cleveland ohio william d. mason prosecuting attorneys office beforefleeing on foot. (t. 90-93)...
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STATE OF OHIO
Appellee
vs.
IN THE OH O SUPREME COURT
12-.411On Appeal from the Eighth DistrictCourt ofAppeals.CA; 97314
Trial Ct. CR-532075A
JERREL T. GLENN
Appellant
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT JERREL T. GLENN
Prosecuting Attorneys OfficeWilliam D. Mason1200 Ontario St. 9`" FloorCleveland Ohio44113
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
JERREL T. GLENN #603-951PO.BOX 57MARION OHIO43301
APPELLANT - PRO SEAUG 17 7017
CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF OHIO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXPLANATION OF WHYTHIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREATGENERAL INTERSEST AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION .................................. ........................................................................... 1,2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............................................:.................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .............................................................................. 4,5.
Proposition of Law No:1 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals decisionviolate Appellants Constitutional Rights pursuant to the Standard of reviewwhen presented with Manifest Weight argument? ..........:......................................... 6,7
Proposition of Law No: II Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals errorby affirming the trial courts erroneous decision to render a verdict withoutthe required proof beyond a reasonable Doubt? ....................................................... 8,9
Proposition of Law No: III Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals decision to allowtext messages conversations violated Appellants Constitutional Right to Due Process asGuaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ............... 10
Proposition of Law No: 4 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals violate AppellantsConstitutional Right by failing to reversed the multiple Firearm specifications that allarose from the same transaction? ......................................................................:...... 11
Conciusior ............................................................................................................. 12
Certificate of Service ........................................:.......................................:............ 13
APPENDIX Appx Page
Opinion of the Eighth District Court of Appeals(July 5`" 2012) ........................................................................................................
Judgment Entry of the Eighth District Court of Appeals(July 5" 2012) ........................................................................................................
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OFPUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND
INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
This case present three critical issues for this Ohio Supreme Court pertaining to Appellant's
June 29' 2011 conviction. Appellant now ask this Honorable Court to grant his Memorandum in
Support for the following reasons stated herein.
The decision of the Eighth District court of appeals denies Appellant the protections provided
within the basic protections within R.C.2941.25 where the legislative intent was to prevent "Shot Gun
convictions" State v Brown, 119 Ohio St. 3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, at ¶ 69. This Ohio Supreme Court
would be reasonable to find reversible error in the imposition of Multiple punishments for allied
offenses committed in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District decision on July 5°i 2012,
clearly ignored the Protections against Double Jeopardy. The Decision by the eighth district affects all
citizens in Ohio who are faced with Multiple Firearm specification as in this case.
If the decision were allowed to stand in this case, all citizens would be denied the protections
afforded within R.C. 2941.25; Which protects a defendant only from being punished for allied offenses.
Tiiis case, presents serious Critical Questions of Law for tlie Ohio Supreme Coart. (1) Did the Eighth
district violate the double Jeopardy Standard in this case pursuant to R.C.2941.25?.
The Decision of the Eighth District court of Appeals threatens the Structure of the requirement of
Sufficiency determination in this case. Appellant Jerrell Glenn ask this Ohio Supreme Court to review
the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, as the Eighth District Court of Appeals decision on July 5`n
2012 reached a erroneous decision that affects all Ohio Citizens who faced the Sufficiency test as in
this case. State v Tompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 390, 1997 Ohio 52, 678 N.E. 2D 541, provided the
proper test in which the decision of Eighth District Court of appeals clearly ignored in its decision. The
Proper Question for this Honorable Court is;(2) Was the relevant inquiry, after reviewing the evidence
in light most favorable to prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant Jerrell Glenn answer's in the negative. The evidence in this case, demonstrates the Ohio
Court of Appeals for the Eighth district violated Appellant Glenn of his Constitutional Right on Appeal
to the relevant inquiry of the Sufficiency test utilized in State v Thompkins Supra.
All Ohio Citizens are afforded the same Protections this case prevents, Appellant now ask this
Ohio Supreme Court to address the Question; Did the Court ofAppeals for tlte Eighth District violate
appellant's right,when the Court ofAppeals allowed circumstantial evidence in this case to be
reviewed as `proof' in light of real evidence?
Hearsay Rule/Evidence Rule
Appellant Jerrell Glenn asserts that this case presents a critical Question for the Ohio Supreme
Court pertaining to the violation of his Constitutional rights against inadmissible evidence in light of
Evidence R.90 1. In the present case, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District violated the right
of Appellant to the protections provided by Legislative intent, when the Ohio Court of Appeals decision
allow evidence admitted of text messages into evidence in this case. The Proper Question for the Ohio
Supreme Court consist of; Did the decision of the Eighth District Court ofAppeals to improperly
admit Evidence that was not authenticated under Evid R. 901(A) Violate Appellant's Constitutional
Right on Appeal?
