibly from higher priority capability requirements.

50. There is currently no advice available, to either DMO or industry, on therelative priority between the PICs. Strategic Policy Division should develop, forconsideration by Government, a clear basis and criteria for assessing the relativepriority of the PICs, and, therefore, the relative priority of proposals for anygovernment intervention in the market.

An appropriate starting point for those criteria is the discussion of the PICs inthe 2009 Defence White Paper [paragraphs 16.22-23].

The annual Planning Guidance provided by Defence to Government shouldalso include judgments on what should, and should not, be included as a PIC.

51. On the grounds of both those capabilities which confer the greatest strategicadvantage by being available in Australia and the additional costs or premiumsto be paid for that local capability, the PIC for combat clothing and personalequipment itself does not appear to be a high priority, compared to some otherPICs - and, within the PIC, personal equipment appears to be a higher prioritythan combat clothing.

52. PIC policy does not currently address whether there are other countries whosesupply of raw materials, fabric or garments and further development of thecombat clothing would not be seen as contrary to Australias strategic interests

or which might be seen as equivalent to local supply. This applies particularly toNew Zealand, but close allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom andCanada might be included.

Industry representatives suggested strongly that research and testing couldbe coordinated by a prime with extensive knowledge of the textile industry,working with DSTO but using an overseas fabric manufacturer. They arecondent that appropriate protections could be given to the technology andassociated intellectual property.


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Industry representatives advise that they could work, for example, with a UKfabric supplier and NZ garment manufacturer on further technical developmentof the uniform.

The major issues would then be an assurance of the ready availability of sucha capability, and which specic countries might be acceptable.

It is unlikely, however, that the Australian Government would wish to investin the development of technology, through DSTO, which would then becommercialised in an overseas country. The Government would likely wish to

ensure that the benets of its investment were reaped in Australia.53. Strategic Policy Division should develop, for consideration by Government

in the ongoing renement of defence industry policy and the PICs and in

accordance with broader trade policy, advice about those specic countries

whose industry capabilities might also support Australian defence capability

identied in the PICs.

54. There is opportunity to clarify and rene the description of the PICs in the annualreview of PICs as part of Defence Planning Guidance [a process set out in theDefence White Paper 2009, para 16.25]. Following Government consideration andendorsement of the Defence Planning Guidance, more detailed guidance on thePICs should be developed and distributed for procurement staff.

PROSPECTS OF FURTHER dEvELOPMENT OF THE COMBAT UNIFORM55. It is not possible at this stage to make an accurate assessment of the possibilities

for further development of the combat uniform, over what timeframe and at whatresearch cost. It is not possible, therefore, to provide denitive advice on therelative priority, feasibility and likelihood of success of further development work ondifferent aspects of combat clothing and personal equipment.

The Review assesses that, prima facie, there are better prospects ofproportionately greater development success in areas such as combatprotective equipment [for example, in ballistic protection], rather than in simplythe fabric of the jacket and trousers of the uniform.

DSTO is working with industry and international partners on the protective

capabilities of fabrics, materials, and equipment, including ceramics andtextile-based soft armour. It retains strong interest in the ongoing technicaldevelopment of combat clothing and equipment, a major component of whichinvolves working with the textile industry.

56. It is recommended that DMO and Strategic Policy Division, in consultation withDSTO, assess the potential for successful further development of combat clothing and, in particular, the relative potential and priority for further technical developmentof both the fabric and the combat uniform itself (jacket and trousers), compared tothat for items worn or carried in combat, such as combat protective equipment.

ARMY CLOTHING REqUIREMENTS57. The Chief of Army stated that he simply wants the best gear at the best price.

There are no emotional or other issues about the country of supply of the combatuniform, of either the fabric or the garments. He is very condent that that is not,and would not be, an issue amongst Army personnel. Much combat clothing andpersonal equipment is already sourced from overseas. The principal concern is toget the right gear for the task at the best price.

58. LTGEN Gillespie also indicated that the cost of combat clothing could be reducedwith a more sophisticated approach to risk management. A high technologyuniform was needed for situations of real risk, but a cheaper, lower technologyuniform could be used in less risky operational circumstances and in non-operational situations.

59. The Chief of Army has recently directed that the daily work dress to be worn in Armyheadquarters be the DPCU, and has given discretion to local Army commanders todetermine the day-to-day dress in their units. He reported to Senate Estimates inFebruary that many commands are wearing the DPCU. This represents a signicantcost saving if Army personnel are able to avoid buying the more expensive polyesteruniforms previously worn. However, many Army personnel are not able to doso, because they are still required to use the more presentable polyesters forrepresentational duties, such as appearance at Senate Estimates.

