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7/28/2019 CIA Doolittle

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Source:

http://www.foia.cia.gov/helms/pdf/doolittle_report.pdf
http://www.foia.cia.gov/helms/pdf/doolittle_report.pdfhttp://www.foia.cia.gov/helms/pdf/doolittle_report.pdf


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TOBE RELEASED ONLY BY:DCIDDCIExecut i ve Director

per Lyman B. KirkpatrickExecutive Director

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Copy provided t o O L C for SehateSelect .Committee on Intelligence user

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THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTON

26 J uly 1954

Lt. Gon. J ames W. Doolittle, USAFRWashington, 0. C.R e: Panel of Consultantr on Covert Activitieso f the Contra1btalligmxeAgency

Daar General Doolittle:I have requartad you, andyou have (~g toed ,o act as Chairmanof ap o l of coneuluntr to conduct a rtudy o the covert activities of?,hu Cmttxal krtdligeacoAgency. Wth your concurrence I U v e inv itedMerrrr. W i l l i a m B. I rmke, Morrir U h y , a d W i l l i a m Pawley toact w i t h you a1 mmiborr of the pursl. Adr. S. Paul J ohnrta ha8 k W-l y 8greed to m r v e a#Sxecutivr Director of the panel.It i r my &m i t o that the Pew1d Conrultantr 8horJ d rwdertrksacomprahenrivertudy of tha tovort activitbr o the Central Intelligence

Agency, in particular tho#* carr ied out W e ? the tezrmof NSCID YSof Augurt 28, 1951, endNSC 5412 d Uarch 15, 1954. Yo u wil l conridertho psrroarubt frctorr, th. r o c u x l t y , the adequacy, the efficrcy urd UMrelative cortr ob there operatlonr and, a8 far ar poisiblo, equate thec o a t of the over dl affortr totb tarultr achieved. Y o u w i U znah m yrecom~end&ionr r r lculated to improvob conduct 04 there operations.T o thewetant that 8gelcier of the Government, other than the Cen t r aIntdligeaco Agency, u e eaga#edh covert operationr whi ch mayparallel, duplicate, or rupplermnt the operatioar of CIA, you maybvertigate mchother oporationr conductsdby amy o t h e r departmentor agencyo th@Gowrru#eat h o+&r t o IRrure, innosU 80 practicable,?hatthe field o foroign cluadrrrthaopsr&onr i o adequately coveredand that thoro i o nouamcarrary duplication o f d f o r t or rxpbnre.

In view of the particularly renritive nature o there covert operations,their relation to the corrdact o our foreign policy, and the fact thst t h e r erenri t ive operations u e c u r k d on purrurnt to Nati onal Security C o u n c i lactionapprovidby me, I eloriret a t p u r report be made to mepstroxdlyand clrrrified TOP SECRET, I will determine whether or not the report


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g. relocatingagenckr now rsrpondble di rectl y tothe Preridmt ia deprrtmsatr or ot&r agencieer.AB ho work o th e Xoovor T8rk Forcewill get under way shortly,I ruggeet th8t you and General C W k coder in order to avoid any un-nece88uy duplicdion o work 88 betweenyou. Thedirtinction betweent he w o r k of your Study Q t w p ando the Hoover Tark Force i o thi o:

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or any part thereof shouldhave any further dirscrnination. I rhouldappreciate it if your report coul d be available to me prior to October 1,1954.As you h o w , the Commisrionon Organhatian o the Executivebroach of the Govermrmnt, genarrlly known a8 t h e Hoover Gornmio8ion8i o conrtituting a T ask Force t o rtudpand make recommendatioar withrsrpect to the orgauimtiorr and xn8thdr o operationr of the CIA. GeneralMar k W. Clarkbar been designatedby Mr. Hoover to head thir T u kForcewhich, I underrtand, wil l pr obabl y be orgsnimd and s ta r t its wor ksometime in September aemt. . Under th e l a w conetituting the HooverComnrirrion, the Taok ForceOW tudy and iaveatigate the presentorganisationand methodr of operation of the Agency t o datermine what

changer t herei n are necOO#8?y toaccomplish the policyof Congrerr topromoteeconomy, efficiency, and improved rerviceby.a. r econunendi ng metbod0urdpr ocrdur er for r educi ngexpenditorem to t h o l owei t axmount conrirtent with the efficientperformanceof ei8enti.l oervices. act iv i t ier and functions:b. eliminatingduplication aadoverlapping of retvicer,activitier, andhurcti onriC . c o n ~ d i d r t i n g~ervicea,actiritler, and functionsofo W r ature;6. abolirhing oervicer, activftiar, and function. notnmcerruy to the efficbat conduct o Governmeat;e. a1l;iminrting noasrrentlrrl rervicer, functionr, urdactivities wh ich u a competitive w l t h privateentsspriee;

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DwightD Eisenhower

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!IIOTEDBYGENERALMARKCLARKON 10 Auguet 1954 iI

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TH E W H I T E HOUSE .1W A S H IN G T O N

26 J uly 1954

Allen W . Dulles, EequireDirector of Central IntelligenceWashington, D. C .Dear Mr. Dul l es:

I am sending you herew t h a copy of my letter of today'sdate to Lt. Gen. JamesH. Doolittle, USAFR, requesting him t oact aaChai rman of a panel of consul t ant s to r evi ew the covertactivities of the Central Intelligence Agency under the conditionsand for the purposes eet forth in that letter. Yo u wi l l kindlyextend to General Doolittlethe facilities necessary to enablehim andhir arsociater to carry out this study i ncl udi ng accesBto any and all information relating to the covert activities ofCIA.Sincerely,A 9 " n u - k

hcl,i


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T O P S R E T\


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SPECI AL ST m OROUPWashington, DC

30 September 1954"he PresidentThe Whi t e HouseDear M . Presiderrtt

I n conrpllance with your verbal directive, conf i rmed byyour letter of 26 J ul y 19% (Appendix A), t he undersi gnedhave made ammpreheneive a t * of the covert actlvitiea ofthe Cent ral I nt el l l gance Agency.exthlned I t s operations i n th ie area.due consideration i n our stuctg to the Agency's o v e r tactivities and t o i t a relationship w t h t he intelligencecomunlty as a whole.

We have carefUllyWe have alao given

Our f indings a r e embodied In the attached report. Foryour convenience, c o n c l ~ l o n sand recornmendationsareaummarl5ed on pagesI0 t o 18.agreement.

With t h e s e we are I n unaninvaus


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We cannot speak t o o highly o f the assistance andcooperation that has been even to u8 by t he CentralI ntell igence Agency at al l levels, and by the otheragenclea o f Qover nment and Individuals contacted.

We a r e part i cul arl y indebted t o our BcecutiveDirector, Mr. S. Paul J ohnaton, and t o Mr. J . PatrickCoyne of the Nati onal Securify Council, both of whomhave worked with w t hroughout and whoee assistancehas been inmsluable.


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IV.

mSCI J SSION

APPENDICHSA l?resldonti8l MreotiveB Prog~p~andplpaedures0. Chart - Prwent OrganbationI). Chart - Poari bl e Organbationo f W Pof nn/ P

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Introduotion -= 2

norm of huwn oonduot do not agpl y. I f the United Statw


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TU%RET Introduction -- 3mat be reanaidered. Me met develop effective

wpianrge and aountelvspi~gearviaea andmut l earnt o UubVOA, oabot age Md destroy O m meld- by mm C l eVe r8mor e uophlaticated and mor a ef f eot i ve methob than thorowed aga inu t w epeople be made eoqrrrinted w i t h , under8tand and rrupgort t h hhnr dr plsnto~epugnUrt P w R W -

I tm beoone neceamry that the heriaan

Becawe o f the t ight eocuTity control8 that havebeen mtabllhed by tho V.8.S.R. and i ts satallites,t he pmblan of Wtra t lon by human agent4 i s extremel ydi ff i cul t .elaborate syntemm of fenaing, llghta, mineu, eta.,backed up by ComtPnt surve l l l8nce.bordera --f rom deteCtiOn i 8 extremely difFiou3t because o f constantcheb on personnel acklvithta and personal &mentation,The information we have obt ai ned by this method ofecqubiklonhas been negl i gi bl e and the cost in e f f o r t ,dollars and human livecr prohibitive.

Most bordere ar e madephysically s e m by

Onco acro8sparaahute, or by ur y other m8pI y -- emape

The def moti on o f Sovi et and eatellitopereonnelo f f e r 8 a mreprofitable field f o r Enploitstion. TheAgency Is properly foansing a great deal of I t a effort


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Introduction-i n thlrr direotion, &ne and i n oollaborrtlonwith theArmed S e r r i o r s abroad. The i n f o m t l o n obtained f roa,th io aome haa been of vulw but ia sporadic andincomplete.

A s t i l l greater potential l i es in codcationsi n t e l l l g e n o e .more effort 8hould be expanded I n exploring everypoeei bl e s cl ~t i f i ond technical avenue of approaaht o the intelligenceproblem.

Thi s lab t o t h e oonviotion that much

The s t u d y group he8be- Urt-i~W briefed by C.1.A. W ~ S O ~ad byt he Araped Servlcea in thenethads and equQaent thatar e presenlAy In w e and under development in thbarea.certain oiviUnn conmalcultB who are working on ~ u c hspeoir l projeots. We are imprmsed by what b a beendone, but f eel that there is an i m a m s o pot em i al yett o be axplored.rhauld be Sntons ive ly appl i ed and ne# ones rrhould bedeveloped t o i norease our intdlligeJ Ioo acquisltlon by

We have a b 0 had the benefit of advice f r om

WebeUetre that every known teohnique

W ~ c a t i o n Snd e l e & t r o n i O 8 ~ ~ d l h ~ i 3 ,h It& -tude vbual, photogrephic and radar r ec o ~~a n c eithmanned or woasurned vehic les, upper atmoephere and ocomo-graphlo etudim, physioal and c h s r i o a l research, d o .


