civic culture and democracy in pakistan · to decisions of jinnah who, together with his...

CIVIC CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Marvin G. Weinbaum

The weakness of democratic practice in Pakistan is ex- plained in many ways. Some observers stress constitutional and electoral provisions among institutional factors said to have undermined responsible and responsive government. Others point to the quality of Pakistan's leadership over most of the country's history, namely, that Pakistan has been let down by unprincipled political figures motivated by raw ambition and material gain. Economic arguments are also advanced to explain the difficulties of societies like Pakistan to realize and sustain democratic institutions. Many commentators also seriously question the compatibility of Islamic doctrines with more liberal conceptions of democracy.

Contemporary scholarly inquiry looking for the bases of democratic politics often proposes the importance of an accompanying civil society that is characterized by its numerous and largely autonomous political associations, political tolerance, and a sense of citizenship. The emergence of a viable civil society is seen as furnishing a critical buffer between a state and its people, assuring that the government's role is limited and appropriate. In the area of associational activity, Pakistan does reasonably well. Even during periods of more authoritarian rule, political groups and movements have managed to organize and be heard. But judged by a societal willingness to accept the legitimacy of opposing ideas and forces or agree on a common political identity, Pakistan has in most respects been found wanting.

While civil society has not fully or consistently been realized over nearly a half century of independence, societal forces in Pakistan are hardly feeble; society in its primordial forms contests with varying degrees of success against the Pakistani state. In periods of state weakness, moreover, democratic political openings have been grasped. Unlike many other national systems currently involved in a transition from authoritarian to democratic

Marvin G. Weinbaum is Professor of Political Science and Director, Program in South and West Asian Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. ? 1996 by The Regents of the University of California

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institutions, Pakistan does not need to invent constitutional and representative institutions. In much the same way, civil society-even if partially formed- always remains a potential force, needing only to be stirred and strengthened.

To understand the shortcomings of civil society in Pakistan, we must find explanations for its weaknesses in political tolerance and identity. Analyti- cally prior to these societal features lies the country's political culture. Spe- cifically, there appear to be sets of reasonably autonomous and enduring beliefs and values within Pakistan that have important consequences in the societal and ultimately political spheres. Popular expectations of authority, in particular toward those who govern, must be understood and presumably al- tered if Pakistan is to realize the kind of system that permits a sustainable democracy. Legal provisions and better people seeking public office are important, but progress in building civic virtue or civic spirit will also have to occur. In the absence of such a culture, factional anarchy and authoritarian rule thrive.

The building blocks of a broad political culture in Pakistan undoubtedly begin with Islamic morality and egalitarianism. Ethno-regional cultures-the Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluch, and Pathan-add to and modify the product. The heritage of British judicial and administrative values, including norms that underlie parliamentary practices, remains visible. By appreciating Pakistan's shared cultural premises, we are in a better position to identify and understand those elements in the prevailing belief system that present both obstacles and supports for a vital civic culture.

Few books or articles on Pakistan are concerned with the values and attitudes of its larger publics. Interpretations of events and elite personalities dominate discussions. To an extent this is understandable in a country whose political history often appears to be the handiwork of a few key figures or seems at the mercy of domestic challenges and outside forces. However, increasingly in Pakistan, as throughout the less industrialized world, public images and expectations leading to attitudes toward governmental perform- ance register with greater importance. The limits of what decision-makers do is in ever larger fashion framed by their perceptions and evidence of popular constraints and group demands. Leaders are not without opportunities to ma- nipulate opinion and cultivate specific support for regimes, but they have greater difficulty in altering values and feelings that emerge from deeper cultural wells. Most of these cultural premises come from Islamic and ethnic identities, as already noted. But they also reflect socializing experiences ac- quired after more than two generations of rulers and policies in Pakistan.

The Historical Legacy Pakistan's political culture is naturally a strong product of its past, including its people's earlier history under the British Raj. What Pakistan's leaders

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM 641 knew best from this inheritance was the so-called viceregal system that made little or no provision for popular awareness or involvement. The system was designed to rule over a subjected population and intended to keep order and collect taxes. In fact, what the British bequeathed was often a contradiction between theories of governance and their practices. Ideals of representative government and equality before the law were incomplete exports. LaPorte notes how historical factors impeded the movement toward democratization in several ways: the "emergency frame of mind" growing out of the confron- tations with India; the existence of the country's two wings-their socio- cultural differences and struggle for a share of power; and the early death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.1 The effects of these realities registered not only on the policy-making elites and their willingness to introduce democratic procedures but on the larger publics and their expectations and tolerance of non- democratic practices.