60. Army has commenced an overall review of its uniform. This will involve extensiveconsultation with Army personnel. There will likely be an opportunity in that reviewto consider the costs of different uniform options, including the potential forsavings from much wider use of a camouage uniform that does not have NIR orother signature reduction properties. Such use might include ofce and barracksuse, and training and operations that do not involve a sophisticated adversary.Air Force is apparently planning a similar review of its uniform, including thedevelopment of a new and unique camouage pattern.

61. Army has also commissioned work on a mid-point camouage uniform, betweenthe greener colours of the DPCU and the lighter colours of the DPDU. This wouldbe an all-purpose uniform for most operating environments, as is the UK MTPuniform. The Clothing SPO is overseeing the development and trial of this new

uniform.

62. Army should expedite its work on rening its future uniform requirements,particularly in relation to the appropriate uniform to wear in different functionsand locations. and to the development of a new mid-point camouage uniform.It should also review its overall policy in relation to NIR, to ensure that therequirements for signature reduction are applied consistently to different items ofclothing and personal equipment. This information is needed for the forthcomingOpen DPCU Tender.


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COMBAT UNIFORM COSTS63. Two aspects of the cost of combat uniform are relevant:

The cost savings identied in the Defence Budget Audit and approved inthe Strategic Reform Program that would be foregone if overseas supply isprecluded, and the cost premiums associated with any broader application ofthe PIC [not only to the DPCU fabric but also to other elements of the combatuniform if local sourcing was mandated for them].

The relative costs of uniforms made of different fabrics and materials, and

worn in different functions and locations.

64. Of the total Clothing SPO annual budget of approximately $90m, approximately70 per cent ($63m) is expended on combat clothing of that amount, some $50mis expended in Australia and $13m overseas. Advice from the SPO indicatesthat items currently produced overseas [at a total annual cost of $13m] wouldcost on average around 40 per cent more to be produced in Australia - a costpremium of $5-6m (although not all of the items under combat clothing could bemanufactured in Australia).

Savings in the range of $13m-$19m per annum were identied in the DefenceBudget Audit for the Clothing SPO, primarily by moving from current localsourcing to overseas suppliers.

There is, therefore, an $18-25m cost differential annually between achievingthe savings planned under the Strategic Reform Program and the costs arisingfrom any decision to source all of the combat clothing in Australia.

65. There are differing assessments of the proportion of the combat uniform costsrepresented by the fabric manufacture and the garment manufacture.

An analysis of the costs of the uniforms to be provided under the RestrictedDPU Tender suggests that the cost of the fabric manufacture (from rawmaterials through weaving to the fabric with the desired camouage patternand signature reduction properties) is about 50 per cent of the total cost, withthe remaining 50 per cent being the garment manufacture (alternatively calledcut, make and trim (CMT) or stitching).

However, the relative costs of the fabric and garment manufacture depend onthe nature of the fabric used in the garment and the sourcing of the garmentmanufacture.

If overseas supply is allowed for the fabric for uniforms not used in combat,there is signicant potential for savings. On the basis that the estimatedsavings from the Chinese DPCU fabric would have been of the order of 40 percent, a higher saving would be expected for Chinese-sourced non-signature

reduction fabric of the order of 50 per cent or higher. If overseas garmentmanufacture was also used, higher savings would be achievable.

The Clothing SPO advises that further savings are possible if other items ofclothing are included for example, if the boots worn in non-combat situationswere not the combat uniform boots. There would also be additional savings ininventory and supply chain costs from a rationalisation of clothing requirements.

66. If Australian procurement of fabric for the combat jacket and trousers wasmandated under the PIC, a particular issue would be how to put reasonable

constraints on the cost, especially in a situation in which a supplier is in amonopoly situation. No straightforward mechanism for doing so was reported tothe Review. Garment manufacturers expressed concern about being hostage tothe fabric manufacturers price, if they were required to source the fabric withinAustralia.

This issue might be addressed by the Clothing SPO negotiating an extensionto the current Standing Offer for fabric manufacture in order to provide priceassurance this would mean, in effect, that the fabric would be provided tothe garment manufacturer as Government Furnished Material (GFM).

Apart from DMO taking responsibility for controlling the price of the fabric inthis way, three broad options were presented to the Review having an openbook on the fabric suppliers costs; paying a specied per cent premium ontop of the cost of overseas supply; or paying a product price plus an agreedmanagement overhead.