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TOP S?b&(


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I n M attempt t o be ConStnwUveand in the hope that we maybe hdLpful, we make the fb lbwb# m w m t b n o :


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T O P h R E T


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2. Preparetionand t m t of a r s rdi l y W p l a w n t . b l eplan for the i n u e d i r t o ud ef f ecti vu avaibbfflty of lo&oovert rmrrak t o theator oommdem at the outbreak of


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Board under t he N.S.C. shoul d bebmdened to pmvidet h e DC1 with adequatesnpport on t he more isportoat00vex-b pro3ecto.


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5. h p i t e the reaonnuended reduct i on i n pre8entpersonnel and budgetary wormmi08 that the C.I.A. mnutcunt inue to grow i n oapacity unt i l it l a abl e t o meet,sartirely, i t s national oomlnl-.

6, C o n t n l i s e d accawodrtions, hprLd-toilored t oi ta nbecb, rho- be pmvidrrd to how8 the Agenqy.

E* W t h 6baDWt b8t EhctorSThat althougR the aat4Vlties of C.I.A. ehould be expanded,

wets of prment operrtiom ehouldbe reduoed.I n part, aommpli6h.d through8

Thia can be

1 The exarabe of 'better control over qdi-tuzw f or al l covert projeots, and speoificPlly t hat( except for thse of an extrmely sensitivenature)they be d e ubJ ect t o revi ew and approval by theA g w ' e PmJ ~otep fa^CoplmittW*

2. FurnIehingthe Con@awller ( under properseourity provbiOnrr) with rruffident iir&rpration onal l covert pr0300ts t o enable him t o exerciaeproperaccount ing contml on a f i a c a l year baaL.


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(Note8al l activities that are not "overt."indLuded under n c o v e r t l ~ he operationemsigned t o theAgenoy by NSC %l2 a0 w U a 8 i ts Jandwtine espi onage andoountsreupionage opercrtiom )

Throughout thi e report we have coonsidered . s ' D 0 ve r t f1Specifioally, we have


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govertment sal ar yj dl but 2 are collq. pnduatiws) 13 hveadvanced dogrwa. Twelve have had1 or mro year8 bueineaaoapsrleme; al l but 6 have a d n the U5 Armed Forwe315 have had intelligenae experhnao (OSSt Amed Bbraea,d o , ) prior t o 1947; and 10 hem hrd speai al i sed C.I.A.training. Of thb group 32 ham had 3 yeam or mor e s e r v i c ewith C.I.A., 20 have hod 5 yearr, or more, and I f i have beenwith the A ~ O I W ~or the full 7 years since it w.0 entabliehodin i t8 present formin 1947.

Tho O f f l a e of Pawamel supp l ied an e x o e l l e n t atatiatlds tu d y cotrerbg r b t 6 f f aupbywa and agent s o n t he metcurUI of 30 J une l9af m m whl oh the f dl l ow ag &to were Wen:d e a makeup 58 perosrrt of total, fsmolea, 42 percentj averageago L 34.2 ywwa and tuo-thirds are in the 25-39 yoax agebra&& I b for ducation, aLrproodrartdy68per& of thetoW are high s u b 0 1 gr8duate8, am6 47 percent have B.A.(or equivalent) dogrow, und about 24 percmt havo &ne pat-graduatemr* or pom~rwssadvanced degrom. lbrty-five percentham mmed 3 yeam or morewith the C.Z.A. hk inq at priorlntdligenae rpqMlllence, uhloh lnaludea 8&ce wlth theAnnedFbrcea or with the Ageng1e prsdecc~~orrganlsatlons,mdrealblng that a l l Aganay pomonnel do not require euah t~lnlng,71 percent had none#but 29 percant have had 1year or mor e and l lperaent 2 or moreyeam. O f tho Agenay total , 73 peraent have had


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som foreign language training or experi ence, and nearlyhalf have had some prior forsign uw knowledge, S l i gh t l yover 50 prooat ar e Amed Serv ice veterano,

Fmm theabove wo foal that the prosent personnelpotential of the Agenoy i o rea8oxubly good, There l a con-pincing uvidenoe, however, that @deadWood" eadet e atvi r tua l ly al l l evel s. We have heud aritiw ranark t ot he effect t hat there are t o0 many ex-Utary people.We ham been m e d hat 80me peopl e 0 back t o head-q u a r t e r a Fromovemeaa aaslgmenta are sometimes not assi gnedt o new J obs f or l ong periods,frequent in ternal reorganlsatlona, together w l t h wqetitlonf rominduetry frequently caw8 good people t o seek esnpkrymentouteido. Am in other government al agenaiiee, there i s atendmay thmugh inertia or because o f a desire f or f l n a n c l a l8eourlty, for themediocre t o stay. Aa a result, despitethe cont i nual and necassary acquisii,ionof additional goodpeopl e, the cmpotence 1eV.l of t he &amy l a not rLiq a~rapidly aa l a desirable. Prompt and drast i c action t olnaroaae the rate of impmvement ks f ndi coted. We are ofthe opinion that a planned reducti on of at least 10 percenti n present pmonnel can and should be achievedw t houtredao ing the amount and quality of Agency otttpt.

