clement atlee and the british labour party

POLI20532 – From Blitz to the Big Society; British Politics Since 1940 7366537 – University ID

The General Election of 1945 produced an overwhelming victory for Clement Attlee and the Labour Party. It took the

mass radicalism engendered by the Second World War to give the party its first Parliamentary majority, and “hence

its first opportunity to test in untrammelled political conditions the potential for substantial social change” (Coates,

1975, p.42).

The party’s distinctive election manifesto of 1945, ‘Let Us Face the Future’, declared the party’s intention to

bring out “…the establishment of the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain - free, democratic, efficient,

progressive, and public-spirited…” (Political Stuff, 2001). The manifesto’s radical promise tapped the aspirations of

an electorate whose experience of austerity and ‘total war’ left many eager for fundamental changes in British

society. It generated a climate of optimism, with the genuine conviction that pre-war poverty and privilege should not

be allowed to return. Hugh Dalton, Attlee’s first Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared triumphantly, “…a new

society was to be built; and we had the power to build it” (Marquand, 2009, p.118).

I

In Britain Since 1918, David Marquand claimed that Attlee’s victory in the 1945 election put “democratic-collectivist

étatisme into the saddle”. Collectivism, from the Latin ‘Colligere’ – “To gather together”, is the belief that collective

human action is morally and practically superior to individual self-striving. It places emphasis on the interdependence

of every human being – holding that an individual’s actions should benefit not themselves, but a collective

community. Collectivists believe that individual submission to the ‘collective goal’ guarantees individuals against

being exploited and subordinated to the ‘goals’ of others.

Étatisme, or ‘statism’, is the belief that the state is at the centre of the political vision. It is a political

philosophy that emphasises the exertion of state control over an individual citizen, and supports the use of the state to

achieve economic, social, or general political goals. It describes the institutions and political practices in which

executive authority gathers increasing levels and varieties of power into its hands, with the aim of achieving goals in

the interests of the majority.

In light of these definitions, it is the thesis of this essay that Attlee’s 1945 – 1951 Administration did not put

“democratic-collectivist étatisme into the saddle”. By evaluating the Nationalisation programme (Section II), the

Welfare Programme and Social Reforms (Section III), and the Economy and Economic Planning (Section IV), one


will suggest that instead of creating a more egalitarian, collectivist, and socialist society, Clement Attlee’s

Administration nurtured British capitalism – steering it through a period of stress in the aftermath of the Second

World War. The Administration’s policies failed to revolutionise the lives of the people it claimed to support.

II

The Public Ownership programme was the ‘distinctive side’ of the Government’s plans – a symbolic charge that the

party stood for “social transformation rather than mere social reform” (Marquand, 2009, p.131). It was, as Clement

Attlee assured the Party conference in 1945, “our Socialist policy, which we must carry out as rapidly and

energetically as we can” (Shaw, 1996, p.24).

According to the 1945 election manifesto, ‘Let Us Face the Future’, “…each industry must have applied to it

the test of ‘national service’. If it serves the nation, well and good; if it is inefficient…the nation must see that things

are put right” (Political Stuff, 2001). Industries were required by constructive supervision “to further the nation’s

needs…not to prejudice national interests by restrictive anti-social monopoly” (Political Stuff, 2001). Labour’s unity

and momentum meant a phase of extraordinary legislative activism between 1945 – 1949; in these four years, the

Attlee Administration had initiated “state takeovers of certain branches of the economy” (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988,

p.219) - nationalising the Bank of England, Cable and Wireless, civil aviation, electricity and gas supply, coal

mining, the railways, long-distance road haulage, and finally, the iron and steel industry {in the face of “intense

Conservative political and industrial opposition”} (Coates, 1975, p.44). By 1951, over two million workers had been

transferred from the private to the public sector. It is true to say that Labour’s nationalisation schemes surpassed all

previous measures. However, despite these achievements, the aims of the programme, at its critical points, were

vague, ambiguous, and abstruse. The party leadership was more concerned with accommodating Labour’s enemies

than with a genuine socialist programme.