The decision of the Eighth district in this case disturbs the protections provided all Ohio Citizens
on appeal to be protected from the very constitutional Rights violated in this case. As a constitutional
Right Appellant in this case asserts that the decision of the Eighth District did not directly address or
permit any protections in which the Constitution of not only Ohio, But the United States Constitution
protects when cases such as the case before this Ohio Supreme Court. Appellant Jerrell Glenn now
Ask this Honorable Court to review his Proposition of Laws for the following reasons stated herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 23,2010, Appellant along with co defendant was indicted by the Cuyahoga County
Grand Jury in Case No. CR-535072 appellant was charged with a six count of kidnapping, two counts
of attempted murder, four counts of felonious assault, and five counts of aggravated robbery, All
charges included one-and three-year firearm specifications. The indictment alleged a conspiracy to rob
and shoot Kenneth Elsleger who was known to carry large amounts of cash.
Appellant appeared at arraignment on March 26, 2010 and entered a plea of "not guilty" to all
charges. A Bench trial pursuant to jury waiver began on June 13, 2011. On June 29,2011 the court
returned its verdicts for both defendants. On August 4, 2011 the Appellant and Co-defendant were
sentenced. Prior to sentencing the state acknowledged on the record as to counts 4 and 5 and the
underlying gun specification to merge leaving count 4 for sentencing purposes. Counts 6 and 7 were
also merged with sentencing going forward on count 7. As to counts 11 and 12 the state elected to go
forward on count 11.
The trial court imposed a prison sentence at Lorain Corr Inst of 16 years. All 1 year and 3 year
firearm specifications merged. 3 year gun specifications are to be served prior to and consecutive with
2 years on the base charge on counts 4 and 5; counts 4 and 5 merged; 3 year gun specification to be
served prior to and consecutive with 3 years on the base charge on counts 6 and 7 merge; 3 year
gun specifications to be served prior to and consecutive with 2 years on the base charge on counts 11
and 12 merge, counts 11 and 12 are consecutive to counts 4 and 5 and counts 6 and 7 for a total of 16
years. The trial court imposed a fine of $1,000.00 on counts 4,7 and 11.
counts 4 and 5 merged; 3 year consecutive to 3 years for firearm specification
counts 6 and 7 merged; 4 years consecutive to 3 years for firearm specification consecutive to count 4.
counts 11 and 12 merge; 2 years consecutive to 3 years for firearm specification, all consecutive to count
4 and 7... Total prison term sentence; 16 years.
STATrM GNT 0r FA CTs
The Appellant was charged in a multiple count indictment along with co-defendant Adam
Cassano. Both Appellant aiid Cassano were charged with aggravated robbery, kidnnppinb, and
feloniotts assault stemining fi'on1 events that ocenued tlie evening of February 13, 2010, in
Parma, Ohio. Below are the facts oPthe case. Closer scrutinyof specific facts is made in each
separate assignment of error.
Kenneth I?lsleger testified that on the evening ot'Pebruary 132010 he wns out drinlcing
with Appellant, Joseph Zlsleger (Kemieth's brotfier), N[ario Galipo, and Samantha DiVincenzo.
The evening began around Sp.m.at Elseger's apartment where all parties gathered and left
in one vehicle; Eseger's cnr. Tieywe& to the Lido Lounge on Vdcst 117" Street in Cleveland,
Ohio. After Lido's tlicy went to Scorelceepers Lounge in Parma, Ohio. Shortly after 2:30 a.m.
the group a0ved in the same vehicle at the parlciiig lot of Llsleger's apartuaent.Moments aftei-
leaving the p'ailcedcar a hooded bunman confironted the group and tolcl Elslegel- to empty his
pockets. The gunman ri.pped a necklace off oP Elsleger. A. nioment later the gunmait shot
ICenaeth Plsleger in the neclc and his brother, Toseplt Glsleger in the slomach. Kenneth could
iot identify the gunroan. All lie could say was thathe was a"white guy". (T. 49-69) As a result
of the shooting 131sleger is unable to walk.
7oseph Llsleger's testimony was nearly identical to his brother's witli the addition of
many otherfacts. Iie indicated that Appellant got out of the car and ran as sooii asthey pulled
iiito theparlcinglot. (T. 78) I-te grabbed tl e gunman by thewrist and struggled withhim tintil
Mario Galipo pulled him off freeing tlie gunman. IIe was then shoved to grouucl by an unknown
person, the gun went off, strikiug his brother. Wliile on the bround 7oseph was sliot. The
gunman ran from the area. Joseph also eould not iclentif'y the gLiniilan and otlier than noticing
that lie was a`9ight-skinned whitc guy". (T. 83-87)
Mario Galipo stated tliat everyone Was drunlc when they arrived nt the parl.ing lot. A
man came up and asked if he had a lighter. Moments later he saw fhe mnn shoot three shots into
the air. Galipo saw the man fii-e one sliot at Kenneth Dlsleger and one shot at Joseph Elsleger
beforefleeing on foot. (T. 90-93) Galipo wns shown a photo liiie-up by the Parma Police
Department out of which lie chose the photo of an unknown person - not Co-Defendant Adam
Cassano. (T.95)
San3antha DiViiicenzo's version of events reflected Mr. Galipo's yet difl'ered in that slie
believed the gumnan was either an African-Ainerican witl-t hlaekhair someone with a covering
over his face. Slie couldnot i(lentify the sliooter from the police photo array. (T. 129-149)
Detective Klein of the Pnrma Police Department conducted the investigation of this case.
