civ law rev digests into to restrictions on capacity

8/14/2019 Civ Law Rev Digests Into to Restrictions on Capacity

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Digests

Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transportedin the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-sixcarabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur withBatangas as their destination. They were providedwith three certificates:1) a health certificate from the provincialveterinarian,2) permit to transfer/transport from theprovincial commander; and3) three certificates of inspections.In spite of the papers, the carabaos wereconfiscated by the provincial veterinarian and thetowns police station commander while passingthrough Camarines Norte. The confiscation was

based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits thetransportation of carabaos and carabeef from oneprovince to another.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing forthe confiscation and forfeiture by the governmentof carabaos transported from one province toanother, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceablebefore publication in the Official Gazette on June14, 1982

RULING: No. The said order is not enforceableagainst the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it isa penal regulation published more than twomonths later in the OG. It became effective onlyfifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 ofthe Civil Code and Sec-11 of the RevisedAdministrative Code.

The word laws in article 2 includes circulars andregulations which prescribe penalties. Publicationis necessary to apprise the public of the contentsof the regulations and make the said

penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that allPresidential executive orders having generalapplicability should be published in the OfficialGazette. It provides that every order ordocument which shall prescribe a penalty shall bedeemed to have general applicability and legaleffect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-Abecause its confiscation and forfeitureprovision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Itresults that they have cause of action for therecovery of the carabaos. The summaryconfiscation was not in order. The recipients of

the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.However, they cannot transport the carabaos toBatangas because they are now bound by the saidexecutive order. Neither can they recoverdamages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted ingood faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersalof the carabaos.

Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation anddispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside.Respondents to restore carabaos, with therequisite documents, to petitioners for theirown disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur

People v Veridiano Digest

G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984

Effectivity of laws

At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22which was circulated a month after privaterespondent issued the dishonored check.

Facts:1. On or about the 2nd week of May 1979,private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued acheck amounting to P200, 000 to one FilipinasTan. Said check was subsequently dishonored anddespite repeated demands, the respondent failedto make the necessary payment. Hence, the filingof charges against him for violation of B.P. 22 orthe Bouncing Check law.

2. Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash allegingthat the information did not charge an offence onground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect whenthe offense was committed on May 1979. Said lawtook into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecutionopposed the motion and contended that the dateof the dishonor of the check -- September 26,1979, is the date of the commission of the offense,

hence BP 22 is applicable.

3. The respondent judge granted Go Bio'smotion and dismissed the criminal action hence,this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 waspublished in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979,and hence became effective 15 days thereafter oron April 24, 1979. PR contends however that saidpublication was only released on June 14, 1979but since the questioned check was issued aboutthe second week of May 1979, then he could nothave violated BP 22 because it was not yetreleased for circulation at the time.
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Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when

the offense was committed

NO.

The penal statute in question was circulated onlyon June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date ofApril 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessaryso that the public can be apprised of the contentsof a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If astatute had not been published before itsviolation, then in the eyes of the law there was nosuch law to be violated. Hence, the accused couldnot have committed the alleged crime. In effect,when the alleged offense was committed therewas still no law penalizing it. If BP 22 intended tomake the printed date of issue of the OfficialGazette as the point of reference in the

determination of its the effectivity, it could haveprovided a special effectivity provision. Finally,the term "publication" in BP 22 must be given theordinary accepted meaning, to make known to thepeople in general.

Taada vs. TuveraFACTS:Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compelrespondent public officials to publish, and/orcause the publication in the Official Gazette ofvarious presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation andadministrative orders, invoking the right to beinformed on matters of public concern asrecognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not the publication of presidentialdecrees, letters of instructions, general orders,proclamations, executive orders, letter ofimplementation and administrative orders is

necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall

take effect after fifteen days following thecompletion of their publication in the OfficialGazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Courthas ruled that publication in the Official Gazette isnecessary in those cases where the legislationitself does not provide for its effectivity date-forthen the date of publication is material fordetermining its date of effectivity, which is thefifteenth day following its publication-but notwhen the law itself provides for the date when it

goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude therequirement of publication in the Official Gazette,even if the law itself provides for the date of itseffectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of apublic nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decreesthat provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties fortheir violation or otherwise impose a burden or.the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fallwithin this category. Other presidential issuanceswhich apply only to particular persons or class ofpersons such as administrative and executiveorders need not be published on the assumptionthat they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

MRCA, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V.

PELAYO, Judge, Regional Trial court, National

Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig,

M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. &

LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION

P. TIOSECO, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

A complaint was dismissed by the Regional TrialCourt on the ground of non-payment of the properfiling fees, as the prayer of the complaint failed tospecify the amounts of moral damages, exemplarydamages, attorney's fees and litigation expensessought to be recovered by it from the defendants,but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable

Court" or "to be proven during the trial." The trialcourts decision was based on the Supreme Courtruling in Manchester Development Corporation vs.Court of Appeals.

However, petitioner argues that since the decisionin Manchester had not yet been published in theOfficial Gazette when its complaint was filed, theruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling maynot be given retroactive effect because it imposesa new penalty for its non-observance; the

dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction;and, that it should not apply to the present case


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because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trialcourt) had no fraudulent intent to deprive thegovernment of the proper docketing fee, unlikethe Manchester case where enormous amounts ofdamages were claimed in the body of thecomplaint, but the amounts were not mentionedin the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of courtin computing the filing fees to be paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not decisions of the Supreme Courtrequire publication in the Official Gazette beforethey may be applied to other cases.

RULING:

No. The rule is, publication in the Official Gazette

is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a courtruling even if it lays down a new rule ofprocedure, for "it is a doctrine well establishedthat the procedure of the court may be changed atany time and become effective at once, so long asit does not affect or change vested rights."

However, in accordance with our ruling in SunInsurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may beallowed to amend its complaint for the purpose ofspecifying, in terms of pesos, how much it claims

as damages, and to pay the requisite filing feestherefor, provided its right of action has not yetprescribed. This the petitioner is ready to do.

Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest

GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989

Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000sacks of refined sugar owned by petitionerYaokasin, which were then being unloaded fromthe M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to thecustody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7,1988, the District Collector of Customs orderedthe release of the cargo to the petitioner but thisorder was subsequently reversed on June 15,1988. The reversal was by virtue of CustomsMemorandum Order (CMO) 20-87inimplementation of the Integrated ReorganizationPlan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protestand seizure cases where the decision is adverse tothe government, the Commissioner of Customs

has the power of automatic review.Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12

of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that thesewere not published in the Official Gazette. ThePlan which was part of P.D. 1 was howeverpublished in the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87

need to be published in the OG to take effect

NO.Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply tocirculars like CMO 20-87 which is anadministrative order of the Commissioner ofCustoms addressed to his subordinates, thecustom collectors. Said issuance requiringcollectors of customs to comply strictly withSection 12 of he Plan, is addressed only toparticular persons or a class of persons (thecustoms collectors), hence no general

applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera,It neednot be published, on the assumption that it hasbeen circularized to all concerned.

