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 Ac counta bili ty of a c ount ry ’s poli ce , mi li tar y and int ell igence age nci es to ensure that they remain within their mandates is a critical element for democracy in Commonwealth countries. The author compares the effectiveness of monitoring systems across a spectrum of Commonwealth nations with variable records of  democracy and human rights. Even where a strong mix of mechanisms to oversee the security forces exists, sections of the security forces can re tain an officially sanctioned free rein over their activities with no guarantee of parliamentary accountability. D EMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN OV ERSIGHT of a state’s security forces is essential for an effective security sector, good governance and, most importantly, to help protect the human rights of the population. It should be a key element in Commonwealth countries, with their parliamentary systems, commitment to just and accountable government, the rule of law and funda- mental human rights, as expressed in the Harare Declaration and in growing intolerance of military takeovers. With a state’s virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and intrusion, the security forces—nam ely the police, military, and intelligence agencies—need to be monitored by a variety of  mechanisms to ensure that they do not overstep their mandates. This article reviews the oversight systems of Sri Lanka, Nigeria, South Africa, Barbados and St Lucia. It investigates how accountable security forces really are a cross a spectrum of nations differing in size, geography, historical and political context: THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY FORCES NEIL SAMMONDS The Round Table (2001), 359 (213–227) Neil Sammonds is associated with the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit of the Institute of  Commonwealth Studies, University of London. This article is based on research and a report (funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ford Foundation and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association) entitled A Nee d to Know : the Str uggl e for Democratic, Civili an Over- sight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries (ISBN 1855071061). He also writes for Index on Censorship and is involved in the Mariam Appeal . ISSN 0035-8533 print/1474-029X online/2001/020213-15 © The Round Table DOI: 10.1080/0035853012005007 1

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Accountabili ty of a country’s police, military and intell igence agencies to ensurethat they remain within their mandates is a critical element for democracy inCommonwealth countries. The author compares the effectiveness of monitoringsystems across a spectrum of Commonwealth nations with variable records of

democracy and human rights. Even where a strong mix of mechanisms to overseethe security forces exists, sections of the security forces can retain an officiallysanctioned free rein over their activities with no guarantee of parliamentaryaccountability.

D EMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT of a state’s security forces isessential for an effective security sector, good governance and, most

importantly, to help protect the human rights of the population. It should be akey element in Commonwealth countries, with their parliamentary systems,commitment to just and accountable government, the rule of law and funda-mental human rights, as expressed in the Harare Declaration and in growingintolerance of military takeovers. With a state’s virtual monopoly on thelegitimate use of violence and intrusion, the security forces—namely the police,military, and intelligence agencies—need to be monitored by a variety of mechanisms to ensure that they do not overstep their mandates. This articlereviews the oversight systems of Sri Lanka, Nigeria, South Africa, Barbadosand St Lucia. It investigates how accountable security forces really are across aspectrum of nations differing in size, geography, historical and political context:

THE SLOW MARCHTOWARDS DEMOCRATIC,CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF

SECURITY FORCES

NEIL SAMMONDS

The Round Table (2001), 359 (213–227)

213

Neil Sammonds is associated with the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. This article is based on research and a report(funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ford Foundation and the CommonwealthParliamentary Association) entitled A Need to Know: the Struggle for Democratic, Civilian Over -sight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries (ISBN 1855071061). He also writes forIndex on Censorship and is involved in the Mariam Appeal.

ISSN 0035-8533 print/1474-029X online/2001/020213-15 © The Round TableDOI: 10.1080/0035853012005007 1

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from St Lucia with a population of 170 000 to Nigeria with 120 million; fromsouthern Asia via Africa to the eastern Caribbean; from war-torn Sri Lanka, totransitional Nigeria and South Africa and to the stable island democracies inBarbados and St Lucia; and from militarized politics in State of Emergency-ridden Colombo, to the demilitarizing politics of Abuja and Cape Town, to thesmall, police-centred security forces of Bridgetown and Castries.

The Tamil (1983–) and JVP (1987–90) insurrections have provided someexcuse for Sri Lankan state’s appalling human rights record, which includesover 10 000 ‘disappearances’. Sri Lanka’s State of Emergency provisions grantextensive powers to the security forces and strengthen the climate of impunity.In Nigeria, a transition to civilian governance led to the May 1999 presidentialinauguration of retired General Olusegun Obasanjo and to the re-establishmentof democratic institutions. But the top-down constitution making process leavesNigeria far behind examples from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda and SouthAfrica, 1 and reflects the ongoing political leverage of military elites and theweakness of civilian democracy. The South African Police Service, rationalizedand transformed from its 11 apartheid era police agencies, is under-trained,criminalized and corrupt and contributes to 700 deaths annually, but does havea number of civilian mechanisms overseeing it. In a remarkable turnaround, 2

defence institutions of the apartheid era have been transformed and accompa-nied by the formalization of civilian oversight, although inadequacies remain.The Royal Barbados Police Force (RBPF) and the Barbados Defence Force(BDF) 3 sometimes use excessive use of force against civilians, and a complaintsbody is being created to deal with the problem. The ‘rotten’ 4 Royal St LucianPolice Force (RSLPF) is unable to provide a quality policing service, 5 and hasgenerated widespread allegations of police brutality, shootings 6 and impunity, 7

and of corrupt and criminal behaviour. A Police Reform Project is nowattempting to improve the police force, its oversight and its poor image.

