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Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

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Page 1: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

Classification ofQuantum Repeater Attacks

Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meterat SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

Page 2: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Presentation Outline• Quantum Repeater and its elements• Model of Quantum Repeater• Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks

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Page 3: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

Quantum Repeater and its elements

Page 4: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Quantum Application and Repeater• A quantum application, or its server will use quantum state

teleported from client to do something interesting

• To create Quantum Internet, we need to have a way to application client to send a quantum state to a quantum application server

• Quantum repeater, which take the roles of a router in classical internet, is a key to create Quantum Internet

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Page 5: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki / Keio University. All Rights Reserved

Example

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QNIC

QKD Device

QNIC QNIC

Repeater

QNIC

QKD Device

Firbre/Freespace

Classical

IKEdaemon

QKDplugin

IKEdaemon

QKDpluginQKD level exchange

Classical(IP)

IKE level exchange

API call/RPC

DeviceAPI

DeviceAPI

Host(on startup init)

Host(on startup init)

IKEAPI

IKEAPI

API orInterface

QNIC QNIC

Repeater

QuantumSocket

I/F

QuantumSocket

I/F

Inter-RepeaterEntanglement/Purification

Protocols

IPsec Connection (encrypted, secured)

Page 6: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Quantum Repeater Elements• Qubits• Fidelity of a Qubit• Entanglement• Bell Pair and Teleportation• Fidelity and Purification• Entanglement Swapping• Multi-hop entanglement by Purification and Entanglement

swap• Quantum Repeater

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Page 7: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Qubits• Each qubits represents single quantum state• May hold either simple state or complex states like

superposition• Measuring the state of a qubit cause state collapse

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x

y

z

1

0

By Glosser.ca, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Bloch Sphere

Page 8: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Fidelity of a Qubit• How well the qubit hardware correctly represents the state we

want to set is important• Described by the fidelity of the qubit

– e.g., you want set direction of the spin of an electron, and how close the spin actually points to your desired direction is the fidelity

• Essentially, it’s the probability that the state does what you want when you use/measure it

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x

y

z

1

0

Page 9: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Entanglement• By using some known procedure, it is possible to create

entangled pairs of qubits• Some operations on one entangled qubit affects the other ➡ does not mean we can remotely flip a qubit!

• Happens over any distance➡ cannot be used to send data faster than light

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Page 10: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Bell Pair and Teleportation• Bell Pair, which is a kind of entanglement state, can be used

to teleport one quantum state from one side of the entanglement to the other side

• Current known scheme allow to create Bell Pair among two distant qubits connected via a fiber

• Requires supporting classical communication

• Destroys entanglement➡ so making more

entanglement is the work of the network!

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(1) A coupled with B, then both A and B measured

(2) Apply operation by the measurementresult transforms C to state of A

A

B

C

Cnew

1

2

Page 11: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Fidelity and Purification• Just created entanglement between two nodes may not have

desired fidelity• Various qubit operations may diminish fidelity, too

• To use for communication, either improve fidelity of the qubit or apply error correction scheme using multiple qubits

• Purification protocol creates single better fidelity entangled pair from two entangled pairs

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Page 12: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Entanglement Swapping• Entanglement swapping operation extends distance of

entangled qubits by splicing two pairs of entanglements into one

• After entanglement swapping, qubits in the middle node does not provide any role, can be reused

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Node A Node B Node C

Page 13: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Multi-hop entanglementby Purification and Entanglement swap

• By using purification and entanglement swap repeatedly in coordinated manner among nodes, we can create entangled qubits between any two user specified nodes

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Page 14: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Qubits - security point of view• When Alice and Bob want to communicate, we want

– Detect existence of any eavesdropper– To be sure Alice and Bob are actually communicating

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Page 15: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Detection of eavesdroppers• By applying quantum tomography on randomly select

entangled qubits to detect eavesdropper

• But If an eavesdropper can predict the selection of qubits for quantum tomography, he/she can remain undetectable by not touching the selected qubit

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Page 16: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

Model of Quantum Repeater System

Page 17: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Quantum Repeater Node

