U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

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R e s e a r c h F o r u m

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Cosponsored by

Police Executive Research Forum

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Washington, D.C., October 6, 1997

Civilian Police andMultinational Peacekeeping—A Workshop SeriesA Role for Democratic Policing

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice Programs810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington, DC 20531

Janet RenoAttorney General

Raymond C. FisherAssociate Attorney General

Laurie RobinsonAssistant Attorney General

Noël BrennanDeputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy TravisDirector, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of JusticeWorld Wide Web Site World Wide Web Sitehttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

National Institute of Justice

James Burack

William Lewis

Edward Marks

Workshop Directors

Washington, D.C., October 6, 1997

Cosponsored by theCenter for Strategic and International Studies

and the Police Executive Research Forum

January 1999NCJ 172842

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Civilian Police andMultinational Peacekeeping—

A Workshop Series

A Role for Democratic Policing

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect theofficial position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Jeremy TravisDirector

James FinckenauerMarvene O’RourkeProgram Monitors

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes theBureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-quency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

The Professional Conference Series of the National Institute of Justice supports a varietyof live, researcher-practitioner exchanges, such as conferences, workshops, planning anddevelopment meetings, and similar support to the criminal justice field. The ResearchForum publication series was designed to share information from these forums with a largeraudience.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a research institution thatanalyzes and measures the impact of public policy. With resident experts on all the world’smajor geographical regions, CSIS covers such key functional areas as international finance,U.S. domestic and economic policy, and U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a national, nonprofit research institute andmembership organization of police executives, is dedicated to improving the delivery ofpolice services and crime control and to encouraging discussion of police and criminaljustice issues.

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Foreword

Few of us who came of age during the Cold War expected to witness the end of thebipolarity that for so long was the central organizing principle of world politics. Wehave seen a relaxation of that superpower rivalry, which formed the subtext of somany conflicts, but we have not seen it replaced by a long hoped-for era of globalharmony. On the contrary, what has taken its place is a multipolarity generated byseveral new and unfamiliar variables, among them the centrifugal forces unleashedby the breakup of the Soviet Union, the abrupt shift to an unregulated marketeconomy (accelerated by globalization), the abandonment of former client states totheir own devices, and the struggle within those states to rebuild governmental andother institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law.

The many and widely scattered crises ensuing in the wake of these developmentshave created unprecedented opportunities for third-party intervention. The goodnews is that intervention no longer entails the prospect of a clash between super-power patrons of the parties in conflict. The downside is that the major paradigmshift to the new world order has forced the international organizations that deal withregional and intrastate conflict to proceed with outdated “roadmaps.”

Increasingly, civilian police have been introduced into international peacekeepingoperations as a deterrent or stabilizing factor, joining the traditionally deployed civil-ian and military participants. In this context, the roadmap problem translates as alack of systematic, indepth analysis of the role of civilian police. In response, theCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Police Executive Re-search Forum (PERF), with support from the National Institute of Justice, joinedforces to tap the experience and expertise of specialists in the government, nongov-ernmental organizations, the military, academia, and private-sector organizations inidentifying specific problem areas and possible remedial actions.

A series of workshops begun in 1997 under CSIS and PERF sponsorship is address-ing the roles of civilian police in “complex emergencies,” the juridical mandate ofcivil policing in multinational operations, and how the relationship of the civilian po-lice to other participants (such as the military) in these operations should be defined.Professor David H. Bayley, Dean and Professor in the School of Criminal Justice atSUNY-Albany and a specialist in international criminal justice with a particular in-terest in policing, presented the keynote address at the second workshop in the series.His paper on the distinguishing features of democratic policing, as well as other ma-jor addresses from the workshop, are reproduced here.

The National Institute of Justice sponsors studies of all aspects of policing—enforce-ment, prevention, management, and organizational issues—under its broad mandateto conduct criminal justice research. NIJ supported the workshop and is disseminat-ing the results because advancing the understanding of policing issues has alwaysbeen a major priority and, more recently, the Institute has recognized internationaljustice reform as a topic meriting increased attention by researchers and practitionersalike.

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For law enforcement officials in countries either struggling with complex emergencies or making the tran-sition to democracy, Professor Bayley’s analysis of responsiveness and accountability as the distinguishingfeatures of democratic policing has much value. It also provides pertinent information for their counter-parts in the United States.

The number of situations in which the police are called on to assume responsibility in the context of inter-national peacekeeping is likely to increase, making it all the more important to clearly define their peace-keeping role. Our three organizations are confident that the workshop papers and the exchange of ideaswill generate knowledge that can make a useful contribution toward that end.

Jeremy TravisDirectorNational Institute of Justice

Joe MontvilleDirector, Preventive Diplomacy ProgramCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Chuck WexlerExecutive DirectorPolice Executive Research Forum

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Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Overviewby William Lewis and Edward Marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative Viewby David H. Bayley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Managing U.S. Participation in International Police Operationsby Robert M. Perito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Practical Issues in Providing Policing Assistance Abroadby Michael Berkow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Participants’ Comments—A Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Compendium of Participants’ Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Biographies of Presenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Workshop Attendees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Contents

William Lewis and Edward Marks

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OverviewWilliam Lewis and Edward Marks

The number of states experiencing internal unresthas multiplied since the end of the Cold War. Notuncommonly, the unrest has been accompanied bythe breakdown of internal order, the failure of gov-erning institutions, and the emergence of displacedand refugee populations—numbering some 45 mil-lion people according to United Nations estimates.In these circumstances, a growing need for an ef-fective civilian police force has become evident ifreasonably stable internal order is to be maintained.

The burgeoning roles of international civilian policein monitoring and helping to direct the formation ofpublic safety forces present a unique challenge tothe international community. To address the issuesarising out of complex humanitarian emergenciesand the roles of international civilian police, theCenter for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), in collaboration with the Police ExecutiveResearch Forum (PERF) and with the support ofthe National Institute of Justice (NIJ), broughttogether public safety specialists with experiencein peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia,Haiti, and Central America. Also participating inthe workshop were Federal Government officialsand researchers who are concerned with buildingpublic safety institutions in conflict areas of theworld. Held on October 6, 1997, the workshop wasthe second in a series on civilian policing and inter-national peacekeeping.

Democratic policingprinciples elaboratedProfessor David H. Bayley, Dean of the School ofCriminal Justice in the State University of NewYork at Albany and a leading comparative policescholar with extensive experience in internationalaffairs, presented the keynote address. The themewas rebuilding and reforming police institutionson the basis of democratic policing principles. Thecentral question Professor Bayley addressed washow to define the term “democratic policing.” In

doing so, he focused on identifying elementscommon to all democratic police forces around theworld and found two: responsiveness and account-ability.

Responsiveness requires that the police take theircue about what they do from the disaggregatepublic—not from the state and not from the govern-ment. What problems the public brings to the policeto resolve and how the police respond are a clearindications of the extent to which democratic polic-ing practices have been adopted.

Similarly, accountability to oversight institutions,independent of ruling regimes, is an importantunderpinning of democratic policing. These institu-tions may include courts, legislatures, the media,and complaint review boards or independentombudspersons. Democratic police can be distin-guished, ultimately, by their submission to andacceptance of outside supervision and examination.

In seeking to encourage the establishment of policeforces abroad dedicated to responsiveness and ac-countability, there are four guiding principles. First,focus on elements critical to democratic policing,and avoid the temptation to replicate in whole orin part other existing systems or procedures simplybecause they come from police forces in democraticcountries.

Second, recognize that substantive, lasting reformrequires sensitivity to and understanding of localpolicing traditions and, more important, the hostcountry’s basic cultural values. Reform that disre-gards cultural norms is hazardous and very likelydestined to fail. Similarly, superficial reforms, suchas transfers of advanced technologies to embryonicpolice forces, are unlikely to make a significant im-pact on the ability of the indigenous force to engagein democratic policing.

Third, recognize that police play a central role inthe political life of any society. As a result, success-ful reform of the police will require either the active

Overview

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support or, at the very least, passive acquiescence ofthe political forces in the host nation. Police reformcannot occur if the host nation’s political powersare opposed.

Fourth, understand that pressures from competingconstituencies and interests can subvert reform.These pressures come from various sources, includ-ing the imperative for police to provide internalsecurity to the government, the international lawenforcement community’s conflicting aims, thepersonal interests of the individual members of theindigenous police force, and the diverse interests ofthe local population.

Opportunities forimprovement identifiedThe workshop addressed a range of issues relatedto the weaknesses of the United Nations (U.N.)CIVPOL (civilian police) unit, particularly its in-ability to provide effective oversight and logisticalsupport for field operations. Comparable shortfallsin U.S. support for international policing were iden-tified and evaluated. The need for effective integra-tion of military and civilian policing planning wasaccorded special attention by workshop partici-pants. They also made several recommendations forremedial action on the part of the U.N., as well asthe United States and other member states. Theserecommendations merit serious consideration bygovernments involved in past and current civilianpolice operations called in response to complexhumanitarian emergencies.