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides anenumeration of what shall be published in theOfficial Gazette. It provides that besides legislativeacts, resolutions of public nature of Congress,executive, administrative orders andproclamations shall be published except whenthese have no general applicability.

DISSENTING: MEDIALDEAThere is no question that P. D. No. 1/ the Plan isstill a valid law. However, I do not agree that thisis legal authority to uphold the Commissioner'sright to automatically review decisions of theCollector of Customs in seizure cases, and, in theprocess, allow a reversal of a decision favorable tothe importer. When the Plan became law pursuantto P.D. No. 1, Section 2313 of RA 1937 (Tariff andCustoms Code of the Philippines) alreadygoverned the review powers of the Commissioner

of Customs. Thus, while both Section 12 of thePlan and 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code dealwith the review powers of the Commissioner ofCustoms, the Plan is a general law, as it concernsitself with the reorganization of the executivebranch of the government in a martial law regime,whereas the Code is a special law, i.e., specificallyon tariff and customs duties. Consequently, thePlan is subservient to the Code and the automaticreview power granted therein can not be upheld.

Kasalag v Rodriguez

FACTS:
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In 1932, Marcial Kalasag and Emiliana Ambrosioexecuted a document which stated that: the party of the first part (Emiliana) herebyencumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage,only the improvements described in Articles IIand III hereof, of which improvements the party ofthe first part is the absolute owner.

1933, Emiliana was not able to pay the interestand tax. She and Marcial entered into anotherverbal contract, where she conveyed to Marcialthe possession of the land on the condition that nointerest will be collected. So Marcial now, enteredthe land, gathered the produce and did not collectinterest

Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and soheld that the contract entered into by and

between the parties, set out in the said publicdeed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of theland and its improvements. It held the contractVOID but Emilianas heirs mustpay the loan.

SC: The cardinal rule in the interpretation ofcontracts is to the effect that the intention of thecontracting parties should always prevail becausetheir will has the force of law between them.Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this ruleand provides, that if the terms of a contract areclear and leave no doubt as to the intention of thecontracting parties, the literal sense of itsstipulations shall be followed; and if the wordsappear to be contrary to the evident intention ofthe contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.

Contract clearly show that they intended to enterinto the principal contract of loan in the amount ofP1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum,and into the accessory contract of mortgage of theimprovements on the land acquired as homestead,the parties having moreover, agreed upon the

pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In otherwords, the parties entered into a contract ofmortgage of the improvements on the landacquired as homestead, to secure the payment ofthe indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulatedinterest thereon.

Another fundamental rule in the interpretation ofcontracts, not less important than those indicated,is to the effect that the terms, clauses andconditions contrary to law, morals and publicorder should be separated from the valid and legalcontract and when such separation can be made

because they are independent of the valid contractwhich expresses the will of the contracting parties

According to Manresa: a criterion based upon thestability of juridical relations should tend toconsider the nullity as confined to the clause orpact suffering therefrom, except in case where thelatter, by an established connection or by manifestintention of the parties, is inseparable from theprincipal obligation, and is a condition, juridicallyspeaking, of that the nullity of which it would alsooccasion

The petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore notconversant with the laws. When he accepted themortgage of the improvements, it is based on hiswell-grounded belief that he is was not violatingthe prohibition on the alienation of land. Thus is

possessing, and consenting the receipt of its fruits,he has no knowledge that this is already in thenature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien,was prohibited by section 116. Therefore,petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basisof his good faith.

(1) that the contract of mortgage of theimprovements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid andbinding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreedupon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrancewhich burdens the land and, as such, is a null andwithout effect; (3) that the petitioner is apossessor in good faith; (4) that the respondentsmay elect to have the improvements introducedby the petitioner by paying the latter the valuethereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buyand have the land where the improvements orplants are found, by paying them its market valueto be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing theparties; (5) that the respondents have a right tothe possession of the land and to enjoy the

mortgaged improvements; and (6) that therespondents may redeem the mortgage of theimprovements by paying to the petitioner withinthree months the amount of P1,000, withoutinterest, as that stipulated is set off by the value ofthe fruits of the mortgaged improvements whichpetitioner received, and in default thereof thepetitioner may ask for the public sale of saidimprovements for the purpose of applying theproceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit

Puzon v Abellera Digest

G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989
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RetroactivityFacts:The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera(substituted upon her death by Domondon) wasthe owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of landsituated in Baguio City, a land which waspreviously part of the public domain but was titledpursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v PioMarcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titlesissued under RA 931 are null and void since thesaid Act was applicable only to places covered bycadastral proceedings, and not to the City ofBaguio which was covered by a townsitereservation.This same ruling was subsequently incorporatedinto a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An actnullifying decrees of registration and certificates

of title covering lands within the Baguio TownsiteReservation pursuant to RA 931 which took effecton December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered asvalid certain titles of lands that are alienable anddisposable under certain conditions and for otherpurposes. Hence, the lot in question was revertedto the public domain.The subject lots were sold in an auction sale dueto the non-payment of taxes.\Petitioner tookinterest and subsequently won the bid. A yearafter, a certificate of sale was issued. In thisconnection, the petitioner filed a case toconsolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile,Domondon found out about the auction sale andfiled an opposition to the petition forconsolidation filed by petitioner. The trial courtruled that said auction sale is null and void andthat the assessments were illegally made. Thiswas affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence thispetition with petitioner contending that the taxassessments were valid and that PD 1271 has acurative effect.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be appliedretroactively

YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits theretroactive application of laws unless expresslyprovided therein, such rule allows someexceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of theexceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily tomake such titles valid from the time they wereissued. This implies that the intent of the law is torecognize the effects of certain acts of ownershipdone in good faith by persons with Torrens titlesissued in their favor before the cut-off date stated,honestly believing that they had validly acquired

the lands. And such would be possible only byvalidating all the said titles issued before 31 July1973, effective on their respective dates of issue.However, the validity of these titles would notbecome operative unless and after the conditionsstated in PD 1271 are met.

While it may be argued that Article 4 of the NewCivil Code prohibits the retroactive application oflaws unless expressly provided therein, such ruleallows some exceptions. As We have held in thecase of Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, "astatute operates prospectively only and neverretroactively, unless the legislative intent to thecontrary is made manifest either by the express

terms of the statute or by necessary implications."

Considering, however, that during the years 1971-

1977 the land in question was still part of thepublic domain, the oppositor-appellee could not,in those years, obviously be held liable for realproperty taxes over the land in question. Since thevalidity of her title would take effect retroactivelyonly after having complied with the conditions setin PD 1271, only then could she be held liable fortaxes for the period starting 1971 to 1977.

The land should really be considered owned bythe respondent and her title thereto must not bedisturbed BUT she must pay the real propertytaxes thereon for the years 1971-1977.

Acosta v Plan

Facts:Petitioners filed an accion publiciana1 againstprivate respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela.Believing that as pauper litigants they did nothave to submit a record on appeal, they waited forthe trial court to elevate the entire records of thecase to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 ofthe Rules of Court).

