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CLASSICAL SAM. KHYA AND YOGA

Sakhya and Yoga are among the oldest and most influential systems of classicalIndian thought and religious practice. In their classical forms they constitute twoof the six major systems of Hindu philosophy, and their influence has beenpervasive throughout Indian culture. Despite this, much in the core texts ofSakhya and Yoga, the Sakhyakarika and Yogasutra, remains poorly understood.This book provides a thorough examination of Sakhya and Yoga. Placingparticular emphasis on the metaphysical schema which underlies both systems,the author adeptly develops a new interpretation of these systems and exposes theweaknesses of standard views. He shows how SakhyaYoga metaphysics can bemost coherently understood when regarded as an analysis of experience. Drawingupon existing sources and using insights from both Eastern and Westernphilosophy and religious practice, this comprehensive interpretation is respectfulto the underlying spiritual purpose of the Indian systems, whilst illuminating therelation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of Sakhya and Yoga.The book fills a gap in current scholarship and will be of interest to thoseconcerned with Indology, especially Indian philosophies and their similarities anddifferences with other traditions.

Mikel Burley received his PhD in Indian philosophy from the University ofBristol, and currently teaches in the School of Philosophy at the University ofLeeds. His previous publications include Hatha-Yoga: Its Context, Theory andPractice and numerous articles on both Western and Indian philosophy.

ROUTLEDGE HINDU STUDIES SERIESSeries Editor: Gavin Flood, University of Stirling

Former Series Editor: Francis X. Clooney, SJ, Harvard University

The Routledge Hindu Studies Series, in association with the Oxford Centre forHindu Studies, intends the publication of constructive Hindu theological,philosophical and ethical projects aimed at bringing Hindu traditions intodialogue with contemporary trends in scholarship and contemporary society. Theseries invites original, high quality, research level work on religion, culture andsociety of Hindus living in India and abroad. Proposals for annotated translationsof important primary sources and studies in the history of the Hindu religioustraditions will also be considered.

EPISTEMOLOGIES AND THE LIMITATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Doctrine in Madhva VedantaDeepak Sarma

A HINDU CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGYKumarila on perception

The determination of perception chapter of Kumarilabhattas Flokavarttika Translation and commentary

John Taber

FAKARAS ADVAITA VEDANTAA way of teachingJacqueline Hirst

ATTENDING KRSJAS IMAGECaitanya Vaisjava murti-seva as devotional truth

Kenneth Russell Valpey

ADVAITA VEDANTA AND VAISJAVISMThe philosophy of Madhusudana Sarasvati

Sanjukta Gupta

CLASSICAL SAKHYA AND YOGAAn Indian metaphysics of experience

Mikel Burley

CLASSICAL SAM. KHYAAND YOGA

An Indian metaphysics of experience

Mikel Burley

First published 2007by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

2007 Mikel Burley

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,

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information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

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ISBN10: 0415394481 (hbk)ISBN10: 0203966740 (ebk)

ISBN13: 9780415394482 (hbk)ISBN13: 9780203966747 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledgescollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

ISBN 0203966740 Master e-book ISBN

CONTENTS

Series editors preface viiPreface ixNote on the use of italics and underlining xiiiList of abbreviations xiv

Introduction 1

What are classical Sakhya and Yoga? 1The interpretation of Sakhya and Yoga given in this study 5Methodological considerations 7

1 An historical overview of Sakhya and Yoga 15

Early sources 15The classical Sakhya and Yoga texts and their

commentaries 22Post-classical developments 31

2 The relation between the two darfanas 36

The historical relation 37Methodologies 43Metaphysical framework 48

3 Analysing experience: Kantian and phenomenological philosophy 56

Kant and the problem of metaphysics 57Recapitulation and some criticisms of the Kantian view 61Phenomenology and descriptive psychology 64From phenomenological reduction to metaphysical idealism 68The relevance of Kantian and phenomenological thought 69

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4 The imputation of realism 72

The standard interpretation of Sakhya and Yoga (and some of its shortcomings) 73

Yogas alleged refutation of Buddhist idealism 82

5 The nature of prakrti 91

Creation, manifestation and causality 92Prakrti and materiality 97The three strands of prakrti 101

6 The emergence of the manifest principles 108

Cosmos and psyche 109Vertical and horizontal ontologies 110The order of emergence 111The analysis of experience 124The soteriological relevance of the metaphysical schema 129Summary 132

7 Freedom from experience 133

The central interpretive problem of kaivalya 134Ian Whichers view of kaivalya as embodied liberation 138Aloneness and misperception 141Purusa and multiplicity 147Consciousness without content 150

8 Conclusion 156

Appendix A 163

The text of the Sakhyakarika 163The Sakhyakarika in Devanagari and Roman

script, and in English translation 164

Appendix B 180

Diagrammatic representation of classical Sakhyas metaphysical schema 180

Glossary of key Sanskrit terms 181Notes 187Bibliography 205Index 218

CONTENTS

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SERIES EDITORS PREFACE

The Routledge Hindu Studies Series, published in collaboration with the OxfordCentre for Hindu Studies, intends primarily the publication of constructive Hindutheological, philosophical and ethical projects. The focus is on issues andconcerns of relevance to readers interested in Hindu traditions in particular, yetalso in the context of a wider range of related religious concerns that matter intodays world. The Series seeks to promote excellent scholarship and, in relationto it, an open and critical conversation among scholars and the wider audience ofinterested readers. Though contemporary in its purpose, the Series recognizes theimportance of retrieving the classic texts and ideas, beliefs and practices, ofHindu traditions, so that the great intellectuals of these traditions may as it werebecome conversation partners in the conversations of today.

The Indian philosophical tradition known as Sakhya has attracted less attentionfrom scholars than other systems of thought, particularly Vedanta. Yet Sakhya isan extremely important tradition. Although the developed system itself is probablyquite late (not predating the Buddha who died around 400 BCE), Sakhya couldarguably be said to lie at the root of Indian philosophical traditions both in thesense that Sakhya-like speculation can be traced to the very earliest develop-ments, and in the sense that Sakhya categories are assumed and used by the latersystems. The prototypical Indian philosophy is often taken in the West to be somekind of monism, yet Sakhya is an uncompromisingly dualist system thatupholds an ontological distinction between self and matter or nature.Furthermore, it is one of the earliest traditions to offer a description of humanexperience; how contact with the world through the senses occurs, and how thiscontact is processed through our mental apparatus.

Mikel Burleys lucidly clear book is the first for a number of years to offer ahistorical and systematic study of Sakhya. Not only does the book presentSakhya as a system of historical interest or curiosity, it takes the traditionseriously as philosophy and engages with it in terms of philosophical debates inthe West over realism and non-realism, offering a more nuanced interpretation.The book also offers a convincing account of the relationship between Sakhyaand Yoga showing how they share a dualist metaphysics. One of the original

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features of the book is the way it deals with the problem of the fundamentalcategories or tattvas, having both a cosmological and psychological designation.On the one hand they seem to be presented as an account of how the universeunfolds in a causal sequence in which fundamental matter is transformed intomultiple forms, on the other they are presented as an account of how humanexperience arises. The problem can be resolved, argues Burley, if we abandon arealistic and diachronic interpretation in favour of a reading that takes the tattvasas a synchronic analysis of experience. Burley shows how the tattvas can beunderstood in terms of transcendental conditionality rather than as direct causalityand offers an original account of the elements as the forms that must accompanysensory content rather than as material entities that are themselves transformationsof more subtle entities. What makes this an important book is its philosophicallysophisticated readings of the Sakhya and Yoga texts based on an accurateexegesis that offers corrections of previous readings. The power or Burleysphilosophical reading is that it is firmly grounded in close, textual study. Ratherthan an inchoate account of entities beyond direct perceptual grasp, Sakhya is asystematic account of cognition and the senses, a phenomenology of humanexperience akin to accounts developed by Kant and later philosophers. With thisbook we have a return of Sakhya and Yoga as philosophical accounts of humanbeing in the world which need to be taken seriously by all engaged with Indianand comparative philosophy.

Gavin FloodSeries Editor

SERIES EDITORS PREFACE

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PREFACE

I began thinking hard about the meaning of metaphysics in classical Sakhya andYoga in 1996, when I undertook a research MA on this subject at the Universityof Nottingham. At that time I was quite attracted to the view that the sotericaspirations of Sakhya and Yoga involve merely a dissociation of ones sense ofidentity from the panoply of spatiotemporal objects and events that arise andsubside in the world around us. On this view, the process of attaining aloneness(kaivalya) or release (moksa) is one of steadily reducing and eventually eradi-cating ones false identification with worldly phenomena including supposedlyinternal phenomena such as thoughts and sensations but it need not have anyontological consequences for the phenomena themselves. Of course, if oneengages in a disciplined programme of yogic meditation then, inevitably, the sortsof thoughts and feelings that arise in ones consciousness will be modifiedthereby (although not in a way that is necessarily predictable). But the thoughtsand feelings, and other mental activities (vrttis) will still exist, and so will theentities one experiences out there in the world. This might be called thereformist view of Sakhya and Yoga: it sees the goal of these systems asconsisting in a shift of self-identity accompanied by a purification of onesexperience at the levels of emotional responsiveness, perceptual acuity, andgeneral epistemic performance: we come, through the sustained implementationof yogic techniques, to know ourselves and the world more thoroughly we seethings as they truly are.

