civil service com and comelec

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ARTICLE IX

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SECTION 2 The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by thePresident with the consent of the Commission on Appointmentsfor a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a

Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in atemporary or acting capacity.

(1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations with originalcharters.

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as

practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage,directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan politicalcampaign.

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to

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government employees.

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be givensuch protection as may be provided by law.

TUPAS v.National

HousingCorporation

Respondent National Housing

Corporation (hereinafter referred to asNHC) is a corporation organized in 1959in accordance with Executive Order No.399, otherwise known as the UniformCharter of Government Corporations,dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundredpercent (100%) owned by theGovernment from its incorporation underAct 459, the former corporation law. Thegovernment entities that own its sharesof stock are the Government ServiceInsurance System, the Social Security

System, the Development Bank of thePhilippines, the National Investment andDevelopment Corporation and thePeople's Homesite and HousingCorporation. 1Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services(TUPAS, for brevity) is a legitimate labororganization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petitionfor the conduct of a certification electionwith Regional Office No. IV of theDepartment of Labor in order to

determine the exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the workers in NHC. Itwas claimed that its members comprisedthe majority of the employees of thecorporation. 2 The petition wasdismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7,1977, holding that NHC "being agovernment-owned and/or controlledcorporation its employees/workers areprohibited to form, join or assist anylabor organization for purposes of

Whether or not

petitioner (TUPAS)can be allowed tohold a certificationelection.

YES.

In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal dismissal involving the same respondentcorporation, We had ruled that the employees of NHCand of other government owned or controlledcorporations were governed by civil service laws, rulesand regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitutionwhich provided that "the civil service embraces everybranch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of thegovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations."

The rule, however, was modified in the 1987Constitution , the corresponding provision whereof

declares that "(t)he civil service embraces allbranches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agenciesof the government, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters.

Consequently, the civil service now covers onlygovernment owned or controlled corporations withoriginal or legislative charters, that is those created byan act of Congress or by special law, and not thoseincorporated under and pursuant to a generallegislation.

NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or

employees' organizations, pursuant to:

1. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of

the people, including those employed in thepublic and private sectors, to form unions,associations or societies for purposes notcontrary to law shall not be abridged"

2. This guarantee is reiterated in the secondparagraph of Section 3, Article XIII, onSocial Justice and Human Rights, whichmandates that the State "shall guarantee the

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collective bargaining pursuant to Section1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the LaborCode."

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS

appealed to the Bureau of LaborRelations 4 where, acting thereon in BLRCase No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77),Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed theorder of dismissal and ordered theholding of a certification election. 5 Thisorder was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolutionof November 21, 1978 6 upon a motionfor reconsideration of respondent NHC.

In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said

resolution and prays that a certificationelection be held among the rank and fileemployees of NHC.

rights of all workers to self-organization,collective bargaining and negotiations, andpeaceful concerted activities, including theright to strike in accordance with law ...."

3. Specifically with respect to government

employees, the right to unionize is recognizedin Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX Bwhich provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to governmentemployees."

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of acertification election among the workers of NHC for it isclear that they are covered by the Labor Code , theNHC being a government-owned and/or controlledcorporation without an original charter.

It is meet, however, to also call attention to the factthat, insofar as certification elections are concerned,

subsequent statutory developments have renderedacademic even the distinction between the two typesof government-owned or controlled corporations andthe laws governing employment relations therein, ashereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civilservice laws, a certification election may beconducted.

Reason/s:

1. For employees in corporations and entities

covered by the Labor Code, the determinationof the exclusive bargaining representative isparticularly governed by Articles 255 to 259of said Code. Article 256 provides for theprocedure when there is a representation issuein organized establishments, while Article 257covers unorganized establishments. TheseLabor Code provisions are fleshed out by RulesV to VII, Book V of the Omnibus ImplementingRules.(NOTE: NHC is included in this type.)

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2. With respect to other civil servants, that is,employees of all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities and agencies of thegovernment including government-owned

or controlled corporations with originalcharters and who are, therefore, covered bythe civil service laws, the guidelines for theexercise of their right to organize is providedfor under Executive Order No. 180. ChapterIV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12,regulates the determination of the "sole andexclusive employees representative"; UnderSection 12, "where there are two or more dulyregistered employees' organizations in theappropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order theconduct of certification election and shall

certify the winner as the exclusiverepresentative of the rank-and-file employeesin said organizational unit."

De los Santosv. Mallare

The facts are that Eduardo de los Santos,the petitioner, was appointed CityEngineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, bythe President, appointment which wasconfirmed by the Commission onAppointments on August 6, and on the23rd of that month, he qualified for andbegan to exercise the duties andfunctions of the position. On June 1,1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an adinterim appointment by the President tothe same position, after which, on June3, the Undersecretary of the Departmentof Public Works and Communicationsdirected Santos to report to the Bureauof Public Works for another assignment.Santos refused to vacate the office, andwhen the City Mayor and the otherofficials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallarethe salary corresponding to the position,he commenced these proceedings.

Whether or not theremoval of thepetitioner wasconstitutional.

No.

The Constitution authorizes removals and onlyrequires that they be for cause. And the occasionsfor removal would be greatly diminished if theinjunction of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution— that appointments in the civil service shall be madeonly according to merit and fitness, to be determinedas far as practicable by competitive examination —would be adhered of meticulously in the first place.

Positions Excepted from Merit System andRemoval for Cause:

1. Policy-determining positions2. Primarily Confidential Positions3. Highly Technical Positions

As has been seen, three specified classes of positions— policy-determining, primarily confidential and highlytechnical — are excluded from the merit system anddismissal at pleasure of officers and employees

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The petitioner rests his case on ArticleXII of the Constitution, section 4 of whichreads: "No officer or employee in theCivil Service shall be removed orsuspended except for cause as providedby law."

appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. Thesepositions involved the highest degree of confidence, orare closely bound out with and dependent on otherpositions to which they are subordinate, or aretemporary in nature. It may truly be said that the goodof the service itself demands that appointments

coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarilyconfidential, policy-determining, nor highlytechnical.

The petitioner is entitled to remain in office as CityEngineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights andprivileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or isremoved for cause, and that respondent Mallare'sappointment is ineffective in so far as it may adverselyaffect those emoluments, rights and privileges.