On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed theappeal for failure to file a record on appeal, hencethis petition. Under the Rules of Court then inforce, a record on appeal was indeed required tobe filed by a pauper appellant although it did nothave to be printed.

Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a

record on appeal is required for the

1An action for recovery of possession of property filed one year ofthe dispossession. It is a plenary action in an ordinary civilproceeding to determine the better right of possession of realtyindependently of title.
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perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant

NO.Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this casebefore it could be decided, a record on appeal isno longer required for the perfection of an appeal.This law was given retroactive effect.

As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural innature, those provisions may be appliedretroactively for the benefit of petitioners, asappellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure ofthe courts will be construed as applicable toactions pending undetermined at the time of theirpassage. Procedural laws are retrospective in thatsense and to that extent.'

Sec. 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides:

Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper. Where a partydesiring to appeal shall establish to thesatisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauperand unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting theappeal, and that the case is of such importance, byreason of the amount involved, or the nature ofthe questions raised, that it ought to be reviewedby the appellate court, the trial judge may enter anorder entitling the party to appeal as pauper. Theclerk shall transmit to the appellate court theentire record of the case, including the evidencetaken on trial and the record on appeal, and thecase shall be heard in the appellate court upon theoriginal record so transmitted without printingthe same.'

The trial court is hereby ordered to forward theentire records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Courtof Appeals for the determination and dispositionof the petitioners' appeal on the merits.

BPI v IAC

Facts:

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained inCOMTRUST a dollar savings account and a pesocurrent account. An application for a dollar draftwas accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branchmanager of COMTRUST payable to a certainLeovigilda Dizon. In the APPLICation, Garciaindicated that the amount was to be charged tothe dollar savings account of the Zshornacks.There was no indication of the name of thepurchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued acheck payable to the order of Dizon. WhenZshornack noticed the withdrawal from hisaccount, he demanded an explainaton from thebank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the

peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty.Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When heencashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check forP8450 issued by the manila banking corporationpayable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between petitionerand respondent bank is a deposit? YES

Held: No sworn answer denying the dueexecution of the document in question, orquestioning the authority of Garcia to bind thebank, or denying the bank's capacity to enter intothe contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank isdeemed to have admitted not only Garcia'sauthority, but also the bank's power, to enter intothe contract in question. Garcia's act of enteringinto the contract binds the corporation, we now

determine the correct nature of the contract, andits legal consequences, including its enforceability.

The document which embodies the contract statesthat the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank forsafekeeping. The subsequent acts of the partiesalso show that the intent of the parties was reallyfor the bank to safely keep the dollars and toreturn it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus,Zshornack demanded the return of the money onMay 10, 1976, or over five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract definedunder Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from themoment a person receives a thing belonging toanother, with the obligation of safely keeping itand of returning the same. If the safekeeping ofthe thing delivered is not the principal purpose ofthe contract, there is no deposit but some othercontract.

the document and the subsequent acts of the

parties show that they intended the bank tosafekeep the foreign exchange, and return it laterto Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint that heis a Philippine resident. The parties did notintended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bankwithin one business day from receipt. Otherwise,the contract of depositumwould never have beenentered into at all.

Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks,without selling them to the Central Bank within

one business day from receipt, is a transactionwhich is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, itmust be considered as one which falls under the


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general class of prohibited transactions. Hence,pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void,having been executed against the provisions of amandatory/prohibitory law.

Guingona v Carague Digest

Facts:Petitioner senators question the constitutionalityof the automatic appropriation for debt service inthe 1990 budget which was authorized by PD 81.Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31),and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2)restrain the disbursement for debt service underthe 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Whilerespondents contend that the petition involves apolitical question (repeal/amendment of saidlaws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been

impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution

NO.(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal oramendment by implication is frowned upon.Equally fundamental is the principle thatconstruction of the Constitution and law isgenerally applied prospectively and notretrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case thequestioned laws are complete in all their essentialterms and conditions and sufficient standards areindicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, asamended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No.1967 is that the amount needed should beautomatically set aside in order to enable theRepublic of the Philippines to pay the principal,interest, taxes and other normal banking charges

on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred asguaranteed by it when they shall become duewithout the need to enact a separate lawappropriating funds therefor as the need arises.The purpose of these laws is to enable thegovernment to make prompt payment and/oradvances for all loans to protect and maintain thecredit standing of the country.

Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest

Facts:

1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, CarmenOng de Martinez, was riding a carromata in

Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned bythe defendant (used for the transportation offodder and to which two horses are attached),came from the opposite direction, whiletheir carromata went close to the sidewalk inorder to let the delivery wagon pass by.However, instead of merely passing by, the

horses ran into the carromata occupied by theplaintiff with her child and overturned it, causinga serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.

3. The defendant contends that the cochero, whowas driving his delivery wagon at the time of theaccident, was actually a good servant and wasconsidered a safe and reliable cochero. He alsoclaims that the cochero was tasked to deliversome forage at Calle Herran, and for that purposethe defendants employee tied the driving lines of

the horses to the front end of the delivery wagonfor the purpose of unloading the forage to bedelivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driverand made noises that frightened the horsescausing them to run. The employee failed to stopthe horses since he was thrown upon the ground.

4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that thedefendant was guilty of negligence. The courtspecifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 ofthe Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reversesuch decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has

furnished a gentle and tractable team (of

horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is

liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was notnegligent in leaving the horses in the mannerdescribed by the evidence in this case. It isbelieved that acts or performances which, in along time, have not been destructive and which

are approved by the society are considered ascustom. Hence, they cannot be considered asunreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by thesociety is that they are beneficial rather thatprejudicial. One could not easily hold someonenegligent because of some act that led to an injuryor accident. It would be unfair therefore to renderthe cochero negligent because of suchcircumstances.

The court further held that it is a universalpractice of merchants during that time to deliver
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products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it isalso considered universal practice to leave thehorses in the manner in which they were leftduring the accident. It has been practiced for along time and generally has not been the cause ofaccidents or injuries the judgment is thereforereversed.

G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989

RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and

JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of

the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur,

Branch V, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed acomplaint against Rudy Gleo Armigos with theMunicipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur for thecollection of damages and attorney's fees. Aftertrial, judgment was rendered in favor of CristitoMata. A copy of the decision was received byArmigos on June 8, 1977, and the following day,June 9, 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with thesaid municipal court, and on June 24, 1977, hecompleted the other requirements for theperfection of an appeal, including the filing of anappeal bond and the payment of the appellatecourt docket fee. But the presiding judge of Courtof First Instance, Judge L.D. Carpio dismissed theappeal for it was filed beyond the reglementaryperiod.

