SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 144697. December 10, 2003]RODOLFO ALARILLA, SR., ROSARIO G. ALARILLA, RODOLFO G. ALARILLA, JR., RODERICK G. ALARILLA, RAINIER G. ALARILLA, RANDY G. ALARILLA, MA. ROSELLE G. ALARILLA-PARAYNO and ALEJANDRO PARAYNO, JR., petitioners, vs. REYNALDO C. OCAMPO,respondent.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53559 affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, dated February 8, 1996 and May 20, 1996 in LRC Cad. Record No. 291.The AntecedentsSpouses Isidro de Guzman and Andrea E. Enriquez were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of land, with an area of 128.40 square meters located in Fabie Street, Pedro Gil, Paco, Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 94754 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The Spouses De Guzman thereafter constructed a house thereon, with postal address at No. 1526 1st Street, Fabie Estate, Pedro Gil, Paco, Manila.On March 17, 1982, Andrea died intestate and was survived by Isidro and their daughter Rosario de Guzman, married to Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. They executed a real estate mortgage over the property in favor of Spouses Reynaldo C. Ocampo and Josephine C. Llave as security for the payment of their loan. On July 15, 1995, Isidro de Guzman died intestate and was survived by Rosario de Guzman and her children by Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. When the mortgagors-debtors failed to pay the loan despite demands, the Spouses Ocampo filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who was also the Ex-Officio City Sheriff. The property was sold at public auction on July 13, 1994 with the Spouses Ocampo as the highest bidder for P515,430.76. The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a certificate of sale over the property also on the said date. The certificate of sale was registered with the Office of the City Register of Deeds on September 2, 1994. Upon the failure to redeem the property, the Spouses Ocampo executed an affidavit of consolidation of title. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 was issued to and under their names on October 3, 1995.On October 17, 1995, Spouses Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. and their children: Spouses Alejandro Parayno, Jr. and Ma. Roselle Alarilla, Rodolfo Alarilla, Jr., Roderick G. Alarilla, Rainier Alarilla and Randy Alarilla filed a complaint against the Spouses Ocampo and the Ex-Officio Sheriff with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75769, alleged inter alia that (a) by virtue of the Family Code of the Philippines, the property sold at public auction was constituted as a family home; (b) Isidro de Guzman failed to liquidate the family home after the death of Andrea as required by the Family Code of the Philippines, which rendered the real estate mortgage executed in favor of the Spouses Ocampo null and void; (c) upon the demise of Isidro de Guzman on July 15, 1995, the plaintiffs depended on their parents, the Spouses Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. for support; (d) the plaintiffs offered to redeem the property for P356,427.91 to the Spouses Reynaldo Ocampo before the lapse of the one-year redemption period, but the latter refused to accept the same; (e) the Sheriff sold the property for an amount in excess of P401,162.96, the correct amount owed the plaintiffs, thus rendering the sale null and void; (f) the plaintiffs offered to redeem the property for the correct amount due on September 1, 1995, but the defendants refused to accept the same; hence, the period for redemption had not yet expired.The plaintiffs prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from implementing the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 4. The plaintiffs, thus, prayed that after due proceedings:WHEREFORE, and based on the foregoing premises, plaintiffs most respectfully pray that:A. Judgment be rendered declaring the Certificate of Sale and any Deed for that matter that is subsequently issued as null and void;B. The defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos, Philippine currency, plus the additional sum of P45,000.00 to answer for exemplary damage and actual expenses incurred in maintaining the suit, respectively;C. In said judgment, an order be issued making the injunction earlier issued permanent;D. Declaring also that the Family Home comprised of Lot 21 and plaintiffs residence thereat be declared free from any encumbrances, foreclosure sale, Certificate of Sale and Definite Deed of Sale.[2]On November 27, 1995, Reynaldo Ocampo filed a petition for a writ of possession in LRC Cad. No. 291 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4. There was no opposition to the petition. The petitioner adduced evidence ex-parte in support thereof and on February 8, 1996, the court issued an order granting the petition and a writ of possession.The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint praying that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, and foregoing premises considered, the plaintiffs most respectfully pray that:A. Judgment be rendered declaring the Certificate of Sale, the Definite Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 issued to the defendants as null and void;B. In [the] same judgment, an order cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 in the name of said defendants be issued to the Register of Deeds, City of Manila;C. The defendants shall be ordered also to pay the plaintiffs the damages in the total sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX (P436,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS, Philippine currency;D. The injunction earlier issued be ordered to be permanent;E. In [the] said judgment, the Family Home of the plaintiffs comprised as Lot 21 and the plaintiffs residence thereat be declared free from any encumbrances, foreclosure sale, Certificate of Sale, Definite Deed of Sale, attachment and the null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439 aforementioned and any other document that may later on be shown as affecting the same Family Home.[3]In a parallel move, Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr. filed on March 25, 1996 in LRC Cad. No. 291 a motion to set aside the Order dated February 8, 1996 and to dismiss the petition for a writ of possession. On May 20, 1996, the court issued an Order in LRC Cad. No. 291 denying the motion. The movants appealed the order to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Decision on February 17, 2000 affirming the assailed order. The movants-appellants received a copy of the decision of the CA on March 3, 2000. On March 20, 2000, they filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. On August 17, 2000, the CA issued a resolution denying the motion of the appellants. The latter received a copy of the said resolution on September 4, 2000 and on September 19, 2000, the appellants, now petitioners, filed with this Court a motion for extension of thirty days within which to file a petition for review of the decision of the CA.In their petition at bar, the petitioners assailed the decision of the CA contending that:THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ART. 158 OF THE FAMILY CODE IN RELATION TO ART. 153 THEREOF WHERE THE FAMILY RESIDENCE OF PETITIONERS/BENEFICIARIES IS CONSTITUTED BY OPERATION OF LAW AS FAMILY HOME.[4]The petitioners assert that the real estate mortgage executed by the Spouses De Guzman on March 9, 1993 is null and void for failure to secure the conformity of the beneficiaries of the family home as required by Article 158 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Although the respondents are entitled to a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the said provision has been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines, as provided for in Article 211 thereof. The petitioners also contend that the petitioners cannot be ousted from the property without the respondents filing an ordinary action for the recovery of possession of the same, to give the mortgagors an opportunity to be heard not only on the issue of possession of the property but also on the obligations of the mortgagors under the real estate mortgage.For its part, the CA noted that:After expiration of the redemption period without redemption being made, the writ must issue in order to place the buyer in possession of the foreclosed property (Veloso, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra). The right to such possession is absolute; it may be obtained thru a writ which may be applied for ex-parte pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended (Navarra vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850).The subject property was not redeemed within the one-year period. Being the successful bidder in the foreclosure sale, appellee had consolidated ownership over the property, for which TCT No. 224439 was issued to him. In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. vs. Nera (19 SCRA 181), the Supreme Court stated that if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the court has the power, on the ex-parte application of the purchaser, to issue a writ of possession during the period of redemption, there is no reason why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of that period, especially where, as in this case, a new title has already been issued in the name of the purchaser.