class action complaint - dwsd v general chemical

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DETROIT WATER AND SEWERAGE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK A. REICHL, GENERAL

CHEMICAL CORPORATION,

GENERAL CHEMICAL

PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, LLC,

GENTEK,

INC. and JOHN

DOES 1-10.

Defendants.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff Detroit Water and Sewerage Department brings this action both

individually and on behalf of a Class of plaintiffs consisting of all persons and entities in the

United States, who purchased liquid aluminum sulfate (“Alum”) directly from defendants at

any time from January 1, 1997 through at least July 31, 2010 (the “Class Period”).

2. Alum is a versatile chemical that can function as a coagulant, flocculant,

precipitant and emulsion breaker. Alum removes turbidity, suspended solids, total organic

carbon and biochemical oxygen demand. Alum is used in both municipal and industrial

applications.

3. Defendants are manufacturers and distributors of Alum used primarily by

municipalities in potable water and wastewater treatment and by pulp and paper manufacturers

as part of their manufacturing processes. Alum is also used for algae control in lakes and

Case 2:15-cv-07896-JLL-JAD Document 1 Filed 11/04/15 of 21 PageID: 1

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ponds, to fix dyes to fabrics and textiles, and by poultry houses as a litter amendment for

ammonia control.

4. Plaintiff alleges that during the Class Period, defendants conspired, combined and

contracted to fix, raise, maintain and stabilize prices at which Alum would be sold. As more

fully detailed infra, Frank Reichl, a former senior executive at defendant General Chemical

Corporation has pleaded guilty to participating in said conspiracy already. As a result of

defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiff and the other members of the proposed Class paid

artificially inflated prices that exceeded the amount they would have paid if a competitive

market had determined prices for Alum.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, (15 U.S.C.

§§ 15 and 26), to recover treble damages and costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,

against defendants for the injuries sustained by plaintiff and the members of the Class by

reason of the violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).

6. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 and by

Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26).

7. Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 22 and

28 U.S.C § 1391(b), (c) and (d) because during the Class Period, defendants resided,

transacted business, were found, or had agents in this District, and a substantial portion of the

affected interstate trade and commerce described below has been carried out in this District.

8. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant because, inter alia, each

defendant: (a) transacted business throughout the United States, including in this District; (b)

sold Alum throughout the United States, including in this District; (c) had substantial contacts

with the United States, including in this District; and/or (d) was engaged in an illegal scheme


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and price-fixing conspiracy that was directed at and had the intended effect of causing injury to

persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout the United States, including in this

District.

PLAINTIFF

9. Plaintiff Detroit Water and Sewerage Department is a corporation with its

principal place of business located at 735 Randolph, Room 701, Detroit, Michigan. During the

Class Period, Detroit Water and Sewerage Department purchased Alum directly from one or

more defendants. As a result of the alleged conspiracy, plaintiff was injured in its business or

property by reason of the antitrust violations alleged herein.

DEFENDANTS

10. Upon information and belief, Defendant Frank A. Reichl (“Reichl”) is a resident

of Flanders, New Jersey. At all relevant times, Reichl actively conspired with Defendants and

co-conspirators in their unlawful price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracy. On October 27,

2015, Reichl pleaded guilty for his role in the conspiracy as described herein.

11. Upon information and belief, Defendant General Chemical Corporation was a

Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business at 90 East Halsey Road, Parsippany,

New Jersey. Defendants General Chemical Corporation and General Chemical Performance

Products, LLC, are referred to collectively herein as “Genchem.” As a leading manufacturer

and supplier of water treatment chemicals, including Alum, Genchem sold Alum in large

quantities to Plaintiff and other direct purchasers in this district and other locations in the

United States. At all relevant times except for the period from approximately July 2005 to

approximately December 2006, Reichl held high level executive positions with Genchem, and

his active participation in the price-fixing and big-rigging conspiracy was fully authorized

and/or ordered by Genchem.


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12. Upon information and belief, Defendant General Chemical Performance Products

LLC, was a limited liability company existing under the laws of Delaware, with its principal

place of business at 90 East Halsey Road, Parsippany, New Jersey.

13. Upon information and belief, Defendant GenTek Inc. (“GenTek”) was a Delaware

corporation, with its principal place of business at 90 East Halsey Road, Parsippany, New

Jersey. Genchem was a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary by GenTek from

approximately 1999 to approximately October 2009. At all relevant times, as Genchem’s

parent company, GenTek was fully aware of Genchem’s role and participation in its unlawful

price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracy as described herein.