The underdevelopment of a civic or democratic culture is frequently traced to decisions of Jinnah who, together with his successors, failed to see it as his responsibility to cultivate popular support. In consequence, the public was left untutored in the kind of vigilance usually needed to hold political leaders accountable. The subsequent education of people to accept democracy through meaningful participation in their political affairs was minimal. With- out wide public awareness and an effective public opinion, the political system gave wide berth to ambitious and corrupt political leaders. Instead of including a broad citizenry in the political process, power was concentrated in the hands of an elitist bureaucracy and over-ambitious military. The country's semi-feudal system with its sets of obligations and hierarchy provided similarly inhospitable soil for building a democracy. The traditional power brokers, the wealthy, large land-holding families, were prepared to give their allegiance to any who promised to protect their material interests and way of life.

While Jinnah had at least sought to instill the concept of impartiality, his successors, weak in their own feelings for democratic rule, governed in an arbitrary fashion. They used their power to impose central rule or governor's rule in Pakistan's provinces, dismissing provincial ministries and undercut- ting democratic procedures. Their unwillingness to establish democratic institutions was in part due to fear of inviting mass agitation, but in fact there was little popular pressure, at least in West Pakistan, against a system that offered scant opportunity to effect representative government respectful of majority rule or minority rights. A conspicuous danger in democracy for the

1. Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Another Try at Democracy," in J. Henry Korson, ed., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 171-62.


leaders was that the political system was likely to come under East Pakistan (Bengali) domination.

Meanwhile, a tradition of the military's detachment from active engage- ment in politics failed to take hold. Civil-military relations diverged sharply from developments in India where the civil authority's supremacy became established in accordance with the 1950 Constitution. Pakistan's civilian government, however, succumbed to military rule that sought to legitimize itself with the public by attacks on democratic ideals and political institutions in hopes of leaving them in disrepute as well as decay. Despite the revival of democracy from time to time, it was predictably held in suspicion. One of the tenets of civil society, the concept of a legitimate opposition, naturally won little acceptance among competing political elites or within the larger public. At a psychological level, feelings of trust in authority fared little better.

Other developments contributed toward lowered expectations for democratic rule. Several basic constitutional issues were left unresolved, most of all provincial autonomy, and Pakistan was without a formal, written constitution until 1956. The democratic myths that so often sustain a system were thus only weakly instilled, and precedents were created that undermined those few parliamentary and democratic norms that could be drawn upon. It did not help that in the early years non-party prime ministers were appointed by the head of state rather than by those who had to appeal to an electorate.

Under President Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies system, an indirect form of democracy was supposed to mobilize people and educate them to be par- ticipants in local affairs; in fact, the system was designed to keep the ordinary citizen out of politics. Ayub justified his limited representative system by claiming that because Muslims in the Subcontinent had historically never known real sovereignty, they would take longer as Pakistanis to adjust psy- chologically to their newborn freedoms. Writing about the mass of voters under the indirect, basic democracies of Ayub, Sayeed noted that the "grind- ing poverty, religious fatalism, and layers of authority reaching down to the village level through revenue and policies officials have together instilled in the villager an attitude of utter helplessness and servility. The idea that those elected are 'by the free choice of the people' . . . still seems unreal and fanciful to most of the villagers."2

Mass involvement in politics, if defined by rallies and periodic opportunities to vote, certainly increased over the years. Street demonstrations helped to bring down governments, namely Ayub's in 1968, Yahya Khan's in 1971, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's in 1977. Yet while these actions strengthen feel-

2. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 176.

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM 643

ings of efficacy, none can be easily equated with democratic processes. These popular outpourings marked a breakdown in law and order, and reflected above all an absence of trust in authority. Such anomic movements may have heralded demands for better representation but in themselves were more the signs of frustration and anger than of belief in a more pluralistic, tolerant political system. The popular image of government as little more than a game played by self-seeking leaders did not change very much.