Parliamentary oversight

Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon recently observed that‘almost everywhere the balance has swung much too far in the direction of theexecutive and away from the legislature’ and that Parliament’s ‘vital task of scrutiny … must be safeguarded and strengthened’. 8 This judgement resonatesclearly in Sri Lanka. G. L. Peiris, ex-Minister of Constitutional Affairs andProfessor of Law at Colombo University, has written that the central feature of the 1978 Constitution, which established an Executive Presidency, is the‘excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president’. In Parliamentthe government inhibits debate on the security forces and its three-monthlyextension of the State of Emergency is a mere rubber-stamping of its powers.The President—who is also Minister of Defence—rarely attends parliamentherself. Roy Denish, former defence correspondent of the Sunday Leader , saysthat when opposition MPs have raised questions over defence procurement theDeputy Defence Minister ‘usually says he’ll respond later but never does, orsays it’s a matter of national security and says nothing’. 9 Parliament has beendenied the reports of commissions investigating a decade of disappearances.There are also more sinister obstacles to debate: a respected source says that a

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prominent politician who criticized the Secretary of Defence found that hisnumber of protection vehicles was immediately reduced.

In Nigeria’s 1998/99 elections only three of 26 political associations werepermitted to stand and after decades of military rule the House and Senate arestill learning the arts of civilian government and the Alliance for Democracy(AD) and All Peoples Party (APP) have not established themselves as strongand viable opposition parties. Considerable political bickering has hamperedparliamentarians from doing little more than award themselves generousfurniture allowances. Ninety-three military officers ‘corrupted’ by politicaloffice were retired by Obasanjo, in an act requiring political courage. Althoughpolitical military elites are well versed in accountability narrative many aresuspicious of their motives.

The South African National Defence Force is now accountable to theMinister of Defence, the President, and Parliament. Richard Pillay of the‘Westminster-style’ opposition Democratic Party says the Ministers of Safetyand Security, of Intelligence and of Defence have all responded well to securitysector questioning in parliament, 10 even if Parliament is still lied to about thesecurity forces. 11 Bishop Mogoba of the Pan African Congress (PAC) and LouisGreen of the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) say far too manyquestions are avoided. 12 There are concerns that the ANC members whodominate Parliament and its committees are reluctant to put hard questions totheir own Ministers.

In Barbados the budgets of the police, BDF and Regional Security Systemare discussed openly and negotiated with ministers against other departments,and Parliament was relatively quick to respond to calls for a police complaintsbody. But with only one sitting member of the opposition debate is weakened,although leader of the opposition David Thompson says there is ongoinginformal contact between the Prime Minister and himself. Similarly in St Luciadebate is weak with only two of 28 MPs representing the opposition. None-theless security forces are discussed six or seven times a year. 13

Good signs for progress with the Police Reform Project are that PrimeMinister Kenny Anthony is said to be enthusiastic and that the Minister of Home Affairs reportedly has a hotline for police whistle-blowers.

Parliamentary committees

The Sri Lankan Consultative Defence Committee is a weak parliamentarycommittee chaired, inappropriately, by the Deputy Defence Minister. Almostno-one outside its nine members knows of its existence. It may sit monthly butusually sits every three months. It clearly is not over-active, 14 and is reportedlysupine to the executive. Air Vice-Marshall (Retired) Harry Goonatilleke saysthat when he appeared before the committee to testify over procurement in theair force, he tried to name high-placed people involved in profit-making dealsbut was told to keep quiet. 15

The Nigerian Senate, with 109 senators, has 53 committees while the Househas 360 Representatives and 50 committees. Each chamber has defence, policeand intelligence committees whose chairs are appointed by the Senate Presidentin consultation with the Senate party leaders, often on the basis of loyalty rather

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than experience. The Defence Committee, with 35 members, has oversight overall defence issues, and it can initiate enquiries on any issue. Ibrahim Zailani(APP) says meetings are very well attended and there are ‘very good relations’with the military. But these immature committees are yet to prove themselvesand are reportedly ‘sidelined by the Presidency and the Defence Minister, andby the military itself and its foreign consultants’. 16

In 1994 the Safety and Security ministry put SAPS, with its National PoliceCommissioner and 128 000 officers, on a level with the small and activecivilian-headed Secretariat oversight body. However, given the violent crimewave certain politicians and Minister Tshwete emphasized their support for‘macho’ policing, 17 and the Secretariat consequently became less influential andits staff was decimated. Similarly weakened was the once promising Safety andSecurity Committee overseeing the police. The South African 12-member JointStanding Committee on Intelligence has wide-ranging functions and is said tohave open, vibrant debates. The Committee is well attended but researchcapacity is quite low and the agencies are slow in coming forward. The tworeports in six years of the JSCI have been a little disappointing, lacking in detailand hard to obtain. 18 Question marks hang over the JSCI’s appointments pro-cedure which failed to give security clearance to Mogoba and Pillay. 19 Mogobaremains disenchanted with the whole committee system for the security forces,convinced that ‘real oversight goes on elsewhere’, namely in the Cabinet. Apolitical journalist calls the JSCI ‘useless’ for not ‘hauling the agency [the NIA]over the coals for its spying on the German embassy’, and a diplomatic sourcesays the Committee ‘makes very few waves’. Apparently reflecting a popularswing against ‘human rights policing’ the Safety and Security Committee isbecoming less vigorous in its probing of the executive and the police. 20

The opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), in addition to civil society,has been credited with the establishment of a parliamentary committee on lawand order but the terms of reference of the committee exclude oversight of thepolice itself and David Thompson considers it ‘a waste of time’. DLP SecretaryGeorge Pilgrim feels that a committee system in small states could functionmore efficiently if there were fewer parliamentarians on it and it had more inter-action with enlightened members of the public and civil society.