14. Upon information and belief, Defendants John Does 1 through 10 are corporations

and/or entities whose true names and capacities, or otherwise, are unknown to Plaintiff.

Therefore, Plaintiff sues such John Does 1 through 10 by such fictitious names. Further, upon

information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is in

some manner responsible for the events alleged herein and that Plaintiffs' damages were

proximately caused by such John Doe Defendants.

15. Whenever in this Complaint reference is made to any act, deed or transaction of

any corporation, the allegation means that the corporation engaged in the act, deed or

transaction by or through its officers, directors, agents, employees or representatives while they

were actively engaged in the management, direction, control or transaction of the corporation’s

business or affairs.

16. All acts alleged in this Complaint to have been done by defendants were

performed by their officers, directors, agents, employees or representatives while engaged in

the management, direction, control or transaction of defendants’ business affairs.


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CO-CONSPIRATORS

17. Various other persons, firms, corporations and entities have participated as

unnamed co-conspirators with defendants in the violations and conspiracy alleged herein. In

order to engage in the offenses charged and violations alleged herein, these co-conspirators

have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the antitrust violations and

conspiracies alleged herein.

18. At all relevant times, each defendant was an agent of each of the remaining

defendants, and in doing the acts alleged herein, was acting within the course and scope of

such agency. Each defendant ratified and/or authorized the wrongful acts of each of the

defendants. Defendants, and each of them, are individually sued as participants and as aiders

and abettors in the improper acts and transactions that are the subject of this action.

INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE

19. The business activities of defendants that are the subject of this action were within

the flow of, and substantially affected, interstate trade and commerce.

20. During the Class Period, defendants sold substantial quantities of Alum in a

continuous and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce to customers throughout the United

States.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

THE INDUSTRY

21. During the Class Period, defendants and their co-conspirators manufactured,

among other things, performance chemicals utilized for water treatment and chemical

processing. Alum is one of the primary chemicals sold by defendants and their co-conspirators

in the water treatment market, with other uses including pulp and paper manufacturing

processes.


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22. During the Class Period, defendants and their co-conspirators operated

manufacturing facilities throughout the United States. For example, in 2008, defendant Gentek

operated manufacturing plants for its performance chemical business, which included Alum, in

California, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Washington. Other Alum

manufacturers operated Alum manufacturing facilities in Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama,

South Carolina, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio and Indiana.

23. Alum is sold by the ton and transported to customers by rail or truck, usually from

the Alum supplier’s closest manufacturing plant. Freight is a significant component of price.

24. Alum is generally acquired by municipalities through publicly advertised

competitive bidding processes, after which contracts for the supply of Alum, usually for a

duration of one year, are awarded. The results of the municipal bidding are typically made

public.

25. Alternatively, pulp and paper manufacturers typically acquire Alum by issuing

requests for price to manufacturers, including defendants. Contracts for supply are then

negotiated, with those contracts lasting for a year or more. Unlike the municipal bidding

process, results of the negotiations between Alum suppliers and pulp and paper manufacturers

are usually not disclosed to the public.

26. On information and belief, sales of Alum by defendants and their co-conspirators

in the United States during the Class Period totaled hundreds of millions of dollars.

FACTORS INCREASING THE MARKET’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CONSPIRACY

27. Publicly available data on the Alum industry demonstrates that it is susceptible to

cartelization by the defendants and their co-conspirators. Factors that made the Alum market

susceptible to collusion during the Class Period included: (1) a standardized product for which


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competition was principally on the basis of price; (2) weak demand in a mature market; (3) the

lack of available economic substitutes; and (4) high barriers to entry.

Standardized Product with High Degree of Interchangeability

28. Typically, when a product is characterized as a commodity, market participants

compete on the basis of price rather than other attributes such as product quality or customer

service. When competition occurs principally on the basis of price it is easier to implement

and monitor a cartel because price is more often objectively measurable and observable than

non-price factors such as service. Research conducted by industry analysts and leading

manufacturers indicates that Alum is a commodity product and competition in the market is

driven by price.

29. For example, in a 2004 Chemical Market Reporter article, one industry executive

described aluminum sulfate as a “mature commodity market with severe competition among

suppliers.”

30. Similarly, a 2006 report on the North American water treatment chemicals

market noted that “factors such as price competition from foreign participants and increased

commoditization of the chemicals” may result in increasing pricing pressure in the future.

31. More recently, a 2012 analyst report described inorganic coagulants as

“commodity chemicals that are relatively easy to manufacture.”