Without costs.Salazar v.Mathay

On January 20, 1960, petitioner MelaniaC. Salazar was appointed by the AuditorGeneral "confidential agent" in the Officeof the Auditor General, GovernmentService Insurance System withcompensation of P3,120.00 per annum,to take effect on January 27, 1960 uponher assumption of office. Herappointment was noted by theCommissioner of Civil Service underSection 5, paragraph (j) of Republic ActNo. 2260, subject to the usual physical

and medical examination. On March 28,1962 she was extended anotherappointment by way of promotion, as"confidential agent" in the same officewith compensation of P3,300.00 perannum, to take effect on April 1, 1962.On August 28, 1964, her salary as"confidential agent" was adjusted toP4,200.00 per annum, effective July 1,1964. On February 12, 1965, the ActingDeputy Commissioner of the Civil Serviceissued a third indorsement to the Auditor

Whether or not theservices of petitioneras "confidentialagent" in the Officeof the Auditor, GSISwas validlyterminated on thealleged ground of loss of confidence.

YES.

Two instances when a position may beconsidered primarily confidential:

1. When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now CivilService Commission) has declared the positionto be primarily confidential;

2. In the absence of such declaration when by thenature of the functions of the office, thereexists "close intimacy between the appointee

and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedomfrom misgiving or betrayals of personal trust orconfidential matters of state."

In the case before Us, the provision of ExecutiveOrder No. 265, declaring "... confidential agents inthe several department and offices of the Government,unless otherwise directed by the President, to beprimarily confidential" brings within the fold of theaforementioned executive order the position of

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General stating that the petitioner hasqualified in the general examination heldon February 27, 1969 and herappointment, which have beenpreviously approved as provisional undersection 24(c), Republic Act 2260, was

approved anew subject to the usualphysical and medical examination.Again, on October 7, 1965, petitioner'ssalary as "confidential agent" wasadjusted to P5,500.00 per annumeffective July 1, 1965.

On March 18, 1966, much to hersurprise, petitioner received a noticefrom the Auditor General that herservices as "confidential agent" in theOffice of the Auditor, GovernmentService Insurance System have been

terminated as of the close of office hourson March 31, 1966.

On March 31, 1966, the Auditor Generalupon favorable recommendation of Mr.Pedro Encabo, Auditor of theGovernment Service Insurance Systemissued an appointment to petitionerMelania C. Salazar as Junior Examiner inhis office with a compensation of P2,400.00 per annum, to take effect onApril 1, 1966. Said appointment wasapproved by the Commission of Civil

Service under Section 24(c) of RepublicAct No. 2260 with a notice that generalclerical eligibility is not appropriate forthe position involved. On the same day,petitioner assumed the position of JuniorExaminer in the Office of the Auditor,GSIS, with the salary of P2,400.00 whichwas later adjusted to P2,580.00 perannum effective July 1, 1966.

On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote

confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, asamong those positions which are primarily confidential.Since the position of the petitioner falls under the firstcategory of primarily confidential positions, it is nolonger necessary to inquire into the nature of thefunctions attached to the office in order to determine

whether her position is primarily confidential or not.

Her position being primarily confidential, petitionercannot complain that the termination of her servicesas confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSISis in violation of her security of tenure.

Ingles vs. Mutuc, Vol. 26, SCRA, 171.

It should be noted, however, that when such pleasureturns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed"or dismissed" from office — his "term" merely"expires," in much the the same way as officer,

whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixedterm for which he had been appointed or elected, isnot and cannot be deemed "removed" or "dismissed"therefrom, upon the expiration of said term.

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the Commissioner of Civil Servicerequesting that she be reinstated to herformer position as "confidential agent" inthe Office of the Auditor, GSIS. However,no action was taken on said letter.

On March 18, 1967, petitioner filed apetition for mandamus with the SupremeCourt docketed as G.R. No. L-37256 tocompel the Auditor General to reinstateher to her former position as"confidential agent" in the Office of theAuditor, GSIS, effective April 1, 1968 butthe Supreme Court dismissed thepetition for mandamus without prejudiceto her filing the proper action to theCourt of First Instance which petitionerdid by filing the proper action in theCourt of First Instance of Manila anaction for mandamus to compel theAuditor General to return her to herformer position as "confidential agent" inthe Office of the Auditor General.

Corpus v.Cuaderno

On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, thenholding the position of "Special Assistantto the Governor, In Charge of the ExportDepartment" of the Central Bank, a

position declared by the President of thePhilippines on 24 January 1957 as highlytechnical in nature, and admitted assuch by both the present litigants, wasadministratively charged by severalemployees in the export departmentwith dishonesty, incompetence, neglectof duty, and/or abuse of authority,oppression, conduct unbecoming of apublic official, and of violation of theinternal regulations of the Central Bank.

Whether or nothighly technicalemployees may beremoved by reason

of lack of confidence.

No.

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidentialpositions (such as private secretaries of public

functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, becausetheir term of office lasts only as long as confidence inthem endures; and thus their cessation involves noremoval. But the situation is different for those holdinghighly technical posts, requiring special skills andqualifications.

The Constitution clearly distinguished the primarilyconfidential from the highly technical, and to apply theloss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is toignore and erase the differentiation expressly made byour fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that

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On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Boardsuspended the petitioner from officeeffective on said date and created athree-man investigating committeecomposed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus,chairman; and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino,Assistant Fiscal of the City of Manila, andProfessor Gerardo Florendo, seniorattorney of the Central Bank, members.In its final report dated 5 May 1959, theinvestigating committee, "after mostextensive hearings in which bothcomplainants and respondent wereafforded all the opportunity to submittheir evidence, and after a mostexhaustive and conscientious study of the records and evidence submitted inthe case," made the following conclusion

and recommendation:

(1) In view of the foregoing, theCommittee finds that there is no basisupon which to recommend disciplinaryaction against respondent, and,therefore, respectfully recommends thathe be immediately reinstated.

Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, theMonetary Board approved the followingresolution:

xxx upon formal statement of theGovernor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant tothe Governor and In-Charge of theExport Department (such position beingprimarily confidential and highlytechnical in nature), the Monetary Boardfinds that the continuance of therespondent in the service of the CentralBank would be prejudicial to the bestinterests of the Central Bank and, xxx

while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer,mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure andmay not be removed at pleasure, a highly technicalofficer, such as an economist or a scientist of avowedattainments and reputation, should be denied securityand be removable at any time, without right to a

hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical menworthy of the name would be willing to accept workunder such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocatedby the Bank would demand that highly technicalpositions be filled by persons who must labor alwayswith an eye cocked at the humor to their superiors. Itwould signify that the so-called highly technicalpositions will have to be filled by incompetents andyes-men, who must rely not on their own qualificationsand skill but on their ability to curry favor with thepowerful. The entire objective of the Constitution inestablishing and dignifying the Civil Service on thebasis of merit would be thus negated.