After completing my MA at Nottingham in 1997, I moved my focus ofattention to Tantric traditions of Yoga, especially hatha-yoga, and explored thisfascinating area both theoretically and practically. This research involved someintensive training in India and Nepal, and resulted in my first book, Hatha-Yoga:Its Context, Theory and Practice (2000). Hatha-yoga tends to be saturated withelaborate symbolism, as does Tantrism more generally. The theory underlying thepractice is so overlaid with imagery relating to tutelary deities, energy channels(nadis) and plexuses (cakras), mythological creatures and the coiled serpent-power (kujdalini-fakti) that the pithy mnemonic statements of classical YogasYogasutra appear arid by comparison. This imagery creates a rich and colourfulmythic environment within which Tantric practice occurs. It is an environment

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that can, however, be worrying for those such as myself who have a persistentintellectual urge to ask: What does this all mean?

Thus I have repeatedly been drawn back to the classical darfanas (viewpoints,systems) to the apothegmatic threads of the Yogasutra and the dense poetryof the Sakhyakarika. And it was in these two religio-philosophical systems thatI immersed myself from 2001, when I began working in earnest on the project thatresulted in my PhD at the University of Bristol (2005), and, after some substantialrevisions of my doctoral dissertation, in the book that you are now reading.

As my study of the traditional texts deepened, the reformist reading becameincreasingly less plausible to me. I began to see that what Sakhya and Yogaadvocate is more than a process of bringing our experience progressively intocloser conformity with the true nature of empirical reality. Instead, they seem tobe proposing something more radical, namely that we should come to recognizethat empirical reality is purely contingent. It is not a collection of entities thatexists independently of its being encountered by conscious subjects, but is, rather,generated as a consequence of (something approximating) that very encounter.The encounter in question is between two principles, one of them being whatSakhya generally calls the self (purusa) and Yoga calls the seer (drastr), andthe other being what Sakhya generally calls prakrti and Yoga calls the seeable(drfya). Of these terms, I find prakrti the hardest to translate by a single Englishterm. Etymologically, it is very close to the words procreate and procreatrix,the latter of which has the sense of a feminine creative source or mother. Theseimplications of creativity and femininity are perfectly apt for prakrti; however,procreatrix is too unfamiliar a word to serve as a workable translation, andprocreate is not nounal enough.

Prakrti has typically been translated as matter (or as primordial matter andsimilar expressions), which is a highly problematic translation because it is solikely to be interpreted in a narrowly realist sense. By this I mean that it is liableto be construed as referring primarily to the sort of stuff that common sense andmost contemporary science tell us composes the physical universe that we inhabitand roam around in. On the whole, people assume that this universe, thoughaffected by our physical actions, is not touched by our mere experience of it.I think the confusions that arise from assuming that prakrti is matter in thatsense are littered throughout the secondary literature on Sakhya and Yoga.My view now is that prakrti is matter only in the sense that it is that which makesup the matter of experience. It is, very roughly speaking, the content of experi-ence, but is also its own formal container. Purusa, meanwhile, is the bare witness,to whom container and content are displayed. This metaphor is too crude to takeus very far, but it gets us started. The crucial point is that, if prakrti is the matterof experience, then it makes no sense to think of prakrti and its manifestations asreal in a sense that implies mind-independence. According to Sakhya andYoga, the mindworld (or empirical-selfworld) distinction is something thatoccurs within experience, rather than experience being something that happenswithin the mind. Thus, for these systems, there is no sense in which experience

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and ones conception of selfhood can be transformed without, at the same time,the empirical world being transformed.

Ultimately the goal of Sakhya and Yoga is to reach a self-sufficient state, inwhich all empirical factors have been disidentified with and experience possessesno further purpose. At that point, experience ceases, and hence the world ceasestoo. This might be called the abolitionist interpretation of Sakhya and Yoga,since it takes it to be the view of these systems that the liberated state is not onein which experience has been emotionally and epistemically purified or reformed;rather, experience, and the world that featured in it, have been abolished. Thisinterpretation tends to produce in us more discomfort than the reformist one, forunderstandable reasons. We are, after all, very attached to the idea that experienceis something worth having, and worth having in itself, not merely because it is ameans to some higher spiritual end. Sakhya and Yoga do not promise us anafterlife in heaven. They do speak of heavenly realms, but these are merelytemporary stations that offer less distressing modes of experience from that whichwe endure in the present life; they are not the final destination. That finaldestination is not merely beyond words, but beyond experience, and hencenothing intelligible can be said about it.

I do, at various places, and in Chapter 7 in particular, try to say somethingintelligible about the liberated state. But for the most part, the reader will be gladto hear, I try to stick to matters about which intelligible things can be said, notablythe metaphysical schema that forms the contribution to philosophical theory forwhich Sakhya in particular is most immediately recognized. Whether whatI have said about it succeeds in being intelligible is a matter that readers will haveto judge for themselves.

There are many people whose assistance has enabled me in one way or anotherto bring this project to its current state. Looking back to my years as an under-graduate at the University of Essex (19901993), Id like to thank Jay Bernstein(now at The New School for Social Research, New York) for his inspiring lecturesand seminars on Kants critical philosophy and on phenomenology. Little did I(or he) know at the time how these strands of modern Western thought wouldinform my thinking about classical Indian philosophy. It was also at Essex thatI first met Nick Bunnin (now Director of the Institute for Chinese Studies,University of Oxford), whose dual commitment to Western and Chinese philoso-phy has spurred me to persevere with my own peculiar menagerie of interests.

My teachers at the University of Nottingham were Jonardon Ganeri (now at theUniversity of Liverpool) and Brian Carr (now at the University of Exeter). I amgrateful to both of them, and also to Ian Whicher (now at the University ofManitoba), who I first met in Cambridge at that time and with whom I have sincehad some interesting correspondence. Our views on Yoga have diverged increasinglyover the years, and he will not agree with the interpretation presented herein; butdisagreement is not unfruitful in philosophy.

The doctoral research that forms the more immediate background of this bookwas supervised by John Peacock at the University of Bristol. I wish to thank him,

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and other members of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, notablyPaul Williams and Rupert Gethin. Staff at Bristols Arts and Social SciencesLibrary also deserve thanks for their efficiency in obtaining the many out-of-printobscurities that I requested.

At Routledge, Dorothea Schaefter and Tom Bates have guided the booktowards publication. I extend my thanks to them, and to two anonymous reviewerswho provided helpful comments on an early draft; and also to Gavin Flood(Universities of Oxford and Stirling) who, as editor of the Hindu Studies Series,has been immensely supportive from the outset.

Parts of Chapter 7 formed the basis of an article, Aloneness and theProblem of Realism in Classical Sakhya and Yoga, which was published inAsian Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 3 (November 2004). I am grateful to the editors ofthat journal, Indira Mahalingam and Brian Carr, and to Carfax Publishing(http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/carfax/09552367.html) for permission to re-usethe material in this book.

On a more personal note, I wish to thank my parents, Stephanie and Roger, whohave not only tolerated but actively encouraged my idiosyncratic pursuits; andSue Richardson, without whom I dont know where I would be.

Mikel BurleyUniversity of Leeds

December 2005

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NOTE ON THE USE OF ITALICS ANDUNDERLINING

In the literature on Indian philosophy there is no universal standard of practiceconcerning the italicization of Sanskrit terms. Some scholars invariably italicizethem, while others do so very sparingly. Although I do not claim to be entirelyconsistent in my use of italics, I generally employ them in the following cases:(a) when a Sanskrit term is being used for the first time in the work as a whole;(b) when the term (or phrase, etc.) appears in parentheses to indicate what anEnglish term is intended to stand for; (c) when it is the word itself, or the concept,that is being indicated, as distinct from the referrent of the word; (d) in footnotes,when the original version of a sentence or verse that has been quoted in the maintext is given.