32. In addition, a 2015 analyst report noted that the water management chemicals

market is split into two major categories: specialty chemicals and “[c]ommodity chemicals

such as alum.”

Weak Demand in a Mature Market

33. Static or declining demand is one factor which makes the formation of a collusive

arrangement more likely. Under normal business conditions, when faced with static or


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declining demand conditions, firms will attempt to increase sales by taking market share from

competitors by decreasing prices. For this reason, firms faced with static or declining demand

have a greater incentive to collude to avoid price competition with competitors and protect

against bankruptcy.

34. Demand for Alum is driven by the demand for end-use markets in which it is

employed. These markets include the water treatment sector and the pulp and paper industry,

which uses Alum to manufacture corrugated cardboard and shipping containers. According to

one 2004 article, “demand for alum has slowed due to retraction and consolidation in the pulp

and paper market, a major market for alum.”

35. Figure 1 below illustrates actual revenues and unit shipments for the North

American coagulants and flocculants market in the U.S. from 2003 to 2006. As shown,

demand was relatively stable during these years and was forecast to continue to increase only

slightly from 2007 through 2010.

Figure 1: North American Demand for Coagulants and Flocculants used in Water

Treatment


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Source: Frost & Sullivan, “North American Industrial Water Treatment Chemicals Markets,” August 31, 2007.

36. Kemira Oyj, a global chemicals company headquartered in Finland which was

listed among Gentek’s water treatment competitors in its 2008 annual report described demand

in its 2014 annual report as follows: “[o]nly modest growth can be expected in the Municipal

& Industrial segment’s relevant market in Europe and North America, as water treatment

infrastructure is already largely built and growth in demand is therefore restricted.”

37. In addition, evidence indicates that the market for Alum is mature. In mature

industries, firms’ ability to increase sales is limited to population growth and the replacement

of existing products. This means that slow growth rates often exist in mature industries

because new distribution channels, which might raise sales, have typically been exhausted.

Consequently, the only way for firms in operating in mature industries, where demand growth

is slow, to capture additional market share is by competing with each other on the basis of

price. This factor is exacerbated in industries for commodity products, such as Alum, since

product differentiation would not be an alternative way to gain market share.

38. One 2001 article described the Alum market as “very mature, with a projected

annual growth rate of roughly 2 percent.” Similarly, a 2015 analyst report notes that the

“technologies currently used in water treatment are mature.” As a mature market, future sales

of Alum are determined by population growth. In its 2013 annual report, Chemtrade Logistics,

which acquired Genchem in 2014, noted that the “North American market for water treatment

chemicals generally tracks GDP and population growth.”

Lack of Substitutes

39. The lack of available substitutes for a product facilitates collusion among possible

conspirators. That is, customers are not able to avoid supra-competitive prices for Alum by

switching to another type of inorganic coagulant.


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40. Research indicates that in water treatment applications, there are several

substitutes for Alum such as aluminum chloride, polyaluminum chloride (PAC), aluminum

chlorohydrate, ferric sulfate, and ferric chloride. However, it is important to note that while

these goods can be functional substitutes for Alum, they are not necessarily economic

substitutes for Alum. An article from Chemical Market Reporter notes that “[b]ecause PAC

compounds are processed more than basic water treatment chemicals like aluminum sulfate,

they are pricier. The PAC family, which includes aluminum chloride, PAC and aluminum

chlorohydrate, accounts for 15 percent of the water treatment market. Alum is the most mature

product and has a market share of more than 40 percent.” Another article states that the market

for Alum benefitted from the “recent trend toward phosphorous reduction in water treatment as

municipalities turn back to alum from iron salts – which are less efficient binders than

aluminum compounds – as the most cost-effective method of lowering phosphorous levels.”

41. Economists regard products as economic substitutes if a nominal change in price

for one product results in increased demand for the other product. The change in price

necessary to cause consumers to switch to a substitute good is often considered to be around

five percent. Given the quality and cost differences discussed above, there do not appear to be

any economic substitutes for liquid aluminum sulfate.

Barriers to Entry

42. Supra-competitive pricing in a market normally attracts additional competitors

who want to avail themselves of the high levels of profitability that are available. However,

the presence of significant barriers to entry makes this more difficult and helps to facilitate the

operation of a cartel.

43. Here, there are significant barriers to entry which have prevented potential

competitors from effectively competing in the U.S. Alum market during the Class Period.