The nationalisation programme strengthened the private sector, reinforcing the economic and social position of its

ruling groups. It “relieved [the private sector] of its responsibility for industries requiring vast new investment

programmes” (Howell, 1976, p.153), and “…provided them instead with an infrastructure of publically owned basic

industries whose pricing policies could be designed so as to subsidise the private sector” (Coates, 1975, p.52). Its

pattern of public ownership had strengthened the very classes it had promised to reform – it did not shift the balance

between labour and capital. It had failed to “achieve a fundamental transformation in the balance of class power, both


within individual industries and in society as a whole” (Francis, 1997, p.66). As Ralph Miliband opined, “the

Government enjoyed the co-operation of private industry. Or, more accurately, private industry enjoyed the co-

operation of the Government” (Miliband, 1961, p.290). Over 80% of the economy remained in private hands – its

piecemeal legislation to nationalise one-fifth of the economy was a departure from previously held beliefs. The

‘Labour Believes in Britain’ policy statement, released in 1949, said that nationalisation was only appropriate where

private enterprise was ‘failing the nation’. Labour had accepted the ‘mixed economy’ – a stark betrayal of Clause IV

of the party constitution, “To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry…upon the

common ownership of the means of production” (The Socialist, 2008). The public ownership programme initiated by

the Attlee Administration was not as statist or centralist as David Marquand suggested. It failed to put the levers of

economic power into the hands of the state. Furthermore, compensation schemes paid by the Labour Government

were “inconceivably generous” (Shaw, 1996, p.25). The compensation schemes “…lessened the redistribution of

class power in post-war British society…strengthening the prestige of the very groups which had prospered amid

inter-war depression” (Coates, 1975, p.52). David Marquand suggested the nationalisation programme “allowed the

state to channel economic forces in the direction that the public interest required” (Marquand, 2009, p.131).

Collectivism was non-existent. The profiteering rich and the oligarchs of newly-nationalised industries re-invested

their compensation money in the private profitable sector. Individual self-striving remained prominent – much to the

disillusionment of the working-classes. Attlee’s Administration acted as a manager of capitalism – justifying it

without shame.

Labour’s nationalisation programme also led to a lack of democracy in the workplace. The schemes failed to

challenge the workplace hierarchy of the “managerial responsibilities on the one hand, and the trade union functions

and workers’ tasks on the other” (Coates, 1975, p.50). Between 1948 and 1949, “thirty-four resolutions at the Labour

party conferences dealt with democratic control of nationalised industries, supporting workers’ participation, and the

inclusion of more Socialists on the boards of industries” (Rubinstein, 1977). Instead of participative forms of

organisations, new Morrisonian public-corporations were introduced. They were undemocratic and bureaucratically

structured, with “traditional status divisions between management and workforce perpetuated” (Shaw, 1996, p.25).

These new public corporations were headed by members of the “managerial and ownership class of the former

private industries” (Coates, 1975, p.48). For example, the head of the National Coal Board had previously been head

of one of the largest private colliery companies in the country. The Labour Party had accepted the traditional


capitalist managerial rule. They restricted workers in the decision-making process – forbidding them to exercise full

control of their own industrial destinies. Many workers were dissatisfied with the ‘fruits’ of nationalisation – the

Railway Review reported that at the end of 1948, “45% of the 485 railwaymen who replied to their questionnaire felt

frustration had increased after a year of nationalisation” (Rubinstein, 1977). There had been no change under public

ownership – “private capitalists were reassured that their interests were being looked after” (Cliff and Gluckstein,

1988, p.222). The workers were alienated and pessimistic of future nationalisation schemes. Ownership had changed;

power did not.

III

As opined by Edmund Dell, the “Attlee Government’s enduring monument is the welfare state” (Dell, 2000, p.138).

The expansion of the Welfare State was based on three Acts – the National Health Service Act 1946, the National

Insurance Act 1946, and the National Assistance Act 1948. The Labour Government’s welfare achievements were

real and of lasting value; “a challenge to the inherited structure of social inequality” (Coates, 1975, p.47).

Despite the tenuous finances of the country (the initial stages of the Welfare State were to be funded by the $4

billion American loan that Britain received in December 1945), the ‘Let Us Face the Future’ manifesto pledged the

establishment of a universal healthcare service that would be available free for all. It committed itself to a house-

building programme – “it will proceed with a housing programme with the maximum practical speed until every

family in this island has a good standard of accommodation” (Political Stuff, 2001). It promised to create a system of

universally available social insurance, “providing guaranteed minimum incomes to those subject to unemployment,

ill-health, industrial accidents, disablement, infirmity and old-age” (Coates, 1975, p.46). The Attlee Administration

promised to maintain ‘Jobs For All’ – the continuation of the highly successful “Full Employment” programme

established on a collectivist-consensual basis during the wartime coalition government. Finally, in terms of

Education, the Labour Party promised “an educational system that will give every boy and girl a chance to develop

the best that is in them” (Political Stuff, 2001). On paper, these were to be “one of social democracy’s finest

accomplishments” (Shaw, 1995, p.37) – enshrining the fundamental values of socialism.