In several places, when quoting from the works of other scholars, I have madeuse of underlining as a means of emphasizing certain terms or statements. This isto avoid confusion when the original passage already contains one or more itali-cized words. In those cases where the original passage contains no italics, I havemyself used italics for the purpose of supplying emphasis. I have acknowledgedall cases where emphasis has been added.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ahir. Ahirbudhnya-sahitaBhG/Gita BhagavadgitaBrhad. Brhadarajyaka-upanisadBSBh Brahmasutrabhasya (of Fakkaracarya)CPR/Critique Kants Critique of Pure Reason [I have followed the standard

practice of indicating its first and second editions by the lettersA and B respectively]

EIP Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (general editor, Karl Potter)EIP4 Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4, entitled: Sakhya:

A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy, edited by Larson andBhattacharya

GBh Gaudapadabhasya (of Gaudapada)Maitr. Maitrayajiya-/Maitri-upanisadMBh MahabharataMW MonierWilliams SanskritEnglish DictionaryProl. Kants Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsSK/Karika Sakhyakarika (of Ifvarakrsja)SPBh Sakhyapravacanabhasya (of Vijanabhiksu)SS Sakhyasutra (attributed to Kapila)SSV Sakhyasutravrtti (of Aniruddha)STV Sakhyataruvasanta (of Mudumba Narasihasvamin)Fvet. Fvetafvatara-upanisadTK Tattvakaumudi (of Vacaspatimifra)TV Tattvavaifaradi (of Vacaspatimifra)up. UpanisadWebsters Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language (unabridged), 16th edn, 3 vols (paginated consecutively)YBh/Bhasya Yogabhasya (attributed to Vyasa)YD YuktidipikaYS Yogasutra (attributed to Patajali)YV Yogavarttika (of Vijanabhiksu)

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INTRODUCTION

The present work is the result of a detailed inquiry into the classical systems ofIndian philosophy known as Sakhya and Yoga. My aim has been to develop aninterpretation that takes seriously the claim of these systems to provide a com-prehensive strategy for the overcoming of suffering and discontent by means ofspiritual awakening.

Many previous attempts have been made by scholars to present the philosophiesof Sakhya and Yoga in an intelligible fashion, and some of these have madeextremely valuable contributions to a general understanding of the subject. I amnot, however, convinced that any previous interpretation has adequately explainedthe relation between, on the one hand, the schema of metaphysical principles orcategories set forth systematically in the Sakhyakarika and alluded to in theYogasutra, and, on the other hand, the professed salvific goal of establishing theself (purusa) or seer (drastr) in a state of immaculate disassociation fromempirical existence. I do not claim to have unravelled all the intricate mysteriesof Sakhya and Yoga; indeed, it would not be feasible to try to cover every aspectof these systems within a single study. I do, however, feel confident that theaspects I have focused upon have been dealt with here in a way that represents asignificant advance on much of the existing interpretive literature.

What are classical Sakhya and Yoga?

I have already referred to Sakhya and Yoga as systems of Indian philosophy.When I use the term systems in this way, the Sanskrit term that I have chiefly inmind is darfana. A darfana is literally a vision, an event of seeing; but, morefiguratively, it has traditionally been used to mean a worldview or systematicattempt to represent how reality is. Thus a darfana can be said to be a philosophy,or a philosophical viewpoint or system.

As is to be expected from a highly evolved culture, or collection of cultures,with a history as long and colourful as that of the Indian subcontinent, the num-ber of darfanas that could be listed is very large indeed. In order to classify themin a manageable way, the standard method has been to distinguish them accord-ing to broad religious affiliations. Thus, in most textbooks on Indian philosophy,

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we find the darfanas divided into those which are orthodox (astika) and thosewhich are non-orthodox or heterodox (nastika). Astika is an affirmative expres-sion, translatable as it is or there is, which, in the present context, is taken toimply acceptance of the divinely inspired and infallible nature of the Vedas.Nastika (na-astika) it is not, there is not meanwhile implies denial of Vedicauthority. Typically, into the latter (heterodox) category are placed Buddhism(bauddha-darfana) and Jainism ( jaina-darfana), along with the Carvaka darfana,which is generally characterized as metaphysically materialist and highly scepticalabout religious claims. The orthodox category is standardly divided into six maindarfanas, each of which has its own classical formulation that is, a central text,tersely constructed which subsequently came to be interpreted and commentedupon in ways that were not always consistent, thereby giving rise to various minorschools and lineages under the rubric of the classical system concerned.

The categorization of Indian philosophies in terms of their orthodoxy andheterodoxy in relation to Vedic doctrine is, on the whole, unhelpful in my view.This is because such categorization (a) falsely suggests a uniformity concerningthe importance that was placed by classical Indian philosophers upon onesattitude to Vedic authority, and (b) serves to mask the diversity of philosophicalpositions within each of the broad religious categories. In short, the lines of philo-sophical agreement and disagreement do not map neatly onto those of religion.Since Indian philosophies have tended to be categorized in these ways, however,it is worth mentioning where Sakhya and Yoga sit in relation to this schematicdemarcation.

Sakhya and Yoga are commonly regarded as two of the six orthodox darfanasof classical Indian philosophy, the other four being Nyaya, Vaifesika, Purva-mimasa, and Vedanta. Of the six, it is the last two (Purva-mimasa and Vedanta)whose status as orthodox is least problematic, as these two darfanas (which, ofcourse, have their own sub-schools and hermeneutic diremptions) are chiefly con-cerned with the interpretation and systematization of Vedic teachings. Each of theother four, however, has a contentious association with Vedic orthodoxy. I will saynothing about Nyaya and Vaifesika here beyond the fact that, like Sakhya andYoga, their relationship with one another is usually viewed as that of philosophicalcomrades rather than dogged opponents.

The relation between Sakhya and Yoga is sometimes characterized in termsof their being two expressions of the same system, while at other times they aresaid to differ on matters such as theology and soteric methodology. I shall saymore about their relation in Chapter 2. Their orthodoxy is questionable on thegrounds that their connection with Vedic doctrine is by no means clearly defin-able. Several of the texts known as Upanisads which have been appended to, andincorporated into, the Vedic canon give expression to concepts and themes dis-tinctive of Sakhya and Yoga; but where these concepts and themes seem mostin step with classical Sakhya and Yoga, they seem least accordant with what iscommonly perceived as the Upanisads strong emphasis upon the identity ofabsolute Being (brahman) and the essential self (atman).

INTRODUCTION

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Where Sakhya and Yoga come more to the fore is in the great Indian epicknown as the Mahabharata (especially in the portions known as theBhagavadgita and Moksadharma), and also in the mythological narratives ofseveral of the Purajas, and in parts of the early legal compendiums such as theManusmrti. But, again, in each of these cases the version of Sakhya and Yogathat we get is noticeably brahmanized in the sense that the dualistic oppositionbetween the seer and the seeable that is so notoriously characteristic of classi-cal Sakhya and Yoga is typically subordinated to the unifying absolute principle,brahman. This is a recurrent feature in the history of Sakhya and Yoga: what wehave come to call their classical forms are in fact untypical of the general trend,which is towards bringing the ostensibly dualist metaphysics of these systems intoconformity with the monistic aspirations of leading religious theoreticians. It hasthus become standard practice to distinguish between classical Sakhya andYoga, on the one hand, and pre- and post-classical versions of these systems, onthe other. A family resemblance between the different versions warrants ourreferring to them by a generic name, but it would be unwise to try to stipulate aprecise set of dogmatic criteria, exclusive accordance with which qualifiesa philosophical viewpoint as belonging to that family.

This study deals with Sakhya and Yoga in their respective classical forms. Ishall make reference to non-classical versions of these systems in Chapter 1, andoccasionally elsewhere, but for the majority of the time there will be quite enoughto concentrate on just in the classical material. When I say the classical material,what I am referring to is the central texts of classical Sakhya and Yoga, namelythe Sakhyakarika and Yogasutra respectively. Although it is common for scholarsto mean by classical not only these central texts but also the commentaries uponthem that were composed over subsequent centuries, I have broken from thispractice slightly. I have opted to restrict my use of the term classical to theSakhyakarika and Yogasutra alone, and to use other phrases such as the Sanskritcommentaries (where appropriate) and traditional commentaries to denote therelatively early Indian (and, more rarely, non-Indian) works that are primarily con-cerned with explicating and discussing them. In my view the standard practice oflumping the commentaries in with the primary texts under the heading classicalleads to confusion when one wishes to discuss what the classical view is on a cer-tain matter. Since there is no general agreement on which commentaries count asclassical and which do not, and since the commentaries frequently conflict withone another on substantial interpretive issues, we would if we were to adopt tooliberal an application of classical never be quite sure what we were meaningby it. (For the sake of brevity, I shall of course often use the terms Sakhya andYoga without any adjectival qualifier. In each instance it should be clear fromthe context whether it is the classical or some other version of these systems thatis being referred to.)

I wont say much at this point about how classical Sakhya and Yoga aresituated within the history of Indian philosophy, as this topic will be addressed (tosome extent at least) in Chapter 1. If it is precise historical dates that one is

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seeking, then, as with so much other Indian material, one is unlikely to find them.These days the Yogasutra is generally estimated to date from the third or fourthcentury CE, and the Sakhyakarika from around the middle of the fifth century,but the evidence for these dates is far from secure. They are both evidently com-posed with an eye on concision, and would undoubtedly have been transmitted bymeans of oral recitation prior to, or at any rate alongside, their transcription.1 Ishall continue to refer to them, for the sake of convenience, as texts, althoughI intend this term to be taken in the broad sense of a verbal composition, whetherwritten or spoken.