[5]The respondents posit that the decision of the CA had become final and executory when the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the decision only on March 20, 2000 or seventeen (17) days after being served a copy of the said decision. Furthermore, the CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision on the merits of the petition.By way of riposte, the petitioners aver that March 18, 2000, the last day to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the CA, fell on a Saturday. Hence, they had until March 20, 2000, the first regular working day, to file the said motion. However, the respondents did not raise the issue in the CA, and raising the issue now in this case is but a mere afterthought. In any event, the petitioners argue that their failure to seasonably file their motion for reconsideration is a mere procedural lapse; hence, it should not prevail over their right to appeal from the assailed decision of the CA.The petition has no merit.The parties raised two issues in this case: (a) whether the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the CA was filed out of time; and (b) on its merits, whether the petition should be granted.The petitioners motion for reconsiderationof the CA decision was filed within thereglementary period therefor.Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, as amended, and as applied in several cases, provides that where the last day of the period for doing an act as provided by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time should not run until the next working day. In this case, the petitioners had until March 18, 2000 within which to file their motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. Since March 18, 2000 was a Saturday, the petitioners had until March 20, 2000, the next working day thereafter, to file their motion. The petitioners filed their motion on the said date; hence, the motion was filed within the reglementary period therefor.[6]The petition, however, stands tofail on the merits.The petition is bereft of merit, and is hereby denied due course.First. The one-year period for the petitioners to redeem the mortgaged property had already lapsed. Title to the property had already been consolidated under the name of the respondent. As the owner of the property, the respondent is entitled to its possession as a matter of right.[7] The issuance of a writ of possession over the property by the court is merely a ministerial function. There is no need for the respondent to file an action to evict the petitioners from the property and himself take possession thereof.Second. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending action for the nullification of the sale at public auction, or the foreclosure itself, or even for the nullification of the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners over the property, the respondent as purchaser at public auction is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the action filed by the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75769.[8]Third. The writ of possession issued by the trial court must be enforced without delay. It cannot be stymied or thwarted by the petitioners by raising issues already raised by them in Civil Case No. 95-75769.Fourth. The petitioners did not even oppose the petition for a writ of possession filed by the respondent in the court a quo. Instead, they filed the complaint for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings, the sale at public auction and the nullification of TCT No. T-224439 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in the name of the respondent, with a plea for injunctive relief.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Marina L. Buzon concurring.[2] Records, p. 35.[3] Id. at 46-47.[4] Rollo, p. 13.[5] Id. at 29-30.[6] Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, 362 SCRA 510 (2001).[7] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752 (2001); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 44 (1986).[8] Ong v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 189 (2000).

G.R. No. 75311 October 18, 1988ROSITA ZAFRA BANTILLO, petitioner, vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELSA MANIQUIS-SUMCAD respondent.Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa for petitioner.Isidro T. Barcelona for private respondent.Lino R. Casabas Jr. collaborating counsel for private respondent.FELICIANO, J.:The subject of the present Petition for Review is the Decision 1 dated 3 April 1986 of the then intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV 05774 (entitled "Rosita Zafra Bantillo, for herself and in representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candida Zafra. and Maria Pimentel Zafra, plaintiff-appellants, versus Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad, defendant-appellee'). The appellate court affirmed a 2 August 1983 Order of Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of North Cotabato, ordering (a) the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 161; and (b) the striking out of the Amended Complaint filed in the same case.The case at bar originated from a Complaint for Reconveyance 2 (docketed as Civil Case No. 161), dated 19 April 1982, filed by petitioner Rosita Zafra Bantillo against respondent Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad with the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato. The action involved a 240 square meter parcel of land (Lot No. 63, BSD-11551) situated in the poblacion of Midsayap, North Cotabato. In the Complaint, it was alleged that petitioner Bantillo (plaintiff below) "is the surviving heir" of the deceased spouses, Candido Zafra and Maria Pimental Zafra; that the Zafra spouses had occupied and possessed Lot No. 63 "under claim of ownership since 1950;" that petitioner, as surviving heir and in representation of the heirs of [the Zafra] spouses," had been in open and continuous possession and occupation of Lot No. 63 ever since the death of the spouses; that by virtue of Original Certificate of Title No. P35267 issued in the name of respondent Sumcad, respondent had claimed ownership of the disputed land and had sought petitioner's removal therefrom; and that respondent had rejected demands to reconvey the land to petitioner.Respondent Sumcad (defendant below) filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars 3 in response to the complaint. In that motion, respondent Sumcad requested that petitioner Bantillo be directed by the court: (a) 'to specify what kind of surviving heir she is ...;" and (b) "to specify by what right or authority she represents the so-called 'heirs of the spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra ... and [to show] the papers under which she is authorized to represent them in court, and also (to specify and Identify these other heirs by name and the nature of their heirship.'On 16 June 1982, petitioner Bantillo questioned the propriety of respondent Sumcad's motion. 4 Petitioner Bantillo alleged that the matters mentioned in the "Motion for Bill of Particulars" were not essential to enable respondent Sumcad to file an answer to the complaint, that such matters are not proper subjects of a motion for bill of particulars.The subsequent facts, which are stated in the appellate court's decision presently under review, are not disputed:In response to a motion for a bill of particulars, regarding the complaint filed by the plaintiff, the latter's counsel manifested in open court that she was willing to specify the names of the heirs allegedly being represented by plaintiff Rosita Bantillo as well as to submit the special power of attorney executed by said heirs in plaintiffs favor. Hence, the court a quo issued the following Order dated July 5, 1982:This is a hearing on the motion for bill of particulars and the opposition thereto. The counsel for the plaintiff agreed to specify the names of the heirs and to submit a special power of attorney executed by said heirs in favor of the first-named plaintiff, Rosita Zafra Bantillo. After the amendments made by the counsel, the counsel is directed to furnish the counsel for the defendant a copy of the said amendments.Defendant is given en (15) days from the receipt of the copy of the amended complaint within which to file the defendant's responsive pleading.The pre-trial will be set as soon as the proper amendments [are] submitted.SO ORDERED. (P. 46, Records)On September 3, 1982, counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. In support of the motion, it was pointed out that the plaintiff had not as yet submitted her amended complaint as directed by the court. Neither had the plaintiff complied with the July 5, 1982 Order of said court directing her to specify the other Bantillo heirs and to produce the special power of attorney authorizing her to represent their heirs in the action.Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to dismiss. The Opposition stated, among other things, "that the delay was due to the fact that this Honorable Court (had) for quite a time no presiding judge, so that even if said pleading be filed, it still could not be acted upon." Attached to the Opposition was an amended complaint. 