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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-3-57(Super:,edes NIE 11-6-55)

PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OFSOVIET ATTACK ON THE US

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE IN FULL

Submitted by theDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in thepreparation of this est:mate: The Central Intelligence Agencyand the intelligence organizations of the Departments ofState, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Star,the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation.

Concurred in by theINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 18 June 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of NavalIntelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the DeputyDirector for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic EnergyCommission Representative to the IAC; and the Assistant

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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CENTRAL INTEL,IGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copyis for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential disseminationmay be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department ofState

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Armyc. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navyd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Forcee. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stafff. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commissiong. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation11. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-

partment or Agency

2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retainit for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate shouldeither be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69:2, 22June 1953.

Nireh•Flipeit401.4

material contains information :lift gthe Defense of the Unit tate.swithin the me th age laws,Title 18, USC, Secs. 794. the trans-mission or • on of whic ny manner

authorized person is prohib e

D ISTRIB Imo NIWhite HouseNational Security CouncilDepartment of StateDepartment of DefenseOperations Coordinating BoardAtomic Energy CommLssionFederal 13ureau of Investigation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageTHE PROBLEM 1SCOPE 1CONCLUSIONS 1DISCUSSION • 3

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3VARIABLE FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM

OF WARNING 5Circumstances in Which the Soviet Decision to Attack is Made 5Effect of a Period of Tension 7Functioning of Intelligence Under Crisis Conditions . 7Effect of Soviet Deception Attempts 8Variations in the Character of the Initial Attack : . . 9

WARNING FROM PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK IN 1957. . 9Attacks by Long-Range Aircraft 9Attacks by Guided Missiles 10Attack on Western Europe by Soviet Forces in East Germany. 11General Mobilization 11Clandestine Attack 12Defensive Preparations 12Other Considerations 12

WARNING FROM THE EVALUATION OF INDICATIONSIN COMBINATION 13

CHANGES IN TH.8 WARNING PROBLEM BETWEEN PRESENT AND MID-1960 13

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PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF

SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US

THROUGH MID-1960*

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the warning which could be provided by intelligence in the case of aSoviet initiation of hostilities against the US between the present and mid-1960!

SCOPE

The warning of Soviet attack discussed in this paper is that which intelligencemight be able to give prior to the actual launching of an attack. Warning whichmight be obtained from US or allied early warning radar or other tactical detectiondevices is not discussed. Nor do we discuss the possibility of obtaining chance warn-ing from sources whose primary mission is not early warning, e.g., weather stations,naval and commercial vessels at sea. The possibility that the USSR might resortto an ultimatum and thus itself warn of attack in the event of a rejection is also ex-cluded from consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the absence of a high level penetra-tion of the Soviet government, the warn-ing of attack given by intelligence mustbe the end product of a process of reason-ing from incomplete evidence, and ittherefore represents a judgment of prob-

ability. Under the most favorable circum-stances, intelligence might be able tostate that the degree of probability of at-tack was very high; in other cases thejudgment might be only that the chancesof a Soviet attack were somewhat better

• The Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information todetermine how fully and promptly present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmissionchannels can provide information essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.A revised estimate will be prepared 11 the findings of the survey warrant changes in judgments madeIn the present estimate.

'The date raid-1960 .does not relate to any estimated capability or intention of the USSR to attack theUS at that time. It is chosen to make this paper parallel studies of Soviet capabilities which aresimilarly projected about three years ahead.

2S-Re-R--13.4k1

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than even; in many situations intelligencemight be able to do no better than to saythat the USSR possibly intended to at-tack. The warning actually given will de-pend upon the particular context ofevents, upon unique features of such sit-uations including even elements of purechance, and upon certain variables whichcannot be fully anticipated or compen-sated for by prepared procedures. (Par-as. 5-6, 11, 15)

2. Preliminary and successive warningsmay be given by intelligence which couldhave a cumulative effect. Even if thesedid not permit a firm conclusion that theUSSR intended to attack, they might stillprovide a basis for critically importantpolitical, military, or intelligence deci-sions. In the crisis situation likely toprecede an attack, the ability of intelli-gence to give more reliable warning mightdepend largely on exceptional collectionmeasures requiring prior policy decisions.These measures would provide informa-tion, possibly of great value, on Sovietcapabilities and readiness, and inferen-tially perhaps on Soviet intentions toattack. (Paras. 13, 25)

3. The constant factor in intelligencejudgments affecting warning is our meas-ure of Soviet capabilities, specificAlly,the level of military readiness prevailingat the time. We have examined whatindications of military preparations in-telligence might obtain which would pro-vide a basis for giving warning of attack.The kind of warning given would alsodepend on the apparent pace of Sovietattack preparations and the correlationof military and nonmilitary indications.(Paras. 7, 44) Assuming the USSR wereto attack now, we conclude that:

a. As a rough estimate, a force up to 300long-range aircraft could probably belaunched concurrently without produc-ing indications permitting intelligenceto give warning of possible attack. Gen-erally speaking, the probability of obtain-ing warning indications would increaseas the numbers of aircraft increased.There is no basis for judging at whatpoint the chances of receiving warningindications would be about even; we be-lieve, however, that if the number of air-craft launched concurrently were asgreat as about 800, the chances of theirproducing warning indications would beconsiderably greater than even. If re-ceived, these indications would probablypermit intelligence to warn of a possibleattack some 4-8 hours before attackingaircraft could reach radar warning lines.It would always be possible, however, forthe movement to and out of forward basesto be a practice maneuver rather than anattack. (Paras. 31-32)

b.. Warning of the employment of sur-face-to-surface guided missiles up toranges of 700 nautical miles, includingthose launched from submarines, is im-probable. (Paras. 29, 34-35)

c. Warning of possible attack on West-ern Europe by Soviet forces stationed inEast Germany would vary seasonally, de-pending on whether units were at homestations or at some field-training phaseof the annual training cycle. Warningbased on movements of units to attackpositions would probably vary as follows:

(1) From a few hours to a few daysin April and in September-Octo-ber; but possibly none.