As their titles suggest, the Yogasutra is composed in the sutra form and theSakhyakarika in the karika form. A sutra is a single statement, comprising onlya small number of words and in some texts (though not in the Yogasutra) only oneword. A karika, meanwhile, is a distich; that is, a unit of verse consisting of twolines which together usually constitute a sense unit. It is therefore longer thanmost sutras, but both sutras and karikas can be semantically dense and arefrequently open to varying interpretations.

The prevailing orientation of the Yogasutra and Sakhyakarika is soteriological,by which I mean that in each case what the text is chiefly concerned with is theinculcation of a set of teachings that will aid hearers and readers in their quest forsalvation, a final deliverance from sin, pain and ignorance. The texts are there-fore not straightforwardly philosophical in the way that this term is applied in themodern academic world; that is, they do not consist in tightly argued expositions,in which a named author endeavours to advance or defend a specific thesis and tocriticize and undermine rival positions. Such a disputatious style of philosophicaldiscourse did exist in ancient India, but it is frequently intermixed with concernsthat would be better described as philological or hermeneutic, that is, concerns aboutthe proper interpretation of authoritative (often religiously authoritative) texts.

Neither the Yogasutra nor the Sakhyakarika is disputatious, whether in aphilosophical or a philological way, although both texts certainly make claimsthat are philosophical in content. One of the major difficulties that the modernreader faces in trying to understand these ancient works derives from the fact thatthe process by means of which a particular philosophical position was arrived atis frequently left unexplicated in the original text. This lack of explication canresult in considerable ambiguity surrounding the status of an ostensibly philo-sophical claim in relation to rational standards; and this ambiguity has repercus-sions for the claims persuasive force and also our comprehension of its semanticcontent (the meanings of philosophical statements often remain opaque unless weare aware of the theoretical milieu out of which those statements arose). Rationalarguments do occur in the two classical texts that we are concerned with albeitfar more noticeably in the Sakhyakarika than in the Yogasutra but these areinvariably highly abbreviated.

Owing to the difficulties to which I have just alluded, a large part of the task ofany would-be interpreter of classical Sakhya and Yoga consists in trying toestablish at least an approximate idea of what is going on in the texts: what the

INTRODUCTION

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points being made are, and how they cohere with other points in their vicinity andwith the overall soteriological programme of the system. These are the sorts ofissues that have been at the front of my mind throughout the detailed textualexamination contained herein.

The interpretation of Sakhya and Yoga given in this study

My purpose in this study of classical Sakhya and Yoga is, then, primarilyexegetical. It is to address the question of what the central texts of these Indiansystems mean. In order to explore this question I have concentrated mainly uponthe metaphysics that constitutes the systems theoretical core. In practical terms,this means that, although the material contained in this book inevitably rangesover the whole of the Sakhyakarika and Yogasutra, its principal focus is the firsthalf of the former of these two texts, for it is there (in, roughly speaking, SK 138)that we find the basic metaphysical structure presented in its most systematic way.

My subtitle for this work An Indian Metaphysics of Experience is inten-tionally Kantian in flavour,2 but the Kantian resonance ought not to be extendedtoo far. My main thesis is that there exist some serious problems in the ways thatSakhya and Yoga have commonly been interpreted, and that these problemsderive primarily from what I regard as a false assumption, namely that, inpresenting their metaphysical doctrines, the Indian systems are concerned withgiving an account of how the universe is that is, what it comprises and how it isconstructed independently of anyones experiencing it. In short, the assumptionis that Sakhya and Yoga are offering a realist account of the world or universe.Closely connected with this assumption of realism (or, more fully, externalrealism) is the view that the major part of the metaphysics namely, the schemaof twenty-three principles or ontological categories, which are held to emergefrom an unmanifest source constitutes a cosmogony or creation myth, that is anarrative reconstruction of the chronological order in which a set of cosmologicalentities came into existence.

The two most important of the problems that the above interpretive assumptionsgive rise to are the following. First there is the problem of explaining why, if theontological categories presented in the Sakhyakarika are cosmological innature, most of them are described in ways that link them explicitly with psycho-logical capacities and processes. One response to this problem indeed, perhapsthe only response in the literature that amounts to more than a mere brushingaside of the incongruity is to argue that the Sakhya categories are both cos-mological and psychological; or, rather, that the unitary (or univocal) definitionsand descriptions given in the Sakhyakarika are only apparently unitary, and thisapparent unitariness disguises the fact that each description operates on twolevels. That is, each description simultaneously relates to a cosmological entitythat exists in itself without reference to any individuals experience, and to apsychological capacity or process that constitutes part of a living organisms (and,more specifically, a human organisms) mental architecture. Such an interpretation

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amounts to an exceedingly unparsimonious treatment of the textual material, forit requires that, for each of the twenty-three ontological categories, we read itsdescription in a way that attributes that description to two entirely distinct kindsof entity, when at no point in the text itself is such bivalence even hinted at.

The second important problem arising from what I will call the realistcosmological interpretation of Sakhya metaphysics is that of determining how ifthe ontological categories are partially, or perhaps exclusively, cosmologicalin nature our improved understanding of them is supposed to assist us inovercoming suffering and dissatisfaction and ascending to the spiritual goal ofself-abiding pure consciousness. In short, it is the problem of how, in Sakhyaand Yoga, metaphysics relates to soteriology. No interpreter of Sakhya and Yogawould deny that the soteriological approach of these systems involves a translo-cation of ones sense of identity, away from the mutable structures of experience(which are always morally and epistemically compromised) and towards theimmutable and essential self. In order to see any purpose in the amount of timeand effort that Sakhya expends on presenting its metaphysical schema, it istherefore necessary to understand the schema as relating to the structure ofexperience for it is this that Sakhya and Yoga are evidently most interested in.This means that, when it comes to discussing the relation between metaphysicsand soteriology, interpreters of Sakhya and Yoga often conveniently leave to oneside the cosmological reading of the metaphysical schema (which they are other-wise committed to) and dwell exclusively upon the psychological reading. Buteven then they typically fail to grasp why the ontological categories which havenow become psychological ones are presented in precisely the order that theyare in the Sakhyakarika; and hence such interpreters are liable to conclude thatthe sequence of emergence (or evolution) of the categories has, as Larson putsit, very little to do with the problem of salvation and is, as Radhakrishnanremarks, merely the result of historical accidents.3

I do not wish to claim that I have entirely resolved these problems. I think the pre-cise relation between the metaphysical schema and the soteriological practiceremains unclear, and I can see no way of fully clarifying it. To do so would requirehaving insight into the philosophical and mystical methodologies of the originatorsof the Sakhya and Yoga systems, and these insights are simply not available to us.What I do wish to claim, however, is that the interpretation put forward in this bookeradicates the first of the problems outlined above, namely that of how to explainthe incongruity of a cosmogonic narrative whose components seem in the main tobe psychological in nature. At first glance, my solution is very simple: it is, inessence, to abandon the cosmological reading from the outset, and to stick with thepsychological one. Upon closer inspection, however, it is both more complicatedand more radical than this. The psychological reading of Sakhya metaphysics hasgenerally taken the categories to be, as I have suggested already, psychologicalprocesses and capacities (faculties, powers). Now, I do not want to say that this isan altogether misguided way of seeing the matter. What I do want to say, however,is that a shift of emphasis needs to be made, away from a psychological analysis in

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terms of capacities or faculties and towards an analysis of experience. A largeproportion of the present work is an attempt to think through the implications of thissuggestion, but I shall endeavour to say something briefly about it here.

The problem with the psychological reading of Sakhya metaphysics as it istypically formulated is that, while it manages to avoid the incongruity that inerad-icably plagues the cosmogonic or cosmological reading, it holds onto the assump-tion that what is being provided is a realist account of the chronological order inwhich a set of entities comes into being. Although most of these entities are nowconstrued as psychological or psychosensory, the conviction is frequently main-tained among interpreters that at least some of them must be physical, mostnotably the five known as elements or gross elements (bhutas or mahabhutas).The standard psychological reading therefore gives rise to two problems. One isthat of explaining how a set of psychological faculties can be said to come intoexistence sequentially, when ordinarily we take a mind to be an integrated unitwhose components would have great difficulty existing independently of the inte-grated whole. And the second problem is that of explaining how physical entitiescan be said to emerge or evolve from psychological ones. These two problems canbe resolved, in my view, only if we jettison the assumption that the schema oftwenty-three categories is to be understood realistically and diachronically. Ifinstead we understand it as a synchronic analysis of experience that is, as anaccount of the constituents that make up experience at any one time then, Ibelieve, we stand a chance of comprehending the meaning of Sakhya metaphysicsin a way that significantly ameliorates the incongruities with which multiplegenerations of interpreters have saddled it.