5Reacting to the Opposition, defendant on July 5, 1983 interposed a Rejoinder with Motion to Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleadings, pointing out therein that the plaintiffs compliance with the court's Order was made more than one year from the issuance of the said Order. Invoking Section l(c), Rule 12 of the Rules of Court which grants a party only a ten-day period within which to respond to a bill of particulars, the defendant denounced plaintiffs tardy compliance as an outright sham and a mere ploy intended to outsmart this Honorable Court and the parties.Not to be outdone, plaintiff through her counsel filed a Rejoinder to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the late compliance to [sic] the lower court's July 5, 1982 Order was excusable under Section 1, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which allows amendment of pleadings without regard for mere technicalities.On August 2, 1983, the court a quo issued the Order which is the subject of this present Appeal. In this Order the lower court decreed as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the Motion to Strike Out/ Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleadings, filed by the Defendant's Counsel meritorious, grants the same and orders the dismissal of the complaint and the striking out of the amended complaint, with costs.SO ORDERED. (P. 49, Ibid.)In her appeal, the plaintiff alleges five (5) errors purportedly committed by the lower court. However, for purposes of resolving the appeal, We deem it necessary only to consider the first two (2) assignments of error, namely: The court a quo erred:I. In striking [out] the amended complaint on the grounds:A. That it must follow the agreement embodied in the Order of the Court dated July 5, 1982;B. That the amended complaint must be filed 'at anytime within ten (10) days after it is servedII. In dismissing the complaint for plaintiffs failure to comply with the Orders of the court.xxx xxx xxxThe trial and appellate courts both held that dismissal of petitioner Bantillo's complaint in this case was warranted as she had been "guilty of an unreasonable delay in complying with the July 5, 1982 Order of the (trial] court.' The appellate court cited in this connection Section l(c) of Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court under which petitioner Bantillo had ten (10) days from notice of the trial court's Order of 5 July 1982or until 15 July 1982within which to comply with the directives contained in that order. In addition, both courts held that the amended complaint should have been filed, at the very least, within a "seasonable" time and in a manner consistent with "[petitioner's] agreement as embodied in the Order of the [trial] court dated July 5, 1982." Finally, it was noted that the alleged vacancy at Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (which succeeded Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance) of North Cotabato at Midsayap lasted only from 18 January 1983 until 29 March 1983, or for a period of just a little over two (2) months. This latter circumstance further convinced the two (2) courts that petitioner Bantillos amended complaint, which was submitted to the trial court on 22 June 1983, had not been filed seasonably.The present Petition for Review was received by this Court on 1 August 1986. Respondent filed an Answer 6 on 28 October 1986, to which petitioner submitted a Reply. 7 In a Resolutions 8 dated 27 July 1987, the Court, without giving due course to the Petition, required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.Petitioner Bantillo contests the application in this case of Section 1 of Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging once more that the matters mentioned in respondent Sumcads disputed motion are "not within the scope and ambit of a bill of particulars." Petitioner also alleges that "there was really no bill of particulars required of (petitioner)" by the trial court. Furthermore, it is contended that Rule 10 of the Rules of Court is the applicable provision here.1. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Re Rules of Court reads, in part:Section 1. Motion for bill of particulars.Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10) days after service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of part of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for "a more definite statement" or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submission of such statement or bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.The title of the (original) Complaint in Civil Case No. 161 expressly stated that petitioner Bantillo had then brought suit "for herself and in representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra." In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint, petitioner Bantillo alleged her capacity personally to maintain the judicial action for reconveyance, manifesting that she is the "surviving heir" of the Zafra spouses, the alleged original owners of the land under litigation. The Court notes, however, the absolute lack of allegations in the Complaint regarding the petitioner's capacity or authority to bring suit in behalf of her alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs. On this matter, Section 4 of Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides:Section 4. Capacity.Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner Bantillo having failed to allege in her Complaint a factual matter which, under the Rules, must be alleged or pleaded, respondent Sumcad was not unjustified in moving for clarification of such matter. Knowledge of the identity or identities of petitioner's alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs and, more importantly, of the basis of petitioner's claimed authority to represent the latter, would obviously be useful to respondent in the preparation of a responsive pleading, respondent Sumcad should be given sufficient opportunity intelligently to contest these matters and possibly to raise the same as issues in her Answer. The Court hence believes that the "Motion for Bill of Particulars" filed by respondent Sumcad was not improper.2. The first paragraph of the disputed 5 July 1982 Order (quoted supra, pp. 3-4) of the trial court in Civil Case No. 161 states that petitioner Bantillo, through counsel, had agreed to specify the names of her alleged co-heirs and to submit a special power of attorney authorizing her to represent said co-heirs in the action for reconveyance. Petitioner's counsel was also directed to furnish respondent's counsel with a copy of the corresponding "amendments." The second paragraph of the Order continued:Defendant is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy of the amended complaint within which to file the defendant's responsive pleadings. (Emphasis supplied)As pointed out by petitioner in her Memorandum, the trial court did not in its Order of 5 July 1982 expressly direct petitioner Bantillo to submit a bill of particulars. What was in fact required of petitioner was an amended complaint, which would incorporate the "amendments" mentioned in the first paragraph of the Order. This singular circumstance, however, does not preclude application in this case of Rule 12, Section l(c) of which provides:xxx xxx xxx(c) Refusal.If an order of the court to make a pleading more definite and certain or for a bill of particulars is not obeyed within ten (10) days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may order the striking out of the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such other order as it deems just. It may, upon motion, set aside the order, or modify it in the interest of justice. (Emphasis supplied)Under the above provision, the court may upon motion in appropriate cases direct the adverse party (a) to file a bill of particulars, or (b) to make the pleading referred to in the motion more definite and certain, either by amending or supplementing the same. The trial court's disputed Order of 5 July 1982 falls squarely within the second category. As the Order itself did not specify the period for compliance with its terms, petitioner Bantillo was bound to comply therewith within ten (10) days from notice thereof, i.e., on or before 15 July 1982.3. Petitioner Bantillo's reliance on Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Courtwhich allows amendment of pleadings once as a matter of course is served.is misplaced. That provision does not apply in situations where it is the court itself that orders a party litigant to amend his or her pleading. Where, as in the case at bar, the trial court orders the amendment after a motion for a bill of particulars has been filed by the adverse party and heard by the court, the applicable provision is Section 1 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court: the amended pleading must be filed within the time fixed by the court, or absent such a specification of time, within ten (10) days from notice of the order.4. The record shows that petitioner Bantillo filed her Amended Complaint with the trial court only on 22 June 1983, or more than eleven (11) months after the reglementary period of ten (10) days had expired. The trial judge found no merit in the reasons advanced by petitioner Bantillo for such delay and dismissed the Complaint, declaring that an "unreasonable length of time" had already elapsed.There is of course no question that petitioner's Amended Complaint was filed out of time. Nonetheless the Court believes that in the interest of substantial and expeditious justice, 9 the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken from the record. In the first place, the amendment of the original complaint consisted simply of deletion of any reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance; petitioner, in other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and heir and therefore was no longer suing also in a representative capacity. This amendment, in the second place, imposed no substantial prejudice upon respondent Sumcad and was thus formal in character. 10 As a matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive pleading at all and had not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of ownership of Lot No. 63. The issues had not yet been joined. Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was already before the trial court and it could have and should have proceeded with the case.Alternatively, if it be assumed that the Amended Complaint was properly dismissed, such dismissal should not, for the same reasons of substantial and expeditious justice, be deemed as having the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and hence should be regarded as without prejudice to petitioner's right to re-file her complaint in its amended form. Under this alternative hypothesis, to require petitioner to re-file her complaint in a new action, would appear little more than compelling her to go through an Idle ceremony. Under either view, therefore, the trial court should have admitted the Amended Complaint instead of striking it off the record. Public policy favors the disposition of claims brought to court on their merits, rather than on any other basis. 11 The trial court's discretion should have been exercised comformably with that public policy.ACCORDINGLY, the appellate court's Decision appealed from is REVERSED and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of North Cotabato at Midsayap, is DIRECTED to admit petitioner's Amended Complaint and promptly to resume proceedings in Civil Case No. 161. This Resolution is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Petitioner,- versus -SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS), G.R. No. 148154 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and REYES,* JJ. Promulgated: December 17, 2007 Respondents.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xRESOLUTIONQUISUMBING, J.:The propriety of filing and granting of a motion for a bill of particulars filed for the estate of a defaulting and deceased defendant is the main issue in this saga of the protracted legal battle between the Philippine government and the Marcoses on alleged ill-gotten wealth.This special civil action for certiorari[1] assails two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court or court) issued during the preliminary legal skirmishes in this 20-year case:[2] (1) the January 31, 2000 Resolution[3] which granted the motion for a bill of particulars filed by executor Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (respondent) on behalf of his fathers estate and (2) the March 27, 2001 Resolution[4] which denied the governments motion for reconsideration.From the records, the antecedent and pertinent facts in this case are as follows:The administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino successively sued former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Mrs. Marcos), and their alleged cronies or dummies before the anti-graft court to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth that they amassed during the former presidents 20-year rule. Roman A. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz), then president and general manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); president of the Philippine Airlines (PAL); chairman and president of the Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., owner of Hyatt Regency Manila; chairman and president of Manila Hotel Corporation; and chairman of the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM), is the alleged crony in this case.On July 21, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Complaint[5] for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages alleging that Cruz and the Marcoses stole public assets and invested them in several institutions here and abroad. Specifically, Cruz allegedly purchased, in connivance with the Marcoses, assets whose values are disproportionate to their legal income, to wit: two residential lots and two condominiums in Baguio City; a residential building in Makati; a parcel of land and six condominium units in California, USA; and a residential land in Metro Manila. The PCGG also prayed for the payment of moral damages of P50 billion and exemplary damages of P1 billion.On September 18, 1987, Cruz filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, strike out averments in the complaint, and for a bill of particulars.[6]On April 18, 1988, the court ordered that alias summonses be served on the Marcoses who were then in exile in Hawaii.[7] The court likewise admitted the PCGGs Expanded Complaint[8] dated April 25, 1988, then denied Cruzs omnibus motion on July 28, 1988 after finding that the expanded complaint sufficiently states causes of action and that the matters alleged are specific enough to allow Cruz to prepare a responsive pleading and for trial.[9] On September 15, 1988, Cruz filed his answer ad cautelam.[10]On November 10, 1988, the alias summonses on the Marcoses were served at 2338 Makiki Heights, Honolulu, Hawaii.[11] The Marcoses, however, failed to file an answer and were accordingly declared in default by the anti-graft court on April 6, 1989.[12] In Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. Garchitorena, et al.,[13] this Court upheld the validity of the Marcoses default status for failure to file an answer within 60 days from November 10, 1988 when the alias summonses were validly served in their house address in Hawaii.On September 29, 1989, former President Marcos died in Hawaii. He was substituted by his estate, represented by Mrs. Marcos and their three children, upon the motion of the PCGG.[14]On July 13, 1992, Mrs. Marcos filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,[15] which was granted by the anti-graft court on October 28, 1992.[16] InRepublic v. Sandiganbayan,[17] this Court affirmed the resolution of the anti-graft court, ruling that Mrs. Marcos had a meritorious defense, and that failure of a party to properly respond to various complaints brought about by the occurrence of circumstances which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, such as being barred from returning to the Philippines, numerous civil and criminal suits in the United States, deteriorating health of her husband, and the complexities of her legal battles, is considered as due to fraud, accident and excusable negligence.[18]On September 6, 1995, Mrs. Marcos filed her answer,[19] arguing that the former President Marcos wealth is not ill-gotten and that the civil complaints and proceedings are void for denying them due process. She also questioned the legality of the PCGGs acts and asked for P20 billion moral and exemplary damages andP10 million attorneys fees.On January 11, 1999, after pre-trial briefs had been filed by Cruz, the PCGG, and Mrs. Marcos, the court directed former President Marcos children to appear before it or it will proceed with pre-trial and subsequent proceedings.[20]On March 16, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading as executor of his late fathers estate.[21] The PCGG opposed the motion, citing as ground the absence of a motion to set aside the default order or any order lifting the default status of former President Marcos.[22]On May 28, 1999, the court granted respondents motion:x x x xThe Court concedes the plausibility of the stance taken by the Solicitor General that the default Order binds the estate and the executor for they merely derived their right, if any, from the decedent. Considering however the complexities of this case, and so that the case as against the other defendants can proceed smoothly as the stage reached to date is only a continuation of the pre-trial proceedings, the Court, in the interest of justice and conformably with the discretion granted to it under Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court hereby accords affirmative relief to the prayer sought in the motion.Accordingly, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.[,] as executor of the [estate of] deceased defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos[,] is granted a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution within which to submit his Responsive Pleading.x x x x[23]Respondent asked for three extensions totaling 35 days to file an answer. The court granted the motions and gave him until July 17, 1999 to file an answer.But instead of filing an answer, respondent filed on July 16, 1999, a Motion For Bill of Particulars,[24] praying for clearer statements of the allegations which he called mere conclusions of law, too vague and general to enable defendants to intelligently answer.The PCGG opposed the motion, arguing that the requested particulars were evidentiary matters; that the motion was dilatory; and that it contravened the May 28, 1999 Resolution granting respondents Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading.[25]The anti-graft court, however, upheld respondent, explaining that the allegations against former President Marcos were vague, general, and were mere conclusions of law. It pointed out that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of former President Marcos participation in Cruzs alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively preventing respondent from intelligently preparing an answer. It noted that this was not the first time the same issue was raised before it, and stressed that this Court had consistently ruled in favor of the motions for bills of particulars of the defendants in the other ill-gotten wealth cases involving the Marcoses.The fallo of the assailed January 31, 2000 Resolution reads:WHEREFORE, the defendant-movants motion for bill of particulars is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to amend pars. 9 and Annex A, 12 (a) to (e), and 19 in relation to par-3 of the PRAYER, of the Expanded Complaint, to allege the ultimate facts indicating the nature, manner, period and extent of participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the acts referred to therein, and the amount of damages to be proven during trial, respectively, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution[.]SO ORDERED.[26]

