Civil Rights Amendments, Laws, and Supreme Court Cases

13th Amendment

14th Amendment

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2.

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male (/constitution/amendment xix) inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age (/constitution/amendment xxvi), and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

Section 3.

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Formally abolishing slavery in the United States, the 13th Amendment was passed by the Congress on January 31, 1865, and ratified by the states on December 6, 1865.

15th Amendment

19th Amendment

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

24th Amendment

Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section 2.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

26th Amendment

Section 1.

The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.

Section 2.

The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The 15th Amendment to the Constitution granted African American men the right to vote by declaring that the "right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

Supreme Court Cases

HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

The Plessy v. Ferguson Decision

Although the Declaration of Independence stated that "All men are created equal," due to the institution ofslavery, this statement was not to be grounded in law in the United States until after the Civil War (and,arguably, not completely fulfilled for many years thereafter). In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and finally put an end to slavery. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) strengthened the legal rights of newly freed slaves by stating, among other things, that no state shall deprive anyone of either "due process of law" or of the "equal protection of the law." Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) further strengthened the legal rights of newly freed slaves by prohibiting states from denying anyone the right to vote due to race.

Despite these Amendments, African Americans were often treated differently than whites in many parts of thecountry, especially in the South. In fact, many state legislatures enacted laws that led to the legally mandatedsegregation of the races. In other words, the laws of many states decreed that blacks and whites could not usethe same public facilities, ride the same buses, attend the same schools, etc. These laws came to be known asJim Crow laws. Although many people felt that these laws were unjust, it was not until the 1890s that theywere directly challenged in court. In 1892, an African American man named Homer Plessy refused to give up his seat to a white man on a train in New Orleans, as he was required to do by Louisiana state law. For thisaction he was arrested. Plessy, contending that the Louisiana law separating blacks from whites on trainsviolated the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, decided to fighthis arrest in court. By 1896, his case had made it all the way to the United States Supreme Court. By a vote of81, the Supreme Court ruled against Plessy. In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Henry Billings Brown,writing the majority opinion, stated that:

The lone dissenter, Justice John Marshal Harlan, interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment another way, stated, "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Justice Harlan’s dissent would become a rallying cry for those in later generations that wished to declare segregation unconstitutional.

Sadly, as a result of the Plessy decision, in the early twentieth century the Supreme Court continued to uphold the legality of Jim Crow laws and other forms of racial discrimination. In the case of Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education†(1899), for instance, the Court refused to issue an injunction preventing a school board from spending tax money on a white high school when the same school board voted to close down a black high school for financial reasons. Moreover, in Gong & Lum v.Rice (1927), the Court upheld a school’s decision to bar a person of Chinese descent from a "white" school.

The Road to Brown v. Board

Early Cases

Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy and similar cases, many people continued to press for theabolition of Jim Crow and other racially discriminatory laws. One particular organization that fought for racialequality was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) founded in 1909. Forabout the first 20 years of its existence, it tried to persuade Congress and other legislative bodies to enact lawsthat would protect African Americans from lynchings and other racist actions. Beginning in the 1930s, though,the NAACP's Legal Defense and Education Fund began to turn to the courts to try to make progress inovercoming legally sanctioned discrimination. From 1935 to 1938, the legal arm of the NAACP was headed byCharles Hamilton Houston. Houston, together with Thurgood Marshall, devised a strategy to attack Jim Crowlaws by striking at them where they were perhaps weakest—in the field of education. Although Marshall playeda crucial role in all of the cases listed below, Houston was the head of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund while Murray v. Maryland and Missouri v. Gaines & Canada were decided. After Houstonreturned to private practice in 1938, Marshall became head of the Fund and used it to argue the cases ofSweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education.

Sweatt v. Painter

Encouraged by their victory in Gaines’ case, the NAACP continued to attack legally sanctioned racialdiscrimination in higher education. In 1946, an African American man named Heman Sweat applied to theUniversity of Texas’ "white" law school. Hoping that it would not have to admit Sweat to the "white" law schoolif a "black" school already existed, elsewhere on the University’s campus, the state hastily set up anunderfunded "black" law school. At this point, Sweat employed the services of Thurgood Marshall and theNAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and sued to be admitted to the University’s "white" law school. Heargued that the education that he was receiving in the "black" law school was not of the same academic caliberas the education that he would be receiving if he attended the "white" law school. When the case reached theU.S. Supreme Court in 1950, the Court unanimously agreed with him, citing as its reason the blatantinequalities between the University’s law school (the school for whites) and the hastily erected school forblacks. In other words, the "black" law school was "separate," but not "equal." Like the Murray case, the Courtfound the only appropriate remedy for this situation was to admit Sweat to the University’s law school.Brown v. Board of Education (1954,1955)