IIe arrived at the crime sccne an hour after the shooting. 1~roni there he went to intcrview tlie
APpellant and Adam Cassano. (T. 153-158)
Klein obtained cell plione records of Appellant. Appellant gave Detective Klein his cell
phone no. 440-665-3167 (hereinafter known as 'Appellant's phone'). Klein identified certain
text messeges in Appellant's cell phone records he deemed "suspicious" (T: 165-170). A phot'o
of Appellant snd Adam Cassano with an unlcnown female was located in Appellant's residence
(State's Ex. 38).
Verizon Cellular's John Michael Brogan testified regarding cell plione records for several
plione numbers with a focus on text messages to and itom Appellant's phone, 440-665-3167 and
216-618-4722 (hereinafter ]uiown as the `mystery number') and 216-624-9341.
Proposition of Law No; 1 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals decision violate AppellantsConstitutional Rights pursuant to the Standard of review when Presented with Manifest Weight
argument?
Appellant asserts that although the Eighth District Court of Appeals may determine#hat the
Judgment in this case may be sustained by sufficient evidence, The court of Appeals nevertheless
erred when it concluded that the Judgment was against the weight of the Evidence in this case.
In the present case before this Ohio Supreme Court, the Eighth District Court of appeals erred in
finding this case met the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompkins at 386-87, On appeal
all Ohio Defendant's are entitled to have their cases reviewed in a fair and unjust manner, When a
challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence attacks the verdict in light of the State's burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court may reverse the judgment of conviction if it
appears that the trier of fact "clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Appellant asserts that although this case presented both the Sufficiency evidence along with the
Manifest weight of the evidence, the Court of Appeals address both issues together as they were so
closely related. However, Appellant present separate arguments for Both issues; Here Appellant argues
that the Trial court [Bench Trial] clearly lost its way when deciding appellants issue of Manifest Weight
of the evidence; Here is why
This case was tried to the court pursuant to Appellant signing a waiver of the Jury. Appellant
asserts the Ohio Court of Appeals review of Manifest weight issues remain the same under review. In
all Ohio Case, when on review of Manifest Weight, the trial court must detennine if the state has
produced proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each defendant. This case presented [Two Co-defendant]
Appellant Jerrell T. Glenn and Adam Cassano. Moreover, The facts presented to this Honorable Court
consisted of; [Evidence of Texting] along with [Text Messages] along with the State's Burden to link
Adam Cassano to the Mystery Number on Appellant°s Phone.
The Crux of the matter in this case, resolves around the question; Did the Court ofAppeals for
the Eighth District err when it affirmed the Trial court's decision without the required necessarv
Proof of reasonable doubt? as required in State v Thompkins 678 N.E. 2Nd 541 (1997) Ohio Courts
have consistently held that; The legal concept of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence
are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision if allowed to stand, violates Appellant's
Constitutional Right on appeal to have the Standard of Review required in State v Thompkins 678 N.E.
2"a 541. Moreove, there were two co defendant's and several Text Messages, In which the State's
overall theory was that Co defendant Cassano was the Gunman and he worked in concert with
Appellant who allegedly guided Cassano to the scene via a series of Text Messages. The Question for
the Ohio Supreme Court now consist of; Did the Eighth District Court ofAyneals Properly and fully
satisfy the rertuiredproof to establish that the Recipient ofAppellant {Glenn's1 Test messaQes was in
fact his Co-defendant? and, given the victims 'failure to identify him as the shooter, there was
significant doubt whether Appellant was properly convicted in review of the Manifest Weight issue.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision clearly failed to establish that Appellant forward
any test messages at all. Does the Eighth district violate Appellant's Constitutional right by failing to
require the State of Ohio to a Higher Standard of Proofas Required by Ohio law when deciding the
Manifest Weight issue as in this case?
This decision by the Eighth District Court of appeals affects all citizens in Ohio when on appeal of
Manifest Weight Issues. Appellant asserts that the Public would be affected by the decision of the
Eighth District, as Appeals to Manifest Weight require the court of appeals sit as a Thirteenth Juror in
determining after reviewing the entire case, if the Trial court clearly and convincingly lost its way as in
the present case before the Ohio Supreme Court. Appellant's ask this Ohio Supreme Court the
Question; Did the Eighth District Review in this case consist of the totality of circumstances to reach
a decision based on the entire record in this case as required by Ohio Law on Manifest Weight issues?
Proposition of Law No; 11 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals error by affirming the trialcourt's erroneous decision to render a verdict without the required proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
This case present a Question of law pertaining to Appellant's Specific argument of Sufficiency of
the evidence in this case. The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision was erroneous in several ways.
Does the rlecision of the Eighth District go against the standard of insufJficient evidence in tlcis case?
Here, the test for Sufficiency requires a determination of whether the prosecutiommet its burden of
production at trial. Appellant asserts the State did not..... Here is Why; The relevant inquiry is whether,
after reviewing the evidence in this case in light of most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond the reasonable doubt; See
State v Thomplins 78, Ohio St. 380 678 N.E. 2D 541.
This case is the result of evidence of [Text Messages] that were improperly allowed as evidence
against Appellant to determine the truth of the matter in question. The Question for this Honorable
Court to consider is; Did the Text messages offered in this case constitute an offer for the truth of their
contents in this case? Furthermore, Did the Eighth District Court ofAppeals error by ruling that none
of the test messages were offered for the truth of their contents? Clearly the Ohio court of appeals for
the eighth district reached an erroneous conclusion based solely on inferences. Does inferences alone
constitute a valid Convictions?