Not convinced by petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,[27] the court ruled in the assailed March 27, 2001 Resolution that the motion for a bill of particulars was not dilatory considering that the case was only at its pre-trial stage and that Section 1,[28] Rule 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows its filing.In urging us to nullify now the subject resolutions, petitioner, through the PCGG, relies on two grounds:I.THE MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS CONTRAVENES SECTION 3, RULE 9 OF THE 1997 RULES [OF] CIVIL PROCEDURE.II.THE MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS IS PATENTLY DILATORY AND BEREFT OF ANY BASIS.[29]Invoking Section 3,[30] Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner argues that since the default order against former President Marcos has not been lifted by any court order, respondent cannot file a motion for a bill of particulars. Petitioner stresses that respondent did not file a motion to lift the default order as executor of his fathers estate; thus, he and the estate cannot take part in the trial.Petitioner also contends that respondent was granted leave to file an answer to the expanded complaint, not a motion for a bill of particulars. The anti-graft court should not have accepted the motion for a bill of particulars after he had filed a motion for leave to file responsive pleading and three successive motions for extension as the motion for a bill of particulars is dilatory. Petitioner insists that respondent impliedly admitted that the complaint sufficiently averred factual matters with definiteness to enable him to properly prepare a responsive pleading because he was able to prepare a draft answer, as stated in his second and third motions for extension. Petitioner adds that the factual matters in the expanded complaint are clear and sufficient as Mrs. Marcos and Cruz had already filed their respective answers.Petitioner also argues that if the assailed Resolutions are enforced, the People will suffer irreparable damage because petitioner will be forced to prematurely divulge evidentiary matters, which is not a function of a bill of particulars. Petitioner maintains that paragraph 12, subparagraphs a to e,[31] of the expanded complaint illustrate the essential acts pertaining to the conspirational acts between Cruz and former President Marcos. Petitioner argues that respondent erroneously took out of context the phrase unlawful concert from the rest of the averments in the complaint.Respondent, for his part, counters that this Court had compelled petitioner in several ill-gotten wealth cases involving the same issues and parties to comply with the motions for bills of particulars filed by other defendants on the ground that most, if not all, of the allegations in the similarly worded complaints for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth consisted of mere conclusions of law and were too vague and general to enable the defendants to intelligently parry them.Respondent adds that it is misleading for the Government to argue that the default order against his father stands because the May 28, 1999 Resolution effectively lifted it; otherwise, he would not have been called by the court to appear before it and allowed to file a responsive pleading. He stresses that the May 28, 1999 Resolution remains effective for all intents and purposes because petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.Respondent likewise denies that his motion for a bill of particulars is dilatory as it is petitioners continued refusal to submit a bill of particulars which causes the delay and it is petitioner who is hedging, flip-flopping and delaying in its prosecution of Civil Case No. 0006. His draft answer turned out not an intelligent one due to the vagueness of the allegations. He claims that petitioners actions only mean one thing: it has no specific information or evidence to show his fathers participation in the acts of which petitioner complains.In its Reply,[32] petitioner adds that the acts imputed to former President Marcos were acts that Cruz committed in conspiracy with the late dictator, and which Cruz could not have done without the participation of the latter. Petitioner further argues that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged but by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances.In a nutshell, the ultimate issue is: Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondents motion for a bill of particulars as executor of former President Marcos estates considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed?We rule in the negative, and dismiss the instant petition for utter lack of merit.Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in default, upon motion and notice, for failure to file an answer within the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting party cannot take part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.[33]The remedies against a default order are: (1) a motion to set aside the order of default at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment on the ground that the defendants failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that the defendant has a meritorious defense; (2) a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt of judgment by default, if judgment had already been rendered before the defendant discovered the default, but before said judgment has become final and executory; (3) an appeal within 15 days from receipt of judgment by default; (4) a petition for relief from judgment within 60 days from notice of judgment and within 6 months from entry thereof; and (5) a petition for certiorari in exceptional circumstances.[34]In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for failure to file an answer. He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case was pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii in February 1986 during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives failed to file a motion to lift the order of default.Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of his fathers estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted by the anti-graft court.Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the default order against the former president is deemed lifted.Considering that a motion for extension of time to plead is not a litigated motion but an ex parte one, the granting of which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court; that in some cases we have allowed defendants to file their answers even after the time fixed for their presentation; that we have set aside orders of default where defendants failure to answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading; and considering that no real injury would result to the interests of petitioner with the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, the three motions for extensions of time to file an answer, and the motion with leave to file a responsive pleading, the anti-graft court has validly clothed respondent with the authority to represent his deceased father. The only objection to the action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation, it would be erroneous to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed to promote their objective in assisting the parties obtain a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their case.[35]While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft courts act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. It was the operative act lifting the default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant whom respondent is representing, founded on the courts discretionary power to set aside orders of default.It is noteworthy that a motion to lift a default order requires no hearing; it need be under oath only and accompanied by an affidavit of merits showing a meritorious defense.[36] And it can be filed at any time after notice thereof and before judgment. Thus, the act of the court in entertaining the motions to file a responsive pleading during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings effectively meant that respondent has acquired a locus standi in this case. That he filed a motion for a bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue because he, as party defendant representing the estate, is allowed to do so under the Rules of Court to be able to file an intelligent answer. It follows that petitioners filing of a bill of particulars in this case is merely a condition precedent to the filing of an answer.Indeed, failure to file a motion to lift a default order is not procedurally fatal as a defaulted party can even avail of other remedies mentioned above.As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the courts below to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to present their case fairly without resort to technicality.[37] Judicial experience shows, however, that resort to motions for bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or, even if not so intended, actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is suspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime. As understood under Section 1 of Rule 12, mentioned above, a motion for a bill of particulars must be filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the pleading sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required by the Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or implied admission of the facts not responded to.