Just as, in the 1780s, Kant sought to engender a Copernican revolution in ourthinking about the relation between the world and our cognition of it, so this study,in its own much more modest way, represents my attempt to bring about a revolu-tion in the way the metaphysics of Sakhya and Yoga is construed. Like Kant, andlike certain phenomenological philosophers of more recent times, Sakhya andYoga did not, I think, begin with fanciful speculations about the sorts of entitiesthat exist beyond the reaches of our experience. Rather, they began with a carefuland systematic analysis of experience itself. The system they devised from thisanalysis is far from being identical to that of Kant or anyone else; and yet it is,when viewed in the proper light, surprisingly astute and both psychologically andphilosophically insightful. My interpretation is not entirely original. It builds upona smattering of suggestions from earlier interpreters. It does, however, go againstthe grain of the standard way of interpreting Sakhya and Yoga; and it carries acertain exegetical line what might be called a phenomenological reading ofSakhya and Yoga metaphysics further than any previous treatment that I know of.

Methodological considerations

W. V. O. Quine once remarked that The more absurd the doctrine attributed tosomeone, ceteris paribus, the less the likelihood that we have well construed his

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words (1969: 304). In some ways this could be taken as the guiding methodologicalstatement of the present study. That is, in approaching the task of interpreting thetextual material of Sakhya and Yoga, one of my key considerations has been:Does the interpretation I am offering make sense? By this I do not primarily meanto ask whether the system, as interpreted, makes sense to us in the light of ourown philosophical predilections (although, inevitably, such factors do encroachupon ones exegetical judgement). Rather, what I mean is: Does it have a highdegree of internal consistency; and, more specifically, does the way that I amunderstanding the Sakhya and Yoga metaphysics cohere with (and seem plausiblein view of) the overall soteriological enterprise of these systems?

In approaching a system of philosophy, one must not rule out in advance thepossibility that the system could turn out to be internally inconsistent. Indeed, itis to be expected (due to the prodigious difficulties associated with philosophicalconstruction) that any system will contain ingredients that are in tension with oneanother. However, with this in view, I still consider it to be incumbent upon thediligent scholar, where there is a choice of interpretations, to opt for the one thatharbours the fewest inconsistencies and nonsensical elements ceteris paribus(as Quine wisely notes). This last qualification the need for all other factors tobe equal is crucial; since of course, if the weight of evidence tips the scalestowards an interpretation that happens not to be the most coherent of those avail-able, then we would be obliged to relinquish coherence in favour of exegeticalfidelity. It should go without saying that one must be guided first by the evidenceand only second, where alternative readings are possible, by the coherence criterion.

As it happens, however, in the present case I think both the textual evidence andthe coherence criterion point in the same direction. It was the incoherence of stan-dard interpretations of Sakhya and Yoga that alerted me to the need to lookagain at the textual sources, but having embarked upon this reappraisal I startedto see that the most coherent reading was also the most parsimonious in the sensethat it required, on the whole, the least tortuous treatment of the primary texts(although this is not to say that the reading it requires is always the most literal).

Now, in practical terms my method of gathering together the relevant data, andof assessing it in such a way as to arrive at what seems to me the most plausibleinterpretation, can be broken down into four main constituents, which I shalloutline below.

(1) First and foremost has been a close and thorough reading and analysis of theprimary texts, namely the Sakhyakarika and Yogasutra, traditionally ascribed toIfvarakrsja and Patajali respectively.4 It is rare indeed that a scholar finds anexisting translation of a text satisfactory in every respect; and, while retaininggreat admiration for those translators that have gone before me, it graduallydawned upon me over the course of my inquiry that a whole new translation ofthe Sakhyakarika would be required. This is included as Appendix A. I did notgo to the trouble of also translating the entire Yogasutra, as I am doubtfulthat I could bring anything to this task that has not already been covered in the

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abundance of translated editions that are currently available. However, unlessotherwise stated, all quotations from Sanskrit texts whether from theSakhyakarika, the Yogasutra, or anything else may be assumed to be my own.(And, incidentally, it should not be assumed that my translations of passages fromthe Sakhyakarika in the main body of the book are in every case identical tothose in Appendix A. There are invariably multiple options as to how a text maybe translated, and not one of these is definitive.)

It should be noted that, at the same time as enhancing ones appreciation of thesemantic and syntactic nuances of a text, a greater familiarity with it in its origi-nal language can serve to dampen the exaggerated awe with which a highlyesteemed work of philosophy is often approached. Having heard, for instance,that a text is the work of a single author, and that it expresses the condensedwisdom gleaned from that authors flashes of gnostic inspiration, it can come asa sobering disappointment to discern signs of, for example, multiple authorshipand a somewhat cut-and-paste style of composition. Such signs are especiallyprevalent in the Yogasutra, in comparison with which the Sakhyakarika comesacross as being a relatively strongly cohesive work. I should point out, however,that I do not see it as part of the purpose of this study to enter into these compo-sitional issues in any depth. They are probably impossible to resolve, and for themost part both of the classical texts I am dealing with are sufficiently cohesive towarrant their being treated as integral wholes rather than as more or less baggycollections of disparate fragments.

(2) The second component of my approach has been a broad-ranging consider-ation of secondary sources, within which category I include: (a) traditional(almost exclusively Sanskrit) commentaries, (b) pre- and post-classical versionsof Sakhya and Yoga, and (c) more recent interpretive works by scholars, mainlyfrom India, Europe and the USA. In the use that I have made of each of thesetypes of text I have, of necessity, needed to be selective, since a fully compre-hensive discussion of them would have made the book unmanageably bloated.I have endeavoured to draw upon them fairly and representatively in order toexemplify particular views upon issues raised by the primary sources.

The traditional commentaries that I have consulted are all included in theBibliography (under Primary Sources A, since they are invariably publishedalongside the primary texts). Of these, the ones I have found most useful,and which I most frequently cite, are (on the Sakhyakarika) GaudapadasBhasya and Vacaspatimifras Tattvakaumudi, and (on the Yogasutra) VyasasYogabhasya and Vacaspatimifras Tattvavaifaradi (which is, strictly speaking, a sub-commentary upon the Yogabhasya). A good deal of excitement has beenexpressed in recent decades concerning an extensive commentary on theSakhyakarika entitled the Yuktidipika. This commentary is thought to date fromsomewhere between the sixth and tenth centuries, but was rediscovered by schol-ars of Sakhya only in the 1930s. Although its rediscovery has been heralded bysome as being of such great significance as to render all previous scholarshipoutdated,5 my own view is that such claims are exaggerated. The Yuktidipikas

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significance derives mostly from the information it provides about disputesbetween proponents of Sakhya and those of rival Indian systems, especiallyBuddhism. What it does not do, in my opinion, is shed any new light upon themeaning of the classical text itself. While I have, then, consulted the available edi-tions, I have not treated the Yuktidipika as any more or less authoritative than theother traditional commentaries.

An unfortunate characteristic of a lot of modern-day exegetical work onSakhya and Yoga is that, while it does an admirable job of informing us whatsome commentators say about a particular passage and how other commentatorsdiffer from them, it takes us very little distance towards a deepened understand-ing of the philosophical content of the original text. The solution to this problemis not to ignore the traditional commentaries; for they do in many places havevital contributions to make. Rather, it is to treat them discerningly, and to refrainfrom believing that knowing what each of the commentaries says on a certainmatter is equivalent to fully explicating the matter in question.

With regard to pre- and post-classical formulations of Sakhya and Yoga thatis, those works which put forward what is recognizably a version of the same sys-tem but is not merely a commentary upon the classical text I make relatively fewreferences to these anywhere other than in Chapter 1. This is because my intentionhas been to provide a close and detailed study of the classical material and not acomprehensive (and therefore relatively thinly spread) treatment of the gamut ofSakhyas and Yogas. At certain places I find it useful to mention passages fromone particular post-classical work on Sakhya, namely the Sakhyasutra (whichis generally agreed to be several centuries later than the Sakhyakarika) alongwith a couple of commentaries upon it (most notably in the section on the strands(gujas) in Chapter 5); but in the main I limit the discussion to the classical works.

As a background to the inquiry, I have familiarized myself with the scholarlyliterature on Sakhya and Yoga that has been written in or translated into English,from Henry Colebrooke and Horace Wilson (1837) through to the present day;and selective references to this literature will be found throughout this study. Theexisting interpretations that have been of particular value to me during the courseof my research are those presented by Dasgupta (1922, 1924), Davies (1894),Eliade (1969), Feuerstein (1980, 1989a), Ghosh (1977), Larson (1979, 1987),Radhakrishnan (1927, II) and Whicher (1998). Although my view is that none ofthese interpretive efforts is completely satisfactory and this view is reflected ina number of critical comments upon them each of them (among others) has insome way or other not only made my task easier, but made it possible; for, as anyscholar knows, it is on the back of, and in response to, previous scholarship thatones own work evolves.