There are no parliamentary standing committees in the St Lucian parliamentand hence there is no standing committee to oversee the RSPLF. There is notknown to have been any proposal to establish such oversight committees in StLucia. 21

Complaints bodies

The powers of the Sri Lankan police, swollen by the State of Emergency andPrevention of Terrorism Act, are not known to be challenged by any mean-ingful police complaints body.

The Nigerian federal police force is grossly under-resourced—the whole of Lagos (with a population of over 10 million) has only 1500 officers—and therapid response anti-crime teams are Nigeria’s ‘most egregious human rightsoffenders’. Obasanjo has prioritized police reform but non-governmentalorganization (NGO) proposals to include an oversight function in regional

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Police Relations Committees have not been accepted.The South African Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) has been

investigating deaths in police custody or arising through police action since1997. However, due to under-staffing, under-resourcing, difficulties with itsmandate, and lacking clear empowerment it has opted mostly to supervise andmonitor investigations. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Recon-ciliation (CSVR) has advocated various measures to improve the powers andperformance of the ICD, 22 which is otherwise seen to be playing a crucial rôle ina hostile environment. 23 South Africa also has Community Police Forums(CPFs), established to promote accountability to local communities but so farwith a mixed record of performance. 24 Still, even in the areas with limited phys-ical and intellectual resources, the CPFs still play an important rôle in airingexplanations for police action, and for listening to complaints.

Since 1964 police complaints in Barbados have been dealt with by a depart-ment headed by a superintendent at the Central Police Station in Bridgetown. 25

However, a working-group was established leading to the October 2000 Bill toestablish a new complaints authority, hopefully to be running by the end of March 2001. The body will have three or five members, appointed by theGovernor-General on the advice of the Attorney-General, of whom at least onewill be representing the public.

The 1998 Appraisal gives a sobering picture of the current St Lucian policecomplaints department which ‘can best be described as piecemeal. In [thecapital] Castries, one Inspector located at the Central Police Station works,currently without support, to deal with all local complaints. In addition tomatters outstanding from previous years, the Inspector has received almost 50complaints this year, half of them alleging brutality from officers. He is …under considerable pressure and the location of the Unit at CPS is far from idealif independence and confidentiality are to be respected … The Commissionerrefers some complaints to middle-ranking officers for investigation. This has tobe carried out in addition to their primary workload and delays are common.There is no automatic referral of cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions(DPP) where a police officer has committed a criminal offence. The net resultof this system is a lack of police officer and public confidence in the impar-tiality and confidentiality of the system.’ 26 DCP Parker envisages the establish-ment of a new strong and transparent complaints unit. While recognizing thatsome civilian oversight through a body of interested stakeholders would bebeneficial, such a unit need not necessarily be external. 27 Parker feels that anyfatal shooting should be automatically referred to the DPP, that crime statisticsand commissions of enquiry reports should be made public, and that the publicshould have input into needs analysis for the police. Furthermore there shouldbe a drive towards more community-based policing. In the meantime, HomeAffairs Minister Velon John has been outspoken in ‘exhorting’ the public toreport ‘unbecoming police conduct’ via his Crime Action Line or personal faxmachine. 28

Civil society

Press Freedom Director of the Commonwealth Press Union, Lindsay Ross, says

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‘Sri Lanka has one of the most repressive censorship regimes in the Common-wealth’. Editors and journalists face frequent court cases, harassment andthreats, and slander in the state media if they cover the northern war and itsaccompanying corruption and bungling in defence procurement. The ever-busyCompetent Authority (chief censor) is empowered to cut liberally articlesloosely deemed to be against ‘national security’ or risking ‘demoralization’ of the armed forces, while it is widely felt that the lack of transparency is hurtingthe national interest more. Roy Denish says the Leader ’s and Times ’s defencereports ‘sink like stones into deep water’. Deepika Udagama says that theEmergency Regulations underlying the censorship regime are incompatiblewith international human rights law. They place over-broad powers on the state,are inaccessible to the public and have no central registry. The state does notfulfil its obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsregarding notification of reasons for derogation, nor by tying the Regulationsstrictly to the exigencies of the situation. Sri Lanka has one of the highest NGOdensities in the world, and Tyrol Ferdinands of the National Peace Council saysNGOs feel relatively safe provided they do not touch ‘the holy cow of the wareffort’. The bringing to trial of security officers who abducted, raped and killedKrishanthy Kumaraswamy shows the strength of a mobilized civil society, butthe dropping down the agenda of the investigations into the Chemmani massgraves shows its inconsistency.