David H. Bayley

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The Contemporary Practices ofPolicing: A Comparative ViewDavid H. Bayley

The purpose of this workshop is to examine whatcountries such as ours can do to reconstruct andreform foreign police forces, when the need arises,so that they can provide security for their popula-tions in a humane and democratic way. This is anew mission for the international community, onethat has grown enormously since the end of theCold War.1 Efforts to construct an effective butdemocratic police come after peacemaking; that is,after fundamental conditions of security have beenachieved but before responsibility for maintaining itis returned to the indigenous forces. This rebuildingand reform is sometimes referred to as institutionbuilding. It constitutes a separate agenda of activi-ties for the international community after militaryintervention and the forceful stabilization of domes-tic security.

In this paper, I will address the issue of rebuildingand reforming police institutions abroad by examin-ing three topics:

● The varieties of world policing.

● The distinguishing features of democratic policing.

● The process of managing democratic changeabroad.

Varieties of world policingWhen I was approached to address this workshop,I was asked to summarize the varieties of policeexperience around the world, evidently in the hopethat this tour d’horizon would help policymakersunderstand what models of policing they mightselect from and also might need to replace. Frankly,the more I thought about this idea, the less I likedit. Classifying police systems globally is an intel-lectual game that I think is better left to the aca-demics. I say this not because police systemscannot be classified globally, but because such

schemes will not inform the work of this workshopin a useful way.

For example, police systems have been classified as“democratic” as opposed to “colonial,” dependingon whether they were established to serve indig-enous populations or to maintain control by foreignpowers. Curiously, Great Britain created the modelfor both, which shows the complexity of police his-tory. Another common classification distinguishesAnglo-Saxon policing (decentralized, accountableto law, limited in functions, democratically con-trolled) from Continental policing (centralized rule-making power, multiple functions, democratic orauthoritarian control) and from communist policing(centralized, political rather than legal control, om-nibus regulatory functions, authoritarian polity).2

I tried my own hand at this several years ago, comingup with “Anglo-Saxon,” “Authoritarian,” and “Orien-tal,” the latter category distinguished by the sharing ofresponsibility for security between government andpopulace in social systems founded on communitarianas opposed to individualist principles.3

In my judgment, all these schemes are unsatisfac-tory for informing policy, not because they arewrong, but because they are arbitrary. The police isa complex institution; it can be classified in termsof a very large number of elements. Any method forclassifying police systems depends entirely on theelements chosen. For example, one arrives at differ-ent classification schemes depending on whetherone focuses on the national structure of policing,involvement of the military, range of functions,accountability, forcefulness, operational strategies,recruitment requirements, rank structure, training,pay and benefits, social composition, equipment,organizational specialization, and so forth. In thecomputer world we are familiar with the expression“garbage in, garbage out.” The analog here wouldbe “criteria in, classification out.” To be useful for

The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

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policymaking, the classification exercise needsto be tied to a particular set of interests. Becausereform of the police needs to involve so manydifferent facets of organization and practice, anyclassification scheme is bound to be limited, super-ficial, arbitrary, and problematic.

Furthermore, all the classification schemes I knowmiss what may be the most important trend inworld policing, namely, the rise of private policing.They do so because they focus on state policing—on police created by governments. All over theworld, however, in developed and underdevelopedcountries alike, the state is rapidly losing its mo-nopoly on policing; that is, on the task of providingsecurity.4 After centuries of increasing state controlof policing, it is now being denationalized. Indeed,it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the au-thority to provide security within countries is beingrefeudalized among businesses, industrial establish-ments, gated communities, neighborhood crime-prevention organizations, and for-profit securityservices.

This seems to be occurring for three main reasons.First, fear of crime has increased, sometimesreflecting genuine crime and disorder crises conse-quent on rapid social change, at other times reflect-ing the exploitation of crime by commercial mediain democratic, market-centered economies. Second,“mass private property” has increased as a resultof the expansion of free-enterprise worldwide.5

(“Mass private property” refers to space used bythe public that is privately owned, such as shoppingmalls, banks, office buildings, sports stadiums, andcondominiums.) Although all mass private propertyis subject to policing by the state, security is beingprovided increasingly in all of it under private aus-pices. Third, states themselves, paradoxically, areencouraging communities to participate in policingthrough a variety of neighborhood-based crimeprevention programs such as Neighborhood Watch,civilian patrols, police reserves, crime preventioncouncils, and police-citizen problem solving. Thissort of public-state partnership is the hallmark ofpolicing in Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore, andhas been rediscovered in the West under the bannerof community-oriented policing.

If our purpose in this workshop is to explore how tocreate democratic police forces more successfully

abroad, I believe our time is better spent not inreviewing various classifications of world policeexperience but in examining, first, what democraticpolicing looks like substantively and, second, whatproblems are involved in creating its specific fea-tures abroad.

Distinguishing features ofdemocratic policingWhat makes a police force democratic? I thinkthere are two features—responsiveness and ac-countability. Everything else is unimportant in thesense that it may be compatible with both demo-cratic and undemocratic forms of policing.

A police force is democratic when it responds tothe needs of individuals and private groups as wellas the needs of government. Most police forcesin the world are what I call “regime police,” con-cerned primarily with doing what the governmentrequires. Democratic police, on the other hand,orient their activities primarily to the needs of thedisaggregate public. The clearest sign of this orien-tation is the emergency telephone numbers that citi-zens may use to call for police assistance. Throughthis device, individuals command the services ofgovernment in the form of a uniformed and oftenarmed police officer who will attend to their imme-diate problems, whatever they may be. This is aremarkable development in the evolution of govern-ment. It constitutes, I believe, an advance incivilization.

A democratic police force is organized to be re-sponsive downward; an undemocratic police forceis organized to be responsive upward. I suggest,therefore, two tests for the “democraticness” of anypolice force. First, what proportion of its work isgenerated by requests from the disaggregate public?Second, do people call the police only at times ofdesperate need or whenever they feel the need forauthoritative intervention or effective assistance,regardless of whether laws have been violated?Although police in the developed democratic coun-tries frequently complain about the burden of re-sponding to trivial calls from the public, I submitthat those calls are a vital indicator of the contribu-tion the police are making to the political health ofthe country.

David H. Bayley

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The second distinguishing feature of democraticpolice forces is that they are accountable to mul-tiple audiences through multiple mechanisms. Po-lice in developed democratic countries are watchedand supervised by elected politicians; by civil,criminal, and administrative courts; by the media;and increasingly by independent ombudspersonsand civilian complaint-review boards. All of theseare supported by accountability to written, demo-cratically enacted law. In other words, democraticpolice forces are open to monitoring by outsiders.They may not always like being watched andsecond-guessed, but they recognize that this isinevitable in a democracy. Indeed, reflective policeofficers understand that their effectiveness in pro-viding security depends almost entirely on theirwilling acceptance of outside supervision.

In this connection, I would suggest that a solidindicator of the democraticness of the police iswhether a country gives visas to foreigners to studyits police operations, because this suggests open-ness to outside examination.

In summary, then, our efforts to reform foreignpolice forces to make them humane and democraticshould concentrate on making them responsive tothe needs of individuals and private groups andaccountable to multiple external audiences.

Process of managingdemocratic change abroadAs foreign reformers try to implement thesechanges abroad, they should keep four principlesin mind.

1. Isolate the substance of democraticpolicing. First, reformers must separate what isessential substantively to democratic policing fromwhat is not. There is a strong tendency for foreignadvisers to advocate the practices they are familiarwith at home. The logic seems to be that since theycome from democratic countries, whatever their po-lice forces do must be in the interests of democracy.This is what the Allied Powers did in Germany andJapan after World War II. Indeed, the United States,Britain, France, and Russia set up replicas of theirown police systems in each of their zones of occu-pation. As soon as they left, however, both Germansand Japanese went back to their historical pattern oforganization.

The favorite reforms that American advisers urgeupon foreign police are decentralizing policing tolocal control; combining uniformed patrol andcriminal investigation functions within a singleorganization; establishing a nonstratified rankstructure, with recruitment only at the bottomrank; adopting technological modernization; and,most recently, incorporating community-orientedpolicing. Close examination of contemporary andhistorical experience will show, however, thatdemocratic policing is compatible with the absenceof all of these. None of these necessarily leads toenhanced responsiveness or accountability. Indeed,technological enhancement and community-oriented policing may in various circumstances beinimical to the development of democratic policing.Technology may simply make more efficient apolice force whose primary purpose is serving a re-pressive regime. It empowers the repressors, not theforces of democratic evolution. Community polic-ing, too, rather than empowering local communitiesvis à vis the police, may become a device for in-structing the populace rather than for listening to it.It becomes an instrument whereby authoritarianregimes mobilize and monitor populations, as inCuba, China, and the former Soviet Union. In short,American police advisers must understand what isdemocratic in what they do at home. Unfortunately,very few bring this sort of perspective to theircustomary activities.

Another feature that American advisers frequentlyinsist on is the separation of the police from themilitary. This is correct and exceedingly important,in my view. When I recently reviewed the extent towhich the military participated in policing in morethan 120 countries,6 I found that policing was moreheavily penetrated by the military in Latin Americathan in any other region of the world. Only Africasouth of the Sahara came close. Police in the West-ern democracies, as well as in communist countries,carefully excluded the military from internal polic-ing. It would appear, therefore, that the separationof the military from the police is necessary but notsufficient for enhancing responsiveness and ac-countability. So reformers must understand thatwhile penetration of policing by the military inhib-its democratic development, separation is not anend in itself. It is only the beginning of democraticreform.