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High barriers to entry existed, because only a determined competitor with specialized

knowledge, the capital necessary to build manufacturing facilities and access to distribution

channels could have competed in this market.

GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION

44. On October 27, 2015, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)

announced that Frank A. Reichl had agreed to plead guilty to participating in a conspiracy to

eliminate competition by fixing prices, rigging bids and allocating customers for Alum.

45. Based upon information, belief and research, Reichl was the Vice President of

Sales and Marketing for Genchem between 2006 and 2010. Prior to that time, during the Class

Period, he also served as General Manager of Water Chemicals for Genchem. In both

positions, Reichl’s responsibilities included oversight of the sale and marketing of water

treatment chemicals, including Alum. Reichl was responsible for pricing, strategy, analyzing

and approving bid and pricing proposals, and supervising Genchem’s sales and marketing

employees.

46. According to the criminal information filed against Mr. Reichl, Mr. Reichl and his

co-conspirators “entered into and engaged in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and

eliminate competition in the sale of marketing of [Alum] by agreeing to rig bids and allocate

customers for, and to fix, stabilize, and maintain the price of [Alum] sold to municipalities and

pulp and paper companies in the United States,” which conspiracy constituted a “continuing

agreement, understanding, and concert of action among Reichl and his co-conspirators.”

47. Further according to the criminal information, while he was employed by

Genchem, Reichl and his co-conspirators carried out the conspiracy by, inter alia:

a. participating in meetings and/or conversations to discuss each other’s

Alum business and the price of Alum in the United States;


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b. agreeing during those meetings and conversations not to pursue Alum

business with each other’s “historical” customers;

c. tracking bid and pricing histories in order to determine if a customer was

the “historical” customer of another co-conspirator in order to determine whether

or not to pursue that potential customer’s business or submit intentionally losing,

“throw-away” bids or price quotes;

d. submitting intentionally losing, “throw-away” bids or price quotes to each

other’s “historical” customers;

e. discussing prices to be quoted to customers by the intended winner of the

customers’ business in order to determine the amount of the intended losers’

intentionally losing, “throw-away” bids or price quotes;

f. withdrawing inadvertently winning bids submitted to each other’s

“historical” customers;

g. intentionally bidding to lose the business of one of their own “historical”

customers if an inadvertently winning bid to one of its co-conspirator’s

“historical” customers could not be withdrawn; and

h. instructing employees how to determine whether and how to bid or price

quote potential business in order to comply with the agreement not to compete.

48. The fact that the DOJ Antitrust Division investigation is criminal, as opposed to

civil, is significant. The Antitrust Division’s “Standards for Determining Whether to Proceed

by Civil or Criminal Investigation” state: “[i]n general, current Division policy is to proceed by

criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful

agreements such as price fixing, bid rigging and horizontal customer and territorial

allocations.” See Antitrust Division Manual, Chapter III.C.5.


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DEFENDANTS’ ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS

49. Beginning at least as early as January 1, 1997, and continuing until at least July

30, 2010, the exact dates being unknown to plaintiff, defendant and its co-conspirators engaged

in a continuing agreement, understanding, and conspiracy in restraint of trade to artificially

raise, fix maintain or stabilize the price of Alum in the United States.

50. In formulating and effectuating the contract, combination or conspiracy,

defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in anticompetitive activities, the purpose and

effect of which were to artificially raise, fix, maintain, and/or stabilize the price of Alum sold

in the United States. These activities included the following:

a. Defendants participated in meetings and/or conversations to

discuss each other’s Alum business and the price of Alum in the United States;

b. Defendants agreed during those meetings and conversations not to

pursue Alum business with each other’s “historical” customers;

c. Defendants tracked bid and pricing histories in order to determine

if a customer was the “historical” customer of each co-conspirator in order to

determine whether or not to pursue that potential customer’s business or submit

intentionally losing, “throw-away” bids or price quotes;

d. Defendants submitted intentionally losing, “throw-away” bids or

price quotes to each other’s “historical” customers;

e. Defendants discussed prices to be quoted to customers by the

intended winner of the customers’ business in order to determine the amount of

the intended losers’ intentionally losing, “throw-away” bids or price quotes;

f. Defendants withdrew inadvertently winning bids submitted to each

other’s “historical” customers; and


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g. Defendants intentionally bid to lose the business of one of their

own “historical” customers if an inadvertently winning bid to one of its co-

conspirator’s “historical” customers could not be withdrawn.

51. Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in the activities described above for

the purpose of effectuating the unlawful agreements described in the Complaint.