(2) From two to five days in May-August.

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(3) From five to seven days in No-vember—March. (Para. 36)

d. If a Soviet attack was preceded byfull mobilization, warning of possible at-tack could probably be given a few weeksin advance. We might during the courseof mobilization be able to forecast theapproximate date at which military prep-arations would be complete, but it wouldalways be possible for the USSR to attackwith its ready forces at an earlier date.(Paras. 37-39)

e. Warning of attack by clandestinemeans would depend primarily on thepossibility that some part of the Sovietclandestine plan had miscarried or onchance discovery. Thus there could beno assurance that intelligence would beable to warn of such forms of attack.(Paras. 40-41)

4. The general effect of the developmentof Soviet capabilities estimated as likelyto be developed by 1960 will be to re-duce the chances of obtaining significantwarning indications. The key factors willbe the degree of modernization achievedby Soviet armed forces and the stateof readiness which they normally main-tain. If higher levels of general readi-ness and activity are maintained, therewould be fewer indications derived frompreparations prior to attack. To the ex-tent that ballistic missiles of intermediateor intercontinental range may be avail-able to the USSR by 1960, the warningproblem would be further complicated,since intelligence is unlikely to be ableto give advance warning of the use ofsuch weapons. (Paras. 47-52)

DISCUSSION

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. Warning given by intelligence must bebased on the collection and evaluation of in-formation about Soviet preparations for at-tack and about Soviet behavior prior to at-tack. Given the considerable effort by theUSSR to limit the collection of informationconcerning its plans and activities, such in-formation would probably always be incom-plete, and concerning some Soviet activitieswould be either fragmentary or unobtainable.Nevertheless, the varied collection methodsavailable to intelligence would almost cer-tainly yield some evidence, probably discreteitems of information, pointing to increasingmilitary readiness. These latter would notnecessarily, in and of themselves, establisha Soviet intention to attack, inasmuch asthey might also be consistent with an inten-tion to threaten, to deter, or to be ready todefend and retaliate. Only penetration ofthe Soviet government or military command

at a high level would be likely to produce fulland reliable information on Soviet militaryplans and intentions: It is unlikely that suchinformation would be available.6. Thus, intelligence must reason from manykinds of indirect evidence in order to reachconclusions about the USSR's actual and in-tended courses of action. In these circum-stances, warning is the end product of a proc-ess of reasoning from incomplete evidence, andit therefore represents a Judgment of probabil-ity. Such a judgment would rest in the firstinstance upon a weighing of indications ofSoviet activities to establish whether theypointed to one or another course of action.The warning judgment would also proceed inpart from the then prevailing estimate of gen-eral Soviet capabilities and intentions. Thelatter would provide a guide to the alternativecourses of action which might be entertainedby the Soviet leaders. The ability to give reli-able warning would therefore depend upon the

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completeness and accuracy of this estimativebackground, as well as upon correct inter-pretation of the available specific indicationswhich might reflect a Soviet decision to adoptone specific course of action from among theavailable alternatives. If the current indica-tions were inconclusive, warning would ofnecessity have to rest more heavily upon ageneral appraisal of Soviet intentions andprobable courses of action.

7. The constant factor in judgments affectingwarning is our measure of Soviet capabilities,specifically, the level of military readinessprevailing at the time. It is in this area •of physical preparations that intelligence isbest able to gather significant evidence. Thelikelihood of attack could normally be judgedas minimal so long as the Soviet military es-tablishment was judged not to have attaineda reasonable stage of general readiness for at-tack. After this stage had been reached, fur-ther warning would almost certainly have tocome from military indications of last-min-ute pre-attack preparations and from non- •military indications pointing to an increas-ing likelihood of attack. Indications of last-minute military preparations would be highlysignificant in arriving at a judgment of prob-able Soviet intent to attack. However, a basicdifficulty in judging Soviet intentions underthese circumstances would be in reachinga conclusion that these Soviet activities re-flected exclusively an intent to attack (i.e.,did not reflect an intent to deter, or to beready to retaliate if attacked). An additionaldifficulty would be that many of these finalpreparations would be made so close to thelaunching of the attack that there would beonly the shortest time to obtain the informa-tion, to assess it, and to communicate warn-ing within the US government.

8. In reaching a conclusion with respect totheir significance, indications of Soviet last-minute military preparations would not beconsidered in isolation, since these prepara-tions would always occur in a context of So-viet political and economic activities. Someindication of these latter activities would al-most certainly be detected, so that intelligencewould be able to judge the significance of mill-

tary preparations in light of a more com-prehensive picture of Soviet behavior at thetime. In general, the more indications of So-viet military and nonmilitary preparationsintelligence has, the more certain it could beof forecasting the probable course of actionwhich they portend.