An additional complication would arise if the current fabric manufacturingcompany also developed or acquired a garment manufacturing capability,and competed as a prime tenderer. Other tenderers would be required to usethat companys fabric. In such circumstances, companies indicated that theywould not be able to compete, with the fabric manufacturer having a naturaladvantage, being able to play with two margins (on the manufacture of boththe fabric and the garment), and would likely win any open tender for thecombat jacket and trousers.

Such a situation would be mitigated if other companies developed a fabric

manufacture capability within Australia. But that would require signicantinvestment of resources, which companies would be unlikely to make unlessthere was a long-term assurance of a continuing requirement for local fabricmanufacture.

67. The fabric manufacturers representatives understand concerns about the futurecost of its fabric. They say that the company is open to negotiations about thecost of its fabric, and that it may be open to an independent audit of its costs orother means to validate costs and identify productivity savings. The more that


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DMO is able to provide a reasonable, longer term forecast of likely or possiblefabric procurement, the more open the representatives are to such arrangements.

68. The Clothing SPO should investigate further the cost of different uniform options,so that Army and Air Force (and possibly Navy) decisions on their future uniformrequirements are informed by a full understanding of the resource impact and thepotential for resource savings.

LOCAL INdUSTRY vIABILITY ISSUES69. There would remain, however, a very signicant practical difculty in applying the

PIC policy on Combat Clothing and Personal Equipment. It relates to the issue ofthe critical mass needed to maintain a viable local industry capability.

If it was decided that the PIC related to the further technical developmentof the fabric for the combat uniform, and hence a local fabric manufacturingcapability needed to be retained; an if it was agreed that the high technologyfabric would only be used in the uniform to be worn in combat against asophisticated adversary, with a different uniform worn by Army personnelfor other functions; then there may not be a sufcient volume of business toensure a viable local capability particularly on a full-time, ongoing basis.

If so, Defence would need either to provide additional work in specialisedfabric manufacture to provide the minimum volume needed to maintain the

capability, or to be prepared to accept temporary closure of the capabilitywhen the manufacturer ran out of orders, with its political ramications, andaccept the risk and cost of start-up once more fabric was needed. Defence could provide the additional work only by ordering more high

technology fabric than was strictly needed under the ADFs requirements. Defence would then either retain greater stockholdings of fabric or

completed garments (which would only serve to defer the date of thelocal manufacturing capability running out of orders) or use the fabric inuniforms worn more widely than just in combat or training for combat.That in turn would mean that the use of a cheaper, low technology fabricuniform would be more limited.

This would mean a signicant cost premium associated with retention of the

local fabric manufacturing capability. DMO and the Government would still be exposed to the risk of public and

media comment by manufacturers about the volume of business needed tomaintain a commercially viable capability, and the possibility of plant closuresand staff lay-offs.

The issue would be complicated further if there was more than one localsupplier of fabric competing for a limited volume of business.

70. The issue of maintaining basically a standing industry capability becomes morecomplex when looking across all of the PICs. In circumstances in which the SRPrequires signicant savings, and the Audit identied such savings through overseassupply of clothing, the key judgment to be made is the relative priority of the PICsand the associated premiums for local supply. The Government would not wishto set a precedent now, in maintaining a local capability in combat uniform fabricmanufacture at a cost premium, which could then be invoked by companies inother PIC areas which are, or are thought to be, of higher priority.

There is also potential utility in some more explicit guidance on the premium or

margin allowable, in value for money assessments, of Australian complianceand other costs.

71. The optimum solution to this conundrum is for the local Australian industry to becost-competitive with overseas suppliers. If that was not the case, DMO wouldneed to apply a stringent test of the relative strategic priority for local manufactureand supply, with the associated cost premiums, across all the PICs.

ASSURANCE ABOUT SUPPLIERS72. Until now, assurance activity within the DMO has related predominantly to the

quality of the nished product being supplied [through measures such as contractrequirements, accreditation of companies with particular quality standards,product testing and site visits]. Some attention has been given to broader factors

such as the nancial viability and future of supplying companies [through nancialinvestigations], but this has largely been only for major procurement contracts.Very little attention appears to have been given to issues related to the workforce,social, ethical or environmental responsibilities of the companies.