The origins of a comprehensive national health service date back before the beginnings of the Attlee Administration

in 1945. The Liberal Health Insurance Schemes of 1906, along with the Dawson Report 1920, and the Royal

Commission on National Health Insurance 1926, point to the existence of a democratic-collectivist consensus for a


national scheme, “dictated by the logic of circumstances, rather than by the ideology of politicians or the demands of

pressure groups” (Kavanagh and Morris, 1989, p.74). The introduction of the health service, to combat the ‘giants’ of

“Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness”, furthered notable collectivist and egalitarian ideals. The creation

of the NHS was seen as a turning point for the Attlee Administration. With a free universal health service, it is true of

David Marquand to suggest that “étatisme was put into the saddle” – the state played an integral role in the vision and

achievement of this social goal. Healthcare was no longer a ‘commodity’ – the “state suppressed the unfairness of the

market…so the service was run on merit and pursuing the public interest” (Marquand, 2009, p.131). The immediate

results of the NHS were staggering. The Rowntree Foundation, in 1950, found that poverty in a working-class area of

York had reduced by 25% - mainly due to the universal healthcare service and the implementation of the ‘full-

employment’ programme. Despite these accomplishments, the National Health Service spending never “exceeded

4.5% of Britain’s GNP; compared to the Netherlands (5.9%), the US (6.8%) and Canada (7.3%)” (Cliff and

Gluckstein, 1988, pp.225 – 226). These important social reforms were imperative to improving the quality of life for

the working-class electorate; however, power had not shifted between the classes. The qualitative social

transformation of “privilege, wealth, and equality of opportunity” (Coates, 1975, p.47) had not come. In terms of

spending on Welfare benefits, Britain compared unfavourably with other European countries. For instance, “West

Germany, France, and Spain offered a number of welfare benefits more generous than those in Britain” (Cliff and

Gluckstein, 1988, p.226).

During the first three years of the Attlee Government, “750,000 new homes were built” (Marquand, 2009,

p.122) – an incredible achievement for an Administration who were attempting to ease the transition from total war to

a state of peace. The Housing policy was based on “specifically socialist ideals; based on the concepts of provision on

the basis of need and the right to a quality service irrespective of purchasing power” (Francis, 1997, p.129). Under the

guardianship of Aneurin Bevan, the Labour Administration was able to inject a specifically collectivist, socialist

element into its social security programme. In spite of the triumphs, when Labour left office in 1951, there was still

“an immense pool of uncleared slums and unsatisfied demand remained” (Marquand, 2009, p.122). The physical

destruction of cities, as a result of the Second World War, remained prominent.

Finally, the Education system, after the Attlee Administration, remained the “most divisive, unjust, and wasteful of

all the aspects of social inequality” (Francis, 1997, p.141). The Labour Party, when in power, failed to use the

education system as a tool to create a more egalitarian society. It failed to introduce a distinctly socialist policy –


choosing instead to continue to implement the Education Act of 1944. The education system was largely neglected –

the equality of opportunity and access remained a distance dream. Selective education remained (predominantly

based on the unfair 11-plus examination) – the British education system remained distinctly unmeritocratic and bias

towards the middle-classes.

True to its promise of alleviating the individual from the endemic destitution, the Labour Administration, in

democratic-collectivist and statist style, created a framework by which the working-classes were able to improve their

lives. The state played an integral role in what was to become an enduring domestic legacy – with which the benefits

it brought to the British people at large are not in doubt. Nevertheless, these reforms, initiated by the Labour Party,

depended almost “entirely on the vigour of national capitalism” (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988, p.227). The health of the

nation was subordinated to the health of capitalism frequently throughout Clement Attlee’s time in office. Whether it

is the rearmament programme, or the establishment of the nuclear weapons programme, “social reforms were

attacked with increasing ferocity whenever things became tight” (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988, p.227).