This case presents challenges for all Ohio Citizens when convicted solely based on insufficient
evidence as in this case. Furthermore, if allowed to stand, the burden of proof as required by Ohio Law
would prove to be meaningless. As the evidence in this case, does not link both Appellant and his Co-
defendant together in committing any Crime.
State v Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 574 N. E 2D 492 (1991) The Trier of Fact in this case which
was the Judge [Bench Trial] violated Appellant Constitutional right to the Fourteenth Amendment by
allowing inadmissible evidence at trial. Wherefore, the Eighth District Court of Appeals erred by
failing to protect Appellant's Constitutional Right to the insufficient Evidence Appellant was convicted
on at trial.
This Ohio Supreme Court would be reasonable to accept Appellant's Memorandum in Support as
it raises appropriate questions of Law that would protect all Ohio Citizens on appeal. In this case there
is evidence that the Witnesses in this case, could not and did not identify his Co-defendant.
Appellant asserts that not only did the state not meet its burden of proof in this case, Appellant
asserts that his Co-Defendant was never positively Identified as the Shooter. Notably; this case was
built on a Theory of the two Defendants Conspiring to commit a Robbery. The Eighth district Court of
appeals decision on July 5"' 2012 relied upon circumstantial evidence, stating; "Although there are
obvious differences between direct and circumstantial evidence, those differences are irrelevant to the
probative value of the evidence- - the Eighth district went further to state; Circumstantial evidence
carries the same weight as direct evidence. State v Treesh, 90 Ohio St. 3d 460, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001).
Appellant relies upon the Ohio Supreme Courts decision in State v Heinish, 50 Ohio St. 3d 231,
238, 553 N.E.2d 1026 (1990) which stated in part; "that Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
a conviction if the evidence would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Does lack of Identification result in evidence sufficient to support a conviction?
In the present case before this Ohio Supreme Court, all Ohio citizens would suffer a Miscarriage of
Justice if the Court of Appeals decision to allow Evidence to be deem sufficient even when the victims
Identification result in uncertainty as in this case. The Question of Law for this Ohio Supreme Court
directs this cour-C to the irrational decision rendered on July 5" 2012 by the Eighth District Court of
appeals affirming Appellant's Conviction in liglit of witnesses that failed to Identify not only Appellant
as the Co Conspirator, But failed to Identify Appellants co defendant as the Shooter.
Appellant Jerrell T. Glenn ask this Ohio Supreme Court to review his case with the Question of
Law; Does the facts of this case, in light of the witnesses failure to Identify Co-defendant as the
shooter in this case, along with the theory the state Relied upon, Constitute enough evidence to
overcome a invalid Conviction?
Proposition of Law No:111 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals decision to allow test messagesconversations violate Appellants Constitutional Right to Due Process as Guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment tothe United States Constitution.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision is of great interest to the General Public and effects
all citizens rights on appeal when courts erroneously admit Records into evidence that constitute the
truth of the matter sought, In violation of Evid R.901(A).
Appellant asserts the Eighth district Court of Appeals decisions violates his Constitutional Right
by allowing the Trial courts admission of Text Message Conversations as Business Records. The Crux
of the Matter here, resolves around a series of Constitutional Questions in which Appellant Jerrel T.
Glenn presents to this Honorable Court; (1) Does the Testimony of Verizon's John Brogan satisfy
the exception of the Rule in Evid R. 901(A)? The decision of the Eighth District Court of appeals
allows inadmissible evidence to infer compliance to the exception Rule, which allows John Brogan to
testify as to the authentication of the Text Messages.
The exception Rule of Evid R. 901(A) in this case is Critical. Here is Why; This case involves a
Mystery Number. Without an authentication identifying the person wot whom this number is registered
any evidence regarding it cannot be admitted. ( 2) Did the Eighth District's Decision ignore the
prejudice Appellant suffered on Appeal when John Brogan could not testify how the records were
complied and and whether the method of record retention was in fact reliable?
Appellant ask this Honorable court to review the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals
and resolve the Question of; (3) Did the Court of Appeals ignore the inference of hearsay, even after
the Trial court Concedes the hearsay problem exist (T.326)? This case consist of serious prejudicial
problems created by the admittance of theses text messages.
Wherefore, to protect the interest of the public and all Ohio citizens on Appeal, Appellant Jerrel
T. Glenn ask this Ohio Supreme Court to Protect his Constitutional Right on Appeal pertaining to the
admittance of inadmissible Evidence in violation of Evid R. 901(A) and Resolve the question of;
Did Appellant suffer prejudice when Eighth District allowed inferences from unreliable text messages?
Proposition of Law No:4 Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals violate Appellants Constitutional Right byfailing to reversed the multiple Firearm specifications that all arose from the same transaction?
Appellant was convicted and sentenced to Multiple firearm specification all stemming from a
single act or simply put a single transaction. Ohio Courts have consistently dealt with cases where
multiple firearms have been reversed when there were no separate acts. State v Jones, 10'h Dist. No.98
AP-639, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1248 (Mar.18, 1999). In Jones, the court note; "The separate animus"
test applicable to R. C.2941.25 does not apply when determining whether firearm specif cations merge.
