FACTSLOAN Private resps. & PNB secured by a REM covering several parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur & Naga City.

01.

EF - for failure of private resps. to pay at maturity.02.NOTICE OF EFS announced that the sale of 13 titles covering 14 parcels of land located in Camarines Sur & Naga City is scheduled on MAR. 22, 1999 at 9AM / soon thereafter, at the entrance

of the MTC of Pili, Cam. Sur. (This notice was published in the Feb. 7, 14, 21 issues of Vox Bikol)

03.

PCS dated Apr. 26, 1999 certified by Atty. Clavecilla that on Mar. 22, 1999, at exactly 10AM, he sold at a public auction at the LOBBY of the RTC, Hall of Justice, Naga City, the mortgaged properties to PNB for P213k+, w/c amount the latter considered as proportionate payment of prs loan.

04.

REGISTRY of PCS w/ the RD of Cam Sur.05.ACTION for NULLIFICATION of PCS & Auction Proceedings by priv . resps. w/ the RTC of Naga City06.PET. for the Issuance of WOP w/ the RTC of Pili, Cam. Sur by PNB over the properties covered by 7

TCTs.

07.

ISSUANCE of WOP despite Opposition by private resps.08.MR w/ Opposition was denied.09.Pet. for Certiorari & Prohibition under R65 w/ the CA by priv . resps. alleging that the application for EF was not submitted to the proper COC after payment of the filing fee, in contravention w/ SC Administrative Order No. 3 & AC No. 3-98; & that the foreclosure sale was null & void for having been

held at the RTC of Naga City & not at the entrance of the MTC of Pili, Cam. Sur as published.

10.

CA ruled in FAVOR of RESPS. Because of the lapses committed by Atty. Clavecilla in the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings, the PCS upon w/c the issuance of the WOP was based, is fatally infirm, &

that consequently, the WOP was not validly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuance were not satisfied.

11.

Pet. for Rev. under R45 w/ the SC by PNB.12.

ISSUESDid the CA err in holding that the procedural requirements in the conduct of the EF was not complied

w/, thus, the issuance of the WOP was not proper?

13.

WON the CA committed an error in granting the resp.s pet. for rev. on certiorari & prohibition under R65.

14.

WON the pet. should be dismissed because pet. failed to append a SPA/BR to support the authority

of the signatory in the CNFS, failed to disclose that there was another action pending, & that PNB failed to move for reconsideration before filing the instant pet.

15.

HELD

The CA erred in ruling that the WOP was wrongfully issued despite the existence of procedural

lapses. The judge to whom an application for WOP is filed NEED NOT LOOK into the VALIDITY of the

mortgage / the MANNER of its foreclosure.In the issuance of a WOP, NO DISCRETION IS LEFT to the trial ct. Any question regarding the

cancellation of the writ / in respect of the validity & regularity of the public sale should be

determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in S8, Act. 3135.

YES. PNB has sufficiently established its right to the WOP. I t presented as documentary exhibits the contract of REM & the PCS on the face of w/c appears proof of its registration w/ the RD in Cam. Sur.

Since the lands were not redeemed w/in one year from the registration of the PCS, it should follow, therefore that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the WOP. The RTC had a

MINISTERIAL DUTY to issue that writ, as it did actually, upon motion, conformably to S7 of Act No. 3135.

16.

The soundness of the order granting the WOP is a MATTER OF JUDGMENT w/ respect to w/c the remedy is ordinary appeal.Palpably, the CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted resps. pet. for certiorari.

YES. Considering that the RTC of Pili issued the WOP in compliance w/ the provs. of Act No. 3135, & as a ministerial duty, I T CANNOT BE CHARGED W/ GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Absent grave abuse of

discretion, resps. should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a pet. for certiorari.

17.

Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board dated Oct. 8, 1997, authorizing Mrs.

Amon to prosecute & defend cases for &// against the bank, amply demonstrates the

signatorys authority to sign & verify the instant pet.PNB was likewise not obliged to disclose the alluded case pending before the CA as it was not

initialed by the bank &, more importantly, the subject matter & the properties involved therein are altogether different.The contention that the Ct should not entertain the pet. until a MR has been filed does not hold

water where the proceeding in w/c the error occurred is a patent nullity.Thus, a MR may be dispensed w/ in the instant case.

The SC held that there was SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE w/ the PROCEDURAL REQS. of the Ct.18.

CASE NO. 1. PNB VS. SANAO MRKTG. CORP.

Case Digest Page 1

FACTSPlaintiffs are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land w/ 3-door apartment. The property was

formerly owned by the father of the plaintiffs, the late Carlos Torres.

01.

In 1981, Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the property on a P3,500.00 monthly rental &

continued to occupy the same even after the death of Carlos Torres on Dec. 26, 1993.

02.

On Jul. 1, 1995, plaintiffs sent Gozum a letter of demand to vacate the premises.03.

After a failed barangay conciliation, on Nov. 24, 1995, plaintiffs commenced an ejectment case

w/c was dismissed due to a technicality.

04.

Two years after, the plaintiffs again sent a letter of demand to vacate & said that the verbal

contract to lease has already expired & that the defendant already discontinued payment of

monthly rentals.

05.

An accion publiciana was filed w/ the RTC.06.

Defendants filed a MTD alleging that unlawful detainer must be filed, w/c was however denied

because RTC said that an unlawful detainer must be filed w/in 1 yr from the notice to vacate given

as early as Jul. 1, 1995 & since over 2 yrs had passed when the case was filed, the proper action is

accion publiciana & no longer unlawful detainer.

a.

Defendant thereafter filed his answer asseverating that he has a 10-year contract of lease over the

premises executed between him & plaintiffs late father on Oct. 1, 1989 to expire on Sept. 30, 1999 & so, the notice to vacate & the present case were all prematurely done.

b.

Defendant likewise denied the allegation that he has not been paying rentals.c.

When it was elevated to the CA, the appellate ct. reversed the decision of the RTC & dismissed the

case, holding that the lower ct. had no jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana

considering that it had been filed before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last letter of

demand to resp. had been made. The CA ruled that the proper remedy of Prs. should have been

an action for unlawful detainer filed w/ the municipal / metropolitan trial ct.

01.

ISSUE

Whether the proper action is unlawful detainer / accion publiciana

I t should be accion publiciana.

To summarize, Prs. claim that (1) they are the owners of the property, being the successors-in-

interest of the original owners; (2) their predecessors-in-interest entered into a verbal lease

agreement w/ resp. on a month-to-month basis; (3) they decided to terminate the verbal

lease contract upon the expiration of the last monthly term sometime in 1995; & (4) on Jul. 1,

1995, they demanded that resp. leave the property, but resp. refused to do so.