The case that came to be known as Brown v. Board of Education was actually the name given to five separatecases that were heard by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the issue of segregation in public schools. These cases were Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Briggs v. Elliot, Davis v. Board of Education of Prince Edward County (VA.), Boiling v. Sharpe, and Gebhart v. Ethel. While the facts of each case are different, the main issue in each was the constitutionality of state sponsored segregation in public schools. Once again,Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund handled these cases.

Although it acknowledged some of the plaintiffs’/plaintiffs claims, a three judge panel at the U.S. District Court that heard the cases ruled in favor of the school boards. The plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

When the cases came before the Supreme Court in 1952, the Court consolidated all five cases under the name of Brown v. Board of Education. Marshall personally argued the case before the Court. Although he raised a variety of legal issues on appeal, the most common one was that separate school systems for blacks and whites were inherently unequal, and thus violate the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, relying on sociological tests, such as the one performed by social scientist Kenneth Clark, and other data, he also argued that segregated school systems had a tendency to make black children feel inferior to white children, and thus such a system should not be legally permissible.

Meeting to decide the case, the Justices of the Supreme Court realized that they were deeply divided over theissues raised. While most wanted to reverse Plessy and declare segregation in public schools to beunconstitutional, they had various reasons for doing so. Unable to come to a solution by June 1953 (the end ofthe Court's 19521953 term), the Court decided to rehear the case in December 1953. During the interveningmonths, however, Chief Justice Fred Vinson died and was replaced by Gov. Earl Warren of California. After thecase was reheard in 1953, Chief Justice Warren was able to do something that his predecessor had not—i.e.bring all of the Justices to agree to support a unanimous decision declaring segregation in public schoolsunconstitutional. On May 14, 1954, he delivered the opinion of the Court, stating that "We conclude that in thefield of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities areinherently unequal. . .”

Expecting opposition to its ruling, especially in the southern states, the Supreme Court did not immediately tryto give direction for the implementation of its ruling. Rather, it asked the attorney generals of all states withlaws permitting segregation in their public schools to submit plans for how to proceed with desegregation. Afterstill more hearings before the Court concerning the matter of desegregation, on May 31, 1955, the Justiceshanded down a plan for how it was to proceed; desegregation was to proceed with "all deliberate speed."Although it would be many years before all segregated school systems were to be desegregated, Brown andBrown II (as the Courts plan for how to desegregate schools came to be called) were responsible for gettingthe process underway.

MENDEZ V. WESTMINSTER BACKGROUND

While Brown v. Board of Education is a widely known landmark Supreme Court case, few can trace its origins to the case of nine year old Sylvia Mendez in Mendez v. Westminster.

Sylvia’s case, which was decided in the federal courts in California, preceded Brown by about eight years.Thurgood Marshall represented Sylvia Mendez and Linda Brown. Marshall used some of the same arguments from Mendez to win Brown v. Board of Education.

Hernendez v. Texas

HERNÁNDEZ V. STATE OF TEXAS. The first and only Mexican-American civil-rights case heard anddecided by the United States Supreme Court during the post-World War II period was Hernández v. theState of Texas. In 1950 Pete Hernández, a migrant cotton picker, was accused of murdering Joe Espinosain Edna, Texas, a small town in Jackson County, where no person of Mexican origin had served on a juryfor at least twenty-five years. Gustavo (Gus) Garcíaqv, an experienced Mexican-American civil-rightslawyer, agreed to represent the accused without fee. García envisioned the Hernández case as a challengeto the systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of jury duty in at least seventycounties in Texas. It was not surprising to him when Hernández was found guilty and the decision wasupheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Supreme Court acted upon a writ of certiorari and heard the arguments on January 11, 1954. With García were James de Anda and Chris Alderete of the American G.I. Forum and Carlos Cadena and John J. Herrera of the League of United Latin American Citizens. García argued that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed protection not only on the basis of race, Caucasian and Negro, but also class. Those who administered the process of jury selection introduced discrimination because of exclusion based on class. The state of Texas contended that the Fourteenth Amendment covered only whites and blacks, and that Mexican Americans are white. The state admitted that no person with a Spanish surname had served on any type of jury for twenty-five years, but that this absence only indicated coincidence, not a pattern of attitude and behavior. García and his associates presented comprehensive evidence that in Jackson County discrimination and segregation were common practice, and Mexican Americans were treated as a class apart.