IV

At the end of the Second World War, the British economy was “nearly-bankrupt and grossly overstretched”

(Marquand, 2009, p.123) – its prestige and wealth had been severely reduced. With “accumulated debts of £2,723

million” (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988, p.228), Britain had gone from being the largest creditor to the world’s largest

debtor – the search for national solvency was the Attlee Administration’s main aim.

The 1945 ‘Let Us Face the Future’ election manifesto stated that “Labour was to plan from the ground up”

(Political Stuff, 2001). Private investment and development was to conform to government purposes. The manifesto

attacked the “Czars of big business…in whose hands the concentration of too much economic power was held”

(Political Stuff, 2001). Labour was going to stand up against the chaos of “economic do-as-they-anarchy” –

promoting the use of economic assets in the interests of the electorate. It was a fiercely anti-capitalist, pro-collectivist

pledge. With the use of the state to achieve economic goals, it aimed to “reduce the rainy days to a minimum”

(Political Stuff, 2001). Despite the election pledges, the aims of the manifesto were not achieved. The Attlee

Administration had diluted its socialist commitment – “abandoning it in favour of Keynesian-inspired expedients”

(Francis, 1997, p.34).


Economic Planning had a limited impact, “and did not markedly transform either class relations or capitalist

economic imperatives” (Coates, 1975, p.55). There was no central planning department, and the National Investment

Board, proposed in the ‘Let Us Face the Future’ manifesto “to determine social priorities and promote better timing in

private investment” (Political Stuff, 2001), was never established. The Labour Government of 1945 – 1951 did not

use the planning machinery it had inherited from the wartime coalition to curtail the economic power and social

privileges of the classes it attacked in its manifesto. Instead, “it sought a close and co-operative working relationship

with them” (Coates, 1975, p.56). The controls which the Labour Party inherited were essentially negative – “they can

stop activity but they cannot promote it” (Dell, 2000, p.148). The Attlee Administration, by 1947, had dismantled the

“complete edifice of war-time controls” (Coates, 1975, p.58). This was the first steps towards a ‘free economy’ – the

Attlee Government had succumbed to the pressure of profit-aspiring private corporations. The Labour Party had

discredited economic planning – failing to transform the private capitalist society that prospered during the

depression of the 1930’s. David Marquand’s claim that the 1945 – 1951 put “étatisme into the saddle” can be

disputed. From 1947 – onwards, the Labour Party disassociated itself from the levers of economic control. Instead,

the government attached itself to Keynesian-style economic policies. It promoted the market economy and private,

self-interested entrepreneurial activity. It was a complete “defeat for the government at the hands of the private

industry” (Shaw, 1995, p.32). The dramatically altering direction of the Government’s economic policy from 1947 –

onwards led to an unprecedented draconian attack on the people it claimed to represent and serve.

The terms of the Land-Lease Plan and Marshall Aid, a programme to enable European economies to rebuild

after the Second World War, allowed the British Pound to be freely convertible into American Dollars. During the

Attlee Administration, this led to three sterling crises (1947, 1949 and 1951). It resulted in “delayed investment,

slowed technical change, low productivity, and weakened Britain’s competitive position in the world” (Cliff and

Gluckstein, 1988, p.230). The result of the sterling crises led to an economic policy far from being based on the

notions of collectivism. There were basic cuts in basic rations of meat, fat, sugar, and other foodstuffs. As David

Marquand opined, “Food was adequate, but dismal; queues were ubiquitous; black markets flourished” (Marquand,

2009, p.122). In addition, “the average calorie intake per person per day was cut by nearly 14%” (Cliff and

Gluckstein, 1988, p.230). There was a sharp reduction in consumer spending power, large reductions in living

standards, workers were required to pay higher taxes, and under the government White Paper entitled ‘Statement on

Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices’, there would be no increase in wages, salaries or dividends. The Tribune


Magazine in 1948 enthusiastically claimed that the austerity policy and wage freeze was “bold” and “understandably

adequate” (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988, p.249). Collectivism in British society during 1945 – 1951 was an illusion; a

fallacious ideal. As Ralph Miliband highlights in Parliamentary Socialism, it was “much easier to place the major

share of the burden on the poor than on the rich” (Miliband, 1961, p.313). The Attlee Administration grew “more

conservative in its attempt to encourage private growth” (Coates, 1975, p.66). It had created an environment in which

private enterprise could flourish – “strengthening the political and economic position of the very social groups that it

had once promised to bring down” (Coates, 1975, p.66). The Labour Party had promised socialism – expectations that

were not fulfilled. They, instead of creating a collectivist society ‘at home’, continued to fund extravagant

rearmament programmes to salvage Britain’s dwindling imperialist role in the world. The Labour Party attacked the

very people it claimed to support – a negation of its aims at a domestic level. They were the “epitome of austerity”

(Dell, 2000, p.202) – the electorate were asked to suffer because of the failings of its government.