Of the scholars just mentioned, Jajneswar Ghosh is the one whose understandingof Sakhya and Yoga comes closest to my own, although even in his case muchof his published work on the subject remains within strictures dictated by therealistcosmological assumption that I find objectionable. It is principally in theintroductory chapter that he wrote for a book by his guru, Swami Hariharananda

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Arajya (first published in 1936, and reissued in 1977), that Ghosh begins todevelop a more thoughtful and sophisticated articulation of Sakhya philosophy.He stresses the phenomenological character of the metaphysical schema, notingthat Sakhyas world is the world of experience, as it [i.e. Sakhya] knows noth-ing of any world or system of objects and events existing in independence of con-sciousness (1977: 3). He describes Sakhyas methodology as one of analyticreflection which is brought to bear primarily on the contents of consciousnessand which involves no great leap from thought to things in themselves; that is,no commitment to the existence of empirical objects independently of experienceitself (p. 4). This is a refreshingly different perspective from the standard lineabout Sakhyas being realist with regard to physical entities, and I think it isessentially on the right track. Due to the necessary brevity of an introductoryessay, however, Ghosh is unable adequately to flesh out the pertinent insights thathe exhibits, and he seems nowhere to have given a fuller exposition of this view-point. Furthermore, the essay has been passed over in silence by most subsequentscholars, who have for the most part gravitated back to a simplistically realistinterpretive paradigm.

The plausibility of a phenomenological reading of Sakhya and Yogametaphysics was also spotted by Braj Sinha, who, in a comparative study ofSakhyaYoga and Abhidharma Buddhism, refers to that metaphysics as primarilyan attempt at a transcendental analysis of the facts of human experience (1983: 17).The use of the expression transcendental analysis is more Husserlian thanKantian here; while it is not inappropriate, it requires a good deal of clarificationif it is to help us understand the Sakhya and Yoga position. Sinha, however, limitsthe scope of his study to the concept of temporality and does not fully work outhis initial intuition concerning the metaphysical schema as a whole.

Larson, too, hinted at the possibility of an interpretation of Sakhya alongphenomenological lines when, in an early article, he compared it with the phe-nomenological ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre (Larson 1969). In his subsequentpublications, however, Larson has moved away from this approach and adopted aversion of the cosmological-cum-psychological interpretive model instead. Thishas led him to question whether Sakhyas metaphysics bears any relation to itsprofessed soteriological aim (see Chapter 6). My view is that the metaphysics andsoteriology are intimately connected, but that the nature of the connection will beseen only if we stick with, and follow through as far as we can, the phenomeno-logical interpretation, which Larson once saw the potential of but never workedout in any detail.

(3) The third component of my approach relates to my training and experiencein western philosophy. While taking care not to try to force uniquely Indiandoctrines and models into the conceptual molds of a foreign tradition, I have atseveral places found certain terms and concepts derived from western thought tobe particularly helpful for drawing out the meanings of the Sakhya and Yogamaterial. Since I am writing in English for a largely Anglophone readership, andsince I cannot extract myself from my European cultural heritage, there is a

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degree of inevitability attached to my using western philosophical tools; but suchinevitability does not extend to the particular way in which I interpret the Indiansystems. This is shown by the fact that among the targets of my criticisms ofseveral existing interpretations is what I regard as their misapplication of westernconcepts to Sakhya and Yoga, including especially such concepts as realism andmateriality.

As will have become evident to the reader already, the two areas of westernphilosophy that I draw most heavily upon are Kants so-called critical philosophy(which he also dubbed transcendental philosophy) and the phenomenologicalapproach to philosophy most closely associated with the likes of Franz Brentanoand Edmund Husserl.6 My point is decidedly not to try to make out that the Indiansystems I am discussing are straightforwardly prototypes of either Kantian orphenomenological philosophy. The situation is far more complicated than that.For a start, whole industries of scholarship have grown up around the tasks ofinterpreting Kant and Husserl (along with other phenomenologists) and the rela-tions between their respective philosophies. Therefore anyone who wishes to citethe work of these philosophers for the purposes of comparison is obliged to beaware that many questions of how to interpret that work are yet to be settled (andwill probably always remain contentious). Since I did not wish the present bookto turn into yet another exercise in Kantian, Brentanian, or Husserlian exegesis,any comparisons that I make between the ideas of these philosophers andthose of Sakhya and Yoga must necessarily have a degree of tentativeness andconditionality about them.

A further reason for this tentativeness is the fact that, insofar as the Sakhyaand Yoga texts do not lend themselves to definitive explication, any declaration tothe effect that these texts are putting forward views that precisely match those ofKant or anyone else would be out of place. Of course I do, in a sense, want toargue that there are proto-Kantian and proto-phenomenological elements inSakhya and Yoga. If I did not think this were so, there would be little point inmy making the comparisons that I do. But this proto- should not be assumed tocommit me to anything approximating a simple equation of what are patently verydifferent philosophical systems.

With all these qualifications in view, the reader could be excused for wonderingwhy I ever bothered to bring Kant and phenomenology into the discussion in thefirst place. The answer is that I do think that, in their respective ways and notwith-standing their less than limpid expository styles, Kant, Brentano and Husserlbrought about a radical reorientation, not only of much philosophical theory, butof the very way in which those who have intensively investigated their philoso-phies view reality and the selfworld relation. Kant in particular has made animpact on world philosophy, the repercussions of which are likely to go on beingfelt for many generations to come. The reorientation that I have in mind here isthat which takes place when one ceases to conceive of empirical reality that is,the world as we experience it as something that exists outside and independentlyof our consciousness, and instead conceives of consciousness as being, in some

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sense, the field or domain within which empirical reality exists. It is this reorien-tation that constitutes the first step towards idealism and away from metaphysicalrealism; and while it is a step that is by no means unique to Kant or phenomenology,I think each of these two approaches exemplifies an extraordinarily interestingway of trying to think through its implications. What makes this reorientation sopertinent to Sakhya and Yoga is that, on my understanding, these Indian systemswere also involved in formulating a conception of empirical reality in which thatreality is exclusively contained within the bounds of consciousness. Again, likeKant and phenomenology, they were not unique in this endeavour; indeed it islikely that some version of this idealist manoeuvre is common to most of theeastern contemplative traditions. But in the case of Sakhya and Yoga the factthat they are performing such a manoeuvre has been so abysmally overlooked bythe majority of interpreters, that a rectification is urgently required.

Although, for the sake of brevity, I have been referring, and will continue torefer, to my interpretation of Sakhya and Yoga as a phenomenological interpre-tation, this expression does not tell the whole story. These Indian systems areconcerned not merely with the analysis of phenomena, in the sense of observingand categorizing the various constituents that make up the content of experience.They are also concerned with postulating metaphysical principles that must be inplace if experience of any kind is to be possible. To this extent, then, Sakhyaand Yoga are engaged in both phenomenological analysis that is, the analysis ofexperiential content and transcendental analysis in a roughly Kantian sense that is, the analysis of the necessary conditions of any possible experience. Theselatter conditions are structurally prior to experience and hence are themselvesunexperienceable, although (to make use of Kantian language once again) theyare knowable a priori. It is for these reasons that I consider it useful to bring incomparisons with Kant, who unquestionably pioneered the use of transcendentalreflection as a means of excavating the universal and necessary conditions ofexperience. Of course, the distinction between what is phenomenological andwhat is transcendental, in the senses of these terms that I have just outlined, israrely as clear as we would like it to be. We must wait until Chapter 3 for furtherexamination of these points.

(4) The fourth of my methodological components could be called intrapsychicfieldwork. By this I mean practical training in the techniques of yoga7 includinga comprehensive range of postural, breathing and meditative procedures designed to engender the kinds of sharpened states of awareness alluded to inSakhya and Yoga texts. Although teachers of yoga disagree over the precisemethods that are best suited to achieving the desired results, there is little dis-agreement about the fact that, for most students, significant results are not easilyobtained. Practice (abhyasa) is the effort [required to gain] stability, says theYogasutra (1.13). It becomes firmly embedded [or consolidated (bhumi)] whencultivated diligently for an extended period without interruption (1.14). It wouldbe insipient, therefore, for one such as myself to claim to be anything more thana novice when it comes to accomplishment in the discipline of yoga. The training

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I have undergone with a number of teachers, in India and Nepal as well asEurope and Australia, has however given me a better understanding of what yogasadhana (roughly: spiritual practice) comprises and of the psychological andphysiological effects it can initiate than I would otherwise have had. Moreover,while I would certainly not make any claim to possess superior access to theunderlying truths of Sakhya and Yoga by means of contemplative insight, I doregard my experience of yoga as having enhanced my appreciation of the ways inwhich the theory and practice of the two systems cohere and interrelate.