[38]But as defaulted defendants are not actually thrown out of court because the Rules see to it that judgments against them must be in accordance with the law and competent evidence, this Court prefers that the lifting of default orders be effected before trial courts could receive plaintiffs evidence and render judgments. This is so since judgments by default may result in considerable injustice to defendants, necessitating careful and liberal examination of the grounds in motions seeking to set them aside. The inconvenience and complications associated with rectifying resultant errors, if defendant justifies his omission to seasonably answer, far outweigh the gain in time and dispatch of immediately trying the case.[39] The fact that former President Marcos was in exile when he was declared in default, and that he later died still in exile, makes the belated filing of his answer in this case understandably excusable.The anti-graft court required the Marcos siblings through its January 11, 1999 Order[40] to substitute for their father without informing them that the latter was already declared in default. They were unaware, therefore, that they had to immediately tackle the matter of default. Respondent, who stands as the executor of their fathers estate, could assume that everything was in order as far as his standing in court was concerned. That his motion for leave to file a responsive pleading was granted by the court gave him credible reason not to doubt the validity of his legal participation in this case. Coupled with his intent to file an answer, once his motion for a bill of particulars is sufficiently answered by petitioner, the circumstances abovementioned warrant the affirmation of the anti-graft courts actions now being assailed.As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the allegations against former President Marcos appear obviously couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show how the Marcoses acted in unlawful concert with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, property and funds in amounts disproportionate to Cruzs lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the president at the time.The pertinent allegations in the expanded complaint subject of the motion for a bill of particulars read as follows:11. Defendant Roman A. Cruz, Jr. served as public officer during the Marcos administration. During his . . . incumbency as public officer, he acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.12. . . . Cruz, Jr., in blatant abuse of his position as Chairman and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), and as Executive Officer of the Commercial Bank of Manila, by himself and/or in unlawful concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, among others:(a) purchased through Arconal N.V., a Netherland-Antilles Corporation, a lot and building located at 212 Stockton St., San Francisco, California, for an amount much more than the value of the property at the time of the sale to the gross and manifest disadvantageous (sic) to plaintiff.GSIS funds in the amount of $10,653,350.00 were used for the purchase when under the right of first refusal by PAL contained in the lease agreement with Kevin Hsu and his wife, the owners of the building, a much lower amount should have been paid.For the purchase of the building, defendant Cruz allowed the intervention of Sylvia Lichauco as broker despite the fact that the services of such broker were not necessary and even contrary to existing policies of PAL to deal directly with the seller. The broker was paid the amount of $300,000.00 resulting to the prejudice of GSIS and PAL.(b) Converted and appropriated to . . . own use and benefit funds of the Commercial Bank of Manila, of which he was Executive Officer at the time.He caused the disbursement from the funds of the bank of among others, the amount of P81,152.00 for personal services rendered to him by one Brenda Tuazon.(c) Entered into an agency agreement on behalf of the Government Service Insurance System with the Integral Factors Corporation (IFC), to solicit insurance, and effect reinsurance on behalf of the GSIS, pursuant to which agreement, IFC effected a great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, which, was a non-insurance company registered in London[,] with defendant . . . Cruz, Jr., as one of its directors.IFC was allowed to service accounts emanating from government agencies like the Bureau of Buildings, Philippine National Oil Corporation, National Power Corporation, Ministry of Public Works and Highways which under the laws are required to insure with and deal directly with the GSIS for their insurance needs. The intervention of IFC to service these accounts caused the reduction of premium paid to GSIS as a portion thereof was paid to IFC.(d) Entered into an agreement with the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) whereby the GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed property consisting of five (5) adjoining parcels of land situated in Manila covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 49853, 49854, 49855 and 49856 to AIC in exchange for AIC property known as the Pinugay Estate located at Tanay, Rizal, covered by TCT No. 271378, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.The appraised value of the GSIS parcels of land was P14,585,600.00 as of June 25, 1971 while the value of the Pinugay Estate was P2.00 per square meter or a total amount ofP15,219,264.00. But in the barter agreement, the Pinugay Estate was valued at P5.50 per square meter or a total of P41,852,976.00, thus GSIS had to pay AIC P27,287,976.00, when it was GSIS which was entitled to payment from AIC for its failure to pay the rentals of the GSIS property then occupied by it.(e) purchased three (4) (sic) additional Airbus 300 in an amount much more than the market price at the time when PAL was in deep financial strain, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of Plaintiff.On October 29, 1979, defendant Cruz, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of . . . (PAL) authorized the payment of non-refundable deposit of U.S. $200,000.00 even before a meeting of the Board of Directors of PAL could deliberate and approve the purchase.[41]In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature, manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties; and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.Also, respondent wanted to know the specific nature, manner, time and extent of support, participation and collaboration of his father in (1) Cruzs alleged blatant abuse as GSIS president and general manager, PAL president and chairman of the board, and executive officer of the CBM; (2) the purchase of a lot and building in California using GSIS funds and Cruzs allowing Lichauco as broker in the sale of the lot and building contrary to PAL policies; (3) Cruzs appropriating to himself CBM funds; (4) Cruzs disbursement of P81,152 CBM funds for personal services rendered to him by Tuazon; (5) Cruzs entering into an agency agreement for GSIS with IFC to solicit, insure, and effect reinsurance of GSIS, as result of which IFC effected a great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, a London-registered non-insurance company, of which Cruz was one of the directors; (6) Cruzs allowing IFC to service the accounts emanating from government agencies which were required under the law to insure and deal directly with the GSIS for their insurance needs; (7) the GSIS-AIC agreement wherein GSIS ceded and conveyed to AIC five parcels of land in Manila in exchange for AICs Pinugay Estate in Tanay, Rizal; (8) PALs purchase of three Airbus 300 jets for a higher price than the market price; and (9) if former President Marcos was connected in any way to IFC and INRE Corporation. Respondent likewise asked, what is the specific amount of damages demanded?The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine[42] prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth,[43] which was similarly worded as the complaint in this case. That doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion for a bill of particulars.While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly in unlawful concert with the former. There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by petitioner.That the late presidents co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint does not necessarily mean that his estates executor will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since the answering defendants defense might be personal to them.In dismissing this petition, Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic[44] also provides us a cogent jurisprudential guide. There, the allegations against former President Marcos were also conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises. The particulars prayed for in the motion for a bill of particulars were also not evidentiary in nature. In that case, we ruled that the anti-graft court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying an alleged cronys motion for a bill of particulars on a complaint with similar tenor and wordings as in the case at bar.Likewise we have ruled in Virata v. Sandiganbayan[45] (1993) that Tantuicos applicability to that case was ineluctable, and the propriety of the motion for a bill of particulars under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court was beyond dispute.[46]In 1996, in the similar case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division),[47] we also affirmed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion for a bill of particulars of Marcos alleged crony, business tycoon Lucio Tan.