Uncertai nt i es in pol i ay,

TOPhET


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We have been briefed on the Career Sem i ce Pl an byrneana of which theAgency hopes t o increase per sonnelstability.88 yet \urknown, but I t will not in I tself solve the Agen0y18personnel problmci. Neverthelaw we believe that a soundCareer ServicePlan i s deeirable and should be implemented

Whether the plan w i l l achieve, this resul t l a

OB pmww a8 P 0 8 i b l O .The CI.A h a a rearuitnent program operat i ng i n

wllegea and unlvereitiea t hroughout the United States.Thi s program has not been enth%ly 8uccw8fal i n prpducingeither the que&ity or the quallty of appl i cant s neededf or Agency rcrquiramente.

I n part, tu irr due t o the general shortage oftechniaally tra3ned people vb-a-vis heavy arrent demanrjaby hriu8tq i n prautically el l f i el de. On the other handwe have heard critioiwn from scrholaatie80urc88 that theC1A approach, both t b t he soh001 and to the indlvldd,l a not what I f should be, cuad fhrthemore, that manypotentially good people are lost betxiuse of the varygreat length of time that n ow olapeeabetween initialcontact anc entry into t he job.


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C lea ra l l oe of new personnel at present averages 90 daye.The F.B.I. talrer'tmly 30 d ~ y amaxbs for olearbg i t6 ompereonnel. Although we aweahto fully t he epoaial probhainvolved i n CI.B, we bel i eve it i s both waatiaal andwsential t o reduee the present 90 dey p e r i o d a8 muah asporelble.

YIangr appliaants f ind the mee~~mrylearanoe proaedureeunpal atabl e and annoyi ng. SOlaQ ar e repelled by mmmder-rtanding of t he purpome of polygraphia examlaation and thet eahni quer snplopd. Sow, ( part i cul arl y in sai ent i f i c fieldrwhere future p P O f o 8 d O W i l reputation my depend upon publ i ca-tion oi paper8, eto.) ar e unwilling t o aoaept t he i r p~aat ionsof a l l f etl me of anonymity, or of l i fe under a paeudoqm.We do not ouggeet that there requi rement s be abandoned orrolrued i n any degree. We ar e oertaln t hat they are neoem-sa r y f or mmclmwn reaurityand s u a o e ~ f cavort operatioas.But soae better meatu of approaoh rhould be devel oped t oarbme the proepeative enrp1ope that he is neoessary, andt o permade bi n that I n this Agemy he uan f i ni a desirableoareer aad at the same the perf orm vital sel?aae to hi samt r y.

We have been i mpreseed by fihe exoel l enos of the Agenay' straining faailitlor aab the owtpetenae o f i t 8 instrmotorpersonnel. Om ooment i s that i nsuf f i oi ent we I 8 made of


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T O P ~ E T Dieauseion -- 9these feoUtierr.cation and alande6tineagent training centers uhl ch weinspeotd are bei ng operated f ar under oapacity luveb.T h i s , o f wurae, l a a r e f l w b l o n o f thesleeking o f f i nredt ing program, but It suggeeta ala0 that adequat ew e of the faoilitiea i e not now bei ng made t o improve theover-all quality of Agenay covart aotivitles by new train-i n g or refteaher training of per8omel already In t he Agency.

We are a w e t hat t he present tendomy of the Agenuy t o

I t L obvious that thelanguage, communi-

fake o n more work than it can handl e satiafuctorily haalimited optimumu8e of the trcri ni ng froi l l t les, but itbe repeated too f r equent l y that I n CI.A covert operationequrlity i o more lngwtant than quantity. A e a umber ofcompetent people i n a eermitlve ageney can bemor e ueeful thana large number o f i nconpetants. I n the l ong run i t w f f l payt0 Stop 80- O f t he 1088 OS@&lthlp@m i OnS I lO W p e t1045 peroent of Agency Qovertpersonnel t o go into traiairrg.de t he backlog of inrdequrtely trained pa~lonnel a reducedand the oolopcrtenoe levd o f Agency per sonnel i ncreased, th i speroentagemay be lowered.

TOPbitRET


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of provbfonal or other intorim clearnoerr shouldbe miniariCed.


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shoul d continue t o be prerquisite to hi r i ng for al l positions.Indipiduab rmo n the r o l l s w h o have not had the benefitof them Ful l aeourity cl eorrnce pmcedures should be BOprocmaed at t he earliest p o e r l b l e date. (A t the timeof om $tu& them w e r e n ~ ~ u a r t e r e --ppersonnel w ho had m been plygraphed because they hadentered o n QIty prior to the institution of the polygraphpr ~gr r ~ln 1948)

We are imprwred with the competent manner in whichthep a r a p h programL handled i n the Agency and with theresul t s obtained thersfPom.provet3 exhmelyusem in identlpgfag

Pol ygr aph emmination bns

Weendome the Agenoyce continuation of the paraph programaa an ai d t o investigation and i nterr ogat i on a8 loag ad thepre~ent i gh atradarcia govern thewe of bhb device.