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2. Balance the democratic with the achiev-able. Foreign reformers must frame their agendacarefully. They must avoid doing what is easy butinconsequential, such as pursuing technologicalmodernization. And they should avoid what isimpossible because of local traditions. Probablythe most resistant feature of policing, but onethat Americans have insisted on trying to changeabroad, is the national structure of the police. It isan article of faith among Americans that a decen-tralized system based on autonomous local policeforces is the hallmark of democracy. This is whatwe tried to bring about in Japan and Germanyimmediately after World War II, and it is what wetried again in Bosnia under the Dayton Accords.I predict that in the latter case, as in the former,we will fail.

For institutional reform to succeed abroad, we muststudy, therefore, what is democratic in our own po-licing and what is achievable given local traditionsabroad. Both of these require careful comparativeanalysis. The implication for reform operations isthat the reform agenda must be carefully plannedbefore intervening abroad. A successful CIVPOLoperation requires the same sort of advanced plan-ning that the military requires in foreign operations.Curiously, the American government has a muchgreater capacity to anticipate problems of militaryinvolvement where, arguably, it has overwhelmingpower, than in civilian involvement, where it hashardly any power.

3. Keep in mind the link of policing topolitics. Reformers must never forget that policingcannot be separated from politics. Reform will goonly as far as the local political situation will allow.If the indigenous government is hostile to thedemocratic reform of policing, go home. Demo-cratic reform of the police cannot take place in theface of undemocratic governments. The police arenot the tail that wags the governmental dog.

At the same time, police can become downwardlyresponsible and more widely accountable throughtheir own actions if governments are either ambivalentor indifferent to police affairs. Reform requires per-mission from political regimes, not active direction.Police officials frequently argue that they cannotundertake reform unless the political establishment isengaged. This is an avoidance of responsibility.

Indifference by the political establishment can be anopportunity. It provides space for courageous leadersin the police to work. Hostility on the part of govern-ment, however, is hopeless. In that case, institutingreform is like beating a dead horse.

4. Recognize the pressures under which thepolice operate. Reformers must recognize thepressures on any foreign police force, regardless oflocal histories, that will inhibit democratic reform.Police are susceptible to pressure from the follow-ing four constituencies, all of them legitimate andall of them potentially able to impede democraticreform:

● Governments. Governments always put their ownsecurity interests ahead of the public’s. It is naiveto expect governments that are under violent at-tack, or the threat of violent attack, not to requirethe police to protect them first. One sees this inSri Lanka, the Punjab, Israel, Northern Ireland, andapartheid South Africa. This is not cynical selfish-ness on the part of political leaders. Reform ofgovernmental institutions cannot take place unlessthere is a stable political center. Unstable govern-ments rarely create democratic police forces.

● The international community. The members of thiscommunity have law enforcement interests that viewith democratic reform for precedence. The gov-ernment of the United States, for example, wants toenlist foreign nations in combating terrorism, drugtrafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigra-tion. Its specialized agencies, such as the FBI,DEA, and INS, are more interested in maintainingor establishing close working relations abroadthan in pressing for uncomfortable reforms. Theenhancement of law enforcement capability takesprecedence over democratic reform. Their advo-cacy is not wrong; they are being true to theirmission. But it means that the international com-munity, including the United States, often sendsconflicting signals to foreign police about what isimportant at any given moment. So, too, do inter-national human rights groups. Their pressure forthe investigation of human rights violations and theprosecution of war criminals supports the effective-ness agenda and, paradoxically, may deflect localattention, from longer range reforms involvingresponsiveness and accountability.

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● The police themselves. The police themselves haveboth corporate and personal interests that must beserved, among them levels of remuneration, immu-nity from legal harassment, stability of livelihood,and professional standing within the community.Policing is an occupation, and its practitioners can-not realistically be expected to be more selflessthan others.

● The public. The agenda of the public rarely coin-cides altogether with the agendas of any of the pre-viously described constituencies. It overlaps but isdistinct in emphasis, tending to focus on personalcrimes, disorderly events that are inconvenient andthreatening but not necessarily criminal, and ser-vices that are urgently required but beyond theirown ability to provide. Unfortunately, this agenda,which constitutes the heart of democratic policereform, tends to come last.

The key to democratic reform, therefore, is to moverapidly from the agendas of the regime, the interna-tional community, and the police themselves to theagenda of the dissagregate public. All are legiti-mate, all are important. The last, however, may bethe surest way to achieve the others, although ittakes unusual courage on the part of local policeofficials to act on this insight.

Conclusion—being smartTo be successful in achieving democratic police re-form abroad, foreign CIVPOL agents must, aboveall things, be smart. The reform enterprise is highlydemanding intellectually. Reformers need to besmart about:

● What is essential to democratic policing.

● What is democratic in our own police experience.

● What is unchangeable in local police traditions.

● The connection between politics and policing.

● Our own conflicting pressures on foreign policing.

Democratic police reform abroad is difficult anddemanding. It cannot be successful if its practitio-ners are intellectually lazy. Although the UnitedStates has the intellectual capacity to succeed inthis enterprise, it will do so only if the issue isgiven the attention it deserves.

Notes1. Myall, James, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, FormerYugoslavia, and Somalia, LSE Monographs in Interna-tional Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1996; and Zartman, William, Collapsed States: TheDisintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

2. Mawby, R.I., Comparative Policing Issues: The Brit-ish and American Experience in International Perspec-tive, London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

3. Bayley, David H., “A World Perspective on the Roleof the Police in Social Control,” in The Maintenance ofOrder in Society, Toronto: The Canadian Police College,1982; and Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing, NewBrunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985.

4. Bayley, David H., and Clifford Shearing, “The Futureof Policing,” Law and Society Review 30 (3) (1996):585–606.

5. Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning, “PrivateSecurity: Implications for Social Control,” Social Prob-lems 30 (1983): 493.

6. Bayley, David H., “What’s in a Uniform?A Comparative View of Police-Military Relations inLatin America,” in Between Public Security and Na-tional Security: The Police and Civil-Military Relationsin Latin America, proceedings of the 1994 conference,Miami, Florida: Florida International University(forthcoming).

Robert M. Perito

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Managing U.S. Participation inInternational Police OperationsRobert M. Perito

More than 3,000 international police officers from53 countries are currently engaged in United Na-tions peace operations in 8 countries. The largestoperation is in Bosnia, with 2,027 officers; thesmallest and oldest operation is in Cyprus, with35 officers. These operations, in which policefrom around the world are engaged in monitoring,mentoring, training, and generally assisting theirlocal counterparts, provide a useful perspectivefrom which to view the issues raised in ProfessorBayley’s presentation. While a scholarly analysisis beyond the scope of these brief remarks, I wouldlike to make a few observations on how the actualexperience in these operations appears to eithersupport or raise questions concerning ProfessorBayley’s conclusions. This approach is fair, as Pro-fessor Bayley was an active participant in craftingthe U.N. International Police Task Force’s (IPTF’s)program for police reform in Bosnia.

Defining democratic policingIn a recent address to a United Nations (U.N.)seminar on the role of police in peacekeeping,former IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgeraldrecalled his experience when he informed theBosnian police they would have to adopt interna-tional police standards. When the Bosnians askedfor a copy of the standards, Fitzgerald and hisfellow IPTF officers, who came from different cul-tures, traditions, and policing philosophies, discov-ered that standards varied widely and determinedthat there must be something else they had in com-mon. That something was a set of democratic prin-ciples that were reflected in the “Commissioner’sGuidance for Democratic Policing in the Federationof Bosnia-Herzegovina” in May 1996. ProfessorBayley aided in drafting the “Guidance,” which in-cludes model codes of conduct and guidelines onhow policing should be carried out in a democraticsociety. These principles formed the basis of subse-

quent training programs for the Bosnian police andare among the most important contributions theUnited Nations has made to the peace implementa-tion process in Bosnia. Now when someone asks,“What is democratic policing?” there is an answer.

Managing democraticpolicingProfessor Bayley is both right and wrong about theapproach taken toward managing democratic policereform in Bosnia. He believes Americans have a“knee jerk” reaction in favor of decentralization.In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, publicsecurity was the responsibility of 10 cantons withethnically segregated police forces. IPTF, with strongU.S. support, used a common police certificationprocess. U.S. advisers pressed the cantons to adoptcommon procedures, standards, and codes of con-duct. With U.S. backing, IPTF promoted commoninstitutions such as a civil disorder management unitmade up of police officers from all cantons and theFederation. All this was done in an effort to ensureas much commonality as possible in a situation inwhich central control would be anathema.

Before the conflict, the Yugoslavian police forcecontained paramilitary units. Consistent with Pro-fessor Bayley’s belief in the importance of separat-ing the police from the military, the IPTF programin Bosnia stressed the importance of creating acompletely civilian police force. This involved rig-orous vetting and testing to remove former fighters;providing new, Western-style civilian police uni-forms; and training in respect for human dignityand basic police skills for every police officer.It also included visits to Germany and the UnitedStates to introduce the new Bosnian police leader-ship to community policing. After observing U.S.police officers operating community centers andproviding other community-related services, some

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of the Bosnians have introduced similar programsin their own police agencies.