Nigerian civil society has little oversight over the security forces whichremain buffered by low societal expectations and a reluctance to demandlegitimate information. When the security forces are held to account by civilsociety the state may simply deny any validity to the story—as in the allegedlyfake October 1999 Punch photos of soldiers raping women in Choba. Obasanjohas begun a welcome if slightly sycophantic Monthly Media Chat with

journalists. Human rights act ivists like Matthew Kukah have been drawn intopolicy making, and the International Committee for the Red Cross is under-taking human rights training with the police. NGOs and journalists generallyconcur that there is a slightly larger—and safer—space for them in Nigeria’sinchoate transition to democracy.

With apocalyptic crime levels and 200 to 300 police officers being killedevery year, SAPS currently has a lot of public sympathy in its use of forceagainst the crime wave. Recent footage of police brutality in Brixton andagainst black immigrants has led to trials of the perpetrators but generally thereare three less positive common strands to opinions on security sector mediacoverage: firstly that outside the Mail and Guardian there is little informeddebate and few heavy-weight, independent journalists; secondly, that the mediafrequently gets the facts wrong; thirdly, the white-managed press allegedlydistorts criminality into something habitually black and beyond the control of the (black-led) government and security sector. Media oversight became moreproblematic when Police Commissioner Jack Selebi joined Minister Tshwete’shardline stance by inexplicably banning the dissemination of certain crimestatistics, and by ordering police officers not to speak to the media without theMinister’s prior consent. 29

Barbados produces comprehensive monthly crime statistics but while thefigures are discussed fairly openly by ministers and senior police officers they

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are not disseminated as a public document and so debate remains controlled.The Government is regularly criticized in the rather sensationalist 30 media 31 andsome debate is highly informed. 32 The radio call-in programmes are a particu-larly popular media for venting steam and debating serious issues includingpolice brutality. 33

Rickey Singh, journalist and member of the Caribbean Human RightsNetwork, believes it was the pressure from NGOs and the media which forcedthe Barbadian government and security forces to end its ‘period of denial’ overpolice brutality, and to initiate moves for an independent complaints body.Singh resents the marginalization of NGOs and society from debates over crimestatistics and policing, citing the recent establishment of the police’s RapidResponse Units (RRU)—a high-profile force of 70 elite police designed topatrol areas mainly with high tourist densities and to respond immediately tocriminal acts—whose raison d’être has not been fully explained. ‘If it’s true thatthe crime rate has fallen from 13 000 to 10 000, then why is there a need forsuch a new unit? There has been no explanation of this,’ said Singh. Singh alsoexpressed concern regarding what he considers to be inadequate accountabilityof the RRU. It is feared may be able to use force more liberally with less over-sight. For Attorney-General David Simmons there is a tendency in the smallBarbadian community to get over-emotional about crime and not to understandit scientifically 34—something which might perhaps be strengthened by bringingthe public into closer dialogue on police and policing, or by allowing thembetter access to crime figures.

The St Lucian mass media carries a wide spectrum of political opinion and isoften critical of the government. 35 One particularly loud voice against policebrutality and impunity is Rick Wayne (who one diplomat termed ‘the real oppo-sition’), whose Star articles and controversial ‘Talk’ TV programme frequentlyengage the issue. 36 Yet Wayne says civil society’s criticisms of the police havedrawn no obvious successes other than occasional police statements and ageneral increase in popular awareness of rights. Similarly Ione Erlinger-Ford of the Crisis Centre in Castries says that despite 10 years of dealings with thepolice over rape and abuse cases, that the RSPLF was still incompetent and

judg emental and had no specialized ra pe uni ts . Erling er-Ford is one of anumber of St Lucians believing the only way to overcome the ineffective andnepotistic police is to have its members recruited from overseas. DCP Parker isopen to the notion, aware that this is already the practice of Bermuda, butbelieves ‘direct entry recruitment at every level’ is more realistic. Wayne is lessoptimistic, believing that while new faces are needed to make reform work, arotation of officers would only mean a ‘rotation of mediocrity’ when the funda-mental problem is one of human resources. Parker agrees, aware that anenlightened and experienced workforce could only truly materialize if and whenSt Lucians have significantly higher socioeconomic conditions.

National Human Rights Commissions

The Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission’s (HRC) substantial if unrealizedpowers include to monitor those detained under the Emergency Regulations andthe Prevention of Terrorism Act. The second HRC, chaired by Faiz Mustafa,

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announced it will prosecute the police if they fail to report detentions andCommissioner Goonatilleke says there has been ‘by and large observance’.However, NGO members believe adherence is very limited, and that the HumanRights Task Force, which previously monitored adherence to the PTA, wasmuch more pro-active. A leading UNP MP adds he has ‘not heard of a singlecase of reporting happening within 48 hours’ and believes the police have noteven been issued with receipt books. 37

The 16-member presidentially-appointed Nigerian Human Rights Commis-sion is still establishing its regional offices and is said to have over 2000petitions awaiting the Commissioners’ signature. In four years the presidentiallyappointed NHRC has produced only one inaccessible annual report and of the343 complaints received in 1999 only 12 relate to police brutality, 37 to deten-tion and nine to extra-judicial executions.

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has focused onracial equality rather than security sector abuses, 38 and has not done humanrights training since 1995, although it is involved in monitoring criminal justicelegislation.