There l a considarrble room for in@mvernent i n exl8ting~ecur lty xpocrssing proceduxw f or al i en oparational per~onnel.Becauee. aomeper sonnel mat be wed for Inmediate shor t term

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operations, Itue c u r i t y clearanoe p r o e m o thsaa.sometimes be dif fi cult t o appls fuu.m


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1 A u n i f o r r raqulramnt should be aacltrblicrhedI


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reporta on t he r t e b of pmo~& physiocrl, domawand r e t & e l a u d a of s e d t y .rubrdttodt o tho Offloo of S e d t y with copiee t o theI nspecf or O am r a l and the appmpriate dlvblon of DD/P,We reQoIIwBndthat prriodio ~ e o u r l t yr18pectionsshoul dbe made by theOffice O f 8ecurl.t;J r o f d l o~em6R6mlt~si01mand of DD/Fr hadquarters and other fadlitiea i n t h eU n i t e d Statorr.and p.rtiau&rly i n the f i e l d wlll better inoura the s&tyof the Agmoyr faolUtIe8, opOmtion8, sourom and met&&.&planeatation of .them reco-btiom shoul d aid i n rab-in# the lwel of a d t y hroughout t he entire Agency,partloularly throughout the oovert se rv i oea *

S w h report8 shoul d be

Tighter o d t y pmo.duree at headquartera

If such 8 sp#BIPof report- and ln8peotiQg i r r adoptad,the Direotor a n 8 for the flmt the, look t o one o f f l o efor the uecurlty of the enti re Agenoyoa -re prvcisemd t hel y picture of securi t y- rel at eddmaloprenta throughout t he &exmy.

He w l l t hen have

w t h i 5 0 t oo 8%- the i m p o r t a m e ofthe oontlrmationand Intormifloation of CI.A 8 wuntor-intaXLQymooeff i r ts to prevent, or detrut rad eliminatepenetntiona of C e S Aiatelligenoa praat%cwof the Agency ubi & include

We on&me f U l y the proaent courrtor-


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be- WMidared for tramfer i n t hs f l e l d or r8aasl4xment ath a - r t m , B W U r l t y aheoLs O f w o a d nowiaPted ibropeolal t y p a of olearmwe, eto.periodic re-irrpwtigrtion of al l pezwonnel i u mu necessary,but we believe that oonpmhsnsive recheola, of pensonno1

We do not thlnk t hat

8hoUld be=de on a 8Ole&%V@be Sb uhanewr round OOturtW-I n t e l U g s n o e pxuotioerr d l o ta te .be intonaively InvwUgated and acpedltlonely resolved.

Tho countere8plonageaotivitiw of the clmdestlner e r v i o ea CUI be one of t he nort fertile MIUFOBII of Infoma-t l on conoeminq attempted penetratlona of C.I.A.

Queetioaoblec a m should

Appropriate8%- 6hOUld bo tpkm b8t l re the c b 8 W t pO8Sible Ooordina-tion o f mPcs oountompionage aoti vi ti ea i n t hi s f i el d withthe ovar-d l aoun t ew i n t e i l l i pme aativitierr of the O f f l c e o fSeoUrity. Any penetration made agalmt C.I.A.,uhether I t i nvol ve8 bency pareonnel and/or olandwtineintelUgenoe operatione, can never be ftally Coatmlled andcprplaitod mtXL el l infoxmation concoming ruoh attempts --whether made In the United &tea or oversem 0- b chaxmeled-ugh one focal point, prdorabu the Seaurity Offlce.


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&gular %eOufitya1u-8~ programs shouldbe iaaogursted 'i n o r de r thst al l pemonnel may be reminded o f the contiapring need for n8eouritycoIIIIaiOnB11o8s" in the oonduot oft h ei r CbJ-tO-day affura.

Moatbreaohea of bemr i t y oomitted by C.I .A. personnelappeer to be iaadvertent rather than I ntenti onal .a f f e c t of such brsrcbes on the m t l o n a l 8eaurity i r r the Baa8regardlees o f intat.attitude !met be adopted Prith respect to securfty breachwand 8evere penalfiles meted out t o sppploJnes at al l l o bwho advortcnrtl;r or lnad~ertently iolate seourity.

%e w t

Without exoeption, an inflexible

Too sasp access t o muoh of CI.A~ OLSeaif ied data i aa potential 8 o r m e of trouble.tiom&maround ruper-aensitive material, large s wo f CI.A's f i l e s are open t o l napecti on and use by Agency

Except for the tQht reatric-

pWBOMa VithOUt q&flOetM a8 "n8ed-tO-W."Improvement ia needed i n oarrylng o u t the fiaeed-fo-hrow"nt l e a~a baais fo r iatra-Agenoy, aa w e l l aa l n t e rdepar t naa t a l ,dlatributbn of C O L A . ' 8 c l a e a i f l e d data. Thio situation


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i e aggrevatedmnsldorably by t he fact tbat there are toomany dup l loa te records.f ur t her joopardised by a teuxbnoy t o ove-clwsifg documen-tary data o r i g l n a t i n # i n the Agemy, o coaditisn w h i o hoperatee i n demgatbn of the 8 e d t y clasaif'ication systemaa a whole.