[48]Phrases like in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers with grave and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws, unjust enrichment, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth, arrogated unto himself all powers of government, are easy and easy to read; they have potential media quotability and they evoke passion with literary flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt those statements in the late 1980s. But they are just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood statements they are, although now they might be a politically incorrect expression and an affront to mothers everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses in the case at bar.In Justice Laurels words, the administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork.[49] The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.[50] We must stress anew that the administration of justice entails a painstaking, not haphazard, preparation of pleadings.The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible. To avoid a situation where its pleadings may be found defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause of action, petitioner for its part must be given the opportunity to file a bill of particulars. Thus, we are hereby allowing it to supplement its pleadings now, considering that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed especially before trial.Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound discretion of the court. As usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.[51] This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.[52]What is important is that this case against the Marcoses and their alleged crony and dummy be decided by the anti-graft court on the merits, not merely on some procedural faux pas. In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of law.WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting respondents Motion for Bill of Particulars, the petition isDISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 and March 27, 2001 in Civil Case No. 0006 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to prepare and file a bill of particulars containing the ultimate facts as prayed for by respondent within twenty (20) days from notice.SO ORDERED.LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate JusticePRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeRUBEN T. REYESAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeChairpersonC E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

* Additional member due to the inhibition of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.[1] Rollo, pp. 2-33.[2] Id. at 5; Records, Vol. 1, p. 42. Civil Case No. 0006, titled Republic of the Philippines v. Roman A. Cruz, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.There were 39 such complaints filed against the Marcoses by the PCGG.[3] Records, Vol. 4, pp. 1,754-1,760.[4] Id. at 1,919-1,920.[5] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-24.[6] Id. at 68-89.[7] Id. at 175-188; 196-198.[8] Id. at 210-232.[9] Id. at 255-264.[10] Id. at 282-293.[11] Id. at 306; Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. Garchitorena, et al., G.R. Nos. 90110-43, February 22, 1990 (Unsigned Resolution).[12] Id. at 364.[13] G.R. Nos. 90110-43, February 22, 1990 (Unsigned Resolution).[14] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 397-399; 415-418.[15] Id. at 946-960.[16] Id. at 987-1,014.[17] G.R. Nos. 109430-43, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 529.[18] Id. at 534-535.[19] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 1,161-1,182.[20] Records, Vol. 4, p. 1,589.[21] Id. at 1,609-1,611.[22] Id. at 1,614-1,617.[23] Id. at 1,633-1,634.[24] Id. at 1,665-1,672.[25] Id. at 1,705-1,712.[26] Id. at 1,760.[27] Id. at 1,764-1,781.[28] SECTION 1. When applied for; purpose. Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.[29] Rollo, p. 13.[30] SEC 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. . . . x x x x[31] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 218-222.[32] Rollo, pp. 206-207.[33] Supra note 31.[34] Lina v. Court of Appeals, No. L-63397, April 9, 1985, 135 SCRA 637, 641-642; See The Mechanics of Lifting an Order of Default, December 14, 1981, 110 SCRA 223, 227-232.[35] Amante v. Suga, No. L-40491, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 192, 195-197.[36] RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Sec. 3, par. (b).[37] Santos v. Samson, No. L-46371, December 14, 1981, 110 SCRA 215, 220.[38] 1 F. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, 198-199 (7th rev. ed., 1999).[39] Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, No. L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 425, 453-454.[40] Rollo, p. 89.[41] Id. at 65-69.[42] Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86926 & 86949, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 680; Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. dissented, saying the motion to dismiss should have been granted because the complaint consisted of mere inferences and general conclusions, with no statement of ultimate facts to support the sweeping and polemical charges, which cannot substitute for a cause of action.[43] Id. at 694-695.[44] G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428.[45] G.R. No. 106527, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 52.[46] Id. at 62.[47] G.R. No. 115748, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 411.[48] Id. at 419.[49] Go Occo & Co. v. De la Costa and Reyes, 63 Phil. 445, 449 (1936).[50] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17, at 538.[51] Santos v. Liwag, No. L-24238, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA 327, 329.[52] Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 114331, May 27, 1997, 272 SCRA 661, 688.

THIRD DIVISIONSONIA MACEDA ALIAS SONIALITA MACEDA AND GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY, Petitioners,- versus -G.R. No. 164947Present:QUISUMBING J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES, andTINGA, JJ.ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY, Respondent.Promulgated:January 31, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:Petitioner Sonia Maceda (Sonia) and Bonifacio Macatangay (Macatangay) contracted marriage on July 26, 1964.[1] The union bore one child, petitionerGemma Macatangay (Gemma), on March 27, 1965.[2]The couple separated not long after the marriage.In 1967, the couple executed a Kasunduan[3] whereby they agreed to live separately.Macatangay soon lived with Carmen Jaraza (Carmen).After the death on December 7, 1998 of Macatangay who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) or on December 14, 1998, his common-law wife Carmen filed a death benefit application before the SSS Lucena Branch. The SSS denied[4] her application, it ruling that it is Macatangays wife who is his primary beneficiary.On January 9, 1999, petitioner Sonia filed before the SSS a death benefit application.Macatangays children with his common-law wife Carmen, namely Jay, Elena, and Joel, aged 27, 31, and 29 years old, respectively, also filed in 1999[5]separate applications for death benefits following the SSS denial of their mothers application.On September 10, 1999, the SSS denied Macatangays illegitimate childrens claim on the ground that under Republic Act 8282, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1997, it is the dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, who is the primary beneficiary of the deceased member.[6] Petitioner Sonias application for death benefit was approved on December 20, 1999. She received a lump sum amount of P33,000 representing pensions [7]from the SSS.On February 22, 2000, Macatangays mother, herein respondent Encarnacion de Guzman, filed a petition before the Social Security Commission (SSC) inMakati City[8] against herein petitioners Sonia and Gemma, for the grant to her of social security benefits, she claiming that her son designated her and his three illegitimate children as his beneficiaries under the SSS;[9] she was made to sign a document regarding the distribution of benefits of Macatangay by SSS LucenaBranch Chief Atty. Corazon M. Villamayor who, however, did not furnish her a copy thereof nor inform her of its nature;[10] and after she signed the document, the three illegitimate children received notices denying their application for death benefits.[11]The SSS office in Quezon City filed a petition-in-intervention in the petition filed by respondent before the SSC in Makati City.[12]In her position paper, respondent contended as follows:[I]n the present case, the agreement of the spouses to live separately four (4) months after their marriage and which agreement was finally made in writing before theBarangay will unquestionably show that Sonia or Sonialita Maceda was not dependent upon the late member for support and therefore cannot be considered as his primary beneficiary under the aforesaid law. Said agreement, though proscribed by law by reasons of public policy, was a mutual agreement short of a court decree for legal separation and will not in any way change the fact that the two lived separately. This under any circumstances will dispute the presumption of the dependency for support arising from the legitimacy of the marital union as reasoned out by the SSS in their Petition for Intervention.