civlawrev digests # 1 for november 9

Civlaw Rev Digests Legarda for November 9, 2012Mascenon

Aruego v. CA

“The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.” – The court’s response in the petitioner contention that the Family Code should be applied in the instant case.Ponente: Justice HERMOSISIMA, JR., 1996FACTS:Private respondent Antonia & Evelyn Aruego, as represented by her mother Fabian, filed a petition, in the RTC, compelling the Aruego children of Torres to recognize and acknowledge them as compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose. M. Aruego; on the grounds that they possess an open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children to wit:

(a) The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways.

(b) The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.

Petitioner denied all these allegations. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent, declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose M. Aruego.Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging that the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Family Code of the Philippines. The motion was denied the lower court.Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Respondent Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the respondent court.

ISSUES:Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.W/N the provisions of the Family Code be applied.W/N the application of the Family Code in this case impairs nay vested rights of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect.DECISION:The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.

Francisco v. CA

Facts: Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebio’s (private respondent) legal wife second marriage. Conchita

Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.

Teresita’s allegations:

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o Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they’ve acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.

o These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them.

o Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute.

RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that:o CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already been repealed by

art. 253, FCo It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC

However, issue in Teresita’s reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4

Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.

Held and Ratio: Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art. 254,

FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesn’t operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved based on provisions of New CC.

Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.

As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebio’s testimony that he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.

Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to Art. 148, New CC.

Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."

As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art. 1431, New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence).

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Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art. 158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there is also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.

Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing and phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.

Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to administer property.

Heirs of Simon v. Chan (2011)

Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Chan, 644 SCRA 13 (2011)G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011.HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, petitioners, vs. ELVIN** CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Criminal Procedure; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Civil Liability; Civil liability to the offended party cannot be denied; the payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.—The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987), holding: x x x Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action; No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.—There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides: x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable; The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws; except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses.—The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

Although the court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil

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liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable.—The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez, 371 SCRA 72 (2001), to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

Remedial Law; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Requisites for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action.—For litis Pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.

Llave v. Republic (2011)

What law governs the marriage between Muslims? This is one of the issues answered in this case between Julia and Hannah who both claimed to have legally married Bert, a Muslim.

Bert first married Hannah also a Muslim on May 31, 1958 under civil rite, followed by a ceremonial Muslim celebration. Out of their marriage were born nine children. Records show that Bert also got married with other Muslim women under Muslim rites as attested by his siblings in their affidavits.

After more than 30 years Bert met and fell in love with Julia, a Christian. Eventually he married Julia, twice, initially under the Islamic law and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently under a civil ceremony officiated by a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge in Lanao del Sur, on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Bert’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”.

Since then, Julia had been representing herself to the whole world as Bert’s wife and when Bert died about only 11 months later sometime in May 1994, Julia continued to represent herself as his widow.

But on November 23, 1994, Hannah and her eldest son, in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Bert’s children with her, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for declaration of nullity of the marriage between Bert and Julia for being bigamous. Hannah claimed that her marriage to Bert in 1958 having been celebrated under the New Civil Code is governed by this law. She claimed that both under the Civil Code and subsequently the Family Code which was already the existing law at the time she filed the case, particularly under Article 35 (4), the subsequent marriage entered into by Bert with Julia is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to her (Hannah) was still subsisting. Hannah contended that Bert’s status as being “divorced” appearing in the marriage contract with Julia, has no factual and legal basis because Bert never divorced her in his lifetime and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the Civil Code.

But Julia was also steadfast in her belief that her marriage to Bert is valid as the latter was already divorced under PD 1083 the law that codified Muslim personal laws at the time Bert married her. She

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asserted that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Hannah and Bert without the need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She also pointed out that Bert married all his wives under Muslim rites as attested by his siblings. Was Julia correct?

No. The marriage between Hannah and Bert was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force at that time governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950 under the provision of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act 394 which was approved on June 18, 1949 allowing divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces for a period of 20 years. But this law was not availed of during its effectivity.

PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws cannot also benefit Julia. This law applies only to marriage solemnized either in accordance with Muslim law or the Civil Code in any part of the Philippines between Muslims or where only the male is a Muslim. It does not apply or provide for a situation where the parties were married in both civil and Muslim rites.

Moreover, PD 1083 took effect only on February 4, 1977. So this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Bert and Hannah. In fact PD 1083 itself explicitly provides for the prospective not retroactive application of its provisions unless otherwise provided (Art. 186 [1]). So the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1958. And under the Civil Code, Bert’s prior marriage to Hannah subsisted at the time Julia married him. Such marriage with Julia is therefore void ab initio. This is the ruling in the case of Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, et. al., G.R. 169766, March 30, 2011, 646, SCRA 637.

DM Consunji v. CA (2001)

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:

The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance

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Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

Ferrer v. Diaz (2010)

Succession; waiver of inheritance. The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant?

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened., (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. Guided by the above discussions, the court declares in this case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner’s adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled. Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010.