The s e d t y o f CI.A@ data i 8

Considaring CI.A's unduly dispersed herdquarters (43building6 in theWashi ngt on UIM ) , I t s pmidaoourityprogram i s reasonably good.InheMat i n woh wide-spread dbperaal make i t W 8 & i a l t hatthe Agency continue i ta e f f o r t 8 t o ocnsolidate the headquartamfaOi33titw srrto fewer, mreadequate building6.

a36 potent ia l recuri ty &a

Thephysical 8eCwitynwurea i n effect a t CI.A installa-t ions which vore virrlted in t h e general v i d n i t y o f Uaablngtonare excellent.vtsitedKi th l ocal o l r ~ t a n o e a nd oondi t iono,

Thephytdeal remyity of overeeaa inrrtal lat ionrrcrpresentat1P.a of o u r rtudg group appeared t o vary

The United Maber


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briefiq of penomel deparblmg for overemu asaignarentoconoernlng the cover o f their a3isaions and their personalcovw PFOblW.


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/ by t he organieatlon without first obt ai ni nga complete clearanoe from the Agency.


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T O P Sb T


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C. coordination and OperationeThe 8UCCBbd Of t he O O V e Opslatione Of C.I.A. d e p d

upon ho w ef f l oi snt l y they are conducted and h ow w e l l theyar o ooordinrtedw t h other agmcie8 of the Qovernmmt.These critorirr plvvoil bath i n peace and In uar, but bothcoordi nat i on and operatiom are nmessarily somewhat di f f er-ent durhg each of these periods.ocoepted ~ o l l l l e f the word, appear6 to be irPporrsibleofachievement i n the foreseeable future,of the Agency mu6t therefore be pl anned and coordinated i norder to meet the rsquirmenta of a continuing col d warsituation as wel l aa the requizuaneot8 of poaslble hot uar.CI.A has this oblQatlon under NSCD

Peace i n arv o r d i n r r i l p

The covert oper at i ons

(March 15, l.954).hoking toward t h e poaeible outbreak of actual hostilities

i n any theater of oporatlom, 8 detailedplan shoul d bedeveloped now delineating the wartime headquarters responsi-bilitiea of C.f.AL. to I nawe that appropriatepol i cy gul danoe,

. integrated with N.S.C. and J.CS plane, be f urnl ehed t o CI.Arepresentative6 in the f ield. In an eopergenoy situation tLaeobviouslywill not pelnit referral of a l l arltical covertoperational queatione to ~auhiagton. Mhermore, the needsof commandera i n t he f i el d may r equ i r e the i nmedi ate traneferO f mar r y bCel C.1.A. COV& O p e r r t i O n a l aSSOt8 to their


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these a o f "agreed aQ6IVltle8."t o resolve t he di f f emo.~ are been mavaiumg.that the prime rcuponai bi l i ty for t he f a i l u re does o o t U o

To date the att-We belleve

reaohed o n a vol uutary bapb, the &pate shouldbe r8aolr.d


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I rg the NSC I n the aeftlement ofthi s diqmte, i naddi t i on t o r eoogni oi ng t he right of t he Armed Servi ces t operform counterintelligaeeeetioitier f or the maurityof t hei r own lnstalhtione and personnel , the Armd Serviaeeshould be al l owed fo engage i n espionage and aountsrerrpianageo p m a t b n s .(provided they a r e aoordlnated by the Direotor ofCentral Inkllipnoe)until muoh time as C . I .A . has the uapabi l i t yto perform a11 oep~o- a# oounierorpionageaperatioas aut-side the Unlkd Sta f sa ,

I n mdm to avoid undw dew i n the rerol ut i on of rwhpebleme i n the future, the D-kur, of Centml Intelligenoe(ar ooordinatw o f al l fore- intelllgeme) ehauld reportregularly to the B.S.C. on the 6 b t l U of efforts t o implementI .SoC Q reoti ves, ldth WMOUlar - 8 i l on M-ururerolved quest f ona.Ioasnuah aa t he expl oi tat i on of Suviat and aateUitobefootors outside the United Sts tas has been a aour08 ofannopnoe ani^ even hostiliw) on tbe part of ouane o f t hemli tary s&oes and other agsnoisa towerd 0.1.4. s l l d rimverba, we bsUm that rt4p ehoul d be taken iaabdateu t olnorrro ful l iaplamentation of the def eat or program i n soaord-w e with fks rpirit r ud letter of WID 13 (J an. 19 , 1950) .

Tba miatuderufandiaga uhtoh @xiatbet ween C I14. mt he Ar med Sorvi aeu atem largely i rar instrtfioient exchange


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J o p ~ E T Diecussion- 3of informrtion and coor&mt%onwith rwpect t o espionage,counterespi onage, and covert opcu9tfons. We barn beenadPlsed, for example, that i n certain i ns tances CI.Aopsratora appear t o have been too secretive with respectt o Infoxmation ubi& is of direct M e r e s t t o t he U t a r yservi cea and r i a e ver8a. We have been told of Inoidmtawhere i nspartant mart operations have been "blown" beuaweC.I.A. and ml i ta ry intelligence uni ts were operat i ng againstea& other , withmat knowledgeof aach other' s interest oraat lv i ty. The relatdomhip that saietrr i n varlowl oountriw

I .

between cove r t C.I.A. p e r a o M e l and t he militrrg attaches

pl ayi ng iprportant m e8 i n t he collection of foreign i ntel -l i gence and in t he dofocfor prepam, and It i s, theref ore,essent i al that olo88.r COOrdinstiOnand grerter wahsnge ofAnformation be wtabUshed between C.X.A. )E reprwantatlveeand t he mili$arg at mezy foraign atatton.