9. It is evident from this summary statementof the manner in which warning judgmentswould be made that the warning given wouldbe neither complete nor unequivocal. Never-theless, there are various preliminary kinds ofwarning which could be given with a high de-gree of certainty and reliability. For example,intelligence could probably give reliable warn-ing of potential danger in situations, result-.ing either from Soviet actions or reactions toWestern actions, which could lead to a Sovietdecision to attack. Intelligence could prob-ably warn of military and other preparationswhich raised Soviet capabilities to a stage ofreadiness at which attack became an increas-ingly feasible course of action. It might warnof a technological breakthrough which simi-larly increased Soviet capabilities for attack_

10. Valuable as such warnings would be, thecritical task of warning would always be toprovide a timely judgment regarding Sovietintention to attack. In this area, it is con-siderably more difficult to achieve a high de-gree of certainty. The judgment concerningthe likelihood of Soviet intention to attackmight be expressed as a warning of possibleintent to attack, probable intent to attack,or clear intent to attack; the uncertainty in-volved could therefore range continuouslyfrom the minimal case of judging that a so-viet attack was only a possibility to the ex-treme case of being virtually certain that anattack would be launched.

11. We believe that intelligence would almostcertainly not be able to give warning of clearintent to attack because the USSR's prepara-tions could also be interpreted as indicatingan intention to threaten, to deter, or to defenditself. The most that could reasonably be ex-pected of intelligence would be a judgmentthat attack was the probable Soviet courseof action. Under the most favorable circum-stances, intelligence might be able to state

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that the degree of probability was very high;in other cases, the judgment might be onlythat the chances of a Soviet attack were some-what better than even. In many situations,intelligence might be able to do no better thanto say that the USSR possibly intended to at-tack.

12. Within the categories of probable and pos-sible intent to attack, the warning judgmentcould also vary in regard to the particulars ofthe attack itself. Some indication of the form,scale, or time of a possible attack might beascertained from the character and pace ofSoviet preparations, even though Soviet inten-tions were so unclear as to preclude a judg-ment that an attack was probable. However,just as Soviet behavior and preparatory ac-tivities would rarely, if ever, permit intel-ligence to give warning of clear intent to at-tack, so too the time, scale, or form of the at-tack would invariably be uncertain in somerespect.

13. This is not to say that warning cannotperform a useful function unless it can pre-dict attack with complete certainty. Warn-ings of lesser degrees of certainty may begiven in such a way that they have a cumu-lative effect. Such successive warnings, evenif they did not permit a firm conclusion thatthe USSR intended to attack, might still pro-vide a basis for critically important politi-cal, military, or intelligence decisions. Theymight be adequate, for example, to justifyundertaking diplomatic moves to cope witha developing crisis, placing US military forcesat one or another stage of alert, or invokingspecial intelligence collection measures in or-der to provide a basis for firmer and morecomplete warning.

14. The process of warning is complete onlywhen warnings given by intelligence are actedupon by decision-making elements of govern-ment. Intelligence must be able to earncredibility for its warning judgments amongofficials who are not regularly involved withintelligence. It must therefore be concernedto make as complete as possible a showingof evidence for any warning given. A warn-ing which did not carry conviction to respon-

sible policy officials could be as much an in-telligence failure as no warning at all.

15. It is evident from the foregoing that warn-ing will depend upon the particular contextof events, upon unique features of such situa-tions including even elements of pure chance,and upon certain variables which cannot befully anticipated or compensated for by pre-pared procedures. Some of the variable fac-tors which affect the warning problem arediscussed in the following section.

VARIABLE FACTORS AFFECTING THEPROBLEM OF WARNING

Circumstances in which the Soviet Decisionto Attack is Made

16. An important variable factor affecting thewarning problem is the kind of situation whichmay lead to the Soviet decision to attack.Several alternatives are conceivable. Onewould be that a Soviet decision to attack wasmade well in advance of the actual launchingof the attack, and in the absence of any crisisoffering an immediate challenge to vital So-viet interests. Such a decision might be madeif the Soviet leaders believed that they hadacquired so decisive a margin of militarysuperiority that they could anticipate defeat-ing the US without the USSR itself receiv-ing unacceptable damage. A major break-through to some offensive or defensive capa-bility which could not. be countered by theUS would permit the USSR such a choice. 2

If intelligence were to get evidence that abreakthrough had been made, this fact it-self would alert intelligence and possibly serveas the basis for giving general warning. Ourability to get evidence of a breakthrough de-pends primarily on the kind of breakthroughachieved. If some knowledge of the fact ofa breakthrough was obtained, our ability togive more specific warning would depend onthe preparations and the time necessary toexploit the breakthrough operationally, and

'We have estimated the Soviet capacity for futurescientific advances and the likelihood of a break-through within the period of this estimate inParas. 65-88 of NIE 11-8-58; "Capabilities andTrends of Soviet Science and Technology" (9October 1968).

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the effect that its exploitation would have onother preparations which would be necessaryfor attack.

17. The Soviet leaders might also decide forwar if they believed that the US was planningan eventual attack on the USSR and thattheir best chance of surviving lay in attack-ing first. 3 In this case, as in the case of atechnological breakthrough, a decision to at-tack, if made well in advance of the attack,would enable the USSR to take a long periodto prepare. This would provide the intelli-gence community with time to collect abroader range of indications and these mightprogressively assume a meaningful pattern.Initially at least, such preparations wouldprobably not have an emergency characterand would probably be regarded as a normaldevelopment of military capabilities. At somepoint in the course of this period of prepara-tion, however, certain actions might be takenclearly at variance with the pace of a normaldevelopment of capabilities or the characterof the world situation. Toward the end ofthis period, actions of a last-minute charactermight be observed which, together with earlierwarnings, would increase our ability to givewarning. Thus, while an atmosphere of ris-ing tension characteristic of a crisis situationmight not be present until a late stage, in-telligence might be alerted at an earlier pointduring the period of preparation.