Armigos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamuswith preliminary injunction with the Court ofAppeals, claiming that from June 8, 1977, when hereceived a copy of the decision of the municipal

court, to June 24, 1977, when he perfected hisappeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so thatthe decision of the Court of First Instance of Davaodel Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filedbeyond the reglementary period, is erroneous andcontrary to law. The petitioner contended that thecomputation of the period to appeal shouldcommence on the hour he received copy of thedecision, so that the first of the 1 5-day periodcomprising 24 hours is: from 4pm of June 9, 1977to 4pm of June 10, 1977 and the last day, from4pm of June 23, 1977 to 4pm of June 24, 1977.

ISSUE/S:

a.) Whether or not the computation of theperiod to appeal should commence on thehour of the receipt of the decision.

b.) Whether or not Armigos filed his appealon time.

HELD:

a.) No. The Court of Appeals rejected Armigosinterpretation for it would result in manyconfusing situations and many unreliabletestimonies as to the time a copy of adecision, order or pleading.

In the case of Republic of thePhilippines vs. Encarnacion, theCourt held that when a law was tobe effective upon approval by the

President and the President signedthe same on June 16, 1950, the lawshould be considered to havetaken effect not on the exact hourwhen the President signed thesame on June 16, 1950 but fromthe very first minute or hour ofsaid day of June 16, 1950.

b.) No. Because it was filed beyond thereglementary period. He should have filed

it on June 23, 1977 for his appeal to bevalid. Art. 13 of the NCC, provides that incomputing period, the 1stday is excluded,the last day is included.

The Petition is DENIED.

NAMARCO V. TECSON[29 S 70 (1969)] F: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgmentin a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs.Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case.On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all theproperties, assets, rights, and choses in action ofPrice, as pltff in that case and judgment creditortherein, filed w/ the same court, a complaintagainst defendants for the revival of thejudgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson movedto dismiss said complaint, upon the ground ofprescription of action, among others. The motionwas granted by the court. Hence, the appeal tothe CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the

ground that the only question raised therein isone of law, namely,


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ISSUE: W/n the present action for the revival of ajudgment is barred by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action forjudgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from thetime the judgment sought to be revived hasbecome final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c wasreceived by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal havingbeen taken therefrom. The issue is thus confinedto the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, butappellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the lawspeaks of years xxx it shall be understood thatyears are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 dayseach, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from

12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65.Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is noquestion that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to12/21 of the following year is one year. If theextra day in a leap year is not a day of the year,bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does itbelong? Certainly, it must belong to the yearwhere it falls, and therefore, that the 366 daysconstitute one yr.

HELD: The very conclusion thus reached byappellant shows that its theory contravenes theexplicit provision of Art. 13 limiting theconnotation of each "year"-- as the term is used inour laws-- to 365 days.[The action to enforce a judgment which becamefinal on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" interms of 365 days each, the action has prescribedon December 19, 1955, since the two interveningleap years added two more days to thecomputation. It is not the calendar year that isconsidered.]

Barreto Gonzales v Gonzales

FACTS:

The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of thePhilippines, married & lived together fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After whichthey voluntary separated & have not livedtogether as man & wife, they had 4 minor childrentogether.After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed toallow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her &her childrens support of P500 (five hundredpesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of

necessity & illness, and that the title of certainproperties be put in her name.Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales(defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on theground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. Onthat same date he went through the forms ofmarriage with another Filipino citizen as well &had 3 children with her.When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reducedthe amount he had agreed to pay monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & hasnot made the payments fixed in the Reno divorceas alimony.Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August

1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an actionat the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratifythe decree of divorce issued by the courts ofNevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such isrequested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what wouldhave been due to their children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parentsdied intestate on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage existing betweenBarreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved &Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 permonth, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expensesincurred in educating the 3 minor sons. Theguardians of the children also filed as intervenorsin the case.After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted thejudgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors,but reduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead &also granted the costs of the action against thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales sayingthat the lower court erred in their decision.

ISSUE:

WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens ofthe Philippine Islands, will be recognized in thisjurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and underconditions for which the courts of the PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce.NO.

The lower court erred in granting the relief asprayed for on granting the divorce, because:

The court said that securing the jurisdiction of thecourts to recognize & approve the divorce done in


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Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to thepublic policy in this jurisdiction on the question ofdivorce.Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on

cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the parties from the time of theirseparation until the case was submitted prayingthe ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly acircumvention of the law regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions not authorized by ourlaws.The matrimonial domicile of the couple hadalways been the Philippines & the residenceacquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was abona fide residence & did not confer jurisdictionupon the court of that state to dissolve the

matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in1919.Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Lawof the Philippines does not allow such to be done,the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines

says that litigants cannot compel the courts to

approve of their own actions or permit the

personal relations of the Citizens of the

Philippines to be affected by decrees of

divorce of foreign courts in manner which out

government believes is contrary to public

order & good morals.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO [15 SCRA 355]

F: Pastor Tenchavez (PT), 32, married VicentaEscano (VE), 27 on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. Asof June 1948, the newly-weds were alreadyestranged. On 6/24/50, VE left for the US. On8/22/50, she filed a verified complaint for divorceagainst the herein pltff. in the State of Nevada onthe ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental incharacter."

On 10/21050, a decree of divorce was issued bythe Nevada Court. On 9/13/54, VE married anAmerican Russel Leo Moran IN Nevada. She nowlives w/ him in California and by him, hasbegotten children. She acquired Americancitizenship on 8/8/58. On 7/30/55, PT filed acomplaint for legal separation and damagesagainst VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.HELD: At the time the divorce decree was issued,VE like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.She was then subject to Philippine law under Art.15, NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then nowin force, does not admit absolute divorce but onlyprovides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorcedecrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patentviolation of the declared policy of the State,especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC.Moreover, recognition would give rise toscandalous discrimination in favor of wealthycitizens to the detriment of those members of oursociety whose means do not permit them tosojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorceoutside the Phils.

Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens,sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC,is not entitled to recognition as valid in thisjurisdiction.

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO [139 SCRA 139]

F: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen ofthe Phils. while private resp. Richard Upton is a UScitizen; they were married in HK in 1972; after themarriage, they established their residence in thePhils. and begot 2 children; the parties weredivorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitionerhas remarried also in Nevada, this time toTheodore Van Dorn.

On 6/18/83, Upton filed a suit against petitionerin the RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner'sbusiness in Ermita, Mla. (the Galleon Shop), isconjugal prop. and asking that petitioner beordered to render an accounting of that business,and that Upton be declared as having the right tomanage the conjugal prop.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principleembodied in Art. 13, NCC, only Phil. nationals arecovered by the policy against absolute divorcesthe same being considered contrary to ourconcept of public policy and morality. However,aliens may obtain divorces abroad, w/c may be

recognized in the Phils., provided they are validaccording to their national law.

In this case, the divorce in Nevada releasedprivate resps from the marriage from the stds ofAmerican law, under w/c divorce dissolves themarriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is nolonger the husband of petitioner. He would haveno standing to sue in the case below aspetitioner's husband entitled to exercise controlover conjugal assets. xxx.