The election of 1970, the first to be held on the basis of universal suffrage, appeared to be a watershed for democracy in Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto provided the strongest hope for a politics that would involve the masses and socialize them to democratic, if also socialist ideals. The mass mobilization of the electorate by his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) succeeded in communicating with many rural voters. People listened to Bhutto and other political leaders not only at rallies but over radio and television. The issues of the day were articulated forcefully and clearly, such that voters had meaningful choices to make. And these masses demonstrated that they could throw off-if it really served their interests-the feudal assumptions that usually shaped their attitudes and actions. Yet rather than build up his popular movement on the democratic ideals of supremacy of the people, in power Bhutto shed much of the regime's populist ideology and strongly personalized his rule rather than working through participatory institutions and educating the public to their value. By his 1977 reelection campaign, he had come to rely on feudals and discarded many of the political allies who had stood with him earlier. Above all, Bhutto had failed to deliver a liberal state, one able to tolerate a legitimate political opposition. While he had opened up for the future the possibility of more participatory politics, the civic virtues that would be needed to buttress it were in the end discredited.

The parliamentary elections in March 1977 that were expected to return Bhutto to office as prime minister were challenged as fraudulent by a coali- tion of opposition parties. The country came to a near standstill as the opposition brought out street demonstrations in the cities. Ostensibly to restore a constitutional order, the army chief, General Zia ul-Haq, seized power in July 1977, insisting that his mandate also included instituting a true Islamic rule. Despite repeated promises to hold early elections, he soon questioned whether an Islamic state could also be a parliamentary democracy. Zia's denial of a popular mandate for the country did not end until December 1984, and then only with a transparent effort to legitimize holding the presidency- for an additional five years-through a national referendum that formally sanctioned moving toward an Islamic government.

Not until 1985 did Zia agree to share some power with a civilian government. Nonparty elections for national and provincial assemblies were held in February 1985, and he used the new legislature to push through revisions to


the 1973 Constitution. The most important change was the Eighth Amend- ment that gave the president power to dissolve the federal legislature and call fresh elections, as well as make senior government and military appoint- ments. The purpose was clearly to try to perpetuate the kind of arbitrary rule that would undercut the authority of elected leaders and, as demonstrated by the dismissals of prime ministers in 1986, 1990, and 1993, render a democratic mandate nearly meaningless. Without question, the Zia legacy was one that conveyed a disdain for democracy. Its deep impression on Pakistan con- tinues to be reflected in low voter participation and factional politics aimed at delegitimizing those in power. Continuing threats by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, leader of the major opposition party, to mobilize the people to undo the 1993 national elections is only the most recent example.

Cultural Parameters From one perspective, Pakistan compares well with other constitutionally governed Islamic states. It has had, after all, a number of reasonably free elections over the last quarter century or so and a parliament that permits wide expression. With the exception of Turkey, which is not officially an Islamic state, and possibly Malaysia, no other Muslim people have had as much opportunity to choose their leaders. But Pakistan has experienced more notably long periods of military rule. No elected government has been per- mitted to complete its term of office since 1977. Measured by the extent of popular participation, the effectiveness of its representative institutions, and its commitment to a constitutional order, Pakistan's democratic experience has been inconsistent and shallow.

That democracy fails to suit the genius of the Pakistani people is asserted often enough.3 The alleged corruption and incapacity of leaders and institutions supposedly reflects this defect. Yet the job of determining cultural de- fects and their presumed meaning for creating a civic culture in Pakistan is necessarily an impressionistic exercise. Analysts have few if any comprehen- sive, longitudinal, and objective attitude surveys to instruct them, and we have no data on those variables that have cross-nationally been found to be a cultural syndrome conducive to viable democracy. In any case, surveys con- ducted in socially and politically restrictive circumstances, when polling or- ganizations also have partisan links-e.g., Pakistan's Gallup Poll-are bound to be unreliable. We are thus left to glean from various other sources the relevant features of the country's political culture, their origins, and the likelihood of change. The task is daunting, especially since the course and character of Pakistan's politics are almost entirely written in terms of strategi-

3. See discussions in Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Sh. Muham- mad Ashraf, 1975), p. 136.

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM 645 cally important individuals and privileged groups. Elitism and patrimonial- ism, then, bulk large in shaping political beliefs in Pakistan. The effects on elections of a feudalistic, male-dominated society are all too apparent. Aside from particular personalities, the familiar categories of study are the country's civil servants, the military, tribal chiefs, businessmen, landlords, religious leaders, and public officials.