Undeniably, the foregoing averments constitute a cause of action that is based primarily on

unlawful deprivation / withholding of possession. Prs. seek the recovery of the possession of the

leased premises following the lapse of the term of the verbal lease contract entered into by

Prs. predecessors-in-interest w/ resp.. The allegation that the contract is on a month-to-month

basis becomes material in this sense because it signifies that the lease contract is terminable at

the end of every month.Thus, Prs. may exercise their right to terminate the contract at the end of any month even if

none of the conditions of the contract had been v iolated, & such right cannot be defeated by

the lessee's timely payment of the rent / by his willingness to continue doing so.

Moreover, even if the month-to-month agreement is only on a verbal basis, if it is shown that

the property is needed for the lessors own use / for the use of an immediate member of the family / for any of the other statutory grounds to eject, then the lease is considered terminated

as of the end of the month, after proper notice / demand to vacate has been given. At this

juncture, it must be pointed out that notice / demand to vacate had been properly served

upon resp. through the letter dated Jul. 1, 1995.Defendants say that the date should be reckoned from May 27, 1997 & not Jul. 1, 1995.

To reiterate, the allegation that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to

saying that the lease expired every month. Since the lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as

communicated in Prs. letter dated Jul. 1, 1995, it was at that time that resp.s occupancy became unlawful.

Moreover, a perusal of the May 27, 1997 letter shows that it merely reiterated their original

demand for resp. to vacate on the basis of the expiration of the verbal lease contract

mentioned in the first letter.In sum, more than one year has lapsed from the letter to vacate & hence, the proper remedy

would be accion publiciana & not a case for unlawful detainer.

HELD

[1] A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.

TORRES RACAZA and TORRES PARAS vs. GOZUM

Case Digest Page 2

[1] A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.

[2] A final order / judgment is one that finally DISPOSES of a case, LEAVING NOTHING MORE to the ct to do w/ respect to it. It is an ADJUDICATIONON THE MERITS which, considering the eveidence presented at the trial, DECLARES CATEGORICALLY WHAT THE RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE; / it may be an order / judgment that DISMISSES an action.[3] Disgruntled - to make somebody feel dissatisfied & irritated.[4] Iota - a very small amount of something.

Case Digest Page 3

FACTS

Pr. averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdiv ision, Matina, Davao City, covered by TCT Nos. 108174, 108175, & 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land

covered by TCT No. T-247792.

01.

The prev ious occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the

lots of the herein parties.

02.

Resps. have been using the building as a warehouse.03.Pr. further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he

informed resps. that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building.

04.

But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that

resps. demolish & remove the part of the building encroaching his property & turn over to him their possession.

05.

But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion & even

made improvements on the building.

06.

The dispute was then referred to the "barangay lupon", but the parties failed to

reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.

07.

A Complaint for illegal detainer (CC3506-B-96) on Nov. 6, 1996 by Ruben Santos w/ the MTCC, vs Sps Tony & Mercy Ayon.

01.

In their answer, resps. sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the ct. has no jurisdict ion over it since there is no lessor-lessee relat ionship between the part ies. Resps. denied they were occupying Pr.s property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested port ion & have been occupying the same long before Pr. acquired his lots in 1985.

02.

On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of Pr..03.On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision CC25, 654-97, affirmed "in toto "the MTCC judgment.

04.

Resps. then elevated the case to the CA through a petit ion for review. 05.In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by Pr., the CA held that Pr.s proper remedy should have been an "accion" "publiciana "before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus: In this case, petit ioners were already in possession of the premises in quest ion at the t ime private respondent 3 lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a port ion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondents bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that

respondent might have tolerated petit ioners possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petit ioners possession from its inception. & in this regard, the Ct. notes that the complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been occupying a port ion of the above propert ies of the plaint iff for the past several yrs. by virtue of the tolerance of the plaint iff. Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petit ioners possession of the premises. Consequently, respondent should present his claim before the RTC in an "accion publiciana "& not before the MTC in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.

06.

Pr. filed a MR, but was denied.07.Hence, the instant petition for review on "cert iorari08.ISSUE

Whether the CA committed a reversible error of law in holding that Pr.s complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.HELD

YES. It is an elementary rule that the jurisdict ion of a ct. over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint & cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.

This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed w/ the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts & the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restorat ion of possession

RUBEN SANTOS vs. Sps. TONY AYON & MERCY AYON

Case Digest Page 4

Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restorat ion of possession but also all claims for damages & costs arising therefrom.

The said courts are not divested of jurisdict ion over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the quest ion of ownership over the lit igated property in his pleadings & the quest ion of possession cannot be resolved w/out deciding the issue of ownership.

Under S1, R70 of the RCP, there are two entirely dist inct & different causes of action, to wit : (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; &(2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from

defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by v irtue of a contract (express or implied) w/ the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his

possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.Pr.s complaint for unlawful detainer in CC 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures & have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several yrs. by v irtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at

the time he has no need of the property;5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 & made demands to the

defendants to vacate & turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that w/out any justifiable reasons,

defendants refused to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage & prejudice of the plaintiff.6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Brgy. Captain of Matina

Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The "barangay" case reached the "Pangkat" but no settlement was had.

Thereafter, a Certification To File Action dated Mar. 27, 1996 was issued.Verily, Pr.s allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdict ion over Pr.s complaint.A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful w/out necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Here, there is an allegation in Pr.s complaint that resps. occupancy on the port ion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Pr.s cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from resps. failure to vacate the quest ioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) yr. therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, Pr. filed the instant complaint.

It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner.

Our ruling in "Roxas vs. CA" is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, w/out any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

Case Digest Page 5

FACTSOn May 24, 1994, resp. Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint w/ the RTC of Toledo,

Cebu, Branch 29, against Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E of subdiv ision plan psd. 271428, a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-an,

Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square meters covered by TCT No. 47171. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the Pr. had been a lessee of a certain

Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; & that sometime in 1985, the Pr., by means of threat, strategy, & stealth, took possession of his property & deprived

him of its possession.1 The resp. prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the Pr. to vacate the property & pay him actual

damages, attorneys fees, & expenses of litigation. Appended to the complaint was a contract of lease3 executed by the Pr.s wife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma, on March 1, 1977, over a parcel of land owned by Socorro Chiong covered by Tax Declaration No. 05561.

01.

