citizenship and exclusion

8/10/2019 Citizenship and Exclusion

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/citizenship-and-exclusion 1/37

Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What is Wrongwith Communitarianism?Author(s): Veit BaderSource: Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 211-246Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191876 .

Accessed: 01/01/2015 17:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 17:00:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/stable/191876?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/191876?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage



CITIZENSHIP

NDEXCLUSION

Radical

Democracy,

Community,

nd

Justice.

Or,

What Is

Wrong

with

Communitarianism?

VEITBADER

Universityof

Amsterdam

1. PARADOXES

F

SO

VEREIGN7Y

ND

CITIZENSHIP

Ours s

a time ullof

paradoxes.

he

development

f

the

modem tatewas

characterized

y

a

specific

monopolization

nd

unificationf

powers.

How-

ever,

his

development,

ramatizeds it was n the

uridico-political

yth

of

absolute,

nitary,

nd

ndivisible tate

sovereignty,'

eems o

be

over.I

see

four

main

paradoxes

f state

overeignty

n an

epoch

marked

imultaneously

andcontradictorilyy a processof erosionandstrengtheningf nation-

states :

1)

in a worldof fast and

horough

conomic, cological,political,

and nformational

lobalization,

e are

confronted ith

ethnic

evivals,

new

ribalism,

ethnic

leansings,

he

mplosion

f

states,

nd he

ike.

(2)

The

myth

and

practices

f indivisible

overeignty

f

nation-states

ontradict

the

developments

f internal

elegation devolution

f state

overeignty

o

states,

provinces, egions,

communities)

nd external

delegation

recon-

struction f state

overeignty )

o

suprastate

evels

and nternational

rgani-

zations hataresimultaneouslyoingon. (3) Themythandpractices f

unitaryovereignty,

ocused

n

the

nation-statend

claiming

monopolyn

legislation,

urisdiction,urrency,

axation,

nd

egal

enforcement,ontra-

dicts hesimultaneous

isentanglement

nd

delegation

f

those

powers e.g.,

European

urrency,uropean

ourts). 4)

The

myth

and

practices

f unlim-

ited,

absolute

overeignty

f the

nation-state

ontradictshe

growing actual,

moral,2

nd

egal

external

imitationshat

omplement

he

well-knownnter-

nal

limitations

liberal-democratic

onstitutions). imitations

y interna-

tionalaw, nternationalovenants,ndcourts, owever recariousheymay

be,

are

ncreasingly

ollowed

by proclamations

ndpoliciesof

intervention

AUTHOR'S

NOTE:

For

corrections of the

English text,

I

would like to thank T

Dekker,

P

Pekelharing,

and

T

Strong.

POLITICAL

THEORY,

Vol.

23 No.

2, May

1995 211-246

?

1995

Sage Publications,

nc.

211







212

POLITICALHEORY/

May

1995

in cases

n which

hemost

lementary

uman

ights

re

eriously

nd

blatantly

violated:

nternational

rotection

f civil

rights

ersus tate

sovereignty

and heoldprinciplef noninterventionnthe internal ffairse.g.,Helsinki

conference

n

peace

and

ecurity, ambodja,

raq/Kurdistan,

x-Jugoslavia);

democratic politicalights

ersusnonintervention

e.g.,

Haiti).

As I see them,

hemost mportantaradoxes

f citizenship oincide

with

these

developments

ndcanbesummarized

s follows:

1)

within

tates,

he

tendency

owarduniversalistnclusions

relatively

advancedlegal

and

politicalequality

among itizens).However,

his

equality

f inclusion

has

alwaysbeen,

and

still

s, intrinsically

nterwoven ith

systematic

xclusion

(legalandpoliticalnequality

etween

itizens

and

noncitizens

foreigners,

metics,

denizens, tc.).3 2)

Noncitizens

nddenizens

ncreasinglyetrights

that,

raditionally,

ave beenreserved

o

citizens,and,by this, citizenship

does

lose much

of

its

traditional

egal, political,

and

social

importance.

Moreover,

t is

exactly

his

development

hatadds

additional

momentum

o

the

tendency

f

exclusion.

3)

Citizenship

s

developing

n two

ways

nto a

multiple

ndmultilayeredoncept: olitical

itizenship

s

complemented

y

economic,ndustrial,ndsocialcitizenshipmany pheres f citizenship),

and

politicalcitizenship

s

gaining mportance

n

different,ncreasingly

suprastate

evels

of

political

ntegrationmany

evels of

political

citizen-

ship).4

However,

he

deaand

practice

f democraticelf-determinationnd

democraticitizenship

s still

predominantly

inkedand limited

o

state

membership

nd nationhood.

4)

As a

consequence

f

migration

nd

processes

of

European

nification

multicultural

ocieties and

European

citizenship),

ne

finds

a strong ultural nd

politicalpressure ven in so-

callednation-statesoward disentanglementf ethnicity, ulture, ndna-

tionhoodrom

itizenship.

et

at

thesame ime, n a reactivemove,onefinds

the

traditional

uperposition

nd

amalgamation

f

ethnic, racial,

ultural,

and

national

dentity

nd

citizenship

ecoming venstronger.

In

practical

olicies,

hose

paradoxes equire

flexibleresponse.Theo-

retically,

hey

ask

for

quick

and

horoughgoing

ethinking.t is

urgent,rom

botha

descriptive

nd

an

explanatory

erspective,

swellasfrom normative

one,

o

conceptualize

overeignty

s a

bundle

f

powers hat an

be divided,

limited,delegated.Citizenship as to be thoughtof as a multipleand

multilayered

oncept.'

Predominant

egal and

political heory

as well as

political hilosophy

eem

o

have

much

rouble

venstartingucha process.

They

are-as

always-in the

rearguard:ot onlyreactionarynd

neo)con-

servative

heory

butalso most iberal, ommunitarian,

nd neo)republican

theories f

democracy.6

By way

of

illustration,

shallconsiderhe

exemplary ifficulties

Michael

Walzer

has,

as

a radical

ocial democrat,n tackling hese

paradoxes f







Bader

CITIZENSHIP

ND

EXCLUSION 213

citizenship.

Walzer

s,

for

two

reasons,

one of the more

nteresting

authors n

this

regard:

his

pluralistdemocracy

s

opposed

to

strongparticularism

nd

to

allconservativeversionsof communitarianismnddoesaccept reiteratively

universalist

claims of

justice and

morality;

he breaksthe

eardeafening

silence

or

nearlycomplete

neglectof

problems

of

membership

nd

exclusion

inpredominant

iberal heories

ofjustice

(e.g.,

Rawls,Dworkin).

(Indeed,

he

was one of the first

in recent

politicalphilosophy

o

highlight

this

perplexing

problem.)

Nevertheless,

for

ethical-political

easons,

he

opts,

with

regard

o

the

first

paradox,

for

policies

of

fairly

closed borders.With

regard

to

the

second paradox,

Walzer

attacks,

for

democratic

reasons,

all

versions of

second

class

citizenship

or extended

periods.

He therefore s in

favor of

strong

irst

admission

election.With

regard

o the third

paradox,

Walzer

hinks

that

admission ndexclusionareat thecoreof communal

ndependence.

They

suggest

the

deepest

meaning

of

self-determination

1983, 62).

He states

that

to

give up

the state

is to

give

up any

effective

self-determination

(p.

44). The hardcore of his

ethical-political

rguments

gainstopen

borders

shows

that

Walzer,

with

regard

o the

fourth

paradox,clings

to the

superpo-

sition of ethnic,cultural,andnational dentitiesandcitizenship: i) closureis

thought

o be

necessary

and

egitimate

o defendthe

shared

meanings,

values,

and

ways

of life of

specific

(ethnic,

cultural,religious,

linguistic,

historical)

political

communitiesor

states; (ii)

closure

is

necessary

and

legitimate for

the

reproduction

nd

development

of

collective

political

identity

and attach-

ment;(iii)

closure

is

necessary

and

egitimate

or the

development

of

socially

or

culturally

embedded,

rich

personalities.

In this

essay

I

first

summarize ecent

discussions n

moraltheoryon

free

movement andshow thattherearestrongmoralreasons n favor of policies

of

fairlyopen

borders.

Next,

I

present

a short

sociological

critiqueof the

four

principal

arguments

y

which

Walzer riesto show

that

he

(nation-)state

is

the

adequateunit

of

political

ntegration nd

democratic

elf-determination.

Finally,

I

will

try

to

develop

a

multilayered onceptof

citizenship hat

allows

one,

at

least

in

principle,to combine

the moral

requirements f universalist

justice

with

the

requirements f

(differentversionsof)

radical

democracyand

particularorms

of life.

2. CITIZENSHIP

ND

EXCLUSION:MORAL,

PRUDENTIAL, EALIST

AND

ETHICALARGUMENTS

In

international

elationsof

exploitation,oppression,

and

discrimination,

citizenshiphas

always

been and still is the

single most

important

riterionof







214 POLITICALHEORY/

May

1995

inclusion

and exclusion

see

Brubaker

992).

Notwithstanding

he

strong

universalist

anguage

f human

ights

and he

nternationalisthetoric

n

the

liberal tradition( freemovementof capital ),the socialist tradition

( proletarian

nternationalism ),

nd the

anarchist

radition,

hose ex-

clusionaryconsequences

avebeen

widely gnored

n thedominant

heories

of

justice.7

Most recent

moral

theory

has as its common ore

some versionof a

universalist

galitarianism

see Kymlicka

990,5;

Goodin

1992, 7).

The

exclusionary

ffects

of

citizenship

re

ncompatible

ith this

egalitarian

plateau.

he

egalitarian

rinciple

f

equal

iberties

ervesas a criterion f

radical

ritique

of all

ascriptive rivileges.

Citizenship

aws

combine,

n

different

ways,

criteria f birthor descent

jus

sanguinis)

nd

erritory

jus

soli).

These

ascriptive

riteria re

morally

no more

defensible hanall the

other,

ike

kinship,

ex, age, region,

residence,anguage,

habits,culture,

lifestyles,

ender,eligion,

ationhood,

ocial

lass,

membership

n

churches,

parties,

nd o on.

Citizenship

n

Westerniberal

emocraciess the

modern

equivalent

f feudal

rivilege-an

nheritedtatus hat

reatly

nhances

ne's

life chances.Likefeudalbirthrightrivileges,estrictiveitizenships hard

to

justify

when

one thinksabout t

closely Carens

1987,252;

see

also

Carens

1992;

Dummet

1992, 171;

Brubaker

992, 31f;

Walzer

1983, 55,

1992,96f;SchuckandSmith

1985,

2).

Theuniversalism

f the moral

point

of

view,

even n its

thoughtful

nd weak

ersions,

which

favor,8

oes

not

allow

moral

privilege

o the

members f

particular

ommunities.

Following rguments

rom

ustice,

ather

han

rgumentsor ree

mobility

as a human

ight,9

think

necan

plausibly

how hat he

existing

nequalities

withinandbetween tatescannotbemorallydefended.Carens,Weithman,

and

Poggi

have reconstructed

awls's

1971)

argument

o

show

thatone

should

understandhe

originalpositionglobally:he

difference

rinciple,

then,requires

ar-reaching

nternational

edistributionf

resources ndre-

wards.Wereone to

introduce

ouchers or the

choice of

citizenshipn a

particular

tate nto

Dworkin'sdeaof an

ambition-sensitivend

ndowment-

insensitive

uction o as to

obtain,

nitially, fair

distributionf resources,

one

could,

most

probably, et

similar

esults.10 he

constructionf such

models s intendedoshowwhatajustdistributionn an deal,globalworld

would look

like.

They

wouldmostlikely

demonstraten

enormous ap

between hose

deal

distributionsnd the

existing

nternationalelations f

exploitation,

ppression,

nd

exclusion.A

just distribution

f resources

within tates

would

mplyredistributionf

control

ver

resources adically

incompatible ith

theusual

accommodation ith

capitalist

market cono-

mies. The

international

onsequenceswould

be, obviously,even more

radical.







Bader

CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION 215

Moral

constructions

f ideal worlds

are ntended o show what

ustice

requires;hey

do not

ellus

directly

what o do in nonidealworlds.

My

sketch

of anargumentoesnot ssue nanydirect ndunconditionalpresumption

for

ree

migration Carens

992,25).

It

shows,rather,i)

directly,

s the

irst

and

preferredption,

he

urgent equirement

f radical

nternational

edistri-

bution f

resources

the

orms

f

which cannot ven

ouch

on

here).'1

t

also

shows

ii) indirectly,

s a secondbest

option,

hemoral

equirement

f

fairly

openborders, pen

o the

degree

o

compensate

or

policies

of

international

redistribution,

renot

ntended,

mplemented,

rdo

not

have

any

successand

significant

mpact.12 ustice,

not

charity

r mutual

id,

asksfor

fairlyopen

borders.

Moral

arguments

re not the

only practical

rguments.

he

worldof

practical eason

and

udgment

s

a

complex

one. Moral

arguments

aveto

compete

with

prudential

rguments,

ith

realist

rguments,

ndwithethical-

political

ones.13

As we

are

confrontedwith

many

serious

heoretical nd

practical

ensions

between

hem,

t

is

useful o

distinguish

hese

arguments

analytically.

n all

those

hard

ases,

one needsnot

only prudence

ut

some

kindof priorityules.

Prudentialrgumentsanbe in favorof

open

bordersn all

conditions

n

which

open

borders re

n

the

well-informed,ong-termational

nterest f

the

particular

tate

n

question.

ut

prudential

rguments

re

always ondi-

tional.

n the

present lobal

ituation,

think

t is

unproblematic

o state

hat

arguments

bout nterestare

mainly

used

by defenders

f

fairly closed

borders:ollectivewelfare

hauvinism.

The

status

of

political

ealism s a

distinct

ormative

heory s question-

able,andrealismdoesnot, n itself,haveany ntrinsic irection.However,

realist

rguments

t eastremind s of two

points: i) ought

mplies an nd

(ii)moral rgumentshould

ake

nto

accounthemostprobablend xpected

consequences

f

just

action:

thicsof

responsibilityersus

justice e done,

though

heheavens

all.

From

umerous

olitical

nd

heoreticaltatements,

we know

herealist

rgumentsgainst penborders lltoo

well:overwhelm-

ing

numbers f

migrants

nd

refugees

flood ); ublicorderproblems;

unemployment

ndethnic

egmentationf labor

markets;

tressor break-

downof thesocial ecurity ystems; erious verload fpublic ocial ervices

(education, ousing,health,

ransportation,tc.); serious

politicaleffects

(welfare

backlash,

enophobia, acism,and immigrant

undamentalism);

cultural

Uberfremdungalienation).

n

thisarticle

cannot iscuss he real-

ity of thesewell-known

cenariosor

disaster. orthe sake

of argument,

accept

hat

hey

arenot

ust

black

prophecy laying

on

fear

andprejudice.