It appears that DMO procurement staff [at least in the Clothing area] havelargely relied on, and trusted, companies themselves to comply with allrelevant national and local laws, with little explicit audit or checking of thatcompliance. Such a low-regulation approach appears to have worked well in the

overwhelming majority of DMOs business it has been an entirelyreasonable risk management approach, and has meant lower DMO andlower industry costs.

But with new measures such as the Fair Work Principles, and as the growingfocus on the ethical, social and environmental responsibilities of companies istranslated into government procurement policies, DMO procurement staff willneed to devote more attention to these issues and assurance will be seen toapply to compliance with all relevant laws and standards, not just product quality.

73. While the Review was tasked particularly to look at assurance issues related tooverseas suppliers, it must be noted that many assurance issues relate also toAustralian suppliers in the TCF industry.


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There is some additional assurance within Australia arising from initiativessuch as the Fair Work Principles, the Homeworkers Code of Practice, EthicalClothing Australia, and the proposed Ethical Quality Mark for the TCF industry;and the certication of many suppliers to international standards.

But both TCF companies and the TCF Union report that there are stillsignicant breaches of the required working conditions, OH&S and wageswithin the TCF industry in Australia, especially in relation to piecework doneoutside factories.

It is not clear, on the limited investigation done by this Review, to what extentthese concerns apply to the work done within Australia under Defencecontracts. The major companies involved in fabric and garment manufacture for

the combat uniform state that they do not commission any work outsidetheir factories [notwithstanding this, there was one allegation made tothe Review that one company has manufactured DPCU garments usingworkers outside its factory this was denied by the company concerned,and there is no evidence available to support the allegation].

Other Defence clothing [that is, non combat] may be produced in lesstransparent, or assured, conditions.

74. Broadly, the main areas in which assurance is, or may be, needed are:

Product quality and compliance with specication including product safety,chemical treatments and residues;

Social accountability - labour or workforce conditions, labour rights, fair wages;

Environmental impact water use, greenhouse impact, environmentalsustainability, product and manufacturing emissions, waste management; and

Animal welfare.

Assurance Processes beyond Defence

75. The principal mechanisms used in the government and commercial sectors forassurance about both quality and broader social and environmental factors are:

Company [and manufacturing facility] participation in, and compliance with,relevant international and national standards and agreements, including: Worldwide standards, such as International Standards Organisation

[ISO] standards [including quality management and environmental

management systems]; the Social Accountability Standard SA8000

[related to labour and working conditions]; Worldwide Responsible

Accredited Production [WRAP, related to workplace standards,

regulations and local laws]; and Oeko-Tex 100 [related to ecology and

the health and safety of textile products].

Other international standards or agreements, such as International LabourOrganisation conventions, European Union eco-label certication, NATOstandards and Allied Quality Assurance Publications.

International regulations related to specic industries and their supplychains for example, aircraft spare parts.

Overseas initiatives that are gaining wider acceptance, such as the UKsEthical Trading Initiative, or the USs Fair Labor Association.

National standards or agreements, such as ACCC guidelines, industrysector certication schemes [for example, the TCF Ethical Quality mark,

Ethical Clothing Australia, and Good Environmental Choice Australia], orthe Green Leader Program.

Clear agreements and close working relationships with suppliers, including: Previous cooperation and proven performance Transparency of processes and arrangements

Carefully specied contracts for supply, including: Guarantees and warranties Regular manufacturer testing and demonstration of product compliance Manufacturer acceptance of unannounced visits and inspections by the

purchaser including possibly open-book accounting

Audit and review procedures, including:

Independent product testing, initially and periodically, both at themanufacturing site and at delivery

Manufacturing site visits Periodic independent audits of production, quality management

systems, product, and nances.

76. With an increasingly global supply chain in many industry sectors, there isgrowing recognition of the importance and value of multi-stakeholder schemes[involving government, industry and unions/workforce] for negotiating and agreeingregulations and standards.

77. There are, however, concerns, on the part of industry, the union and DMO, aboutthe reliability of international standards and testing to them at least in some

overseas locations. There are unveried reports of suppliers or factories buyingaccreditation, even to international standards, without ongoing assurance abouttheir products or processes or whether the products are actually made in thecertied facility.

Assurance Processes used by Australian Suppliers:

78. The Review did not examine the full range of current clothing suppliers to Defencein order to assess their assurance processes. Interviews were conducted withmajor combat uniform suppliers which all have in place comprehensive quality


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systems, which extend beyond systems related to the quality of products tothose encompassing broader social and ethical responsibilities. Such supplierscould respond readily to any developments in government assurance processesor requirements. The Review did not examine the assurance processes used bysmaller suppliers of non-combat clothing.