V

The Labour Administration of 1945 – 1951, led by Clement Attlee, was the zenith of social reconstruction – “…

ranked with the great reforming governments of Gladstone and Asquith” (Marquand, 2009, pp.118 – 119). The

creation of the Welfare State, its most memorable and significant achievement, improved the war-torn lives of

millions of the British electorate. The Labour Party were the ‘people’s party’ – its popularity showed no signs of

slowing down. Memberships had exceeded the one-million mark by 1950, and its share of the popular vote continued

to grow in successive general elections – “…in the 1951 election, Labour achieved the highest poll ever for one party

– 13,948,605 votes – with only the vagaries of the electoral system keeping them out of office” (Cliff and Gluckstein,

1988, p.253).

Despite these accomplishments, one believes it is wrong of David Marquand to suggest that the Attlee

Administration put “democratic-collectivist étatisme into the saddle”. The concentration of capital and economic

privilege remained, and the “old power structure was undeniably intact” (Coates, 1975, p.74). Collectivism was

missing, and statism was absent. The Attlee Administration failed to reform the classes it rightfully attacked in its

1945 election manifesto. The Labour Party represented a wave of hope and optimism – with many believing they

would help to make the world a better place. It failed, however, to champion the rights of the working-people – it

used draconian measures to stifle their voices. By 1951, class, gender, and economic differences resulted in a “British

society that had reverted back to being highly divided” (Fielding et al, 1995, p.128). As John Saville highlights in Jim


Firth’s Labour’s High Noon, the Attlee Administration’s legacy in office “provided a springboard for the rich to take

off into the profiteers’ paradise of the 1950s” (Saville in Fyrth, 1993, p.37).

Word Count – 2,093 words.

Bibliography and References:

Books:

Cliff, Tony, and Gluckstein, Donny (1988), “The Labour Party – A Marxist History”, Cox and Wyman Publishers, Reading.

Coates, David (1975), “The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism”, Cambridge University Press, London.

Dell, Edmund (2000), “A Strange Eventful History – Democratic Socialism in Britain”, Harper Collins Publishers, London.

Fielding, Steven, Thompson, Peter, Tiratsoo, Nick (1995), “England Arise! The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain”, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Francis, Martin (1997), “Ideas and Policies under Labour 1945 – 1951: Building a New Britain”, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Fyrth, Jim (1993), “Labour’s High Noon – Government and the Economy 1945 – 1951”, Lawrence and Wishart Publishers, London.

Howell, David (1976), “British Social Democracy: A Study in Development and Decay”, Croom Helm Publishers, London.

Kavanagh, Dennis, and Morris, Peter (1989), “Consensus Politics from Attlee to Thatcher”, Basil Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

Marquand, David (2009), “Britain since 1918 – The Strange Career of British Democracy”, Phoenix Publishers, London.

Miliband, Ralph (1961), “Parliamentary Socialism: A Study of the Politics of Labour”, Allen and Unwin Publishers, London.

Shaw, Eric (1996), “The Labour Party since 1945”, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

Internet Websites:

Rubinstein, David, “Socialism and the Labour Party – The Labour Left and Domestic Policy 1945 – 1951”. Published in 1977. Accessed at http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/pages/History/Lableft.html. Date Accessed; 01/03/2012.

Political Stuff, “The 1945 Labour Party Election Manifesto – Let Us Face the Future; A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation”. Published in 2001. Accessed at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1945/1945-labour-manifesto.shtml. Date Accessed; 12/03/2012.

The Socialist Party Newspaper, “1918 – 2008; Clause IV and Nine Decades of Workers’ Struggle”. Published on 20th February 2008. Accessed at http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/3792 . Date Accessed; 01/03/2012.

http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/3792

http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1945/1945-labour-manifesto.shtml

http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/pages/History/Lableft.html

clement atlee and the british labour party

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