AndI

take t for

granted

hat

heopening f

borderss notan

adequate olicy

against nternational

nequalities.







216 POLITICAL

HEORY/

May

1995

Realistarguments,

f

applied gainst penborders,

ead

to two

conclu-

sions: i)

it is

apparent

hat adical

nternational

edistributions thefirstand

most mportantptionn thestruggle gainsttructuraloverty nd nequal-

ity.14

o

hedegree

hat

his

policy

doesnot

ucceed,

neof themost

mportant

causes

of forced

migration

annotbe removedand the

legitimacy

f

all

possible

other

normative

rguments

n favor of closed borderswill

be

severelyundermined

s a

consequence.

ii)

If one defends he

opening

of

borders s

asecond

best

stop-gap,

nehas to tackle he

apparent

ensions

between

moral

equirements

f

justice

andrealist

equirements

f

prudence.

Defensible olicies

of

open

bordershould ake

consequences

nto

account.

Neither

Carens

nor

Goodin,

herefore, pt

for

an

immediate

nd

complete

opening

f

all

borders;

haveused

he

phrase fairly pen

borders.

ut

f

it

comes

o

practicalmmigration,

efugee,

ndnaturalization

olicies,

doesnot

thatmean hat

he

seemingly uge

differencesetween

ositions

n

normative

philosophy

ecome

rrelevant? oesnot

fairly pen ctually

mean

xactly

the same

as

fairly

losed?

do notthink o. Firstof

all,

these

positions

influence

he

way

in which

consequences

re

conceived,discussed,

and

takenntoaccount ;econd, he directionf thosepoliciesdiffers onsid-

erably:

rom

a moral

point

of

view,

one

asks,

ooks

ntensely or,and ries

out

more,

much

more

Carens).

Realist

argumentsin

their

traditional

mixture

with

prudential

nd

ethical-politicalrguments)urrently

ean

ess,

much ess

immigration,sylum,

ndnaturalization.

Prudentialndrealist

arguments

or

closedborders

re

usuallymixedup

with different ersions

of

ethical-politicalrgumentssee the Walzerian

versionof communitarianism

n

section

1).

One can

speculate hat,

n an

imagineddealworld, herequirementsf morality ndSittlichkeit ould

complement

achother

harmoniously.

n

our

world,

and

particularly

n

the

case

of borders nd

citizenship,

heir ensions re

sharp

ndvisible.

Walzer,

in his characteristic

larity, learly

mentionshese ensions'5

see 1983,280.

On

the

other

hand,

he

recognizes,

with

a

disarming penness, he limitsof

hiscommunitarian

pproach:

Ican'tmove

beyond.Todo thatwould equire

a different

heory

which

would akeas its

subject

ot he

commonife of the

citizen

p. 30).

If

communitarianism,

or

all its versions, retendso be an

identifiableositionnpracticalhilosophy,hen t mustmean hat n allhard

cases

he

particularistequirementsf

community ust rumpheuniversal-

ist ones of

justice.

This

priority

ule

clearly

contradicts

he strongmoral

intuitions

hat are elaborated

n

modem

universalistmoraltheoriesand

internationalndconstitutionalaw:universalist

rinciplesndrights hould

not

only trump rudentialisttility

but

alsothe ethicsof particularommu-

nities.

Otherwise,morality

wouldbe no

more

hana thin

deological

mask

of

ethicalor utilitarian elfare hauvinism.







Bader

CITIZENSHIP

ND

EXCLUSION 217

3.

SOCIOLOGICAL

RITIQUE

OFA

COMMUNITARIANEFENSEOF CLOSED

BORDERS

Walzer

represents

one of the most liberal

and

pluralist

versions

of

com-

munitarianism.'6

herefore,

he

cannot

be criticizedfor the usual

theoretical

andhistorical

myths

thatcharacterizehe conservativeor

protective

versions:

the basic

concept

of

community

emains

vague;

he historical

oleof

violence

and

community

construction

or

building

s

ignored

n

pictures

of an

organic

development

of

communities;

nternal

homogeneity

of

communities s

pos-

tulatedand

cross-cutting

communal

allegiances

and

collective

identities are

forgotten;

n a kind of

retrospective

nostalgia,

communities

are

thought

o

be

harmonious

(traditional)

Gemeinschaften

and

confronted with

conflict-

ridden

and

(modem)strategic

Gesellschaften;

ultural

ommunities

are

con-

structedwithout

anyanalysis

of

structural

ntagonism

nd

conflict,

particularly

class

antagonism

and

conflict; 7

he idea of

shared

meaning,

of

shared

cognitive

andnormative

ramesand

nterpretations

s

very

much

overstressed.18

Nevertheless he does sharefour

presuppositions

with all

hard-core

political

communitarians.These are not

very plausible

and can

easily

be

refuted:

1.

Superimposition

f

linguistic,cultural,

religious,ethnic,

national,po-

litical communities

andthe state.

In

sociology

as well

as

in

normative

heory,

broad

container-concepts

f

ethnicity preclude

a

detailed

analysis

of

the

analytically

different

but

historically

overlapping

criteriaof

exclusion and

possible

community

formation.

Elsewhere,

I

have

triedto

construct,

rom a

perspective

of

inequalities,

a

disaggregated

cheme of

criteria

of

exclusion

and

corresponding

practices

and

legitimations

of

exclusion. 9

From a

per-

spectiveof identity,culture,andcollectiveaction,I also tried to show under

which

circumstances

particular

ommunities

develop/canbe

constructed.20

Even

in

Walzer one can

find the

usual mix

of

ethnic,

linguistic,

territorial,

cultural,religious,

and

national

communitiesand

statescommon

to

commu-

nitarian

egitimationsof

exclusion. It is

obvious,however,

hat

some of

these

communities

are not

onlyseparated

nalyticallybut

historicallyas well.

They

do not

always

peacefully

overlap.

Usually

they

are

not

coextensive,

andthey

conflict with

one

another.

2. Walzer, of course, knows that

states

are not necessarily, or even

commonly,

ethnic or

cultural

homogeneous

entities.2'

Nevertheless,he

does

speak

of

states as

nations r

communities ll

the time,

even

whenthis is

obviously false.22

This is

notjust a

conceptualweakness,

it

plays a

crucial

role in the

first

(hermeneutic) f the

four

argumentsn

favorof

states as

most

appropriateunities

for

arguments

about

distributive ustice.

Without

it he

would

not be

able to

writethese

normatively rucial

sentences:

thepolitical

community

is

probably the

closest

we can

come to a

world

of common







218

POLITICAL

HEORY/

May

1995

meanings. anguage, istory,

ndculture ome

ogethercome

more

closely

together

herethan

anywherelse)

to

produce

collectiveconsciousness

(1983, 28).23 tateswouldonlybe legitimate,n thisregard, s worldsof

common

meaning,

hared

anguages,

ndcommon

ognitive

nd

normative

frames.

But his ink s

theoretically

eakand

historically

ore handubious.

It is obvious

hat

historical tatesdiffer n

degree

of

linguistic

ndcultural

homogeneity

nd

hat hesedifferencesre

very mportant.

or hree

easons,

Walzer's

tatement

mustbe refuted:

i)

it is

obviouslywrong

o

assume,

ven

under

resent onditions,

hata stateless orld wouldbe a worldwithout

particular eaning 1983,34),

inhabited

y radically

eracinatedenand

women

p. 39);(ii)

his

argument,bviously,

oesnot

hold or

multicultural

and

bi-

or

multilingualtates;

iii)

there re

many

nternational

inguistic-

cultural

ommunities,

ld ones as well as new

(religious,

professional,

artistic, olitical),

ndWalzer imselfknows

perfectly

ellthat

many

maller

infra-statenits

howmuch

stronger

worlds f common

meaning

nd

much

tronger

ffiliation nd

commitments.

3. Not

allcommunitarians-andot

only

communitarians24-conceive

f

the state as

apolitical community.

Walzerhalfheartedly, ut no less mislead-

ingly,

treats

he state n

analogy

with

neighborhoods,

lubsand amilies

(pp.

35-42).

Historical tatesare not such

warm,

horizontal

Vergemein-

schaftungen

or

freeand

democratic

ssociations,

ased n

consent,

ut

rather

coldvertical

nstitutions,

asednoton free

entry

buton

enforced

membership

and

physical

violence.

Strictly

peaking,hey

are

not associations

t

all,

but nstitutions. f

course,

here

re

differencesn

this

regard

etween

tates,

and hesedifferences re

mportant.

uteven

nation-states

hat

are

cultur-

ally fairlyhomogeneousnd ratherdemocratic ave beenstates n class

societies.Toevade he

connotationsf

coldness, ertical ierarchies,

ureau-

cracy,centralism,

ultural

normalization,

nd

illegitimate ominationo

commonly

ssociatedwith

states,

Walzer

misleadingly refers o speakof

countries r

politicalommunities. emaybeperfectlyightnstating

hat

the

ommunity

s itself

a

good-conceivably

he

most

mportantood p.

29),

but

this

communitarian

onviction

robably

ells less in

favor han

against

the

state,

or

more

precisely,

t couldbe

mobilizedn

its favoronly if and o

thedegreenwhich, mpirically,tateswere o resemblehenormativedeals

in

the booksof

democraticonsent-theory.f one recognizeshatstates

are

not

culturally omogeneous

r

democraticolitical ommunities,he

moral

and

ethical

egitimacyf their

xclusionaryrighto communal

elf-detenrnina-

tion

gets severelyundermined.

4. Walzer

hereforeriesto

backup the ethical egitimacy f states

by

ascribing

o thema

crucial

ole in the defenseandreproductionf cultural

diversity:







Bader

CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION

219

Neighborhoods

anbe

openonly

f countries reat east

potentially

losed....

Neigh-

borhoods

might

maintainomecohesive ultureor a

generation

rtwo on a

voluntary

basis,butpeoplewouldmove n,peoplewouldmoveout; oon hecohesionwouldbe

gone.

Thedistinctivenessf cultures

nd

groups

epends pon

losure

nd,

without

t,

cannot e

conceived

s a stable eature f human

ife. If distinctivenesss a

value

..

thenclosure

mustbe

permitted

omewhere.

pp.

38-9)

To

put

t

crudely,

Walzer

redicts,

s

a

necessary

esult

of

open

borders,

some

kind

of cultural

ntropy

Walzer's

amous

second aw of

cultural

thermodynamics?).

his,

n at

least

hree

espects,

s a

curious

rgument:

(i)

That ultural

istinctiveness

epends

n one or

other ormof

closure

may,

n a

verygeneral

ense,

betrue.25

owever,

he

phrase

s much oo

vague

to

be useful

n

either

mpirical

r normative

rguments:

irst,

not

all

cultural

distinctions

an be defended

rom

a liberal-democratic

erspective

e.g.,

classist,

litist, acist,

exist, tc.).Second,

ne

should

pecify

he

ype

or form

of closure:losure

y

free

onsent

from

nsiders nd

utsiders)

iffers

adically

fromenforced

losure

by custom,

ocial

convention,

nd

law

(backed

by

threat r

application

f

physical

iolence).

Walzer

ees

clearly

hat

enforced

closure replacescommitment with coercion.

. .

. So far as the coerced

members re

concerned,

here s no

longer

a

community

orth

defending

(p.

39).

But

his

own

argument epends

upon

a

completelyunspecified

conception

f enforced losure

by

the

state.

f

cultural

istinctiveness

ould

thrive

otally

on

state-enforced

losure,

he

postmodernist

ppraisal

f dif-

ference

would

have o

be

judged

roma

different

ngle.

Third,

ne

should

be sensitive o thesocial

context

n which

losure

akes

place:

losure

under

conditions

f

rough

quality

iffers

adically

rom losure nder

onditions

of systematicxploitation,ppression,iscrimination,ndexclusion.26

(ii) Historically,

ithmodern

apitalism,

he state

has

alwaysbeen

the

strongest nemy

of

cultural

iversity.nternally,he modern

nation-state

actedas a

radical ultural

nifier, reating

thenation

y

making

peasants

into

Frenchmen,

sing outright

iolenceto

crush

cultural

ndnational

minorities. t

applied

well-known

ducational,

edagogic,and

civilizing

strategies

f

normalizationnd

discipline

n

order o

erase

other

anguages

and/or ialects

n

creating

he

unified

igh

anguage;o crush

ivalpagan

nd

other eligions ycreating eligious omogeneity;ocrush ompetingeas-

ant,

popular,

raft

cultures,

ndframes f

meaning

nd

nterpretation.

he

creation

f Walzer's

common

world

of

meaning,

equired n

erasure f

rival

memories ndhistories

o

as

to

producehe

dominanthistory

f the

nation, and so

on.27

Externally,modern

nation-states

ave acted,as a

byproduct

f

theirdirect

conomic nd

political

olonization

ndconquest

of

the

world,

nd

usually s

its

main

deologicalmyth,as

large-scale

ultural

imperialists

complete

xtinction

r

radical

ubmission nd

enforceddapta-







220

POLITICALHEORY

May

1995

tion

of

all

native

eoples

and

cultures).

t is a

strangerony

of

history

hen

thatWalzer ntrusts o those

very

states he heroicrole of

champions

nd

defendersf cultural iversity

(iii) It

is one

thing

o

recognize

heenormous

ole

of

force,violence,

and

power

n the

historical

ormation

f

linguistic,eligious,

thnic, ultural,

nd

so

on,

homogeneity.

t is

quite

anothero

argue mpirically

nd

normatively

forthe

necessary

ole

of

enforced

losure or the

preservation

nd

develop-

ment

of cultural

iversity.

mpirically,

Walzer's

rediction

f cultural n-

tropy

s not a

very

soundone:

contrary

o the common

myth

of

purity

and

organic evelopment

f national

ultures,

most

high

culturesn

history

ave

been the resultof

hybrid rossings.Contrary

o conservativeearsof one

unified Coca-Cola

orld-culture,

ne finds

even

in the

present

world

context

f

severe

economic,ultural,

nd

political

nequalities

rich

variety

of

newly

created ultures.

Normatively,

onservationist

rguments

ay

be

appropriate

ith

respect

o

national ndcultural

minoritieshatwould

other-

wise become

xtinct

by

the

overwhelmingower

of

imperialist ajorities.28

But

or

me,

t is

strange

o

see

those

argumentspplied

with

espect

o

exactly

thoseculturalmajorities, hich, or the ast 500yearsorso, conqueredhe

world

culturally

s well as

economically

nd

politically.

he

threat f

the

poor mmigrants

houldbe

analyzed

n the

context f

powerasymmetrieso

put

t in context.Wheredoes his

fear

or

cultural

ncounter,

o

typical

or

conservatistndneonationalistlracist

olitics,

ome rom n

Walzer's

oliti-

cal

theory,

which

otherwisetretches

luralism

o its

limits?