Of course, a position may be declared both highlytechnical and confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.

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therefore, in accordance with theprovisions of Section 14 of the BankCharter, considers the respondent R.Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.

The Court of First Instance of Manila,after trial, rendered judgment declaringthe Board resolution null and void, andordering, among others, thereinstatement of the herein petitionerand awarding him P5,000.00 asattorney's fees. As aforesaid, both thepetitioner and the respondents appealedthe judgment.

The appeal of the Central Bank and its

Monetary Board is planted on theproposition that officers holding highlytechnical positions may be removed atany time for lack of confidence by theappointing power, and that such powerof removal is implicit in section 1, Art.XII, of the Constitution:

Section 1. A Civil Service embracing allbranches and subdivisions of theGovernment shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-

determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be madeonly according to merit and fitness, to bedetermined as far as practicable by competitive examination.

Luego v. CSC The petitioner was appointedAdministrative Officer 11, Office of theCity Mayor, Cebu City, by MayorFlorentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described aspermanent" but the Civil ServiceCommission approved it as "temporary,"

Whether or not theCivil ServiceCommissionauthorized todisapprove apermanentappointment on the

No.

The appointment of the petitioner was not temporarybut permanent and was therefore protected byConstitution. The appointing authority indicated that itwas permanent, as he had the right to do so, and itwas not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to

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subject to the final action taken in theprotest filed by the private respondentand another employee, and provided"there (was) no pending administrativecase against the appointee, no pendingprotest against the appointment nor any

decision by competent authority that willadversely affect the approval of theappointment."

On March 22, 1984, after protractedhearings the legality of which does nothave to be decided here, the CivilService Commission found the privaterespondent better qualified than thepetitioner for the contested position and,accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the

Administrative Division, Cebu City, inplace of Felimon Luego whoseappointment as Administrative Officer IIis hereby revoked." The privaterespondent was so appointed on June 28,1984, by the new mayor, Mayor RonaldDuterte. The petitioner, invoking hisearlier permanent appointment, is nowbefore us to question that order and theprivate respondent's title.

ground that anotherperson is betterqualified than theappointee and, onthe basis of thisfinding, order his

replacement by thelatter?

reverse him and call it temporary.

The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of theappointment, which was clearly described as"Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service

Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983.

What was temporary was the approval of theappointment, not the appointment it sell And whatmade the approval temporary was the fact that it wasmade to depend on the condition specified therein andon the verification of the qualifications of the appointeeto the position.

The Civil Service Commission is not empowered todetermine the kind or nature of the appointmentextended by the appointing officer, its authority beinglimited to approving or reviewing the appointment in

the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.When the appointee is qualified and authorizing theother legal requirements are satisfied, the Commissionhas no choice but to attest to the appointment inaccordance with the Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power andmust be performed by the officer in which it is vestedaccording to his best lights, the only condition beingthat the appointee should possess the qualificationsrequired by law.

The Commission on Appointments could review the

wisdom of the appointment and had the power torefuse to concur with it even if the President's choicepossessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. Nosimilar arrangement is provided for in the CivilService Decree. On the contrary, the Civil ServiceCommission is limited only to the non-discretionaryauthority of determining whether or not the personappointed meets all the required conditions laid downby the law.

Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil service Decreecontemplates hat all the Commission is actually

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allowed to do is check whether or not the appointeepossesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or therequired qualifications. If he does, his appointment isapproved; if not, it is disapproved.

It had no authority to revoke the said appointment

simply because it believed that the private respondentwas better qualified for that would have constituted anencroachment on the discretion vested solely in thecity mayor.

Province of Camarines Surv. CA

Private respondent Tito Dato wasappointed as Private Agent, and thensubsequently promoted AssistantProvincial Warden. He had no civilservice eligibility for the position he wasappointed to so his appointment wasonly temporary, renewed annually. His

status was changed from temporary topermanent upon the latter'srepresentation that he passed the civilservice examination for supervisingsecurity guards. CSC did not favorablyact on the change of status due to TitoDato’s lack of necessary civil serviceeligibility for the office.On March 16, 1976, Tito Dato wasindefinitely suspended after criminalcharges were filed against him. Two years after the request for changeof status, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the

Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC, wrote theGovernor a letter informing him that TitoDato’s status has been changed fromtemporary to permanent after havingpassed the examination for SupervisingSecurity Guard. Tito Dato was alsoacquitted from the criminal charges. Hethen requested the Governor forreinstatement and backwages. When hisrequest was not heeded, Tito Dato filedan action for mandamus. RTC orderedfor Tito Dato’s reinstatement with

Whether or notprivate respondent Tito Dato was apermanent employeeof petitioner Provinceof Camarines Sur atthe time he was

suspended on March16, 1976.

No.

Dato was merely a temporary employee at thattime, hence, is not entitled to his claim forbackwages for the entire period of his suspension.At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial

Warden, he had not yet qualified in an appropriateexamination for the aforementioned position. Suchlack of a civil service eligibility made hisappointment temporary and without a fixed anddefinite term and is dependent entirely upon thepleasure of the appointing power. The fact thatprivate respondent obtained civil service eligibilitylater on is of no moment as his having passed thesupervising security guard examination, did notipso facto convert his temporary appointment into apermanent one. What is required is a newappointment since a permanent appointment is nota continuation of the temporary appointment —

these are two distinct acts of the appointingauthority.

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backwages, which CA affirmed afterpetitioner’s appeal.Petitioner filed the present petitionsubmitting that the CA erred in (a)affirming that private respondent TitoDato was its permanent employee and

(b) allowing private respondent to claimbackwages.

Santos v. Yatco The Secretary of National Defense, Alejo

Santos was sought to be restrained fromconducting a house-to-house campaignin behalf of the administration during the1959 elections.

Petitioner in campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of theNacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan, was acting as member of theCabinet in discussing the issues beforethe electorate and defending theactuations of the Administration to whichhe belongs.