Finally, the international police assistance effort inBosnia has been anything but high-tech. U.S. equip-ment donations have been limited primarily totraining materials and replacements of basic equip-ment and furniture destroyed during the war. OneU.S. police adviser created a sensation by introduc-ing a preprinted, standard incident report form atSarajevo’s Centar Station. The new form replacedthe form previously in use—a blank sheet of paper.U.N. appeals for international equipment donationsfor the police program have gone unheeded. Of ne-cessity, the emphasis has been on low-technology,labor-intensive efforts such as Community Watch todeal with a growing crime problem.

Planning police operationsWhile civilian police in emerging democraciesshould be separated from the military, ProfessorBayley was correct in pointing out that internationalpolice operations require a degree of planning equalto if not greater than international military opera-tions, and that the U.N. Department of Peacekeep-ing Operations (DPKO) is ill equipped to performthis function. As many speakers noted during theU.N. seminar referred to earlier, the CIVPOL officein DPKO is extremely understaffed (there is onlyone U.N.-funded position) and overwhelmed byits “mission impossible” of managing eight policeoperations. Seminar speakers noted that DPKO hasno police planners and police officers have been ex-cluded from assessment missions. This is a problemthat should be solved now by member states requir-ing that the United Nations create and fund posi-tions for the CIVPOL office in DPKO. The firsttask of these new police officers would be to de-velop a generic plan for police operations. The planwould serve as a template for future operations,providing an overall framework that could be modi-fied in response to local conditions.

It is also time to address our own shortcomings inmanaging U.S. participation in international policeoperations. With some 18,000 independent policedepartments, the United States has no nationalpolice force to provide expertise and personnel.Instead, responsibility for policy formulation, orga-nization, implementation, funding, and training for

international police operations—including the rais-ing of U.S. contingents—is divided among the Na-tional Security Council, three Federal Governmentdepartments, a large number of bureaus and offices,and several civilian contractors. This situation isawkward at best and costly and confusing at worst.In my view, there is a need to identify one Federaldepartment in which a single office would be fullyresponsible for managing and funding all aspects ofU.S. participation in international police operations.This unit would be staffed by law enforcement pro-fessionals and diplomats with experience in han-dling international police operations. With our ownhouse in order, the United States would be betterable to work with Sweden, Canada, and othercountries concerned with improving CIVPOLoperations.

Training for roles andmissionsIn my judgment, among the areas that require atten-tion is training for potential CIVPOL officers, par-ticularly training in how to perform their roles andmissions. The common experience of CIVPOL per-sonnel is that they arrive in country, are sent to theirstations, and then spend a good deal of time tryingto figure out what to do. The 5-day orientation thatthe United Nations provides for IPTF in Bosnia is astart, but this needs to be supplemented by trainingin the tasks CIVPOL personnel are expected to per-form. Such training would require prior agreementamong donor countries on doctrine, standards, andprocedures for operating CIVPOL stations and per-forming basic tasks. This would take time to workout, but it is absolutely essential. In peace opera-tions, CIVPOL normally takes months to deployand even longer to become operational. By the timeit is functioning effectively, the initial period of theoperation is over, and the best chance for effectingchange is lost.

These recommendations for improving CIVPOLperformance are not expensive nor are they beyondthe capacity of the international community. Itwould, however, take political will on the part ofconcerned states to effect change. Attendees at theU.N. seminar on the role of police in peacekeepingindicated a strong interest in improving CIVPOLperformance. We should take advantage of thecurrent environment to see what can be done.

Michael Berkow

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Practical Issues in Providing PolicingAssistance AbroadMichael Berkow

This workshop on civilian policing and interna-tional peacekeeping was proposed as a way to bringto the table some of the various stakeholders ininternational policing ventures and examine whatthe United States can and should be doing in theinternational context. I have been asked to speak tothe practical: What are the issues in the delivery ofpolice development assistance abroad, and howcan we begin to address them?

I offer my comments in the context of a “growthindustry”: the United States’ role in internationalpolice assistance. That role has grown tremen-dously since 1986, and it continues to expand.Expansion covers all aspects of our assistance andincludes State Department aid funneled throughthe International Criminal Investigative TrainingAssistance Program (ICITAP), State Departmentgrants to various NGOs in support of specificprojects in selected countries, and training andassistance provided by the operational agenciesoverseas (i.e., the DEA, FBI, and U.S. CustomsService). In all areas, the U.S. Government isincreasing its assistance to law enforcementagencies in foreign countries.

Although the U.S. role is a growth industry, we areoperating without either a vision or a business plan.We are committing increased amounts of moneyfrom myriad agencies and providers—and we aredoing it without agreement on the scope, the intent,or the desired result, let alone any coordinationor any discussion about what it is that the UnitedStates has to offer other countries in the way ofpolicing.1 Moreover, many of the key U.S. playersdo not agree on the fundamental aspects of policingassistance or the ways to deliver it.

Situations calling forpolicing assistanceBecause of the lack of agreement, I want to startwith the basics—some definitions and specifics ofthe different types of policing missions. Why is itwe commit ourselves to policing assistance over-seas, and what is it that we strive to do once there?

Broadly speaking, there are two types of situationsin which the U.S. is providing police assistance:transitional situations and what experts call “com-plex humanitarian emergencies,” or failed-statessituations. While both have separate and distinctcharacteristics, they are not totally unconnected.Rather, they can occupy different points on acontinuum of policing. This is especially true forcomplex humanitarian emergencies: If the rescuemission is successful, at some point the emergencywill downgrade to a transitional situation.

Transitional situations. Briefly, transitionalefforts involve aid and assistance to a country’s in-ternal security forces (read “police”) as they movefrom one political system—communist, socialist,whatever—to a democratic system based on therule of law. Professor Bayley suggests that the twokey features of democratic policing are responsive-ness and accountability. I would agree: Democraticpolicing means the police are responsive to the lawsof the country and the public—not a specific regimeor government—and they are held accountable fortheir actions as measured against the laws of thestate.

Our efforts to assist police agencies in transitionalsituations are going on around the world but haverecently been most prominent in Latin Americaand in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the

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former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern Euro-pean countries emerging from totalitarian rule.

The common elements of a state where transitionalassistance is being offered are:

● An existing, functioning government.

● An existing, functioning police force of sometype. This police force does not have to be great oreven very effective. It only has to be one in whichpeople put on uniforms and go to work chargedwith the mission of internal or public security.

● The U.S. efforts generally aim to improve the effi-ciency and effectiveness of the other government’spolice force. Examples include provision of train-ing in Honduras to control auto theft or in theNewly Independent States to control money laun-dering. There may be a security gap in these coun-tries but there is not an absence of security. We arenot serving as the police nor are we assuming re-sponsibility for law enforcement. Rather, we arestrengthening the local capacity that is alreadyproviding police safety.

As I mentioned, this is both a growing arena and aconfused one. The money is being spread among avariety of providers but the essential coordination—what is the goal of our assistance—is not as clear.For example, in 1997, the State Department in itsState and Local Law Enforcement Programs pro-vided more than $7 million for initiatives rangingfrom Project Harmony (law enforcement exchangesbetween Russia/Ukraine and police departmentsin New England), to Florida State University’sexchange program and annual seminar with theCzech Republic, to Connect/US-Russia (a programfocused on domestic violence, with exchanges andconferences in Moscow and Minnesota). Theseprojects were in addition to the ICITAP programs(also funded by the State Department) and the workbeing done by the operational agencies in variouscountries (for example, $10,000 in crime scenephotography training provided by the FBI toAntigua or $20,000 in training provided by theATF in Bolivia).

Thus, the U.S. Government is throwing millions ofdollars into transitional policing efforts through avariety of sources but without an overall game plan

or desired end state. What is lacking is an analysisof the process of managing democratic changeabroad similar to the one Professor Bayley con-ducted. This is especially true in regard to consider-ation of what we ought to be helping to createoverseas or, as Professor Bayley put it, “What is thesubstance of democratic policing that we ought tobe exporting?”

Complex humanitarian emergencies. But thatis not the primary topic here. We are focused onthe more critical and larger complex humanitarianemergencies—the situations in which a true crisisor disaster has occurred. These situations, while notoccurring frequently, tend to be much more costlyand require a more extensive U.S. commitment thando the situations calling for transitional assistance.And they tend to have a much higher profile.

We have to agree on what a “complex humanitarianemergency” is. I would suggest that the best defini-tion is the one provided by Andrew Natsios, whoidentified five characteristics that each of these situ-ations possesses with varying degrees of intensity:2

● The most visible characteristic is civil conflict,which is rooted in traditional ethnic, tribal, orreligious animosities.

● The authority of the national government deterio-rates to such an extent that public services disap-pear and political control over the country passeselsewhere; for example, to regional centers ofpower or warlords.

● Mass population movements occur because inter-nally displaced people and refugees want to escapeconflict or search for food.

● The economic system suffers massive dislocation.

● Food security declines, a situation to which thefirst four characteristics contribute.

I cannot say it better than Natsios, who wrote,“Communal violence is not only the most commonof the five characteristics, but frequently the earliestsequentially.”

Thus, in these complex humanitarian emergencies,the key common element is the absence of a safeand secure environment. This creates an immediate

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problem in the attempt to create a democratic policeforce. As Professor Bayley pointed out in his paper,“Reform of governmental institutions cannot takeplace unless there is a stable political center.Unstable governments rarely create democraticpolice forces.”