Thorton v. Thorton (2004)

Facts: Richard Brian Thorton got married to Adelfa Francisco Thorton in 1998. A year later, Adelfa gave birth to a child, Segueira Jennifer Thorton. After 3 years of marriage, Adelfa Thorton grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub. Thereafter, she left the family home with their daughter, without notifying her husband. She left word that she was bringing Sequiera to Basilan.Richard filed case with the Family Court in Makati but this was dismissed, because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Richard went to Basilan to check on the whereabouts of Adelfa and their daughter but he did not find them there. He gave up his search when he got hold of Adelfa's cellular

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phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Richard then filed another petition for Habeas Corpus, this time with the CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

CA: Petition denied for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Family Court Act of 1997 (RA 8369) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for "custody of children and habeas corpus in relation to the latter" (Section 5 b).

Issue: WON the CA should take cognizance of the case

Held:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like the petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. The Court ruled therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word “exclusive” as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. In the said case, the Court applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantee of social justice in ruling that the Commissioner's exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular court for damages. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy “to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children” under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

Licera v. Licera (1975)

F: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

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A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

Pesca v. Pesca (2001)

FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

March 3, 1975 – Lorna Pesca (petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (respondent) were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a seaman, he did not often stay with petitioner.

In 1988 – respondent showed signs of immaturity, cruelty, was a habitual drinker November 19, 1992 – petitioner left with her children due to his cruel behavior but returned and

gave Zosimo a second chance. March 22, 1994 – respondent assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly to leave Zosimo.

Petitioner filed for annulment, invoking psychological incapacity as grounds April 25, 1994 – summons were served on respondent but he failed to file an answer within

reglamentary period. August 3, 1994 – prosecutor submitted report that no collusion exists between both parties January 11, 1995 – respondent filed an answer denying psychological incapacity November 15, 1995 – RTC granted nullity of marriage but CA reversed the decision on the basis

that petitioner has not sufficiently established the grounds for psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability

ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pesca’s actions constitute “psychological incapacity”

HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that respondent showed signs of mental incapacity that would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant provided in Art. 68 of the Family Code.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

De Castro v. JBC (2010)

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De Castro v. JBCFacts:This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES

W/N the petitioners have legal standing?

W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?

W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?

W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING

Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.

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Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.”

There is a justiciable issue

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”

The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court:

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.

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The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.

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Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno’s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of

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those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Martinez v. Van Buskirik

Facts: 11th day of September 1908, plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendandt used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of said plaintiff’s carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant’s delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant’s wagon and horses ran into the carrmoata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

Defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that on for purpose of delivery, the cochero driving the team as defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon, and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up to Calle Herran to Calle Real, which they turned up and on which street they came into collision with the carromatta, in which the plaintiff, Carmen de Martinez was riding.

Carmen Ong de Martinez with his husband filed a case against the cuchero and its employer

Court of first instance saw the case in favor of the appellee/plaintiff and found that the defendant was guilty of negligence and a judgemenet of Php 442.50 with interest of 6% per annum

Issue: Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the cuchero thus the accident.Whether or not the employer has liability on the case.

Held:

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Judgment is reversed. There was no negligence on the part of the cuchero and there is also no liability on the employer as well. Ratio DecidendiArt. 1902 states: “A person who by an act or ommision causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so doneArt 1903 states: The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable not only for personal acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

Regarding Art. 1902, negligence was not proved because of the following grounds: That the cochero was experienced and capable, the horses on the other hand are gentle and

tractable and that the cochero has driven one of the horses for a year and the other one for 6 months but no accident occurred.

It has become a custom for all cocheros to leavethe horses as they were during the incident to help carry the loads off the wagon. This was allowed because it was beneficial to the businessmen.

The performance was not proved to be destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held of themselves unreasonable and imprudent

That the act of not tying the horses, which resulted to an injury, is in itself not negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because it only creates a prima facie evidence

Regarding Art 1903, it was also not proved thus the employer is not liable on the ff ground: Neligence of the cochero was not proved thus art 1903 does not apply against the employer

CIR v. Primetown (2007)

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:

March 11, 1999:- Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent primetown, applied for refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997- explained that respondent suffered losses so it was not liable for income tax- respondent still paid its quarterly corporate income tax therefore, he was entitled to tax refund or tax credit

May 13, 1999- revenue officer, Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim-respondent complied but claim was not acted upon

April 14, 2000- respondent filed a petition for review in the CTA

December 15, 2000- CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for

filing a judicial claim for tax refund/ tax credit.

* CTA found that respondent filed its adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.

- CTA: year 2000 was a leap year, so petition was filed 731 days after. 1 day beyond the

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reglementary period.

August 1, 2003- CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA- Article 13 did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year[national marketing Corporation v. Tecson: year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year]

Repeal of a Law:Article 13 of the Civil Code of 1950 – a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a

regular year or a leap year.vs.

Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987- a year is composed of 12 calendar months, number of days is irrelevant.

Proper Basis: Administrative Code of 1987- more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods

Held: Petition for certiorari is denied.

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civlawrev digests # 1 for november 9

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