He claimed that he was not covered bythe constitutional prohibition.

Respondent Honorable Nicasio Yatco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prohibited respondent Alejo Santosfrom campaigning personally or in hisofficial capacity.

Hence this petition.

Whether or not the

prohibition applies todepartmentsecretaries?

No.

Partisan Political Campaign-It includes every form of solicitation of the elector’svote in favor of a specific candidate. (People v. deVenecia)-It includes contribution of money for election purposesand distributions of handbills.-It does not prevent any officer or employee formexpressing his views on current political problems orissues, or from mentioning the names of candidates forpublic office whom he supports. (Sec 29, RA 2260). This is also the sense under the 1987 Constitution.

The prohibition does not apply to departmentsecretaries. A proposal in the 1935 ConstitutionalConvention to include department secretaries wasdisapproved.

Considering that respondent Alejo Santos isSecretary of National Defense and head of theDepartment of National Defense, with power of control and supervision over the armed forces;considering that the position of Secretary of National Defense is not embraced and includedwithin the term "officers and employees in the civilservice" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the

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Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of executivedepartments within the civil service was rejected),the prohibition does not apply to him.

SSS EmployeesAssociation v.

CA

On June 11, 1987, SSS filed with the RTCof Quezon City a complaint for damages

with a prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction against petitioners, allegingthat on June 9, 1987, the officers andmembers of SSSEA staged an illegalstrike and barricaded the entrances tothe SSS Building, preventing non-strikingemployees from reporting for work andSSS members from transacting businesswith the SSS; that the strike wasreported to the Public Sector Labor -Management Council, which ordered thestrikers to return to work; that thestrikers refused to return to work; and

that the SSS suffered damages as aresult of the strike. The complaintprayed that a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued to enjoin the strikeand that the strikers be ordered to returnto work; that the defendants (petitionersherein) be ordered to pay damages; andthat the strike be declared il legal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strikeafter the SSS failed to act on the union'sdemands, which included:implementation of the provisions of the

old SSS-SSSEA collective bargainingagreement (CBA) on check-off of uniondues; payment of accrued overtime pay,night differential pay and holiday pay;conversion of temporary or contractualemployees with six (6) months or moreof service into regular and permanentemployees and their entitlement to thesame salaries, allowances and benefitsgiven to other regular employees of theSSS; and payment of the children'sallowance of P30.00, and after the SSS

Whether or notemployees of the

Social SecuritySystem (SSS) havethe right to strike.

No. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissionersintended to limit the right to the formation of unions orassociations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civilservice embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,including government-owned or controlled corporationswith original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l)] and thatthe SSS is one such government-controlled corporationwith an original charter, having been created underR.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil

service (NASECO v. NLRC) and are covered by the CivilService Commission's memorandum prohibitingstrikes. This being the case, the strike staged by theemployees of the SSS was illegal.

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deducted certain amounts from thesalaries of the employees and allegedlycommitted acts of discrimination andunfair labor practices.

SECTION 7 No elective official shall be eligible for appointment

or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shallhold any other office or employment in theGovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

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Civil LibertiesUnion v.ExecutiveSecretary

President Aquino issued on July 25, 1987Executive Order No. 28, the pertinentprovisions are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or bythe ordinary functions of his position,

a member of the Cabinet,undersecretary or assistant secretaryor other appointive officials of theExecutive Department may, inaddition to his primary position, holdnot more than two positions in thegovernment and governmentcorporations and receive thecorresponding compensationtherefor; Provided , that this limitationshall not apply to ad hoc bodies orcommittees, or to boards, councils orbodies of which the President is the

Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet,undersecretary or assistant secretaryor other appointive official of theExecutive Department holds morepositions than what is allowed inSection 1 hereof, they (sic) mustrelinquish the excess position in favorof the subordinate official who is nextin rank, but in no case shall anyofficial hold more than two positions

W/N theprohibition inSection 13,Article VII of the1987Constitution

insofar asCabinetmembers, theirdeputies orassistants areconcernedadmit of the broad exceptionsmade forappointiveofficials ingeneral underSection 7, par.

(2), Article IX-B?

[Note: The firstissue that needsto be resolved iswhether Section13, Article VIIshould beconjugated withArticle IX-B. Inother words, isthe assailed EOunconstitutional,

in as much as it

Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.Ostensibly restricting the number of positions thatCabinet members, undersecretaries or assistantsecretaries may hold in addition to their primaryposition to not more than two (2) positions in thegovernment and government corporations, Executive

Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multipleoffices or employment in direct contravention of theexpress mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unlessotherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution was toimpose a stricter prohibition on the President and hisofficial family in so far as holding other offices oremployment in the government or elsewhere isconcerned.1

1 practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-

enrichment … overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos,should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiplegovernmental offices and employment…Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government service were the data contained therein thatRoberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23);Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); RubenB. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten(10) each.

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other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect theinterest of the government in

government-owned or controlledcorporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of suchcorporation should either be asecretary, or undersecretary, orassistant secretary.

lumps Sec 13,Article VII andSection, par. (2),Article IX-B,which, in effect,

allows membersof the Cabinet,theirundersecretaries,and assistantsecretaries tohold multipleofficessimultaneously?]

…proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treatthe President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission tobe stricter with the President and his official family wasalso succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente

Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong notedduring the floor deliberations and debate that therewas no symmetry between the Civil Serviceprohibitions Commissioner Foz Commented, "Weactually have to be stricter with the President and themembers of the Cabinet because they exercise morepowers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints onthem are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14

Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general

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ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13 ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION7, PAR. (2)

prohibition pertains to an office or employment inthe government and government-owned orcontrolled corporations or their subsidiariesdisqualification isabsolute

Qualified by "in theGovernment." [Note: notabsolute]

The prohibition imposedon the President and hisofficial family is thereforeall-embracing and coversboth public and privateoffice or employment.

prohibitions are notsimilarly imposed onother public officials oremployees such …members of the civilservice in general…

members of the Cabinet,their deputies andassistants may do soonly when expresslyauthorized by theConstitution itself

are allowed to hold otheroffice or employment inthe government duringtheir tenure when suchis allowed by law or bythe primary functions of their positions



rule applicable to all elective and appointive publicofficials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII ismeant to be the exception applicable only to thePresident, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,their deputies and assistants.

The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided inthis Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannotpossibly refer to the broad exceptions provided underSection 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution.