This Ohio Supreme Court has defined the term "transaction," as used in the firearm specification
statutes, as a "series of continuous acts bound together by time, space and purpose, and directed toward
a single objective. In the present case at bar, this complete case is based on the Stateof Ohio's theory
and the Eighth District Court ofAppeals inferences. The Question before this Honorable Court now
consist of; (1) Did the Eighth District Court of Appeals violate Appellant's Constitutional Right
on Appeal by affirming the Trial Court's Multiple Firearm Conviction? Here is Why? The Court of
Appeals relied on; R.C.2929.14(B)(1)(g), as it was amended by H.B.86, which provides the same
language as former R.C.2929.14(D)(1)(b).
Appellant asserts that he vaas convictcd and sentenced c:. August 4" 2011, clearly prior to any
amendment of R.C.2929.14(D)(1)(b). Notably; the language in either Statute allows Appellant to be
sentenced only on two of the most serious felonies.... Appellant ask this Ohio Supreme Court; Does
the Trial Court abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant on Third Firearm specification in
light of R.C.2929.14 (D)(1)(g) as held by the Eighth district court of appeals in this case?
This case presents a critical Question of Law allowing Ohio Court of Appeals to affirm convictions
of Multiple offenses pursuant to R.C.2929.14(D)(1)(b). Appellant asserts that this case affects all
citizens on appeal facing Multiple convictions for firearm specifications. Moreover, Appellant ask this
court to reverse the Decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals based on this Ohio Supreme
Courts ruling in; State v Wills, 69 Ohio St. 3d 690, 691, 1994 Ohio 417, 635 N E.2d 370.
CONCLUSION
The Crux of the State of Ohio's Case against Appellant Jerrel T. Glenn was based solely on the
inferences that he co-conspired with another Adam Cassano to commit a Robbery. The Eighth District
Court of Appeals allowed evidence of Test Messages that simply were not reliable to the truth of the
Matter sought in this case. Appellant stood not chance after the Trial court allowed into evidence
unreliable Text Messages in this case. Furthermore, The State along with the Trial court Relied on
the Exception to the Hearsay Rule in this case, which violated Appellant's Constitutional Right to
Evid. R. 901(A).
Additionally, this case is the result of the trial court's abuse of discretion by imposing multiple
convictions on firearm specifications pursuant to R.C.2929.14(D)(1)(b). Appellant should not have
been convicted on the Multiple Firearms all stemming from a single transaction as defined in State v
Wills 69 Ohio St. 3d 690,1994 635 N.E.2d 370. Where the Ohio Supreme Court defined the term
"transaction" as used in the firearm specification statutes, as a "series of continuous acts bound
together by time, space and purpose, and directed toward a single objective. The facts of this case all
demonstrate a single transactions in which the trial court should have merged the firearm specification.
Appellant ask several questions that effect all cases when Multiple firearms are subject for review as in
the present case, wherefore appellant Jerrel T. Glenn ask this Honorable Court to except Jurisdiction in
this case to resolve the Conflict the Eighth District Court of Appeals decision created in light to this
Ohio Supreme Court's Decision in State v Wills as stated herein.
In Summary, Appellant ask this Ohio Supreme Court to review his Proposition of Law in light of
the evidence in this case, to resolve the erroneous decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals
decision in light of the Insufficient evidence presented at trial. Appellant was convicted based all on
inferences, as the Identification in this case was not determined of the Co defendant Cassano as the
one Conunitting the Robbery. Appellant directs this Honorable court to the Question; If the Identity of
the actual Perpetrator is not reliable does the state meet its burden to convict appellant as co defendant?
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a copy of Memorandum in Support has been forward to the
Prosecutor's office located at 1200 Ontario St. Cleveland Ohio 44113 9'b Floor on this ^
2012, by Regular U.S. Mail.
JUL 0 5 2012
Caurt of 0(ppeaYg of ObioEIGHTH APPELLATE DIS T RCCT
COUNTY OF CUYAH'OGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINIONNo. 97314
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs,
JERREL T. GLENN
D EFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from theCuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-5350'72
SEFORE: Cooney, J., Boyle, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 5, 2012
CA11097314 74533045
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Joseph. E...Eeighan,, III..14516 Detroit AvenueLakecvoocl, Ohio 44107
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. MasonCuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Stephanie HeibertshausenAssistant County Prosecutor9"` Floor., Justice Center1200 Ontario StreetCleveland, Ohio 44113
FILED AND JOURNALIZED^rR APP.R. 22(C)
JUL o 5 2012
GERALp E, FUERST
L. °lF.AK,{j22'OOQRT OF 0.PPFAIS
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COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jerrel Glenn ("Glenn"), appeals his convictions
and-sentence. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
{^(2} In March 2010, Glenn was charged with six counts of kidnapping,
two counts of attempted murder, four counts of felonious assault, and five
counts of aggravated robbery. All the charges included one- and three-year
firearm specifications. The indictment alleged a conspiracy to rob and shoot
Kenneth Elsleger ("Kenneth"), who was known to carry large amounts of cash.