The Pr. avers that he & his wife Praxedes became owners of Lot No. 00013 by v irtue of

CLT No. 0-031817 which was awarded in the latters favor. As such, they are entitled to the possession of the lot. The Pr. contends that unless & until CLT No. 0-031817 is nullified

in a direct action for the said purpose before the DARAB, they cannot be evicted from the said property. He posits that the action of the resp. against him in the RTC for

recovery of possession of real property is, in reality, an indirect attack on the CLT issued to his wife which is proscribed by the ruling of this Ct. in Miranda v. CA. He asserts that

the decision of the trial ct. declaring him in illegal possession of the property & not a de jure tenant of the resp. operates as an illegal forfeiture / cancellation of the CLT.

02.

For his part, the resp. asserts that his complaint against the Pr. did not indirectly assail the

CLT issued to the latters wife. He contends that his action was one for the recovery of his possession of a portion of his property Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, & not that of

Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 which is a portion of Lot 4-C owned by his aunt Socorro Chiong. He notes that the Pr. himself admits that he has never been his

agricultural tenant over his property. Consequently, the resp. concludes, the trial ct. correctly ruled that the dispute between him & the Pr. is civ il in nature & w/in its

exclusive jurisdiction.

03.

ISSUESFirst WON the action of the resp. in the trial ct. is in reality an indirect attack on the

validity of CLT No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the guise of an action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of the property covered by TCT No. 47171;Second WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the resp.; &Third WON the Pr. is liable for damages in favor of the resp.

RULINGWe agree w/ the resp. that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the Pr..

The bone of contention of the parties & the decisive issue in the trial ct. was WON Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0- 031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171

under the name of the resp.. This is the reason why the parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong & to Lot 4-E titled in

the name of the resp.. After a calibration of the ev idence on record & the reports of Epan & Navarro, the trial ct. ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by

Socorro Chiong & not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the resp.: In v iew of the absence of the above-mentioned indispensable requisites / any one of them in order to establish

the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between plaintiff & defendant, as earlier mentioned, does not make defendant a de jure tenant under the Land Reform

Program of the govt under existing tenancy laws.The Pr. has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial ct. in the petition at bar;

JUSTINO LARESMA vs. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA

Case Digest Page 6

The Pr. has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial ct. in the petition at bar;

hence, he is bound by the said findings.We agree w/ the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments of his

complaint, the action of the resp. against the Pr. is not an agrarian dispute w/in the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction

of the ct. over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint & the law, irrespective of WON the plaintiff is entitled to

recover all / some of the claims / reliefs sought therein. In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Serv ices, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corp., we ruled that the jurisdiction of the ct. over

the nature of the action & the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the ct. / upon a MTD for, otherwise, the question of

jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.We also held in Arcelona v. CA that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision

arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.I t must be stressed that the regular ct. does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment

case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the ct. to

receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. I f, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the ct. should dismiss the case for lack of

jurisdiction.I t is axiomatic that the nature of an action & the jurisdiction of a tribunal are

determined by the material allegations of the complaint & the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter / nature of

an action is conferred only by law & not by the consent / waiver upon a ct. which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter / nature of an action.

Lack of jurisdiction of the ct. over an action / the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, / even by express consent of the parties. If the ct.

has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu /

motu proprio. A decision of the ct. w/out jurisdiction is null & void; hence, it could never logically become final & executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly /

collaterally.

We agree w/ the ruling of the trial ct. that based on the material allegations of the

resp.s complaint & even on the admission of the Pr., the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the resp.. In fact, the resp. claimed that based on the CLT issued to

his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such, the DARAB

had no jurisdiction over the said action.For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the

parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to

establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner & the tenant /

agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is

to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the

tenant / agricultural lessee; & 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner & the tenant

/ agricultural lessee.

In Vda. de Tangub v. CA, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is

limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian

reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts & land tenure-related problems; & c) approval &

disapproval of the conversion, restructuring / readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, & other non-agricultural uses.

Prs. & private resp. have no tenurial, leasehold, / any agrarian relations whatsoever that

could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy & should not have

taken cognizance of private resp.s petition for injunction in the first place.However, we find & so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the resp.In this case, the resp. filed his complaint against the Pr. on May 24, 1994. Hence, the

Case Digest Page 7

In this case, the resp. filed his complaint against the Pr. on May 24, 1994. Hence, the

jurisdiction of the regular ct. over the nature of this action is governed by RA No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. S3 thereof amended S33 of BP Blg. 129, & reads:S33. Jurisdiction of MTCs: MTCs shall exercise (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions

which involve title to, / possession of, real property, / any interest therein where the assessed

value of the property / interest therein does not exceed P20k /, in civil actions in MM, where such

assessed value does not exceed P50k exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses & costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the

adjacent lots.

On the other hand, S1 of the Rule amending S19 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. RTCs shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdictions: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, / possession of, real

property, / any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20k

/, in civil actions in MM, where such assessed value does not exceed P50k exclusive of interest,

damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses & costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by

the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana &

reinv indicatoria. To determine which ct. has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint / the

interest thereon.

3. That plaintiff is the owner & possessor of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. T-47171 of the

Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu;

4. That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P. Chiong, which adjoins the parcel

of land owned by the plaintiff as shown by a leasehold;

5. That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, & stealth, the herein defendant

took possession of the parcel of land owned by herein plaintiff, thus effectively depriving

plaintiff of the possession thereof;

6. That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of herein plaintiff, cut trees, &

harvested the fruits of said land causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of

P50,000.00;

7. That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate said land & return the

possession thereof to herein plaintiff, thus compelling the plaintiff to file the present action;

8. In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the services of counsel for P10,000.00 &

expects to incur expenses of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00.

In this case, the complaint of the resp. against the Pr. for recovery of possession of real

property (accion publiciana) reads:

The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E covered

by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the resp.. Moreover, as gleaned from the

receipt of realty tax payments issued to the resp., the assessed value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00.Patently then, the MTC, & not the RT, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the

resp.. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null & void.

Case Digest Page 8

CASE NO. 15 CESAR T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, resp. Heirs of

SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, resps.-intervenors.

FACTS

Prs. are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon.01.

In 1996, they filed a complaint w/ the RTC of Romblon vs resp., alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, & that resp.

constructed his house thereon w/out their knowledge & refused to vacate

the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private resp. to vacate the property & restore possession thereof to them.

02.

The complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed valueof the land.03.

Nevertheless, Prs. were able to present during the trial the most recent Tax Dec., w/c shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.

04.

The resp. filed a MTD on theground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied.

05.

Resp. then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the complaint, contending that Prs. had no cause of action against him since

the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the

Mr. & Mrs. Salustiano Salvador.

06.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Prs.07.

On appeal,the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership & possession of real property, & that absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the

MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action. The CA then ordered the refiling of the case in the proper ct..

08.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.

HELD

NO. Pr. argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus,

regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive

jurisdiction falls w/in the said ct. This argument is w/out merit.