In

Walzer's

pheres f

Justice

1983),

these four

communitarianrgu-

mentsarebacked

by

the

traditional

rgument

n

favorof

state

sovereignty.

As alternativeosovereigntates sunits fpolitical ecisionmaking,Walzer

allows

only

fora choicebetween

two

ormsof

simple quality

with

regard

to

membership p. 34)

and

dismissesboth

of

them.The

choicewouldbe

between

global

tate

world

tate

p.48],

global

ocialism

p.34]) or a

worldwithout

tates, global

ibertarianism.

ertiumon

datur.Theworld-

state

option

would

mean

a

world

without

articular

eanings ndwithout

political

ommunities

p.

34), global ibertarianismould

also be a world

without

olitical ommunities,world

n

which no

one

was

a

member r,

moreprecisely,world fmany mallparochialtates: if tates verbecame

largeneighborhoods

t

is

likely

hat

neighborhoodsill

become ittlestates

(p. 38).

To ear

down hewallsof

thestate s

not. . .tocreate

worldwithout

walls,

butrather

o

create

a

thousand etty ortresses p.

39). Even f one

were o

accept

all

this,

one is still

notforced

o accept,

without lternatives,

theworldof the

bigexclusionary

ortressesf the

existing tates s the

esser

evil.

Walzer,

n

his

struggle gainst imple

equality,alls

prey o the simple

conception

f

absolute,

ndivisible

overeigntyhat have

already riticized.







Bader CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION

221

In

fact,

we

already

ive

in

a worldwith

limited,delegated,

nd

divided

sovereigntyights,

a world

n

whichunitsof

political

decision

making ery

much ross-cut ndoverlapachotherneighborhoods,ommunities,ities,

regions,

tates,

ederal

epublics,nions,

united

nations).

And t is

precisely

this

kindof constellationhat hould

be

argued

or

morally.

do

agree

with

Walzerhat

aneffective

ight

against

arochial

losure

does,

ndeed, equire

some kindof

largeness

p. 39).

However,

not

just

states are

able

to

counterbalance

his

trend,

butall inter-local

nd

nter-national

nits.29 he

ideal

of

democratic

olitical

elf-determinationells us little

about he ade-

quate

erritorial

nits,

and f

it does

tell

us

something,

t is

that t is

in

favor

of smaller nits.

So

we

may

conclude hat he

hermeneutic,

ultural,ocial,

and

political

arguments

or he

ethico-political

ustification

f

the

right

f

states

o closure

do notstand

p

to critical

crutiny.

nd

we arenow n

aposition

o

understand

whyWalzers forced o talkso

often

n

a

crypto-normativist

ay:

he

wants

states o be what

hey

historically

nd

actually

ever ave

been-linguistically

andculturally

omogeneous

orldsof common

meaning,

ree

associations

based on democraticonsent.Onlyin this way is he able to link state

sovereignty

o thedemocratic

rinciple

f

self-determinationr

communal

self-determinationndcan he

say,

as

already

uoted,

hat to

give

up

the

state

s to

give

up any

effective

elf-determination

p.

44).3?

4. HOW

TO COMBINE

THE

REQUIREMENTS F

UNIVERSALISTUSTICEANDRADICALDEMOCRACY

Forms

f

democracy

tronger

han

hose

predominant

n

developed

api-

talist tates hould

be

favouredor our

easons:i)

political

emocracy

tself

is,

intrinsically,form

of

good ife;(ii) the

reproduction

f thin

democracy

asks or

strongerorms

of

political

llegiancehant can

create

y

itself; iii)

ecologicaldisasters

nd the

destruction

f

nature an

be

prevented,n a

democratic

ay,

only

bystronger

ormsof

democracy;31

iv)

radical edis-

tributions,withinandbetweenstates,can be realized,egitimately nd

effectively, nly

n

stronger

emocracies. etall

known

historical

ormsof

stronger

emocracy

nd

most

heoretical

odelsof

republican,

eorepubli-

can,

and

communitarian

emocracy

ave

been inkedwith

rigorous

olicies

of

exclusion.

The

developmentf

theoretical

modelsof

strong,

empow-

ered

democracy,

pluralist

epublicanism,

associational,

associative,

or

liberal-socialist

emocracy as,up till

now,

not

sufficiently ealt

with

this

problem.32







222

POLITICALHEORY

May

1995

Recently,

s a

consequence

f

growing

umbersf

migrantsndrefugees,

the contradiction

between

the universalist

principles

of rule of law and

democracy n one hand,andtheparticularistlaimsto integrity f given

formsof

life,

on the

other

hand

Habennas 992,632f)

hasbecome

greater.

Not

each ethos

s

worth

defending.

heconfrontationetween

iberalism

and

communitarianism

as shown hatone

always

has to ask:Which om-

munities?

see Kymlicka1988;

Walzer

1990b;Cunningham 991).

The

tension

between

moral

equirements

nd

ethical-political

iscourse

hould

be

approached,

s

I

stated

bove,

roma

qualified riority

or

morality.Many

authors, tarting rom

similar

considerations,

ave

analyzed he conse-

quences

for the internal

relationswithin

communities.

Conservative

r

protective

ommunitarianism

s criticizedor

(i)

a lack

of individual uton-

omy

and he

freedomo

choose; ii)

not

eavingany,

or

enough,

oom

within

communities

r traditions

or

distance, riticism, ebellion, onflict,

and

change; iii) ignoring

ll formsof structural

nequalities

nside

communities

(exploitation,ppression, iscrimination,xclusion);iv)

lack

of

civil

rights

and

civil

culture;

nd

(v)

lack of

democratic

oliticalrights

and culture.

Normatively, third osition longsideiberalism ndcommunitarianism

emerges

rom

his

criticism, omething

ike a

liberal-democraticommuni-

tarianism

r a communitarianiberalism.33ut even within his

evolving

tradition,

o serious ttentionasas

yet

been

paid

o the

problematicxternal

relations etween

ommunities:

i) parochialistlosure nd ii)allformsof

power-asymmetries

etween

communities,

most

particularly,omination/

oppression

ndexclusion.34

Bringingogether

oth inesof

argumentfordemocracy

nd

ommunity),

aconceptuallarificationndnormative-theoreticalethinkingf therelation

of

democracy

o

particularistethnic, ultural, ational)

dentities r

commu-

nities

and

itizenship

nd

democracy,

emains

rgent.

n

other

words,wehave

to

rethink

he

relations etweenhe

ethnic nd ivic

aspects

f modern

ations

(A.

D.

Smith).

4.1

Disentanglementf Citizenship

fromAscriptive Characters ndIdentities

Any morally

efensible

oncept

f

democraticitizenship ught o start

fromuniversalism.Within

tates,

universalnclusion s

required;

etween

states,

all formsof

morallyllegitimate

losure re o

be criticized. s a first

step,therefore,itizenship ught

o be

disentangled

rom

ascriptive riteria

and dentities

particularly

rom

descent, olour, ex, ethnicity, ationhood).

This s what have

suggestedabove. tsconsequencesorconceptsof citizenship







Bader

CITIZENSHIPAND

EXCLUSION

223

in

political

philosophy

nd

egal

theory

havebeen

worked

ut

by

Carens,

Kymlicka,

nd

Habermas,

nd

by

Brubaker,

eater,

Meehan,

nd

others.

Carens1993), ollowingHabermas,istinguishesharply etween two

cultural ontexts:

group

culture,

ike

the

culture f a

religious

or

ethnic

group,

nd he

public

political

ulture

f a liberal

democratic

ociety

25).

He

distinguishes

between

hose

aspects

f the

public

ulture f a

particular

democratic

ociety

hatare

required

y

liberal emocratic

rinciples

.. and

those

aspects

f a

society's

ulturehat eflectts

particular

istory,

raditions,

and

forms of life but

cannotbe

construed s

ways

of

instantiating

he

requirementsf liberal

democracy

p.23).

The

constitutional

rinciples

rooted

n a

political

ulture re an

expression

f

moral

universalism,

he

substantive nd

concrete,

icher

ethical-cultural

orm

of

life as a

whole

refers o

the

ethical-political

iscourse.

The

most

promisingpplication

f

Habermas's

ifferentiated

iscourse

theory

1992),up

till

now,

can

be found n

his

treatmentf

citizenship

nd

national

dentity.

fter

riticizing

eorepublican

nd

ommunitarian

oncep-

tions of

constitution,

olitics,

and

citizenship,35

e

argues

or

a

complete

analytical eparationf Ethnos nd Demos : n unfasteningf the

semanticink

between

itizenship

nd

national

dentity p.634)36

and

even

for a

relatively

argoing

istorical

isconnection.With

he

French

Revolu-

tion,

he

argues,

thnic ementwas

replaced

y

a

democratic

ommunity

f

consent

p.636).

Thenation

of

citizens

inds ts

identity

not in

ethnic-

cultural

ommonalities,

ut in

democratic

rocedures,

alk,

and

decision

making.

Historically

verstretching

is

case,

he

continues:

Herehe

repub-

lican

component

f

citizenship

isengages

tself

completelyrom ts

affili-

ationto a pre-politicalommunityGemeinschaft)ntegratedy descent,

shared

radition nd

common

anguage

p.

636).37

Whereasn

1983,

Walzer

eems

completely

ommittedo

the

conceptual

and

historical

onnectedness

f

citizenshipwith

ethnicity

nd

nation/state,

his later

position

becomes

much

more

ophisticated,s in

his

in 199038

and

his

1992article

n civil

society:

The

ourth

nswero

the

question

bout

he

good life

prefers he

setting

of

the

nation,within

which

we are

loyal

members, ound

o one

another

y ties of

blood

and

history

p.

96); its

understandingf memberships ascriptive;t requires opolitical hoices

and no

activity

beyondritual

affirmation. n

a

much

more

distancing

treatment,

e

sees

that in

time of

trouble,t can

readilybe

turned

gainst

other

nations,

particularly

gainst

he

internal

thers:

minorities,

liens,

strangers.

Democratic

itizenship,

worker

olidarity,

ree

enterprise nd

consumer

utonomy-all

theseare

ess

exclusive

han

nationalism....

The

nature

f

nationalist

ervor

ignals

he

inadequacy

p.97).

In

his

favorite







224 POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

pluralist

erspective p.

98),

thecivil

society

s a

setting

f

settings, iving

some

hope

to domesticate

ationalism

101),

particularly

s

international

civilsociety.

Inweaker

ersions

f this

disentanglement,

ommon

anguage

nd

history

are

still

accepted

as

legitimate

riteria,

n

stronger

ersions

hey

are not

crucial

anymore

or the

concept

and

practice

f democratic

itizenship.39

Historically,

ome

version f the

disentanglement

rom

ascriptive

riteria

nd

identities

asbecome

a

crucial lement

n

the

myth

andhas

been,

o

a

lesser

degree,

n the constitutionsnd

practices

f

French,American,

nd

Swiss

republicanism.

As

a

second,much

more

ontested,

tep,

democratic

itizenship

ught

o

be

disentangled

rom

itizenship

s

state

membership.

istorically,

ome

version

of

this

type

of

disentanglement

s at the

root

of

all versions f

economic,

industrial,

rsocial

associational)

emocracynd

of

all forms

f

local, own

hall,provincial

olitical

democracy

s

well.

In

recent

political

philosophy,

the

conceptual

isentanglement

s

perhaps

most

learly

tated

y

Habermas.40

Political

philosophy,

with he

usual ime

ag,

reflects

practical

rocess-

es, forcingus to disconnect emocraticitizenshipromboth ethnicity/

nationhood

nd rom

state

membership.4

his s

quite

obvious

n

the

case

of

European

unification.

t the same

time,

this

case remindsus of

the

enormous

ractical

ensions ndcontradictionshe

reformulationf

collec-

tive

political,

particularlyational,

dentities

ring

withthem

n an

age

of

democratic

luralism,

multiculturalism,

mmigration,

nd he

formation

f

international

oliticalunits.

Onlyextreme

ight-wing

eonationalistnd

conservative

hilosophy

nd

politics

can

openly

avoidthis

dilemma.The

hiddenneonationalistdeologyof conservativearties ndgovernments,t

least n

Europe,

s

put

under

much

tress, nd

iberal,

emocratic,nd ocialist

positions

have o

come

to

terms

with hese

ensions.

4.2

Thick r Thin

Concepts

f Citizenship?

Different

Citizenshiptatuses

Theugly nternalonsequencesf republicanoncepts fcitizenship re

criticized

n anexcellent

waybyBenjamin

arber

1984,chaps.

8

and

9) and,

more

uperficially,

y

Walzer

1990a,

217f;

1992,91f,105ff)and

Habermas

(1992,

6580).

Strong

democratic

itizenship,

owever,

does not,unfortu-

nately,

exclude

illegitimate

xternal

exclusion,

even

if it is completely

disentangled

romall

ethnic

r

nationalriteria

nd

dentities.nthisrespect

it is

symptomatic

hat

both

modem

tatesmentioned y

Habermas1992,

642f)

to show the

possibility

f this

disconnection,heUnited

Statesand







Bader CITIZENSHIP

NDEXCLUSION

225

Switzerland,ave

external

olicies

marked

y

collective

gotism

and

condi-

tional

nclusion

r

exclusion.42

o avoid his

morally

llegitimate

xclusion

and to defendstronger ersionsof democracy,ne shoulddifferentiate

conceptually

nd

practically

etween

ifferentevels

of

citizenship

nd

argue

for a

legal

nd

low hreshold

oncept

f

citizenshipCarens

993)

with

regardo

immigration,

efugee,

and naturalizationaw and

policies.

The

indications

or such a

strategy

n

Carens

and,

particularly,

n

Habermas43

remain

oo

vague

n

legal

and

practical

erms.

They

hould

urgently

e

made

more specific.

In

a

very

shortoutlineof such a

program,

propose

o

distinguish

he

following

evels of discourse nd

related tatuses

f citizen-

ship

andduties:

Discourse

Citizenship

Status

Duties

1.

Passive status of

person moral

duties

Moral

2.

Negative

status or status libertatis

legal

duties

3.

Positive status or

status civitatis

status

subjectionis

Legal

(Staatsangeh6rgkeit)

4.

Active status or

status activus civilis

legal

duties

(aktive

Staatsburgerschaft)

Political 5.

Liberal,

republican,

or

strong political

moral

and

politicalduties

citizenship

Ethical

6.

Ethnic,

cultural,

national

concepts

ethical

duties

of

citizenship

Figure 1.