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ARTICLE VII,SECTION 13

ARTICLE IX-B,SECTION 7, PAR. (2)

The President, Vice-President, theMembers of the

Cabinet, and theirdeputies or assistantsshall not, unlessotherwise provided inthis Constitution, holdany other office oremployment duringtheir tenure. Theyshall not, during saidtenure, directly orindirectly practice anyother profession,participate in anybusiness, or befinancially interested

in any contract with,or in any franchise, orspecial privilegegranted by theGovernment or anysubdivision, agency,or instrumentalitythereof, includinggovernment-owned orcontrolledcorporations or theirsubsidiaries. Theyshall strictly avoidconflict of interest inthe conduct of their

office.

Unless otherwiseallowed by law or by the primary functions

of his position, noappointive officialshall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,agency or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries



Flores v. Drilon The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "BasesConversion and Development Act of 1992,"under which respondent Mayor Richard J.Gordon of Olongapo City was appointedChairman and Chief Executive Officer of the

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), ischallenged.

Paragraph (d) reads —

(d) Chairmanadministrator — ThePresident shall appoint aprofessional manager asadministrator of the SubicAuthority with acompensation to bedetermined by the Boardsubject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, whoshall be the ex oficio chairman of the Boardand who shall serve as thechief executive officer of theSubic Authority: Provided,however, That for the first year of its operations fromthe effectivity of this Act, themayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief

executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasissupplied).

Petitioners maintain that the provisoinfringes on Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of theConstitution, which states that "no electiveofficial shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any publicofficer or position during histenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo

Whetherthe proviso inSec. 13, par. (d),of R.A. 7227violates theconstitutional

proscriptionagainstappointment ordesignation of elective officialsto othergovernmentposts.

Yes. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:No elective official shall be eligible for appointment ordesignation in any capacity to any public office orposition during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary

functions of his position, no appointive official shallhold any other office or employment in theGovernment or any subdivision, agency orinstrumentality thereof, including government-ownedor controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The section expresses the policy against theconcentration of several public positions in one person,so that a public officer or employee may serve full-timewith dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. Hence, a public officer or employee,like the head of an executive department should beallowed to attend to his duties and responsibilitieswithout the distraction of other governmental duties or

employment. The proviso directs the President to appoint an electiveofficial, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to othergovernment posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). This is precisely what theconstitutional proscription seeks to prevent. Hence, theproviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of theConstitution.

The view that an elective official may be appointed toanother post if allowed by law or by the primaryfunctions of his office ignores the clear-cut differencein the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraphauthorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointiveofficial when allowed by law or by the primaryfunctions of his position, the first paragraph appears tobe more stringent by not providing any exception tothe rule against appointment or designation of anelective official to the government post, except as areparticularly recognized in the Constitution. Theexemption allowed to appointive officials in the secondparagraph cannot be extended to elective officials whoare governed by the first paragraph.

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City is an elective official and the subjectposts are public offices

Respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to theposition of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executiveof SBMA as it contravenes the Constitution. He,however, remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his actsas SBMA official are not necessarily null and void. Hemay be considered a de facto officer.

SECTION 8 No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without theconsent of the Congress, any present,emolument, office, or title of any kind fromany foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not beconsidered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Quimson v.Ozaeta

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFIof QC, dismissing Quimson’s complaint forthe recovery of accrued salaries, first takento the CA, and later certified to the SC forthe reason that said appeal involved onlyquestions of law.

Sometime in 1947, Aurelio R. Peña, thecomptroller of the Rural Progress

Administration & performing duties of auditor in representation of the AuditorGeneral recommended to the BOD of theAdministration that for purposes of economymunicipal treasurers be appointed agent-collectors of the Administration, and thisrecommendation was adopted by the BODs.

Thereafter, Faustino Aguilar, then managerof the Administration, prepared theappointment for the post of agent- collector

W/N petitionerQuimson isentitled to receivehis salaries asagent collectorof theAdministration,aside from hissalaries as deputyprovincial &municipaltreasurer.

Double appointment NOT illegal provided thereis no incompatibility of duties.

• The employment of Quimson as agent-collectorwas not in itself unlawful because there is noincompatibility between said appointment andhis employment as deputy provincial treasurer& municipal treasurer.

• There is no legal objection to a governmentofficial occupying two government offices and

performing the functions of both as long asthere is no incompatibility.

• The constitutional prohibition refers to doublecompensation and NOT to doubleappointments & performance of functions of more than 1 office.

However, Quimson assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his

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on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff Braulio Quimson, w/ compensation of P720per annum, the appointment to take effectupon assumption of duty. At the time,Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer

and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal.

Defendant - Roman Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was actingas Chairman of BODs, signed theappointment and forwarded the papers tothe President through the Secretary of Finance for approval. Without waiting for thesaid approval Quimson assumed his positionon May 6, 1948 and rendered service asagent-collector of the Administration untilOctober 21, 1949, inclusive, when he wasinformed that because of the disapproval of

his appointment, his services wereconsidered terminated.

There were several objections to hisappointment, among them that of theAuditor General on the ground that sinceQuimson was deputy provincial treasurerand municipal treasurer of Caloocan, hisadditional compensation as agent-collectorwould contravene the Constitutionalprohibition against double compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said thathe would offer no objection to the additionalcompensation of Quimson as agent-collectorprovided it was authorized in a specialprovision exempting the case from theinhibition against the payment of extracompensation in accordance with section259 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The Section of the Administrative Codeprovides that in the absence of specialprovision, no officer or employee in anybranch of the Government service shall

appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to gothrough. He, therefore, took the risk or hazard of not being paid for any service that he may render in themeantime.

Note: Sec. 691 of the Revised Administrative Code w/cmakes the chief of the office responsible for theemployment of person contrary to law, personallyliable for the pay that would have accrued had theemployment been lawful, refers & applies to unlawfulemployment and NOT to unlawful compensation.

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receive additional compensation on accountof the discharge of duties pertaining toanother or to the performance of publicservice of whatever nature.

Faustino Aguilar as manager of theAdministration asked for the reconsiderationof the ruling of the Auditor General, allegingthat the appointment of Quimson was forreasons of economy and efficiency, but theAuditor General denied the request statingthat reasons of economy and efficiency arenot valid grounds for evading theconstitutional prohibition against additionalcompensation in the absence of a lawspecifically authorizing such compensation.