As conceived by those most associated with the cultural approach, one part of the civic syndrome involves a sense of interpersonal trust. This is posited as a prerequisite to effective political participation and ultimately to an acceptance of the opposition as a loyal opposition. Interestingly, along with interpersonal trust and life satisfaction is support for revolutionary change (negatively correlated with the civic culture).4 On the first two, there may exist weakness in Pakistan; on the third, there is decidedly little evidence of broad support for truly radical change of the kind that would be brought about through armed rebellion. At least in the case of the Pathan and Sindhi secession movements, the thrust has been more toward acquiring greater influence at the center than for basic changes in the system of government.

It is impossible to conceive of improving perceptions of the legitimacy of Pakistani institutions and leaders without wide electoral participation. How- ever, large numbers of Pakistanis continue to believe that elections are exer- cises in intimidation and outright fraud. Moreover, very little of political life is seen as egalitarian. Politics tends to reflect the highly stratified character of social classes in Pakistan where, in general, most citizens see political debates and contests as largely irrelevant to their lives. Pakistan's voting turnout, usually greatly exaggerated in official reports as exceeding 60% of eligible voters, was probably between 30% and 40% in 1989 and 1993. Vot- ing and voter turnout are only partial indicators, however. Reasonably clear policy alternatives are also necessary to build confidence and instill a deep sense of civic virtue and pride in the system. There seems to be no better vehicle for defining the issues than political parties, but at least in the Paki- stani context, parties have rarely performed that function very well.

Under these circumstances, frustration and insecurity lead many people to find solace and support in their subnational allegiances-in the primordial group ecology of Pakistani society. Sindhi, Baluch, and Pathan nationalisms as well as Sunni and minority Islamic allegiances all offer psychological and social refuge, and frequently divisive discourse. Few popular resentments are more intense than the view outside of the Punjab that there is a Punjabi domi- nance, politically and socially. Yet the crisis of identity suggested here is rather different from that of many other developing states. On one level no

4. See Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review, 82:4 (December 1988), p. 1219.


crisis, in fact, exists. The origins of the state are understood, and the reasons for its existence-to give self-determination and security to Muslims-jus- tify the state's existence in the eyes of its citizens. Jinnah, along with Mo- hammad Iqbal and other intellectual fathers of the state, provided the necessary founding ideas and myths. Yet, Pakistanis lack the self-confidence that normally goes with a history that is broadly validated. The secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), of course, undermined much of the original ra- tionale for the state.

Along with identity problems is a more serious crisis of authority. The social and political forms of authority erected have never met the basic needs or expectations of most citizens. Pakistan has failed to throw off those semi- feudal class structures that present serious obstacles to a successful modern state, especially one called upon to exercise functions of welfare and enlightenment for its masses. Not only opposition politicians but large numbers of their supporters in the electorate believe that governments in power are ille- gitimate, both for how they get elected and the way they use their powers for personal gain. At the same time, those in office and their followers regularly conceive of their political opponents as guilty of treasonous acts. The authority crisis can be blamed in part on popular views of an idealized Islamic state. Having established a homeland for Muslims and laid the groundwork for an ethical regime, the subsequent exercise of power in Pakistan has cast doubt on the ability of those in official positions to measure up to expectations. Ranked against Islam's idealization of authority, Pakistan's leadership seems especially unworthy. To be sure, from time to time the people seem in awe of a political figure, but their respect does not last long as the individual leader fails to show the expected qualities of dedication, piety, and achieve- ment.

Much of Pakistan's contemporary political culture also carries the imprint of economic change. While much of public governance has failed, an invigo- rated private sector has emerged bringing up a middle class with more of an economic than political agenda. It is a middle class that exhibits a distinct trend away from regionalism and finds its interests closely aligned with those seeking to build a strong, modern state. All the same, this class is self-ab- sorbed and has excluded larger sections of the population.5 For the masses, development's dislocations, including urbanization and employment outside the country, bring mostly the loss of community. Modernization, rather than helping to supplant older allegiances, has only added to the overall difficulties of identification with Pakistan as a political entity. Social and economic changes have moved many individuals into a higher degree of awareness of inequalities supported and enhanced by the state, and assisted by a freer

5. S. Akbar Zaidi, "The Hidden Revolution," Herald (election special, 1993), p. 58.


press, they have also piqued the awareness of many to the blatant, almost shameless corruption among those holding public office.