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To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws,petitioner has to be considered still married tohim and still subject to a wife's obligations underthe NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not beobliged to live together with, observe respect andfidelity, and render support to private resp. Thelatter should not continue to be one of her heirsw/ possible rights to conjugal prop. She shouldnot be discriminated against in her own country ifthe ends of justice are to be observed.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal propertyis subject to the law of the country where it issituated.However, intestate and testamentary successions,both with respect to the order of succession and tothe amount of successional rights and to theintrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall

be regulated by the national law of the personwhose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the property andregardless of the country wherein said propertymay be found.Balane: In Art. 16 par. 1 provides that the lex situsor lex rei sitae governs real or personal prop. Thisrule applies even to incorporeal property. InTayag v. Benguet Consolidated, 26 S, the SC saidthat Phil. courts have jurisdiction over shares ofstocks located in the Phils.Tolentino: The rule of mobilia sequunturpersonam in personal property has yielded to theto the lex situs bec. of the great increase inmodern times of the amount and variety of prop.not immediately connected w/ the person of theowner.Law on Succession.-- The law governingsuccession may be considered from the point ofview of (a) the execution of wills, and (b) thedistribution of property. The formalities ofexecution of will are generally governed by thelaw of the place of execution (Art. 17, par. 1.) But

the distribution of the estate is governed by thelaw of the nation of the deceased.Applicability of Foreign Law.-- The second par. ofthis article can be invoked only when the deceasedwas vested w/ a descendible interest in prop.w/in the jurisdiction of the Phils.The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the willof a foreigner who dies in the Phils. is to bedetermined by the laws of his own state orcountry, and not by those of the Phils. Thus, acondition in a will of a foreigner that his legateerespect his order that his prop. be distributedaccording to the laws of the Phils. instead of thelaws of his own country, was held illegal and

considered as not written.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,wills, and other public instruments shall begoverned by the laws of the country in which theyare executed.When the acts referred to are executed before thediplomatic or consular officials of the Republic ofthe Philippines in a foreign country, thesolemnities established by Philippine laws shall beobserved in their execution.Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts orproperty, and those which have for their objectpublic order, public policy and good customs shallnot be rendered ineffective by laws or judgmentspromulgated, or by determinations or conventionsagreed upon in a foreign country.Balane: The rule in par. 1 is known as the lex loci

celebrationis.Tolentino: Validity and Effects of Obligations.--The code fails to mention the law w/c shall governthe validity and effects of obligations. (1) First, thelaw designated by the parties shall be applied; (2)if there is no stipulation on the matter, and theparties are of the same nationality, their nationallaw shall be applied; (3) if this is not the case, thelaw of the place of perfection of the obligationshall govern its essence and nature, and the law ofthe place of the performance shall govern itsfulfillment; (4) but if these places are not specifiedand they cannot be deduced from the nature andcircumstances of the obligation, then the law ofthe domicile of the passive subject shall apply.(Manresa and Valverde.)

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was marriedwith private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, aGerman national before the Registrar of Births,

Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, FederalRepublic of Germany. They have a child who wasborn on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella PilapilGeiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated inprivate respondent and he initiated a divorceproceeding against petitioner in Germany beforethe Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. Thepetitioner then filed an action for legal separation,support and separation of property before theRTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated onJanuary 15, 1986 on the ground of failure ofmarriage of the spouses. The custody of the child


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was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal ofManila alleging that while still married to Imelda,latter had an affair with William Chia as early as

1982 and another man named Jesus Chuasometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecutepetitioner on the ground of adultery even thoughthey are no longer husband and wife as decree ofdivorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecutionfor adultery and concubinage, the person who can

legally file the complaint should be the offendedspouse and nobody else. Though in this case, itappeared that private respondent is the offendedspouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in hiscountry, the Federal Republic of Germany, andsaid divorce and its legal effects may berecognized in the Philippines in so far as he isconcerned. Thus, under the same considerationand rationale, private respondent is no longer thehusband of petitioner and has no legal standing tocommence the adultery case under the imposturethat he was the offended spouse at the time hefiled suit.

PEOPLE vs RITTER

G.R. No. 88582. March 5, 1991. GUTIERREZ, JR., JFACTS:

Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crimeof rape with homicide involving a young girl ofabout 12 years old who had been allegedly rapedand who later died because a foreign object leftinside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the

accused pleaded "Not Guilty".

Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.The trial court rendered a decision convicting theappellant of such crime.

ISSUE:

Whether SC should affirm the conviction of theaccused rendered by the lower court?

RULING:

Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court toaffirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt ofthe accused has been proved beyond reasonable

doubt, it behooves us to exert the mostpainstaking effort to examine the records in thelight of the arguments of both parties if only tosatisfy judicial conscience that the appellantindeed committed the criminal act. Before theconviction is affirmed, we must first follow therule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988])to wit: xxx The rule is that the death of thevictimmust be the direct, natural and logicalconsequence of the wounds inflicted upon him bythe accused. And since we are dealing with acriminal conviction, the proof that the accusedcaused the victim's death must convince a rationalmind beyond reasonable doubt. xxx

We cannot convict on anything less than proofbeyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the

Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system areas much, if not more so, for the perverts andoutcasts of society as they are for normal, decent,and law-abiding people. The requirement of proofwhich produces in an unprejudiced mind moralcertainty or conviction that the accused didcommit the offense has not been satisfied. Theestablished facts do not entirely rule out thepossibility that the appellant could have inserted aforeign object inside Rosario's vagina. This objectmay have caused her death. It is possible that theappellant could be the guilty person.

However, the Court cannot base an affirmance ofconviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions andpossibilities are not evidence and therefore shouldnot be taken against the accused. (People v.Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainlycommitted acts contrary to morals, good customs,public order or public policy (see Article 21 CivilCode). The appellant has abused Filipino children,enticing them with money. The Court deplores thelack of criminal laws which will adequately

protect street children from exploitation bypedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their ownparents or guardians who profit from the sale ofyoung bodies. The provisions on statutory rapeand other related offenses were never intendedfor the relatively recent influx of pedophilestaking advantage of rampant poverty among theforgotten segments of our society. We have toacquit the appellant because the Bill of Rightscommands us to do so. We, however, express theCourt's concern about the problem of streetchildren and the evils committed against them.Something must be done about it.


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HELD:

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on grounds ofreasonable doubt

ROE v WADE

Facts: January 22, 1973 - The U.S. SupremeCourt, in a 7-2 decision, affirms the legality of awoman's right to have an abortion under theFourteenth amendment to the Constitution.1971 - The case is filed by Norma McCorvey,known in court documents as Jane ROE againstHenry WADE, the district attorney of DallasCounty from 1951 to 1987, who enforced a Texaslaw that prohibited abortion, except to save awoman's life.

The Case: The Constitutional Question: Does the

Constitution embrace the right of a woman toobtain an abortion, nullifying the Texasprohibition?The ruling allows for legal abortions during theentire pregnancy, but set up conditions to allowstates to regulate abortion during the second andthird trimesters.

Decision:The Court held that a woman's right toan abortion fell within the right to privacy(recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protectedby the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gavea woman a right to abortion during the entirety ofthe pregnancy and defined different levels of stateinterest for regulating abortion in the second andthird trimesters.