Citizen-Status or

Levels of

Citizenship

Ad1. Themoral

oncept

f

an

autonomous

ndividual,

moral erson

with

freedomo

chooseand

responsibilityor

her

actions,s

the

basisofany

egal

concept

of a

person

as a

bearer

f

rights,

he

precondition

f the

general

concept

f

right

andall

specific

ubjective

ights,

rivate r

public.44

ights

require

hemoral

nd

egal

recognition

f

individualss

persons;

ubjective

public

rights

cannotbe

separated

rom

natural ersons

see

Jellinek

1905,

83f;1928,418).Theposition fthe ndividual ithrespect othestate s the

basisof

the

egal

concept fa

status, t

is

expressedn

this

verygeneral

nd

abstract

oncept

of

a

status

passivus.

Ad

2.

The

negative

status,status

libertatis or

Menschenrechtsstatus

(Grawert),

s

a

bridge etween

moral nd egal

concepts.

Historically,

t is

the

result

fexternal

nd

nternal

imitationsf

state

overeignty.

he

protection

of a

sphere

f

individuality

y

specific ights

of

privacy nd

due

process

s







226 POLITICAL

HEORY

May

1995

guaranteed

o allhuman

eings

ntering

he

erritory

f

a

state;

t

is

not

imited

to

Staatsangehorige.

Therefore,

t is

not

called

a

status

civilis but

a human

rights tatus. t applies, rbetter,houldapply, qually oaliens, trangers,

tourists,

iplomats,egal

or

illegal

residents

capitalists,

usiness

managers,

migrant

workers,

tc.)

as toinborn

r

naturalizeditizens.

Ad

3.

The

positive

status of

citizenship,

status

civitatis

or

Staatsange-

horigkeit,

sually

ontains

wo

things:

egalprotection

nddue

process

nd

claims

n the administrative

ctivities f the state

or

individual

nterest

(Jellinek

1928,420)

or claims

o

public

goods

and

services

like

housing,

education,

ealth

are,

social

security,

nd

services),

whether

r

not articu-

lated

constitutionally

s

social

rights.

ellinek

has

conceptualized

his

positive

tatus

as

a kindof

compensation

or all the

sacrifices he

state

asks

from ts

subjects.

ogether,

hese

sacrificesorm

heir

tatus

ubjectionis:

their

egal

duties

o

perform

irectly

r

indirectly

or the

state

(obey,pay

taxes,

or

perform

ublic

work)

and/or o fulfill

public

services

military,45

social,

udicial).

Concerning

ur

problem,

'd ike o

mention

nly

wo

points.

(i) Just ikeclaims o legal protectionincluding ightsof privacyanddue

process),

claims to

public

social

insurances nd

services

ncreasingly

o

longer

depend

on

state

membership:

status

ositivus

s not

anylonger

coextensive

with

status

ivitatis.

s

I

stated

lready

n

section

1, egal

state

membership

oses

importance

n this

regard see

Grawert

984,

184).

All

legal

residents an

legally

claim

protection

nd

services

they

pay taxes,

social

security, nd

old

age

contributions),

ndeven

illegal

residents ave

better

moral laims he

onger

hey

stay. ii)

If

one

accepts

hat

heer

duration

of stay,andwith t growingocialrelations ndexpectations-irrespective

of the

character

legal

or

illegal)of

the

firstentry

nto a

state

whateverts

criterion

r

motivation-isa

sound asis

orenhanced

moral

nd

egal

claims

to

citizenship,he crucial

ssue

becomes

ncreasinglyhe

legitimacy nd

effectiveness f

control f

first

entry seeWalzer

983,34f).

Furthermore,f

one

accepts

hat

lldifferent

tatusesf

long-term

econd- r

hird-class

itizen-

ship,

metics,

denizens, Gastarbeiter

re

morally

ndefensible,

nd hat,

accordingly,

ll

statemembers

ndat

eastall

ong-term

esidentshould

ave

activeandpassivedemocraticolitical ights seetheexcellentreatmentn

Walzer

993,

53ff),

his rucial

ole,

orall

restrictive

olicies, f

first

dmission

decisionsand

effective

border

ontrol,

becomes

even more

evident.

Ad

4. The

status

activus

ncludesall

activeand

passive

political

ights

(universal,ree,

equal,

ecret,

direct

ballot,and

right o get

elected n

office)

and the

freedoms f

political

communication.

n

most

liberal-democratic

constitutions,

hese

rights

are

not

connectedo

a

corresponding

egal

duty o







Bader CITIZENSHIP

AND EXCLUSION

227

vote,

to

candidateor

office, or to

makeactive

use of thepossibilities

or

political

participation,

egally

guaranteed

y

thefreedoms f

political

om-

munication.nmyview,one shoulddistinguishharply etween thin r

low threshold

oncept

of this

legal

status

activuscivilis and

the

different

empirical

ractices

nd thicker

ormative

onceptions

f

political

itizen-

ship see

Ad

5). Legal

itizenship

s no

more,

but

alsono

ess,

thanoneof

the

prerequisites

or active

political

participation:

t is not meant o

guarantee

political

articipation

nd

t cannot o so. It

is a

complex

f

moral,egal,

and

politicalrights.

These

rights

are

compatible

with

competing

moral

and

politicaldutiesandconceptionsf politicsanddemocraticitizenship,ut

they

do

not andshouldnot

prescribe

egal

duties.Political

ights

and

ree-

domscannot

uarantee

hared ivic and

democratic

ommitment,

common

culture,

ommon

irtues,

nd

moral

nd

political)

duties.This

asymmetry

between

ights

andduties s

typical

or

modern

aw.46

One

point

needs o be stressed ere.Of

course,

we

expectmmigrants

nd

applicants

or naturalizationo

obey

the

law and fulfill

their

egal

duties

entailed

n the status

subjectionis.

And,

of

course,

we

mayhope

that,

n

addition, heymorallyacceptandrespect he law as we hopethat state

members o,

although

we

may

nothave

hemeans o enforce t.

Butwe

do

not askfull native

itizens o makeactive

use

of

their

ights

o

participate

norarewe

legally ntitledo ask

hem.

We

do notand

arenot

entitledojudge

whether hey are

competent

itizens,

s so

many liberal

efenders f

privileges

f

wealthand

education nder he

guiseof

democracy avedone.

Consequently,

e

are not

entitled,

ither

egally

or

morally,

o

ask

from

immigrants hat

we

do notask

from

ourselves.

Ad 5.

It is

quite

obvious hat

his low

threshold

onceptof legal

status

activus

oes,

and s

meant

o, allow or

different

mpirical

egrees f

political

participation.

t is also

obvious

hata

democratic

olitical

ystem

annotbe

reproducedr

strengthened

ithout t

east ome

minimumf

active

political

participation

f

some

citizens.

Empirically,

ne

can

udge hedegree f

actual

democracy

y

studying

how

many

people

participaten

public

talk and

decision/action

ow

often, n

how

many

pheres, ndon how

many

evels.47

Thisdegreewillbequite owincapitalist,exist,racist, ndelitist ocieties.

Normatively,

the

moral,

ethical,and

politicalduties

to

participateiffer

significantlyn

accordance

with the

competing

onceptsof

democratic

constitutions,olitics,

and

citizenship.These can

be

grouped,ollowing

Barber,ntothree deal

ypes:

liberal,

unitary, nd

strong

emocracy.

A

low

threshold

oncept f

legal

tatusactivus

doesallow or he

corresponding

and

competingormative

onceptionsf

political

itizenship,

hich, or our

purposes,

an

be

summarizedy

reproducing

arber'sable

1984,

219).4







228

POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

TABLE 1

Forms of

Citizenship

Representative

Unitary

Strong

Democracy

Democracy

Democracy

Citizens conceived

legal persons

brothers

neighbors

Bound together

by

contract blood

common

partici-

patory

activity

Related to

sovereign

but

corporate body

active

participant

govemment

as also

subject

By

ties that

are vertical

(citizen

horizontal

(citizen

dialectical

( levels

to

government)

to

citizen)

vanish)

Political

style

distrusfful,

self-abnegating,

cooperative,

active

passive

submissive

Civic

virtue

accountability

fratemrity

civility

(reciprocal

(reciprocal

(reciprocal

love

empathy

and

control) and

fear)

respect)

Status

of

citizenship

discretionary

omnicompetent

sovereign

(the

first

(vis Avis other (one among (the only among equals)

social identities

many) permissible

one)

Ideal

ground

common

contract

common

beliefs,

common

talk,

(actural

ground

(generic

valuec, ends,

decision,

work

is

territory)

consensus)

identity

(creative

(substantive

consensus)

consensus)

SOURCE:

From

Benjamin

Barbers

Strong

Democracy:

articipatory

olitics ora

New

Age. (1984, Figure3, p. 219). Reprntedby pernission from he UniversityofCalifomiaPress.

I

sharemostof

Barber's

rguments

gainst

thin 49

nd

unitary

emoc-

racy

and n

favor

f

the

nstitutions,

ultures,

irtues, nd

practices f

stronger

democracy.

owever,

t

seems

necessary

o stress

wo

points,both

ignaling

thatmost

recent

neorepublicanheories

have

trouble

voiding strong

e-

mocracy

o

fall back

nto

unitary

emocracy. hey

thereby

ross, n

a

thoughtless

ut

systematic

way,

he

ine

between

egitimatemoral,

political

duties and

legal

duties.

(i) Internally,

this

line should

function as

a

legal

safeguardgainst

oth

otalitarianism

nd he

ethical

monism f

republican

versionsof a

good

life, whichare

incompatible

ith

ethicalpluralism

n

modern

ocieties.It is true

that

some

ingredients

f

stronger

emocratic

culture,

virtues,

habits,

and

practices re

requiredor

the

reproduction

f

thin

emocracy

nd

that, herefore,

omplete

tate

neutralitys

wrong.50

The

stateandother

public

agents

implyhave o opt

for

andrealize

policies

that

ocialize,

ducate,

nd

rain

nborn

nd

mmigrant

itizens nthe

neces-







Bader

CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION 229

sary

habits,

ustoms,

ndvirtues f a minimal

ublic

or

political

morality.

Without

uch,

he

reproduction

f

liberal-democratic

nstitutions

nd

public

political ulturewouldbeseriously ndermined,ndwith t thesafeguards

of

precisely

hat thical luralism.

efending

minimal

hreshold

oncept

f

status

ctivus husdoesnot

prevent

nefrom

defending

nd

arguing

or

much

thicker

onceptions

f

political

itizenship

ndof democratic

ducation.

t

onlyprevents

ne from

doing

so in an lliberal

way.

(ii)

Externally,

hick

republican

onceptions

f

citizenship

ecessarily

work

and are meant o work n favorof

highly

restrictive

mmigration,

asylum,

nd

naturalization

olicies

wheneverhe ine

s crossed

hat

eparates

the

ethical,

moral,

nd

political

uties,

nd

democratic

irtueshat

are

praised

in all citizens

rom

egal

dutiesandcriteria f

entry.5

Ad

6.

In

most

neo)republican

heories,

trong-democratic

olitical

oncep-

tionsof

citizenship

re

ntimately

ied

up

with

ethico-political

rguments

or

ethnic,

ultural,

r national

onceptions

f

citizenship

nd

he

corresponding

ethical uties ndvirtues.Most civil

eligions

re

n

fact

ethnicist,

enomina-

tionalist,ulturalistic,rnationalist.his, gain, emonstratesowdifficultt is

to

distinguish

etween

ifferent

ersions

f

democratic

olitical

culture nd

virtueshat

re,

n

principle,

niversalistnd

particularist

thical

onceptions.52

Unfortunately,

ere can

only

state hat

hese

onceptual

istinctions

pen

up

a

promising

nd

new

strategy

n

normative

heorizing,

llowing

one

to

combine

he

advantages

f

minimal, eutral,r

so-callediberal

onceptions

of

politics

and

citizenship

using

their

critical

power

against

llegitimate

exclusion)

with

those of

conceptionsnd

theories f

stronger

emocratic

politicsandcitizenship, ecessaryor thecontinuity ndreproductionf

liberal

emocracy.

Such

an

argument

s

confronted

ytwo

serious

heoretical

nd

practical

problems:

ow s

it

possible

o

distinguishhe

hardoreof

universalist

iberal

and

democratic

olitical ulture

rom

particularist

thnic-culturalorms n

which t

is

inevitably

mbedded?

ow

s oneto

overcome

he

impotencef

the

ethical,

he weak

motivational

orceof

universalist

moral alk and

minimal

hreshold

oncepts

f

politics

and

citizenship?

hese

arethehard

questionscommunitarianriticismoses ouniversalistliberal efenders

of

human

ights,

democracy,nd

he

ruleof

law.

4.3

What

s

the

Hard

Core

of

Liberal

Democratic

Culture?

Even

analytically

nd

theoretically,

he

proposed

istinction

etweena

liberal, democratic

public

or

political

cultureand

ethical-cultural

orms of







230

POLITICAL

THEORY/

May

1995

life

is not

without

problems.

A

complex

normative

heory

of

democracy

should

distinguish

nd

discuss

the interrelations

etween he

following

levels:democraticrinciples,nstitutions,

ultures-habits-virtues,

nddemo-

cratic

udgment

ndaction

see

Bader

1990).

Now

it is an

old

republican

wisdom hatdemocratic

rinciples

nd

nstitutions

annotbe

maintained

r

strengthened

ithoutdemocratic

ulture

nd

hat hereexists a

dialectic

between ulture ndhabits

as well asbetween

irtues nd

udgment. 3

s

it

possible

o

spell

out he

hard,

niversalist

oreofthis

civic

ulture,

which,

historically,

an

only

be

found mbeddedn

rivaling

nd

changing articu-

larist

orms

of

ethnic, eligious,nationalultures?Or, o state heproblem

more

generally

nd

systematically:

how)

canone

identify

he

hard oreof

liberaland

democratic

rinciples,

nstitutions,

ultures,

abits,

virtues,

nd

practicesf one

recognizesi)

that

hey

all are

developed

n

particularist,

historically,

nd

socially

situated

ultures;

ii)

that

they

themselveshave

changed

istorically

ndcontinueo do

so;

and

iii)

that heir

articulation

nd

interpretation

s

always

contested. must

confine

myself

to

three

remarks

using

democracy

s an

example.

1.Democraticrinciplesautonomy,oliticaliberty nd quality,artici-

pation)

do notfall

from

heaven,

orare

hey

nscribedn

nature r

language.

They

are

articulated

n

specific

(e.g.,

western,

modern,

apitalist,

acist,

sexist)

societies,

periods,

nd

political

units.Their

articulation

as

changed

considerablyduring

he

last

three

centuries

e.g., through

he

struggles

for a

truly

universal

understanding

nd

codification of

the

right

to

vote). Their

interpretationas

always

been,andstill

s, contested:

short ook

in

books

in

political

philosophy

makes his

evident.There s

not even

consensus n

what he basicprinciples re,whetherhere s oneormany. f many,how

many?

How do

they

relate to

each

other?