Policing and other assistancein complex emergenciesThe number of complex humanitarian emergenciesis growing, and the U.S. response now includespolice assistance almost as a matter of course. Thepast 10 years have seen a number of these majorassistance efforts, starting with Panama in 1989 andcontinuing with El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, andLiberia—and then Bosnia, which bears elements ofboth a failed state and a transitional effort.

Defining the role. In each crisis, we must con-sider the nature of the policing role that the interna-tional community is playing. Are we entering thecountry to assume the law enforcement function(true operational responsibility) or are we expectedto provide assistance to other entities—local enti-ties—that will then undertake the policing chores.In each of the recent large-scale complex humani-tarian emergencies that has included a U.S. policingresponse, our role has been different.

In Somalia, the international community program(and especially the U.S. Government program) con-sisted strictly of training, assistance, and infrastruc-ture. There was no operational staff, and the U.N.CIVPOL contingent was neither equipped norstaffed for law enforcement operations. In contrast,in the early stages of the Haiti intervention, therewas significant assumption of responsibility fordelivery of law enforcement services by the interna-tional community, including certain aspects of theU.S. assistance. With Bosnia, CIVPOL has returnedto the training/assistance role rather than the provi-sion of law enforcement services.

There are substantial differences between the tworoles—provider of law enforcement services andprovider of training and other transitional assis-tance. We need to be explicit at the outset aboutwhat role the international police are to assume,

and we need to avoid having our assistance effortsplay roles in which they cannot succeed.

Progression to the transitional stage. I wouldsuggest that in a perfect world, a complex emer-gency should serve merely as the starting point on acontinuum that leads to the transitional side of theequation. If done well, any response to a complexemergency should result, ultimately, in transitionalassistance as the host country moves out of thecrisis stage.

El Salvador and Panama are key examples ofthis progression. Initially, both countries had nofunctioning police/internal security force; both hadexperienced a major change in political system anddirection; and in both there were major U.S. interestsat stake and hence U.S. commitments. In both coun-tries, our initial efforts were aimed at establishing aninterim security force and then moving to fill the se-curity gap long-term. Finally, in both countries, overtime, our effort has shifted from the creation andsupport of a new internal police force to efforts thatenhance, strengthen, and realign the force.

Perspective of the militaryMy key point in addressing these various rolesis that at the outset of any response to a complexemergency, the end result must be kept in mind.We cannot simply focus on the short-term issueof the security gap at the onset of the problem or,alternatively, at the onset of U.S. entry into theproblem area.

A number of “fundamental truths” (or “hardtruths”) derive from considering the onset of ourinvolvement:

● The military drives these major interventions atthe outset. The Department of Defense is the majorplayer here and the Department of Justice hastended to be a bit player in the planning and initialexecution.

● That first fundamental, or hard truth, has provenvery problematic for my second hard truth: the mili-tary views civilian policing as an exit strategy andhence does everything in its power to accelerateeffective civilian policing’s arrival/operation.

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Within that second truth several key points arehidden:

● The military does not “do” civilian policing or in-ternal security. There may well be a security gap onthe ground, but traditionally the U.S. military doesnot want to fill it, even in the short run. This causesa variety of problems depending on the specificsituation. For example, in Haiti it was a problemuntil the interim force had been trained.

Indeed, the primary reason for the creation of aninterim public security force was to fill this initial“security gap.” Part of the former Haitian militarywas recycled into this force because there was noone else to fill the void. The U.S. military, althoughultimately providing significant assistance to theinterim force, wanted to avoid the public safetymission. In Somalia, day-to-day public safety wasa constant problem because of the extreme level ofviolence coupled with the type of weapons andtheir numbers throughout the country.

● Civilian policing is not the same as creating a mili-tary force. This fact tends to be ignored. Civilianpolicing takes longer. It requires key agreementswith political elements of the host government, thecivilians, and others. If they are developed well,these agreements provide the foundation for endur-ing change. The need for speed, however, can pre-vent them from developing as needed.

From the outset, a public security force is engagedin its primary mission. As the members of the forcegraduate from training and are deployed, they are“in action.” In contrast, when a military operationis set up in a foreign country, rarely is the newmilitary pressed into immediate operation.Generally, it is standing by, ready to go to work asneeded. Thus, the new policing organization hasno time for rigorous training, testing, “shakeouts,”practice missions, and the like. It goes to work andthe mistakes it makes during early development areseen as failures. To be convinced of this, one onlyhas to read the early reports of the newly createdHaitian police force.

Vastly divergent views. Let me share a shortstory that illustrates these different perspectives.3

It involves a writing assignment in which universitystudents were asked to pair off and work coopera-

tively to construct a short story. The purpose was toteach the students something about the importanceof consistent plot and characterization. A womanand a man paired up, with the following result:

Woman: Eleanor sat with her legs curled underher. As she watched her teabag steeping,her mind drifted to thoughts of Peter.Could relationships really be this diffi-cult? Was it really as arduous a task toknow the soul and heart of another as itnow seemed?

Man: Meanwhile, out in the cosmos, unknownto Eleanor, on the planet of Zorgan, theevil Zorgonians were planning an assaulton the earth that would render Eleanor’sinterpersonal difficulties insignificant.For, in a few moments, Eleanor, Peter,and all the other luckless inhabitants oftheir fair city would be vaporized alongwith the other hapless earthlings.

Woman: Fortunately, in Eleanor’s travels asan astronaut, she had befriended theZorgonians and, using her special satel-lite hookup to Zorgan, she brokereda peace treaty just moments beforethe earth was to be obliterated. TheZorgonian space crafts returned to theirplanet, happy and content that they nowcould live peacefully with their sistersand brothers on earth.

Man: Unfortunately, the Zorgonians werenot to be trusted. After making a looparound the earth’s moon, they hid on thedark side, planning their merciless sur-prise attack.

Woman: I can’t continue this. It is a mockery ofliterature . . . and you are an insensitive,macho jerk.

Man: And you are a neurotic, self-absorbed,narcissistic navel gazer.

Woman: Jerk!

Man: Idiot!

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And so forth. The nature of the communicationbetween civilian police and the military often re-sembles this scenario. We do not speak each other’slanguage; nor have we created the necessary inter-face between our senior military command and ourpolicing institutions. The creation of police forcesin certain foreign cultures is new, and we are strug-gling to get a handle on it. We are just beginning toestablish the requisite studies and baseline require-ments. More importantly, we are wrestling withthe questions that Professor Bayley has focused on:What are the distinguishing features of democraticpolicing and how can we “export” them? Thecivilian policing side of the equation is working toestablish its protocol and, as it does so, it mustconvince the military of the legitimacy of itsoperating style.

This dichotomy of focus takes us back to my story:the woman wanted to write about relationships; theman, about action and war. The two do not fit to-gether. The civilian police development experts arethinking about what will happen down the road andenvisioning the transitional phase; the military isthinking, “When do we get out of this peacekeepingrole and get back to our primary mission?”

No ready forces fordeploymentAnother hard truth about these missions is that onthe civilian police side, two key elements are re-quired: personnel and logistics. Civilian police haveneither ready for immediate deployment; we lack asurge capacity. A fundamental difference with themilitary is that the police are actively engaged intheir primary mission. The military, in contrast, istraining, preparing, and standing ready for theirprimary mission—war (national defense). Everypolice officer removed from the street of any cityor town is removed from active engagement. In themilitary, this would be the equivalent of taking sol-diers from the battlefield in the midst of an engage-ment and sending them elsewhere. Our towns andcities are our battlefields, and police officers are oursoldiers. We simply do not have personnel who arenot engaged. The transfer of any personnel to for-eign duty is a diminution of effort at a time whenthe Federal Government, among others, has triedto increase the numbers of “cops/soldiers” in the

battle. Just consider the billions of dollars providedby the Federal Government to the Office of Com-munity Oriented Policing Services for hiring100,000 police officers. The goal was to get moreofficers in the field in the United States, not toprovide them for overseas missions.

We do not even have a single pool of police to drawfrom—we have no national police force and thusno trained cadre ready for deployment. Rather, wehave to implore the chiefs of more than 17,000agencies to give us personnel on “loan,” or we hireretired officers.

These are critical issues that have not been re-solved. In Haiti, for the first time, the United Statescommitted to provide personnel for the CIVPOLforce tasked with actual operational law enforce-ment responsibilities. Yet there was (and is) nosystem to obtain the appropriate staffing for thesepositions. This situation was repeated in Bosnia:We obtained officers from a variety of localesacross the country on short-term assignments.

Police lack support systems. Civilian policingalso lacks the logistical support to respond to thesesituations. The police do not have the field kitchens,and the water systems, and the portable buildingsthat the military have. The police do not havetransport capacity for movement to remote, hostilelocations around the world. Yet most of the majorpolicing missions have been in exactly these typesof locales. In the absence of developing an indepen-dent logistical support system, the police need thehelp and support of the military. They need to beviewed as a critical element of the force package,not an add on or a burden.