Other mechanisms

In Sri Lanka in November 1994 three regional Presidential Commissions of Enquiry into Disappearance were established, and investigated 27 526 petitions.However, the United Nations (UN) Working-Group on Disappearances stated anumber of complaints: that the publications were very difficult to obtain;families were not informed; disappearances under the UNA government wereinvestigated more thoroughly than those under the PA; the HRC was kept onthe sidelines; that very few of the suspected perpetrators were convicted, andsome were even promoted; and that the disappearance-friendly PTA andEmergency Regulations have not been abolished.

Until the late 1980s it was very difficult to challenge Sri Lankan stateviolence which was legally abetted by 18-month detentions of suspects, preven-tative detention, exemptions from prosecution of security officials, andpolitically appointed judges. Now, writes Dr Deepika Udagama, the courts‘almost presume executive wrongdoing … [placing] a higher onus on theexecutive to prove that it has acted constitutionally’. In its fundamental rights

jurisdiction the Supreme Court has now made progressively bold judgements,has recognized that torture includes mental torture, and has repeatedly censuredthe Secretary of Defence for approving detention orders mechanically. 39 DrSaravanamuttu of the Centre for Policy Alternatives adds that the courts couldbe significantly more proactive, could take on board public interest litigation,and should accept more cases.

A number of bodies with government-sanctioned oversight functions havebeen created in Nigeria but they remain under-resourced, under-publicized andlack teeth. In 1999 Obasanjo appointed retired Judge Oputa to lead a panel of investigators into abuses committed between 1966 and 1999 40 and by February2000 it had received 11 000 complaints. The Commission has been starved of adequate funding and has yet to organize hearings. The media has allowed thePanel to slide out of the news, and Commission members are said to be increas-

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ingly disillusioned. Obasanjo also appointed a panel under Dr Kolade to review1999’s civil and military deals but no findings have been released and themedia has dropped the issue. How over 1000 civilians have been killed in 18months of politicized inter-ethnic clashes is being reportedly investigated butNGOs do not expect to hear any findings. In a spiral of violence in November1999 hundreds were killed as the military besieged Odi. The (now impeached)Senate President Okadigbo led a fact-finding mission with the Senate Com-mittee on Judiciary, Ethics and Human Rights but no-one has been chargedwith perpetrating violence and Lieutenant-Colonel Agbabiaka, who led theassault, was promoted to Colonel.

The renowned South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)investigates the causes, nature and extent of gross human rights violationscommitted between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994. Degrees of accountabilityin the process include full, public disclosure of individuals and that responsi-bility for violations be taken by all individuals which benefited from thesecurity forces’ abuses. The new post of Inspector General of Intelligence (IG)was finally filled by Fazel Randera, a former Commissioner of the TRC. TheIG is responsible to the President, has functions including monitoring andreviewing activities of the services, and has powers of access to any informationor facility which the intelligence community possesses. Randera appears a well-respected appointment but there is discomfort over the location of the IG’soffice—in the same building as NIA, SASS and Nicoc. The Auditor-Generalaudits the accounts of all national, provincial and municipal departmentsincluding the intelligence agencies, and has made a number of criticismsregarding the lack of sufficient controls on the agencies. He also emphasizesthat: ‘A number of audit queries which were raised in previous reports showlittle or no progress towards being resolved. This is of major concern to theOffice.’ Alleged high-level corruption in arms deals is being presently investi-gated by the Public Ac counts Comm ittee, and the Auditor-General, butPresident Mbeki has blocked the probing of Judge Willem Heath’s SpecialInvestigative Unit. 41

The lid has been kept on 10 commissions of enquiry into the St Lucianpolice, 42 reportedly the most damning being the Hudson-Phillips Report of thelate 1980s. The enquiry was embarked upon following a media and NGOcampaign and is said to include information about ‘killer squads’ and a certainofficer who shot dead 11 civilians and still faced no disciplinary charges. Theruling SLP’s stated intention to release the document is doubted 43 since theyhave managed to sit on it for three years already.

Expanding accountability issues

Alleged collusion between multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state’ssecurity forces includes that Shell provided money, weapons and logisticalsupport in the violent suppression of popular protest, and instigated the im-prisonment, torture and killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the rest of the OgoniNine. 44 Redress appears unlikely domestically, but Shell will be facing a legalcase in the United States under laws allowing action against firms accused of human rights violations anywhere in the world. In the chequered record of the

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large Nigerian contingent in the Liberian and Sierra Leonian peacekeepingmissions HRW reports that the forces prevented wider civilian bloodshed butwere also responsible for looting, illegal detentions and summary executions. 45

The transfer of the Sierra Leone security mandate from ECOMOG to the UNimproved the N igerian forces’ record, 46 but they still traded drugs anddiamonds. 47 The National Assembly has not scrutinized ECOMOG’s activities,and Abacha has refused to state the human or financial costs of the inter-ventions. 48

The South African private security industry’s turnover rocketed from R141million in 1978 to R8.8 billion in 1998. It employs 470 000 people and has80 000 vehicles compared with 128 000 and 37 000 respectively for SAPS 49 yethas less oversight mechanisms, since it ‘operates on a profit motive and isaccountable to its clients only’. 50 New regulation in the Security Officers Acthas been attacked for excluding comprehensive regulation on the issuing andcarrying of firearms, the standards and conduct of security guards, and thegathering of information which may violate people’s rights and civil liberties. 51

Allegedly permeating the South African agencies’ blurred edges are the intelli-gence organizations of the ANC and of President Mbeki. The impression is thatthe ANC’s agencies overlap to some extent with the agencies of the state, and itthat sometimes the party machinery takes precedence over that of the state. ThePresident also takes primary responsibility for the multi-tasked Scorpions whoare recruited from the police, yet ‘have twice the guns and salaries but half theoversight.’ 52 Intelligence units are also mushrooming in the Department of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs and there are worries that the NIA maybe able to slide certain activities into these less scrutinized domains. Observersnote that there must be oversight of any intelligence activity, not just of specificagencies.