The jurisdiction of the ct. over an action involving title to / possession of

land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property & not the market value thereof.

In the case in controversy, the complaint does not contain an allegation

stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The ct.

cannot take judicial notice of the assessed / market value of land. The Ct.

noted that during the trial, the Prs. adduced in evidence a tax dec., showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00.

ThePrs., however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the Tax Dec. containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their

complaint in 1996.

Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the

same in 1995 / 1996, the MTC, & not the RTC had jurisdiction over the

CASE NO. 15 CESAR T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, resp. Heirs of SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, resps.-intervenors.Saturday, March 22, 2014

4:03 PM

Case Digest Page 9

same in 1995 / 1996, the MTC, & not the RTC had jurisdiction over the

action of the Prs., since the case involved title to / possession of real

property w/ an assessed value of less than Php20,000.00.

As the CA had held:The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property

in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the

assessed value exceeds Php20,000.00, & the MTC, if the value is

Php20,000.00 / below.

An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, & is contained in the Tax Dec.

In the case at bench, the most recent Tax Dec. secured & presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that

the property was worth Php 3.5M, not to mention that there is absolutely

no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value.

It is the amount in the Tax Dec. that should be consulted & no other kind of value, & as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case,

therefore, falls w/in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC of

Romblon w/c has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, & not the ct. a quo.

Case Digest Page 10

CASE NO. 14. VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. CA & Heirs of JUAN DE LA CRUZFACTS

Complaint for Recovery of Port ion of Registered Land w/ Compensation & Damages against Pr. before the RTC Br. XI of Tuao, Cagayan.

01.

They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan.

02.

In the mid-70s, Pr. started occupying a house on the north-west port ion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of resps.

03.

In 1993, they asked Pr. to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the property; that Pr. refused, claiming ownership over the lot; & that they suffered damages for their failure to use the same.

04.

Pr. filed a MTD claiming that the RTC has no jurisdict ion over the case under RA No. 7691 arguing that since the 346 sq m lot w/c he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.

05.

RTC denied the MTDstating that the action was in the nature of accion publiciana.

06.

Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.07.ISSUE

WON the RTC have jurisdict ion over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved.WON the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property involved. HELD

NO. The doctrine on w/c the RTC anchored its denial of Pr.'s MTD, as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession / accion publiciana lies w/ the

RTCs regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.

08.

As things now stand, a dist inct ion must be made between those propert ies the assessed value of w/c is below P20k, if outside Metro Manila; & P50k, if w/in.

a.

The Ct. has also declared that all cases involving t it le to / possession of real property w/ an assessed value of less than P20k if outside Metro Manila, falls

under the original jurisdict ion of the MTC

b.

Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdict ion over the action of the resps.

01.

Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC / the MTC has original &

exclusive jurisdict ion over the Pr.'s action. The ct.s cannot take judicial not ice of the assessed / market value of the land.

a.

Jurisdict ion of the ct. does not depend upon the answer of the defendant /

even upon agreement, waiver / acquiescence of the part ies. Indeed, the jurisdict ion of the ct. over the nature of the action & the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the ct. / upon a MTDfor, otherwise, the quest ion of jurisdict ion would depend almost ent irely on the defendant.

b.

Considering that the resps. failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the MTD. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null & void,& the CA erred in affirming the RTC.

CASE NO. 14. VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. CA & Heirs of JUAN DE LA CRUZSaturday, March 22, 2014

4:03 PM

Case Digest Page 11

affirming the RTC.

Case Digest Page 12

CASE NO. 13 DANILO DUMO & SUPREMA DUMO vs. ERLINDA ESPINAS, et al.FACTSA complaint for forcible entry w/ prayer for the issuance of a TRO &// PI was filed by sps. Danilo & Suprema Dumo vs resps. w/ the MTC of Bauang, La Union, docketed as

CC881. In their complaint, Prs. alleged:

01.

That plaintiffs are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land w/ all the improvements standing thereon, located in Paringao, Bauang, La Union, w/ an area of 1, 514 sq. m., covered

by Tax Dec. No. 22839;

a.

That on Nov. 17, 1995, Severa Espinas filed a civil complaint before this same ct., docketed as

CC857, entitled Quieting of Title &// Ownership & Possession against sps. Sandy & Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same real property, for w/c plaintiffs seeks that

the Ct takes judicial notice of the same;

b.

That although a decision has been rendered against the defendants in CC857, the same was

not enforced as per Sheriffs return dated Nov. 4, 1996, attached to the records of CC857;c.

That on Oct. 30, 1996, at about 1:45 P.M., all defendants acting for the interest of Severa Espinas,

apparently disgruntled[3] w/ the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the

questioned real property, & in open defiance w/ the official action taken by the sheriff, took it

upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, & threat, to enter the said question real property, & despite protestations made by plaintiffs, who were there then present & visibly

outnumbered by defendants & their agents who were armed w/ sticks, bolos, hammers, & other

deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, & took over the premises; that arrogantly, the

defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the judge to do just that to forcibly enter & take over the premises; that defendants while inside the premises, demolished & totally tore down all the improvements standing thereon, consisting of, but not

limited to shed structures intended for rent to the public;

d.

That defendants are still in the premises to date, & have even started putting & continuously

putting up structures thereon;

e.

That the plaintiff being the rightful owner of the disputed property & not being a party in CC857,

can never be bound by the proceedings thereon; that the acts of defendants in forcibly

entering the property of plaintiff, & taking over the same w/out no lawful basis is patently a

violation of her proprietary rights, the commission & the continuance of the unlawful acts aforementioned of defendants verily works injustice to plaintiffs;

f.

Prs. prayed for the payment of actual damages in the amount of P75k, lost earnings of

P5k per day, moral damages of P100k & attorneys fees in the amount of P50k.01.

On Nov. 12, 1996, the MTC issued a TRO directing the defendants to cease & desist from

destroying / demolishing the improvements found on the subject land & from putting up structures thereon.

02.

In its Order of Jan. 15, 1997, the MTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.03.In their Answer, resps. contended as part of their Special & Affirmative Defenses:04.That Sps. Marcelino & Severa Espinas purchased the questioned parcel of land from Carlos

Calica in 1943;

a.

That said parcel of land has been declared for taxation purposes under their name & the real

estate taxes have been religiously paid;

b.

That said parcel of land has been surveyed, w/c Plan Psu-202273 is duly approved by the

Director of Land, w/ an area of 1,065 sq. m. more / less;

c.

That to remove & clear all doubts & cloud over the ownership of said parcel of land, CC857 was

filed & after hearing, decision was rendered declaring herein defendants the lawful owners of

said parcel of land;

d.