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Petitioners, on the other hand, hinged their claim on Section 8(e) and (k) of The Social Security Act of 1997. Thus they argued:Section 8 (e) and (k) of Republic Act 8282 is crystal clear on who should be Bonifacio De Guzman Macatangays beneficiary, thus:(e) Dependents The dependents shall be the following:(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally, and(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member; Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the second beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary. (Underscoring and emphasis in the original)[14]As for the SSS, it argued that:[T]o be considered dependent for support, a surviving spouse of a member must only show that she is entitle[d] for support from the member by virtue of a valid marriage. The surviving spouse is not required to show that he/she actually received support from the member during his/her lifetime. Her dependency for support is actually presumed from the legitimacy of the marital union.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The SSC, taking the Kasunduan[16] as proof that Sonia was no longer dependent for support on Bonifacio,[17] and declaring that the SSS Lucena Branch acted in good faith in granting the benefits to Sonia, granted respondents petition by Resolution of November 14, 2001.[18] It accordingly disposed as follows:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby orders respondent Sonia (Sonialita) Macatangay to refund the monthly pensions paid to her by mistakeand for the SSS to collect the same immediately upon receipt hereof.Meanwhile, the System is ordered to grant the SS lump sum death benefits of member Bonifacio Macatangay to designated beneficiaries Encarnacion Macatangay, Elena, Joel, and Jay Macatangay, subject to existing rules and regulations.SO ORDERED.[19] (Underscoring supplied)Petitioners motion for reconsideration[20] of the SSC Resolution was denied by Order of August 14, 2002.[21]Petitioners thereupon filed a petition for review,[22] docketed as CA G.R. No. 73038, before the Court of Appeals which dismissed it outright, by the present challenged Resolution of October 21, 2002,[23] on the following procedural grounds:A perusal of the petition however shows that there was no written explanation as to why respondents were not personally served copies of the petition as required underSection 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Also, the petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto (i.e., position papers filed by the parties before the SSC, motion to dismiss filed by petitioner before the SSC) as required under Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Finally, petitioners counsel failed to comply with the requirements under Bar Matter No. 287 which requires that all lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings, motions and papers signed and filed by them the number and date of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year x x x. In the instant petition, Atty. Calayan failed to indicate the number and date of the official receipt evidencing payment of IBP dues.[24] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)Via an Omnibus Motion,[25] petitioners prayed the Court of Appeals to (a) RECONSIDER its Resolution dated October 21, 2002 dismissing the Petition for Review; and (b) ADMIT the thereto attached certified true copies of the parties Position Papers and the petitioners Motion to Dismiss filed with the SSC,[26] the Certificate of Life Membership of their counsel Atty. Ronaldo Antonio Calayan,[27] and the Official Receipt showing said counsels payment of lifetime membership fee to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.[28] The Court of Appeals, finding no substantial compliance by petitioners with the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:Section 11. Priorities in Modes of Service and Filing Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this rule may cause to consider the paper as not filed.,denied the Omnibus Motion by Resolution of August 4, 2004.[29]Hence, the present Petition for Review[30] faulting the appellate court as follows:I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN STRICTLY ADHERING TO TECHNICALITIES, RATHER THAN IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING IN THIS PETITION FIND SUPPORT IN DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN FAVOR OF THE REVERSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION UNDER REVIEW.[31] (Underscoring supplied)Petitioners posit that they complied substantially with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:Sonias affidavit of service clearly shows the impracticability of personal service of copies of the petition to the adverse parties. Manifest in the same affidavit is theintervenor Social Security Systems address in Quezon City; that of the private respondents lawyer in Lopez, Quezon, and that of Social Security Commission in Makati City.Sonias counsels address is Lucena City. The distance between these addresses, it is most respectfully submitted as a matter of judicial notice, may be construed as more than competent indicia as to why Sonia resorted to service by mail.[32] (Underscoring supplied)And they cite jurisprudence calling for a liberal interpretation of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice,[33] specifically Barnes v. Reyes[34] which classifies Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules as a directory, rather than a mandatory, rule.The petition is meritorious.In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[35] this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:[37]As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.[38](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City.[39] Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.[40] Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor,[41] a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous.As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals,[42] liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of petitioners petition in CA G.R. No. 73038, if petitioners allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld without giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations, petitioner Sonia would be deprived of her rightful death benefits just because

of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Macatangay which contract is, in the first place, unlawful.[43] The resulting injustice would not be commensurate to petitioners counsels thoughtlessness in not explaining why respondents were not personally served copies of the petition.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2002 and August 4, 2004 in CA G.R. No. 73038 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to take appropriate action on petitioners petition for review in light of the foregoing discussions. SO ORDERED.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeChaipersonANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeDANTE O. TINGAAssociate JusticeATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 4.[2] Id. at 5.[3] Id. at 55.[4] Supra note 2. The records of the case do not contain a copy of the advice of denial.[5] SSC records, pp. 18-20.[6] Id. at 21-23.[7] Id. at 30, 129, 147. Vide note 2.[8] Id. at 1-31.[9] Id. at 2. See also pp. 13 and 14 (copies of SSS Forms E-4 and E-1 containing the designation of beneficiaries).[10] Id. at 4.[11] Ibid.[12] Id. at 37-40.[13] Id. at 97 (citations omitted).[14] Id. at 135-136.[15] Id. at 39 (citation omitted).[16] Id. at 145. See also supra note 3.[17] Id. at 145-146.[18] Id. at 143-148.[19] Id. at 147.[20] Id. at 151-155.[21] Id. at 169-172.[22] CA rollo, pp. 2-16.[23] Penned by Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with the concurrence of Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; id. at 75-76.[24] Ibid.[25] CA rollo at 79-84 [sic].[26] Id. at 85-119 [sic].[27] Id. at 110 [sic].[28] Id. at 111 [sic].[29] Id. at 115-117 [sic].[30] Rollo, pp. 3-16.[31] Id. at 8 and 10.[32] Id. at 8.[33] Id. at 10-12, citing Fulgencio, et. al. v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 141600, September 12, 2003, 411 SCRA 69 and Tan v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 356 Phil. 1058 (1998).[34] G.R. No. 144533, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 538.[35] 355 Phil. 404 (1998).[36] Id. at 413-414.[37] 430 Phil. 128 (2002).[38] Id. at 138.[39] Supra note 32.[40] The Municipality of Lopez, Quezon: In a Nutshell (from The Official Website of MUNICIPALITY OF LOPEZ), 13 October 2005, (visited 20 January 2006).[41] Supra note 37 and note 38.[42] Supra note 33.[43] Vide Albano v. Gapusan (162 Phil. 884 [1976]). In this case, Judge Patrocinio Gapusan was censured for notarizing a document for personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andrews and Guillermo Maligta and for extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. We held: There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals, and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Marriage and the family are the bases of human society throughout the civilized world. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife and every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (Id. at 888, citations omitted; underscoring supplied) Vide also Article 68 of the Family Code: The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (Emphasis added)

THIRD DIVISIONANDY QUELNAN,Petitioner, - versus -VHF PHILIPPINES,Respondent.G.R. No. 138500Present: PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.Promulgated:September 16, 2005x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NGARCIA, J.: Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision[1] dated September 17, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942, and its resolution[2] dated April 27, 1999, denying petitioners motio