So, the services of Quimson as agent-collector of the Administration wereterminated. But R. Gonzales Lloret, thenmanager of the Administration on October18, 1949, inquired from the auditor of theAdministration whether Quimson could bepaid for the period of actual service renderedby him from May 10, 1948, and the saidauditor gave the opinion that it could not bedone for the reason that in his opinion theappointment extended to Quimson wasclearly illegal and the Administration maynot be obliged to pay him for the servicesrendered since it was a violation of section 3,Article XII, of the Constitution prohibitingdouble compensation.

At the same time he expressed the opinionthat under section 691 of the RevisedAdministrative Code the appointing officialwho made the illegal appointment should bemade liable for the payment of salary of theappointee, and consequently, Quimsonshould claim his salary for services renderedagainst said appointing officer.

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COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SLDFKJSKLDFSection 1(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of aChairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-borncitizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of acollege degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shallbe members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be

appointed by the President with the consent of theCommission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithout reappointment. Of those first appointed, threeMembers shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shallany Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Cayetano v.Monsod

Respondent Christian Monsod wasnominated by President Corazon C. Aquinoto the position of Chairman of the COMELECin a letter received by the Secretariat of the

Commission on Appointments on April 25,1991.The CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office andassumed office as Chairman of theCOMELEC.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of thePhilippine Bar, having passed the barexaminations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of

W/N Atty. Monsodpossessed theconstitutionalrequirement of a

minimum 10-yearengagement inthe practice of law.

Yes. Atty. Monsod met the 10-year minimumrequirement in the practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,

which requires the application of law, legal procedure,knowledge, training and experience."To engage in the practice of law- is to

perform those acts which are characteristics of theprofession. Generally, to practice law is to give noticeor render any kind of service, which device or servicerequires the use in any degree of legal knowledge orskill."

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of theterm Practice of law". particularly the modern

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the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since itsinception in 1972-73. He has also beenpaying his professional license fees aslawyer for more than ten years.

After graduating from the UP College of Lawand having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father . Duringhis stint in the World Bank Group, Monsod worked as an operations officer for about 2 years in Costa Rica and Panama, whichinvolved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to thePhils. in 1970, he worked with the MeralcoGroup, served as CEOr of an investment bank and subsequently of a business

conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or CEO. As former Sec.-General & National Chairman of NAMFREL.Monsod's work involved beingknowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearingsbefore the COMELEC. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the BishopsBusinessmen's Conference for HumanDevelopment, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and

urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for theagrarian reform law and lately the urbanland reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of theDavide Commission, a quast judicial body,which conducted numerous hearings (1990)and as a member of the ConstitutionalCommission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers, for which he was cited by the

concept of law practice, and taking intoconsideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both

the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy theconstitutional requirement — that he has beenengaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

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President of the Commission, Justice CeciliaMuñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendmentsto reconcile government functions withindividual freedoms and publicaccountability and the party-list system for

the House of Representative

Petitioner Cayetano opposed the nominationbecause allegedly Monsod does not possessthe required qualification of having beenengaged in the practice of law for at leastten years. He challenged the saidconfirmation and the consequentappointment of Monsod as Chairman of COMELEC be declared null and void.

Brillantes v. Yorac

Pres. Corazon Aquino designated Assoc.Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as ActingChairman of the COMELEC, in place of

Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had beennamed chairman of the fact-findingcommission to investigate the Dec. 1989coup d’etat attempt.

Brillantes challenged the designationcontending that the President has no powerto make such designation in view of thefollowing reasons:

1. The status of the COMELEC as anindependent constitutional body,and

2. The specific provision of Art IX-C

Section 1 (2) of the Constitution that(1) no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed ordesignated in a temporary oracting capacity.

Petitioner invokes Nacionalista Party v.Bautista, where President Quirino designatedthe Solicitor General as acting member of

W/N thedesignation of Associate

Commissioner Yorac as ActingChairman of theCOMELEC isunconstitutional.

Yes, the designation is unconstitutional.

The choice of a temporary chairman of the COMELEC is

within the discretion of the Commission itself, and suchdiscretion cannot be exercised for it, even with itsconsent, by the President of the Philippines.

Art IX-A Sec 1 of the Constitution expressly describesall the Constitutional Commissions as ‘independent.’Although essentially executive in nature, they are notunder the control of the President in the dischargeof their respective functions. Each of theseCommissions conducts in own proceedings under theapplicable laws and its own rules and the exercise of its discretion. The choice of a temporary chairman inthe absence of the regular chairman comes under

that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised forit, even with its consent, by the President of thePhilippines.

A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very termsessentially temporary and therefore revocable at will.No cause need be established to justify its revocation.Assuming its validity, the designation of therespondent as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC maybe withdrawn by the President at any time and forwhatever reason she sees fit and the respondent,

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the COMELEC and the Court revoked thedesignation as contrary to the Constitution.It is also alleged that the respondent is noteven the senior member of the COMELEC,being outranked by Associate CommissionerAlfredo E. Abueg Jr.

The Solicitor General counters that thedesignation should be sustained for reasonsof ‘administrative expediency,’ to preventdisruption of the functions of the COMELECin the absence of legal provisions fortemporary succession similar to the SupremeCourt’s (Sec 12 Judiciary Act of 1948) as wellas the CA (Sec 5 BP 129).

having accepted such designation, will be stoppedfrom challenging its withdrawal.

In the choice of the Acting Commissioner, themembers of the COMELEC would most likely have beenguided by the seniority rule as they themselves would

have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and thebasis thereof were for them and not the President tomake.

Lindo v.Comelec

Petitioner Conrado Lindo & privaterespondent Octavio Velasco were candidates

for the position of municipal mayor of Ternate, Cavite, in the 1988 local elections.After canvass, the MBC of Ternateproclaimed petitioner Lindo as the electedmayor of Ternate.

Velasco filed an election protest with theRTC, protesting the results of the election in17 of 22 precincts in the municipality. Afterhearing testimonies of the respectivechairmen of the controverted precincts, thetrial court excluded the ballots from theseprecincts from the revision. Velasco filed amotion for reconsideration of the order whichwas denied on December 9, 1 988.