That completes this summary of the four main elements in my methodologicalapproach. There remains just one more element that could be mentioned, although itis perhaps more like the glue that binds the other elements together. This is imagi-nation. I have, to some extent, followed the advice that K. C. Bhattacharyya offers inthe Preface to his Studies in Sakhya Philosophy, which is that the interpretationof Sakhya (and presumably of Yoga as well) demands imaginativeintrospectiveeffort at every stage on the part of the interpreter (1956, I: 127). As I understand it,this demand does not give the exegete a licence to attribute all manner of fantasticdoctrines to the classical darfanas; rather, it recognizes the necessary contributionthat imaginative reconstruction must make to an interpretive project if that projectis not to be unduly constrained by, but is to venture beyond, the limits of existinginterpretations.

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1AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OFSAM. KHYA AND YOGA

Time is commonly depicted in Indian mythology as the great producer and thegreat destroyer. It devours everything that it has previously emitted. This analogyis very apt when it comes to the historical investigation of pre-modern India, andwith regard to philosophical traditions such as Sakhya and Yoga, time has cer-tainly eaten up the source materials that would be required to arrive at anythingeven remotely resembling a clear picture of their historical development. Yet,despite the paucity of information, there is no option of ignoring the historicaldimension completely, for an appreciation of the meaning of any tradition ofIndian philosophy demands at least some attempt to view it within its broadercontext. The present chapter constitutes such an attempt.

Several studies exist on the histories of Sakhya and Yoga, some of which areportions of works that set out to cover Indian philosophy in its entirety,1 andothers of which attend more singularly to either Sakhya or Yoga, or to both ofthese together.2 The reader interested in a more comprehensive treatment of thesubject than that which can be given here is referred to these works and to othersmentioned in the notes. What I shall provide is, for the most part, a summary ofexisting data, and, on points of contention, a brief assessment of competing argu-ments. Since it is principally philosophical history that we are concerned with, Ishall follow the standard approach of focussing upon textual sources withoutventuring far into other cultural domains.

Early sources

Sakhya is often said to be the oldest of the major systems of Indian philosophy.3

It is not always clear, however, what this claim amounts to. Very few scholarswould deny that what has come to be known as classical Sakhya that is, theversion of the system given expression in the Sakhyakarika is by no means thesystems earliest or original formulation. It was preceded by, and probably existedcontemporaneously with, several other formulations, all of which bore a discernibleresemblance without adhering to a monolithic doctrinal catechism.

When the claim to unrivalled antiquity is made, therefore, it is rarely meant thatclassical Sakhya is the oldest system of Indian philosophy.4 It is, rather, something

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much vaguer than that. What is usually meant, I suspect, is that the genealogicalragbag of Sakhyan-esque or proto-Sakhyan (and Yogic) themes and ideas canbe traced further back in the ancient textual record and most particularly in thecategory of text known as major Upanisads than can any of the other systemsof Indian philosophy. The claim, in its usual form, is therefore highly dubious, forthere is no firm evidence that a cohesive Sakhya system existed earlier thanother systems. Indeed, there is no definitive data to show that such a system pre-existed the founding of Buddhism sometime during the fourth or fifth centuryBCE, or that of Jainism around the same time. And Vedantins, irrespective ofwhich particular sub-school they belong to, would argue that the Upanisads them-selves present a coherent body of teachings, which, while containing Sakhyaelements in places, subsumes and eclipses Sakhya as a philosophical system.

The story of the formation of Sakhya and Yoga is sometimes presented usinga metaphor of gestation or ontogeny, according to which the two systems or, atleast, some embryonic forms of them were conceived alongside a range ofcompeting ideas and speculations sometime around the time when the earliestUpanisads were composed. If a date is to be put on this period, then it is usuallyestimated at c. 900600 BCE, although such estimates are not undisputed.5 TheUpanisads are sacred texts consisting largely of myths and sermons, attributed torenowned sages and prompted by the pertinent questions of disciples. Dozens ofthem have been appended to one or other of the four Vedas, although there is acore set of thirteen or fourteen which are customarily regarded as the majorUpanisads. Among these, the gestation model has it that a number of themes andideas characteristic of Sakhya and Yoga are evident in early prose Upanisads such as the Chandogya, Brhadarajyaka, Aitareya and Kausitaki and that theseideas continued to develop until, in the metrical Upanisads, most notably theKatha and Fvetafvatara (both c. 500200 BCE according to standard estimates),they emerged from the womb as an identifiable philosophical viewpoint.6

Typical examples of proto-Sakhyan ideas to be found in the earliestUpanisads include the following. Chandogya VI.4.17 speak of fire, sun, moonand lightning each being composed of three forms (rupas), these being: light orheat (tejas), which is identified with the colour red; water (ap), identified withwhiteness; and earth or food (anna), identified with blackness or the dark(krsja). These three forms and their corresponding colours, which are also men-tioned at Fvetafvatara 4.5, are evocative of the three strands (gujas) that, inSakhya, constitute the creative source known as prakrti or pradhana.

It is also in the Chandogya (VII.25.1) that we find the earliest textual appearanceof the term ahakara. The verse is of considerable interest, suggesting, as it does,a conformity between the empirical world and the personal ego: So now thedoctrine of the ahakara: I, indeed, am below; I am above; I am to the west; I amto the east; I am to the south; I am to the north; I am, indeed, all this. In relationto this passage, and to Chapter VI of the same work, van Buitenen has plausiblypostulated a continuity between the act of creation depicted in the Chandogya (andalso at Brhadarajyaka I.2.1 and I.4.13) and the concept of ahakara as it occurs

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in classical Sakhya: in both cases there is an affirmation or formulation, asvan Buitenen puts it of oneself as I (aham), which affirmation is the verymoment of the worlds coming into manifestation.7

Moving on now to the metrical Upanisads: One of many precursors of laterSakhya and Yoga in the Katha is its account of the stages through which onepasses on the way to the highest goal:

Beyond the sense-capacities (indriyas) are their objects (arthas), andbeyond these objects is mentation (manas); beyond mentation is discern-ment (buddhi), and beyond discernment is the great self (atmamahat).Beyond the great self is the unmanifest (avyakta); beyond the unmanifestis self (purusa). Beyond self there is nothing. That is the destination; thatis the highest goal (paragati).

(Katha I.3.1011)

Although neither the schema of categories presented in these verses, nor theslightly variant one that that appears later in the same Upanisad (Katha II.3.78),is identical with that of classical Sakhya, the similarities between them canhardly be ignored. The passages appear to portray a progressive refinement ofattention, leading ultimately to the disclosure of the true self (purusa), which isthe declared goal of Sakhya and Yoga. That the means of achieving this self-revelation are those of sustained meditation is indicated at other places in the text.Katha I.3.13, for example, speaks of restraining speech (vac), mentation (manas),and other capacities in the tranquil self (fanta-atman), while at II.3.1011 thehighest state (parama gati) is said to be instantiated upon the cessation of sen-sory and intellectual activity; and the steady holding of the capacities (sthiramindriya-dharajam) is explicitly referred to as yoga.8

The first known mention of sakhya and yoga together occurs at Fvetafvatara6.13. They are there described as mutually important factors for knowing thedivine (deva) and thereby gaining release from all fetters, although they are notexplicitly defined. It is likely that the use of the terms here is similar to that in thethird chapter of the Bhagavadgita, where sakhya is identified with revelatoryknowledge (jana) and renunciation (sanyasa), and yoga is identified with dis-ciplined action (karman). The optimum method, as presented at BhG 3.38, is tocombine the two factors by performing dutiful actions while at the same timemaintaining an attitude of non-attachment to the fruits of those actions.

Whatever might be the precise meanings of sakhya and yoga in theFvetafvatara, the end to which they are directed is knowledge of the lord (ifa,hara) or the divine (deva). In certain places the descriptions of this supremebeing anticipate those of the self (purusa) in classical Sakhya, such as when heis said to be a witness (saksin), consciousness (cetas), solitary (kevala), andwithout strands (nirguja [i.e. devoid of any features characteristic of empiricalreality]) (Fvet. 6.11). Elsewhere, however, the impression is given of thelords performing a more active and controlling role in relation to the world: his

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magic power (maya) is the worlds creative source (prakrti) (4.10); it is due tothe lords greatness that the wheel of generation (brahman) turns (6.1);9 and itis he who, like a spider, covers himself with threads from the primordial source(pradhana) (6.10). Throughout the Fvetafvatara, the lord is treated more as afocus for reverence and devotion than is purusa in classical Sakhya, and in thisrespect the concept is closer to that of ifvara in classical Yoga.10

Of the later prose Upanisads (c. 400200 BCE), the Prafna (4.8) contains acomprehensive list of existent principles, which tallies very closely with that ofthe manifestations of prakrti in classical Sakhya. But it is the Maitrayajiya(or Maitri) that, of all the major Upanisads, displays the strongest affinity withboth classical Sakhya and Yoga. Although it relies heavily upon quotations fromearlier Upanisadic and other sources, and appears to lack a consistent approach ofits own, when the Maitrayajiya gets round to discussing metaphysical andmethodological matters its similarity with the two classical systems is often verystriking. The self (purusa) is identified with consciousness (cetas),11 and isdescribed as the enjoyer of food [supplied by] prakrti (Maitr. 6.10).12 Prakrti issaid to comprise the three strands (triguja) and to exist in both a manifest and anunmanifest state (ibid.).