This

means,

however, at

best that

theyshould

not

be identified

with

specific

nterpretations

ndrecent

odifi-

cations.The

process

of their

understandingnd

articulations

open-ended,

but uch

hat t

showsa clear

direction

oward

niversalist

nclusion.t

means,

second,

hat

hey

can

always

be

challenged.

A

fundamental

isagreement

even on

principles s

possible

and s

protected

by

something ike

a

metanorm

of

consensuso

dissent,

agreement

o

disagree.

hird,

t

means hat

he

processof theirchangingarticulationsannotbe

steered

completelyby

propositionally

rticulated

rinciples.t

assumes

omethingikea

metalegal,

metaconstitutional

asic

commitmentor

democratic

habit

beyond

construc-

tivist

rationalism. hismust

be

embeddedn the

evolution f culture54

nd

cannot e

controlled

y

Reason

witha

capitalR.

Finally,or

allthis

historical,

social,

cultural,

or

hermeneutic

boundedness,

there

still is no

cause

for

historicism r

social

and

cultural

elativism.Many

ommunitarian

nd

her-

meneutic

hilosophersr

cultural

nthropologists

hink t

is thefinal

blow

to







Bader

CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION

231

any

kindof universalist

rgument.

t isn't.

It is

only

the

starting oint

of

all

interesting

iscussions.We

areable o

translate,

o

learn,

o

compare,

nd

o

detectdirectionn thesechanges, o engage n reiterative r relational

universalist

rojects.55

2.

It is

quiteeasy

to show that

our

interpretations

f

principles

are

informed,

ometimes

vendetermined

y

our

nstitutions,

ur

cultures,

nd

our

practices.

And his s the

basic

argument

gainst

iscourses

n

normative

theory

hatrestrict

hemselves

o this level of

principles

see

Unger1983,

99-102).

Thecritical istanceoward

articular

nstitutions on

by

analytical

andcomparative

bstractionlsoworks n the

otherdirection.t

opensways

to thinkaboutalternativenstitutionalranslationsf

democratic

rinciples

and allows for

a

thoroughgoing

ritique

f

the

common deduction

f

a

present onstitutional

esign

e.g.,representative

olitical

arty-democracy)

in

a particularistorical

radition.

emocratic

rinciples

llow or

different

institutional

esigns

e.g.,

direct

s.

representative)

n

different

ontexts.56

3. The more

specific

and more

context-dependent

he

level,

the

more

difficult

s

the

process

f

abstraction

n

search orthe

common oreof

liberal

democracy. etit shouldbe possible o spellout what iberaldemocratic

culture,

abits,

nd

virtues, part

romall

particularist

ariations, inimally

mean.Whatdo we refer

o whenwe

speak

f a liberal

nd

democratic

ublic

or

political

ulture?What

redemocratic

ultures,

hat re

epublicanirtues

of

citizenship

part

rom

heir

French,

American,

Genevan

oinage?

These

again

are

hard

uestions.57 confine

myself

o two

verygeneral emarks.

(i) Even f one

stresses hat

radical

emocracy

s an

open-ended

roject,

directed

mainly

oward

resent

nd

uture

public

alk

and

action ather

han

towardome maginedr realpast,it stillmustberooted n somecommon

democraticnd

iberal

ractices

f the

past o

form

a

traditiont

all, toshow

relatively

table

habits,

o

develop

ecognizable

irtues.

Cultures,

abits, nd

virtuesneed ime o

growanddevelop

see

Bader1991a,

98ff).

Democracy

and

olerationmustbe

learned nd

practicedhrough

onger

periods f time

to

strike oots n the

character

f

persons,heir

udgments, nd

actions.Even

Habermas-whootherwise

eriously

underestimates,oth

empirically nd

theoretically,

tradition n

modernity-putshis trust

n and

buildsupona

populaceBevdlkerung)abituatedopolitical reedom, ccustomedo the

We-

perspective

f

the

practice f

self-determination

1992,

642).Herewe

are

confronted,

heoretically

nd

practically,

ith

another

hard

paradox.

Universalist

rinciples

nd

institutions f

democracy sk

for

democratic

cultures,

abits,

nd

virtues hat

annot e

thoughtwithout

heir

wn

history

and

radition;

et,

at the

same

ime,

his

reference

o

particular

istories an

be

used,

and

s

used,

as a

criterion f

exclusion.

This

paradox

maywell be

thebestandmost

egitimate

rgument,rom

a

democratic

ointof

view, n a







232

POLITICALHEORY

May

1995

defense

of

politics

of

fairly

closedborders.

t liesat theheartof

the

tension

between

democracy

nd

ustice,

ven n theories

hat

ry

o

interpretemoc-

racy

n termsas

universalists

possible.

Of courseno

easy

solution

may

be

expected,

but

all

democrats

hould

hink

very

hard o show

practical

ways

outof

this

dilemma.58

(ii)

Everything

epends,

herefore,

n

a

specification

f those

raditions:

which

traditions?

Theymust,

of

course,

be liberal

and democratico

a

considerable

egree.

Even

if it

turned

out to be

quite

difficult,

t

is

not

impossible

o

disentangle

emocratic

olitical

ulture

nd

citizenship

rom

too narrow inks withparticularthnic,nationalhistories.The familiar

distinction etween

praiseworthy

atriotism

nd

nasty

nationalismries

o

articulate soft version f this

disentanglement. 9

4.4

Weakness

f

Morality ?

The defenseof low

threshold

oncepts

f

citizenshipndof the

discon-

nectionof democratic

olitical

citizenship

rom

all

ascriptive

raditions,

loyalties,allegiances,ommitments,ollective

dentities,

nd

particularly

fromnational

ultures,

s

confronted ithat

least our

serious

problems.

1. Is

it

possible

o have

strong

ommitments

asedon

universalist

rinci-

ples?

Benjamin arber

nd

many

thers ave

onvincingly

emonstratedhat

the

reproduction

f thin

emocracy

tself

requires

t least

some

stronger

democratic

olitical

commitments.6'

s it

possible

empiricallyo

develop

these

stronger

ommitmentsn a

universalist

manner

without

he

familiar

connotationsfnationalism,hauvinism,ingoism;o havea constitutional

patriotism

ithoutall

traditional

onnotations

f

patria ?

owfar can

liberal-democratic

oncepts

of

constitution,egal

and

political

itizenship,

political

ommunity

nd

dentity,without

considerable

oss

in motivating

force,

etorn

way,

bstracted,

isentangled,

leaned

rom-real

or

magined-

common

descent,

heredity,

istory,

eligion,

thnicity,nd

nationhood,nd

be based

only

on

language?

s it even

possible o

do

without

nedominant

common

anguage?

an

we not

only

magine

ut

realize

political

commu-

nity withouta particularististoryandculture?6's it possible o break

fundamentally

ith

the

superposition

f

culture-nation-state-citizenship?

Historically,

ll

known

ormsof

liberal-democratic

r

republican

niver-

salism

p

till

noware

badly

disguised

ersions f

chauvinism.here

s still

a

longway

o

go

in

the

historical

rocess

f

universalization,

owunderway

for more

han hree

enturies,ut

which

might

ultimately

ead-in afuture

hopefully

not

too

distant-from

universalist

eclarationsnd

claims to

universalist

ractices.f

thiswere

o be

possible, s I

believe t is,

would uch







Bader

CITIZENSHIPAND

EXCLUSION 233

a

political

dentity

have

enough

practical,

motivating

orce

to combat

and

overcome

he

strong

dentifications

long

ethnic,

cultural,

nationalist,

statist

ines?

Or

to be more

precise:

would

t be

strong

nough

o

tackleall

premodern

ersions

f

conservative

ommunitarianism,

s

well

as the

reac-

tionary

appeal

o

ethnic,

racist,

nationalist

communities,

o

successful

today

n

ex-Jugoslavia,

n the ormer oviet

Union,

butalso

n

many

respect-

able tates

n

Western

urope?

ndwould

t be

strong

nough

o

cope

with

the

neorepublican

nd

democratic-communitarian

ppeal

or

fairly

losed

borders?

2. How

may

one deal

with

the

impotencef morality n normative

theory?

n

terms f recent ormative

heory,

his

problem

s

probably

he

most

problematic

onsequence

f the

analytical

eparation

rom

morality

and

Sittlichkeit.

abermas,

gain,

learly ecognizes

his

problem.

The

motiva-

tionaldeficit

of

procedural,

ommunicative

eason s

a

result f

thefact

hat

this

reason

an

only

present

he weak orceof

rational

motivation.

Any-

way, t cannot

guarantee

he

transmission

f

insights

n

motivated

ction

(1992,

19).

This is

the core

problem

hat

Habermashares

with

Kant's

autonomous oralwill(seeHabermas992,145,202),withRawls's heory

of

justice,

which ooks or the

motivational

hrust

f a

convivial

entgegen-

kommend) olitical

culture

86),

and

with

Dworkin's

ttempt

o

embed

principles

f

law intoa liberal

thics

p.

87).

The

action-relevanceof such a

morality hat has been

absorbedback

into

the

cultural

system remains atentas

long

as it is

not

actualized

by motivated

actors

hemselves.They

must be in a

disposition to

act

conscientiously.Rational

Moralitythus

dependsupon

convivial socializingprocesses.These shouldproducecorresponding nstances of con-

scientiality,

that

is

to

say

corresponding ormations

of the

superego.

Although

the

motivating orces of the

good reasons of such

a moralityare

weak

it

becomesstronger

only

to the

degree

that

moral

principles

are

intemalizedand

anchored n

the

personality

system.

(Habermas

1992,

145f)

Thisskepticism

ith

regardo

the

motivationalorceof

universal,moral-

point-of-view

rguments as

oneof

themain

easonsor

he

strong articu-

larist

bias

in

Walzer's

Spheres.

nterestingly

nough,Walzer

himself s

immediatelyonfronted ith he sameproblem ssoonas hetries o tackle

the

nasty

nternal

nd

external

onsequences

f the

nation,

whichaskfor

a

domestication

y

civil

society.

He

feels

somewhat

neasywith the

civil

societyargument:

It

cannotbe

said that

nothing s

lost

when we

give up the

singlemindedness f

democratic

citizenship

or

socialist

cooperation

or

individual

autonomy or

national

dentity.There

was a kind

of

heroism in

those

projects-a

concentration

of

energy, a clear sense

of







234

POLITICALHEORY

May

1995

direction,nunblinldngecognitionf friends

ndenemies.Tomakeoneof them

one's

own

wasa serious ommitment.

1992,105)

And this

threatening

oss of commitments

particularly

erious n

com-

parison

with

the

very strong

nationalist/ethnic/racist

dentifications. oth

positions,

universalist emocratic

iscourse

heory

andcivic

pluralism

n

nationalopular iscourse,

s Brian

Barry

alled

t,

have o tackle hesame

problem.They

do so

starting

romdifferent

ngles,but,

as faras I can

see,

they

do

not differmuch

n

topics

and

policies.

3. How

o

develop oyalty

o universalist

emocracyractically?

he ask

is threefold:i) to socializepeoplen awaythat hey identify ithcivility

and

iberal-democratic

rinciples, onstitutions,

nd

culture;

ii)

to educate

them

effectively

n a democratic

anner;62iii)

to create nstitutional

ppor-

tunities

or

practicing

olerationnd

democracy

n all

spheres

f

life,

not

only

in politics. 63

ll

liberal

emocratsan

only hope

that his is not

only

possible,

but

effectivelydone,

andwe

should,

as

political

heorists,

ot be

content

with

reiterating

hat t shouldbe donebut workout more

detailed

institutionalndpractical roposals.

4. Which

public

shouldone talk to? The

preferred

iscoursesdiffer:

universalist

moral-political

iscourse ersus

national-popular

iscourse.

But

again,

n the

end,

he differences not as

great

as

one

might

expect: i)

One

mustwrite oror

speak

o a

public.

Butthereare

numerous

ublics

nd

arenas f

publicity.

Mostwrite oran

(international)

cademic

ublic

as well

as

for

a broader

mostlynational) ublic

of citizens.Walzer oes

t

in

a

style

and hetorichat

onlyslightly

iffers romone

group

o the

other.Habermas's

styleandrhetoricn his academicexts s verydifferentrom hose n his

broader

ublic

nterventions.

e, rightly,

hinks hatthere s a

necessary

divisionof discourses ndwork

andthat heoreticalnd

politicalprojects

both

are

cooperative

ndeavors.Walzer eems

o be

reluctant

n

this

regard,

showing

at least some remnants f the

integratedheoretical

ndpolitical

oneman

how,

o

characteristicf the

orerunnerse admires,

heHebraic

prophets.ii)

Both

mustkeep

n

touchwith pecificpublics;nterestingly,he

public

f Walzer's

ational-popular

iscourses

increasinglyn nternational

one,although nfortunatelytillmostlyacademic.f Iunderstandis articles

from

1989

on

correctly,

he nation

ecomes progressively

oreproblem-

atic

public.

f

there till does

not exist a globalpublicof

citizens, his does

not

mean

hatone shouldnot

contributeo

creating ne (asChomsky nd

otherswish to

do). (iii)

What

o tell the

public?Oneshould

avoidnotonly

the

danger

f

speaking

o a

globalpublic

hatdoes

not yetexist or cannot

understandutalso he

danger

f

telling

he ocal

publicwhat twants o hear.

In

most

questions,Walzer-again ike his beloved

prophets-clearly ount-







Bader

CITIZENSHIP

ND

EXCLUSION

235

ersthis

danger.

With

egard

o

citizenship

s

exclusion,

is talk

unfortunately

is more

dubious.Nevertheless,

believe hatboth

hope

hat

something

ike

an internationalivil society s actually eveloping,withglobalor atleast

interstate

renas, ublics,

ocial

movements, ongovernmental

rganizations

(NGOs),

nd

a

variety

f official

nternational

rganizations.

4.5

RadicalDemocratic

Communitarians

andNeorepublicans

s New

Conservatives?

Politicalheoristsfradical, niversalistemocracy-Iseemyselfasone

ofthem-have

considerablerouble

inding

onvincing

heoreticalnd

prac-

tical

answers o

the

problems

hat

I

dealt

with n the

preceding

wo

para-

graphs.

Democraticommunitarians

nd

neorepublicans

o have

really

hard

times

in

combining ustice

and

democracy

withoutmorally llegitimate

exclusionary

onsequences.