Politics in Pakistan tends to be highly personal and emotionally evocative. There is a strong defensiveness in efforts to belittle and humiliate opponents. Most criticism tends to be seen as a personal attack-which it normally is. In general, one finds intolerance of opponents and the absence of a constructive political dialogue.6 Very rarely are issues debated. In their place, leaders are likely to offer up patriotic themes meant to out-compete their political adver- saries. Because the mores of the system still promote the ideals of civility and legality, the public is treated to usually lengthy efforts by its leaders to maintain the outward signs of regular and legitimate procedures. As is often the case in other cultures, there are public lies and private truths. Appear- ances count even while most citizens understand that they bear little relation to reality. In Pakistan, as the journalist Naipal was informed, everybody- civil servants, politicians, the military, etc.-tries to fool everybody else but in fact nobody is really fooled.7 Public fictions are regularly found, for example, in the government's implementation of Islamic policies, its reports of economic progress, the country's military posture, the legal protections of minorities and women, and so on. Private truths hold that the systems of political and economic justice have little to offer the common man. Only those who are better off in the society are perceived as able to make claims against the system and be satisfied. However valid, the images assure deep cynicism about nearly all authority.

Political cynicism grows easily out of distrust of those in positions of authority, seeing them as not only unable to sustain law and order but in many instances as promoting criminality. Rather than a government viewed as as- suming responsibility for ensuring the safety of its citizens, authority is viewed as part of the problem. News stories of politicians being kidnapped or held in luxury hotels or bought off with sports vehicles, civil servants tampering with election results, opposition figures jailed and tortured have naturally contributed to the disdain of politics and politicians. Where once the military was viewed more positively, martial law regimes not only tram- pled on the Constitution but army officials were themselves caught in corrupt activities. More generally, there is a disbelief that anything can be done through the more formal institutions by which leaders are supposedly held accountable. Conceding their inability to control officials or failing to realize

6. Similar ideas were offered by Zulfiqar Gilani in "Political Culture and the Leader-Follower Relationship," a paper read at the Oxford Conference on Pakistan, Oxford University, April 1994.

7. V. S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 123.


the need to do so, Pakistanis are thus more willing to leave government to the self-appointed professionals.

Pakistani Muslims are often seen to act as though they were an oppressed, threatened minority-despite having their own state. This leads to a defensiveness which seems to have little basis in reality; the state's minorities are viewed as far stronger and more dangerous a threat to Islam than the facts would warrant. Notwithstanding the pride that Pakistan's citizens take in their religious heritage, they are not above acknowledging the need for changing or overcoming those aspects of their national character that seem ineffectual or dysfunctional. Their insecurity leads them to question many of their traditional values and practices, and denies them the psychological ar- mor that often goes with a more self-assured chauvinism. Pakistan gains little of the confidence that is normally found in an old civilization; indeed, the country remains ambivalent about its pre-Islamic history. There is even stronger ambivalence toward the colonial legacy that supposedly placed Paki- stan at a disadvantage, especially vis-a-vis India, so many Pakistanis tend to look longingly and enviously at the greater efficiency and legal order associated with the British Raj.

Plainly, Pakistanis do not flourish on the defensive as do those in some other cultures who, viewing themselves as beleaguered, believe they are better in the end for having endured. There seems no positive way to channel feelings of humiliation that often come with having failed to register greater success with their economic and political systems. A paranoid style of politics follows quite naturally from this defensiveness. While Pakistanis are willing to blame some of their troubles on themselves, feelings of responsibility are lessened by the alleged sinister behavior of others. It is far more comforting to contend that their impotence comes from the reality that they have been singled out for manipulation and exploitation, and regularly let down by their friends.