{¶3} At a bench trial, Kenneth testified that on the night of the shooting,
he had gone out drinking with Glenn, his brother Joseph Elsleger ("Joseph"),
and two friends, Mario Galipo ("Galipo") and Sarnantha DiVincenzo
("DiVincenzo"). After stopping at the Lido Lounge, the group went to
Scorekeeper's Lounge ("the bar") in Parma and returned to Kenneth's
apartment building at 2:30 a.m. When Kenneth parked the car, Glenn exited
the vehicle and quickly disappeared. Galipo and DiVincenzo, who had been
arguing, walked over to Galipo's car so DiVincenzo could retrieve items from the
trunk. Joseph accompanied the couple to the car to help DiVincenzo carry these
items.
{¶4} Meanwhile, a man wearing a hooded sweatshirt confronted
Kenneth in the parking lot and ordered him to empty his pockets. Kenneth
raised his hands. The man shot a gun into the air and ripped a necklace from
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Kenneth's neck. Joseph heard the commotion and returned to assist Kenneth.
Joseph did not see the gunman's face but recognized the gun as a Glock firearm,
To preventthe gunman from shootingKennet'h, Joseph grabbedthe,man's arm.
Galipo observed the struggle and pulled Joseph off the gunman. The gunman
shot Joseph in the stomach and fled. During the struggle, the gunman also shot
Kenneth in the neck. Kenneth sustained a spinal cord injury, which resulted
in quadriplegia.
{¶51 DiVincenzo called the police. Officer Daniel Kravanis ("Kravanis")
of the Parma Heights police, responded to the scene. Kravanis testified that
there was a`Yresh blanket" of snow on the ground and that he observed a single
set of footprints leaving 'L'he scene. He followed the footprints past two
apartment complexes, through a parking lot, and up to the entrance of another
apartment 'building.
{¶6} Although Kenneth was the only witness who saw the gunman's
face, a11 the witnesses agreed the suspect was a stocky, white, balding male,
approximately 5'6" tall, and wearing a hooded sweatshirt. When Kravanis
reached the end of footprints, he observed a person who matched the
description. This person, who was later identified as Adam Cassano
("Cassano"), told Kravanis that he had just arrived at the apartment. Moments
later, a second man, who was later identified as Glenn, exited the building and
greeted Cassano. In resporise to questioning, Glenn told Kravanis he had been
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with his friends on the third floor all night. However, when Kravanis
questioned the men in the apartment, they informed him that Glenn had just
arrived; and that Cassano had -been with them in the apartment all night:
{¶7} Detective Daniel Heinz ("Heinz") of the Parma police testified that
during his investigation of the crime scene, he found a "fired bullet" and two
spent shell casings near a blood stain in the parking lot. Jonathan Gardner
("Gardner"),. a firearms expert froLn the Bureau of Criminal Investigation,
testified that the fired buUet and the shell casings recovered from the scene
came from a 9mm Glock fzrearm.
{¶8} Glenn told police he intended to walk home from Kenneth's
apartment upon their return from the bar. Parma police detective Michael
Klein ("Klein") determined that Glenn's residence was located midwaybetween
the bar and Kenneth's apartment, and that the distance between Kenneth's and
Glenn's apartments was approximately two miles. He doubted Glenn's claim
that he intended to walk home on a cold snowy night at 2:30 a.m. after a night
of drinking when Kenneth could have easily dropped him off as they passed his
residence on the way home. Further, at a police interview, Glenn denied
leaving his car at Kenneth's address. However, further investigation revealed
that Glenn's car was in fact parked at the crime scene.
{¶9} As a result of numerous inconsistencies in his story, police suspected
Glenn was involved in the shooting and obtained a record of his cell phone
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activity. These records showed that he sent and received several text messages
to the same phone number shortly before the shooting. The messages seemed
to direct the recipient to the victims' location.
{¶10) The State called John Brogan of Verizon Wireless to verify the
authenticity of Glenn's cell phone records and the records of the unidentified
recipient of Glenn's messages. The recipient used a Boost Mobile cell phone
("Boost Mobile phone"), which is a pay-as-you-go phone that keeps no subscriber
information. The Verizon records established that Glenn periodically informed
the user of the Boost Mobile phone of his whereabouts and activities during the
night. One message from the Boost Mobile phone to Glenn's phone stated:
"Keep nie updated." A message from Glenn's phone to the Boost Mobile phone
stated: "I'll callyou again once I get a chance," At 1:24 a.m., a message from the
Boost Mobile phone to Glenn's phone asked: "Which complex?" Moments later,
a message from Glenn's phone replied: "It's in Forrest Ridge. You would see
my car." At 1:31 a.m., a message from the Boost Mobile phone stated: "I'm
walking around here. All the cars got snow on them by the pools or farther
download" A message from Glenn's phone responded, "My car right there."
Still unable to find Glenn's car, the recipient of Glenn's messages complained:
"There are a lot of buildings is BT the side street?" Finally, at 2:31 a.m., a
message from Glenn's phone informed: "We on our way."
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{4F 11} Police further discovered that the Boost Mobile phone made calls
to a landline telephone at Cassano's mother's house, where Cassano lived. '!'he
day after Cassano was -interviewed by police; Glenn called the Boost Mobile
phone, received no answer, and immediately called the landline at.the Cassano
home. Using this information, the police obtained a search warrant, searched
the Cassano home, and found a large quantity of firearms. Detective Klein
testified that he also recovered a clip belonging to a nine millimeter Glock
handgun and a photo of Cassano and Glenn with an identified female. The.
firearm used in the crimes, however, was never recovered.