Issues

1. Do abortion laws that criminalize allabortions, except those required onmedical advice to save the life of themother, violate the Constitution of theUnited States?

2. Does the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution protect the right toprivacy, including the right to obtain anabortion?

3. Are there any circumstances where a statemay enact laws prohibiting abortion?

4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy hadalready terminated naturally before thiscase was decided by the Supreme Courtrender her lawsuit moot?

5. Was the district court correct in denyinginjunctive relief?

Holding and Rule (Blackmun)

1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws thatexcept from criminality only life-savingprocedures on the mothers behalf, and

that do not take into consideration thestage of pregnancy and other interests, areunconstitutional for violating the DueProcess Clause of the FourteenthAmendment.

2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects theright to privacy, including a womans rightto terminate her pregnancy, against stateaction.

3. Yes. Though a state cannot completelydeny a woman the right to terminate herpregnancy, it has legitimate interests inprotecting both the pregnant womans

health and the potentiality of human life atvarious stages of pregnancy.

4. No. The natural termination of Roespregnancy did not render her suit moot.5. Yes. The district court was correct in

denying injunctive relief.

The Court held that, in regard to abortions duringthe first trimester, the decision must be left to thejudgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In

regard to second trimester pregnancies, statesmay promote their interests in the mothers

health by regulating abortion procedures relatedto the health of the mother. Regarding thirdtrimester pregnancies, states may promote theirinterests in the potentiality of human life byregulating or even prohibiting abortion, exceptwhen necessary to preserve the life or health ofthe mother.The Supreme Court held that litigation involvingpregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet

evading review, is an exception to the generalrule that an actual controversy must exist at eachstage of judicial review, and not merely when theaction is initiated.

The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 doesnot authorize a party seeking only declaratoryrelief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,review is not foreclosed when the case is broughton appeal from specific denial of injunctive reliefand the arguments on the issues of both injunctiveand declaratory relief are necessarily identical.The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was

based on contingencies which might or might notoccur and was therefore too speculative topresent an actual case or controversy. It wasunnecessary for the Court to decide Hallfords

case for injunctive relief because once the Courtfound the laws unconstitutional, the Texas


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authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.

Geluz v CA

Facts:The litigation was commenced in the Court of FirstInstance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, thehusband of Nita Villanueva, against petitionerAntonio Geluz, a physician. Lazos cause of actionwas the third and last abortion of his wife to thesaid doctor.

The wife aborted the first baby before they werelegally married. She had herself aborted again bythe defendant in October 1953. Less than twoyears later, she again became pregnant and wasaborted when the husband was campaigning inthe province. He did not give his consent.

The trial court granted the petition and order thedoctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. Thedoctor appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the husband can recover damagesfrom the death of a fetus

Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for thedeath of a person, does not cover the case of anunborn foetus that is not endowed withpersonality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on accountof personal injury or death pertains primarily tothe one injured, it is easy to see that if no actionfor such damages could be instituted on behalf ofthe unborn child on account of the injuries itreceived, no such right of action could derivativelyaccrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if acause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn

child, the same was extinguished by its pre-nataldeath, since no transmission to anyone can takeplace from on that lacked juridical personality.Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child shouldbe subsequently born alive: "provided it be bornlater with the condition specified in the followingarticle". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In thepresent case, there is no dispute that the child wasdead when separated from its mother's womb.

As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: Thecourt ruled that evidently because the appellee'sindifference to the previous abortions of his wife,also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that

he was unconcerned with the frustration of hisparental hopes and affections.

He appeared to have taken no steps to investigateor pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure thepunishment of the responsible practitioner. Evenafter learning of the third abortion, the appelleedoes not seem to have taken interest in theadministrative and criminal cases against theappellant. His only concern appears to have beendirected at obtaining from the doctor a largemoney payment, since he sued for P50,000.00damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstancesof record, was clearly exaggerated.

Quimiging v Icao

Facts:

Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, aminor. As a result, she had to pay forhospitalization and stopped studying. The latterclaimed damages Php 120 a month. Dulysummoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss forlack of cause of action since the complaint did notallege that the child had been born. The trial judgesustained defendant's motion and dismissed thecomplaint.Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allegethat as a result of the intercourse, she had latergiven birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustainingdefendant's objection, ruled that no amendmentwas allowable, since the original complaintaverred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealeddirectly to this Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Ratio:A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given

by law a provisional personality of its own for allpurposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided inArticle 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Theunborn child, therefore, has a right to supportfrom its progenitors.It is thus clear that the lower court's theory thatArticle 291 of the Civil Code declaring thatsupport is an obligation of parents and illegitimatechildren "does not contemplate support tochildren as yet unborn," violates Article 40aforesaid, besides imposing a condition thatnowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It istrue that Article 40 prescribing that "theconceived child shall be considered born for all


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purposes that are favorable to it" adds further"provided it be born later with the conditionsspecified in the following article" (i.e., that thefoetus be alive at the time it is completelydelivered from the mother's womb).Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversingthe orders appealed from is that for a marriedman to force a woman not his wife to yield to hislust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of hisvictim that entitles her to claim compensation forthe damage caused. Says Article 21 of the CivilCode of the Philippines:ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss orinjury to another in a manner that is contrary tomorals, good customs or public policy shallcompensate the latter for the damage.The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered inthe following and analogous cases:(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lasciviousacts

Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

TITLE: De Jesus v SyquiaCITATION: 58 Phil 866FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years ofage was a cashier in a barber shop owned by thedefendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza.Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age andan unmarried scion of a prominent family inManila was accustomed to have his haircut in thesaid barber shop. He got acquainted with Antoniaand had an amorous relationship. As aconsequence, Antonia got pregnant and a babyboy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy,

defendant was a constant visitor. On February1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev fatherconfirming that the child is his and he wanted hisname to be given to the child. Though he was outof the country, he continuously wrote letters toAntonia reminding her to eat on time for her andjuniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr.Talavera to attend at the birth and hospitalarrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and hischild at a House in Camarines Street Manila wherethey lived together for about a year. WhenAntonia showed signs of second pregnancy,

defendant suddenly departed and he was marriedwith another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening ofthe child, the defendant who was in charge of thearrangement of the ceremony caused the nameIsmael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar SyquiaJr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connectionwith the other letters written by defendant toAntonia during her pregnancy provesacknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that IsmaelLoanco had been in the uninterrupted possession

of the status of a natural child, justified by theconduct of the father himself, and that as aconsequence, the defendant in this case should becompelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father servesas admission of paternity and the other letters aresufficient to connect the admission with the childcarried by Antonia. The mere requirement is thatthe writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child

must be in the continuous possession of the statusof a natural child; and the period in this case waslong enough to reveal the father's resolution toadmit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trialcourt in refusing to provide damages to AntoniaLoanco for supposed breach of promise to marrysince action on this has no standing in civil law.Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a

judgment could be based requiring the defendantto recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.Finally, SC found no necessity to modify thejudgment as to the amount of maintenanceallowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50pesos per month. They likewise pointed out thatit is only the trial court who has jurisdiction tomodify the order as to the amount of pension.