18. The USSR might also reach a decisionto attack the US in response to developmentsIn some local crisis which neither party orig-inally intended to lead to general war. TheUSSR might decide to attack because it be-lieved that an actual or threatened interven-tion in its sphere of vital interest could notbe countered by limited means. Or it mightconclude that the USSR had become engagedbeyond retreat in some area where the West-ern Powers would be prepared to risk generalwar. In either case, the Soviet leaders might

'Our views of the Soviet estimate of the worldsituation and probable Soviet courses of actionrelevant to this point are set forth in NIE 11-

-56, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Coursesof Action Through 1981" (2 August 1958). Seeespeciall y Pares. 89-94 and 148-171.

decide that general war was preferable to sub-mitting to a serious reversal and that it wouldbe to their military advantage to attack first.In this situation the decision to attack wouldIn all probability be accompanied by some de-gree of political tension, perhaps a very highdegree, which would in itself give rise to pre-liminary warning. However, the time periodover which a local crisis reached an acutestage could vary considerably, and this wouldaffect the ability of intelligence to assemblea meaningful pattern of indications. If thecrisis developed over a brief period of time,and if Soviet military readiness was alreadyadvanced or if the Soviet leaders decided to at-tack with only minimum preparations, theindications obtained might be few. If, on theother hand, the USSR took a certain amountof time to prepare and position its forces,further and more specific warning might beobtained from the pace and nature of thelast-minute preparations. In the latter case,a higher degree of probability could be at-tached to the warning of attack. Neverthe-less,'in each case, the nature of the warninggiven would depend also upon a judgment asto (a) whether the USSR considered that theconcrete situation presented an unacceptablechallenge to Soviet interests, and (b) whetherthe Soviet government would take any alter-native course of action short of war which wasopen to it and which could preserve its in-terests.19. It is also possible that in a local crisisthe USSR would decide to engage US or West-ern forces locally while hoping to avoid generalwar. This course of action would rest on acalculation that Soviet objectives could beachieved by a limited application of force andthat the US would be deterred from initiatingan attack on the USSR itself. There wouldclearly be great danger that such a situationwould develop into general war. The Sovietleaders would have to recognize that the USmight conclude that expansion of hostilitieswas inevitable and therefore itself seize theadvantage of launching the first attack in ageneral war. Faced with this possibility, theSoviet leaders might at some point decide tolaunch such an attack themselves. This sit-uation might be in some respects the most

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difficult of all for warning purposes. Once itsforces were involved in a local action, theUSSR could decide at any phase to make thehostilities general. Tensions would be veryhigh, and while this might assist intelligenceIn some ways, it would also make the inter-pretation of indications extremely difficult. Inthe given circumstances, Soviet forces wouldpresumably be close to full readiness and max-imum security precautions would be in effect.A certain degree of intelligence and militaryalert in the US would also obtain, based onwarnings as to the growing Soviet commit-ment in the local crisis. Any warning of So-viet intent to expand the local crisis into ageneral war would have to be inferred fromevidence of Soviet last-minute preparationsof a scale, character, or location at variancewith those required for the local engagementin progress.

Effect of a Period of Tension

20. The degree of political tension that pre-vailed would also be an important variablefactor. A period of rising tension would initself constitute warning of an increasing like-lihood of war. It would produce more in-dications, bring intelligence to a high degreeof alertness, and perhaps lead it to take ex-ceptional measures to collect information onSoviet activities. On the other hand, a periodof tension also creates difficulties in the cor-rect evaluation of information about Sovietactivities and about Soviet interpretation ofUS activities. For example, most of theUSSR's political and propaganda actions pre-paratory to attack on the US might not differgreatly from those which could be expectedIn any period of heightened tension. Thesecould include: diplomatic approaches to cer-tain states to persuade them to abandon theiralliances with the US; explicit threats againstcountries furnishing bases to the US; massive"peace" propaganda directed at the popula-tions of Western states in order to underminetheir will to resist or to destroy their con-fidence in the motives and intentions of thegovernments; plausible new proposals to bannuclear weapons; intensified propaganda di-rected to the Bloc populations to prepare them

psychologically for "resistance to aggression."Such actions could in themselves be inter-preted as defensively motivated or as part ofa war of nerves, and they would thus not es-tablish that the USSR had the intention toattack. However, taken in conjunction withother kinds of indications, they might enableintelligence to give warning with a relativelygreater degree of certainty. For example, in-telligence would view seriously evidence re-ceived, during a period of rising tension, thatCommunist parties had been instructed tostand by for the execution of sabotage andsubversion missions, and this type of evidencemight be in hand.

21. A period of rising tensions would alsomake it more difficult to interpret indicationsof Soviet military preparations as evidenceof a specific intent to attack. The USSRmight be carrying out military preparations,not on the basis of a firm decision to initiatewar, but for purposes of Intimidation or inorder to increase its defensive readiness andits ability to retaliate against a US attackwhich it feared was impending. It is also pos-sible that Soviet preparations for war mightbe undertaken because of a m isinterpreta-tion of US policies, by which the Soviet leadersconsidered that they were about to be forcedto go to war, against their real desire. Theimportance of a correct US estimate on thispoint would be very great, yet it would beparticularly difficult to make such an estimateduring a period of rising tension.