Criminal justice operationsFinally, both the police and the military tend to for-get another hard truth: The police are merely onepart of a criminal justice system. You need prosecu-tors, judges, and prisons to complete the system. Inevery mission we have been involved in we forgot,ignored, or did not deal with this problem at theoutset. It is only after we start policing opera-tions—start arresting people—that we stop and say,“Oops! We need some judges, some prosecutors,and some jails.” Our failure to think of the opera-tions as requiring a criminal justice “system”

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creates serious problems in executing the supportactivities.

Part of this is extremely unfair to the military. In theworst situations, it is the military that is first on theground. It is the military that must deal with peoplewho are imprisoned, many times unjustly, in horrificconditions. In Haiti, it was courageous and thought-ful military officers who dealt with the people im-prisoned there. The same was true in Somalia.

Implications for futureoperationsIn thinking about and improving future civilian po-licing operations, we might consider the following:

● Encouraging the police and the military to betterunderstand each other’s systems and capabilities.The military needs to learn something about civil-ian policing and vice versa.

● Developing a better sense of who we need andwhen we need them in an operation, based on ahard assessment of the on-the-ground reality. Dowe need regular civilian police? Do we need para-military civilian police like the Carabinière? Do wehave the logistical support we need?

● Determining at the outset the specific role of theinternational police—support, training and assis-

tance, or actual law enforcement operations—andproviding appropriate staff and equipment.

● Developing the capacity to bring the systems intoplay—prisons at the outset and prosecutors/judges/courts shortly after the police are operational.

● Ensuring that the political will is there—both in theUnited States and in the host country—to carry outthe ultimate mission.

As I noted, civilian policing in this context is agrowth industry. Just as the military has truly “goneto school” on peacekeeping missions amid a recog-nition that they will be increasingly frequent, so toowill the police need to work on their response tointernational peacekeeping missions as an integral,timely, effective part of the force package. Civilianpolicing has a large and growing role in these en-deavors, one that we must “get right.”

Notes1. This last point is addressed very effectively byProfessor Bayley in his paper.

2. Natsios, Andrew, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the FourHorsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief inComplex Emergencies,” The Washington Papers, Vol.170, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1997.

3. I would like to thank Dr. Steven Vicchio for “lending”me this story.

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Participants’ Comments—A Summary

Problems in the makeup ofthe international civilianpolice forceWorkshop participants believe the experience inBosnia has underscored the need for a more effec-tive international civilian police infrastructure toorganize, direct, and maintain standards for interna-tional civilian police deployments. As the Bosniaoperation has demonstrated, the 30-plus participat-ing countries that contributed police “monitors” didnot universally subscribe to a common recruitmentstandard, and as a result it was not uncommon forunqualified personnel to be deployed to the opera-tion. This necessitated the establishment of a time-consuming vetting process. In addition to languagedifficulties (English was the official language of themission), some recruits could not meet minimumstandards for policing, such as the ability to drive acar. Further complicating factors, according to theworkshop participants, include the differing politi-cal agendas of some contributing nations, the lim-ited material and financial resources available tosome contingents, and time constraints that affectedthe ability to fully train personnel.

Military and civilianpolice functionsPanama and Haiti presented different challenges,according to workshop participants. In both in-stances, at the time of intervention, primary policefunctions were carried out by corrupt, poorly super-vised police agencies, which has sometimes beenthe case in parts of Latin America and Africa. Inmany cases, policing institutions, frequently in col-laboration with the military, were directly protect-ing and sustaining the undemocratic ruling elites.

Privatization of the policeIn growing proportions both in the United Statesand elsewhere, private security agencies and othernontraditional policing institutions are promotingpublic safety in societies threatened by crime. InSouth Africa, Liberia, and a number of other coun-tries, some staff in these private organizations origi-nally were trained by public police agencies. Defec-tions from public police agencies for higher pay inthe private sector may weaken the performance ofpublic police. The proliferation of private policemay also fragment spans of control and weaken theperceived legitimacy of regular civilian police. Par-ticipants felt that while private police may contrib-ute to a higher level of law and order, at least insome areas, they may also contribute to diminishedauthority of the public police and, by extension,already fragile governing institutions.

TechnologyIn many complex emergency situations, policeneeds are frequently at the low end of the technol-ogy spectrum. Haiti in the period 1994 to 1996 wascited by participants as a classic example. With theremoval of the military establishment and creationof a national civilian police force, the basic supportrequirement was for uniforms; vehicles; radios (thepolice have few telephones); and riot control gearsuch as shields, batons, and other basic equipment.

Advanced technology could not be used effectivelyin the emergent police force, and when it was, itwas frequently not cost-effective. For rural police,for example, horses and bicycles were preferableto motor vehicles. Because of the difficulty ofmaintaining vehicles in less developed areas of theworld, and because of the poor state of the roads inmany rural areas in those countries, motor vehiclesare frequently not the best way to provide localpolice with reliable transport to reach the bulk ofthe population.

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Postoperation diagnosisSeveral participants voiced concern about the ab-sence of a centralized U.S. authority to monitor per-formance and measure outcomes to create effectiveand responsive local police abroad. The U.S.military’s “lessons learned” process is exceptionallyvaluable in capturing useful knowledge from pastU.S. military operations. However, these partici-pants say there is no system that can provide com-parable information for nonmilitary operations.They cited legislative constraints as part of the rea-son, and the absence of central oversight authoritywithin the executive branch of the U.S. Governmentas another part. They felt serious considerationshould be given to corrective legislation, but pend-ing that development, some additional analysis andevaluation capability could be introduced.

The justice triadParticipants noted that a one-dimensional approachrelying primarily or exclusively on postcrisis devel-opment of the police will invariably fail if two otherinstitutional requirements—development of anindependent judiciary and development of an effec-tive penal system—are not met. Frequently, priorityis given by the intervening international communityto civilian police reform, with penal and judicialmatters treated as marginal issues. For example, thefailure of the Somali police, despite their best inten-tions, is partially attributable to the absence of thepenal and judicial “legs” in the justice triad.According to workshop participants, there were

comparable shortcomings in contemporary Haitiand Bosnia. Contributing to this absence of a bal-anced triad are the personnel and institutional gapsin the international agencies and governmentsresponsible for the intervention.

Strategic and operationalintegrationIn many complex emergency and humanitarianassistance situations, the United States and variousinternational agencies must likely deal with a mixof failed governments and collapsed institutions.Security for the intervening forces, or “force pro-tection,” will compete for resources needed to pro-vide extensive and abundant humanitarian relief.It can be expected in the initial phase of operationsthat military peacekeeping forces will be present,along with civilian U.N. assets, nongovernmentaland international organizations and, perhaps, indig-enous resources and personnel. This collection ofassets, capabilities, interests, agendas, and pro-grams must be coordinated and priorities estab-lished. This in turn requires some measure ofstrategic planning to determine the roles andmissions of participants, including those of interna-tional civilian police. Concomitantly, the establish-ment of an effective multinational police forcerequires that agreement on standardized street-leveland patrol procedures be reached by all contributingnational police forces. Establishing this coordina-tion at both the strategic and the tactical level willprove to be the challenge.

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Compendium of Participants’ Views

“Police skills are fundamentally different from those that we train oursoldiers in.”

Robert E. Houdek

“Police can undermine democracy and they can reinforce it, but theycannot create it.”

David H. Bayley

“One of the things we need in Washington is what I refer to as the ‘cen-ter of gravity’ in terms of centralizing and coordinating our [internationalpolicing] activities.”

William Lewis

“This business of ‘feudalization’ of private law enforcement is an amaz-ing phenomenon. And it’s really making life a lot more difficult for us.”

Robert Perito

“The only tradition that exists in policing in many countries is themilitary one. . . . But you have got to tell them that policing is not a war.Policing is something else.”

Rachel Neild

“The police in Bosnia are not going to change until the entire criminaljustice system has moved in the right direction.”

Bob Edwards

“I think we need to be careful about simply assuming that, for example,community policing works well in Prince George’s County [in theUnited States]; therefore, we will send it to Bosnia and do it over there.”

Chuck Wexler

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Workshop Agenda

Appendix A: Workshop Agenda9 a.m. Welcome and Introduction

Mark Sakaley, Acting DirectorNational Institute of Justice International Center

Joe Montville, Director, Preventive Diplomacy ProgramCenter for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive DirectorPolice Executive Research Forum

9:15 a.m. Opening Remarks: “Cops and Crises”

Ambassador Robert E. Houdek, Adviser to USAID Greater Horn of AfricaInitiative and former Ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda

9:30 a.m. Keynote: “The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View”

Dr. David H. Bayley, Dean, School of Criminal JusticeState University of New York at Albany

10:30 a.m.Responses to Keynote and Group Discussion

Moderator: Dr. William LewisProfessor Emeritus, George Washington University

Donna Hansen, Former Chief, Fort Myers [Florida] Police DepartmentFormer Chief, Support Unit, International Police Task Force, UnitedNations, Zagreb, Croatia

Robert Perito, Deputy DirectorInternational Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)U.S. Department of Justice

Rachel Neild, Senior AssociateWashington Office on Latin America

12 noon Lunch and Presentation: “Is There International Police Power?The Legal Basis for International Intervention”

Introduction: James Burack, Counsel, Police Executive Research Forum

Colonel F.M. Lorenz, U.S. Marine Corps, Industrial College of the Armed ForcesNational Defense University

Appendix A

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Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

1 p.m. Discussion: “Civilian Policing—Across the Spectrum of Crisis”

Moderator: Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)

Michael Berkow, Chief, South Pasadena [California] Police DepartmentFormer Police Project Manager in Somalia and Haiti for ICITAP, U.S. Department of Justice

Colonel Larry Forster, U.S. ArmyDirector, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

Colonel Michael J. Dziedzic, U.S. Air ForceInstitute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

2:15 p.m. Adjournment

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Appendix B: Biographies of PresentersDavid Bayley is dean and professor in the Schoolof Criminal Justice, State University of New York atAlbany. A specialist in international criminal justicewith a particular interest in policing, he has con-ducted extensive research in India, Japan, Australia,Canada, Britain, Singapore, and the United States.Professor Bayley’s research on policing has focusedon strategies of policing, the evolution of police or-ganizations, organizational reform, accountability,and the tactics of patrol officers in discretionary lawenforcement situations. Recently he served as aconsultant to the U.S. Government and the UnitedNations on police reform in Bosnia. His most re-cent book, Police for the Future, is based on fieldresearch in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan,and the United States. Professor Bayley holds aB.A. degree from Denison University, an M.A.degree from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. fromPrinceton.