That under & by virtue of said Decision, defendants entered, occupied & possessed said land, &

in the exercise of their right of ownership, cleaned the same of illegally constructed structures

w/c were done w/out the knowledge & consent of herein defendants;

e.

After trial, the MTC rendered judgment holding that Prs. were able to prove their right of

possession over the subject property.

01.

CASE NO. 13 DANILO DUMO & SUPREMA DUMO vs. ERLINDA ESPINAS, et al.Saturday, March 22, 2014

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Case Digest Page 13

possession over the subject property.Aggrieved by the decision of the MTC, resps. appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang,

La Union. I t was docketed as CC1099-BG.

02.

In a letter filed w/ this Ct. dated Jul. 24, 1998, RTC Judge who handles CC1099-BG,

requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself from further sitting in said case on the ground that the Prs. have filed an administrative complaint against her for partiality, &

by reason of such complaint she honestly feels that she can no longer continue deciding CC1099-BG w/out bias & unnecessary pressure. However, in SCs Resolution, the request was denied on the ground that the mere filing of an administrative complaint does not preclude a judge from deciding a case submitted to him/her for

resolution. Hence, Judge Molina-Alim proceeded in deciding the case.

03.

In its Decision, the RTC reversed & set aside the Decision of the MTC & dismissed the

case filed by the Prs., Severa Espinas had a possession antedating that of the latter. Even if the possession of plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Pedro & Bernardo Trinidad since 1951, were to be considered, still, Severa Espinas enjoys the priority of possession long before the filing of the instant case on Oct. 30, 1996. Under these

circumstances, priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolv ing the issue of possession.

04.

What is more, Severa Espinas was never divested of her possession except in 1987 when

the plaintiffs put up the retaining seawall on the western portion & cyclone wire on the southern portion of the property w/out Sveras consent. Despite the latters protestations, plaintiffs continued to introduce these improvements & challenged her to file a suit in Ct. & lately, in CC857, when Saldy & Fresnida Saldaa tried to encroach on

the property claiming ownership thereof.

05.

What is more, the possession of Severa Espinas since 1943 was bolstered by the decision

rendered in the land registration case, as well as in the CC, wherein she was declared the owner of the property in question.

06.

Hence, the MTC erred in finding plaintiffs to have priority of possession. On the contrary,

defendants ev idence is very clear that Severa Espinas & her husband had been in actual, open, continuous, adverse in the concept of owner, possession of the land

since 1943.

07.

In addition, the evidence of possession presented in the land registration & quieting of

title cases surely dispels any iota[4] of doubt that may exist in regard to the possession of defendant Severa Espinas over the subject property.

08.

As regards the issue on the award of damages: The rule is settled that in forcible entry /unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value

/ the reasonable compensation for the use & occupation of the leased property. The

reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages w/c could be recovered are those w/c the

plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, / those caused by the loss of the use & occupation of the property, & not the damages w/c he may have suffered but w/c

have no direct relation to his loss of material possession (Araos vs. CA, 232 SCRA 770).

09.

Then too, under S17 of R70, in forcible entry & unlawful detainer, the monetary award is

limited to the sum justly due as arrears of rent / as reasonable compensation for the use

& occupation of the premises, attorneys fees & costs. In this case, the MTC erred in awarding damages w/c are not the reasonable compensation for the use &

occupation of the property. Rather, these are damages w/c may have been suffered by plaintiffs w/c have no direct relation to the use of material possession, hence, should

not have been awarded.

10.

Besides, the award of P30k as actual damages plus P500/day as loss earnings has no

factual & legal basis, hence, should have been disallowed.

11.

True, the aforecited rule now allows attorneys fees to be awarded, but the grant of the same must be in accordance w/ Art.2208 of the Civ . Code w/c in all cases must be reasonable. The award of attorneys fees by the MTC lacks basis. The body of the appealed decision indeed does not show justification for the award. Hence, there is no basis for such award, w/c, consequently, should have been removed. The power of the

12.

Case Digest Page 14

basis for such award, w/c, consequently, should have been removed. The power of the

Ct. to award attorneys fees under the above cited article, demands factual, legal & equitable justification. I ts basis cannot be left to speculation & gesture.Prs. then filed a Pet. for rev iew w/ the CA. On Oct. 14, 1999, the CA promulgated the

presently assailed Decision setting aside the judgment of the RTC & reinstating w/

modification the decision of the MTC, by deleting the awards for actual, moral &

exemplary damages.

13.

Prs. filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its

Resolution dated Feb. 18, 2000.Hence, the present Pet.

ISSUE/S1. WON Decision rendered by the RTC is null & void because it v iolates Prs. constitutional right to due process considering that Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim who sat during the trial & penned the questioned RTC decision had previously admitted

her bias against Prs.2. WON the RTC had no authority to reverse the judgment of the MTC respecting the

award of damages & the CA did not have jurisdiction to rule on the matter of damages because this issue was not raised in the appeal filed before it.3. WON the RTC & CA erred in holding that actual, moral & exemplary damages

cannot be awarded in ejectment cases.

HELD

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,

for just / valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory & voluntary. The instances

mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively presume that judges

cannot actively & impartially sit in a case. The second paragraph, w/c embodies voluntary

inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just & valid reasons, w/ only their conscience as guide.

To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when

circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, & out of such suspicions a suggestion is made

of record that they might be induced to act w/ prejudice for / against a litigant, they

should conduct a careful self-examination. Under the second paragraph of the cited

Section of the Rules of Ct., parties have the right to seek the inhibition / the disqualification

of judges who do not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial / independent in

handling a case. Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own

sound discretion. That discretion is a matter of conscience & is addressed primarily to their sense of fairness & justice.

However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the ct.s of justice would not be impaired. A salutary norm for them to observe is to reflect

on the possibility that the losing parties might nurture at the back of their minds the thought

that the former have unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against them. Of course, the judges right must be weighed against their duty to decide cases w/out fear of repression.

Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered

discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just &

valid causes. The mere imputation of bias / partiality is not enough ground for them to

inhibit, especially when the charge is w/out basis. This Ct. has to be shown acts / conduct

clearly indicative of arbitrariness / prejudice before it can brand them w/ the stigma of

bias / partiality.

1. NO. A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is impartial & disinterested. Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice & hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge. S1 of R137 of the RoC

provides: S 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge / judicial officer shall sit in any case in w/c he,

/ his wife / child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor / otherwise, / in w/c he is

related to either party w/in the sixth degree of consanguinity / affinity, / to counsel w/in the

fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, / in w/c he has been executor,

administrator, guardian, trustee / counsel, / in w/c he has presided in any inferior ct. when his

ruling / decision is the subject of review, w/out the written consent of all parties in interest, signed

by them & entered upon the record.