DMO-Wide Arrangements:

79. DMO [and Defence more broadly] has in place tiered arrangements, involvingcentrally developed and promulgated policy and procedural advice; intermediate

management layers; and devolved procurement authority and responsibility restingwith program and project ofces.

80.The principal current source of advice within Defence is the DPPM, the

responsibility of General Manager Commercial staff. However, the DPPM

deals predominantly with ensuring product or service quality, and it is not

easy to identify quickly all the sections related to assurance about quality and

wider issues.

DPPM, Chapter 3.5 deals with Quality Assurance. Its language is almostentirely about supplies for example, being t for purpose and posing nohazard [paragraph 5], reducing the risk of receiving non-compliant supplies[paragraph 8], and managing sub-contractors quality [paragraph 12]. Whileother chapters deal with other aspects of assurance, none appears to do so ina comprehensive manner.

DPPI 11/2010, of 1 July 2010, provided updated tender and contracttemplates to implement changes arising from the Fair Work Principles.

General Manager Commercial staff are currently reviewing the DPPM, andits associated tender and contract templates, to ensure that they coverassurance issues comprehensively.

81. There are additional sources of advice and direction on assurance matters withinDefence and the DMO:

Defence promulgates a suite of QA instructions, under the sponsorshipof CJLOG. The overwhelming focus of the instructions is on the quality of

products, supplies and services. However, the extant instructions appear to be limited and incomplete in

scope. Many are related to process and procedures, rather than practicaladvice for staff.

DMO [General Manager Commercial staff] is developing additional guidanceon Supplier QA, including a Defence Materiel Instruction, a draft DIG, a draftnew section for the DPPM, an options paper on DMO training, and a draftpaper on the Supplier/Contractor QA Lifecycle.

This work represents an acknowledgement that, overall, there is a gap inthe quality of advice available to DMO staff on QA issues.

The Director Supplier QA Services is also responsible for international QAarrangements and processes, including multilateral agreements. Australia has government QA arrangements with 26 countries, 21 of them

through the NATO framework. MOUs are in place with several of thesecountries, with additional MOUs being negotiated. These arrangementsallow mutual access to QA services and both supplier and productinformation. Such services may be used to audit suppliers in thosecountries, thereby avoiding the need for visits from Australia. Currently, however, there is no systematic collection of supplier and

product information, and no database maintained. NATO is apparentlyinvestigating such an initiative.

DMO Industry Division manages some relevant initiatives, which might bea source of useful information. These include the Company Scorecard although this doesnt cover all relevant issues, or overseas suppliers andproducts.

Clothing SPO Arrangements

82. The Clothing SPO operates within this broad framework. The principal referenceavailable [as it should be] is the DPPM.

83. Clothing SPO staff are not condent that assurance is done sufciently well andunderstand that it will be more difcult with the demands for assurance aboutbroader social and ethical responsibilities. SPO staff do not believe that there aresufcient staff, skills and/or time to determine the additional levels of assurance onsocial responsibility and nancial matters.

For example, considering aspects of suppliers longer term nancial viabilitywill require assistance from the central DMO Financial Investigation Services.With other SPOs also likely to need more FIS assistance, it is likely that FISslimited resources will be in great demand careful decisions will be needed onthose areas requiring priority attention, based on a risk assessment, and fullnancial assurance may not be possible.

The extent of ongoing product testing, after the initial assurance that theproduct meets the contract specication, varies signicantly across thenumerous contracts. In some contracts, suppliers are asked to provideregular test results from accredited test agencies demonstrating continuingcompliance of the product. In other contracts, especially those relating to low-value clothing items, there is limited ongoing testing undertaken. Until now, there has also been limited testing of the ongoing compliance of

the product after its introduction into use with the ADF.


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A specic concern is the realistic options available to the SPO if a product nolonger meets the precise terms of the specication, especially if the supplierhas a monopoly or an alternate supplier would take some time to come online. Given the limited amount of testing currently conducted, the user may notbe aware that the product no longer meets the specication [for example, thebreathability of a garment, or the NIR properties of a fabric]. How much tolerance should be given for small variations from

specication? If there is initially some tolerance for variations, how arefurther variations to be handled?

The SPO is planning changes to its testing program, to introduceadditional periodic testing of the products, but it is not currently resourcedto do this extensively.