Barbados is a member of the seven-mem ber Regional Security System and itsCouncil of Ministers—namely the Prime Ministers of each country—meetannually to discuss plans and budgets. As a treaty organization contributions donot need parliamentary approval, but the Barbadian Auditor-General doesscrutinize the RSS’s accounts. The RSS does not need parliamentary approvalfor deployment of forces either, and it is feared the RSS is ‘the baby of its Co-ordinator’, Rudyard Lewis. 53 When asked how the 1983 Grenada intervention—which Brigadier Lewis had led—had been overseen, he replied: ‘It was suc-cessful; we restored democracy!’ The lack of awareness of the RSS’s existencecreates room for potential ill-discipline.

Conclusion

A strong mix of parliamentary and civil societal mechanisms is required inoverseeing security forces, yet even where such a mixture exists, eg in SouthAfrica, there are various lacunae—presumably sanctioned by the executive—affording a disturbing free rein to sections of the security forces. The fivestudies presented in this article show how lacunae exist throughout all oversightsystems. Parliament is frequently sidelined for major statements and even fordecisions over whether to deploy armed forces. Having a civilian legislaturedoes not guarantee democratic oversight as debate can be stifled or discouraged,

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parliamentarians may be unprepared or unable to assert themselves, and parlia-ment may be superseded anyway by the executive. Indeed, the reviews of SriLanka and Nigeria suggest that parliament at times may be little more than afaçade behind which political decisions are made by unaccountable elites. Over-sight must be democratic as well as civilian.

A review of the security committees of Commonwealth countries revealssome glaring strengths and weaknesses. Committees should be chaired by wellrespected, experienced and independently minded individuals, free to criticizethe executive where necessary. A good example of this is when the committeeis chaired by a high-standing member of the opposition (eg JSCI, UK), whilebad cases are when the chair is the Prime Minister (ISC, New Zealand) orrelevant minister (CDC, Sri Lanka). The committees may have excellent (NewSouth Wales) or abysmal (Papua New Guinea) resources, and may have hadsubstantial effects on policy (Australia) or none at all (Namibia). Committeemembers should be able to act independently but this is unlikely if they areselected by the party whips (UK, in effect) or by the leader of the government(Papua New Guinea). As expressed by Don McKinnon, it is the process of democracy and accountability which is the benchmark for success, not the mereticking-over of an assembly or a committee. Just as security committees are alitmus test of democratic, civilian control in a country they are also a realm forpotential progress, 54 given their unique location, mandates, and access to peopleand papers. Recommendations to help them realize their potential include thatpower to appoint members is taken away from party whips or the PrimeMinister, that Parliament should debate all comm ittee reports, 55 and thatcommittees have greater information about security issues and of their counter-part committees abroad. 56

Police complaints mechanisms are another good indicator of how closely astate wishes its police to be monitored. The present examples in Barbados andSt Lucia are inadequate but the proposed new systems should be much better.Even the more complex bodies in South Africa and the UK have drawn manycriticisms and are liable to be changed. 57 Quasi-independent national HumanRights Commissions have great potential to improve systems of accountabilitybut, where they have been established, they tend to focus on other human rightsissues or are still finding their feet. They are uniquely placed, tend to havestrong mandates, and should have kudos with people, parliament and securityforces alike. However, for various political and economic reasons they remainlacking in teeth. In smaller states, such as in the Caribbean, nations could createperhaps a regional HRC, just as there are plans to create a Caribbean Court of Justice. 58

The situations in St Lucia and Barbados lend themselves towards a widerdebate about accountability in small states: Is the Parliament of a small stateable to scrutinize adequately its security forces, given the vagaries of localpolitics—the tidal changes in election results which produce tiny oppositionparties, the limited numbers of MPs to sit on committees, the networks of tieswhich may undermine independence, etc? Could regional bodies, such as aCaribbean Human Rights Commission, play a rôle in monitoring the securitysector and its oversight mechanisms? The enquiry into the RSPLF by formerTrinidad and Tobago Attorney-General Hudson-Phillips points to the possibility

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of other reviews by regional experts or organizations? Could the presentexample of the Commonwealth being actively involved in the security reviewof Papua New Guinea be a blueprint for further reviews in states with problem-atic finances and human resources? The Bermudan example of recruitingcertain police officers from off the island is an imaginative means of counteringsome of the political problems of effective policing is a small state, althoughincreased cost may be an issue. However, even with imported or rotatedpolice officers, low socioeconomic conditions will hamper the evolution of ahigh level police force, whatever the size of the state. The higher socio-economic conditions in Barbados contribute to its having more effective over-sight mechanisms than in St Lucia.