The Maitrayajiyas instructions on yoga practice, and its descriptions ofextraordinary experiences engendered thereby, are among the most explicit in thewhole of Indian literature. In certain respects they foreshadow elements of clas-sical Yoga; for example, the six-limbed (sadakga) system of practice introducedat Maitrayajiya 6.18 resembles the last five limbs of the classical eight-limbed(astakga) regimen (YS 2.29 ff.).13 In other ways, the Maitrayajiya is more like aTantric treatise on hatha-yoga, especially in passages such as 6.2122, where thetechnique of concentrating vital breath (praja) in the gracious channel(susumna-nadi) is described along with the various sounds that are heard internallyas the breath ascends through that channel.14

In addition to the Upanisads, textual sources that anticipate themes andconcepts of classical Sakhya and Yoga include portions of Indias immensewealth of epic and mythological literature, most notably the Moksadharma andBhagavadgita sections of the Mahabharata, but also passages in severalPurajas.15 These works, which are often encyclopaedic in scope, tend to be philo-sophically promiscuous in the sense that, as Arthur Keith notes with regard to theMahabharata, they frequently present diverse and incompatible ideas in imme-diate proximity to one another without any apparent sense of their incongruity(1949: 36). The relevant passages in these works are too numerous to receivefull attention here, and thus I shall restrict my comments to one fairly generalobservation, and a couple of more specific ones.16

The general observation is that, within the epic (or itihasa, literally thus itwas) and Purajic literature as also in the case of the Upanisads there seemsnot to be a clear and consistent distinction between Sakhyan (or proto-Sakhyan) doctrines on the one hand, and what are these days loosely referredto as Vedantic doctrines on the other. There is in particular a considerable degree

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of ambiguity attached to the important term brahman; which ambiguity is, again,not unique to the epicPurajic branch of Indian verbal composition, but isespecially noticeable therein. Brahman is conspicuous by its absence in theSakhyakarika and Yogasutra, although it does occur in several commentaries(among the synonyms of prakrti, for example, but also in other contexts).17 In thepre-classical versions of Sakhya and Yoga, however, brahman figures promi-nently as a term for the supreme metaphysical principle.18 This might spur us toquestion whether they can be counted as versions of Sakhya and Yoga at all; orcontrariwise, we might wonder (as at least one provocative writer has done)whether it is not these ostensibly earlier texts that represent the authentic teaching,and the so-called classical systems that are eccentric.19 In my view, rather thanaccept either of these extreme positions, we would do better to recognize thatthere is a range of more or less systematic doctrinal collections that are suffi-ciently similar to one another to warrant their being called Sakhyan or Yogic.We are concerned here more with relations of resemblance than with either strictidentity or authentic versus inauthentic expressions of a viewpoint. It thusremains legitimate to speak of epic Sakhyas and Yogas and Purajic Sakhyasand Yogas, just as it does of classical Sakhya and Yoga. The term classical does,of course, lend a certain prestige to these latter systems, but such prestige shouldnot be confused with an exclusive entitlement to the names Sakhya and Yoga.

The more specific points I want to make relate to the use of the terms sakhyaand yoga in the epic and Purajic material; for although these two terms do occurtogether at several places (thereby indicating a close association between them),it appears that their meanings bear only an oblique relation to the systems ofphilosophy with which I am chiefly concerned. One instance of this from theBhagavadgita has been mentioned already in the discussion of the Fvetafvatara-upanisad above, and it may be instructive to consider another of the Gitas state-ments on the theme. In Chapter 5 the blessed lord (fri bhagavan) says to Arjuna:

Fools (balah) proclaim that sakhya and yoga are separate, not the learned(pajditah).

Diligently abiding in one of them alone, the fruit of both is won.The station reached by adherents of sakhya is also reached by adherents

of yoga.He who sees that sakhya and yoga are one, he [truly] sees.

(BhG 5.45)20

As in the earlier passage (3.3 f.), it seems that sakhya and yoga are being usedhere to mean renunciation and disciplined activity respectively. This is furthersuggested by the succeeding verse (5.6), which reads: But, without yoga, [only]distress (duhkha) is achieved by means of renunciation (sanyasa) [. . .]. Fixed inyoga (yoga-yukta), the sage goes to brahman in no time. If sakhya is synony-mous with sanyasa as is implied in these verses then we are faced with twoincompatible statements: on the one hand both sakhya and yoga are declared to

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be equally successful (and self-sufficient) means of attaining the sought-aftergoal, whereas on the other hand it is said that sakhya can generate only distressin the absence of yoga. We need not dwell upon such incongruities here, however,for my immediate purpose is merely to highlight the distinctly non-classicalemployment of the terms sakhya and yoga that is exemplified in the Gita.

A qualification needs to be added to the point I have just made. This is that,although it is evident that sakhya does not in the Gita denote any particularmetaphysical system, and is in this respect applied in a way that seems to differfrom classical usage, we should not leave this discussion without noting thestrong probability that the sense of renunciation did not fall away entirely fromthe term in the classical period. The Sakhyakarika is not a work that sets out tovindicate the value of worldly activity (as the Gita, at least in part, tries to do); itstarts from the premise that such activity is inherently dissatisfying (SK 1, cf. SK 55),and concludes with an account of the utter relinquishment of experience and ofthe embodied personality that is its pre-condition (SK 68). It is, in short, a trea-tise whose guiding principle is the necessity of renunciation. And thus the senseof renunciation is relevant to the term sakhya both as it occurs in the Gita andas it applies to the classical system presented in the Sakhyakarika. What isdifferent is that, in the systematic expressions of the Sakhya philosophy, theterm sakhya implies, in addition to a renunciant orientation, an approach tometaphysics that involves the exposition of principles in enumerated sets.21

Before leaving the Bhagavadgita, I would like to suggest that, in the sakhya-and-yoga duad that we find there, we have a forerunner (or coeval variant, dependingon ones view of the chronology of the texts concerned) of the two-prongedmethodology that is central to both Sakhya and Yoga in their classical forms.The two prongs are vairagya and abhyasa (YS 1.1216) or (at SK 45) vairagyaand aifvarya. The first of these, vairagya (desirelessness), involves letting go ofthe thirst (trsja) for worldly enjoyment (YS 1.15), and hence shares much incommon with the Gitas notion of sakhya as renunciation. Abhyasa, meanwhile,is the assiduous practice required to achieve the transformation of mind that Yogademands; and aifvarya (mastery, lordliness) is the power, self-control and com-posure necessary to eradicate obstacles; both terms having, therefore, an affinitywith the broad sense of yoga as disciplined action.

Among other textual sites of pre-classical Sakhya, the following deserve tobe mentioned: ancient collections of doctrines and laws such as theManavadharmafastra, also known as the Manusmrti (c. 200 BCE200 CE); trea-tises on Indian medical science (ayurveda), notably the Sufrutasahita andCarakasahita; and a section in an early (c. 100 CE) account of the life of theBuddha known as the Buddhacarita of Afvaghosa. A further text, KautilyasArthafastra (c. fourth century BCEfirst century CE), famously names only threephilosophical approaches (anviksiki) in its second verse, these being Sakhya,Yoga and Lokayata. Once again, we cannot assume that sakhya and yoga denotehere anything even approximating the systems associated with Ifvarakrsja andPatajali, and nor can we say exactly what is meant by lokayata. The latter term

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is often associated with the philosophy of Carvaka, which in turn is taken to be akind of materialism.22 As Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has pointed out, however,lokayata can also be understood to mean prevalent among the people and, con-sequently, the philosophy of the people (1968: 1);23 and, if it is taken in this way,then sakhya and yoga may, by contrast, stand for those approaches to philosophyor life more generally that are not so prevalent, but are adhered to by select groupsof initiates. On this interpretation we need not be surprised that other philosophicalsects or schools go unmentioned by Kautilya, for the sense of sakhya (and to alesser extent of yoga) could be sufficiently wide here to cover a range of suchschools.

One further contribution to the somewhat perplexing picture of pre-classicalSakhya and Yoga is provided by a treatise belonging to the Pacaratra sect ofVaisjavism entitled the Ahirbudhnya-sahita (Compendium of the serpent-from-the-depths). The Pacaratra, or Bhagavata, sect is generally held to be atleast as old as Buddhism (i.e. c. fourth century BCE), although the textual sourcesassociated with it are likely to be considerably later. The Ahirbudhnya, essentiallya work of Tantric Vaisjavism, comprises material that was probably composedover a span of several centuries during the first millennium of the Common Era.The reason for mentioning it here is that in its twelfth chapter are included sum-maries of two earlier works, or bodies of doctrine (tantras), which deal withSakhya and Yoga respectively. The first of these two summaries (Ah