M r t mderat uzdi ngs b&ueen dome of t he swvioes and theAgomy ara not canfined to overeeaa operations. A l ackOf knOUhd#e O f phl8, f&O=tieS, a d OpeMtbm Ssodat In som areas betvieen t he Pentagon and CI.Ab-t&bn OM be &ed frr. m V e z p e n f icollaboration a t the w o r w evel s i s partic\3rJ .ly wssential.


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I I b a result, people have worked at ~ a ruqoses,with wrfortutl.te resul ts. I t l a realimxl t hat there aresituation8 I n uhieh di8clomu-a of plan and purpose rrhouldbe hel d t o a minirun number of peoplo, but in al l wee theBentor U S. Representative rhould be sufficiently advia&t o in8ure proper coorctination i n acaordance with appmvedN.S.C. i n t e l l l g e n o o dirootivem.


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I). Oknisation and AdminimtrotionIXI h e manse of invcsstigating the eovert oper at i ons or

the Agenay, wewore bri ef ed on the organisation of theindividual uomponenta of th e DD/ p ampla.the benefit of the thinking of a nwnber of key Agenoy peopl ewith respect to the DD/P organisation ae, o whol e. Aa aresult o,u l to in g0ne-d. obmervationsw i t h respect t 0 DDP

We a l s o had

organbation ham emerged whi ch ar e gannsne to theprobla~Of the O f f i C I a y and OOOmw O f i t8 OpS~tiOne.

&om the r e 8 hat have been made o n t h e 8ubject ofAgenay hbtory and poreomel problepms, It l a cl ear that theorganhation i n 8 W . l i n an evolutionary stage.cruffered f r om a d x e d Inheritance, a lack of pol i cy continuity,tMaerrdwrr prm~ureso aooept commltmnto b-nd i ts ccrpacltyto perfirm, and a mmhroom eorpansion.been an abrencaof long-range PrCuJ ni ag with conrrequentor gdmt i onal dlfficultle8.t hat m e r t r o a a l i n i a g of organiortion, c l r r l f i c r t i on offunctlom, and rtraightoning of lines o f authoritywill rosul ti n mor e and better work w t h f ewer people at l o w e r coats.

I t has

b a result t here has

We are strongly of the opinion

The a v o r t aativitlw of CI.A f a l l under t he di rect i ono f the Deputy Ihretotor for P h ( m) .hey a r e present l yconduoted by a compl ioated organlsatlon of a mixed rtr ai ght- l l ne


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TOP RET\ --26


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better coordination ia needed for t he more impportant covertidtie8 of C.I.A. at the nati onal level. ~hi r rL thection o f th e Operation8 CoordA~~tIonard, but at the

an t t ime i t &em aotqpeer t o be g l v l n g t he Agenoyt e gui dance and advice on the mre important covert

j eo t8 . The aofAvi%ierof %heBoard rhould be brpadenedorder t o provide the D.O.I. with the r r u ~ r p o r the neab onh proj.~ts*


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II


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TOP+RETI -

Diffcursion- 1

&ea not i n c h d o 3naW under contract, w hoa p l o y e s a o f the Agemy, individ\lrb under

engaged i n proprietary heFpCisw, andTho aggregate of pe~eona n theae

moat of w h cm are w a g e d

The iactual number o f individpals t o be engaged on Bgmqcal year 19% will, therefore, be

mvert operat i oas of t he k m c y are budgeted andcounted t o r on 8 plrojectbis e%eept fbr heacQ&era aud

muI l i+ary pr oJ ects exoeeding o specifled rpinimrrmdollarervsewrd and approved by a Projeotreign I nt.lligsoce pr oj ects are nothi e oonmlt tee but are authorized by


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Mscussion -- 33lInist&tion and the ComptrOUm. Binoe, of necessity,1 fundal muat be madeavoilobleby the ~r o l l s r ,t i snritabdethat he w i l l have knowledge thsf opercrtione of.B n a t e are baing conductedand it is Unwrely thatmoreiciflc 5nforraation relating t o t he projects can l ong be)tsecrlet front him,mtantw 8 w ur n expended, the ~ r o ~ e rae cal ladIn to npke the expenditureswith I Y) sppgorthg data bedng

to him a t the time or at any future dote. WhearequestedbreakdOwM of cwte of the operation we foundit t h 4were amllable o n l y i n the area division i nvol vedi that ,they mre inconq$Leteand uneatisfactory.the o g M o n that thi s ddation f r om the n o d pmcedureplacing upon the h@mller the respoasibillty of account-[ for Qxpanditursrr l e unwund, und I s not j ust i f i ed by thei l mdtthe security o f t he opemtion i 6 i mproved by tNs

I n one gortSoular instance where

W e ar e

r i a t i O &We of the opi ni on that the adminlotrativepbnm f or

aividql covert projects are not i n al l i n s t n n o e e aanplete I n detail acI l a dat8irabl.eand that i f they uere?lifleql he Comptroller and t he AwUtor-in-Chief uould bea mob better porition to uarry out their respective

tiee and remponsibfflti~.