ۦ12} At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Glenn guilty of four
counts of felonious assault and two counts of aggravated robbery. All the
charges included one- and three-year firearm specifications. The court merged
Counts 4 and 5, which alleged felonious assault on Kenneth, and Counts 11 and
12, which alleged felonious assault on Joseph. The court sentenced Glenn to an
aggregate 16-year prison term with mandatory five years' postrelease control.
Glenn now appeals, raising four assignments of error.
Sufficiency and Manifest Weig:ht
{¶ 13} In his first and second assignments of error, Glenn argues there is
insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that his convictions are not
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Glenn contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the convictions because none of the witnesses
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could identify Cassano as the gunman and there is no evidence linking him to
the gunman. He also cont'ends the evidence of text messaging lacked s'ubstance
and-probative value.- V(re ad-dress these assigned-errors. together because. they ....
are closely related.
{¶14} The test for sufficiency requires a determination of' whether the
prosecution met its burden of production a't trial. State u. Thorrtpkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 390, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found'the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 942
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Further, "proof may be made by
circumstantial evidence as well as by real evidence and direct or testimonial
evidence, or any combination." Id. at 272.
{¶15} A challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence attacks the
verdict in light of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thompkins at 386-87. A reviewing court may reverse the judgment of
conviction if it appears that the trier of fact "clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered." Id. A finding that a conviction was supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency. Id.
at 388.
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{¶16} Glenn claims the text inessages constituted social communication
between friends rather than aiding and abetting a crime. However, as
-previously stated, messages-sent from Glenn's-p-hoae-to•the Boost-^NIobile p-hone --
directed the recipient to the victims' location at the same time the shooting
occurred. The recipient of Glenn's messages not only asked for periodic updates
on Glenn's present location, but also sought clarification of the location of
Glenn's car. The last message sent from Glenn's phone before the robbery
simply stated: "We on the way." None of these messages, however, were offered
for the truth of their contents. Thus, they did not constitute hearsay.
{¶17} DiVincenzo testified that she observed Glenn send and receive
numerous text messages the night of the shooting. While they were driving
back to Kenneth's apartment from the bar, she observed Glenn "being sneaky
on the phone, like trying to hide it in-between his legs." The text messages
coupled with the presence of an armed robber waiting for victims to arrive at
2:30 a.m. on a cold snowy night allowed the trier of fact to reasonably conclude
that Glenn directed the robber to this location at the precise time the group
returned. It is dou'btful that a random robber would lie in wait in the cold at
2:30 a.m. unless he knew the victim would 'be arriving shortly.
(118) Finally, Glenn argues that because the evidence linking Cassano to
the crime is insufficient, the evidence of Glenn's participation in the crime is
likewise insufficient. We disagree.
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{^f 19} Glenn asserts that because none of the witnesses at the shooting
could identify Cassano from the photo arrays, the evidence failed to prove that
-C-assano-was-the gunman: However;the-State usedcircumstantialevidenee-to -
prove Cassano's role in the crimes. Although the witnesses were unable to
identify Cassano as the shooter, they all provided the saine general description
of his height and weight, baldness, and hooded sweatshirt-
{¶'20} Moreover, circumstantial evidence proved Cassano used the Boost
Mobile phone on the night the crimes were committed. First, Officer Kravanis
met hiin near the crime scene shortly after the shooting. Cassano falsely
informed Kravanis that he had just arrived at the apartment, apparently
attempting to distance himself from the crime. The cell phone records showed
that someone using the Boost Mobile phone called the Cassano house. The
records also showed that when Glenn called the Boost Mobile phone and received
no answer, he immediately called the landline at Cassano's home, obviously
trying to reach the person who usually answers the Boost Mobile phone. Each
of these facts, considered alone, is innocuous, However, when all the facts are
considered together, they tell the story of how Glenn and Cassano conspired to
ro'b Kenneth, whom they knew carried a large amount of cash. It is not clear
whether Joseph was a premeditated target, but the evidence is clear he was a
victim of their conspiracy.
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(¶ 21) Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions,
and the convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
-{-¶22} The first. and--secend--assignmen-ts-oferror are overruled.
Text Message Evidence
{¶ 23} In his third assignment of error, Glenn argues the court erroneously
admitted evidence of text messages into evidence. He contends the evidence was
not properly authe.nticated under Evid.R. 901(A), and that the evidence
constituted inadmissible hearsay.
{¶24} First, as we noted above, the messages were not offered for the truth
of their contents and thus are not hearsay. Even if considered hearsay, however,
they fit within an exception to the hearsay rule,
{¶25} Evid.R. 901 governs the authentication of demonstrative evidence
such as recordings of telephone conversations and text messages. The threshold
for admission is quite low, as the proponent need only submit "evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims." Evid.R. 901(A). This means that "the proponent must present
foundational evidence that is sufficient to constitute a rational basis for a jury
to decide that the primary evidence is what its proponent claims it to be." State
u, Payton, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2606, 2002 WL 184922 (Jan. 25, 2002). A
proponent may demonstrate genuineness or authenticity through direct or
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circumstantial evidence. State v. Williams, 64 Ohio App.2d 271, 274, 413 N.E.2d
1212 (8th Dist. 1979).