22. Thus a large number of military indica-tions might not justify a warning of probableattack. Intelligence could say that the like-lihood of war and the USSR's readiness forattack were increasing. If such a situationwas protracted and if enough indications wereobtained, intelligence could probably projectthe trend of Soviet preparation toward a peri-od of maximum danger.

Functioning of Intelligence under CrisisConditions

23. Since warning is a product of judgment,there are variable human factors which mustbe taken into account. Alertness would vary

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depending on the manner in which the crisisdeveloped, its intensity, and duration. Thereare manys ways in which the alertness and ef-fectiveness of intelligence increases undercrisis conditions. For example, field report-ing and intelligence analysis become sharplyfocused on the crisis situation; new sourcesof information held in reserve for such situa-tions are put into use; resources of the intel-ligence community are more closely inte-grated to deal with the crisis, and, intelligenceIs increasingly disposed to consider whethercurrent evidence indicates hostile intent. On •

the other hand, in the event of a long sus-tained crisis involving a high degree of ten-sion, key personnel would be subjected to fa-tigue and strain. If at one stage or anotherapparently mistaken warning judgments hadbeen made, undue caution might come intoplay. 4

24. Once a crisis situation arises, the volumeof reports increases and their reliability onthe whole declines, thus confronting intel-ligence with a large number of ambiguousreports from inadequately identified sourcesand of uncertain reliability. There is also anincrease in the number of reports from sourcesof known reliability, some of which sourcescome into play as a result of a crisis situation.In these circumstances, communications chan-nels may be overloaded, with resulting delaysin the transmission and the receipt of informa-tion. However, it is not possible for the in-telligence officer to suspend judgment untilmore complete and satisfactory evidence be-comes available, because of the pressure oftime in a developing crisis and the demandsof intelligence consumers for guidance. As aconsequence, the intelligence warnings givenmay be less reliable or more tentative.

25. Intelligence could employ emergency col-lection procedures under conditions of crisis

'It is possible that preliminary warnings wouldresult in US precautionary measures whichwould lead the USSR to cancel or postpone aplanned attack. In this case, what appearedto be a mistaken warning would in fact havebeen a correct one. Intelligence might haveaccomplished its warning mission completely, yetnot be able to demonstrate that it had done so.

In order to Improve the quantity and qualityof information available. Photographic andelectronic reconnaissance over Soviet con-trolled territory could be undertaken. Agentsheld in reserve for such a situation andequipped with special means of communica-tion could be activated. New locations anddevices for monitoring levels of activity atSoviet air bases and other military installa-tions might be available. Some of these ex-ceptional ' measures would provide informa-tion, possibly of great value, on Soviet capabil-ities and readiness, and inferentially perhapson Soviet intentions to attack. Some meas-ures in this category, in particular air pene-trations, could have the effect of increasingtensions or even of provoking Soviet attack.For intelligence to employ them would prob-ably require policy decisions; these might ormight not permit their use and would in anycase cause delay.

Effect of Soviet Deception Attempts'

26. It seems almost certain that, whateverform the initial Soviet attack took, the So=viet leaders would wish to achieve surprise.Therefore, they would probably attempt tomislead Western intelligence as to their in-tention to attack, or even as to their capabil-ities and readiness for attack. This could bedone in a variety of ways. For example, theUSSR could make diplomatic moves or ad-just its propaganda in order to reduce ten-sions. It could make plausible proposals tonegotiate the issues which had given rise tothe crisis. It could simulate reduction ofits military preparations, or even actually re-duce some of them. It could arrange forWestern intelligence to obtain false informa-tion as to deficiencies in Soviet readiness andcapabilities.

27. It is impossible to predict whether or notIn any actual situation attempts at deceptionwould be successful. Intelligence might still

'See SINTLE 100-2-57, "Soviet Capabilities for De-ception" (28 May 1957) for a fuller discussion ofthe deception problem. Pares. 68-70 deal withdeception in connection with attacks on the con-tinental US.

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be able to detect the continuation of specificmilitary preparations. Such preparations, ifdetected, could be explained by Soviet cautionand mistrust, but they would also point to thepossibility of a deception maneuver and theymight be particularly significant as evidenceof a possible Soviet intention to achieve sur-prise in launching an attack. Even if a So-viet deception attempt was not wholly suc-cessful, however, the warning problem wouldbe complicated. Because of contradictory in-dications, intelligence might not be able togive warning as promptly, firmly, or specifical-ly as it could in the absence of a deceptionattempt.

Variations in the Character of the InitialAttack

28. As we have stated earlier, a major warn-ing problem for intelligence stems from thefact that the actual Soviet plan for attackwould almost certainly not be known to us.This means that intelligence could not con-clude categorically that the particular degreeof readiness which we estimated had beenreached had brought Soviet preparations to astage of near completion. It would thereforebecome necessary to use the information wehad, first, to point to the character of thevarious attacks which the USSR could launch,and second, to assess the probability that aparticular attack would be launched. Beyondthis, many specific elements bearing on thecharacter of an initial attack and affectingthe warning problem could not be preciselyestimated, for example, the weight and direc-tion of attack which the Soviet leaders wouldconsider necessary and at the same time com-patible with surprise, what delivery systemsother than aircraft would be used in initialattacks, the allocation of forces to continentalUS targets as opposed to targets elsewhere,and the bases from which initial attacks wouldbe launched. In any given situation, the in-dications obtained by intelligence would con-sequently vary in frequency, number, andkind, and would have to be related to alter-native hypotheses as to the form and scale ofthe initial attack.