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IiIrsneitlve nature of thwe coverto0ndue-t of our foraign policy,them r e m l t l v e opemtiona are orrrrledon pumurnfCot lnci l a&ion rppl loved by me, I desire thatmepata0nU.y and d . a r s l f i o d TOP SZtXlEIT. Ireport or aw plrt thereof shouldI shoul d appreolate it i f pur xqp0x-tt o Ootober 1 19%

amm3lng methodo and procedures f or ruiucbgt o the b wwt amount oonsistent with the efficientm a p 0 of maentl(LJ.aorwlceu, aat l v l t lw and f uncti ons;

k Forue w i l l g a t under w p y shortly,rk confer i n order t o avoid anybutween you. The dhtinctionand of th. Hoover Task &roe


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prsSid8nti.l direotlve of 26 J ul y 19% (Apperdix A


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T O ~ E Tpwmted t h e over-all prpblea f r om the Viawpo ln t oftheAgenay.

TheOroup 011 a whol e aet f or the finst t i m a in lk rThesrlgned speoe I n C.I.A. headquarters on 29 J u ly.

Chai r man outlined hi s Views a6 t o the job t o be &ne andtheprocedurw t o be f o l l ~~a d ~which had been prepared by Agency peraonnel i n t he in ter imw ~ c gdiscwad ur d accepted. The non-C I ,A agencies t obe heard wer e agreed ugon and theprogram o u t l i n e d belowwae initiated. The r & d e of the hearings cud 8 Ustof a l l w t nesses heard by t he Omup i s attached.

A program of briefbgo

At fho requwt of theQmupextemfvebriefiDgs weresrrmnged by theOf f i ce of $be Searetam of Defame, thethree Am& Servicsrr , the Derportment of S t a t e , the FederalBureau of Investigation and the Bureau of the Budget.&mostmea the doormnentation h.om w h i c h briefings wereconducted w a a made ovailabls for Gr oup otudy.

A number of lndlviduala whose kmuledge and badcgrounds e d er t i nent to the st udy wer e lnvlted t o prwsnt theirxLem. Others w e r e conaalted infonrally by varloua mderao f the Group.of intereet to t he At om10 kergy~amis810nwith It a Chai rman,e. hisL Stmuas.

The C h r i r n a n discussed Intelligence matters

He alw discuessd mattem ofi


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T D ~ E Toooperxtion between the two Cormstteecl with Ex-PrCwidentHerbert C, Hoover and Genera l Ifark W Clark, U.S.A. (Ret.)

S e v e d flu trlprr vere Wan during the couroe of

the O f f l o o of Cowaun3oetioneStaff Tr ai ni ng iastalt3.on,&r$ng t he weak o f U September the Chairman, accompaniedby M. Cope, made an inapeotion of repreaentattvs C.I.A.8t8tiOM wO8brn k p ,

IBecauseof the rrrtrenely sensitive nature of most of

the paper work made avoflable t o t he Oroop, speciol pro-oautiom were taken with re6pect t o its hndling and o d t y .No ouch pap~rrruero taken out of the iransoliate offiae1ce0eaoept under suifiablepreoautionrrgmeaourea$and r l l work ingpop.= f i l e s , o r other records have either been destroyedor reimned to their MIUZY)~. Thi s b u p has developed rmaX-ChiV88.

The fact that the Omup VBB able t o oovd so muahground i n euch a l i a i t e d time b t w rom the o s e b t a n o eand cooperation that ma rmeived f m m theAgency at al llevels.in aeeing tbt the Omu p had a l l nseded frcffltiam and

The Director t ook personal and continuing Intermst


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the aol e oeoretarial r s e b t a n t of the Groqp, for hereffloierzt and effeotiva h. adl i Dg of a U paper wrk andother dapto-day o f f l c e re~uirment8.


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29 J uly30 J*


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ails Lea -- 2

26 A m t27 Augus t31 August Operatima o f Sov ie t Eluclsla DivisionPP A o t l d t i e s of SR DlvirionDeswtionr

Coordbmtionof OWAotivlt lw w i t hOperation I rur

bittame Dgporb#nt

hveentedWinobn S o o t tPaul Birdaal l Ek S t a f f

R#r Acbr, C.F. &pC Staffnpne Ilul%nd& StaffMol i a 0. NatlrbovMcrhard E. Kovichh v l d E, Mur phy


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14 Soptonibor17 Soptrabor22 September28 September

Presented byF!YF?lOm. L.K. T W W t t L SM fcol . Scott PettyBmnaon TurodyA l f r e d C . UkerUel l fieldsW i l l i a m Hood-rad E Hi l l er & Staf fC l a i r e Booth ho.


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LI ST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE- CONSULTED1 Central Intelligence Agency

Appendix 8 -- 8


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Appendi x B -- 9


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Appendi x B -- 10


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