{9126}-;Efexxsay-is generally net acFmissible-unless it falts-withia-one-of-the -
recognized exceptions. Evid.R. 802; State u. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 1.11, 119, 509
N.E.2d 383 (1987). Evid.R. 803(6) provides a hearsay exception for regularly
recorded business records. A telephone or cell phone record may fall within the
business record exception provided under 803(6), if properly authenticated,
State u. Hirtzinger, 124 Ohio App.3d 40, 49, 705 N.E.2d 395 (2d Dist:1997); State
u. Knox, 18 Ohio App.3d 36, 37, 480 N.E.2d 120 (9th Dist.1984). Evid.R. 803(6)
provides:
A m.einorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, ofacts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or frominform.ation transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in thecourse of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was theregular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony ofthe custodian or other qualified witness or as provided by Rule901(B)(10), unless the source of information or the method orcircumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. Theterm `business' as used in this paragraph includes business,instit•ation, association, profession, occupation, and calling of everykind, whether or not conducted for profit.
{1127} Thus, the rule requires that a custodian, or other qualified witness,
testify as to the regularity and reliability of the business activity involved in the
creation of the record. While the witness providing this foundational testimony
need not have firsthand knowledge of the transaction, he or she must be
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sufficiently familiar with the operation of the business and with the
circumstances of the record's preparation, maintenance, and retrieval.
IWrtzinger at-49 - -
{¶28} The State called a Verizon representative, John Brogan, to lay the
foundation and to authenticate Glenn's cell phone.records. Brogan, testifying as
a custodian of records, stated that Verizon regularly maintains a detailed list of
the identities of their custoiners and their customers' cell phone usage. He
explained that computers automatically record incoming and outgoing calls, call
duration, and content. There was no evidence to suggest that the automatic
recording of cell phone activity was unreliable. Moreover, he testified that
Verizon maintains these records in the regular course of business for billing and
rate plan purposes, and Verizon often makes this information available to police
as a courtesy to law enforcement. Based on his testimony, we find that Brogan
properly authenticated the cell phone records as business records, which are
excepted from the hearsay rule.
{4129} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
Consecutive Sentences
{1730} Tn his fourth assignment of error, Glenn argues the trial court erred
by sentencing him to three consecutive three-year terms on the firearm
specifications. He contends the court was required by 'law to merge multiple
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firearm specifications for sentencing if the specifications involve the same "act
or transaction:" In support of this argument, Glenn relies on R.C. 2929.14(D)(1).
{¶3Y}-R:C: 2929.14(D)(1)(b), as it - existed -at-the time-of-sentencing;
prohibited a trial court from imposing more than one prison term for multiple
firearm specifications if the specifications were commi'tted as part of the same
act or transaction. However, R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(g) provided an exception for
certain felonies including felonious assault and aggravated robbery. R.C.
2929.14(D)(1)(g)i stated:
If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies,if one or more of those felonies is aggravated murder, murder,attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravatedrobbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convictedof or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described underdivision (D)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more ofthe felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender theprison term specified under division (D)(1)(a) of this section for eachof the two most serious specifications of which the offender isconvicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in itsdiscretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specifiedunder that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.
{¶32} The sentencing entry states that Glenn was found guilty of four
counts of felonious assault (Counts 4, 5, 11, and 12) and two counts of
aggravated robbery (Counts 6 and 7). All of these charges included one- and
three-year firearm specifications. Under R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(g), the court was
required to impose prison terms for the two most serious firearm specifications
1 R.C. 2929.14, as amended by H.S. 86, provides the same language in
what is now R.C. 292914(13)(1)(g).
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against that victim and had discretion to impose a sentence for the third firearm
specification. State v. Worth, lOth Dist. No. 10AP-1125, 2012-Ohio-666, ¶ 96.
Glenn--does--not-contend that-the -court- abused its discretion by -imposing --a- ._..
sentence fox• the third firearm specification. Because the sentence was not
contrary to law, and Glenn offers no reason to question the court's discretion, we
find no error.
{¶33} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this ap'peal:
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directi'ng the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The conviction
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NIARY J. BOYLE, P.J., andMARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
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CC 97 1P7Y3
EbB OtatQ ot ®blo, 1 ss.Cuyahoga County. J I, GLRA,LD E, FTJ&RST, Cletk of the Court of
Appeals within and for said County, and in whose custody the files, Journals and records of said Court are
reqaired by the laws otvtlxe S!^e of Ohiojo be, kept, hezeby certify that the foregoing is taken and copied
from the Journal
of rhe proceedings of the Court of Appealstwifhin and for said Cuyahoga Cou y, and that the sai oregoing
copy has been compared by me with the original entry on said Jounial VU-60 ^
and that the same is correct transcript thereof.
.3A lEe8timottp V( ereef, . 1 do hereunto subscribe my nanie officially,
and affix the seal of said court, at the ^ayrt34eu,e in the City of
Cleveland* said Couut
day of
By D
thia
ER4
A.D. 20
FUIFRS'T,) Clerk of
n
iurts
Deputy C'lerk
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