While calls for revitalizing of legislatures should be heeded, research pointsto a parallel need to strengthen democratic processes between parliament andcivil society, and within civil society itself. Civil actors inside and outsideparliament often lack the relevant experience and leverage with which to feedinto the democratic and accountability processes. This appears starkly to be soin Nigerians’ inability to challenge their country’s personality-led securitypolicies—as shown in the state’s announcing the establishment of an 83rdDivision to police the Delta—a decision taken solely by executive members inconsultation with the US MPRI consultancy company. The media and NGOsare often unable to fulfil their public watchdog rôle with limited access to—andawareness of—security and security sector oversight issues. This may be aparticular concern in states coming out of a period of military rule or civiliandictatorship, where journalists have been reporting on security forces in a mean-ingful way, and public discourse has been severely restricted. The Common-wealth Journalists Association, Commonwealth Press Union and Common-wealth Broadcasting Association could carry out training sessions w ithappropriate media representatives. Journalists who are security sector literatecould increase general security sector literacy amongst the wider population.Governments should be encouraged to follow the example set at present bySouth Africa in having links from its government website to dozens of NGOsmonitoring the democratic process.

Developments in information gathering highlight a need for oversight bodiesto be scrutinizing intelligence and security activities, rather than of specificagencies, since various departments (Finance, Immigration, etc) are nowinvolved in intelligence work and will be less monitored than their more estab-lished counterparts. Similarly the growth of private security, notably in SouthAfrica, has occurred outside the umbrella of meaningful oversight and generatesa pressing need to establish accountability mechanisms for private as well aspublic security officers.

The ultimate call is for society to be as literate as possible in security sectorissues. For a real national dialogue to occur, the general public needs to be moreaware of its rights against defence and intelligence agencies, to know whatinformation it may legitimately expect, to comprehend the workings of parlia-ment and the whole oversight system, and to know which complaints bodiesthey can access. The sporadic bursts of human rights training conducted byNHRCs or via education systems contributes to better public understanding butis far too limited. Journalists need to understand how to carry out responsibly

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their watchdog rôle, 59 and the CPU and other freedom of expression NGOsshould continue to support those struggling against strict censorship regimes,particularly when they are covering security sector issues.

Crucially, as Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon has stated, itis vital to recognize that ‘democracy is a process rather than an event’. Thegreater the level of popular participation in the process the better for all con-cerned. The people must be de-marginalized from the political process and fromdiscourse on the security forces. This will stimulate national debate, increaseunderstanding of security issues, and provide an extra tier of oversight at themost important, popular level. It will also rejuvenate regime legitimacy and theconcept of democracy.

Notes and references

1 Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘How to make an undemocratic constitution: the Nigerianexample’, Third World Quarterly , Vol 21, No 2, 2000, pp 343–366.

2 On 24/25 April 1994 the South African Defence Force (SADF) became the SouthAfrican National Defence Force (SANDF), and the ex-military commander of theANC, Joe Modise, was appointed Minister of Defence. Under him was ex-SADFCommander General G eorge M eiring who had previously led the militarycampaign against the ANC.

3 Respected journalistic and human rights’ sources say it is ‘an open secret’ thatwhen the Barbados Defence Force (BDF) supports the police it uses force

liberally.4 Earl Bousquet, Prime Minister’s Press Secretary, telephone conversation withauthor, September 2000.

5 Government of St Lucia: Institutional Appraisal and Strategic Review of the RoyalSt Lucian Police Force, 18/9/98.

6 Mary Francis, a respected human rights lawyer, says 12 to 20 civilians were shotin 2000 while Deputy Police Commissioner Parker, while saying he does not haveexact figures, accepts there were two fatal killings in the five months up toOctober.

7 Deputy Police Commissioner Neal Parker says police officers have been disci-

plined for misconduct, but human rights lawyer Mary Francis, journalists anddiplomats have not heard of a single case.8 In his address to the 46th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, Edinburgh,

Scotland, 28 September 2000.9 Conversation with author, July 2000.

10 Conversation with author, August 2000.11 ‘MPs lied to over military spying’, Mail and Guardian , 11–17 August 2000, p 8.12 Conversations with author, August 2000.13 During the Appropriation Bill, for example, the police is discussed at length and

the head of police is called to account.

14 ‘We just sit back in our chairs, don’t talk very much, and look from side to sideuntil someone thinks it’s about time that something else was said,’ a memberexplained. Conversation with author, July 2000.

15 Conversation with author, July 2000.16 ‘A military makeover’ , Afr ica Confidential , Vol 41, No 20, 13 October 2000, p 6.17 Tshwete has said, ‘We want the criminals to have bleeding noses by the time they

reach the police station’ and has called for a review of the rights of criminals.18 In the 20-page 1997/8 Report, for example, the Committee notes ‘with concern the

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massive growth of the private security and intelligence industry’, yet makes norecommendation as to how this should be responded to.

19 Both nominations were repeated; Mokoba’s was vetoed again, and Pillay’s rejec-tion was overturned.

20 Peter Gastrow, Director of the ISS, Cape Town, South Africa, August 2000,conversation with author.

21 There are only 17 St Lucian MPs, with heavy constituent and national workloads,but with discussions on creating a new tier of local government MPs might be leftwith the time in participate in such committees.