All

good

easons or

stronger

ersionsof

democracy, articularly

ll reasons or

solving

n a

radical emocratic

ay

the two

most

paramountroblems

f the

twenty-first

entury, amely,

he

ecologicalproblemnd heproblemf internationalnequalitiesndmigra-

tion,

canbe

transformed

nto

ust

as

many

bad easons orexclusion.This

will

happen

f it

proves

o

be

impossible

o elaborateoncepts

ndpractices

of

stronger

emocracy

n

sucha

way

as

to

prevent

r

at eastseverely

hinder

their

use as exclusionary evices.Otherwise,

oth heorieswould ust add

another

rancho the ast-growing

reeof

exclusionary

deology:

esides he

all

too

familiar acist and neonationalist

deologies,

one is increasingly

confronted ith

new

iberal,

ommunitarian,

ndneorepublicanersions f

culturalundamentalism. '4adical ndprogressiveemocrats ould urn

out to be transformed

nto

defenders

f morallyllegitimaterivileges

n a

similarway

as liberaldefenders fprivileges f wealth

ndeducation

n the

nineteenthentury rgued

ndacted sconservatives

gainst

he rendoward

internally

niversalistnclusion.

Notes

1.

See Bader and Benschop

(1989, chap. 8,

4.4), for the cross-cutting and

analogous

development

of

absolute

privateproperty. Pogge's

(1992)

treatment s much

too

vague,

analytically

as well as

historically.

See the classical

historical tudiesof v.

Gierke,Kern,Hintze,

Max

Weber,Elias, Tilly,and

manyothers.See the short

andexcellent

reatmentnRuggie (1993).

2. The

increasing

factual limitation s a

consequence of growing

internationalnterdepen-

dencies

in

economic

(capitalist

world

economy,

nternational

Monetary

Fund

[IMF],

Worldbank,







236

POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

etc.), political

(alliances, etc.),

ecological,

and cultural

perspective.

The

increasing

moral

limitation

s due

to the

impact

of human

rightsdiscourses,

nternational

ocial

movements,

and

nongovernmental rganizations NGOs;like AmnestyInternational). ee for the latteraspect:

Habermas

1992,

659f)

and Walzer

1992a, 1993, 53).

3. See

Walzer

1983) ( metics ),

Heater

1990),

Brubaker

1992),

Tassin

(1992),

Meehan

(1993),

Muus

(1993)

for excellent

treatments

f second-class

citizenship.

See

v.

Dijk (1992)

for

an excellent

treatment f the so-called

Schengenparadox:

ree movementwithin he EU. On

the

other

hand,

states are

required

o lead

policies

to make

people

stay

where

they

are and to

radically

close the

European

Fortress

externally.

4. See

the relation of

Citizenship

of the Union and Danish

citizenship

in the

Danish

Declaration

n

Edinborough

December

11-12,

1992

(quoted

n

Lange

1993).

5. See for

sovereignty:Ruggie

(1993).

His treatment s

very

similarto

my protheoretical

strategy

of

disaggregation,

laborated

n

Bader

(1989, 1991).

This

strategyopens

up promising

perspectives

or normative

heory

and

political

philosophy

as

well. See

Kymlicka

and Norman

(1994,

309f)

and Parekh

1990, 702).

6. It is a clear

symptom

hatthe

exclusionary

effects of

citizenship

are

completely lacking

in

two

recent readers:

Gemeinschaft

und

Gerechtigkeit

Brumlik

and

Brunkhorst, ds., 1993;

exception:

Wellmer)

and

Auf

der Suche

nach

der

gerechten

Gesellschaft

Frankenberg 993)

in

which

many

different third

ositions

are

gathered

between

liberalism nd

communitarian-

ism.

In

Kymlicka

and Norman

1994) they are,

explicitly

but not

surprisingly,

xcluded.

In

this

article,

I

exclude so-called differentialistor

postmodern

attempts

to deal

with the

problem

because they have still not overcome their fundamental trangenessto ethics and political

philosophy,

particularly

heir

really

terrible ack

of institutional

concreteness

(see

the

more

interesting

versions of

Connolly

1991; Young 1990;

Benhabib

1993;

in

some

respect

also

Brunkhorst

1994).

7.

Only veryrecently

one finds a

growing

amountof studies

on these

topics (Singer 1972;

Barry 1973, chap. 12;

1989, chap.

12

and

16;

Beitz

1979;Beitz,

Cohen,Scanlon, and

Simmons

1985; Dowty 1987;

Shue

1988;

Veldhuis

1990;

Shklar

1991; Barryand

Goodin

1992). My own

sketch

(for

a more

extended

version,

see Bader

1993b)

is

verymuch

informedby

the writings

of

Joe Carensand Goodin.

8. See Waldron 1987);Bader(1990).

9. See Carens

(1992)

and

Dummett

(1992)

along

those lines.

Both

strategiesencounter

serious internal

consistency problems

and

externalcriticism(see

the

commentariesby Wood-

ward

[1992]

and Finnis and the

illuminatingcomparison

of

alternative

perspectivesby Terry

Nardin

[1992]).

Without

being

able to

show this

here,

argumentsfrom justice seem more

promising

to me. Frank

Cunningham

as

rightly

criticizedmy

essay for not

giving reasons in

this

respect.

10.

Suggestion

made

by

Robertv.d.

Veen.

11. This is

as seriousan

omission

n

the

sketchof

my argument

s the fact thatI have to leave

out the

question

of how

and

by

whom

ustice will be

democratically

mplemented bothMichael

Walzer and Frank

Cunningham

did

remind

me

in

their comments of the

seriousness of this

omission).

12. See Goodin

(1992,

8f)

for the

logic of this

indirectmoral

argument.

13. See Raz

(1975), Habermas

1991, 1992). A

note on

terminology eems urgenthere: he

distinctionbetween

morality nd ethics ollows

Habermas's

erminology. Ethics efers to

Sittlichkeit

ndcould

perhaps

better

be

translatedwith

ethos. The

Hegelian

distinctionbetween

Moral

(Kant)

and

Sittlichkeit

Aristotle)

shows analogies but is not

identical with the

distinctionbetween

the

right

nd the

good n the

Rawlsian

tradition.







Bader CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

237

14.

Realist

arguments,

f

applied against

open

border

policies, strengthen

he

urgency

of

international

edistribution. f

appliedagainst

both

options (as

usual), they

are

outright

conser-

vative in theirconsequences.

15.

Only

the world

is

a

self-containeddistributiveworld

(Walzer1983, 28),

the

only

plausible

alternative

s

humanity

tself....

entire

globe (p. 29):

a Rawlsian idealcontractual-

ism or Habermas's

undistorted ommunication

may

be

the

only

viable

options.

See Brumlik

and

Brunkhorst

1993, 13).

16. If one

sets aside communitarian

iberals ike

Selznick,

Etzioni

1989),Unger,and,

more

outspoken

liberal,

Gutmanand

Kymlicka.

17. And that

s even true for

Kymlicka

1989b, 178, 199,

201f).

18.

See

for a

critique:

Bader

199la, chap.

Artikulation),

xcellent:

J. Scott

(1985),

Anderson

(1993,

104ff).

Walzer

himself

recognized ( second

qualification

n

a lecture in

Amsterdam,

October

26,

1993)

that

he should have

seriously

better

qualified

his talk about shared

values

and shared

meaning

n

Spheres.

19. See Bader

and

Benschop (1989,

234). Unfortunately,

common

history-Estab-

lished/Outsiders-historistic

ideologies

are

not

analytically

solated and

separately

dealt with.

They should therefore

be

added

(after

erritorial

haracteristics).

20. See Bader

(1991a) chap.

3

on Collective

Identity.

See excellent

historical

examples

in

Brubaker

1992);

Anderson

(1983).

21.

See Walzer

(1983, 28f, 52) ( national

lub

is

different rom

the

state ).

See a bit

clearer

in his

Comment

Walzer

1992c)

on

Taylor,

where he

distinguishes liberalnationstates ike

Norway,France,and the Netherlands rom immigrantocieties like theUnitedStates p. 101).

But

even

this distinction

does,unwillingly, eproduce

he

deology

of the

ethnically

and

culturally

homogeneous

nationstates

(ask

the

Bretons,

the

Occitantiens,

he

Fries).

A

really homoge-

neous nation-state s a theoretical

iction,

not

a

historical

eality,

even afterso

many

centuries

of

unifying

and

disciplinary

tate

policies.

Empirically,

he

real

nterestingquestions

concern,

as

always,

the different

degrees

of

homogeneity

or

heterogeneity.

See for

a

critique

of

this ideal

fit

of states

in

cultural traditions :

Kymlicka

(1989b);

v.d.

Berg (1993)

B

Presumptionof

Nation-States.

22. See Walzer

1983,

42) Perhaps he

borderof the

political community sic] was drawn

years ago so as to leave theirvillagesand towns onthewrongside ;states arealso the political

expression

of a common life

and

(most

often)

of

a

national

family' ; (63)

If

the

community

[sic]

is

so

radically

divided

that

a

single citizenship

s

impossible,

then its

territorymust be

divided,

too.

If

Walzerwould

take this

crypto-normativist

axim

seriously,

t

wouldmean that

most recent states should

radically

be broken

up into smaller

quasi-homogeneous ommuni-

ties: see below

(vs. global

state andstate-less

world).

If

the

sharing akesplace

in smallerunits

(p. 29), why

not

adjust

the

politicalunits ?

That the

adjustmentmust itself be worked out

politically

and

that one has

to appeal o

common meanings s not only no

argument n favor

of the state as the

appropriate

nit,

but

it

outright ontradicts t.

23. See Walzer 1992b,164f, 168)withmorestresson thesocial construction f communities.

24. One

can

find

that

too,

for

instance,

n

texts

of

Kymlicka (1989b, 135,

178, 199, 201f)

and

Carens.See for

critique:

Habermas

1992, 166); Bader,

Berger,

GanlBmann,nd Knesebeck

(1976, 356ff)

25. See

Bourdieu (1979). But from the

very general

argumentof some

necessary relation

between

identity, group,

boundaries, nd closure, no

specific

argument n favor of the

state can be

drawn.

Normativelyspeaking,

t

may

be

legitimate

for

co-owners of apartment

houses

andfor worker

ooperatives o apply

strongly elective

admission

policies (bothexamples

from

Walzer's

reply

to

my critique n

Amsterdam,October

1993) because theexcluded can find







238 POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

their way somewhereelse, but

even this

example

shows the limits: morally llegitimate

criteria

of exclusion

on one

hand,

exclusion without

alternatives

n the other.The

analogy

with the

state

is frivolousfortwo reasons: i) so long as statememberships such an important sset in many

respects (including housing,

work,

etc.),

it should not be

simply compared

o

membership

n

neighborhoods

nd

clubs ; (ii)

if all states

apply

the same

exclusionarypolicy (see

Carens's

critique

of the

legitimacy

of the state

system

and the

asymmetry

of exit and

entry ;

ee

Brubaker1992).

26. See Kymlicka 1990, chap. 9)

for

consequences

n the normativedebateabout

pluralism

and

state

neutrality.

ee

also Carens

1990);

see

analytically:

Bader and

Benschop (1989, IV, ?

4.6.3 Selective association vs. ? 4.6.4 Patronage.

27. See

E.

Weber,Elias, Foucault,

E. P.

Thompson,AnthonySmith,

B.

Anderson,Brubaker,

Hobsbawm,

and

many

others.

28. See Kymlicka(1989b)

for native Indians

n Canadaand the

United

States.

29. See Ruggie (1993, 174);Pogge (1992)

for a

critique

of this ideal it of institutions

within

territorial

tates.

This

presumption

f State of

Spheres Berg 1993)

and

the

corresponding

statement

of state

sovereignty

s much

qualified

n later

writings

of Walzer

see 1993, 54). Pogge

(1992, 61ff)

discusses

four

main

reasons

for

a vertical

dispersal

of

sovereignty

in

his multi-

layered

scheme :

peace/security, educingoppression,global

economic

ustice,

and

ecology.

30.

This

voluntarist hetoric

of

exclusion

s

quite

common

anguage

n

right-wingparties

(see

for

France:

Brubaker

1992, 157).

31. Achterberg 1994).

32.

See

(Barber 1984; Unger

1987

II;

Walzer

1989;

Hirst

1994;

Cohen and

Rogers 1992;

Held

1992;

Brunkhorst

994).

For

an

excellent treatment f the historical raditionsof the

two

conceptions

of

citizenship

and

the

respective egitimations

of

exclusion,

see Schuck

and

Smith

(1985).

33.

See

(Gutman1985;

Greschner

1989; Kymlicka1988, 1989, 1990;

Selznick1992;Etzioni

1988).

34. See Barber

1984) (very

little on

parochialism,nothing

on

exclusion);

Greschner

1989,

140); (Hirst 1994)

is much

more

aware

of

the

problem.

n

his

later

writings,

Walzer

moreclearly

distinguishes

between

nasty

nd noblenationalism

1989, 1990)

and triesto discuss nations

in different historical contexts of dominance(1992a, 164, 166, 169f): historical forms of

nationalismand

the

consequences

or

the

many

conceivable

arrangements

etween dominance

and

detribalization nd

dominanceand

separation ;

ee also his

defense

of moral

minimalism

as a standard

or

dealing

with tribal

zealots. Of course there is some

hope that internal

democratic

organization

t least

helps

to

temper

external

oppression, xploitation,

and exclusion

(see Cunningham1991, 317,

who is

more

friendly

to the communitarian osition than I) for a

restatementof Friedrich

Engels's hope

in

this

respect, which has a hard

time with Athenian,

Venetian,Dutch, American mperialism,and Swiss xenophobia.See also Macedo's (1991, 279)

questionable

statement hat

no

two

liberal

regimes

have ever

gone

to war with one another.

Unfortunately,hereis, in my mind,more reasonforskepticism.

35.

See

Habermas

1992, 333-48): Discourse theory breakswith an

ethical conceptionof

civic

autonomy,

which draws

ts

legitimatingpower from the convergence

of familiarethical

convictions,

and

presupposes

an

ascriptive membership n an intersubjective

ife-form and

coherence

of

tradition,

common

ife, a commonpast, anda substantial

onceptof a people

(Volksbegriff),

which

apprehends

he

constitutionas a civic or national

religion, which

understands

Staatsburgerschaft

r

citizenship

not

legally but ethically,

and which favors

(austragt)

a dominant thical

meaning

n

politics andpoliticaldiscourse.

Accordingly his does

not

make

sharpenough

the actualdifference

between politics andethics

(p. 346).







Bader CITIZENSHIP

AND

EXCLUSION 239

36.

See

Habermas

1992,637)

Conceptually,

itizenship

and

national

dentity

were

always

already independent.

Historically,

o the

contrary,

thnic and

civic

aspects

have

always

been

combined, n one way or the other, n nations(see Smith 1989, 348f).

37. See

much more

critically:

Brubaker

1992).

See for some

consequences

of the

republican

French

traditionof

citoyennete,

which-officially-does

not

pay any

respect

to

ascriptive

criteria,

for

immigration

and

naturalization

policies

and traditions

(political

integration)

n

comparison

with

he British

race -basedmodel

of

multiculturalism nd

incorporation :

erena

Stolcke

(1993).

38.

I

do not wantto

suggest

too

strong

a link

betweennationand

community.