It may not be straightforward to build assurance process costs into the tenderevaluation. For example, as a general principle, it is valid and appropriateto include assurance costs into the value for money assessment duringthe tender evaluation of competing bids, with higher assurance cost for anuntested overseas supplier compared to a proven domestic supplier. But itis very difcult to determine, ahead of the contract and its implementation,precisely what those costs would be.

Recommended Approach:

84. A signicant consideration in specifying the appropriate assurance processes is toensure that the cost of compliance, for both industry and DMO, is commensuratewith the value of the product and the signicance or impact of any shortcomings incompliance.

85. The key to assurance is risk management that is, where there is a higher riskof shortcomings in product quality or a suppliers adherence to broader socialor ethical responsibilities, there should be more stringent assurance processesin place. Additionally, the greater the value and the cost of the product beingacquired, and the more signicant or detrimental any shortcomings in productquality are, the more stringent the assurance processes should be and the higherthe assurance should be.

Such a statement is unexceptionable but one uncertainty or variable is thedifferent assessments which might be made of risk, and the associated riskappetite or tolerance, by different stakeholders. For example, would Ministers have a different assessment of acceptable

risk in relation to reputation? Would DMOs judgment on this be sustainedduring a political controversy about a companys compliance forexample, a Chinese supplier?

86. An assessment of risk might begin with the jurisdiction within which the supplieris based. For example, if the supplier is based in Australia, or an allied or NATO

country, it will be subject to signicant local regulation and will likely be compliantwith certain national and international standards. Its home base can be taken asa reasonable initial guide to the level of assurance that might be assumed. Butthis is not denitive or absolute. for example, note the earlier comments on theAustralian TCF industry. On the other hand, if the supplier is based in Eastern Asia,there is currently a prima facie need for more stringent checking of its capacity toprovide assured supply of the product.

87. This is another area in which DMO should develop greater awareness of industryperformance. As well as the earlier recommendations on an enhanced understanding

of industry dynamics, DMO should develop enhanced information on specicindustry sectors, in this case TCF including past performance, compliance withstandards and quality requirements. This would best be done by the relevant SPO.

A related point is the industry suggestion that there might be an accreditationor pre-tender registration process for companies with a proven track recordand capacity to meet specic requirements. While there is general supportfor this among the companies consulted, there is also concern about theworkload and resources involved and that this not become a barrier to entryfor new suppliers.

CEO DMO is receptive to this suggestion. He envisages the accreditationoperating on a panel basis, with companies able to seek and gain a renewable

compliance certicate, and thereby avoid inclusion of extensive documentationon these compliance areas in each tender response they make. Thiscompliance would be subject to agreed conditions, such as arrangements foraudit and random testing by DMO.

This proposal should be investigated further by the Clothing SPO.

88. The following, then, are the broad principles of the DMO Assurance Processes:

(1) Assurance relates not only to the quality of the product but also to broaderworkforce, social, ethical and environmental responsibilities.

(2) The cost of assurance should be broadly commensurate with the value of theproduct and the likelihood and signicance/impact of any shortcomings incompliance.

(3) The stringency of the assurance processes used should be proportionate tothe assessed risk [likelihood and signicance] of shortcomings in compliance.

(4) There should be cascading, complementary and mutually-supportingresponsibilities for assurance. The rst and principal responsibility forassurance [and its associated costs] rests with the supplier DMOsassurance processes should complement and validate those of the supplier.Within DMO, enterprise-wide assurance processes should be complementedby SPO processes.


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(5) DMO must either retain the capacity to be a well-informed buyer or customer[the preferred option], with an in-house capability to undertake assuranceactivities; or buy in such independent services from the market.

89. The following are the key elements or parameters of a comprehensive assuranceprocess:

Careful identication and promulgation of the product sought.

Inclusion in the tender requirements of the assurance processes required [bothabout the product and about the company, its manufacturing processes and

its nancial situation]; and the right of DMO to investigate and audit thoseprocesses, and the means by which DMO will exercise that right.

Rigour in the selection of the preferred tenderer.

Careful translation of the tender requirements into the contract documentation including any warranties or guarantees, testing program, quality plans, andaudit arrangements.

Appropriate accreditation, registration and certication of suppliers, withdomestic and international bodies and standards.

Effective QA and audit processes, both by the company and by DMO [or itsagent], involving the testing of the product, the manufacturing facilities and the

company itself. Careful contract management, to ensure maintenance of performance to

specication and within tolerances and ongoing compliance with relevantcontract requirements and standards.

Maintenance of records of supplier perfor

clothing procurement report

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