WARNING FROM PREPARATIONS FORATTACK IN 1957

29. We have estimated elsewhere, and arenot concerned here, with Soviet strategy inthe event of an attack on the US. 6 In thissection we discuss the warning indicationswhich intelligence may be able to obtain frompreparations of various elements of Sovietforces which could be used in an initial at-tack.

Attacks by Long-Range Aircraft on theContinental US and Various US andAllied Targets in Eurasia and ItsPeriphery

30. Suppose, as a first example, that theUSSR decided to launch in an initial attackits whole force, or virtually its whole force, oflong-range bombers, i.e., some 1,400 bombers,less an estimated 10 percent down for main-tenance.' We believe that the state of train-ing and readiness in Soviet Long-Range Avia-tion is such that probably several months ofpreparations would be required prior to anattack of this scale. Accordingly, indicationswould be derived from increased numbers oftraining flights, a higher level of mainte-nance activity, and possibly the preparation ofspecial weapons. Moreover, since Soviet Long-Range Aviation consists primarily of mediumbombers, an attack on the continental USwould almost certainly involve use of forwardbases in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, Kola, andCentral Arctic areas. Indications of prepara-tions would probably be derived from activ-ities at or associated with these bases, andfrom the increased frequency of long-distanceflights of larger groups of aircraft to and outof these bases. During the period over whichall these preparations were proceeding, espe-cially if they were carried out with great

'See NIE 11-4-58, especially Pares. 131-138.'See SN1E 11-8-57, "Soviet Gross Capabilities forAttack on the Continental US in Mid-1980," (15January 1957), Para. 13, for the last agreed esti-mate of the strength of Soviet Long-Range Avia-tion. A new estimate will be made in a forth-coming NIB. The view of the Director of In-telligence, USAF, is that the present strengthIs about 1,500.

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urgency, intelligence would almost certainlybe able to- warn with increasing firmness thatSoviet Long-Range Aviation was approach-ing a stage of readiness at which the entireforce could be utilized in an initial attack.

31. Suppose, as a second example, the USSRwere to launch an initial air attack now, em-ploying a force which it would be able tomount without a further period of prepara-tion. In this case, since there would by defi-nition be no further extended preparationsof aircraft, crews, or bases prior to the at-tack, warning would have to be derived fromIndications of the final movement of aircraftImmediately prior to launching of the attack,and from such other related activities asmight occur. The chances of obtaining suchindications would depend mainly on the num-ber of aircraft employed concurrently in anattack, and to a lesser degree on the extentto which forward bases were used. Our abil-ity to give warning of attack would belargely dependent upon the operation oftwo related factors: the character and level ofair activity which the US had come to consideras normal; and, the ability of the USSR to con-ceal air activity above that level. The higherthe level of air activity which had been con-sidered by the US as normal during the peri-od prior to an attack, the greater the numberof aircraft which could be deployed for at-tack without being considered abnormal. Thepresent estimated level of Soviet Long-RangeAviation activity in and out of forward basesand peripheral areas of the Soviet Bloc islow, no single flight to the forward areashaving exceeded an estimated 50 aircraft.The present level could be raised somewhatwithout being considered abnormal, and, inaddition, the USSR could probably conceal thelaunching of some bombers from both the for-ward and the interior bases.

32. As a rough estimate, we believe that atpresent a force up to 300 long-range aircraftcould probably be launched concurrently with-out producing indications permitting intel-ligence to give warning of possible attack.Generally speaking, the probability of obtain-ing warning indications would increase as thenumbers of aircraft increased. There is no

basis for judging at what point the chancesof receiving warning indications would beabout even; we believe, however, that if thenumber of aircraft launched concurrentlywere as great as about 800, the chances of theirproducing warning indications would be con-siderably greater than even. If received,these indications would probably permit in-telligence to warn of a possible attack some4-8 hours before attacking aircraft couldreach radar warning lines. It would alwaysbe possible, however, for the movement to andout of forward bases to be a practice maneuverrather than an attack.

33. In an attack of this scale, as of any other,activities related to Soviet air operations andsecurity, as distinguished from the movementand weaponing of the attack bombers, mightalso provide indications of preparations forattack, perhaps as much as several days be-fore an attack. Such preparations might in-clude: the imposition of very strict controlsover air traffic; quicker and more decisive airdefense reactions to accidental or stray flights;strict enforcement of regulations for air trafficthrough gates into Soviet air space, such asthe Berlin corridors; and unusual activity ator near supkly bases serving Soviet Long-Range Aviation. Such indications, especiallyif they occurred concurrently and within ashort period of time, might provide a basisfor giving a preliminary warning earlier thanwarning which might be given based on themovement of the bombers themselves.

Attacks by Guided Missiles

34. At present, the USSR could probably em-ploy in an initial attack some surface-to-sur-face guided missiles up to ranges of 700 nauti-cal miles. 8 We have no reliable intelligenceas to the numbers of these weapons whichmay be available or the location of launchingsites. It is possible that, during a period ofurgent preparation for attack, activities as-sociated with these weapons would be de-tected. Such indications would be of greatsignificance for gauging the Soviet state of

'See NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Prob-able Programs in the Guided Missile Field"(12 March 1957).

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readiness for war. Once these weapons werepositioned for launching, warning of theiruse would be unlikely.