Case Digest Page 15

bias / partiality.

In a string of cases, the SC has said that bias & prejudice, to be considered valid reasons

for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved w/ clear & convincing evidence.

Equally important is the established doctrine that bias & prejudice must be shown to have

resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of

judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented & the conduct observed by

the magistrate, such opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous -- will not prove personal

bias / prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the

decision / the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice /corrupt purpose. At bottom, to disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias & prejudice

by clear & convincing evidence.

In any case, Prs. contention that they have been deprived of due process is denied by the fact that they were able to appeal the questioned RTC Decision to the CA via a Pet. for

review &, subsequently, file a MR of the CA Decision. The essence of due process is found

in the reasonable opportunity to be heard & submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As

long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would

have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the

essence of due process.

We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error

properly assigned, / upon w/c a determination of the question raised by the error

properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate ct. notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.Prs. admit in the present Pet. that herein resps., in their appeal w/ the RTC, raised

the question of WON the prevailing party may be awarded damages. Since this issue had been seasonably raised, it became open to further evaluation. I t was

only logical & natural for the RTC to deal w/ the question of whether Prs. are indeed entitled to the damages awarded by the MTC.Moreover, even if the issue on damages was not raised by resps. in their appeal w/

the RTC, it is not erroneous on the part of the RTC to delete the award of damages

in the MTC decision considering that the RTC judgment reversed the decision of the

MTC. I t would be the height of inconsistency if the RTC sustained the award of

damages in favor of herein Prs. when, in the same decision, it reversed the MTC judgment & dismissed the complaint of Prs.

2. NO. We have held that an appellate ct. is clothed w/ ample authority to rev iew

rulings even if they are not assigned as errors. This is especially so if the ct. finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before it.

Although the MTCs order for the reimbursement to Prs. of their alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, w/c is a beach resort, could have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use & occupation of the property

while it was in the possession of the resps., records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the RTC that the award for lost earnings has

no ev identiary / factual basis; & in the decision of the CA affirming the same.

Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages w/c could be recovered are those w/c the plaintiff could have

sustained as a mere possessor, / those caused by the loss of the use & occupation of the property, & not the damages w/c he may have suffered but w/c have no

direct relation to his loss of material possession.

3. NO. The SC agrees w/ the CA & the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award

actual, moral & exemplary damages in v iew of the settled rule that in ejectment cases,

the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value / the reasonable compensation for the use & occupation of the property.

Case Digest Page 16

CASE NO. 12. MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAYFACTS

Resps. filed a Pet. w/ the RTC for quo warranto w/ Damages & Prayer for Mandatory & Prohibitory Injunction, Damages & Issuance of TRO against herein Prs..

01.

Resps. alleged that they had been members of the board of directors & officers of St . John Hospital, Inc., but Prs., who are also among the incorporators &

stockholders of said Corp., forcibly & w/ the aid of armed men usurped the powers w/c supposedly belonged to resps..

02.

RTC Branch 58 issued an Order t ransferring the case to the RTC in Naga City.03.However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case

folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stat ing that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative

jurisdiction.

04.

RTC Branch 58 then proceeded to issue & serve summons on Prs..05.

Prs. filed their Answer raising therein the affirmative defenses of improper venue,

lack of jurisdiction, & wrong remedy of quo warranto.

06.

Thereafter, the other Prs. also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the part ies were then required to submit their respective

memoranda. RTC Br.58 denied the MTD & ordered the case remanded to the RTC Naga City w/c under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special ct.

to try & decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.

07.

Petioner then filed a Pet. for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure.

08.

ISSUE: Whether a branch of the RTC w/c has no jurisdict ion to try & decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal ct..

HELD

The assailed order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a Pet. under Rule 45.

An order denying a MTDis merely interlocutory & therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a Pet. for review on certiorari.

Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal

from the judgment after trial.The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to

trial, & if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.

However in the int erest of just ice & t o prevent more violence bet ween t he part ies, the ct. preceded to give due course to a case despite the wrong

remedy resorted by the Pr..Evidently, the RTC Br58 lacks jurisdiction over resps. Pet. for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the Pet., the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial ct. should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799

& the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Ct., RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Ct.; hence, it was never vested w/ jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SC.

Such being the case, RTC Br.58 did not have the requisite authority / power to

order the transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the Pet.

CASE NO. 12. MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAYSaturday, March 22, 2014

4:05 PM

Case Digest Page 17

order the transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the Pet.

for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the filing of the Pet. w/ the RTC Br.58 w/c had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

Case Digest Page 18

CASE NO. 11. HILARION M. HENARES, JR vs. LAND

TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING & REGULATORY BOARD& DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONSFACTSAsserting their right to clean air, Prs. contend that the bases for their Pet. for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use

CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in S16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v . Factoran, & Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.

01.

Prs. attempted to compel judicial action against the ban of air pollution & related env ironmental hazards.

02.

Prs. alleged that the particulate matters such as complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, & liquid droplets emitted into the air from various

engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health.

03.

Prs. aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

04.

Prs. insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same S3, R65 of the Rev ised Rules of Ct. that the Solicitor General

invokes.

05.

ISSUEWON mandamus lies to compel the use of CNG.

HELDMandamus will not generally lie from one branch of govt to a coordinate branch, for the obv ious reason that neither is inferior to

the other. The need for future changes in both legislation & its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Ct., especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity w/ & ct.esy to a coequal branch dictate that we give

sufficient time & leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the env ironmental problems raised in this Pet.. The Clean Air Act designates the DENR to set the emission standards for fuel use & the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are

concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC & the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan & implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy & adequate remedy

herein sought by Prs., i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the

Saturday, March 22, 2014

4:05 PM

Case Digest Page 19

resps. to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the resps.

LTFRB & the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked to grant preferential & exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience / franchises to operators of NGVs

based on the results of the DOTC surveys.

Case Digest Page 20

CASE NO. 10. WACKWACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE

& BIENVENIDO A. TANFACTSIn its amended & supplemental complaint for interpleader of Oct.23, 1963, Pr., a non-stock, civ ic & athletic Corp. duly organized under the laws of the Phils., w/ principal

office in Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleged:

01.

for its first cause of action, that Lee E. Won claims ownership of its MFC(membership fee

certificate) 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in CC26044 of the CFI of Manila, & also by

virtue of MFC201-Serial No.1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy CoC of

CFI of Manila, for & in behalf of the president & the secretary of the Corp. & of the People's Bank

& Trust Co. as transfer agent of the said Corp., pursuant to the order of Sep. 23, 1963 in the said

case;

a.

that Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid MFC201 by

virtue of MFC201-Serial No.1199 issued to him on Jul. 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in

his favor by "Swan, Culbertson & Fritz," the original owner & holder of MFC 201;

b.

that under its articles of incorporation & by-laws the Corp. is authorized to issue a maximum of

400 MFCs to persons duly elected / admitted to proprietary membership, all of w/c have been

issued as early as Dec. 1939;

c.

that it claims no interest whatsoever in said MFC201;d.that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof;e.that it is w/out power to issue two separate certificates for the same MFC201, / to issue another

MFC to Lee, w/out violating its articles of incorporation & by-laws; &

f.

that MFC201-serial no. 1199 held by Tan & the MFC 201-serial No. 1478 issued to Lee proceed

from the same MFC 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson & Fritz".

g.