On appeal by Velasco, the COMELEC, EnBanc, set aside the order of the trial court onthe ground that the examination of theballots and the recounting of the votes fromcontested precincts are mandatory underthe circumstances pursuant to Section 255of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code). Itlikewise directed the trial court to proceed

W/N the COMELECcommitted grave

abuse of discretion byconstituting aninvalidpromulgation.

No, the COMELEC didn’t committed grave abuse of discretion.

Promulgation is:

-the process by which a decision is published, officiallyannounced, made known to the public or delivered tothe clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to theparties or their counsel.-It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication-It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court.

The additional requirement imposed by the COMELECrules of notice in advance of promulgation is not partof the process of promulgation. Hence, there was nopromulgation of the trial court's decision. The trialcourt did not deny that it had officially made thedecision public. From the recital of facts of bothparties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner'scounsel of record and petitioner's himself. Anothercopy was sent to private respondent

What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently

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with the revision of the ballots from thesefour (4) controverted precincts.

On February 6, 1990, the trial court rendereda decision proclaiming Lindo the winner witha plurality 29 votes. LIndo’s counsel was

served a copy of the decision while attendingthe hearing of another case.

Velasco filed a Notice of Appeal to theCOMELEC. His main argument was that thewinner in an election protest case should bedetermined not only on the basis of theresults obtained from the contestedprecincts but from the results of both thecontested and uncontested precincts. Lindo,on the other hand, filed a Notice of Appeal ,claiming that he knew of the decision only onFebruary 22, 1990. The trial court gave due

course to the appeal of Velasco and denieddue course to Lindo's appeal on the groundthat it was filed out of time. It likewisedirected its clerk to forward the records of the case to the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, 1st Division rendered itsdecision & reversing the proclamation of Lindo was the winner. Velasco wasproclaimed the winner by 54 votes. This wasaffirmed by the COMELEC En, Banc. OnSeptember 14, 1990, Lindo filed this petitionfor certiorari with a prayer for a temporary

restraining order:

objected to was not the promulgation of the decisionbut the failure of the trial court to serve notice inadvance of the promulgation of its decision as requiredby the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such noticein advance of the promulgation may be considered aprocedural lapse on the part of the trial court which

did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did notvitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court norof the promulgation of said decision.

A procedural lapse or error should be distinguishedfrom lack of jurisdiction.

- In the former, the proceedings are null and void if and when the error is shown to have caused harmwhile in the latter, the proceedings are null and voidunconditionally.

- There is a great difference in the results which

follows the failure to give the necessary notice toconfer on the court jurisdiction over the person and thesubject matter of the action, and that which follows afailure to give notice of a step taken after the court hasobtained such jurisdiction and is proceeding with theaction. Failure to give notice of the action by theservice of a summons for example, is a jurisdictionaldefect and the court acquires no jurisdiction over theperson of the defendant. . . . When, however, thecourt, by the service of proper notice has obtained jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, thenthe failure to give notice of a subsequent step in theaction or proceeding is not jurisdictional and does not

render an order made without notice void.

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Section 2 The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over allcontests relating to the elections, returns, and qualificationsof all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving electivemunicipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission onelection contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, allquestions affecting elections, including determination of thenumber and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, lawenforcement agencies and instrumentalities of theGovernment, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commissionon Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be

registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals throughviolence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhereto this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreigngovernment shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions,or candidates related to elections, constitute interference innational affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additionalground for the cancellation of their registration with theCommission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissionsconstituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures tominimize election spending, including limitation of placeswhere propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other

disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, acomprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

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Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibitionunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.Petitioners would to restrain and enjoinpublic respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr.,Presiding Judge of Branch 28 the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with

the proceedings in a petition for injunction,prohibition and mandamus with a prayer fora writ of preliminary injunction andrestraining order filed by the privaterespondent Pedro Romualdo.

Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit theenforcement of the TRO, issued by therespondent Judge Tabamo on 10 April 1992,on the ground that the latter actedwhimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of thecase and issued the said order. It is thepetitioners' thesis that the said caseprincipally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Codethe jurisdiction over which is exclusivelyvested in the COMELEC. It is additionallyaverred that the action is completelybaseless, that the private respondent is nota real party in interest and that the publicrespondent acted with undue haste,manifest partiality and evident bias in favorof the private respondent in issuing the TRO.

At the time of the filing of both the specialcivil action and the instant petition,

petitioner Antonio Gallardo was theincumbent Governor of Camiguin and wasseeking re-election in the 11 May 1992synchronized elections. Petitioners AntonioArevalo, Cresencio Echaves, EmmanuelAranas and Palermo Sia are the provincialtreasurer, provincial auditor, provincialengineer and provincial budget officer of Camiguin, respectively. Their co-petitionersRonnie Rambuyon, Primo Navarro and NoelNavarro are all gov’t project laborers. On the

W/N the trial courthas jurisdictionover theenforcement of laws involving theconduct of

elections.

No, the trial court has no jurisdiction.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction to enforce &administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

• In Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, decided by the SC on1968, it was squarely resolved the issue. TheSC explicitly ruled that considering that theCOMELEC is vested by the Constitution withexclusive charge of the enforcement andadministration of all laws relative to theconduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a caseinvolving the enforcement of the Election Code"is at war with the plain constitutionalcommand, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and

unmistakable in recent decisions.”

• The 1987 Constitution & extant election lawshave further strengthened the foundation of the Zaldivar Doctrine. There can be no doubtthat the present COMELEC has broader powersthan its predecessors. It grants theCommission the power to promulgate itsrules and regulations. The COMELEC shallexercise the ff powers & functions: (1) Enforceand administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

The word “regulations” is not found in eitherthe 1935 or 1973 Constitutions.

• The COMELEC has also the power to“investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,including acts or omissions constitutingelection frauds, offenses, and malpractices."

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other hand, the private respondentRomualdo was the incumbent Congressmanof the lone Congressional District of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office inthe said synchronized elections and theRegional Chairman of the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.