35. Although warning from tactical detec-tion devices is outside the scope of this esti-mate, such consideration is necessary in re-gard to guided missile submarines (SSG) be-cause of the extreme unlikelihood of obtainingtimely warning by any other means. TheUSSR may have a few guided missile sub-marines, but there is no definitive knowledgeon the war-readiness status of this weaponsystem. Sorties of a substantial number ofsubmarines from either the Baltic or BlackSeas, other than through the Inland Water-ways System to the White Sea, would almostcertainly jeopardize the achievement of sur-prise in an attack. However, the USSRmight consider that it could employ a fewguided missile submarines from its North-ern and Pacific Fleets without undue riskof alerting us prematurely. If indicationsof possible submarines were detected byour Sound Surveillance System, ASW air-craft back-up could confirm identification ofsuch contacts as submarines. If so identi-fied, we would be alerted and the time mightbe as much as five days prior to possible SSGreaching launching points. This would notpermit specific warning of attack by subma-rine-launched guided missiles, although thepossibility of such attack would have to beconsidered in the warning given.

Attack on Western Europe by Soviet Forces

Stationed in East Germany

36. Soviet forces in East Germany are main-tained in a high state of readiness, and noreinforcements would be necessary to initiatean attack. The period of preparation wouldprobably not exceed two to seven days, as-suming a desire to maximize the chances ofattaining surprise. Warning of unusual andthreatening activity would be obtained if ma-jor elements were actually assembled in for-ward positions. Time to accomplish this dis-position would vary seasonally, depending onwhether units were at home stations or atsome field training phase of the annual train-ing cycle. Warning based on movements of

units to attack positions would probably varyas follows:

a. From a few hours to a few days in Apriland in September—October, although the pos-sibility exists that there would be no warning;

b. From two to five days in May—August;c. From five to seven days in November—

March.

General Mobilization

37. If the USSR undertook to mobilize itsfull war potential, a great variety of indica-tions would be obtained. They would relateto such activities as call-ups of reserves, reten-tion of annual clssses beyond the time of nor-mal release, redeployment of units to forwardareas, and intensified training programs. Eco-nomic measures would be taken affecting pro-duction programs, allocations of materials andlabor supply, and utilization of transport.Many of these measures would have to be ac-companied by public instructions and explana-tions and therefore the fact that mobilizationwas proceeding could not be hidden from in-telligence.

38. At some point during the total mobiliza-tion of Soviet national life, both the occur-rence of mobilization and the pace at whichit was proceeding would almost certainly bedetected by intelligence. In this case, therewould probably be a period of at least sixmonths during which intelligence could givewarning of progressively greater readiness forwar. However, it is uncertain that the pat-tern of indications would justify more specificwarning at any time during this period.

39. In view of the economic costs and disloca-tions involved, evidence that the USSR wasfully mobilizing the military establishment,which we estimate could be accomplished inabout 30 days, would almost certainly haveto be interpreted as indicative of Soviet ex-pectation'of hostilities, and intelligence mightbe able to forecast the approximate date atwhich these military preparations would becomplete. However, it would always be pos-sible for the USSR to attack with its readyforces at an earlier date.

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Clandestine Attack40. The USSR could also commit acts of waragainst the US clandestinely. In an initialattack it could, to take the most serious caseas example, employ nuclear weapons whichhad been introduced clandestinely into theUS or into overseas bases. • The ability of in-telligence to give warning of an initial attacklaunched by this means would depend prima-rily on the possibility that some part of theSoviet clandestine plan had miscarried in away which would provide disclosure, thatsome individual privy to the arrangementshad defected, or on chance discovery. Dis-covery that the USSR was attempting to in-troduce a nuclear weapon into the US or oneof its bases would lead intelligence to give itsfirmest warning of Soviet intent to attack.Similarly, discovery of Communist plans forsystematic sabotage of civil and military com-munications at a given time would providevery firm indications of a Communist inten-tion to attack.

41. Clandestine activities of a lesser order ofimportance — e.g., strikes, minor acts of sabo-tage on a large scale, etc. — might contributeto our ability to give meaningful warning.We could not be certain, however, that suchactivities had been organized in conjunctionwith an attack on the US.

Defensive Preparations

42. In view of the threat posed by Westernretaliatory power, the Soviet leaders wouldalso undertake certain defensive preparations.Military measures which could be taken mightInclude alerting of air defense forces and in-structions to them to prevent confusion dur-ing launching of the Soviet bombers; air de-fense measures for military units and installa-tions; reconnaissance by submarines and air-craft to locate US carrier forces. If stepssuch as these were not taken, the USSR'sability to withstand a retaliatory blow wouldbe seriously handicapped. If they were taken,they might be detected as much as a weekor 10 days prior to the Soviet initial attack.

'See SNIE 11-6-57, Para.% 69-71.

Civil measures which could be taken mightInclude activation of civil defense and evac-uation of key personnel and possibly elementsof the population from potential target areas.The USSR might decide to forego such prepa-rations until a short time before the initial at-tack in order to increase chances of achievingsurprise. If, however, such measures weretaken earlier on a substantial scale they wouldbe detected. Since these would involve higheconomic cost and risk of causing panic inthe population, they would greatly increasethe definiteness with which warning wouldbe given.

43. The risk which the USSR would be willingto accept as a result of neglecting some or allof this type of defensive preparations woulddepend in part on the degree of success whichthe Soviet leaders expected their own initialattack to achieve. We believe that in ele-mentary prudence they would be unwillingto forego preparations to receive a retaliatoryattack, especially in 1957. Therefore, someimportant indicators of this type would prob-ably be obtained.