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QNICQNIC qubitsRealtime Controller

QNICQNIC qubitsRealtime Controller

Quantum LinksQuantum Repeater Node

Classical Links

To

Other

QNodes

To

Classical

Network

Buffer qubitsQBufferRealtime Controller

CNICNode Controller

Page 18: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Quantum Application Node

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QNICQNIC qubitsRealtime Controller

Quantum LinksQuantum Application Node

Classical Links

To

Other

QNodes

To

Classical

Network

Term. qubitsQApplicationRealtime Controller

CNICNode Controller

Page 19: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Peculiarities of Quantum Repeaters• Quantum operation require classical communications

• Requires realtime operation

• Hop by hop decision on each router is not feasible

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Page 20: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Quantum operation requireclassical communications

• Many of the operation on entangled pair, or teleportation require communication using classical information system

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Page 21: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Requires Realtime operation• Operation should be done in realtime, synchronized manner

– All of the operation onto qubits must be controlled by realtime manner

– Some of the operation among nodes should be done in accurately synchronized clocks

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Page 22: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Hop by hop decision is not feasible• (Extending entanglement one hop at a time is not feasible)

• Creation of end-to-end entanglement require repeated and coordinated creation of entanglements among participating nodes in between two end nodes– Creation of an entangled pair require physical connection– Qubit’s fidelity decays as time passes

• Purification require two entangled pairs on same nodes

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Page 23: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

Classification of Attacks

Page 24: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Elements Groupingwrt attack vector characteristics

• Qubits– Terminal qubits– Interface qubits– Buffer qubits

• Channels– In-node quantum channels– Inter-node quantum channels– Inter-node classical channels

• Classical node resources24

Page 25: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Qubits• Terminal qubits

– Qubits used as interface to application. Has direct interface to application, but no direct interface to outside of the node

• Interface qubits– Qubits which has direct interface to outside of the node

• Buffer qubits– Qubits which works in between terminal qubits and interface qubits

to work as buffers. No direct interface to application or outside of the node

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Page 26: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Channels• In-node quantum channels• Inter-node quantum channels

• Inter-node classical channels

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Page 27: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Classical node resources• Node has usual classical components such as:

– Power supply and external power– Clocks– Buses– etc, etc…

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Page 28: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Relationship with RFID system• Quantum repeater systems and RFID systems has similar

properties• Both systems are tightly coupled hybrid systems of sensing

and software elements, and also expect to make use of the effects of interaction with the outside world

• Due to this, We have referenced some of discussion on attack to RFID systems

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Page 29: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Attack to Qubits

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Confidentiality Integrity AvailabilityTerminal qubits Eavesdropper

detectablePossibility of out-of-system attacks

Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system

Interface qubits Eavesdropper detectable but direct attack to Quantum interface demonstrated

(same as above) (same as above)

Buffer qubits Eavesdropper detectable

(same as above) (same as above)

Page 30: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Attack to Quantum Channels

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Confidentiality Integrity AvailabilityIn-node quantum channels

Safe N/A Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system

Inter-node quantum channels

Eavesdropper detectable but direct attack to Quantum interface demonstrated

N/A Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system

Page 31: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Attack to Classical Channels and Classical node resources

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Confidentiality Integrity Availability

Inter-node classical channels

Vulnerable to Classical Confidentiality attack possible

N/A Vulnerable to Classical Availability attack possible

Classical node resources

Vulnerable to Classical Confidentiality attack possible

Vulnerable to Classical Integrity attack possible

Vulnerable to Classical Availability attack possible

Page 32: Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks · Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA

© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved

Summary• In this paper, we provided an model of a quantum repeater network and

grouped elements of them, then, provided an analysis on a quantum repeater architecture based on our current knowledge– On confidentiality, quantum repeater systems have great advantage

by applying quantum tomography to detect third party eavesdropper– On integrity and availability, a quantum repeater system seems to be

not so different from a classical network system• Since quantum repeater system heavily depends on classical

information system, classical part is a key to make quantum repeater system secure

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This research has been supported byAsian Office of Aerospace Research and Development,Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant 144051

Acknowledgements