The paranoid syndrome conspicuously employs conspiracy theories to explain political outcomes. An aspect of political culture, it is also a means employed to mobilize support for a regime and discredit political opponents. The paranoid style, well-practiced but by no means unique to Pakistan, thrives on the belief that forces are at work, confounding and manipulating others with their near higher, omnipotent powers. It often seems that "everybody is an amateur conspiracy theorist . . . nothing is taken at face value."8 The conspiracy theories always paint the blackest scenario, which invariably has a foreign hand-Indians most of the time but often enough the Ameri- cans and the British. Stories are transmitted by rumors and become a form of

8. Emma Duncan, Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey Through Pakistan (London: Ar- row Books Limited, 1989), p. 33.


entertainment as well. Political paranoia grows out of suspicions readily sus- tained in the absence of full, creditable information. Its theories offer disarm- ingly simple and not entirely implausible explanations, and no amount of evidence can refute them. If predicted events fail to occur, the conspiracy is easily reinterpreted. Indeed, the more the evidence seems to disprove the theory, the deeper the conspiracy is conceived to be. The perpetrators are then depicted as even more devious than was supposed, able to disguise their actions more effectively.

Conspiratorial thinking, lying deep in a national psyche, is naturally corro- sive to a civic culture. It reinforces a sense of distrust for political figures and political institutions-feelings which initially provide the impetus for most conspiracy theories. It affects not only the motivation to vote in elections but to engage in other democratic forms of participation. As a means of constructing reality, this paranoia is an invitation either to apathy in politics or an inducement to move toward more violent means of political expression. For Pakistan as elsewhere, it leaves mass publics open to suggestion that the only change is outside the system and to those individuals who offer quick and facile solutions.

With the moral basis for authority weak, the central government has little on which to win the confidence of people for political change or economic development. Unlike the Chinese, Pakistanis are not prepared to give a central role to government in shaping society. At the same time, and more positively, Pakistan's political culture refrains from insisting, as does the Chinese, on the impropriety of government responding to private interests competing for the favor of government. Pakistanis can easily conceive of legitimate power existing outside the formal domain of government. In recognition of autonomous associational spheres of interest, not all problems must be sub- sumed by the state. Moreover, there is no rigid ideology that would deny, as in China, non-political specialists a role in influencing policy.9 As such, Pakistanis are in a better position than the Chinese to accommodate a pluralistic system responsive to popular demands. With some strong ideas about rights against arbitrary authority may also come a better basis for a civil society in Pakistan. And for all the willingness of Pakistan's voters to follow charismatic figures, they are less liable to create artificial images of their leaders such as allowed an officially planned cult of the leader to flourish in China. Nor is there evidence that Pakistanis have the displaced personal ag- gression of the Chinese that allows their authoritarian leaders to easily channel these feelings into violent mass movements.10

9. See Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 17.

10. Ibid., pp. 30-31.


Islam and a Civic Culture Much debated in Pakistan as elsewhere is the question of whether Islam poses serious obstacles to realizing a democratic state. There seems to be little doubt that Islam presents no barrier to participatory forms of politics. A more contentious issue is whether in theory or practice Islam can coexist with liberal concepts of democracy and, in doing so, give more than limited status to minorities. Many insist that Islamic precepts and prohibitions need not put too heavy or unacceptable a burden on a democratic system. Arguably, the concepts of election, consensus of the community, and inclusiveness indicate important areas of compatibility with democratic ideals. For Maulana Maudoodi, a truly Islamic Pakistan could be democratic because rule would be by the whole community of Muslims rather than by a particular class.11 To explain why, in fact, Muslims almost everywhere live under authoritarian rule, blame is usually placed on a supposed degeneration over time of the authentic Islamic system. Logically then, Islam restored to its legitimate as- cendant position would permit genuine democratic government.

However, if the notion of a civic culture assumes that sovereignty lies with the will of the people, Islam, based on the ultimate authority of God's word, would seem to be incompatible with representative institutions. Islam does not derive its legitimacy from popular mandates expressed through free political associations or elected assemblies. The belief that Islam-as in other orthodox faiths-possesses the only truth understandably leads to the view that other views must be opposed for being false or misguided. Callard, re- ferring to Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, wrote that "Islam has not en- couraged systematic opposition. . . . The vision of good government possessed by many Muslims is that of a people united under a strong leader and confident in possession of certain truth."12 While Islamic rulers have usually given protection to minorities with different life styles and religious beliefs, historically the state has never given them full political equality. Is- lamic precepts are at some variance with a civil society that envisions a com- petitive arena for the articulation of various interests protected by a set of procedural rules. In contrast, Islam and popular culture in Pakistan offer up the powerful social and political influence of pirs (spiritual and political leaders of the Sufi Islamic sect), especially in the rural areas. Election to the National Assembly is virtually assured for those considered a living saint by their constituents. Furthermore, Islam's supposed particular reverence for the military is said to leave civilian-run democratic rule vulnerable.