Communities

can

take other

forms....

Reiterativeuniversalismoffers a

way

of

understanding

nd

ustifying

those boundaries.

There is no sure

way, given

the

circumstancesof

national

ife,

to

get

them

right.Nor

is it

any

part

of

my argument

hat

hese boundaries hould

always

be state

boundaries

(Walzer

1990a,554f).

39.

With

respect to

language,

Habermas's

reatment

emains

inconsistent:

sometimes

he

seems to

accept

linguistic

bonds as essential:

In

the last

analysis,

what

brings together

egal

associates

in a lawful

community

s

the

tie

of

language,

of

people

communicating

ogether

(1992,

372,

interestinglyenough

with

reference to Walzer's

FourMobilities

[1990,

13f]).

Whereas

at other

places,

common

language

s

treated

as an

ascriptive

criterion

see

Habermas

1992,

636, 642),

which is

more

in line

with the

reality

of bi-

or

multilingual

tates like

Canada,

Switzerland,and,

more

recently,

South Africa. Carens s

defending

he claim

that

n

Quebec,

in

a contextof

power

asymmetries,

anguage

s a

legitimate

riterion n

immigration

olicies (1993,

10), but he carefullycriticizes thick heoriesof languageacquisition 33f) to prevent urther-

going

claims of cultural

adaptation

o which

Charles

Taylor

has

drawn

much

attention. V.

Gunsteren

1988)

unproblematically

ccepts

history

as a

relevant

criterion,

whereas

Choenni,

following

Baubock,signalizes

llegitimate

xclusionary

ffects

(1992,67,71,74)

of

conceptions

of

citizenship

starting

rom

predefined

olitical

community

and assumes

that

citizenship

s

the

cement

of its

cohesion. See below

(section

4.3)

for a

more

systematic tatement f this

problem.

40. If

one understands

emocracypolitically,

not

ethically,

nd

if

one shifts the

balance

n

the

democratic

rinciple

rom he

still,

n some

way, particularist

echtsform

oward

Moralprinzip,

the

result

is

a universalist

onception

of

democratic

itizenship

hat

leaves

completely

open the

questionof political evelsorunits. However,hisunmistakabledentity i.e.,anassociationbound

together

by

law with

specific

forms of

life

and

traditions

V.B.]

does

not

identify

t

as a

political

community

f

citizens.On the

contrary, eneral

principles

fjustice

hold

sway

over

the

democratic

process, principles

which are

equally constitutive for each

polity

(Burgerschaft)

Habermas

1992,

372).

In

Habermas's

version of the

democratic

principle,

the

universalistprinciple of

morality

s

stronger

hanthe

lawful form

(Rechtsform)

f the

particular

awful

communitywith

which it is

combined. State

citizenship and world

citizenship form

a

continuum,

which can

already

be

recognized

in

its

outlines

(das sich immerhin

schon

im Umrissen

abzeichnet).

Democratic

citizenship (in

the

universal

sense of

Burgerschaftnot

Staatsburger)

howing a

tendency toward a global citizenship status, becomes historicallydisconnectedfrom state

membership

and linked with

membership

n

the

republic

of

republics

n

the Kantian

or

Habermasian

version:

der

Republik

der

Weltburger.

The

political

discourse,

consequently, s

supposed o show a

significantshift

from

ethical-political oward

moral-political

iscourse.

41. Carens

1993, 37ff) for Quebec.

42.

See for the

UnitedStates:

Korver

1990,

chap.5);see the short

review

of U.S. immigration

law in

historicalperspective:

Elster

(1992,57-61). See for

Switzerland:

Anderson 1983, 123-7).

43.

Following

an

old

legal distinction

between

different

statuses f

citizenship,Habermas

(1992, 638ff)

distinguishes

between

Staatsangehorigkeit nd

Staatsburgerschaft,

r, tradi-







240 POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

tionally,

between

status

positivus

civilis and

status activus.

Unfortunately,

he

consequences

of

this

distinction

for

our

problem

are

not elaborated n detail.

Habermas

s content with two

remarks: i) the conventionalascriptivendices of residenceandbirth ius soli and ius sanguinis)

establish

no irrevocable

ubmission

to the

sovereign power, they

are much more

only

admin-

istrative

criteria

or the attribution

f civil status.But he

correctly

ndicates hat the

decoupling

of the normativemeaning

of civil

status rom the

ascriptive

ndices

of descent has

certainly

not

been completely

carried out. Normatively,he argues

for a very liberal and

permissive

immigration

policy

without

any

further

pecification

635f). (ii)

He

distinguishes

betweenlegal

political rights,

which are included n the status

activus on the one

hand,

and more

extensive

republican

olitical

or moral duties

of a civic

praxis,

to which no one can be

compelled by

legal

norms.

A

legally

enforced

obligation

o observe democratic

ights

has

something

of

the

totalitarian.... Forgood reasons,modernobligatory ight(Zwangsrecht)

s

not

concerned

with

motives

and

disposition.

Republicanpractices

and virtues

depend

properly

n

uncompelled

motives and opinions

of

a

citizenry

oriented o the common

good

(Habermas1992,641). Again,

the consequences

for our

problem

remain

very

much

implicit

and would

roughly

mean that

republican

democraticculture,virtues,

and

practices

cannot be used

in

any way

as criteriaof

exclusion,

because

they

cannot

even

legally

be asked from state members.

In

my sketch,

I

elaborate

he

multilayered

oncept

of

citizenship

tatusesof

Georg

Jellinek

1905,

1928)

without

stating

hatthese

different tatuses

shouldbe

integrated

n some

harmonistic,

olistic

concept

of

citizenship.

I

hope

that it is

unnecessary

o mention that

I

do not follow Jellinek's more than

dubioustheory

of

democracy see

de

Lange

1993).

44. Still excellent:

Jellinek

(1905, 83f) See,

for one of the

many

recentversions of the same

argument,

Dworkin

(1977).

45. See

Brubaker

1992)

for the

importance

n

republicanpolitical

discourseon

citizenship

law and

naturalization

n France.

46.

From Kant onward:

oro

interno versus

oro externo;

see Walzer

(1990a, 216); status

activus

and

what ies

beyond.

47. See

Cunningham 1987)

for those criteriaand the crucial

question

of

degrees.

Empiri-

cally,

there

can be found

huge

differencesbetween democratic

political

systems (see

v. Beyme

and

many others).

Normatively,

he scale runs from defendersof restrictiveelite

versions of

representativepoliticaldemocracy(fromSchumpeter o Huntington) o extensive versions of

participatory

ocial

and

political

democracy.

48.

For

similar,

but much less

developed

treatments,

ee

Habermas

1992, 640-3);

Walzer

(1983, 306-11, 1989,

and

particularly

1992: comparison

of

the

model of the good life in

republican

democracy ? II],

in

the

marketplace? IV],

and

in

civil

society [?

VI]).

49. See

Bader

(1992).

See

Kymlicka

and Norman

(1994, 357ff).

Unfortunately,Barber

(1984)

himself,

in

his

regrettable

nd unnecessaryantiliberal hetoric,

usually equalizes

liberal

theories

with liberal

onstitutions,politics,

and

practices ;

ow threshold

egal citizenship

and

representative emocracy

with

thin

democracy. This does

not help to clarify the relation

betweenlegalstatusactivusandstrongpoliticalcitizenshipor thatbetween representative nd

strong

democracy.

n

Figure

3 of Barber

p.

219),

it

would,therefore,be muchbetter

andmore

in line with the

spirit

of

his

arguments o deal with thindemocracy

nstead of representative

democracy

in strong

democracy:

itizens are also

legal persons, tc.).

50.

See

(Raz 1986;

Gutman

1987;Kymlicka

1990,205-7,216-25,

throughout).The minimal

nonneutrality

of liberal-democratic tates can be, and is commonly,

overstressed. In their

criticism of The

Left,

Civic

republicanism,

nd Civil society theorists, Kymlickaand

Norman

distinguish

between

citizenship

s

legal

status and citizenship s desirable

activity

(1994, 353),

a distinction that is

very

close to what I have

proposed.

They point to urgent

dilemmas

confronting

iberal heories

of

virtues.







Bader CITIZENSHIPAND

EXCLUSION 241

51. This is evidently

he case in v. Gunsterens iscussionof admission

equirements 1988,

736-8). See,

for similar

arguments,

Oldfield

(1990, 147).

See as a kind of

post

mortem

warning

the perverse version of communitarianism n constitutional heory and practice of real

existing

socialism

(see

the shortreview in Grawert

1984,

195f)

52.

A

symptomatic

ndicationof this

difficulty

can be found n Carens's

ambivalent

attitude

toward stronger conceptions

of culture and virtues: in his texts on distributive

ustice

and

problems of incentives he, rightly,

insists on their relevance

(1981, 1987);

in his texts on

immigration,refugees

and

naturalization,

e avoids it

for fear of

exclusionary consequences.

Now,

I thinkthis

fear is

empirically

well foundedbut

conceptuallyunnecessary.

And it

forms

a

bottleneck

in

normative

theory.

One

can and should defend a minimal threshold

concept

of

citizenship,

but

doing

this does not

prevent

one from

arguing

or much

thickerversions

of

politics

and political citizenship.

The

importance

of a clear

distinction

of

thick

political conceptions

from thick

ethnic

conceptions

of

citizenship

is demonstrated

xcellently by

Brubaker

see

1992,

178ff for

Germany).

53.

See Bourdieu

1979);

Bader

(1991a, chaps.

on Habitusand Kollektive

Identitat);

Barber

(1984). This,

in

part,

s

recognizedby

Habermas:

Legallyguaranteed

onditionsof

recognition

do not however

reproduce

hemselves

automatically.They

need the

cooperative

ffort of a civic

practice,something

to which no one

can

be

compelled by

legal requirements.

Thus

the

legally

constituted

civic

dependsupon

a

convival,

consonant

background

f motives and

opinions

of a

citizenryreceptive

o the

common

good

whichcannotbe

legally

ordained

1992, 641). Compare,

Thecontext

of a

political

culture

of

freedom

p. 642).

See Wellmer

1993, 183ff), Brunkhorst,

and others.

54.

This

insight

is not

a

privilege

of

communitarians.

ee,

for different

versions, Dewey

(see Joas 1993);

Rawls's

overlapping

consensus

(1993, 133ff);

Habermas's

evolutionary

arguments.See Carens(1993),

the

only ust political order,

at least

undermodem conditions

(p. 24),

the

political

culture

of a liberaldemocratic

ociety

itself

implies

a

specific culture,

ethos, history,

and

way

of life

(39f). Living

in

modem societies includes a minimal

prize:

societal

differentiation,

ne or other version of

private-public

istinction,

ecularized

public

spheres

that are

incompatible

and incommensurable

with all

versions of

religious

fundamental-

ism;

the

commitment o

pluralism

s

not without imits

of

tolerationof cultural

differences

(see

26f on violence andon exit optionsfordissenters).

55.

See Walzer

(1990a).

Re-iterativeuniversalism does not

require

an

external

standpoint

or

a universal perspective (527);

the universalvalues

of moral minimalism

all have

particularist mplications ;

thin

morality

is

always

and

necessarily

embedded

in

thick

morality see

lecture

Amsterdam,

October

26, 1993).

56.

All

this is

excellently

elaborated

y

Roberto

Unger(1983,

1987

II;

see

also Bader199 b).

See the same idea

in

Habermas

(1992, chap. 9), but with the usual lack

of institutional

concreteness.

57.

See the excellent treatment f

liberaltheories

of

virtue, which have been neglected for

so long, in Macedo(1991) andGalston(1991); see also Cunningham 1987, 144-50).

58. See Bader

(199la, 421f)

for

individual and

collective

problems

of

reconciliation of

individuality,contingency,mortality,

and

history with

universalistreason under conditions of

modernity.

59.

See

Riedel

(for

an excellent

interpretation f

Kant).

Huizinga,

Putte. Habermas s not

content

with

this

proposal.

It is for

Habermasa historical act thata political culture n which

the basic

constitutional

principles

can

put down roots may in

no ways rest on a common ethnic,

linguistic and culturaldescent of all citizens (Habermas

1992, 642). My personal aversion

against

he

use of nation-states

ay,

n

this respect,be

very much nfluencedby the historically

understandable

egativeattitude f most democratic nd

eftist German ntellectualswith regard







242

POLITICAL

THEORY May

1995

to (mainstream)

German

history,

community,

nd traditionof this verspatete

Nation. But

I

doubt

that this

would

make

much difference for the core of

my

theoreticalargument.

Joas

highlightscorrectly he completelydifferent ontextandhistoryof community iscussionsin

the United States,

but even

he

completely

neglects,

in his

critique

of the

generalized

uspicion

againstparochialism,

egional

and national dentities

1993,

60),

all exclusionary

effects.

60.

Carens,

to my mind,

is

too careful

in this

regard:

democraticcommunitiescannot

do

without

more

than

some commitment o civil

rights,

rule

of

law,

democraticrights (see

1993,

24f, note

27:

Howmany

citizens

have to be committed

howmuch o secure he

reproduction

of democratic

culture

and therewith

of democratic nstitutions

and

principles?

Probably

too

weak,

iberal

state

neutrality

may

not be

enough.

61. These questions

can

easily

be misunderstood s if I would

perpetuate

hree

well-known

shortcomings

of most

versions

of liberal

heory: 1) usually,

he

benign

ersions of

state-neu-

trality

with

regard

o

ethnicity

are

only

thinlydisguised

versionsof

chauvinist niversalism

n

which the ethnicity

of the

predominant

roup/nation

s ignoredand,

thereby,presented

as

neutral

and universal. 2)

No

complete

ethnic

neutrality

f

states

is

possible

if one takes into account

thatall states

have one

(or more)

official

languages,specific

borders,

anddistributions

f

powers

between

federal,

regional,

and local

levels;

that

all

states have to distribute

carce

resources

among

competing

nations,

ethnic

groups,

and so on.

(3)

The normative

deal of ethnic

neutrality

itself has

to

be reformulated:

relational

thnic neutrality in analogy to the

reformulation f

objectivity

n

philosophy

of

science,

cf.

Bader

1988);

the

institutional ranslationwould

certainly

nclude

the

recognition

of

specific

group-rights,

roportional

epresentation,nd so

on

(cf. Kymlicka

1994).

I do not

want to continue the

symptomatic

black-box f most liberal

theories

that

ignore

the

space

between

individual nd state

completely

or

do

recognize

only

voluntary

associations

not allowing

institutional, rganizational,

nd

juridicalspace for ethnic

andother

collective

communitiesapart

rom the so-called

political

ommunity.

62. See already

Karl

Mannheim

beforethe second WorldWar;

ee

Amy

Gutman 1987).