52. During and throughout the period of the conspiracy alleged in this Complaint,

plaintiff and members of the Class purchased Alum from defendants (or their subsidiaries or

controlled affiliates) or their co-conspirators at inflated and supra-competitive prices.

53. Defendants’ contract, combination or conspiracy constitutes an unreasonable

restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

54. As a result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiff and the other members of

the class have been injured in their business and property in that they have paid more for Alum

than they would have paid in a competitive market.

55. The unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy has had the following effects,

among others:

a. price competition in the market for Alum has been artificially

restrained;

b. prices for Alum sold by the defendants have been raised, fixed,

maintained, or stabilized at artificially high and non-competitive levels; and

c. purchasers of Alum from the defendants have been deprived of the

benefit of free and open competition in the market for Alum.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

56. Defendants and their co-conspirators affirmatively and wrongfully concealed their

anticompetitive conduct from Plaintiff and the Class from at least January 1, 1997 through at


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least October 27, 2015, when the antitrust investigation of Alum manufacturers became public.

During that time, Plaintiff and the Class did not learn or discover the operative facts giving rise

to their claims, despite due diligence. Thus, Defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolled the

statute of limitations through at least October 2015.

57. Defendants and their co-conspirators represented publicly, both to customers and

otherwise, that their pricing and bidding activities were unilateral. In making those false

representations, Defendants misled Plaintiff and members of the Class as to the true, collusive,

and coordinated nature of their bid-rigging, customer allocation, and price-fixing activities.

58. Defendants and their co-conspirators’ wrongful conduct was carried out in part

through means and methods that were designed to avoid detection, and which, in fact,

successfully precluded detection.

59. In particular, Defendants and their co-conspirators participated in meetings,

conversations, and communications to discuss the bids and price quotations to be submitted to

customers in the United States.

60. During these secret meetings, conversations, and communications, Defendants

and their co-conspirators agreed upon bids and price quotations to be submitted to customers in

the United States.

61. Defendants and their co-conspirators likewise secretly agreed to allocate the

supply of Alum sold to customers in the United States.

62. In accordance with their secret agreements, Defendants and their co-conspirators

submitted collusive bids and price quotations to customers in the United States.

63. Defendants further concealed their agreement not to compete by submitting

“throw-away” bids and price quotes intended to lose business, thereby giving Plaintiff and

members of the class the false impression that defendants were competing for business.


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64. As a result of their secret coordinated actions, and unbeknownst to Plaintiff,

Defendants and their co-conspirators sold Alum to purchasers in the United States at collusive

and noncompetitive prices.

65. Moreover, Defendants and their co-conspirators’ successful contract,

combination, or conspiracy was by its nature inherently self-concealing.

66. Despite due diligence, Plaintiff had no knowledge of Defendants and their co-

conspirators’ unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy.

67. In the course of purchasing Alum, Plaintiff studied prices of the specific products

involved.

68. Plaintiff received various pricing information from one or more of Defendants or

their co-conspirators. Plaintiff had no way to know that these prices were higher than they

should have been due to the conspiracy alleged herein.

69. Plaintiff did not and could not have discovered Defendants and their co-

conspirators’ unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy at any earlier date, despite due

diligence. Defendants and their co-conspirators undertook affirmative acts of concealment of

their contract, combination, or conspiracy, including their attendance at secret meetings,

making misrepresentations to Plaintiff and the Class of the reasons for the prices charged, and

engaging in secret conversations concerning the allocation of customers, bid-rigging, and

price-fixing of Alum.

70. In this regard, plaintiff avers that the announcement of Mr. Reichl’s guilty plea on

October 27, 2015, is significant because it constituted the first public notice that a horizontal

conspiracy among competitors may have injured purchasers of Alum.


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71. Accordingly, plaintiff avers that the applicable statute of limitations does not

constitute a bar to the claims set forth herein or to damages for any portion of the Class Period

asserted in this Complaint.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

72. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action under the

provisions of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on

behalf of the following class (the “Class”):

All persons and entities in the United States who purchased Alum directly from any defendant between January 1, 1997 and at least July 31, 2010. This class excludes any judicial officer who is assigned to hear any aspect of this action, governmental entities, defendants, co-conspirators, and the present and former parents, predecessors, subsidiaries and affiliates of the foregoing.

73. Plaintiff believes that there are at least hundreds of Class members as above

described, the exact number and their identities being known by defendants, making the Class

so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members in impracticable.

74. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which questions relate

to the existence of the conspiracy alleged, and the type and common pattern of injury sustained

as a result thereof, including, but not limited to:

a. Whether defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in a

combination and conspiracy among themselves to fix, raise, maintain and/or

stabilize prices of Alum and/or engaged in market allocation for these products

sold in the United States.

b. The identity of the participants in the conspiracy;

c. The duration of the conspiracy alleged in this Complaint and the

nature and character of the acts performed by defendants and their co-conspirators

in furtherance of the conspiracy;


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d. Whether the alleged conspiracy violated Section 1 of the Sherman

Act;

e. Whether the conduct of defendants and their co-conspirators, as

alleged in this Complaint, caused injury to the business and property of plaintiff

and other members of the Class;

f. Whether Defendants undertook actions to conceal their unlawful

conspiracy;

g. The effect of defendants’ conspiracy on the price of Alum sold in

the United States during the Class Period; and

h. The appropriate measure of damages sustained by plaintiff and

other members of the Class.

75. Plaintiff is a direct purchaser of Alum and its interests are coincident with and not

antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, has

claims that are typical of the claims of the Class members, and will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the members of the Class. In addition, plaintiff is represented by

counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of antitrust and class action

litigation.

76. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would

create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.

77. Defendants have acted, and refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the

Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

78. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate

over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and factual issues

relating to liability and damages.


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79. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy. Treatment as a class action will permit a large number of

similarly situated persons to adjudicate their common claims in a single forum simultaneously,

efficiently and without duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions

would engender. The Class is readily definable through the files of defendants and their co-

conspirators, and prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious

litigation. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many

Class members who otherwise could not afford to litigate an antitrust claim such as is asserted

in this Complaint. This class action presents no difficulties of management that would

preclude its maintenance as a class action.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1

80. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges each allegation set forth in the preceding

paragraphs of this Complaint.

81. Beginning at least as early as January 1, 1997, and continuing thereafter,

defendants and their co-conspirators, by and through their officers, directors, employees,

agents, or other representatives, entered into a continuing agreement, understanding, and

conspiracy in restraint of trade to artificially raise, fix, maintain, and/or stabilize prices for

Alum in the United States, and its territories and possessions, in violation of Section 1 of the

Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).

82. Defendants’ unlawful conduct resulted in artificially high prices charged by

defendants and their co-conspirators to plaintiff and the members of the Class for Alum.

83. Plaintiff and members of the Class had to pay more for Alum than they would

have paid in a competitive marketplace.


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84. Plaintiff seeks to recover for these overcharge damages.

85. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ scheme, plaintiff and the members

of the Class have been injured and financially damaged in their respective businesses and

property, in amounts which are presently undetermined. Plaintiff’s injuries consist of paying

higher prices to purchase Alum than it would have paid absent defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff’s

injuries are of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and flow from that which

makes defendants’ conduct unlawful.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows:

A. That the Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class action

under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. That the contract, combination or conspiracy, and the acts done in furtherance

thereof by defendants and their co-conspirators, be adjudged to have been in violation of

Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).

C. That judgment be entered for plaintiff and members of the Class against

defendants for three times the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff and the Class as allowed

by law, together with the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

D. That defendants, their affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees, and the

officers, directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or

claiming to act on their behalf, be permanently enjoined and restrained from, in any manner

continuing, maintaining or renewing the contract, combination or conspiracy alleged herein, or

from engaging in any other contract, combination or conspiracy having a similar purpose or

effect, and from adopting or following any practice, plan, program or device having a similar

purpose or effect.


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E. That plaintiff and members of the Class have such other, further and different

relief as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a jury trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), of all

triable issues.

Dated: November 4, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

BY: /s/ Jeffrey J. Corrigan

Jeffrey J. Corrigan

Jeffrey L. Kodroff

William G. Caldes

Jeffrey L. Spector

SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF &

WILLIS, P.C.

1818 Market Street, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Tel: 215.496.0300

Fax: 215.496.6611

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff Detroit Water and Sewerage

Department and the proposed Class

David H. Fink Darryl Bressack FINK + ASSOCIATES LAW 100 West Long Lake Road; Ste. 111 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Tel: 248.971.2500 Fax: 248.971.2600 [email protected] [email protected]

Christian A. Jenkins MINNILLO & JENKINS, CO. LPA 2712 Observatory Avenue Cincinnati, Ohio 45208 Tel: 513.723.1600 Fax: 513.723.1620


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class action complaint - dwsd v general chemical

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