For its second cause of action, it alleged MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy CoC of

CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corp. is null & void because issued in violation of its by-laws, w/c

require the surrender & cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before

issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president &

secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in CC26044 is not binding

upon Tan, holder of MFC 201-serial no. 1199;

h.

that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action / bring a separate action to

protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal & beneficial interest in the subject matter of

this litigation; &

i.

that he is made a part so that complete relief may be accorded herein.j.

The Corp. prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee & Tan to interplead & litigate

their conflicting claims; & (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, & ordering the surrender

& cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

k.

In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds

of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, & bar by prescription.These motions were duly opposed by the Corp.

l.

Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment & failure to state a cause of action well

taken, the trial ct. dismissed the complaint, w/ costs against the Corp.

m.

ISSUEWON there is propriety & timeliness in the filing of the remedy of interpleader.

HELDA stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to ct.. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of

interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader w/in a reasonable time after a dispute

has arisen w/out waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he

may be barred by laches / undue delay.But where he acts w/ reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the

CASE NO. 10. WACKWACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE & BIENVENIDO A. TANSaturday, March 22, 2014

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Case Digest Page 21

remedy is not barred.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,

especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the

judgment & neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by

one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.

The Corp. has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in CC26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves

their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered

against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to

show that lie has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. & since the

Corp. is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly

improper & unavailing.

In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corp. had already been made independently liable in CC26044 &, therefore, its present application for interpleader

would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the

appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid CC&, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights

anew, & thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, w/c is one of the purposes of an

interpleader suit, w/ the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said CCmight eventually be taken away from him; & because the Corp. allowed itself to be sued to final

judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for w/c

reason it is barred by laches / unreasonable delay.

Case Digest Page 22

CASE NO. 9. ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

FACTSAlejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank),

made several money placements totaling P210,595,991.62 w/ the bank's affiliate,

Westmont Investment Corp. (Wincorp), a domestic entity engaged in the business

of an investment house w/ the authority & license to extend credit.

01.

Sometime in Feb. 2000, Pr. received disturbing news on Wincorp's financial condition

prompting him to inquire about & investigate the co.'s operations & transactions w/

its borrowers.

02.

He then discovered that the co. extended a loan equal to his total money

placement to a Corp. [Power Merge] w/ a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This

credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to

another Corp. [Hottick Holdings].

03.

When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it & its

surety.Settlement was, however, reached in w/c Hottick's president, Virata,

assumed the obligation of the surety.

04.

Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp & Hottick's president, Pr.'s money

placements were transferred w/out his knowledge & consent to the loan account

of Power Merge through an agreement that v irtually freed the latter of any liability.

Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp & its officers & directors, Pr.

was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to

Virata/Power Merge.

05.

Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit & connived w/

Wincorp's officers & directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit w/out any

intention of paying the said placements, Pr. instituted, on Oct. 19, 2000, CC00-99006

for damages w/ the RTC of Mla. One of the defendants impleaded in the complaint

is herein resp. Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman & Director of Wincorp.

06.

On Oct. 26, 2000, on the basis of the allegations in the complaint & the Oct. 12,

2000 Affidavit of Pr., the trial ct. ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants

in the CCsubject, among others, to Pr.'s filing of a P50M-bond.

07.

The writ was, consequently, issued on Nov. 6, 2000.08.

Arguing that the writ was improperly issued & that the bond furnished was grossly

insufficient, resp., on Dec. 22, 2000, moved for the discharge of the attachment. The

other defendants likewise filed similar motions.

09.

On Oct. 23, 2001, the RTC, in an Omnibus Order, denied all the motions for the

discharge of the attachment.

10.

The defendants, including resp. herein, filed their respective motions for

reconsideration but the trial ct. denied the same on Oct. 14, 2002.

11.

Incidentally, while resp. opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-

defendants, Virata & UEM-MARA Philippines Corp. (UEM-MARA), assailed the same

v ia certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.

12.

The CA, however, denied the certiorari Pet. on Aug. 21, 2003, & the MR thereof on

Mar. 16, 2004.

13.

In a Pet. for review on certiorari before the SC, in G.R. No. 162928, we denied the Pet.

& affirmed the CA rulings on May 19, 2004 for Virata's & UEM-MARA's failure to

sufficiently show that the appellate ct. committed any reversible error.

14.

We subsequently denied the Pet. w/ finality on Aug. 23, 2004.15.

On Sept. 30, 2004, resp. filed before the trial ct. another Motion to Discharge 16.

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Case Digest Page 23

Attachment, re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the

following additional grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board

meetings approving the questionable transactions; & (2) that he could not have

connived w/ Wincorp & the other defendants because he & Pearlbank Securities,

Inc., in w/c he is a major stockholder, f iled cases against the co. as they were also

victimized by its fraudulent schemes.

16.

Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders

aff irmed by the CA & the SC, & that the additional grounds were resp.'s aff irmative

defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, the trial ct. denied the

motion in its Jan. 6, 2005 Order.

17.

W/ the denial of its MR, resp. filed a certiorari Pet. before the CA. On Sept. 14, 2005,

the appellate ct. rendered the assailed Decision reversing & setting aside the

aforementioned orders of the trial ct. & lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to

the extent that it concerned resp.'s properties.

18.

Pr. moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same in

its Jan. 6, 2006 Resolution. Thus, Pr. filed the instant Pet.

19.

ISSUEWON THE CA COMMITTED SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN RESOLVING FAVORABLY THE

GROUNDS ALLEGED BY RESP. IN HIS PET. & LIFTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY

ATTACHMENT, SINCE THESE GROUNDS ALREADY RELATE TO THE MERITS OF

CC00-99006 W/C, UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE USED AS BASIS

FOR DISCHARGING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT.

HELDIn the case at bench, the basis of Pr.'s application for the issuance of the writ of

preliminary attachment against the properties of resp. is S1(d) of R57 of the RoC w/c

pertinently reads: S1. Grounds upon w/c attachment may issue.- At the

commencement of the action / at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff /

any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security

for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases: x

xxx (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting

the debt / incurring the obligation upon w/c the action is brought, / in the

performance thereof.