Limjuco v Estate of Fragante

FACTS:

On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commissionissued a certificate of public convenience to the


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Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,authorizing the said intestate estate through itsSpecial or Judicial Administrator, appointed by theproper court of competent jurisdiction, tomaintain and operate an ice plant with a dailyproductive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell theice produced from the said plant in theMunicipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal,and Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate estate isfinancially capable of maintaining the proposedservice.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution ofthe legal representative of the estate of Fragantefor the latter as party applicant and afterwardsgranting the certificate applied for is acontravention of the law.

ISSUE:Whether the estate of Fragante be extended anartificial judicial personality.

HELD:The estate of Fragrante must be extended anartificial judicial personality. If Fragrante hadlived, in view of the evidence of record, wouldhave obtained from the commission the certificatefor which he was applying. The situation has notchanged except for his death, and the economicability of his estate to appropriately andadequately operate and maintain the service of anice plant was the same that it received from thedecedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate orthe mass of property, rights and assets left by thedecedent, directly becomes vested and chargedwith his rights and obligations which survive afterhis demise. The reason for this legal fiction, thatthe estate of the deceased person is considered a

"person", as deemed to include artificial orjuridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice orprejudice resulting from the impossibility ofexercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legalobligations of the decedent as survived after hisdeath unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered anartificial or juridical person for the purposes ofthe settlement and distribution of his estatewhich, include the exercise during the judicialadministration of those rights and the fulfillmentof those obligations of his estate which survivedafter his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature arenot extinguished by death go to make up a partand parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefitof the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, andthe heirs of the decedent. It includes those rightsand fulfillment of obligation of Fragante whichsurvived after his death like his pendingapplication at the commission.

TITLE: Dumlao v Quality PlasticsCITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered onFebruary 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven,Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang topay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of

P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest fromNovember 1958 before its decision became finalor else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized toforeclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay theamount before the limit given. Oria's land, whichwas covered by Original Certificate of Title No.28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenthshectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriffat public auction on September 24, 1962 which hehas given as security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or longbefore June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was notaware on Orias death. The summons and copiesof complaint was personally served on June 24,1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which thelatter acknowledged and signed in his own behalfand his co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, allsurnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs inOria's duly probated will, sued Quality PlasticProducts, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment

of the judgment against Oria and the executionagainst his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in hiscapacity as administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria andexecution against his land be annulled on theground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead priorcase T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed intheir stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics wasunaware of Orias death and that they acted in


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good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria,thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 isvoid for lack of jurisdiction over his person as faras Oria was concerned. He had no more civilpersonality and his juridical capacity which is thefitness to be the subject of legal relations was lostthrough death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics inorder to annul the judgment against Oria does notfollow that they are entitiled to claim attorneysfees against the corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision isreversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case

No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void forlack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria'sland covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

Eugenio vs Velez185 SCRA 45FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware ofthe formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a

petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27,1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental allegingthat she was forcible taken from her residencesometime in 1987 and was confined by the hereinpetitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacialresidence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The courtthen issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitionerrefused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the

sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot besubjected to habeas corpus proceedings.Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failuredue to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugeniosresidence. The court ordered that the body should

be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy butEugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of thecourt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claimcustody of the deceased.

HELD:The court held that the custody of the dead bodyof Vitaliana was correctly awarded to thesurviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section1103 of the Revised Administrative Code whichprovides:

Persons charged with duty of burial- if thedeceased was an unmarried man or woman or achild and left any kin; the duty of the burial shalldevolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse ascontemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,Philippine law does not recognize common lawmarriages where a man and a woman not legally

married who cohabit for many years as husbandand wife, who represent themselves to the publicas husband and wife, and who are reputed to behusband and wife in the community where theylive may be considered legally mauled in commonlaw jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that theman and woman living together must not in anyway be incapacitated to contract marriage.Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage

with another woman, legal impediment thatdisqualified him from even legally marryingVitaliana.

Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet vs.

Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the

port of Cebu, resp.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed bythe petitioner to compel Natividad to issue acertificate of Philippine registry in favor of theformer for its motor vessel Bato.

Facts:

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organizedand existing under the laws of the PhilippineIslands. A majority of its stockholders are Britishsubjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel knownas the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Batowas brought to Cebu in the present year for thepurpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandisebetween ports in the Islands. Application wasmade at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the

Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippineregistry. The Collector refused to issue thecertificate, giving as his reason that all thestockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were notcitizens either of the United States or of thePhilippine Islands. The instant action is the result.Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith,Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the lawsbecause it, in effect, prohibits the corporationfrom owning vessels, and because classification ofcorporations based on the citizenship of one ormore of their stockholders is capricious, and thatAct No. 2761 deprives the corporation of itsproperty without due process of law because by


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the passage of the law company was automaticallydeprived of every beneficial attribute ofownership in the Bato and left with the naked titleto a boat it could not use.

Issue:

Whether the Government of the PhilippineIslands, through its Legislature, can deny theregistry of vessel in its coastwise trade tocorporations having alien stockholders

Ruling:

Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:Investigation into character of vessel Noapplication for a certificate of Philippine registershall be approved until the collector of customs issatisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it isengaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate

trade and that it is of domestic ownership as suchownership is defined in section eleven hundredand seventy-two of this Code.

Certificate of Philippine register Uponregistration of a vessel of domestic ownership,and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate ofPhilippine register shall be issued for it. If thevessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tonsgross or less, the taking of the certificate ofPhilippine register shall be optional with theowner.While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation havingalien stockholders, is entitled to the protectionafforded by the due-process of law and equalprotection of the laws clause of the Philippine Billof Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of thePhilippine Legislature, in denying to corporationssuch as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to registervessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, doesnot belong to that vicious species of classlegislation which must always be condemned, butdoes fall within authorized exceptions, notably,

within the purview of the police power, and sodoes not offend against the constitutionalprovision

Barlin V. RAMIREZ[7 P 41] F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by thepltff parish priest, took possession of the churchon 7/5/01. He administered if as such under theorders of his superiors until 11/14/02. Hissuccessor having been then appointed, the lattermade a demand on this def. for the delivery to himof the church, convent, and cemetery, and thesacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, andother prop. of the church. The def., by a written

document of that date, refused to make suchdelivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, inconjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, hasseen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Romeand his representatives in these Islands, and tojoin the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def.,alleging in his amended complaint that the RomanCatholic Church was the owner of the church bldg,the convent, cemetery, the books, money, andother prop. belonging thereto, and asking that itbe restored to the possession thereof and that thedef. render an account of the prop. w/c he hadreceived and w/c was retained by him, and forother relief.

The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of thepltff.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that theRoman Catholic Church has no legal personality inthe Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made withreference to an institution w/c antedates byalmost a thousand years any other personality inEurope, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquencestill flourished in Antioch, and when idols werestill worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does notrequire serious consideration.