Delgado v. Bastrop

Edgewood ISD v. Kirby

Tinker v. Des Moines

Background: At a public school in Des Moines, Iowa, students organized a silent protest against the Vietnam War. Students planned to wear black armbands to school to protest the fighting but the principal found out and told the students they would be suspended if they wore the armbands. Despite the warning, students wore the armbands and were suspended. During their suspension the students' parents sued the school forviolating their children's right to free speech. A U.S. district court sided with the school, ruling that wearing armbands could disrupt learning. The students appealed the ruling to a U.S. Court of Appeals but lost and took their case to the United States Supreme Court.

Decision: In 1969 the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 7-2 decision in favor of the students. The high court agreed that students' free rights should be protected and said, "Students don't shed their constitutional rights at the school house gates."

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.

QuestionDid Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons?

Decision

In a unamimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder.

Miranda v. Arizona

Facts of the Case The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.Question Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?

The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.

White v. Regester

In 1964, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that members of the U.S. House of Representatives must be chosen from districts approximately equal in population. That same year, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court ruled that members of both houses of a state legislature must be chosen from districts approximately equal in population.

In 1970, as required by the Texas Constitution after each national census, the Texas Legislature drew up a reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives but was unable to agree upon a reapportionment plan for the Texas Senate. Litigation was immediately filed in a Texas District Court challenging the constitutionality of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House. The Texas Supreme Court eventually ruled that the legislature’s House reapportionment plan violated the Texas Constitution. Meanwhile, as required by the Texas Constitution, the Legislative Redistricting Board began the task of reapportioning the Texas Senate. Because of the judicial invalidation of the House reapportionment plan, the Board soon also had to work on reapportioning the Texas House.

In October 1971, the Board released its proposed reapportionment plans for both chambers of the Texas Legislature. Four lawsuits, eventually consolidated, were filed in a three-judge U.S. District Court. With respect to the House plan, these lawsuits alleged that the districts as drawn contained impermissible deviations from population equality and that the plan’s multi-member districts for Dallas and Bexar counties were constitutionally invalid because they diluted the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities. The three-judge District Court upheld the reapportionment plan for the Senate but agreed with both arguments made by the plaintiffs and found the House plan unconstitutional. This court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1973 to reapportion the Texas House but did allow the Legislative Redistricting Board’s plan to be used for the 1972 elections except for the requirement that the multi-member districts for Dallas and Bexar counties be reconstituted into single-member districts. As provided by law, the judgment of the three-judge U.S. District Court was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Legislation

Civil Rights Act of 1957

Civil Rights Act of 1964

Civil Rights Act of 1991

The Act marked the first occasion since Reconstruction that the federal government undertook significant legislative action to protect civil rights. Although influential southern congressman whittled down the bill?s initial scope, it still included a number of important provisions for the protection of voting rights. It established the Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department, and empowered federal officials to prosecute individuals that conspired to deny or abridge another citizen?s right to vote. Moreover, it also created a six-member U.S. Civil Rights Commission charged with investigating allegations of voter infringement. But, perhaps most importantly,

the Civil Rights Act of 1957 signaled a growing federal commitment to the cause of civil rights.

The provisions of this civil rights act forbade discrimination on the basis of sex as well as race in hiring, promoting, and firing.

The 1991 Act amended several of the statutes enforced by EEOC, both substantively and procedurally. Previously, jury trials were possible only in cases brought under the EPA or the ADEA. Under the provisions of the 1991 Act, parties could now obtain jury trials, and recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII and ADA lawsuits involving intentional discrimination. The Act placed statutory caps on the amount of damages that could be awarded for future pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, and punitive damages, based on employer size. The maximum award of compensatory and punitive damages combined was set at $300,000 for the largest employers (more than 500 employees).

In addition, the 1991 Act added a new subsection to Title VII, codifying the disparate impact theory of discrimination, essentially putting the law back as it had been prior to Wards Cove. And in response to Price-Waterhouse, the Act provided that where the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating factor for an employment decision, the employer is liable for injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs (but not individual monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have made the same decision in the absence of a discriminatory motive. The Act also provided employment discrimination protection to employees of Congress and some high-level political appointees. Lastly, Title VII and ADA coverage was extended to include American and American-controlled employers operating abroad.