For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show

the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be

inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt / failure to comply w/ his

obligation.

The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to

defraud the creditor.

In the instant case, Pr.'s Oct. 12, 2000 Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that

resp. committed a fraud.The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp &

Virata &// Power Merge, w/c, by the way, explains why this Ct., in G.R. No. 162928,

affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.

The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to

how the fraud imputed to resp. was committed for the ct. to decide WON to issue

the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that resp., at

the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan / intention not to

pay, / w/out any showing of how resp. committed the alleged fraud, the general

averment in the affidavit that resp. is an officer & director of Wincorp who allegedly

connived w/ the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give

a hint about what constituted the fraud & how it was perpetrated because

established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.

Case Digest Page 24

established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.

Verily, the mere fact that resp. is an officer & director of the co. does not necessarily

give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud / that he connived w/ the other

defendants to commit a fraud.While under certain circumstances, ct.s may treat a Corp. as a mere aggroupment

of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the

wrongdoing has been clearly & convincingly established.

Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh &

rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation & annoyance. The rules governing its

issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the

requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the ct. shall refrain from issuing

it, for, otherwise, the ct. w/c issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice. I f it is

wrongfully issued on the basis of false / insuff icient allegations, it should at once be

corrected.

Considering, therefore, that, in this case, Pr. has not fully satisfied the legal

obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by

resp., the trial ct. acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of

preliminary attachment against the properties of resp.

Case Digest Page 25

CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.FACTSPr. Mangila is an importer of sea goods who engaged in the serv ices of the resp.,

the owner of a freight forwarding business. The Pr. failed to pay the private resp. on

several shipments made by the latter.

01.

Private resp. filed a civ il action against Pr. Mangila for the collection of sum of

money amounting to P106,376. However, the sheriff failed to serve the summons

because according to the help found at the Pr.s residence the latter had left for Guam.

02.

Construing Pr.s departure from the Philippines as done w/ intent to defraud her

creditors, private resp. filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On Sept. 26, 1988,

the trial ct. issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment against Pr.. The following day,

the trial ct. issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

03.

Subsequently, a Notice of Levy was served upon the help of the Pr..04.

On Nov. 7, 1988, the Pr. filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment w/out

submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial ct.. She pointed out that up to then,

she had not been served a copy of the Complaint & the summons. Hence, Pr.

claimed the ct. had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. The ct. granted her

motion for Discharge of Attachment upon her filing of a counter-bond. However,

the Ct. did not rule on its jurisdiction / the writ of preliminary attachment.

05.

On Dec. 26, 1988, private resp. applied for an alias summons, w/c the trial ct. issued

on Jan. 19, 1988. I t was only on Jan. 26, 1989 that summons was finally served on Pr..

06.

The case pursued & on the day of the pre-trial, the trial ct. issued an Order

terminating the pre-trial & allowing the private resp. to present ev idence ex-parte.

07.

The Trial Ct. ruled in favor of private resp..08.

The Pr. received a copy of the Decision, ordering Pr. to pay resp. P109,376.95 plus 18

percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorneys fees & costs of suit.

09.

ON appeal, the Pr. included the question of validity of the writ of preliminary

attachment. However, the CA affirmed the decision of the TC & upheld the validity

of the writ of preliminary attachment.

10.

Hence, this Pet..11.

ISSUE WON the writ of preliminary attachment was valid?

HELDNO. This Ct. has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to prov isional

remedies. The Pr. contends that because of failure to serve summons on Pr. /

simultaneously w/ the writs implementation, Pr. claims that the trial ct. had not

acquired jurisdiction over her person & thus the serv ice of the writ is void. The ct.

agrees w/ the contention of the Pr..Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy

at the commencement of the action / at any time thereafter. This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint w/c is the moment that marks

the commencement of the action. The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, / even before summons issues. The grant of

the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:

first, the ct. issues the order granting the application;

CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.Saturday, March 22, 2014

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Case Digest Page 26

first, the ct. issues the order granting the application;

second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; &

third, the writ is implemented.

For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant be first obtained.

In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on Sept. 27,

1988 & implemented on Oct. 28, 1988.

However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the ct. must have

acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for w/out such jurisdiction, the ct. has no

power & authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing

from the Ct. will not bind the defendant.

However, the alias summons was served only on Jan. 26, 1989 / almost three months

after the implementation of the writ of attachment.The trial ct. had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on Sept. 27 since a

motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action. However, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial ct. should have, previously

/ simultaneously w/ the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the Pr..

Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually served on

Pr. several months after the writ had been implemented.

Case Digest Page 27

CASE NO. 07 MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO vs. HON SAMUEL REYES, et.al.FACTSIt appears that the Perez Rubio sps. owned shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. registered in

their names & in the names of Joaquin Ramirez & Joaquin Ramirez, Jr.

01.

The Perez Rubios, w/ the conformity of the Ramirezes, sold said shares to Robert O. Phillips & Sons,

Inc. for P5.5M payable in installments & other conditions agreed upon.

02.

Phillips & Sons, Inc., & Phillips, himself & his wife, entered into an agreement w/ the Perez Rubios

deferring payment of the Apr. 30, 1964 installments already overdue to Aug. 31, 1964.

03.

In the meantime, Phillips, in his behalf & in that of his wife & ROPSI entered into negotiations for

the sale of their shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco.

04.

Upon being informed of this, the Perez Rubios, through their attorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez,

reminded the Phillips sps. & the ROPSI in writing of their obligations under the contract of sale &

reminded them in particular that the shares subject matter thereof were still subject to the

payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price. They gave a similar notice to Alfonso Yuchengco, but expressed no objection to the sale provided the obligations in their favor were

satisfied.

05.

the Phillips through their attorney, sent a letter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in substance, that

the only obstacle to the consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the shares of stock of

Hacienda Benito, Inc. was their letter of Nov. 24, 1964 & warned that unless the same was

withdrawn by Mar. 29, they would seek redress elsewhere.

06.

On Mar. 27, 1965, the Perez Rubios, for their part, wrote Phillips that due to the latter's inability to

comply w/ the former's conditions, the negotiations going on between them were cancelled, &

should the full amount due to them remained unpaid by noon of Mar. 31, 1965, they would file

action in ct. in the afternoon thereof.

07.

Original Complaint w/ prayer for issuance of a TRO &// ex parte writ of preliminary injunction

(CC8632) w/ the CFI by ROPSI, et al. vs. Miguel Perez Rubio to prevent &