22 CSVR, ‘Submission regarding the proposed ICD white paper’, September 1999.23 Director of the Institute of Security Studies’ Cape Town office and former adviser

to the Minister of Safety and Security, Peter Gastrow says that the ICD ‘is playinga crucial rôle in a hostile environment’. It does investigate major assaults by thepolice, but it isn’t liked by the police, nor is it supported by the Minister of Safetyand Security.

24 Their effectiveness has varied greatly across the country. Black communities havebeen generally more concerned with ameliorating socioeconomic causes of crimewhile white communities are more concerned with keeping crime and criminalsout of their areas. Other CPFs have become allegedly more concerned withfinding egalitarian representation than with probing the important issues.

25 I cal led the office of Superintendent Lewis every day for one week but heremained unavailable, apparently failing to receive permission from the Com-missioner of police to meet with me.

26 Government of St Lucia: Institutional Appraisal and Strategic Review of the RoyalSt Lucian Police Force, 18/9/98 , p 22.

27 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Force has a 90 per cent favourable rating bythe Canadian people while investigating itself, Neal Parker says.

28 St Lucia Star , 30 December 2000.29 Nevertheless, comprehensive commentary on crime statistics is available on the

SAPS web-site a t: http://www.saps.co.za/78_crimeinfo/bulletin/index.htm.30 For example, when security forces resorted to lethal force in apprehending a

pirogue of 11 Venezualan suspected drug traffickers, the media went to town on aminute-by-minute description of events—but yet not a single line was printedquestioning the fatal shooting. Similarly on 26 September, the Nation newspaperdevoted its full front page to ‘Robbery at salon’ in which three women at a hair-dressers had been robbed of their purses at gunpoint .

31 US Depar tment of State, p 3.32 The previous day’s edition of the Nation included: a letter on whether condoms

should be distributed in prisons; a comparison of the merits of prison comparedwith rehabilitation; a debate on the death penalty in the Caribbean; and an articleconsidering whether the UK should sell arms to Jamaica given the Jamaicanpolice force’s high levels of excessive use of force.

33 For example, in August 2000 a woman called in to complain about her son whohad been beaten up for alleged marijuana possession, and soon after the Police

Commissioner rang in to say he would look into the matter.34 Conversation with author, September 2000.35 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour,

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: St Lucia, 1999 , February 2000.36 For example, in mid-2000 a girl said her brother had been shot five times in the

back, with two witnesses present, and yet the police were still not holding aninquest and, importantly, the government had failed to call for one either.

37 Conversation with author, July 2000.

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38 Louis Green (ACDP) of the parliamentary committee of the HRC believes it istime for a change of focus. Conversation with author, August 2000.

39 Dr Deepika Udagama, ‘Taming the beast: judicial responses to state violence inSri Lanka’, LST Review , Volume 9, Issue 137, March 1999.

40 The dates were ini tially 1994 to 1999 but Obasanjo bowed to pressure andextended them.

41 Heath was investigating alleged corruption in a 43 billion Rand ($6 billion) armsdeal with Britain.

42 Conversation with Earl Bousquet, September 2000.43 Star editor Rick Wayne, conversation with author, September 2000.44 ‘She ll to face US lawsui t fo r Saro-Wiwa execut ion’ , The Independent , 19

September 2000, p 13.45 Human Rights Watch, Nigeria Report 2000 .46 http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/Sier988-05.htm#P623_127748 .47 ‘UN gets warning shot on peacekeeping’, The Guardian , 9 September 2000, p 16.48 Kayode Soyinka of Africa Toda y says the Liberian operation alone cost Nigeria

some $3 billion.49 Martin Schonteich, ‘Fighting crime with private muscle: the private sector and

crime protection’, African Security Review , Vol 8, No 5, 1999.50 Jenny Irish, Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africa’s Private Security

Industry , ISS Monograph Series, No 39, August 1999.51 Ibid.52 Richard Pillay, MP, conversation with author, August 2000.53 A military source said Lewis makes all appointments, and there is little known of

his plans for the RSS or for his successor.54 As recognized by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in sponsoring the

strengthening of committees, via, eg CPA, Parliamentary Committees: Enhancing Democratic Government , London, Cavendish, 1999, and Neil Sammonds, A Need to Know: the Struggle for Democratic, Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector inCommonwealth Countries , London, CPSU, 2000.

55 U K Liaison Comm ittee, Shifting the Balance: Select C ommittees and the Executive , 2 March 2000.

56 Sammonds, p 44. The author also noticed the astonishment in the face of amember of the Sri Lankan CDC when informed that the UK Commons’ Intelli-gence and Security Committee is chaired by Tom King, an opposition Tory MP.Such good case examples can be cross-fertilized around the Commonwealth withimproved awareness.

57 Plans for the UK include having less investigators from police backgrounds.Recommendations from the legal NGO Liberty are available at www.freedomto-care.org/page144.htm.

58 See, for example, Hugh Rawlins, The Caribbean Court of Justice: The Historyand Analysis of the Debate , Georgetown, Guyana, 2000.

59 The Emeritus President of the Commonwealth Journalists Association, Derek Ingram, is sympathetic to the idea of developing security sector training for jour-

nalists in the Commonwealth. Discussion with author, December 2000.

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