Other Considerations

44. In the foregoing paragraphs an attempthas been made to describe in a general waythe evidence which might become availablefrom various kinds of Soviet military prepara-tions for attack, and to estimate the lengthof time before attack that such evidence wouldbe available. In addition, however, the cer-tainty and urgency of the warning whichwould actually be given by intelligence woulddepend upon the following factors:

a. The rate, or pace, at which Soviet prep-arations for attack appeared to be under-taken. We have frequently estimated thatSoviet capabilities for attack are continuallyincreasing as Soviet weapons and weaponsdelivery systems gradually improve under nor-mal Soviet policies of military development.Such preparations do not produce warningsthat an attack is likely. However, a substan-tial acceleration of the tempo of such . prepara-tions, especially if pointed to achievement atan early date of a degree of readiness thought

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to be adequate for attack, would lead to warn-ing of considerable urgency.

b. Indications in political, economic, psy-chological and other fields which would prob-ably accompany evidence of increasing mili-tary readiness for attack. All these indica-tions would have to be weighed together withthe strictly military evidence, and they wouldexert an important influence on the certaintyand urgency of the warning which was actu-ally given.

WARNING FROM THE EVALUATION OFINDICATIONS IN COMBINATION

45. In Paragraphs 29-43, we considered theactivities which the USSR might undertakein preparing to launch an attack, and the in-dications of these activities which we mightget from Soviet preparations for various formsor elements of an attack. We have alsodiscussed the warnings which intelligencemight give based on these indications. InParagraph 28, we pointed out the problemconfronting us because of the fact that theUSSR could select from among various strate-gic alternatives in planning its initial attack.Whatever form and scale of initial attack theSoviet leaders eventually decided upon, anactual attack would probably involve severalof the various kinds of preparations discussedearlier, carried on concurrently in order to beready for all contingencies.

46. Indications received by intelligence ofpreparations undertaken concurrently wouldpermit their evaluation in combination. In-dications which might be obtained of suchmultiple preparations would tend to be mutu-ally reinforcing and could provide the basis forwarning that was more certain and timely

' than that estimated above based on indica-tions of preparations taken separately.

CHANGES IN THE WARNING PROBLEMBETWEEN THE PRESENT ANDMID-1960

47. The general effect of the development ofSoviet capabilities likely to take place by 1960will be to reduce warning times. The keyfactors will be the degree of modernization

achieved by Soviet armed forces and the stateof readiness which they normally maintain.By 1960, Soviet Long-Range Aviation probablywill have improved its air crew training andsupport facilities to a point at which virtuallythe entire force could be employed on shortnotice against the continental US and West-ern bases on the Bloc periphery. If only theelements kept in constant readiness were used,few if any indications of attack could be ob-tained from air preparations. If the maxi-mum number of planes were to be used inthe attack, there would be increased likeli-hood of detection of some of the preparationswhich an operation of this scale would require.

48. Assuming a very high level of readiness,the chances of detection would depend on thearea or areas from which attacks werelaunched. Possibilities of detection would begreatest if aircraft were staged through for-ward bases, less if aircraft were launchedfrom home bases only, and least if an attackemployed only aircraft regularly present atforward bases. Assuming detection of themovement, it would still be difficult to identi-fy it as an attack, especially if high levels ofair activity had become normal as a resultof intensive training operations over an ex-tended period.

49. The USSR will probably develop new capa-bilities by 1960 which will permit other formsof attack than those discussed for 1957. Wehave estimated that the USSR could probablyhave ballistic missiles with a range of 1,600nautical miles in operational status beginningin 1959, and that it could have a few inter-continental ballistic missiles in 1960. 10 Thenumbers of these weapons available in 1960and limitations in their reliability and accu-racy make it unlikely that the scale of attacksby aircraft would be appreciably changedby that date. There might be indications ofpreparations of the launching sites over anextended period, but warning of the actuallaunching of the missiles could almost cer-tainly not be given.

50. By 1960, the use of m tRsile-launching sub-marines is likely to be a more important ele-

"See Nr8 11-5-57, Paras. 82 and 84.

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ment in an initial attack than at present,and some of these submarines would prob-ably be nuclear-powered. " The latter wouldbe more difficult to detect during a slow speedapproach to the launching area, because theentire run could be made without coming tothe surface. We are unable to give a defin-itive estimate of the number of submarinesthe USSR would consider it safe to employwithout jeopardizing surprise, but we believethat it would be only a few. The possibilityof detection would probably extend over aperiod up to two weeks, depending on the areasattacked and the inclusion of conventional-powered vessels in the attack force.

51. The warning problem with respect to theother forms of attack discussed earlier — at-.tacks by Soviet forces Sta.tioned in Germany

" See SNIE 11 6 57, Para. 65.

or full-scale attack after mobilization willprobably not change greatly between the pres-ent and 1960. Any major political develop-.rnent which resulted in a new pattern of de-ployment for Soviet forces outside the USSRwould of course present different problems.

52..1.4 Paragraph 44 above, we pointed outthat the certainty and urgency of the warn-ing which would actually be given by intel-ligence would depend especially on the rate,or pace, at which Soviet preparations for at-tack appeared to be undertaken, and thatwarnings in various degrees of certainty woulddepend upon the correlation of indications ofall kinds, military and nonmilitary. This willbe the case throughout the period through1960, although the relative influence of in-dividual indications on the warning judgmentmay well vary.