Michael Berkow is the police chief of Coachella,California. He served previously as Police ProjectManager in Somalia and Haiti for the InternationalCriminal Investigative Training Assistance Programof the U.S. Department of Justice. In the missionsto both countries he was responsible for creatingpolice academies, providing technical assistance,and helping to establish local civilian police forces.He spent 13 years with the Rochester [New York]Police Department, leaving with the rank of lieuten-ant. He was an adjunct professor at the State Uni-versity of New York-Brockport and taught at anumber of police academies and other institutions,including the Connecticut State Police Academy,the Orlando [Florida] Police Academy, andNorthwestern University. Chief Berkow received abachelor’s degree from Kalamazoo College in arts,sociology, and public policy; and a J.D. from Syra-cuse University. He also is a graduate of the FBINational Academy.

James Burack is Counsel with the Police Execu-tive Research Forum. He participated in two U.S.State Department projects related to the UnitedNations International Police Task Force (IPTF) inBosnia, including working on recruitment andselection issues for the U.S. contingent, managingtechnical assistance provided to the IPTF, and

serving briefly with the IPTF planning staff inSarajevo. Before assuming a position with PERF,he was a Marine Corps judge advocate and servedas a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. He is currentlyserving as a civil affairs officer in the Marine CorpsReserve. Mr. Burack was a patrol officer with theWestminster [Colorado] Police Department for 4years and graduated from the Senior ManagementInstitute for Police. He received an A.B. degree ingovernment and history from Dartmouth Collegeand a J.D. degree from the University of Colorado.

Michael Dziedzic is currently a senior military fel-low at the Institute for National Strategic Studies,where his principal issue areas are peace operationsand security affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Pre-viously, he was a member of the faculty at the Na-tional War College. He also served as air attache inEl Salvador from 1992 to 1994, during the imple-mentation of the peace accords. Before that posting,he was a political-military planner in the WesternHemisphere Division of the Air Staff (1992), a ten-ured professor in the Department of Political Sci-ence of the U.S. Air Force Academy (1988 to1991), and a visiting fellow at the International In-stitute for Strategic Studies in London (1987 to 88).His writings include Mexico: Converging Chal-lenges and a number of articles on Mexican defensepolicy, the transnational drug trade, hemisphericsecurity matters, and currentU.S. peace operations.

Larry Forster is director of the U.S. Army Peace-keeping Institute. Colonel Forster has been com-mander of the Military Coordination Center inZakho, Iraq; Provost Marshal/Force Protection Of-ficer in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Rwanda;and a U.N. military observer in the Sinai and Leba-non. As a Military Police (MP) officer, he was chiefof MP operations for U.S. Army Europe; Com-mander of the 701 MP Battalion; Director of LawEnforcement/Commander of the 291 MP Company,Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Provost Marshal of theYakima Firing Center; and Provost Marshal, PleikuProvince, Vietnam. From 1995 to 1996 he was afellow at the Harvard Center of International Affairsand taught history at the U.S. Military Academy atWest Point. Colonel Forster earned an M.A. degree

Appendix B: Biographies of Presenters

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in criminal justice from John Jay College of Crimi-nal Justice and an M.A. degree in history from theUniversity of California, Davis. He also is a 1988graduate of the FBI National Academy.

Donna Hansen, a consultant in criminal justice,recently returned from a 1-year assignment in theformer Yugoslavia, where she served as chief of theU.N. Support Unit. In that capacity she was respon-sible for the training and rotation of more than2,000 international civilian police who monitoredthe activities of local police in three U.N. missions.Ms. Hansen’s law enforcement career includes4 years as the chief of police for the City of FortMyers, Florida, and 21 years with the Metro-DadePolice Department, Miami, Florida. Ms. Hansenholds an M.A. degree from Florida InternationalUniversity and is a graduate of the Southern PoliceInstitute Senior Management Program.

Robert E. Houdek is an adviser to the USAIDGreater Horn of Africa Initiative and former U.S.ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda. AmbassadorHoudek returned to the United States in 1996 toassume his current position after having served 3years as the first U.S. ambassador to Eritrea. Beforehis posting there, he served as the Deputy AssistantSecretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Depart-ment of State. Ambassador Houdek has served inBelgium, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Kenya,Uganda, and Ethiopia. In 1991, he was awarded thePresident’s Exceptional Service medal for his rolein evacuating Ethiopian Jews to Israel in the lastdays of the Ethiopian civil war. In 1997 Ambassa-dor Houdek was on special assignment in EasternZaire, where he served as a negotiator and liaisonofficer for an AID Disaster Assistance ResponseTeam that was assisting in the evacuation ofRwandan refugees and the resettlement of Congo-lese people internally displaced by the civil war.

William Lewis is professor emeritus in politicalscience and international relations at George Wash-ington University, where he taught from 1978 to1994. He was the founder and director of the Secu-rity Studies Program and was a visiting professor atthe University of Michigan and Georgetown Uni-versity. In addition to having served as DeputyUndersecretary of State for Security Assistance,U.S. Department of State, he was assigned to thepolicy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary

of Defense, the Presidential Task Force on ForeignAid, and the State-Defense Departments strategyplanning group. He currently provides consultingservices to several government and research institu-tions, including the U.S. Departments of Stateand Defense, the Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, Science Applications, Inc., and CSIS. Heis a graduate of Johns Hopkins University and re-ceived a doctorate from The American University.

Frederick M. Lorenz is a colonel in the U.S. Ma-rine Corps. He currently occupies the Marine Chairat the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Na-tional Defense University. He served as the seniorlegal adviser in Somalia for Operation RestoreHope from 1992 to 1993 and for United Shield in1995, and was on the legal staff of Operation JointEndeavor in Sarajevo in early 1996. Colonel Lorenzhas lectured and written widely on operational lawissues such as the rules of engagement and the useof force in peacekeeping operations. As a Marinejudge advocate, he has held a wide variety of posi-tions, including prosecutor, defense counsel, militaryjudge, and rifle company commander. Additionalassignments, focusing on environmental law issues,led to his current research on international environ-mental security. Colonel Lorenz received his under-graduate and law degrees from Marquette Universityand a Master of Law degree from George Washing-ton University.

Edward Marks retired in 1995 from the U.S. For-eign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor inthe Senior Foreign Service. His most recent assign-ments were as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Insti-tute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at theNational Defense University, Deputy U.S. Repre-sentative to the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations, Deputy Chief of Mission in SriLanka and the Republic of Maldives, Senior Visit-ing Fellow at CSIS, Deputy Director of the Officefor Combating Terrorism and Emergency Planning,and Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.Ambassador Marks continues to provide consultingservices to INSS; CSIS; Booz, Allen and Hamilton;Cubic International; and the U.N. DevelopmentFund. He received his bachelor’s degree from theUniversity of Michigan and his master’s degreefrom the University of Oklahoma. He is also agraduate of the Foreign Service Institute and the

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National War College. Ambassador Marks hastaught at New York University and served in theU.S. Army.

Joe Montville is the Director of CSIS’s PreventiveDiplomacy Program, which specializes in commu-nity-building and support of peacemaking incountries affected by serious ethnic conflict. Mr.Montville was a career diplomat, serving in Iraq,Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco. He spent a year inEgypt as a Fulbright Scholar. At the State Depart-ment, Mr. Montville was regional policy adviser inthe Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairsand was Near East Division Chief and Director,Office of Global Issues, in the Bureau of Intelli-gence and Research. He also was research directorat the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs at theForeign Service Institute. Mr. Montville has been aconsultant to the Department of Defense and cur-rently cochairs a State Department open forumworking group on conflict resolution, civil society,and democracy. During the past 15 years, Mr.Montville has been developing expertise in andwriting about cultural diversity and ethnic conflictresolution theory and practice. His field work hasincluded South Africa, Slovakia, Serbia, Slovenia,Croatia, Northern Ireland, Russia, the Baltic coun-tries, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, and the MiddleEast. A founding member of the International Soci-ety of Political Psychology, Mr. Montville is alsoauthor and editor of Conflict and Peacemaking inMultiethnic Societies and coeditor of The Psychody-namics of International Relationships. He holdsfaculty appointments at the Center for the Study ofMind and Human Interaction at the University ofVirginia Medical School and, as a lecturer onpsychiatry, at the Harvard Medical School. Mr.Montville graduated from Lehigh University anddid graduate work at Harvard and Columbia Uni-versities.