Islam, however, can further a sense of citizenship for Pakistanis. Although seldom the basis for building a national consensus on contemporary issues,

11. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 169. 12. Keith Callard, Pakistan, a Political Study (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 125.


the country's religious heritage creates a convergence on what constitutes the public good for its citizens. Indeed, the mission of the Islamic state is to carry religious virtues into the public sphere, infusing government structures with appropriate values. Islamic jurisprudence among Sunnis does insist on mutual contractual obligations between subjects and their sovereign. Practi- cally, of course, there is an inadequate basis for finding rulers to have broken a trust-so long as they profess to be good Muslims and to be implementing the Sharia (Islamic) law. There exists no ready means of either determining when they have violated their trust as the immediate sources of God's authority or an institutionalized means to remove them when they have.

The skeptic sees Islamic parties advocating democracy as a means not an end. This accusation was first heard in Pakistan in the 1950s when the Jama'at-i-Islami proclaimed its support for democratic procedures; its opponents insisted the party was merely using the system to dislodge President Ayub and that, once in power, Jama'at would never give the political opposition a similar opportunity. Yet Pakistan's more extremist Islamic parties have consistently and legally participated in the democratic process-when it was available. To be sure, they have never succeeded in gaining wide electoral support, but the Pakistan case nevertheless casts doubt on the propo- sition that Islamists, when given opportunity to articulate their views in a democratic fashion, will inevitably seek to undermine the system. In general, much depends on the timing of democratic concessions and a willingness to consider that the Islamic parties are not necessarily monolithic or un- pragmatic. While some Islamic leaders are bound to remain irreconcilable to compromise, rhetoric aside, most probably prefer a share of political power to remaining indefinitely on the outside.

Pakistan could indeed become a crucible for determining whether exten- sions of democratic practice are likely to provide a successful means of ac- commodating militant Islamic political movements. The country's experiences suggest that militant Islamic parties may be moderated when given a democratic option-an honest opportunity to compete. The popularity of Is- lamic parties in many states, according to this reasoning, is largely of a pro- test variety, coming from the denial of a more open political process. Meaningful political outlets provide real alternatives to violence through procedural means. Conceivably, freer access to the political arena also provides options to those other groups-joined by blood and common heritage-that in the absence of a civic culture and civil society are more likely to settle their accounts through armed conflict.

Conclusion So much of the literature of late has focused on the transition to democracy among those systems, as in the former communist bloc, that have little or no


experience with democracy. Whatever the necessary strategies for the successful evolution of democratic institutions, there are many other countries, like Pakistan, for which democracy is not so new or untried; rather, they have demonstrated difficulty in sustaining it. Very likely, these countries can be said to have inchoate civic cultures and potential civil societies, and thus require somewhat different sets of strategies to succeed. For Pakistan, appropriate role models may be less necessary than cumulative positive experiences.

In general, opportunities for a civic culture and civil society in Pakistan will be enhanced the longer the period during which democratic practices are allowed to prevail. The repeated dismissal or overthrow of elected regimes leaves no positive memory and little chance for institutions to adapt and sup- portive values to root. Although elections are sometimes tainted by design or overzealous officials, the more elections that take place in which losers accept defeat and winners are magnanimous in victory, the greater the chances for an electoral process capable of surviving inevitable challenges. Older allegiances and traditional leaders may continue to be salient, but the public expression that goes with an autonomous associational life also comes to be better understood over time.

Political culture appears to serve as a crucial link between economic development and democracy, especially where the society is trying to cast off feudal values. Economic factors are of course a necessary part of the equation for a sustainable democracy, sharing with cultural factors an influence over citizens' life satisfaction and deep-rooted political contentment. For without a reasonable degree of economic prosperity, a civic culture is likely to erode. As is often observed, favorable economic conditions together with cultural values help create people with a stake in the status quo or at least a willingness to take their chances on the future. While democratic institutions may be accused of responsibility for the low state of citizens' welfare, a strong civic culture and civil society are usually found to have been critical where deep economic hardship has been endured and democracy retained.