Voting Rights Act of 1965

By 1965 concerted efforts to break the grip of state disfranchisement had been under way for some time, but had achieved only modest success overall and in some areas had proved almost entirely ineffectual. The murder of voting-rights activists in Philadelphia, Mississippi, gained national attention, along with numerous other acts of violence and terrorism. Finally, the unprovoked attack on March 7, 1965, by state troopers on peaceful marchers crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, en route to the state capitol in Montgomery, persuaded the President and Congress to overcome Southern legislators' resistance to effective voting rights legislation. President Johnson issued a call for a strong voting rights law and hearings began soon thereafter on the bill that would become the Voting Rights Act.

Congress determined that the existing federal anti-discrimination laws were not sufficient to overcome the resistance by state officials to enforcement of the 15th Amendment. The legislative hearings showed that the Department of Justice's efforts to eliminate discriminatory election practices by litigation on a case-by-case basis had been unsuccessful in opening up the registration process; as soon as one discriminatory practice or procedure was proven to be unconstitutional and enjoined, a new one would be substituted in its place and litigation would have to commence anew.

President Johnson signed the resulting legislation into law on August 6, 1965. Section 2 of the Act, which closely followed the language of the 15th amendment, applied a nationwide prohibition against the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the literacy tests on a nationwide basis. Among its other provisions, the Act contained special enforcement provisions targeted at those areas of the country where Congress believed the potential for discrimination to be the greatest. Under Section 5, jurisdictions covered by these special provisions could not implement any change affecting voting until the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the change did not have a discriminatory purpose and would not have a discriminatory effect. In addition, the Attorney General could designate a county covered by these special provisions for the appointment of a federal examiner to review the qualifications of persons who wanted to register to vote. Further, in those counties where a federal examiner was serving, the Attorney General could request that federal observers monitor activities within the county's polling place.

The Voting Rights Act had not included a provision prohibiting poll taxes, but had directed the Attorney General to challenge its use. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court held Virginia's poll tax to be unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment. Between 1965 and 1969 the Supreme Court also issued several key decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 and affirming the broad range of voting practices that required Section 5 review. As the Supreme Court put it in its 1966 decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act:

Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat wide-spread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.

American Indian Citizenship Act of 1924

With Congress’ passage of the Indian Citizenship Act, the government of the United States confers citizenship on all Native Americans born within the territorial limits of the country.

Before the Civil War, citizenship was often limited to Native Americans of one-half or less Indian blood. In the Reconstruction period, progressive Republicans in Congress sought to accelerate the granting of citizenship to friendly tribes, though state support for these measures was often limited. In 1888, most Native American women married to U.S. citizens were conferred with citizenship, and in 1919 Native American veterans of World War I were offered citizenship. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act, an all-inclusive act, was passed by Congress. The privileges of citizenship, however, were largely governed by state law, and the right to vote was often denied to Native Americans in the early 20th century.

Affirmative Action – California v. Bakke

Facts of the Case Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

Question Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

Legal provision: Equal ProtectionSplit Voted

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Title IX of the Education Code

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 protects people from discrimination based on sex in education programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance.

The Title IX regulation describes the conduct that violates Title IX. Examples of the types of discrimination that are covered under Title IX include sexual harassment, the failure to provide equal opportunity in athletics, and discrimination based on pregnancy. To enforce Title IX, the U.S. Department of Education maintains an Office for Civil Rights, with headquarters in Washington, DC and 12 offices across the United States.

For each Supreme Court Case your answer will include the following: (4pts)1) Background2) Ruling3) Impact4) Amendment(s) involved

13th Amendment14th Amendment15th Amendment19th Amendment20th Amendment21st Amendment24th Amendment26th Amendment

Define each amendment and determine its intent (2pts)

Define and determine the area of civil rights each law was meant to address.Civil Rights Act of 1957Civil Rights Act of 1964Civil Rights Act of 1991

Voting Rights Act of 1965

American Indian Citizenship Act of 1924

What purpose did affirmative action serve? Is it constitutional (see California v. Bakee)

Why did the Supreme Court determine it was important ensure each individual was notified of their rights in Miranda v. Arizona.