Standard Oil v Arenas

Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment,including the appellant Vicente Villanueva whoacted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manilaordered the defendants to pay jointly andseverally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While thejudgment was in the course of execution, ElisaVillanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and allegedthat her husband was declared insane on July 24,1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized bythe court as guardian to institute the proper legalproceedings for the annulment of several bonds

given by her husband while in a state of insanity.

Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering frommonomania of wealth necessarily warrants theconclusion that the person does not have capacityto act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, wasincapable of entering into contract at the time thebond was executed on December 15, 1908.Held: The court affirmed the trial court decisionthat Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. TheSC held that there is no evidence to warrant theconclusion, in a judicial decision, that a personsuffering from monomania of wealth is reallyinsane and therefore is deranged and incapable of


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binding himself in a contract. From the testimonyof his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the libertyto go wherever he wished, that he had property ofhis own and was not deprived of its management,as well as the fact that he had never squanderedany large sum of money.As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof thatshowed that at the date of the giving of the bond,December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapableof acting because of insanity. The witnesses whoas physicians, testified that they observed insaneperiods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on1908, but none at the time of the execution of thesaid bond on December 15, 1908. It was alsoshown that the wife never before sought to legallydeprive her husband management over his estateknowing full well that he was insane.

Mercado & Mercado vs. Espiritu; 37 Phil 215Facts:The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sistersConcepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, werethe children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, asister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that MargaritaEspiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernalproperty a tract of land of 48 hectares. Thedefendant (Luis Espiritu) was accused to haveinduced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting theplaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 asopposed to its original value. The annulment of adeed of sale was sought by the plaintiffs. Theyasserted that two of the four parties were minors.These two minors (Domingo & Josefa Mercado)presented themselves to be of legal age uponsigning it and they made a manifestation in frontof the notary public.

Issue:Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when theminors presented themselves that they were oflegal age.

Held:The courts have laid down the rule that the sale ofreal estate, made by minors who pretend to be oflegal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, andthey will not be permitted to excuse themselvesfrom the fulfillment of the obligations contractedby them, or to have them annulled.

BAMBALAN v MARAMBA

FACTS:Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her firsthusband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received aloan from Genoveva Muerong and German

Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leavingBambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922,Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, whowas at that time, a minor, to sell their land aspayment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but saidthat he was forced because they were threateninghis mother with imprisonment. Muerong andMaramba bought Bambalans first cedula toacknowledge the document.

ISSUE:Whether sale of the land to Maramaba andMuerong is valid.

RATIO:The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he wasa minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laiddown in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not

applicable to this case, because the plaintiff didnot pretend to be of age, and the defendant knewhim as a minor.

Important Statutes:

Civil Code, Article 38.

Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of beinga deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction aremere restrictions on the capacity to act, and donot exempt the incapacitated person from certainobligations, as when the latter arise from his actsor from property relations, such as easements.

Civil code, Art. 1327.

The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-muteswho do not know how to write. (1263a)

Civil code, Art. 1390.

The following contracts are voidable orannullable, even though there may have been nodamage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable ofgiving consent to a contract;(2) Those where the consent is vitiated bymistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence orfraud.

Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Ramon Alcantara,March 4, 1950


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Facts:

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale wasexecuted by Rufino Alcantara and his sonsDamaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantaraconveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land topetitioner Sia Suan

On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husbandof Sia Suan) received a letter from FranciscoAlfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara,informing him that Ramon Alcantara was aminor and accordingly disavowing thecontract.

After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter,Ramon Alcantara went to the office of GawChiaos counsel ratifying the sale.

Ramon Alcantara received from GawChiao the sum of P500 as payment for the soldparcels of land.

On August 8, 1940, an action wasinstituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court ofFirst Instance of Laguna for the annulment ofthe deed of sale on the ground of his minorityat the time of sale. Action wa s denied a ndSia Suan, Gaw Chiao,Ramons father and brother, Nicolas andAntonio Azores were absolved

Ramon brought the case to CA; CFIdecision reversed.

Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao filed a petition forcertiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Ramon Alcantaras executionof the deed of sale is valid despite being a minor atthe time of its execution.

Held:Ramon Alcantara in his minority may not beallowed to execute the deed of sale but his act ofratification, the contract was given a binding effect

BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS:Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from DeVilla Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and inconsideration thereof, promised in writing to payhim P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency ofthe Philippines 2 years after the cessation of thewar. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them

in March 1949. The Manila court of first instanceand CA held the family solidarily liable to pay

according to the contract they signed. The familypetitioned to review the decision of the CAwhereby they were ordered to solidarily pay DeVilla Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying forconsideration of the minority of the Braganza sonswhen they signed the contract.

ISSUE:Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18respectively, are to be bound by the contract ofloan they have signed.

RATIO:The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to payher share in the contract because the minority ofher sons does not release her from liability. She isordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.However with her sons, the SC reversed the

decision of the CA which found them similarlyliable due to their failure to disclose theirminority. The SC sustained previous sources inJurisprudence in order to hold the infant liable,the fraud must be actual and not constructive. Ithas been held that his mere silence when making acontract as to his age does not constitute a fraudwhich can be made the basis of an action ofdeceit.The boys, though not bound by the provisions ofthe contract, are still liable to pay the actualamount they have profited from the loan. Art.1340 states that even if the written contract isunenforceable because of their non-age, they shallmake restitution to the extent that they may haveprofited by the money received. In this case, 2/3of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which whenconverted to Philippine money is equivalent toP1,166.67.

PEOPLE vs RAFANAN Jr

Insanity

FACTS:On February 27, 1976, complainant EstelitaRonaya who was then only fourteen years old washired as a househelper by the mother of theaccused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and hisfamily lived with his mother in the same.Policarpio was then married and had twochildren.On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner,Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of theaccused to help in their store which was located infront of their house. Attending to the store at thetime was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in theevening, the accused called the complainant to


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help him close the door of the store and as thelatter complied and went near him, he suddenlypulled the complainant inside the store and saidthat they should have intercourse, Ronayarefused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it tothe throat of the complainant threatening her withsaid bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronayain spite of her resistance and struggle. After thesexual intercourse, the accused cautioned thecomplainant not to report the matter to hermother or anybody in the house, otherwise hewould kill her. In the evening of March 17, 1976,the family of the accused learned what happenedthat night.The principal submission of appellant is that hewas suffering from a metal aberrationcharacterized as schizophrenia when he inflictedhis violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial court

suspended the trial and ordered appellantconfined at the National Mental Hospital inMandaluyong for observation and treatment. Inthe meantime, the case was archived. Appellantwas admitted into the hospital on 29 December1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellantwas described as behaved, helpful in householdchores and no longer talking while alone. He wassaid to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and asdenying having hallucinations. The reportconcluded that he was in a "much improvedcondition" and "in a mental condition to standcourt trial."Trial

civ law rev digests into to restrictions on capacity

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