On 10 April 1992, Romualdo filed hispetition (Special Civil Action No. 465) beforethe court a quo against petitioners Gallardo,Arevalo, Echaves, Aranas and Sia to prohibitand restrain them from pursuing orprosecuting certain public works projects;from releasing, disbursing and/or spendingany public funds for such projects; and fromissuing, using or availing of treasurywarrants or any device for the futuredelivery of money, goods and other things of

value chargeable against public funds inconnection with the said projects as :

(1) said projects were undertaken inviolation of the 45-day ban on public worksimposed by the Omnibus Election Code(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) becausealthough they were initiated a few daysbefore 27 March 1992, the date the ban tookeffect, they were not covered by detailedengineering plans, specifications or aprogram of work which are preconditions forthe commencement of any public works

project; hence, they could not have beenlawfully and validly undertaken;

(2) the hiring of hundreds of laborers in thedifferent projects continues unabated inflagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v)and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus ElectionCode;

(3) the projects were undertaken in violationof the provisions of the Local Government

• It is not true that, as contended by thepetitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited tocriminal actions for violations of the OmnibusElection Code. The Constitution itself grants toit exclusive original jurisdiction overcontests involving elective municipal officials.

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Code governing the use and expenditure of the twenty percent (20%) development fundof the Province of Camiguin;

(4) these projects, which are "Locally-Funded", were pursued without the requisiteapproval of the provincial budget by theRegional Office of Budget and Managementas required by Section 326 of the LocalGovernment Code;

(5) some of the projects which are "Foreign-Assisted" and funded by the SpanishAssistance for Integrated Livelihood Program(SAIL) lack the required building permits andare without any relevance to those livelihoodprojects envisioned by the SAIL; and

(6) more importantly, as alleged inparagraph VII of his Petition:

…the illegal prosecution of these publicwork projects requiring massive outlay of public funds during this election period hasbeen and is being done maliciously andintentionally for the purpose of corruptingthe voters and inducing them to support thecandidacy of Respondent Gallardo and hiscandidates in the coming May 11, 1992election.

That unless the illegal acts are enjoined orrestrained immediately first by the issuanceof the restraining order upon the filing of thisPetition and immediately after that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, great or irreparableloss and injury shall be caused not only toPetitioner himself, as a candidate and as ataxpayer, but also to the entire LDP slate of candidates, whose supporters are beingcorrupted and illegally induced to vote for

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Respondent Antonio A. Gallardo and hiscandidates in consideration of theiremployment in these projects, but most of all the greatest and most irreparable loss,damage and injury, in terms of wanton,

irresponsible, excessive, abusive andflagrant waste of public money, is now beingcaused and shall continue to be caused,primarily and principally to the sixty-thousand or more taxpayers of the Provinceof Camiguin, whom he represents asCongressman and whose interests Petitioneris sworn to uphold, promote and protect.

The questioned projects are classified intotwo (2) categories: (a ) those that areLocally-Funded , consisting of 29 differentprojects for the maintenance or concreting of

various roads, the rehabilitation of theKatibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) thosedesignated as Foreign-Assisted , consistingof 15 projects which include the constructionof the Human Resource DevelopmentCenter, various Day Care cum ProductionCenters and waterworks systems; theextension and renovation of variousbuildings; the acquisition of hospital andlaboratory equipment; and the rehabilitationof office and equipment.

On the same day Judge Tabamo issued thequestioned TRO and directed the petitionersto file their Answer w/in10 days from receiptof notice and set the hearing on theapplication for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for 24 April 1992.Instead of filing the Answer, the petitionersfiled the instant special civil action forcertiorari and prohibition before the SC.

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Relampagos v.Cumba

This is a special civil action of certiorari .

Petitioner Relampagos and privaterespondent Rosita Cumba were candidatesfor the position of Mayor in the municipalityof Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Cumba was

proclaimed the winning candidate, with amargin of only twenty-two votes over theformer.

Petitioner filed an election protest with theRTC of Agusan del Norte. The trial courtfound the petitioner to have won with amargin of six votes over private respondent.

Private respondent appealed the decision tothe COMELEC. Petitioner filed with the trialcourt a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion for

execution pending appeal. Thereafter,private respondent filed a motion forreconsideration of the order of executionwhich was denied.

Private respondent filed with the respondentCOMELEC a petition for certiorari to annulthe order of the trial court granting themotion for execution pending appeal and thewrit of execution. COMELEC promulgated itsresolution granting the petition and orderingthe restoration of Rosita Cumba to theposition contested.

COMELEC upheld its jurisdiction in certiorari,prohibition and mandamus cases saying thata special law, Sec. 50 of BP 697, grants such jurisdiction and remains in full force as it wasnot expressly repealed by the OmnibusElection Code. COMELEC claims that in theperformance of its judicial functions, it is themost logical body to issue the extraordinarywrits of certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus in election cases where it

W/N the COMELEChas jurisdictionover petitionsfor, certiorari,prohibition,and mandamus in

election caseswhere it hasexclusiveappellate jurisdiction.

COMELEC had taken cognizance of two cases: theordinary appeal from the RTC decision and the specialcivil action for certiorari, which were not consolidated.It issued the challenged resolution under the specialcivil action case; it cannot now state that it issued it asan incident of the ordinary appeal.

In the Garcia, Uy and, Veloria doctrines, SC ruled thatthe COMELEC has no jurisdiction over theextraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,and mandamus because there is no specificconstitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

COMELEC points out Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697expressly granting it such jurisdiction. Nevertheless,the said law was "to govern the election for the regularBatasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives

thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and inview of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code, thisCourt is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio afterthe 14 May 1984 election of members of the regularBatasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of thesectoral representatives at the latest, and whether itwas repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

There are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime gobeyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequentselection of sectoral representatives. The very wordingof the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

The Commission is hereby vested withthe exclusive authority to hear anddecide petitions forcertiorari,prohibition and mandamus involvingelection cases.

The exercise of the power was not restricted within a

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has appellate jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed the instant special civilaction. Solicitor General commented on theissue and posited that in annulling the Orderof Execution of the RTC, COMELEC did notexceed its jurisdiction since its action wasnecessary to preserve the subject of theappeal and to maintain the status quo of theparties pending the final outcome of itsreview.

specific period of time. It seems quite obvious that thegrant was intended as a remedial legislation toeliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationalityresulting in a splitting of jurisdiction.

The repealing clause of the Omnibus Election Code isin the nature of a general repealing clause. It appearsthat the Batasang Pambansa made a reservation thatall prior election statutes or parts thereof notinconsistent with any provisions of the Code shallremain in force.

The ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases arenow vacated. The last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive

authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such caseswhere, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The COMELEC has the authority to issuethe extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Edding v.Comelec

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Galido v.Comelec

People v. Inting

People v.Basilia

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People v.Delgado

Comelec v. Judge Silva

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civil service com and comelec

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