Rachel M. Neild is a Senior Associate with theWashington Office on Latin America (WOLA), anonprofit organization that promotes internationaland national policies to advance human rights, de-mocracy, and social and economic justice in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean. Ms. Neild is respon-

sible for WOLA’s work on comparative issues inpolice reform in Haiti and edits Enlace, a quarterlySpanish-language bulletin. She has publishednumerous papers and two major reports on policereform in Haiti and edited “Demilitarizing PublicOrder; the International Community, Police Reformand Human Rights in Central America and Haiti.”She also has written reports on human rights train-ing programs of the U.S. military and on humanrights and democratization issues in Chile and Para-guay. Ms. Neild has a master’s degree in interna-tional affairs from the University of Colombia, anda bachelors’ degree in philosophy and literaturefrom the University of Manchester. She previouslyworked with the Comision Andina de Juristas inLima, Peru; the Inter-American Institute for HumanRights in San Jose, Costa Rica; and AmericasWatch [now Human Rights Watch/Americas] inWashington, D.C., and New York.

Robert Perito is Deputy Director of the Interna-tional Criminal Investigative Training AssistanceProgram (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice.He is retired from the State Department, where heserved in numerous diplomatic posts around theworld.

Chuck Wexler is the Executive Director of thePolice Executive Research Forum. He previouslyworked for the Boston Police Department, where hehelped develop and manage the community disor-ders unit, which earned a national reputation as amodel for the investigation and prosecution of ra-cially motivated crime. He also headed the profes-sional development division for the InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police. In addition, heserved as special assistant to the Nation’s first“drug czar,” managed a national project for thePresident’s Drug Advisory Council, and worked forthe Partnership for a Drug-Free America, where hecollaborated with major corporations on the drug-free workplace initiative. Dr. Wexler earned abachelor’s degree from Boston University, amaster’s degree in criminology from Florida StateUniversity, and a doctorate in urban studies andplanning from the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.

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Appendix C: Workshop AttendeesProfessor David BayleyDean, School of Criminal JusticeState University of New York at Albany135 Western AvenueAlbany, NY 12222518–442–5214518–442–5212 (Fax)

Chief Michael BerkowSouth Pasadena Police Department1422 Mission StreetSouth Pasadena, CA 91030818–799–1121818–441–3985 (Fax)mjberkow@earthlink.net

Mr. Anne Willem BijleveldRepresentative, United NationsHigh Commissioner on Refugees1775 K Street N.W., Suite 300Washington, DC 20006202–296–5191202–296–5660 (Fax)usa.wa@unhr.ch

Mr. Jim BurackCounselPolice Executive Research Forum1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930Washington, DC 20036202–466–7820202–466–7826 (Fax)jburack@PoliceForum.org

Mr. Ray DallandInternational Security and PeacekeepingBureau of Political and Military AffairsU.S. Department of State2201 C Street N.W.Washington, DC 20520202–736–7747202–647–4055 (Fax)

Colonel Michael DziedicInstitute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense UniversityFort McNair S.W.Washington, DC 20319–6000202–685–2220

Ms. Wendy EatonDefense Forecasting, Inc.21 Dupont Circle N.W.Washington, DC 20036202–785–9041

Mr. Bob Edwards943 Jennifer StreetIncline Village, NV 89451702–832–7181702–832–7191 (Fax)

Mr. Steven EdwardsProgram ManagerOffice of Research and EvaluationNational Institute of JusticeU.S. Department of Justice810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington DC 20005202–307–0500202–307–6394 (Fax)

Colonel Larry ForsterDirectorU.S. Army Peacekeeping InstituteArmy War CollegeCarlisle, PA 17013–5050717–245–3740717–245–3279 (Fax)forsterl@csl-emh1.army.mil

Mr. Eliot M. GoldbergNational Defense UniversityFort McNair, Bldg. 62 S.W.300 Fifth AvenueWashington, DC 20319–5066202–685–2375202–685–3972 (Fax)goldberge@ndu.edu

Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

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Ms. Donna HansenP.O. Box 247Ft. Myers, FL 33902hansup@worldnet.att.net

Mr. Glenn HodesResearch AnalystOverseas Development Council1875 Connecticut Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20009202–234–8701202–245–0067 (Fax)hodes@odc.org

Ambassador Robert E. Houdek2030 Rhode Island AvenueMcLean, VA 22101703–534–4761703–534–9170 (Fax)

Ms. Ruby KahnCenter for Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street N.W.Washington, DC 20036202–775–3179202–775–3199 (Fax)rdk@csis.org

Mr. Robert J. KaminskiSocial Science AnalystNational Institute of JusticeU.S. Department of Justice810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington, DC 20531202–616–9135202–307–6394 (Fax)rkaminski@aol.com

Ms. Lorelei E. KellyResearch FellowStanford Center on Conflict and NegotiationsStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305–8610650–723–2574650–723–9421

Dr. William LewisProfessor Emeritus1101 S. Arlington Ridge Road, #307Arlington, VA 22202703–521–0881

Colonel Fred Lorenz, USMCIndustrial College of the Armed ForcesFort McNair S.W.Washington, DC 20319202–685–4202202–685–4175 (Fax)lorenzf@ndu.edu

Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)2737 Devonshire Place N.W.Washington, DC 20008202–588–1632edwardmarks@msn.com

Mr. Bill MaudlinAdministrator, International ProgramsInternational Association of Chiefs of Police515 Washington StreetAlexandria, VA 22314703–836–6767, ext. 325703–836–4543 (Fax)

Mr. Sam McQuadeSocial Science Program ManagerNational Institute of JusticeU.S. Department of Justice810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington DC 20531202–307–0200202–307–6394 (Fax)

Ms. Johanna MendelsonUSAID/BHR/OTIRoom 5314A NSU.S. Department of State2201 C Street N.W.Washington, DC 20523–0059202–647–3990202–647–0218 (Fax)

Mr. David C. MitchellPolicy and Missions OfficeSecretary of DefenseSpecial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict2500 Defense Pentagon, Room 2B525Washington, DC 20301–2500703–693–2897703–693–0615 (Fax)mitchellda@osd.pentagon.mil

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Mr. Joe MontvilleDirectorPreventive Diplomacy ProgramCenter for Strategic and International

Studies1800 K Street N.W.Washington, DC 20006202–775–3277202–775–3199 (Fax)jvm@csis.org

Ms. Rachel NeildSenior AssociateWashington Office on Latin America400 C Street N.E.Washington, DC 20002202–544–8045

Ms. Diane PaulHuman Rights Watch321 St. Dunstans RoadBaltimore, MD 21212410–323–1055410–435–8003 (Fax)pauls@charm.net

Mr. Robert PeritoDeputy DirectorInternational Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance ProgramU.S. Department of Justice1331 F Street N.W., 5th FloorWashington, DC 20004202–305–4234202–616–8429 (Fax)

Mr. Richard RankinProgram ManagerBETAC International Corporation2001 N. Beauregard StreetSuite 1100Alexandria, VA 22311703–824–3207703–825–3130 (Fax)

Mr. Mark SakaleyActing DirectorInternational CenterNational Institute of JusticeU.S. Department of Justice810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington, DC 20531202–305–2698202–307–6394 (Fax)sakaleym@usdoj.gov

Mr. Thomas SchillerInternational Networking LiaisonNational Criminal Justice Reference

ServiceAspen Systems Corporation2277 Research BoulevardRockville, MD 20850202–305–1294301–519–5932301–519–5313 (Fax)tschiller@ncjrs.orgschiller@ojp.usdoj.gov

Mr. Frank SeversAssistant to Head of DelegationInternational Committee of the Red Cross2100 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 545Washington DC 20037202–293–9430303–293–9431 (Fax)

Lieutenant Colonel Louis ThompsonSenior FellowAtlantic Council910 17th Street N.W., 10th FloorWashington, DC 20006202–778–4980202–463–7240 (Fax)lthompson@acgate.acus.org

Mr. J. Matthew VaccaroOAS S&R PK-HAPeacekeeping and Humanitarian AffairsU.S. Department of Defense2900 Defense PentagonWashington, DC 20301–2900703–614–0446703–614–0442 (Fax)jmvaccaro@aol.com

Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

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Ms. Heather WardVera Institute of Justice377 BroadwayNew York, NY 10013212–334–1300212–941–9407 (Fax)hward@vera.org

Colonel Kim WardBaltimore County Police Department700 East Joppa RoadTowson, MD 21286410–887–2206410–887–4581 (Fax)kimward@bellatlantic.net

Mr. Chuck WexlerExecutive DirectorPolice Executive Research Forum1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930Washington, DC 20036202–66–7820202–466–7826 (Fax)cwexler@policeforum.org

Dr. Susan WoodwardForeign Policy StudiesBrookings Institution1771 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20036202–797–6092202–797–6003 (Fax)swoodward@brook.edu

Mr. Donald ZoufalGeneral CounselChicago Police Department111 South State Street, Suite 400Chicago, IL 60605312–747–7972312–747–2430 (Fax)

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