Hopes among modernizers for a public sufficiently informed to buttress a civil society usually rest on bringing changes through enlightenment, that is, in mass secular education. Tinker, writing in 1961, observed that democracy in South Asia would depend on the spread of adult education and the emanci- pation of woman.13 If so, one cannot be too sanguine, particularly about contemporary Pakistan. It is well known that the country ranks near the bot- tom of all states in the percentage of national expenditures for education. Liberalization of the press and airwaves accomplished under recent governments no doubt contributes to public enlightenment and could have a lasting

13. Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 9.


impact on the way the people view their governments. Wider communication sources can help to institutionalize an open system that would make it more difficult for a future authoritarian figure to stifle debate. At the same time, with citizens gaining greater awareness of politics in their own country and elsewhere, comparisons have already led to new heights of cynicism about Pakistan's domestic institutions and public actors.'4 Uninterrupted revela- tions of corruption among elected public officials have begun to raise the question among many whether democratic government in Pakistan inevitably invites corruption, and whether to eradicate it requires a strong, populist re- former.

With respect to women's rights, the country took a step backward with the promulgation by Zia ul-Haq in 1979 of the hudood ordinances and the 1982 Law of Evidence. Intended to ensure "Islamic" punishments for certain crim- inal acts, the laws have placed women at increased disadvantage in legal pro- ceedings. The failure to create clear distinctions between adultery and rape, and the differences accorded men's and women's legal testimony are alleged to be strongly discriminatory toward women.15 Despite protests by women's groups and others against these laws and broader claims that women are de- nied equal civil and economic liberties, even the ascent to power of a female as prime minister has not brought changes. Benazir Bhutto's promises to address the plight of women and, specifically, to introduce reforms of the laws have fallen victim to parliamentary opposition and her fear that she will be judged as undermining the progress in Islamization.

Societies like Pakistan that are preoccupied with national security concerns are notably less tolerant of groups and ideas that challenge the dominant views or values. Indeed, such publics are usually willing to place their faith in individuals who promise to deliver them from the perceived dangers, and without much concern for leadership accountability. This deference grows more out of fear than trust. Perceived threats to security may create a sense of unity in the face of a common enemy but it is a cohesion that is unlikely to carry over to other public affairs. Indeed, national insecurities, whether military or social, create traumas with lasting impact on political culture. Much of the time these influences in Pakistan have done little to enhance involvement, trust, or satisfaction with the political system.

Plainly, the kind of civil society and underlying culture appropriate for Pakistan should not be expected to mimic Western experiences. Any democ-

14. A survey of businessmen by Transparancy International, a European organization that monitors corruption in many countries, found that Pakistan is perceived to be the most corrupt country in Asia and, after Nigeria, the second most corrupt of all those studied. Economist, June 15, 1996, p. 37; also Time, June 10, 1996, p. 24.

15. See Anita M. Weiss, "The Status of Women," in Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul Bakhsh Rais, eds., Pakistan 1995 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 45-59.


racy in Pakistan will have to take into account certain Islamic prescriptions and other legacies. The strong emphasis on individual rights in the Anglo- American experience, along with other concepts and practices, will require modification in a Pakistani context. Democratic ideals of maximizing free- dom, equality, and the public good are bound to be defined somewhat differ- ently in a Pakistani civic culture, just as are expectations about associational life, civility, and identity in an indigenous civil society.

Even so, minimizing or denying the relevance of Western democratic experiences to Pakistan is probably unwarranted. Very likely the best reason to insist on the appropriateness of democratic values and institutions is that, from an ideological-constitutional standpoint, democracy does not represent an alien goal. The country was founded on many of these precepts, and as ideals they continue to resonate widely. Such basic ideas as representative government and rule of law remain part of the Pakistani society's aspirations for itself. To be sure, there has been a rejection at the emotional level of some aspects of Western culture and disgust with secular political institutions. Replacement with authentic Islamic institutions is the widely accepted ultimate objective. Yet the desire of most in Pakistan to remain true to Islam and also realize the material benefits identified with the West apparently pose few moral problems. So, too, room appears to exist to incorporate the values embedded in a more universally defined civil culture. Notwithstanding the seeming contradictions, Pakistan might still become both an ideological and a democratic state.

civic culture and democracy in pakistan · to decisions of jinnah who, together with his...

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