63. Habermas's

heory

leaves room for more detailedproposals

n all threerespects, but ts

most

disappointing

spect

s thathe does not makeany

step

in

elaboratingwhatthat

would mean

(see

Bader

1993a;

also

Unger

1987;

Hirst

1994).

Walzer's

Spheres

(1983) nearly neglects the

problem

of how to tame the

ugly

external consequences,

but

is,

obviously,

much richer in

institutionaldetail.

64. See Stolcke

(1993),

Bader(1985).

REFERENCES

Achterberg,

W. 1994. Sustainability, ommunity, nd

Democracy.

Paperpresented

at ECPR

conference,April16-22,Madrid.

Anderson,

B.

1983. magined

Communities.

London:Verso.

Anderson,

E. 1993.

Value

n Ethics and Economics.

Cambridge:

HarvardUniversity

Press.

Bader,

V. M. 1985. Nieuw Racisme of Neo-nationalisme?

KOMMA

, no. 1:109-143.

. 1989.

Sociale Advocatuur n Mensenrechten.

n Sociale

Advocatuuren Mensenre-

chten,

edited

by

T.

Hoogenboom

et

al.,

23-46. Nijmegen.

.

1990. PoliticalPhilosophyof Libertarian-Democratic

ocialism.

Paper

presentedat

the American

Philosophical

AssociationConference,

December

26-29, Boston.

.199 la. KollektivesHandeln.Opladen:

Leske

& Budrich.







Bader CITIZENSHIPND

EXCLUSION

243

1

991b. TheConstitutionf

Empowered

emocracy:

ream

r

Nightmare.

n

Plural

Legalities:

Critical

Legal

Studies n

Europe,

edited

by

R.

deLange,

K.

Raes,

6-22.

Nijmegen.

. 1992. Liberale emocratieonderAlternatief? olitieknCultuur2,no.3:16-21.

*

1993a. Viel

Geltung

nd

Immer

Weniger

aktizitat.

n

Festschrift

ir

Sebastian

IIerkommer,dited

by

H.

GanBmann,

0-78.

Hamburg:

SA.

. 1993b.

Citizenship

ndExclusion.

aper resented

tthe

Conferencen

Citizenship

andLocal

Justice,

October,

msterdam.

Bader,V.

M.,

andA.

Benschop.

989.

Ungleichheiten.

pladen:

eske

&

Budrich.

Bader,

V.

M.,

J.

Berger,

H.

Gangmann,

nd

J.v.d. Knesebeck.1976.

Einfuhrung

n

die

Gesellschaftstheorie

und

II.

Frankfurt,

New York:

Campus

Verlag.

Barber,

. 1984.

Strong

Democracy.

erkeley:

niversity

f

California

ress.

Barry,B. 1973. The LiberalTheoryof Justice. Oxford:Clarendon.

. 1989.

Democracy,

Power,

and

Justice. Oxford:

Clarendon.

Barry,

B.,

and R. E.

Goodin,

eds. 1992.

Free Movement.

Ethical Issues

in the

Transnational

Migration

of

People

and

of

Money.

New

York:

Harvester&

Wheatsheaf.

Beitz, C.

R.

1979. Political

Theory

and

International

Relations.

Princeton,

NJ:

Princeton

University

ress.

Beitz,C.

R.,

M.

Cohen,

T.

Scanlon,

ndA.

Simmons,

ds.1985.

nternational

thics.

rinceton,

NJ:Princeton

niversity

ress.

Benhabib,. 1993. Demokratiend

Differenz. n

Gemeinschaft

nd

Gerechtigkeit,dited

by

M. Brumlik ndH.Brunkhorst,7-116.Frankfurt.

Berg,P.v.d.

993. What sLocal

ustice: laims nd

Critics.

aper resentedt he

Conference

on

Citizenship

nd

Local

Justice,

October

6,

Amsterdam.

Bourdieu,

.

1979.

La

Distinction.

aris: es

editons

e minuit.

Brubaker,

R. 1992.

Citizenship

nd

Nationhood n

France and

Germany.

Cambridge:Harvard

University

ress.

Brumlik,

M.and

Brunkhorst,.,

eds.

1993.

Gemeinschaft

nd

Gerechtigkeit.rankfurt:

ischer.

Brunkhorst,

.

1994.Demokratie

nd

Differenz.

rankfurt:

ischer.

Carens,

. H. 1987.

Who

belongs?

Theoretical

nd

egal

questions

bout

irthright

itizenship

in

theUnited tates.

. 1990.

Differencend

Domination.

eflections

nthe

Relation

etween

luralism

nd

Equality.

n

NomosVol.

32,

edited

y

J. W.

Chapman

nd

A.

Wertheimer,

26-50.

. 1992.

Migrationnd

Morality: Liberal

galitarian

erspective. n

Free

Movement.

Ethical Issues

in the

Transnational

Migrationof

People and

of

Money,edited

by B.

Barry

andR.

E.

Goodin,

5-47.New

York:

Harvester

Wheatsheaf.

. 1993.

Immigration,

olitical

Communitynd he

Transforationf

Identity:

uebec's

Immigrationolicies

n

Critical

erspective.

npublished

anuscript.

Choenni,

.E.S.

1992.

Allochtonen

n

Burgerschap.

n

Burgerschap

n

Praktijken,

dited

by

H. R. Gunsteren

ndP.

Hoel,57-97.deelI

WRR:

DU

s'Gravenhage.

Cohen, .,and .Rogers. 992.

Secondaryssociations

nd

Democratic

overnance. olitics

and

Society 0,

no.

4:393-472.

Connolly,

W.E.

1991.

dentity/Difference.

thaca:

ornell

University

ress.

Cunningham,

.

1987.

Democratic

heory

nd

Socialism.

Cambridge:

ambridge

niversity

Press.

.

1991.

Community,emocracy

nd

Socialism.

raxis

nternational

1,no.

3:310-26.

Dijk, P. 1992.

Free

Movementof

Persons:

Towards

European

Citizenship.

FIDE

Coll.

Lisboa.

Dowty,

A. 1987.

Closed

Borders.

ew

Haven:Yale

University

ress.







244

POLITICAL

HEORY/

May

1995

Dummett,

. 1992.

TheTransnational

igration

f

People

Seen romWithin

Natural aw

Tradition.

n Free

Movement:EthicalIssues in the Transnational

Migrationof People

and

of Money, ditedbyB.Barry ndR. E. Goodin, 69-80.NewYork.

Dworkin, .

1977.

Taking ights eriously.

ambridge,

A:Harvard

niversity

ress.

Elster,

. 1992.

LocalJustice.

NewYork:Russell

age.

Etzioni,

A. 1988.

TheMoral

Dimension. ewYork:

reePress.

. 1989.

Towardn

I

&

We

Paradigm. ontemporaryociology 8,

no. 2:171-5.

Frankenberg,G.,

ed. 1994.

Auf

der Suche Nach der Gerechten

Gesellschaft.

Frankfurt: ischer.

Galston,

W. 1991. Liberal

Purposes: Goods, Virtues,

nd Duties in theLiberal

State.

Cambridge,

MA:Cambridge niversity

ress.

Goodin,

R. E. 1992a. If

people

were

money.

In Free Movement:Ethical Issues in

the Transna-

tionalMigrationof People and of Money,editedby B. Barryand R. E. Goodin,6-21. New

York.

.

1992b.

Commentary:

hePolitical

Realism

f

FreeMovement.

n

FreeMovement:

Ethical Issues

in

the Transnational

Migration

of People

and

of Money, edited by B. Barry

and

R. E.

Goodin,

48-63.

New

York.

Grawert,

. 1984.

Staatsangehorigkeit

nd

Staatsbiirgerschaft.

erStaat

23,

no. 2:179-204.

Greschner,

. 1989. Feminist oncerns

with

the

New

Communitarians.

n

Law

and the

Community,

dited

by

A. HutchinsonndL.

Green,

19-50.Toronto.

Gunsteren,

.v.1988.

Admissiono

Citizenship.

thics

8,

no.

4:731-41.

Gutman,A. 1985. Communitarianritics

of

Liberalism. hilosophyndPublicAffairs

Summer:

08-22.

.

1987. DemocraticEducation.Princeton.

Habermas.1991.

Erlauterungen ur

Diskursethik.Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp.

.

1992.

Faktizitdt

und

Geltung.

Frankfurt/Main:

uhrkamp.

Heater,

D. 1990.

Citizenship.

The CivicIdeal in World

History,Politics and Education.London:

Longman.

Held,

D. 1992.

Prospects or Democracy.Oxford:

Blackwell.

Hirst,

P.

1994.Associative

emocracy. ambridge:

olityPress.

Jellinek,

G.

1905.

System

der

SubjektivenOffentlichen

Rechte.Leipzig.

.

1928.

Allgemeine

taatslehre.

ad

Homburg,urich, erlin:VerlagDr.MaxGehlen.

Joas,

H. 1993. GemeinschaftndDemokratiendenUSA.

n

GemeinschaftndGerechtigkeit,

edited

by

M. Brumlik ndH.

Brunkhorst,

9-62.

Frankfurt.

Korver,

Ton. 1990.

The

Fictitious

Commodity.

A Studyof the U.S. Labor Market, 1880-1940.

New York:Greenwood.

Kymlicka,

W. 1988. LiberalismndCommunitarianism.n Canadianournal f Philosophy

18,

no. 2:181-204.

1989a. Liberalndividualism

ndLiberalNeutrality. thics 9:883-905.

1989b.

Liberalism,Community,

nd

Culture.

Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

1990.

Contemporary

olitical

Philosophy.

Oxford:Oxford

UniversityPress.

Kymlicka,W.,

andW.

Norman.

994.

Returnf the Citizen:A Survey f RecentWork n

Citizenship heory.

thics

104:352-81.

Lange,

K. de. 1993 Paradoxesf

European itizenship.

aper resentedt the Conference:

TheRuleof Law

Revisited,

Oxford.

Macedo,

S.

1991. Liberal

Virtues,Citizenship,

Virtueand Communityn Liberal Constitution-

alism.Oxford: larendon.

Meehan,

E.

1993.

Citizenship

n the

European

Community.

ondon:

Sage.

Muus,

P. 1993. Internationale

Migratie

naar

Europa.Amsterdam: UA.







Bader

CITIZENSHIPNDEXCLUSION

245

Nardin,

. 1992.

Alternativethical

erspectives

nTransnational

igration.

nFreeMove-

ment: Ethical Issues in

the Transnational

Migration of People

and

of Money,

edited

by

B. Barry ndR. E.Goodin, 67-78.NewYork.

Oldfield,

A. 1990.

Citizenship

and

Community.

ondon.

Parekh,

. 1990.

TheRushdie ffair. olitical tudies

8:695-709.

Pogge,

T.W. 1992.

Cosmopolitanism

nd

Sovereignty.

n

Ethics103:48-75.

Rawls1971.

A

Theory f

Justice.

Cambridge,

A:

Harvard.

.

1993.PoliticalLiberalism. ewYork:Columbia

niversity

ress.

Raz,

J.

1975.

Practical Reason

and Norms. London:Hutchinson.

.

1986. The

Moralityof

Freedom.Oxford:Clarendon.

Ruggie,

J. G. 1993.

Territoriality

nd

beyond:

Problematizingodernity

n

International

Relations. nternationalOrganization 7, no. 1:139-74.

Schuck, P.,

and

R. M.

Smith.

1985.

Citizenship

withoutConsent:

llegal

Aliens in the

American

Polity.New Haven/London.

Scott,

J. C. 1985.

The

Weapons f

the Weak.New

Haven/London.

Selznick,

. 1992.The

Moral

Commonwealth.

erkeley: niversity

f

Californiaress.

Shklar,

J. 1991. American

Citizenship.

The

Questfor

Inclusion.

Cambridge,

London.

Shue,Henry.

988.

Mediating

uties. thics

8:687-704.

Singer,

P.

1972.

Famine,Affluence,

nd

Morality. hilosophy

nd Public

Affairs1,

no.

3:229-43.

Smith,

A.

D. 1989.

The

Origins

f

Nations. thnic ndRacialStudies

2,

no.

3:340-67.

Stolcke,

V. 1993.

European

ulture:

New

Rhetoric f Exclusion?

aper resented

t

the

Conferencen

Ethnicity,

ationalismndCulturen

Western

urope, ebruary

4-27,

University

f

Amsterdam.

Tassin,

. 1992.

Europe:

Political

ommunity?

nDimensions

f

Radical

Democracy,dited

by

C.

Mouffe,

69-92.London: erso.

Unger,

R.

1983.

The

Critical

Legal

Studies Movement.

Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press.

. 1987.Politics.3

vols.

Cambridge:

ambridgeniversityress.

Veldhuis,

. 1990.Vriendenn

Vreemden.

ssen/Maastricht:

an

Gorcum.

Waldron,. 1987.Nonsense ponStilts.London:Methuen.

Walzer,

M.

1983.

Spheresf

Justice.New

York: asic

Books.

. 1989.

Citizenship.

n

Political

Innovationand ConceptualChange,edited by T.

Ball,

J.

Farr,

t

al., 211-19.Cambridge, A.

.

1990a. Nation

and

the

Universe.

n

The

Tanner

Lectures

on Human Values,Vol.

11,

edited

by

G.

B.

Peterson,

09-556.Utah.

1990b.

The

Communitarian

ritique

f Liberalism. oliticalTheory 8,no.

1:6-23.

1992. TheCivil

Society Argument. n

DimensionsofRadical Democracy,

edited by

C.

Mouffe,

9-107.

London: erso.

1992a. TheNewTribalism. issent pring:64-71.

1992b. Comment.

n

Multiculturalism nd ThePolitics

of Recognition,

edited by

C.

Taylor,

9-103.

Princeton,

J:

Princeton

niversity ress.

. 1993. Between ation

ndWorld.

conomistSept.):

1-17,51-4.

Wellmer,

A.

1993.

Bedingungen

iner

Demokratischen

ultur. n Gemeinschaft

nd

Gerechtigkeit,

dited

by

M.

Brumlik

nd

H.

Brunkhorst,73-96.

Frankfurt:ischer.

Woodward,

. 1992.

Commentary:iberalism

ndMigration. nFree Movement.

thical

Issues in the

TransnationalMigrationof

People and of Money,

edited by B. Barryand R. E.

Goodin,

9-83.

New

York.







246 POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1995

Young, I. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

VeitMichael

Bader

s

Professor

f

PhilosophySocialPhilosophy)ndof

Sociology t

the

Universityf

Amsterdam.e teaches

heoretical

ociology

nd

theories

f society

and

heirhistory,

s well

as

critical ndmarxist

hilosophy;

heories

fjustice.

His

main

research

reas are social

inequalities

nd collective

ctionand

programmaticnd

strategic

pproaches

o the

politicsof

a

libertarian,

emocratic

ocialism.

citizenship and exclusion

Documents